ඇමුණුම 01 – 1.1.1

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ සිදු කර තිබුණු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව

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1 උක්ත වාර්තාව නිකුත් කිරීමේ පසුබිම සහ වාර්තාවේ ස්වභාවය.

2016 මැයි 06 දින පැය 1430 ට පැවති පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා සාකච්ඡාවේදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදුකර තිබුණු පසුගිය හා වත්මන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් පිළිබඳව වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලෙස විගණකාධිපති වෙත දුන් උපදේශය සහ ඒ සඳහා වූ එකඟතාවය පරිදි මෙම වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබේ. මෙම විෂයයට අදාළව 2016 ජූනි 08 දින පැවති පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙත විගණකාධිපති විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ලිපියද (ඇමුණුම i) මේ සමඟ ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇත. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව වෙතින් විගණනයට ලබා ගන්නා තොරතුරුවල පැවතිය හැකි සංවේදීභාවය හේතුවෙන් ඒවායේ රහස්‍යභාවය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම පිළිබඳව නීතිපති විසින් 2004 පෙබරවාරි 12 දින ප්‍රකාශ කර තිබූ එම මතය (ඇමුණුම ii) සහ එම මතය සඳහන් කරමින් මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ලිපියක් ද (ඇමුණුම iii) දක්වා ඇත. එහෙයින් මෙම වාර්තාවේ ඇමුණුම් ලෙස ඇතුළත් කර ඇති ඇතැම් ලේඛන එලෙස රහස්‍යභාවය ආරක්ෂා විය යුතු ලේඛන යැයි හැඟී ගිය හෙයින් එම ඇමුණුම් රහිත වාර්තාවක් ඔබ කමිටුව වෙතද, එම ඇමුණුම් සහිත වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ද ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කර ඇත.

2. මෙම වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේදී පහත දැක්වෙන ක්‍රමවේදයන් අනුගමනය කරන ලදී.

2.1 පහත සඳහන් ලේඛන පරීක්ෂා කිරීම

2.1.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී අනුගමනය කරන පිළිවෙත් දැක්වෙන මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත.

2.1.2 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශණය කිරීම සඳහා වූ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනුකාරක සභාව විසින් පවත්වන ලද පරීක්ෂාවට අදාල වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්.

2.1.3 ඉහත 2.1.2 ඡේදයෙහි සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අදාළව පරීක්ෂා කර වාර්තා කිරීම සඳහා පත්කළ ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටු වාර්තාව.(2015 මැයි 19 දින මෙම වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රී ගරු ලක්ෂමන් කිරිඇල්ල මැතිතුමා විසින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ සභාගත කර ඇත.)

2.1.4 ඉහත 2.1.2 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව විශ්‍රාමික ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණ විනිසුරුවරයකුගේ පරීක්ෂණ වාර්තාව.

2.1.5 1949 අංක 58 දරන මුදල් නීති පනත එහි සංශෝධන සමඟ.

2.1.6 අදාල දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටු සහ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණ.

2.1.7 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙහි වෙබ් අඩවියෙහි පළ වූ තොරතුරු හා දත්ත.

2.2 වෙනත් පරීක්ෂාවන්.

2.2.1 විවිධ ආකාරයෙන් ලද තොරතුරු විශ්ලේෂණාත්මක විග්‍රහයකට ලක් කිරීම.

2.2.2 ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළට අදාළ ඇතැම් තොරතුරු පරීක්ෂාව.

2.2.3 ද්විතික වෙළෙඳපොලට අදාළ ඇතැම් තොරතුරු පරීක්ෂාව.

2.2.4 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු ඇගයීමට ලක් කිරීම.

2.2.5 අදාළ පාර්ශවයන් සමග සාකච්ඡා කිරීම.

3. විෂය පථය සීමාවීම

මෙම වාර්තාවෙන් ඉස්මතු කර ඇති නිරීක්ෂණයන් තුළින් නිගමනයන්ට එළඹීමේදී මාගේ විෂය පථය මතු දැක්වෙන සීමා කිරීම්වලට යටත්ව තිබූ බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ.

3.1 විෂයගත ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළව මහ බැංකුව යම් මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතක දැක්වෙන පිළිවෙත් අනුව කටයුතු කළ බව සඳහන් කර තිබුණද, එය එහි මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් හෝ වෙනත් අධිකාරී බලයක් සහිත ආයතනයක් විසින් අනුමත කළ සමස්ථ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතක් නොවන බව මා වෙත වාර්තා වී තිබීම. (ඇමුණුම iv සහ v)

3.2 විෂයගත ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වීමේ කාර්යය විගණකාධිපති වෙත පැවරුනු දිනය හා අදාල සිද්ධීන් සිදු වූ දිනයන් අතර සැලකිය යුතු කාල පරතරයක් තිබීම.

3.3 අදාල විෂයගත කරුණු පිළිබඳ විෂය බද්ධ පෘථුල දැනුමක් සහිත මූල්‍ය හා ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයින්ගේ සහය ලබා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් නොතිබීම හා මෙම වාර්තාවේ පළමු ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය පිළිබඳව ගැටළු සහගත තත්ත්වය නිසා එවැනි සහයක් ලබාගැනීම ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී වීම.

3.4 ඉහත 3.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් විශේෂඥයින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව සිටියද එම නිලධාරීන්ගේ සහය අපක්ෂපාතී ලෙස ලබාගත හැකිද යන්න ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී වීම.

3.5 අදාල විෂයට සම්බන්ධිත ඉතා වැදගත් ද්විතික වෙළඳපල පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු එම තෙවන පාර්ශවයන් වෙතින් සෘජුව ලබාගැනීමට හෝ තහවුරු කරවා ගැනීමට අධිකාර බලයක් විගණකාධිපති වෙත නොතිබීම.

3.6 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට මෙම වාර්තාවේ (ඇමුණුම vi) හි දක්වා ඇති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත ප්‍රමාණාත්මක බලපෑමක් සිදු කිරීමේ හැකියාවක් තිබුණේ ද යන්න අනාවරණය කරගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් නොවීම.

3.7 ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතර ද, මහ බැංකු අධිපති සහ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතරද එකිනෙක පුද්ගලයන් අතර ප්‍රමාණාත්මක බලපෑමක් සිදු කිරීමේ හැකියාවක් තිබුණේද යන්න අනාවරණය කර ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් නොවීම.

3.8 ශ්‍රී මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් හා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතර සිදුවන දුරකථන සංවාද පටිගත කර නොතිබීම නිසා එම තොරතුරු පරීක්ෂා කළ නොහැකි වීම.

3.9 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසිය සිදු වූ අවස්ථාවට අදාල පටිගත කළ සජීවී දර්ශණ භෞතිකව පරීක්ෂා නොකිරීම.

3.10 මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරතුරු නිවැරදිව හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර අනුව ලබා දී ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබීම හේතුවෙන් වාර්තා කිරීමට සීමා පැවතීම. (ඇමුණුම iii)

4. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය හැඳින්වීම

4.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ආර්ථික හා මිල ස්ථායිතාවය පවත්වාගෙන යාමද මූලික අරමුණු ලෙස සළකා ස්ථාපිත කර ඇති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පස් දෙනෙකුගෙන් සමන්විත මහ බැංකු මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ ප්‍රධානියා ද වන මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙහෙයවනු ලැබේ (ඇමුණුම vii). තවද මුදල් නීති පනතේ 19(1) වගන්තිය පරිදි මහ බැංකු අධිපති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියා ද වේ. (ඇමුණුම viii) මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ දැනුම්දීම මත රජයේ ඉදිරි මාසික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරාලීම සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් (Treasury Securities) එනම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් (Treasury Bills) හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර (Treasury Bonds) නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ වගකීම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් දරනු ලබයි (ඇමුණුම ix). වර්ෂයකට වඩා අඩු කාලයකින් කල් පිරෙන (Maturity) අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කරනු ලබන අතර වර්ෂයකට වැඩි දිගු කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරයි. මෙම බැඳුම්කරයක මුහුණත වටිනාකම (Face Value) රුපියල් 100 ක අගයක් ගනි. මෙහිදී මහ බැංකුව විසින් රජය වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් සපයා දීම සිදුකරනු ලබන අතර මුදල් නීති පනතේ 106 (1) වගන්තියට (ඇමුණුම x) අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව රජයේ නියෝජිතයකු ලෙස කටයුතු කරන බව දක්වා ඇත. මෙම සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා සුදුසුකම්ලත් ආයතන 16 ක්

2015 වර්ෂය අවසාන වන විට ලියාපදිංචි කර තිබූ අතර, 2016 වර්ෂයේ දී ඉන් එක් ආයතනයක් ඉවත් වී ඇත (ඇමුණුම vi). එම ආයතන අතර රාජ්‍ය මෙන්ම පෞද්ගලික ආයතන ද වේ. මෙම ආයතන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් / වෙළඳුන් (Primary Dealers) ලෙස හඳුන්වනු ලබයි. තවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට ද ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොලෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදීගැනීමට අවසර ලබා දී තිබේ.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයන් 2 ක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි. ඉන් පළමු ක්‍රමය වූයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන දැන්වීමක් අනුව ඉහතින් සඳහන් කරන ලද ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් මිලගණන් කැඳවා ඒ අනුව බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි (auction) මඟින් අවශ්‍ය මුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමයි. දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය වූයේ සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට සුරකුම්පත් නිකුත්කිරීම හෙවත් පෞද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයයි (Direct Placement / Private Placement). මෙම දෙවන ක්‍රමයේ දී සිදුවූයේ මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන ලද බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඉපයුම්/ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් (Weighted Average yield Rate) මත ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම් සඳහා අවස්ථාව ලබාදීම වේ. මෙහිදී මෙම බරතැබූ ඉපයීම් අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීම ක්‍රම 2 ක් අනුව සිදු කරනු ලැබේ. එක් ක්‍රමයක් වන්නේ ආසන්නතම පෙර කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේ දී සමාන කල්පිරීමේ කාලයක් (Maturity Period) සහිත බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් හි බරිත සාමාන්‍ය අගය ඵලදා අනුපාතය ලෙස ගැනීම වේ. අනෙක් ක්‍රමය වන්නේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලේ (Secondary Market) පවතින සමාන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර ඵලදා අනුපාත පදනම් කරගෙන නැවත ඵලදා අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීමයි. සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වෙන්දේසි දින හැර අනෙකුත් සෑම වැඩකරන දිනයකම විවෘතව පවතින අතර බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට කැමති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පෙර තීරණය කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් යටතේ, අලෙවියට ඇති බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගැනීමට අයදුම්කළ හැකිය. භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවක දී අනුගමනය කරනු ලබන ක්‍රියාවලිය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි (Public Debt Department Operation Manual) දක්වා තිබේ.

4.2 භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර පොළී අනුපාතයකට (Coupon Rate/Interest Rate) විවිධ පරිණත කාලසීමාවන් සඳහා නිකුත් කරනු ලබයි. එලෙස නිකුත් කරනු ලබන බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකමට අනුව පොළී අනුපාතය මත අර්ධ වාර්ෂිකව රජය විසින් පොළී ගෙවනු ලබයි. (ඇමුණුම xi). බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියන්හිදී ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන පොළි අනුපාතයක් මත පදනම්ව විවිධ මිල ගණන් යටතේ ලංසු ඉදිරිපත්

කරනු ලබයි. එම ලංසු අධිමිලකට (Premium) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වැඩි මිලකට, සමමිලට (at par) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට සමාන වූ මිලකට සහ අවමිලට (Discount) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වඩා අඩු වූ මිලකටද ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. මෙහිදී ඔවුන් විසින් අධිමිලට ඉල්ලුම්කළ හොත් බැඳුම්කරයේ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පොළි අනුපාතයට වඩා පහළ අගයක් ගන්නා අතර සම මිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන අගයක්ද, අවමිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක්ද ගනු ලබයි. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට ඉහළින් ඇති ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට වඩා අවමිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත්, පොළී අනුපාතය හා ඵලදා අනුපාතය සමාන වන විට බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට නිකුත් වන බවත්, පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා පහළින් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී මුහුණත අගයට ඉහළ වූ අධිමිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත් දැක්විය හැක. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් අධිමිලක් ලැබෙන අතර එයින් රජයට අමතර මූල්‍ය වාසියක් ලැබේ. එමෙන්ම පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතයට එනම් වට්ටම් අනුපාතයකින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් රජයට මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදු වේ. පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන ඵලදා අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළහොත් රජයට අමතර වාසියක් හෝ අවාසියක් සිදුනොවේ.

4.3 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා රජයේ මූදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයෙන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් සපුරා ගත් ආකාරය පහත වගුවේ දැක්වේ.

වගු අංක 1: බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ ක්‍රමවේදය සහ වටිනාකම (2014 ජනවාරි - 2016 මැයි)

වර්ෂය හා මාසය	බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ ක්‍රමවේදය හා වටිනාකම			නිකුත් කළ වටිනාකමින් ප්‍රතිශතයක් ලෙස	
	වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය (Auction)	සෘජු ක්‍රමය (Direct Placement)	එකතුව	වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය (Auction)	සෘජු ක්‍රමය (direct Placement)
	රු.බිලියන	රු.බිලියන	රු.බිලියන	%	%
2014 ජනවාරි	5.500	32.717	38.217	14	86
2014 පෙබරවාරි	3.050	80.088	83.138	4	96
2014 මාර්තු	5.000	130.117	135.116	4	96
2014 අප්‍රේල්	-	117.673	120.372	0	100
2014 මැයි	5.950	31.200	68.694	9	91
2014 ජූනි	-	126.209	126.209	0	100
2014 ජූලි	5.300	109.483	114.783	5	95
2014 අගෝස්තු	-	44.200	44.200	0	100

2014 සැප්තැම්බර්	2.950	72.458	75.407	4	96
2014 ඔක්තෝබර්	-	22.617	22.617	0	100
2014 නොවැම්බර්	-	13.788	13.787	0	100
2014 දෙසැම්බර්	4.000	18.148	22.147	18	82
2015 ජනවාරි	-	69.923	69.923	0	100
2015 පෙබරවාරි	10.058	23.524	33.582	30	70
2015 මාර්තු	171.659	14.144	185.802	92	8
2015 අප්‍රේල්	44.306	-	44.306	100	0
2015 මැයි	35.730	-	35.730	100	0
2015 ජූනි	82.900	-	82.900	100	0
2015 ජූලි	99.575	-	99.575	100	0
2015 අගෝස්තු	100.578	-	100.578	100	0
2015 සැප්තැම්බර්	57.576	-	57.576	100	0
2015 ඔක්තෝබර්	55.811	-	55.811	100	0
2015 නොවැම්බර්	20.594	-	20.594	100	0
2015 දෙසැම්බර්	29.545	-	29.545	100	0
2016 ජනවාරි	61.119	-	61.119	100	0
2016 පෙබරවාරි	38.959	-	38.959	100	0
2016 මාර්තු	135.667	-	135.667	100	0
2016 අප්‍රේල්	30.44	-	30.44	100	0
2016 මැයි	114.335	-	114.335	100	0

කෙසේ වෙතත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා ඉහත සඳහන් ක්‍රම දෙකම අනුගමනය කර තිබුණද, එදින සිට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් තාවකාලිකව සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි.

4.4 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය මුළුමනින්ම ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා වූ මාස 15 ක කාලය තුළ, සෘජු ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදාගත් මාසයන්ද වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත් මාසයන් ද මෙම ක්‍රම දෙකම යොදාගත් මාසයන්ද, පැවති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. කෙසේ වුවත් එම මාස 15 ක කාලය තුළ නිකුත් කළ සමස්ථ බැඳුම්කරයන්ගෙන් සියයට 80 කට වඩා සෘජු ක්‍රමය යොදාගෙන නිකුත් කර තිබුණු බව වැඩි දුරටත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

5. නිරීක්ෂණයන්

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට ඉදිරි කාලයට අදාල භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව සිදුකළ නියැදි විගණන පරීක්ෂාවේ දී අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු සහ ඒවායේ ස්වභාවය ඉස්මතු වී ඇති ආකාරය අනුව පහත පරිදි උප ශීර්ෂ තුනක් යටතේ විගණන නිරීක්ෂණ සඳහන් කරනු ලැබේ.

(අ.) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිදු කළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

(ආ) 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

(ඇ) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවට අදාල ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනසින් පසු ඇති වූ ප්‍රවණතාවයන්

5.1 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිදු කළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම

5.1.1 මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/05/18/97 (ඇමුණුම xii) ට අනුව 1997 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මගින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. වෙළඳපලේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවක දී හෝ පොළි අනුපාතිකයන් අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවකදී වෙන්දේසි මගින් සපයා ගැනිමට නොහැකි වූ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල යොදා ගත යුතු බව **ද,** එහිදී නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මේ නිසා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පොළී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලනය කිරීමේ යාන්ත්‍රණයක් ලෙස සෘජු ක්‍රමය මත අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම යොදා ගෙන තිබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

5.1.2 තවද මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/1/26/2008 හි කරුණු (ඇමුණුම xiii) සැලකිල්ලට ගැනීමෙන් පසුව සහ රජයේ සුරකුම්පත් සමබන්ධව පොළී අනුපාත ඉහළයාම සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් 2008 වර්ෂයේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/25/20/2008 ට අනුව (ඇමුණුම xiv) මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලේ පවතින පොළී අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05 (Five Basis Points) ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාතයන් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් වෙළඳපොළ ද්‍රවශීලතාව ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි.

5.1.3 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහි අධිකාරි අමතා මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහි (Treasury Operation Department) අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල් විසින් එවන ලද අංක TO/DG/CFS/03 දරන හා 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දිනැති ලිපිය (ඇමුණුම xv) සමග 2015 මාර්තු මාසයට අදාලව ඉදිරිපත් කරන ඇති මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බිලියන 172 ක් විය. එහි 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින සඳහා පමණක් වූ රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බිලියන 13.550 ක් වන අතර මෙම අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් රු.බිලියන 1 ක් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියක් තුළින්ද ඉතිරි රු.බිලියන 12.550 සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ද සම්පාදනය කර ගැනිම මගින් රජයට අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව දේශිය ණය කළමනාකරන කමිටුව DDMC) විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1300 පැයට (ඇමුණුම xvi) පවත්වන ලද රැස්වීමේදී

නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් ද ඇතුළත් මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් 04 දෙනෙක්ගෙන් සැදුම්ලත් මෙම කමිටුවේ වගකීම වනුයේ දේශීය ණය ගැනුම් වියදම හා අවදානම අවම වන ආකාරයෙන් පවත්වා ගැනීමයි. (ඇමුණුම xvii). කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ මෙම රැස්වීම සඳහා එම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ නියෝජිතයා සහභාගී වී නොතිබුණි. එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් යටතේ එම පැමිණ නොසිටි සාමාජිකයාගේ එකඟත්වය විකල්ප ක්‍රමයකින් එනම් දුරකථනය මඟින් හෝ ලබාගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය. ඉන් පසු එනම් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින මෙම තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතිය ද (ඇමුණුම xvi) ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

5.1.4 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කර සපුරා ගතයුතු රජයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වූ රු.බිලියන 261.683 ක් (මේ තුළ රු.බිලියන 89.683 ක් වූ වර්ෂය තුළ නැවත නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ද ඇතුළත් වේ.) සඳහා වූ රජයේ ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන (Government Borrowing programme) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. එම වැඩසටහනට අනුව එකී සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් රු. බිලියන 89.683 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වලින්ද, රු.බිලියන 172 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මඟින් ද ලබා ගැනීමටත්, එම රු.බිලියන 172 න් රු. බිලියන 1 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් ද, ඉතිරිය ඍජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් ද සපයා ගැනීමටත් තීරණය කර තිබුණි.

මෙම අනුමැතිය නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපති (SM) මඟින් රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී (Superintendent of Public Debt) වෙත දැනුම් දී තිබුණද, (ඇමුණුම xvi) ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම එම කටයුතු ක්‍රියාත්මක නොවූ බව මාර්තු මාසය තුළදී සපුරා ගන්නා ලද රු. බිලියන 185.802 ක් වූ සම්පූර්ණ මුදලින් ඍජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් රු. බිලියන 14.143 ක් පමණක් සපුරා ගෙන තිබීම (4.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වගුව පරිදි) හේතුවෙන් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

5.1.5 එසේම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින නිකුත් කිරීමට සැලැසුම් කර තිබුණේ වසර 30 කින් කල්පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර වන අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කාලීන බැඳුම්කර සඳහා සාමාන්‍ය ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත් වීමක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් අපේක්ෂා කර නොතිබූ බවත් පොළී ඵලදා වක්‍රය වසර 30 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම මඟින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළින් විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත්වීමක්ද අපේක්ෂා කර තිබූ බව (ඇමුණුම xviii) මඟින් අනාවරණය වී තිබුණි**.** එසේ වුවද විදේශ ආයෝජකයන් සිය ආයෝජන නැවත ආපසු ලබාගෙන ඇති බව 2015 වර්ෂයේ වාර්ෂික වාර්තාව මඟින් තහවුරු කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම අපේක්ෂා සාර්ථක වී තිබුණේද යන්න ගැටළු සහගත විය. (ඇමුණුම xix)

5.1.6 මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු දිනයට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළ තුළ වසර 30 ක බැඳුම්කර සඳහා වූයේ සියයට 9.48 ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවැති අතර (ඇමුණුම xx) එම අනුපාතයන්ට ආසන්න අනුපාතයන්ගෙන් මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවද සිදුවේයැයි අපේක්ෂාවක් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සතුව පැවති බව මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශණය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාචික සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් (වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්) පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේ දී අනාවරණය විය (ඇමුණුම xxi). එසේ බලාපොරොත්තු වූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් සහිතව අධිමිලකට බැඳුම්කර විකිණීමට අමතරව ඉහත 4.1 ඡේදයේ දක්වා තිබූ පරිදි රජයට වැඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාව තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දින සහ 26 දින පිළිවෙලින් අන්තර්ජාලයේ සහ පුවත්පත්වල ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලද දැන්වීම්වලට අනුව ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 16 දෙනා වෙත වසර 30 ක කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන රු.බිලියන 1 ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සියයට 12.5 ක් වන පොළී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි (ඇමුණම xxii).

මේ පිළිබඳව වූ ලංසු ලැබීමේ තොරතුරු වාර්තාව (ඇමුණම xxiii) පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේදි නිරීක්ෂණය වූයේ සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සහ ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් 16 දෙනෙකු විසින් රු.බිලියන 20.708 ක එකතු වටිනාකමක් දක්වා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ බවයි. තවද එම මුදලින් සියයට 75 ක් පමණ එනම් රු.බිලියන 15.531 ක් එක් පෞද්ගලික ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු විසින් සහ ඔහු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකුවන ලංකා බැංකුව මගින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ බවද නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

5.1.7 දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් නිකුත් කිරීමට නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණේ රු.බිලියන 1 බැඳුම්කර පමණි. එසේ වුවද එම ප්‍රමාණය මෙන් දසගුණයකටත් වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වන දින වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන් ද අනතුරුව පැය 1230 සිට පැය 1310 , දක්වා පැවැත්වුනු අංක 2/2015 දරන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව (Treasury Bond Tender Committee) විසින් තීරණය කර තිබුණි (ඇමුණුම xxiv). මෙහිදි නිරීක්ෂණය වූ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ ඉහත තීරණය ගෙන ඇත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන්ද අනතුරුව බවය. මෙය ඉහත 5.1.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් රු.බිලියන 12.550 ක් සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් සපුරා ගැනීමට කර තිබූ තීරණයෙන් සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම බැහැර වීමකි. එම තත්ත්වය යටතේ එදින පැවති වෙන්දේසියේදී 9.3510 සිට 11.7270 දක්වා වූ බරතැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් 14 දෙනෙකුට වසර 30 කින් කල්පිරෙන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් (ඇමුණුම xxv) රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් උපයා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළද වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට (අවම්ලට) නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රු.බිලියන 9.658 ක් පමණක් උපයා ගැනීමට

හැකිව තිබුණි. මෙහිදි අනාවරණය වූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ඉහත පරිදි සපයා ගත නොහැකි වූ රු.බිලියන 0.371 (රු.බිලියන10.058 - රු.බිලියන 9.687) ක මුදල වෙනත් කෙටිකාලින ප්‍රභවයකින් සපුරා ගැනීමට සිදුව තිබුණි.

5.1.8 ඉහත ඡේදයේ කරුණු අනුව නිරීක්ෂණය වන ඉතාම වැදගත් කරුණ වන්නේ 2015 මාර්තු 27 දින පැය 0830 සිට පැය 1100 දක්වා වූ වෙන්දේසිය පවත්වන අවස්ථාව වන විටත් එම වෙන්දේසිය මගින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දිනට අවශ්‍ය රු.බිලියන 13.550 ක් වූ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයද ඇතුළත් 2015 මාර්තු මස මාසික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයද ඇතුළත් දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශය මෙන්ම මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතියද, එනම් වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් වී ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය ලබා ගැනිමටත් පසුව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ ණය ගැණුම් වැඩසටහන සඳහා නිර්දේශය සහ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

ඉහත ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත දෙන ලද උපදෙස් (එකී උපදේශයේ උද්ධෘතයක් පහත දැක්වේ) ප්‍රකාරව ගන්නා ලද්දක් බව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි විසින් ලංසු සාරාංශ වාර්තාව (Bid Summery Report) මත අත්අකුරින් (ඇමුණුම xxvi) සටහන් කර තිබුණි. (එම සටහන තමන් විසින්ම තබන ලද සටහනක් බවට (ඇමුණුම xxvii) එම අධිකාරි විසින් වාචික සාක්ෂියක් මගින් තහවුරු කර තිබුණි). ඉහත සඳහන් සටහනට අමතරව එකී බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය මගින්ම මෙම රු.බිලියන 10.058 ප්‍රමාණයක් සපයා ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනත් කිසිදු ලිඛිත සාක්ෂියක් විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොකෙරිණි. ඉහත ලිඛිත සටහනෙන් ප්‍රකාශිත උද්ධෘතය සහ එහි සිංහල පරිවර්තනය පහත දැක්වේ.

“Governor instructed to raise funds up to Rs.10 Billion taking into consideration additional fund requirement of the Government” (ඇමුණුම xx vii)

"රජයේ අතිරේක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳව සැලකිල්ලට ගැනීමෙන් පසු රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක් දක්වා අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීමට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා විසින් උපදෙස් දෙන ලදී."

5.1.9 තවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ මිල ගණන්, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි සඳහන් ක්‍රමවේදයට අනුව විවිධ වූ විශ්ලේෂණයන්ට ලක් කිරීමෙන් පසු සකසන ලද විවිධ විකල්ප (Option) 07 ක් අතුරින් 05 වන විකල්ප අවස්ථාව අනුගමනය කිරීම උචිත බවත්, රු.බිලියන 2.608 ක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් උපයා ගන්නා ලෙසත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම xxvi)

5.1.10 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1110 පැයට පවත්වන ලද වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ විස්තරද ඇතුළත් වූ 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන එදිනම පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ (ඇමුණුම

xvi) දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. අනුපාතිකයන් ස්ථාවර කිරීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල (EPF),ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමණාකරන සමාගම **(NSB)** සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රක්ෂණ සමාගම **(SLIC)** වෙත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට විමසන ලෙස වැනි අදහසක් දැක්වෙන සටහනක් සහ වර්ෂ 20, 30 සහ 50 ලෙස එක් වර්ගයකින් රු.බිලියන 10 ක් බැගින් නිකුත් කර බැඳුම්කර රු.බිලියන 40 ක් රැස්කර ගන්නා ලෙස සටහනක් ද තබමින් (ඇමුණුම xvi) 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන තුළ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින අනුමැතිය දී තිබුණි. එහිදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිවක් එම අනුමැතියෙහි සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි. එම සටහන් දෙක (අ) සහ (ආ) ලෙස පහත දක්වා ඇත.

(අ) *"Raise Rs.40 bn through issue of 20,30,50 years of T-Bonds, 10 bn each"*

(ආ) *"EPF/NSB/SLIC to be asked to stabilize rates"*

(කෙසේ වෙතත් මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් වර්ෂ 50 කින් කල් පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලෙසට ඉහත (අ) ලෙස දක්වා ඇති සටහනේ තිබුණද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිහිටුවීමෙන් අනතුරුව කිසිදු අවස්ථාවක වර්ෂ 30 ඉක්මවා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර නොතිබුණු බවත් එහි දක්වා ඇති සංයුතියේ එකතුව රු. බිලියන 40 ක් නොවන බවත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.)

5.1.11 ඉහත ඡේද අංක 5.1.10 න් විස්තර කළ පරිදි රු.බිලියන 40 ක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා දිගුකාලීන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සෘජු ක්‍රමයට නිකුත් කිරීමක් ද මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින අනුමත කර තිබුණද (ඇමුණුම xvi) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට මාර්තු 06 දින දක්වා කාලය තුළ සිදු වූ සිදුවීම් පෙළ එකී නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟ නොවන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. එනම් අවශ්‍ය සම්පූර්ණ මුදලම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවති වෙන්දේසියෙන් සපයා ගැනීම සිදුකර තිබූ අතර එය භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව විසින් අනුමත කර තිබුණි. එසේම 2015 මාර්තු 06 දින දක්වා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම අනුමත කර නොතිබුණි. 2015 මාර්තු 06 දිනැති හා MB/ER/5/3/2015 අංක දරන මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවට (ඇමුණුම xxviii) අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී භාවිතා කරන සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කළ දැනුවත් කිරීම පරිදි එය එදිනම අපරඅනුමැතියට (Ratification) ලක් කර ඇත. තවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 23 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේ සටහන් අනුව (ඇමුණුම xviii) මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් එම සතිය තුළ වසර 30 ක පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර

වෙන්දේසියක් පැවැත්විය යුතු බවට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට උපදෙස් දීම හැර සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යොදා ගැනීම සඳහා කිසිදු තීරණයක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ලබා ගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය.

5.1.12 දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් පෙර අනුමත කර තිබූ පරිදි බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කරනු ලැබුවේ නම් එම වෙන්දේසියේ දී ලැබුණු මිල ගණන් අඩුම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයේ සිට ඉහළම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය දක්වා වර්ගීකරණය කිරීමෙන් පසු පහත දැක්වෙන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් 7 දෙනෙකුගෙන් බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 10.4652 ට රු.බිලියන 01 ක මුදල සපුරාගැනීමට පමණක් නොව රජයට රු.බිලියන 1.403 ක් දක්වා මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. එසේ සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 11.7270 දක්වා වැඩි නොවනු ඇත.

5.1.13 ඉහත තත්ත්වය ලංසු කැඳවීමේ තොරතුරු පත්‍රිකාවලට (Bid acceptance Information sheet) අනුව සකසන ලද (ඇමුණුම xxv) පහත දැක්වෙන වගුවට අනුව අනාවරණය වේ. (ඉහත 01 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවය හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ගේ අනන්‍යතාවය හෙළි නොවන පරිදි එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉංග්‍රීසි අක්ෂරයකින් හඳුන්වාදී ඇත.)

වගුව අංක 2 : පළමු ලංසු හතට අදාළ දත්ත

අනු අංකය	**ගනුදෙනුකරු (Dealer)**	**බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම රු.**	**වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලද මුදල රු.**	**බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය (WAYR)**
1	**B** ආයතනය	8,000,000	9,546,736	9.3510
2	**A** ආයතනය.	50,000,000	56,005,000	9.9063
3	**F** ආයතනය	100,000,000	110,954,800	10.0278
4	**B** ආයතනය	500,000,000	546,966,000	10.1970
5	**E** ආයතනය	50,000,000	52,253,650	10.2339
6	**H** ආයතනය	100,000,000	104,507,300	10.2959
7	**EPF**	500,000,000	522,536,500	10.4652
	එකතුව	**1,308,000,000**	**1,402,769,986**	

තවද ඉහත දැක්වූ පරිදි ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසිය රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් 7 දෙනා හැරුණුවිට එදිනට ලැබී තිබූ එකතුව රු.බිලියන 20.708 ක් වූ සියළුම මිල ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම්වලින් සියයට 75 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ පහත 5.1.15 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති K ආයතනය ඇතුළු වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට අවස්ථාවක් නොතිබූ බව ඉහත වගුවෙන් පැහැදිලි වේ. එදින වෙන්දේසිය මගින් නිකුත් කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු.බිලියන 1 ක මුදල රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා වැඩිකිරීමට තීරණය කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 07 දෙනා අතර ද නොසිටි K ආයතනයට එදින නිකුත් කරන ලද මුළු බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකමින් සියයට 50 ක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 5 ක් ලබා ගැනීමේ (ඇමුණුම xxv) අවස්ථාව උදාවී තිබීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලක්ෂණයක් විය. මෙහිදී එම රු.බිලියන 5 කින් රු. බිලියන 2 ක් සෘජුවමත් රු. බිලියන 3 ක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා වක්‍රාකාරයෙනුත් ලබා ගැනීමට එම ආයතනය කටයුතු කර තිබුණි.

5.1.14 ඉහත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ දී සිදුවූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙහි අධීක්ෂණයට යටත් වන සහ ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් ඇති ආයතනයක් ලෙස සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයන් සහිත ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් සාපේක්ෂව අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගෙන (ඇමුණුම xxix a) තිබූ අතර අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයක් සහිතව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළෙන් මිලදී ගැනීම හේතුවෙන් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ මූල්‍ය වාසිය අහිමි කර ගෙන තිබුණි.

5.1.15 ඉහත 5.1.6 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි 2015 මාර්තු 02 දිනට රාජ්‍ය ණය වාරික පියවීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයද නිශ්චිතව දක්වමින් 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව වෙත ලැබී තිබූ හෙයින් සුදුසු ක්‍රමෝපායන් භාවිතයෙන් එම මුදල ජනනය කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

ඒ අනුව අනවශ්‍ය ලෙස වට්ටම් ලබා දීමකින් තොරව සහ වෙළඳපළ පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් ඉහළ යාමට ඉඩ ප්‍රස්ථා විවර නොකරමින් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය නම් පහත දැක්වෙන විකල්ප ක්‍රමෝපායන් ද අනුගමනය කිරීමේ අවස්ථාව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(i). මහජන බැංකුවෙන් හා ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් දැනටමත් ලබා දී ඇති අයිරා පහසුකම් භාවිතා කර පසුව කෙටිකාලීන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් එම අයිරාව පියවා දැමීම.

(ii). සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ අතිරික්ත අරමුදල් තිබුණේ නම් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් එම අරමුදලෙන් මුදල් සපයා ගැනීම.

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වන විට සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් රු.බිලියන 3 කට ආසන්න මුදලක් රැස් කර තිබූ අතර 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින වන විට තිබූ ඉතිරි අවශ්‍යතාවය ද සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් රැස්කර ගත නොහැකි බවට කරුණු තහවුරු නොවූ හෙයින් එලෙස මුදල් රැස් කර ගැනීම. (1997 වර්ෂයේ සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක කර තිබූ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අසාර්ථක වී තිබූ බවට නිරීක්ෂණය නොවූ අතර තවදුරටත් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ලබා ගැනීම) .

5.1.16 මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට අදාලව පහත කරුණු නිරීක්ෂණය වීම හේතුවෙන් එය සැක සහිත ගනුදෙනුවක් බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(i). වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් කිරීමට ඉතා ආසන්න කාලය තුළ එනම් අවසන් මිනිත්තු 08 තුළ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු.බිලියන 20.708 කින් රු.බිලියන 13.60 ක ලංසු ලැබී තිබීම.

(ii). ඉහත සඳහන් රු.බිලියන.13.60 ක වටිනාකම තුළ රු.බිලියන 13.00 ක් K ආයතනය වෙනුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

(iii). රු.බිලියන 01 ක් වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනිම.

(iv). K නමින් හඳුන්වා දී ඇති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරු වෙනුවෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව රු. බිලියන 13 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ පළමු අවස්ථාව වීම.

(v). රු. බිලියන 01 ක් සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී, K ආයතනය විසින් රු. බිලියන 2 ක් සෘජුවත් රු.බිලියන 13 ක් ලංකා බැංකුව හරහාත් වශයෙන් එකතුව රු.බිලියන 15 ක් සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ලංසු කැඳවා තිබූ වටිනාකම මෙන් 15 ගුණයක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් වීම.

5.1.17 2015 මාර්තු 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හැකිව තිබූ විකල්ප ක්‍රම තුනක් සහ ඒවායේ ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි අවාසි වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් පහත දක්වා ඇත.

(i). 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අපේක්ෂා කළ පරිදි රු.බිලියන 01 ට සීමා කලේ නම් එම වටිනාකම ආවරණය වන පරිදි ලබා තිබූ ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය අනුව බැඳුම්කරයක ලංසු වටිනාකම රු.104.5073 ක් දක්වා පමණක් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කලේ නම් රු.මිලියන 1,403 ක් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. එලෙස එම වටිනාකමට

බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සිමා නොකිරිම නිසා පහත වගුවෙහි දැක්වෙන පරිදි රජයට රු.මිලියන 889 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.

වගුව අංක 3 : රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කලේනම් ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්	ලංසු මිල රු.	බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම (රජයේ වගකීම) රු.	ගෙවියයුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම රු.	අවාසිය රු.
7	**සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල**	**104.507**	**500,000,000.00**	**1,402,769,986.00**	**-**
8	E	103.116	50,000,000.00	1,454,327,886.00	695,750.00
9	J	102.207	100,000,000.00	1,556,535,086.00	2,300,100.00
10	H	102.207	100,000,000.00	1,658,742,286.00	2,300,100.00
11	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	102.207	1,000,000,000.00	2,680,814,286.00	23,001,000.00
12	G	102.207	50,000,000.00	2,731,917,786.00	1,150,150.00
13	H	101.758	100,000,000.00	2,833,675,786.00	2,749,300.00
14	G	99.999	50,000,000.00	2,883,675,286.00	2,254,150.00
15	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	99.999	500,000,000.00	3,383,670,286.00	22,541,500.00
16	K	97.878	250,000,000.00	3,628,365,286.00	16,573,250.00
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000.00	3,867,963,786.00	21,669,750.00
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000.00	5,065,556,286.00	108,748,750.00
19	P	93.879	50,000,000.00	5,112,495,786.00	5,314,150.00
20	K	93.879	500,000,000.00	5,581,890,786.00	53,141,500.00
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000.00	6,501,818,786.00	125,145,000.00
22	P	90.177	50,000,000.00	6,546,907,286.00	7,165,150.00
23	N	90.177	100,000,000.00	6,637,084,286.00	14,330,300.00
24	I	90.177	250,000,000.00	6,862,526,786.00	35,825,750.00
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000.00	6,952,703,686.00	14,330,400.00
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000.00	9,657,800,686.00	430,122,000.00
	එකතුව				**889,358,050.00**

(ii). රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේනතුව විසින් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව වෙත ලබාදුන් විකල්ප ක්‍රම දැක්වෙන පත්‍රිකාවේ (Option Sheet) නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ රු.බිලියන 2.608 ක බැඳුම්කර (බැඳුම්කරයක ලංසු වටිනාකම රු.102.20720 ක් වන පරිදි) බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ හැකියාව තිබුණි. එසේ නොකර රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රජයට පහත වගුවෙහි ගණනය කර ඇති පරිදි රු.බිලියන 0.688 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.

වගුව: අංක 4 - නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ රු.බිලියන 2.608 ක් ඉක්මවීම නිසා සිදු වූ අවාසිය

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්	ලංසු මිල රු.	බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම (රජයේ වගකීම) රු.	ගෙවියයුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම රු.	අවාසිය රු.
12	**G**	**102.21**	**50,000,000.00**	**2,731,917,786.00**	**-**
13	H	101.76	100,000,000.00	2,833,675,786.00	449,000.00
14	G	100.00	50,000,000.00	2,883,675,286.00	1,104,000.00
15	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	100.00	500,000,000.00	3,383,670,286.00	11,040,000.00
16	K	97.88	250,000,000.00	3,628,365,286.00	10,822,500.00
17	K	95.84	250,000,000.00	3,867,963,786.00	15,919,000.00
18	M	95.81	1,250,000,000.00	5,065,556,286.00	79,995,000.00
19	P	93.88	50,000,000.00	5,112,495,786.00	4,164,000.00
20	K	93.88	500,000,000.00	5,581,890,786.00	41,640,000.00
21	K	91.99	1,000,000,000.00	6,501,818,786.00	102,142,000.00
22	P	90.18	50,000,000.00	6,546,907,286.00	6,015,000.00
23	N	90.18	100,000,000.00	6,637,084,286.00	12,030,000.00
24	I	90.18	250,000,000.00	6,862,526,786.00	30,075,000.00
25	C	90.18	100,000,000.00	6,952,703,686.00	12,030,100.00
26	B	90.17	3,000,000,000.00	9,657,800,686.00	361,113,000.00
	එකතුව				**688,538,600.00**

(iii). තවද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරීම රු.බිලියන 1 ට සීමා නොකර මෙම වාර්තාවේ 5.1.18(ii) ඡේදයේ දක්වා තිබූ පරිදි මහ බැංකු අධිපති යෝජනා කළ රු.බිලියන 20 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කලේ නම් පහත වගුවෙහි ගණනය කර ඇති පරිදි රු.බිලියන 2.730 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් රජයට සිදු වීමට ඉඩ තිබුණි.

වගුව 5 - මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ යෝජනාව ක්‍රියාත්මක කලේනම් ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්	ලංසු මිල රු.	බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම (රජයේ වගකීම) රු.	ගෙවියයුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම රු.	අවාසිය රු.
7	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	**104.5073**	**500,000,000.00**	**1,402,769,986.00**	**-**
8	E	103.1158	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	695,750.00
9	J	102.2072	100,000,000.00	100,000,000.00	2,300,100.00
10	H	102.2072	100,000,000.00	100,000,000.00	2,300,100.00
11	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	102.2072	1,000,000,000.00	1,000,000,000.00	23,001,000.00
12	G	102.207	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	1,150,150.00
13	H	101.758	100,000,000.00	100,000,000.00	2,749,300.00
14	G	99.999	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	2,254,150.00
15	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	99.999	500,000,000.00	500,000,000.00	22,541,500.00
16	K	97.878	250,000,000.00	250,000,000.00	16,573,250.00
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000.00	250,000,000.00	21,669,750.00
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000.00	1,250,000,000.00	108,748,750.00
19	P	93.879	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	5,314,150.00
20	K	93.879	500,000,000.00	500,000,000.00	53,141,500.00
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000.00	1,000,000,000.00	125,145,000.00
22	P	90.177	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	7,165,150.00
23	N	90.177	100,000,000.00	100,000,000.00	14,330,300.00
24	I	90.177	250,000,000.00	250,000,000.00	35,825,750.00
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000.00	100,000,000.00	14,330,400.00
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000.00	3,000,000,000.00	430,122,000.00
27	I	88.428	150,000,000.00	150,000,000.00	24,118,950.00
28	B	88.4074	5,000,000,000.00	5,000,000,000.00	804,995,000.00
29	B	86.769	5,000,000,000.00	5,000,000,000.00	886,915,000.00
30	D	86.7428	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	8,882,250.00
31	I	86.7425	100,000,000.00	100,000,000.00	17,764,800.00
32	A	86.74	100,000,000.00	100,000,000.00	17,767,300.00
33	D	86.0851	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	9,211,100.00
34	O	76.4803	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	14,013,500.00
35	O	74.2125	50,000,000.00	50,000,000.00	15,147,400.00
36	L	62.6216	100,000,000.00	100,000,000.00	41,885,700.00
	එකතුව				**2,730,059,050.00**

ඉහත ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය ගණනය කර ඇති ආකාරය ඇමුණුම xxx හි දැක්වේ.

තවද ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසි එම දිනට ක්ෂණිකව ඇති වූ/ඇති විය හැකි තත්ත්වය පමණක් වන අතර එමගින් දීර්ඝකාලීනව ඇතිවන බලපෑමද සළකා බැලුවහොත් එම විකල්ප අවාසි තවත් ඉහළ යාමට ඇති ඉඩකඩද බැහැර කළ නොහැක.

5.1.18 2015පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවති වෙන්දේසියට අදාලව ලබා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු. බිලියන 01 ක බැදුම්කර වටිනාකමට එරෙහිව එකතුව රු. බිලියන 10.058 ක් ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට ගත් තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ක්‍රියා කලාපය ප්‍රබල ලෙස බලපා ඇති බව රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ අනු කමිටුව විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ සිදු කරන ලද විමර්ශණයේදී අදාල නිලධාරීන් විසින් ලබා දී ඇති වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්හි ඇති පහත කරුණු හේතුවෙන් තහවුරු විය.

(i). වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා අවසන් වූ ද පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් වූ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු. බිලියන 20 ක්ම නොගන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගෙන් විමසා තිබීම.

(ii). එලෙස රු. බිලියන 20 ක් දක්වා බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හොත් එය ඉතා ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාතිකයක් වන හෙයින් එය නුසුදුසු බව රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය සහ අතිරේක රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.අසීම් මහතා විසින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට අවධාරණය කර තිබීම.

(iii). ඉන්පසු මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රු.බිලියන10 කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ කර තිබීම (Why don't you go for 10 bn) හා ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී පවා රු.බිලියන 10 කට යාම නිසා ඉහළ (that too much)පොළී අනුපාතිකයක් බව අනාවරණය කර තිබීම.

5.1.19 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් තීරණය කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 9.48 ක් විය. එලෙස තිබියදී අදාල වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා සියයට 12.5 ක ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කර තිබුණි. තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසි සඳහා ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතය ලෙස සියයට 12.5 තීරණය කළ ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවීය. එලෙසම ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් යටතේ වර්ෂ 30 ක් වැනි දිගුකාලීන අමතර පිරිවැයද රජයට සිදුවන අවාසියක් ලෙස සැලකිය යුතු බවද නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ. මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ වර්ෂ 30 ක වැනි දිගුකාලීන බැදුම්කරයක පොළී අනුපාතිකයේ සිදුවන ඉතා කුඩා වැඩිවීමකින් වුවද, රජයට විශාල මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවිය හැකිවීමය.

5.2 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින සිදුකළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

ඉහත 5.1 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවෙන් පසු එලෙස මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකම ඉක්මවා ඉතා ඉහළ වටිනාකමකින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබූ දෙවන අවස්ථාව ලෙස 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම ඉස්මතු වී පෙනී යන හෙයින් ඒ පිළිබඳව විශේෂයෙන් පරීක්ෂා කරන ලදී.

5.2.1 2016 මාර්තු 10 දින හා මාර්තු 24 යන දිනවල බැඳුම්කර අලෙවි කිරීම සඳහා පවත්වා තිබූ වෙන්දේසි දෙකම අපේක්ෂා කල අනුපාතයන්ට වඩා වැඩි අනුපාතයන් දක්වමින් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් වීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම xxxi).

කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙම අවස්ථාවලදී සෘජු ක්‍රමයට අරමුදල් ලබා ගැනීම කෙරෙහි අවධානය යොමු කර තිබූ බව අනාවරණය නොවීය.

ඉහත ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීමට හේතු වූයේ යැයි සලකන ලද අනුපාතයන් පහත වගුවෙහි වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් දැක්වේ.

වගුව 6 - ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන ලද ලංසුවලට අදාළ බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්

වෙන්දේසි දිනය	පරිණත කාලය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතය
2016.03.10	වසර 03 මාස 08	LKB00819K017	11.4498-12.2625
	වසර 05මාස 05	LKB00821H019	11.8503-12.6855
	වසර 07මාස 10	LKB01024A014	12.2004-12.9879
2016.03.24	වසර 04 මාස 01	LKB00520E014	12.5000-14.1570
	වසර 05 මාස06	LKB00721J157	12.6999-14.4099
	වසර 06 මාස06	LKB00922J011	12.8997-14.8950
	වසර 08 මාස 11	LKB01025C157	12.9996-14.7510

අනතුරුව ඉහත (ආ) උපශීර්ෂයෙහි දැක්වෙන 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රුපියල් බිලියන 10 බැගින් වූ විවිධ පරිනත කාලයන් සහිත කල්පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර 04 ක් එනම් රුපියල් බිලියන 40 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි.

එහිදි එම නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කර 04 සඳහා මිල ගණන් ලැබීම් හා එම මිල ගණන් පිළිගැනීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

වගුව 7 - මිල ගණන් ලැබීම් සහ පිළිගැනීම්

අනු අංකය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	මිල ගණන් ලද වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	පිළිගත් බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන
01.	LKB00520E014	10	27.022	10.272
02.	LKB01025C157	10	36.915	21.475
03.	LKB01226F014	10	32.560	17.010
04.	LKB01530E152	10	45.925	28.975
	එකතුව	**40**	**142.422**	**77.732**

මෙහිදි නිරීක්ෂණය වන එක් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ රු.බිලියන.40 ක සීමාවකට කැඳවන ලද අතර එම මිල ගණන් මත තවත් අමතර රු.බිලියන 37.732 ක් (මුහුණත අගය) එනම් රු.බිලියන 77.732 ක් (මුහුණත අගය) දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබීමයි. එලෙස මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ වටිනාකම ඉක්මවා නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කර වලින් සියයට 60 ක් K ආයතනය හිමි කර ගෙන තිබුණි. එම ආයතනය විසින් විවිධ පොළී අනුපාතයන් යටතේ ඉහත සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර වර්ග 04 හිමිකරගත් අනුපාතය විග්‍රහ කිරීමේදී පහත සඳහන් වගුව අනුව අනාවරණය වන්නේ අඩුම ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේදී පළමු බැඳුම්කරයෙන් සියයට 0.5 ක් පමණක් හිමිකරගන්නා K ආයතනය ඉහළ ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේ නිකුත් කර ඇති අනෙක් බැඳුම්කර තුනෙන් සියයට 35 ක සිට සියයට 44 ක් දක්වා ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට සමත් වී ඇති බවයි. එනම් වට්ටම් ප්‍රමාණය වැඩිවන විට වැඩි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගෙන තිබීමය.

වගුව 8 - රු.බිලියන 40 ක් ඉක්මවා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම නිසා K ආයතනයට හිමි වූ ප්‍රමාණයන්

අනු අංකය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	ලබා ගත් ප්‍රතිශතය	බර තැබූ අනුපාතය
01.	LKB00520E014	0.5%	**12.6909**
02.	LKB01025C157	39.3%	**13.0689 - 13.7979**
03.	LKB01226F014	44.7%	**13.2984 - 13.9311**
04.	LKB01530E152	35.6%	**13.1823 - 14.0742**

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කළ දිනයට පෙර පැවති වෙන්දේසි දෙකම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබූ පදනම වූ ඵලදා අනුපාත වැඩිවීම මෙම වෙන්දේසියේ දීද එලෙසම නිරීක්ෂණය වුවද, ඉහළම ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්ට එනම් සියයට 14.0742 ක් දක්වා ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්

කර තිබුණි. මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ඉහත අවස්ථා දෙකෙහිදීම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන ලද අනුපාත ඉක්මවා මෙවර අනුපාතය පිළිගැනිමය.

තවද, ඉහත පරිදි බැඳුම්කර 4 ක් මඟින් රු.බිලියන 77.73 ක මුහුණත අගයක් ලැබෙන පරිදි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණද, වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා පහත සඳහන් වගුවේ දැක්වෙන පරිදි රු.බිලියන 59.325 ක් පමණක් ලැබී තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව ඉතිරි රු.බිලියන 18.407 වෙනත් කෙටිකාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයකින් සපුරා ගැනිමට සිදුව තිබුණි.

වගුව 9 - වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා අපේක්ෂිත බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත් අගය නොලැබීම නිසා වෙනත් කෙටිකාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයකින් එය සපුරා ගැනිම

වෙන්දේසිය සිදු වූ දිනය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	කල්පිරෙන කාලය	වෙන්දේසි කරන ලද මුළු වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	ගෙවන ලද මුළු වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	වෙනස රු.බිලියන
2016.03.29	**LKB00520E014**	**10 Y 2 M**	**10.272**	**8.734**	**1.538**
	LKB01025C157	**8 Y 11 M**	**21.475**	**16.250**	**5.225**
	LKB01226F014	**4 Y 1 M**	**17.010**	**13.161**	**3.848**
	LKB01530E152	**14 y 1 M**	**28.975**	**21.180**	**7.794**
	එකතුව		**77.732**	**59.325**	**18.407**

තවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනැති බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ රු.බිලියන 1 ක ප්‍රමාණය ඉක්මවා රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගෙන තිබීම හා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රු.බිලියන 40 ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා රු.බිලියන 77.73 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම හැරුනු විට එවැනි විශාල ලෙස අපේක්ෂිත සීමාවන් අභිබවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සළකා බලන ලද කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදුව නොමැති බව අනාවරණය විය. ඒ අනුව එම අපේක්ෂිත සීමා ඉතා විශාල ලෙස ඉක්මවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් එම එකිනෙක සීමාව ඉක්ම වූ කොටස හිමිකර ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව බහුලව K ආයතනයට හිමිවීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලෙස වර්ධනය වී ඇති බව පහත වගුවෙන් හා ප්‍රස්ථාරයෙන් අනාවරණය වේ.

වගුව 10 – K ආයතනය ලබාගත් ප්‍රමාණය

අනු අංකය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	නිකුත් කල මුලු බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	K ආයතනය ලබා ගත් ප්‍රමාණය රු.බිලියන
01	LKB00520E014	0.272	-
02	LKB01025C157	11.475	7.950
03	LKB01226F014	7.010	6.600
04	LKB01530E152	18.975	8.075

රූපසටහන 1 - වගුව 10 – K ආයතනය ලබාගත් ප්‍රමාණය



5.2.2 තවද මෙම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරු විසින් මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත්කර ඒවා අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සහ අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ ටෙන්ඩර් අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සන්සන්දනය කිරීමේදී K ආයතනයේ ලංසු ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වීම සාපේක්ෂව පහළ මට්ටමක පැවති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

5.2.3 මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ ඉතාම වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගත හැකි ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල විසින් 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින තුළදී නිකුත් කල බැඳුම්කරයන්ගෙන් ඵලදා අනුපාතය සියයට 12.20 ක සිට සියයට 12.5 ක් දක්වා පරාසයක් තුළ රු.බිලියන 9.736 (ඇමුණුම xxix a) ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් ලබා ගෙන තිබුණු බවයි. සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා

2016 මාර්තු 29 දිනට ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුනේ පහත පරිදි ඉතා අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට බව පැහැදිලි වේ . එම තත්ත්වය ඇමුණුම (xxix b) හි තොරතුරු මඟින් පැහැදිලි වේ. ඒ අනුව එම සියලු ඉල්ලීම් සාර්ථක වී තිබූ අතර ඔවුන්ට අවශ්‍ය ඉතිරි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් මිලදී ගැනීමට අයදුම්කර හෝ නොමැතිව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් මිලදී ගෙන තිබීම ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී වේ. තවද මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ භාරකාරීත්වයේ පවතින ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙලෙස කටයුතු කිරීම පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකුව විසින් අවධානය යොමු නොකිරීම ද ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී තත්ත්වයකි.

වගුව 11 - සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ සාර්ථකත්වය

අනු අංකය	මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම රු.බිලියන	පිළිගත් මිල ගණන් වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන
01.	-	-
02.	1.000	1.000
03.	0.500	0.500
04.	1.000	1.000
එකතුව	2.500	2.500

මෙම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් අපේක්ෂිත නාමික වටිනාකම වූ රු.බිලියන 40 ක් වෙනුවට රු.බිලියන 77.732 ක් දක්වා පිළිගෙන තිබුණි. එසේ නොකර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව මුහුණත වටිනාකම වූ රු.බිලියන 40 කට සීමා කලේනම් පහත වගුවේ ගණනය කර දක්වා ඇති රු.784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වාගත හැකිව තිබුණි.

වගුව 12 - සීමාව ඉක්මවා පිළිගැනීම නිසා ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්	ලංසු මිල රු.	බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම (රජයේ වගකීම) රු.	ගෙවියයුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම රු.	අවාසිය රු.
31	B	84.3512	800,000,000.00	**8,733,875,000**	-
	එකතුව				**-**
63	**J**	**75.57580**	**120,000,000.00**	**7,886,053,130.00**	**-**
64	G	75.4451	100,000,000.00	75,445,100.00	130,700.00
65	J	75.4451	120,000,000.00	165,979,220.00	156,840.00
66	J	75.3147	120,000,000.00	256,356,860.00	313,320.00
67	K	75.2279	50,000,000.00	293,970,810.00	173,950.00
68	J	75.2279	160,000,000.00	414,335,450.00	556,640.00
69	K	75.2279	200,000,000.00	564,791,250.00	695,800.00
70	J	75.1845	120,000,000.00	655,012,650.00	469,560.00

71	J	75.0547	120,000,000.00	745,078,290.00	625,320.00
72	J	74.9253	120,000,000.00	834,988,650.00	780,600.00
73	M	74.8393	100,000,000.00	909,827,950.00	736,500.00
74	K	74.7961	50,000,000.00	947,226,000.00	389,850.00
75	K	74.7961	100,000,000.00	1,022,022,100.00	779,700.00
76	P	74.7961	100,000,000.00	1,096,818,200.00	779,700.00
77	J	74.7961	120,000,000.00	1,186,573,520.00	935,640.00
78	K	74.7961	250,000,000.00	1,373,563,770.00	1,949,250.00
79	M	74.7959	160,000,000.00	1,493,237,210.00	1,247,840.00
80	C	74.7959	200,000,000.00	1,642,829,010.00	1,559,800.00
81	K	74.3678	50,000,000.00	1,680,012,910.00	604,000.00
82	J	74.3678	200,000,000.00	1,828,748,510.00	2,416,000.00
83	K	74.3678	250,000,000.00	2,014,668,010.00	3,020,000.00
84	K	73.943	50,000,000.00	2,051,639,510.00	816,400.00
85	K	73.943	500,000,000.00	2,421,354,510.00	8,164,000.00
86	B	73.9345	250,000,000.00	2,606,190,760.00	4,103,250.00
87	C	73.732	100,000,000.00	2,679,922,760.00	1,843,800.00
88	P	73.7319	100,000,000.00	2,753,654,660.00	1,843,900.00
89	K	73.5216	50,000,000.00	2,790,415,460.00	1,027,100.00
90	J	73.5216	250,000,000.00	2,974,219,460.00	5,135,500.00
91	K	73.5216	750,000,000.00	3,525,631,460.00	15,406,500.00
92	K	73.1036	50,000,000.00	3,562,183,260.00	1,236,100.00
93	M	73.1036	180,000,000.00	3,693,769,740.00	4,449,960.00
94	K	73.1036	750,000,000.00	4,242,046,740.00	18,541,500.00
95	M	72.6891	100,000,000.00	4,314,735,840.00	2,886,700.00
96	C	72.6891	100,000,000.00	4,387,424,940.00	2,886,700.00
97	P	72.68902	100,000,000.00	4,460,113,960.00	2,886,780.00
98	K	72.689	50,000,000.00	4,496,458,460.00	1,443,400.00
99	F	72.689	100,000,000.00	4,569,147,460.00	2,886,800.00
100	K	72.689	750,000,000.00	5,114,314,960.00	21,651,000.00
101	B	72.656	180,000,000.00	5,245,095,760.00	5,255,640.00
102	K	72.483	2,000,000,000.00	6,694,755,760.00	61,856,000.00
103	M	72.2778	100,000,000.00	6,767,033,560.00	3,298,000.00
104	K	72.2777	50,000,000.00	6,803,172,410.00	1,649,050.00
105	J	72.2777	160,000,000.00	6,918,816,730.00	5,276,960.00
106	K	72.2777	2,000,000,000.00	8,364,370,730.00	65,962,000.00
	එකතුව				**258,828,050.00**
70	**C**	**75.91150**	**200,000,000.00**	**8,012,848,545.00**	
71	J	75.821	60,000,000.00	45,492,600.00	54,300.00
72	J	75.6858	60,000,000.00	90,904,080.00	135,420.00
73	K	75.6858	500,000,000.00	469,333,080.00	1,128,500.00
74	K	75.2376	750,000,000.00	1,033,615,080.00	5,054,250.00
75	K	74.7933	100,000,000.00	1,108,408,380.00	1,118,200.00
76	C	74.7933	200,000,000.00	1,257,994,980.00	2,236,400.00
77	K	74.7933	750,000,000.00	1,818,944,730.00	8,386,500.00
78	K	74.134	500,000,000.00	2,189,614,730.00	8,887,500.00
79	K	74.0904	500,000,000.00	2,560,066,730.00	9,105,500.00
80	K	74.0468	500,000,000.00	2,930,300,730.00	9,323,500.00
81	K	74.0032	500,000,000.00	3,300,316,730.00	9,541,500.00
82	K	73.9597	500,000,000.00	3,670,115,230.00	9,759,000.00

83	K	73.9162	2,000,000,000.00	5,148,439,230.00	39,906,000.00
	එකතුව				**104,636,570.00**
88	**K**	**73.71470**	**1,000,000,000.00**	**8,185,426,680.00**	**-**
89	M	73.7146	50,000,000.00	36,857,300.00	50.00
90	P	73.4701	100,000,000.00	110,327,400.00	244,600.00
91	K	73.2268	25,000,000.00	128,634,100.00	121,975.00
92	P	73.2268	50,000,000.00	165,247,500.00	243,950.00
93	P	73.2268	100,000,000.00	238,474,300.00	487,900.00
94	K	73.2268	1,000,000,000.00	970,742,300.00	4,879,000.00
95	M	73.2267	20,000,000.00	985,387,640.00	97,600.00
96	C	72.9849	100,000,000.00	1,058,372,540.00	729,800.00
97	P	72.9848	150,000,000.00	1,167,849,740.00	1,094,850.00
98	P	72.9848	500,000,000.00	1,532,773,740.00	3,649,500.00
99	P	72.9848	600,000,000.00	1,970,682,540.00	4,379,400.00
100	K	72.7441	25,000,000.00	1,988,868,565.00	242,650.00
101	J	72.7441	40,000,000.00	2,017,966,205.00	388,240.00
102	P	72.7441	100,000,000.00	2,090,710,305.00	970,600.00
103	K	72.7441	1,000,000,000.00	2,818,151,305.00	9,706,000.00
104	H	72.744	10,000,000.00	2,825,425,705.00	97,070.00
105	H	72.2665	10,000,000.00	2,832,652,355.00	144,820.00
106	K	72.2665	25,000,000.00	2,850,718,980.00	362,050.00
107	M	72.2665	40,000,000.00	2,879,625,580.00	579,280.00
108	P	72.2665	100,000,000.00	2,951,892,080.00	1,448,200.00
109	K	72.2665	1,000,000,000.00	3,674,557,080.00	14,482,000.00
110	P	72.0296	250,000,000.00	3,854,631,080.00	4,212,750.00
111	H	71.794	10,000,000.00	3,861,810,480.00	192,070.00
112	J	71.794	60,000,000.00	3,904,886,880.00	1,152,420.00
113	M	71.794	100,000,000.00	3,976,680,880.00	1,920,700.00
114	C	71.794	100,000,000.00	4,048,474,880.00	1,920,700.00
115	P	71.794	550,000,000.00	4,443,341,880.00	10,563,850.00
116	P	71.794	550,000,000.00	4,838,208,880.00	10,563,850.00
117	M	71.3266	60,000,000.00	4,881,004,840.00	1,432,860.00
118	P	71.3265	100,000,000.00	4,952,331,340.00	2,388,200.00
119	K	71.0946	1,000,000,000.00	5,663,277,340.00	26,201,000.00
120	K	71.0484	1,000,000,000.00	6,373,761,340.00	26,663,000.00
121	K	71.0022	1,000,000,000.00	7,083,783,340.00	27,125,000.00
122	K	70.9561	1,000,000,000.00	7,793,344,340.00	27,586,000.00
123	K	70.9561	1,000,000,000.00	8,502,905,340.00	27,586,000.00
124	J	70.864	80,000,000.00	8,559,596,540.00	2,280,560.00
125	P	70.86395	100,000,000.00	8,630,460,490.00	2,850,750.00
126	P	70.63451	500,000,000.00	8,983,633,040.00	15,400,950.00
127	P	70.63451	500,000,000.00	9,336,805,590.00	15,400,950.00
128	C	70.6345	100,000,000.00	9,407,440,090.00	3,080,200.00
129	M	70.4065	15,000,000.00	9,418,001,065.00	496,230.00
130	M	70.4065	80,000,000.00	9,474,326,265.00	2,646,560.00
131	I	70.4063	5,000,000,000.00	12,994,641,265.00	165,420,000.00
	එකතුව				**421,434,135.00**
	මුළු එකතුව				**784,898,755.00**

ඉහත ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය ගණනය කර ඇති ආකාරය ඇමුණුම (xxxii) හි දැක්වේ.

5.3 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින සෘජු ක්‍රමයට බැඳුමකර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමෙන් පසුව එම සිදුවීමට අදාළව ඇති වූ තත්ත්වයන්

ඉහත 5.1.11 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන පරිදි 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින සිට සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව නැවැත්වූ පසුව 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ සිට මේ වන තෙක් නිකුත් කර ඇති සෑම බැඳුම්කරයක්ම ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යටතේ නිකුත් කර තිබුණු අතර ඒ පිළිබඳව පහත දැක්වෙන නිරීක්ෂණයන් කරනු ලැබේ.

5.3.1 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසු බොහෝ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබූ පළමු අවස්ථාවේ සිටම බැඳුම්කර වෙනුවෙන් වට්ටම් සහිත මිල ගණන් එනම් නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු අගයන්ට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් වී තිබුණු අතර එහි ප්‍රතිඵලය වූයේ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් ගෙන තිබීමයි. මෙමගින් රජයට අමතර පිරිවැයක් දැරීමට (ආයෝජකයන්ට වට්ටම් ලබා දීම) සිදු විය. එනම් මුහුණත අගය රු.100 ක බැඳුම්කර වට්ටම් සහිතව ඊට වඩා අඩු අගයකට අලෙවිකළද, බැඳුම්කරය කල් පිරීමේදී රුපියල් 100 බැගින් ආපසු ගෙවිය යුතු වීම හේතුවෙන් එම වට්ටම් වටිනාකම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කළ දිනයේදීම රජයේ අමතර වගකීමක් බවට පත්වීම වේ. වට්ටම් කළ අගයකට බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට අලෙවි කළද ඒවායේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළ මිල ඉහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළ විකිණීම මගින් වැඩි ලාභ ආන්තිකයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් ලැබෙන අතර එම තත්ත්වයන් තුළ රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසි සහගත තත්ත්වයක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදනුකරුවන් වෙත විතැන්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම පසුබිමතුළද සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයම සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති මිල ගණන් පිළිගෙන වෙන්දේසි මඟින්ම වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබුණි.

5.3.2 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසුව සිදු වූ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනස්කම් සමගම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වූ සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල, ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණ සමාගම, මහජන බැංකුව , ලංකා බැංකුව වැනි රාජ්‍ය ආයතන එම වෙන්දේසිවලින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ගැනීම දුර්වල වී තිබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

5.3.3 ඇතැම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිවලදී ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාත සමග මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම වෙන්දේසි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළ අවස්ථා ද විය. 2015 වර්ෂයේ සිට 2016 මැයි 31 දින දක්වා පැවති වෙන්දේසිවලින් වෙන්දේසි 5 ක් ඉහත

තත්ත්වය තුළ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබුණද, 2014 වර්ෂයේදී එවැනි ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම් වාර්තා වී නොතිබුණි. ඒ අනුව නිරීක්ෂණය වනුයේ 2015 වර්ෂයේ දී සිදු කළ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනසින් පසුව ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව අපේක්ෂා කරන මිල ගණන්වලට වඩා ඉතා ඉහළ මිල ගණන්වලටද, මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් ඇති වී තිබීමය. (ඇමුණුම xxxiii) එනම් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල පවතින අනුපාතයන්ට සාපේක්ෂව ඉහළ අනුපාතයන් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කිරීමය. මෙම තත්ත්වය පහත දැක්වෙන රූපසටහන 2 මගින් පැහැදිලි වේ.

රූපසටහන 2 - වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් භාවිතා කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඵලදායි අනුපාතයට වූ බලපෑම



යොමුව - ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ සභයේ ආර්ථික විග්‍රහය -ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු වෙබ් අඩවිය

ඉහත දක්වා ඇති ප්‍රවනතාවය විවිධ වූ සාධකයන්ගේ බලපෑම් මත සිදුව ඇති බව නිරීක්ෂණය කළද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින ගත් බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවට අදාල ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයද ඉවහල් වූ බවට අනුමාන කිරීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී නොවන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

6. පද්ධති දුර්වලතා

6.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තවදුරටත් ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකර සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ඉදිරියට ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ දී ඉන් සිදුවන මුල්‍ය බලපෑම පිළිබඳව ප්‍රතිඵල විශ්ලේෂණයක් සිදුකර එම අධ්‍යයනය ප්‍රතිඵල හා නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟව එම තීරණය ගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවුණි.

6.2 ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙන්දේසියේදී අවම්ලට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන එම බැඳුම්කර නැවතත් ක්ෂණිකව ඉහළ මිලට ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළ අලෙවි කිරීම තුළින් ලාභයක් ලැබීම අපේක්ෂා කරන අතර එමගින් රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසිය නොලැබුණි. මෙය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් බාහිර වූ පාර්ශවයන් විසින් වෙළඳපල පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් කෘතිමව හැසිරවීමක් ලෙසත්, මෙමගින් පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් පදනම් රහිතව උච්චාවනයට ලක්වන බවත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම තත්ත්වය පාලනය කිරීමේ වගකීම පැවරී ඇති මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය පියවර ගෙන තිබූ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය.

6.3 ඉහත 3.1 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව පවතින මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපළ නියාමනය කිරීමේ වගකීම මැනවින් ඉටුකරලීම සඳහා මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපළෙහි හැසිරීම් රටාවන් පිළිබඳව වැදගත් සියළු දත්ත තමන් සතුකර ගත හැකි ක්‍රමවේදයක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වාගත යුතු වුවද, පහත දැක්වෙන නිරීක්ෂණයන් හේතුවෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට එම නියාමන කාර්යය මනාව කළ හැකිද යන්න ප්‍රශ්ණ ගතව ඇත.

6.4 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිකුත් කරනු ලබන බැඳුම්කර හඳුන්වාදීම සඳහා, ඒවායේ කල්පිරෙන දිනය පදනම් කර ගෙන සකස් කරන ලද ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් (International Security Identification Number) භාවිතා කරනු ලබයි. එකම දිනකදී පරිණත වන බැඳුම්කර කිහිපයක් වරින්වර නිකුත් කිරීමේ දී එම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා එම එකම ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් භාවිතා කිරීම නිසා ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේ දී එම බැඳුම්කරය කුමන දිනකදී නිකුත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කරයක්ද යන්න වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් හඳුනාගත නොහැකි බවට විගණනයට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

6.5 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේදී ලබා ගනුයේ ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකය සහ එම බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම සහ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු කළ දිනය යන තොරතුරු පමණක් බවත් එම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙහි අලෙවි වූ වටිනාකම හා ඵලදායි අනුපාත පිළිබඳ දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව නොමැති බව විගණනයට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

6.6 ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති පරිදි අවශ්‍ය මුළු මුදලම වෙන්දේසිය මඟින් සපුරා ගැනීමට ගෙන ඇති තීරණය ඉහත 5.1.1 ඡේදයේ ඇමුණුමේ සඳහන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු පොළී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලන වගකීම ඇතුළු කරුණු සළකා බලා ගන්නා ලද තීරණයක්ද යන්න පැහැදිලි නොවීම.

6.7 එලෙසම ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති තීරණය ගැනීමේදී ඉහත 5.1.2 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ඇමුණුමේ දැක්වෙන කරුණු හා තීරණය පිළිබඳ අවධානයක් යොමු කර තිබුණු බව පැහැදිලි නොවීම.

6.8 තවද ඉහත 2.1 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුවා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට තීරණයක් ගෙන තිබුණද ඉහත 01 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් මාර්ගෝපදේශය තුළ හෝ වෙන යම් ලිඛිත නීතියකගේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්,සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයක් ගැනීමේ අභිමතයක් තිබේද යන්න විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

6.9 ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් තීරණය ගැනීමෙන් පසුව මේ වන විට වර්ෂයකට ද වැඩි කාලයක් ගත වී තිබුණද එකී තීරණය හේතුවෙන් සෘජුවම හෝ වක්‍රව මූල්‍ය වෙළඳ පළට සිදු වී ඇති බලපෑම පිළිබඳව අධ්‍යයනයක් කර එම තාවකාලික අත්හිටුවීම ස්ථාවර කිරීමට, ඉවත් කිරීමට, නැවත සළකා බැලීමට හෝ වෙනයම් නිශ්චිත අනුපාතයක් මත සෘජු ක්‍රමය හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය තෝරාගැනීම වැනි විකල්ප ක්‍රමයක් අනුගමනය කළ යුතුද යන්න පිළිබඳව පසුවිපරමක් හෝ විධිමත් අධ්‍යයනයක් කළ බවට තොරතුරු විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

6.10 වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට අනුව වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගත් ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන් ඒවා ක්ෂණිකව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලෙහි අලෙවි කර අධික ලාභ ලබන්නේද එමගින් රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසියක් වෙනත් පාර්ශවයකට විතැන් වී තිබේද යන්න පිළිබඳ අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදුකිරීමට හෝ එවැනි අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදු කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය දත්ත තමන් සතු කර ගැනීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බවට තොරතුරුද විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

6.11 රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් මෙම වෙන්දේසිවලදී ලබා ගන්නා සාර්ථකත්වය අවම වීමට හා පෞද්ගලික අංශයන්හි එම සාර්ථකත්වය ඉහළ යාමට හේතු සොයා බලා රජයට අවම පිරිවැයක් සහිතව අරමුදල් රැස්කරදීමේ වගකීමද ඉටුවන පරිදි අවශ්‍ය නියාමනයන් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කටයුතු කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

6.12 තවද වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගත් පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් එම බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන ඉතා කෙටි දින ගණනකින් රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හෝ ආයතන වඩා අඩු පොළී අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගෙන තිබේද යන්න පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂා කළ බවට හෝ එලෙස කටයුතු සිදු වී තිබේනම් එලෙස රජයට

සිදුවන මූල්‍ය අවාසිය අවම කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය නියාමනය කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

6.13 පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් තමන් වෙනුවෙන් බැදුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් මගින් සිදුකිරීම තුළ රාජ්‍ය අංශයට හා පෞද්ගලික අංශයට ලැබෙන වාසි අවාසි සළකා බලා රජයේ පිරිවැය අවම කිරීමට කටයුතු කළ බවට හෝ අවශ්‍ය නියාමනයන් කළ බවට කරුණු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

6.14 ඉහත 5.3.3 ඡේදයේ නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇති පොළී අනුපාතයන්හි ක්‍රමිකව ඉහළ යාමේ ප්‍රවණතාවය ඇති වීමට ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයෙහි සඳහන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය සෘජුව හෝ වක්‍රව හේතු වූයේද යන්න තීරණය කිරීමට තරම් ප්‍රමාණාත්මක විශ්ලේෂණයක් කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

7. නිර්දේශ

7.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණවලදී මෙන්ම පවතින ක්‍රමවේදයන් වෙනස්කම්වලට භාජනය කිරීමේ දී සහ නව ක්‍රමවේදයන් හඳුන්වාදීමේ දී එමගින් රටේ ආර්ථිකයට සිදුවන ධන හෝ ඍණ බලපෑම් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අරමුණු වලට ඉන් සිදුවන බලපෑම දිගුකාලීන හා කෙටි කාලීන වශයෙන් සලකා බලා අදාල තීරණ වලට එළඹිය යුතු වන අතර එලෙස කටයුතු කල බවට පිළිගත හැකි සාක්ෂි අවශ්‍ය අවස්ථාවන් හි දී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට හැකිවන පරිදි පවත්වාගෙන යාම.

7.2 ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලද නියාමනය කිරීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු නොවන තත්ත්වයක් තුල මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල හැසිරවීමේ හා නියාමනය කිරීමේ කාර්යය වඩාත් ඵලදායිව ඉටුකිරීම අඩපන වීම වලක්වනු වස් අවශ්‍ය සියලු දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව පවත්වා ගැනීම.

7.3 මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිකුත් කල බැදුම්කරයන් කල්පිරී මුදල් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා තමන් වෙත ඉදිරිපත් වන අවස්ථාව දක්වා එම බැදුම්කරයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය හා ගණුදෙනු වන ආකාරය පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වා ගැනීම.

7.4 රටක මහ බැංකුව කෙරෙහි පවතින විශ්වාසය එහි නිලධාරීන් විසින් ගන්නාවූ තීන්දු තීරණවල අවංකභාවය මතද රඳාපවතින හෙයින් හා එම විශ්වාසය දේශීයව මෙන්ම අන්තර්ජාතික වශයෙන්ද නොකැල්ලව පවත්වාගත යුතු හෙයින් එම නිලධාරීන් ගන්නා වූ තීන්දු තීරණයන්ගේ අවංකභාවය කාල පමාවකින් තොරව ඒත්තු ගැන්විය හැකි පරිදි යම් යම් සීමාවන්ට යටත්ව හෝ විනිවිද භාවයකින් යුතුව කටයුතු කිරීම.

7.5 නෛතික තත්ත්වයන් ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේඛයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද ඒවාටම සීමා නොවී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ කළමනාකරණ තීරණයන්ට බලපෑම් කළ හැකි මට්ටමේ නිලධාරීන් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට සම්බන්ධිත ආයතන අතර යම් බැඳියාවන්හි ගැටීම් පවතින්නේ නම් සද්භාවය පෙරදැරි කරගෙන සුදුසු අනාවරණයක්ද සහිතව සිය කාර්යයන් ඉටු කිරීමට මහ බැංකුවේ ඉහළ කළමණාකාරීත්වය කටයුතු කිරීම.

7.6 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන බොහෝ තීරණ සමස්ථ ආර්ථිකයට දිගුකාලීනව බලපෑම් ඇති කරවන අතර එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්,සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයන් ගැනීමේදී නිවැරදි පදනමකින් එම තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේද යන්න ස්වාධීන පාර්ශවයකගේ පරීක්ෂාවන්ට සහ අධීක්ෂණයකට ලක්වීම ඉතා වැදගත් වනුයේ එකී තීරණයන්ගෙන් ජනිතවන යහපත් මෙන්ම අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵලවලටද සමස්ථ ජනතාවට මුහුණ දීමට සිදුවන හෙයිනි. ඒ අනුව එවැනි සංකීර්ණ තීරණ විධිමත් ඇගයීමකින් තොරව ඉතාමත් සරලව හා ක්ෂණිකව ගෙන එමගින් යම් අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵල ඇති වී තිබේද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ඒ සඳහා බලවරමක් ඇති ආයතනයන්ට ලබා දීමට බාධා සිදුවන පරිදි මුදල් නීති පනතේ 45 වගන්තියේ සටහන් රහස්‍යතාවය සුරැකීමේ ප්‍රතිපාදන යොදා ගත නොහැකි වන පරිදි එම වගන්තිය සුදුසු පරිදි සංශෝධනයන්ට ලක් කළ යුතුය.

7.7 මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරතුරු නිවැරදිව හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර (ඇමුණුම xxxiv) එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර (ඇමුණුම iii) අනුව ලබා දී ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබේ. එහෙයින් රාජ්‍ය විගණනය විසින් එවැනි තොරතුරුවලින් හඳුනාගනු ලැබූ තොරතුරු මෙම වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුළත් නොකර එම තොරතුරු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ලබා දෙන බවත් සඳහන් කළ යුතුව ඇත.

7.8 ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් අතර බැඳුම්කරවලට අදාළව සිදුවන අන්තර් ගනුදෙනු නියාමනය කිරීම සඳහා නිසි ක්‍රමවේදයක් මාර්ගෝපදේශ මගින් හඳුන්වා දිය යුතුය.

7.9 බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියට අදාළව ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන වෙන්දේසිවල අවසාන දිනය හා වේලාව යම් යම් අවස්ථාවලදී දීර්ඝ කිරීම් අනුමත කර තිබූ අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කිරීම් නොවැලැක්විය හැකි සහ සාධාරණීකරණය කළ හැකි කරුණුවලට සීමා කළ යුතුය.

7.10 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු නොවුවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු මෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ලබා දී ඇත. එසේ වුවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට විකල්පයන්

ලෙස වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් දක්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. මේ වන විට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ පවතින අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල එම අධීක්ෂණයෙන් බැහැරව ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කළ හැකි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බවට පත් කිරීම.

7.11 මේ වන විට ඉදිරි මාසයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය වෙතින් ලබා ගන්නා අතර අවම වශයෙන් එය ඉදිරි මාස තුනක කාලයක් දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම.

7.12 ඉහත පරිදි මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය ලබා ගන්නා ලද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරය කල් ඇතිව තීරණය කිරීම.

7.13 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම. එනම් පසුගිය කාලය තුළ එක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බුන්වත්භාවයට පත්වීම හේතුවෙන් රජයද ඇතුළුව එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු සමග ගනුදෙනු කළ ආයෝජකයන් අසීරුතාවයට පත්ව ඇත. එවැනි තත්ත්වයන් වැලකෙන පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඔවුන් මූල්‍ය ශක්තීන් ඇතුළු අදාල චර්යාවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම.

7.14 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විගණකාධිපති වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති තොරතුරු අතර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකිය යුතු ලේඛන හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්ගෙන් විමසන ලදී. ඒ සඳහා පිළිතුරු ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරයකු දන්වා තිබුණේ, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අදාලව මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යයන් වර්ෂයේ විසර්ජන පනතින් අනුමත සීමාවන් තුළ රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය මාසික පදනමින් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ මහ බැංකුව වෙත දැනුම් දීමට සීමා වන බවයි. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණ කටයුතු භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යභාරය ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති සරල කාර්යයකට සීමා වන බවට විගණනයේදී එකඟ විය නොහැක.

8. නිගමන

8.1 ඉහත 5.1.17 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වාගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.889,358,050 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය සහ 5.2.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වා ගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසිය ලෙස 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින පැවැති භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි දෙකේදී වලක්වා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබූ එකතුව රු.1,674,256,805 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වා ගැනීමට කටයුතු නොකිරීම පිළිබඳව බලධාරීන් වගකිවයුතු බව නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ.

තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමයට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට තීරණය ගත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා සිදුකර ඇති බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්

කිරීම්වලට අදාලව ද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි හෝ අවාසි ගණනය කළහොත් ඉහතින් දක්වන ලද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය තවදුරටත් ඉහළයාමේ හැකියාවක් පැවැතීමද බැහැර කළ නොහැක.

8.2 මෙම වාර්තාව සැකසීමේ දී විගණකාධිපති වෙත අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු සහ ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේද වලින් අවධාරණය කර ඇති කරුණු අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ස්වකිය කාර්යය මෙහෙයවීමේ දී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයකුගෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරනු ලබන මට්ටමේ වෘත්තිමය විචක්ෂණභාවයකින් (Professional Due Care) යුතුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බව තහවුරු නොවීය.

8.3 මෙම වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේ දී විගණකාධිපති වෙත හිමි බලතල හා විෂය සීමාව තුල කටයුතු කර ඇති බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ. ඉන් ඔබ්බට සාපරාධී හෝ විගණකාධිපතිට නිගමනය කල නොහැකි මට්ටමේ නීති විරෝධී කටයුතු සිදු වී ඇත්දැයි යන්න මෙහිදී පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් නොවුනු හෙයින් එවන් පරික්ෂාවක් අවශ්‍යය හැඟී යන්නේ නම් ඒ සඳහා විශේෂිත වූ ආයතනයන්හි සහය ලබා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව නිගමනය කරමි.

එච්.එම් ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ

විගණකාධිපති

විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේදී

2016 ජූනි මස 29 වන දිනදීය

BAF/H/Gen/2016/36

2016 ජූනි 02 දින

සභාපතිතුමා,
පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමණි,

<u>ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මෑත කාලයේදී සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව වාර්තාව</u>

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් ඉල්ලා සිටි පරිදි ඉහත සඳහන් වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීම සඳහා මාගේ විධානය අනුව මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු ලබාගැනීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ විගණන කටයුතු භාර විගණන අධිකාරිවරිය විසින් කටයුතු කරන ලදි.

02. ඒ අනුව නිශ්චිත කාලසීමාවක් තුළ සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව විස්තර සපයන ලෙසට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිකාරිවරයාගෙන් 2016 මැයි 11 (අදාල ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම i ලෙස යාකර ඇත) සහ 2016 මැයි 17 (අදාල ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම ii ලෙස යාකර ඇත) දින ඉල්ලා සිටියද අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු අප වෙත ලබා නොදුන් හෙයින් එකී තොරතුරු නොපමාව ලබා නොදුනහොත් ඒ බව පාර්ලිමේන්තුව වෙත වාර්තා කිරීමට සිදුවන බව 2016 මැයි 25 දින (ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම iii ලෙස යාකර ඇත) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති වෙත දැනුම් දෙන ලදි.

03. බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීම සඳහා අප විසින් ඉල්ලා ඇති නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු ලිඛිතව ලබාදෙන මෙන් එලෙස ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද නමුදු 2016 ජූනි 02 දින (අදාල ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම iv ලෙස යාකර ඇත) රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිවරයා විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ විගණන අධිකාරිවරිය වෙත දන්වා තිබුණේ ඉල්ලා ඇති පරිදි බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව නිශ්චිත දත්තයන් සුදුසු පරිදි ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා සිය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට පහසුකම් සලසා දෙන ලෙසට ඔහුට මහබැංකු කළමනාකරණයෙන් උපදෙස් ලැබී ඇති බවත් ඒ අනුව විගණන නිලධාරීන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත එවා පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කර අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු රැස්කර ගන්නා ලෙසත්ය.

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04. අනතුරුව 2016 ජුනි 03 දිනැතිව මා අමතන ලද නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයෙකුගේ "විගණන කටයුතු සඳහා තොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීම" මැයෙන් වූ ලිපිය (ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම v ලෙස යාකර ඇත) මඟින්ද බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ලබාගැනීමට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන්ට පහසුකම් සලසා දී ඇති හෙයින් අවශ්‍ය වන නිශ්චිත දත්තයන් එකී පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමෙන් ලබාගත හැකි බව දන්වා තිබුණි.

05. තවද විගණන කාර්යයන් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය පරිදි විශේෂයෙන් සකසන ලද තොරතුරු ලබාදීම මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ට අදාල කාර්යයක් නොවන බවත් එය විගණන නිලධාරීන්ගේ වගකීමක් බවත් ඉහත ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ලිපියේ දක්වා තිබුනද ඒ පිළිබඳව මා එකඟ නොවන බවද කරුණාවෙන් දන්වනු කැමැත්තෙමි.

06. මේ අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් අප විසින් ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද තොරතුරු ලබාදීම සෘජුවම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර නොතිබුණද පහත සඳහන් හේතූන් මත උක්ත වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමට නොහැකි විය හැකි බව/ පිළියෙල කිරීම ප්‍රමාද විය හැකි බව ඔබ කමිටුව වෙත කරුණාවෙන් දන්වමි.

(අ) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉතා විශාල ගණුදෙනු සංඛ්‍යාවක් සහ දත්ත සංඛ්‍යාවක් පරිගණක ජාලය තුළ පවතින බැවින් අපගේ නිලධාරීන්ට අදාළ නිශ්චිත දත්ත ලබාගැනීම සඳහා එකී සියලුම දත්තයන් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට සිදුවන බැවින් සහ ඒ සඳහා විෂයානුබද්ධ විශේෂඥ දැනුමක් අවශ්‍ය වන බැවිනුත් ක්ෂනිකව අදාළ තොරතුරු උපුටා ගැනීම ප්‍රායෝගිකව අපහසුවීම.

(ආ) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද නිශ්චිත දත්තයන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් මීට පෙර ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද අවස්ථාවලදී එකී තොරතුරු ඉතා සුළු කාලයක් තුළ ලබාදී තිබියදී මෙවර ඔවුන්ගේ පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කර බලා තොරතුරු උපුටා ගන්නා ලෙස දැනුම් දීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වීම.

(ඇ) මහ බැංකුව විසින් මෙවර යෝජනා කර ඇති ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කර විශාල කාලයක්ද වැයකර අදාල තොරතුරු මාගේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් සොයා ගනු ලැබුවද ඒවායේ නිවැරදිභාවය පිළිබඳව නැවතත් මහ බැංකුව වෙතින් සනාථ කර ගතයුතුවීම හේතුවෙන් එකවරම මහ බැංකුව විසින් අපට අවශ්‍ය නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු සැපයීම වඩාත් කාර්යක්ෂමව හා නිවැරදිව උක්ත වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමට හේතුවන බව අවබෝධවීම.

07. තවද විගණන කටයුතු සඳහා සුදුසු පරිදි සකසන ලද මෙම නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු මාවෙත ලබානොදීම මඟින් අදාල වාර්තාව කාරක සභාව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට ඕනෑකමින්ම බාධා පැමිණවීමට මහබැංකු කළමනාකරණය විසින් කටයුතු කරන බව නිශ්චිතව සඳහන් කළ නොහැකි වුවද ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු කළමනාකරණය විසින් මාගේ ව්‍යවස්ථාපිත කටයුතු ඉටු කිරීම ප්‍රමාද වන අයුරින් වෙහෙසකර ක්‍රියාවලියකට මාගේ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලය පත් කිරීමට උත්සාහ කරමින් මාගේ විෂය පථය සීමා කිරීමට පසුබිම සැකසීම පිළිබඳ නොසතුට පල කිරීමට සිදුව ඇති බවද කරුණාවෙන් දන්වමි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ
විගණකාධිපති

Regd: Post

Annex 4 අමුණුම ii

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මගේ අංකය
எனது இல.
My No. E 118/03/C1B5

මගේ අංකය
உமது இல.
Your No. SC/G/CB

දුරකථන අංක
தொலைபேசி இல.
Telephone Nos. : 433967, 433769, 320800, 327919

ඉලෙක්ට්‍රොනික් තැපෑල්
மின்-அஞ்சல்
E-mail attorney @ sri.lanka.net, counsel @ sri.lanka.net

ෆැක්ස
பெக்ஸ்
Fax 436421

නීතිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
சட்டமா அதிபதி திணைக்களம்
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

කූ. පෙ. අංකය
அஞ்சல் பெட்டி
P. O. Box No. 502

කොළඹ 12.
கொழும்பு 12.
Colombo 12.

February 12, 2004



1. Auditor General,
Auditor General's Department,
Independence Square,
Colombo 7.

2. Director Legal,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha,
Colombo 1.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

I refer to the letter of the Auditor General dated 11th April 2003 and the letters of the Director Legal, Central Bank dated 17th June 2003, 19th August 2003 and 23rd January 2004, on the above subject.

Further to the above letters consultations were had on the above issue with the Auditor General and Mr. Nagahawatte, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, and the following questions were raised :

By the Auditor General :

1. Whether Article 154 of the Constitution applies to the audit of the Central Bank and whether section 45 of the Monetary Law Act, applies against the right of access of information, and documents by the Auditor General in terms of Article 154(5) of the Constitution.

2. Whether the Central Bank is accountable to Parliament and subject to the examination by the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE)

3. Whether the Provisions of the Finance Act No.38 of 1971 except certain provisions exempted by the Hon. Minister of Finance are applicable to the Central Bank.

D/Legal
I enquire the Governor
above our discussion with
AG. and said that we will
be following up with a letter to AG.
DG/N 12/04/03/10

Pl. put in Audit file. Ag
2004/03/17

Pl. put in Audit file. Ag
2004/03/17

Reb the consultation we had with AG

D/Legal
Pl. file
12-03/12 3/12

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By the Central Bank :

4. Whether the Central Bank is obliged by law to divulge all information and documents of the Central Bank or available to the Central Bank to the Auditor General.

5. Whether the Central Bank is obliged by law to comply with instructions issued by Treasury and Public Administration Circulars.

Having considered previous opinions expressed on related matters, my opinion on the above questions is as follows :

1. The Auditor General is empowered by Article 154 of the Constitution and by sections 42 and 43 of the Monetary Law Act to audit the accounts of the Central Bank. As Article 154 of the Constitution applies to the audit of the Central Bank, and as there should be uniformity in the application of the Auditor General's powers to all institutions audited by him, the Auditor General would be entitled in terms of Article 154(5)(a) of the Constitution:-

   (i) to have access to all books, records, returns and other documents,

   (ii) to have access to stores and other property; and

   (iii) to be furnished with such information and explanations, as may be necessary for the performance of his duties and functions, with regard to the Central Bank.

   Part VII of the Monetary Law Act deals with the Audit of the Central Bank. The secrecy clause (section 45) appears in Part VIII of the Monetary Law Act concerning restrictions relating to the officers and servants of the Central Bank. Having considered the scheme of the Monetary Law Act and the placement of the secrecy clause outside the Part in the Monetary Law Act dealing with audit, I am of the opinion that section 45 of the Monetary Law Act does not impose any restrictions on sections 42 or 43 of the said Act which deals with the audit of the Central Bank. I am further of the opinion that an officer or servant of the Central Bank who discloses information to the Auditor General in the course of the audit, would be performing his duty in terms of the Monetary Law Act and would therefore not contravene section 45 (1) thereof.

2. In terms of section 42(2) of the Monetary Law Act, the Minister of Finance is charged with laying before Parliament the Auditor General's report on the accounts of the Central Bank. The Central Bank is therefore accountable to Parliament. In terms of the definition of a public corporation in Article 170 of the Constitution and in terms of the opinion expressed by the Attorney General to the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank by letter dated 20th April 1981 (copy annexed for easy reference) the Central Bank would be subject to the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises as it was established by funds provided by the Government.

3. As I am of the opinion that the accounts of the Central Bank are subject to Parliament and the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises, I am also of the opinion that the Finance Act No. 38 of 1971 as amended would apply to the Central Bank except certain provisions therein, exempted by the Hon. Minister of Finance.

4. In terms of Article 154(5) of the Constitution and section 43 of the Monetary Law Act, the Central Bank would be obliged to divulge all information and documents available to the Auditor General in so far as they are applicable to the audit. The Auditor General should bear in mind that certain information contained in documents of the Central Bank would be of a sensitive nature and therefore avoid disclosing such information, doing so if necessary only with the concurrence of the Central Bank. In any event, it would be prudent and appropriate for the Auditor General to communicate with the Monetary Board, the reasons for seeking sensitive information and consider the observations of the Board before proceeding.

5. For the reasons above, I am of the opinion that Treasury and Public Administration Circulars would apply to the Central Bank in so far as they apply to public corporations. It is noted however, that in terms of the Monetary Law Act the Secretary, Ministry of Finance is a member of the Monetary Board. This appointment to the Board ensures comity between the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. As Treasury circulars are generated by the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, he would be in a position in consultation with the Monetary Board, to exempt the Central Bank from certain Treasury circulars, if necessary.

Rajiv Goonetilleke
State Counsel

Sgd. K.C. Kamalasabayson P.C.
Attorney General

24th June, 2016

Mr Gamini Wijesinghe
Auditor General
Auditor General's Department
306/72, Polduwa Road
Battaramulla

My dear Auditor General,

Audit Examination on Treasury bond issuance by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Further to your letter dated 17th June 2016 reference BAF/H/GEN/2016/41 in which you have requested the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to inform you as to information of a sensitive nature contained in documents or any secret documents furnished to the Auditor General.

I draw your attention to the letter from the then Governor of Central Bank of Sri Lanka Mr. A.S. Jayawardena to the then Auditor General Mr. S.C. Mayadunne dated 10th April 2001 (copy attached) in which it was stated that the Central Bank considered as sensitive "all information relating to impending or future monetary, exchange rate, interest rate and government policy and matters relating to third parties such as banking institutions falling within the ambit of Section 45 of the Monetary Law Act". We wish to reiterate this definition of market sensitive information.

Moreover, we consider that the entirety of the documentation handed over to your officers on Monday 20th June 2016 constitutes information relating to impending and future interest rates and matters relating to third parties, in this case direct dealer participants and their clients, as recognized under section 21E of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance.

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(9411) 2477577
FAX: (9411) 2477677
E-MAIL: governor@cbsl.lk

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Moreover, in a letter from the Attorney General dated 12th February 2004 addressed to the then Auditor General and the then Director- Legal/ Central Bank of Sri Lanka (copy attached), it is stated in the 4th paragraph of the Hon. Attorney Generals' opinion that "the Auditor General should bear in mind that certain information contained in documents of the Central Bank would be of a sensitive nature and therefore avoid disclosing such information, doing so if necessary only with the concurrence of the Central Bank. In any event, it would be prudent and appropriate for the Auditor General to communicate with the Monetary Board, the reasons for seeking sensitive information and consider the observations of the Board before proceeding."

I would therefore, be grateful if you could acknowledge that the most appropriate modality for your department officials to examine such sensitive information and documentation would be for them to peruse such documents in the premises of Central Bank of Sri Lanka, in order that we do not run the risk of such information and documentation falling into unauthorized hands.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Arjuna Mahendran
Governor
Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Copy to – Hon Attorney General

Encls.

A. S. Jayawardena
The Governor

Central Bank of Sri Lanka
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha
Colombo 1, Sri Lanka.

April 10, 2001

Strictly Confidential

Mr S C Mayadunne
Auditor General
Auditor General's Department
Colombo.

Dear Sir,

FURNISHING OF INFORMATION

I thank you for your co-operation at the discussion held on 28/03/2001 to resolve a long outstanding issue relating to the type of information that could be made available to you for the audit of the Central Bank's accounts. While you were of the view that all information should be made available, you were appreciative of the fact that section 45 of the Monetary Law Act precluded information being disclosed by the Central Bank on certain matters.

2. It was also mentioned that having considered the Monetary Law Act and the Constitution, the Attorney General has ruled that the Auditor General has the right of access to and examination of the accounts of the Central Bank and of all books and documents containing information with respect to matters connected with such accounts. Upto now, the Central Bank has been guided by this ruling.

3. However, in order to enable you to undertake a more comprehensive audit of the Central Bank accounts, we agreed to make available the following;

a) agendas of all Board Meetings,

b) all confirmed Board decisions, excluding those containing market sensitive information, those relating to impending or future monetary, exchange rate, interest rate and government policy and matters relating to third parties such as banking institutions falling within the ambit of section 45 of the Monetary Law Act

c) all other information and documents required for the purpose of the audit, other than information and documents that are sensitive or pertaining to policy matters and to third parties, as stated above.

4. I trust that the above meets with your acceptance.

Thanking you,

Yours sincerely,

P.O. BOX 590
Colombo
TEL : (941) 477477
(941) 477577
FAX : (941) 477677
E-mail : jayawar@lanka.ccom.lk
asjayaward@cbsl.lk

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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் Public Debt Department

June 24, 2016

Mrs L S I Jayaratna
Superintendent of Audit
External Audit Department

Public Debt Department Manual

With regard to the queries raised in your letter dated 17th June 2016 on the above subject, our responses are as follows:

i. PDD's operational manual has not been approved.
ii. This manual is relevant to the period of February 2015.

Addl. Superintendent of Public Debt

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94 11 2477277/574
10 ஆம் மாடி, இல. 30 சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை கொழும்பு 1 த. பெ. இல. 590, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை
94 11 2477718
Level 10, No. 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1 P . O. Box. 590, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka
pdebt@cbsl.lk
www.cbsl.gov.lk

27th June, 2016

Auditor General's Secretariat
Add.AG AAG
DAG Sec
27 JUN 2016
AG
7.10 pm.

The Auditor General
Auditor General's Department
306/72, Polduwa Road
Battaramulla

My dear Auditor General,

Operational Manual of the Public Debt Department

I refer to your letter dated 24th June, 2016 BAF/H/GEN/2016/45 signed by Mr S M D S S Rohitha, Assistant Auditor General. I write to inform you that, in terms of operational procedures followed hither to in the Central Bank, there is no specific requirement imposed by the Monetary Board to obtain approval of the Monetary Board for Operational Manuals of the Departments of the Central Bank. Therefore, the statement that the Operational Manual of the Public Debt Department has not been approved by the Monetary Board should be corrected. The Public Debt Department carries out its operations in terms of the provisions of the sections 33 and 113 of the Monetary Law Act and various provisions of the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance and Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance. I wish to mention that the Public Debt Department has been in operation in the Central Bank since 1950. Therefore, the issue of the legal validity of decisions taken in terms of the Public Debt Department Manual does not arise.

Yours sincerely,

Arjuna Mahendran
Governor
Central Bank of Sri Lanka

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Colombo
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(9411) 2477577
FAX: (9411) 2477677
E-MAIL: governor@cbsl.lk

List of Primary Dealers - 2014

1. Acuity Securities Ltd
2. Bank of Ceylon
3. Capital Alliance Ltd
4. Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC
5. Entrust Securities PLC
6. First Capital Treasuries Ltd
7. NatWealth Securities Ltd
8. NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd
9. Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC
10. People's Bank
11. Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
12. Sampath Bank PLC
13. Seylan Bank PLC
14. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd
15. WealthTrust Securities Ltd

List of Primary Dealers - 2015

1. Acuity Securities Ltd
2. Bank of Ceylon
3. Capital Alliance Ltd
4. Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC
5. Entrust Securities PLC
6. First Capital Treasuries Ltd
7. NatWealth Securities Ltd
8. NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd
9. Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC
10. People's Bank
11. Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
12. Sampath Bank PLC
13. Seylan Bank PLC
14. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd
15. Union Bank of Colombo PLC
16. WealthTrust Securities Ltd

List of Primary Dealers - 2016

1. Acuity Securities Ltd
2. Bank of Ceylon
3. Capital Alliance Ltd
4. Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC
5. Entrust Securities PLC
6. First Capital Treasuries Ltd
7. NatWealth Securities Ltd
8. NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd
9. Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC
10. People's Bank
11. Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
12. Sampath Bank PLC
13. Seylan Bank PLC
14. Union Bank of Colombo
15. WealthTrust Securities Ltd

Superintendent
Public Debt Department

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK TO ADMINISTER AND REGULATE THE MONETARY SYSTEM

PART I – THE CENTRAL BANK, ITS POWERS AND PURPOSES

Establishment and objectives of Central Bank. [§.2, 32 of 2002]

5. An institution, which shall be called and known as the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as "the Central Bank") is hereby established as the authority responsible for the administration, supervision and regulation of the monetary, financial and payments system of Sri Lanka, and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act, the Central Bank is hereby charged with the duty of securing, so far as possible by action authorised by this Act, the following objectives, namely–

(*a*) economic and price stability; and

(*b*) financial system stability,

with a view to encouraging and promoting the development of the productive resources of Sri Lanka.

Powers of the Central Bank and the Monetary Board in relation to section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act No. 4 of 1963. [§.56, 18 of 1965]

5A. (1) For the purposes of section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act, No. 4 of 1963, the Central Bank may open, maintain and manage special deposit accounts.

(2) Where an institution is approved by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance by Order made under paragraph *(b)* of subsection (2) of section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act, No. 4 of 1963, the Monetary Board may determine the terms and conditions subject to which that institution may open, maintain and manage special deposit accounts for the purposes of that section.

Capital of Central Bank. [§.2, 15 of 2014]

6. The capital of the Central Bank shall be fifteen million rupees, which sum is hereby appropriated to the bank from the surplus assets of the Board of Commissioners of Currency:

Provided however, the Monetary Board may from time to time, having regard to the viability and stability of the financial system of Sri Lanka and in the interest of the national economy, with the concurrence of the Minister to whom the subject of Finance has been assigned, increase the capital of the Central Bank to an amount not exceeding fifty billion rupees.

Place of business.

7. The Central Bank shall have its principal place of business in Colombo, and may have such branches, agencies, and correspondents in other places in Sri Lanka or abroad, as may be necessary for the proper conduct of the business of the bank.

PART II – THE MONETARY BOARD

Constitution of Monetary Board. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

8. (1) The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall, in addition to determining the policies or measures authorised to be adopted or

taken under this Act, be vested with the powers, duties and functions of the Central Bank under this Act, and be generally responsible for the management, operations and administration of the Bank:

Provided, however, where the Monetary Board considers it appropriate, it may delegate to the Governor, or to any officer of the Central Bank or to a Committee of such officers, any power, duty or function conferred or imposed on, or assigned to, the Board by Section 10(*a*), (*b*), (*bb*), (*d*) and section 27.

(1A) Where any power, duty or function is delegated by the Monetary Board under subsection (1), the person or the group of persons to whom such power, duty or function is delegated shall exercise perform or discharge such power, duty or function, in accordance with such general or special directions or guidelines as may be issued by the Monetary Board. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

(2) The Monetary Board shall consist of –

(*a*) the Governor of the Central Bank who shall be the chairman of the board;

(*b*) the person holding office for the time being as Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance; and [S3, 52 of 1985

(*c*) three members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, with the concurrence of the Constitutional Council. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

(3) In the absence of the Governor from any meeting of the Monetary Board, the Deputy Governor designated as Senior by the board shall act as his alternate and shall preside at the meeting and have the right to vote thereat.

(4) In the absence of the member of the Monetary Board mentioned in paragraph (*b*) of subsection (2) from any meeting of the board, the person holding office for the time being as Deputy Secretary to the Treasury shall act as that member's alternate at the meeting and have the right to vote thereat.

Monetary Board to be a body corporate.

9. (1) The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall in that name be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue or be sued in its corporate name.

(2) The Monetary Board shall have the power, in the name of the Central Bank, to hold property, both movable and immovable, and to sell and dispose of the same, to enter into contracts and otherwise to do and perform all such acts or things as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the principles and provisions of this Act.

(2) Meetings of the board shall be convened by the Governor.

(3) At any meeting of the board, three members shall constitute a quorum. [§.9, 32 of 2002]

(4) No decision taken at any meeting of the board shall be deemed to be a decision of the board unless it has the concurrence of at least three members, or, in any case where any other provision of this Act requires a unanimous decision, the concurrence of all five members. [§.9, 32 of 2002]

Attendance of certain officers at meetings of Monetary Board.

18. The Deputy Governor designated as senior by the Monetary Board and the Director of Economic Research may attend meetings of the Monetary Board, but shall not have the right to vote on any question.

PART III - THE GOVERNOR AND DEPUTY GOVERNORS

General functions and duties of Goveernor.

19. (1) The Governor shall be the chief executive officer of the Central Bank and shall accordingly be charged with the following powers, duties, and functions :–

(a) the execution of policies and measures approved by the Monetary Board and, subject to any such policies and measures as may be applicable, the direction, supervision, and control of the operation of the Central Bank and its internal management and administration;

(b) the preparation or the agenda for meetings or the Monetary Board and the submissions for the consideration of the board of policies and measures considered by him to be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the principles and provisions of this Act; and

(c) the exercise or performance of such other powers or duties as may be conferred of imposed upon him by the Monetary Board.

(2) Every instrument of the following description, that is to say, every contract, promissory note, security, report, balance sheet, statement, or other document and every rule, regulation, order, direction, notice, or requirement which bears the signature of the Governor or such other officer as may be authorized in that behalf by the Monetary Board, shall be deemed for all purposes to be an instrument executed, made, or issued by the Central Bank or by the Monetary Board, as the case may be.

Governor to be principal representative of Central Bank and Monetary Board.

20. The Governor of the Central Bank shall be the principal representative of the bank and of the Monetary Board and shall in that capacity, but in accordance with policies or rules approved or made by the board, have authority.-

"securities" means–

(i) treasury bills issued in accordance with the provisions of the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance whether issued in scripless form or otherwise;

(ii) registered stock or securities issued in accordance with the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance whether issued in scripless form or otherwise;

(iii) any securities of the Central bank whether issued in scripless form or otherwise.

Any body corporate to privide facilities under sections 98(1) and 112A. [§ 28, 32 of 2002]

112B. (1) Any or all of the functions referred to in subsection (1) of section 98 and section 112A may, notwithstanding the provisions of such section, be carried out by a body corporate authorised for the purpose by the Monetary Board subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Monetary Board.

(2) A body corporate referred to in subsection (1) may hold an account with the Central Bank for the purpose of carrying out such functions.

Management of the public debt.

113. The Central Bank shall, as agent of the Government, be responsible for the management of the public debt.

Advice on Government credit operations.

114. No new loan shall be raised and no new issue of stock or debentures shall be made by the Government or by any agency or institution referred to in subsection (1) of section 106, whether in pursuance of authority conferred by any written law or otherwise, unless the advice of the Monetary Board has first been obtained upon the monetary implication of the proposed loan or issue.

Recommendations as to policy, &c. of Government agencies or institutions.

115. The Monetary Board may from time to time make recommendations to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance or to any agency or institution referred to in subsection (1) of section 106, as to the measures and policies which should be adopted by such agency or institution for the purposes of co-ordinating its policy with the policies of the board; and where any such recommendations are made to the Minister, the Minister or any other authority or person may, if empowered so to do by any such other written law as may be applicable, make or issue such orders or directions or take such other action as may be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to such recommendations.

Monetary policy and fiscal policy. [§.11, 37 of 1974]

116. (1) On or before the fifteenth day of September in each year the Monetary Board shall submit to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance for use in preparation of the budget speech a confidential report describing and analysing the monetary situation in Sri Lanka and the current monetary policy of the board, and examining the effect of the current fiscal policy of the Government upon the ability of the Central Bank to achieve the objects specified in section 5.

Conditions of eligibility of credit instruments for discount, &c., by Central Bank.

105. The Monetary Board may declare that credit instruments held by banking institutions and licensed specialized banks will not be accepted for discount or rediscount by, or advances from, the Central bank, if the interest rates charged by such institutions and banks in respect of the loans or other credit operations to which such instruments relate exceed the interest or rediscount rates of the Central Bank by more than such percentage or margin as may from time to time be prescribed by the board.

CHAPTER VA

THE CENTRAL BANK TO PURCHASE SHARES IN CERTAIN COMPANIES

Central bank to purchase share in companies. [§.2, 26 of 1995]

105A. Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act or anything in any other written law, the Central bank may acquire and hold shares in any company which in the opinion of the Monetary Board was formed for the advancement and promotion of human resources and technological development in the banking and financial sector in Sri Lanka, or to provide for all or any of the facilities referred to in subsection (1) of section 98 or 112A of this Act.

CHAPTER VI

THE CENTRAL BANK AS FISCAL AGENT, BANKER, AND FINANCIAL ADVISER OF THE GOVERNMENT

Central Bank to be fiscal agent and banker of the Government.

106. (1) The Central Bank shall act as the fiscal agent and banker of the Government and of agencies or institutions acting on behalf of the Government, whether established by any written law or otherwise.

(2) The Central Bank may, in addition to exercising the functions mentioned in subsection (1), act as agent of the Government for the purposes of any matter or transaction if it is authorised so to do by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance after consultation with the Monetary Board.

Official depository of the Government.

107. (1) The Central bank shall be the official depository of the Government and or agencies or institutions referrred to in subsection (1) of section 106:

Provided, however, that the Monetary Board may authorise one or more commercial banks operating in Sri Lanka to accept Government deposits, subject to such rules and regulations as the board may prescribe.

(2) The monetary Board shall advise the Government regrding the distribution of official deposits between the Central Bank and commercial banks and the effects of such distribution on monetary conditions in Sri Lanka.

x. In relation to issues of T-bills, send a letter to TOD, identifying such details viz. face value, book value of the relevant issue (Appendix BO-10).

B. Rupee Securities (RSs)

BO receives summary of the investments in Rupee Securities that are on float from the FO together with the relevant cheques for full amounts.

i. Enter information on applicants/Investors i.e. name/s, amount subscribed, cheque no., date of the receipt of application in the register named 'Cheque Register- Rupee Securities' as well as in the computer programme maintained at the Back Office.

ii. Verify cheques forwarded by applicants to ascertain that they are drawn in favor of the 'Registrar Public Debt- Government Securities- PDD Current A/c 4203' and also reconcile with the amount indicated in the application.

iii. Send DOD, cheques collected together with input sheets prepared for effecting the credit to 'PDD Current Account No. 4203'. After realization of the cheques prepare another input sheet to debit PDD Current account No. 4203 and credit DST's account No. 4201 along with a duly completed paying-in-voucher No. 118 and forward to DOD in order to credit funds to DST (Appendix BO-7).

iv. Inform FO in writing confirming the receipt of subscriptions from investors enabling it to issue stock certificates to the subscribers.

2. Servicing of domestic debt

A. T-bills/ T-bonds (fund transfer from the Treasury to CBSL only)

T-bills mature on every Friday and in the event of such day falling on a holiday, payments will be effected on immediate business day prior to the maturity date. With respect to T-bonds servicing involves both payment of semi-annual interest and maturity payments and in the event the payment due date (ie. Either or both interest and maturity) falls on a holiday payments will be effected on the following business day.

යවහත් පත්‍රය
MINUTE PAPER

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CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය
MONETARY BOARD

CONFIDENTIAL

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. MB/PD/05/18/97

ගොනු අංකය :
File No. PD/U7

රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 05/97

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 18

දිනය :
Date : 14.02.1997

විෂය :
MINUTE : 18. Issue of Treasury Bonds

The Board approved of :

a) Recommending to the Government -

i) the auction of Treasury Bonds carrying a half yearly coupon rate through Primary Dealers commencing March, 1997;

ii) the issue of Treasury Bonds amounting to Rs.10,000 million from March to December, 1997; and

iii) that the coupon rate and the maturity of Bonds be determined by the Central Bank.

b) The Central Bank making administrative arrangements for the issue of Treasury Bonds from the first week of March, 1997.

c) i) appointment of Primary Dealers for Treasury Bills as Primary Dealers for Treasury Bonds; and

ii) appointment of Treasury Bill Tender Board to act as Treasury Bond Tender Board; and

d) the arrangements proposed in this Board Paper for the subscription by EPF of any shortfall in any issue of Treasury Bonds.

TRUE COPY

H M [illegible]
Secretary
Monetary Board

52 TO: S/PD / ED(D)

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රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. 5/97

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. 18

දිනය :
Date : 14th February 1997

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක : MB/PD/5/18/97
Board Paper No.

ලිපිගොනු අංක :
File No. PD/U7

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව :
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board.

මාතෘකාව :
SUBJECT : ISSUE OF TREASURY BONDS

The Board Paper discusses arrangements made by the Central Bank on the proposed issue of Treasury Bonds (T.Bonds) and seeks Board approval to undertake the issue, servicing and re-payment of T.Bonds.

2. T.Bonds will be issued under the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance, as amended by Registered Stock & Securities Amendment Act No.32 of 1995.

3. T.Bonds will be a new Government debt instrument with a medium and long term maturity carrying interest coupons payable half yearly at a rate specified for each issue. These bonds will be issued on auction basis through Primary Dealers and are transferable by endorsement and delivery. These instruments will be issued in addition to the presently available Treasury Bills and Rupee Loans (Registered Stocks).

4. At present, only Treasury Bill yields are market determined and the yields of Rupee Loans (RLs) are pre-determined at the time of issue by the Central Bank. The absence of a medium and long term instrument, with a market determined yield has been a hindrance to the development of a yield curve for debt securities. Yields of T.Bonds will be market determined as these bonds will be issued with coupons and will be sold in auction. The investors will be able to purchase these bonds at market determined yield rates. The addition of T.Bonds to the debt securities market inter alia, will facilitate the development of the money and capital markets by providing a benchmark for private debt securities.

5. The introduction of the new debt instrument will also strengthen the secondary market for Government Securities. The only government debt instrument that is traded in the secondary market, at present is T.Bills. RLs are not traded at all. Owing to the requirement of registration of transfers and the procedures involved, RLs are not attractive in the secondary market. On the other hand, T.Bond is an instrument with a great deal of flexibility and convenience for trading. In a situation where the government is not planning to issue new T.Bills in the near future, T.Bonds of 2-3 year maturity are likely to be accepted by the dealers.

6. At present, short term debt form a significant proportion of domestic debt. Treasury bills totalling Rs.125,000 million account for 38 per cent of domestic debt. This high proportion of short term debt is largely due to the use of Treasury bills as a funding instrument of the Budget. This has also led to an anomalous situation in the risk and return structure for Treasury bills in that, as compared to bank deposits, T.Bills carry a higher rate of interest. The introduction of T.Bonds as a funding instrument will also reduce the share of short term debt in government domestic debt.

. Public Debt Department has finalised all arrangements for the commencement of Treasury bond auctions by the first week of March. Draft regulations, necessary to be gazetted by the Hon. Minister of Finance was approved by the Board at its meeting No.1/97 held on 3rd January, 1997 and forwarded to the Legal Draftsman for final drafting. These regulations will be ready by 14th February, 1997 for gazetting by the Hon. Minister.

7. Detailed guidelines to be issued to Primary Dealers regarding auction procedure, calculation of interest, payment of interest and

maturity proceeds, pricing of bonds and also the issue of duplicates, sub-division and consolidation of bonds have been finalised after a series of discussions with all Primary Dealers. The Department proposes to issue these to all Primary Dealers by 17th February, 1997. Annex 1.

8. All documentation necessary for the issue of T.Bonds in scrip form have been prepared. These include the bond certificate which is in final form and printing will be completed by the 17th February, 1997. (Annex II). Other documents necessary for the primary issue will be printed at the Central Bank Press.

9. As T.Bond issues will be a part of the borrowing programme of the Government and as the Central Bank is not permitted to subscribe to primary issue of T.Bonds, it would be necessary to make special arrangements to ensure total subscriptions to these Bonds. The following special arrangements have been made in order to ensure total subscription.

i. A minimum level of participation has been fixed for each Primary Dealer depending on its level of performance in primary auction of Treasury bills. This level will range from 2 per cent at the minimum to 10 per cent at the maximum, varying with the performance of each Primary Dealer; and

ii. In order to ensure that the market behaves in an orderly manner the Superintendent, Employees' Provident Fund (S/EPF) will also be permitted to bid at these auctions. This will in addition help to ensure that the issue will be fully subscribed.

11. Auctions will be held twice a month. The Central Bank will determine the maturity, coupon rate and the amount to be issued at each auction. The auction procedure will be similar to that of

Treasury Bills. A new computer based system has been developed in-house in the Public Debt Department to deal with T.Bond auctions. The Public Debt Department will also make recommendations in regard to acceptance/rejection of bids to the T.Bond Tender Board, the decision of which will be final as regards the price and amount to be accepted.

12. It is planned to issue T.Bonds amounting to Rs.500 million at each auction to be held twice a month. Accordingly, issue of Rs.10,000 million of bonds is envisaged for the period from March to December 1997. This amount is about 20% of the total domestic borrowing requirement of the government for 1997.

13. The Monetary Board is invited to approve of;

a) recommending to the Government

i) the auction of T.Bonds carrying a half yearly coupon rate through Primary Dealers commencing March, 1997;

ii) the issue of T.Bonds amounting to Rs.10,000 million from March to December, 1997; and

iii) that the coupon rate and the maturity of Bonds be determined by the Central Bank.

b) The Central Bank making administrative arrangements for the issue of T.Bonds from the first week of March, 1997.

c) i) appointment of Primary Dealers for Treasury bills as Primary Dealers for T.Bonds; and

ii) appointment of Treasury bill Tender Board to act as T.Bond Tender Board; and

d) the arrangements proposed in this Board paper for the subscription by EPF of any shortfall in any issue of T.Bonds.

S M R Ellepola
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

Annex I

Treasury Bonds Guidelines 1

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
PUBLIC DEBT DEPARTMENT

PROCEDURES FOR PRIMARY ISSUE, TRANSFER AND COLLECTION OF INTEREST AND MATURITY PROCEEDS, ISSUE OF DUPLICATES , RENEWAL ,CONSOLIDATION AND SUB-DIVISION OF TREASURY BONDS

1. General

1.1. These procedures are applicable to Treasury Bonds issued in written form, with coupons attached. Treasury Bonds, issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL or Central Bank) on behalf of the Government, are transferable, medium and long term debt instruments on which periodic payments of interest at a specified rate are made. The bonds are issued in terms of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chapter 420), as amended by Act No. 51 of 1983, Act No. 3 of 1985 and Act No. 32 of 1995, and the Appropriation Act pertaining to each financial year.

1.2 As used in these Procedures, the following terms have the meanings set forth below:

"Auction date" will be the date three working days preceding the issue date, fixed for the series except where the auction date falls on a Treasury Bill auction date in which case the auction date will be the working day preceding the Treasury Bill auction date.

"Dealer" means any person who is authorized to deal in Treasury Bonds for its own account and for the account of customers, either as a Primary Dealer or as a Secondary Market Dealer.

"Issue date" means the date for settlement of payment for the Bond by the successful bidders to CBSL at a primary auction. It is also the date from which the Bonds of that series commence to accrue interest.

"Primary Dealer" means any commercial bank, company or other person appointed by the Monetary Board as a Primary Dealer for the purpose of dealing with the Central Bank as a counterparty in the primary and secondary markets for stock and securities.

"Secondary Market Dealer" means any person, other than a Primary Dealer, authorized by the Central Bank to be a Dealer in Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds.

"Value date" means the date for settlement of payment by the buyer and delivery of the Bond certificates by the seller, in the secondary market.

2. Auction Procedures

2.1 Treasury Bonds will be issued by the auctions from time to time depending on the fund requirements of the Government of Sri Lanka and on terms and conditions to be stipulated by the Government of Sri Lanka and the CBSL.

2.2. Tenders will be accepted from Primary Dealers. In addition, CBSL may authorize a few additional major institutional investors to bid directly at primary auctions (referred to in these procedures as "Designated Non-dealer Bidders"). The general public will not be permitted to bid directly or make direct subscriptions to Treasury Bonds. The general public is advised to purchase Treasury Bonds from the Primary Dealers.

2.3 Tenders must be made on forms obtainable from the Public Debt Department of CBSL.

2.4 Tenders must be in multiples of Rupees one million, with a minimum tender of Rupees five million.

2.5 A separate tender form should be forwarded in respect of each bid if a bidder wishes to make bids at more than one bid price. The bid price should be quoted in Rupees and cents for each Rs.100/- to be tendered. Bids should not be made in fractions of cents.

2.6 Treasury Bonds will carry semi-annual interest payments at a fixed rate per annum (also referred to as the coupon rate). However, tenderers will have the flexibility to bid at par, at a premium or at a discount.

2.7 Duly perfected tender forms should be enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed to the 'Registrar of Public Debt, Central Bank of Sri Lanka', and marked on top left hand corner, 'Treasury Bonds'. The sealed envelopes must be deposited in the tender boxes provided for the purpose at the premises of the Public Debt Department, CBSL, or at other pre-announced places, within the stipulated time limit. Tenders in respect of which tender forms are not duly perfected are liable to be rejected.

2.8 CBSL will reserve to itself the right of accepting any portion of a tender or the whole of it, and shall have the right of rejecting any or all tenders without assigning any reason.

2.9 Successful tenderers will be notified by telephone as early as possible upon finalisation of the tenders.

2.10 For each auction of a series of Treasury Bonds, an issue date will be specified for the series. In general the issue date for a series will be 1st of the month or 1st working day of the month or the 15th of the month or the 1st working day after the 15th of the month. CBSL presently intends to issue Treasury Bonds twice a month with interest payment dates and maturity dates falling either on the first day of the month, or on the 15th day of a month.

11 In order to ensure full subscription of primary issues, the CBSL may stipulate minimum participation levels to each Primary Dealer. The participating level expected of one Primary Dealer will not be made known to the other Primary Dealers.

12 A first press notice inviting bids for each auction will be published in national newspapers approximately two weeks before the auction date for the information of Primary Dealers, investors and the general public. The press notice will carry details pertaining to the auction, including date of auction, amount on offer, terms and conditions governing submission of bids, date the Bonds will be issued, maturity date, and interest payment dates. The notice will also state that the coupon rate for payment of interest will be specified in a subsequent press notice. A second press notice will be published in national newspapers at least three days before the auction date, specifying the coupon rate for payment of interest. Promptly after the auction, a press release will be published, announcing the results of the auction.

2.13 All payments on account of accepted tenders must be made in full on the dates specified in the press announcement. All cheques in settlement of accepted tenders must be handed over to the Public Debt Department within the time frame stipulated, unless otherwise specified.

Non-payment by a successful bidder of an accepted tender within this stipulated time frame will result in disciplinary action against the bidder pursuant to the Statement of Responsibilities and Privileges for Primary Dealers, and the Central Bank will not release the bidder from liability for payment in full of the accepted tender.

2.14 Promptly after the issue date for a series, the Registrar of Public Debt will issue the Treasury Bonds for the series in the form of printed certificates, made payable to the successful tenderers. These certificates may be obtained in one or more denominations indicated on the reverse of the tender form. The minimum value is Rs. 10,000/-. Certificate requirements should be clearly indicated, on the reverse of the tender form. If the required denominations are not specified, bond certificates will be issued in denominations as decided by the Registrar of Public Debt.

2.15 Unless specifically authorised by the customer in writing to do otherwise, the Primary Dealer should, not later than the next working day after receipt of the related certificate from CBSL, properly endorse and deliver the certificate, with all interest coupons attached, to the customer.

3. Coupon and Maturity Dates

3.1 Treasury Bonds will provide for semi-annual interest payments. For each series of Treasury Bonds, the first coupon date will be determined by CBSL and announced in a press notice preceding the auction. Once the first coupon date is fixed, the second coupon date will be the same date of the month 6 months hence; the third coupon date will be the same date of the month 6 months thereafter, and so forth. This pattern will continue throughout the life of the Bond.

eg.

If the date of a two year Treasury Bond is January 15, 1997, the interest payment dates and maturity date will be as follows.

Coupon/maturity	Date
First coupon	July 15, 1997
Second coupon	January 15, 1998
Third coupon	July 15, 1998
Fourth coupon	January 15, 1999
Maturity date	January 15, 1999

3.2 To simplify calculations, CBSL will normally set the first coupon date exactly 6 months after the issue date for the Bonds, resulting in a normal first interest period (normally containing between 181 and 184 days). Under some circumstances, however (due to weekends,

holidays or other reasons), it may be necessary to schedule the first coupon date at slightly more or slightly less than the normal six month period. When such an irregular first coupon period occurs for a bond series, an appropriate adjustment will be made in the amount of the first interest payment on that series, to reflect the irregularity. All subsequent interest payments, however, will be made in the normal amount.

3.3 In the event that any coupon date or maturity date falls on a non-working day, interest payments and maturity payments will be made by CBSL on the next working day.

3.4 To help simplify Bond calculations, record keeping, and comparisons between bond series, CBSL intends to standardize the coupon dates and maturity dates among bond series as much as practicable (that is, to choose the same day of the month as the payment date for interest and maturity proceeds), as noted in Section 2.10 above. As series of Treasury Bonds accumulate, standardized maturity dates will also allow the issue dates for settlement of new bond issues to be matched more closely with the maturity dates of old bond issues. Thus, eventually, this will aid with the re-investment of maturing bond proceeds and funding of new issues.

4. Calculation of Interest

4.1. Half yearly interest coupon carry an amount of interest exactly equivalent to one half of the interest due on the Bond, for a year at the coupon rate specified for the series (although the exact number of days falling within the specific half year period vary from 181 to 184 days) except in the case of first coupon whenever the actual number of days from the issue date to the first coupon date is less or more than the exact number of days for the relevant 6 month period.

4.2 Wherever the actual number of days within the first coupon period is less or more than the exact number of days for a period of 6 month from the issue date, interest is calculated on the following basis. Interest will be calculated to the nearest rupee.

$$C_1 = r\left[\frac{D^*}{D} - \frac{1}{2}\right]F$$

C_1 = Coupon amount for the first coupon period

r = Coupon rate as specified for the Bond series

D^* = Actual number of days from the issue date to the second coupon date

D = Actual number of days for a complete period of one year from the issue date (Which is 365 days for a normal year and 366 days, in respect of the year commencing on first March of the preceding year of a leap year and ending on 29 th February of the respective leap year.

F = Face value

Example

Calculate interest amount on 15%, 1999 Bond series with a face value of Rs.10,000 with an issue date of 17th February 1997 and first coupon date of 15th August, 1997.

$$C_1 = r\left[\frac{D^*}{D} - \frac{1}{2}\right]F$$

$$= 15\left[\frac{363}{365} - \frac{1}{2}\right] \times 10{,}000$$

$$= 15\left[\frac{726 \div 365}{730}\right] \times 10{,}000$$

$$= 15\left[\frac{361}{730}\right] \times 10{,}000$$

$C_1 \div Rs.741.78$

rounded off to Rs. 742

5. Payment of Interest

5.1 Semi-annual interest payments will be made by CBSL on the coupon payment dates specified at the time of initial issue and indicated on the face of the bond certificate and attached interest coupons. As noted in section 3.3 above, if a coupon payment date is not a working day, the interest payment will be made on the next working day.

5.2 Bonds will be issued as written certificates with interest coupons attached. Interest payments will be made by CBSL on the due date only in accordance with the procedures set forth below for the proper completion and submission of coupons.

5.3 Interest payments will not be made directly to any holder of a Treasury Bond, or any holder of a Treasury Bond interest coupon, or any agent of such holder, unless the holder is either a Primary Dealer, a Secondary Market Dealer, or a Designated Non-dealer Bidder. Any other holder must collect its interest payments through either a Primary Dealer or a Secondary Market Dealer pursuant to the requirements of these Procedures. There is no requirement that the Dealer making the collection on behalf of the customer be the same Dealer from whom the Treasury Bond was acquired by the holder.

5.4 Interest will be paid on submission of the relevant interest coupons in accordance with the following procedures and requirements:

(a) The lawful owner of the Bond must furnish the Bond certificate with the coupons intact to a dealer.

(b) To collect interest payments on behalf of a customer, the Dealer must ensure the following.

i. It must satisfy itself that the customer has proper title to the coupon and the underlying Treasury Bond.

ii. Ensure that the coupon is attached to the Treasury Bond certificate in the same manner as when originally issued. The coupon must then be detached from the certificate by the Dealer.

iii. It must enter the customer's name on the reverse side of the coupon, and must sign and seal the coupon at the appropriate place to certify that the named customer is the holder of the Treasury Bond, and that fate of proceeds is guaranteed. Completing, signing and sealing the coupon in this manner constitutes the guaranty of the Dealer that the interest proceeds of the coupon will be paid to the named customer immediately upon receipt from CBSL. The completed, signed and sealed coupon, together with any other documents that may be required by CBSL, must be submitted to CBSL.

(c) To collect interest payments on Treasury Bonds held for its own account, the Dealer must enter its own name on the reverse side of the coupon, and submit it, together with any other documents that may be required, to CBSL for collection at the appropriate time.

(d) Interest coupons may be submitted to CBSL for collection no sooner than 7 working days prior to their respective due dates. Properly submitted interest coupons will be paid to the Dealer on their due date or, if the due date is not a working day, on the next working day, provided the coupon is submitted to CBSL not less than 3 working days prior to the due date. Coupons submitted later than 3 working days prior to their due date will be paid by CBSL after processing as soon as practicable.

(e) Immediately upon receipt of an interest payment by a Dealer on behalf of a customer, the Dealer must immediately, effective as of the same working day, credit the interest to the account of the customer. To avoid practical problems that might hinder such same day crediting of interest, the Dealer is expected to make prior arrangements to solve problems of this nature, so that same day crediting for all customers can take place on the date interest is received from CBSL.

5.5 Under no circumstances will any Dealer use an interest coupon, surrendered to it by a customer for purposes of collection, for any other purpose whatsoever.

5. Payment of Maturity Proceeds

5..1 Maturity proceeds of Treasury Bonds will be paid by CBSL on the maturity date specified at the time of initial issue and indicated on the face of the bond certificate. As specified above in section 3.3, if the maturity date is not a working day, the principal amount will be paid on the next working day.

5.2 Payments of maturity proceeds will not be made directly to any holder of a Treasury Bond, or any agent of such holder, unless the holder is either a Primary Dealer, a Secondary

Market Dealer, or a Designated Non-dealer Bidder. Any other holder must collect its maturity proceeds through either a Primary Dealer or a Secondary Market Dealer pursuant to the requirements of these Procedures. There is no requirement that the Dealer making the collection on behalf of the customer be the same Dealer from whom the Treasury Bond was acquired by the holder.

6.3 Payment of maturity proceeds will be made by CBSL on the maturity of a Treasury Bond only in accordance with the following procedures and requirements:

(a) The lawful owner of the Bond must furnish the bond certificate to a dealer after duly perfecting the relevant cage.

(b) To collect maturity proceeds on behalf of a customer, the Dealer must ensure the following:

i. It must satisfy itself that the customer has proper title to the Bond.

ii. It must sign and seal the Bond certificate at the appropriate place to indicate fate of proceeds is guaranteed. This signature and seal constitutes the guaranty of the Dealer that the maturity proceeds of the Bond will be paid to the customer by the Dealer immediately upon receipt from CBSL.

iii. The bond certificate, together with attachments for endorsements and other documents that may be required by CBSL, must be submitted to CBSL.

(c) To collect maturity proceeds on maturing Treasury Bonds held for its own account, the Dealer, as holder, must sign the collection instructions printed on the reverse side of the bond certificate, and submit the bond certificate, together with any attachments for endorsements and other documents that may be required, to CBSL.

(d) Maturing Bond certificates may be submitted to CBSL for collection no sooner than 7 working days prior to their maturity date. The maturity proceeds for properly submitted bond certificates will be paid to the Dealer on maturity date of the bond or, if the maturity date is not a working day, on the next working day, provided that the certificate is submitted to CBSL not less than 3 working days prior to the maturity date. Bond certificates submitted later than 3 working days prior to their maturity date will be paid by CBSL after processing as soon as practicable.

(e) Immediately upon receipt of maturity proceeds by a Dealer on behalf of a customer, the Dealer must immediately, effective as of the same working day, credit the proceeds to the account of the customer. To avoid practical problems that might hinder such same day crediting of maturity proceeds, the Dealer is expected to make prior arrangements to solve problems of this nature, so that same day crediting for all customers can take place on the date the maturity proceeds are received from CBSL.

6.4 Under no circumstances will any Dealer use a bond certificate, surrendered to it by a customer for purposes of collection, for any other purpose whatsoever.

7. Endorsement and Transfer

7.1 Following a primary auction, the bond certificates are initially issued in the name of successful tenderers. Although CBSL keeps a record of this initial ownership of Treasury Bonds, it does not thereafter keep records to track changes in ownership after initial issuance. Treasury Bonds are transferable by endorsement, and transfers do not require registration. In order to effect a valid transfer, however, CBSL will require the endorsement and transfer to be carried out in accordance with the requirements and procedures described below.

7.2 The only party entitled to transfer a Treasury Bond by endorsement is the person duly entitled to own the bond. Each transfer of a Treasury Bond to be valid must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) The transferor must endorse the bond to the transferee by completing an endorsement in the form "pay _____ , or order" by inserting the transferee's name legibly. This endorsement must be contained on the reverse side of the Bond certificate, or on a separate attachment in the form prescribed by CBSL. If the transferee is an individual, the National Identity Card number of the transferee must also be inserted. The endorsement must then be signed by the transferor, as owner, or by his duly appointed representative.

(b) The endorsement by the transferor must be certified by a dealer. There is no requirement that the Dealer certifying the transfer be the same Dealer from whom the Treasury Bond was acquired by the transferor.

8. Issue of Duplicates

8.1 Applications for issue of duplicates will indicate the circumstances under which a bond has been lost, stolen or destroyed totally or in part. This request should be addressed to the Registrar of Public Debt and shall be accompanied by:-

(a) A statement indicating:

(i) the Bond series, Bond number and the value of the Bond,

(ii) the last occasion when interest has been collected,

(b) A letter from the Primary Dealer from whom the Bond was purchased, indicating the Bond series, Bond number and the value of the Bond and the certification that the Bond has been sold to party making the request.

(c) A letter from at the Dealer who authenticated the last transfer indicating the Bond series, Bond number and the value of the Bond and the certification that the Bond has been sold to party making the request.

(d) Post office registration receipt if the letter containing the Bond, was lost in transmission by registered post.

(e) An affidavit indicating that the party:-

(i) is the legal holder of the Bond which has been lost, stolen or destroyed,

(ii) that he is not in possession of the Bond and

(iii) has not transferred the Bond to any other person or hypothecated it as security for any purpose whatsoever.

(f) The remaining portion of a bond, if the Bond is partly damaged or if coupons are lost or damaged or destroyed.

8.2. If the registrar is satisfied, that the Bond is lost, he will instruct the applicant to publish a notice at his expense in a national newspaper giving notification of the loss, theft or destruction of the Bond in a format indicated below:-

Treasury Bond
Lost, Stolen or Destroyed

The Government of Sri Lanka ....Treasury Bond.....series bearing Bond No.....issued on.....and maturing on.....for Rs.....originally standing in the name of.....and the first endorsed to.....and last endorsed to..... by whom it was never endorsed to any other person, having been lost or stolen or destroyed, notice is hereby given that payment of the above Bond and the interest thereon has been stopped by the Registrar, and that application has been made to the Registrar for the issue of a duplicate Bond in the name of the Applicant. The public is warned against purchasing or otherwise dealing with the above mentioned Treasury Bond.

Any person entitled to make a claim pertaining to these Bonds should forwarded same to Registrar/Superintendent of Public Debt, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Level 29, World Trade Center, West Tower, Colombo 1, within 14 days from date hereof.

Name of Applicant
Address Date

The Registrar will issue a duplicate if he is satisfied with the information forwarded to him and after the lapse of 6 months from the date of the loss or after the next interest payment date which ever occurs first after obtaining an Indemnity Bond indemnifying the government of Sri Lanka, the CBSL and Registrar against any loss or damage resulting from the issue of the duplicate Bond. No duplicate interest coupon will be issued under any circumstances for existing Bonds. In the event of loss of interest coupon/coupons too, the procedure will be the same. The duplicate Bond will carry interest coupon only for the balance life time of the Bond and will be stamped 'Duplicate'.

9. Renewal, Consolidation and Sub-division

Applications for renewal, consolidation and sub-division of Treasury Bonds should be forwarded in forms designed for that purpose together with the original Bond/Bonds through Primary Dealers. The applicant should reimburse the cost of the renewal ,

consolidation and sub-division of Treasury Bonds as specified by the Registrar of Public Debt.

The Registrar shall issue the renewed, consolidated or sub-divided Bonds after stamping the Bonds "Renewal", "Consolidation" or "Sub-division" as the case may be, to the Primary Dealer and the Primary Dealer shall issue such Bonds to the holder with necessary endorsements.

The Registrar shall not receive applications for renewal, consolidation or sub-division during the period of one week immediately preceding the respective date of interest payments.

10. Stamp Duty and Taxes

10.1 Treasury Bonds are exempted from stamp duty and withholding tax. However, income tax will have to be paid in the normal manner with respect to interest or other income arising from ownership of the Bond.

11. Miscellaneous

11.1 All Primary Dealers and Secondary Market Dealers are required to furnish to the Public Debt Department the names and certified specimen signatures of officers who are authorised to sign on their behalf for any purposes under the Registered Stock & Securities Ordinance, Regulations made thereunder, or these Guidelines. These signatures will be updated and circulated among Primary Dealers.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය/இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

බැඳුම්කර අංකය/முறி எண்/Bond No. :

අනුක්‍රමික අංකය/தொடர் எண்/Serial No.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය
இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி
Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series

කල්පිරෙන දිනය / முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி / Date of Maturity

රු./ரூபா/Rs.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar :

දිනය/ திகதி/Date .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය

இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

අනුක්‍රමික අංකය/தொடர் எண்/Serial No.

බැඳුම්කර අංකය/முறி எண்/Bond No. :

මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කරනු ලබන්නේ .....අංක..... දරණ විසර්ජන පනතින් යටත් බලයෙන් හා (420 වැනි අධිකාරය වන) ලියාපදිංචි කළ ව්‍යාපාර විස්තර හා ඇපකර ආඥාපනතේ විධිවිධාන යටතේ .....මුදල් වර්ෂයේ පෝරවීන් සඳහා වැය කරනු පිණිසය/..... ඇති ද්‍රව්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සඳහා වැය කිරීමට ඇති බලය යටතේ හා ඒ ආඥාපනතේ විධිවිධාන යටතේ .....ඇති ඇණ්ඩිය ..... ඇති ද්‍රව්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සඳහා වැය කිරීමට ඇති බලය යටතේ හා ඒ ආඥාපනතේ විධිවිධාන යටතේ

This Treasury Bond is issued on the authority of the Appropriation Act No.....of.....and under the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chap. 420) to meet expenditure for the service of the financial year.....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය
இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி
Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series

කල්පිරෙන දිනය / முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி / Date of Maturity

රු./ரூபா/Rs.

ඉහත දැක්වෙන කල්පිරෙන දිනයේ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ අරමුදලින් කොළඹ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් රුපියල් .....යි හෝ වෙනත් ඇමෙරිකා .....හෝ අඩවි හෝ මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරයෙන් හිමිකම් පැවෙන්නේය/இந்தத் திறைசேரி முறியானது மேலே குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட முதிர்ச்சித் திகதியில் கொழும்பு, ...என்பவருக்கு அல்லது இலங்கை මධ්‍ය වාණිජ්‍ය බැංකුවේ ඉලංකා අරසාන්ක නිධීන්ගලිල් ඉරුන්තු තිරුප්පික් කොටුක්කප්පටුම්පොතු ..... කට්ටළෙප්පඩි රූපා .....ඉන් ගෙවීමට හිමිකම් කියනු ලැබේ./This Treasury Bond entitles..... .....or order to payment of Rupees..... out of the funds of the Government of Sri Lanka on the above maturity date at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo.

කල් දිරෙන දිනය දක්වා සෑම වර්ෂයකම ..... සහ ..... යන දිනවලදී .....දින පටන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මත කල් ඇති ඕනෑම අලෙවිකරුවකුගේ මාර්ගයෙන් කොළඹ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත මෙම බැඳුම්කරයට යා කර ඇති අදල පොළී කූපනය ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසුව ඉහත් සඳහන් දිනවල හෝ ඒ පසු දිනක පොළිය ලැබේ/ඇත්තේය. මෙම බැඳුම්කරය මත ලියාපදිංචි කර ඇති හිමිකරුගේ නම හා ලිපිනය වෙනස් කිරීම් ඇතුළත් ඉල්ලීම් ලිඛිතව ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුය. ඉහත

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය/இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

අනුක්‍රමික අංකය/தொடர் எண்/Serial No. .....

බැඳුම්කර අංකය/முறி எண்/Bond No. : .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය / இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி / Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond ..... | කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series ..... | කල්පිරෙන දිනය / முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி / Date of Maturity .....

රු/ரூபா/Rs.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar : .....

දිනය/ திகதி/Date .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය

இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

අනුක්‍රමික අංකය/தொடர் எண்/Serial No.

බැඳුම්කර අංකය/முறி எண்/Bond No. : .....

මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කරනු ලබන්නේ ..... අංක ..... දරණ විසර්ජන පනතින් හෝ බලයෙන් හා (420 වැනි අධිකාරය වන) රියාපදිංචි කළ ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු හා ඇපකර ආඥාපනතේ විධිවිධාන යටතේ ..... මුදල් වර්ෂයේ සේවාවන් සඳහා වැය කරනු පිණිසය./ இவ் திறை ஈட்டுப் பங்குகளின் பதிவு செய்தல் கட்டளைச் சட்டத்தின் (அதிகாரம் 420) ..... ஆம் ஆண்டின் ..... ஆம் நிதி ஆண்டிற்குரிய செலவுகளுக்காக ஒதுக்கீடு செய்வதற்கான ..... ஆம் ஆண்டின் ..... ஆம் இலக்க ஒதுக்கீட்டுச் சட்டத்தின் அதிகாரப்படி (420 ஆம் அத்தியாயமான) பதிவுசெய்யப்பட்ட. பங்குத்தொகுதிப் பிணைகள் கட்டளைச் சட்டத்தின் ஏற்பாடுகளின் கீழ் திரட்டப்படுகின்றது. This Treasury Bond is issued on the authority of the Appropriation Act No. ..... of ..... and under the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chap. 420) to meet expenditure for the service of the financial year. .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය / இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி / Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond ..... | කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series ..... | කල්පිරෙන දිනය / முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி / Date of Maturity .....

රු/ரூபா/Rs.

ඉහත දැක්වෙන කල්පිරෙන දිනයේ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ අරමුදලින් කොළඹ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් රුපියල් ..... ක් හෙවිනු පැමිණිමට ..... හෝ ඒහට හෝ මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරයෙන් සිහිකම් දැනෙන්නේය/இந்தத் திறைசேரி முறியானது மேலே குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட முதிர்ச்சித் திகதியில் கொழும்பு, இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியில் இலங்கை அரசாங்க நிதியங்களில் இருந்து திருப்பிக் கொடுக்கப்படும்போது ..... என்பவருக்கு அல்லது கட்டளைப்படி ரூபா ..... இனை உரித்துடையதாக்கும்./This Treasury Bond entitles ..... or order to payment of Rupees ..... out of the funds of the Government of Sri Lanka on the above maturity date at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo.

කල් පිරෙන දින දක්වා සෑම වර්ෂයකම ..... සහ ..... යන දිනවලදී ..... දින පටන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා පත් කර ඇති මූල්‍යකරුවකුගේ මාර්ගයෙන් කොළඹ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත මෙම බැඳුම්කරයට යා කර ඇති අදල පොළී කූපනය ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසුව පොළී මුදල් හෙවිනු ලැබේ/வட்டியானது இதனோடு இணைக்கப்பட்டுள்ள பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டுக்களை திறைசேரி முதி வணிகர்களின் ஊடாக கொழும்பு இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளருக்கு சமர்ப்பிக்கும்போது ..... தொடங்கி முதிர்ச்சியடையும் வரை ஒவ்வொரு ஆண்டு ..... நாளும் ..... நாளும் செலுத்தப்படும்./Interst is payable on the ..... and ..... of each year commencing on ..... until maturity at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, on submission of the relevant coupon attached to this Bond through any Dealer for Treasury Bonds to the Registrar of Public Debt, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුව වෙනුවට හා වෙනුවෙන්.
இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்திற்காகவும் அதன் சார்பிலும்.
for and on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar

කොළඹ/கொழும்பு/Colombo .....

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පොළී කූපනය – 4/பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டு – 4/Interest Coupon – 4

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පොළී කූපනය – 3/பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டு – 3/Interest Coupon – 3

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පොළී කූපනය – 2/பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டு – 4/Interest Coupon – 2

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පොළී කූපනය – 1/பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டு – 4/Interest Coupon – 1

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ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar : .....

"பதிவு நம்பிக்கையாளரினால் குறித்த திகதியன்று அல்லது அதற்கு முன்னர் திறைசேரி முறிகளின் பின்புறத்தில் அல்லது இணைப்புக்களில் செய்யப்பட்ட அனைத்து ஒப்புதல்களும் சரியானவை என்பதை வியாபாரி உறுதிப்படுத்தியுள்ளார் என்பதை ஒப்புதல் பெறுநர் உறுதிப்படுத்திக் கொள்ள வேண்டும்." / "At every point of transfer the transferee must ensure that a Dealer has duly certified the preceding endorsements."

இம்முறி சம்பந்தமாகவோ அல்லது இம்முறி இணைக்கப்பட்டுள்ள இணைப்புக்கள் சம்பந்தமாகவோ பொது முகாமையாளரினால் குறித்த நோக்கத்திற்காக வழங்கப்பட்ட விண்ணப்பங்களின் பின்புறத்தில் அல்லது இதற்கு தேவைப்படுகின்ற பதிவாளரின் தேவைக்கு இணங்க இதற்கு திகதியிடப்பட்ட முறிகள

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මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/12-6/2008

රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 1/2008

ලිපිගොනු අංකය :
File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 2.6

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව :
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

දිනය :
Date : 7.1.2008

TABLED BOARD PAPER

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

මාතෘකාව :
SUBJECT : PROPOSED YIELD STRUCTURE FOR TREASURY BONDS TO BE MOBILISED THROUGH DIRECT PLACEMENTS IN 2008

The purpose of this Board Paper is to;

(i) inform the Monetary Board of the plan of direct placements on Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans in 2008 to be arranged through the captive type investors.

(ii) seek the Monetary Board approval for the yield structure proposed for medium and long term direct placements on Treasury bonds and Rupee loans.

Introduction

According to the government cash flow for 2008, government expects to raise Rs 355 bn from domestic rupee sources by issuing Treasury bonds and Rupee loans. The main investor group operating in the long term debt market is state owned and state managed captive type sources. Major captive investors are EPF, NSB and ETF. Resource availability with these captive sources in 2008 is estimated at Rs 300 bn. (EPF -Rs 183 bn, NSB – Rs 83 bn and ETF – Rs 33 bn). The annual investment programmes of these captive sources indicated that Rs 235 bn would be invested in Treasury bonds while the balance to be invested in Treasury bills and other instruments.

Based on the above estimates, Rs 120 bn has to be collected from non captive sources mainly from Treasury bonds and Rupee loans through auction process to meet the borrowing requirement. In addition, Rs 9 bn is to be raised through new Treasury bills as indicated in the Cash Flow totaling Rs 129 bn borrowings from non captive market sources. This amount excludes the re-issue of maturing Treasury bills during the year estimated at Rs. 690 bn.

In 2008, the governments borrowings requirement from the domestic market through Treasury bonds and Rupee loans is excessive and not be able to raise through the normal auction process at a reasonable yield rates. Therefore, it would be advisable to raise funds available with captive type investors through direct placements. Further, considering the bunching problem in the domestic debt, it is suggested to issue long term securities in order to lower the refinancing risk in the future. Since, there is no active yield curve for long term maturities, this paper has proposed

suitable rate structure for long term maturities based on the medium term inflation targets given by the Economic Research Department.

Proposed Yield Rate Structure

The Medium Term Macroeconomic Framework has targeted a downward inflation path as given in Table 1 and on which the proposed rate structure is based.

Table 1
Inflation Targets as per MT Macroeconomic Framework

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
11.0%	9.0%	7.0%	5.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%

Based on these inflation targets, a proposed yield rate structure is estimated taking in to account real returns of 3% - 4% and appropriate risk premium for future market risks. The proposed yield rate structure for different maturities is given below. Details of the yield rate analysis is attached (Annex 1).

Table 2
Proposed Yield Rate Structure (After Tax)

Maturity	2 yrs	3yrs	4 yrs	5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	9 yrs	10 yrs	15 yrs.
Yield (%)at Real return of 4%	16.70%	15.85%	15.10%	14.40%	13.80%	13.46%	13.20%	13.00%	12.80%	12.60%
Yield(%) at Real return of 3%	15.80%	14.90%	14.15	13.40%	12.90%	12.45%	12.15%	11.95%	11.80%	11.55%

Possible Implications

- Shifting of a large share of fund mobilization program through direct placements would help lower the amount to be raised through the auction process thereby reducing the pressure on the market yield.
- However, this has a negative impact on the domestic debt market development.
- Initially, there would be a dual rate structure for similar maturities that would distort the market operations since current market rates are above the proposed rate structure due to high inflationary expectations.
- Possible mark to market losses for captive holders until the entire debt market stabilize around the proposed rate structure.
- Captive holderswould keep these securities in their investment portfolio in order to avoid mark to market losses.

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

- Captive holders could not trade or sale these bonds without capital losses if duel rate structure continues.
- This would have some impact on Primary Dealer operations reducing their operation in primary and secondary markets.

Considering the above issues, it is suggested to issue long term bonds with 6,8, 10 and 15 years tenure for direct placements. The proposed rates for these bonds (net of taxes) are 13.90%, 12.15%, 11.80% and 11.55% respectively.

Since the domestic debt market is volatile in the recent past, it is proposed to review this rate structure at end of April 2008, taking into consideration the development in debt market and macroeconomic environment in the economy.

The Monetary Board approval is sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placements of Treasury bonds and Rupee loans in respect of captive investors such as EPF, NSB and ETF during January-April 2008.

DG(W) SMB

AG(P) Actg. SPD

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

A Proposal for the Yield Rates (Based on Inflation expectations)

Method 1

Nominal Interest Rates Which Would Equate
Net Present Value At Given Real Rate Of Return

Maturity Years	Without Market Risk Premium at Real rate of					Market Risk Premium	With Market Risk Premium at Real rate of					Remarks
	0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	4.00%		0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	4.00%	
2	12.78%	13.66%	14.59%	15.53%	16.46%	0.25%	12.95%	13.90%	14.84%	15.78%	16.71%	After Tax Rate
3	11.53%	12.49%	13.45%	14.40%	15.34%	0.50%	12.03%	12.99%	13.95%	14.90%	15.84%	
4	10.91%	11.49%	12.46%	13.43%	14.39%	0.70%	11.21%	12.19%	13.16%	14.13%	15.09%	
5	9.56%	10.55%	11.54%	12.52%	13.50%	0.90%	10.45%	11.45%	12.44%	13.42%	14.40%	
6	8.76%	9.78%	10.78%	11.79%	12.78%	1.10%	9.86%	10.88%	11.88%	12.89%	13.88%	
7	8.19%	9.21%	10.24%	11.25%	12.26%	1.20%	9.39%	10.41%	11.44%	12.45%	13.46%	
8	7.75%	8.79%	9.82%	10.85%	11.87%	1.30%	9.05%	10.09%	11.12%	12.15%	13.17%	
9	7.41%	8.46%	9.50%	10.53%	11.56%	1.40%	8.81%	9.86%	10.90%	11.93%	12.96%	
10	7.13%	8.19%	9.24%	10.28%	11.32%	1.50%	8.63%	9.69%	10.74%	11.78%	12.82%	
15	6.30%	7.38%	8.46%	9.53%	10.59%	2.00%	8.30%	9.38%	10.46%	11.53%	12.59%	
2	14.11%	15.16%	16.21%	17.25%	18.29%		14.39%	15.44%	16.49%	17.53%	18.57%	Before Tax Rate
3	12.81%	13.88%	14.94%	16.00%	17.05%		13.37%	14.43%	15.49%	16.55%	17.60%	
4	11.65%	12.76%	13.84%	14.92%	15.99%		12.46%	13.54%	14.62%	15.70%	16.77%	
5	10.62%	11.72%	12.82%	13.92%	15.01%		11.62%	12.72%	13.82%	14.92%	16.01%	
6	9.74%	10.86%	11.98%	13.09%	14.20%		10.96%	12.08%	13.20%	14.32%	15.42%	
7	9.10%	10.24%	11.37%	12.50%	13.62%		10.43%	11.57%	12.71%	13.83%	14.96%	
8	8.61%	9.77%	10.91%	12.05%	13.19%		10.06%	11.21%	12.36%	13.50%	14.63%	
9	8.23%	9.40%	10.55%	11.70%	12.84%		9.79%	10.95%	12.11%	13.26%	14.40%	
10	7.93%	9.10%	10.26%	11.42%	12.57%		9.59%	10.76%	11.93%	13.09%	14.24%	
15	7.00%	8.20%	9.40%	10.59%	11.77%		9.22%	10.42%	11.62%	12.81%	13.99%	

Inflation Expectations (Forecasts)

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	>2017
15.00%	11.00%	9.00%	7.00%	5.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%

TRUE COPY

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

සටහන් පත්‍රය
MINUTE PAPER

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය
MONETARY BOARD

17 JAN 2008
රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

CONFIDENTIAL

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/1/26/2008

ලිපි ගොනු අංක :
File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

රැස්වීම් අංක :
Meeting No. : 1/2008

විෂය අංක :
Item No. : 26

දිනය :
Date : 07.01.2008

සටහන :
MINUTE : 26. Proposed Yield Structure for Treasury Bonds to be Mobilised through direct Placements in 2008

The Chairman informed the Board that the CBSL has been concerned about the unwarranted increases in the interest rates on government securities. Against this background, he informed that he had requested the Departments of Public Debt and Economic Research to come up with proposals with respect to the issue of government debt instruments and also aiming at minimizing the interest rate differentials between the primary and the secondary markets. The Board discussed the proposal in detail.

The Official Member was of the view that the investors mentioned in the paper, namely, the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF), Employees' Trust Fund (ETF) and the National Savings Bank (NSB), should not be treated alike as the cost structure in mobilizing funds by these three institutions differ. He also emphasized the need to take a realistic inflation forecast and stated that during the first half of the current year inflation is likely to remain high as several projects will continue to incur costs towards completion, whilst defence expenditure is unlikely to reduce and that certain adjustments in the administered prices will also have to be made. He further mentioned that in addition to the three institutions mentioned in the paper, the Public Debt Department should also look at several other sources such as different funds. He was also of the view that auctioning of government securities should aim at sources with more liquid funds.

(P.T.O)

The Board taking into consideration the views expressed by the members, approved :

(a) to allow the EPF to invest in longer term Government papers based on long term inflationary expectations plus 4 percent real rate of return and 2 percent risk premium to cover the errors in inflation projections;

(b) ETF also to be offered investment opportunities in Government paper on the same basis;

(c) for Superintendent of Public Debt (SPD) to negotiate with NSB for investments in Government paper, based on yield rates proposed in the paper; and

(d) For the Monetary Board to review the rates after April, 2008.

The Board requested SPD to report back to the Board with the progress on the proposal. The Board also requested CBSL to review the primary dealer system as this doesn't seem to raise funds from the market in an effective manner.

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M A R C Cooray
Secretary

TO : SPD
DER
S/EPF

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

(7)

(667)

පිටපත් අංකය :
Copy No. :

රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 25/2008

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 2.2

දිනය :
Date : 07.10.2008

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/25/)8/2008

ලිපිගොනු අංකය :
File No. : 08/11/003/0060/002

අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

TABLED BOARD PAPER

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board

මාතෘකාව :
SUBJECT: IMPROVEMENT OF MARKET LIQUIDITY THROUGH ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF EMPLOYEES' PROVIDENT FUND.

The purpose of this Board Paper is to seek the Monetary Board approval to;

(i) Issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at an interest rate 5 basis points above the rates prevailed in the secondary market through private placements; and

(ii) Request EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations.

2. It has been observed an emerging pressure on the government borrowing programme since mid September 2008. The main contributory factors include excessive government borrowings from domestic sources, delay in government borrowing from external foreign currency sources, newly developed turmoil in the international capital market and continuous shortfall in liquidity in the domestic market. As a result, there is a high risk of increasing the interest rates in the domestic market and the possibility of funding through the Central Bank to meet borrowing shortfalls.

3. In this context, it would be advisable to adopt a market stabilisation process by inviting the EPF to play an active role in both the primary market, preventing upward pressure in the primary market and actively trading in the secondary market thereby improving liquidity in the government securities market.

4. Accordingly, the Monetary Board is invited to approve;

(i) to issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at a interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and,

(ii) to request the EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations.

DG(W) S/MB AG(P) S/PD

M A R C Cooray
Secretary

668

සටහන් පත්‍රය
MINUTE PAPER

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය
MONETARY BOARD

CONFIDENTIAL

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක : Board Paper No. : MB/PD/25/20/2008
ගොනු අංක : File No. : 08/11/003/0060/002

රැස්වීම් අංක : Meeting No. : 25/2008
විෂය අංක : Item No. : 20
දිනය : Date : 7.10.2008

සටහන : MINUTE : 20. Improvement of Market Liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund (EPF)

The Board having considered the paper approved of :

(a) Issuing Treasury Bonds to EPF and other captive sources at an interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and

(b) Requesting the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engaging in secondary market operations.

TRUE COPY

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

TO: S/PD
Thro' AG(P)

TRUE COPY

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

ඇමුණුම XV

භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
திறைசேரி செயற்பாடுகள் திணைக்களம்
Department of Treasury Operations

මුදල් හා ක්‍රමසම්පාදන අමාත්‍යාංශය,මහලේකම් කාර්යාලය,
කැ.පෙ.1559, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව.

நிதி திட்டமிடல் அமைச்சு, செயலகம்,
தபெ. 1559, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை

Ministry of Finance & Planning, The Secretariat,
P.O.Box: 1559, Colombo 01. Sri Lanka.

අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්
பணிப்பாளர் நாயகம்;
Director General
0094112484729
dgto@tod.treasury.gov.lk

ෆැක්ස්
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Fax
0094 112 484970

පොදු
பொது
General
0094 112 484500
0094 112 484600

මගේ අංකය
எனது இல
My No. TO/DG/CFS/03

ඔබේ අංකය
உமது இல
Your No.

දිනය
திகதி
Date 20.02.2015

Superintendent of Public Debt,
Public Debt Department,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
Colombo 01.

Dear Sir,

Cash Flow & Borrowing Requirement for the month of March , 2015

I am sending herewith cash flow forecast for the month of March 2015.

I shall be thankful if you could arrange the borrowing requirement mentioned in the cash flow, March 2015. Actual cash flow position up to 19th February , 2015 also attached.

Yours sincerely,

M.S.D. Ranasiri
Director General

Additional Director General (Foreign Aid , Public Debt, Admin & Finance)
Tel : 0094 112 484738
Fax : 0094 112 320042

Additional Director General (Consolidated Fund Mgt, Revenue & Reforms.)
Tel : 0094 112 484748
Tel : 0094 112 484970

Director (Cash Management)
Tel: 0094 112484901
Tel : 0094 112 484970

Director (Consolidated Fund Mgt)
Tel: 0094 112 484994
Tel : 0094 112 484970

Director (Revenue)
Tel: 0094 112484638
Tel : 0094 112 484970

Director (Foreign Aid Mgt)
Tel: 0094 112484751
Tel : 0094 112320042

Director (Debt Mgt)
Tel: 0094 112484749
Tel : 0094 112320042

Projected Govt. Daily Cash Flow Statement for the period of 02nd March 2015 to 31st March 2015

Cash Management Division - Dept. of Treasury Operations

Rs. Million

		March	02.03.15	03.03.15	04.03.15	06.03.15	09.03.15	10.03.15	11.03.15	12.03.15	13.03.15	16.03.15	17.03.15	18.03.15	19.03.15	20.03.15	23.03.15	24.03.15	25.03.15	26.03.15	27.03.15	30.03.15	31.03.15	Total	SN
		Original Est	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	Est	
Opening Cash Balances-Actual/Projected-Surplus/(Deficit)		(171,926)	(171,926)	(174,745)	(174,307)	(172,831)	(185,492)	(182,655)	(181,726)	(179,713)	(178,199)	(166,943)	(156,957)	(154,512)	(181,525)	(179,791)	(169,938)	(188,680)	(186,544)	(184,550)	(182,810)	(180,474)	(179,329)	(171,926)	(1)
(1) Add: Cash Inflows from Collection of Revenue																									1.1
1.1	CG Inland Revenue - Tax	5,968	163	146	128	123	260	90	562	519	512	1,782	247	139	128	77	179	218	84	175	120	92	223	5,968	
	- VAT	10,282	165	85	60	43	105	57	51	86	156	1,743	296	149	425	5,213	242	188	87	37	89	228	776	10,282	
	- NBT	1,978	19	22	17	12	13	8	16	17	37	105	56	58	142	1,162	97	100	19	34	11	15	20	1,978	
	- Withholding Tax	8,768	366	44	-	182	1,546	13	4	-	-	5,077	40	251	-	99	104	55	26	322	-	614	24	8,768	
1.2	DG Customs	38,395	1,800	1,850	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,825	1,850	1,825	1,800	1,825	1,850	1,875	1,850	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,850	1,845	1,825	1,850	1,875	38,395	1.2
1.3	DG Customs (Special Provisions)	5,454	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	5,154	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	5,454	1.3
1.4	TRC	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,500	1.4
1.5	Motor Traffic	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	200	1.5
1.6	Commissioner of Excise (Liquor)	8,300	325	62	19	41	29	48	20	41	4,350	122	132	22	87	42	27	75	92	61	43	62	2,600	8,300	1.6
1.7	DGTOD	3,975	-	-	-	652	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,332	-	-	11	-	-	-	1,980	3,975	1.7
1.8	Profit,Dividends & Sur. F./ CBSL Profit Transfer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8
1.9	Imprest Refunds,Deposits,Grants & CPF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.9
1.10	RFA Loans & Grants	115	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	-	-	-	10	-	-	115	###
1.11	Miscellaneous	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1
	Sub Total (1)	85,935	2,838	2,209	2,024	2,953	3,753	2,041	2,553	2,488	12,009	10,654	2,621	2,494	2,632	9,825	5,004	2,436	2,170	2,474	2,198	2,861	7,698	85,935	
(2) Less: Cash Out flows for Recurrent Expenditure									20,403	12,671	16,955	7,732													(2)
2.1	For Personnel Emoluments	53,406	-	-	-	1,392	320	-	-	300	-	-	-	28,310	-	-	23,084	-	-	-	-	-	-	53,406	2.1
2.2	For Pension Payments/Samurdhi	14,900	3,000	-	-	11,900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,900	2.2
2.3	For Other Recurrent Expenditure Payments	7,959	2,127	50	190	2,160	200	50	50	349	466	50	50	1,177	164	50	107	150	70	199	50	150	100	7,959	2.3
2.4	For Defence LC Payments	380	-	-	-	-	60	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	120	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	380	2.4
2.5	Fertilizer	1,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,200	-	1,200	2.5
2.6	Medical Supplies	3,332	-	1,666	-	-	-	1,000	-	-	-	666	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,332	2.6
	Sub Total	81,177	5,127	1,716	190	15,452	580	1,050	50	749	466	716	50	29,487	284	50	23,191	150	70	299	50	1,350	100	81,177	
2.7	For CBSL Interest Payments - Local	36,183	12,231	-	-	1,498	-	6	-	-	1,215	14,596	2,921	-	-	2,483	-	406	-	36	764	7	20	36,183	2.7
	- Foreign	6,162	230	-	629	1	40	-	-	15	51	636	55	17	1056	2045	495	45	-	0	541	170	134	6,162	
	- Loan Flotation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Interest Pre Received	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Sub Total (2)	123,522	17,588	1,716	819	16,951	620	1,056	50	764	1,732	15,948	3,026	29,504	1,340	4,577	23,686	601	70	335	1,355	1,528	254	123,522	
(3) Less: Cash Outflows for Capital Expenditure																									(3)
3.1	For Ministries, Departments & Statutory Board	4,002	352	-	300	200	350	-	400	150	350	-	150	-	500	-	500	150	50	350	-	100	100	4,002	3.1
3.2	Foreign Finance Associated Costs	210	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	50	-	-	-	-	50	-	40	-	-	-	30	-	-	210	3.2
3.3	RFA Loans & Grants	315	-	50	-	-	-	50	50	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	55	-	50	-	10	-	-	315	3.3
3.4	Grants, Deposits & CPF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.4
3.5	Advances to POO	473	178	5	75	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	105	-	-	-	5	50	-	50	-	473	3.5
	Sub Total (3)	5,000	530	55	375	200	350	55	490	200	350	-	150	-	705	-	595	150	105	400	40	150	100	5,000	
(4) Less: Cash Outflows for Repayment of Public Debt (Capital)																									(4)
4.1	For CBSL Payments - Local	111,844	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	111,820	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	111,844	4.1
	- Foreign	17,454	1,089	-	4	362	547	-	-	10	3,072	1,600	-	2	2,553	4,794	565	-	-	-	1,567	38	1,252	17,454	
4.2	Admin. Borrowings, Others & etc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.2
4.3	Deferred Payments -Fertilizer/Defence/PTF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.3
4.4	Treasury Bill Retirement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.4
	Sub Total (4)	129,298	1,089	-	4	362	547	-	-	10	3,072	113,420	-	2	2,553	4,794	565	-	-	-	1,567	38	1,276	129,298	
(5) Add: Borrowings - Treasury Bonds		172,000	13,550	-	650	1,900	600	-	-	-	4,400	128,700	3,000	-	3,700	9,400	1,100	450	-	-	3,100	-	1,450	172,000	(5)
	- Treasury Bills	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	- SLOB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	- Foreign Borrowings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	- Othere/Pro.Ad/obu/Rupee Loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Total Borrowings (Net)	172,000	13,550	-	650	1,900	600	-	-	-	4,400	128,700	3,000	-	3,700	9,400	1,100	450	-	-	3,100	-	1,450	172,000	
(6) CBSL TEB																									
(7) Closing Cash Balance - Surplus / (Deficit)		(171,810)	(174,745)	(174,307)	(172,831)	(185,492)	(182,655)	(181,726)	(179,713)	(178,199)	(166,943)	(156,957)	(154,512)	(181,525)	(179,791)	(169,938)	(188,680)	(186,544)	(184,550)	(182,810)	(180,474)	(179,329)	(171,810)	(171,810)	
(8) *Estimated Bank Balance at the end of the Month / day*																									
(9) Net effect of modified Treasury Single Account System																									

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H/FO

ASPD(A) 4/3 As G and DG(SM) instructed follow the future fund raising strategies under option 2 in the attached proposal 3/3

SPD

Pl. see G's instructions below and discuss. We strategically. 02/03

Governor

DG (SM) 27/02

AG (S) Participation of DG/TOD & MOF at DDMC is required. We will take necessary action in this regard. AG(S) 27/02/2015

Domestic Borrowing Programme for March 2015

The Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC) at its meeting held on 27.02.2015 decided to make the following recommendations regarding the Government borrowing programme for the month of March 2015, on the basis of the Cash flow and borrowing requirement of the General Treasury.

(1) Total Domestic Borrowings (estimates)

Table – 1

Rupee Borrowing Requirement – March 2015

Rupee Borrowings	Rs. million	Mode
T- bills (Re-issue)	Rs. 89,683 (Book Value)	Primary auctions, direct placements with institutional investors and market sources
T-bonds	Rs. 172,000 (Book Value)	

(2) The above borrowing requirement is to be raised as per the time table given in the Annexure – 1 and raise funds from investors including SLDBs, as prefunding to meet future financing requirement, as and when market conditions support.

(3) The Committee recommended to continue with the flexible arrangements to raise the funds from the market/ institutional investors depending on the availability of funds with such sources even allowing investments by foreigners in T-bills and T-bonds on conditions favourable to the economy.

Submitted for your information and approval please.

Members of the Committee:

Sr. No	Designation	Signature
1	Superintendent of Public Debt	
2	Director General/Treasury Operations, MOF	Absent
3	Director of Economic Research, CBSL	
4	Director of Statistics, CBSL	
5	Director of Domestic Operations, CBSL	

Mode of borrowing - only from primary auction.
cost ↑.

DDMS - 22/S.

Annexure –

Time Table for the Domestic Borrowing Programme
March 2015

For the week ending	Value date	Mode of borrowings and date	Re-issue of T-bills (BV) (Rs Mn)	T-bonds (BV) (Rs Mn)	Weekly total (Rs. Mn)
06.03.2015	02.03.2015	Primary auction (27.02.2015) Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		1,000 * 12,550 *	41,570
	04.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		650	
	06.03.2015	Primary auction (02.03.2015) Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources	25,470	1,900	
13.03.2015	09.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		600	26,223
	13.02.2015	Primary auction (11.03.2015) Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources	21,223	4,400	
20.03.2015	16.03.2015	Auctions ∝ Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		128,700	167,360
	17.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		3,000	
	19.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		3,700	
	20.03.2015	Primary Auction (18.03.2015) Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources	22,560	9,400	

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27.03.2015	23.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional / Market sources		1,100	25,080
	24.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional / Market sources		450	
	27.02.2015	Primary Auction (25.02.2015) Direct placements - Institutional / Market sources	20,430	 3,100	
04.04.2015	31.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional / Market sources		1,450	1,450
Total for the month			**89,683**	**172,000**	**261,683**

DG(SM)

1. Raise Rs 40k. through issue of 20,30,50 years T bonds. 10 bn each.
2. CRF / NSB / SLIC to be asked to stabilize rates.
3. Revert rates to pre Sep-2014 levels.
4. Manage Rupee liquidity to stabilize USD/LKR at 132/90 Spot.

2/3

i. Preparation of the Order Papers and prospectus for T-bonds and RSs in order to obtain required authorization of the Finance Minister as stipulated in the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (RSSO).

ii. Reservation of gazette numbers in consultation with the Government Printing Department for publication of gazette notifications of T-bonds and RSs.

B. Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC)

The Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC) is the committee responsible for taking decisions on raising funds from domestic market with a view to minimizing the cost and risk of government public debt. DDMC meetings are held monthly in order to decide on the borrowing programme for the subsequent month. The Terms of Reference (TOR) of the DDMC is given in (Appendix FO-1). In this regard, FO has to attend to the followings;

i. One week prior to beginning of each month, prepare the monthly borrowing programme for the forthcoming month on the basis of the approved annual borrowing programme, the cash flow requirements of the government for the respective month obtained from Treasury and resources available in the market. The monthly borrowing programme consists of details on dates of proposed auctions, the size of auctions, maturity period, planned private placements and special arrangements if any.

ii. Make arrangement for the meetings.

iii. Submit the monthly issuance programme recommended by the DDMC for the Governor's approval.

iv. Communicate the details of the approved borrowing programme and debt service payments to be made to the PDs.

v. At the end of the each year prepare gazette notifications for all T-bonds, RSs, SLDBs and ILBs issued during the year.

vi. Make necessary arrangements with the Government Printing Department to publish relevant gazette notifications. The formats of the gazette notifications (in three languages) of RSs and T-bonds are given in the (Appendix FO-2 and FO-3).

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE MONETARY BOARD
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

MINUTE PAPER

Board Paper No. : MB/ER/4/2/2015 File No. : 03/16/025/0002/001

Meeting No. : 4/2015 Item No. : 2 Date : 23.02.2015

2. Review of the Monetary Policy Stance - February 2015

2.1 Mrs S Gunaratne, Director of Economic Research (DER), made a presentation to the Board.

2.2 The Board having considered the paper and the presentation was of the view that the cut in policy rates as recommended by the Monetary Policy Committee for the purpose of rationalization of two tier Standing Deposit Rate is not appropriate at this stage, given the rising trend of market interest rates and rising growth of private sector credit and decided to maintain the policy interest rates at current level until the next month's monetary policy review.

2.3 The Board was of the view that issuing 30 year Treasury bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and re-profile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors. Accordingly, the Board instructed the Superintendent of Public Debt to conduct a 30 year Treasury bond auction during the week and arrange to list sovereign bonds in Euro Clear Exchange in future.

2.4 The Board raised concerns whether bank credit is sufficiently channeled to the needy sectors instead of corporate customers and instructed the DER to undertake a research to identify major borrowers and report to the Board at the next meeting.

TRUE COPY

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

06.03.2015

පොලී අනුපාතිකය හා වෙළඳපොළ ප්‍රතිමිලදී ගැනුම් පොලී අනුපාතිකය අතර සීමා පරාසය පදනම් අංක 0 ත් 131 ත් අතර දෝලනය විය.

මුදල් වෙළඳපොළ ද්‍රවශීලනාවය බොහෝ දුරට දෛනික පදනමක් මත අවශෝෂණය කර ගත්නා ලදී. පැවැති මූලය ප්‍රතිපත්ති රාමුව සහ පසුගිය වසරට සාපේක්ෂව 2015 වසරේ දී ශීඝ්‍ර ලෙස ද්‍රවශීලනාවය පිරිහීම හේතුවෙන් වසර තුළ දී විවිධ වෙළඳ කටයුතු සඳහා වන වෙන්දේසි අල්ප ප්‍රමාණයක් පමණක් පවත්වන ලදී. ප්‍රතිමිලදී ගැනුම් වෙන්දේසි ආවරණය කිරීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් රාජ්‍ය සුරුකුම්පත් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු වූ බැවින් සහ දෛනික වශයෙන් වෙන්දේසි නොපැවැත්වූ බැවින් වසර තුළ දී රාජ්‍ය සුරුකුම්පත් ණයට ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදය මත සුරුකුම්පත් ණයට ගැනීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවයන් අවම විය.

දේශීය විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළ

2015 වසර තුළ දී එක්සත් ජනපද ඩොලරයට එරෙහිව ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල සැලකිය යුතු ප්‍රමාණයකින් අවප්‍රමාණය විය. සමස්තයක් ලෙස ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල එක්සත් ජනපද ඩොලරයට එරෙහිව සියයට 9 කින් එනම් රුපියල් 131.0 සිට රුපියල් 144.1 දක්වා අවප්‍රමාණය විය. 2015 වර්ෂය තුළ දී විනිමය අනුපාතිකය මත වූ පීඩනය වැඩි වීම කෙරෙහි මූලිකවම හේතු වූයේ රජයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ බැඳුම්කර, කොළඹ කොටස් වෙළඳපොළ සහ සාතුමය ආනයන නිසා වූ විදේශ මුදල් ආපසු රටින් පිටට ගලායෑමය. එමෙන්ම 2015 සැප්තැම්බර් 04 දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විනිමය අනුපාතය තීරණය කිරීම සඳහා වෙළඳපොළට වැඩි අවස්ථාවක් ලබා දීම හේතුවෙන් ද එක්සත් ජනපද ඩොලරයට එරෙහිව ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල අවප්‍රමාණය විය. ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියලෙහි සමස්ත අවප්‍රමාණයට අනුගත වෙමින් වාණිජ බැංකුවල විදුලි පැවරුම් සඳහා වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලදී ගැනීමේ හා විකිණීමේ සාමාන්‍ය අනුපාතිකය, 2015 වසරේ දී පිළිවෙළින් රුපියල් 141.9 ක් සහ රුපියල් 146.2 ක් ලෙස වාර්තා වූ අතර, 2014 වසරේ දී එය පිළිවෙළින් රුපියල් 130.4 ක් සහ රුපියල් 133.4 ක් විය. වසර තුළ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල අනෙකුත් ප්‍රධාන මුදල් ඒකක වන ස්ටර්ලිං පවුම්, ජපන් යෙන් සහ ඉන්දියානු රුපියලට එරෙහිව පිළිවෙළින් සියයට 4.5, සියයට 8.2 සහ සියයට 4.6 කින් අවප්‍රමාණය වුවද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල යූරෝවලට එරෙහිව සියයට 1.3 කින් අධිප්‍රමාණය විය.

2015 වසර තුළ දී දේශීය විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළේ ගනුදෙනු පරිමාව, පසුගිය වසර හා සසඳන කල සියයට 12.2 කින් පහළ ගොස් ඇත. දේශීය වෙළඳපොළේ විදේශ විනිමය ගනුදෙනු පරිමාව 2014 වසරේ දී වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 15,478 සිට 2015 වසර තුළ දී එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 13,593 ක් දක්වා පහළ ගොස් ඇත. ඊට සමගාමීව අන්තර් බැංකු විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළේ දෛනික ගනුදෙනු පරිමාවේ සාමාන්‍යය ද 2014 වසරේ දී වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 64 සිට 2015 වසරේ දී එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 57 ක් දක්වා පහළ යෑමත් වාර්තා විය.

2015 වසරේ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව දේශීය විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළේ ශුද්ධ විකුණුම්කරුවෙකු විය. මේ සඳහා හේතු වූයේ විනිමය අනුපාතිකයේ අපාමාන්‍ය උච්චාවචනයන් සමනය කිරීමේ අදහසින්, මේම වසර තුළ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළට මැදිහත් වීමයි. ඒ අනුව වසර තුළ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 179 ක් වෙළඳපොළෙන් මිලදී ගන්නා ලද අතර එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 3,429 ක් වෙළඳපොළට මුදාහරින ලදී. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව 2015 වර්ෂයේ සැප්තැම්බර් මස 4 වැනි දිනට පෙර සිට විනිමය අනුපාතය තීරණය වීමට දේශීය විදේශීය විනිමය වෙළඳපොළට වැඩි අවකාශයක් ලබා දීමට පෙර එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 2,060 ක් වෙළඳපොළට මුදාහරින ලද අතර එයින්, එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 782 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්/බැඳුම්කර ආශ්‍රිත අරමුදල් ආපසු රැගෙන යෑම සඳහා ද ඉතිරි එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 1,278 අනෙකුත් වෙළඳපොළ ගෙවීම් සඳහා ද මුදා හරින ලදී. 2015 සැප්තැම්බර් 4 දිනෙන් පසුව ද මහ බැංකුව සිය විදේශ සංචිතවලින් එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 1,369 ක් මුදා හරින ලද අතර, එයින් එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 562 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් බැඳුම්කර ආශ්‍රිත අරමුදල් ආපසු රැගෙන යෑම සඳහා ද ඉතිරි එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 807 අනෙකුත් වෙළඳපොළ ගනුදෙනු සඳහා ද විය. සමස්තයක් වශයෙන් ගත් කල 2015 වසර තුළ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් දේශීය විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළට ශුද්ධ සැපයුම එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 3,250 ක් විය.

රජයේ සුරුකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ

2015 මාර්තු 2 වන දින සිට බලපැවැත්වෙන පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිත්‍ය තැන්පතු පහසුකම් මත පනවා තිබූ සීමාවන් ඉවත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් මුල් මාස 2 තුළ ස්ථාවරව තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ඵලදා අනුපාතික මාර්තු - අප්‍රේල් කාලපරිච්ඡේදයේ දී ඉහළ යන ලදී. කෙසේ නමුත් 2015 අප්‍රේල් 15 දින ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොලී අනුපාතය පාදකාංක 50 කින් අඩු කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඵලදා අනුපාතික නැවත පහළ යෑමට පටන් ගන්නා ලදී. ණය කළමනාකරණ උපකුමයක් ලෙස පොලී අනුපාතය පහළ මට්ටමක රඳවා ගැනීම සඳහා, ආණ්ඩුකාර

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ප්‍රාග්ධන වෙළඳපොළෙන් ණය ගැනීම් දේශීය පොලී අනුපාතිකය මත වූ අනිසි පීඩනය ඉවත් කර පවත්වාගෙන යෑමට උපකාරී වී ඇත. ඒ අනුව 2015 ජූනි මස කුපන අනුපාතය සියයට 6.125 ක් වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 650 ක හා 2015 නොවැම්බර් මස කුපන අනුපාතය සියයට 6.85 ක් වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 1,500 ක ජාත්‍යන්තර ස්වෛරීත්ව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලදී. කෙසේ වුවත්, ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් එක්සත් ජනපද ප්‍රතිපත්ති අනුපාතය ඉහළ යා හැකි බවට ආයෝජකයින් තුළ පැවැති සුභවාදී ආකල්ප හේතුවෙන්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර මත වූ විදේශ ආයෝජන 2015 අවසාන භාගයේ දී ශීඝ්‍රයෙන් පහළ යන ලදී. එසේ වුවත්, රජයේ ණය කළඹේ සාමාන්‍ය කල්පිරීමේ කාලය වැඩි කිරීම තුළින් ප්‍රතිආයෝජන අවදානම අවම කර ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට හැකියාව ලැබිණි. තවදුරටත් අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීමේ කටයුතු සඳහා හිතකර පරිසරයක් නිර්මාණය කිරීම සඳහා සඵලදායී නිර්නායක පිහිටුවීම් වස් 2015 වසරේ දී ද අවදානම් රහිත ඵලදා වක්‍රයේ දිගුකාලීන අන්තය අඛණ්ඩව සක්‍රීය කරන ලදී. එසේ නමුත්, විදේශ ආයෝජන පිටතට ගලා යෑම හා දෙසැම්බර් මාසයේ දී ව්‍යවස්ථාපිත සංචිත අනුපාතය පාදකාංක 150 කින් ඉහළ දැමීමට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගන්නා ලද තීරණයත් සමඟ 2014 වසරට සාපේක්ෂව 2015 වසර අග භාගයේ දී දින 364 ක කල්පිරීම් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා වන ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පාදකාංක 130 ක ඉහළ යෑමක් වාර්තා විය. 2015 අග වන විට දින 91, දින 182 හා දින 364 ක කල්පිරීම් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා පොලී අනුපාතිකය පිළිවෙළින් සියයට 6.38, සියයට 6.69 හා සියයට 7.11 ක් විය.

2015 වසරේ දී භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රධාන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වෙනස්කම් අනුව යමින්, ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ වෙන්දේසි පදනම් කරගත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පසුගිය වර්ෂය හා සසඳන කල සැලකිය යුතු ලෙස ඉහළ යන ලදී. ඒ අනුව, 2014 වසරේ ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි මගින් නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ප්‍රමාණය වන රුපියල් බිලියන 760 හා සසඳන කල 2015 වසරේ දී රුපියල් බිලියන 1,006 ක් විය. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු 8.17 සංඛ්‍යා සටහන මගින් දැක්වේ.

සුදුසු ණය නිකුත් කිරීමේ උපක්‍රමයන් අනුගමනය කර තිබියදී පවා කෙටිකාලීන පොලී අනුපාතිකයේ ඉහළ යෑම 2015 වසර අවසානයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ඵලදා අනුපාතයේ ඉහළ යෑමට හේතු වන ලදී. 2015 වසරේ දී භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ගේ තිබූ රුචිකත්වය සැලකිය යුතු මට්ටමකින් පහළ ගොස් ඇත. 2015 දෙසැම්බර් අග වන විට භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරවල විදේශීය ආයෝජන රුපියල් බිලියන 303.8 ක් විය. මෑත අතීතයේ දී සිදු වූ පරිදි විදේශිකයන් විසින් සිදු කරනු ලබන හදිසි ආපසු ගැනීම් නිසා විදේශීය සංචිත මත ඇතිවන අනවශ්‍ය පීඩනය අවම කිරීමේ අරමුණින් රජය 2016 අයවැය මගින්, මුළු භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර තොගයෙන් විදේශිකයන්ට ආයෝජනය කිරීමට තිබූ අවස්ථාව සියයට 12.5 සිට සියයට 10 දක්වා සංශෝධනය කරමින් රජයේ සුරැකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ විදේශිකයන් වෙත නිරාවරණය වීම අවම කිරීමට කටයුතු කරන ලදී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කර කෙරෙහි ආයෝජකයන්ගේ කැමැත්ත ඉහළ යෑම නිසා, 2015 වසර තුළ දී කල්පිරුණු ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කර එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 835.57 ක ප්‍රමාණයට අමතරව එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 2,491.37 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් අලුතින් රැස්කර ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට හැකියාව ලැබුණි. බාහිර සාධකයන්ගෙන් වන අවදානම අවම කර ගැනීමට 2015 වසර තුළ දී භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා විදේශ ආයෝජන උපක්‍රමික‍ව ප්‍රගස්ථ මට්ටමකට අඩු කිරීම සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ආයෝජකයන්ගේ මෙම කැමැත්ත ඉහළ යෑම සඳහා හේතු විය. තවද, රජයේ ණය ගැනීමේ වැඩසටහනට මූල්‍යනය කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය රුපියල්වලින් නාමනය වූ සුරැකුම්පත්වල අවශ්‍යතාවය ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කරවලින් වූ ගලාඒම් තුළින් පියවීම නිසා තවදුරටත් දේශීය වෙළඳපොළේ පොලී අනුපාතිකය මත ඇති විය හැකි පීඩනය අවම මට්ටමක පවත්වාගෙන යෑමට ද හැකියාව ලැබුණි.

2015 වසර තුළ දී සමස්ත දේශීය රාජ්‍ය ණය කළඹේ සාමාන්‍ය කල්පිරීම් කාලය තවදුරටත් වැඩි වූ අතර පසුගිය වසරේ වාර්තා වූ වර්ෂ 5.75 සමඟ සසඳන විට 2015 වසරේ දෙසැම්බර් අවසානයට එය වර්ෂ 6.28 ක් ලෙස වාර්තා විය. 2014 දෙසැම්බර් අවසානයේ වසර 6.98 ක් වූ නොපියවූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර කළඹේ සාමාන්‍ය කල්පිරීමේ කාලය 2015 දෙසැම්බර් අවසානය

8.17 සංඛ්‍යා සටහන **භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ බැඳුම්කරවල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ නිකුතූන් සහ බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතික**

වර්ෂය	නිකුත් කළ වටිනාකම (රු. බිලියන)		
	වෙන්දේසිගත	කෘජු නිකුතූන්	මුළු වටිනාකම
2013	201	816	1,017
2014	28	833	861
2015	712	158	870

මූලාශ්‍රය: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

8.18 සංඛ්‍යා සටහන භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්හි වාර්ෂික ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ බරිත සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතික

වාර්ෂික ප්‍රතිශතය

වර්ෂය	පරිණත කාලය			සමස්ත සාමාන්‍යය
	දින 91	දින 182	දින 364	
2011	7.28	7.21	7.41	7.31
2012	10.72	12.29	12.14	11.81
2013	7.54	7.85	8.29	8.20
2014	6.58	6.57	6.73	6.68
2015	6.32	6.5	6.6	6.46

මූලාශ්‍රය: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

වන විට වසර 7.36 ක් දක්වා ඉහළ යන ලදී. 2015 වසර තුළ දී දිගුකාලීන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සැලකිය යුතු ප්‍රමාණවලින් නිකුත් කිරීම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර කළඹෙහි මෙම සාමාන්‍ය කල්පිරීම් කාලය වැඩි වීම කෙරෙහි හේතු විය.

සාංගමික ණය සුරුකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ

ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ සාංගමික ණය සුරුකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළෙහි වැදගත් සහ අත්‍යවශ්‍ය කාර්යභාරයක් ඉටු කරන ණයකර වෙළඳපොළ 2014 වසරට වඩා 2015 වසරේ දී සාපේක්ෂව ඉහළ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වයක් පෙන්නුම් කරන ලදී. බැංකුවල සහාය ඇතිව 2015 වසර තුළ දී නිකුත් කළ වාණිජ පත්‍රවල සමස්ත වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියන 7.9 ක් වූ අතර, එය 2014 වසරේ දී නිකුත් කළ වාණිජ පත්‍රවල වටිනාකම වූ රුපියල් බිලියන 8.2 කට සාපේක්ෂව රුපියල් බිලියන 0.3 ක අඩුවීමක් වාර්තා කරන ලදී. 2015 වසර තුළ දී වාණිජ පත්‍රවලට අදාළ පොලී අනුපාතික සියයට 7.0 ත් 12.0 ත් අතර පරාසයක විචලනය වූ අතර එය 2014 වසරට සාපේක්ෂව එතරම් විචලනාවයක් පෙන්නුම් නොකරන ලදී. මාස 3 ක් හෝ ඊට අඩු කල්පිරීම් කාලයක් සහිත වාණිජ පත්‍රවල දායකත්වය සමස්ත නව නිකුතුන්වලින් සියයට 65.5 ක් වූ අතර, මාස 6 ක සහ මාස 12 ක කල්පිරීමේ කාලයක් සහිත වාණිජ පත්‍රවල ප්‍රතිශතය පිළිවෙලින් සියයට 19.4 ක් සහ සියයට 15.1 ක් විය. 2015 වසර අවසානයට නොපියවූ සමස්ත වාණිජ පත්‍රවල වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියන 4.5 ක් වූ අතර, 2014 වසර අවසානයට එම වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියන 3.5 ක් විය.

8.19 සංඛ්‍යා සටහන රජයේ සුරුකුම්පත්වල ඵලදා අනුපාතික

වාර්ෂික ප්‍රතිශතය

අයිතමය	ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ		ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ	
	2014	2015	2014	2015
භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්				
දින 91	5.74-7.42	5.74 - 7.10	5.47-7.52	5.72 – 7.00
දින 182	5.83-7.53	5.86 - 7.31	5.64-7.83	5.85 – 7.12
දින 364	5.89-7.95	6.00 - 7.37	5.82-8.27	6.03 – 7.30
භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර				
වසර 2	6.15-8.70	6.70 – 8.14	5.97-8.86	5.95 - 7.75
වසර 3	6.20-8.80	7.18 – 8.70	6.45-9.05	6.93 – 9.02
වසර 4	6.40-9.06	8.15 – 9.50	6.50-9.54	7.13 - 9.42
වසර 5	6.48-9.29	8.11 – 9.79	7.09-10.29	7.24 – 9.63
වසර 6	6.64-9.42	8.87 – 9.90	7.41-10.37	7.45 – 9.85
වසර 10	7.78-10.15	7.88 – 10.94	7.79-10.89	7.93 – 10.43
වසර 15	8.50-10.91	9.67 - 10.96	8.28-11.60	7.65 - 10.71
වසර 30	8.85-11.80	11.73	9.27 - 11.24	9.27- 11.60

මූලාශ්‍රය: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

ලැයිස්තුගත ණය සුරුකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ 2015 වසරේ දී රුපියල් බිලියන 83.4 ක වාර්තාගත අරමුදල් රැස්කිරීමක් සිදු කළ අතර එය 2014 වසරේ දී වාර්තා කරන ලද රුපියල් බිලියන 54.2 ට වඩා සියයට 53.9 ක ඉහළ අගයකි. කොළඹ කොටස් හුවමාරුවට අනුව 2015 වසරේ දී ණයකර නිකුතුන් 25 ක් මගින් මෙම කාර්යසාධනය ළඟා කරගත් අතර එය 2014 වසරේ දී නිකුත් කළ ණයකර නිකුතුන් 20 ට සහ 2015 වසරේ දී මූල්‍ය අංශයෙන් සිදු කළ ණයකර නිකුතුන්ට සාපේක්ෂව වාර්තා කළ ඉහළම ලැයිස්තුගත සාංගමික ණයකර නිකුතුන් ප්‍රමාණය විය. ආයෝජකයන් විසින් සාංගමික ණයකර නිකුතුවෙන් ලබන පොලී ආදායම 2015 අයවැයෙන් යෝජනා කරන ලද ආකාරයට ආදායම් බදුවලින් නිදහස් කරනු ලැබූ අතර එම නිසා එකී වාසි සහගත තත්ත්වය යටතේ වැඩියෙන් ණයකර නිකුත් කිරීමට සමාගම් පෙළඹෙන ලදී. කෙසේ වුවද, මෙම ප්‍රතිලාභය 2016 අයවැය තුළින් ද තවදුරටත් දීර්ඝ කරන ලදී. 2015 වසරේ දී ලැයිස්තුගත සමාගම්වල ණයවලින් ඉහළම අගය වූ රුපියල් බිලියන 9 ක් ජාතික සංවර්ධන බැංකුවෙන් නිකුත් කළ අතර, ලංකා බැංකුව විසින් රුපියල් බිලියන 8 ක් ද, සම්පත් බැංකුව විසින් රුපියල් බිලියන 7 ක් සහ පීපල්ස් ලීසිං සමාගම රුපියල් බිලියන 6 ක් ද නිකුත් කරන ලදී.

කොළඹ කොටස් වෙළඳපොළ

මිල දර්ශකවල උච්චාවචනයන් හේතුවෙන් 2015 වසරේ දී කොළඹ කොටස් හුවමාරුවෙහි මන්දගාමී කාර්යසාධනයක් වාර්තා කරන ලදී. 2015 වසර අවසානයට සමස්ත කොටස් මිල දර්ශකය, දර්ශකාංක 6,894 දක්වා සියයට 5.5 කින් ද, එස් ඇන්ඩ් පී ශ්‍රී ලංකා 20 දර්ශකය දර්ශකාංක 3,626 දක්වා සියයට 11.3 ක් ද පහත වැටුණු අතර මෙයට සාපේක්ෂව 2014 වසර අවසානයට පිළිවෙලින් 7,299 ක් සහ 4,089 ක් විය. ප්‍රමාදීත ප්‍රතිපත්ති නිර්දේශ මෙන්ම දේශපාලනික වෙනස්වීම්, පොලී අනුපාතික ඉහළ යෑම, විනිමය අනුපාතය අවප්‍රමාණය වීම හේතුවෙන් ආයෝජකයින්ගේ අවිනිශ්චිතතාවය ඉහළ යෑම සහ නැගී එන වෙළඳපොළ ආර්ථික තුළ වූ විදේශීය

FISCAL SECTOR

3.1 Government Finance (Rs.bn)

Item	2014 * Jan-Sep	2013 Jan-Sep
Revenue and Grants	836.9	787.2
Revenue	828.2	784.2
Tax	752.2	710.7
Non tax	76.0	73.5
Grants	8.7	3.0
Expenditure & Lending Minus Repayments	1,326.7	1,279.1
Current	962.1	920.4
Capital & Lending Minus Repayments	364.6	358.7



* Provisional **Revised

3.2 Government Debt (Rs.bn)

Item	2014* End Sep	2013 End Dec
Total domestic debt	4,186.0	3,832.8
of which		
Treasury bills	620.1	700.1
Treasury bonds	2,821.0	2,452.4
Rupee loans	55.5	55.5
Total foreign debt	3,182.9	2,960.4
Total outstanding govt. debt	7,368.9	6,793.2



* Provisional

3.3 Government Securities - Primary and Secondary Market Yield Rates as for the week ending - 25th February 2015

Security	Maturity	Primary Market*		Secondary Market			
		This Week	Last Week	This Week			Last Week Average
				Buying	Selling	Average	
Treasury Bills	3 Months	5.98%	5.94%	5.97%	5.83%	5.90%	5.86%
	6 Months	6.09%	6.03%	6.08%	5.97%	6.02%	5.97%
	12 Months	6.13%	6.12%	6.21%	6.10%	6.15%	6.12%
Treasury Bonds	2 < Years	7.00%	6.98%	6.36%	6.22%	6.29%	6.29%
	5 < Years	7.39%	-	7.43%	7.30%	7.36%	7.27%
	6 < Years	-	-	7.64%	7.49%	7.56%	7.49%
	8 < Years	-	-	8.00%	7.89%	7.95%	7.84%
	10 < Years	-	-	8.13%	8.01%	8.07%	7.99%
	15 < Years	-	-	9.05%	8.77%	8.91%	8.70%
	20 < Years	-	-	9.92%	9.68%	9.80%	9.33%
	30 < Years	-	-	10.14%	9.92%	10.03%	9.48%

* Primary market transactions during the week ending 25/02/2015

The secondary market yield rates of T-bonds and T-bills yield rates elevated during the week compared against yield rates of last week.





කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

පෙරේරා මහතා: දැනගෙන
යනවා. අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය
ුත් Dealer කියනවා, Rs. 1
Central Bank එකෙන් ඉල්ලා

ියවන්න මහතා: එය publish

රේරා මහතා: Public notice

නත්ති මහතා: Rs. 13 billion
ry dealer කෙනකු ගැටියට
ආගන්තුකව එන කෙනෙක්
ට -

ශ්නය Chairmanගෙන් අහලා

යවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි.
බැංකුවේ අභ්‍යන්තර විගණන
ක් ගෙන්වා ගනිමුද?

පරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා
රන්නම්.

'remajayantha: That is good
ternal audit report.

Perera: We did not want a
ternal Audit. Since the
ed that I will get that. When
eport?

ා පතියේ ඒ වාර්තාව එවන්න.

Perera: As soon as possible

remajayantha: You can
e report.

Thank you.

(Witness withdrew.)

ත්න මහතා: දැන් audit system
තිබෙන්නේ. බොහෝ දේවල්
නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ risk
කරනවා. සමහර ඒවා, once in
months, one year, once in two
පුළුවන්.It is depending on
ent. අනික් කාරණය, විශාල
al Auditorsලා permanently
y are doing rolling audits.
nal auditors. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ
hat.

'remajayantha: That is fair

මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

(මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ඉල්ලුම්කරු ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා සාක්ෂියට කැඳවයි.)

ජයකඩුතන්ත්‍රී දේවයලාගේ ධර්මපාල,ප්‍රධාන ඉල්ලුම්කරු, ලංකා බැංකුව ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව, විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා:ඔබතුමා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සේවයට පැමිණියේ කොයි කාලයේදීද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා 1991 අප්‍රේල් 22වන දා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සේවයට බැඳුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා:කවුරුන් වශයෙන්ද සේවයට බැඳුණේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කළමනාකරණ පුහුණුවන්නකු වශයෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාදැන් දරන Chief Dealer තනතුරට පත් වුණේ මොන අවුරුද්දේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ අවුරුද්දේ අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ 28වන දා දක්වා මා Chief Dealer තනතුරේ සිටියා. දැනට මා එතැනින් වෙනත් ස්ථානයකට ස්ථාන මාරු කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා ඇහුවේ, ඔබතුමා දැනට දරන තනතුරට පත් වුණේ කවදාද කියලායි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Chief Dealer තනතුරට පත් වුණේ 2013 ජනවාරි මාසයේ 01වන දා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම පළමුවන අවස්ථාව කමිටුව දැනුවත් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ primary dealer කෙනකු වෙනුවෙන් තවත් primary dealer කෙනකු bid කරන එක සම්බන්ධයෙනුයි. ඔය bid එක ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට, ඒ request එක කරන කොට ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන සිටියාද,මේ ඉල්ලන්නේ primary dealer කෙනකුගෙන්ය කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා දැන ගෙන සිටියා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැයි කියලා නීතියේ නැති වුණාටprimary dealer කෙනකුගෙන් තවත් primary dealer කෙනකු ඉල්ලීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒවෙලාවේ සැකයක් මතු වුණේ නැද්ද, මේ පුද්ගලයාටඑය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හැකියාව තිබියදී, Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ඇයි කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ පුද්ගලයා කථා කරන අවස්ථාවේදී මා ඇහුවා, ඔබට හැකියාව තිබියදී අපේ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා මේ ලංසුව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ඇයි කියලා. එයට ඔහු දුන් පිළිතුර වුණේ, දැනටමත් ඒ අයටකෙළින්ම - සෘජුවම- ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න bids කිහිපයක් තිබෙන නිසා, ඒ පැත්තෙනුත් ටිකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑය කියන එකයි. නමුත් රාජ්‍ය බැංකුවක Chief Dealer කෙනකු විධියට විශේෂයෙන්ම මට වග කීමක් තිබෙනවා, රජයේ ණය ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සෑම සහයෝගයක්ම දෙන්න. හැම වෙලාවේම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව primary dealersලා විධියට අපෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන්නා වූ ඉල්ලීම, විශේෂයෙන්ම වෙන්දේසියක් තිබෙන අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ අයට යොමු කරන්න කියලායි. ඒ වගකීම මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා.

අනික් කාරණය, මෙම ගනුදෙනුකරු -ඔය කියන primary dealer- අපිත් සමඟ හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකාර සම්බන්ධයක් තිබෙනprimary dealer කෙනෙක්. මේ bids තුනම, සියයට 12.50ට, සියයට 12.75ට හා සියයට 13ටයි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. මේ අවස්ථාව වන කොට වෙළෙඳ පොළේ මෙවැනි, මීට සමාන අවුරුදු තිහේ බැඳුම්කරයක් වෙළෙඳාම් වුණේ සියයට 9.50ක් වැනි rate එකකටයි. එතකොට සියයට 9.50ත්, සියයට 12.50ත් අතර සියයට 3ක පමණ විශාල වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. දැනට මා භාණ්ඩාගාර අංශයේ අවුරුදු 18ක් සේවය කරලා තිබෙනවා.

මගේ අත්දැකීම අනුව මේ නවයයි පනහට තිබෙන bond එක උපරිම වශයෙන් - basis point - ඒ කියන්නේ සියයට දශම දෙකයි පහක්. දශම පහක් වාගේ තත්ත්වයකින් ඉහළ සහ පහළ යෑමේ ප්‍රවණතාවක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. මීට පෙර auctionsවලදී මම ලබා තිබෙන අත්දැකීම අනුවයි මම එහෙම කියන්නේ. එම නිසා මම කවදාවත් විශ්වාස කළේ නැහැ, නවයයි පනහට තිබෙන rate එක දොළහයි පනහට accept කරන්න. අනිත් එක. මෙතැනදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් තමයි වෙන්දේසියට ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණේ. එතකොට මගේ පූර්ව අත්දැකීම අනුව කියනවා නම්, විශේෂයෙන් මහ බැංකුව සමහර විට Rs. 1 billion භාර ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; Rs. 2 billion ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; තව ඒ වාගේ දෙගුණයක් ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; Rs. 3 billion විතර වාගේ වෙනකම් යන්නත් පුළුවන්. අන්න එහෙම ගත්තත්. කවදාවත් මොනම හේතුවකටවත් දොළහයි පනහේ rate එකට මේවා වදින්නේ නැති වෙයි කියන විශ්වාසය මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා. මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මෙක වදින්නේ නැති වෙයි කියලා. මේක මහ බැංකුව පිළිගන්නේ නැති වෙයි කියලා මට හිතුණා. ඒ වාගේම මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා. මේ bids ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් මගේ බැංකුවට කිසිම අවදානමක් නැති වෙයි කියලාත්. අනිත් එක මොහු ලිඛිතව මට මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණා, මෙය දමන්න කියලා. එම නිසා මට හිතුණා මෙය නොදා ඉන්න එක සදාචාරාත්මක නැහැ කියලා. මොකද, නීතිමය පැත්තෙන් බැලුවත් ඇත්තවශයෙන්ම primary dealer කෙනෙකුගෙන් තව primary dealer කෙනෙකු bid එකක් දමනවා කියන එක කොහේවත් එපා කියලා නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම ඒ සම්බන්ධව මොකුත් තහනමක්වත්, මොකක්වත් නැහැ. මම මුලින් කිව්වා වාගේ මගේ

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DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

ISSUE OF RS 1.0 BILLION TREASURY BOND

Rs. 1,000 million Treasury Bond under the series of 12.50% 2045 'A' is being offered on an auction basis on Friday, 27th February 2015.

Details of these Treasury Bond are as follows:

Series	12.50% 2045 'A'
ISIN	LKB03045C013
Amount offered	1,000 million
Period to maturity	30 Years
Coupon rate	12.50% per annum
Date of issue	01st March 2015
Date of maturity	01st March 2045
Dates of interest payment	01st March & 01st September
Accrued Interest Rate	Rs. 0.0340 per Rs. 100.00
Date of auction	27th February 2015
Closing date and time of tenders	Friday, 27th February 2015 at 11.00 a.m.
Date of settlement	02nd March 2015
Minimum amount of bid	Rupees five million (Rs. 5,000,000/-) and multiples of Rupees one million (Rs.1,000,000/-) there onwards.

Bids are invited from the Primary Dealers in Treasury Bonds on the basis of clean prices (exclusive of accrued interest from the date of issue of the series to the date of settlement). Bids should be made only through the electronic bidding facility provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

The general public is invited to purchase Treasury bills from the following Primary Dealers and any other Licensed Commercial Banks

Acuity Securities Ltd.	2206297	People's Bank	2458935
Bank of Ceylon	2541938	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd.	2206123
Capital Alliance Ltd.	2317777	Sampath Bank PLC.	2305842
Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC	2332319	Seylan Bank PLC.	2456340
Entrust Securities PLC	5500600	The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd.	2421697
First Capital Treasuries Ltd.	2639883	Union Bank of Colombo PLC.	2374158
NatWealth Securities Ltd.	4703000	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd	2675096
NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd.	2564601		
Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC	2565561		

C M D N K Seneviratne (Mrs)
Superintendent/Registrar of Public Debt.

Public Debt Department
Central Bank of Sri Lanka
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1.
Telephone: 2477316 Fax: 2477687
Web: www.cbsl.gov.lk

Treasury Bond Issue March 2015
Amount Offered - Rs 1000 Mn

Settlement Date : 02/03/2015
Issue Date Of The Series: 01/03/2015
Maturity Date Of The Series: 01/03/2045
Coupon Rate: 12.50%

Loan Title: 12.50%2045A
Maturity Period: 30 Years and 0 Months
ISIN : LKB03045C013

Series No: 275
Auction Number: 15023
Accrued Interest Rate: 0.034

27/02/2015

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Amount Payable	Yield to Maturity	Yield Net of Tax	Cumulative Amount Tendered	Cumulative Amount Payable	Weighted Average Price	W.Ave Yield to Maturity	WAYRNT
	BANK OF CEYLON	8,000,000	119.33420	9,546,736.00	10.3900	9.3510	8,000,000.00	9,546,736.00	119.3342	10.3900	9.3510
	ACUITY SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	112.01000	56,005,000.00	11.1110	9.9999	58,000,000.00	65,551,736.00	113.0202	11.0070	9.9063
	FIRST CAPITAL TREASURIES LTD.	100,000,000	110.95480	110,954,800.00	11.2220	10.0998	158,000,000.00	176,506,536.00	111.7130	11.1420	10.0278
	BANK OF CEYLON	500,000,000	109.39320	546,966,000.00	11.3900	10.2509	658,000,000.00	723,472,536.00	109.9502	11.3300	10.1970
	ENTRUST SECURITIES PLC	50,000,000	104.50730	52,253,650.00	11.9440	10.7496	708,000,000.00	775,726,186.00	109.5658	11.3710	10.2339
	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	104.50730	104,507,300.00	11.9440	10.7496	808,000,000.00	880,233,486.00	108.9398	11.4400	10.2959
	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	500,000,000	104.50730	522,536,500.00	11.9440	10.7496	1,308,000,000.00	1,402,769,986.00	107.2454	11.6280	10.4652
	ENTRUST SECURITIES PLC	50,000,000	103.11580	51,557,900.00	12.1110	10.8999	1,358,000,000.00	1,454,327,886.00	107.0934	11.6450	10.4805
	PEOPLE'S BANK	100,000,000	102.20720	102,207,200.00	12.2220	10.9998	1,458,000,000.00	1,556,535,086.00	106.7582	11.6830	10.5147
0	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	102.20720	102,207,200.00	12.2220	10.9998	1,558,000,000.00	1,658,742,286.00	106.4661	11.7170	10.5453
1	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	1,000,000,000	102.20720	1,022,072,000.00	12.2220	10.9998	2,558,000,000.00	2,680,814,286.00	104.8012	11.9100	10.7190
2	NATWEALTH SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	102.20700	51,103,500.00	12.2220	10.9998	2,608,000,000.00	2,731,917,786.00	104.7514	11.9160	10.7244
3	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	101.75800	101,758,000.00	12.2780	11.0502	2,708,000,000.00	2,833,675,786.00	104.6409	11.9290	10.7361
4	NATWEALTH SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	99.99900	49,999,500.00	12.5000	11.2500	2,758,000,000.00	2,883,675,286.00	104.5568	11.9390	10.7451
5	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	500,000,000	99.99900	499,995,000.00	12.5000	11.2500	3,258,000,000.00	3,383,670,286.00	103.8573	12.0220	10.8198
6	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	250,000,000	97.87800	244,695,000.00	12.7780	11.5002	3,508,000,000.00	3,628,365,286.00	103.4312	12.0730	10.8657
7	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	250,000,000	95.83940	239,598,500.00	13.0559	11.7504	3,758,000,000.00	3,867,963,786.00	102.9261	12.1340	10.9206
8	SEYLAN BANK PLC	1,250,000,000	95.80740	1,197,592,500.00	13.0600	11.7540	5,008,000,000.00	5,065,556,286.00	101.1493	12.3539	11.1185
9	WEALTH TRUST SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	93.87900	46,939,500.00	13.3330	11.9997	5,058,000,000.00	5,112,495,786.00	101.0774	12.3630	11.1267
0	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	500,000,000	93.87900	469,395,000.00	13.3330	11.9997	5,558,000,000.00	5,581,890,786.00	100.4298	12.4450	11.2005
1	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	1,000,000,000	91.99280	919,928,000.00	13.6110	12.2499	6,558,000,000.00	6,501,818,786.00	99.1433	12.6110	11.3499
2	WEALTH TRUST SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	90.17700	45,088,500.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,608,000,000.00	6,546,907,286.00	99.0755	12.6200	11.3580
3	HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKIN	100,000,000	90.17700	90,177,000.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,708,000,000.00	6,637,084,286.00	98.9428	12.6370	11.3733
4	PAN ASIA BANKING COPORATION	250,000,000	90.17700	225,442,500.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,958,000,000.00	6,862,526,786.00	98.6279	12.6780	11.4107
5	CAPITAL ALLIANCE	100,000,000	90.17690	90,176,900.00	13.8890	12.5000	7,058,000,000.00	6,952,703,686.00	98.5081	12.6940	11.4246
6	BANK OF CEYLON	3,000,000,000	90.16990	2,705,097,000.00	13.8900	12.5009	10,058,000,000.00	9,657,800,686.00	96.0211	13.0300	11.7270
7	PAN ASIA BANKING COPORATION	150,000,000	88.42800	132,642,000.00	14.1670	12.7503	10,208,000,000.00	9,790,442,686.00	95.9095	13.0459	11.7417
8	BANK OF CEYLON	5,000,000,000	88.40740	4,420,370,000.00	14.1700	12.7530	15,208,000,000.00	14,210,812,686.00	93.4430	13.3970	12.0577
9	BANK OF CEYLON	5,000,000,000	86.76900	4,338,450,000.00	14.4400	12.9959	20,208,000,000.00	18,549,262,686.00	91.7917	13.6410	12.2766
0	COMMERCIAL BANK OF CEYLON LT	50,000,000	86.74280	43,371,400.00	14.4440	12.9996	20,258,000,000.00	18,592,634,086.00	91.7792	13.6430	12.2787
1	PAN ASIA BANKING COPORATION	100,000,000	86.74250	86,742,500.00	14.4440	12.9996	20,358,000,000.00	18,679,376,586.00	91.7545	13.6470	12.2827
2	ACUITY SECURITIES LTD.	100,000,000	86.74000	86,740,000.00	14.4450	13.0005	20,458,000,000.00	18,766,116,586.00	91.7300	13.6510	12.2867
3	COMMERCIAL BANK OF CEYLON LT	50,000,000	86.08510	43,042,550.00	14.5560	13.1004	20,508,000,000.00	18,809,159,136.00	91.7162	13.6530	12.2887
4	UNION BANK	50,000,000	76.48030	38,240,150.00	16.3890	14.7501	20,558,000,000.00	18,847,399,286.00	91.6791	13.6580	12.2927
5	UNION BANK	50,000,000	74.21250	37,106,250.00	16.8890	15.2001	20,608,000,000.00	18,884,505,536.00	91.6368	13.6650	12.2987
6	SAMPATH BANK PLC	100,000,000	62.62160	62,621,600.00	20.0000	18.0000	20,708,000,000.00	18,947,127,136.00	91.4967	13.6860	12.3167

TREASURY BOND TENDER COMMITTEE

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

MINUTE PAPER

Meeting No: 2/2015 - Time: 12.30 to 13.10 hrs. Date: 27.02.2015

1. The information provided by PDD to make a rate decision for Treasury Bond auction held on 27 - 02-2015 are as follows: (See attendance of the Tender Committee Members)

Series	**12.50% 2045 'A'**
ISIN	LKB03045C013
Maturity date	01-03-2045
Settlement Date	02-03-2015
Amount Offered (Rs.mn.)	1,000.0
Bid Received (Rs.Bn.)	20,708

2. The Tender Committee having considered;
   a) tight financing requirement of the Government;
   b) prevailing high liquidity level in the market as reflected in bids; and
   c) the term structure of interest rates prevailed prior to September 2014,

   granted approval for accepting Rs. 10,058 million at the net of tax WAYR of 11.73%.

.....
Chairman
(DG overseeing the PDD)

.....
SPD

.....
Secretary to the
Tender Committee

Approval of the Governor,

.....
27.02.2015

V. Important doc. to be brought in as an annexure

Public Debt Department
Treasury bond Tender Committee Meeting
27th February 2015

	Name	Designation	Dept.	Signature
1.	Mr. P. Samarasiri	DG(SM)	-	
2.	Mr. S. S. Ratnayake	AG (S)	-	
3.	Mr. C. P. A. Karunatilake	AG (KL)	-	
4.	Mrs. C. M. D. N. K. Senevirathne	SPD	PDD	
5.	Mr. P. W. V. N. R. Rodrigo	DDO	DOD	
6.	Mrs. S. Gunaratna	DER	ERD	
7.	Mrs. U. L. Muthugala	ASPD	PDD	
8.	Dr. M. Z. M. Aazim	ASPD	PDD	

AG/ Public debt Price stability

Treasury Bond Issue March 2015
Amount Offered - Rs 1000 Mn

Settlement Date : 02/03/2015
Issue Date Of The Series: 01/03/2015
Maturity Date Of The Series:01/03/2045
Coupon Rate: 12.50%

Loan Title: 12.50%2045A
Maturity Period: 30 Years and 0 Months
ISIN : LKB03045C013

Series No: 275
Auction Number: 15023
Accrued Interest Rate: 0.034

27/02/2015

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Amount Payable	Yield to Maturity	Yield Net of Tax	Cumulative Amount Tendered	Cumulative Amount Payable	Weighted Average Price	W.Ave Yield to Maturity	WAYRN
1	BANK OF CEYLON	8,000,000	119.33420	9,546,736.00	10.3900	9.3510	8,000,000.00	9,546,736.00	119.3342	10.3900	9.351
2	ACUITY SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	112.01000	56,005,000.00	11.1110	9.9999	58,000,000.00	65,551,736.00	113.0202	11.0070	9.906
3	FIRST CAPITAL TREASURIES LTD.	100,000,000	110.95480	110,954,800.00	11.2220	10.0998	158,000,000.00	176,506,536.00	111.7130	11.1420	10.027
4	BANK OF CEYLON	500,000,000	109.39320	546,966,000.00	11.3900	10.2509	658,000,000.00	723,472,536.00	109.9502	11.3300	10.197
5	ENTRUST SECURITIES PLC	50,000,000	104.50730	52,253,650.00	11.9440	10.7496	708,000,000.00	775,726,186.00	109.5658	11.3710	10.233
6	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	104.50730	104,507,300.00	11.9440	10.7496	808,000,000.00	880,233,486.00	108.9398	11.4400	10.295
7	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	500,000,000	104.50730	522,536,500.00	11.9440	10.7496	1,308,000,000.00	1,402,769,986.00	107.2454	11.6280	10.465
8	ENTRUST SECURITIES PLC	50,000,000	103.11580	51,557,900.00	12.1110	10.8999	1,358,000,000.00	1,454,327,886.00	107.0934	11.6450	10.480
9	PEOPLE'S BANK	100,000,000	102.20720	102,207,200.00	12.2220	10.9998	1,458,000,000.00	1,556,535,086.00	106.7582	11.6830	10.514
10	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	102.20720	102,207,200.00	12.2220	10.9998	1,558,000,000.00	1,658,742,286.00	106.4661	11.7170	10.545
11	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	1,000,000,000	102.20720	1,022,072,000.00	12.2220	10.9998	2,558,000,000.00	2,680,814,286.00	104.8012	11.9100	10.719
12	NATWEALTH SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	102.20700	51,103,500.00	12.2220	10.9998	2,608,000,000.00	2,731,917,786.00	104.7514	11.9160	10.724
13	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	101.75800	101,758,000.00	12.2780	11.0502	2,708,000,000.00	2,833,675,786.00	104.6409	11.9290	10.736
14	NATWEALTH SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	99.99900	49,999,500.00	12.5000	11.2500	2,758,000,000.00	2,883,675,286.00	104.5568	11.9390	10.745
15	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	500,000,000	99.99900	499,995,000.00	12.5000	11.2500	3,258,000,000.00	3,383,670,286.00	103.8573	12.0220	10.819
16	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	250,000,000	97.87800	244,695,000.00	12.7780	11.5002	3,508,000,000.00	3,628,365,286.00	103.4312	12.0730	10.865
17	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	250,000,000	95.83940	239,598,500.00	13.0559	11.7504	3,758,000,000.00	3,867,963,786.00	102.9261	12.1340	10.920
18	SEYLAN BANK PLC	1,250,000,000	95.80740	1,197,592,500.00	13.0600	11.7540	5,008,000,000.00	5,065,556,286.00	101.1493	12.3539	11.118
19	WEALTH TRUST SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	93.87900	46,939,500.00	13.3330	11.9997	5,058,000,000.00	5,112,495,786.00	101.0774	12.3630	11.126
20	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	500,000,000	93.87900	469,395,000.00	13.3330	11.9997	5,558,000,000.00	5,581,890,786.00	100.4298	12.4450	11.200
21	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	1,000,000,000	91.99280	919,928,000.00	13.6110	12.2499	6,558,000,000.00	6,501,818,786.00	99.1433	12.6110	11.349
22	WEALTH TRUST SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	90.17700	45,088,500.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,608,000,000.00	6,546,907,286.00	99.0755	12.6200	11.358
23	HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKIN(	100,000,000	90.17700	90,177,000.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,708,000,000.00	6,637,084,286.00	98.9428	12.6370	11.373
24	PAN ASIA BANKING COPORATION	250,000,000	90.17700	225,442,500.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,958,000,000.00	6,862,526,786.00	98.6279	12.6780	11.410
25	CAPITAL ALLIANCE	100,000,000	90.17690	90,176,900.00	13.8890	12.5000	7,058,000,000.00	6,952,703,686.00	98.5081	12.6940	11.424
26	BANK OF CEYLON	3,000,000,000	90.16990	2,705,097,000.00	13.8900	12.5009	10,058,000,000.00	9,657,800,686.00	96.0211	13.0300	11.727

Accept Bids (1) to (26) and Balance _____ to _____ at prices Shown In 'Bid Price' Column (Column 4)

Chairman
Treasury Bond Tender Committee

Prepared by:
L.S. Fernando (1888)
Manager

Verified by:
M.S.M.P Fernando (1678)
Senior Manager

Authorised by:
Assistant Director
Department of Public Debt
Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Level 10 Tower 01
Janadhipathi Mawatha
Colombo 1.
Tel: 011 2477316

97
97

(13)

THIRTY YEARS TREASURY BOND AUCTION : 27-02-2015 I
SETTLEMENT DATE : 02-03-2015
ISSUE DATE : 01-03-2015
MATURITY DATE : 01-03-2045
Series: 12.50% 2045 A

(RATES % P.A.)
(AMOUNTS IN RS. MN)

		without tax	with tax
ISIN	LKB03044F019		
PREVIOUS 30 YEARS AUCTION 13.50% 2044 B (27-05-2014)			
ACCEPTED AMOUNT			2,000
O/W AT PREMIUM			2,000
AT PAR			
AT DISCOUNT			
COUPON RATE			13.50
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY		11.7503	13.0559
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		11.7503	13.0559

		without tax	with tax
ISIN	LKB03045C013		
CURRENT 30 YEARS AUCTION - 12.50% 2045 A (27-02-2015)			
AMOUNT OFFERED			1,000
COUPON RATE			12.50
BIDS RECEIVED	AT PREMIUM		20,708
	AT PAR		
	AT DISCOUNT		

OPTION 1- PREVIOUS CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	11.7503	13.0559
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.9206	12.1340
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		3,758
OPTION 2- PREVIOUS W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	12.7503	14.1670
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	11.7413	13.0459
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		10,208
OPTION 3- ACCEPT ALL BIDS (INDICATIVE)		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	18.0000	20.0000
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.3174	13.6860
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		20,708
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	57	
OPTION 4- ACCEPT AMOUNT OFFERED		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	10.7496	11.9440
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.3806	11.5340
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		1,000
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	137	
OPTION 5- If Accept Rs. 1,408 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	10.9998	12.2220
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.4985	11.6650
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		1,408
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	125	
OPTION 6- If Accept Rs. 2,800 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	11.2500	12.5000
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.7523	11.9470
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		2,800
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	100	
OPTION 7- If Accept Rs. 4,150 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	11.7540	13.0600
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.9944	12.2160
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		4,150
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	75	
Department Recommendation		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	10.9998	12.2220
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.7244	11.9160
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		2,608
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	103	

Hd/FO
G instructed to raize funds upto Rs 10 bn, taking into consideration of additional fund of the Govt. pl.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Rs. 13.5 billion.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් එහි තීරණයක් Monetary Board එකෙන් ගත්තා. auction එකට යන ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කළේ නැහැ. One billion විතර යනවා කියලා තීරණය ගත්තේ ඔබතුමියගේ Department එකද? One billion විතර bids කැඳවන්න තීරණය ගත්තේ කවුද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක ගන්නේ Public Debt Department එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගන්න තීරණයක්. ඔබතුමිගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් එයට යන්නේ නැහැ?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මේ ආකාරයෙන් කැඳවන කොට අපට Deputy Governor ත් කිව්වා, ආණ්ඩුවේ කට්ටියක් ඇවිල්ලා නවත් සල්ලි අවශ්‍ය බව පැහැදිලි කරලා දුන්නා කියලා. ඔබතුමිය හිටියේ නැහැ?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී ද Rs. 10 billion ගන්න ඔබතුමියට Governor instruct කළේ?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Auction එක දවසේ auction එක close කරලා වෙසන් පුංචාට පසුව.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔතනා වෙලාවේදිද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 12.30ට විතර. ඔව්කෙදේ? අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් 12.00ට යනවා Tender Board Meeting එකට, Tender Board එකේ Chairman වලස ඉන්නේ Deputy Governor.නේන් Assistant Governors ලා තිහිප දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ නිසාම අපට අය Corporate Management Meeting එකේ Governor එක්ක හිටියේ. එම නිසා ඔෆිස්එකේ වෙලාවටත් පසුවත් ඉන්න සිදු වුණා. ඊට පසු ඒ meeting අවසන් වෙලා Governor තමයි කාට කොළේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වන විට Governor ලවින දැනලා තිබුණාද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වන විට දැනලා නැහැ. 12.30ට ලබාදෙ පසුව තමයි දැනගන්නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: පත්තරකාරයි එක දැක්කේ? ඔතුමා මෙම instruction දෙන්න කලින් මෙවර list එක දැක්කා.

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔතුමා instruct කලා ද Rs. 10 billion ගන්න, ඔතුමා නොවැසිකා කලා ද Rs. 20 billion බදලක් ගන්න?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඉස්සර වෙලාම Rs. 20 billion ගන්න බලාපොරොත්තුව තිබුණා. අපි හිතුවේ නැහැ ඒ මුදල එයි කියලා. මෙච්චර කාලයකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණේ live times වගේ කමයි අපි offer කරන එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් ඔතුමා මෙම Rs. 20 billion දැකලා තිබ්බා Rs. 20 billion මුදලම් ගන්න කියලා.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Rs. 20 billion ඇවිල්ල තිබෙනවා නම්- why do you not-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He told you to take Rs. 20 billion.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: First he said. Rs. 20 billion. We explained him-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, having seen this and realized that there are 20 billion bids, he instructed or suggested that we should take 20 billion.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: I would say, suggested-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Why did you reject that suggestion?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: That was too high.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Why was it too high? He has told us and Mr. Samarasiri seems to agree with him that since auctions are transparent, you should always take everything by auction. So, why did you refuse? I am very glad that you refused it. I am delighted that you had the courage to say, "No". But, why did you refuse?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: One reason is that sometimes these bids maybe dummy bids. සමහර වෙලාවට ඒ අයට 10 per cent requirement.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක පැහැදිලියි. ඊට පෙනෙන විධියට-

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඉ.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔතුමිය කවදාවත් dummy bids කියලා කියනවාද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සමහර වෙලාවට dummy bids වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඉ.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, කොහොමද dummy bids වෙන්නේ? සල්ලි නැතිව bid කරනවාද? පෙනෙනවා අපි හාර්ගත්තේ නැතිව ඉන්නවාද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ, සමහර වෙලාවට නැහැ කියනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඉ.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔතුමියට එතකොට dummy කියලත් නැහැනෙ. Intentionally ඒ වගේනෙ.

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. ඒක too high. ඉතින් අපිට ඒ rate එකට දමන්න බෑනේ.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is too high. Okay. So, as a responsible officer, you said that these bids are too high and they should be rejected. That is why the country was safe from taking a 20 billion bond. Thank you, Mrs. Senevirathna. Why did you now exercise the same intelligent discretion and tell the Governor this 10 billion is too much?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Especially Dr. Azim, our Additional Superintendent explained him more than four times.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: More than four times that this was too much.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But the Governor insisted?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: We did not have any other option.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You are an officer of the Central Bank. If I might-

සභාපතිතුමා: සිංහලෙන් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හොඳයි. ගෞතුමිය මේ තනතුරට පත් කළෙත් ගෞතුමියගේ පෙංකමට නිසා කියලා සංගම එය කියනවා. මෙහි විකක් සැකයෙන් හිටියා. Mr. Azim පැහැදිලි උලස පෙන්වා දුන්නා Governor ට මේක පොඩි වැරැද්දක් කියලා. ඒනමුත් Governor insist කළා.

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Insist නෙළා. ඔව්නේද, requirement is high. අපට Rs. 13.5 billion තිබුනේ. ඒනමුත් 3 billion-

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හරි, අපිට විකල්ප තිබුනා නේ. Private placement විකල්ප තිබුනා.

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙන කොට කිව්වා යම්කිසි ලෙසකින් private placement කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: කවදා කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ කිව්වාද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Governor කිව්වා. The Governor said that.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Governor කීවාය කියනවා private placements කොළඹවලින්. කිසිම අවස්ථාවක Monetary Board එකෙන් එහෙම නැහැ. Monetary Board එකෙන් කිව්වා interest rate එක ඉහළ නැංවිය යුතු කියලා. සභාපතිතුමා ඉල්ලා සිටියා 20 billion ගන්න කියලා. ඒ sequence එක නම්. සභාපතිතුමා සභාවට කෙටියෙන් කියපු කරුණ Mrs. Senevirathna ට Mr. Azim ට කෙසේද දැනුවා මෙහෙ ඇහැ කියලා. මේ 20 billion කියන්නේ විකුණා ඉවරයි වීමෙන් පුළුවා. රිය පසුව 10 billion ගැනුම Dr. Azim පෙන්වලා දුන්නා. නේද? එහෙ Governor insist කළා. This was at 12.30.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: I will say, "Instructed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Not instructed. Your minute is very clear. Thank you, Mrs. Senevirathna.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Instructed or insisted? Just tell the truth because instructed and insisted has-

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Instructed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But he instructed-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: "Instructed" කියලා තිබෙනවා කොළේ. "Insisted" කියලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගෞතුමියගේ අවසාන කාරණය පසුව ඒක කියන්න? ගෞතුමියට අවසරයක් මම පසුව දෙන්නම්.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think I should explain to the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake that responsible officers of the responsible officers of the Bank, Mrs. Senevirathna, who has no experience in this area, and Dr. Azim who has a lot of experience indicated to the Governor why it was not a suitable action.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Nevertheless, he instructed- I think I am entitled to use the word "insisted". If you give an instruction and when the professional advise against it, but you say "No, no", that is what in English we call "insisted". But, Mrs. Senevirathna, being a mild lady එලා තිබෙනවා "Governor instructed". So, what is very clear is that following the discussion with the officials of the Bank, the officials of the Bank who did their best to give professional advice, the Governor continued to instruct and it was subject to that instruction that the Tender Board made its decision. Is that correct?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you. ඒ note එකේ තිබෙනවා, What time did you write this note?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගෞතුමියගේ අවසාන [illegible] කියන්න?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can you confirm at what time you wrote this note?

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CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

MINUTE PAPER

Board Paper No. : MB/ER/5/3/2015 File No. : 03/16/025/0002/001

Meeting No. : 5/2015 Item No. : 3 Date : 06.03.2015

3. Ratification of the Withdrawal of the 5 per cent Special Standing Deposit Facility Rate

3.1. .....

3.2. .....

3.3. The Chairman informed the Board that the Central Bank temporarily suspended the method of direct placements of Treasury bills and Treasury bonds used to raise funds for the Government with a view to move towards a greater market mechanism based on standard auction system followed alternatively at present. Accordingly, the Central Bank at the 30 year Treasury bond auction held on 27th February 2015 decided to accept Rs. 10 billion out of Rs. 20 billion worth bonds received for Rs. 1 billion announced to the market for bids in order to meet the Government's funding requirements only from the open market bids.

TRUE COPY

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

17.03.2015

Employee Provident Fund - Purchases from Secondary Market

Bond Issued date	ISIN No	Purchase Dat	Coupon	Yield	Face Value	Purchase Cost	Counter party
2015.02.27	LKB03045C013	25.05.2015	12.50	11.00	400,000,000	452,128,400	Seylan Bank PLC
		25.05.2015	12.50	11.00	100,000,000	113,032,100	Seylan Bank PLC
		04.06.2015	12.50	10.85	100,000,000	114,509,600	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
		05.06.2015	12.50	10.80	40,000,000	46,004,120	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
		08.06.2015	12.50	10.75	30,000,000	34,654,380	Seylan Bank PLC
		11.06.2015	12.50	10.50	2,000,000,000	2,361,970,000	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
		11.06.2015	12.50	10.50	50,000,000	59,049,250	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
Total Purchase cost for 2015.02.27 bond issue						**3,181,347,850**	
2016.03.29	LKB01226F014	18.04.2016	11.00	12.20	100,000,000	93,101,100	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
	LKB01530E152	12.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,176,000	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		12.04.2016	11.00	12.42	50,000,000	45,317,600	DFCC Bank
		18.04.2016	11.00	12.45	500,000,000	452,301,000	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.50	1,000,000,000	901,596,000	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	452,314,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	452,314,500	DFCC Bank
		25.04.2016	11.00	12.50	250,000,000	225,416,750	DFCC Bank
		25.04.2016	11.00	12.50	750,000,000	676,250,250	DFCC Bank
		25.04.2016	11.00	12.50	1,000,000,000	901,667,000	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		12.05.2016	11.00	12.20	250,000,000	230,083,750	First Capital Treasuries
		12.05.2016	11.00	12.20	250,000,000	230,083,750	DFCC Bank
		12.05.2016	11.00	12.16	2,250,000,000	2,076,374,250	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		13.05.2016	11.00	12.25	800,000,000	733,794,400	National Savings Bank
Total Purchase cost for 2016.03.29 bond issue						**9,736,704,850**	

Source - Invesment in Treasury Bonds information sheets receved from EPF

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Employee Provident Fund - Purchases from Primary Market

Bond Issued date	ISIN No	Purchase Date	Bid price	Face Value	Purchase Cost	Counter party
2015.02.27	LKB03045C013	2015.02.27	104.5073	500,000,000	522,536,500	CB
			102.2072	1,000,000,000	1,022,072,000	CB
			99.9990	500,000,000	499,995,000	CB
Total Purchase cost for 2015.02.27 bond issue					2,044,603,500	
2016.03.29	LKB01530E152	2016.03.29	75.9765	500,000,000	379,882,500	CB
			75.7200	500,000,000	378,600,000	CB
					758,482,500	
	LKB01226F014	2016.03.29	79.6594	500,000,000	398,297,000	CB
	LKB01025C157	2016.03.29	77.6667	1,000,000,000	776,667,000	CB
	LKB00520E014	Not purchased				
Total Purchase cost for 2016.03.29 bond issue					1,933,446,500	

Source - Bids accepted documents of Central Bank

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Estimated Loss occurred from the Primary Auction held on 27.02.2015

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tendered Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price Rs. (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
Panel A - Estimated loss by accepting bids amount in to Rs.10.058 Bn of Face Value as opposed to accepting Rs.1.308 Bn of Face Value							
1	B	119.3342	8,000,000	8,000,000	9,546,736		-
2	A	112.0100	50,000,000	58,000,000	65,551,736		-
3	F	110.9548	100,000,000	158,000,000	176,506,536		-
4	B	109.3932	500,000,000	658,000,000	723,472,536		-
5	E	104.5073	50,000,000	708,000,000	775,726,186		-
6	H	104.5073	100,000,000	808,000,000	880,233,486		-
7	**EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND**	**104.5073**	**500,000,000**	**1,308,000,000**	**1,402,769,986**		-
8	E	103.1158	50,000,000	1,358,000,000	1,454,327,886	1.3915	695,750
9	J	102.2072	100,000,000	1,458,000,000	1,556,535,086	2.3001	2,300,100
10	H	102.2072	100,000,000	1,558,000,000	1,658,742,286	2.3001	2,300,100
11	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	102.2072	1,000,000,000	2,558,000,000	2,680,814,286	2.3001	23,001,000
12	G	102.2070	50,000,000	2,608,000,000	2,731,917,786	2.3003	1,150,150
13	H	101.7580	100,000,000	2,708,000,000	2,833,675,786	2.7493	2,749,300
14	G	99.9990	50,000,000	2,758,000,000	2,883,675,286	4.5083	2,254,150
15	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	99.9990	500,000,000	3,258,000,000	3,383,670,286	4.5083	22,541,500
16	K	97.8780	250,000,000	3,508,000,000	3,628,365,286	6.6293	16,573,250
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000	3,758,000,000	3,867,963,786	8.6679	21,669,750
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000	5,008,000,000	5,065,556,286	8.6999	108,748,750
19	P	93.8790	50,000,000	5,058,000,000	5,112,495,786	10.6283	5,314,150
20	K	93.8790	500,000,000	5,558,000,000	5,581,890,786	10.6283	53,141,500
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000	6,558,000,000	6,501,818,786	12.5145	125,145,000
22	P	90.1770	50,000,000	6,608,000,000	6,546,907,286	14.3303	7,165,150
23	N	90.1770	100,000,000	6,708,000,000	6,637,084,286	14.3303	14,330,300
24	I	90.1770	250,000,000	6,958,000,000	6,862,526,786	14.3303	35,825,750
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000	7,058,000,000	6,952,703,686	14.3304	14,330,400
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000	10,058,000,000	9,657,800,686	14.3374	430,122,000
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**889,358,050**

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tendered Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price Rs. (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
Panel B - Estimated loss by accepting bids amount in to Rs.10.058 Bn of Face Value as opposed to accepting Rs.2.608 Bn of Face Value							
1	B	119.3342	8,000,000	8,000,000	9,546,736		-
2	A	112.0100	50,000,000	58,000,000	65,551,736		-
3	F	110.9548	100,000,000	158,000,000	176,506,536		-
4	B	109.3932	500,000,000	658,000,000	723,472,536		-
5	E	104.5073	50,000,000	708,000,000	775,726,186		-
6	H	104.5073	100,000,000	808,000,000	880,233,486		-
7	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	104.5073	500,000,000	1,308,000,000	1,402,769,986		-
8	E	103.1158	50,000,000	1,358,000,000	1,454,327,886		-
9	J	102.2072	100,000,000	1,458,000,000	1,556,535,086		-
10	H	102.2072	100,000,000	1,558,000,000	1,658,742,286		-
11	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	102.2072	1,000,000,000	2,558,000,000	2,680,814,286		-
12	**G**	**102.2070**	**50,000,000**	**2,608,000,000**	**2,731,917,786**		-
13	H	101.7580	100,000,000	2,708,000,000	2,833,675,786	0.4490	449,000
14	G	99.9990	50,000,000	2,758,000,000	2,883,675,286	2.2080	1,104,000
15	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	99.9990	500,000,000	3,258,000,000	3,383,670,286	2.2080	11,040,000
16	K	97.8780	250,000,000	3,508,000,000	3,628,365,286	4.3290	10,822,500
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000	3,758,000,000	3,867,963,786	6.3676	15,919,000
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000	5,008,000,000	5,065,556,286	6.3996	79,995,000
19	P	93.8790	50,000,000	5,058,000,000	5,112,495,786	8.3280	4,164,000
20	K	93.8790	500,000,000	5,558,000,000	5,581,890,786	8.3280	41,640,000
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000	6,558,000,000	6,501,818,786	10.2142	102,142,000
22	P	90.1770	50,000,000	6,608,000,000	6,546,907,286	12.0300	6,015,000
23	N	90.1770	100,000,000	6,708,000,000	6,637,084,286	12.0300	12,030,000
24	I	90.1770	250,000,000	6,958,000,000	6,862,526,786	12.0300	30,075,000
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000	7,058,000,000	6,952,703,686	12.0301	12,030,100
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000	10,058,000,000	9,657,800,686	12.0371	361,113,000
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**688,538,600**

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tendered Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price Rs. (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
Panel C - Estimated loss if the bids amount in to 20.708 Bn in Face Value were accepted on opposed to accepting Rs.1.308 Bn in Face Value							
1	B	119.3342	8,000,000	8,000,000	9,546,736		-
2	A	112.0100	50,000,000	58,000,000	65,551,736		-
3	F	110.9548	100,000,000	158,000,000	176,506,536		-
4	B	109.3932	500,000,000	658,000,000	723,472,536		-
5	E	104.5073	50,000,000	708,000,000	775,726,186		-
6	H	104.5073	100,000,000	808,000,000	880,233,486		-
7	**EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND**	**104.5073**	**500,000,000**	**1,308,000,000**	**1,402,769,986**		-
8	E	103.1158	50,000,000	1,358,000,000	1,454,327,886	1.3915	695,750
9	J	102.2072	100,000,000	1,458,000,000	1,556,535,086	2.3001	2,300,100
10	H	102.2072	100,000,000	1,558,000,000	1,658,742,286	2.3001	2,300,100
11	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	102.2072	1,000,000,000	2,558,000,000	2,680,814,286	2.3001	23,001,000
12	G	102.2070	50,000,000	2,608,000,000	2,731,917,786	2.3003	1,150,150
13	H	101.7580	100,000,000	2,708,000,000	2,833,675,786	2.7493	2,749,300
14	G	99.9990	50,000,000	2,758,000,000	2,883,675,286	4.5083	2,254,150
15	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	99.9990	500,000,000	3,258,000,000	3,383,670,286	4.5083	22,541,500
16	K	97.8780	250,000,000	3,508,000,000	3,628,365,286	6.6293	16,573,250
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000	3,758,000,000	3,867,963,786	8.6679	21,669,750
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000	5,008,000,000	5,065,556,286	8.6999	108,748,750
19	P	93.8790	50,000,000	5,058,000,000	5,112,495,786	10.6283	5,314,150
20	K	93.8790	500,000,000	5,558,000,000	5,581,890,786	10.6283	53,141,500
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000	6,558,000,000	6,501,818,786	12.5145	125,145,000
22	P	90.1770	50,000,000	6,608,000,000	6,546,907,286	14.3303	7,165,150
23	N	90.1770	100,000,000	6,708,000,000	6,637,084,286	14.3303	14,330,300
24	I	90.1770	250,000,000	6,958,000,000	6,862,526,786	14.3303	35,825,750
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000	7,058,000,000	6,952,703,686	14.3304	14,330,400
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000	10,058,000,000	9,657,800,686	14.3374	430,122,000
27	I	88.4280	150,000,000	10,208,000,000	9,790,442,686	16.0793	24,118,950
28	B	88.4074	5,000,000,000	15,208,000,000	14,210,812,686	16.0999	804,995,000
29	B	86.7690	5,000,000,000	20,208,000,000	18,549,262,686	17.7383	886,915,000

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tendered Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price Rs. (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
30	D	86.7428	50,000,000	20,258,000,000	18,592,634,086	17.7645	8,882,250
31	I	86.7425	100,000,000	20,358,000,000	18,679,376,586	17.7648	17,764,800
32	A	86.7400	100,000,000	20,458,000,000	18,766,116,586	17.7673	17,767,300
33	D	86.0851	50,000,000	20,508,000,000	18,809,159,136	18.4222	9,211,100
34	O	76.4803	50,000,000	20,558,000,000	18,847,399,286	28.0270	14,013,500
35	O	74.2125	50,000,000	20,608,000,000	18,884,505,536	30.2948	15,147,400
36	L	62.6216	100,000,000	20,708,000,000	18,947,127,136	41.8857	41,885,700
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**2,730,059,050**

TREASURY BONDS TENDER BOARD
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
MINUTES PAPER

Meeting No: 05/2016 Time: 1230 to 1330 hrs. Date: 10.03.2016

1. Members of the Tender Board attended as detailed at Annex I.

2. The key details provided by PDD to facilitate making decisions on the Treasury bond auctions (held on 10.03.2016*) were as follows. The Technical details provided by PDD to the Tender Board members are at Annex II.

Series	8.00% 2019'A'	11.00% 2021 'A'	11.40% 2024 'A'
Period to Maturity	03 Year 08 Months	5 Years 05 Months	07 Years 10 Months
ISIN	LKB00819K017	LKB00821H019	LKB01024A014
Maturity Date	01-11-2019	01-08-2021	01-01-2024
Amount Offered (Rs.mn.)	2,000	2,000	2,000
Bid Received (Rs.mn.)	6,514	7,040	9,535

* Settlement Date: 11.03.2016

3. PDD made a technical presentation with the following highlights (Annex III).

   a. The previous corresponding bond auctions' information and comparison of those yields with the prevailing secondary market yield rates.

   b. Movement in secondary market yield rates and overall movements in money market liquidity, call money market and central bank policy rate corridor.

   c. The yield curve moved upwards over 50 bps in 2-years and in 3-years in addition to this yield curve moved upwards by 10 to 25 bps rest of maturity compared to the last week.

   d. The call money rate increased to 7.78% level compare to February 29, 2016 level of 7.50% and exchange rate appreciated to Rs.140.00/USD from February 29th level of Rs.144.35/USD.

   e. The money market liquidity level declined to negative Rs.5.38 billion compared to positive Rs.32.84 billion in the last week.

Superintendent
Public Debt Department

f. Year to date net foreign out flows from T- bill and T-bond amounted to USD 440.41 million.

4. The Tender Board made the following observations:

a. Today's auction was to raise funds for the coupon payment of Treasury Bonds amounting to Rs.12.77 bn.

b. As per the department recommendations only around Rs. 4.00 bn can be raised with the increases in yield rates by 54 to 264 bps across the maturities. Any other option to raise more funds would further increase the yield rates which may not be prudent.

c. The excessive speculation appears to continue as reflected in bids. The yield rates since the recent monetary policy tightening have increased by nearly 100 to 150 bps and further increase doesn't appear to be appropriate at this stage.

5. Decision

Accordingly, the Tender Board decided to decline to accept the departmental recommendation and reject consideration of all bids.

Chairman .....

SDG, DG overseeing PDD

AG(R), AG overseeing PDD .....

Actg. SPD .....

Add DER .....

A221 D/DOD .....

Superintendent
Public Debt. Department

ASPD (M), Secretary to the Tender Board

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6. Approval of the SDG

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10.03.2016

Superintendent
Public Debt Department

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TREASURY BONDS TENDER BOARD
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
MINUTES PAPER

Meeting No: 06/2016 Time: 1300 to 1330 hrs. Date: 24.03.2016

1. Members of the Tender Board attended as detailed at Annex I.

2. The key details provided by PDD to facilitate making decisions on the Treasury bond auctions (held on 24.03.2016*) were as follows. The Technical details provided by PDD to the Tender Board members are at Annex II.

Series	**9.25% 2020'A'**	**9.45% 2021 'A'**	**10.00% 2022 'A'**	**10.25%2025'A'**
Period to Maturity	04 Year 01 Months	05 Years 06 Month	06 Years 06 Months	08 Years 11 Months
ISIN	LKB00520E014	LKB00721J157	LKB00922J011	LKB01025C157
Maturity Date	10-05-2020	15-10-2021	01-10-2022	15-03-2025
Amount Offered (Rs.mn.)	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Bid Received (Rs.mn.)	13,628	17,500	13,520	33,150

* Settlement Date: 01.04.2016

3. PDD made a technical presentation with the following highlights (Annex III).

   a. The previous corresponding bond auctions' information and comparison of those yields with the prevailing secondary market yield rates.

   b. Movement in secondary market yield rates and overall movements in money market liquidity, call money market and central bank policy rate corridor.

   c. The yield curve moved upwards by 60 bps, 70 bps, 85 bps and 85 bps in 4-years, 5-years, 7-year and in 9-years compared to the last week.

   d. The call money rate as at today increased to 8.00% level compare to March 15, 2016 level of 7.83% and exchange rate remained unchanged at Rs.143.898/USD.

   e. The money market liquidity level decreased to Rs.3.33 billion compared to Rs.10.893 billion in the last week.

Superintende-i
Pubic Debt. Department

f. Year to date net foreign out flows from T- bill and T-bond amounted to USD 568.15 million.

4. The Tender Board made the following observations:

a. Today's auction was to raise part of the funding requirement on 01.04.2016 amounting to Rs.105.0 bn.

b. The bids at today's auction for all maturities have begun in the range of 12.50% to 13.00% which are very high compared to the recent auctions. Therefore the amount that can be raised from the auction as recommended by the department is very limited to Rs.10.3 bn in book value.

c. Therefore, one or more auctions has to be announced to raise the balance part of the funding requirements where such funds will have to be raised at further higher yield rates if any bids are accepted at today's auction.

d. On the other hand, sufficient liquidity will be available from maturity proceeds and coupon payments in the market for investment in bonds. However, bids placed for this auction are limited, expecting further increase in yield rates at the upcoming auctions.

e. Accordingly, the Tender Board was of the view that raising fund from this auction is not advisable and consideration of raising total funding requirements from the next auction could be more prudent

5. Decision

Accordingly, the Tender Board decided to reject the acceptance of all bids,

Chairman

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DG(SM), DG overseeing PDD

AG(R), AG overseeing PDD .....

Superintendent
Public Debt Department

Actg. SPD Absent

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Addl DER

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D/DOD

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ASPD (M), Secretary to the Tender Board

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6. Approval of the Governor

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24.03.2016

Superintendent
Public Debt. Department

Immediate Loss occurred from Primary Auction held on 29.03.2016 by accepting bids at a discounted Price

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tenderd Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
ISIN - LKB00520E014, 9.25% 2020A (4 YEARS AND I MONTHS),AMOUNT OFFERED RS.10,000 MN							
31	B	84.35120	800,000,000	10,272,000,000	8,733,875,000		-
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						-
ISIN -LKB01025C157,10.25% 2025A (8 YEARS AND 11 MONTHS),AMOUNT OFFEREDRS 10,000 MN							
63	J	75.57580	120,000,000.00	10,065,000,000.00	7,886,053,130.00		
64	G	75.44510	100,000,000.00	10,165,000,000.00	7,961,498,230.00	0.1307	130,700.00
65	J	75.44510	120,000,000.00	10,285,000,000.00	8,052,032,350.00	0.1307	156,840.00
66	J	75.31470	120,000,000.00	10,405,000,000.00	8,142,409,990.00	0.2611	313,320.00
67	K	75.22790	50,000,000.00	10,455,000,000.00	8,180,023,940.00	0.3479	173,950.00
68	J	75.22790	160,000,000.00	10,615,000,000.00	8,300,388,580.00	0.3479	556,640.00
69	K	75.22790	200,000,000.00	10,815,000,000.00	8,450,844,380.00	0.3479	695,800.00
70	J	75.18450	120,000,000.00	10,935,000,000.00	8,541,065,780.00	0.3913	469,560.00
71	J	75.05470	120,000,000.00	11,055,000,000.00	8,631,131,420.00	0.5211	625,320.00
72	J	74.92530	120,000,000.00	11,175,000,000.00	8,721,041,780.00	0.6505	780,600.00
73	M	74.83930	100,000,000.00	11,275,000,000.00	8,795,881,080.00	0.7365	736,500.00
74	K	74.79610	50,000,000.00	11,325,000,000.00	8,833,279,130.00	0.7797	389,850.00
75	K	74.79610	100,000,000.00	11,425,000,000.00	8,908,075,230.00	0.7797	779,700.00
76	P	74.79610	100,000,000.00	11,525,000,000.00	8,982,871,330.00	0.7797	779,700.00
77	J	74.79610	120,000,000.00	11,645,000,000.00	9,072,626,650.00	0.7797	935,640.00
78	K	74.79610	250,000,000.00	11,895,000,000.00	9,259,616,900.00	0.7797	1,949,250.00
79	M	74.79590	160,000,000.00	12,055,000,000.00	9,379,290,340.00	0.7799	1,247,840.00
80	C	74.79590	200,000,000.00	12,255,000,000.00	9,528,882,140.00	0.7799	1,559,800.00
81	K	74.36780	50,000,000.00	12,305,000,000.00	9,566,066,040.00	1.2080	604,000.00
82	J	74.36780	200,000,000.00	12,505,000,000.00	9,714,801,640.00	1.2080	2,416,000.00
83	K	74.36780	250,000,000.00	12,755,000,000.00	9,900,721,140.00	1.2080	3,020,000.00
84	K	73.94300	50,000,000.00	12,805,000,000.00	9,937,692,640.00	1.6328	816,400.00
85	K	73.94300	500,000,000.00	13,305,000,000.00	10,307,407,640.00	1.6328	8,164,000.00

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tenderd Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
86	B	73.93450	250,000,000.00	13,555,000,000.00	10,492,243,890.00	1.6413	4,103,250.00
87	C	73.73200	100,000,000.00	13,655,000,000.00	10,565,975,890.00	1.8438	1,843,800.00
88	P	73.73190	100,000,000.00	13,755,000,000.00	10,639,707,790.00	1.8439	1,843,900.00
89	K	73.52160	50,000,000.00	13,805,000,000.00	10,676,468,590.00	2.0542	1,027,100.00
90	J	73.52160	250,000,000.00	14,055,000,000.00	10,860,272,590.00	2.0542	5,135,500.00
91	K	73.52160	750,000,000.00	14,805,000,000.00	11,411,684,590.00	2.0542	15,406,500.00
92	K	73.10360	50,000,000.00	14,855,000,000.00	11,448,236,390.00	2.4722	1,236,100.00
93	M	73.10360	180,000,000.00	15,035,000,000.00	11,579,822,870.00	2.4722	4,449,960.00
94	K	73.10360	750,000,000.00	15,785,000,000.00	12,128,099,870.00	2.4722	18,541,500.00
95	M	72.68910	100,000,000.00	15,885,000,000.00	12,200,788,970.00	2.8867	2,886,700.00
96	C	72.68910	100,000,000.00	15,985,000,000.00	12,273,478,070.00	2.8867	2,886,700.00
97	P	72.68902	100,000,000.00	16,085,000,000.00	12,346,167,090.00	2.8868	2,886,780.00
98	K	72.68900	50,000,000.00	16,135,000,000.00	12,382,511,590.00	2.8868	1,443,400.00
99	F	72.68900	100,000,000.00	16,235,000,000.00	12,455,200,590.00	2.8868	2,886,800.00
100	K	72.68900	750,000,000.00	16,985,000,000.00	13,000,368,090.00	2.8868	21,651,000.00
101	B	72.65600	180,000,000.00	17,165,000,000.00	13,131,148,890.00	2.9198	5,255,640.00
102	K	72.48300	2,000,000,000.00	19,165,000,000.00	14,580,808,890.00	3.0928	61,856,000.00
103	M	72.27780	100,000,000.00	19,265,000,000.00	14,653,086,690.00	3.2980	3,298,000.00
104	K	72.27770	50,000,000.00	19,315,000,000.00	14,689,225,540.00	3.2981	1,649,050.00
105	J	72.27770	160,000,000.00	19,475,000,000.00	14,804,869,860.00	3.2981	5,276,960.00
106	K	72.27770	2,000,000,000.00	21,475,000,000.00	16,250,423,860.00	3.2981	65,962,000.00
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**258,828,050.00**
ISIN - LKB01226F014,11.00% 2026A (10 YEARS AND 2 MONTHS),AMOUNT OFFERED RS.10,000 MN							
70	**C**	**75.91150**	**200,000,000.00**	**10,090,000,000.00**	**8,012,848,545.00**		
71	J	75.82100	60,000,000.00	10,150,000,000.00	8,058,341,145.00	0.0905	54,300.00
72	J	75.68580	60,000,000.00	10,210,000,000.00	8,103,752,625.00	0.2257	135,420.00
73	K	75.68580	500,000,000.00	10,710,000,000.00	8,482,181,625.00	0.2257	1,128,500.00
74	K	75.23760	750,000,000.00	11,460,000,000.00	9,046,463,625.00	0.6739	5,054,250.00
75	K	74.79330	100,000,000.00	11,560,000,000.00	9,121,256,925.00	1.1182	1,118,200.00

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tenderd Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
76	C	74.79330	200,000,000.00	11,760,000,000.00	9,270,843,525.00	1.1182	2,236,400.00
77	K	74.79330	750,000,000.00	12,510,000,000.00	9,831,793,275.00	1.1182	8,386,500.00
78	K	74.13400	500,000,000.00	13,010,000,000.00	10,202,463,275.00	1.7775	8,887,500.00
79	K	74.09040	500,000,000.00	13,510,000,000.00	10,572,915,275.00	1.8211	9,105,500.00
80	K	74.04680	500,000,000.00	14,010,000,000.00	10,943,149,275.00	1.8647	9,323,500.00
81	K	74.00320	500,000,000.00	14,510,000,000.00	11,313,165,275.00	1.9083	9,541,500.00
82	K	73.95970	500,000,000.00	15,010,000,000.00	11,682,963,775.00	1.9518	9,759,000.00
83	K	73.91620	2,000,000,000.00	17,010,000,000.00	13,161,287,775.00	1.9953	39,906,000.00
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**104,636,570.00**
ISIN - LKB01530E152, 11.00% 2030A (14 YEARS AND 1 MONTHS),AMOUNT OFFERED,RS.10,000 MN							
88	**K**	**73.71470**	**1,000,000,000.00**	**10,775,000,000.00**	**8,185,426,680.00**		
89	M	73.71460	50,000,000.00	10,825,000,000.00	8,222,283,980.00	0.0001	50.00
90	P	73.47010	100,000,000.00	10,925,000,000.00	8,295,754,080.00	0.2446	244,600.00
91	K	73.22680	25,000,000.00	10,950,000,000.00	8,314,060,780.00	0.4879	121,975.00
92	P	73.22680	50,000,000.00	11,000,000,000.00	8,350,674,180.00	0.4879	243,950.00
93	P	73.22680	100,000,000.00	11,100,000,000.00	8,423,900,980.00	0.4879	487,900.00
94	K	73.22680	1,000,000,000.00	12,100,000,000.00	9,156,168,980.00	0.4879	4,879,000.00
95	M	73.22670	20,000,000.00	12,120,000,000.00	9,170,814,320.00	0.4880	97,600.00
96	C	72.98490	100,000,000.00	12,220,000,000.00	9,243,799,220.00	0.7298	729,800.00
97	P	72.98480	150,000,000.00	12,370,000,000.00	9,353,276,420.00	0.7299	1,094,850.00
98	P	72.98480	500,000,000.00	12,870,000,000.00	9,718,200,420.00	0.7299	3,649,500.00
99	P	72.98480	600,000,000.00	13,470,000,000.00	10,156,109,220.00	0.7299	4,379,400.00
100	K	72.74410	25,000,000.00	13,495,000,000.00	10,174,295,245.00	0.9706	242,650.00
101	J	72.74410	40,000,000.00	13,535,000,000.00	10,203,392,885.00	0.9706	388,240.00
102	P	72.74410	100,000,000.00	13,635,000,000.00	10,276,136,985.00	0.9706	970,600.00
103	K	72.74410	1,000,000,000.00	14,635,000,000.00	11,003,577,985.00	0.9706	9,706,000.00
104	H	72.74400	10,000,000.00	14,645,000,000.00	11,010,852,385.00	0.9707	97,070.00
105	H	72.26650	10,000,000.00	14,655,000,000.00	11,018,079,035.00	1.4482	144,820.00
106	K	72.26650	25,000,000.00	14,680,000,000.00	11,036,145,660.00	1.4482	362,050.00

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tenderd Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
107	M	72.26650	40,000,000.00	14,720,000,000.00	11,065,052,260.00	1.4482	579,280.00
108	P	72.26650	100,000,000.00	14,820,000,000.00	11,137,318,760.00	1.4482	1,448,200.00
109	K	72.26650	1,000,000,000.00	15,820,000,000.00	11,859,983,760.00	1.4482	14,482,000.00
110	P	72.02960	250,000,000.00	16,070,000,000.00	12,040,057,760.00	1.6851	4,212,750.00
111	H	71.79400	10,000,000.00	16,080,000,000.00	12,047,237,160.00	1.9207	192,070.00
112	J	71.79400	60,000,000.00	16,140,000,000.00	12,090,313,560.00	1.9207	1,152,420.00
113	M	71.79400	100,000,000.00	16,240,000,000.00	12,162,107,560.00	1.9207	1,920,700.00
114	C	71.79400	100,000,000.00	16,340,000,000.00	12,233,901,560.00	1.9207	1,920,700.00
115	P	71.79400	550,000,000.00	16,890,000,000.00	12,628,768,560.00	1.9207	10,563,850.00
116	P	71.79400	550,000,000.00	17,440,000,000.00	13,023,635,560.00	1.9207	10,563,850.00
117	M	71.32660	60,000,000.00	17,500,000,000.00	13,066,431,520.00	2.3881	1,432,860.00
118	P	71.32650	100,000,000.00	17,600,000,000.00	13,137,758,020.00	2.3882	2,388,200.00
119	K	71.09460	1,000,000,000.00	18,600,000,000.00	13,848,704,020.00	2.6201	26,201,000.00
120	K	71.04840	1,000,000,000.00	19,600,000,000.00	14,559,188,020.00	2.6663	26,663,000.00
121	K	71.00220	1,000,000,000.00	20,600,000,000.00	15,269,210,020.00	2.7125	27,125,000.00
122	K	70.95610	1,000,000,000.00	21,600,000,000.00	15,978,771,020.00	2.7586	27,586,000.00
123	K	70.95610	1,000,000,000.00	22,600,000,000.00	16,688,332,020.00	2.7586	27,586,000.00
124	J	70.86400	80,000,000.00	22,680,000,000.00	16,745,023,220.00	2.8507	2,280,560.00
125	P	70.86395	100,000,000.00	22,780,000,000.00	16,815,887,170.00	2.8507	2,850,750.00
126	P	70.63451	500,000,000.00	23,280,000,000.00	17,169,059,720.00	3.0802	15,400,950.00
127	P	70.63451	500,000,000.00	23,780,000,000.00	17,522,232,270.00	3.0802	15,400,950.00
128	C	70.63450	100,000,000.00	23,880,000,000.00	17,592,866,770.00	3.0802	3,080,200.00
129	M	70.40650	15,000,000.00	23,895,000,000.00	17,603,427,745.00	3.3082	496,230.00
130	M	70.40650	80,000,000.00	23,975,000,000.00	17,659,752,945.00	3.3082	2,646,560.00
131	I	70.40630	5,000,000,000.00	28,975,000,000.00	21,180,067,945.00	3.3084	165,420,000.00
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**421,434,135.00**
	ESTIMATED GRAND TOTAL LOSS						**784,898,755.00**

T BOND AUCTION DETAILS SINCE 2014 TO 2016

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
1	10/1/2014	5 Years 6 Months	LKB00619G019	2,000	6,750	2,000	4,750	Q	1,000,000,000	50.0%	8.6490-8.6490
								H	1,000,000,000	50.0%	
2		14 Years 11 Months	LKB01529A012	3,000	8,100	3,500	4,600	Q	3,000,000,000	85.7%	10.6100-10.6100
								H	500,000,000	14.3%	
3	26/02/2014	8 Years 4 Months	LKB00922G017	1,000	2,575	1,050	1,525	H	1,000,000,000	95.2%	9.9000-9.9027
								M	50,000,000	4.8%	
4		9 Years 10 Months	LKB01024A014	1,000	3,825	1,000	2,825	H	1,000,000,000	100.0%	9.9999-9.9999
5		14 Years 10 Months	LKB01529A012	1,000	3,625	1,000	2,625	H	1,000,000,000	100.0%	10.7604-10.7604
6	27/03/2014	8 Years 3 Months	LKB00922G017	1,000	2,675	1,000	1,675	H	1,000,000,000	100.0%	9.9999-9.9999
7		19 Years 9 months	LKB02034A012	2,000	5,050	2,000	3,050	Q	2,000,000,000	100.0%	11.3202-11.3202
8		29 Years 9 Months	LKB03044A010	2,000	7,875	2,000	5,875	Q	2,000,000,000	100.0%	11.7504-11.7504
9	27/05/2014	5 Years 1 Months	LKB00619G019	1,000	6,750	1,750	5,000	F	200,000,000	11.4%	8.9198-8.9282
								H	1,000,000,000	57.1%	
								N	250,000,000	14.3%	
								M	300,000,000	17.1%	
10		14 Years 7 Months	LKB01529A012	2,000	5,475	2,200	3,275	Q	2,000,000,000	90.9%	10.5000-10.8760
								J	200,000,000	9.1%	
11		30 Years	LKB03044F019	2,000	5,530	2,000	3,530	Q	2,000,000,000	100.0%	11.7504-11.7504
12	10/7/2014	9 Years 6 Months	LKB01024A014	2,000	6,200	2,000	4,200	H	2,000,000,000	100.0%	9.2303-9.2303
13		14 Years 10 Months	LKB01529E014	2,000	7,025	3,300	3,725	F	1,300,000,000	39.4%	10.5498-10.5758
								H	2,000,000,000	60.6%	
14	29/09/2014	8 Years	LKB00922J011	1,000	4,050	1,000	3,050	H	1,000,000,000	100.0%	7.1400-7.1400
15		14 Years 7 Months	LKB01529E014	1,000	5,150	1,950	3,200	F	772,727,000	39.6%	8.6000-8.6340
								H	1,000,000,000	51.3%	
								E	150,000,000	7.7%	
								K	27,273,000	1.4%	
16	30/12/2014	6 Years 7 Months	LKB00821H019	1,500	5,250	2,500	2,750	H	1,000,000,000	40.0%	7.0497-7.0497
								J	1,500,000,000	60.0%	
17		10 Years 4 Months	LKB01225E019	1,500	4,800	1,500	3,300	Q	1,500,000,000	100.0%	7.8804
18	27/02/2015	30 Years	LKB03045C013	1,000	20,708	10,058	10,650	Q	2,000,000,000	19.9%	9.3510-11.7270
								A	50,000,000	0.5%	
								F	100,000,000	1.0%	
								H	300,000,000	3.0%	
								E	100,000,000	1.0%	
								C	100,000,000	1.0%	
								G	100,000,000	1.0%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	P	100,000,000	1.0%	
								K	2,000,000,000	19.9%	
								B	3,508,000,000	34.9%	
								N	100,000,000	1.0%	
								J	100,000,000	1.0%	
								M	1,250,000,000	12.4%	
								I	250,000,000	2.5%	
19	10/3/2015	7 Years 4 Months	LKB00922G017	10,000	45,895	18,240	27,655	A	850,000,000	4.7%	8.5049-9.1701
								H	5,250,000,000	28.8%	
								E	50,000,000	0.3%	
								C	100,000,000	0.5%	
								P	2,240,000,000	12.3%	
								K	1,600,000,000	8.8%	
								B	2,000,000,000	11.0%	
								D	5,200,000,000	28.5%	
								M	950,000,000	5.2%	
20		10 Years 0 Months	LKB01025C157	10,000	38,607	15,707	22,900	Q	5,000,000,000	31.8%	9.5040-10.0863
								A	750,000,000	4.8%	
								F	500,000,000	3.2%	
								H	4,100,000,000	26.1%	
								C	50,000,000	0.3%	
								G	750,000,000	4.8%	
								P	300,000,000	1.9%	
								K	3,000,000,000	19.1%	
								B	1,007,000,000	6.4%	
								M	250,000,000	1.6%	
21		20 Years	LKB02035C155	10,000	41,340	17,890	23,450	Q	10,000,000,000	55.9%	10.8990-11.2032
								F	440,000,000	2.5%	
								H	1,200,000,000	6.7%	
								P	50,000,000	0.3%	
								K	3,000,000,000	16.8%	
								D	1,000,000,000	5.6%	
								M	1,700,000,000	9.5%	
								I	500,000,000	2.8%	
22		3 Years 2 Months	LKB00618F013	10,000	34,343	22,943	11,400	A	3,000,000,000	13.1%	8.2503-8.6976
								F	1,760,000,000	7.7%	
								H	6,150,000,000	26.8%	
								E	100,000,000	0.4%	
								C	450,000,000	2.0%	
								G	350,000,000	1.5%	
								P	3,283,000,000	14.3%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
	12/3/2015							K	100,000,000	0.4%	
								D	2,400,000,000	10.5%	
								N	500,000,000	2.2%	
								M	4,650,000,000	20.3%	
								I	200,000,000	0.9%	
23		8 Years 5 Months	LKB01023I019	10,000	27,890	14,462	13,428	A	450,000,000	3.1%	9.2502-9.7910
								F	750,000,000	5.2%	
								H	4,000,000,000	27.7%	
								C	650,000,000	4.5%	
								G	600,000,000	4.1%	
								P	3,362,000,000	23.2%	
								K	100,000,000	0.7%	
								N	300,000,000	2.1%	
								M	4,050,000,000	28.0%	
								I	200,000,000	1.4%	
24	17/03/2015	4 Years 6 Months	LKB00619I155	7,000	24,763	9,846	14,917	A	4,040,000,000	41.0%	8.9001-9.1305
								F	780,000,000	7.9%	
								H	300,000,000	3.0%	
								C	355,000,000	3.6%	
								G	300,000,000	3.0%	
								P	1,121,000,000	11.4%	
								K	500,000,000	5.1%	
								D	250,000,000	2.5%	
								J	700,000,000	7.1%	
								M	1,500,000,000	15.2%	
25		6 Years 4 Months	LKB00821H019	7,000	21,206	7,858	13,348	A	3,030,000,000	38.6%	9.1998-9.5517
								F	350,000,000	4.5%	
								H	550,000,000	7.0%	
								C	50,000,000	0.6%	
								G	200,000,000	2.5%	
								P	500,000,000	6.4%	
								D	678,000,000	8.6%	
								M	2,300,000,000	29.3%	
								I	200,000,000	2.5%	
26		4 Years 6 Months	LKB00619I155	10,000	40,620	19,245	21,375	A	5,725,000,000	29.7%	8.6202-8.9208
								F	2,500,000,000	13.0%	
								H	100,000,000	0.5%	
								E	45,000,000	0.2%	
								C	1,100,000,000	5.7%	
								G	100,000,000	0.5%	
								P	1,500,000,000	7.8%	
								K	625,000,000	3.2%	
								D	2,100,000,000	10.9%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
	26/03/2015							N	1,000,000,000	5.2%	
								J	1,300,000,000	6.8%	
								L	200,000,000	1.0%	
								M	1,800,000,000	9.4%	
								I	1,150,000,000	6.0%	
27		8 Years 5 Months	LKB01023I019	20,000	74,600	20,100	54,500	Q	5,000,000,000	24.9%	9.4401-9.7344
								A	2,000,000,000	10.0%	
								F	2,050,000,000	10.2%	
								C	1,300,000,000	6.5%	
								P	2,150,000,000	10.7%	
								D	200,000,000	1.0%	
								N	2,000,000,000	10.0%	
								J	2,000,000,000	10.0%	
								L	200,000,000	1.0%	
								M	3,000,000,000	14.9%	
								O	200,000,000	1.0%	
28	30/03/2015	5 Years 2 Months	LKB00820F015	5,000	22,760	5,265	17,495	Q	3,000,000,000	57.0%	9.0000-9.0747
								F	150,000,000	2.8%	
								H	250,000,000	4.7%	
								E	15,000,000	0.3%	
								G	100,000,000	1.9%	
								P	550,000,000	10.4%	
								K	300,000,000	5.7%	
								D	500,000,000	9.5%	
								M	200,000,000	3.8%	
								I	200,000,000	3.8%	
29		10 Years	LKB01025C157	20,000	48,048	20,103	27,945	Q	17,000,000,000	84.6%	9.9000-10.0260
								F	150,000,000	0.7%	
								H	200,000,000	1.0%	
								C	303,000,000	1.5%	
								K	1,250,000,000	6.2%	
								D	150,000,000	0.7%	
								M	1,050,000,000	5.2%	
30		2 Years 2 Months	LKB00417E153	12,500	32,756	12,441	20,315	A	50,000,000	0.4%	8.0001-8.1387
								F	1,241,000,000	10.0%	
								E	300,000,000	2.4%	
								C	350,000,000	2.8%	
								G	350,000,000	2.8%	
								P	2,000,000,000	16.1%	
								K	1,650,000,000	13.3%	
								D	1,650,000,000	13.3%	
								N	3,050,000,000	24.5%	
								J	200,000,000	1.6%	
								M	1,100,000,000	8.8%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
	7/4/2015							O	500,000,000	4.0%	
31		6 Years 4 Months	LKB00821H019	7,500	27,400	7,600	19,800	Q	3,000,000,000	39.5%	9.2502-9.3960
								A	350,000,000	4.6%	
								F	100,000,000	1.3%	
								E	100,000,000	1.3%	
								C	1,000,000,000	13.2%	
								G	50,000,000	0.7%	
								P	1,450,000,000	19.1%	
								K	500,000,000	6.6%	
								D	150,000,000	2.0%	
								L	100,000,000	1.3%	
								M	800,000,000	10.5%	
32	16/04/2015	4 Years 2 Months	LKB00619G019	5,000	26,800	-	26,800	-	-	-	-
33	21/04/2015	3 Years 1 Months	LKB00618F013	3,000	21,860	4,560	17,300	A	300,000,000	6.6%	8.0982-8.1549
								F	2,000,000,000	43.9%	
								E	100,000,000	2.2%	
								C	300,000,000	6.6%	
								D	850,000,000	18.6%	
								L	100,000,000	2.2%	
								M	210,000,000	4.6%	
								O	500,000,000	11.0%	
								I	200,000,000	4.4%	
34		7 Years 2 Months	LKB00922G017	3,000	21,585	-	21,585	-	-	-	-
35	29/04/2015	3 Years 1 Months	LKB00618F013	10,000	38,755	15,205	23,550	A	950,000,000	6.2%	7.8498-7.9587
								F	1,150,000,000	7.6%	
								E	200,000,000	1.3%	
								C	400,000,000	2.6%	
								G	100,000,000	0.7%	
								P	1,200,000,000	7.9%	
								K	600,000,000	3.9%	
								D	2,100,000,000	13.8%	
								N	1,000,000,000	6.6%	
								J	2,555,000,000	16.8%	
								L	200,000,000	1.3%	
								M	1,650,000,000	10.9%	
								O	500,000,000	3.3%	
								I	2,600,000,000	17.1%	
36		9 Years 11 Months	LKB01025C157	10,000	32,369	4,500	27,869	A	250,000,000	5.6%	8.9001-8.9838
								F	100,000,000	2.2%	
								C	750,000,000	16.7%	
								P	1,200,000,000	26.7%	
								K	800,000,000	17.8%	
								M	700,000,000	15.6%	
								O	100,000,000	2.2%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								I	600,000,000	13.3%	
37	5/5/2015	2 Years 9 Months	LKB01518B013	5,000	17,300	-	17,300	-	-	-	-
38		5 Years	LKB00520E014	5,000	16,970	5,750	11,220	Q	5,000,000,000	87.0%	8.3997-8.4627
								F	250,000,000	4.3%	
								I	500,000,000	8.7%	
39	12/5/2015	4 Years 1 Months	LKB00619G019	5,000	19,600	6,500	13,100	A	50,000,000	0.8%	8.0901-8.9531
								F	100,000,000	1.5%	
								H	550,000,000	8.5%	
								C	50,000,000	0.8%	
								K	50,000,000	0.8%	
								B	250,000,000	3.8%	
								D	550,000,000	8.5%	
								J	3,550,000,000	54.6%	
								L	100,000,000	1.5%	
								M	1,250,000,000	19.2%	
40		6 Years 2 Months	LKB00821H019	5,000	19,375	-	19,375	-	-	-	-
41	19/05/2015	7 Years 4 Months	LKB00922J011	2,000	11,540	-	11,540	-	-	-	-
42		9 Years 10 Months	LKB01025C157	2,000	14,670	3,290	11,380	Q	1,000,000,000	30.4%	8.9100-9.0135
								A	100,000,000	3.0%	
								H	100,000,000	3.0%	
								C	100,000,000	3.0%	
								P	1,000,000,000	30.4%	
								K	150,000,000	4.6%	
								B	200,000,000	6.1%	
								D	540,000,000	16.4%	
								M	100,000,000	3.0%	
43	28/05/2015	4 Years 11 Months	LKB00520E014	3,000	11,210	1,910	9,300	F	450,000,000	23.6%	8.2602-8.3538
								H	400,000,000	20.9%	
								P	50,000,000	2.6%	
								J	710,000,000	37.2%	
								M	300,000,000	15.7%	
44		8 Years 3 Months	LKB01023I019	7,000	27,880	7,830	20,050	Q	3,000,000,000	38.3%	8.7102-8.7786
								F	450,000,000	5.7%	
								H	400,000,000	5.1%	
								C	250,000,000	3.2%	
								P	800,000,000	10.2%	
								K	100,000,000	1.3%	
								D	200,000,000	2.6%	
								N	500,000,000	6.4%	
								J	830,000,000	10.6%	
								M	1,300,000,000	16.6%	
								Q	7,000,000,000	67.0%	9.5499-9.6723

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
45		14 Years 11 Months	LKB01530E152	10,000	33,330	10,450	22,880	P	500,000,000	4.8%	
								K	2,000,000,000	19.1%	
								M	750,000,000	7.2%	
								I	200,000,000	1.9%	
46	9/6/2015	4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520E014	9,000	27,350	16,500	10,850	A	350,000,000	2.1%	7.9002-8.1063
								F	300,000,000	1.8%	
								H	2,300,000,000	13.9%	
								E	150,000,000	0.9%	
								G	100,000,000	0.6%	
								P	350,000,000	2.1%	
								K	1,000,000,000	6.1%	
								B	100,000,000	0.6%	
								D	600,000,000	3.6%	
								N	5,000,000,000	30.3%	
								J	4,900,000,000	29.7%	
								L	100,000,000	0.6%	
								M	350,000,000	2.1%	
								I	900,000,000	5.5%	
47		7 Years 4 Months	LKB00922J011	9,000	30,100	16,100	14,000	F	600,000,000	3.7%	8.3997-8.5617
								H	1,900,000,000	11.8%	
								P	400,000,000	2.5%	
								K	50,000,000	0.3%	
								B	100,000,000	0.6%	
								J	12,600,000,000	78.3%	
								M	350,000,000	2.2%	
								I	100,000,000	0.6%	
48		9 Years 9 Months	LKB01025C157	9,000	27,330	-	27,330	-	-	-	-
49	12/6/2015	4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520E014	2,000	8,100	-	8,100	-	-	-	-
50		7 Years 3 Months	LKB00922J011	3,000	15,700	5,350	10,350	Q	2,000,000,000	37.4%	8.4996-8.5644
								H	400,000,000	7.5%	
								J	2,900,000,000	54.2%	
								L	50,000,000	0.9%	
51		9 Years 9 Months	LKB01025C157	7,000	23,150	9,650	13,500	Q	4,000,000,000	41.5%	8.8002-8.8947
								A	150,000,000	1.6%	
								F	100,000,000	1.0%	
								H	1,000,000,000	10.4%	
								C	100,000,000	1.0%	
								P	900,000,000	9.3%	
								J	3,000,000,000	31.1%	
								M	400,000,000	4.1%	
52	23/06/2015	2 Years	LKB00517F157	1,000	6,100	1,500	4,600	H	700,000,000	46.7%	6.6996-6.7005
								B	200,000,000	13.3%	
								J	600,000,000	40.0%	
								H	500,000,000	33.3%	7.1802-7.1802

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
53		3 Years 5 Months	LKB00718K151	1,000	6,100	1,500	4,600	B	300,000,000	20.0%	
								J	700,000,000	46.7%	
54	29/06/2015	4 Years 11 Months	LKB00820F015	10,000	17,200	3,700	13,500	H	1,400,000,000	37.8%	8.1503-8.1594
								B	1,000,000,000	27.0%	
								D	300,000,000	8.1%	
								J	1,000,000,000	27.0%	
55		6 Years 6 Months	LKB01022A018	10,000	29,580	13,300	16,280	Q	10,000,000,000	75.2%	8.5698-8.6679
								H	1,300,000,000	9.8%	
								B	1,000,000,000	7.5%	
								J	1,000,000,000	7.5%	
56		8 Years 2 Months	LKB01123I017	10,000	32,370	15,300	17,070	Q	12,000,000,000	78.4%	8.8002-8.8227
								H	1,300,000,000	8.5%	
								B	1,000,000,000	6.5%	
								J	1,000,000,000	6.5%	
57	2/7/2015	4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520E014	5,000	8,700	1,000	7,700	H	500,000,000	50.0%	8.1999-8.1999
								J	500,000,000	50.0%	
58		7 Years 3 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	9,250	1,000	8,250	H	500,000,000	50.0%	8.5698-8.5698
								J	500,000,000	50.0%	
59	9/7/2015	4 Years 9 Months	LKB00520E014	15,000	28,850	11,500	17,350	F	250,000,000	2.2%	8.2701-8.3853
								H	2,500,000,000	21.7%	
								E	100,000,000	0.9%	
								G	200,000,000	1.7%	
								B	5,100,000,000	44.3%	
								D	850,000,000	7.4%	
								N	1,000,000,000	8.7%	
								J	500,000,000	4.3%	
								M	1,000,000,000	8.7%	
60		6 Years 3 Months	LKB00721J157	10,000	17,365	7,615	9,750	F	500,000,000	6.6%	8.8497-9.0792
								H	2,500,000,000	32.8%	
								G	100,000,000	1.3%	
								P	200,000,000	2.6%	
								K	100,000,000	1.3%	
								B	1,500,000,000	19.7%	
								D	1,000,000,000	13.1%	
								J	715,000,000	9.4%	
								M	1,000,000,000	13.1%	
61		7 Years 2 Months	LKB00922J011	15,000	27,800	12,100	15,700	Q	4,000,000,000	33.1%	8.9001-9.1448
								F	250,000,000	2.1%	
								H	2,500,000,000	20.7%	
								P	50,000,000	0.4%	
								B	1,750,000,000	14.5%	
								D	800,000,000	6.6%	
								J	1,250,000,000	10.3%	
								M	1,500,000,000	12.4%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
62	14/07/2015	3 Years 3 Months	LKB00418J150	10,000	21,820	4,670	17,150	F	200,000,000	4.3%	7.9002-8.1818
								H	1,500,000,000	32.1%	
								E	70,000,000	1.5%	
								B	350,000,000	7.5%	
								D	1,750,000,000	37.5%	
								J	500,000,000	10.7%	
								M	300,000,000	6.4%	
63		8 Years 1 Months	LKB01023I019	10,000	29,150	11,050	18,100	Q	5,000,000,000	45.2%	9.1998-9.5814
								A	150,000,000	1.4%	
								F	200,000,000	1.8%	
								H	1,500,000,000	13.6%	
								E	50,000,000	0.5%	
								C	200,000,000	1.8%	
								P	1,600,000,000	14.5%	
								B	350,000,000	3.2%	
								D	800,000,000	7.2%	
								J	600,000,000	5.4%	
								M	600,000,000	5.4%	
64	27/07/2015	3 Years 11 Months	LKB00619G019	12,500	49,665	27,630	22,035	F	750,000,000	2.7%	8.1503-8.1918
								H	2,000,000,000	7.2%	
								G	200,000,000	0.7%	
								P	1,180,000,000	4.3%	
								D	1,550,000,000	5.6%	
								N	20,000,000,000	72.4%	
								J	1,250,000,000	4.5%	
								L	500,000,000	1.8%	
								M	200,000,000	0.7%	
65		6 Years	LKB00821H019	12,500	47,420	23,010	24,410	F	425,000,000	1.8%	8.8002-8.8740
								H	1,000,000,000	4.3%	
								C	500,000,000	2.2%	
								G	100,000,000	0.4%	
								P	1,435,000,000	6.2%	
								B	200,000,000	0.9%	
								D	1,000,000,000	4.3%	
								N	15,000,000,000	65.2%	
								J	1,250,000,000	5.4%	
								L	300,000,000	1.3%	
								M	1,800,000,000	7.8%	
66		10 Years	LKB01025H016	15,000	59,710	-	59,710	-	-	-	-
67		3 Years 11 Months	LKB00619G019	5,000	20,400	-	20,400	-	-	-	-
								Q	5,000,000,000	43.8%	9.0000-9.0666
								A	100,000,000	0.9%	
								F	250,000,000	2.2%	
								H	250,000,000	2.2%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
68	4/8/2015	6 Years	LKB00821H019	5,000	28,835	11,405	17,430	E	100,000,000	0.9%	
								C	850,000,000	7.5%	
								G	150,000,000	1.3%	
								P	1,050,000,000	9.2%	
								B	150,000,000	1.3%	
								D	750,000,000	6.6%	
								N	400,000,000	3.5%	
								J	1,255,000,000	11.0%	
								M	1,100,000,000	9.6%	
69		10 Years	LKB01025H016	10,000	56,680	14,340	42,340	Q	11,000,000,000	76.7%	9.5004-9.6327
								F	50,000,000	0.3%	
								H	250,000,000	1.7%	
								E	100,000,000	0.7%	
								C	120,000,000	0.8%	
								G	50,000,000	0.3%	
								P	1,420,000,000	9.9%	
								K	1,000,000,000	7.0%	
								B	50,000,000	0.3%	
								J	200,000,000	1.4%	
								M	100,000,000	0.7%	
70	11/8/2015	4 Years 8 Months	LKB00520E014	3,000	22,273	6,273	16,000	F	100,000,000	1.6%	8.2998-8.3781
								H	700,000,000	11.2%	
								C	400,000,000	6.4%	
								P	700,000,000	11.2%	
								B	100,000,000	1.6%	
								D	300,000,000	4.8%	
								N	3,400,000,000	54.2%	
								J	173,000,000	2.8%	
								M	400,000,000	6.4%	
71		10 Years	LKB01025H16	5,000	32,918	6,660	26,258	Q	3,000,000,000	45.0%	9.5003-9.6687
								F	95,000,000	1.4%	
								H	700,000,000	10.5%	
								E	155,000,000	2.3%	
								C	460,000,000	6.9%	
								G	95,000,000	1.4%	
								P	705,000,000	10.6%	
								K	200,000,000	3.0%	
								B	150,000,000	2.3%	
								J	800,000,000	12.0%	
								M	300,000,000	4.5%	
72		4 Years 2 Months	LKB00819K017	5,000	12,508	-	12,508	-	-	-	-
								Q	5,000,000,000	48.6%	9.5796-9.7595
								F	47,000,000	0.5%	
								H	800,000,000	7.8%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
73	25/08/2015	8 Years	LKB01023I019	10,000	30,452	10,294	20,158	E	90,000,000	0.9%	
								C	804,000,000	7.8%	
								G	42,000,000	0.4%	
								P	695,000,000	6.8%	
								B	592,000,000	5.8%	
								D	198,000,000	1.9%	
								J	1,416,000,000	13.8%	
								L	50,000,000	0.5%	
								M	560,000,000	5.4%	
74		9 Years 11 Months	LKB01025H016	12,500	43,996	20,288	23,708	Q	15,000,000,000	73.9%	9.6660-9.9747
								F	47,000,000	0.2%	
								H	800,000,000	3.9%	
								E	140,000,000	0.7%	
								C	143,000,000	0.7%	
								G	42,000,000	0.2%	
								P	1,795,000,000	8.8%	
								B	111,000,000	0.5%	
								D	250,000,000	1.2%	
								J	1,660,000,000	8.2%	
								M	300,000,000	1.5%	
75		14 Years 8 Months	LKB01530E152	12,500	40,220	-	40,220	-	-	-	-
76	31/08/2015	4 Years 8 Months	LKB00520E014	5,000	14,268	5,500	8,768	F	483,000,000	8.8%	9.0999-9.3537
								H	1,250,000,000	22.7%	
								E	136,000,000	2.5%	
								C	146,000,000	2.7%	
								G	32,000,000	0.6%	
								P	187,000,000	3.4%	
								B	134,000,000	2.4%	
								D	1,700,000,000	30.9%	
								N	500,000,000	9.1%	
								J	632,000,000	11.5%	
								M	300,000,000	5.5%	
77		5 Years 11 Months	LKB00821H019	12,500	25,190	1,755	23,435	F	135,000,000	7.7%	9.6003-9.7073
								H	700,000,000	39.9%	
								E	40,000,000	2.3%	
								C	15,000,000	0.9%	
								G	25,000,000	1.4%	
								P	40,000,000	2.3%	
								B	40,000,000	2.3%	
								D	500,000,000	28.5%	
								J	60,000,000	3.4%	
								M	200,000,000	11.4%	
								Q	16,000,000,000	66.5%	10.0998-10.3356
								F	986,000,000	4.1%	
								H	800,000,000	3.3%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
78		10 Years 09 Months	LKB01226F014	12,500	39,937	24,063	15,874	E	16,000,000	0.1%	
								C	20,000,000	0.1%	
								G	26,000,000	0.1%	
								P	415,000,000	1.7%	
								K	2,250,000,000	9.4%	
								B	1,279,000,000	5.3%	
								J	21,000,000	0.1%	
								M	250,000,000	1.0%	
								I	2,000,000,000	8.3%	
79	8/9/2015	4 Years 8 Months	LKB00520E014	2,000	14,110	3,735	10,375	A	2,200,000,000	58.9%	9.6003-9.6498
								H	300,000,000	8.0%	
								E	50,000,000	1.3%	
								C	100,000,000	2.7%	
								G	25,000,000	0.7%	
								P	350,000,000	9.4%	
								K	500,000,000	13.4%	
								D	50,000,000	1.3%	
								M	160,000,000	4.3%	
80		8 Years	LKB01023I019	2,000	14,060	4,470	9,590	H	300,000,000	6.7%	10.0503-10.2509
								C	350,000,000	7.8%	
								P	950,000,000	21.3%	
								K	2,000,000,000	44.7%	
								D	470,000,000	10.5%	
								M	200,000,000	4.5%	
								I	200,000,000	4.5%	
81		10 Years 9 Months	LKB01226F014	3,000	14,769	-	14,769	-	-	-	-
82		14 Years 8 Months	LKB01530E152	3,000	17,401	7,427	9,974	Q	3,000,000,000	40.4%	10.7000-10.9575
								H	212,000,000	2.9%	
								C	50,000,000	0.7%	
								P	1,700,000,000	22.9%	
								K	150,000,000	2.0%	
								I	2,315,000,000	31.2%	
83		4 Years 7 Months	LKB00520E014	3,000	20,003	3,100	16,903	A	50,000,000	1.6%	9.4896-9.5768
								F	200,000,000	6.5%	
								E	50,000,000	1.6%	
								C	450,000,000	14.5%	
								P	1,000,000,000	32.3%	
								K	100,000,000	3.2%	
								D	100,000,000	3.2%	
								J	500,000,000	16.1%	
								L	50,000,000	1.6%	
								M	300,000,000	9.7%	
								I	300,000,000	9.7%	
								F	1,490,000,000	15.6%	9.0486-9.9495

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
84	15/09/2015	7 Years 0 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	19,773	9,559	10,214	H	300,000,000	3.1%	
								E	29,000,000	0.3%	
								C	32,000,000	0.3%	
								G	36,000,000	0.4%	
								P	2,331,000,000	24.4%	
								K	3,500,000,000	36.6%	
								B	48,000,000	0.5%	
								J	1,543,000,000	16.1%	
								L	50,000,000	0.5%	
								M	200,000,000	2.1%	
85		9 Years 10 Months	LKB01025H016	5,000	15,582	5,241	10,341	F	400,000,000	7.6%	10.2500-10.3815
								H	200,000,000	3.8%	
								C	150,000,000	2.9%	
								P	2,050,000,000	39.1%	
								K	1,300,000,000	24.8%	
								D	130,000,000	2.5%	
								J	1,011,000,000	19.3%	
86		12 Years 11 Months	LKB01528I017	3,000	17,779	10,884	6,895	Q	3,000,000,000	27.6%	10.5003-10.8845
								F	973,000,000	8.9%	
								H	300,000,000	2.8%	
								E	18,000,000	0.2%	
								C	100,000,000	0.9%	
								G	21,000,000	0.2%	
								P	4,274,000,000	39.3%	
								K	1,500,000,000	13.8%	
								B	28,000,000	0.3%	
								D	30,000,000	0.3%	
								J	40,000,000	0.4%	
								M	400,000,000	3.7%	
								I	200,000,000	1.8%	
87	28/09/2015	3 Years 11 Months	LKB00619I155	2,000	14,610	3,000	11,610	A	1,500,000,000	50.0%	9.4500-9.5003
								H	1,500,000,000	50.0%	
88		5 Years 10 Months	LKB00821H019	3,000	15,060	6,500	8,560	A	3,050,000,000	46.9%	9.8000-9.9018
								F	50,000,000	0.8%	
								H	1,800,000,000	27.7%	
								P	350,000,000	5.4%	
								D	120,000,000	1.8%	
								J	1,030,000,000	15.8%	
								L	50,000,000	0.8%	
								M	50,000,000	0.8%	
89		8 Years 3 Months	LKB01024A014	4,000	15,593	-	15,593	-	-	-	
90		12 Years 11 months	LKB01528I017	4,000	18,965	3,660	15,305	Q	1,000,000,000	27.3%	10.9800-11.0448
								H	600,000,000	16.4%	
								P	955,000,000	26.1%	
								K	1,000,000,000	27.3%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								J	55,000,000	1.5%	
								M	50,000,000	1.4%	
91		3 Years 10 Months	LKB00619I155	7,000	32,562	8,000	24,562	H	8,000,000,000	100.0%	9.0702-9.1377
92		6 Years 11 Months	LKB00922J011	7,000	32,611	6,222	26,389	F	700,000,000	11.3%	9.6003-9.6488
								H	1,500,000,000	24.1%	
								P	506,000,000	8.1%	
								K	300,000,000	4.8%	
								B	106,000,000	1.7%	
								D	310,000,000	5.0%	
								J	600,000,000	9.6%	
								L	2,100,000,000	33.8%	
								M	100,000,000	1.6%	
93	26/10/2015	12 Years 10 Months	LKB01528I017	6,000	27,247	8,880	18,367	Q	2,000,000,000	22.5%	10.1502-10.3913
								F	5,000,000	0.1%	
								H	3,000,000,000	33.8%	
								C	10,000,000	0.1%	
								G	5,000,000	0.1%	
								P	2,260,000,000	25.5%	
								K	900,000,000	10.1%	
								B	610,000,000	6.9%	
								D	30,000,000	0.3%	
								J	10,000,000	0.1%	
								I	50,000,000	0.6%	
94		19 Years 4 Months	LKB02035C155	10,000	37,295	22,340	14,955	Q	10,000,000,000	44.8%	10.8900-11.1321
								F	105,000,000	0.5%	
								H	500,000,000	2.2%	
								C	460,000,000	2.1%	
								G	605,000,000	2.7%	
								P	3,300,000,000	14.8%	
								K	2,250,000,000	10.1%	
								B	1,010,000,000	4.5%	
								J	10,000,000	0.0%	
								M	200,000,000	0.9%	
								I	3,900,000,000	17.5%	
95	30/10/2015	4 Years 6 Months	LKB00520E014	3,000	30,473	3,669	26,804	A	100,000,000	2.7%	8.9496-8.9946
								F	750,000,000	20.4%	
								H	500,000,000	13.6%	
								P	481,000,000	13.1%	
								N	1,000,000,000	27.3%	
								J	288,000,000	7.8%	
								M	150,000,000	4.1%	
								I	400,000,000	10.9%	
96		8 Years 2 Months	LKB01024A014	3,000	13,735	-	13,735	-	-	-	-
								A	600,000,000	9.0%	10.1070-10.3275

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
97		14 Years 06 Months	LKB01530E152	3,000	28,060	6,700	21,360	P	1,450,000,000	21.6%	
								K	1,050,000,000	15.7%	
								B	600,000,000	9.0%	
								I	3,000,000,000	44.8%	
98		4 Years 5 Months	LKB00520E014	2,000	17,877	1,244	16,633	H	1,000,000,000	80.4%	8.9001-8.9082
								J	244,000,000	19.6%	
99		10 Years 6 Months	LKB01226F014	3,000	17,567	500	17,067	H	500,000,000	100.0%	9.3500-9.3500
100	27/11/2015	19 Years 3 Months	LKB02035C155	7,000	36,400	18,850	17,550	H	1,000,000,000	5.3%	10.2500-10.4984
								Q	7,000,000,000	37.1%	
								A	550,000,000	2.9%	
								F	300,000,000	1.6%	
								C	400,000,000	2.1%	
								G	150,000,000	0.8%	
								P	400,000,000	2.1%	
								K	1,750,000,000	9.3%	
								B	700,000,000	3.7%	
								M	600,000,000	3.2%	
								I	6,000,000,000	31.8%	
101		5 Years	LKB00520L159	2,000	12,614	-	12,614	-	-	-	-
102	15/12/2015	9 Years 7 Months	LKB01025H016	3,000	12,075	3,000	9,075	A	500,000,000	16.7%	9.9503-10.3563
								F	655,357,000	21.8%	
								H	200,000,000	6.7%	
								C	550,000,000	18.3%	
								G	69,643,000	2.3%	
								P	450,000,000	15.0%	
								B	150,000,000	5.0%	
								J	225,000,000	7.5%	
								M	200,000,000	6.7%	
103		19 Years 3 Months	LKB02035C155	5,000	27,975	12,555	15,420	Q	5,000,000,000	39.8%	10.5003-10.8567
								A	950,000,000	7.6%	
								F	1,345,000,000	10.7%	
								H	80,000,000	0.6%	
								C	400,000,000	3.2%	
								G	750,000,000	6.0%	
								P	1,850,000,000	14.7%	
								K	50,000,000	0.4%	
								B	330,000,000	2.6%	
								M	1,100,000,000	8.8%	
								I	700,000,000	5.6%	
104		5 Years	LKB00520L159	3,000	10,050	1,300	8,750	H	1,100,000,000	84.6%	9.3996-9.5589
								B	200,000,000	15.4%	
105		14 Years 5 Months	LKB01530E152	3,000	10,010	2,860	7,150	A	400,000,000	14.0%	10.4796-11.0016
								H	1,100,000,000	38.5%	
								P	600,000,000	21.0%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
[illegible]	18/12/2015	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	B	150,000,000	5.2%	
								J	310,000,000	10.8%	
								M	300,000,000	10.5%	
106		19 Years 3 Months	LKB02035C155	6,000	15,430	2,930	12,500	A	550,000,000	18.8%	11.1951-11.4480
								F	200,000,000	6.8%	
								H	1,280,000,000	43.7%	
								P	450,000,000	15.4%	
								K	50,000,000	1.7%	
								B	100,000,000	3.4%	
								J	200,000,000	6.8%	
								M	100,000,000	3.4%	
107	23/12/2015	5 Years	LKB00520L159	2,000	7,650	2,150	5,500	F	350,000,000	16.3%	9.5499-9.7947
								H	1,150,000,000	53.5%	
								B	200,000,000	9.3%	
								D	250,000,000	11.6%	
								M	200,000,000	9.3%	
108		7 Years 9 Months	LKB01023I019	3,000	10,990	3,140	7,850	Q	1,000,000,000	31.8%	10.5003-10.8162
								F	207,692,000	6.6%	
								H	500,000,000	15.9%	
								C	350,000,000	11.1%	
								P	157,693,000	5.0%	
								B	300,000,000	9.6%	
								J	274,615,000	8.7%	
								M	350,000,000	11.1%	
109		9 Years 7 Months	LKB01025H016	5,000	14,215	1,610	12,605	Q	83,333,000	5.2%	10.8000-10.9395
								H	505,000,000	31.4%	
								E	5,000,000	0.3%	
								P	200,000,000	12.4%	
								B	300,000,000	18.6%	
								J	300,000,000	18.6%	
								M	216,667,000	13.5%	
110	29/12/2015	3 Years 10 Months	LKB00819K017	3,000	8,700	-	8,700	-	-	-	-
111		5 Years 10 Months	LKB00721J157	5,000	11,950	-	11,950	-	-	-	-
112		12 Years 8 Months	LKB01528I017	5,000	12,405	-	12,405	-	-	-	-
113		4 Years 11 Months	LKB00520L159	2,000	14,830	-	14,830	-	-	-	-
114		9 Years 7 Months	LKB01025H016	5,000	23,379	6,059	17,320	Q	1,000,000,000	16.5%	10.8900-11.0538
								F	950,000,000	15.7%	
								H	200,000,000	3.3%	
								C	200,000,000	3.3%	
								P	800,000,000	13.2%	
								K	1,500,000,000	24.8%	
								B	135,000,000	2.2%	
								D	464,000,000	7.7%	
								J	600,000,000	9.9%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								M	210,000,000	3.5%	
115	8/1/2016	14 Years 4 Months	LKB01530E152	5,000	24,285	13,585	10,700	Q	5,000,000,000	36.8%	11.2500-11.4552
								A	300,000,000	2.2%	
								F	1,600,000,000	11.8%	
								H	300,000,000	2.2%	
								C	100,000,000	0.7%	
								P	350,000,000	2.6%	
								K	2,000,000,000	14.7%	
								D	650,000,000	4.8%	
								J	35,000,000	0.3%	
								M	100,000,000	0.7%	
								I	3,150,000,000	23.2%	
116		25 Years	LKB02541A016	8,000	41,975	19,635	22,340	Q	10,000,000,000	50.9%	11.5595-12.0888
								A	950,000,000	4.8%	
								F	450,000,000	2.3%	
								P	1,150,000,000	5.9%	
								K	3,000,000,000	15.3%	
								D	50,000,000	0.3%	
								J	35,000,000	0.2%	
								I	4,000,000,000	20.4%	
117		4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520L159	2,000	13,275	-	-	-	-	-	-
118		10 Years 4 Months	LKB01226F014	3,000	19,030	6,190	12,840	A	250,000,000	4.0%	10.8504-11.1393
								F	415,000,000	6.7%	
								H	550,000,000	8.9%	
								P	2,187,500,000	35.3%	
								B	685,000,000	11.1%	
								D	270,000,000	4.4%	
								J	1,432,500,000	23.1%	
								M	400,000,000	6.5%	
119	28/01/2016	14 Years 3 Months	LKB01530E152	5,000	27,150	15,650	11,500	A	1,450,000,000	9.3%	11.1059-11.5344
								F	1,000,000,000	6.4%	
								H	250,000,000	1.6%	
								C	200,000,000	1.3%	
								G	100,000,000	0.6%	
								P	1,750,000,000	11.2%	
								K	4,150,000,000	26.5%	
								B	530,000,000	3.4%	
								D	360,000,000	2.3%	
								J	1,140,000,000	7.3%	
								M	4,190,000,000	26.8%	
								O	40,000,000	0.3%	
								I	490,000,000	3.1%	
120		29 Years 01 Months	LKB03045C013	5,000	44,840	-	44,840	-	-	-	-
121		4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520L159	2,000	11,972	-	-	-	-	-	-

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
122	5/2/2016	14 Years 3 Months	LKB01530E152	3,000	42,865	10,455	32,410	Q	2,000,000,000	19.1%	11.5002-11.6640
								A	650,000,000	6.2%	
								F	1,300,000,000	12.4%	
								H	230,000,000	2.2%	
								C	100,000,000	1.0%	
								P	2,250,000,000	21.5%	
								K	1,600,000,000	15.3%	
								D	25,000,000	0.2%	
								J	300,000,000	2.9%	
								M	1,200,000,000	11.5%	
								I	800,000,000	7.7%	
123		24 Years 11 Months	LKB02541A016	5,000	48,080	10,250	37,830	A	450,000,000	4.4%	11.9997-12.1527
								C	200,000,000	2.0%	
								P	550,000,000	5.4%	
								K	6,250,000,000	61.0%	
								I	2,800,000,000	27.3%	
124	29/02/2016	5 Years 5 Months	LKB00821HO19	3,000	12,277	5,312	6,965	Q	4,000,000,000	75.3%	11.0502-11.4236
								A	50,000,000	0.9%	
								F	150,000,000	2.8%	
								C	200,000,000	3.8%	
								P	100,000,000	1.9%	
								B	150,000,000	2.8%	
								D	100,000,000	1.9%	
								J	262,000,000	4.9%	
								M	300,000,000	5.6%	
125		7 Years 6 Months	LKB01023I019	3,000	18,750	7,637	11,113	Q	5,000,000,000	65.5%	11.6496-11.7836
								F	200,000,000	2.6%	
								C	250,000,000	3.3%	
								P	250,000,000	3.3%	
								B	340,000,000	4.5%	
								N	1,000,000,000	13.1%	
								J	175,000,000	2.3%	
								M	278,000,000	3.6%	
								O	126,000,000	1.6%	
								I	18,000,000	0.2%	
126		1 Years 11 Months	LKB01518B013	3,000	15,760	5,305	10,455	C	5,000,000	0.1%	9.8000-9.9962
								N	5,000,000,000	94.3%	
								J	50,000,000	0.9%	
								M	250,000,000	4.7%	
127	10/3/2016	03 Years 08 Months	LKB00819K017	2,000	6,514	-	6,514	-	-	-	-
128		05 Years 05 Months	LKB00821H019	2,000	7,040	-	7,040	-	-	-	-
129		07 Years 10 Months	LKB01024A014	2,000	9,535	-	9,535	-	-	-	-
130		4 Years 1 Months	LKB00520F014	1,000	6,805	1,305	5,500	A	455,000,000	34.9%	11.6000-11.8736
								F	100,000,000	7.7%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	H	600,000,000	46.0%	
								M	150,000,000	11.5%	
131		1 Year 3 Months	LK00517F157	1,000	8,300	-	-	-	-	-	-
132	17/03/2016	7 Years 9 Months	LKB01024A014	2,000	13,030	6,620	6,410	Q	4,000,000,000	60.4%	10.9314-12.2571
								F	550,000,000	8.3%	
								H	460,000,000	6.9%	
								G	50,000,000	0.8%	
								P	600,000,000	9.1%	
								K	20,000,000	0.3%	
								D	90,000,000	1.4%	
								N	400,000,000	6.0%	
								J	150,000,000	2.3%	
								M	300,000,000	4.5%	
133	24/03/2016	04 Years 01 Months	LKB00520E014	5,000	13,628	-	13,628	-	-	-	-
134		05 Years 06 Months	LKB00721J157	5,000	17,500	-	17,500	-	-	-	-
135		06 Years 06 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	13,520	-	13,520	-	-	-	-
136		08 Years 11 Months	LKB01025C157	5,000	33,150	-	33,150	-	-	-	-
137	29/03/2016	4 Years 1 Month	LKB00520E014	10,000	27,022	10,272	16,750	F	122,000,000	1.2%	12.5000-12.7809
								H	3,550,000,000	34.6%	
								C	400,000,000	3.9%	
								P	150,000,000	1.5%	
								K	50,000,000	0.5%	
								B	1,000,000,000	9.7%	
								J	5,000,000,000	48.7%	
138		8 Years 11 Months	LKB01025C157	10,000	36,915	21,475	15,440	Q	1,000,000,000	4.7%	12.7503-13.7979
								F	100,000,000	0.5%	
								H	4,000,000,000	18.6%	
								C	800,000,000	3.7%	
								G	100,000,000	0.5%	
								P	350,000,000	1.6%	
								K	8,450,000,000	39.3%	
								B	1,550,000,000	7.2%	
								D	15,000,000	0.1%	
								J	3,850,000,000	17.9%	
								M	1,140,000,000	5.3%	
								I	120,000,000	0.6%	
139		10 Years 2 Months	LKB01226F014	10,000	32,560	17,010	15,550	Q	500,000,000	2.9%	12.9996-13.9311
								F	250,000,000	1.5%	
								H	3,500,000,000	20.6%	
								C	900,000,000	5.3%	
								G	125,000,000	0.7%	
								K	7,600,000,000	44.7%	
								B	1,000,000,000	5.9%	
								D	35,000,000	0.2%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								J	3,000,000,000	17.6%	
								I	100,000,000	0.6%	
140		14 Years 1 Month	LKB01530E152	10,000	45,925	28,975	16,950	Q	1,000,000,000	3.5%	12.7998-14.2263
								F	400,000,000	1.4%	
								H	1,030,000,000	3.6%	
								C	1,400,000,000	4.8%	
								P	6,450,000,000	22.3%	
								K	10,310,000,000	35.6%	
								B	1,000,000,000	3.5%	
								D	35,000,000	0.1%	
								J	1,200,000,000	4.1%	
								M	750,000,000	2.6%	
								I	5,400,000,000	18.6%	
141		3 Years 5 Months	LKB00619G019	5,000	15,025	5,000	10,025	H	2,500,000,000	50.0%	11.7504-11.7504
								B	500,000,000	10.0%	
								J	2,000,000,000	40.0%	
142		5 Years 4 Months	LKB00821H019	5,000	24,175	14,350	9,825	A	7,600,000,000	53.0%	11.9897-11.9986
								F	600,000,000	4.2%	
								H	1,000,000,000	7.0%	
								G	750,000,000	5.2%	
								P	750,000,000	5.2%	
								K	625,000,000	4.4%	
								B	500,000,000	3.5%	
								N	500,000,000	3.5%	
	31/03/2016							J	1,825,000,000	12.7%	
								M	200,000,000	1.4%	
143		1 Year 10 Months	LKB01518B013	5,000	21,254	9,000	12,254	H	3,000,000,000	33.3%	11.7504-11.7513
								B	2,500,000,000	27.8%	
								J	3,500,000,000	38.9%	
144		12 Years 5 Months	LKB01528I017	10,000	52,605	21,660	30,945	A	250,000,000	1.2%	13.3299-13.7996
								H	1,000,000,000	4.6%	
								K	15,000,000,000	69.3%	
								B	4,000,000,000	18.5%	
								D	10,000,000	0.0%	
								J	1,000,000,000	4.6%	
								M	400,000,000	1.8%	
145		4 Years 8 Months	LKB00520L159	5,000	14,080	-	14,080	-	-	-	-
146	18/04/2016	6 Years 5 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	14,200	-	14,200	-	-	-	-
147		7 Years 8 Months	LKB01024A014	5,000	31,236	-	31,236	-	-	-	-
148		4 Years	LKB00520E014	8,000	33,970	9,360	24,610	Q	6,000,000,000	64.1%	11.5497-11.7774
								A	300,000,000	3.2%	
								F	350,000,000	3.7%	
								H	1,500,000,000	16.0%	
								C	160,000,000	1.7%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
148		4 Years	LKB00520E014	8,000	33,970	9,360	24,610	P	600,000,000	6.4%	
								B	100,000,000	1.1%	
								D	200,000,000	2.1%	
								M	50,000,000	0.5%	
								O	100,000,000	1.1%	
149	28/04/2016	2 Years 6 Months	LKB00718K151	8,000	28,800	15,600	13,200	Q	1,500,000,000	9.6%	11.2500-11.5334
								A	3,500,000,000	22.4%	
								F	2,400,000,000	15.4%	
								H	1,500,000,000	9.6%	
								P	2,900,000,000	18.6%	
								B	400,000,000	2.6%	
								D	1,000,000,000	6.4%	
								J	1,900,000,000	12.2%	
								M	500,000,000	3.2%	
150		6 Years 5 Months	LKB00922J011	8,000	42,230	5,480	36,750	Q	2,000,000,000	36.5%	11.6901-11.9817
								A	350,000,000	6.4%	
								F	675,000,000	12.3%	
								H	1,030,000,000	18.8%	
								C	50,000,000	0.9%	
								P	900,000,000	16.4%	
								K	5,000,000	0.1%	
								D	320,000,000	5.8%	
								M	150,000,000	2.7%	
151		4 Years	LKB00520E014	5,000	29,271	7,001	22,270	Q	500,000,000	7.1%	
								A	400,000,000	5.7%	
								F	350,000,000	5.0%	
								H	200,000,000	2.9%	
								C	1,205,000,000	17.2%	
								P	2,626,000,000	37.5%	
								D	820,000,000	11.7%	
								J	100,000,000	1.4%	
								M	500,000,000	7.1%	
								I	300,000,000	4.3%	
152		2 Years 6 Months	LKB00718K151	5,000	35,405	8,400	27,005	Q	500,000,000	6.0%	
								A	1,000,000,000	11.9%	
								F	3,800,000,000	45.2%	
								H	200,000,000	2.4%	
								C	50,000,000	0.6%	
								P	1,650,000,000	19.6%	
								B	100,000,000	1.2%	
								D	250,000,000	3.0%	
								M	700,000,000	8.3%	
								O	150,000,000	1.8%	
	12/5/2016							Q	1,000,000,000	28.2%	

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153	12/5/2016	6 Years 5 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	23,065	3,545	19,520	A	300,000,000	8.5%	
								F	250,000,000	7.1%	
								H	250,000,000	7.1%	
								C	500,000,000	14.1%	
								P	900,000,000	25.4%	
								D	45,000,000	1.3%	
								M	300,000,000	8.5%	
154		7 Years 8 Months	LKB01024A014	4,000	28,802	2,817	25,985	Q	1,000,000,000	35.5%	
								A	779,000,000	27.7%	
								F	22,000,000	0.8%	
								H	210,000,000	7.5%	
								C	231,000,000	8.2%	
								G	26,000,000	0.9%	
								P	170,000,000	6.0%	
								K	24,000,000	0.9%	
								B	14,000,000	0.5%	
								D	147,000,000	5.2%	
								J	16,000,000	0.6%	
								M	155,000,000	5.5%	
								O	5,000,000	0.2%	
								I	18,000,000	0.6%	
155	19/05/2016	2 Years 5 Months	LKB00718K151	10,000	33,070	12,845	20,225	F	3,678,975,000	28.6%	
								A	561,538,000	4.4%	
								B	300,000,000	2.3%	
								D	1,935,897,000	15.1%	
								H	1,148,718,000	8.9%	
								M	1,048,718,000	8.2%	
								J	3,371,795,000	26.2%	
								P	725,000,000	5.6%	
								O	74,359,000	0.6%	
156		3 Years 11 Months	LKB00520E014	10,000	29,545	11,970	17,575	F	721,428,000	6.0%	
								A	455,000,000	3.8%	
								B	600,000,000	5.0%	
								D	1,300,000,000	10.9%	
								H	1,700,000,000	14.2%	
								M	1,150,000,000	9.6%	
								J	3,635,000,000	30.4%	
								C	100,000,000	0.8%	
								P	1,800,000,000	15.0%	
								I	100,000,000	0.8%	
								K	54,286,000	0.5%	
								O	354,286,000	3.0%	
								F	15,000,000	0.6%	
								A	900,000,000	34.6%	
								B	300,000,000	11.5%	

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157		7 Years 7 Months	LKB01024A014	12,500	31,755	2,601	29,154	D	200,000,000	7.7%	
								H	330,278,000	12.7%	
								M	367,192,000	14.1%	
								J	417,978,000	16.1%	
								K	3,360,000	0.1%	
								O	67,192,000	2.6%	
158		10 Years	LKB01226F014	12,500	45,296	17,450	27,846	F	690,000,000	4.0%	
								A	2,250,000,000	12.9%	
								B	200,000,000	1.1%	
								D	115,000,000	0.7%	
								H	1,660,000,000	9.5%	
								M	680,000,000	3.9%	
								Q	6,000,000,000	34.4%	
								G	50,000,000	0.3%	
								P	650,000,000	3.7%	
								K	5,055,000,000	29.0%	
								O	100,000,000	0.6%	
159	26/05/2016	2 Years 4 Months	LKB00418J150	10,000	38,765	13,865	24,900	F	2,100,000,000	15.1%	
								B	4,500,000,000	32.5%	
								D	2,600,000,000	18.8%	
								H	1,700,000,000	12.3%	
								M	400,000,000	2.9%	
								J	2,255,000,000	16.3%	
								C	110,000,000	0.8%	
								P	200,000,000	1.4%	
160		5 Years 4 Months	LKB00721J157	15,000	38,093	11,611	26,482	F	1,150,000,000	9.9%	
								A	450,000,000	3.9%	
								B	1,000,000,000	8.6%	
								H	3,100,000,000	26.7%	
								M	550,000,000	4.7%	
								Q	1,000,000,000	8.6%	
								J	1,511,000,000	13.0%	
								C	700,000,000	6.0%	
								P	1,750,000,000	15.1%	
								K	250,000,000	2.2%	
								O	150,000,000	1.3%	
161		7 Years 7 Months	LKB01024A014	12,000	39,360	14,130	25,230	F	300,000,000	2.1%	
								A	750,000,000	5.3%	
								B	217,000,000	1.5%	
								D	1,323,000,000	9.4%	
								H	4,073,000,000	28.8%	
								M	650,000,000	4.6%	
								Q	1,000,000,000	7.1%	
								J	1,517,000,000	10.7%	
								C	100,000,000	0.7%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								P	1,800,000,000	12.7%	
								K	2,200,000,000	15.6%	
								O	200,000,000	1.4%	
162		10 Years	LKB01226F014	8,000	54,100	8,100	46,000	F	500,000,000	6.2%	
								A	150,000,000	1.9%	
								M	100,000,000	1.2%	
								Q	2,000,000,000	24.7%	
								P	350,000,000	4.3%	
								I	500,000,000	6.2%	
								K	4,500,000,000	55.6%	

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கணக்காய்வாளர் தலைமை அதிபதி திணைக்களம்
AUDITOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

මගේ අංකය எனது இல. My No. } BAF/H/GEN/2016/41 ඔබේ අංකය உமது இல. Your No. } දිනය திகதி Date } 17 June 2016

Governor
Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Audit Examination on the Bonds Issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Upon our request you have submitted to us information pertaining to the Bonds issued during the period of 1st January 2014 to date.

As you are aware this information was sought to prepare a report to the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) pertaining to the Bond issue on the direction of the COPE.

Please let us know whether there is any information of sensitive nature contained in the documents or any secret documents furnished to the Auditor General in order to maintain the sensitivity or confidentiality required in preparing the report to the Committee on Public Enterprises as requested by the Committee.

Your early response in this regard is very much appreciated.

o/c

S.M.D.S.S. Rohitha
Assistant Auditor General
For Auditor General

අංක 306/72, පොල්දූව පාර, බත්තරමුල්ල, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව. - இல. 306/72, பொல்துவ வீதி, பத்தரமுல்லை, இலங்கை. - No. 306/72, Polduwa Road, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka
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கணக்காய்வாளர் தலைமை அதிபதி திணைக்களம்
AUDITOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

මගේ අංකය எனது இல. My No. BAF/H/GEN/2016/41 ඔබේ අංකය உமது இல. Your No. දිනය திகதி Date 17 June 2016

Secretary
Ministry of Finance

Audit Examination on the Bonds Issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka

As you aware the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) is acting as the sole agent of debt management for the Government and is solely responsible for issuance of Treasury Bonds.

We were directed by the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) of Parliament to submit a special report pertaining to Treasury Bonds issued by the CBSL.

To prepare the said report, CBSL has submitted the necessary information to us upon our request.

Please inform me whether there are any matters of sensitive or confidential nature relating to the Ministry of Finance with regard to the issuance of Bonds by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Your early response in this regard is very much appreciated.

g/c

S.M.D.S.S. Rohitha
Assistant Auditor General
For Auditor General

අංක 306/72, පොල්දූව පාර, බත්තරමුල්ල, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව, . - இல. 306/72, பொல்துவ வீதி, பத்தரமுல்லை, இலங்கை. - No. 306/72, Polduwa Road, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka
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MONETARY LAW ACT
(Chapter 422)

(Incorporating Amendments
up to 30th June, 2014)

Printed by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka
143

MONETARY LAW ACT
(Chapter 422)

(Incorporating Amendments
up to 30th June, 2014)

(iv)

MONETARY LAW ACT

(CHAPTER 422)

Owing to the numerous amendments made to the Monetary Law Act, it has become necessary to publish a reprint of that Act. This reprint which incorporates all amendments made to that Act up to 30th June, 2014 is, however, not a statutory reprint. It is only issued for purposes of convenience.

Governor,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Disclaimer

This is an unofficial version and does not constitute a statutory reprint. Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the text but the Central Bank of Sri Lanka does not hold itself responsible for any errors or omissions.

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MONETARY LAW ACT

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE MONETARY SYSTEM OF SRI LANKA AND THE CENTRAL BANK, TO ADMINISTER AND REGULATE THE SYSTEM AND TO CONFER AND IMPOSE UPON THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSES OF SUCH ADMINISTRATION AND REGULATION, AND TO PROVIDE FOR CONNECTED MATTERS.

Acts
Nos. 58 of 1949
33 of 1954
11 of 1963 (§.67)
18 of 1965 (§.56)
16 of 1967
5 of 1968
21 of 1968
2 of 1969 (§.7)
30 of 1971 (§.88)

Laws
Nos. 37 of 1974
16 of 1977 (§.8)
10 of 1978

Acts
Nos. 14 of 1979
62 of 1980
52 of 1985
7 of 1988
30 of 1988 (§.84)
26 of 1995
6 of 1998
32 of 2002
9 of 2006
15 of 2014]

[Chapter II - 16th December, 1949]
[Chapter I, III to VIII - 28th August, 1950]

1. This Act may be cited as the Monetary Law Act. Short title.

CHAPTER 1

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONETARY UNIT

2. (1) The standard unit of monetary value in Sri Lanka shall be the Sri Lanka rupee, which shall be represented by the signs "Re." and "Rs." The unit of monetary value.

(2) The Sri Lanka rupee shall be divided into one hundred units each of which shall be called a "cent".

3. (1) The Monetary Board shall by unanimous decision, recommend to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance that the par value of the Sri Lanka rupee be determined in terms of special drawing rights or in terms of such other common denominator as may be prescribed by the International Monetary Fund, and upon such recommendation, the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance shall, by Order published in the Gazette, determine and declare the par value of the Sri Lanka rupee in accordance with the terms specified in such recommendation: The par value of the rupee. (§.8, Law 10 of 1978)

Provided, however, that if the Monetary Board is of the view that international economic conditions do not warrant the introduction or maintenance of exchange arrangements based on stable but adjustable par values, it may, by unanimous decision, recommend to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance that no determination be made under the preceding provisions of this section or that any Order made under this section be revoked, and upon any such recommendation, the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance shall desist from making an Order under this section, or, as the case may be, revoke an Order made under this section.

(2) The Monetary Board may by unanimous decision recommend to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance the alteration of the par value of the Sri Lanka rupee, if the Board is of the opinion that such alteration of the par value of the Sri Lanka rupee is rendered necessary in any of the following circumstances, that is to say–

(a) if the continuance of the existing par value hinders or is likely to hinder unduly, the achievement and maintenance of a high level of production, employment and real income and the full development of the productive resources of Sri Lanka, or results, or is likely to result, in a serious decline in the International Reserve of the Central Bank or in other utilizable external assets of Sri Lanka or if such decline cannot be prevented except by–

(*i*) a large scale increase in the external liabilities of Sri Lanka;

(*ii*) the persistent use of restrictions on the convertibility of the rupee into foreign currencies in settlement of current transactions; or

(*iii*) undue or sustained Government assistance to one or more of the major export industries; or

(*iv*) prolonged use of measures designed to restrict the volume of imports of essential commodities; or

(b) if the maintenance of the existing par value is producing, or is likely to produce, a persisting surplus in the balance of payments on current account and a monetary disequilibrium which cannot be adequately corrected by other Government or by Central Bank action authorised by this Act; or

(c) if uniform proportionate changes in the par values of currencies of its members are made by the International Monetary Fund,

and upon such recommendation, the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance may, by Order published in the *Gazette*, amend, in accordance with the terms specified in such recommendation, any Order made under subsection (1).

(3) Any Order made under subsection (1) or subsection (2) shall cease to have effect after a period of ten days from the date of publication thereof, unless such Order is approved by Parliament within that period:

Provided however, that if Parliament is not in session on the date of publication of the Order, the Order shall cease to have effect after a period of ten days from the date of the next meeting of Parliament, unless such Order is approved by Parliament within that period.

The use of the rupee.

4. (1) Every obligation of the following description, that is to say, every contract, sale, payment, bill, note, instrument, and security for money, and every transaction, dealing, matter, and thing whatsoever relating to money, or involving the payment of money or the liability to pay any money, shall, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary which is not rendered invalid or unlawful by any other written law, be held to be made, executed, entered into, done, and had in Sri Lanka according to the Sri Lanka rupee.

(2) In any case where any such obligation which is by agreement expressed in any monetary unit other than the Sri Lanka rupee has, by reason that such agreement is rendered invalid or unlawful by any other written law, to be executed or liquidated in Sri Lanka rupees, the necessary conversions shall be effected on the basis of the legal parties ruling at the time when such obligation falls to be executed or liquidated, or at such other time as may be specified in that behalf in the agreement.

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK TO ADMINISTER AND REGULATE THE MONETARY SYSTEM

PART I – THE CENTRAL BANK, ITS POWERS AND PURPOSES

Establishment and objectives of Central Bank. [§.2, 32 of 2002]

5. An institution, which shall be called and known as the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as "the Central Bank") is hereby established as the authority responsible for the administration, supervision and regulation of the monetary, financial and payments system of Sri Lanka, and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act, the Central Bank is hereby charged with the duty of securing, so far as possible by action authorised by this Act, the following objectives, namely–

(*a*) economic and price stability; and

(*b*) financial system stability,

with a view to encouraging and promoting the development of the productive resources of Sri Lanka.

Powers of the Central Bank and the Monetary Board in relation to section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act No. 4 of 1963. [§.56, 18 of 1965]

5A. (1) For the purposes of section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act, No. 4 of 1963, the Central Bank may open, maintain and manage special deposit accounts.

(2) Where an institution is approved by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance by Order made under paragraph *(b)* of subsection (2) of section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act, No. 4 of 1963, the Monetary Board may determine the terms and conditions subject to which that institution may open, maintain and manage special deposit accounts for the purposes of that section.

Capital of Central Bank. [§.2, 15 of 2014]

6. The capital of the Central Bank shall be fifteen million rupees, which sum is hereby appropriated to the bank from the surplus assets of the Board of Commissioners of Currency:

Provided however, the Monetary Board may from time to time, having regard to the viability and stability of the financial system of Sri Lanka and in the interest of the national economy, with the concurrence of the Minister to whom the subject of Finance has been assigned, increase the capital of the Central Bank to an amount not exceeding fifty billion rupees.

Place of business.

7. The Central Bank shall have its principal place of business in Colombo, and may have such branches, agencies, and correspondents in other places in Sri Lanka or abroad, as may be necessary for the proper conduct of the business of the bank.

PART II – THE MONETARY BOARD

Constitution of Monetary Board. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

8. (1) The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall, in addition to determining the policies or measures authorised to be adopted or

taken under this Act, be vested with the powers, duties and functions of the Central Bank under this Act, and be generally responsible for the management, operations and administration of the Bank:

Provided, however, where the Monetary Board considers it appropriate, it may delegate to the Governor, or to any officer of the Central Bank or to a Committee of such officers, any power, duty or function conferred or imposed on, or assigned to, the Board by Section 10(*a*), (*b*), (*bb*), (*d*) and section 27.

(1A) Where any power, duty or function is delegated by the Monetary Board under subsection (1), the person or the group of persons to whom such power, duty or function is delegated shall exercise perform or discharge such power, duty or function, in accordance with such general or special directions or guidelines as may be issued by the Monetary Board. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

(2) The Monetary Board shall consist of –

(*a*) the Governor of the Central Bank who shall be the chairman of the board;

(*b*) the person holding office for the time being as Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance; and [S3, 52 of 1985

(*c*) three members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, with the concurrence of the Constitutional Council. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

(3) In the absence of the Governor from any meeting of the Monetary Board, the Deputy Governor designated as Senior by the board shall act as his alternate and shall preside at the meeting and have the right to vote thereat.

(4) In the absence of the member of the Monetary Board mentioned in paragraph (*b*) of subsection (2) from any meeting of the board, the person holding office for the time being as Deputy Secretary to the Treasury shall act as that member's alternate at the meeting and have the right to vote thereat.

Monetary Board to be a body corporate.

9. (1) The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall in that name be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue or be sued in its corporate name.

(2) The Monetary Board shall have the power, in the name of the Central Bank, to hold property, both movable and immovable, and to sell and dispose of the same, to enter into contracts and otherwise to do and perform all such acts or things as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the principles and provisions of this Act.

(3) The Monetary Board may, in the name of the Central Bank, acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities as result directly from operations authorized by this Act or as are essential for the proper conduct of such operations.

General powers of Monetary Board.

10. For the purposes of the exercise of its powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities under this Act, the Monetary Board-

(a) may, subject to the provisions of section 22 and section 23, appoint such officers and servants as the board may consider necessary and remove them from office or dismiss them, and may fix the salaries or wages, or other remuneration, of such officers and servants, and may prescribe their conditions of service;

(b) may establish and regulate pensions or provident funds or schemes for the benefit of officers and servants and their dependants and nominees, and may make contributions to any such fund or scheme.

[§2, 7 of 1988]

(bb) may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph *(c)* of section 117, grant loans and advances, for housing purposes, to officers and servants of the Central Bank on the mortgage of, or otherwise on the security of, immovable property;

(c) may make such rules and regulations as the board may consider necessary in relation to any matter affecting or connected with or incidental to the exercise, discharge, or performance of the powers, functions, and duties of the Central Bank; and

(d) may utilize the funds of the Central Bank for the purpose of meeting all expenditure incurred by the board in the management, administration, and operation of the bank and in the exercise, performance, and discharge of powers, functions, and responsibilities of the bank under this Act.

Disqualification for appointment as Governor, or as member of the Monetary Board.
[§.4, 32 of 2002]

11. (1) A person shall be disqualified for appointment as the Governor of the Central Bank if –

(*a*) he is a Member of Parliament, or a member of any Provincial Council or any local authority; or

(*b*) he is a public officer or judicial officer within the meaning of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, or holds any office or position (other than an academic position) either by election or appointment, for which salary or other remuneration is payable out of public funds or the funds of any local authority; or

(*c*) he is a director, officer, employee or shareholder of any banking institution (other than the Central Bank).

(2) A person shall be disqualified for appointment as a member of the Monetary Board under paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of Section 8 if –

(*a*) he is a Member of Parliament, or a member of any Provincial Council or any local authority; or [§.4, 32 of 2002]

(*b*) he is a public officer or judicial officer within the meaning of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, or holds any office or position (other than an academic position) either by election or appointment, for which salary or other remuneration is payable out of public funds or the funds of any local authority; or

(*c*) he is a director, officer, employee or shareholder of any banking institution (other than the Central Bank) or any other institution supervised or regulated by the Central Bank. [§.4, 32 of 2002]

Appointment, remuneration, &c. of Governor, Central Bank. [§.5, 52 of 1985]

12. (1) The Governor of the Central Bank shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance;

(2) The Governor shall devote his full professional time to the business of the bank; and accordingly the Governor shall not accept or hold any other office or employment whatsoever, whether public or private, and whether remunerated or not:

Provided, however, that nothing in the preceding provisions of this subsection shall be deemed to prevent the Governor from accepting or holding any academic office or position or any office or position in an institution or organisation, established for the purpose of carrying on research in the subjects of economics, money, banking, statistics and finance, or from being appointed to be or acting as a member of any commission constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act for the purposes of any inquiry relating to monetary, banking, financial or general economic matters or questions affecting the national welfare of Sri Lanka, or of any council, committee, or other body investigating or examining, or advising upon, any such matters or questions. [§.5, 52 of 1985]

(3) The Governor shall receive such salary as may be fixed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance. [§.5, 52 of 1985]

Term of office of Governor and appointed member. [§.5, 32 of 2002]

13. (1) The term of office of the Governor, and of any person appointed under paragraph (*c*) of subsection (2) of Section 8 (hereinafter referred to as "an appointed member") shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, be the period of six years commencing on the date of his appointment:

Provided, however, that the term of office of the first appointed member holding office under this Act shall be the period of three years from the date of his appointment.

[§.5, 32 of 2002]

(2) In the event of the vacation of office by the Governor or by an appointed member before the expiration of his term of office, another person shall be appointed in his place to hold office during the unexpired part of the term of office of the Governor or member so vacating office.

(3) Any person vacating office as Governor or as appointed member by effluxion of time shall be eligible for reappointment.

Remuneration of appointed member. [§.6, 32 of 2002]

14. (1) An appointed member shall receive an allowance for each day on which he attends a meeting of the Monetary Board.

[§.5, 37 of 1974]

(2) The amount of such allowance shall be fixed by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance in consultation with the President.

Alternate for appointed member. [§.7, 32 of 2002]

15. (1) Where an appointed member is, through illness, absence from Sri Lanka, or for any other reason, temporarily unable to perform the functions of his office, the President may, on the recommendation of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, appoint some other person to act in his place for such period as may be specified by the President.

(2) The provisions of section 11 shall apply in relation to any such appointment.

[§.7, 32 of 2002]

(3) The person appointed to act as a member of the board under this section shall during the period of his appointment be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be an appointed member.

Removal from office of Governor or appointed member. [§.8, 32 of 2002]

16. The President may, on the recommendation of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, remove the Governor or an appointed member from office–

(a) if he becomes subject to any disqualification mentioned in section 11; or

(b) if he becomes permanently incapable of performing his duties; or

(c) if he has done any act or thing which, in the opinion of the President is of a fraudulent or illegal character or is manifestly opposed to the objects and interests of the Central Bank; or

(d) in the case of the Governor, if he acts in contravention of subsection (2) of section 12.

Meetings of Monetary Board. [§.6, 37 of 1974]

17. (1) Meetings of the Monetary Board shall be held at least once in every two weeks and, in addition, as frequently as is necessary for the purpose of the discharge of its responsibilities under this Act.

(2) Meetings of the board shall be convened by the Governor.

(3) At any meeting of the board, three members shall constitute a quorum. [§.9, 32 of 2002]

(4) No decision taken at any meeting of the board shall be deemed to be a decision of the board unless it has the concurrence of at least three members, or, in any case where any other provision of this Act requires a unanimous decision, the concurrence of all five members. [§.9, 32 of 2002]

18. The Deputy Governor designated as senior by the Monetary Board and the Director of Economic Research may attend meetings of the Monetary Board, but shall not have the right to vote on any question. Attendance of certain officers at meetings of Monetary Board.

PART III - THE GOVERNOR AND DEPUTY GOVERNORS

19. (1) The Governor shall be the chief executive officer of the Central Bank and shall accordingly be charged with the following powers, duties, and functions :– General functions and duties of Goveernor.

(a) the execution of policies and measures approved by the Monetary Board and, subject to any such policies and measures as may be applicable, the direction, supervision, and control of the operation of the Central Bank and its internal management and administration;

(b) the preparation or the agenda for meetings or the Monetary Board and the submissions for the consideration of the board of policies and measures considered by him to be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the principles and provisions of this Act; and

(c) the exercise or performance of such other powers or duties as may be conferred of imposed upon him by the Monetary Board.

(2) Every instrument of the following description, that is to say, every contract, promissory note, security, report, balance sheet, statement, or other document and every rule, regulation, order, direction, notice, or requirement which bears the signature of the Governor or such other officer as may be authorized in that behalf by the Monetary Board, shall be deemed for all purposes to be an instrument executed, made, or issued by the Central Bank or by the Monetary Board, as the case may be.

20. The Governor of the Central Bank shall be the principal representative of the bank and of the Monetary Board and shall in that capacity, but in accordance with policies or rules approved or made by the board, have authority.- Governor to be principal representative of Central Bank and Monetary Board.

(a) to represent the Central Bank and the board in all relations with other persons, including the Government and any body of persons, corporate or unincorporate, whether public or private, domestic, foreign, or international; and

(b) to represent the Central Bank and the board in any legal proceedings either personally or through an attorney-at-law.

Delegation of powers of Governor.

21. Subject to and in accordance with such rules, if any, as may be made by the Monetary Board in that behalf, the Governor may delegate to any other officer of the bank his authority to represent the bank for any purpose mentioned in section 20, so however that the Governor shall remain and continue to be responsible to the board for and in respect of any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any such delegate.

Appointment of Deputy Governor.

22. The Monetary Board shall, with the concurrence of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance appoint one or more Deputy Governors who shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the board.

Disqualification and removal of Deputy Governor.

23. (1) A person shall be disqualified for appointment as a Deputy Governor if–

(a) he is a Member of Parliament, or a member of any local authority; or

(b) he is a public officer or judicial officer within the meaning of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, or holds any office or position (other than an academic position) either by election or appointment, for which salary or other remuneration is payable out of public funds or the funds of any local authority; or

(c) he is a director, officer, employee or shareholder of any banking institution (other than the Central Bank).

[S.3,7 of 1988]

Nothing in paragraph *(b)* or *(c)* shall be held to disqualify an officer or servant of the Central Bank who has been temporarily released to serve in any office or position for which salary or remuneration is payable out of public funds or who is a director of any banking institution which is a public corporation, for appointment as a Deputy Governor.

(2) The Monetary Board may, with the concurrence of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, remove any Deputy Governor from office–

(a) if he becomes subject to any disqualification mentioned in subsection (1); or

(b) if he becomes permanently incapable of performing his duties; or

(c) if he has done any act or thing which, in the opinion of the board, is of a fraudulent or illegal character or is manifestly opposed to the objects and interest of the Central Bank; or

(d) if, in the opinion of the board, he has failed to carry out his duties: [§.3, 7 of 1988]

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be held to empower the Monetary Board. with the concurrence of the Minister, to remove from office, any Deputy Governor who has been temporarily released, under subsection (3) to serve in any office or position for which salary or other remuneration is payable out of public funds or to serve with a banking institution which is a public corporation, as a Director of that banking institution by reason only of the fact that such Deputy Governor holds such office or position or is such Director. [§.3, 7 of 1988]

(3) The Monetary Board may, with the concurrence of the Minister, temporarily release a Deputy Governor to– [§.3, 7 of 1988]

(a) serve in an office or position for which a salary or other remuneration is payable out of public funds;

(b) serve with a banking institution, which is a public corporation, as a Director of that banking institution,

on such terms as may be determined by the Monetary Board, with like concurrence.

For the purpose of this section, "public corporation" shall have the same meaning as in Article 170 of the Constitution.

Deputy Governor to act as Governor.

24. In the event of the temporary absence from duty of the Governor or of the temporary inability of the Governor to perform his functions and duties, the Deputy Governor designated as senior by the board shall act as the chief executive officer of the Central Bank and shall have authority to execute the powers and perform the functions and duties of the Governor under this Act.

Authority of Deputy Governor to obtain information. [§.6,52 of 1985]

24A. (1) A Deputy Governor may require any person–

(a) to furnish him or to any officer or servant of the Central Bank designated by him within such time and in such manner as he may specify, such information as he may

consider necessary to obtain for the purpose of the proper discharge of the functions and responsibilities of the Central Bank; or

(b) to produce for inspection to him or to any officer or servant of the Central Bank, designated by him within such time and in such manner as he may specify, any books or records in the possession of such person containing or likely to contain any such information as is referred to in paragraph *(a)* of this subsection.

(2) Any person who, without reasonable cause, fails or refuses to comply with any requirement under subsection (1), shall be guilty of an offence.

(3) In this section "person" includes any officer of any department of Government and any body of persons, corporate or unincorporate, whether established or constituted under any written law or otherwise.

PART IV - DEPARTMENTS OF THE CENTRAL BANK

(A) - The Department of Economic Research

Establishment and functions of department of economic research.

25. (1) The Central Bank shall establish and maintain a department of economic research which shall prepare data and conduct economic research, for the guidance of the Monetary Board and the Governor in formulating, implementing, and executing policies and measures and for the information of the public, in the subjects of money and banking and other economic subjects of general interest.

(2) The head of the department established under subsection (1) shall be called the Director of Economic Research.

Authority to obtain information.

26. (1) The Director of Economic Research or any officer of the department of economic research authorised for the purpose by the Director may in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made under section 10–

(a) require any person to furnish to him such information as he may consider it necessary to obtain for the purposes of the proper discharge of the functions and responsibilities of the Central bank; or

(b) require any person to produce for inspection any books or records in his possession containing or likely to contain any such information.

(2) Any person who without reasonable cause fails or refuses to comply with any requirements made under subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence.

(3) In this section "person" includes any officer of any department of Government, and any body of persons, corporate or unincorporate, whether established or constituted under any written law or otherwise.

Training of technical personnel.

27. The Central Bank shall promote and sponsor the training of technical personnel on the subjects of money, banking, statistics, finance, and other economic subjects, and for this purpose, the Central Bank is hereby authorized to defray the costs of study, in Sri Lanka or abroad, of employees of the bank who are of proved merit, or of any other qualified persons selected by the Monetary Board.

(B) - The Department of Bank Supervision

Establishment and functions of department of bank supervision.

28. (1) For the purposes of the continuous supervision and periodical examination of all banking institutions in Sri Lanka, the Central Bank shall establish and maintain a department of bank supervision.

(2) The head of the department established under subsection (1) shall be called the Director of Bank Supervision

Examination of banking institutions.

29. (1) The Director of Bank Supervision shall examine, or cause an examiner of his department to examine, the books and accounts of every commercial bank in Sri Lanka at least once in each examination period, and shall make such further examinations in respect of any specified bank whenever required so to do by the Governor.

(2) Examination of books and accounts of banking institutions other than commercial banks, or of any specified banking institution, shall be made if directions in that behalf are given by the Monetary Board.

(3) A report on the results of each examination under this section shall be furnished by the Director of Bank Supervision to the Governor.

(4) It shall be lawful for the Director of Bank Supervision or for any examiner of his department–

(a) to administer oaths or affirmations, in accordance with the Oaths Ordinance, to any director, officer, or employee of any banking institution;

(b) to require any such director, officer, or employee to furnish such information as the Director or examiner may consider it necessary to obtain for the purpose of enabling the true condition of the affairs of the institution to be ascertained; or

(c) to require any such director, officer, or employee to produce for inspection any books, records, or other documents in his possession containing or likely to contain any such information.

(5) It shall be the duty of every director, officer or employee of any banking institution to afford to the Director of Bank Supervision or to any examiner of his department full opportunity to examine books and records and its cash, available assets, full liabilities and general condition, whenever so requested by the Director.

(6) In this section "examination period" means each period of such duration as may be fixed for the purpose by the Monetary Board.

Continuous supervision of banking institutions. [§.7, 52 of 1985]

29A. The Director of Bank Supervision may for the purpose of the continuous supervision of banking institutions–

(a) require any commercial bank, and if so authorized by the Monetary Board any banking institution other than a commercial bank, to furnish from time to time and within such period as may be specified by him, such statement and information relating to the business or affairs of a commercial bank or a banking institution, as the case may be, as he may consider necessary to obtain for the purpose of ascertaining the true condition of the affairs of the commercial bank or the banking institution;

(b) require the auditor of any commercial bank, and if so authorized by the Monetary Board of any Banking Institution other than a commercial bank, furnish to him within such period as may be specified by him, any information in relation to an audit carried out by such auditor of the commercial bank or banking institution, as the case may be, as he may consider necessary to obtain for the purpose referred to in paragraph *(a)*; and

(c) to examine or cause an examiner of his department to examine the books and accounts kept by any commercial bank, or other banking institution as he may deem necessary for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of any statement or information so furnished.

Director of Bank Supervision to examine books of any subsidiary or agency of a banking

29B. (1) The Director of Bank Supervision shall examine or cause an examiner of his department to examine the books and accounts of any subsidiary or agency of any commercial bank, or the books and accounts of any subsidiary or agency of any banking institution other than a commercial bank, if directions in that behalf are given by the Monetary Board or the books and accounts of any society registered under the

Co-operative Societies Law, No. 5 of 1972, which carried on banking business, if direction in that behalf are given by the Governor.

institution or of a Co-operative Society carrying on banking business. [§.7, 52 of 1985]

(2) The provisions of subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 29 and sections 30, 31 and 32 of this Act shall, *mutatis mutandis* apply, to and in relation to, all or any of the institutions referred to in subsection (1) of this section.

Power of Monetary Board to suspend or restrict business of a banking institution.

30. (1) In any case where the Director of Bank Supervision is satisfied, after examination by himself or any examiner of the affairs of any banking institution, or upon information received from the institution, that the institution is insolvent or is likely to become unable to meet the demands of its depositors, or that its continuance in business is likely to involve loss to its depositors or creditors, the Director shall make a report accordingly to the Governor for submission to the Monetary Board; and if the board, upon review of the facts and circumstances, is of opinion that action should be taken as hereinafter provided, the board may make order directing the institution forthwith to suspend business in Sri Lanka and directing the Director to take charge of all books, records and assets of the institution and to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent the continuance of business by the institution.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in any written or other law, no action or proceeding may be instituted in any court for the purpose of securing the review or revocation of any order made under subsection (1) or in respect of any loss or damage incurred, or likely to be or alleged to be incurred, by reason of such order.

[§.8, 52 of 1985]

(3) An order made by the Monetary Board under subsection (1) in respect of any banking institution shall cease to have effect upon the expiration of a period of six months from the date on which it is made; and it shall be the duty of the board, as soon as practicable and in any event before expiration of the said period–

(a) to make order permitting the institution to resume business, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as the board may consider necessary in the public interest or in the interests of the depositors and other creditors of the institution; or

[§.8, 52 of 1985]

(b) to cause the Director of Bank Supervision to make application to the competent court under such written law as may be applicable in that behalf for the winding up of the institution; or

[§.8, 52 of 1985]

(c) to cause the Director of Bank Supervision to make application to the competent court, to wind up the affairs of a branch of an institution, incorporated outside Sri Lanka.

(4) Where an order has been made by the Monetary Board under subsection (3) permitting the resumption of business by any banking institution subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, the competent court may, on application made to it in that behalf by the banking institution at any time while the order is in force, make a declaration permitting the institution to resume business unconditionally, or varying or altering, in such manner as the court may determine, any or all of the conditions specified by the board; and any such declaration shall have effect notwithstanding anything in the order made by the board under subsection (3).

The Director of Bank Supervision shall be named respondent to any such application and shall be entitled on behalf of the board to be heard and to adduce evidence at the hearing thereof.

(5) In any case where application is made by the Director as provided in subsection (3) for the winding up of any banking institution-

(a) the institution shall not carry on business during the pendency of the application unless it is authorized so to do by the court and except in accordance with such conditions, if any, as may be specified by the court; and

(b) the court, if it is of opinion after such inquiry as it may consider necessary, that the institution is not insolvent, may make a declaration permitting the institution to resume business either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as the court may consider necessary in the public interest or in the interest of the depositors and other creditors of the institution.

(6) Every order made by a competent court under this section shall be subject to an appeal to the Court of Appeal and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to appeals in civil actions shall apply *mutatis mutandis* in the case of any such appeal:

Provided that an order under paragraph *(a)* of subsection (5) shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal.

(7) Every application to a competent court under this section shall be deemed to be an action of the value of five thousand rupees.

(8) In this section, "competent court", in relation to any banking institution, means the District Court of Colombo or of the district in which the principal office in Sri Lanka of the institution is maintained.

[§.8, 52 of 1985]

(9) Where the business of a banking institution has been suspended under subsection (1), the Director of Bank Supervision may–

(a) require such banking institution to forthwith take any action or to do any act or thing which the Monetary Board may consider necessary for carrying on the business of such bank;

(b) appoint a fit and proper person to advise such banking institution with regard to the proper conduct of the business of such banking institution;

(c) assume control of, and carry on the business of such banking institution or delegate to another person, the carrying on of business of the banking institution;

(d) reorganize, such banking institution by increasing its' capital and arranging for new shareholders and by the reconstitution of its' board of directors; and

(e) make such arrangements as are necessary for the amalgamation of such banking institution with any other banking institution, that consents to such amalgamation.

[§.10, 32 of 2002]

(10) (*a*) Where an order has been made by the Monetary Board under subsection (1) of Section 76M of the Banking Act, No.30 of 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "Banking Act") in respect of a licensed specialised bank, the provisions of subsections (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of this Section shall, notwithstanding subsections (3) and (4), of Section 76M of the Banking Act and subject to paragraph (*ii*) of this subsection, apply, mutatis mutandis, to such bank as if it were a banking institution.

(*b*) Where under paragraph (*i*) of this subsection, the application of the provisions of subsection (3) of this section requires -

(*i*) the winding up of a licensed specialised bank, the Monetary Board shall cancel the licence issued to such bank under Part IXA of the Banking Act and, the provisions of Part VIII of that Act shall apply to such winding up as if it were a compulsory winding up of the bank, in the case of a bank incorporated or established within Sri Lanka or a compulsory winding up of the affairs or closure of the business of the bank, in the case of a bank incorporated outside Sri Lanka;

(*ii*) the resumption of business of a licensed specialised bank, the Monetary Board may exercise the powers conferred on it under Section 76N of the Banking Act.

(*c*) In this subsection "licensed specialised bank" shall have the same meaning as in the Banking Act.

Winding up of a banking institution. [§.11, 32 of 2002]

31. Where an order is made by the Monetary Board under section 30 requiring the winding up of a banking institution–

(*a*) in the case of a commercial bank, the Monetary Board shall cancel the licence issued to it under the Banking Act and the provisions of Part VIII of that Act shall apply as if it were a compulsory winding up of the bank, in the case of a bank incorporated or established within Sri Lanka or a compulsory winding up of the affairs or closure of the business of the bank, in the case of a bank incorporated outside Sri Lanka;

(*b*) in the case of any other banking institution, not being a licensed specialised bank to which subsection (10) of section 30 is applicable, the Director of Bank Supervision shall nominate a person to be the liquidator for the purpose of winding up and subject to such nomination, such institution shall be wound up in accordance with the law applicable to such institution.

Offences in regard to information and examinations.

32. (1) Any owner, agent, director, officer, or employee of any banking institution, who fails to furnish any information or to produce any book, record, or other document when required so to do by the Director of Bank Supervision or any examiner under the preceding provisions of this Part or who obstructs or fails to permit the Director or any examiner to make any examination authorized to be made under any such provision, shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) Any person who in any report or information furnished to the Director of Bank Supervision, or to any examiner, makes any statement which he knows to be false shall be guilty of an offence.

Scheme to insure deposits held by banking institutions and co-operative societies. [§.7, 37 of 1974]

32A. The Central Bank may establish, maintain, manage and control, as determined by the Monetary Board from time to time, a scheme for the insurance of deposits held by banking institution and societies registered under the Co-operative Societies Law, No, 5 of 1972.

Insurance of deposits held by banking institutions or societies. [§.7, 37 of 1974]

32B. (1) Any banking institution, or any society registered under the Co-operative Societies Law, No. 5 of 1972, and carrying on banking business of any kind, may, as prescribed , apply to the Central Bank to insure deposits held by such institution or society.

(2) The Central Bank may, in its discretion, accept any application made under subsection (1).

(3) Every banking institution or society, whose application has been accepted under subsection (2), is hereafter in this Part of this Act referred to as "insured bank" or "insured society", as the case may be.

32C. (1) Every insured bank or insured society shall be liable to pay a premium to the Central Bank on its deposits on such basis as may be determined by the Monetary Board from time to time, with the approval of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance.

Premiums payable on deposits. [§.7, 37 of 1974]

Provided that the premium payable by any insured bank or insured society for any period shall not exceed fifteen cents per annum for every hundred rupees of the total amount of the deposits in that bank or that society.

(2) The premium shall be payable for such periods, at such times and in such manner as may be determined by the Monetary Board.

(3) If an insured bank or insured society makes any default in the payments of any premium, it shall, for the period of such default, be liable to pay to the Central Bank, interest on the amount of such premium at such rate as may be determined by the Monetary Board.

32D. (1) The Director of Bank Supervision may, at his discretion, examine, or cause an examiner of his department to examine, the books and accounts of any insured bank or insured society.

Examination of insured banks and insured societies, &c. [§.7, 37 of 1974] [§.9, 52 of 1985]

(2) The provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of section 29, paragraph *(b)* of section 29A, section 30, section 31 and section 32 of this Act shall, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to insured banks and insure societies.

32E. Regulations may be made by the Monetary Board in respect of–

Regulations. [§.7, 37 of 1974]

(a) the periods for which, the times at which and the manner in which premiums will be calculated and may be paid by an insured bank or an insured society.

(b) the interest which may be charged from an insured bank or an insured society where it makes default in the payment of premiums;

(c) any matter that is stated or is required to be prescribed or in respect of which a regulation is authorized to be made under this Part of this Act;

(d) any other matter affecting, connected with, or incidental to, the exercise, discharge, or performance of the powers, functions and duties of the Central Bank under this Part of this Act.

(C) - Other Departments

Other departments.

33. The Monetary Board may establish and maintain such other departments as it may consider necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the business of the Central Bank.

PART V - REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS

Monthly Statement. [§.12, 32 of 2002]

34. The Central Bank shall publish a general balance sheet showing the volume and composition of its assets and liabilities as at the last day of each month before the last day of the succeeding month.

Annual Report. [§.8, 37 of 1974]

35. (1) Within four months after the end of each financial year, the Monetary Board shall submit to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance and shall publish an annual report on the condition of the Central Bank and a review of the policies and measures adopted by the Monetary Board during the financial year and an analysis of the economic and financial circumstances which prompted those policies and measures.

(2) The annual report shall include a statement of the financial condition of the Central Bank, and shall present as a minimum the following data–

(a) the monthly movements of the money supply, distinguished between currency and demand deposits;

(b) the monthly movements of purchases and sales of exchange and of the International Reserve of the Bank;

(c) the annual balance of payments of Sri Lanka;

(d) the monthly indices of wages, of the cost of living, and of import and export prices;

(e) the monthly movement, in summary form, of exports and imports, by volume and value;

(f) the monthly movement of the accounts of the Central Bank and, in consolidated form, of the commercial banks;

(g) the principal data on Government receipts and expenditures and on the state of the public debt, both domestic and foreign; and

(*h*) the texts of the major legal enactments and administrative measures adopted by the Government and the Monetary Board during the year which relate to the functions or operations of the Central Bank or of banking institutions operating in Sri Lanka.

(3) The annual report shall be laid before Parliament within fourteen days after the receipt thereof by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, if Parliament is then in session, or, if Parliament is not in session, within fourteen days after the commencement of the next ensuing session.

Signatures on balance sheets and financial statements.

36. The balance sheet and other financial statements of the Central Bank (including the statement of financial condition referred to in section 35 (2) shall be signed by the Governor and the Chief Accountant of the Bank, and shall be certified by the Auditor-General.

PART VI - PROFITS, LOSSES, AND SPECIAL ACCOUNTS

Financial year.

37. The financial year of the Central Bank shall be the calendar year.

Computation of profits and losses.

38. Before the expiration of thirty days after the end of each financial year, the Central Bank shall determine its net profits or losses, and in the calculation of net profits the bank shall make adequate allowance or establish adequate reserves for such purposes as the Monetary Board may deem fit.

Distribution of profits.

39. Before the expiration of sixty days after the end of each financial year, the Monetary Board shall carry out the distribution of the net profits in accordance with the following provisions :–

(a) Firstly – all the net profits of the Central Bank shall be used to reduce the Monetary Adjustment Account, defined in the following section, whenever such account exists, until the account has been completely liquidated.

(b) Secondly – any net profits remaining after liquidation of the Monetary Adjustment Account, if any, shall be carried to surplus until such time as the total capital accounts of the bank reach a sum equal to at least fifteen *per centum* of the difference between the total assets of the bank and its assets in gold and in foreign currencies.

(c) Thirdly – any net profits remaining after compliance with the preceding provisions shall, after consultation with Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, either be applied in liquidation

of any outstanding Government obligations to the Central Bank or be paid and credited to the Consolidated Fund.

Extraordinary expenses of currency issue and monetary stabilization.

40. The Monetary Board may, whenever it deems it advisable, exclude from the computation of the annual profits and losses of any particular financial year all or any part of any extraordinary expenses of the following description which may have been incurred during that year.

(a) the costs of any extraordinary coin or note issue;

(b) expenditures incurred in the issue and placing of, and the payment of interest on, the securities to which reference is made in section 91;

(c) interest paid on bank reserves in accordance with section 95.

The amount so excluded from the computation of profits and losses shall be entered in a suspense account which shall be called the "Monetary Adjustment Account". The expenses charged to such account shall in every case be amortized not later than five years after they are so charged.

Revaluation profits and losses.

41. (1) Profits or losses arising from any revaluation of the Central Bank's net asset or liabilities in gold or foreign currencies as a result of changes in the par value of the Sri Lanka rupee or of changes in the parities or exchange rates of foreign currencies with respect to the Sri Lanka rupee, or profits or losses assumed by the Central Bank in accordance with the provisions of section 79, shall not be included in the computation of the annual profits and losses of the Central Bank.

(2) All such profits or losses shall be carried in a special account, which shall be named "International Reserve Revaluation Account", and the net balance of which shall appear either among the liabilities or among the assets of the Central Bank, according as the revaluations have produced net profits or net losses.

(3) The International Reserve Revaluation Account shall be neither credited nor debited for any purposes other than those specifically mentioned in this section.

PART VII - AUDIT

Audit.

42. (1) The accounts of the Central Bank shall be audited by the Auditor-General and the cost of audit shall be paid by the bank.

(2) The Auditor-General shall submit an annual report on the accounts of the Central Bank to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance who shall lay such report before Parliament.

Powers and functions.

43. (1) The Auditor-General and any officer of his department authorized by him in that behalf shall at all times have the right of access to, and examination of, the accounts of the Central Bank and of all books and documents containing information with respect to matters connected with such accounts.

(2) The Auditor-General shall at such intervals as may be fixed by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance furnish to him reports setting out the results of the examination of the accounts of the Central Bank.

PART VIII - RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO CENTRAL BANK OFFICERS AND SERVANTS

Duty to maintain secrecy. [§.8, 37 of 1974] [§.10, 52 of 1985]

*__45.__ (1) Except in the performance of his duties under this Act, every officer and servant of the Central Bank shall preserve and aid in preserving secrecy with regard to all matters relating to the affairs of any banking institution or of any client of any such institution or of any matter relating to the affairs of any department of Government, corporation, company, partnership or person that may come to his knowledge in the performance of his duties under this Act, the Control of Finance Companies Act, No. 27 of 1979, or any other law for the time being in force, and any such officer or servant who communicates any such matter to any person, other than the Monetary Board or an officer of the Central Bank authorized in that behalf by the Governor, or suffers or permits any unauthorized person to have access to any books, papers or other records relating to any banking institution, department of Government, corporation, company, partnership or person, shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) No officer or servant of the Central Bank shall be required to produce in any court any book or document or to divulge or communicate to any court any matter or thing coming under his notice in the performance of his duties under this Act, except as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.

(3) Where, in any legal proceedings, a certified copy of any book or document of the Central Bank or of any entry in such book or document is produced, such certified copy shall be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such book, document or entry, as the case may be, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions or accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original book, document or entry is now by law admissible, but not further or otherwise.

In this subsection, “certified copy" in relation to any book, document or entry, means a copy of such book, document or entry, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a

* Section 44 is repealed by Act No. 62 of 1980

true copy of such book, document or entry; that such book or document is still in the custody of the Central Bank; that such entry is contained in one of the ordinary books of the Central Bank, and was made in the usual and ordinary course of business, such certificate being dated and subscribed with his name and official title, by such officer as may be authorised for the purpose by the Governor of the Central Bank.

Liability for false statements in Central Bank accounts, &c.

46. Any member of the Monetary Board or any officer or auditor of the Central Bank who certifies or verifies any statement, account, or list required to be furnished to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance in pursuance of this Act, knowing the same to be false in any material particular, shall be guilty of an offence.

Protection for acts done in good faith, &c.

47. (1) No member of the Monetary Board or officer or servant of the Central Bank shall be liable for any damage or loss suffered by the bank unless such damage or loss was caused by his misconduct or wilful default.

(2) Every member of the Monetary Board and every officer or servant of the Central Bank shall be indemnified by the bank from all losses and expenses incurred by him in or about the discharge of his duties, other than such losses and expenses as the board may deem to have been occasioned by his misconduct or wilful default.

CHAPTER III

THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE MEANS OF PAYMENT

PART I - ISSUE OF MEANS OF PAYMENT

(A) Currency

Definition of "currency". [§.11, 52 of 1985]

48. For the purpose of this Act unless the context otherwise requires, "currency" means all currency notes and coins issued or circulating in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Issue power..

49. The Central Bank shall have the sole right and authority to issue currency in Sri Lanka.

Prohibition against issue of notes by any person other than Central Bank.

50. (1) No person other than the Central Bank shall draw, accept make, or issue any bill of exchange, promissory note, or engagement for the payment of money payable to bearer on demand, or borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of money on the bills or notes payable to bearer on demand of any such person:

Provided that cheques or drafts payable to bearer on demand may be drawn on commercial banks or agents by their customers or constituents in respect of moneys in the hands of such banks or agents held by them at the disposal of the person drawing such cheques or drafts.

(2) Every person who contravenes any provision of this section shall be guilty of an offence.

Liability for notes and coins.

51. Currency notes and coins issued by the Central Bank shall be liabilities of the bank. The bank's holdings of its own notes and coins shall not be considered as part of its currency issue and, accordingly, shall not be taken into account in determining the assets or liabilities of the bank.

Currency to be legal tender.

52. All currency notes and coins issued by the Central Bank shall be legal tender in Sri Lanka for the payment of any amount.

Issue of commemorative currency notes or coins. [§2,6 of 1998]

*__52A.__ (1) (a) The Central Bank may, with the aproval of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance and subject to section 53, issue commemorative currency notes or coins.

(b) Commemorative currency notes or coins issued under paragraph (a) of this subsection may be sold at a price higher than the denomination specified in such note or coin and as may be determined by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance.

* This section is deemed to have come into effect from February 4, 1998. See section 4, Act 6 of 1998.

(2) The sale of a commemorative currency note or coin issued under subsection (1) at a price higher than the denomination specified in such currency note or coin shall be deemed not to be a contravention of section 58A.

(3) In this section "commemorative currency note or coin" means a currency note or coin isuued to commemorate any person or a special event.

Characteristics of currency.

53. (1) The Monetary Board shall, with the approval of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, prescribe the denominations, dimensions, designs, inscriptions, and other characteristics of currency notes issued by the Central Bank.

(2) Every currency note shall bear the signatures in facsimile of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance and of the Governor of the Central Bank and shall be stated on the face thereof to be issued on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka.

(3) The Monetary Board shall, with the approval of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, prescribe the metals, fineness, weight, size, designs, denominations, and other characteristics of the coins issued by the Central Bank.

Contracts for printing of notes and minting of coins.

54. The Central Bank shall have the authority to enter into contracts with other persons in Sri Lanka or abroad for the printing of currency notes and the minting of coins.

Exchange of currency. [§3, 6 of 1998]

***55.** (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) upon surrender by any person to the Central Bank of any Sri Lanka currency, the bank shall deliver to that person in exchange, on demand and without charge, Sri Lanka coins and currency notes of equivalent value in such denominations as may be required by that person:

Provided that if the bank is temporarily unable to deliver currency notes or coins of any required denomination, the bank shall be deemed to comply with its obligation if it delivers notes or coins of the next higher or next lower available denomination.

[§3, 6 of 1998]

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be read and construed as imposing an obligation on the Central Bank to deliver on demand under subsection (1), any commemorative curency note or coin issued under section 52A, where the required currency note or coin is of a denomination specified in such currency note or coin.

Replacement of currency unfit for circulation.

56. The Central Bank shall withdraw from circulation and shall cancel all currency notes and coins which for any reason whatsoever

* The amendments made to this section should be deemed to have come into effect from February 4, 1998. section 4, Act 6 of 1998.

are unfit for circulation, and shall, as soon as practicable and subject to such rules and regulations as may be made in that behalf by the Monetary Board with the approval of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, replace them by the delivery in exchange of fit notes and coins.

Retirement of old notes and coins.

57. (1) The Monetary Board may in its discretion, by notice published in the *Gazette* call in for replacement currency notes or coins of any issue or denomination.

(2) Notes and coins called in for replacement in accordance with this section shall remain legal tender for such period not exceeding one year from the date of call as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board and shall thereafter cease to be legal tender.

(3) During the period of five years succeeding the date of call, or such longer period as the Monetary Board may determine, the Central Bank or any agent authorised by the board for the purpose, shall, upon surrender of any currency notes or coins so called in for replacement, replace such notes or coins, at par and without charge, by the delivery in exchange of fit notes or coins.

(4) All currency notes and coins called in for replacement and not surrendered as provided in subsection (3) shall cease to be a liability of the Central Bank and the bearer of any such notes or coins shall not be entitled to any compensation.

Mutilation of defacement of currency notes.

58. Any person who without the authority of the Monetary Board–

[§.12, 52 of 1985]

(a) cuts, perforates, or in any other way whatsoever mutilates any currency note;

[§.12, 52 of 1985]

(b) prints, stamps, or draws anything upon any currency note, or affixes any seal or stamp to or upon any currency note;

[§.12, 52 of 1985]

(c) attaches or affixes to or upon any currency note anything in the nature or form of an advertisement; or

[§.12, 52 of 1985]

(d) reproduces in any form whatsoever, or makes a facsimile of, any currency note,

shall be guilty of an offence.

Use of currency coin otherwise than aslegal tender.
[§ 2, 14 of 1979]

58A. (1) Any person who, without the authority of the Monetary Board, melts, breaks up, perforates, mutilates or uses otherwise than as legal tender, any coin which is legal tender in Sri Lanka shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) Any person who knowingly uses, possesses or deals with any metal or article which he knows or has reasonable cause to believe, is derived from any coin which has been dealt with in contravention of subsection (1), shall be guilty of an offence.

Conclusive evidence of imitation of a currency note. [§.2, 33 of 1954] [S.2, 52 of 1985]

59. (1) Where in any proceedings in any court it has to be determined whether a document purporting to be a currency note is an imitation of a currency note, a certificate under the hand of the Governor of the Central Bank or, if the Governor is temporarily absent from duty or temporarily unable to perform his functions and duties, a certificate under the hand of the Deputy Governor for the time being acting as the Chief Executive Officer of the Central Bank, to the effect that such document is an imitation of a currency note and is not a currency note issued or deemed to be issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka shall be received in those proceedings as conclusive evidence of the fact that such document is an imitation of a currency note.

(2) The Governor or the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank who issues a certificate under this section shall not be examined or cross-examined with respect to that certificate.

[§.13, 52 of 1985]

(3) Every certificate issued under this section shall be substantially in the following form:–

I,....., Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka*/Deputy Governor for the time being acting as the chief executive officer of the Central Bank of Srl Lanka, do hereby certify that I have examined the document marked .....which purports to be a currency note of the denomination .....bearing number ....., and dated ..and that such document is an imitation of a currency note and is not a currency note issued or deemed to be issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Signature: .....
Date:.....
(*Delete inapplicable words)

(4) This section shall apply–

Application of section. [§.3, 33 of 1954]

(a) to proceedings in respect of all offences whether committed before or after the 8th day of July, 1954, and

(b) to proceedings pending before or awaiting inquiry or trial in any court on the 8th day of July, 1954.

Conclusive evidence of imitation of a coin or current coin.

59A. (1) Where in any proceedings in any court it has to be determined whether an article purporting to be a coin or a current coin is an imitation of such coin or current coin, a certificate under the hand of the Governor of the Central Bank or, if the Governor of the Central

[S.2, 5 of 1968] [S.2, 52 of 1985]

Bank is temporarily absent from duty or temporarily unable to perform his functions and duties, a certificate under the hand of the Deputy Governor for the time being acting as the chief executive officer of the Central Bank, to the effect that such article is an imitation of a coin or a current coin, as the case may be, and is not a coin or a current coin issued or deemed to be issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, shall be received in those proceedings as conclusive evidence of the fact that such article is an imitation of a coin or current coin.

(2) The Governor or the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank who issues a certificate under this section shall not be examined or cross-examined with respect to that certificate.

[§.14, 52 of 1985]

(3) Every certificate issued under this section shall be substantially in the following form:–

I, ..., Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka*/Deputy Governor for the time being acting as the chief executive officer of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, do hereby certify that I have examined the article delivered in a sealed packet by .....together with letter No.... in respect of case No. ..... which purports to be a coin*/current coin of the denomination .....and that such article is an imitation of a coin*/ current coin issued or deemed to be issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and is not a coin*/current coin issued or deemed to be issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Signature :.....
Date :-.....
(*Delete inapplicable words)

(4) This section shall apply–

(a) to proceedings in respect of all offences whether committed before or after the fifteenth day of August, 1967; and

(b) to proceedings pending before or awaiting inquiry or trial in any court on the fifteenth day of August, 1967.

(5) In this section, the expression "current coin" shall have the same meaning as in the Penal Code.

(B) - Demand Deposits

Definition of "demand deposits".

60. For the purposes of this Act, "demand deposits" means all those liabilities of the Central Bank and of commercial banks which are denominated in Sri Lanka currency and are subject to payment in legal tender upon demand by cheque, draft or order.

61. The acceptance or creation of demand deposits shall be subject to the control of the Monetary Board in accordance with the powers granted to the board under this Act.

Acceptance and creation of demand deposits.

PART II - THE MONEY SUPPLY

62. For the purposes of this Act, the expression "the money supply" means all currency, demand deposits, time and savings deposits and such other financial assets as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board from time to time and are owned by persons other than the Government, commercial banks and such financial institutions or categories of financial institutions as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board and for the purposes of this section "financial institutions" shall have the same meaning assigned to it in subsection (5) of section 93.

Expression of the Definition of "the money supply". [§.13, 32 of 2002]

PART III – PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS

62A. (1) The Central Bank may establish and operate one or more systems–

Establishment of Systems for transfer of funds and transfer and settlement of Scripless Securities. [§.14, 32 of 2002]

(*a*) for the transfer of funds by and between the Central Bank, commercial banks and such other institutions or persons that maintain a settlement account with the Central Bank and who are admitted as participants to such system by the Central Bank;

(*b*) for the transfer and settlement of scripless securities by and between the Central Bank and direct participants;

(*c*) for the settlement of payment obligations in respect of transfer and settlement of scripless securities under paragraph (*b*).

(2) A system established under subsection (1) may be linked to another system in Sri Lanka or elsewhere for the clearing or settlement of payment obligations or securities.

(3) The Central Bank may enter into agreements with the participants of a system established under subsection (1) and issue in writing to the participants of the system rules for the operation of the system.

(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (3), such rules may provide–

(*a*) for the provision of intra-day credit against the collateral of securities to the participants and the conditions attaching to the provision of such credit;

(*b*) for the appointment of the Central Bank as a certification authority for the purpose of issuing certificates to participants

under any law applicable to the appointment of certification authorities in respect of electronic signatures;

(*c*) for the formulation and adoption of a code of conduct for participants;

(*d*) for the authentication of transactions carried out electronically;

(*e*) for the Central Bank, if it considers necessary in the interest of the system, to cease or suspend the operation of the system, or to withdraw or suspend the privileges or rights of any participant or category of participants or to suspend or revoke the membership in the system of a participant;

(*f*) for the appointment of auditors or inspectors for the auditing or inspection of the operating systems of participants in respect of the settlement system; and

(*g*) for the payment of charges and fees to the Central Bank by the participants.

(5) A payment or transfer made through a system established under subsection (1), is final and irrevocable –

(*a*) in the case of a transaction involving a funds transfer only, upon the settlement account of the participant requesting the funds transfer being debited;

(*b*) in the case of a transaction involving a securities transfer only, upon the securities account of the participant requesting the securities transfer being debited;

(*c*) in the case of a transaction involving both a funds transfer and a securities transfer, upon debiting the settlement account or the securities account of a participant requesting the funds transfer or the securities transfer as the case may be, whichever occurs earlier,

and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, such payment or transfer shall not be required to be reversed, repaid or set aside nor shall any court, order such payment or transfer to be rectified or stayed.

(6) Scripless securities issued under this Act or the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance or the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance shall be transferred, pledged, encumbered, lent, borrowed or transacted in only as provided by or under the regulations made under this Act or the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance or the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance, as the case may be. A transfer, pledge, encumbrance, loan, borrowing or transaction effected accordingly shall be valid and effectual notwithstanding any other written law, and the claim of a participant of

the system on any scripless securities posted as collateral in accordance with those regulations as may be applicable shall have priority over the claims on such scripless securities of a person who is not a participant of the system.

(7) Nothing in subsections (5) and (6) shall affect any other legal right or remedy available to a person who has suffered any loss or damage by a payment, transfer or settlement effected through a system established under subsection (1).

(8) Notwithstanding the provisions of any written law relating to the winding up of companies, if proceedings for the winding up of a participant of a system have commenced –

(*a*) the Central Bank may do anything permitted or required by the rules of the system in order to net obligations incurred before or on the day on which the proceedings commenced;

(*b*) the obligations that are netted under the rules of the system shall be disregarded in the proceedings; and

(*c*) the netting made by the Central Bank and any payment made by the participant under the rules of the system shall not be voidable in the proceedings.

(9) If proceedings for the winding up of a participant is commenced and a payment or settlement owed by such participant has been made as referred to in subsection (5) or (8), and if a payment or settlement of such funds or securities would have been void or voidable under any other written law if made outside the system, the liquidator of such participant may recover from the person to whose benefit such payment or settlement was made such amount as would have been recoverable if such payment or settlement had been made outside the system.

(10) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of section 47, the Monetary Board, any member of the Monetary Board, any officer or employee of the Central Bank or any person acting under the direction of the Monetary Board shall not be liable for any loss or damage suffered by any person or participant, arising directly or indirectly, from the use of the system by any participant, unless such loss or damage results from gross negligence or willful misconduct of the Monetary Board or any member of the Monetary Board or any officer or employee of the Central Bank or any person acting under the direction of the Monetary Board.

(11) Where any transaction effected through a system established under subsection (1) is carried out electronically, such transaction shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the ground that such transaction is carried out electronically or that the information relating to such transaction is maintained in the form of an electronic record, and such record may be tendered in evidence in proceedings before any court or tribunal in accordance with the provisions of

Parts II and III of the Evidence (Special Provisions) Act, No.14 of 1995 or any other law for the time being in force relating to the tendering of computer evidence, before any court or tribunal.

(12) Any or all of the functions referred to in subsection (1) may, be carried out by a body corporate authorised for the purpose by the Monetary Board, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Monetary Board.

(13) For the purposes of this section –

"direct participant" and "scripless securities" shall have the same meaning as in section 112A;

"rules" mean any rule issued by the Central Bank under subsection (3) of this section;

"securities" shall have the same meaning as in section 112A except that for the purposes of paragraph (a) of subsection (4), securities shall not include securities of the Central Bank issued in scripless form or otherwise;

"settlement account" means an account maintained by a participant with the Central Bank under this Act and used for the purposes of the system with the approval of the Central Bank;

"securities account" means an account maintained by a participant with the Central Bank in terms of paragraph (*b*) of section 112A.

CHAPTER IV

THE CENTRAL BANK AND NATIONAL MONETARY POLICY

PART I - DOEMSTIC MONETARY STABILIZATION

Principles governing determination of domestic monetary policy.

63. (1) The Monetary Board shall endeavour so to regulate the supply, availability, and cost of money as to secure, so far as possible by action authorised by this Act, the objects mentioned in section 5; and shall for such purpose have regard to the monetary needs of particular sectors of the economy as well as of the economy as a whole.

(2) In determining its domestic monetary policies the Monetary Board shall especially consider their effects on Sri Lanka's international financial position as evidenced by the relation of domestic to world prices and costs, by the level and composition of exports and imports, by the international balance of payments, and, ultimately, by the ability of the Central Bank to maintain the international stability of the Sri Lanka rupee and its free convertibility for current international transactions.

Action to preserve domestic monetary stability

64. (1) Whenever the Monetary Board anticipates economic disturbances that are likely to threaten domestic monetary stability in Sri Lanka or whenever abnormal movements in the money supply or in the price level are actually endangering such stability, it shall be the duty of the board–

(a) to adopt such policies, and to cause such remedial measures to be taken, as are appropriate in the circumstances and authorised by this Act;

(b) to submit to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance and, if not prejudicial to the public interest, make public, a detailed report which shall include, as a minimum, an analysis of–

(*i*) the causes of the anticipated economic disturbances, or of the actual abnormal movements of the money supply or the price level;

(*ii*) the probable effects of such disturbances or movements on the level of production, employment, and real income in Sri Lanka; and

(*iii*) the measures which the Monetary Board has already taken, and the further monetary, fiscal, or administrative measures which it proposes to take or recommends for adoption by the Government.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), it shall be the duty of the Monetary Board to submit a report in terms of paragraph *(b)* of that subsection if at the end of any month the board finds that the amount of the money supply has increased or decreased by more than fifteen *per centum*, or the cost of living index has increased by more than ten *per centum*, of its level at the end of the corresponding month in the preceding year.

(3) The Monetary Board shall continue to submit further reports periodically so long as the circumstances which occasioned the submission of the first report constitute a threat to domestic monetary stability.

PART II - INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILIZATION

Principles governing determination of international monetary policy. [§.8, Law 10 of 1978]

65. In determining its international monetary policy the Monetary Board shall endeavour to maintain the par value of the Sri Lanka rupee, or where no determination of such par value has been made under section 3, maintain such exchange arrangements as are consistent with the underlying trends in the country and so relate its exchange with other currencies as to assure its free use for current international transactions.

International Reserve.

66. (1) In order to maintain the international stability of the Sri Lanka rupee and to assure the greatest possible freedom of its current international transactions, the Monetary Board shall endeavour to maintain among the assets of the Central Bank an international reserve adequate to meet any foreseeable deficits in the international balance of payments.

[§.8, Law 10 of 1978]

(2) In judging the adequacy of the International Reserve, the Monetary Board shall be guided by the estimates of prospective receipts and payments of foreign exchange by Sri Lanka; by the volume and maturity of the Central Bank's own liabilities in foreign currencies; and, in so far as they are known or can be estimated, by the volume and maturity of the foreign exchange assets and liabilities of the Government and of banking institutions and other persons in Sri Lanka. So long as any part of the foreign currency assets of Sri Lanka are held in currencies which are not freely convertible by the Central Bank, whether directly or indirectly, into special drawing rights or such other common denominator prescribed by the International Monetary Fund or into foreign currencies

freely usable in international transactions, or are frozen, the Monetary Board shall also take this factor into account in judging the adequacy of the International Reserve of the Central Bank.

Composition of International Reserve. [§.7, 2 of 1969]

67. (1) The International Reserve of the Central Bank may include the following assets :–

(*i*) gold;

(*ii*) assets in foreign currencies in the form of -

(a) documents and instruments of types customarily employed for the international transfer of funds; or

(b) demand and the time deposits in central banks, treasuries, and commercial banks abroad; or

(c) securities of foreign Governments; or

(d) foreign notes and coins; and [§.7,2 of 1969]

(*iii*) either the whole, or such maximum percentage of the whole, of the holdings of such drawing rights in the Special Drawing Rights Department in the International Monetary Fund according as may be determined from time to time by the Monetary Board. [§.7,2 of 1969] [§.8, Law 10 of 1978]

(2) The Monetary Board shall endeavour to hold at least a nuclear reserve in gold or currencies freely convertible by the Central Bank, whether directly or indirectly, into gold. The board shall particularly consider the prospects of stability and convertibility of all of the currencies in the International Reserve as well as the anticipated demand for such currencies.

Action to preserve the international stability of the rupee.

68. (1) Whenever the Monetary Board anticipates that there may develop a deficit in the international balance of payments of such magnitude as to cause a serious decline in the International Reserve, or whenever there is an imminent threat of a serious decline in the International Reserve, or whenever the International Reserve actually falls to a level which the board considers to be a threat to the international stability of the Sri Lanka rupee, or whenever international payments or remittances are being made which in the opinion of the board constitute an actual or a potential threat to such stability or are prejudicial to the national welfare, it shall be the duty of the board–

(a) to adopt such policies, and to cause such remedial measures to be taken, as are appropriate to the circumstances and authorised by this Act, and

(b) to submit to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance a detailed report which shall include, as a minimum, an analysis of–

(*i*) the nature, causes, and magnitude of the actual or potential threat to the international stability of the Sri Lanka rupee; and

Dealings in gold.

(*ii*) the measures which the board has already taken, and the further monetary, fiscal or administrative measures which it proposes to take or recommends for adoption by the Government.

(2) The Monetary Board shall submit further periodical reports to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance until the threat to the international stability of the rupee has disappeared.

CHAPTER V

INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL BANK ACTION

PART I - OPERATIONS IN GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

***70.** The Central Bank may import, export, buy, sell, hold, or otherwise deal in gold in any form.

Foreign exchange operations of Central Bank.

71. (1) The Central Bank may engage in spot or other foreign exchange operations, that is to say, it may effect transfers of funds by telegram, letter, or other method of communication, and may buy and sell foreign notes and coins and any documents or instruments of types customarily employed for the international transfer of funds.

(2) Foreign exchange operations may be transacted by the Central Bank only with–

(a) commercial banks operating in Sri Lanka;

(b) the Government and agencies or institutions acting on behalf of the Government (whether established by any written law or otherwise);

(c) foreign commercial or central banks;

(d) international financial institutions; and

* Section 69 is repealed by Law No. 10 of 1978.

(*e*) foreign Governments and agencies or institutions acting on behalf of foreign Governments.

Purchases and sales of foreign exchange from or to commercial banks in Sri Lanka. [S.8, Law 10 of 1975] [§.15, 32 of 2002]

72. In order to ensure the free use of the Sri Lanka rupee for current international transactions, the Central Bank may buy any quantity of foreign exchange offered, or sell any quantity of foreign exchange demanded, by any commercial bank in Sri Lanka:

Provided that nothing in the preceding provisions of this subsection shall require the Central Bank to purchase foreign exchange in any currency which is not freely convertible by the bank, whether directly or indirectly, into special drawing rights or such other common denominator prescribed by the International Monetary Fund or into foreign currencies freely usable in international transactions, unless, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, there is an adequate demand, actual or anticipated, for such currency for the purpose of making payments for current international transactions, or unless the Monetary Board, with the concurrence of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, makes a determination that the acquisition of such currency is in the national interest.

Parities of foreign currencies with respect to the rupee.

73. (1) The Governor shall determine and certify the parities with respect to the Sri Lanka rupee of foreign currencies ordinarily required for the international transactions of Sri Lanka. Parities so determined and certified shall be published in the *Gazette*, and shall be recognized as the legal parities for all purposes. The Governor may in addition certify the parity of any foreign currency not included in the published list of parities.

(2) The Governor may at any time desist from certifying or publishing the parity of any foreign currency if the exchange rates for that currency in international markets are unstable or widely divergent.

(3) The legal parities of foreign currencies with respect to the Sri Lanka rupee shall be determined by the Governor, in accordance with the following provisions :–

(a) The currency of a country which is a member of the International Monetary Fund shall have its parity with respect to the rupee established on the basis of its par value as agreed with the fund in every case where the country is permitting exchange transactions between its currency and the currencies of other members only within the maximum and the minimum rates prescribed in the International Monetary Fund Agreement for such transactions. In any other case, or if the par value of the currency of a member country has not been agreed with the fund, the parity of such currency with respect to the

rupee may be calculated on the basis of the exchange rates for that currency in the international markets; and if there is divergence among the rates quoted in the international markets, the Governor may determine which rates to use for the determination of parity.

[§.8, Law 10 of 1978]

(b) The currency of a country which is not a member of the International Monetary Fund shall have its parity with the rupee calculated on the basis of the exchange rates for the currency in international markets; and if there is divergence among the rates quoted in international markets the Governor may determine which rates shall be used for the determination of the parity.

Exchange rates for Central Bank transactions.

74. (1) The Monetary Board shall from time to time determine the rates at which the Central Bank will buy and sell foreign exchange.

[§.8, Law 10 of 1978] [§.16, 32 of 2002]

(2) The rates determined under subsection (1) for spot transactions shall not differ by more than four and one-half per centum from the legal parities determined under Section 73, except in the case of the rates for purchases and sales of foreign notes and coins, in which case the Board may have regard to the additional costs of, or incidental to, such transactions.

(3) The rates determined under subsection (1) for transactions other than spot transactions shall not differ from the corresponding rates for spot transactions, except in so far as is necessary to reimburse the bank for the additional costs, expenses, or risks of each type of transaction.

(4) The Central Bank shall not accept any commission or impose any charge of any description in respect of the purchase or sale of foreign exchange, except telegraphic or other costs actually incurred in connection with such purchase or sale.

Loans to and from foreign institution, &c.

75. (1) The Central Bank may grant loans to, or take loans from, any institution of any description referred to in paragraphs *(c), (d)* and *(e)* of subsection (2) of section 71 and may engage in such other transactions with such institutions as are expedient or desirable in the public interest and are appropriate having regard to the character of the bank as a Central Bank.

The Central Bank may act as agent or correspondent of any such institution other than a foreign commercial bank.

(2) Any loan taken as provided in subsection (1) may be secured by gold or other assets held by the Central Bank.

PART II - REGULATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE OPERATIONS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

Rates applicable to purchases and sale of exchange by commercial banks. [§8, 10 of 1978] [§.17, 32 of 2002]

76. (1) The Monetary Board shall determine the minimum rate at which commercial banks may buy spot exchange and the minimum rate at which they may sell spot exchange. Where the Monetary Board has certified the legal parity of a currency in accordance with section 73, the maximum and minimum exchange rates established for such currency shall not differ from such parity by more than four and one-half *per centum.*

(2) No commercial bank shall buy spot exchange at any rate below the minimum rate determined under subsection (1) or sell spot exchange at any rate exceeding the maximum rate so determined; and no commercial bank shall in respect of any purchase or sale of such exchange accept any commission or impose any charge of any description except telegraphic or other costs actually incurred in connection with such purchase or sale.

(3) No commercial bank shall carry out any transaction in exchange, not being a spot transaction, at any rate which differs from the rate determined under subsection (1) for a spot transaction–

(a) by a margin greater than is reasonable having regard to the additional costs, expenses or risks of the transaction; or

(b) by such margin, if any, as may be prescribed in that behalf by the Monetary Board.

Governor's powers in relation to exchange rate. [§.18, 32 of 2002]

76A. (1) Where the Governor is of opinion that it is inexpedient to determine and certify, in accordance with the provisions of section 73, the parities with respect to the Sri Lanka Rupee of foreign currencies ordinarily required for the international transactions of Sri Lanka, the Governor–

(*a*) may desist from determining and certifying the parities of such foreign currencies under that section; and

(*b*) may or may not determine the rates at which the Central Bank may buy and sell foreign exchange in spot or other transactions.

(2) Where the Governor acts in terms of subsection (1), the provisions of sections 73, 74 and 76 shall cease to have any force or effect in law.

(3) Where the Governor determines, under paragraph (*b*) of subsection (1) the rates at which the Central Bank may buy and sell foreign exchange in spot or other transactions, the following provisions shall apply upon such determination -

(a) such determination may be limited to such foreign currencies as the Governor may deem appropriate;

(b) the rates determined under paragraph (*b*) of subsection (1) shall not apply in the case of the purchases and sales of foreign notes and coins, in which case the Central Bank may have regard to the additional costs of, or costs incidental to, such purchases or sales;

(c) the Central Bank shall not accept any commission or impose any charge of any description in respect of the purchase or sale of foreign exchange, except the telegraphic or other costs actually incurred in connection with such purchase or sale;

(d) it shall be competent for the Governor to authorise, in writing, any officer by name or by office, to vary from time to time within such limits as may be specified by the Governor, the rates determined by the Governor under paragraph (*b*) of subsection (1);

(e) where the Governor makes a determination under paragraph (*b*) of subsection (1) with respect to foreign currency but makes no determination under that subsection with respect to any particular foreign currency, the Central Bank may buy and sell such currency in respect of which no determination has been made at a rate calculated on the basis of the exchange rate for that currency in the international markets in relation to any foreign currency with respect to which the Governor has made a determination under paragraph (*b*) of subsection (1).

(4) Where the Governor desists from determining and certifying parities under subsection (1)(*a*) and does not determine the rates at which the Central Bank may buy and sell foreign exchange in spot or other transactions under paragraph (*b*) of subsection (1), the Central Bank may buy and sell foreign exchange at such rates as the Governor or an officer authorised by the Governor for the purpose may deem appropriate.

(5) (*a*) Where the Governor determines under subsection 1(*b*) the rates at which the Central Bank may buy and sell foreign exchange, the Governor may determine the minimum rate at which any commercial bank may buy spot foreign exchange and the maximum rate at which any commercial bank may sell spot foreign exchange.

(b) Notwithstanding that the Governor has desisted from determining and certifying parities under subsection (1)(*a*)

and has not determined the rates at which the Central Bank may buy or sell foreign exchange under paragraph (*b*) of subsection (1) the Governor may determine the minimum rate at which any commercial bank may buy spot foreign exchange and the maximum rate at which any commercial bank may sell spot foreign exchange.

(c) The provisions of paragraph (*d*) of subsection (3) shall, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to and in relation to, the minimum and maximum rates determined under paragraph (a) or paragraph (*b*) of this subsection.

(d) Where no determination is made under paragraph (*a*) or paragraph (*b*) of this subsection, a commercial bank may buy, sell or carry out any transaction in foreign currency at rates calculated on the basis of the exchange rates for that currency in the international markets.

(e) Where a determination is made under paragraph (*a*) or paragraph (*b*) of this subsection as to the minimum and the maximum rates at which commercial banks may buy and sell spot foreign exchange –

(*i*) no commercial bank shall buy spot foreign exchange at any rate below the minimum rate determined under those paragraphs as may be applicable or sell spot foreign exchange at any rate exceeding the maximum rate so determined as may be applicable; and no commercial bank shall in respect of the purchase or sale of such exchange accept any commission or impose any charge of any description except telegraphic or other costs actually incurred in connection with such purchase or sale; and

(*ii*) no commercial bank shall carry out any transaction in foreign exchange, not being a spot transaction, at any rate which differs from the rates determined under paragraph (*a*) or paragraph (*b*) of this subsection as may be applicable by a margin greater than is reasonable having regard to the additional costs, expenses or risks of the transaction, or by such margin, if any, as may be prescribed in that behalf by the Governor.

Control of foreign exchange holdings of commercial banks.

77. (1) In order more effectively to control the use and disposition of the foreign exchange resources of Sri Lanka or in order to promote the domestic investment of the resources of commercial banks, the Monetary Board may from time to time fix, or prescribe the manner of determination of, the maximum amount of the working balances which commercial banks may hold in foreign currencies generally or in any specified foreign currency or currencies, and may from time to time

require such banks to sell to the Central Bank all or any specified part of the surpluses in excess of such maximum amount.

(2) The Monetary Board may, having regard to the special needs of any particular commercial bank, permit that bank to hold working balances in any specified foreign currency in excess of the maximum amount fixed or determined for such currency under subsection (1).

(3) In ascertaining whether the working balances of any commercial bank in any foreign currency are in excess of the maximum amount fixed or determined as herein before provided, there may be deducted from such balances the net liabilities of that bank in currencies into which the first-mentioned currency is freely convertible.

Requirements regarding currency position of commercial banks.

78. (1) The Monetary Board may direct that the proportion which the assets in Sri Lanka rupees of commercial banks in Sri Lanka bear to the liabilities in Sri Lanka rupees of such banks shall not be less than such proportion as the Monetary Board may prescribe, or may direct such banks to maintain a balanced position between their assets and liabilities in any currency or currencies in which they operate. The board shall allow to such banks a reasonable period of time in which to comply with any such direction.

(2) Any direction under subsection (1) shall be made applicable to all commercial banks without discrimination:

Provided, however, that the Monetary Board may give such a direction to any particular commercial bank in any case where, in the opinion of the board, such action is necessary in order to protect against possible loss to depositors and other creditors of the bank who are citizens of Sri Lanka or to companies or associations controlled by citizens of Sri Lanka.

Revaluation profits and losses on holdings of foreign exchange by banking institutions. [§.8, Law 10 of 1978]

79. (1) Any revaluation profits realized or any revaluation losses incurred by banking institutions on their net assets and liabilities in foreign currencies freely convertible by the Central Bank, whether directly or indirectly, into special drawing rights or such other common denominator prescribed by the International Monetary Fund or into foreign currencies freely usable in foreign transactions and arising from changes in the par value of the Sri Lanka rupee or in the legal parities or in the Central Bank's exchange rates, of such currencies with respect to the Sri Lanka rupee, shall be assumed in their entirety by the Central Bank and shall be debited or credited accordingly.

(2) (a) If the Monetary Board so declares, the provisions of subsection (1) shall apply in relation to revaluation profits realized or revaluation losses incurred by banking institutions on their net assets or liabilities in any specified foreign currency which is not freely convertible by the Central Bank, whether directly or indirectly, into gold.

(b) Any such declaration shall have effect until it is revoked by the board. Notice of the date on which any such declaration will be revoked shall be given to banking institutions not less than eight days before the proposed date of revocation.

(c) During the period commencing on the date of the notice referred to in paragraph (b) and ending on the date of revocation of the declaration to which it relates, every banking institution shall comply with such directions, if any, as may be given by the Monetary Board for the purpose of preventing banking institutions from increasing their holdings of the currency to which the declaration relates.

(3) Where in consequence of a determination made under subsection (1) of section 76A, the provisions of sections 73, 74 and 76 cease to be of any force or effect, the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall also cease to be of any force or effect, and accordingly, the Central Bank shall not assume any revaluation profits realised or revaluation losses incurred by any banking institution. [§3, Law 16 of 1977]

80. (1) Every commercial bank shall, as soon as may be after the close of business at the end of such period as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board, make a report to the Central Bank setting out the volume and composition of its purchases and sales of foreign exchange during that period, and shall furnish such additional information as the Central Bank may require with reference to such purchases and sales and to the movements of its accounts in foreign currencies. Information on exchange operations.

(2) The Monetary Board may also require any other person to make reports to the Central Bank at specified times or intervals as to all transactions or operations in gold, in any shape or form, and in foreign exchange.

(3) Every report under this section shall be in such of the appropriate forms as the Monetary Board may prescribe for the purpose.

(4) The Director of Bank Supervision may make such inspection or examination of the books and accounts kept by any commercial bank or other person as he may deem necessary for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of any statement set out in any report made by such commercial bank or person.

81. Whenever there is in progress an inward or outward movement of capital which in the opinion of the Monetary Board is actually endangering, or threatening to endanger, the domestic or international stability of the Sri Lanka rupee, it shall be the duty of the board to take such action as is appropriate under section 64 or section 68. Capital movements.

PART III-CREDIT OPERATIONS WITH BANKING INSTITUTIONS

Priciples governing credit operations.

82. (1) The Central Bank shall exercise the authority conferred by this Part of this Act to carry out the national monetary policy by regulating the supply, availability, cost, and character of credit and by providing the banking system with liquid funds in times of need.

(2) If the Monetary Board determines that it is necessary so to do by reason that, in the opinion of the board, there is in progress, or has occurred, an expansion of the money supply that represents a threat to the domestic or international monetary stability of Sri Lanka, the board shall direct the suspension of the grant of credit by the Central Bank to banking institutions, except when the board, having regard to the special circumstances, by unanimous decision approves the grant of credit.

Types of operations normally authorised. [§.88, 30 of 1971]

83. (1) Subject to the principles stated in section 82 of this Act, the Central Bank may ordinarily transact with commercial banks and the National Savings Bank, credit operations of any description set out hereunder :–

(a) Commercial credits – The Central Bank may discount, rediscount, buy and sell bills, acceptances, promissory notes, and other credit instruments with maturities of not more than 180 days from the date of their discount, rediscount, or acquisition by the Central Bank and resulting from transactions related to–

(*i*) the importation, exportation, purchase, or sale of readily saleable goods and products, or their transportation within Sri Lanka; or

(*ii*) the storage of non-perishable goods and products which are duly insured and deposited under conditions assuring their preservation, in authorised bonded warehouses or in other places approved by the Monetary Board.

(b) Production credits – The Central Bank may discount, rediscount, buy and sell bills, acceptances, promissory notes, and other credit instruments having maturities of not more than 270 days from the date of their discount, rediscount, or acquisition by the Central Bank and resulting from transactions related to the production, manufacture, or processing of agricultural, animal, mineral, or industrial products.

(c) Advances. – The Central Bank may grant loans or advances for any fixed period not exceeding 180 days upon promissory notes secured by the pledge with the bank of–

(*i*) gold coins or bullion; or

(*ii*) negotiable Treasury Bills, promissory notes, debentures, bonds, or other negotiable securities of the Government; or

(*iii*) securities issued by the Central Bank itself or other credit instruments of banking institutions operating in Sri Lanka and approved by the Monetary Board; or

(*iv*) credit instruments referred to in paragraph *(a)* of this subsection; or

(*v*) credit instruments referred to in paragraph (b) of this subsection.

Notwithstanding anything in the preceding provisions of this paragraph, a loan or advance secured by the pledge of any credit instrument referred to in paragraph *(b)* of this subsection may be for a period not exceeding 270 days.

(2) Except in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as the Monetary Board may determine, the Central Bank shall not grant to any commercial bank or to the National Savings Bank, any loan or advance upon the security of the pledge of any instrument referred to in paragraph *(c)* of subsection (1) in any case where such instrument is held by such commercial bank or the National Savings Bank as security for the repayment to it of the amount due upon any overdraft account. [§.88, 30 of 1971]

Extension of maturitie.

84. Whenever, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, a deflationary situation exists which requires special relaxation of normal maturities applying to Central Bank credit operations, the board may determine that credits may be granted by the bank on instruments referred to in paragraph *(a)* or paragraph *(b)* of section 83(1) having a maturity of a period longer than the period specified in those paragraphs but not exceeding one year, and may authorise loans or advances to be granted under paragraph *(c)* of that section for any period not exceeding one year.

Loans to mortgage institutions.

85. (1) in special circumstances in which the Monetary Board considers it necessary to promote or facilitate lending operations or particular classes of such operations by banking institutions which make loans upon mortgages, whether of movable or of immovable property, the Central Bank may grant loans or advances to any such institution against

promissory notes given by such institution subject to and in accordance with the following conditions :–

(a) that the loan or advance is repayable within a period not exceeding one year;

(b) that the repayment to the Central Bank of the loan or advance is secured by the assignment to the bank by way of pledge–

(i) of debts falling due for payment within the same period to the institution by its borrowers, and

(ii) of the mortgages given as security for the payment of such debts to the institution;

(c) that the borrowers from whom such debts are due to the institution are not in default or arrears; and

(d) that the total amount of the loan or advance by the Central Bank must not exceed fifty *per centum* of the total amount of the debts which are so assigned to it.

(2) The Central Bank may make advances to any institution referred to in subsection (1) upon the terms and conditions mentioned in section 83(1).

(3) Loans or advances shall not be made under subsection (1) by the Central Bank at any time when the board is of opinion that the grant thereof would cause or aggravate inflationary tendencies.

Emergency loans and advances.

86. (1) In periods of emergency or of imminent financial panic which directly threaten monetary and banking stability, the Central Bank may grant to banking institutions, and may renew, extraordinary loans or advances secured by any assets which are defined as acceptable for the purpose by the Monetary Board by unanimous decision.

(2) A banking institution to which an extraordinary loan or advance is granted under subsection (1) shall not, while the loan or advance is outstanding, expand the total volume of its loans and investments except with the prior approval of the Monetary Board.

Interest and discount rates.

87. The Monetary Board shall fix the interest and discount rates to be charged by the Central Bank on its credit operations in accordance with the character and term of each such operation; and the board shall, in so doing, have regard to the soundness of credit conditions, the needs of the market, and the general requirements of the national monetary policy.

88. The Monetary Board may prescribe the conditions subject to which credit facilities of the Central Bank will be available to banking institutions, including conditions relating to the rates of interest charged by such institutions, to the purposes for which their loans in general are destined, and to any other matter affecting or connected with the credit policy of such institutions.

General conditions as to grant of credit facilities.

PART IIIA- MEDIUM AND LONG TERM CREDIT OPERATIONS WITH CREDIT INSTITUTIONS

[§.67, 11 of 1963]

88A. (1) With the object of granting financial accommodation to any credit institution in respect of lending operations carried out by such institution for any productive purpose, the Central Bank may, from time to time, grant, out of the Fund, any loan or advance to such institution against a promissory note given by such institution subject to and in accordance with the following conditions :-

Loans or advances to credit institutions.

[§67, 11 of 1963]

(a) that the loan or advance is repayable within such period not exceeding fifteen years as may be determined by the bank;

(b) that the repayment to the Central Bank of the loan or advance is secured by the assignment to the bank by way of pledge of debts owing to such institution by its borrowers in respect of such purpose or purposes; and

[§.2, 21 of 1963]

(c) such other conditions including the rate of interest to be charged by the Bank on such loan or advance, as may be determined by the Monetary Board.

Such assignment is in this Part of this Act referred to as an "assignment by way of pledge".

(2) The Monetary Board may prescribe the conditions subject to which loans or advances will be available out of the Fund to credit institutions, including conditions relating to the rates of interest charged by such institutions, to the purposes for which their loans in general are destined, and to any other matters affecting or connected with the credit policy of such institutions.

(3) An assignment by way of pledge to the Central Bank under this Part of this Act shall be effected by an instrument which shall be substantially in the following form :-

Form of Assignment by way of pledge to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka under section 88A of the Monetary Law Act

[§.2, 52 of 1985]

We, ..., in terms of section 88A of the Monetary Law Act, do hereby assign to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka by way of pledge, the

debts owing to us, particulars whereof are set forth in the Schedule hereto, as security or further security for the repayment to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka of a *loan/advance of Rs ..... granted to us by the Bank repayable .....with interest at ..% per annum.

*Delete whichever is inapplicable.

SCHEDULE

Amount of debt	*Borrowers name and address*	*Date*	*Notary*

[§.2, 21 of 1968]

(4) The Central Bank shall, on the execution of an assignment by way of pledge under this Part of this Act, have a first charge on the debts assigned.

(5) The provisions of this Part of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other provisions of this Act.

Instrument of assignment by way of pledge tothe Central Bank to be free of stamp duty. [§.67, 11 of 1963]

88B. No duty shall be chargeable or payable under the Stamp Ordinance* on or in respect of any instrument of assignment by way of pledge to the Central Bank under this Part of this Act, and accordingly, for the purposes of that Ordinance, such instrument shall be deemed to be exempt from such duty.

Instrument of assignment by way of pledge tothe Central Bank need not be registered under the Registration of Documents Ordinance. [§.67, 11 of 1963]

88C. No instrument of assignment by way of pledge to the Central Bank under this Part of this Act shall require registration under the Registration of Documents Ordinance, and accordingly any such instrument shall be deemed not to be void by reason only of its not being so registered.

Notarial execution not required in the case of assignments by way of pledge. [§.67, 11 of 1963]

88D. No assignment by way of pledge shall require execution before a licensed notary public and witnesses as provided by section 2 of the Prevention of Frauds Ordinance, and accordingly any such assignment shall be deemed not to be void by reason only of its not being so executed.

Medium and long term credit fund. [S.67, 11 of 1966]

88E. (1) The Central Bank may establish, maintain, manage, and control at the bank, a Fund to be called the Medium and Long Term Credit Fund (in this Part of this Act referred to as the "Fund").

[§.3, 21 of 1968]

(2) *(a)* The Monetary Board may, from time to time, transfer to the Fund, out of the reserves of the bank, such sums of money as it may deem necessary to enable the bank to discharge its functions under this Part of this Act.

* See also the Stamp Duty Act, No. 43 of 1982.

(b) The bank may pay to the Fund the amounts of loans granted to the bank by international financial institutions.

(3) The Central Bank shall pay out of the Fund–

(a) the amounts of all loans and advances granted by the bank to credit institutions under this Part of this Act;

(b) all sums of money representing other liabilities incurred by the bank in the discharge of its functions under this Part of this Act; [§.3, 21 of 1968]

(c) all sums of money which the bank may, from time to time, decide to retransfer from the Fund to the reserves of the bank; and [§.3, 21 of 1968]

(d) all sums of money due to international financial institutions in repayment of loans granted to the bank by such international financial institutions if the amounts of such loans had been paid into the Fund. [§.3, 21 of 1968]

(4) The Central Bank shall, in addition to the sums of money referred to in subsection (2), pay into the Fund all sums of money paid to or recovered by the bank in repayment of the loan or advances granted by the bank to credit institutions under this Part of this Act. [§.3, 21 of 1968]

88F. In this Part of this Act,–

(a) "credit institution means any banking institution as defined in subsection (1) of section 127 of this Act and includes the Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon established under the Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon Act; and Interpritation. [§67, 11 of 1963]

(b) "productive purpose" means any such purpose connected with or relating to the promotion or development of agriculture, industry, trade, commerce or business, as may be determined, from time to time, by the Monetary Board.

88G. The provisions of this Part of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the provisions of any other written law, and accordingly in the event of any conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of this Part of this Act and the provisions of such other written law, the provisions of this Part of this Act shall prevail over the provisions of such other written law. This Part of this Act to prevail over other written law. [§.67, 11 of 1963]

PART IV - CREDIT OPERATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT

89. The Central Bank may make direct provisional advances to the Government to finance expenditures authorised to be incurred out of the Consolidated Fund: Provisional advances to the Government.

Provided that every such advance shall be repayable within a period not exceeding six months, and the total amount of such advances outstanding at any time shall not exceed ten *per centum* of the estimated revenue of the Government for the financial year in which they are made.

PART V - OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS

Principles governing open-market operations.

90. (1) The Central Bank shall so exercise the authority conferred by this Part of this Act to conduct open-market operations as to secure any of the following purposes, that is to say :–

(a) to increase the liquidity or stabilize the values of the securities referred to in section 91 in order thereby to promote private investment in such securities; and to prevent or moderate sharp fluctuations in the quotations of such securities, so, however, as not to alter fundamentally movements in the market resulting from basic changes in the pattern or level of interest rates;

(b) to increase or decrease the supply, availability, and cost of money, in accordance with the national monetary policy as determined by the Monetary Board.

(2) In conducting open-market operations in Government securities, the Central Bank shall have regard to the need for maintaining adequate holdings of short-term securities in order to enable the bank more readily to contract its credit if such contraction becomes necessary.

(3) If the Monetary Board determines that it is necessary so to do by reason that, in the opinion of the board, there is in progress, or has occurred, an expansion of the money supply or of bank reserves that represents a threat to the domestic or international monetary stability of Sri Lanka, the board shall take action to secure–

(a) that purchases of rupee securities in the open market by the Central Bank are suspended, except in special circumstances where the board by unanimous decision determines that such purchases are necessary in the public interest; and

(b) that sales of rupee securities are transacted in the open-market by the bank to such extent as market conditions permit.

Authority of Central Bank to transact open-market operations.

91. (1) in order to carry out the purposes of this Part the Central Bank is hereby authorised–

(a) to purchase and sell in the open-market securities issued by the Government or securities fully guaranteed by the Government; and

(b) to issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable securities of the bank itself.

(2) The power conferred on the Central Bank by the preceding provisions of this section shall be deemed to include the power to purchase and sell Government securities which are denominated in foreign currencies.

Conditions as to issue of securities by Central Bank. Monthly Statement.

92. (1) Securities issued by the Central Bank shall be on such terms and conditions and in such form as may be determined by the Monetary Board.

(2) Any security issued by the Central Bank which is purchased or redeemed by the bank shall not be included among its assets and shall be immediately retired and cancelled.

PART VI - REGULATION OF THE RESERVES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS AND PRESCRIBED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

[§.19, 32 of 2002]

[§.20, 32 of 2002]

93. (1) The Monetary Board shall, in order to limit the volume of money created by the credit operations of the financial system, require commercial banks and such other financial institutions operating in Sri Lanka as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board (in this Part referred to as the "prescribed financial institutions") to maintain reserves against their deposit liabilities and such of their other financial liabilities as the Monetary Board may consider necessary and shall, for that purpose, prescribe the classes of deposit liabilities and the categories of other financial liabilities against which reserves are required to be maintained.

(2) The reserves required to be maintained by a commercial bank or a prescribed financial institution under subsection (1), shall be proportionate to the volumes respectively, of each class of its deposit liabilities and each category of its other financial liabilities and shall, subject to subsection (4), take the form of rupee deposits in the Central Bank.

(3) The accounts maintained at the Central Bank by prescribed financial institutions under subsection (2), shall be maintained only for the purpose of keeping the rupee deposits required to be maintained as reserves by such financial institutions.

(4) The Monetary Board may in the interest of the national economy and the banking and financial systems of the country, permit the maintenance of any part of the reserves required to be maintained under subsection (1), in the form of assets other than rupee deposits in the Central Bank.

(5) In this Part –

"financial business" in relation to a financial institution means the accepting of money in any form from the public, in the ordinary course of business, by way of deposit or by the issue of bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, certificates, notes, commercial paper or other similar instruments by means of which money is raised from the public, and the use of that money, in whole or in part, for the grant of loans or making that money available to third parties or for the benefit of third parties, as a business;

"financial institution" means a licensed specialised bank as defined in the Banking Act, No.30 of 1988, or a finance company as defined in the Finance Companies Act, No.78 of 1988, and includes any person or body of persons carrying on financial business;

"other financial liabilities" in relation to a licensed commercial bank or a prescribed financial institution, means liabilities (other than deposit liabilities) incurred by any such bank or financial institution by the acceptance of money in any form from the public, in the course of its business, by the issue of bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, certificates, notes, commercial paper or other similar instruments by means of which money is raised from the public.

Monetary Board to prescribe reserve ratios. [§.21, 32 of 2002]

94. (1) The Monetary Board shall prescribe, and may, from time to time, vary, the reserve ratios applicable to each class of deposit liabilities and each category or other financial liabilities against which reserves are required to be maintained under Section 93.

(2) Any increase in a reserve ratio which is to be applicable in respect of any liability that existed on the date of the increase shall be made by the Monetary Board in a gradual manner and shall not exceed four percentage points in any one period of thirty days.

(3) The Monetary Board shall, other than in exceptional circumstances, endeavour to give commercial banks and other prescribed financial institutions not less than fourteen days notice of the date on which any increase in a reserve ratio is to become effective.

Interest on reserves when payable. [§.22, 32 of 2002]

95. Where any commercial bank or any prescribed financial institution is required to maintain a reserve against any class of deposit liabilities or any category of other financial liabilities, the Central Bank shall, if so determined by the Monetary Board, in the interest of the national economy and the banking and financial systems of the country, pay to that bank or to that financial institution, as the case may be, interest at such rate as may be determined by the Monetary Board, on the amount maintained as a reserve or a part thereof.

Computation of required reserves. [§.23, 32 of 2002]

96. (1) The reserves required to be maintained by a commercial bank or a prescribed financial institution shall be calculated on such basis as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the principal office in Sri Lanka of a commercial bank or a prescribed financial institution and the respective branches and agencies of such bank or financial institution shall be deemed to be one unit.

Consequnces of reserve deficiencies. [§.24, 32 of 2002]

97. (1) Where the reserves maintained by a commercial bank or a prescribed financial institution are below the reserves required to be maintained by such bank or financial institution calculated on the basis prescribed under Section 96, the commercial bank or the prescribed financial institution, as the case may be, shall pay to the Central Bank, interest on the amount of the deficiency at such rate as may be determined by the Monetary Board.

(2) Where a commercial bank or a prescribed financial institution regularly fails to maintain the reserves required to be maintained by such bank or financial institution calculated on the basis prescribed under Section 96, the Monetary Board may, in the interests of the national economy, make order –

(*a*) prohibiting or restricting the making of loans or investments by that bank or financial institution;

(*b*) prohibiting the application of the whole or any specified part of the net profits of that bank or financial institution for the purpose of payment of a dividend to its shareholders.

Clearance and settlement. [§.25, 32 of 2002]

98. (1) The Central Bank shall provide facilities for clearance transactions among commercial banks operating in Sri Lanka.

(2) The deposit reserves maintained by commercial banks in the Central Bank under this Part shall serve as a basis for the clearance of cheques and the settlement of balances among such banks in accordance with such rules as may be made in that behalf by the Monetary Board.

Powers of the Director of Bank Supervision. [§.26, 32 of 2002]

98A. (1) The Director of Bank Supervision may examine, or cause an examiner of his department to examine the books, accounts and records of a prescribed financial institution and may require any such financial institution or its directors or officers to furnish from time to time or within such periods as may be specified, such books, accounts, records or information as may be required for the purpose of ascertaining whether such institution is complying with the provisions of this Part.

(2) Any person who resists or obstructs the Director of Bank Supervision or an examiner of his department, in the exercise by such Director or examiner, of the powers conferred on him by subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence.

Interpretation for Part VII [§.3, 9 of 2006]

98B. For the purposes of this Part of this Act, "licensed specialized bank" shall have the same meaning as in the Banking Act, No.30 of 1988.

PART VII-ADDITIONAL REGULATION OF CREDIT OPERATIONS OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS

Priciples governing additional regulation.

99. The powers conferred on the Monetary Board by this Part of this Act shall be so exercised as to regulate the supply, availability, cost and character of bank credit in accordance with the national monetary policy as determined by the board, and to ensure that bank credit is not granted for speculative purposes, or other purposes, prejudicial to the public interest.

Maturities of bank loans and security therefor.

100. The Monetary Board may from time to time by order prescribe the maximum permissible maturities for loans and investments made by commercial banks and licensed specialized banks after the order comes into force and the nature and amount of the security to be permitted or required for various types of credit operations.

Limitation of loans and investments of commercial banks.

101. (1) The Monetary Board may from time to time by order -

(a) prohibit commercial banks and licensed specialized banks from increasing the amount of their loans and investments; or

(b) fix limits to the rate at which the amount of loans and investments may be increased within specified periods; or

(c) fix the minimum percentage of loans to be extended, to any identified sector of the economy, by the commercial banks or licensed specialized banks:

Provided, however, that nothing in any such order shall be deemed to require any commercial bank or licensed specialized bank to reduce the amount of its loans and investments below the amount outstanding at the date of the order.

(2) An order under subsection (1) may be made applicable to all the loans and investments of each commercial bank or licensed specialized bank or any specified class or classes of such loans and investments so, however, that every such order shall be applicable to all banks uniformly and without discrimination.

Minimum capital ratios.

102. The Monetary Board may from time to time by order prescribe the minimum ratios which the capital and surplus of commercial banks and licensed specialized banks shall bear to the total volume of their assets or to any specified categories of such assets.

Margin requirements against letters of credit.

103. The Monetary Board may by order direct that letters of credit shall not be opened by commercial banks unless such letters are covered by minimum margins of such kind, amount, or proportion as may be prescribed by the board; different margins may be so prescribed for different classes of transactions to be financed by means of letters of credit.

Fixing of interest rates, commissions and charges. [§.3, 9 of 2006]

104. (1) The Monetary Board may from time to time make order

(a) fixing the maximum rates of interest which commercial banks and licensed specialized banks may pay upon various classes of deposits: or

(b) fixing the maximum rates of interest which commercial banks and licensed specialized banks may charge for different types of loans or other credit operations.

(2) Subject as hereinafter provided, the maximum rate of interest fixed by order under subsection (1) shall apply in relation to any deposit, or to any loan or credit operation, as the case may be, completed before the date on which the order comes into force:

Provided, however, that nothing in any such order–

(a) shall apply in relation to any interest accrued before that date; or

(b) shall require or be deemed to require the reduction of the rate of interest payable upon any deposit completed before the date if such reduction would constitute a breach of the contract or agreement relating to such deposit.

(3) For the purposes of preventing evasion of any order made under subsection (1), the Monetary Board may from time to time prescribe the maximum rates which may be paid to or charged by commercial banks in the form of commissions, discounts, fees or other payments whatsoever.

105. The Monetary Board may declare that credit instruments held by banking institutions and licensed specialized banks will not be accepted for discount or rediscount by, or advances from, the Central bank, if the interest rates charged by such institutions and banks in respect of the loans or other credit operations to which such instruments relate exceed the interest or rediscount rates of the Central Bank by more than such percentage or margin as may from time to time be prescribed by the board.

Conditions of eligibility of credit instruments for discount, &c., by Central Bank.

CHAPTER VA

THE CENTRAL BANK TO PURCHASE SHARES IN CERTAIN COMPANIES

105A. Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act or anything in any other written law, the Central bank may acquire and hold shares in any company which in the opinion of the Monetary Board was formed for the advancement and promotion of human resources and technological development in the banking and financial sector in Sri Lanka, or to provide for all or any of the facilities referred to in subsection (1) of section 98 or 112A of this Act.

Central bank to purchase share in companies. [§.2, 26 of 1995]

CHAPTER VI

THE CENTRAL BANK AS FISCAL AGENT, BANKER, AND FINANCIAL ADVISER OF THE GOVERNMENT

106. (1) The Central Bank shall act as the fiscal agent and banker of the Government and of agencies or institutions acting on behalf of the Government, whether established by any written law or otherwise.

Central Bank to be fiscal agent and banker of the Government.

(2) The Central Bank may, in addition to exercising the functions mentioned in subsection (1), act as agent of the Government for the purposes of any matter or transaction if it is authorised so to do by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance after consultation with the Monetary Board.

107. (1) The Central bank shall be the official depository of the Government and or agencies or institutions referrred to in subsection (1) of section 106:

Official depository of the Government.

Provided, however, that the Monetary Board may authorise one or more commercial banks operating in Sri Lanka to accept Government deposits, subject to such rules and regulations as the board may prescribe.

(2) The monetary Board shall advise the Government regrding the distribution of official deposits between the Central Bank and commercial banks and the effects of such distribution on monetary conditions in Sri Lanka.

(3) The bank shall not pay interest on deposits of the Government or of agencies or institutions referred in subsection (1).

Loan Guaratntees and loan insurance.

108. (1) The Central bank may act as agent, or for the account, of the Government or of any of the agencies or institutions referred to in subsection (1) of section 106, in guaranteeing, insuring, or particiapating in the loans, or any category thereof, of banking instituions operating in Sri Lanka.

(2) The Cental Bank may give guarantees in favour of the Government or of any of the agencies or institutions referred to in subsection (1) of section 106.

Guarantee of loans to small-scale enterprises. [§. 10, Law 37 of 1974.]

108A. (1) The Central Bank may, subject to such directions as may from time to time be made by the Monetary Board, guarantee loans, advances or other accommodation granted to small-scale enterprises by credit institions operating in Sri Lanka.

(2) Where the Central Bank has prior to the date or coming into operation of this section and acting as agent, or for the account, of the Government, guaranteed under section 108 any loans, advances or other accommodation granted by credit institutions to small-scale industrial enterprises, such guarantee shall, with effect from such date, be deemed to be a guarantee given by the Central Bank on its own account.

(3) In this section "credit instituion" means any banking institution as defined in subsection (1) of section 127 of this Act, and indludes-

(a) the Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon established under the Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon Act; and

(b) any such society registered under the Co-operative Societies Law and carrying on banking business of any kind as is approved for the purposes of this section by the Monetary Board.

Other Institutions as agents of Central Bank.

109. In the performance of its functions as fiscal agent and banker of the Government, the Central Bank may engage the services of banks or other institutions in places, whether in Sri Lanka or abroad, where the Central Bank does not have offices or agencies adequately equipped to perform such functions.

Remuneration for services.

110. The Central Bank shall not ordinarily collect any commissions, fees, or other charges for services which it renders to the Government or to any agencies or institutions referred to in subsection (1) of section 106:

Provided, however, that the Monetory Board may, in special cases, conclude an agreement with the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance providing for reimbursement for services the cost of which the bank is unable to bear.

Representation with foreign Governments, agencies, and international institutions.

111. The Central Bak may represent the Government of Sri Lanka in any dealing, negotiations, or transactions with the International Monetary Fund and shall carry such accounts as may result from Sri Lanka's membership in, or operations with, the fund. The Central Bank may also be authorised by the Government to represent it in dealing, negotiations, and transactions with foreign Governments, institutions, or agencies, or with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or other international financial institutions and agencies.

Issue of Government securities.

112. The issue of secutities of the Government or of any of the agencies or institutions referred to in seubsection (1) of section 106 shall be made through the Central Bank, shich shall act as agent, and for the account, of the Government or of such agency or institution:

Provided, however, that except in the case of treasury Bills, for which the Central Bank may make direct ternders, the bank shall not subscribe to any issue of such secutities or agree to purchase the unsubscribed portion of any such issue.

Facilities for maintenance of accounts at the Central Bank and a depository for scripless securities. [§.27, 32 of 2002]

112A. The Central Bank shall provide facilities –

(a) for non-commercial bank primary dealers to maintain accounts at the Central bank for the purpose of settling securities transactions;

[§.27, 32 of 2002]

(b) for direct participants including any direct participant which are not commercial banks, to maintain accounts at the Central Bank for the purpose of holding scripless secutirties, clearing and settling transactions in scripless securities among direct participants; and

[§.27, 32 of 2002]

(c) for the maintenance of a depository for recording of title to scripless securities of the Central Bank, of direct participants and, in the case of dealer direct participants, of their customers. The Central Bank may make such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary in relation to the depository.

For the purpose of this section–

"dealer direct participant" and "direct participant" shall have the respective meanings assigned to them in the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance and the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance;

"non-commercial bank primary dealer" means a primary dealer who is not a commercial bank;

"primary dealer" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance and the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance;

"scripless securities" means securities issued in scripless form; and

"securities" means–

(i) treasury bills issued in accordance with the provisions of the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance whether isseud in scripless form or otherwise;

(ii) registered stock or securities issued in accordance with the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance whether issued in scripless form or otherwise;

(iii) any securities of the Central bank whether issued in scripless form or otherwise.

Any body corporate to privide facilities under sections 98(1) and 112A. [§ 28, 32 of 2002]

112B. (1) Any or all of the functions referred to in subsection (1) of section 98 and section 112A may, notwithstanding the provisions of such section, be carried out by a body corporate authorised for the purpose by the Monetary Board subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Monetary Board.

(2) A body corporate referred to in subsection (1) may hold an account with the Central Bank for the purpose of carrying out such functions.

Management of the public debt.

113. The Central Bank shall, as agent of the Government, be responsible for the management of the public debt.

Advice on Government credit operations.

114. No new loan shall be raised and no new issue of stock or debentures shall be made by the Government or by any agency or institution referred to in subsection (1) of section 106, whether in pursuance of authority conferred by any written law or otherwise, unless the advice of the Monetary Board has first been obtained upon the monetary implication of the proposed loan or issue.

Recommendations as to policy, &c. of Government agencies or institutions.

115. The Monetary Board may from time to time make recommendations to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance or to any agency or institution referred to in subsection (1) of section 106, as to the measures and policies which should be adopted by such agency or institution for the purposes of co-ordinating its policy with the policies of the board; and where any such recommendations are made to the Minister, the Minister or any other authority or person may, if empowered so to do by any such other written law as may be applicable, make or issue such orders or directions or take such other action as may be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to such recommendations.

Monetary policy and fiscal policy. [§.11, 37 of 1974]

116. (1) On or before the fifteenth day of September in each year the Monetary Board shall submit to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance for use in preparation of the budget speech a confidential report describing and analysing the monetary situation in Sri Lanka and the current monetary policy of the board, and examining the effect of the current fiscal policy of the Government upon the ability of the Central Bank to achieve the objects specified in section 5.

(2) In the event of any difference of opinion between the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance and the Monetary Board as to whether the monetary policy of the board is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Sri Lanka, the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance and the board shall endeavour to reach agreement. If the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance and the board are unable to reach agreement, the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance may inform the board that the Government accepts responsibility for the adoption by the board of a policy in accordance with the opinion of the Government and direct that such a policy be adopted by the board. Where a direction is so given by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, the board shall carry out that direction.

CHAPTER VII

GENERAL

Business which Central Bank may not transact.

***117**. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Bank shall not–

(a) engage in trade or otherwise have a direct interest in any commercial, industrial, or other undertaking except such interest as it may in any way acquire in the course of the satisfaction of any of its claims:

Provided that all such interests shall be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity; or

(b) purchase the shares of any other banking institution or of any company, or grant loans or advances upon the security of any such shares; or

(c) grant loans or advances on the mortgage of, or otherwise on the security of, immovable property or documents of title relating thereto.

Exemption from income tax, import duty, and stamp duty.

118. Notwithstanding anything in any other written law–

(a) the Monetary Board shall be exempt from the payment of income tax and profits tax upon the income or profits of the Central Bank;

(b) all goods of any description imported or purchased out of bond by the board for the purposes of the Central Bank shall be exempt from customs duty; and

(c) the Monetary Board shall be exempt from the payment of stamp duty on any instrument executed by, or on

* Section 116A is repealed by Act No. 30 of 1988

behalf of, or in favour of the Monetary Board or the Central Bank in cases where, but for this exemption, the Monetary Board would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect of such instrument.

Acts of Monetary Board valid notwithstanding subsequent discovery of disqualification.

119. All acts done at any meeting of the Monetary Board shall, notwithstanding that it shall afterwards be discovered that there was some defect in the appointment of any member thereof or that any such member was disqualified, be as valid as if every such member had been duly appointed and duly qualified.

Officers and servants to be deemed public servants for purposes of Chapter IX of Penal Code.

120. Every member of the Monetary Board and every officer or servant of the Central Bank shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning and for the purposes of Chapter IX of the Penal Code.

Release of officers and seervants of the Central Bank. [§.4, 7 of 1988]

120A. The Monetary Board may, subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of section 23, at the request of the Government or otherwise temporarily release any officer or servant of the Central Bank with the consent of such officer or servant to serve in any office or position outside the Central Bank, on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Monetary Board.

Protection for banking institution.

121. Notwithstanding anything in any written or other law, no banking institution shall be liable or subject to any action or proceedings in any court in respect of any loss or damage suffered or incurred or alleged to have been suffered or incurred by any person by reason of any act or thing done or omitted to be done by such institution for the purpose of carrying out or complying with any provision of this Act or any rule, regulation, order, direction or requirement made or given under this Act.

Offences and penalties.

*__122.__ (1) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provisions of this Act or any rule, regulation, order direction or requirement made or given thereunder shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.

[§.29, 32 of 2002]

(2) Every person who is guilty of an offence by reason of the contravention of, or failure to comply with, section 30, or section 32(2) or section 45 or section 46 or section 50 or section 98A(2) or any rule, regulation, order, direction or requirement made or given under section 30 or section 79(2)(*c*) or section 98A(1) or section 101 or section 102 shall be liable–

[§.29, 32 of 2002]

(a) on conviction after summary trial before a Magistrate to imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand rupees, or to both such imprisonment and such fine; or

*Section 121A and 121B are repealed by Act No. 30 of 1988

(b) on conviction before a District Court to imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding one million rupees, or to both such imprisonment and such fine.

[§.29, 32 of 2002]

(2A) Every person who is guilty of an offence by reason of the contravention of subsection (1) or subsection (2) of section 58A shall be liable on conviction after summary trial before a Magistrate to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand rupees or to imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding two years or to both such fine and imprisonment. A Magistrate may, on conviction of any person for an offence under subsection (1) or subsection (2) of section 58A, make order that any coin in respect of which the offence was committed or any metal or other article derived therefrom be forfeited to the State.

[§.29, 32 of 2002]

(3) Every person who is guilty of an offence for which no punishment is prescribed by subsection (2) or subsection (2A) shall be liable on conviction after summary trial before a Magistrate to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand rupees or to imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

Offences by corporations.

123. Where the person convicted of an offence under this Act is a body corporate, every person who at the time of the commission of the offence was a director or an officer of the body corporate shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of such offence.

Exclusion of application of Companies Ordinance.

124. Nothing in the Companies Ordinance* shall apply to or in relation to the Central Bank or the Monetary Board.

Provision for conflict with other written law.

125. In the event of any conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of this Act and the provisions of any other written law by or under which any banking institution is constituted or established, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.

Defence (Finance) Regulations, &c.

126. The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in substitution or derogation of the provisions of the Defence (Finance) Regulations, Defence (Finance No.2) Regulations, Defence (Finance No.3) Regulations and Defence (Securities) Regulations.

Interpritation.

127. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires–

"appointed date" means the 28th day of August, 1950;

"banking institution means -

* Repealed and replaced by the Companies Act No. 17 of 1982

(a) any commercial bank;

(b) any agency or institution acting on behalf of the Government (whether established by any written law or otherwise) which makes loans, advances or investments or accepts deposits of money from the public;

(c) the Co-operative Federal Bank of Ceylon, Limited; and

(d) any other person or body of persons declared by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, by Order published in the *Gazette*, to be a banking institution for the purposes of this Act;

"commercial bank" means any person or body of persons, corporate or unincorporate, which carries on in Sri Lanka the business of accepting from the public, or of creating, demand deposits, but does not include the Central Bank;

"current international transactions" means transactions which are not for the purpose of transferring capital, and includes, without limitation–

(*i*) all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;

(*ii*) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;

(*iii*) payments, of amounts not exceeding such maxima as may be fixed by the Monetary Board, for amortisation of loans or for depreciation of direct investments; and

(*iv*) remittances, of amounts not exceeding such maxima as may be fixed by the Monetary Board, for family living expenses;

"currency", "demand deposits" and "money supply" have the meanings assigned to those expressions by sections 48, 60 and 62 respectively.

(2) For the purposes of this Act, any question which may arise as to whether any agency or institution is an agency or institution acting on behalf of the Government shall be referred to the President for decision; and such decision shall be final.

CHAPTER VIII

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Validity of currency in circulation, &c.

128. (1) The Central Bank is hereby empowered to issue any currency notes or Ceylon coins printed or minted under the authority of the Board of Commissioners of Currency and remaining unissued on the appointed date.

(2) All currency notes and Ceylon coins issued or deemed to have been issued under the Currency Ordinance, No.21 of 1941* , prior to the appointed date and in circulation on that date (including any such notes or coins which have ceased to be legal tender and have not been surrendered to the Board of Commissioners of Currency), and all currency notes and coins issued by the Central Bank under subsection (1) shall be deemed for all purposes to be currency notes and coins issued by the Central Bank under this Act and to be liabilities of the Central Bank; and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly to and in relation to such currency notes and coins in like manner as they apply to and in relation to currency notes and coins issued under this Act.

Appointment of pensionable pulic officers to posts in Central Bank.

129. (1) Where any person in the service of the Government of Sri Lanka and holding a post declared to be pensionable under the Minutes on Pensions (hereinafter referred to as a "pensionable public officer") is appointed to be a temporary officer of the Central Bank, he shall be deemed to have been seconded to an office to which pension rights are not attached and accordingly section 24 of those Minutes shall apply to him.

(2) Where a pensionable public officer is appointed to be a permanent officer of the Central Bank on or before the appointed date, he shall be deemed, for the purposes of the Minutes on Pensions, to continue to hold a post declared to be pensionable under those Minutes so long as he is in the employ of the bank, and shall be eligible for the grant of a pension as though his service under the bank were service under the Government, and the Minister in charge of the subject of Public Administration may grant such pension in accordance with those Minutes.

(3) Where a pensionable public officer, whether or not he is an officer to whom subsection (1) applies, is appointed to be a permanent officer of the Central Bank after the appointed date, the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance may, by Notification published in the Gazette, declare that the post in the service of the bank to which such officer is appointed shall, while it is held by such officer, be deemed, for the purposes of the Minutes on Pensions, to be a pensionable post

* Repealed by Act. No.58 of 1949

in the service of the Government; and upon the publication of any such Notification, the officer referred to therein shall be eligible for the grant of a pension as though his service under the bank were service under the Government, and the Minister in charge of the subject of Public Administration may grant such pension in accordance with the Minutes on Pensions.

(4) Where a person in the employ of the Central Bank is eligible, under the preceding provisions of this section, for the grant of a pension in accordance with the Minutes on Pensions, he shall, notwithstanding anything in the Widows' and Orphans' Pension Fund Ordinance, be deemed, so long as he remains in such employ, to be a public officer within the meaning, and for the purposes of the application, of that Ordinance.

Contributions by Central Bank in respect of pensionable public officers appointed to posts in the bank.

130. (1) In respect of every such officer in the employ of the Central Bank as is eligible, under subsection (2) or subsection (3) of section 129, for the grant of a pension in accordance with the Minutes on Pensions and is deemed, under subsection (4) of that section, to be a public officer within the meaning, and for the purposes of the application, of the Widows' and Orphans' Pension Fund Ordinance, the banks shall contribute out of the funds of the bank to the Consolidated Fund, in respect of every complete month during which that officer is in the employ of the Bank–

(a) such sum not exceeding twenty-two *per centum* of the highest monthly salary received by that officer in his substantive post in the service of the Government or the bank as the Minister in charge of the subject of Public Administration may from - time to time determine, and

(b) a sum equivalent to three per centum of the salary of that officer for that month.

(2) In subsection (1) "salary" means the emoluments of the pensionable appointment held by the officer exclusive of allowances other than personal allowances

(3) The Central Bank shall pay the contributions under subsection (1) annually to the Treasury on or before such date as may be fixed by the Deputy Secretary to the Treasury.

MONETARY LAW ACT

RULES & REGULATIONS

MONETARY LAW ACT

SECTION 10 (C)

REGULATION A

HOURS OF BUSINESS

1. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka shall be open for banking business–

(*a*) on any day, other than a Saturday, Sunday, Monday or bank holiday, between 0900 hours and 1330 hours;

(*b*) on any day, not being a bank holiday, which is a Monday between 0900 hours and 1300 hours.

2. In this regulation, "bank holiday" means any day declared to be a bank holiday by or under the Holidays Act, No. 29 of 1971.

REGULATION B

SERVICE OF NOTICES, & C.

Any communication, notice, order, circular or other document may be served by post by registered letter on any banking institution, and if so served, shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter containing the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of post, and in proving such service, it shall be sufficient to prove that the communication, notice, order, circular or other document was properly addressed and put into the post.

SECTION 26

REGULATION C

AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION

1. The Director of Economic Research or any officer of the Department of Economic Research authorized in that behalf by the Director may exercise the powers conferred on him by section 26(1) of the Monetary Law Act by notice in writing under his hand. The notice shall specify the time within which the requirements thereof shall be complied with.

2. In this regulation–

(*a*) the expression "Director of Economic Research" means the head of the Department of Economic Research; and

(*b*) the expression "Department of Economic Research" means the Department of Economic Research established and maintained by the Central Bank under the Monetary Law Act.

REGULATION D

RESERVE REQUIREMENTS

804/16 of 3.2.1994
958/1 of 13.1.1997
958/3 of 25.3.1997
1092/24 of 12.8.1999
1143/12 of 1.8.2000
1206/18 of 17.10.2001
1280/7 of 20.3.2003

1. In terms of the provisions of Section 93 of the Monetary Law Act, commercial banks operating in Sri Lanka shall maintain reserves against all deposit liabilities denominated in Sri Lanka rupees.

2. (*i*) In terms of the provisions of Section 94 of the Monetary Law Act, the reserves required to be held by commercial banks against their deposit liabilities specified in Regulation 1 above shall be an amount equal to 10 *per centum* of the total of such deposit liabilities.

(*ii*) The reserves required to be held by a commercial bank against the deposit liabilities specified in Regulation 1 above shall take the form of Rupee deposits in the Central Bank provided that an amount over and above two *per centum* of the average of rupee deposit liabilities specified in Regulation 3 below but not exceeding four *per centum* thereof may be maintained as a part of its required reserves in the form of Sri Lanka Currency notes and coins held by such bank as its assets.

3. The computation of the reserves required to be maintained by a commercial bank shall be made each Thursday on the basis of the daily average of rupee deposit liabilities at the close of the business on each day of the week ending the preceding Tuesday. The reserves permitted to be maintained by way of Sri Lanka currency notes and coins held by a commercial bank shall be the average of the holdings at the end of each day of such week.

4. The reserves computed as specified in Regulation 3 above shall be maintained as an average for the week commencing the Friday following the

day of computation to Thursday of the following week. Such average shall be calculated based on the balances at the close of business on each day of such week.

5. Interest at the rate of one tenth of one *per centum* per day shall be paid by a commercial bank to the Central Bank on any deficiency in reserves. Such interest shall be paid not later than the Friday next following the Thursday on which such required reserves were computed under Section 96 of the Act.

6. A notice issued under the hand of the Director, Domestic Operations or any officer authorized by him in that behalf, stating –

(*a*) That the reserves of such commercial banks are below the amount of the required reserves;

(*b*) The week in respect of which there was a deficiency of such reserve;

(*c*) The amount of such deficiency; and

(*d*) The amount of interest payable on the amount of the deficiency shall be deemed to be sufficient notice to such bank of the interest due from such bank.

7. Every commercial bank shall not later than 12 noon on each Thursday furnish to the Director, Domestic Operations, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, a return substantially in the form prescribed in the Schedule A hereto.

8. These Regulations shall come in to force on 03 April 2003, upon which the Regulation D published in the Sri Lanka Government *Gazette* Extraordinary, No. 804/16 of 3rd February 1994, as amended from time to time shall cease to have any force or effect.

In this regulation unless the context otherwise requires–

"Deposit Liabilities" shall mean all those liabilities of a commercial bank being–

demand deposits, special deposits, savings deposits, time deposits, placements made by any institution other than a commercial bank in the inter-bank call-money market, margins against letter of credit and special deposit schemes if any, such as pension funds, children's deposit schemes and other schemes of a similar nature, and assets held in trust or on behalf of its constituents consequent to deposits made by the denominated in Sri Lanka currency, but does not include inter-commercial bank deposits.

"Demand Deposits" shall mean all those deposit liabilities of a commercial bank which are denominated in Sri Lanka Rupees, subject to payment in legal tender upon demand by cheque, draft or order; but does not include any such liability if it is subject to payment upon conditions.

"Special Deposits" shall means all those deposit liabilities of a commercial bank arising out of monies deposited in any special account under Section 10 of the Inland Revenue Act, No. 28 of 1979.

"Savings Deposits" shall mean all deposit liabilities denominated in Sri Lanka currency other than demand deposits, time deposits and special deposits as defined above.

"Time Deposits" shall mean all deposit liabilities denominated in Sri Lanka currency accepted for a period of maturity and not withdrawable on demand and repaid with interest.

SCHEDULE A

FORM OF REPORT

WEEKLY REPORT OF DAILY AVERAGE DEPOSIT LIABILITIES

(RUPEE DEPOSIT LIABILITIES)

Name of Bank : .....

For the week from Wednesday (.....) to Tuesday (.....)
(date) *(date)*

To: Director,
Domestic Operations Department,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
Colombo 01.

The average amounts of deposit liabilities reported below are based on the deposit balances shown by the books of the Bank at the close of business of the seven days of the week specified above.

(i) Demand Deposits	(ii) Time Deposits and Savings Deposits	(iii) All other deposit liabilities (including special deposits, margins against letters of credit, *etc*.)*1	(iv) Total

*1 In the case of Certificate of Deposit the amount declared should be the paid up value.

Required Reserves

For week commencing Friday, ……

1. ..... % of Rs. …… Rs. ……
(Daily Average of total Rupee Deposit Liabilities)

2. Average of Sri Lanka Currency Notes and Coins held over and above 2% of average deposit liabilities, but not exceeding 4% Rs. ……

3. Total Reserves required to be held on deposit with the Central Bank (1-2) Rs. ……

We/I hereby certify that the above statement is correct and is in accordance with the books of this bank and that the figures shown above are in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka for the purpose.

Date: …… .....
Official Signature

Note – (*a*) Demand deposits are the total of credit balances in current accounts without deducting debit balances in respect of overdraft allowed.

(*b*) Deposits and placements made by National Development Bank, DFCC bank, National Savings Bank, other Financial Institutions and E.P.F. should be accounted for maintenance of required reserves at prescribed ratios.

(*c*) All amounts should be shown to the nearest rupee.

* Pages 68 to 71 are deleted pursuant to amendments to Regulation D.

SECTION 56

REGULATION E

REPLACEMENT OF UNFIT CURRENCY

Definition.

1. In this regulation unless the context otherwise requires –

"altered note" means a note in which an alteration has been made in the number, date, signature or value or in any other respect;

"authorized officer" means any officer authorized in that behalf by the Governor;

"half note" means one half of a note which has been divided vertically, horizontally or diagonally through or near the centre;

"mismatched note" means an imperfect note formed by joining a half note of one note to a half note of another note;

"mutilated note" means a portion of a note (being a note the other portion of which is missing) which is clearly more than a half note and each part of which, if it consists of parts of a note joined together, is identifiable as part of the same note;

"note" means a currency note of the Central Bank, including a currency note issued or deemed to be issued by the Board of Commissioners of Currency under Ordinance No.21 of 1941;

"number" includes the letters of the series to which the note belongs;

"obliterated note" means a note, not being a mutilated or altered note, of which a portion has become or has been rendered undecipherable.

Time limit to claims.

2. No claim for the refund of the value of a damaged or mutilated note will be entertained unless such claim is made within a period of twelve months reckoned from the date when it might first have been made.

Value limit to claims.

3. No claim in respect of a half note or a mismatched note shall be entertained unless such half note or each of the half notes comprising the mismatched note is part of a note of which the denomination exceeds two rupees.

* Pages 68 and 71 are deleted. See foot note in page 67.

Half notes to be entire.

4. A claim for the value of a half note shall be rejected unless the number of the note is identified on the half note and such half note is entire and has not been divided and rejoined.

Claims concerning mutilated notes of less than ten rupees.

5. A claim for the value of a mutilated note of a denomination not exceeding ten rupees shall be rejected unless in the opinion of the authorized officer the portion tendered is at least three quarters of the whole note and if made up of two or more pieces, such pieces belong to one and the same note.

Claims concerning mutilated notes of more than ten rupees.

6. A claim for the value of a genuine mutilated or damaged note of a denomination exceeding ten rupees may be accepted if the number of the note can be identified with certainty by the authorized officer as one of not more than two numbers:

Provided that the authorized officer may, with the Approval of the Governor or Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, pay the value of any mutilated or damaged note in a case where the Governor or Deputy Governor is satisfied that the note tendered is a genuine one.

Stamping of mutilated notes.

7. Where a claim for the value of a mutilated note is rejected under paragraph 5 or paragraph 6 of this regulation the note shall be stamped with the words "PAYMENT REFUSED" and dated before it is returned to the claimant.

Obliterated notes.

8. A claim in respect of an obliterated note or half note shall not be entertained unless the authorized officer is satisfied as to identity of such note or half note.

Altered notes.

9. No claim in respect of an altered note shall be entertained. The authorized officer shall retain every altered note tendered for payment, whether or not the alteration has been made with intent to defraud, and may in addition require every tenderer of an altered note to state in writing the circumstances in which such altered note came into his possession.

Claim in respect of wilfully mutilated notes.

10. No claim in respect of a wilfully mutilated note shall be entertained by the authorized officer. If there are clear indications of wilful mutilation, the authorized officer shall retain the note and in addition require every tenderer of a wilfully mutilated note to state in writing the circumstances in which such note came into his possession.

Claims for half value of notes exceeding rupees 10.

11. A claim for half the value of a note of the denomination of Rs. 50 and above, of which a half note only is presented, shall be entertained if the authorized officer is satisfied that a claim in respect

of a note of the corresponding number and denomination has not been entertained earlier and that the note remains unpaid, or if entertained earlier, that only half value had been paid on that occasion.

Claim for full value notes exceeding Rs.10.

12. (1) A claim for the full value of a note of the denomination of Rs.50 and above–

(*i*) when only a half note is tendered; or

(*ii*) when the portion tendered is less than a half note but contains one number which can be identified beyond doubt;

shall be accompanied by a statement, signed by the claimant, that he was the last lawful holder of the entire note and also briefly detailing the circumstances in which the loss or destruction of the missing portion of the note took place.

(2) If full value of the note has already been paid the claim shall be rejected.

(3) If half the value of the note has already been paid the authorized officer may order half the value of the note to be paid.

(4) If another claim has been received and is under investigation, the authorized officer may order that one claimant be paid the full value of the note, or that each claimant be paid half the value of the note or that both claims be rejected.

(5) If the authorized officer is not satisfied that the counter-part of the section of the note tendered has been lost or destroyed in such circumstances that there is no probability of its being presented at some future date, he may order half the value of the note to be paid or reject the claim.

(6) If the authorized officer is satisfied that the counterpart of the section of the note tendered has been lost or destroyed in such circumstances that there is no probability of its being presented at some future date, he may order that full value be paid on the claimant furnishing an indemnity bond with two sureties in the form prescribed in the Schedule hereto.

Notes to be retained by Central Bank.

13. Save as otherwise provided in this regulation, any note presented in prosecution of a claim shall be retained by the Central Bank whatever be the decision on the claim.

14. Notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this regulation, the value of damaged or mutilated currency notes are refunded as an act of grace and no holder shall be entitled as of right to claim the value of any damaged or mutilated currency note.

Payment of value of damaged notes as matter of grace.

SCHEDULE

FORM OF INDEMNITY BOND

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT WE, ……

……

principal, and ……and ……

Sureties, are held and firmly bound unto the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in the sum

of Rupees …… Lawful money of Sri Lanka, to be paid to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka; for which payment to be well and truly made we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators and representatives; and every two of us bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators and representatives, jointly, and each of us binds himself, his heirs, executors, administrators, and representatives, severally, firmly by these presents, hereby renouncing the beneficium ordinis divisionis et excussionis, and all privileges to which sureties as such are by law entitled.

Witnesses : –

Signed by us, and dated the ……day of ……..19…….

WHEREAS the above-bounden ……alleges that he is the holder of the following Currency Note, to wit :–

AND WHEREAS the said Currency Note …… has been

mutilated and defaced and the said …… has applied to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka for payment of the amount of the said Note, and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, has acceded to the said Application on condition of

the said …… and two sufficient Sureties executing such

Obligation as above written, and the said …… have accordingly as such Sureties agreed to execute the said Obligation with such condition as hereunder is written and whereas the stamp duty on these presents is not payable by virtue of section 118(*c*) of the Monetary Law Act.

NOW the condition of the above-written Obligation is such, that if the above-bounded, their heirs, executors, administrators, or representatives, shall from time to time and at all times hereafter keep harmless and indemnify the

Central Bank of Sri Lanka, and all and every the officers and servants of the Central Bank, from and against all actions, suits and other legal proceedings which shall be brought against the Central Bank of Sri Lanka or any of the officers or servants of the Central Bank, or in which he or they respectively may become involved, and also against all costs, damages, and expenses which by him or them respectively shall be sustained, or have to be paid at any time in respect of the said Currency Note, any of them or the payment of the money hereby secured, or any part thereof, then the above-written Obligation shall be void, otherwise the same shall remain in full force and virtue. Provided and it is hereby agreed by

the said ..... with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, that in the defence and prosecution of any action, suit or other legal proceeding preferred to in the foregoing clause for indemnity, or maintained in virtue thereof, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka shall not be responsible or accountable to the said

..... or any of them, or any or either of their heirs, executors, administrators, or representatives, for any act, omission, or mistake, and that in the defence or prosecution of such action, suit, or other legal proceeding the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and its officers and servants, shall be required to do such acts and taken such steps only as shall be required to do such acts and taken such steps only as shall in that behalf be approved or advised by the Attorney-General, or the person executing the duties of that Officer for the time being.

In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hand and seals at ..... this, ... day of ..... in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred ..... and .....

Witness : .....

SECTION 98

REGULATION F

SETTLEMENT OF BALANCES

The deposit reserves maintained by each commercial bank in the Central Bank shall, upon each settlement of balances under section 98 of the Monetary Law Act, be credited or debited with the amount of the balance according as it is to the credit or the debit of that bank.

The procedure applicable for the purposes of the settlement of balances shall from time to time be notified by the Central Bank to each commercial bank by circular.

MONETARY LAW ACT

SECTION 32 (E)

REGULATIONS

1. These regulations may be cited as the Deposit Insurance Scheme Regulations, No.1 of 1987.

2. Every application to insure deposits made in terms of section 32 B of the Act by any banking institution or any society registered under the Co-operative Societies Law, No.5 of 1972 hereinafter referred to as a "Society" and carrying on banking business of any kind shall be in such form and in such manner as may be specified by the Central Bank.

3. On receipt of an application in terms of regulation 2, the Director of Bank Supervision shall examine or cause an officer of his department to examine in such manner as may be determined by him, the books and accounts of the banking institution or society, which made the application and having satisfied himself that –

(*a*) in the case of a banking institution that such banking institution has adequate assets to enable it to meet all its liabilities; and

(*b*) in the case of a society that such society has assets segregated and earmarked for the purpose of meeting its deposit liabilities and that such assets are adequate to enable it to meet its deposit liabilities,

shall make a report to the Monetary Board, recommending the application. Where the Director of Bank Supervision is of the opinion that such institution or society would not be able to meet its liabilities, he shall make a report to the Monetary Board accordingly.

4. Every banking institution and every society whose application has been accepted by the Monetary Board shall be registered as an insured bank or insured society as the case may be, with effect from the first day of the quarter following the quarter in which the application is accepted and the deposits held by such banking institution or society shall be insured with effect from that date.

5. The Director of Bank Supervision shall within 60 days of accepting an application in terms of regulation 4 inform the banking institution or society concerned in writing that its application has been so accepted by the Monetary Board and the date on which its registration as an insured bank or insured society, as the case may be, shall become effective.

6. Every insured bank and every insured society shall be liable to pay to the Central Bank a premium on its deposits in respect of each of the quarters in each calendar year at the rate prescribed in regulation 7. Such premium shall be payable in

respect of the deposits of such insured bank or such insured society as at the close of business on the last working day of each such quarter. The premium shall be paid in advance on the basis of the deposits of such insured bank or such insured society as at the close of business on the last working day of the preceding quarter, and if the premium in respect of the relevant quarter is greater or less than the advance payment made on account of such premium, the shortfall, if any, shall be added to and the excess, if any, shall be deducted from the advance payment made on account of the premium in respect of the succeeding quarter :

Provided that such insured bank or insured society shall not be liable to make any payment to the Central Bank in terms of this regulation in respect of the premium for the quarter in which its deposits ceased to be insured (apart from the advance payment required to be made on account of such premium) where such insured bank or insured society has been ordered to be wound up under any law.

Gazette Extraordinary of 14.11.1991

7. The premium payable by every insured bank and every insured society in respect of each quarter shall with effect from 1st January, 1992, be three point seven five (3.75) cents for every hundred rupees of its deposits as at close of business on the last working day of such quarter.

8. Every insured bank and every insured society shall within the first month of each quarter forward to the Director of Bank Supervision a statement in duplicate certified as correct by its chief executive officer or any other officer authorized by him in that behalf showing, inter alia, its deposits as at the close of business on the last working day of the preceding quarter, and the premium payable in respect of such preceding quarter.

9. If an insured bank or an insured society makes any default in any payment due to the Central Bank in terms of regulation 6 on account of the premium in respect of any quarter, it shall be liable to pay to the Central Bank interest at the rate of 24 per cent per annum on the amount of such premium for the period of such default.

10. (1) No insured bank shall alter, amend or revise in any way its Memorandum of Association or its Articles of Association without the consent in writing of the Governor.

(2) No insured society shall alter, amend or revise its by-laws without the consent in writing of the Governor.

(3) No insured society shall take any action in terms of section 9 of the Co-operative Societies Law, No.5 of 1972 without the consent in writing of the Monetary Board.

11. (1) Where an insured bank or an insured society has been ordered to be wound up or to be taken into liquidation and a liquidator has been appointed in respect thereof, such liquidator shall within two months from the date of his appointment as liquidator, furnish to the Director of Bank Supervision a list of depositors showing the

original amount in relation to each depositor and such other information in respect of each depositor as may be called for by the Director of Bank Supervision.

(2) The Central Bank shall within one month from the date of the receipt of the list of depositors, furnished by the liquidator in terms of paragraph (1) of this regulation pay to such liquidator the original amount or Rs.100,000 whichever is less in respect of each depositor.

(3) Where the Central Bank has made a payment of any amount to a liquidator in respect of any depositor in terms of paragraph (2) of this regulation, such liquidator shall pay such amount to such depositor within one month from the date of receipt of such payment from the Central Bank and any expenses incurred by such liquidator in making such payment may be reimbursed by the Central Bank at the discretion of the Monetary Board.

Provided that where any depositor to whom any payment is to be made in terms of this regulation, cannot be found or is not readily traceable, the liquidator shall within one month from the date of receiving payment from the Central Bank in terms of paragraph (2) of this regulation, repay to the Central Bank the amount received from the Central Bank in respect of such depositor and adequate provision shall be made by the Central Bank of the eventual payment of such amount to such depositor.

12. Where payment of any amount has been made in terms of regulation 11 (2) by the Central Bank to a liquidator or in terms of regulation 11 (3) by a liquidator to a depositor, the liquidator shall be liable to pay to the Central Bank such sum or sums as make up such amount and he shall make payment to the Central Bank to such extent as may be possible as and when the realisations and other amounts in his hands after making provision for the expenses payable by that time, are sufficient to enable him to declare a dividend of not less than one cent in the rupee.

13. (1) An insured bank or insured society may, at any time, notify the Monetary Board in writing of its intention to cease to be an insured bank or an insured society, as the case may be, and the deposits of such insured bank or an insured society shall cease to be insured after four quarters have lapsed following the quarter in which the Director of Bank Supervision receives such information.

(2) The Monetary Board shall within one month from the date of receipt of a notification given in terms of paragraph (1) of this regulation, inform the insured bank or insured society concerned of the receipt of such notification and also publish in the Gazette a notice in such form as the Monetary Board may determine stating that such insured bank or such insured society has notified the Monetary Board of its intention to cease to be an insured bank or an insured society, as the case may be, and indicating the date with effect from which the deposits of such insured bank or insured society will cease to be insured. The Monetary Board shall also give publicity to such notice by advertisement in the newspapers or by such other means as it may consider suitable.

(3) Where an insured bank or insured society has been informed by the Monetary Board in terms of paragraph (2) of this regulation that a notification given

by such insured bank or such insured society under paragraph (1) of this regulation has been received, such insured bank or such insured society shall inform each of its depositors in writing of its intention to cease to be an insured bank or an insured society, as the case may be, stating also the date, with effect from which its deposits will cease to be insured. A letter to this effect despatched by registered post to each depositor at the last address of such depositor on record in the books of such insured bank or insured society shall be deemed to be compliance with the foregoing requirement.

(4) Where the deposits of a banking institution or a society have ceased to be insured in terms of paragraph (1) of this regulation, such banking institution or such society shall be liable to pay to the Central Bank within one month from the date on which its deposits cease to be insured, the balance amount if any, payable on account of the premium in respect of the last quarter on which the deposits were insured, and such insured bank or insured society shall at the time of making such payment, also furnish to the Director of Bank Supervision, a statement in duplicate in terms of regulation 8.

14. In these regulations–

"deposit" mean the aggregate of the rupee balances due to any person other than the Government of Sri Lanka, any foreign government, any local authority, Public Corporation or banking institution or society in the same capacity and in the same right, in respect of all his accounts by whatever name called with a banking institution or a society;

"depositor" means any person other than the Government of Sri Lanka any foreign government, any local authority, Public Corporation, banking institution or society, for whom a rupee deposit account is maintained by a banking institution or a society;

"Director of Bank Supervision" includes an Additional Director of Bank Supervision and an Acting Director of Bank Supervision;

"original amount" in relation to a depositor means the amount which shall be obtained by deducting from his rupee deposit at the time the deposit of the insured bank or the insured society concerned ceased to be insured the total amount which an insured bank or insured society may at the same time be legally entitled to claim by way of set-off from such depositor in the same capacity and in the same right; and

"quarter" in relation to any calendar year means any of the periods beginning on the first day of January and ending on the thirty-first day of March; beginning on the first day of April and ending on the thirtieth day of June; beginning on the first day of July and ending on the thirtieth day of September; beginning on the first day of October and ending on the thirtyfirst day of December.

Made this 27th February, 1987

MONETARY LAW ACT

SECTION 10 (C) READ WITH SECTION 112A(C)

REGULATIONS

1331/8 of 9.3.2004
1348/11 of 20.3.2004

1. These regulations may be cited as the Sri Lanka Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) and Central Depository Regulations No. 1 of 2004. These regulations shall be deemed to have come into operation on January 30, 2004.

2. (1) A System which shall in these regulations be referred to as "LankaSettle", is hereby established for the purpose of Section 112A(*c*) of the Monetary Law Act (Chapter 422).

(2) LankaSettle shall comprise a facility for the processing and settlement of payments electronically on a gross basis in real-time (hereinafter referred to as "RTGS"), and a facility to electronically issue Scripless Securities, store holdings of and to record ownership and interests in such Scripless Securities and to settle transactions in Scripless Securities (hereinafter referred to as "LankaSecure").

3. (1) Any person other than the Central Bank, being—

(*a*) a licensed commercial bank or a primary dealer or any other person appointed as a direct participant under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance or the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance ; or

(*b*) a person having a settlement account with the Central Bank,

who has entered into an Accession Agreement in the specified form with the Central Bank shall be eligible to participate on LankaSettle.

(2) The Central Bank may having regard to the legally permissible activities of a participant or categories of participants in terms of the Act, restrict the availability of facilities and functions of LankaSettle in relation to such participant or categories of participants, as the case may be.

4. Every participant shall in addition comply with the rules for the operation of the system made from time to time by the Central Bank in terms of Section 62A of the Monetary Law Act (hereinafter referred to as the "System Rules"), with respect to participation by the participants on LankaSettle and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

5. (1) Every participant shall maintain a Securities Account in LankaSecure in the manner set out herein.

(2) The Securities Accounts referred to in paragraph (1) may be of any of the types of accounts as are set out hereunder :—

(*a*) Own Account;
(*b*) Customer Accounts;
(*c*) Pledge Account;
(*d*) Tradable Repurchase Account;
(*e*) Non-Tradable Repurchase Account;
(*f*) Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account;
(*g*) Non-Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account;
(*h*) Primary Auction Purchase Account;
(*i*) ILF Account;
(*j*) Statutory Investment Account;
(*k*) Domestic Operations Repurchase Account;
(*l*) Domestic Operations Reverse Repurchase Account; and
(*m*) Trust Accounts.

(3) Subject to the provisions of regulation 7 the title to and interest in scripless securities in each such type of account specified in paragraph (2) shall vest in the following manner :—

(*a*) *Own Account:*

Own Accounts shall be maintained by the Participants and by the Central Bank. A Participant shall have title to Scripless Securities in the Participant's Own Account. The Central Bank shall have title to Scripless Securities in the Central Bank's Own Account.

(*b*) *Customer Account:*

Customer Accounts shall be maintained by every dealer direct participant for each of its customers to record such customer's title to Scripless Securities. The relevant customer shall be recorded as the owner of Scripless Securities in each Customer Account and shall have title to such Scripless Securities.

(*c*) *Pledge Account:*

A Pledge Account shall be maintained by a participant to record Scripless Securities pledged to such participant, and in the case of a participant who is a dealer direct participant, to record Scripless Securities pledged to its customers. Pledges in Scripless Securities shall be created, and ownership to and pledge interests in such securities shall be recorded as provided for in regulations issued under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance or the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance. Scripless Securities in a Pledge Account shall not be tradable except as provided for in such regulations.

(*d*) *Tradable Repurchase Account:*

A Tradable Repurchase Account shall be maintained by a participant to record Scripless Securities that are transferred to such participant, under a repurchase or reverse repurchase agreement entered into

by such participant in accordance with regulations made under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance or the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance in terms of which agreement such participant is required to return such Scripless Securities at a future date to the counterparty and which Scripless Securities may, subject to that agreement, be traded. Such participant shall be recorded in the relevant Tradable Repurchase Account as the owner of Scripless Securities in such account and shall have title to such securities. The recording of Scripless Securities in a Tradable Repurchase Account shall be evidence that such securities are subject to a repurchase or reverse repurchase agreement.

(*e*) *Non-Tradable Repurchase Account:*

A Non-Tradable Repurchase Account shall be maintained by a direct participant to record Scripless Securities that are transferred to such participant, under a repurchase or reverse repurchase agreement entered into by such direct participant in accordance with regulations made under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance or the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance in terms of which agreement such direct participant is required to return such Scripless Securities at a future date to the counterparty and which Scripless Securities may not be traded. Such direct participant shall be recorded in the relevant Non-Tradable Repurchase Account as the owner of Scripless Securities in such account and shall have title to such securities. The recording of Scripless Securities in a Non-Tradable Repurchase Account shall be evidence that such securities are subject to a repurchase or reverse repurchase agreement.

(*f*) *Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account:*

A Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account shall be maintained by a Dealer Direct Participant to record Scripless Securities that are transferred to a customer under a repurchase or reverse repurchase agreement entered into by such customer with a counterparty in accordance with regulations made under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance or the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance in terms of which agreement such customer is required to return such Scripless Securities at a future date to the counterparty and which Scripless Securities may, subject to such agreement, be traded. Such customer shall be recorded in the relevant Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account as owner of Scripless Securities in such account and shall have title to such securities. The recording of Scripless Securities in a Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account shall be evidence that such securities are subject to a repurchase or reverse repurchase agreement.

(*g*) *Non-Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account:*

A Non-Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account shall be maintained by a Dealer Direct Participant to record Scripless Securities that are transferred to a customer under a repurchase or

reverse repurchase agreement entered into by such customer with a counterparty in accordance with the regulations made under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance or the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance in terms of which agreement such customer is required to return such Scripless Securities at a future date to the counterparty and which Scripless Securities may not be traded. Such customer shall be recorded in the relevant Non-Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account as owner of Scripless Securities in such account and shall have title to such securities. The recording of Scripless Securities in a Non-Tradable Customer Reverse Repurchase Account shall be evidence that such securities are subject to a repurchase or reverse repurchase agreement.

(*h*) *Primary Auction Purchase Account:*

A Primary Auction Purchase Account shall be maintained by every participant who is a primary dealer or a designated non-dealer bidder to record Scripless Securities that are purchased by it at the primary auction. The title to Scripless Securities in a Primary Auction Purchase Account shall vest in the primary dealer or designated non-dealer bidder, as the case may be.

(*i*) *ILF Account:*

An ILF Account shall be maintained by every participant who is eligible for ILF (hereinafter referred to as the "Participant's ILF Account") and by the Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the "Central Bank's ILF Account"). A Participant's ILF Account shall hold Scripless Securities available for transfer to the Central Bank for the purpose of obtaining Infra-Day Liquidity from the Central Bank in terms of an ILF Agreement. The participant shall have title to such Scripless Securities. The Central Bank's ILF Account shall hold Scripless Securities transferred to the Central Bank from a Participant's ILF Account as security for Intra-Day Liquidity. The Central Bank shall have title to the Scripless Securities in such account.

(*j*) *Statutory Investment Account:*

A Statutory Investment Account shall be maintained by a participant to hold Scripless Securities to meet any requirement imposed on such participant by any written law. The participant shall have title to Scripless Securities in such account subject to the provisions of such written law.

(*k*) *Domestic Operations Repurchase Account:*

A Domestic Operations Repurchase Account shall be maintained by a participant to hold Scripless Securities that are transferred to the participant by the Central Bank under the Master Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreement between the Central Bank and the participant in terms of which the Scripless Securities have to be

returned to the Central Bank by the participant at a future date. The participant maintaining such account shall have title to the Scripless Securities in such account. Scripless Securities in a Domestic Operations Repurchase Account shall not be tradable.

(*l*) *Domestic Operations Reverse Repurchase Account:*

A Domestic Operations Reverse Repurchase Account shall be maintained by the Central Bank to hold Scripless Securities that are transferred by a participant to the Central Bank under the Master Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreement between the Central Bank and the participant in terms of which the Scripless Securities have to be returned by the Central Bank to the participant at a future date. The Central Bank shall have title to such Scripless Securities. Scripless Securities in a Domestic Operations Reverse Repurchase Account shall not be tradable.

(*m*) *Trust Accounts:*

A Trust Account shall be maintained by a Direct Participant to record Scripless Treasury Bonds and Scripless Treasury Bills which are held by it as legal owner and which are subject to a trust as recognized in terms of regulations made under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance and the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance, respectively. The legal ownership to securities held in a Trust Account shall vest in the Direct Participant while the beneficial ownership to securities held in a Trust Account shall vest in the person or persons for whose benefit such securities are held in terms of the "relevant trust".

6. Transactions in Scripless Treasury Bills and Scripless Treasury Bonds shall be carried out as provided in Scripless Treasury Bills (Transactions) Regulations, No.2 of 2004 and Scripless Treasury Bonds (Transactions) Regulations, No.2 of 2004 respectively.

7. Notwithstanding anything in these regulations or Scripless Treasury Bills (Transactions) Regulations, No.2 of 2004 or Scripless Treasury Bonds (Transactions) Regulations, No.2 of 2004, a transferee acquires rights to the extent of the interest transferred in the security that the transferror had or had the power to transfer. Except where a transfer of a security is out of a designated securities account, the transferee acquires the transferror's interest in the security free of any adverse claims where the security in which such interest was acquired was posted to the transferee's securities account, and the transferee gave value, without notice of any adverse claim. In the case of a securities account which is subject to a trust recognized in terms of regulations made under the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance and the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance, the mere notice that the transferror acts as a trustee is not a breach of trust or authority, and is not notice of an adverse claim for the purpose of this regulation.

For the purposes of this regulation, "designated securities account" means a securities account in which title to securities held in it is stated to be subject to adverse claims, and the following account types shall be deemed to be designated securities accounts :

— Pledge account

— Tradable repurchase account

— Non-tradable repurchase account

— Tradable customer reverse repurchase account

— Non-tradable customer reverse repurchase account

— ILF account

— Domestic Operations Repurchase Account

— Domestic Operations Reverse Repurchase Account

— Trust Accounts.

8. The Central Bank, participants, and customers of dealer direct participants shall be identified in accounts maintained in LankaSecure in such manner and form as may be specified in the System Rules.

9. A participant shall operate its Settlement Account and Securities Accounts maintained by it subject to the Mandate Agreement and the System Rules. A participant who is a dealer direct participant shall comply with applicable written law in the maintenance and operation of accounts maintained by it for a customer.

10. (1) Subject to paragraph (5) of this regulation, the Central Bank shall issue to every customer of a dealer direct participant to the last address of such customer recorded by the dealer direct participant on LankaSecure :—

(*a*) as and when a Scripless Security is credited to or debited from an account held for such customer, a confirmation of the transaction ; and

(*b*) a monthly statement in respect of each such account.

(2) The Central Bank shall, following upon the payment of interest or maturity proceeds on Scripless Securities, issue to every customer of a dealer direct participant, a statement of interest and maturity payments made to such dealer direct participant in respect of the Scripless Securities in respect of which the customer is recorded as owner.

(3) Every dealer direct participant shall be responsible for the timely recording and updating of information relating to its customers as required by the System Rules issued by the Central Bank.

(4) The Central Bank shall not be responsible for ascertaining the correctness of information relating to a customer as is provided by a dealer direct participant to the

Central Bank and shall update any such information only upon such information being provided to the Central Bank by the dealer direct participant.

(5) The Central Bank shall not be responsible for issuing confirmations of pledge transactions to customers of dealer direct participants or statements in respect of Pledge Accounts maintained for customers by dealer direct participants and the responsibility to issue such confirmations and statements to a customer of a dealer direct participant shall vest with such dealer direct participant. The dealer direct participant shall issue to every such customer, to the address of such customer recorded with the dealer direct participant, a confirmation of a pledge transaction carried out for the customer and a monthly statement of Pledge Accounts maintained for the customer. The Central Bank may specify the form in which such confirmations and statements should be issued.

11. The Central Bank shall, where it is required to do so by an Order of Court or where it is empowered to do so in terms of any written law, freeze a Settlement Account or a Securities Account in LankaSettle, or prohibit or restrict transfers to or from any such account, or effect a transfer to or from any such account.

12. In these regulations unless the context otherwise requires :—

"Accession Agreement" means the agreement in the specified form entered into by a direct participant with the Central Bank by which the participant is admitted to participate on LankaSettle;

"Advance claim" means a claim to a property interest in a security credited to the securities account of a person other than that of the claimant, including to secure payment of a debt and a beneficial interest under trust;

"Central Bank" means the Central Bank of Sri Lanka established under the Monetary Law Act;

"customer" shall have the same meaning assigned to it in the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance and the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance;

"dealer direct participant" means a person appointed as a dealer direct participant under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance and the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance;

"designated non-dealer bidder" means a person appointed under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance and the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance as a designated non-dealer bidder;

"direct participant" means a person appointed as a direct participant under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance and the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance;

"Intra-Day Liquidity" or "ILF" means the provision of funds in LankaSettle for the duration of a day to a participant against security by the Central Bank;

"ILF Agreement" means the agreement entered into by a participant in the specified form with the Central Bank to obtain Intra-Day Liquidity;

"Licensed Commercial Bank" means a bank licensed under the Banking Act, No. 30 of 1988 to carry on banking business as defined in that Act;

"Local Treasury Bills Ordinance" means the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance (Chapter 417);

"Mandate Agreement" means an agreement entered into by a direct participant with the Central Bank in a specified form for the opening, maintenance and operation of such direct participant's Settlement Account and Securities Accounts, and in the case of a dealer direct participant, of Securities Accounts maintained by it for customers;

"Master Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreement" means an agreement entered into by a participant with the Central Bank in a specified form which governs its Open Market Operations with the Central Bank;

"Monetary Law Act" means the Monetary Law Act (Chapter 422) as amended from time to time;

"Open Market Operations" means operations carried out by the Central Bank in terms of Part V, Chapter V of the Monetary Law Act;

"Participant" means a direct participant or any other person who has been admitted to participate in LankaSettle upon execution of an Accession Agreement;

"Pledge Agreement" means an agreement executed for the purpose of creating a pledge of Scripless Securities in accordance with regulations made under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance and the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance;

"Primary Auction" means the allocation and issue of Scripless Securities by the Government to primary dealers, designated non-dealer bidders and the Central Bank or to any of them against payment;

"primary dealer" means a person appointed as a primary dealer under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance and the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance;

"Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance" means the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chapter 420);

"Scripless Securities" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Monetary Law Act;

"Securities Accounts" mean the accounts maintained in LankaSecure in terms of these regulations and the System Rules issued by the Central Bank;

"Settlement Account" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Monetary Law Act.



PUBLIC DEBT DEPARTMENT

OPERATIONAL MANUAL

VERSION 2
UPDATED AS OF 31.07.2013

In terms of the section 113 of the Monetary Law Act, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has been charged with the responsibility for the management of the Public Debt. Accordingly, the Public Debt Department (PDD) engages in function relating to the issuance, servicing and management of domestic debt and servicing of foreign debt on behalf of the government.

PDD consists of following 6 divisions which are responsible for carrying out these functions.

1. Front Office (FO)
2. Middle Office (MO)
3. Back Office (BO)
4. Central Depository System (CDS)
5. Supervision Division (SD)
6. Support Services Division (SSD)

Activities carried out by each of these divisions are described in detail in this Manual.

Public Debt Department - Reporting Lines (26.07.2013)



Legislation relating to public debt

1. Monetary Law Act No.58 of 1949.
2. Local Treasury Bill Ordinance No. 8 of 1923.
3. Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance No.7 of 1937.
4. Treasury Certificates of Deposit Act No. 9 of 1989.
5. Tax Reserve Certificates Act No. 22 of 1957.
6. National Housing Act No. 37 of 1954.
7. State Mortgage and Investment Bank Law No. 13 of 1975.
8. Urban Development Authority Law No. 41 of 1978.
9. Ceiling on Housing Property Law No. 1 of 1973.
10. Loans (Special Provisions) Act No. 40 of 1982.
11. Foreign Loans Act No. 29 of 1957.
12. Appropriation Acts pertaining to each financial year.

Front Office

Front Office (FO) of the PDD is mainly responsible for mobilizing required funds for the government at the lowest possible cost with reasonable degree of risk through implementation of the domestic borrowing programme approved by the Monetary Board. In order to mobilize the required funds of the government, FO issues Treasury bills (T-bills), Treasury Bonds (T-bonds), Inflation Linked Bonds (ILBs), Rupee Securities (RSs), Sri Lanka Development Bonds(SLDBs) and Sri Lanka Nation Building Bonds (SLNBBs). In addition, FO issues certificates for Housing Bonds on behalf of the Government on the requests made by the Ministry of Housing and Construction under section 28 (1) and 28 (2) of the Ceiling on Housing Property Law. Further, FO carries out any other special requests made by the Secretary to the Treasury/Treasury Operations Department (TOD) of Ministry of Finance (MOF) for special funding requirements with the approval of the Deputy Governor/Governor.

The following are the major activities carried out by the FO.

1. Assisting to prepare annual domestic borrowing programme for approval of the Monetary Board based on the borrowing limit authorized in the Appropriation Act.
2. Raising funds by implementing borrowing programme
3. Monitoring market developments
4. Other activities carried out by the FO

1. Preparation of the borrowing programme

A. Once the annual gross borrowing limit of the government is approved and declared by the Parliament through the Appropriation Act for a respective year, an instrument-wise annual debt issuance programme for government debt securities has to be prepared by the Middle Office (MO) for approval of the Monetary Board of the CBSL. The FO of the PDD provides assistance in preparing instrument-wise annual borrowing program.[1] Once the Monetary Board approval is obtained, the FO attend to the following:

[1] The procedure for preparing the annual borrowing programme is given in detail in the section on Middle Office.

i. Preparation of the Order Papers and prospectus for T-bonds and RSs in order to obtain required authorization of the Finance Minister as stipulated in the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (RSSO).

ii. Reservation of gazette numbers in consultation with the Government Printing Department for publication of gazette notifications of T-bonds and RSs.

B. Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC)

The Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC) is the committee responsible for taking decisions on raising funds from domestic market with a view to minimizing the cost and risk of government public debt. DDMC meetings are held monthly in order to decide on the borrowing programme for the subsequent month. The Terms of Reference (TOR) of the DDMC is given in (Appendix FO-1). In this regard, FO has to attend to the followings;

i. One week prior to beginning of each month, prepare the monthly borrowing programme for the forthcoming month on the basis of the approved annual borrowing programme, the cash flow requirements of the government for the respective month obtained from Treasury and resources available in the market. The monthly borrowing programme consists of details on dates of proposed auctions, the size of auctions, maturity period, planned private placements and special arrangements if any.
ii. Make arrangement for the meetings.
iii. Submit the monthly issuance programme recommended by the DDMC for the Governor's approval.
iv. Communicate the details of the approved borrowing programme and debt service payments to be made to the PDs.
v. At the end of the each year prepare gazette notifications for all T-bonds, RSs, SLDBs and ILBs issued during the year.
vi. Make necessary arrangements with the Government Printing Department to publish relevant gazette notifications. The formats of the gazette notifications (in three languages) of RSs and T-bonds are given in the (Appendix FO-2 and FO-3).

2. Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme

Funds are raised through;

A. Auctions

B. Private placements

C. Rupee Loans

A. Auctions

i. Conducting auctions, downloading bids and generating reports of T-bills/ T-bonds

a. Government securities are issued through auctions conducted by the PDD. Auctions are conducted on the electronic platform. Primary Dealers, who maintains funds accounts (current accounts) and securities accounts with CBSL are members of this electronic platform and can place their bids for the auctions through this electronic platform. Other investors can participate in the primary auctions through the PDs. For this purpose, the investors need to open accounts with a bank/Primary Dealer which is called as CDS Account.

b. The PDD, in consultation with the TOD, issues an indicative half-yearly auction calendar for T-bonds which contain information about the tenor of security and the period during which auctions will be held.

c. Each series of T-bill and T-bond is identified by a number called, "International Securities Identification Number (ISIN)" and prior to announcement of a series, ISIN for such series that is being issued has to be obtained by the FO through e-mail from the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE). In case of T-bills, since all T-bill issues for the coming year are known in advance, ISINs for such issues can be obtained from CSE before the beginning of the year. However, ISINs for T-bonds have to be obtained at the time of introducing a new series for the first time to the market.

d. FO with the assistance of Communications Department makes arrangements to publish advertisements in three languages in two national newspapers for T-bill (Appendix FO-4) and T-bond issues (Appendix FO–5) inviting bids for auctions from the public. Advertisements with regard to T-bills are usually published in

newspapers two days prior to the auction date while T-bond advertisements appear one day prior to the auction. These auction details are provided to the public through electronic media also.

e. FO should announce each auction to the market through the electronic bidding facility provided by the Central Bank by 8:30 a.m. of the date of the auction. (See Auction guidelines).

f. PDs are able to enter their bids electronically to the system only after the announcement of auction is made by the FO through the system. Auctions are closed automatically at the scheduled time (at 11.00 a.m.) by the system. However, closing time for bidding at the auction can be extended if there is any valid reason (e.g. system failure etc.) with the approval of the SPD/DSPD.

g. If a PD is unable to send bids before the closing time because of a system error, such a PD should inform the FO about their inability to send bids before the closing time and should make necessary arrangements to provide their bid details with authorized signatories to the FO through facsimile within the time specified by the FO.

h. Any bids once transmitted to the FO, cannot be withdrawn. Therefore, any editing of bids entered into the system by PDs should be undertaken before transmitting them to the FO.

i. If a PD requests to make any corrections for bids already submitted to the FO such corrections have to be approved by the SPD/ASPD.

j. If there are bids submitted through facsimile by PDs as mentioned in the section (G) above, such bids have to be entered by the FO to the system prior to downloading bids for processing under the supervision of a Staff Officer in the FO.

k. After a tender is closed by the system automatically and bids sent by PDs through facsimile are entered to the system if any, bids have to be downloaded and required reports have to be generated through the PC dedicated for auctions. (See Auction guidelines). Bids are serially numbered automatically by the system.

l. Samples of reports required to be generated after processing bids of a T-bill auction are given in (Appendix FO-6, FO-7 and FO-8)

m. Samples of reports required to be generated after processing bids of a T-bond auction are given in (Appendix FO-9, FO-10 and FO-11).

ii. Tender Board meetings on T-bills and T-bond auctions.

a. After closing of each T-bill and T-bond auction, the FO prepares following documents to be submitted to the Treasury Bill/Bond Tender Board Committee which takes decisions on the amount to be accepted that gives the lowest and optimal cost and risk combination (The TOR of the Treasury bill/bond Tender Board is attached in the (Appendix FO-12)).

   i) The summary report giving different types of options with different combinations of cut off/ weighted average prices including the departmental recommendation based on the existing market conditions. The summary report also includes results of the previous relevant auction and basic bid details of the current auction (Appendix FO-13 for T-bills and FO-14 for T-bonds).

   ii) A Table with primary and secondary market yield rates and the yield curve (Appendix FO-15 and for T-bills and FO-16 for T-bonds).

b. The FO makes arrangements in advance, by inviting all members of the Tender Board to attend at the scheduled time for the meeting on the date of auction. The Tender Board meets normally at 12.30 p.m. after each auction.

c. Members of the Tender Board discuss on existing liquidity position of the market, current market rates and market perceptions, current monetary policy stance and expected reserve money targets, and cash flow requirements of the government in deciding the optimal option of a particular Tender.

d. The decision of the Tender Board is submitted for the information and approval of the Governor (as the case may be) by SPD with a brief note giving existing market developments and respective auction outcome (Appendix FO-17 for T-bills and FO-18 for T-bonds).

iii. Releasing Results of T-bills and T-bond auctions.

a. As soon as the approval of the Governor is obtained for the decision of the Tender Board, PDs are informed about the outcome through the network system (Appendix FO-19 for T-bills). The PDs are able to download through the system all information on their successful bids as well as total bids received, total ,bids accepted and the weighted average yield rate/s of the auction.

b. Soon after the auction results are released to the market, details on successful bids are automatically transferred to the SSS System for crediting to relevant PD accounts subject to settlements on the due date. The FO makes arrangements;

(i) With Communication Department to publish a press notice as given in (Appendix FO-20 for T-bills and FO-21 for T-bonds) on auction outcome.

(ii) To provide information on auctions to the BO, MO, SSSS/CDS

(iii) And Supervision Division (SD) for recording, operational and analytical purposes as follows.

BO, MO and SSSS/CDS - FO 22, FO-23 (T-bills) and FO 24 (T-bonds)
SD - FO 8, 15A and 24 (T-bills) FO 11, 16 and 24 (T- bonds)

(iv) To provide information to the General Treasury via fax for their accounting purposes.

(v) To provide information to CSE for their information (Appendix FO-25 for T-bills and FO-26 for T-bonds) and

(vi) To submit the report in (Appendix FO-27 for T-bills and FO-28 for T-bonds) to the chairperson of the T-bill/bond Tender Board, (DG) for his/her approval.

iv. Conducting auctions, downloading bids and generating reports of SLDBs

a. FO conducts a market survey to estimate the market appetite for Foreign currency (FX) denominated bonds. If there is positive response, FO makes arrangements to obtain the Monetary Board approval to issue SLDBs. The Board Paper among other things includes current market appetite for FX denominated bonds, current position of government borrowings, fund

requirements of the government and observations of the Economic Research Department on the issue of such bonds.

b. In Order to obtain the necessary approval, FO prepares relevant schedule (Appendix FO-29) to be sent to the General Treasury to obtain approval of the Minister in charge in the subject of Finance (Appendix FO-30) for the issue of SLDBs.

c. On the receipt of President's authorization, FO appoints Designated Agents (DAs) to carry out trading in SLDBs and a Paying Agent (PA) to facilitate fund transfers/settlement. FO requests the Expression of Interest (EOI) from all commercial banks and PDs to appoint them as DAs (Appendix FO-31). In the case of appointing of a PA, the FO requests EOI from selected commercial banks with their charges and procedures expected to be followed as a PA (Appendix FO-32). Considering the proposals sent by commercial banks, PDD selects one bank as a PA (Appendix FO-33). All commercial banks and PDs who have given consent to appoint as DAs are appointed as DAs (Appendix FO-34). Front Office prepares DA and PA agreements (Appendix FO-35 and 36) with legal consultation and makes necessary arrangements to sign those agreements by the SPD and the relevant parties concerned before the respective SLDB auction.

d. Offer Document and brochure of the specific issue of SLDBs are prepared and published in the CBSL website prior to the scheduled auction date of the series (Appendix FO-37 and FO-38), at least one week prior to the auction. If any change in the Offer Document is required, the Exchange Control Department and the Legal Department have to be consulted as necessary to sort out the conditional and legal issues. One week prior to the auction, an advertisement on the issue with all details has to be published in newspapers (Appendix FO-39). Offer Documents are provided to DAs before the auction date. DAs have to submit their bids by filling tender applications available with the Offer Document. In general, 5 business days are provided for DAs to submit their bids to the PDD.

e. The FO has to accept written Tender applications from DAs during the week given for submission of the bids for the Tender.

f. On the closing date of the auction, FO opens bids, feeds required details of applications to the system and generate required reports from the system (Appendix FO-40 to FO-41).

v. Tender Board meetings on SLDB auctions:

a. Based on auction details, a summary report (Appendix FO-42) is prepared for the submission to the SLDB Tender Board[2] at which a decision on the auction is taken. The decision of the Tender Board is then submitted for the information and approval of the Governor by SPD (Appendix FO-43).

vi. Releasing results of SLDB auctions:

a. When the decision of the Tender Board is received, FO;
b. Sends Letters of Acceptance to all successful subscribers with accepted tender details including instructions for fund transfers (Appendix FO-44)
c. forwards auction details to BO, MO, Paying Agents, the General Treasury for information and necessary actions.
d. sends press notice on the auction results to the media and newswires (Appendix FO-45).
e. Issue of certificates to relevant parties has to be done by BO
f. Documents generated after accepting bids are given in (Appendix FO-46, 47 and 48)
g. When there is a request for a transfer of SLDB, a transfer application has to be issued by the FO to the transferor (Appendix FO-49). FO has to receive the relevant certificate/s from the transferor along with the transfer application.
h. If the transfer application is in order, FO cancels the existing certificate/s submitted by the transferor and inform the BO the transfer details such as the name/s of new holders and effective date of transfer/s on the same date in order to issue a fresh certificate/s to the transferee.

B. Private/ Direct Placements

i. FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the Government as

[2] The SLDB Tender Board is similar to the T-bill/bond Tender Boards.

indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs.

ii. Initially, FO communicates with relevant institutions to make arrangements for placements. In case of T-bills and T-bonds, placements are arranged at weighted average yield rate (WAYR) / below or at a rate between WAYR and the cut-off yield rate of respective previous auction or at a rate decided by the relevant authorities (General Treasury, Governor or SPD). When there is no respective auction for particular instrument, the prevailing market rate is applied with the consent of the Governor/SPD or the General Treasury.

iii. In case of private placements with regard to Rupee securities an administrative rate decided by the authorities is applied.

iv. Based on agreed tenor, yield rate and settlement date etc., FO prepares deal documents with payment instructions for private placements and send them to the relevant parties with whom the placements have been made (Appendix FO-50 to FO-51 for T-bills and FO-52 for T-bonds).

v. Information on placements has to be forwarded to MO, BO and CDS of the PDD.

vi. A covering approval is obtained from the relevant Assistant Governor/Deputy Governor overseeing the PDD and the Governor for all private placements of T-bills and T-bonds made in a month usually soon after the relevant month.

vii. Placements can be arranged with the CBSL;

a. at the request of the DOD

b. at the request of the general Treasury and with the approval of the G/DG

c. to cover any shortfall of the cash flow with relevant approval of the DG.

C. Raising funds through RSs

i. In general, RSs are issued to captive investors such as NSB, EPF, ETF and pension funds and are made as private placements.

ii. When RSs are issued to Public, the Registrar of Public Debt on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka should invite applications from public for subscriptions for RSs, which is on float. When RSs are open for public, an advertisement is published in the Newspapers calling for subscriptions (Appendix FO-53).

iii. Procedure to be followed by applicants is released in local Newspapers and in the CBSL website by the FO for the information of the public (Appendix FO-54) Applications for RSs is issued by the FO at the request by investors (Appendix FO-55).

iv. Duly perfected applications together with a cheque for the due amount to be subscribed have to be forwarded to the FO by investors.

v. The Subscription list opened for each loan will be closed only after the loan is fully subscribed or when the SPD/Registrar of Public Debt instructs to close the loan.

vi. A copy of the application has to be sent to BO with relevant cheque on the date of receipt of each application and cheque. The value date of a particular subscription is the date on which the subscriptions are credited to the DST's account.

vii. Upon receipt of confirmation from BO regarding realization of cheques submitted by investors, for a particular loan, FO maintains a separate register for each loan and makes arrangements to print stock certificates for each subscriber.

viii. Printed certificates are checked by the officer in-charge and sent to relevant subscribers after obtaining the signature of the SPD/Registrar of Public Debt.

ix. Information relating to subscription of RSs has also to be sent to the MO to update the domestic debt database.

x. When there is a request for a transfer of RSs, a transfer application has to be issued by the FO to the transferor (Appendix FO-56). FO has to receive the relevant certificate/s from the transferor along with the transfer application.

xi. If the transfer application is in order, FO cancels the existing certificate/s submitted by the transferor and issue a fresh certificate/s to the transferee. Transfer details such as the name/s of new holders and effective date of transfer/s have to be sent to the BO on the same date.

3. Monitoring market developments

A. Interaction with market participants, i.e. state institutions, Primary Dealers, the General Treasury, institutional investors and Central Bank departments, especially Domestic Operations Department, Economic Research Department and Finance Department to assess the market trends and market appetite.

B. Disseminate information to the market participants on the borrowing programme, debt management practices, debt data, yield rates, secondary market information and development on the fiscal front in order to improve public awareness.

C. Collect two-way quotes of the market for government securities, examine quotes made by the market participants and disseminate weekly market report (Appendix FO-57) based on such information to relevant parties.

D. Communicate timely and effectively on the current developments in these markets and their impact on upcoming auctions and fund raising activities to the management for decision making.

4. Other activities carried out by the Front Office

A. Preparation of the Daily Market Report (Appendix FO-58) – Each morning (by 9.30 – 10.00 a.m.) the FO prepares the Daily Market Report, incorporating information on both domestic and international capital markets, to circulate among the Senior Management. The Report includes the following information:-

B. primary and secondary market yield rates of government securities, secondary market yields rates of the International Sovereign Bonds and movements in US Treasuries,

C. money market information (call money rates, Repo Rates, liquidity position in the domestic market, details of auctions that is Overnight Repo and Reverse Repo Auctions, Term Repo and Reverse Repo Auctions, Outright Sales/Purchases of T-bills, etc.) information on the Government Overdraft with the two state banks,

D. debt statistics such as Total Debt, Outstanding T-bills, T-bonds, SLDBs, Rupee Loans, foreign investments in T-bills and T-bonds, Gross Borrowing Limit and the utilization, Gross holdings of T-bills by CBSL.

E. Economic indicators such as inflation data, exchange rates, information on equity market.

F. Prefunding with the Treasury/CBSL.

G. Preparation of the Daily Transaction Summary – by end of every business day the FO has to submit to the Senior Management the details of transactions committed including amount, maturity date and yield rate etc. for each transaction. The Daily Transaction Report has to be prepared even if no transactions are executed (Appendix FO-59).

H. Preparation of the Implementation Plan of the government borrowing program monthly to be submitted for the information of the Governor.

Middle Office

1. Overview of Middle Office Functions

Middle Office (MO) is responsible for the analytical work on debt dynamics for risk management on public debt in order to ensure best practices of efficient public debt management. For this purpose, the Division keeps track on the government Borrowing Programme, maintains the domestic debt database and the foreign debt database, disseminates information to external and internal users and engages in research related activities on public debt. Accordingly, the functions carried out by MO are broadly classified in four distinctive sections as set below;

1. Database Management (DBM)

A. Maintaining & Updating Domestic Database and CSDRMS
B. Maintenance of Horizon (upcoming)
C. Other related work

2. Monitoring the Borrowing Programme (BRP)

A. Preparation of the Borrowing Programme
B. Borrowing Limit monitoring and warning
C. Budgetary Estimates
D. Front-loading aspects

3. Information dissemination (IND)

A. General Reporting
B. Data to Annual Report
C. Data to Debt Management Bulletin
D. Data to Sovereign Rating Missions
E. Data to IMF/World Bank
F. Data to Treasury
G. Data to others internal departments
H. Updating the Web

4. Coordination (COR)

A. With other divisions of the department

B. With other departments

C. With external parties such as IMF, World Bank, Treasury, Rating Agencies, Rating Advisors etc.

D. Sovereign Rating Review Missions

E. Other

Accordingly, all important activities are detailed as per above functional classification in the next section (Section 2).

List of Current Major and Regular Activities[3]

Activity	Function	Frequency
Updating Domestic Database	DBM	When required
Database Management	DBM	Weekly
Selected info on debt	DBM	Monthly
Foreign loan balance confirmation	DBM	Monthly
Updating gross borrowing limit table	BRP	Weekly
Updating NDF table	BRP	Weekly
Internal Division Head Meeting	BRP	Daily
Preparing and Reviewing borrowing Programme	BRP	Monthly
Preparing monthly statement on domestic debt	BRP	Monthly
Parity Variance Calculation	BRP	Monthly
Preparing annual budgetary estimates	BRP	Annually/Monthly
Preparing Board Papers	BRP	Quarterly
Preparing daily report	IND	Daily
Preparing and maintaining Actual foreign debt service payment summary	IND	Monthly
Provision of Data to Treasury	IND	Monthly
CS-DRMS report generation and dissemination	IND	Monthly
ATM calculation of T-bond Issues	IND	Monthly
Preparing monthly forecast on debt service payments	IND	Monthly
Preparation of WA rates for Secretary	IND	Monthly
Preparing monthly detailed foreign debt service payment forecast	IND	Monthly

Preparation of Monthly Risk Profile	IND	Monthly
Data to IMF/World Bank	IND	Quarterly
Data to Annual Report/FSSR	IND	Annually
Data to Debt Management Bulletin	IND	Annually/Monthly
ATM calculation for Domestic Debt	IND	Annually
Revisions to Monthly Debt Service Payment Forecast	IND	As required
Web updating	IND	Weekly
Coordinating Sovereign Rating Review Missions	COR	Annually
Maintaining MO File Index	COR	As required

Detailed Procedures of the activities in the above list are given in the next section (2) in the order of the above displayed list. An activity may contain a document which has a reference number. All documented are subjected to reference numbering and the list of all such documents is given in the subsequent section. The reader is thus able to trace the sample document from the set of sample documents using the relevant reference number.

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[3] Not in order of priority, but in the order of functional classification first(DBM/BRP/IND/COR), and then in the order of frequency(daily/weekly/monthly)

2. Procedures

Procedures for all the listed activities are written down in a step-wise format. The order of procedures follows the order of activities given in the list under Section 2.

1.Database Management (DBM)

Maintaining & Updating Domestic Database and CSDRMS

Maintenance of Horizon (upcoming)

Other related work

i. Updating Domestic Database

Front Office and Back Office have to provide information on fund raising and debt servicing to Middle office immediately after such activities are finalized. Based on such information Middle Office updates its domestic database and maintains it for analytical purposes.

Responsibility: DBM

Frequency: As and When Necessary

Steps:

a. Information received from;

Front Office- Information Sheets of Treasury bills and treasury bonds (Appendix MO – 1, MO – 2)

Press Releases of T bills and T bond Auctions (Appendix MO – 3)

SLDB Report no. 03

Back Office - Flash Report (Monthly Actual Expenditure Statement) (Appendix MO – 4)

CDS- Maturity Profile of Foreign Holdings (Appendix MO – 5)

Gross and Net borrowings of T-bills and T bonds

b. Database Updating;

Update Tbills.xls and Tbonds.xls workbooks using T-bill and T-bond Information sheets (Appendix MO – 6, MO – 7)

Update Master database (Access) using Tbills.xls and Tbonds.xls workbooks (Appendix MO – 8)

Update SLDB database (Access) using Report no.3 (FO) (Appendix MO – 9)

ii. Database Management

a. Administration of CS-DRMS database in PDD

Responsibility: DBM

Frequency: Daily/On-Going

Steps:

1. The CS-DRMS (Software and Hardware) is maintained at the External Resources Department (ERD) of the Treasury. An interface is maintained at the PDD. (Appendix MO – 10)
2. Extract and transmit data on foreign loan service payments and daily exchange rates as obtained from the Back Office, to the ERD for incorporating in the CS-DRMS.
3. Reconcile the monthly data furbished by the ERD with data available at the Back Office. This includes verification of amortization, interest and other charges, exchange rates and details of terms and conditions of the individual loans.
4. Design reports and queries required by the CBSL for analytical work on debt in consultation with the ERD which is responsible for system maintenance and administration.
5. Communicate with the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, ERD and SL Telecom on the matters relating to the leased line provided by them as and when required.

b. **Report generation through Domestic Master Database**

Responsibility: DBM

Frequency: Ad-hoc

Steps:

1. Use Master Database to generate Reports on Issues, Maturities & Outstanding (Appendix MO – 11, MO – 12, MO – 13)
2. Generate Reports from Access Database (T bills, T bonds and Rupee loans) on the followings;
   a. Maturity Profiles (Daily, Monthly, Annually) (Appendix MO – 14)
   b. Issues and Maturities (Daily, Monthly, Annually) (Appendix MO – 11, MO – 12)
   c. Due payments – Interest and Principal (Daily, Monthly, Annually) (Appendix MO – 15)
   d. Outstanding Stocks
3. Generate following Reports from Excel workbooks;
   1. Issues and Maturities (CBSL, Auction and Placements) (Appendix MO – 16, MO – 17)
   2. Accrued Interest and Premium of T bonds (Appendix MO – 18)
   3. Early Retirement details (Appendix MO – 19)

iii. **Selected Info on Debt**

a. Updating Selected Information on Domestic Database

Responsibility: DBM

Frequency: Monthly

Steps:

1. Obtain Data from following sources for updating Selected Information;
   a. Master Database (Outstanding) (Appendix MO – 13)
   b. Tbills.xls and Tbonds.xls workbooks (Issues and Maturities) (Appendix MO – 16, MO – 17)
   c. Public Debt Service Payments.xls (Appendix MO – 20)
   d. Daily Report (Secondary Market Yield rates) (Appendix MO – 21)

2.Update the relevant data tables accordingly(Appendix MO – 22)

b. Preparing selected information on foreign debt. (Appendix MO – 23)

Responsibility: DBM

Frequency: Monthly

Steps:

Prepare using Monthly CS-DRMS reports, Maturity profile of T-bills and T-bonds from Back Office PDD, information on outstanding defense loans, form Public finance Division of Economic Research Department, actual foreign debt service payment report, report on month end Exchange rates received from International Operations Department. (Appendix MO – 5, MO – 24, MO – 25, MO – 26)

iv. **Foreign loan balance confirmation**

Responsibility: DBM

Frequency: Monthly/Annually

Steps:

Monthly;

1. Compare the invoices received from creditors with the loan outstanding amounts reported in the CSDRMS prior to making the payments. (Appendix MO – 27)
2. Check with ERD/Creditor regarding any differences between the two balances. (Appendix MO – 28)
3. Inform ERD/Creditor to make changes or to rectify the errors if any.

Annually;

1. Obtain loan outstanding amounts from Creditors
2. Make a comparison with loan balances outstanding as at end December as reported in CSDRMS. (Appendix MO – 27)
3. Check with ERD/Creditors regarding any differences between the two balances. (Appendix MO – 28)
4. Inform ERD/Creditor to make changes or to rectify the errors if any.

2. Monitoring the Borrowing Programme (BRP)

Preparation of the Borrowing Programme

Borrowing Limit monitoring and warning

Budgetary Estimates

Front-loading aspects

i. Updating gross borrowing limit table

Responsibility: BRP

Frequency: Weekly

Steps:

1. Calculate project loan disbursements using CS-DRMS report 861_loans (Appendix MO – 29)
2. Update the gross borrowing limit table incorporating total borrowings up to the relevant date. (Appendix MO – 30)

ii. Updating the NDF Table and Gross Borrowing Limit Table

Responsibility: BRP

Frequency: Daily

Steps:

1. Obtain information from following sources
   - Master Database (Issues and Maturities) (Appendix MO – 11, MO – 12)
   - NCG report and OD from Economic Research Department (Appendix MO – 31)
   - Gross and Net borrowings of T-bills and T bonds from CDS
   - Foreign Disbursements from CSDRMS (Appendix MO – 29)
   - SLDB issues from front office and repayments from back office (in Rs/US$)
2. Data Entry into the system
3. Update Table accordingly

iii. Internal Division Head Meeting

Responsibility: BRP
Frequency: Weekly

Steps:

1. Preparation the Gross Borrowing Limit Table and Net Borrowing Limit Table Preparation the note of Highlights
2. Generating T-bonds Maturity Profile, Outstanding Stock And T-bills Maturity Profile
3. Matters to be discussed are; budget deficit financing position, risks attached to current portfolio (bunching issues) and proposed issuance plan for the forthcoming auction. H-MO to brief SPD on the matters affecting financing and also on MO's view on composition of primary issuances.

iv. Preparing and reviewing Borrowing Programme

Responsibility: BRP

Frequency: Annually

The Annual Borrowing Programme is prepared as explained below.

Steps:

1. Obtain Budgetary/cash flow requirement of the Government from the Treasury.
2. Obtain observations from DER on the composition of debt to be issued and terms and conditions for proposed issues during the period under consideration.
3. Estimate resource availability and potential investments by investors as reported by investors.
4. Carry out simulation exercise out to derive nominal interest rates to be paid for Government Securities which are planned to be issued during the year.
5. Recommend issuance programme of Government Securities for the period under consideration by instruments, volumes, interest rates and maturity periods for the approval of the Monetary Board.
6. Send the Board approved annual borrowing programme to the Secretary.

Frequency: Annually

1. Monitor the borrowing programme which is implemented by the Front Office and propose necessary revisions based on the budgetary developments & macroeconomic developments, market developments and cash flow requirements of the Treasury.
2. Submit for approval of the Monetary Board where necessary.

v. Preparation of Monthly Statement of Domestic Debt

Responsibility: BRP

Frequency: Monthly

The purpose of this statement is to provide information on outstanding stock of domestic debt.

Steps:

1. Prepare the statement using the domestic database (Appendix MO – 32)
2. Check the statement using information from CDS and NDF tables (Appendix MO – 33)
3. Send the statement and covering letter to Fiscal Policy Department of the Treasury with copies to Treasury Operations Department, State Accounts and External Resources.

vi. Parity Variance Calculation

Responsibility: BRP

Frequency: Monthly

Steps:

1. Parity Variance is calculated using information from monthly selected information on foreign debt and SLDB and OBU outstanding amounts from NDF table. (Appendix MO – 34)

vii. Preparation of budgetary estimates (BEs) on public debt expenditure

Responsibility: BRP

Frequency: Annually/Monthly

Steps:

1. Budgetary estimates on Public Debt are prepared annually and made revisions whenever necessary considering the market and budgetary developments with regard to the preparation of the annual budgetary estimates.
2. Obtain borrowing requirements of the Government for the following year from the Treasury.
3. Obtain observations from DER/Economic Research Department on borrowing requirements of the Government for the following year, expected exchange and interest rates and LIBOR for foreign loans for the respective period and proposed composition of domestic debt instruments, terms and conditions (rates of interest, maturity periods) expected for debt instruments during the next year as decided by PDD and calculate

monthly debt service payments by debt instruments for the following year based on the existing debt stock and assumed terms and conditions.

4. Estimate debt service payments on the basis of projected issues of government debt securities and expected foreign loan disbursements.
5. For estimations of foreign loan debt service payments, scenarios under management tools are created in the CS-DRMS database. Projected exchange rates for USD are obtained from DER/Economic Research Department in this regard and rates for other currencies are calculated on the basis of USD. Service payments for future periods in reference are generated based on the scenarios built with new exchange rates.
6. The public debt service estimates are provided to the Treasury to be used for budgetary forecasts in the following year. These estimates are also provided to the Economic Research Department of the CBSL for their use in September 15 Report.
7. Reconcile draft budgetary estimates with the actual expenditure of Public Debt and analyze the reasons for differences.
8. Monitor and revise estimates for the rest of the year.
9. Make revisions to the estimates on requirement or as and when actual situation deviates from the assumptions made in the draft estimates and notify to the Treasury accordingly.

vii. Preparation of Board Papers

a. Preparation of Board Papers on early retirement of Rupee Securities

Responsibility: BRP

Frequency: Ad-Hoc

This is an activity to be handled whenever required prior to the capital payments are made

Steps:

1. Compile the maturity profile of Rupee Securities during the following year under two scenarios – Loans with compulsory repayments and Loans with optional repayments.
2. Obtain observations from the DER on whether early repayments option will be exercised during the forthcoming year for those Loans with optional maturity.
3. After receiving DER's observations the draft board paper on repayments of RSs submitted to SPD through DSPD and ASPD, seeking approval of the Monetary Board.
4. Monitor actual repayments of RSs when they are due for payment in terms of the approved repayment schedule.

b. Preparation of Board Papers on Debt Issuances

Responsibility: BRP

Frequency: Quarterly/Annually

Steps:

1. Board Papers are prepared every quarter of the year and each year regarding the borrowing programme.

viii. Preparing Daily Report through Primary Dealer Daily Reporting System (PDDRS)

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Daily

Steps:

1. Receive Daily Summary Report from PDs (Appendix MO – 35, MO - 36)
2. Pool the daily reports and update the links
3. Generate the pooled report (Appendix MO – 37)
4. Check for accuracy
5. Print the final report
6. Disseminate the report to relevant parties through email

3. Information dissemination (IND)

General Reporting

Data to Annual Report

Data to Debt Management Bulletin

Data to Sovereign Rating Missions

Data to IMF/World Bank

Data to Treasury

Data to others internal departments

Updating the Web

E. Maintaining actual foreign debt service payment summary.

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Monthly

Steps:

1. Receive actual foreign debt service payment report from Back Office. (Appendix MO – 25)
2. Use this report for preparing the summary (Appendix MO – 38)

F. Providing data to Treasury on Exchange rates and EURIBOR rates to External Resources Department of Treasury

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Monthly

Steps:

1. Scan and email report on month end Exchange rates received from International Operations Department. (Appendix MO – 26)

2. Export EURIBOR rates downloaded from Bloomberg through "ACT/360 EURIBOR Fixings Curve" search term for relevant month to Excel and email. (Appendix MO – 39)

G. Generation and Dissemination of CS-DRMS Reports

Responsibility IND

a. Frequency: Monthly

1. Prepare and transmit Monthly Bulletin of Government External Debt to DG/Treasury Operations, DG/Fiscal Policy & Economic Affairs, D/Economic Research and S/Government .Audit. (Using reports 826, 837, 838 & 854).
2. Prepare reports on outright grants, concessional and non-concessional loans to be sent to D/Economic Research (Using reports 850, 820, 821, 878,879).

b. Frequency: Quarterly

3. Prepare and transmit Quarterly Bulletin of Govt. External Debt to DG/State Accounts, DG/Fiscal Policy & Economic Affairs and D/Economic Research (Using reports 828).

c. Frequency: Annually

4. Prepare External Debt Annual Report to be sent to ERD (Using reports 503 & 856).

d. Other

5. Prepare various ad-hoc reports for ERD and other departments as and when required.
6. Prepare data and information for special assignments for the PDD.

The report numbers generated from CSDRMS are;

a. Reports generated after monthly MRP and submitted for dissemination: 503, 670, 671, 728_Annual, 728_Monthly, 728_Monthly_concessional, 728_Monthly_non-concessional, 802-1, 837, 838, 850_loans, 850_grants, 854-1, 861_loans, 861_grants.

b. Additional reports generated after monthly MRP only for internal use: 724_Annual_USD, 724_Monthly_USD, 728_Annual_after next years, Aggregation report for debt service payments - creditor category wise, Aggregation report for debt service payments – Instrument ID wise.

H. Calculation of ATM for T bond Issuances

Frequency: Monthly

Responsibility: IND

Steps;

1. Create monthly profile using T-bond issuances during the month and create the profile. (Appendix MO – 40)
2. Calculate remaining maturity days for each maturity in the profile
3. Multiply each maturity (Stock) by the remaining maturity days.

E.g. Stock maturing in 350 days * 350

Stock maturing in 451 days * 451

4. Take the weighted average maturity period (ATM) of each bond in profile as follows;

$$\sum Remaining\ Maturity \times Amount) / \sum Stock$$

I. Preparation of Monthly Forecast on Debt Service Payments

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Monthly

This is required for Treasury accounting purposes and to prepare the cash flow statement for each month. This gives a guideline for both the Treasury and the PDD to prepare in advance for payments on due dates.

Steps:

1. Collect interest and amortization payments of domestic debt (RSs, T-bonds, T-bills and SLDBs) and foreign loans from the respective databases on a daily basis. (Appendix MO – 41)
2. Classify by dates and prepare the statements.
3. Prepare and send statements on payments due for the forthcoming month two weeks in advance to Treasury Operations Department of the Treasury, to the Back Office and Front Office in the PDD and to ERD and DOD.

4. Prepare currency-wise statement of foreign loans for the forthcoming month for submission to the Domestic Operations Department, International Operations Department and Finance Department. (Appendix MO – 42)

5. Prepare and send tentative forecast statements on payments due for the forthcoming months to ERD, Treasury Operations Department of the Treasury and to the Back Office of the PDD. (Appendix MO – 43)

J. Preparation of Weighted Average Rates for the Secretary

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Monthly

Steps:

1. Calculate monthly WAY Rates using Tbills.xls and Tbonds.xls workbooks and send to Secretary. (Appendix MO – 44, MO – 45)

K. Preparing monthly detailed foreign debt service payment forecast

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Monthly

Steps:

1. Prepare Foreign Debt Service Payment Forecast using CD-DRMS report 300, latest month end exchange rates, LIBOR rates, Calendars from Bloomberg, SLDB payment details from SLDB access database and payment advices from Back Office of PDD. (Appendix MO – 46, MO – 47)
2. Compare with actual payment report for corresponding month of last year. This is done for every month by comparing corresponding month of last year. (Appendix MO – 25)
3. Send the statement to IOD and Finance Departments. (Appendix MO – 48)
4. Use this statement to prepare monthly forecast.

L. Dissemination of data to IMF/World Bank

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Weekly

Prepare debt service payments with underlined assumptions to IMF /WB Missions.

Steps:

1. Prepare information sheet on T-bill and T-bond issuance data in excel workbook. (Appendix MO – 49)
2. Cross-check data for accuracy
3. Send the report to ERD.

M. Preparation of data on the activities of the Middle Office to publish in CBSL publications such as CBSL annual Report, Review of FSSR etc..

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Annual

Steps:

1. A note to incorporate in the Central Bank's Annual Report is prepared and submitted to ERD after the necessary approval of the SPD, AG and DG. The procedure of preparing Annual Report note is given below.

2. Collect data for statistical tables on Public Debt for the period under review and analyzed statistical data relating to operational and development activities of the Department during the period under review.(please refer activity No 23 (a-e) for reports to be used for preparation of these information)
3. Incorporate Government External Debt data relating to debt outstanding, disbursements, service payments, interest rates and grant element during the year.
4. Summarize measures adopted by the PDD with regard to MO functions.
5. Compile any amendments to Acts, circulars, rules and regulations issued by the PDD relating to MO functions during the period under reference for incorporation in the Part IV of the Annual Report.
6. Submit draft note to DER with necessary approvals of SPD, AG and DG.
7. Proof reading of the note to ensure accuracy.
8. Prepare Sinhala translations of the note and the tables.

N. Data to Debt Management Bulletin

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Annually

Steps:

A publication on Public Debt Management is prepared annually in order to provide information on debt management strategies, costs and risks of debt stock, movement of debt stock, primary issuance strategies adopted during the year, performance of primary dealers and the secondary market operations of the government securities.

1. Following reports are used for preparing information on external debt for both Annual Report and Debt Management Bulletin;

   a.Selected information on external debt for December (Appendix MO – 23)

   b. Additional CS-DRMS reports generated after December MRP : 163, 303, 503_Annual, 503_ADB, 503_ChinaExim, 503_EIB, 503_IDA, 503_OPEC, 503 for excluding loans, 600, 601, 724_Annual_Rs, 724_Annual_Rs_After10years, 724_HNB_Annual, 724_monthly_Rs, 724_Monthly_Rs for next year, 724_Monthly_USD for next year, 724_Quarterly_Rs, 724_Quarterly_USD, MTDS for GOSL, 837_Annual, 838_Annual, 850_loans_Monlthy, 850_loans_Annual, 850_loans_Monlthy_USD, 854-1_Annual, 854-1_Annual_HNB, 855, 865

   c. Actual debt service payment summary (Appendix MO – 38)

   d. Information on disbursements and repayments of foreign investments in T-bills and T-bonds – obtained from CDS of PDD

   e. Information on disbursements and repayments defense loans – obtained from Public Finance Division of Economic Research Department

2. MO has to coordinate with all other divisions
3. Provide required Data and Data Tables to relevant divisions and authors of the Chapters
4. Review the draft Chapters and check for the accuracy of data and tables.
5. Obtain approval for final draft from AG, DG and Governor.
6. Obtain the ISBN number from Communications Department
7. Arrange with Communications Department for printing the bulletin.
8. Arrange for Sinhala and Tamil translations of bulletin
9. Send the soft copy to Communications Department for publishing in the CBSL web.

O. ATM calculation of Domestic Debt

Frequency: Monthly/ Annually

Responsibility: IND

Steps;

1. Prepare T-bill (T), T-bond (B) and Rupee Loans (R) maturity profile as at end date. (Appendix MO – 50, MO – 51, MO – 52, MO – 53)
2. Do the following calculations for each profile separately.
   a. Calculate remaining maturity days for each maturity in the profile
   b. Multiply each maturity (Stock) by the remaining maturity days.

   E.g. Stock maturing in 7 days * 7

   Stock maturing in 10 days * 10

   c. Take the Weighted Average Maturity Period (ATM) of each T, B and R profile as follows;

$$\sum Remaining\ Maturity \times Amount) / \sum Stock$$

   d. Calculate Total ATM as per following equation (calculate in days and convert into years);

$$(ATM_T \times Stock_T) + (ATM_B \times Stock_B) + (ATM_R \times Stock_R) / \sum Stock_{T,B,R}$$

P. Revisions to Monthly Debt Service Payment Forecast

Responsibility: IND

Frequency: Ad-hoc, in the event of a change to the original forecast.

Steps:

1. Monthly debt service payment forecast may have to be changed in the event of any change that affects the subsequent month's planned debt service payments. For example, if the Front Office issues a bond now which has a due coupon date falling in next month, it will alter the planned coupon payments of next month. First step is to receive such information from the Front Office.
2. Prepare the new debt service payment forecast as per the information received from Front Office.
3. Prepare a letter addressed to DG-TOD of the Treasury with, signed by SPD, with copies to DG-TOD, DG-State Accounts, D-DOD and DER forwarding the revised forecast.
4. An email to be sent to IOD, FD, ERD and SPD, ASPD, FO & BO of PDD attaching the new schedule.

4. Coordination (COR)

With other divisions of the department

With other departments

With external parties such as IMF, World Bank, Treasury, Rating Agencies, Rating Advisors etc.

Sovereign Rating Review Missions

Other

i. Updating PDD Intranet Web site

Responsibility: COR

Frequency: Daily/Weekly

Steps:

1. Update the PDD intranet web with Daily report and other information weekly.
2. Update the web after weekly auctions.

ii. Coordinating Sovereign Rating Missions

Responsibility: COR

Frequency: Annual

Steps:

1. Receive information from the Rating Agency or Rating Advisors regarding the planned review session. Inform the SPD and obtain necessary instructions.
2. Prepare a tentative meeting schedule for the sessions and send for Rating Agency's comments.
3. Call the relevant parties such as Treasury, private sector organizations, embassies etc and reserve date and time. Confirm them by an email.
4. Prepare the final schedule and submit for SPD's approval.
5. Make arrangements to; obtain security clearance for guests with VIP treatment, special lunch, obtain cash for refreshments, reserve the conference room, book vehicles etc.
6. Obtain discussion points from Rating Agency and disseminate to relevant parties such as ER, Treasury, Private Sector, Embassies etc. accordingly.
7. Coordinate with ER to finalize data to be submitted to rating missions relating to PDD
8. Arrange a suitable officer/s to accompany the Mission.

9. Inform external parties about the details of guests, vehicle numbers etc for them to make arrangements for meetings.
10. Arrange for special site visits by the rating missions if there are any requirements.

iii. Maintaining MO File Index

Responsibility: COR

Frequency: On-Going

Steps:

1. Maintain file index with specific file numbers (Appendix MO – 54)
2. Update the file index periodically/as and when required

viii. Preparation of Monthly Risk Profile

Responsibility: COR

Frequency: Monthly

Steps:

1. Finance Department sends the previous month's Risk Profile Table to the PDD (Appendix MO – 55)

2. SPD, ASPD and DSPD and MO Officers exchange views on the current month changes that could be incorporated into the risk profile such as impediments to borrowing programme, limit issues resources availability, interest rates etc.

3. Update table accordingly and submit for SPD's approval through ASPD/DSPD.

Special Notes

i. Guidelines for updating the manual

This is a rolling exercise. This manual has to be updated at least once in six months. The steps involved are;

- *Listing down current activities under each classification*
- *Insert new activities and delete obsolete activities*
- *Make necessary changes to the process map accordingly*
- *Writing down all steps involved under each new activity giving reference to paths, sources, links and add samples in Appendix*

ii. Key to Coding of Specimen/Samples/Formats;

[Specimen Name]
[Division]_[Activity Number]_[Specimen Number]
e.g.:
Gross Borrowing Limit Table
MO_1_1
The list of Specimen, samples and formats with above coding is given under Appendix

Back Office

Back Office (BO) makes service payments on domestic debt raised by the PDD and foreign debt raised by the Government. The debt servicing includes principal repayment as well as interest payments which have to be made on scheduled times. In discharging these duties BO coordinates with External Resources Department (ERD) and Treasury Operations Department (TOD) of the Ministry of Finance and several departments of the CBSL viz. Finance Department (FD), Domestic Operations Department (DOD), International Operations Department (IOD), Payment and Settlement Department (PSD) and Management Audit Department (MAD).

Functions carried out by BO are as follows.

2. Settlement at issuances of following Government Securities
    i. T-Bills/ T-Bonds
    ii. Rupee Securities
3. Servicing of domestic debt
    i. T-bills/ T-bonds (fund transfer from the Treasury to CBSL only)
    ii. Rupee Securities
    iii. Sri Lanka Development Bonds
    iv. OBU Loans
4. Issuance of SLDB Certificates
5. Arranging debt service payments on foreign currency denominated Government of Sri Lanka loans signed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning
6. Correspondence on government debt service payments related matters
7. Monitoring General Ledger A/c No.4203 (PDD Current Account)
8. Handling Housing Bonds issued by National Housing Development Authority
9. Preparation of reports related to debt servicing
10. Maintaining databases
11. Attending to other public debt related issues

1. Settlement at issuances of Government Securities

A. T-Bills/ T-Bonds

Funds raised through issuance of T-bills and T-bonds (scripless domestic debt securities) at the primary auctions are collected through the RTGS system. In this connection, separate statements identifying aggregated receivables falling due by the collection day from each participant is prepared by BO (Appendix BO-1) based on the individual issues made by FO to each such entity which identifies aggregated amounts to be collected from each such participant as issues (i.e., book value) and WHT transferrable to Dept. of Inland Revenue.

In addition, in instances where debt service payment of script securities held by any such participant falls due for the same date, such payables will be set off against aggregated receivables and accordingly the net settlement statement (Appendix BO-1) will identify net receivables/payables to/from such entity by the due date.

The net settlement position may be negative or positive depending on the payments made by participants or CBSL. Negative balances are settled by the PDs/banks, sending 202 SWIFT message to Payments and Settlement Department (PSD). Then the DOD makes arrangements to credit PDD Current Account No.4203 with those due amounts. Positive balances are settled by the CBSL to PDs/banks by crediting their settlement accounts maintained at DOD through PSD.

Following steps are followed with respect to fund transferring of T-bills and T-bonds.

i. Collect the information with details on accepted tenders (Both Auctions and Placements) from FO Master Summary (Appendix (FO – 11B, FO-20 and FO-42 in the case of T-bills and in the case of T-bonds, Appendix FO-17 for auctions and FO-44 for private placements). These include among other things information on allocation of T-bills to PDs, Institutional Investors and the CBSL (Appendix FO-19 B).

ii. Prepare net settlement statements based on the information provided by FO on above formats (Appendix BO-1) and send by fax to each successful participant of the primary auction.

iii. For T-bills purchased by the CBSL, inform PSD, DOD and FD in writing (Appendix BO-2). Necessary arrangements are made by DOD to transfer funds to PDD Current Account No. 4203. (Appendix BO-6(i) and Appendix BO-9(i)).

iv. Send a summary of the receivables from PDs to CDS (both net settlement and taxes) (Appendix BO-3).

v. Monitor the movements of the PDD Current A/c No. 4203 of the General Ledger that is maintained/updated by the DOD for which BO have viewing facility. Accordingly, except for any issue of securities to ETF, on behalf of which funds are transferred through People's Bank Current A/c, ascertain whether the PDD has been fully settled by successful participants to the Primary Auction. In the event of a failure to settle due funds on account of primary auctions by any successful participant to the Primary Auction, bring such failure to the notice of FO. At the end of each settlement date provide a summary of transaction in PDD Current A/c No. 4203 to CDS (Appendix BO-4).

vi. In the event of an overpayment, generate an RTGS outward payment request (Appendix, BO-5) to be passed to DOD to effect the repayment of the overpaid amount.

vii. Total subscriptions receivable from PDs/CBSL on successful bids should be credited to the DST's A/c No.4201 debiting PDD Current Account No.4203 on the date of settlement. For this purpose, send an input sheet indicating the amount to be transferred to DST (Appendix BO-6) to DOD along with a duly completed paying-in-voucher No.118 (Appendix BO-7).

viii. Withholding tax on issue of T-bills has to be charged at the primary issue. Accordingly, BO receives details on withholding tax for issued T-bills from FO on the date of issue. Include this information in the net settlement report on due date. Send the separate report generated through the Net Settlement System to FD (Appendix BO-8).

ix. Send an Input Sheet with the total tax amount to be transferred to Finance Entry Clearing A/c No. 5552 to DOD (Appendix BO-9).

x. In relation to issues of T-bills, send a letter to TOD, identifying such details viz. face value, book value of the relevant issue (Appendix BO-10).

B. Rupee Securities (RSs)

BO receives summary of the investments in Rupee Securities that are on float from the FO together with the relevant cheques for full amounts.

i. Enter information on applicants/Investors i.e. name/s, amount subscribed, cheque no., date of the receipt of application in the register named 'Cheque Register-Rupee Securities' as well as in the computer programme maintained at the Back Office.

ii. Verify cheques forwarded by applicants to ascertain that they are drawn in favor of the 'Registrar Public Debt- Government Securities- PDD Current A/c 4203' and also reconcile with the amount indicated in the application.

iii. Send DOD, cheques collected together with input sheets prepared for effecting the credit to 'PDD Current Account No. 4203'. After realization of the cheques prepare another input sheet to debit PDD Current account No. 4203 and credit DST's account No. 4201 along with a duly completed paying-in-voucher No. 118 and forward to DOD in order to credit funds to DST (Appendix BO-7).

iv. Inform FO in writing confirming the receipt of subscriptions from investors enabling it to issue stock certificates to the subscribers.

2. Servicing of domestic debt

A. T-bills/ T-bonds (fund transfer from the Treasury to CBSL only)

T-bills mature on every Friday and in the event of such day falling on a holiday, payments will be effected on immediate business day prior to the maturity date. With respect to T-bonds servicing involves both payment of semi-annual interest and maturity payments and in the event the payment due date (ie. Either or both interest and maturity) falls on a holiday payments will be effected on the following business day.

The procedure for effecting such payments is as follows.

i. BO receives maturity and interest schedules of T-bills/T-bonds falling due in following month with due dates from MO.

ii. Maturity payments and interest for T-bills are effected by the CDS through the RTGS.

iii. On the payment due date, BO obtains a list of holders from the CDS along with corresponding amounts payable.

iv. Cross check the total payable per CDS with MO's payment schedule identified in a) above.

v. Reconcile any difference in total payable amount and inform MO of any difference. (Generally CDS's payment summary will prevail.)

vi. Obtain SPD's approval in advance for the transfer of total required funds from 'DST A/C No. 4201' to the 'PDD Current A/c No. 4203' for the total payments due on the day.

vii. Send input sheets to DOD to effect the necessary transfer of funds.(Appendix BO-11 for maturing T-bills, BO-12 for maturing T-bonds , BO-13 for coupon payment of T-bonds)

viii. On each maturity payment, issue a letter to the Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury with details of the amounts debited from the DST's A/c 4201. Context of the letter generated will be slightly varying depending on the instance viz. on maturing T-bills (Appendix BO-14), on interest payment of T-bonds (Appendix BO-15) and on maturity payment of T-bonds (Appendix BO-16).

ix. At instances when early retirement of T-bills held by CBSL takes place, MO sends relevant information such as retirement book value and original book value. Cross verify these data with the information of T-bill retirement issued by

FO and send input sheets to DOD to effect necessary fund transfers from DST (Appendix BO-17 and BO-18). In this connection, issue a letter to the Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury with details of the amounts debited from the DST's A/c 4201(Appendix BO-19).

B. Rupee Securities

Maturity proceeds for the RSs are payable on the date indicated in the reverse side of the stock certificate. If the payable date falls on a holiday, payment will be made on the working day immediately following the due date. The procedure for payment of maturity proceeds is as follows.

i. Send Redemption Warrants No. P.D.35 (Appendix BO-20) to all holders of stock certificates at least one month prior to the date of maturity indicated in stock certificate/s.

ii. The Redemption Warrants duly completed shall be submitted by the holder for collection of the proceeds from the PDD. The warrant must be accompanied by the relevant stock certificate/s duly endorsed on the reverse.

iii. Obtain SPD's approval in advance for the transfer of total required funds from 'DST A/C No. 4201' to the 'PDD Current A/c No. 4203' for the total payments due on the day.

iv. On the date of maturity send the input sheet to DOD to effect the necessary transfer of funds from DST to PDD current account No. 4203(Appendix BO-21).

v. Send the relevant payments to the holder by a cheque or as an RTGS payments through a Commercial Bank. In the event DST holds any securities, maturity proceeds will be credited to DST A/c No. 4201 for which a duly filled Paying-in-voucher (Appendix BO-7) will be forwarded to DOD.

vi. In instances when a Primary Dealer is payable with maturity proceeds, any dues on issues of T-bills or T-bonds receivable by the same date will be netted against such receivables(Appendix BO-1).

vii. On each maturity payment, issues a letter to the Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury with details of the amounts debited from the DST's A/c 4201. (Appendix BO-22)

Interest is payable bi-annually each year on the specified dates. The first payment of interest will be for a period commencing from the date on which the relevant

subscription is credited to the DST's account and including the day before such interest payment is made. The procedure for payment of Interest Warrants is as follows.

i. Send the duly filled Interest Warrants (Appendix BO-23) to the subscribers at least one month prior to the due date of interest payments.

ii. On the date of payment, send input sheets indicating the amount to be transferred to DST (Appendix BO-24, BO-25) to DOD and the relevant taxation computation to FD (Appendix BO-26). The computer programme in BO facilitates the calculation of tax on Rupee Securities.

iii. Duly signed interest warrants may be presented in person, or by a duly authorized agent or sent by registered post for payment.

iv. Post the information on interest warrants such as the name of payee, name of loan, period of interest, amount of stock, interest due in the register titled 'Interest Payment of Rupee Securities'.

v. If a holder does not have an account with CBSL, arrange to send the interest payment to the holder (or nominee) by a cheque by registered post or as a RTGS payment through a Commercial Bank unless otherwise instructed by the holder.

vi. On each interest payment, issue a letter to the Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury with details of the amounts debited from the DST's A/c 4201 (Appendix BO-27).

C. Sri Lanka Development Bonds

i. Prior to start of each interest period (generally 6 months) obtain the LIBOR spot rate for the beginning of the relevant interest period (ie. LIBOR for 2 Sri Lankan business days prior to the beginning of the relevant interest period) from Paying Agent (PA) and after verification of the same through Bloomberg, notify such LIBOR rate by fax to each holder (Appendix BO-28).

ii. At each payment cycle, verify the amounts due for each SLDB holder with the PA.

iii. Send a detailed interest and/or maturity payment schedule as applicable to PA in advance as extracted from the SLDB database indicating names of the individual investors, their Bank accounts, amounts due along with the total payable amount in US Dollars, in order to make relevant payments (Appendix BO-29).

iv. Issue a payment advice to FD indicating the total payable amount in US Dollars in advance, for FD to make necessary arrangements to transfer required funds to PA (Appendix BO-30).

v. On the date of payment, send necessary paying in voucher to the FD to credit the total due amount to the PA (Appendix BO-31).

vi. On the date of payment, send the detailed breakdown of the payment Form PD/A2/7 to the DG, TOD (Appendix BO-32).

vii. Get a letter from PA confirming transfer of dues to individual SLDB holders immediately after effecting relevant payments.

D. OBU Loans

OBU loans are serviced in the same way foreign currency denominated loans are serviced as discussed under sub-topic 4, below.

3. Issuance of SLDB Certificates

A. Along with issuance of SLDBs, FO forwards a summary of bids accepted through designated agents which include inter alia Name of Applicant, Designated Agent (DA), Margin Basis Points and Issued Amount (in USD).

B. Obtain from FD, a copy of the swift message 202 in connection with the receipt of relevant funds and verify duly receipt of issued amounts.

C. Contact each DA to obtain required denominations of SLDB certificates.

D. Print SLDB certificates using the printing option in the SLDB database and send to the relevant successful bidders with the signatures of SPD and DST. Continuing from the previous issues, each such certificate carries a unique Certificate Number.

4. Arranging debt service payments on foreign currency denominated Government of Sri Lanka loans signed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning

A. The PDD has to make necessary arrangements to effect the payments of capital, interest and other contractual payments on foreign loans, which are raised by the Ministry of Finance and Planning or the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (in the case of Sovereign Debt) on behalf of the Government.

B. The process of servicing foreign currency loans is described below.

i. Immediately after receiving information to the effect that a foreign loan is contracted by the government, open a separate file for the loan. File agreements and other documents received and correspondence if any in regard to the loans in this file.

ii. Get the monthly payment schedule indicating payments due for each loan prepared in advance by MO using the database maintained under Commonwealth Secretariat-Debt Recording and Management System (CS-DRMS) and the data available with BO.

iii. ERD forwards BO invoice/s issued by the lenders prior to the due date of such payment with appropriate instructions where necessary. Alternatively BO directly receives copies of lender advices.

iv. Verify the lender advices against the CS-DRMS. In the event of any discrepancy between the lender claim and the corresponding payable/s appearing in CS-DRMS, obtain appropriate instructions from the ERD prior to effecting payments.

v. On the basis of the invoices received as referred to in (c) above, endorsed by ERD for the accuracy of such payable amounts where there is any mismatch between the claimed amount by the lender and the CS-DRMS, prepare payments advice/s (Appendix BO-30) in respect of each creditor separately using the comprehensive computer programme, External Debt Management System available in BO.

vi. Send the advices with copies of the payment invoice/s, or other payment instruction/s received from lenders/donors to FD prior to the due date of such repayments (Appendix BO-30).

vii. Convert capital/interest/other payments due on foreign loans for a particular day into rupees by using the relevant exchange rates announced by the IOD, two business days prior to the value date of payment (Appendix BO-31).

viii. On the date of payment prepare a separate debit voucher (Appendix BO-31) to debit 'DST A/c No. 4201' indicating the total repayment of principal, interest and any other payments due for the loan in Rupees.

ix. Complete Form PD/A2/7 (Appendix BO-32) in quadruplicates giving the breakdown of the payment of loan (principal, interest and any other payment).

x. Send the debit voucher and two copies of the duly completed Form PD/A2/7 (Appendix BO-32) to FD and one copy to TOD while filing the fourth copy in the relevant file maintained by BO.

5. Correspondence on government debt service payment related matters

Respond to inquiries such as balance confirmations as raised by auditors of the lenders based on the records available in the division and correspond with PAs and Designated Agents (DAs) for payments and settlements of SLDBs.

6. Monitoring General Ledger A/c No.4203 (PDD Current Account)

Monitor the movements in General Ledger A/c No 4203 (PDD Current A/c) maintained manually by DOD of which BO has viewing facility and reconcile the closing balance of the account on a daily basis to ensure related transactions have been properly recorded. Bring to the notice of DOD any discrepancy promptly.

The accounts and their entries maintained by DOD relevant to BO are as follows.

A. T-bills / T-bonds and Rupee loans

i. Issuances of T-bills / T-bonds/ Rupee Securities

The funds, that is collected through RTGS from the market participants in settling their dues for the purchase of T-bills and T-bonds at the issuance, shall be transferred to DST's account on the same day with following entries that are sent to DOD by BO in a specific input sheet (Appendix, BO-6 (i) , BO-6 (ii)).

i. Book value of T-bills / T-bonds

PDD Current A/c 4203 - Dr

DST A/c 4201 - Cr

ii. Tax component of the T-bills / T-bonds issuance

PDD Current A/c 4203 - Dr

DST A/c 4201 - Cr

B. **Payment of Maturity Proceeds and interest of T-Bills, T-Bonds and Rupee loans**

The required funds to settle the dues of maturities and / or interest shall be transferred to PDD current account from DST's account on the due date with following entries that are sent to DOD by BO in the specific input sheet (Appendix, BO-11 or BO-12 or BO-13 or BO-21 or BO-24 as applicable).

ii. Maturity amount and / or interest of T-bills, T-bonds and Rupee loans

DST's A/c 4201 - Dr

PDD Current A/c 4203 - Cr

iii. Tax component of Rupee loans/ T-bonds at interest payment

At the semi annual interest payment, related tax component is deducted from the due interest of investors.

PDD Current A/c 4203 - Dr

Finance entry clearing A/c 5552 - Cr

iv. Early retirement of T-bills held by CBSL (at retirement book value)

DST's A/c 4201 - Dr

PDD Current A/c 4203 -Cr

PDD Current A/c 4203 - Dr

Finance entry clearing A/c 5552 - Cr

7. Handling Housing Bonds issued by National Housing Development Authority

BO maintains a database on housing bonds issued on behalf of National Housing Development Authority (NHDA) based on the data received from FO at such issues. Using this database, BO prints interest warrants as they fall due (generally semi-annually) and will be collected by NHDA for circulation and to process payments duly. In the event a

bond matures or is retired early as advised by NHDA, BO identifies the capital amount and interest due up to the date of maturity / early retirement and the same will be notified to NHDA, which enable them to process the payment accordingly. The documents used by BO for payment schedules on Housing Bonds are given in (Appendix BO –33, BO- 34 and BO-35).

8. Preparation of reports related to debt servicing

BO monthly prepares and submits following reports to various interested parties as given below;

A. Flash report - Flash report is prepared monthly, giving the details of domestic and foreign loan payments excluding T-bill maturities (due to the rolling over nature of T-bill maturities). This report is delivered to DG/Fiscal Policy of General Treasury and copied to ERD of CBSL (Appendix BO – 36).

B. Total expenditure report on public debt – The total expenditure report contains daily actual domestic and foreign loan payments for a month. This report is delivered to DG/TOD Operation of General Treasury and copied to Government Audit Section of General Treasury. Also a soft copy of the detailed expenditure payments on foreign currency loans is forwarded to the ERD of General Treasury, that enabling them to update the CSDRMS (Appendix BO – 37).

C. Quarterly report – Quarterly report is an analysis of budgeted payments and actual payments for a particular quarter, that should be submitted to the CBSL management before the 15th of Following month of the quarter ended. Further this gives a brief analysis of the new foreign loan agreements signed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning in raising government debt on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka. Also this report highlights Forecast for following quarter.

D. Foreign debt service payments monthly summary – This report is a simple summary of day wise actual foreign debt service payment for a particular month and is sent to International Finance Division of the ERD, CBSL. (Appendix BO-38).

E. Ad hoc reports are prepared as required by the Management.

9. Maintaining databases

BO maintains databases of Net Settlement, Foreign Loans, SLDBs, T-bills and T-bonds Interests and Maturity, Expenditure, and Housing Bonds.

A. Net Settlement Database - Net Settlement Database basically keeps the records of primary dealer wise net settlement details of the issuances of T-bills, T-bonds and Rupee Loans. Further data on service payments that are set off against collections at issuances with respect to Rupee Loans and scrip based T-bonds are also maintained in this database.

B. Foreign Loan database – Details of foreign currency loans that are serviced by BO is recorded in this database, which gives the core details of foreign loans in descriptive manner including the history of payment amounts. Database contains records of service payments since 2005.

C. SLDB database - Data as uploaded by FO to the SLDB database at the primary issue as well as at subsequent transfers are accessed by BO in order to compute due interest for corresponding SLDBs. For this purpose, BO introduces the relevant LIBOR to the database. This database contains holder wise details, but does not contain any historical interest payment details. As any subsequent transfers of SLDBs are updated in the database by FO, this database is used to obtain updated details of holders of SLDBs.

D. Expenditure database – Day wise domestic and / or foreign debt service payments are maintained in the expenditure database and is used particularly to generate monthly flash report and expenditure reports. Further these data could be used to generate any other adhoc report too.

E. T-bills and T-bonds database – Day wise and ISIN wise interest and maturity of T-bills and series wise interest and maturity of T-bonds are recorded here. The sorted data of this is annexed to the expenditure report.

F. Rupee Loan database – Details of the issuance of Rupee loans and the transfers are recorded in the Rupee Loan database in order to print interest and redemption warrants, that are delivered to the investors well before the due date, generally by the

15th of the preceding month. This database is linked to the Web server hosted at ITD – Test web with a backing in DB2 database in AS400 SYS1 in the CBSL server room.

G. Housing bond database – BO updates the housing bond database at issuances of housing bonds by NHDA and prints the interest warrants and delivers to the same.

10. Attending to other public debt related issues

BO of the PDD engages in providing debt servicing related information (ad-hoc) requested by other departments of the bank, and other outside institutions subject to approval from SPD/ASPD.

Central Depository System Division

LankaSecure System

LankaSecure System which commenced operations in February, 2004 consists of the Srcipless Securities Settlement System (SSSS) and the Central Depository System (CDS). It settles and records transactions related to government securities in scripless form which, until January, 2004 had been done in scrip (paper) from. The CDS Division ensures that the system availability is kept above the stipulated value of international standards to enable smooth settlement of transactions related to government securities.

Settlement of scripless government securities takes place instantaneously as and when, transactions are entered into SSSS on delivery versus payment basis (DVP). Securities are transferred from one account to another simultaneously in the form of an electronic data entry with a corresponding fund transfer in the LankaSettle (Real Time Gross Settlement System – RTGS). Accordingly, in an outright buying or selling transaction, there is a buyer whose securities account is credited with securities and a seller whose securities account is debited. The corresponding funds transfer will take place through the RTGS where licensed commercial banks and primary dealers are the participants that holding settlement accounts with the Central Bank. The corresponding accounting entries are made across these settlement accounts. The settlement of securities through the SSSS and funds through the RTGS are confirmed electronically to the participants involved.

Central Depository System

CDS is a computer based database which maintains customer-wise records of holdings in government securities. CDS maintains the accounts of LankaSecure participants and individual accounts of each investor and settle their transactions in government securities. The transfer of holdings of scripless securities is recorded electronically in the CDS according to the instructions received from the participants.
The CDS Division carries out the following activities.

1. Daily operations and monitoring of the LankaSecure system.

2. Issuance of scripless government securities (Settlement process of Treasury bills and Treasury bonds of primary auctions and private placements).

3. Payment of maturity proceeds and interest/coupons to the investors in government securities.

4. Generation of statements confirming trades and balances to investors recorded in CDS.

5. Feeding of secondary market transactions to LankaSecure for settlement. (Match Trade File uploads)

6. Maintenance of the LanakSecureNet, the web based account verification facility for investors in government securities.

7. Taking daily backups at end of each business day and down loading for billing and generation of reports.

8. Attending to enquiries/queries of participants and investors.

9. Attending to activities relating to Business Continuity Planning (BCP).

10. Updating and maintaining foreign transactions database and preparation of reports.

11. Attending to meetings and seminars relating to the activities of LankaSecure system (IT activities, System Administration Activities, computer network and Internet)

12. Monitoring of activities of the outsourced firm for printing and mailing of customers' statements and process their payments.

13. Monitoring of recording of transactions in the LankaSecure and e-trading platform.

1. Daily operations and monitoring of the LankaSecure System.

The business hours of LankaSecure are from 8.00 a.m to 4.30 p.m of each business day. Daily business operations carried out by the CDS Division are as follows.

i. The systems allocated for the CDS are switched on at 6.30 a.m by the Information Technology Department (ITD). The Central Bank Browser Workstation (CBBW) of

the LankaSecure system is used by the CDS division to commence the daily business operations. The time schedule for the daily operations is given in Appendix 1.

ii. Open User log (U – log – LankaSecure system activity monitor) windows of both SSSS and RTGS using SSSS application menu which is available in the allocated computer under "Exceed" icon to view movements in the system.

iii. Read U - logs and check whether the SSSS system software has been re-loaded by the ITD. The message "Start Complete Successfully" should appear in the U logs in order to continue the process.

iv. Ensure that the current price file has been loaded to the relevant UNIX directory (rtgs1:/home/css2casl) by the Domestic Operation Department (DOD).

v. Check whether holiday or participant file has been created by the Payments and Settlements Department (PSD) to LankaSecure static data relevant to holiday and participants. These files are copied into the UNIX directory (using "holiday file upload" or "participant file upload" option through operation of CBBW.

vi. Initiate housekeeping process using menu options available under "Operations" of the CBBW while updating the price file and updating participant/holiday update (using " House keeping" option through operation icon of CBBW)

vii. House keeping process should complete the following activities and each update has to be checked in the U - log of the SSSS.

a. Purging non-essential data
b. Changing business day
c. Changing deferred static data
d. Zeroing the holdings of matured securities
e. Setting the start of day balances

viii. Once the "Housekeeping process is initiated, request PSD to set a new value date to the RTGS system.

ix. After setting the value date, RTGS U-log shows whether following 5 links are up. If any link is down, inform ITD immediately and the process has to be halted until any issues are rectified.

a. RTGS SWIFT LINK- IN (LINS1)
b. RTGS SWIFTLINK – OUT (LOUS1)
c. RTGS SWIFT LINK – ACKNOWLEDGE (LAKS1)
d. RTGS SSSS LINK - IN
e. RTGS SSSS LINK - OUT

x. Load the Price file to update the official buying prices of T-bills and T-bonds for the purpose of granting Intraday Liquidity Facility (ILF) and to conduct open market operations (Auction/Standing facility) (using " Load file of security prices" option through operation of CBBW)

xi. Update the holiday file in LankaSettle business calendar if there are new holidays.

xii. Update the participant file in the LankaSettle, if there are any new participants.

xiii. Initiate start of day activities using menu options available under "Operations" of the CBBW and check whether the process has generated the Intra-day Liquidity Facility (ILF) (using "Run start of day" option through operation of LankaSettle workstation for CSS).

xiv. Open SSSS for business after the successful completion of start of day activities. Check whether three links of the SSSS given below are up after the successful completion of this process.

a. CSS SWIFT INBOUND (LINC1)
b. CSS SWIFT OUTBOUND (LOUC1)
c. CSS SWIFT ACKNOLEDGE (LAKC1)

xv. Initiate at 8.00 a.m, ILF grant to participants who have lodged securities in their ILF accounts.

xvi. Prepare the holdings update files using the facilities available in the CSS interface (AS 400) which has been provided by the ITD. Load the created holding update

files to the primary issuance account (PAP) in the CSS to issue new securities to the market.

xvii. Copy the matched trade feed files created by the PSD relating to repo/reverse repo transactions of open market operations (OMO) to the SSSS. The name of the file with the time to be loaded to the system is notified by the PSD on written document submitted to CDS division (Using " Load file of match trade feed" option through operation icon of CBBW).

xviii. Load matched trade feed files of secondary market customer transactions loaded for settlement using CSS Interface at 9.00 am, 12.00 pm, 2.00 pm, 3.00 pm and 4.00 pm. The participant transactions are automatically settled through the SSSS (using "Load file of match trade feed" option through operation icon of CBBW). (Appendix 2 CDS – 17)

xix. Initiate the reversal of ILF at 4.15 p.m. The reversal of ILF has to be initiated since it is not an automatic process. The command is available under the "Operations" of the CBBW (using "Run final ILF auto reversal" option through operation icon of CBBW).

xx. SSSS is closed for business at 4.30 p.m. Check transactions using transaction enquiries option in CBBW. This ensures that there are no unsettled transactions prior to starting of the LankaSecure shutting down process.

xxi. Initiate process to generate files for maturity payments and coupons /interest which are due on the following working day. Menu options in the CBBW are used for these.

xxii. Shutting down process in the LankaSecure system is activated at 5.00 p.m. through the CBBW.

xxiii. Request from ITD to initiate overnight activities.

2. Issuance of Scripless Government Securities. (Settlement process of Treasury bills and Treasury bonds).

i. The Front Office provides International Securities Identification Number (ISINs) and quantities of new issuances to CDS division. The details of securities to be allocated to primary dealers are getting loaded to the CDS based on primary issuance processing in order to effect issuances of treasury bills and treasury bonds. Create relevant ISINs in the system using the Security Maintaining Facility of the CBBW Using "Add security" option through Securities icon of CBBW).

ii. Load the total amounts to be allocated under different ISINs to the respective securities accounts in CDS using the holding update file available under the CSS interface system. Enter the created holding update file in to the CBBW (using "Load file of holdings update" option through operation icon of CBBW) (Appendix 2 CDS – 18).

iii. On the settlement day, nett payments have to be effected by the primary dealers to the CBSL's RTGS settlement account as informed by the Back Office (BO) of PDD. It is required to verify whether the due payments are made by the primary dealers using the participants' browser workstation. Check nett payment with the net settlement summary prepared by the Back Office (Expected to settle on DVP basis).

iv. Releasing of securities to participants using the CSS Interface and the CBBW are made once the participants have settled their due payments for primary purchases of Government Securities. The due payments should be settled before 2.00 pm on the particular settlement date. Release the securities allocated to primary dealers following options using the CSS interface. (Expected to settle on DVP basis). Due quantities of securities should be debited from CBSL PAP in the CDS account and credited to Own accounts of particular participants (Appendix 2 CDS – 19).

v. Release the securities purchased as private placements, using the CSS interface after verifying whether due payments are made by the respective participants (expected to settle on DVP basis) (Appendix 2 CDS – 20).

vi. Generate the two reports (Primary issues 1 and Primary issues 2) using Access tool (today database). Verify the accuracy of settlement with using the reports (Appendix 2 CDS – 11 & 12). .

3. Payment of maturity proceeds and interest/coupons to the investors in government securities.

i. Payments due to investors are calculated during the process of LankaSecure on the previous business day. This process creates "interest_file.ext", "redemption_file.ext" or both. (using "Run coupon & maturity" option through operation icon of CBBW.

ii. Transfer the payments file generated by the SSSS to RTGS before 8.00 a.m. on the following business day. This file transfer has to be done by using UNIX commands. (cp (file name) /lcssdata/lcssl/BATF)

iii. After the payment file is transferred, inform the PSD name/s and the due date of the payment in writing in order to load payment file to RTGS before 8.00 a.m (Appendix 2 CDS – 13).

iv. Verify whether each payment file has been loaded by the PSD.

v. Transfer the payment file generated by the SSSS to Back Office before 9.00 a.m. on the due date to prepare funds transfer document to DOD (Appendix 2 CDS – 5).

4. Generating statements confirming trades and balances to investors in Government Securities.

Three types of statements to investors are generated.

i. Transaction Summary Statement
ii. Payment Statement
iii. Holdings Statement

Statement printing and dispatching process has been outsourced. Data should be submitted to the outsourced party on first week of the following month (within first 2 working days).

Statements are dispatched to investors as follows. Use the data stored in CDS to prepare the investor data to be sent to the outsourced firm.

Statements are dispatched to investors as follows.

i Transaction summary statement in the first week of following month indicating all transactions carried out during the previous month (Appendix 2 CDS – 14).

ii The statement of payments on the first week of the following month for payments made during the previous month. This could either be maturity or interest payments (Appendix 2 CDS – 15).

iii The statement of holding statement is issued by-annually in the first week of July and January. This gives details of the total portfolios of investors. If beneficial owner code of an investor is same for investments with all participants, this statement provides details of all investments under different participants of such investors (Appendix 2 CDS – 16).

5. Feeding secondary market transactions to LankaSecure.

i. Feeding of open market operation auction and standing facility transactions to LankaSecure

This activity covers settlement of repo/reverse repo sales/purchases transactions of participants with the Central Bank. The matched trade feed (MTF) files created by the PSD is loaded to the CBBW at specific times as shown in the schedule attached (Appendix 1).

ii. Feeding of customer transactions

This involves settlement of repo/reverse repo sales/purchases transactions of customers with the participants of face value not exceeding the value specified by the Central Bank.

6. **Maintenance of the LankaSecureNet, the web based account verification facility for investors in government securities.**

i. Collect investor requests (Corporate or Individual) for new User IDs through the particular participants with the valid authorizations (Appendix 2 CDS – 22 & CDS – 23).

ii. Verify investor accounts details and signatures of participants against CDS data and authorised signatories.

iii. Send the respective User ID and passwords to the particular investors by post or email to the address given in the duly signed user ID request application

iv. Attend to investors inquiries on the LankaSecureNet facility.

7. **Taking daily backups at end of each business day and dowbloading for billing and generation of reports.**

i Generating reports and downloading data are done through the Microsoft Access Tool and the queries developed to filter data. For this activity both menu options of "Import Movements" and "Import Income Earned" should be activated.

ii After downloading of data is completed, compact the MS Access database and back up essential data to the CDS server using the programme available in the desktop. Transfer the downloaded data to the ITD before 5.00 p.m. on each business day and receive confirmation from ITD through an e-mail.

iii Generate reports relating to government securities transactions upon request made by management and other internal and external divisions and departments (Appendix 2 CDS – 3, CDS – 06, CDS – 7 & CDS - 9).

8. **Attending to enquiries / queries of participants and investors.**

Investor inquiries on their investments and participant's inquiries on technical matters are handled through telephone and/or email (Account balances are not disclosed over the telephone and through email).

9. Attending to activities relating to Business Continuity Plan (BCP).

i. Attend as a member of the working committee exercise for contingency plan meetings.

ii. Preparing and updating the BCP document with details relevant to PDD and LankaSecure.

iii. Participate to the semi annual BCP drill conducted by the PSD.

10. Updating and maintaining foreign transactions data base and preparation of reports.

i. Collect foreign deals confirmations from the participants through the email on transactions done in US Dollar terms (Appendix 2 CDS – 21).

ii. Input relevant data to MS Excel Worksheet formats.

iii. Prepare foreign holding reports and submit to top management by 10.00 a.m on each business day (Appendix 2 CDS – 1, CDS – 2, CDS – 4, CDS – 8 & CDS - 10).

11. Attending to meetings and seminars relating to the activities of LankaSettle and LankaSecure.

i. Attend to technical or system related sessions conducted by the ITD.

ii. Attend to LankaSettle/ LankaSecure group meetings conducted by the ITD/PSD.

iii. Report to LankaSecure vendor of any issues on business and technical operations of the system through ITD.

iv. Issue change request to LankaSecure vendor through ITD for new business requirements.

12. Monitoring of activities of the outsourced firm for printing and mailing of customers statements and process their payments.

Prepare transaction data and send to outsourced firm to print investors' statement. Verify whether the customers' statement have been dispatched to respective investors by the outsourced firm. Make the due payments to outsourced firm.

13. Monitoring of recording of transactions in the LankaSecure and e-trading platform.

Supply data to the Supervision Division of PDD for monitoring secondary market transactions in government securities and customer holdings in order to ensure that all security transactions among PDs and between their respective customers are settled through LankaSecure and recorded in the CDS.

Supervision Division

The Primary Dealers (PDs) are dedicated intermediaries appointed by the Monetary Board of CBSL to deal in Government securities.

The supervision of PDs is carried out by the Supervision Division of the PDD to ensure sound and safe PD network which infuses greater competition, liquidity and depth in to the government securities market and thereby reduce the borrowing cost of the government and guarantees customer protection by safeguarding their investments. PDs are expected to support the primary issuances of government securities (G-sec) through underwriting/bidding commitments, success ratios, (future) and improve secondary market trading system, which would contribute to price discovery, enhance liquidity, turnover and encourage holding of G-Sec amongst a wider investor base, which will eventually contribute in achieving the government objective of low cost borrowings at a prudent level of risk. Supervision also ensures the safety of investment in Government Securities.

The supervision of PDs is based on a risk-focussed approach, which evaluates whether the PDs have sufficient capability in terms of assets, liabilities and portfolio for managing the risks associated with the business they engage. Supervision of PDs is mainly carried out in terms of the Local Treasury Bill Ordinance, Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance, Regulations issued by the Minister of Finance and Directions issued by the Superintendent of PDD (SPD).

Main Functions of the Division are to carry out;

1. Off-site surveillance
2. On-site examination
3. Spot examination
4. Policy Formulation
5. Other activities.

1. Off-Site Surveillance

Off-site surveillance is an ongoing monitoring mechanism of the financial soundness and operational performance of individual PDs based on a number of periodic returns submitted to the PDD. It serves as an early warning system of potential adverse developments of individual PDs as well as the PD industry as a whole that needs prompt corrective action. A database is

maintained on financial status of PDs and information on primary and secondary market transactions. A computer based reporting system (FInNet) has been implemented to collect information on financial status of PDs and secondary market transactions. Following are the functions carried out under off-site surveillance.

i. Collection of Primary Market Information
ii. Collection of Secondary Market Information
iii. Collection and Analysis of Financial Statements
iv. Monitoring the recording of transactions in the Central Depository System and e-trading platform
v. Preparation of analytical and management Reports

i. Collection of Primary Market Information:

An application using MS Excel has been developed to compile data received by Front Office (Appendix FO 11A and 11B) on participation of PDs in primary market auctions. The following data bases are updated to generate relevant reports (Appendix 1 SU 7 (g) and SU 7 (h)) on monthly and annual basis.

a. Dealer-wise information on T-bill auction participation.
b. Dealer-wise information on T-bond auction participation.

ii. Collection and analysis of Secondary Market Information:

FInNet system is used to collect weekly information of secondary market transactions from PDs. Templates for weekly reporting are given in Appendix 1 SU 1 (a) to (d). The following are the reports generated. (Frequency, reporting mode and the description of the reports are given in the Appendix 2)

Report No.	Name of the Report
5. PDD-WF-06-TBL	Outright Transactions of Treasury Bills
6. PDD-WF-07-TBD	Outright Transactions of Treasury Bonds
7. PDD-WF-08-RRP	Summary of Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions
8. PDD-WF-05-MP	Asset and Liability – Maturity Profile

iii. Collection and Analysis of Financial Statements:

Under off-site surveillance financial statements are collected through FInNet (Appendix 1 SU 2,3 and 4) on monthly, quarterly and annual basis and they are analysed in order to detect potential issues of individual PDs and identify risks emerging from such issues. Under this system the following reports are generated by PDD, based on the data reported by PDs. (Frequency, reporting mode and the description of the reports are given in the Appendix 2)

Report No.	Name of Report
i. PDD-MF-01-BS	Balance Sheet
ii. PDD-MF-03-CE	Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves
iii. PDD-MF-02-PL	Profit and Loss Account
iv. PDD-MF-04-CF	Cash Flow Statement
v. PDD-MF-05-TL/06-SL	Mark to market report
vi. PDD 13	Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Return
vii. PDD-QF-01-BS	Balance Sheet
viii. PDD-QF-03-CE	Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves
ix. PDD-QF-02-PL	Profit and Loss Account
x. PDD-QF-04-CF	Cash Flow Statement
xi. PDD 11	Code of Conduct
xii. PDD-YF-01-BS	Balance Sheet
xiii. PDD-YF-03-CE	Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves
xiv. PDD-YF-02-PL	Profit and Loss Account
xv. PDD-YF-04-CF	Cash Flow Statement

The accuracy, integrity and comprehensiveness of the data provided by the PDs are analysed under off-Site surveillance compliance reporting system by comparing data with previous reports/data provided by PDs. (Any revisions (as required) made to the templates are informed to all PDs.)

iv. Monitoring the recording of government securities transactions in the Scripless Securities Settlement System (SSSS), Central Depository System (CDS) and the e-trading platform.

Information and data on G-Sec trading received from e-trading platform, FInNet and CDS are used for verification of PD trading activities, ensure customer protection and other monitoring purposes.

As per Circular No. SSSS/04/2007 issued on 28th September 2007 and the SSSS rules effective form 1st September 2009, PDs must record all transactions in the CDS. Regulatory reports generated from e-trading system are monitored on regular basis and compared with CDS and SSSS records to ensure all trades performed on e-trading platform are settled in SSSS and accurately and completely recorded in CDS.

Firm quotes posted by PDs in the e-trading platform are closely monitored. Daily reports received from the Middle Office are verified with the report generated through the e-trading system, by the supervision staff to identify any outliers in information provision and abnormal trading practices. In addition, accounts of PDs on daily trades executed are checked against the Daily reports and e-trading reports, at on-site examination, and on need basis.

The trade information reported through the e-trading platform are compiled and published in the CBSL website on real-time basis to ensure transparency and to remove information asymmetry of market information related to Government Securities.

v. Preparation of reports

On receipt of information / data as detailed under (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the following reports on financial position and performance of PDs are prepared by the Division for internal use, within a week of receiving such information from PDs. Data collection format prepared are given in Appendix SU 7 (a) to (h). (Frequency, and the description of the reports are given in the Appendix 2)

Report No.	Name of Report
PDD 14	Evaluation of financial performance of PDs
PDD 15	Gap Analysis (Portfolio)
PDD 16	Stress Testing (Changes in interest rates)

PDD 17	Secondary Market Transaction Summary
PDD 18	Secondary Market Yield Curve and Table
PDD 19	Auction Summary
PDD 20	Industry Financial Performance Analysis
PDD 21	Off Site Surveillance Report

A Board Paper on performance of PD industry is prepared quarterly and submitted to the Monetary Board for information within a month from the end of the quarter (Report No. PDD 14 -19 are used to provide information for the PDD 20 report and PDD 20 provides the information for the Board Paper) , Any special concerns on the PD industry or individual PDs are informed to the Monetary Board for information approval of remedial action proposed by the Supervision Division of PDD. Off Site Surveillance Report (PDD 21) summaries the performance of the individual PDs and the PD industry for the month.

2. On-site Examination

During on-site examinations PDD focuses on risk assessment of individual PDs, adequacy of capital, liquidity, asset quality, profitability etc. and the adherence to prudential directions, guidelines and good governance procedures.

Phase 1

Phase 1 is the preparation stage for the on-site examination. The Supervision Unit [4]establishes its objectives, defines a preliminary risk profile of the PD, and determines the scope of the examination and set areas to be focused based on analytical data gathered during off site surveillance.

Phase 1 of the on-site examination process should be carried out with on-site and off-Site Supervisors by the Examiner In Charge under the direct supervision of the Deputy Superintendent, as Phase 1 preparation is a major component of the overall supervisory action and it may require two to three weeks to complete.

Pre-Examination preparatory actions

i. Define the examination objectives

ii. Review existing PDD documentation

[4] Team appointed to conduct the On site examination and the Head of Supervision Division

iii. Advise the PD of the proposed examination
iv. Request/review PD baseline documentation
v. Conduct initial risk assessment
vi. Draw up preliminary risk profile
vii. Determine examination scope
viii. Prepare examination work - plan
ix. Assign specific tasks to examination team

Procedure to be followed under each action is as follows:

i. Define examination objectives

a. If the proposed examination is the first to be conducted for the specific PD, the objective will be to evaluate the PD's ability to properly identify, manage and control risks in an effective, efficient and timely manner.

b. It must include an evaluation of PD's compliance with the regulatory framework and PDD Directives governing its operations.

c. The Deputy Superintendent, and the Supervisors for on-site examination and off-site surveillance, should be responsible for the initial definition of examination objectives.

ii. Review existing PDD documentation

a. All documentation – surveillance reports, financial statements, prior examination reports, correspondence, should be reviewed by the examination team and the supervisor responsible for on-site examination.

b. Discussions should be held with the offsite surveillance supervisor to obtain his/her comments and concerns about the PD. Opinions with respect to the timeliness, integrity and accuracy of the PD's compliance reporting should be noted for follow-up by the examination officers.

iii. Advise the PD of the proposed examination

a. The SPD should advise the CEO of the respective PD in writing, about the upcoming examination along with request for certain information as described in iv (a) below.

b. It is extremely important to emphasize that the supervisory team of PDD will require access to all relevant information. At the same time, it is critical to emphasize that all information obtained at any time, before, during and after the examination process will be kept as strictly confidential, and that the evaluation report along with any recommendations for corrective action, will only be shared with the CEO and the Board of the respective PD.

iv. Request/review PD baseline documentation

a. The Supervisor, on-site examination, should draw up a list of baseline documentation Appendix 1 SU 8 and request the PD to supply the Supervision Division with the same for review and analysis prior to the onsite examination.

b. The relevant information at this point would include the latest available statements of policies and procedures, organisation chart, copy of the Annual Report, external and internal audit reports, names of key management officers, and strategic business plans. Some of the documents in the list may be available only at the On-site examination.

c. The purpose of 'iv' is for the on-site examination team to familiarise themselves as much as possible prior to the start of the examination in order to save time for both PD personnel and PDD staff who participate in the examination.

v. Conduct initial risk assessment

a. Based upon 'i' and 'iv' above and to the extent possible, the examination team should identify possible areas of weaknesses and deficiencies prior to commence the examination of the PD. The failure to develop policies and/or weaknesses in the contents of policies, procedures and guidelines might be identified in advance, which would be indicative of certain types of operational risks. Note that in many regards, this step is only preliminary and may not prove to be the case once the examination is underway.

b. Further, the examination officers should review the statutory requirements and Directives governing PD appointment and operations and also refer to the best practices set forth in the Operational Manual (OM) of the respective PD as well.

vi. Draw up preliminary risk profile

a. The purpose of formulating a preliminary risk profile is to compile the analyses performed to date and bring the results of action 'ii'-'v' into meaningful focus.

b. In cases wherein the on-site examination is being conducted for the first time, it should be recognised that the preliminary risk profile is just that, preliminary. It might have been drawn up on the basis of limited information as well as objective and subjective analyses. The most of analytical work will have to be substantiated during the on-site examination process itself.

vii. Determine Examination scope

a. Based upon 'vi' above, the Deputy Superintendent and the Supervisor, on-site examination should determine the examination scope. In addition, any concerns of the Bank Supervision Department with respect to bank PD units, should also be taken into consideration.

b. It is advisable for the Supervisor, off-site surveillance to participate in this process as well, given that there may be a need for assistance during the conduct of the examination.

c. The scope of on-site examinations varies. A full-scope examination will cover all areas of operations which are of interest to the PDD. A limited-scope examination may cover the same areas but in less intensity. A targeted examination (spot examination) may focus on only a few specific areas or functions but examine them in a very intensive manner.

d. On-site examinations, conducted in full-or limited-scope, should be conducted at least annually, dependent upon the overall performance of the PD as suggested by the contents and timeliness of its compliance reporting. A targeted examination (spot examination) may be conducted on a need basis, in response to a suspected adverse situation or crisis.

e. The PD is a Non-Bank Financial Institution, and one dealing with a very limited range of marketable securities. As such, areas and functions that normally would be the subject of an on-site examination of a commercial bank, will not be evaluated in depth, if at all, during the PDD on-site examination exercise. These areas – i.e. human resource management, personnel compensation, benefits policies, accounting methodology relating to fixed assets, depreciation, non-trading assets and liabilities, etc. – are properly the subject matter of the external and internal auditors. The PDD examination would only touch upon these areas with respect to their impact on the overall results of the PD's core business.

viii. Prepare examination work - plan

a. The Deputy Superintendent and Supervisor, on-site Examinations, should prepare a detailed work - plan considering the available staff resources. This should be reviewed and approved by the Additional Superintendent/ Superintendent.

b. The work - plan should be organised in consistent with the structure outlined in the PDD - Primary Dealer Operational Manual. In this manner the on-site examination will adhere to the risk-based approach that forms the basis of overall PD supervision.

c. The PD should be given at least two weeks' notice of the commencement of an on-site examination. Exceptions are made for situations where the PD is in crisis or conditions are known to be deteriorating rapidly.

ix. Assign specific tasks to examination team

a. Based upon 'viii' above, the SPD, should assign personnel for the examination and identify the Examiner-in-Charge.

b. The Supervisor on-site examination and the Examiner-in-Charge should carefully review the work - plan and propose a time schedule.

c. The Examiner-in-Charge must decide upon the type of sampling that will be carried out, if necessary and ensure that the Examination Officers are familiar with the sampling techniques.

d. The Examiner-in-Charge should carefully review the on-site Questionnaires with the team of examination, so that each officer fully understand the type of information being sought, the work papers to be developed, and manner in which some questionnaires are linked together.

x. Conduct initial pre-examination meeting with CEO

a. An initial interview should be conducted with the PD CEO just prior to the commencement of the examination for the purpose of reviewing the work program, the proposed schedule of the examination, selecting a start date and agreeing upon the key PD personnel to be made available to work with the examination team.

b. In addition, the PD CEO should be given the opportunity to schedule a first day meeting with the Board in order to address any concerns it may have.

Phase 2

+Phase 2 refers to the actual period during which the on-site examination is carried out. During Phase 2, every effort should be made to minimise disruption to the normal business operations of the PD. Working hours of the examination team may not always coincide with those maintained with the CBSL. The examination team must be prepared to adapt its schedule accordingly. Further, the examination team must get adjusted to the work space and facilities make available by the PD.

Procedures and guidance to be followed under Phase 2 are as follows;

i. On-site Questionnaires

a. The on-site examination is based upon the on-site Questionnaires contained in the PDD operational manual (Appendix 1 SU 9). It should be noted that these questionnaires contain the basic questions to be addressed in each functional or topical area and are intended only to guide the examination team. The questionnaires can be expanded and modified as appropriate, with the agreement of the Supervisor, on-site examinations.

b. The purpose of the questionnaires is to ensure that the examination officer carries out his/her tasks in a systematic, efficient manner and one that is standardised across all on-site examinations.

c. In most cases a Yes/No answer to the questions will not be sufficient, and additional comments should be noted, either on the questionnaire form itself or as attachments to the form.

ii. Work-paper

a. Each questionnaire, along with its attachments, forms a set of work -papers. These papers are intended to document the procedures followed, the information obtained, the results of the sampling and the initial conclusions reached. They become part of the permanent file of the examination and will be used for future reference. As such the material contained in each set of work-papers must be well organised, indexed, legible and understandable to other members of the Supervision Division and PDD.

b. Primary importance of work-papers is the preparation of the examination report (refer to Subsection : on-site examination - Phase 3.) In addition, work - papers may be necessary to justify and support PDD recommendations resulting from the examination.

c. Work-papers should be prepared on a daily basis, on site, during the examination process. Thus, certain parts may be expanded and/or modified at the end of the day, but the initial findings should be captured as the tasks are completed. Each page of the set of work - papers should be dated and signed by the examination Officer (s) responsible for their preparation.

d. It is extremely important for the Examiner-in-Charge to review the work-papers as soon as they are completed in order to identify areas requiring additional investigation before the completion of Phase 2 of the on-site examination.

e. At the end of Phase 4 of every on-site examination, the Supervisor, on-site examinations, should review and sign off on each set of work-papers. They should then be grouped together and placed in a permanent file. As part of this process, a cover sheet should be prepared and attached to every set of work-papers completed during the examination. This sheet should state the subject area covered by the work - papers, the dates they were prepared and completed, along with any cross-references to other set of work-papers.

f. Work-papers are not to be shared with staff and management of the PD although discussion on the content may take place if appropriate.

g. In addition to the above, work-papers are useful to the Deputy Superintendent, to evaluate the performance of individual staff, to identify areas requiring additional training, to determine the reasonableness of the examination schedule, and estimate resource requirements for future examinations.

iii. Meetings with PD Management

It is customary to meet with the CEO and/or executive management team during the on-site examination to advise on the status of the work, request assistance if necessary, arrange for specific meetings within or outside the PD, as appropriate, and/or advise on problems in securing the co-operation of PD personnel. Such meetings should be brief and highly focused.

The Examiner-in-Charge should also be prepared to meet senior management and/or the Board on request of the CEO and/or executive management team to discuss any issues which are important for them. At the close of the on-site examination exercise, it is customary for the Examiner-in-Charge, accompanied by the Supervisor, on-site examination and, if appropriate, the Deputy Superintendent, to conduct an "exit interview" with the CEO and any staff of his choice. At this meeting the Examiner-in-Charge should give a brief overview of the work accomplished and comment briefly on initial findings of the examination team, in very general terms. The Examiner-in-Charge should also advise the PD of the schedule of completing and presentation of the Examination Report.

Phase 3

Phase 3 is dedicated to the preparation and completion of the Letter of Findings (LOF) and the Examination Report (Report).

Preparation and completion of the LOF and the Report is the responsibility of the Examiner-in-charge, working under the guidance of the Supervisor, on-site examinations.

The draft LOF is sent to the CEO of the PD and agreement is reached on follow-up actions. The PD is allowed to agree/ disagree on supervisory concerns raised by the supervision team. The LOF is a highly confidential document. Although it should be presented to the PD, it remains the property of the PDD. The contents of the LOF should not be disclosed to any party outside of the PD without the authorisation of the Superintendent of Public Debt.

A draft final version of the LOF should be submitted to the Superintendent of Public Debt through Additional Superintendent for review and to comment before it is finalized and sent to the CEO and Board of the PD.

The Examination Report must be prepared in the format presented below based on the supervisory findings in Phase 1 and Phase 2. Report should be precise, and the opinions expressed should be capable of substantiation. The text should also be concise and not be creating any confusion or causing misinterpretation in the minds of the readers.

Table: Examination Report Format and Contents

Section	Title	Description
i	Introduction	The legal provisions under which the examination was conducted.
ii	Scope of the Examination	The areas covered and the methodology used in the on-site examination.
iii	Market Risk Management	Analysis of strengths and supervisory concerns of the risk of loss from adverse movement in the level or volatility of the market prices and positions that can be taken for government securities.
iv	Liquidity Risk Management	Analysis of strengths and supervisory concerns of the PD's ability to meet investment and funding requirements arising from its obligations.
v	Operational Risk Management	Analysis of strengths and supervisory concerns of the PD's systems and controls.
vi	Legal and Reputational Risk Management	Analysis of strengths and supervisory concerns of the PD's exposure to legal risk and risk of losing good reputation.
vii	Strategic Risk Management/ Business strategy	Analysis of strengths and supervisory concerns of the PD's policies, procedures and organizational arrangements that permit the company to minimize risk.
viii	Review of Regulatory Compliances	Listing of areas of PD non-compliances or unsatisfactory performances with regard to the regulatory framework and/ or the submission of compliance reports.
ix	Assessment of Resources	Sufficiency of Financial and Human resources.
x	Corporate Governance	Conducting of Board Meetings and Supervisory concerns relate to good governance.
xi	Other Considerations	Areas of potential weaknesses which if left unattended, may undermine the future performance of the PD.
xii	Conclusion and Recommendation	Comments on PDs performance in relation to above areas and recommended action.

With respect to the Report outline, followings should be taken into consideration:

(i) The Report should include a cover memo, addressed to the CEO of the PD with a request to submit the report to the Board of the PD. The confidentiality of the information contain on the report should be noted.

(ii) Annexures should include, a table giving financial data including performance ratios for the current year and preceding four years and a Time Bound Action Plan for the PD to rectify supervisory concerns.

Phase 4

In Phase 4, the Report is sent to the Board of the PD with a time bound action plan, after submitting to the Monetary Board for approval. The Report is a highly confidential document. Although it should be presented to the PD, it remains the property of the PDD.

i. A signature page should be included in the Report and each Director of the Board should sign off on the final document.

ii. A final meeting should be held by the Superintendent, Additional Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent, Supervisors and Examiner-in-Charge (if other than the Supervisor, on-site examinations), with the CEO and the Board, prior to the submission of the Examination Report to the Monetary Board.

iii. Given the importance of the final meeting, it should be conducted in an orderly manner. An agenda and outline of the issues to be discussed, should be prepared and distributed prior to the meeting. The PD should be given an opportunity to submit a list of items they wished to have in the agenda. The outline for the meeting might be as follows:
   a. The purpose for the meeting.
   b. A brief presentation of the Report findings.

iv. The Report is submitted to the Monetary Board with a Time Bound Action Plan to rectify supervisory concerns and the Monetary Board approval is sought to inform the Board of Directors and senior management of PD to take immediate action to rectify supervisory concerns within time targets recommended in the Time Bound Action Plan given and submit quarterly reports on the progress of rectification of remaining supervisory concerns.

3. Spot Examinations

Spot examinations are conducted to examine specific aspects on PD operations and such requirements may arise due to certain concerns raised in the on-going process of off-site surveillance, customer complaints or complaints from the PD industry. Therefore, the scope of a spot examination is limited and will primarily be based on the specific concern under observation.

4. Policy Formulation

Based on the developments in the market conditions, available policies need to be amended or new policies should be formulated. This warrants PDD staff to engage in search of latest market developments, especially with reference to the regulatory and institutional framework. Constant updates on developments in the international markets also are required and therefore visits to WEB sites such as Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Federal Reserve System (FED), Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Bank of England (BOE) are needed. In order to promote an efficient and sound PD system and to have a smooth functioning of the system, it is required to resolve various policy issues too. Also it is important to review areas such as broadening business lines for PD activities, present tax structure and its applicability and, the prevailing reporting formats submitted by PDs etc to cope with the secondary market developments. For these activities, considerable in depth knowledge is required. It is a task of the supervision staff to suggest appropriate policies in order to make available an efficient government securities market with a stable institutional framework.

5. Other Activities

In addition to the above core activities, Supervision Division also engages in following allied functions.

i. Appointment of new PDs subsequent to a detailed evaluation process. (The application and the documents are studied and evaluated with the relevant Acts, Regulations and Directions. If further information and clarifications are requisite, those need to be communicated and obtained from the applicant. Full information being acquired, prepare the Board paper with the detailed analysis in an annexure, and tender the paper for the Monetary Board approval and upon receiving the approval the license is granted).

ii. Investigation on complains regard to PDs from public.

iii. Evaluation of special requests from PDs (eg: dividend declaration, alterations to share capital, product diversification, new branch opening etc...)

iv. Conducting monthly Primary Dealer Chief Executive Officer's meeting.

v. Public awareness activities through press releases. (eg: information on registered PDs, appointment of new PDs etc...)

vi. Providing ad-hoc information where necessary on auction participation, secondary market trading, e-trading practices, PD industry performance evaluation indicators etc.

Support Services Division

Support Services Division provides assistance to carry out functions of other Divisions of the Department and handles the activities that are generally falling within the definition of conventional Administrative Divisions.

Support Services Division carries out the following activities.

1. Maintaining a database on staff profile.
2. Maintenance of leave and attendance records including overtime.
3. Preparation, maintenance and monitoring of the departmental annual budget.
4. Preparation of Activity Wise Time Recording monthly summary sheets.
5. Maintenance of office equipment including computers and peripherals.
6. Supplies of stationary, office equipment and furniture.
7. Maintenance of petty cash.
8. Maintenance of Asset Register (for furniture, office equipment, computers and record room items).
9. Providing cab service facility to the staff and maintaining relevant records.
10. Maintenance of the floor including floor-duty.
11. Co-ordination with other departments in the CBSL.
12. Miscellaneous work.

The procedures relating to above activities are described below.

1. Maintaining a database on staff profile

The database includes name, address, contact number/s, NIC number, vehicle number, staff training received and the nearest police station of each officer.

a) Update the database based on the addition of new staff and transfers of the staff.

b) Remove the details of out-going staff from the database and maintain them separately for future reference.

c) Provide required information on the staff to other Departments.

d) Maintain a file on allocation of duties for the staff.

e) Coordinate performance evaluation and maintain performance evaluation records.

f) Prepare memos to H R Department on promotions, extension of service and granting annual increments of the staff.

2. Maintenance of leave and attendance and overtime records

This function is carried out according to the directions given under Leave Rules of the CBSL Manual as described below.

a) Obtain daily staff attendance statement from the staff attendance system of the Bank at 10.00 a.m.

b) Check computer printout of staff attendance.

c) Feed leave information of the staff to the Electronic Leave and Time Recording System (ELTRS).

d) Balance the leave records of the staff, generating the year-end report through the ELTRS, prepare schedules for encashment of vacation leave and medical leave.

e) post leave applications, leave notes and medical certificates in the individual leave registers and files and obtain sanction from relevant superior officer.

f) Maintain Short Leave and Late Attendance Registers.

g) Check O/T and Out of Pocket applications monthly, Obtain approval from SPD within the 20 hours limit and obtain approval from AG for any hours exceeding 20 hours limit and submit them to the Finance Department for payment.

h) Prepare the Departmental Compulsory Vacation Leave (CVL) roster, submit to the Secretariat Department and make sure that staff obtains C V L according to the roster.

3. Preparation, maintenance and monitoring of departmental annual budget

The annual budget is prepared according to the directions issued by the Chief Accountant of the CBSL from time to time. The following are the activities relating to this function.

a) Collect data from each division of the department for the annual budgetary requirements under the subheadings of Capital Expenditure, Administrative Expenditure etc.

b) Prepare of estimates for annual budget giving the breakdown of each subject as per Finance Department Circulars.

c) Finalise and obtain approval from the relevant AGs.

d) Maintain records such as stationery, sundries and overtime to monitor expenses within the budgetary limits.

e) Request the budget items from Secretariat Dept and obtaining them to PDD.

f) Monitor the targets of the budget comparing actual numbers.

g) Attend the budget review meetings and make necessary adjustments to the budget.

4. **Preparation of Monthly Activity Wise Time Recording sheets**

a) Send by email, monthly Activity Base Time recording formats to the all officers of the department for filling.

b) Get the filled records from the staff.

c) Prepare the monthly summary sheet by using the received individual records.

d) Send the Department Summary sheet to the Finance Department on or before 15th of the next month.

5. **Maintenance of office equipment including computers and peripherals**

These activities to be carried out based on the circulars issued by the Information Technology Department, Secretariat Department and Premises Department.

a) Update and maintain an inventory for computers and peripherals.

b) Co-ordinate work connected with breakdowns, repairs and maintenance.

c) Replace cartridges, ribbons and various parts of computers, printers, typewriters, fax machines, photo- copy machines and other equipment.

d) Issue gate passes for items that are taken out of the department.

e) Send a list of equipment which required service agreements to the Secretariat Department annually.

6. **Supplying of stationery and printed documents etc.**

a) Ascertain monthly requirements of stationary, order and make arrangements for supplying them to the department.

b) Order, replace and purchase items with petty cash or from the Supplies Division (Secretariat Department), if the cost of the item exceeds the petty cash limit of Rs.2000/=.

c) Make arrangements with the Communication Department for printing various applications, documents, forms and vouchers used by the Department for day to day activities in issuing government debt securities.

d) Make arrangements to print Debt Management Publication of the PDD annually, distribution of the copies among the relevant officers and send the balance copies to the Communication Department for sale.

e) Place orders with companies for procurement of security papers for printing of Rupee Loans, Housing Bonds and Sri Lanka Development Bonds and make arrangements for the printing of these certificates by the Government Printer.

7. **Maintenance of petty cash**

Maintenance of petty cash is done according to the Standing Orders of the CBSL Manual and circulars issued by the Finance Department.

a) Obtain petty cash from the Finance Department at the beginning of each year and maintain a petty cash register.
b) Purchase low cost items using petty cash, if they are not available at the Stores.
c) File receipts after obtaining approval from the Superintendent of Public Debt for the items purchased for audit purposes.
d) Replenish petty cash as and when required.
e) Credit the petty cash balance in hand at the end of the year to the Advance Account.

8. **Maintenance of inventories (such as furniture, stationery, computers and record room items)**

a) Post the capital items to the Inventory Register after assigning numbers for each item obtained from Secretariat Department as well as purchased using Petty Cash.
b) Return damaged and unusable items to the Secretariat Department and delet them from the Inventory Register.
c) Issue gate passes for the items to be removed from the PDD and CBSL premises for repairs etc.

9. **Providing cab service facility to the staff and maintaining relevant documents**

a) Obtain cab vouchers from the Facilities Management Department (FMD).
b) Accept authorised vehicle requests from officers.
c) Checking with FMD whether a Bank vehicle is available for the request.
d) Issue cab vouchers if Bank vehicles are not available.
e) Collect used cab vouchers.
f) Feed data relating to used cab vouchers to the system and send slips to the FMD.
g) Generate monthly statements.

10. **Maintenance of the floor including floor duty**

a) Send the list of Floor Officers of the Department to the Security Services Department.
b) Prepare the floor duty roster.
c) Receive the Department keys in the morning by a floor officer from the Security Services Department and open the floor daily.

d) Supervise and report to the relevant authorities of any damage or irregularity in the department premises.

e) Remove plugs and switch off lights every day before closing the floor.

f) Supervise window cleaning and floor washing on week-ends/weekdays.

11. Co-ordination with other departments in the CBSL

Correspondence with other departments to obtain their assistance and services.

12. Miscellaneous work

a) Accept letters received to the Department, enter them in the register and submit to SPD/distribute among relevant officer.

b) Reply to the various inquiries from the general public and institutions.

c) Arrange meetings (DDMC, Primary Dealers Meetings etc.) , by informing the Protocol division to reserve the conference room, making arrangements to supply refreshment from Staff Services Management department and arranging security clearance.

d) Record keeping of old documents (T-Bill and T-Bond Certificates, RSs vouchers etc.), by arranging documents in order, making arrangements for binding documents and sending old documents for safe keeping to Lanka Archives Management Ltd.

e) Maintain the Record Room and make arrangements to destruct of obsolete documents.

f) Send important documents to Lanka Archives Management Ltd.

g) Receive required documents from Lanka Archives Management Ltd.

h) Disseminate of official information to the staff.

i) Prepare the training plan for the departmental staff and nominate the officers for training programmes (Nominations are done by the Departmental Training Committee headed by ASPD and all Deputies and Division heads of the department).

j) Nominate the fire wardens of the Department, send the list to the Security Services Department and release the officers for fire fighting training programmes when required.

k) Send the authorised signatures list of the officers of the PDD to the Finance Dept and DOD.

l). Send to FMD the details of the officers who require vehicle parking facility.

m) Provide the secretarial services for the department timely and accurately.

n) Maintain the departmental library for the use of officers of the PDD by collecting CBSL Annual Reports, Monthly Bulletin, Statistical Data, Survey reports, Training reports, Satahana Magazines, Gazettes and special publications relevant to public debt management.

Appendix
Front Office

Appendix

FO 01 - TOR-Mandate and Objectives of Domestic Debt Management Committee
FO 02 - Gazette Notifications of Rupee Loans(In 3 languages)
FO 03 - Gazette Notifications of T-bonds(In 3 languages)
FO 04 - T-bill Advertisements (In 3 languages)
FO 05 - T-bond advertisements (In 3 languages)
FO 06 A - Tender Information of T-bill Auction (all Maturities)
FO 06 B - Tender Information of T-bill - Dealerwise Bidcount
FO 07 A - Ranked Received Tender Information on T-bills (without names)
FO 07 B - Ranked Received Tender Information on T-bills (with names)
FO 07 C - Ranked Received Tender Information on T-bills (Compound yeald rates)
FO 08 - Ownership Classification of T-bill Tenders Received From PDs
FO 09 A - Received Tender Information of T-bond Auction
FO 09 B - Received Tender Information of T-bond - Dealerwise Bidcount
FO 10 A - Ranked Received Tender Information on T-bond (without names)
FO 10 B - Ranked Received Tender Information on T-bond (with names)
FO 11 - Ownership Classification of T-bond Tenders Received From PDs
FO 12 - TOR-Mandate and Objectives of T-Bill/T-Bond Tender Board
FO 13 - T-bill Auction Summary
FO 14 - T-bond Auction Summary
FO 15 A - Yield Rates of T-Bills at Primary Auctions
FO 15 B - Primary & Secondary Market Yield Curve
FO 16 A - Yield Rates of T-Bonds at Primary Auctions
FO 16 B - Primary & Secondary Market Yield Curve
FO 17 - T-bill Auction - Note to the Govenor
FO 18 - T-bond Auction - Note to the Govenor
FO 19 - T-bill Auction Accepted Tender Information of T-bills - System Confermation
FO 20 - T-bill Auction Press Release
FO 21 - T-bond Auction Press Release
FO 22 - T-bill Auction Results - Information Sheet
FO 23 - Ownership Classification of T-bills Tenders Accepted From PDs
FO 24 - Ownership Classification of T-bonds Tenders Accepted From PDs
FO 25 - T-bill primary auction issue details to Colombo Stock Exchange
FO 26 - T-bond primary auction issue details to Colombo Stock Exchange
FO 27 A - Ranked Accepted Tender Information on T-bills (without names)
FO 27 B - Ranked Acceptd Tender Information on T-bills (with names)
FO 28 A - Ranked Accepted Tender Information on T-bonds (without names)
FO 28 B - Ranked Acceptd Tender Information on T-bonds (with names)
FO 29 - SLDB Schedule
FO 30 - SLDB Authorization Document
FO 31 - Expression of Interest - Designated Agents
FO 32 - Expression of Interest - Paying Agents
FO 33 - Appointment of Paying Agent
FO 34 - Appointment of Designated Agents
FO 35 - SLDB Designated Agent Agreement
FO 36 - SLDB Paying Agent Agreement
FO 37 - SLDB Offer Document

Appendix

FO 38 - SLDB Brochure
FO 39 - SLDB Advertisement (In 3 languages)
FO 40 A - SLDB Tenders Received - by Application Order
FO 40 B - SLDB Tenders Received - by Application Order (without Name)
FO 41 A - SLDB Tenders Received - by Margin Order
FO 41 B - SLDB Tenders Received - by Margin Order (without Name)
FO 42 - SLDB Auction Summary
FO 43 - SLDB Auction - Note to the Govenor
FO 44 - SLDB Notice of Acceptance of Application
FO 45 - SLDB Auction Press Release
FO 46 - SLDB Tenders Accepted - by Application Order
FO 47 - SLDB Tenders Accepted - by Sum of Alphabetical Order
FO 48 - SLDB Tenders Accepted - by Designated Dealers
FO 49 - SLDB Notice of Transfer
FO 50 - T-bill Direct Placement Information Sheet
FO 51 - T-bill Direct Placement Letter
FO 52 - T-bond Direct Placement Information Sheet
FO 53 - Rupee Loan Advertisement (In 3 languages)
FO 54 - Procedure to be followed by Rupee Loan Applicants
FO 55 - Rupee Loan Application
FO 56 - Rupee Loan Transfer Application
FO 57 - Government Securities Market Weekly Summary of Primary and Secondary Market Transactions
FO 58 - Daily Market Information Summary
FO 59 - Daily Transaction Summary

TOR/Mandate and Objectives of Domestic Debt Management Committee

Mandate/TOR

The Monetary Board, at its meeting on November 05,1999 decided to appoint a Domestic Debt Management Committee, (DDMC) in order to improve domestic debt management strategies. The DDMC consists of the following members:

Superintendent of Public Debt (Chairman)
Director, State Accounts Dept. MOF (Member)
Director, Domestic Operation Department (Member)
Director, Economic Research Department (Member)
Director, Statistics Department (Member)
Addl. Superintendent of Public Debt (Member, Secretary)

The Committee should report to the Governor, through the Deputy Governor overseeing the Public Debt Department and to the Secretary to the Treasury. The DDMC meets monthly or more frequently if necessary.

Objective

The objective of the DDMC is to determine the volume, composition and the maturity structure of the issues of domestic public debt and to decide on the borrowing programme in the immediate future considering the cash flow requirements of the Treasury while adhering to budgetary limits and market developments.

FO-2

ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ ගැසට් පත්‍රය

අති විශෙෂ

අංක 1230/02 - 2002 අප්‍රේල් 01 වැනි සඳුදා - 2002.04.01

(ආණ්ඩුවේ බලයපිට ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලදී)

I වැනි කොටස : (I) වැනි ඡෙදය - සාමාන්‍ය

ආණ්ඩුවේ නිවේදන

ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සහ සුරුකුම්පත් ආඥාපනත

1983 අංක 51 දරන පනතින්, 1985 අංක 03 දරන පනතින් සහ 1995 අංක 32 දරන පනතින් සංශෝධිත (420 වැනි අධිකාරිය වන) ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සහ සුරුකුම්පත් ආඥාපනතේ 4 වැනි වගන්තිය ප්‍රකාර මා වෙත පැවරී ඇති බලතල අනුව, මුදල් ඇමති කයිර්ෂාප්ප් නරිමන් වොක්සි වන මම, ඉහත සඳහන් පනතට අනුකූලව ශ්‍රී ලංකා ජනරජය විසින් එම පනත යටතේ හා 1962 අංක 2 දරන පනතින් ද, 1963 අංක 01 දරන පනතින් ද, 1980 අංක 23 දරන පනතින් ද, 1984 අංක 33 දරන පනතින් ද සංශෝධිත 1957 අංක 29 දරන විදේශ ණය පනත යටතේ ලබාගන්නා ලද ණය ආපසු ගෙවීම පිණිස මෙහි පහත උපලේඛනයෙහි නියමිත මුදල, එම උපලේඛනයෙහි සඳහන් නියමයන් හා කොන්දේසි අනුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව ඇතුළත ණයට ගැනීමට මේ ආඥාවෙන් නියම කරමි.

කයිර්ෂාප්ප් නරිමන් වොක්සි.
මුදල් ඇමති.

2002 අප්‍රේල් මස 01 වැනි දින,
කොළඹ දී ය.

උපලේඛනය

(1) ණයට ගත යුතු මුදල රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂ හාර දහස් හත්සියයක් විය යුතු ය. තව ද, එය සම මිලට නිකුත් කරන ලද අවුරුදු පහක ණය මුදලක් වශයෙන් ලබා ගත යුතු ය.

(2) ණය මුදල ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ ඇතිකර, නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් පමණක් ලබා ගත යුතු ය.

(3) ණය මුදල සඳහා ගෙවිය යුතු පොළිය වර්ෂයකට සියයට 13.00 ක් විය යුතු ය.

(4) ණය මුදල සඳහා සෑම වර්ෂයකම අර්ධ වාර්ෂික පොළිය ගෙවිය යුතු දිනයන් අප්‍රේල් මස පළමු වැනි දින සහ ඔක්තෝබර් මස පළමු වැනි දින විය යුතු ය.

(5) ණය ලබාගැනීම සඳහා නිකුත් කරන ලද ලියා පදිංචි ස්කන්ධ නිදහස් කිරීමේ දිනය 2007 අප්‍රේල් මස පළමු වැනි දින විය යුතු ය. එසේ වුව ද, 2004 මාර්තු මස 31 වැනි දිනට ඉක්බිති වූත්, හය මසකට නොඅඩු කාලයකට පෙර ගැසට් පත්‍රයේ පළ කරනු ලබන නිවේදනයකින් මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා විසින් නියම කරනු ලැබිය හැකි වූත් යම් දිනයක, ඒ ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සම මිලට නිදහස් කිරීමට තෝරා ගැනීමේ බලය රජයට තිබිය යුතු ය.

කාර්ය විස්තර පත

ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සඳහා මුදල් භාර ගැනීමේ ලැයිස්තුව 2002 අප්‍රේල් මස 01 වැනි දින විවෘත කොට ණය මුදල සම්පූර්ණයෙන් දායක වූ විගසම විසා දමනු ලැබේ.

අවුරුදු 5 ක රුපියල් 4,70,00,00,000 ක ණය මුදල

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ සියයට 13.00, 2004 - 2007 "අ" කාණ්ඩයේ ණය මුදල
සම මිලට නිකුත් කොට සම මිලටම ආපසු ගෙවනු ලැබේ.

රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරි විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුව වෙනුවෙන් රුපියල් 4,70,00,00,000 ක ණය මුදලක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා ඉල්ලුම්පත් කැඳවනු ලැබේ. එයට ගෙවිනු ලබන පොළි ප්‍රමාණය සියයට 13.00 කි. ණය මුදල ආපසු ගෙවනු ලබන්නේ 2007 අප්‍රේල් මස පළමු වැනිදා ය. නමුත් හය මාසයක් කලින් දැනුම්දීමෙන් 2004 මාර්තු මස 31 වැනිදාට පසුව මිනෑම දිනක ණය මුදල ආපසු ගෙවීමට රජයට ඉඩ තිබේ. ණය ආපසු ගෙවන්නේ ද සම මිලටම ය.

1A/G 3448-450 (2003/12)

ණය ලබා ගැනීමේ බලය : ණය මුදල ලබා ගන්නේ 2002 අංක 06 දරන විපර්ජන පනතින් ලත් බලයෙන් සහ 1983 අංක 51 දරන පනතින්, 1985 අංක 03 දරන පනතින් සහ 1995 අංක 32 දරන පනතින් සංශෝධිත (420 වැනි අධිකාරිය වන) ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සහ සුරැකුම්පත් ආඥාපනතේ අඩංගු නිති යටතේ ය.

අරමුණ : රජය විසින් මේ ණය මුදල ලබා ගනුයේ 2002 අංක 06 දරන විපර්ජන පනත යටතේ 2002 මුදල් වර්ෂයේ සේවාවන් සඳහා වැය කරනු පිණිසය.

නිකුත් කරන පිළිවෙළ : ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් ණය මුදල ලබාගනු ලැබේ.

ණය කොටසක මිල : ණය කොටසක මිල රුපියල් සියයකි. සම්පූර්ණ මුදල ඉල්ලුම්පත් ඉදිරිපත් කරන විට ගෙවිය යුතු ය. අඩුම කොටස රුපියල් සියයකි.

ඉල්ලුම්පත් : 2002 අප්‍රේල් මස 01 වැනි දින සිට, ලැයිස්තුව සියවන තුරු රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරි විසින් ඉල්ලුම්පත් භාරගනු ලැබේ. ඉල්ලුම්පත් නියමිත පෝරමයේ ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතු අතර, ඒවා සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රේෂණයක් සමඟ එවිය යුතු ය.

ඉල්ලුම්පත් බැංකුවක් (ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීමේ බැංකුව ඇතුළුව), පිළිගත් ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ තැරැව්කරුවෙකු, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා බලයලත් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ නියෝජිතයෙකු හෝ නිතිඥයෙකු මාර්ගයෙන් ද ඉදිරිපත් කළ හැක.

එවැනි බැංකුකරුවෙකුට (ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීමේ බැංකුව ඇතුළුව), ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ තැරැව්කරුවෙකුට හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා බලයලත් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ නියෝජිතයෙකුට, තමන් මගින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තමන්ගේ මුද්‍රාව සහිත වූ ඉල්ලුම්පත් සඳහා භාරගත් දායක මුදලේ නාමික ප්‍රමාණයෙන් සියයට 1/16 ක් කොමිස් වශයෙන් ගෙවනු ලැබේ. එසේ ගෙවනු ලබන්නේ එවැනි ආයතනයක් මගින් සිය ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙනුවෙන් එකී අයදුම් පත් ඉදිරිපත් කළ විටදීය.

නිතිඥයන්ගේ මාර්ගයෙන්, එකී නිතිඥයන්ගේ මුද්‍රාව සහිතව ඉදිරිපත් කෙරෙන අයදුම්පත් සඳහා ද භාරගත් දායක මුදලින් ඉහත කී ප්‍රතිශතයේම හුවමාරු ගාස්තුවක් ඔවුන් වෙනුවෙන් ගෙවනු ලැබේ.

වෙන්පත් මගින් කෙරෙන ගෙවීම් : "ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ ණය මුදල" යනුවෙන් හරස් රේඛිත කොට මහ බැංකුව වෙත ගෙවීමට අණකරන චෙක්පතකින් මුදල් ගෙවිය හැකි ය.

ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සහතික පත්‍ර : ඉල්ලුම්පත් ලැබීමෙන් හා පිළිගැනීමෙන් පසු ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සහතික නිකුත් කරනු ලැබේ.

පොළිය : පැම වර්ෂයකම අර්ධ වාර්ෂිකව ඔක්තෝබර් මස පළමු වැනිදා හා අප්‍රේල් මස පළමු වැනිදා වසරකට සියයට 13.00 බැගින් පොළී ගෙවනු ලැබේ. පළමුවෙන් පොළී ගෙවන්නේ 2002 ඔක්තෝබර් මස 01 වැනි දාය. ඒ පොළිය ගෙවනු ලබන්නේ ඉල්ලුම්පත් පිළිගත් දින සිට 2002 සැප්තැම්බර් මස 30 වැනි දිනය ද ඇතුළත්වන කාලසීමාව සඳහා ය.

අයබදු ගැනීම : (i) මුද්දර ගාස්තු.–ණය නිකුත් කිරීම, පවරාදීම ආපසු හා ගෙවීමාදියේදී පාවිච්චි කරන සෑම ලියවිල්ලක්ම මුද්දර ගාස්තුවලින් නිදහස්ය.

(ii) ආදායම් බදු.–ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ බදු (රඳවා තබාගැනීමේ බදු) අඩු කිරීමෙන් තොරව පොළිය ගෙවනු ලැබේ.

පුරක්ෂිතතාවය : ණය මුදල් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ඒකාබද්ධ අරමුදලෙන් ආරක්ෂා වී ඇත.

ආණ්ඩුවේ ණය මුදලේ ප්‍රමාණය : 2001 දෙසැම්බර් මස 31 වෙනි දිනට ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ ණය ප්‍රමාණය රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂ 1,340,192 කි.

ඉල්ලුම්පත් : ඉල්ලුම්පත් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන්, වාණිජ බැංකුවලින්, කවිවේරිවලින්, තැපැල් කාර්යාලවලින්, ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීමේ බැංකුවෙන් හෝ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා බලයලත් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ නියෝජිතයෙකු ගෙන් ලබා ගත හැකි ය.

රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරි.

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව,
10 වැනි මහල (උතුර),
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව,
ජනාධිපති මාවත,
කොළඹ 01.

2002 අප්‍රේල් මස 01 වැනි දින දී ය.

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ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජයේ මුද්‍රණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මුද්‍රණය කරන ලදී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ ගැසට් පත්‍රය

අති විශෙෂ

இலங்கைச் சனநாயக சோசலிசக் குடியரசு வர்த்தமானப் பத்திரிகை

அதி விசேஷமானது

අංක 1230/02 - 2002 අප්‍රේල් 01 වැනි සඳුදා - 2002.04.01

1230/02 ஆம் இலக்கம் - 2002 ஆம் ஆண்டு ஏப்பிறல் மாதம் 01 ஆந் திகதி திங்கட்கிழமை

(அரசாங்கத்தின் அதிகாரத்துடன் பிரசுரிக்கப்பட்டது)

பகுதி I : தொகுதி (I) - பொது

அரசாங்க அறிவித்தல்கள்

பதியப்பட்ட பங்குத் தொகுதி மற்றும் பிணையங்கள் கட்டளைச் சட்டம்

1983 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 53 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டம், 1985 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 3 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டம் மற்றும் 1995 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 32 ஆம் இலக்கச்சட்டம் என்பனவற்றினாற் திருத்தப்பட்டவாறான பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட பங்குத் தொகுதி மற்றும் பிணையங்கள் கட்டளைச் சட்டத்தின் (அத்தியாயம் 420) பிரிவு 4 இன் மூலமாக எனக்களிக்கப்பட்டுள்ள அதிகாரங்களின் தத்துவங்களின் பண்பால் நிதியமைச்சர் கயர் சாஷ்ப் நறிமன் சொக்ஷி ஆகிய நான் 2002 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 31 ஆம் இலக்க ஒதுக்கீட்டுச் சட்டத்தினால் வழங்கப்பட்ட அதிகாரத்திற்கிணங்க இங்கே இவ்வட்டவணையிற் குறித்துரைக்கப்பட்டுள்ள இத்தொகை அந்த அட்டவணையில் குறித்துரைக்கப்பட்டுள்ள நியதிகள் மற்றும் நிபந்தனைகளின் வழிமுறைகளுக்கமைவாக இலங்கையிற் திரட்டப்பட வேண்டுமெனவும் கட்டளையிடுகின்றேன்.

கயர் சாஷ்ப் நறிமன் சொக்ஷி,
நிதியமைச்சர்.

கொழும்பு,
01, ஏப்பிறல் 2002.

அட்டவணை

(1) திரட்டப்படவுள்ள பணத்தொகை ரூபா நாலாயிரத்து எழுநூறு மில்லியனாக இருப்பதுடன் இது ஐந்தாண்டுக் கடன்கள் மூலமாகத் திரட்டப்படும்.

(2) பதியப்பட்ட பங்குத் தொகுதிகளை உருவாக்கி வழங்குவதன் மூலம் மட்டுமே கடன் திரட்டப்படும்.

(3) கடன் மீது செலுத்தப்படவுள்ள வட்டி வீதம் ஆண்டொன்றுக்கு 13.00 சதவீதமாக இருக்கும்.

(4) ஒவ்வோராண்டிலும் கடன் மீது அரையாண்டிற்கு வட்டி செலுத்தப்படவேண்டிய நாட்கள் ஒற்றோபர் மாதம் முதலாம் நாளும், ஏப்பிறல் மாதம் முதலாம் நாளுமாகும்.

(5) கடனைத் திரட்டும் நோக்கத்திற்காக வழங்கப்பட்ட பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட பங்குத்தொகுதியினை மீட்பதற்கான நாள் 2007, ஏப்பிறல் மாதம் முதலாம் நாளாக இருக்கும், எனினும் இது அத்தகைய நாளுக்கு 6 மாதங்களுக்குக் குறையாத காலத்தின் முன்னர் வர்த்தமானியில் வெளியிடப்படும் அறிவித்தல் ஒன்றின் மூலம் நிதியமைச்சரினால் நியமிக்கப்படக் கூடியதும் 2004, மார்சு மாதம் முப்பத்தியொன்றாம் நாளைத் தொடர்ந்து வருவதுமான நாளொன்றில் அத்தகைய பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட பங்குத் தொகுதியினை முகப்புப் பெறுமதியில் மீட்பதற்கான விருப்பத் தேர்வினை அரசாங்கம் கொண்டிருக்கும் என்ற நியதிக்குட்பட்டதாகும்.

தகவற்றொகுப்பறிக்கை

2002, ஏப்பிறல் 01 ஆம் திகதியன்று இப்பட்டியல் திறக்கப்பட்டு கடன் முழுவதும் பெறப்படும்போது மூடப்படும்.

ரூபா 4,700,000,000 கொண்ட ஒரு 05 ஆண்டுக் கடனின் வெளியீடு

இலங்கை அரசாங்க 13.00 சதவீத வட்டிக் கடன் 2004-2007 "க" தொடர்

முகப்பு மதிப்பின்படி வழங்கப்பட்டது - முகப்பு மதிப்பின்படி திருப்பிக் கொடுபடவேண்டியது.

பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளர், இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தின் சார்பாக 13.00 சதவீத வட்டியுடன் கூடியதான 4700,000,000 ரூபாய்களைக் கொண்ட ஒரு கடனுக்காக விண்ணப்பங்களை கோருகின்றார். இக்கடன் 2007, ஏப்பிறல் 01 ஆந் திகதியில் முகப்பு மதிப்பின்படி திருப்பிக் கொடுபடக்கூடியதாயிருக்கும். எனினும் ஆறுமாத கால அறிவித்தலின் பின் 2004, மார்சு மாதம் 31 ஆந் திகதிக்குப் பிந்திய ஒரு நாளில் முகப்பு மதிப்பின்படி மீட்பதற்கு அரசாங்கத்திற்கு விருப்புரிமை இருத்தல் வேண்டும்.

2 A I කොටස : (I) ඡේදය - ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ අති විශෙෂ ගැසට් පත්‍රය 2002.04.01
பகுதி I : தொகுதி (I)-இலங்கைச் சனநாயக சோசலிசக் குடியரசு வர்த்தமானப் பத்திரிகை அதி விசேஷமானது — 2002.04.01

அதிகாரம் : 2002 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 06 ஆம் இலக்க ஒதுக்கீட்டுச் சட்டத்தின் அதிகாரத்தினாலும், 1982 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 51 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டத்தினாலும், 1985 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 03 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டத்தினாலும், 1995 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 32 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டத்தினாலும் திருத்தப்பட்டவாறான (420 ஆம் அத்தியாயமான) பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட பங்குத் தொகுதிப் பிணைகள் கட்டளைச் சட்டத்தின் ஏற்பாடுகளுக்கிணங்கவும் இக்கடன் திரட்டப்படுகின்றது.

நோக்கம் : இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தின் 2002 ஆம் நிதி ஆண்டிற்குரிய காலப் பகுதிக்கான தேவையினது தொகையைச் சமாளிப்பதற்கென 2002 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 06 ஆம் இலக்க ஒதுக்கீட்டுச் சட்டத்தின் 21 ஆவது பிரிவின்கீழ் இக்கடன் திரட்டப்படுகின்றது.

வெளியீட்டு வடிவம். : பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட பங்குத்தொகுதிகளாக இக்கடன் திரட்டப்படும்.

வழங்கும் விலை : வெளியீட்டு விலை ரூபா 100 சதவீதம் விண்ணப்பக் காலத்தின்போது முழுமையாக கொடுக்கப்பட வேண்டும். ஆகக் குறைந்த உடைமை ரூபா 100 ஆகும்.

விண்ணப்பங்கள் : 2002 ஏப்பிறல் 01 ஆந் திகதி முதல் பட்டியல் மூடப்படும்வரை பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளரால் விண்ணப்பங்கள் ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்படும். விண்ணப்பங்கள் அதற்கான படிவத்தில் நிரப்பப்பட்டு முழு அனுப்பு தொகையுடன் சேர்த்து அனுப்பப்படுதல் வேண்டும்.

எதாவதொரு வங்கியினூடாகவோ (தேசிய சேமிப்பு வங்கி உட்பட) அல்லது அங்கீகாரம் பெற்ற பங்குத் தொகுதித் தரகர் திறைசேரி உண்டியல்களின் விற்பனைக்காக அதிகாரமளிக்கப்பட்டுள்ள முதன்மை வணிகர் ஒருவர் அல்லது ஒரு சட்டத்தரணியினூடாகவோ விண்ணப்பங்கள் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படலாம்.

இத்தகைய விண்ணப்பங்களை சமர்ப்பிக்கும் வங்கியாளருக்கும் (தேசிய சேமிப்பு வங்கி உட்பட) பங்குத் தொகுதித் தரகருக்கும் திறைசேரி உண்டியல்களின் விற்பனைக்காக அதிகாரமளிக்கப்பட்டுள்ள முதன்மை வணிகர்களுக்கும் அவர்களது முத்திரை தாங்கிய விண்ணப்பங்கள் தொடர்பாக எற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்ட உதவு தொகையினது பெயரளவுத் தொகைமீது 1/16 சதவீதத் தரகு வழங்கப்படும். ஆனால் அத்தகைய முகவர்களிடமிருந்து பெறப்படும் விண்ணப்பங்கள் அவர்களது வாடிக்கைக்காரரின் சார்பில் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டதாயிருத்தல் வேண்டும்.

சட்டத்தரணிகளினூடாகச் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட விண்ணப்பங்கள் தொடர்பாக எற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்ட உதவு தொகையின் மீது இதே சதவீதத்தைக் கொண்ட ஒரு பேரப்பேச்சுக் கூலி வழங்கப்படும். ஆனால் இவ்விண்ணப்பங்கள் அவற்றைச் சமர்ப்பித்த சட்டத்தரணிகளின் முத்திரை தாங்கப்பெற்றதாயிருத்தல் வேண்டும்.

காசோலை மூலம் கொடுப்பனவு : இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியின் பெயரில் எழுதப்பெற்று இலங்கை "அரசாங்கக்கடன் கணக்கில்" என்ற குறுக்கே கோடிடப்பெற்ற காசோலை மூலம் கொடுப்பனவு செய்யப்படலாம்.

பங்குத் தொகுதிச் சான்றிதழ் : விண்ணப்பங்கள் பெறப்பட்டு ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்ட பின் பங்குத் தொகுதிச் சான்றிதழ் வழங்கப்படும்.

வட்டி : ஒவ்வோர் ஆண்டிலும் அரையாண்டிற்கொருமுறையாக ஏப்பிறல் மாதம் 01 ஆம் நாளிலும் ஒற்றோபர் மாதம் 01 ஆம் நாளிலும் ஆண்டொன்றுக்கு 13.00 சத வீதம் வட்டி கொடுபடும். முதலாவது வட்டி 2002, ஒற்றோபர் 01 ஆம் நாளில் கொடுபடும். இவ்வட்டி விண்ணப்பம் ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்ட நாள் தொடக்கம் 2002 செத்தெம்பர் மாதம் 30 ஆம் நாளையும் உள்ளடக்கிய காலப் பகுதிக்கு உரியதாகும்.

வரிவிதிப்பு : (i) முத்திரைத் தீர்வை - கடன் வழங்கல், மாற்றல், அல்லது மீட்பு ஆகியவற்றிற்குப் பயன்படுத்தப்படும் ஆவணங்கள் அனைத்தும் முத்திரைத் தீர்வையிலிருந்தும் விலக்களிக்கப்படும்.

(ii) வருமான வரி - பங்குத் தொகுதியுரிமையாளர்களால் வட்டி, குறிக்கப்பட்ட மிகுதி வரி (மிகுத்து வைக்கப்பட்ட வரி) கழிக்கப்படாமலே கொடுக்கப்படும்.

பிணை : இக்கடனுக்கு இலங்கைத் திரட்டு நிதி பிணையாக அமைந்துள்ளது.

பொதுப்படுகடன் : இலங்கையின் 2001, திசெம்பர் 31 ஆந் திகதி வரையிலான நிதியாக்கப்பட்ட மொத்தப் பொதுப்படுகடன் 1,340,192 மில்லியன் ரூபாவாகும்.

விண்ணப்பப் படிவங்கள் : விண்ணப்பப் படிவங்களை பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களத்தில் அல்லது எந்தவொரு வர்த்தக வங்கி, தரகர் அலுவலகத்தில் அல்லது தேசிய சேமிப்பு வங்கியில் அல்லது அதிகாரமளிக்கப்பட்ட முதன்மை வணிகரிடமிருந்தும் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளலாம்.

பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளர்.

பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம்,
10 ஆம் மாடி (வடக்கு),
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி,
கொழும்பு 01,
01, ஏப்பிறல் 2002.

12 - 857

இலங்கை அரசாங்க அச்சுத் திணைக்களத்தில் பதிப்பிக்கப்பெற்றது.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ ගැසට් පත්‍රය

අති විශෙෂ

The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

EXTRAORDINARY

අංක 1230/02 - 2002 අප්‍රේල් 01 වැනි සඳුදා - 2002.04.01

No. 1230/02 – MONDAY, APRIL 01, 2002

(Published by Authority)

PART I : SECTION (I) – GENERAL

Government Notifications

THE REGISTERED STOCK AND SECURITIES ORDINANCE

BY virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 4 of the Registered stock and Securities Ordinance (Chapter 420) as amended by Act. No. 51 of 1983, Act. No. 03 of 1985 and Act. No. 32 of 1995, I, Kairshasp Nariman Choksy, Minister of Finance do by this Order direct that a loan be raised in Sri Lanka in the sum and on the terms and conditions stated in the Schedule for the repayment of loans raised under the said Ordinance and under the Foreign Loans Act. No. 29 of 1957 as amended by Act, No. 2 of 1962, Act, No. 1 of 1963, Act. No. 23 of 1980 and Act. No. 33 of 1984.

KAIRSHASP NARIMAN CHOKSY,
Minister of Finance.

Colombo,
April 01, 2002.

Schedule

(1) The sum of money to be raised shall be Four Thousand Seven Hundred Million Rupees and it shall be raised by way of a five year loan.

(2) The loan shall be raised by the creation and issue of Registered stock only.

(3) The rate of interest on the loan shall be 13.00 per cent per annum.

(4) The dates in each year on which the half yearly interest on the loan shall be payable, shall be the First Day of October and the First Day of April.

(5) The date of redemption of the registered stock issued for the purpose of raising the loan shall be the first day of April, 2007, provided that the Government shall have the option of redeeming such registered stock at par on such date subsequent to the thirty first day of March, 2004, as may be appointed by the Minister of Finance by notification published in the Gazette not less than six months prior to such date.

PROSPECTUS

The list will be opened on 01st April, 2002 and will be closed as and when the loan is fully subscribed

ISSUE OF A FIVE YEAR LOAN OF Rs. 4,700,000,000

GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA 13.00 PER CENT. 2004/2007 "D" SERIES

Issue at par - Repayable at par

The Registrar of Public Debt on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka invites Applications for a 13.00 per cent loan of Rs. 4,700,000,000 The loan is repayable at par on 01st April, 2007. But the Government will have the option of repayment at par on such date subsequent to 31st March, 2004 on giving six months notice.

Authority : The loan is raised on the authority of the Appropriation Act, No. 06 of 2002 and under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chapter 420) as amended by Act, No. 51 of 1983, Act, No. 03 of 1985 and Act, No. 32 of 1995.

Purpose : The loan is raised by the Government of Sri Lanka to meet expenditure for the services of the financial year 2002 in terms of Section 2(1) (b) of the Appropriation Act, No. 06 of 2002.

Form of Issue : The loan will be issued in the form of Registered Stocks

Issue : The issue price is Rs. 100 per cent payable in full at the time of application. The minimum holding is Rs. 100

Applications Forms Application forms may be obtained from the Department of Public Debt or at any Commercial Bank, Kachcheri, Post Office, the National Savings Bank or from a Primary Dealer for government securities.

Applications : Applications will be received by the Registrar of Public Debt from 01st April 2002, until the list is closed. Applications must be on the proper form and must be accompanied by a remittance in full. Applications may be forwarded through a Bank (including the National Savings Bank), a recognised Stock Broker, a Primary Dealer for Treasury Bills and Treasuary Bonds or an Attorney-at-Law. A commission of 1/16th per cent of the nominal amount of subscriptions accepted will be allowed to such banker (including the National Savings Bank), Stock Broker and a Primary Dealer for Treasuary Bills and Treasury Bonds in respect of such applications forwarded through them, bearing their stamp, provided such applications from such agency are made on behalf of their customers. A negotiating fee of the same percentage on the amount of subscription accepted will be allowed to Attorneys-at-Law in respect of applications forwarded through them provided that the seal of such Attorney-at-Law is affixed on the application.

Payments : Payment may be made by cheque drawn in favour of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and crossed "on Account of Government of Sri Lanka"

Scrip : Stock certificate will be issued after the receipt and acceptance of the applications.

Interest : Interest at the rate of 13.00 per cent per annum will be payable half-yearly on the 01st day of October and the 01st day of April in each year. The first payment of interest will be on 01st October, 2002 and will be for the period commencing on the date on which the payment is made up to and including the 30th day of September, 2002.

Taxation : (I) All documents used in the issue, transfer or redemption of the loan will be free from stamp duty.
(II) Income Tax - Interest will be paid to registered holders of stocks without deduction of Tax (Withholding Tax).

Security : The loan is secured on the Consolidated Fund of Sri Lanka.

Public Debt : The gross Public debt of Sri Lanka as at 31th December, 2001 was Rs. 1,340,192 Million.

Registrar of Public Debt.

Department of Public Debt,
Level 10,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
Colombo 01.
02nd May, 2002.

12-857

PRINTED AT THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING, SRI LANKA

ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ ගැසට් පත්‍රය

අති විශෙෂ

අංක 1687/04 - 2011 ජනවාරි 03 වැනි සඳුදා - 2011.01.03

(රජයේ බලයපිට ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලදී)

I වැනි කොටස : (I) වැනි ඡෙදය – සාමාන්‍ය

රජයේ නිවේදන

ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සහ සුරකුම්පත් ආඥාපනත

1983 අංක 51 දරන පනතින්, 1985 අංක 03 දරන පනතින්, 1995 අංක 32 සහ 2004 අංක 02 දරන පනතින් සංශෝධිත 1937 අංක 07 දරන (420 වැනි අධිකාරය වන) ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සහ සුරකුම්පත් ආඥාපනතේ 4 වැනි වගන්තිය ප්‍රකාර මා වෙත පැවරී ඇති බලතල අනුව මුදල් හා ක්‍රම සම්පාදන දහසක මුදලින් මෙහි පහත උපලේඛනයෙහි නියමිත මුදල, එම උපලේඛනයෙහි සඳහන් ආකාරයට ශ්‍රී ලංකාව ඇතුළත ණයට ගැනීමට මේ ආඥාවෙන් නියම කරමි.

මහින්ද රාජපක්ෂ,
මුදල් හා ක්‍රම සම්පාදන ඇමති.

2011 ජනවාරි මස 03 වැනි දින,
කොළඹ දී ය.

උපලේඛනය

(1) ණයට ගතයුතු මුදල රුපියල් මිලියන තුන්සියයක් විය යුතු ය. තව ද, එය අවුරුදු හයක ණය මුදලක් වශයෙන් ලබා ගත යුතු ය.

(2) ණය මුදල භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ඇති කර, නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් පමණක් ලබාගත යුතු ය. එම නිකුතුව, ප්‍රාරම්භක වෙන්දේසි කිපයක දී, ලංසු පදනම මත, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ඒ කාර්යය සඳහා පත්කරන ලද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය විසින් එක් එක් වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා තීරණය කරනු ලබන පරිදි අව මිලට/සම මිලට/අධි මිලට විය යුතු ය.

(3) ණය මුදල සඳහා ගෙවිය යුතු පොලී අනුපාතිකය වාර්ෂිකව සියයට 6.85 ක් විය යුතු ය.

(4) ණය මුදල සඳහා සෑම වර්ෂයකම පොලිය ගෙවිය යුතු දිනයන් අප්‍රේල් මස පහළොස්වැනි දින සහ ඔක්තෝබර් මස පහළොස්වැනි දින විය යුතු ය.

(5) ණය ලබාගැනීම සඳහා නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සම මිලට නිදහස් කිරීමේ දිනය 2012 අප්‍රේල් මස පහළොස් වැනි දින විය යුතු ය.

කාර්ය විස්තර පත

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ සියයට 06.85, 2012 "අ" කාණ්ඩයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර
සම මිලට ආපසු ගෙවනු ලැබේ.

ඉදිරිපත් කරන ප්‍රමාණය	:	රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂ 300
නිකුත් කරන දිනය	:	2006 අප්‍රේල් මස 15 වැනි දින
වෙන්දේසි කරන දිනයන්	:	රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරි විසින් පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම් මඟින් ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන දිනයන් හි දී.
පොලී අනුපාතිකය	:	වර්ෂයකට සියයට 06.85 කි.
පොලී ගෙවිය යුතු දිනයන්	:	අප්‍රේල් මස 15 වැනි දින සහ ඔක්තෝබර් මස 15 වැනි දින.
කල්පිරීමේ කාලය	:	අවුරුදු 06 යි.
කල්පිරීමේ දිනය	:	2012 අප්‍රේල් මස 15 වැනි දින.

01-800/01

1A-G 15787-340 (2011/01)

(5) ණය ලබාගැනීම සඳහා නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සම මිලට නිදහස් කිරීමේ දිනය 2013 නොවැම්බර් මස විසිඑක් වැනි දින විය යුතු ය.

කාර්ය විස්තර පත

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ සියයට 09.22, 2013 "අ" කාණ්ඩයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර
සම මිලට ආපසු ගෙවනු ලැබේ.

ඉදිරිපත් කරන ප්‍රමාණය	:	රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂ 467
නිකුත් කරන දිනය	:	2011 නොවැම්බර් මස 21 වැනි දින
වෙන්දේසි කරන දිනයන්	:	රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරි විසින් පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම් මඟින් ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන දිනයන් හි දී.
පොළී අනුපාතිකය	:	වර්ෂයකට සියයට 09.22 කි.
පොළී ගෙවිය යුතු දිනයන්	:	මැයි මස 21 වැනි දින සහ නොවැම්බර් මස 21 වැනි දින.
කල්පිරීමේ කාලය	:	අවුරුදු 02 යි.
කල්පිරීමේ දිනය	:	2013 නොවැම්බර් මස 21 වැනි දින.

01-800/37

රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී විසින් ජාතික පුවත්පත්වල විස්තර සහිත දැන්වීම් පළ කිරීම මඟින් ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුව වෙනුවෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලෙස ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන් වෙත ඇරයුම් කෙරේ.

මෙම බැඳුම්කර ලබාගැනීම සඳහා කැමැත්තක් දක්වන ආයතන හා මහජනතාව වෙත මෙහි අවසානයෙහි නම් හා ලිපිනයන් සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්ගෙන් හෝ ඔවුන්ගේ ශාඛාවලින් විමසන ලෙස දන්වා සිටිනු ලැබේ.

භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ බලය : භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරනු ලබන්නේ 2010 අංක 20 දරන විසර්ජන පනතින් ලත් බලයෙන් සහ 1983 අංක 51 දරන පනතින්, 1985 අංක 03 දරන පනතින් සහ 1995 අංක 32 දරන පනතින් සහ 2004 අංක 02 දරන පනතින් සංශෝධිත (420 වැනි අධිකාරය වන) ලියාපදිංචි ස්කන්ධ සහ සුරකුම්පත් ආඥාපනතේ අඩංගු නීති යටතේ ය.

අරමුණ : රජය විසින් මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරනු ලබන්නේ 2010 අංක 20 දරන විසර්ජන පනතේ 2 (1) (6) වගන්තිය යටතේ 2011 මුදල් වර්ෂයේ සේවාවන් සඳහා වන වියදම් පියවා ගැනීම සඳහා ය.

නිකුත් කරන පිළිවෙළ : නිර්ලේඛන ස්වරූපයෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරනු ලැබේ. මේවා මධ්‍යම තැන්පතු ක්‍රමය තුළ වාර්තාගත කරනු ලැබේ.

නිකුත් කිරීම : වෙන්දේසියට ඉදිරිපත් වන ලංසු පදනම් මත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය විසින් තීරණය කරනු ලබන පරිදි නිකුතුව අව මිලට/සම මිලට/අධි මිලට විය යුතු ය.

ඉල්ලුම්පත් : ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන් විසින් අදාළ දිනයන් හි දී විද්‍යුත් මාර්ගයෙන් එවනු ලබන ටෙන්ඩර් රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී විසින් භාරගනු ලැබේ.

ගෙවීම් : ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන් ඔවුන්ගේ සථල ලංසු සඳහා කළ යුතු ගෙවීම් අදාළ උපචිත පොළියක් සමඟ රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී විසින් පුවත්පත් නිවේදන මඟින් දැනුම් දෙනු ලබන දිනයන් හි දී ගෙවිය යුතු වේ.

නිර්ලේඛන සුරකුම්පත් : අදාළ ගෙවීම් ලැබීමෙන් පසු ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්ගේ ගිණුම්වලට අදාළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර බැර කරනු ලැබේ. තම ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙනුවෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මිල දී ගන් ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන් එම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ආදාළ ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ මධ්‍යම තැන්පත් ක්‍රමයේ ඇති ගිණුම්වලට බැර කළ යුතු ය.

පොළිය : අර්ධ වාර්ෂිකව, පොළී, නත්කාලීන දළ පියවුම් ක්‍රමය හරහා ගෙවනු ලැබේ.

ආපසු ගෙවීම් : කල් පිරුණු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ප්‍රතිලාභ නත්කාලීන දල පියවුම් ක්‍රමය හරහා ගෙවනු ලැබේ.

බදු : භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුවිකර නිකුත් කිරීමේ දී. පැවරීමේ දී හෝ කල්පිරුණු පසු ආපසු ගෙවීමේ දී භාවිතා කරන සෑම ලියවිල්ලක්ම මුද්දර බද්දෙන් නිදහස් වේ. ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන් ඔවුන්ගේ සථල ලංසුවල පොළී ආදායමෙන් සියයට 10ක රඳවා ගැනීමේ බද්දක් ආදාළ දිනවල දී ගෙවිය යුතු වේ.

පුරක්ෂිතකාවය : භාණ්ඩාගාරය බැඳුම්කර ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ඒකාබද්ධ අරමුදලෙන් පුරක්ෂිතකොට ඇත.

රාජ්‍ය ණය : 2010 දෙසැම්බර් මස 31 වැනි දිනට ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ දළ රාජ්‍ය ණය ප්‍රමාණයරුපියල් දශලක්ෂ 4,590,245 වේ.

රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී.

2011 ජනවාරි මස 03 වැනි දින දී ය.
රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව,
10 වැනි මහල,
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව,
කොළඹ 01.

රාජ්‍ය ණය සුරැකුම් සම්බන්ධ ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්

ලංකා බැංකුව,
7 වැනි මහල, ලංකා බැංකු ප්‍රධාන කාර්යාලය,
4, ලංකා බැංකු මාවත,
කොළඹ 01.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : එස්. එම්. එස්. සී. ජයසූරිය මයා.
දුරකථන : 2439566.

කොමර්ෂල් බැන්ක් ඔෆ් සිලෝන්, පී. එල්. සී.
21, බ්‍රිස්වල් විදිය,
කොළඹ 01.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : ප්‍රින්ස් පෙරේරා මයා.
දුරකථන : 2486334.

ඇකියුරි සිකියුරිටිස් ලිමිටඩ්,
ඇක්විටි හවුස්, 4 වැනි මහල, 53,
ධර්මපාල මාවත, කොළඹ 03.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : අමල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මයා.
දුරකථන : 2206297.

ෆස්ට් කැපිටල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ්,
75, ආර්නෝල්ඩ් රත්නායක මාවත,
කොළඹ 10.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : මහින්ද ගොඩකන්ද ආරච්චි මයා.
දුරකථන : 2639883.

නැට්වෙල්ත් සිකියුරිටිස් ලිමිටඩ්,
17ඒ, බාන්ස් පෙදෙස,
කොළඹ 07.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : චන්ද්‍රා ඩයස් මයා.
දුරකථන : 4716274.

මහජන බැංකුව,
13 වැනි මහල, අංක 75,
මහජන බැංකු ප්‍රධාන කාර්යාලය,
සර් චිත්තම්පලම් ඒ. ගාඩිනර් මාවත,
කොළඹ 02.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : එන්. වසන්ත කුමාර් මයා.
දුරකථන : 2206765.

එන්. එස්. බී. ෆන්ඩ් මැනේජ්මන්ට් ලිමිටඩ්,
255, ගාලුපාර,
කොළඹ 03.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : එන්. කේ. දහනායක මයා.
දුරකථන : 2565956.

සම්පත් බැන්ක් පී. එල්. සී.
110, සර් ජේම්ස් පීරිස් මාවත,
කොළඹ 02.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : ඩබ්ලිව්. දඹවින්න මයා.
දුරකථන : 4730347.

සෙලාන් බැන්ක් පී. එල්. සී.
3 වැනි මහල, සෙලාන් ටවර්, අංක 90,
ගාලු පාර, කොළඹ 03.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : එස්. පලිහවඩන මයා.
දුරකථන : 2542512.

එන්ට්‍රස්ට් සිකියුරිටිස් ලිමිටඩ්,
281, ආර්. ඒ. ද මැල් මාවත,
කොළඹ 03.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : ඒ. එච්. එම්. රියාස් මයා.
දුරකථන : 2564934.

කැපිටල් එලයන්ස් ලිමිටඩ්,
5 වැනි මහල, "මිලේනියම් හවුස්"
46/58, නවම් මාවත,
කොළඹ 02.
වෙළඳාම්කරු : අජිත් ප්‍රනාන්දු මයා.
දුරකථන : 2317700.

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ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජයේ මුද්‍රණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මුද්‍රණය කරන ලදී.

2011

ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ ගැසට් පත්‍රය

අති විශෙෂ

இலங்கைச் சனநாயக சோசலிசக் குடியரசு வர்த்தமானப் பத்திரிகை

அதி விசேஷமானது

අංක 1687/04 - 2011 ජනවාරි 03 සඳුදා

1687/04 ஆம் இலக்கம் - 2011 ஆம் ஆண்டு சனவரி மாதம் 03 ஆம் திகதி திங்கட்கிழமை

(அரசாங்கத்தின் அதிகாரத்துடன் பிரசுரிக்கப்பட்டது)

பகுதி I : தொகுதி (I) – பொது

அரசாங்க அறிவித்தல்கள்

பதியப்பட்ட பங்குத் தொகுதி மற்றும் பிணையங்கள் கட்டளைச் சட்டம்

1983 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 51 ஆம் இலக்கச்சட்டம், 1985 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 3 ஆம் இலக்கச்சட்டம், 1995 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 32 ஆம் இலக்கச்சட்டம் மற்றும் 2004 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 02 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டம் என்பனவற்றினால் திருத்தப்பட்டவாறான 1937 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 7 ஆம் இலக்க பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட பங்குத் தொகுதி மற்றும் பிணையங்கள் கட்டளைச் சட்டத்தின் (அத்தியாயம் 420) பிரிவு 4 இன் மூலமாக எனக்களிக்கப்பட்டுள்ள அதிகாரங்களின் தத்தவங்களின் பண்பால் நிதி மற்றும் திட்டமிடல் அமைச்சர் மஹிந்த ராஜபக்ஷ ஆகிய நான் 2010 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 20 ஆம் இலக்க ஒதுக்கீட்டுச் சட்டத்தினால் வழங்கப்பட்ட அதிகாரத்திற்கிணங்க தொள்ளாயிரத்து தொண்ணூற்று ஏழாயிரம் மில்லியன் ரூபா கொண்ட தொகையைக் கடன் மூலமாக திரட்ட வேண்டுமெனவும் இங்கே அட்டவணையிற் குறித்துரைக்கப்பட்டுள்ள இத்தொகை அந்த அட்டவணையில் குறித்துரைக்கப்பட்டுள்ள நியதிகள் மற்றும் நிபந்தனைகளின் வழிமுறைகளுக்கமைவாக இலங்கையிற் திரட்டப்பட வேண்டுமெனவும் கட்டளையிடுகின்றேன்.

மஹிந்த ராஜபக்ஷ
நிதி மற்றும் திட்டமிடல் அமைச்சர்.

கொழும்பு.
2011, சனவரி 03

அட்டவணை

(1) திரட்டப்படவேண்டிய பணத்தொகை முந்நூறு மில்லியன் ரூபாவாக இருத்தல் வேண்டும் என்பதுடன் இது ஆறு ஆண்டுகடன்கள் மூலமாகத் திரட்டப்படும்.

(2) திறைசேரி முறிகளை உருவாக்கி வழங்குவதன் மூலமாக மட்டுமே கடன் திரட்டப்படும், இவ்வழங்கல்கள் இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியின் நாணயச் சபையினால் இந் நோக்கத்திற்காக நியமிக்கப்பட்ட இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியின் திறைசேரி முறிகள் விலைக்கோரல் சபையினாற் தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டவாறான கழிவிடல்/முகப்பு/மிகைக் கட்டணம் என்ற ரீதியில் அமைந்த விலைக்கோரல் அடிப்படையில் திரட்டப்பட வேண்டுமெனவும் கட்டளையிடுகின்றேன்.

(3) கடன் மீது செலுத்தப்படவுள்ள வட்டிவீதம் ஆண்டொன்றுக்கு 6.85 சதவீதமாக இருக்கும்.

(4) ஒவ்வோராண்டிலும் கடன்மீது வட்டி செலுத்தப்பட வேண்டிய நாட்கள் ஏப்பிறல் பதினைந்தாம் நாளும் ஒற்றோபர் பதினைந்தாம் நாளுமாகும்.

(5) கடனைத் திரட்டுவதற்காக வழங்கப்பட்ட திறைசேரி முறிகள் 2012 ஆம் ஆண்டு ஏப்பிறல் பதினைந்தாம் நாளன்று முகப்புப் பெறுமதியில் மீட்கப்படக் கூடியனவாகும்.

விளக்கக் குறிப்பு

இலங்கை அரசாங்க 6.85 சதவீத திறைசேரி முறிகள் 2012 "அ" தொடர்

முகப்புப் பெறுமதியிற் திருப்பிச் செலுத்தப்படத்தக்கதாகும்.

வழங்கப்பட்ட தொகை	:	ரூபா 300 மில்லியன்
வழங்கிய திகதி	:	15 ஏப்பிறல் 2006
ஏலமிடும் திகதி	:	செய்தித்தாள்களினூடாக பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளரினால் அறிவிக்கப்பட்டவாறு.
நறுக்கு வீதம்	:	ஆண்டொன்றுக்கு 6.85 சதவீதம்
வட்டி செலுத்தப்படும் நாட்கள்	:	15 ஏப்பிறல், 15 ஒற்றோபர்
முதிர்ச்சிக் காலப்பகுதி	:	06 ஆண்டுகள்
முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி	:	15 ஏப்பிறல் 2012

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விளக்கக் குறிப்பு

இலங்கை அரசாங்க 9.22 சதவீத திறைசேரி முறிகள் 2013 "அ" தொடர்

முகப்புப் பெறுமதியிற் திருப்பிச் செலுத்தப்படத்தக்கதாகும்.

வழங்கப்பட்ட தொகை	:	ரூபா 467 மில்லியன்
வழங்கிய திகதி	:	21 நவெம்பர், 2011
ஏலமிடும் திகதி	:	செய்தித்தாள்களினூடாக பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளரினால் அறிவிக்கப்பட்டவாறு.
நறுக்கு வீதம்	:	ஆண்டொன்றுக்கு 9.22 சதவீதம்
வட்டி செலுத்தப்படும் நாட்கள்	:	21 மே, 21 நவெம்பர்
முதிர்ச்சிக் காலப்பகுதி	:	02 ஆண்டுகள்
முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி	:	21 நவெம்பர், 2013

01-800/36

இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தின் சார்பில் பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளர். திறைசேரி முறிகளின் வழங்குகைக்கான தேசிய செய்தித்தாள்களில் தேவையான விபரங்களை விளம்பரப்படுத்துவதன் மூலம் முதனிலை வணிகர்களிடமிருந்து விலைக் குறிப்பீடுகளைக் கோருகின்றார்.

இவ்வறிவித்தலின் அடியில் தரப்பட்டுள்ள பெயர் முகவரிகளைக் கொண்ட முதனிலை வணிகர்களினூடாக அல்லது அவர்களின் ஏதேனும் கிளைகளினூடாக இம் முறிகளுக்கான தமது விலைக் குறிப்பீடுகளைச் சமர்ப்பிக்கும்படி பொதுமக்களும் வேண்டப்படுகின்றனர்.

அதிகாரம் : திறைசேரி முறிகள் 2010 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 20 ஆம் இலக்க ஒதுக்கீட்டுச் சட்டத்தின் அதிகாரத்தின் கீழும் 1983 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 51 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டத்தினாலும், 1985 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 03 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டம், 1995 ஆண்டின் 32 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டம், 2004 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 02 ஆம் இலக்கச் சட்டம் என்பனவற்றினால் திருத்தப்பட்டவாறான பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட பங்குத் தொகுதிகள், பிணையங்கள் கட்டளைச் சட்டத்தின் (அத்தியாயம் 420) ஏற்பாடுகளுக்கினங்கவும் இக்கடன் திரட்டப்படுகிறது.

நோக்கம் : 2010 ஆம் ஆண்டின் 20 ஆம் இலக்க ஒதுக்கீட்டுச் சட்டத்தின் பிரிவு 2 (1) (ஆ) பிரிவின் கீழ் இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தின் 2010 நிதியாண்டுக்குரிய காலப்பகுதிக்கான பணிகளினது செலவை ஈடுசெய்வதற்காக இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தினால் திறைசேரி முறிகள் வழங்கப்படுகின்றது.

வழங்கப்படும் முறை : திறைசேரி முறிகள் பத்திரங்களற்ற வடிவில் வழங்கப்படுவதுடன். மத்திய வைப்பு முறைமையில் பதியப்படும்.

வழங்கல் : இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியின் திறைசேரி முறி கேள்விப்பத்திரச் சபையினால் தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டவாறு கழிவு/முகப்பு பெறுமதி/மிகைக் கட்டணம் என்பவற்றின் மீது ஏலத்தில் பெறப்பட்ட விலைக் குறிப்பீடுகளின் அடிப்படையில் வழங்கல் மேற்கொள்ளப்படும்.

கேள்விப் பத்திரங்கள் : முதனிலை வணிகர்களிடமிருந்து பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளரினால் இலத்திரனியல் ரீதியில் கேள்விப்பத்திரங்கள் குறிப்பிட்ட திகதிகளில் பெறப்படும்.

கொடுப்பனவுகள் : முதனிலை வணிகர்கள், ஒன்று சேர்ந்த வட்டிகள் உட்பட ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்ட விலைக் குறிப்பீடுகளுக்கான கொடுப்பனவுகளை பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளரினால் அறிவிக்கப்பட்ட தொடர்பான தீர்ப்பனவு நாளன்று செய்தல் வேண்டும்.

பத்திரங்களற்ற : பெறப்படவுள்ள கொடுப்பனவுகளைப் பெற்றுக்கொண்ட பின்னர். முதனிலை வணிகர்களின் கணக்குகளுக்கு திறைசேரி முறிகள் கைமாற்றப்படும், அதனைத் தொடர்ந்து முதனிலை வணிகர்கள் அவர்களின் வாடிக்கையாளர் சார்பில் தாம் கொள்வனவு செய்த முறிகளை அத்தகைய வாடிக்கையாளர்களின் மத்திய வைப்பக முறைமையிலுள்ள கணக்குகளுக்கு கைமாற்றுதல் வேண்டும்.

வட்டி : அதே நேர மொத்தம் தீர்ப்பனவு முறைமையின் ஊடாக அரையாண்டுத் தவணைகளில் வட்டி செலுத்தப்படவேண்டியதாகும்.

மீட்பு : உரிய திகதிகளில் அதே நேர மொத்தத் தீர்ப்பனவு முறைமையின் ஊடாக முதிர்ச்சித் தொகை செலுத்தப்படும்.

வரிவிதித்தல் : திறைசேரி முறிகள் முத்திரைத் தீர்வையிலிருந்து விலக்களிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. எனினும் முதன்மை வணிகர்கள் வெற்றிகரமான ஏலத்தின் பின்பு கொடுப்பனவு தொடர்பான திகதிகளின் பின்னர் முதிர்ச்சியின் விளைவுகளில் 10 சதவீதமான தடுத்து வைக்கும் வரியினைச் செலுத்துதல் வேண்டும்.

பாதுகாப்பு : திறைசேரி முறிகள் இலங்கையின் திரட்டிய நிதியின் மூலம் பிணையிடப்பட்டுள்ளன.

பொதுப்படுகடன் : இலங்கையின் மொத்தப் படுகடன் 2010, திசெம்பர் 31 ஆம் நாளன்று ரூபா 4,590,245 மில்லியன் ஆகும்.

பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளர்.

பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம்,
10 ஆம் மாடி,
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி,
சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை,
கொழும்பு - 01.
2011, சனவரி 03

முதனிலை வணிகர்களின் பட்டியல்

இலங்கை வங்கி.
ஏழாவது மாடி,
இலங்கை வங்கி தலைமையகக் கட்டிடம்,
04, இலங்கை வங்கி மாவத்தை,
கொழும்பு - 01.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. எஸ். எம். எஸ். சி. ஜெயசூரிய
தொலைபேசி : 2439566

வ/கொமர்ஷல் வங்கி இலங்கை பிஎல்சி
இல. 21, பிரிஸ்டல் வீதி,
கொழும்பு - 01.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. பிறின்ஸ் பெரேரா
தொலைபேசி : 2486334

வ/தேசிய சேமிப்பு வங்கி நிதி முகாமைத்துவ கம்பனி,
255 காலி வீதி,
கொழும்பு - 03.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. என். கே. தஹநாயக்க.
தொலைபேசி : 2565956

சம்பத் வங்கி பிஎல்சி,
110, சேர் ஜேம்ஸ் பீரிஸ் மாவத்தை,
கொழும்பு - 02.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. டபிள்யு. டம்பவின்ன.
தொலைபேசி : 4730347

வ/அக்குயிட்டி செக்குரிட்டீஸ்,
அக்குயிட்டி ஹவுஸ், 4 ஆம் தளம்.
இல. 53, தர்மபால மாவத்தை,
கொழும்பு - 03.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. அமல் பெர்னாண்டோ
தொலைபேசி : 2206297

வ/பெஸ்ட் கெப்பிட்டல் ரெஸரீஸ்,
இல. 75 ஆர்னோல்ட் ரட்நாயக்க மாவத்தை,
கொழும்பு - 10.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு மகிந்த கொடகந்த ஆரச்சி,
தொலைபேசி : 2639883

வ/நெட்வெல்த் செக்குரிட்டிஸ்,
இல. 17ஏ, பார்ன்ஸ் பிளேஸ்
கொழும்பு -. 07.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. சந்திரா டயஸ்,
தொலைபேசி : 4716274

மக்கள் வங்கி,
13 வதுதளம் இல. 75 மக்கள் வங்கி
தலைமை அலுவலகம்,
சேர் சிற்றம்பலம் ஏ கார்டினர் மாவத்தை,
கொழும்பு - 02.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. என். வசந்தகுமார்,
தொலைபேசி : 2206765

செலான் வங்கி பிஎல்சி
3 ஆம் மாடி., செலான் கட்டிடம்,
இல. 90, காலி வீதி,
கொழும்பு - 03.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. எஸ். பலிஹவர்தன
தொலைபேசி : 2452512.

வ/என்ட்ரட்ஸ் செக்குரிட்டீஸ்,
28, ஆர். ஏ. டி. மெல் மாவத்தை,
கொழும்பு - 03.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. ஏ. எச். எம். ரியாஸ்,
தொலைபேசி : 2564934

வ/ப கப்பிட்டல் எலையன்ஸ்,
5 ஆவது மாடி,
"மிலேனியம் ஹவுஸ்"
46/58, நவம் மாவத்தை,
கொழும்பு - 02.

வணிகத் தொடர்பு : திரு. அஜித் பெர்னாண்டோ,
தொலைபேசி : 2317700

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The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

EXTRAORDINARY

අංක 1687/04 - 2011 ජනවාරි මස 03 වැනි සඳුදා - 2011.01.03

No. 1687/04 – MONDAY, JANUARY 03, 2011

(Published by Authority)

PART I : SECTION (I) – GENERAL

Government Notifications

THE REGISTERED STOCK AND SECURITIES ORDINANCE

BY virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 4 of the Registered stock and Securities Ordinance No. 07 of 1937 (Chapter 420) as amended by Act, No. 51 of 1983, Act, No. 03 of 1985, Act, No. 32 of 1995 and Act, No.02 of 2004 , I, Mahinda Rajapaksa Minister of Finance and Planning do by this Order direct, that of the sum of Nine Hundred and Ninety Seven Thousand Million Rupees for the raising which by way of loan authority has been given by the Appropriation Act, No. 20 of 2010, the sum specified in the Schedule hereto shall be raised in Sri Lanka in the mode specified in that Schedule.

MAHINDA RAJAPAKSA,
Minister of Finance and Planning.

Colombo,
January 03, 2011.

Schedule

(1) The sum of money to be raised shall be Three Hundred Million Rupees and it shall be raised by way of a Six year loan.

(2) The loan shall be raised by the creation and issue of Treasury Bonds only. The issue shall be on the basis of bids at a discount/par/premium as determined by the Treasury Bond Tender Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka appointed for that purpose by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

(3) The rate of interest on the loan shall be 06.85 per cent per annum.

(4) The dates in each year on which the interest on the loan shall be payable shall be the Fifteenth day of April and the fifteenth day of October.

(5) The Treasury Bonds issued for the raising of the loan shall be redeemable at par on the fifteenth day of April, 2012.

PROSPECTUS

GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA 06.85 PER CENT, "A" SERIES TREASURY BONDS 2012.

Repayable at par

Amount Offered	:	Rs. 300 Million
Date of Issue	:	15th April, 2006
Date of Auctions	:	As notified by the Registrar of Public Debt through newspapers
Coupon Rate	:	06.85 per cent per annum
Interest Payable on	:	15th April and 15th October
Maturity Period	:	06 years
Date of Maturity	:	15th April, 2012

01-800/01

1A

THE REGISTERED STOCK AND SECURITIES ORDINANCE

BY virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 4 of the Registered stock and Securities Ordinance No. 07 of 1937 (Chapter 420) as amended by Act, No. 51 of 1983, Act, No. 03 of 1985, Act, No. 32 of 1995 and Act, No.02 of 2004 , I, Mahinda Rajapaksa Minister of Finance and Planning do by this Order direct, that of the sum of Nine Hundred and Ninety Seven Thousand Million Rupees for the raising which by way of loan authority has been given by the Appropriation Act, No. 20 of 2010, the sum specified in the Schedule hereto shall be raised in Sri Lanka in the mode specified in that Schedule.

MAHINDA RAJAPAKSA,
Minister of Finance and Planning.

Colombo,
January 03, 2011.

Schedule

(1) The sum of money to be raised shall be Four Hundred and Sixty Seven Million Rupees and it shall be raised by way of a Two year loan.

(2) The loan shall be raised by the creation and issue of Treasury Bonds only. The issue shall be on the basis of bids at a discount/par/premium as determined by the Treasury Bond Tender Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka appointed for that purpose by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

(3) The rate of interest on the loan shall be 09.22 per cent per annum.

(4) The dates in each year on which the interest on the loan shall be payable shall be the Twenty First day of May and the Twenty First day of November.

(5) The Treasury Bonds issued for the raising of the loan shall be redeemable at par on the Twenty First day of November, 2013.

PROSPECTUS

GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA 09.22 PER CENT, "A" SERIES TREASURY BONDS 2013.

Repayable at par

Amount Offered	:	Rs. 467 Million
Date of Issue	:	21st November, 2011
Date of Auctions	:	As notified by the Registrar of Public Debt through newspapers
Coupon Rate	:	09.22 per cent per annum
Interest Payable on	:	21st May and 21st November
Maturity Period	:	02 years
Date of Maturity	:	21st November, 2013

01-800/36

The Registrar of Public Debt on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka invites bids from Primary Dealers by advertising required details in national newspapers for the issue of Treasury Bonds.

The public and other institutions are invited to bid for these Bonds through Primary Dealers whose names and addresses are given at the bottom of this notice or any of their branches.

Authority : Treasury Bonds are issued on the authority of the Appropriation Act, No. 20 of 2010 and under the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chapter 420) as amended by Act, No. 51 of 1983, Act, No. 03 of 1985, Act, No. 32 of 1995 and Act, No. 02 of 2004.

Purpose : Treasury Bonds are issued by the Government of Sri Lanka to meet expenditure for the services of the financial year 2011, in terms of section 2 (1) (b) of Appropriation Act, No. 20 of 2010.

Form of Issue	:	Treasury Bonds are issued scripless which will be recorded in the central depository system.
Issue	:	The issue shall be on the basis of bids received at auctions at a discount/par/premium as determined by the Treasury Bond Tender Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. .
Tenders	:	Tenders will be received electronically by the Registrar of Public Debt on respective dates from Primary Dealers.
Payments	:	The Primary Dealers should make payments including respective accrued interest for their successful bids on respective settlement dates as notified by the Registrar of Public Debt.
Securities Scripless	:	Treasury Bonds will be Transfered to Primary Dealer accounts after receipt of payments due. The Primary Dealers in turn should transfer the Bonds which they have bought on behalf of their customers to such customer accounts in the central depository system.
Interest	:	Interest will be payable half-yearly through the RTGS System.
Redemption	:	The maturity proceeds will be paid on due dates through RTGS System.
Taxation	:	Treasury Bonds are free from stamp duty. The Primary dealers should pay 10.00 per cent with holding tax on yield to maturity for their successful bids on relevant payments dates.
Security	:	Treasury Bonds are secured on the Consolidated Fund of Sri Lanka.
Public Debt	:	The gross public debt of Sri Lanka as at 31st December, 2010 was Rs. 4,590,245 Million.

Registrar of Public Debt.

Department of Public Debt,
Level 10,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
Colombo 01.

03rd January, 2011.

LIST OF PRIMARY DEALERS

Bank of Ceylon
7th Floor, Bank of Ceylon Head Office
4, Bank of Ceylon Mawatha,
Colombo 1.

Principal Dealer : Mr. S. M. S. C. Jayasooriya
Telephone : 2439566

Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC
21, Bristol Street,
Colombo 1.

Principal Dealer : Mr. Prins Perera
Telephone : 2486334

NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd.
255, Galle Road,
Colombo 3.

Principal Dealer : Mr. N. K. Dahanayake,
Telephone : 2565956

Sampath Bank PLC.
110, Sir James Peiris Mawatha,
Colombo 2.

Principal Dealer : Mr. W. Dambawinna,
Telephone : 4730347

Acuity Securities Ltd.
Acuity House, 4th Floor,
No. 53, Dharmapala Mawatha,
Colombo 03.

Principal Dealer : Mr. Amal Fernando
Telephone : 2206297

First Capital Treasuries Ltd.
No. 75, Arnold Rathnayake Mawatha,
Colombo 10.

Principal Dealer : Mr. Mahinda Godakandaarachchi,
Telephone : 2639883

NatWealth Securities Ltd.
No.17A, Barnes Place,
Colombo 07.

Principal Dealer : Mr. Chandra Dias,
Telephone : 4716274

People's Bank
13th Floor, No.75, People's Bank Head Office,
Sir Chiththampalam A. Gardiner Mawatha,
Colombo 02.

Principal Dealer : Mr. N.Wasantha Kumar
Telephone : 2206765

Seylan Bank PLC
Level 03, SeylanTower,
No. 90 Galle Road,
Colombo 3.

Principal Dealer : Mr. S. Palihawadana,
Telephone : 2452512

Entrust Securities Ltd,
281, R. A. de Mel Mawatha,
Colombo 3.

Principal Dealer : Mr. A. H. M. Riyaz
Telephone : 2564934

Capital Alliance Ltd.
Level 05, "Millenium House",
46/58, Nawam Mawatha,
Colombo 02.

Principal Dealer : Mr. Ajith Fernando,
Telephone : 2317700

01-800/38

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FO - 04

ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජය

භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම

2013 ජූලි 10 වැනි දින රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂ 12,000 ක් වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීමේ වෙන්දේසිය

මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විස්තර පහත සඳහන් පරිදි වේ.

පරිණත කාලය	දින 91	දින 182	දින 364	එකතුව
සු.හ.ජා. අංකය	LKA09113J118	LKA18214A104	LKA36414G113	
වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කළ මුදල (රු.ද.ල.)	1,000	1,000	10,000	12,000

වෙන්දේසි කරන දිනය	2013 ජූලි 10 වැනි දින
ගෙවීම් කළ යුතු දිනය	2013 ජූලි 12 වැනි දින
නිකුතුවේ දිනය	2013 ජූලි 12වැනි දින
ටෙන්ඩර් භාරගන්නා අවසාන දිනය හා වේලාව	2013 ජූලි 10වැනි බදාදා පෙ.ව. 11:00
ලංසුවක් සඳහා අවම මුදල	රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂ පහක් (5,000,000) සහ ඉන් අනතුරුව රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂයේ (1,000,000) ගුණිතයන්ගෙනි.

රජයේ සුරැකුම්පත් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්ගෙන් ලංසු කැඳවනු ලැබේ. ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුත්තේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සපයනු ලැබ ඇති විද්‍යුත් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ පහසුකම මගින් පමණකි.

පහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්ගෙන් සහ අනෙකුත් බලපත්‍රලාභී වාණිජ බැංකුවලින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් මිලදී ගන්නා ලෙස මහජනතාවට දැනුම් දෙනු ලැබේ.

ඇකියුටි සෙකියුරිටීස් ලිමිටඩ්	2206297	නැවෙල්ත් සෙකියුරිටීස් ලිමිටඩ්	4703000
එන්ට්‍රස්ට් සෙකියුරිටීස් පී.එල්.සී	2564936	ෆස්ට් කැපිටල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ්	2639883
		මහජන බැංකුව	2458935
එන්.එස්.බී. ෆන්ඩ් මැනේජ්මන්ට් කම්පැනි ලිමිටඩ්	2564601	ලංකා බැංකුව	2541938
කැපිටල් ඇලයන්ස් ලිමිටඩ්	2317777	වෙල්ත්ට්‍රස්ට් සෙකියුරිටීස් ලිමිටඩ්	2675096
		සම්පත් බැන්ක් පී.එල්.සී.	2305842
කොමර්ෂල් බැන්ක් ඔෆ් සිලෝන් පී.එල්.සී.	2332319	සෙලාන් බැන්ක් පී.එල්.සී	2456340

නිකුත් කරන කාර්යාලය
රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
30, ජනාධිපති මාවත
කොළඹ 01.

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර
රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී/ලේඛකාධිකාරී

දුරකථන : 2477316 ෆැක්ස් : 2477687
http://www.cbsl.gov.lk

இலங்கை சனநாயக சோசலிசக் குடியரசு
திறைசேரி உண்டியல்கள் வழங்கல்

2013 யூலை 10ஆம் திகதிய ஏல விற்பனையினூடாக 12,000 மில்லியன் ரூபாவுக்கான திறைசேரி உண்டியல்கள் வழங்கப்படும்.

இத்திறைசேரி உண்டியல் வழங்கல்களின் விபரங்கள் பின்வருமாறு:

முதிர்வு காலம்	91 நாட்கள்	182 நாட்கள்	364 நாட்கள்	மொத்தம்
ஐஎஸ்ஐ இலக்கம்	LKA09113J118	LKA18214A104	LKA36414G113	
வழங்கப்பட்ட தொகை (ரூ.மில்.)	1,000	1,000	10,000	12,000

ஏல விற்பனைத் திகதி	: 2013 யூலை 10
தீர்ப்பனவுத் திகதி	: 2013 யூலை 12
வழங்கப்படும் திகதி	: 2013 யூலை 12
கேள்விகள் மூடப்படும் திகதியும் நேரமும்	: 2013 யூலை 10 புதன்கிழமை மு.ப. 11.00
கேள்விக்கான ஆகக் குறைந்த தொகை	: ஐந்து மில்லியன் ரூபாய்கள் (ரூ.5,000,000/-) அத்துடன் ஒரு மில்லியன் ரூபாய்களின் (ரூ.1,000,000/-) பெருக்கங்களிலிருந்து

அரசாங்க பிணையங்களிலுள்ள முதனிலை வணிகர்களிடமிருந்து விலைக்குறிப்பீடுகள் கோரப்படுகின்றன. இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியால் வழங்கப்பட்ட இலத்திரனியல் விலைக்குறிப்பீட்டு வசதியூடாக மட்டுமே விலைக்குறிப்பீடுகள் அனுப்பப்பட வேண்டும்.

கீழ்க்காணும் முதனிலை வணிகர்களிடமிருந்தும் எந்தவொரு உரிமம் பெற்ற வர்த்தக வங்கிகளிடமிருந்தும் திறைசேரி உண்டியல்களைக் கொள்வனவு செய்யுமாறு பொதுமக்கள் அழைக்கப்படுகின்றனர்.

வ/ப அக்குயிட்டி செக்குரிட்டீஸ்	2206297	வ/ப நட்வெல்த் செக்குரிட்டீஸ்	4703000
இலங்கை வங்கி —	2541938	வ/ப தேசிய சேமிப்பு வங்கி நிதி — முகாமைத்துவ கம்பனி	2564601
வ/ப கெப்பிட்டல் எலையன்ஸ்	2317777	மக்கள் வங்கி	2458935
இலங்கை கொமர்ஷல் வங்கி பிஎல்சி	2332319	சம்பத் வங்கி பிஎல்சி	2305842
என்றஸ்ற் செக்குரிட்டீஸ் பிஎல்சி	2564936	செலான் வங்கி பிஎல்சி	2456340
வ/ப வ்வெஸ்ட் கெப்பிட்டல் ரெஸரீஸ்	2639883	வ/ப வெல்த்றஸ்ற் செக்குரிட்டீஸ்	2675096

என். டபிள்யு. ஜீ. ஆர். டி. நாணயக்கார
கண்காணிப்பாளர்/ பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளர்

வழங்கும் அலுவலகம்:
பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம்
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
30, சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை, கொழும்பு - 1
தொலைபேசி: 2477316 தொலைநகல்: 2477687
வெப்தளம்: www.cbsl.gov.lk

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DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA
ISSUE OF TREASURY BILLS

Rs. 12,000 million Treasury bills are to be issued through an auction on 10th July, 2013

The details of these Treasury bill issues are as follows.

Maturity Period	91 Days	182 Days	364 Days	Total
ISI Number	LKA09113J118	LKA18214A104	LKA36414G113	
Amount Offered (Rs. mn.)	1,000	1,000	10,000	12,000

Date of Auction	:	10th July, 2013
Date of Settlement	:	12th July, 2013
Date of Issue	:	12th July, 2013
Closing date and time of tenders	:	Wednesday 10th July, 2013, at 11.00 a.m.
Minimum amount of a bid	:	Rupees five million (Rs.5, 000,000/-) and multiples of Rupees one million (Rs.1, 000,000/-) there onwards.

Bids are invited from the Primary Dealers in Government Securities. Bids should be made only through the electronic bidding facility provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

The general public is invited to purchase Treasury bills from the following Primary Dealers and any other Licensed Commercial Banks

Acuity Securities Ltd.	2206297	NatWealth Securities Ltd.	4703000
Bank of Ceylon	2541938	NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd.	2564601
Capital Alliance Ltd.	2317777	People's Bank	2458935
Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC.	2332319	Sampath Bank PLC.	2305842
Entrust Securities PLC.	2564936	Seylan Bank PLC.	2456340
First Capital Treasuries Ltd.	2639883	WealthTrust Securities Ltd	2675096

Issuing Office
Public Debt Department
Central Bank of Sri Lanka
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1.
Telephone: 2477316 Fax: 2477687
Web: www.cbsl.gov.lk

N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara
Superintendent /Registrar of Public Debt

ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජය

රුපියල් මිලියන 13,000 ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

2013 ජුනි මස 13 වැනි බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා දින 09.00% 2033 "අ" කාණ්ඩය යටතේ රුපියල් මිලියන 08,000 ක සහ 09.00% 2033 "අ" කාණ්ඩය යටතේ රුපියල් මිලියන 5,000 ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කෙරේ. මෙම නිකුතුවට අදාල විස්තර පහත දැක්වේ.

කාණ්ඩය	09.00% 2033 "අ"	09.00% 2043 "අ"
සු.හ.ජා. අංකය*	LKB02033F013	LKB03043F011
වෙන්දේසියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන ප්‍රමාණය	රුපියල් මිලියන 8,000	රුපියල් මිලියන 5,000
කල්පිරීමේ කාලය	වසර 20	වසර 30
පොළී අනුපාතිකය	වර්ෂයකට සියයට 09.00	වර්ෂයකට සියයට 09.00
නිකුතුවේ දිනය	2013 ජුනි 01 වැනි දින	2013 ජුනි 01 වැනි දින
කල් පිරෙන දිනය	2033 ජුනි 01 වැනි දින	2043 ජුනි 01වැනි දින
පොළී ගෙවන දිනයන්	ජුනි 01 වැනි දින සහ දෙසැම්බර් 01 වැනි දින	ජුනි 01 වැනි දින සහ දෙසැම්බර් 01 වැනි දින
උපචිත පොළිය	රුපියල් 100 ක් සඳහා රු. 0.3935	රුපියල් 100 ක් සඳහා රු. 0.3935
වෙන්දේසි කරන දිනය	2013 ජුනි මස 13 වැනි දින	
ටෙන්ඩර් භාරගන්නා අවසාන දිනය හා වේලාව	2013 ජුනි මස 13 වැනි බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා පෙ.ව. 11.00 ට	
ගෙවීම් කළ යුතු දිනය	2013 ජුනි මස 17 වැනි දින	
ටෙන්ඩර් සඳහා අවම මුදල	රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂ පහක් (5,000,000) සහ ඉන් අනතුරුව රුපියල් දශ ලක්ෂයේ (1,000,000) ගුණිතයන්ගෙනි	

* සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ ජාත්‍යන්තර අංක

ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්ගෙන් ලංසු කැඳවනු ලැබේ. ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුත්තේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සපයනු ලැබ ඇති විද්‍යුත් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ පහසුකම මගින් පමණකි. නිකුත් කළ දින සිට පියවීම් කරනු ලබන දිනට උපචිත පොළිය රහිත මිළ පදනම් කර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවනු ලැබේ.

පහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්ගෙන් සහ අනෙකුත් බලපත්‍රලාභී වාණිජ බැංකුවලින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගන්නා ලෙස මහජනතාවට දැනුම් දෙනු ලැබේ.

ඇකියුටි සෙකියුරිටීස් ලිමිටඩ්	2206297	නැවෙල්ක් සෙකියුරිටීස් ලිමිටඩ්	4703000
එන්ට්‍රස්ට් සෙකියුරිටීස් පී.එල්.සී.	2564936	ෆස්ට් කැපිටල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ්	2639883
		මහජන බැංකුව	2458935
එන්.එස්.බී. ෆන්ඩ් මැනේජ්මන්ට් කම්පැනි ලිමිටඩ්	2564601	ලංකා බැංකුව	2541938
කැපිටල් එලයන්ස් ලිමිටඩ්	2317777	වෙල්ත් ට්‍රස්ට් සෙකියුරිටීස් ලිමිටඩ්	2675096
		සම්පත් බැන්ක් පී.එල්.සී.	2305842
කොමර්ෂල් බැන්ක් ඔෆ් සිලෝන් පී.එල්.සී.	2332319	සෙලාන් බැන්ක් පී.එල්.සී	2456340

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර
රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී/ලේඛකාධිකාරී

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
30, ජනාධිපති මාවත
කොළඹ 01.

දුරකථන : 2477316 ෆැක්ස් : 2477687
http://www.cbsl.gov.lk

இலங்கை சனநாயக சோசலிசக் குடியரசு
ரூ. 10,000 மில்லியன் திறைசேரி முறிகளை வழங்கல்

18 "அ" இன் 08.00% தொடர்களின் கீழ் ரூ.2,000 மில்லியனையும் 2022 "அ" இன் 08.00% தொடர்களின் கீழ் ரூ.3,000 மில்லியனையும் 2033 "அ" இன் 09.00% தொடர்களின் கீழ் ரூ. 5,000 மில்லியனையும் கொண்ட திறைசேரி முறிகள் 2013 யூலை ஆம் திகதி இடம்பெறும் ஏலங்களின் அடிப்படையில் வழங்கப்படுகின்றன.

இத்திறைசேரி முறிகளின் விபரங்கள் கீழே தரப்படுகின்றன.

நாடர்கள்	08.00% 2018 "அ"	08.00% 2022 "அ"	09.00% 2033 "அ"
ISIN	LKB00718K151	LKB01022A018	LKB02033F013
ங்கப்பட்ட தொகை	ரூ. 2,000 மில்லியன்	ரூ. 3,000 மில்லியன்	ரூ. 5,000 மில்லியன்
முதிர்ச்சிக்கான காலம்	5 வருடங்கள் 4 மாதங்கள்	8 வருடங்கள் 6 மாதங்கள்	19 வருடங்கள் 11 மாதங்கள்
க்கு வீதம்	08.00% ஆண்டொன்றிற்கு	08.00% ஆண்டொன்றிற்கு	09.00% ஆண்டொன்றிற்கு
வழங்கப்பட்ட திகதி	15 நவெம்பர் 2011	01 சனவரி 2012	01 யூன் 2013
முதிர்வுத் திகதி	15 நவெம்பர் 2018	01 சனவரி 2022	01 யூன் 2033
வட்டிக் கொடுப்பனவுக்குரிய நாட்கள்	15 மே, 15 நவெம்பர்	01 சனவரி, 01 யூலை	01 யூன், 01 திசெம்பர்
ஒன்று சேர்ந்த வட்டி வீதம்	ரூ.100.00 இற்கு ரூ.1.3261	ரூ.100.00 இற்கு ரூ.0.3044	ரூ.100.00 இற்கு ரூ.1.0820
விற்பனைத் திகதி	2013 யூலை 11		
கேள்விப் பத்திரங்கள் மூடப்படும் திகதியும் நேரமும்	2013 யூலை 11, வியாழக்கிழமை மு.ப.11.00 மணி		
ப்பனவுத் திகதி	2013 யூலை 15		
விலைக்குறிப்பீடுகளின் ஆகக் குறைந்த தொகை	ஐந்து மில்லியன் ரூபாய்கள் (ரூ.5,000,000/-) அத்துடன் ஒரு மில்லியன் ரூபாய்களின் (ரூ.1,000,000/-) பெருக்கங்களிலிருந்து.		

திறைசேரி முறிகளிலுள்ள முதனிலை வணிகர்களிடமிருந்து உண்மையான விலைகளின் (தொடர்கள் வழங்கப்பட்ட நாளிலிருந்து தீர்ப்பனவு செய்யும் நாள் வரையான ஒன்று சேர்ந்த வட்டி நீங்கலாக) அடிப்படையில் விலைக்குறிப்பீடுகள் கோரப்படுகின்றன. விலைக்குறிப்பீடுகள் இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியினால் வழங்கப்படும் இலத்திரனியல் விலைக்குறிப்பீட்டு வசதிகளினூடாக மாத்திரமே மேற்கொள்ளப்படல் வேண்டும்.

கீழ்க்காணும் முதனிலை வணிகர்களிடமிருந்தும் எந்தவொரு உரிமம் பெற்ற வர்த்தக வங்கிகளிடமிருந்தும் திறைசேரி முறிகளைக் கொள்வனவு செய்யுமாறு பொதுமக்கள் வேண்டப்படுகின்றனர்.

வ/ப அக்குயிட்டி செக்குரிட்டீஸ்	2206297	வ/ப நட்வெல்த் செக்குரிட்டீஸ்	4703000
இலங்கை வங்கி	2541938	வ/ப தேசிய சேமிப்பு வங்கி நிதி முகாமைத்துவ கம்பனி	2564601
வ/ப கெப்பிட்டல் எலையன்ஸ்	2317777	மக்கள் வங்கி	2458935
இலங்கை கொமர்ஷல் வங்கி பிஎல்சி	2332319	சம்பத் வங்கி பிஎல்சி	2305842
என்றஸ்ற் செக்குரிட்டீஸ் பிஎல்சி	2564936	செலான் வங்கி பிஎல்சி	2456340
வ/ப வ்வெஸ்ட் கெப்பிட்டல் ரெஸரீஸ்	2639883	வ/ப வெல்த்றஸ்ற் செக்குரிட்டீஸ்	2675096

என். டபிள்யு. ஜீ. ஆர். டி. நாணயக்கார
கண்காணிப்பாளர்/ பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளர்

பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம்
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
30, சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை, கொழும்பு - 1
தொலைபேசி: 2477316 தொலைநகல்: 2477687
வெப்தளம்: www.cbsl.gov.lk

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

ISSUE OF RS 10,000 MILLION TREASURY BONDS

Rs.2,000 million Treasury Bonds under the series of 08.00% 2018'A', Rs. 3,000 million Treasury Bonds under the series of 08.00% 2022'A' and Rs. 5,000 million Treasury Bonds under the series of 09.00% 2033'A' are to be issued through an auction on July 11, 2013.

The details of these Treasury Bonds are as follows.

Series	08.00% 2018 'A'	08.00% 2022 'A'	09.00% 2033 'A'
ISIN	LKB00718K151	LKB01022A018	LKB02033F013
Amount offered	Rs. 2,000 million	Rs. 3,000 million	Rs. 5,000 million
Period to maturity	05 Years 04 Months	08 Years 06 Months	19 Years 11 Months
Coupon rate	08.00% per annum	08.00% per annum	09.00% per annum
Date of issue	15 November 2011	01 January 2012	01 June 2013
Date of maturity	15 November 2018	01 January 2022	01 June 2033
Dates of interest payment	15 May & 15 November	01 January & 01 July	01 June & 01 December
Accrued Interest Rate	Rs 1.3261 per Rs. 100.00	Rs 0.3044 per Rs. 100.00	Rs 1.0820 per Rs. 100.00
Date of auction	11 July 2013		
Closing date and time of tenders	Thursday, 11th July 2013 at 11.00 a.m.		
Date of settlement	15 July 2013		
Minimum amount of bid	Rupees five million (Rs.5, 000,000/-) and multiples of Rupees one million (Rs.1, 000,000/-) there onwards.		

Bids are invited from the Primary Dealers in Treasury Bonds on the basis of clean prices (exclusive of accrued interest from the date of issue of the series to the date of settlement). Bids should be made only through the electronic bidding facility provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

The general public is invited to purchase Treasury Bonds from the following Primary Dealers and any other Licensed Commercial Bank

Acuity Securities Ltd.	2206297	NatWealth Securities Ltd.	4703000
Bank of Ceylon	2541938	NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd.	2564601
Capital Alliance Ltd.	2317777	People's Bank	2458935
Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC	2332319	Sampath Bank PLC	2305842
Entrust Securities PLC	2564936	Seylan Bank PLC	2456340
First Capital Treasuries Ltd.	2639883	WealthTrust Securities Ltd	2675096

N W G R D Nanayakkara
Superintendent /Registrar of Public Debt

Public Debt Department
Central Bank of Sri Lanka
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1.
Telephone: 2477316 Fax: 2477687
Web: www.cbsl.gov.lk

Report No : x
Date Of Issue :- dd/mm/yyyy
dd/mm/yyyy

FO - 6A

Central Bank Of Sri Lanka
Department Of Public Debt
Tender Information Of Treasury Bills

Seq. No	Dealer	Amount Tender(Rs)	Bid price Per Rs. 100	Maturity Period
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	99	xxx
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	99	xxx
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	99	xxx
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	99	xxx

Report No : 1
Date Of Issue: dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Period : xxx
dd/mm/yyyy

FO - 6B

Central Bank Of Sri Lanka
Department Of Public Debt
Tender Information Of Treasury Bills

Seq. No	Dealer's Name	Number Of Bids
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	x
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	x
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	x
		x
		xx

Report No. 2
Date Of Issue : dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Period: xxx
Date Of Maturity : dd/mm/yyyy
ISIN : LKA00000X000

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT
RANKED TENDER INFORMATION ON TREASURY BILLS

dd/mm/yyyy

Seq No	Amount Tendered	Amount Payable	Bid Price	Discount Rate (p.a)	Yield Rate (p.a)	Cumulative Amount Tendered (Rs.)	Cumulative Amount Payable (Rs.)	Weighted Average Price	Weighted Av. Discount Rate	W.Average Yield Rate
0	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99
0	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99
0	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99
0	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99

FO 713

Report No. 3
Date Of Issue : dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Period: xxx
Date of Maturity : dd/mm/yyyy
ISIN : LKA00000X000
dd/mm/yyyy

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT
LIST OF ACCEPTED TENDERS

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Amount Payable	Yield Rate (p.a)	Net of Yield Tax	Cumulative Amount Tendered (Rs.)	Cumulative Amount Payable (Rs.)	Weighted Average Price	W.Ave Yield Rate (p.a)	WAYRNT
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999	99.99999	999,999,999	9.99	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.99	9.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999	99.99999	999,999,999	9.99	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.99	9.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999	99.99999	999,999,999	9.99	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.99	9.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999	99.99999	999,999,999	9.99	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.99	9.99

Accept Bids ( ) to ( ) at prices Shown In 'Bid Price' Column (Column 4)

Chairman
Treasury Bill Tender Committee

403

Report No. 7
Date Of Issue : dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Period: xxx
Date of Maturity : dd/mm/yyyy
ISIN : LKA00000X000

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT
RANKED TENDER INFORMATION ON TREASURY BILLS
(COMPOUND YIELD RATES)

dd/mm/yyyy

Seq No	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Discount Rate (p.a)	Yield Rate (p.a)	Cumulative Amount Tendered (Rs.)	Cumulative Amount Payable (Rs.)	Weighted Average Price	Weighted Av. Discount Rate	W. Av. Yield Rate	182 Days Compound Rate	364 Days Compound Rate
0	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99	9.99	9.99
0	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99	9.99	9.99
0	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99	9.99	9.99
0	999,999,999	99.99999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99	9.99	9.99

Report No. 5
Date Of Issue : dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Period : xxx
Date Of Maturity : dd/mm/yyyy
ISIN : LKA00000X000
dd/mm/yyyy

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA -- DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT
TREASURY BILL PRIMARY MARKET
OWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION OF TENDERS RECEIVED FROM DEALERS

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Amount Payable	Total Interest	Total Tax Amount
0	CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Commercial Bank Primary Dealers					
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
Non - Commercial Bank Primary Dealers					
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99

FO-9A

Treasury Bond Issue xxxx 0000
Total Amount Offered 0000 Mn

Report No : 1
Settlement Date : dd/mm/yyyy

Loan 00.00%0000X

Series No :000
Coupon Rate : 00.00% Per Annum

Central Bank Of Sri Lanka
Department Of Public Debt
Tender Information Of Treasury Bonds

Seq. No	Dealer	Serial No	Tender Amount (Rs)	Bid price per Rs.100
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	0	999,999,999.99	0
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	0	999,999,999.99	0
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	0	999,999,999.99	0
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	0	999,999,999.99	0

FO-9B

Treasury Bond Issue xxxx 0000
Total Amount Offered 0000 Mn

Report No : 1
Settlement Date : dd/mm/yyyy

Loan Title : 00.00%0000X

Series No :000
Coupon Rate : 00.00% Per Annum

Central Bank Of Sri Lanka
Department Of Public Debt
Tender Information Of Treasury Bonds

Seq. No	Dealer's Name	Number Of Bids
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	0
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	0
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	0
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	0

FO-10A

FO - 15B

Treasury Bond Issue xxxx 0000

Amount Offered - Rs 0000 Mn

Loan Title: 00.00%0000X
Maturity Period:
ISIN : LKB00000X000

Series No: 0
Auction Number: 0
Accrued Interest Rate: 0.0000

Settlement Date : dd/mm/yyyy
Issue Date Of The Series: dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Date Of The Series: dd/mm/yyyy
Coupon Rate: 0.00%

dd/mm/yyyy

Seq No	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Amount Payable	Accrued Interest	Cumulative Amount Tendered	Maturity	Cumulative Amount Payable	Cumulative Accrued Amount	Weighted Average Price	W.Average Yield to Maturity
0	999,999,999.99	99.9999	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	99.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	99.9999	99.99
0	999,999,999.99	99.9999	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	99.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	99.9999	99.99
0	999,999,999.99	99.9999	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	99.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	99.9999	99.99
0	999,999,999.99	99.9999	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	99.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	99.9999	99.99

413

Treasury Bond Issue xxxx 0000
Amount Offered - Rs 0000 Mn

Settlement Date : dd/mm/yyyy
Issue Date Of The Series: dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Date Of The Series: dd/mm/yyyy
Coupon Rate: 0.00%

Loan Title: 00.00%0000X
Maturity Period: 00 Years and 00 Months
ISIN : LKB00000X000

Series No: 0
Auction Number: 0
Accrued Interest Rate: 0.0000

dd/mm/yyyy

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Amount Payable	Yield to Maturity	Yield Net of Tax	Cumulative Amount Tendered	Cumulative Amount Payable	Weighted Average Price	W.Ave Yield to Maturity	WAYRNT
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	9,999,999,999.99	99.99999	9,999,999,999.99	99.99	99.99	9,999,999,999.99	9,999,999,999.99	99.9999	99.99	
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	9,999,999,999.99	99.99999	9,999,999,999.99	99.99	99.99	9,999,999,999.99	9,999,999,999.99	99.9999	99.99	
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	9,999,999,999.99	99.99999	9,999,999,999.99	99.99	99.99	9,999,999,999.99	9,999,999,999.99	99.9999	99.99	
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	9,999,999,999.99	99.99999	9,999,999,999.99	99.99	99.99	9,999,999,999.99	9,999,999,999.99	99.9999	99.99	

Accept Bids ( ) to ( ) and Balance _____ to _____ at prices Shown In 'Bid Price' Column (Column 4)

_____
Chairman
Treasury Bond Tender Committee

FO-11
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CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA -- DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT

TREASURY BONDS PRIMARY MARKET

OWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION OF RECEIVED TENDERS FROM DEALERS

Settlement Date : dd/mm/yyyy
Issue Date Of The Series: dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Date Of The Serie dd/mm/yyyy
Coupon Rate: 0.00%
ISIN: LKB00000X000

Series No: x
Auction Number: xxx
Accrued Interest Rate: x.xx
Series : 00.00%000

dd/mm/yyyy

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Amount Payable	Accrued Interest	Amount Payable + Accrued	Tax Amount	Total Amount Payable
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.

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TOR/Mandate and Objectives of Treasury Bill/Bond Tender Board

Mandate/TOR

The Treasury Bill/Bond Tender Board consists of the following members:

Deputy Governor (Chairman)
Assistant to the Governor (Member)
Superintendent of Public Debt (Member)
Director, Domestic Operation Department (Member)
Director, Economic Research Department (Member)
Additional Superintendent of Public Debt (Secretary and Member)

The Tender Board should report to the Governor. The Tender Board meets after closing of each and every Treasury Bill/Bond auction.

Objective

The objective of the Treasury Bill/Bond Tender Board is to determine the maturity-wise volume to be issued and the cut-off point to accept Treasury Bills/Bonds at each auction taking in to account the developments in the market and Treasury's borrowing needs while adhering to monetary policy requirements of the Central Bank.

TREASURY BILL AUCTION SUMMARY

F0-13

AUCTION DATE : 26-Jun-13
ISSUE DATE : 28-Jun-13
SETTLEMENT DATE : 28-Jun-13

(Amounts in Rs Mn and Yield Rates After Tax)

PREVIOUS AUCTION: 3M, 6M, 1Y	91 Days LKA09113I201	182 Days LKA18213L202	364 Days LKA36414F206	Total	Excess/Shortfall
AMOUNT OFFERED/ RE-ISSUE	1,000	2,000	9,000	12,000	-1,249
CUT-OFF YIELD	8.68	9.83	10.87		
W.A. YIELD	8.66	9.80	10.85		
TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED	1,590	2,016	7,145	10,751	
COMPOSITE YIELD RATE				10.33	
ANNUALISED COMPOUND RATE	8.98	10.07	10.85		
COMPOSITE COMPOUND RATE				10.43	

CURRENT AUCTION DETAILS:	91 Days LKA09113I276	182 Days LKA18213L277	364 Days LKA36414F271		Excess/Shortfall
AMOUNT MATURING (Rs Mn)	825	6,355	8,124	15,304	
O/W: AMOUNT HELD BY CBSL (24.06.2013)				418	
CBSL GROSS HOLDINGS OF TBILLS (FV)-				130,416	
-AS AT 24.06.2013					
AMOUNT TO BE RETIRED				0	
RESERVED FOR MGD FUNDS & OTHER (BV)				0	
RESERVED FOR CBSL					
Funds already arranged (BV)				0	
AMOUNT OFFERED/ RE-ISSUE	1,000	2,000	9,000	12,000	
NEW ISSUES TO THE MARKET	0	0	0	0	
RSVD TO THE MGD FUNDS/ CBSL/RETIRED	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL AMOUNT OFFERED TO THE MARKET	1,000	2,000	9,000	12,000	
TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED	1,620	8,717	44,400	54,737	
OPTION 1: (Previous Cut-off Yield)-Indicative					
CUT-OFF YIELD	8.67	9.80	10.87		
W.A. YIELD	8.62	9.69	10.69		
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (Rs Mn)	488	7,412	41,100	49,000	37,000
COMPOSITE YIELD RATE				10.51	
ANNUALISED COMPOUND RATE	8.93	9.95	10.69		
COMPOSITE COMPOUND RATE				10.56	
Change in Cut Off (in bps)	-1	-3	0		
Change in WAYR (in bps)	-4	-11	-16		
OPTION 2: (Previous W.A.Yield)-Indicative					
CUT-OFF YIELD	9.00	10.85	12.15		
W.A. YIELD	8.66	9.79	10.73		
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (Rs Mn)	627	8,717	44,400	53,744	41,744
COMPOSITE YIELD RATE				10.56	
ANNUALISED COMPOUND RATE	8.98	10.05	10.73		
COMPOSITE COMPOUND RATE				10.60	
Change in Cut Off (in bps)	32	102	128		
Change in WAYR (in bps)	0	-1	-12		
OPTION 3 : Increase in WAYR by 5bps for 3M, 6M & 1Yr					
CUT-OFF YIELD	9.00	9.70	10.75		
W.A. YIELD	8.71	9.66	10.64		
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (Rs Mn)	737	6,053	31,003	37,793	25,793
COMPOSITE YIELD RATE				10.45	
ANNUALISED COMPOUND RATE	9.04	9.92	10.64		
COMPOSITE COMPOUND RATE				10.50	
Change in Cut Off (in bps)	32	-13	-12		
Change in WAYR (in bps)	5	-14	-21		

TREASURY BILL AUCTION SUMMARY

CURRENT AUCTION DETAILS:	91 Days LKA09113I276	182 Days LKA18213L277	364 Days LKA36414F271		Excess/Shortfall
OPTION 4: Accept Amount Offered					
CUT-OFF YIELD	9.35	9.64	10.55		
W.A. YIELD	8.85	9.61	10.54		
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (Rs Mn)	*1,000*	*2,000*	*9,000*	*12,000*	0
COMPOSITE YIELD RATE				10.25	
ANNUALISED COMPOUND RATE	9.18	9.87	10.54		
COMPOSITE COMPOUND RATE				10.32	
Change in Cut Off (in bps)	67	-19	-32		
Change in WAYR (in bps)	19	-19	-31		
Department Recommendation					
CUT-OFF YIELD	9.00	10.10	10.79		
W.A. YIELD	8.66	9.70	10.66		
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (Rs Mn)	*627*	*7,712*	*34,100*	*42,439*	30,439
COMPOSITE YIELD RATE				10.45	
ANNUALISED COMPOUND RATE	8.98	9.96	10.66		
COMPOSITE COMPOUND RATE				10.51	
Change in Cut Off (in bps)	32	27	-8		
Change in WAYR (in bps)	0	-10	-19		

TWENTY YEARS TREASURY BOND AUCTION : 13-06-2013 1

SETTLEMENT DATE : 17-06-2013
ISSUE DATE : 01-06-2013
MATURITY DATE : 01-06-2033
Series: 09.00% 2033 A

(RATES % P.A.)
(AMOUNTS IN RS. MN)

		without tax	with tax
ISIN	LKB02032A016		
PREVIOUS 20 YEARS AUCTION - 08.00% 2032 A (30-01-2012)			
ACCEPTED AMOUNT			
O/W AT PREMIUM			1,026
AT PAR			
AT DISCOUNT			
COUPON RATE			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			8.00
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		10.9980	12.2200
		10.9980	12.2200
ISIN	LKB02033F013	without tax	with tax
CURRENT 20 YEARS AUCTION - 09.00% 2033 A (13-06-2013)			
AMOUNT OFFERED			
COUPON RATE			8,000
BIDS RECEIVED			9.00
	AT PREMIUM		
	AT PAR		
	AT DISCOUNT		
			17,700
OPTION 1- PREVIOUS CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		12.1500	13.5000
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		12.1500	13.5000
			50
OPTION 2- PREVIOUS W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		12.1500	13.5000
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		12.1500	13.5000
			50
OPTION 3- ACCEPT ALL BIDS (INDICATIVE)			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		21.9996	24.4440
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		13.5099	15.0110
Change of WAYR (in basis points)		251	17,700
OPTION 4- ACCEPT AMOUNT OFFERED			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		12.1500	13.5000
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		12.1500	13.5000
Change of WAYR (in basis points)		116	8,000
OPTION 5- If Accept Rs. 8,450 Million			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		13.2003	14.6670
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		12.1815	13.5350
Change of WAYR (in basis points)		118	8,450
OPTION 6- If Accept Rs. 9,100 Million			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		13.5000	15.0000
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		12.2625	13.6250
Change of WAYR (in basis points)		126	9,100
OPTION 7- If Accept Rs. 9,500 Million			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		13.7502	15.2780
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		12.3174	13.6860
Change of WAYR (in basis points)		132	9,500
Department Recommendation			
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY			
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		12.1500	13.5000
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		12.1500	13.5000
Change of WAYR (in basis points)		115	8,050

THIRTY YEARS TREASURY BOND AUCTION : 13-06-2013 2

SETTLEMENT DATE : 17-06-2013
ISSUE DATE : 01-06-2013
MATURITY DATE : 01-06-2043
Series: 09.00% 2043 A

(RATES % P.A.)
(AMOUNTS IN RS. MN)

		without tax	with tax
ISIN	LKB03043F011		
PREVIOUS 30 YEARS AUCTION - 09.00% 2043 A (30-05-2013)			
ACCEPTED AMOUNT			3,000
O/W AT PREMIUM			
AT PAR			3,000
AT DISCOUNT			9.00
COUPON RATE		12.5001	13.8890
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY		12.5001	13.8890
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY			

		without tax	with tax
ISIN	LKB03043F011		
CURRENT 30 YEARS AUCTION - 09.00% 2043 A (13-06-2013)			
AMOUNT OFFERED			5,000
COUPON RATE			9.00
BIDS RECEIVED	AT PREMIUM		
	AT PAR		
	AT DISCOUNT		11,150

	without tax	with tax
OPTION 1- PREVIOUS CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5001	13.8890
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5001	13.8890
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		5,050
OPTION 2- PREVIOUS W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5001	13.8890
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5001	13.8890
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		5,050
OPTION 3- ACCEPT ALL BIDS (INDICATIVE)		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	25.0002	27.7780
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	13.9158	15.4620
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		11,150
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	142	
OPTION 4- ACCEPT AMOUNT OFFERED		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5001	13.8890
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5001	13.8890
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		5,000
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	0	
OPTION 5- If Accept Rs. 5,500 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	13.5000	15.0000
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5667	13.9630
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		5,500
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	7	
OPTION 6- If Accept Rs. 6,000 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	14.1003	15.6670
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.6729	14.0810
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		6,000
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	17	
OPTION 7- If Accept Rs. 6,150 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	14.2497	15.8330
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.7071	14.1190
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		6,150
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	21	
Department Recommendation		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5001	13.8890
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.5001	13.8890
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT DISCOUNT)		5,050
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	0	

FO-15A

Yield Rates of T Bills at Primary Auctions – yyyy

Date of Issue		CUT - OFF (Net of Tax)			WAYR (Net of Tax)			WAYR (With Tax)			Composite Rate (Net of Tax)
		91 D	182 D	364 D	91 D	182 D	364 D	91 D	182 D	364 D	
mm	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
mm	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	dd	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Primary & Secondary Market Yield Curve - Government Securities Market					
	Secondary Market	Primary Market	Secondary Market	Secondary Market	Today's Auction
Average Maturity	dd/mm/yyyy	Last Auction	Last Week	Today (dd/mm/yyyy)	
3 Month	10.00	**8.65**	8.65	8.65	8.66
6 Month	11.40	**9.70**	9.75	9.75	9.70
12 Month	11.50	**10.66**	10.65	10.65	10.66
2 Year	11.50	13.62	11.00	11.10	
3 Year	11.90	10.98	11.15	11.10	
4 Year	11.95	14.10	11.25	11.30	
5 Year	11.85	11.45	11.36	11.38	
6 Year	11.90	10.97			
8 Year		11.44	11.65	11.65	
9 Year		11.77		11.75	
10 Year		11.80			
12 Year		12.09			
15 Year		12.21			
20 Year		12.15			
30 Year		12.50			



TREASURY BONDS

Table of Yield Rates at Primary Issues

Remaining Maturity (Years)	Settlement Date	Yield Rates NET OF TAX (% p.a.)		Yield Rates WITH TAX (% p.a.)		Coupon (%)
		Cut Off	WAYR	Cut Off	WAYR	
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# Year	dd/mm/yyyy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

FO-16B

Primary & Secondary Market Yield Curve - Government Securities Market					
	Secondary Market	Primary Market	Secondary Market	Secondary Market	Today's Auction
Average Maturity	dd/mm/yyyy	Last Auction	Last Week	Today (dd/mm/yyyy)	
3 Month	10.00	8.63	8.65	8.65	
6 Month	11.40	9.68	9.75	9.75	
12 Month	11.50	10.64	10.65	10.65	
2 Year	11.50	13.62	11.10	11.10	
3 Year	11.90	10.98	11.15	11.10	
4 Year	11.95	14.10	11.30	11.30	
5 Year	11.85	11.45	11.50	11.30	11.17
6 Year	11.90	10.97			
8 Year		11.44	11.65	11.65	11.55
10 Year		11.80			
12 year		12.09			
15 Year		12.21			
20 Year		12.15			12.30
30 Year		12.50			



FO – 17

G / DG(S) / AG(A)

Treasury bill Auction – June 26, 2013

The weekly primary auction for the week ending 28-06-2013 was held today. The details of the auction are as follows.

Rs. Million

Maturity	91 D	182 D	364 D	Total
1. Amounts Maturing (FV)	825	6,355	8,124	15,304
o/w, amount held by CBSL				418
Amount Maturing (BV)				14,151
2. Amount Reserved				
CBSL				
CB Managed Funds & Others (FV)				
3. Amount to be retired - CBSL				
- Public				
4. Auction Details (FV)				
4.1 Amount Offered to the Auction	1,000	2,000	9,000	12,000
4.2 Total Bids Received	1,620	8,717	44,400	54,737
4.3 Amount Accepted	627	7,712	34,100	42,439
5. Allocated to CBSL (BV)				
6. Pre-arranged funds (BV)				
T bills / T bonds				
7.Weighted Average Yield Rate (WAYR) % (after tax) (Auction)				
This Week	**8.66**	**9.70**	**10.66**	**10.45**
Last Auction 19/06/2013	**8.66**	**9.80**	**10.85**	**10.33**
Change (basis points)	0	-10	-19	12

Observations;

1. **Today's auction:** Yield rates declined reflecting the reduction in the SRR.
2. **Secondary market rates:** Yield rates across the yield curve came down after the Monetary Board reduced the SRR on all rupee deposit liabilities of commercial banks by 2% to 6% with effect from 1.07.2013.
3. **Market behavior and expectations:** Yield rates to increase on speculation foreign investors would sell-off their positions on the news that the US Federal Reserve would start to unwind its stimulus program.

Considering the above situation in the market, the Treasury bill Tender Board decided to accept Rs. 42,439 million from the auction.

The Press Release is attached.

Submitted for information and approval please.

SPD
26-06-2013

FO – 18

G / DG(S) /AG(A)

20 Years and 30 Years
TREASURY BOND auctions held on 13 June, 2013

The primary auctions for 20 Years and 30 Years Treasury bond series was held today. The details of auction is as follows;

Series and Maturity	09.00% 2033 'A' Series	09.00% 2043 'A' Series
Amount offered (Rs. Mn.)	8,000	5,000
Period of maturity	20 Years	30 Years
Total bids received (Rs. Mn.)	17,700	11,150
Yield range for total bids received % p.a. (after tax)	12.15 – 22.00	12.50 – 27.78
Current Auction (13-06-2013)		
Accepted amount (Rs. Mn.)	8,050	5,050
WAYR % p.a. (after tax)	12.15	12.50
Yield range for accepted bids % p.a. (after tax)	12.15 – 12.15	12.50 – 12.50
Previous Auction		
Date	30.01.2012	30.05.2013
Accepted amount (Rs. Mn.)	1,026	3,000
WAYR % p.a. (after tax)	11.00	12.50
Yield range for accepted bids % p.a. (after tax)	11.00 – 11.00	12.50 – 12.50

Observations;
Today's auction: Bids accepted were from captive sources.

Secondary market rates: T-bond yield rates increased marginally as there was some selling by the foreign investors.

Market behavior and expectations: Yield rates to increase on speculation foreign investors would sell-off their positions on the news that the US Federal Reserve would start to unwind its stimulus program.

Considering the above situation in the market, the Treasury Bond Tender Board decided to accept Rs. 8,050 million from the 09.00% 2033A bond series and Rs. 5,050 million from the 09.00% 2043A bond series from the auction.

The press release with details is annexed.

Submitted for your information and approval pl.

SPD
13-06-2013

FO-19
1/2

Date Of Auction :- dd/mm/yyyy

dd/mm/yyyy

Central Bank Of Sri Lanka
Department Of Public Debt
Tender Information Of Treasury Bills

Seq. No	Dealer	Maturity (Days) / Amount (Rs) 091	182	364	Total
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99
Grand Total					

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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

CommunicationsDepartment
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka.
Tel: 2477424, 2477423, 2477311
Fax: 2346257, 2477739
E-mail: dcommunications@cbsl.lk, communications@cbsl.lk
Web: www.cbsl.gov.lk

Press Release

Issued By: **Public Debt Department**
Date: 26 June, 2013

TREASURY BILL AUCTION

The weekly primary auction for the week ending 28 June, 2013 for the re-issue of Rs. 12,000 million maturing Treasury bills was held today. The auction was oversubscribed with bids amounting to Rs. 54,737 million being received. It was decided to accept Rs. 42,439 million from the auction.

The details of the auction are as follows:-

Maturity (Days)	Bids Received (Rs.Mn.)	Amount Accepted (Rs.Mn.)	Weighted Average Yield Percent per annum After Tax	
			This Week	Last Auction
91 LKA09113I276*	1,620	627	8.66	8.66
182 LKA18213L277*	8,717	7,712	9.70	9.80
364 LKA36414F271*	44,400	34,100	10.66	10.85
Total	54,737	42,439		

* International Securities Identification Number.

The date of settlement is 28 June 2013

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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

Communications Department
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka.
Tel : 2477424, 2477423, 2477311
Fax: 2346257, 2477739
E-mail: dcommunications@cbsl.lk, communications@cbsl.lk
Web: www.cbsl.gov.lk

Press Release

Issued By: Public Debt Department
Date: 13 June, 2013

20 Years and 30 Years

TREASURY BOND auctions held on 13 June, 2013

(Amounts in Rs. Million)

	09.00% 2033 'A' Series	09.00% 2043 'A' Series
Period to Maturity	20 Years	30 Years
Date of Maturity	01-06-2033	01-06-2043
ISIN *	LKB02033F013	LKB03043F011
Coupon Rate	09.00%	09.00%
Amount Offered	8,000	5,000
Bids Received	17,700	11,150
Amount Accepted	**8,050**	**5,050**
Weighted Average Yield (p.a. net of tax)	12.15	12.50
Date of Settlement	17-06-2013	17-06-2013

* International Securities Identification Number.

FO-22

Information of Treasury Bill Issue on 28-Jun-13

Basic Information :	Face Value	Book Value	Interest
Total Amount Maturing	9,999,999,999.00	9,999,999,999.00	-
Book Value Difference	9,999,999,999.00	9,999,999,999.00	-
Allocation :			
Primary Dealers	9,999,999,999.00	9,999,999,999.00	-
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	-	-	-
CBSL	-	-	-
Total Issues	**9,999,999,999.00**	**9,999,999,999.00**	-

ISIN		LKA00000X000	LKA00000X000	LKA00000X000	
Maturity Period (Days)		91	182	364	Total
Maturity Date		27-Sep-13	27-Dec-13	27-Jun-14	
Primary Dealers	Face Value	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	9,999,999,999.00
	Book Value	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	9,999,999,999.00
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	Face Value	-	-	-	-
	Book Value	-	-	-	-
CBSL	Face Value	-	-	-	-
	Book Value	-	-	-	-
Total Issues	**Face Value**	**999,999,999.00**	**999,999,999.00**	**999,999,999.00**	**9,999,999,999.00**
	Book Value	**999,999,999.00**	**999,999,999.00**	**999,999,999.00**	**9,999,999,999.00**
Total Interest		-	-	-	-
Weighted Average	**Bid Price**	**99.9999**	**99.9999**	**99.9999**	
	Discount Rate	**9.9999**	**9.9999**	**9.9999**	
	Yield Rate (with tax)	**9.9999**	**9.9999**	**9.9999**	
	Yield Rate (After tax)	**9.9999**	**9.9999**	**8.9999**	
	Tax Rate per Rs.100/=	**9.9999**	**9.9999**	**9.9999**	

Tax Payments :

Primary Dealers	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	**9,999,999,999.00**
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	-		-	-
CBSL	-	-	-	-
Placements	-	-	-	-
Total Tax	-	-	-	-

Note:

FO-23

Report No. 5
Date Of Issue : dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Period : xxx
Date Of Maturity : dd/mm/yyyy
ISIN : LKA00000X000
dd/mm/yyyy

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA -- DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT
TREASURY BILL PRIMARY MARKET
OWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION OF TENDERS ACCEPTED FROM DEALERS

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Amount Payable	Total Interest	Total Tax Amount
0	CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.9
Commercial Bank Primary Dealers					
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.9
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.9
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.9
Non - Commercial Bank Primary Dealers					
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.9
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.9
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.9
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.99	999,999,999.9

845

FO-24

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA -- DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT

TREASURY BONDS PRIMARY MARKET

OWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION OF ACCEPTED TENDERS FROM DEALERS

Settlement Date : dd/mm/yyyy
Issue Date Of The Series: dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Date Of The Serie dd/mm/yyyy
Coupon Rate: 0.00%
ISIN: LKB00000X000

Series No: 0
Auction Number: 0
Accrued Interest Rate: 0.0000
Series : 00.00%0000X

11/07/2013

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Amount Payable	Accrued Interest	Amount Payable with Accrued	Tax Amount	Total Amount Payable
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00
0	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00	999,999,999.00

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Treasury Bills

Issues to Primary Dealers & CB Managed Funds. Primary Auction Issues

Debt Type	Short Name	Maturity Period (Days)	Date Issued	Date of Maturity	Issued Price per Rs. 100/=	Issued Yield % p.a.	Issued Quantity (Face Value)	Coupon Type	Repayment Terms	ISIN
Treasury Bills	T-Bills	91	28-Jun-13	27-Sep-13	97.88	8.66	627,000,000.00	Zero	At Maturity	LKA09113I276
Treasury Bills	T-Bills	182	28-Jun-13	27-Dec-13	95.37	9.70	7,712,000,000.00	Zero	At Maturity	LKA18213L277
Treasury Bills	T-Bills	364	28-Jun-13	27-Jun-14	90.37	10.66	34,100,000,000.00	Zero	At Maturity	LKA36414F271
						Total Issued to Mkt	42,439,000,000.00			

FO-26

Treasury Bonds – Primary Auction Issue

Debt Type	Short Name	Maturity Yrs	Date Issue	Date of Maturity	Coupon	Issued Price	Issued Yield	Coupon Type	Last Coupon/ Issue Date	Next Coupon/ First Coupon	Issued Quantity Rs.	Interest Interval	Series Name	Repayment Term	ISIN	Settlement Date	Mode of the Issue
Treasury Bonds	T-bonds	20	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-33	9.00%	76.5265	12.15%	Fixed	01-Jun-13	01-Dec-13	8,050,000,000.00	Bi-Annualy	09.00% 2033 A	At Maturity	LKB02033F013	17-Jun-13	Auction
Treasury Bonds	T-bonds	30	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-43	9.00%	72.7300	12.50%	Fixed	01-Jun-13	01-Dec-13	5,050,000,000.00	Bi-Annualy	09.00% 2043 A	At Maturity	LKB03043F011	17-Jun-13	Auction

FO-27A

Report No. 2
Date Of Issue : dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Period: xxx
Date Of Maturity : dd/mm/yyyy
ISIN : LKA00000X000

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT
RANKED TENDER INFORMATION ON TREASURY BILLS

dd/mm/yyyy

Seq No	Amount Tendered	Amount Payable	Bid Price	Discount Rate (p.a)	Yield Rate (p.a)	Cumulative Amount Tendered (Rs.)	Cumulative Amount Payable (Rs.)	Weighted Average Price	Weighted Av. Discount Rate	W.Average Yield Rate
1.00	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99
2.00	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99
3.00	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99
4.00	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.9999	9.99

FO-278

Report No. 3
Date Of Issue : dd/mm/yyyy
Maturity Period: xxx
Date of Maturity : dd/mm/yyyy
ISIN : LKA00000X000
dd/mm/yyyy

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT
LIST OF ACCEPTED TENDERS

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Amount Payable	Yield Rate (p.a)	Yield Net of Tax	Cumulative Amount Tendered (Rs.)	Cumulative Amount Payable (Rs.)	Weighted Average Price	W.Ave Yield Rate (p.a)	WAYRN
1.00	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999	99.9999	999,999,999	9.99	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.99	9.9
2.00	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999	99.9999	999,999,999	9.99	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.99	9.9
3.00	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999	99.9999	999,999,999	9.99	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.99	9.9
4.00	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	999,999,999	99.9999	999,999,999	9.99	9.99	999,999,999	999,999,999	99.9999	9.99	9.9

Accept Bids ( ) to ( ) at prices Shown In 'Bid Price' Column (Column 4)

Chairman
Treasury Bill Tender Committee

455

GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET
WEEKLY SUMMARY OF PRIMARY & SECONDARY MARKET TRANSACTIONS
AND WEIGHTED AVERAGE YIELD RATES

Item / Week Ended	Week Ending 03-Jul-2013	Week Ending 26-Jun-2013
Outstanding Stock of Government Securities	Rs Mn	Rs Mn
Treasury Bills		
Outstanding	795,972	805,990
o/w. amounts held by PDs	92,397	86,053
Treasury Bonds		
Outstanding	2,844,872	2,836,753
o/w. amounts held by PDs	32,488	33,446
	0	0
Government Securities held by Foreign Investors	494,587	494,692
Primary Issues		
Treasury Bills		
Amount Offered	12,000	12,000
Total Bids Received	31,359	54,737
Total Bids Accepted	10,618	42,439
Treasury Bonds		
Amount Offered	0	0
Total Bids Received	0	0
Total Bids Accepted	0	0
Latest Primary Issues		
Treasury Bills		
<=91 days	8.6500 %	8.6600 %
<=182 days	9.7000 %	9.7000 %
<=364 days	10.6600 %	10.6600 %
Treasury Bonds		
<2 year Last Issue	0.0000 %	0.0000 %
2 year Last Issue 02/08/2012	13.6200 %	13.6200 %
3 year Last Issue 24/01/2013	10.9800 %	10.9800 %
4 year Last Issue 02/08/2012	14.1000 %	14.1000 %
5 year Last Issue 01/04/2013	11.4500 %	11.4500 %
6 year Last Issue 01/03/2013	10.9700 %	10.9700 %
10 year Last Issue 01/04/2013	11.8000 %	11.8000 %
15 year Last Issue 01/02/2013	12.2100 %	12.2100 %
20 year Last Issue 17/06/2013	12.1500 %	12.1500 %
Secondary market Activities		
Treasury Bills		
Outright Transactions		
Purchased	7,706	2,573
Sold	25,888	12,392
Repo Transactions		
Repurchase	56,930	53,910
Reverse Repurchase	12,315	27,046
Treasury Bonds		
Outright Transactions		
Purchased	13,816	11,736
Sold	17,415	12,694
Repo Transactions		
Repurchase	148,852	154,479
Reverse Repurchase	24,745	20,014

Item / Week Ended	Week Ending 03-Jul-2013	Week Ending 26-Jun-2013
Secondary Market		
Weighted Average Yield Rates	After Tax	After Tax
Treasury Bills		
Purchased		
<=91 days	8.65%	8.65%
<=182 days	9.75%	9.80%
<=364 days	10.65%	10.85%
Sold		
<=91 days	8.60%	8.60%
<=182 days	9.65%	9.70%
<=364 days	10.60%	10.75%
Treasury Bonds		
Purchased		
<=1 year	0.00%	0.00%
<=2 year	11.00%	11.05%
<=3 year	11.15%	11.10%
<=4 year	11.25%	11.20%
<=5 year	11.36%	11.25%
<=10 year	0.00%	0.00%
<=15 year	0.00%	0.00%
>15 year	0.00%	0.00%
Sold		
<=1 year	0.00%	0.00%
<=2 year	10.90%	10.95%
<=3 year	11.05%	11.00%
<=4 year	11.15%	11.10%
<=5 year	11.30%	11.23%
<=10 year	0.00%	0.00%
<=15 year	0.00%	0.00%
>15 year	0.00%	0.00%

Secondary Market Yield Curves



Treasury bonds:
7 years last issue 16/04/2012 -12.50%
8 years last issue 01/02/2013 -11.44%
9 years last issue 02/05/2013 -11.77%
12 years last issue 02/05/2013 -12.09%
30 Years last issue 17/06/2013 - 12.50%

The yield rates of Treasury bills in the primary market auction held on July 03,2013 showed a decline for 091 day maturity while 182 day and 364 day maturities remained same. The Treasury bill auction was oversubscribed with Rs. 31,359 million of bids received against the offered amount of Rs. 12,000 million. Rs. 10,618 million was accepted at the auction.

The total outright transactions reported by primary dealers for the week ending July 03,2013 amounted to Rs.64,825 million, of which Rs.31,231 million was reported for T-bonds and Rs.33,594 million was reported for T-bills. The repurchse and reverse repurchase transactions by primary dealers amounted to Rs.242,842 million for the same period.

Source : Primary Dealer Weekly Reporting System, Public Debt Department, CBSL

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Market Information Summary 16 July 2013

Government Securities Market

Maturity	3 M	6M	1 Y	2 Y	3 Y	4 Y	5 Y	8 Y	15 Y	30 Y
Primary Market - Last Auction (WAYR)	8.63	9.68	10.64	13.62	10.98	14.10	11.17	11.55	12.21	12.50
Secondary Market - Previous Day (Bid Rate)	8.65	9.70	10.65	10.75	10.85	11.10	11.33	11.60		
Secondary Market - Today (Bid Rate)	8.65	9.70	10.65	10.75	11.00	11.15	11.35	11.65		





Call Money & Repo Market

Date	4-Jul	5-Jul	8-Jul	9-Jul	10-Jul	11-Jul	12-Jul	15-Jul	16-Jul
WA Call Money Rates	8.66	8.69	8.70	8.71	8.69	8.71	8.71	8.70	8.70
Call Money Rate (Current Range)	8.50-8.75	8.65-8.75	8.55-8.75	8.70-875	8.50-8.75	8.70-8.75	8.50-8.75	8.65-8.75	8.70-8.75
WA Market Repo Rates	8.19	8.25	8.26	8.16	8.12	8.16	8.13	8.07	



	31-Dec-12	12-Jul-13	15-Jul-13	16-Jul-13
UST 10 Yr	1.701	2.555	2.582	2.547

Jun-13	(USD Mn)	(Rs Bn)	As at Apr-13	
SLDBs	1,987	258	Domestic Debt	3,536 (56%)
OBUs	150	19	Foreign Debt	2,808 (46%)
Rs Loans		56		
Debt		As at Dec-11	As at Dec-12	As at Apr-13
		5,133	6,000	6,344

Open Market Operations

Date		4-Jul	5-Jul	8-Jul	9-Jul	10-Jul	11-Jul	12-Jul	15-Jul	16-Jul
Market Liquidity (Rs Bn)		39.98	33.39	35.09	32.60	30.72	28.62	25.42	35.19	30.73
Overnight Repo Auction -	Offered (Rs mn)	39,000	33,000	35,000	32,000	30,000	28,000	25,000	35,000	
	Accepted (Rs mn)	37,504	29,438	31,058	26,582	27,888	24,419	13,485	22,588	
	WAYR (% p.a.)	7.79	7.80	7.80	7.80	7.80	7.81	7.80	7.79	
Overnight Rev Repo Auction-	Offered(Rs mn)									
	Accepted (Rs mn)									
	WAYR (% p.a.)									
Term Repo Auction-	Amt Accepted									
	DTM & WAYR									
Term Rev.Repo Auction-	Amt Accepted									
	DTM & WAYR									
Standing Facility -	Overnight Repo at 7.00%	1,152	3,155	3,098	3,276	2,773	3,831	11,739	11,545	
	Reverse Repo at 9.00%									
Outright Sales (Tbills) -	Offered (Rs mn)	2,750								
	Accepted (Rs mn)	1,000								
	DTM/ WAYR (% p.a.)	28/8.17								

Foreign Inv in GSec FV Rs.Bn - on 15/07/2013 (T-bill/bond)	76.87	421.40	498.27

Government Securities Outstanding (FV/BV)	as at 30/12/11	30/12/2012	15/07/2013	
T Bill (Rs Bn)	661 / 625	709 / 648	800.3 (FV)	
T Bond (RS Bn)	2,023 / 1,755	2,495 / 2,063	2,848.1 (FV)	
CBSL Gross Holdings Rs Mn Totals (FV)	168,811	154,005	as at 16/07/13	79.4

Government Over Draft (Rs Bn)

2009	49.20
2010	49.40
2011	45.93
2012	95.00
2013 Jan Beg.	88.80
12-Jul	96.99
15-Jul	90.55

BOC 76.796 PB 13.752

CBSL Policy Rates

	Last	Last Change	Today
Repo	7.50	09-May-13	7.
Reverse Repo	9.50	09-May-13	9.
SRR	8.00	01-Jul-13	6.

Cost of Living (Base 2006)

	May-13	Jun-
New CCPI	173.9	176
Ann. Average	8.8	8
Point to Point	7.3	6
Core Inflation (y-o-y)	5.7	4
Oil Price (USD per barrel)	**15-Jul-13**	**16-Jul-**
West Texas Intermediate(WTI)	106.01	106.1
Brent SPOT	108.54	108.4
Stock Market	**12-Jul-13**	**15-Jul-**
ASPI	6,028.74	6,015.
S&P SL 20	3,385.43	3,397.
Mkt Capitalization	2,315.4	2,310

Banks Deposit Rates

	May	Jun
Savings (NSB)	5.00	5.0
1y FD (NSB)	12.50	12.5
AWDR	10.74	10.5
AWFDR	13.90	13.6

Lending Rates

	31-May-13	28-Jun-1
AWPR	12.75	12.0
Call Money Weekly Ave. (CMR)	9.00	8.5
SLIBOR (7 days)	9.62	9.2

Exchange Rate *(Cross Currency/ Rs per unit)*

	15-Jul-13		16-Jul-13	
USD		130.9143		130.9475
EURO	1.3072	171.1312	1.3075	171.2139
GBP	1.5119	197.9228	1.5116	197.9402
JPY	99.2250	1.3194	99.7150	1.3132
INR	59.8910	2.1859	59.8150	2.1892
Gold (per trot oz)	1,292.60		1,279.45	

Gross Borrowing Limit - 2013

	For 2013	Utilized-05 July	Balance	Usage %
	1,267.50	787.61	479.89	62.1
Domestic	884.10	480.03	404.08	54.3
Foreign	383.40	307.58	75.82	80.2

	2011	2012	2013
Net Borrowing	461.00	469.00	507.50
Gross Borrowing	997.00	1,203.12	1,267.50
Budget Deficit as a % GDP	6.9%	6.2%	5.8%
Debt to GDP %	78.5%	79.1%	

Sovereign Bond Rates (Avg)

	28-Jun	12-Jul	15-Jul	16-Jul
SRILAN 7.40 2015	3.48	3.31	3.30	3.29
SRILAN 6.25 2020	6.82	6.21	6.21	6.21
SRILAN 6.25 2021	7.03	6.25	6.25	6.25
SRILAN 5.87 2022	6.76	6.31	6.34	6.31

Prefunding with CBSL and TOD

Rs. Mn

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	28-Jun-13	16-Jul-13
CBSL	(9)	2,294	(14,578)	19,369	16,671	13,434	29,559
TOD	-	-	-	-	1,274	-	-

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~ Public Debt Department ~ Central bank of Sri Lanka ~

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AG(A)

SPD

Addl. SPD

Daily Transaction summary for .....

Sr. No.	Time	Value Date	T-bill / T-bond	Maturity	Amount Rs. million	Rate	Primary Dealer

.....
DSPD

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Head/FO

Appendix
Middle Office

Appendix

MO 1 – Information Sheet of Treasury Bills and Bond Issues

MO 2 - Information Sheet of Treasury Bills and Bond Retirement

MO 3 – Press Releases on Treasury Bills and Bond Auctions

MO 4 – Flash Report (Monthly Actual Expenditure Statement) Not Available

MO 5 – Maturity Profile of Foreign Holdings (Treasury Bills and Bonds)

MO 6 – Tbills.xls Workbook ("Data" Information Sheet)

MO 7 – Tbonds.xls Workbook ("Database" Information Sheet)

MO 8 – Master Database (Access)

MO 9 – SLDB Database (Access)

MO 10 – CS – DRMS Interface

MO 11 – Report on Issues of T-bills and T-bonds (Access)

MO 12 – Report on Maturities of T-bills and T-bonds (Access)

MO 13 – Report on Outstanding Stock of T-bills and T-bonds (Access)

MO 14 – Report on Maturity Profiles of T-bills and T-bonds (Access)

MO 15 – Reports on Payments Due (Access)

MO 16 – Report on Issues (Excel)

MO 17 – Report on Maturities (Excel)

MO 18 – Report on Accrued Interest and Premium of T-bonds (Excel)

MO 19 – Report on Early Retirements (Excel)

MO 20 – Public Debt Service Payments Workbook

MO 21 – Daily Report (Secondary Market Yield Rates)

MO 22 – Selected Information (Domestic)

MO 23 – Selected Information (Foreign)

MO 24 – Information on Outstanding Defense Loans

MO 25 – Actual Foreign Debt Service Payment Report

MO 26 – Report on Month End Exchange Rates

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MO 36 – Individual Daily Summary Report (T-bond Information)

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MO 39 – EURIBOR Rates

MO 40 – ATM Monthly Profile

MO 41 –Interest and Amortization Payments of Domestic Debt

MO 42 – Currency wise Statement of Foreign Loans

MO 43 – Tentative Forecast Statement on Payments Due

MO 44 – Calculation of Monthly WAY Rates for T-bills

MO 45 – Calculation of Monthly WAY Rates for T-bonds.

MO 46 – 300 Report (Foreign Debt Service payment Forecast)

MO 47 – Report on SLDB Outstanding (Access)

MO 48 – Monthly Detailed Foreign Debt Service Payment Forecast

MO 49 – Information on T-bills and T-bonds for dissemination to IMF/WB

MO 50 – T-bill Maturity Profile

MO 51 – T-bond Maturity Profile

MO 52 – Rupee Loan Maturity Profile

MO 53 – Summary of Maturity Profiles (T-bills, T-bonds and Rupee Loans)

MO 54 – File Index of the Middle Office

MO 55 – Monthly Risk Profile

MO 1 – Information Sheet of Treasury Bills and Bond Issues

Information of Treasury Bill Issue on 12-Jul-13

Basic Information :	Face Value	Book Value	Interest
Total Amount Maturing	15,407,290,000.00	14,374,988,185.91	1,032,301,814.09
Amount Retired	1,665,290,000.00	1,948,979,229.91	-
Allocation :			
Primary Dealers	13,742,000,000.00	12,426,008,956.00	1,315,991,044.00
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	-	-	-
CBSL	-	-	-
Total Issues	13,742,000,000.00	12,426,008,956.00	1,315,991,044.00

ISIN		LKA09113J118	LKA182I4A104	LKA36414G113	
Maturity Period (Days)		91	182	364	Total
Maturity Date		11-Oct-13	10-Jan-14	11-Jul-14	
Primary Dealers	Face Value	1,000,000,000.00	1,000,000,000.00	11,742,000,000.00	13,742,000,000.00
	Book Value	976,586,280.00	948,985,750.00	10,500,436,926.00	12,426,008,956.00
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	Face Value	-	-	-	-
	Book Value	-	-	-	-
CBSL	Face Value	-	-	-	-
	Book Value	-	-	-	-
Total Issues	Face Value	1,000,000,000.00	1,000,000,000.00	11,742,000,000.00	13,742,000,000.00
	Book Value	976,586,280.00	948,985,750.00	10,500,436,926.00	12,426,008,956.00
Total Interest		23,413,720.00	51,014,250.00	1,241,563,074.00	1,315,991,044.00
Weighted Average	Bid Price	97.6586	94.8986	89.4263	
	Discount Rate	9.3656	10.2028	10.5737	
	Yield Rate (with tax)	9.5901	10.7513	11.8239	
	Yield Rate (After tax)	8.6311	9.6762	10.6415	
	Tax Rate per Rs.100/=	0.2292	0.4866	0.9557	

Tax Payments :

Primary Dealers	2,291,985.00	4,865,375.00	112,211,286.00	119,368,646.00
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	-	-	-	-
CBSL	-	-	-	-
Placements	-	-	-	-
Total Tax	-	-	-	-

Note:

MO 2 - Information Sheet of Treasury Bills and Bond Retirement

Information of Treasury bill Retirement on 28-Jun-13
Based on the Information of Treasury bill Issue on* 15-Mar-13

Basic Information :	Face Value	Book Value	Interest
Total Retirement	20,850,500,000.00	20,294,672,573.50	555,827,426.50

Allocation :			
Primary Dealers			
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds			
CBSL	20,850,500,000.00	20,294,672,573.50	555,827,426.50
Total Issues	20,850,500,000.00	20,294,672,573.50	555,827,426.50

ISIN				15/03/2013 LKA18213I133	03/04/2013 LKA18213I273	31/05/2013 LKA18213K295	17/06/2013 LKA18213L137	Total
Maturity Period (Days)		91	182	77	91	154	168	
Maturity Date		27-Sep-13	27-Dec-13	13-Sep-13	27-Sep-13	29-Nov-13	13-Dec-13	
Primary Dealers	Face Value							
	Book Value							
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	Face Value							
	Book Value							
CBSL	Face Value			10,000,000,000.00	3,243,500,000.00	3,300,000,000.00	4,307,000,000.00	20,850,500,000.00
	Book Value			9,820,510,000.00	3,174,766,991.50	3,174,039,000.00	4,125,356,582.00	20,294,672,573.50
Placements	Face Value							
	Book Value							
Total Issues	Face Value			10,000,000,000.00	3,243,500,000.00	3,300,000,000.00	4,307,000,000.00	20,850,500,000.00
	Book Value			9,820,510,000.00	3,174,766,991.50	3,174,039,000.00	4,125,356,582.00	20,294,672,573.50
Total Interest				179,490,000.00	68,733,008.50	125,961,000.00	181,643,418.00	555,827,426.50
Weighted Average	Bid Price	97.6810	94.8867	98.2051	97.8809	96.1830	95.7826	
	Discount Rate	9.3960	10.2266	8.4850	8.4764	9.0220	9.1277	
	Yield Rate (With tax)	9.6222	10.7778	9.6000	9.6222	10.4222	10.6000	
	Yield Rate (After tax)	8.6600	9.7000	8.6400	8.6600	9.3800	9.6400	
	Tax Rate per Rs.100/=	0.2299	0.4876					
		Last auction data						

Tax Payments :							
Primary Dealers							
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds							
CBSL							
Placements							
Total Tax							

Note: Early Retirement of Treasury bills issued to the Central Bank

Prepared by: Checked by:

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MO 3 – Press Releases on Treasury Bills and Bond Auctions

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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

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Press Release

Issued By Public Debt Department
Date 10 July, 2013

TREASURY BILL AUCTION

The weekly primary auction for the week ending 12 July, 2013 for the re-issue of Rs. 12,000 million maturing Treasury bills was held today. The auction was oversubscribed with bids amounting to Rs. 42,906 million being received. It was decided to accept Rs. 13,742 million from the auction.

The details of the auction are as follows:-

Maturity (Days)	Bids Received (Rs.Mn.)	Amount Accepted (Rs.Mn.)	Weighted Average Yield Percent per annum After Tax	
			This Week	Last Auction
91 LKA09113J118*	2,716	1,000	8.63	8.65
182 LKA18214A104*	4,387	1,000	9.68	9.70
364 LKA36414G113*	35,803	11,742	10.64	10.66
Total	42,906	13,742		

* International Securities Identification Number.

The date of settlement is 12 July 2013

MO 4 – Flash Report (Monthly Actual Expenditure Statement)

HEAD - 803-PUBLIC DEBT
PROGRAMME - II, PROJECT - I
PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT

June 2013

Category/Object Title		Actual Expenditure(Rs)
RECURRENT EXPENDITURE		
INTEREST PAYMENTS ON DOMESTIC DEBT - 1601		17,943,229,834.26
	Domestic Currency Debt	
	(1)Treasury Bills	5,031,484,711.14
	(2) Medium and Long Term Rupee Loans	0.00
SPECIAL LAW	(3) Treasury Bonds (Coupon Payments)	11,936,477,670.00
	Less Accrued Interest and Premium (T.Bonds)	389,459,132.00
	(4) Treasury Bonds (Discount on Maturity)	1,052,665,093.50
	(5) Tax Reserve Certificates	0.00
	(6) Treasury Certificates of Deposits	0.00
	(7) Project Loans	0.00
	Foreign Currency Debt	
	(8) Foreign Currency Banking Unit	312,061,491.62
	- Of which Other Domestic Interest - HNB	21,458,503.71
	(9) Sri Lanka Development Bonds	0.00
DOMESTIC FUNDS	(1) Administrative Borrowings (KFW AL556)	0.00
	(2) National Development Bonds	0.00
INTEREST PAYMENTS ON FOREIGN DEBT -1802		1,458,094,836.03
SPECIAL LAW	(1) Medium Term Foreign Loans	19,945,865.45
	(2) Long Term Foreign Loans	1,438,148,970.58
LOAN FLOTATION EXPENDITURE AND OTHERS - 1405		47,219,599.62
	(1) Management Charges and Commissions	0.00
	(2) Foreign Loan Flotation Expenses	47,219,599.62
	(3) Domestic Flotation expenses	0.00
TOTAL RECURRENT EXPENDITURE		19,448,544,269.91
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE		
REPAYMENTS OF DOMESTIC DEBT - 3001		55,075,428,661.83
	Domestic Currency Debt	
	(1) Medium and Long Term Rupee Loans	0.00
SPECIAL LAW	(2) Treasury Certificates of Deposits	0.00
	(3) Treasury Bonds (Book Value)	54,991,354,906.50
	(4) Project Loans	0.00
	Foreign Currency Debt	
	(5) Foreign Currency Banking Unit	84,073,755.33
	- Of which Other Domestic Capital - HNB	84,073,755.33
	(6) Sri Lanka Development Bonds	0.00
DOMESTIC FUNDS	(1) Administrative Borrowings (KFW AL556)	0.00
	(2) National Development Bonds	0.00
	(3) Redemption of Tax Reserve Certificates	0.00
REPAYMENTS ON FOREIGN DEBT - 3002		6,249,790,868.24
SPECIAL LAW	(1) Medium Term Foreign Loans	336,536,948.67
	(2) Long Term Foreign Loans	5,913,253,919.57
OTHER REPAYMENTS - 3003		0.00
SPECIAL LAW	(1) Redemptions of National Development Bonds	0.00
	(2) Repayments of Treasury Bills	0.00
	(3) Repayments of Advances Obtained from CBSL	0.00
TOTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURE		61,325,219,530.07
	Fund Transfered to Special Accounts No. 4222	0.00
TOTAL RECURRENT AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE		80,773,763,799.98

MO 5 – Maturity Profile of Foreign Holdings (Treasury Bills and Bonds)

Maturity Profile of Foreign Holdings (Treasury Bills and Bonds) as at 10/07/2013

Maturity	Account	Treasury Bill Face Value (Rs.)	Treasury Bond Face Value (Rs.)	Total Face Value -Bill and Bond (Rs.)
2013				
	CFD	136,602,136	15,967,893	152,570,029
	CSF	26,962,727,914	41,858,011,589	68,820,739,503
2014		27,099,330,050	41,873,979,482	68,973,309,532
	CFD	79,881,827	35,997,904	115,879,731
	CSF	48,386,344,667	57,398,930,000	105,785,274,667
2015		48,466,226,494	57,434,927,904	105,901,154,398
	CFD		31,152,029	31,152,029
	CSF		91,004,050,000	91,004,050,000
2016			91,035,202,029	91,035,202,029
	CFD		44,654,895	44,654,895
	CSF		40,556,930,000	40,556,930,000
2017			40,601,584,895	40,601,584,895
	CFD		8,338,000	8,338,000
	CSF		35,659,060,000	35,659,060,000
2018			35,667,398,000	35,667,398,000
	CFD		61,015,700	61,015,700
	CSF		98,244,292,500	98,244,292,500
2019			98,305,308,200	98,305,308,200
	CSF		4,918,500,000	4,918,500,000
2021			4,918,500,000	4,918,500,000
	CFD		2,280,000	2,280,000
	CSF		52,141,000,000	52,141,000,000
2028			52,143,280,000	52,143,280,000
	CSF		2,150,000,000	2,150,000,000
2032			2,150,000,000	2,150,000,000
	CFD		39,400,000	39,400,000
			39,400,000	39,400,000
Total Outstanding Stock		797,134,030,000	2,845,091,857,182	3,642,225,887,182
*Provision for Non-residents (12.5% Total Outstanding Stock)		99,641,753,750	455,278,235,898	455,278,235,898
Current Non-residents' Holdings		*75,565,556,544*	*424,169,580,510*	*499,735,137,054*
Foreign Holdings (CSF) Outstanding		*75,349,072,581*	*423,930,774,089*	*499,279,846,670*
Diaspora Holdings (CFD) Outstanding		*216,483,963*	*238,806,421*	*455,290,384*
**Current Non- residents' Holdings as a % of Total Outstanding Stock*		*9.48*	*11.65*	*13.72*
Current Leeway for Non-residents		*-44,456,901,156*	*-44,456,901,156*	*-44,456,901,156*
Current Leeway for Non-residents as a %		*-1.22*	*-1.22*	*-1.22*

* Incase of bonds, the provision is 12.5% of the total outstanding bill and bond stock. Incase of bills, the provision is 12.5% of the outstanding bill stock.
** This figure could exceed 12.5% when part of the outstanding balance of TBills and Bonds matures, and/or new issues are not recorded simultaneously in the SSSS to update the total outstanding stock.
# Stock allocated to non-residents with a value date for future settlement does not appear in this report. Thus, great care must be taken at the time of new allocations
# Includes Bonds held in scrip form and Bonds issued to CWE amounting to Rs. 4,408,000,000 Maturing in 2013 and 2016 respectively.
# This printout should be taken close to SSSS closure for business (around 4.30pm). Or else, any securities maturing on the next business day will be removed from the balance displayed in this report, as closing balances in SSSS will be zeroized for securities maturing on the following business day.

MO 6 – Tbills.xls Workbook ("Data" Information Sheet)



MO 7 – Tbonds.xls Workbook ("Database" Information Sheet)



MO 8 – Master Database (Access)



MO 9 – SLDB Database (Access)



MO 10 – CS – DRMS Interface



MO 11 – Report on Issues of T-bills and T-bonds (Access)



Issue Information

Security	Issued ate	Face value	Book Value
T-Bill	7/5/2013	10,618,000,000.00	9,568,227,465.00
	7/12/2013	13,742,000,000.00	12,426,008,956.00
	7/15/2013	4,811,000,000.00	4,306,119,227.00
Sum		29,171,000,000.00	26,300,355,648.00
Security	Issued ate	Face value	Book Value
T-Bond	7/1/2013	6,310,000,000.00	4,423,257,910.00
	7/2/2013	50,000,000.00	43,794,900.00
	7/3/2013	50,000,000.00	43,796,900.00
	7/4/2013	50,000,000.00	43,801,150.00
	7/5/2013	50,000,000.00	43,804,250.00
	7/9/2013	70,000,000.00	56,898,940.00
	7/10/2013	50,000,000.00	43,819,950.00
	7/11/2013	50,000,000.00	43,823,100.00
	7/12/2013	2,461,080,000.00	1,779,518,694.68
	7/15/2013	64,825,900,000.00	48,195,466,580.90
Sum		73,856,980,000.00	64,718,004,675.78

MO 12 – Report on Maturities of T-bills and T-bonds (Access)



Maturity Information

Security	Maturity date	Face value	Book Value
T-Bill	7/1/2013	9,054,500,000.00	8,193,379,023.00
	7/5/2013	9,456,470,000.00	8,846,652,931.84
	7/12/2013	15,407,290,000.00	14,374,988,185.91
Sum		33,918,660,000.00	31,415,020,140.75
Security	Maturity date	Face value	Book Value
T-Bond	7/15/2013	64,397,300,000.00	53,078,464,263.30
Sum		64,397,300,000.00	53,078,464,263.30
Grand Total		98,315,960,000.00	84,493,484,404.05

MO 13 – Report on Outstanding Stock of T-bills and T-bonds (Access)



Outstanding Stock as at 7/15/2013

Security	Face Value	Book Value
Rupee Loan	55,517,766,290.00	55,517,766,290.00
T-Bill	800,279,740,000.00	720,750,183,168.15
T-Bond	2,848,051,537,182.00	2,313,785,932,706.80
Grand Total	**3,703,849,043,472.00**	**3,090,053,882,164.95**

Tuesday, July 16, 2013 Page 1 of 1

MO 14 – Report on Maturity Profiles of T-bills and T-bonds (Access)



Maturity Profile As at 16-Jul-13

Due Date	T - Bills	T - Bond	Rupee Loan	Total
7/19/2013	12,480,300,000			12,480,300,000
7/26/2013	10,297,000,000			10,297,000,000
Monthly Total	22,777,300,000			22,777,300,000
8/1/2013		79,593,300,000		79,593,300,000
8/2/2013	14,425,850,000			14,425,850,000
8/9/2013	17,157,320,000			17,157,320,000
8/16/2013	21,970,500,000			21,970,500,000
8/23/2013	11,912,600,000			11,912,600,000
8/30/2013	16,598,000,000			16,598,000,000
Monthly Total	82,064,270,000	79,593,300,000		161,657,570,000
9/1/2013		70,270,310,000		70,270,310,000
9/6/2013	9,566,000,000			9,566,000,000
9/13/2013	14,400,300,000			14,400,300,000
9/20/2013	12,011,100,000			12,011,100,000
9/27/2013	18,425,170,000			18,425,170,000
Monthly Total	54,402,570,000	70,270,310,000		124,672,880,000
10/4/2013	11,623,600,000			11,623,600,000
10/5/2013		397,969,682		397,969,682
10/11/2013	23,467,300,000			23,467,300,000
10/18/2013	7,276,000,000			7,276,000,000
10/25/2013	15,020,300,000			15,020,300,000
Monthly Total	57,387,200,000	397,969,682		57,785,169,682
11/1/2013	11,972,200,000	59,449,600,000		71,421,800,000

MO 15 – Reports on Payments Due (Access)



Payments by Type of Obligation

Month	Date	Payment Type	Amount
August 2013			
Rupee Interest			
	8/1/2013	Rupee Interest	1,445,280,000.00
Rupee Interest Total			1,445,280,000.00
Tbills Interest			
	8/2/2013	Tbills Interest	1,157,586,517.10
	8/9/2013	Tbills Interest	1,329,982,746.64
	8/16/2013	Tbills Interest	1,262,596,890.00
	8/23/2013	Tbills Interest	620,512,136.60
	8/30/2013	Tbills Interest	1,164,908,336.00
Tbills Interest Total			5,535,586,626.34
Tbills Principle			
	8/2/2013	Tbills Principle	13,268,263,482.90
	8/9/2013	Tbills Principle	15,827,337,253.36
	8/16/2013	Tbills Principle	20,707,903,110.00
	8/23/2013	Tbills Principle	11,292,087,863.40
	8/30/2013	Tbills Principle	15,433,091,664.00
Tbills Principle Total			76,528,683,373.66
TBond discount			
	8/1/2013	TBond discount	13,638,730,973.30
TBond discount Total			13,638,730,973.30
TBond Interest			

MO 16 – Report on Issues (Excel)



Treasury Bond Issues -2013

Remarks (All)

Years	Sett_Date	Data	Total	Acc+Pre	
2013	Jan	Sum of Amou_Acce	153,088.90000000	2,769.27546280	1.81%
		Sum of Amou_Pay	123,726.92189760		
		Sum of Accntc	2,769.27546280		
		Sum of Premium	0.00000000		
		Sum of Discount	32,131.25356520		
		Sum of BookValue	120,957.64643480		
	Feb	Sum of Amou_Acce	123,007.68000000	2,170.63729404	1.76%
		Sum of Amou_Pay	98,146.94902888		
		Sum of Accntc	2,170.63729404		
		Sum of Premium	0.00000000		
		Sum of Discount	27,031.36826516		
		Sum of BookValue	95,976.31173484		
	Mar	Sum of Amou_Acce	67,928.90000000	942.482700	1.39%
		Sum of Amou_Pay	55,701.18340210		
		Sum of Accntc			
		Sum of Premium			
		Sum of Discount			
		Sum of BookValue	54,758.70070210		
	Apr	Sum of Amou_Acce	184,060.30000000	2,429.508086	1.32%
		Sum of Amou_Pay	159,148.94623000		
		Sum of Accntc	2,429.50808630		
		Sum of Premium	0.00000000		
		Sum of Discount	27,340.86185630		
		Sum of BookValue	156,719.43814370		

Sum of Amou_Pay (Data)
Row: 2013 - Mar - Sum of Amou_Pay

MO 17 – Report on Maturities (Excel)



Participant (All)

Years	Month	Issue	W.A.	Data	Maturity Period 11	Maturity Date 14	156	172	179	Grand Total
					28/06/2013	01/07/2013	22/11/2013	06/12/2013	13/12/2013	
2013	Jun	17-Jun	10.5556	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted			4355.1			4355.1
				Sum of Amount_Payable			4164.298714			4164.298714
				Sum of Interest			190.8012861			190.8012861
				Average of W.A_Yield			10.56			10.56
			10.7556	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted				9457.5		9457.5
				Sum of Amount_Payable				9000.088013		9000.088013
				Sum of Interest				457.4119875		457.4119875
				Average of W.A_Yield				10.76		10.76
			10.8444	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted	4307	3554.9			1618.1	9480
				Sum of Amount_Payable	4088.945204	3374.922523			1536.178833	9000.046560
				Sum of Interest	218.054796	179.9774772			81.9211668	479.95344
				Average of W.A_Yield	10.84	10.84			10.84	10.84
		17-Jun Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted			4307	3554.9	4355.1	9457.5	1618.1	23292.6
		17-Jun Sum of Amount_Payable			4088.945204	3374.922523	4164.298714	9000.088013	1536.178833	22164.433286
		17-Jun Sum of Interest			218.054796	179.9774772	190.8012861	457.4119875	81.9211668	1128.166714
		17-Jun Average of W.A_Yield			10.84	10.84	10.56	10.76	10.84	10.77
Total Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted					4,307.000000	3,554.900000	4,355.100000	9,457.500000	1,618.100000	23,292.600000
Total Sum of Amount_Payable					4088.945204	3374.922523	4164.298714	9000.088013	1536.178833	22164.4332864000
Total Sum of Interest					218.054796	179.977477	190.801286	457.411988	81.921167	1,128.166714
Total Average of W.A_Yield					10.84	10.84	10.56	10.76	10.84	10.77

MO 18 – Report on Accrued Interest and Premium of T-bonds (Excel)



Treasury Bond Issues -2013

Remarks (All)

Years	Sett_Date	Data	Total	Acc+Pre	
2013	Jan	Sum of Amou_Acce	153,088.90000000	2,769.27546280	1.81%
		Sum of Amou_Pay	123,726.92189760		
		Sum of Accntc	2,769.27546280		
		Sum of Premium	0.00000000		
		Sum of Discount	32,131.25356520		
		Sum of BookValue	120,957.64643480		
	Feb	Sum of Amou_Acce	123,007.68000000	2,170.63729404	1.76%
		Sum of Amou_Pay	98,146.94902888		
		Sum of Accntc	2,170.63729404		
		Sum of Premium	0.00000000		
		Sum of Discount	27,031.36826516		
		Sum of BookValue	95,976.31173484		
	Mar	Sum of Amou_Acce	67,928.90000000	942.482700	1.39%
		Sum of Amou_Pay	55,701.18340210		
		Sum of Accntc			
		Sum of Premium			
		Sum of Discount			
		Sum of BookValue	54,758.70070210		
	Apr	Sum of Amou_Acce	184,060.30000000	2,429.508086	1.32%
		Sum of Amou_Pay	159,148.94623000		
		Sum of Accntc	2,429.50808630		
		Sum of Premium	0.00000000		
		Sum of Discount	27,340.86186630		
		Sum of BookValue	156,719.43814370		

Sum of Amou_Pay (Data)
Row: 2013 - Mar - Sum of Amou_Pay

MO 19 – Report on Early Retirements (Excel)



Retirement date	Remaining Maturity of retired E	Original Maturity Period	Original Issue Date	Original Maturity Date	Face Value	Original Book Value	Retirement Book Value	Interest	Investor	Yield Rate (Retired)	Applicable Yield (original)	
4/19/2013	119	182	2/15/2013	8/16/2013	3,000.00	2,840.910000	2,909.172000	68.262000	CBSL	9.5500%	10.0800%	
4/22/2013	95	252	11/16/2012	7/26/2013	1,126.90	1,029.422023	1,100.252196	70.830173	CBSL	9.2800%	12.3100%	
4/22/2013	95	182	1/25/2013	7/26/2013	2,850.30	2,694.468398	2,782.898956	88.430558	CBSL	9.2800%	10.4100%	
4/23/2013	101	182	2/1/2013	8/2/2013	1,146.20	1,084.275399	1,116.905420	32.630022	CBSL	9.3600%	10.2800%	
4/23/2013	108	182	2/8/2013	8/9/2013	1,500.00	1,418.661000	1,462.068000	43.407000	CBSL	9.3500%	10.2800%	1550
4/23/2013	108	178	2/12/2013	8/9/2013	720.04	681.568983	700.441961	18.872978	CBSL	9.4300%	10.1600%	720.04
4/23/2013	116	182	2/15/2013	8/16/2013	829.96	786.702485	807.370149	20.667664	CBSL	9.4300%	10.1200%	829.96
4/23/2013	136	158	4/1/2013	9/6/2013	1,600.60	1,515.720162	1,553.960117	38.239935	CBSL	9.8000%	10.0800%	
4/24/2013	100	182	2/1/2013	8/2/2013	1,600.00	1,526.462800	1,603.673600	77.420800	CBSL	9.7300%	9.9900%	
4/26/2013	98	182	2/12/2013	8/2/2013	2,464.20	2,331.069131	2,402.617178	71.548047	CBSL	9.3300%	10.2800%	
4/26/2013	98	182	2/12/2013	8/2/2013	5,445.30	5,151.112222	5,312.151524	161.039302	CBSL	9.3100%	10.2800%	
4/26/2013	98	182	2/12/2013	8/2/2013	1,000.00	946.000000	975.840000	29.840000	CBSL	9.3100%	10.2800%	
5/2/2013	99	178	2/12/2013	8/9/2013	956.70	905.888916	932.147729	26.258813	CBSL	9.2900%	10.1200%	
5/3/2013	98	178	2/12/2013	8/9/2013	5,117.30	4,850.586324	4,992.560695	141.974371	CBSL	9.2800%	10.1200%	
5/8/2013	30	182	12/7/2012	6/7/2013	2,526.60	2,367.454519	2,507.751564	140.297045	CBSL	9.1200%	12.1000%	
5/8/2013	100	182	2/15/2013	8/16/2013	1,119.70	1,060.322309	1,091.804914	31.482605	CBSL	9.3000%	10.0800%	
6/7/2013	70	182	2/15/2013	8/16/2013	3,297.30	3,122.444181	3,243.164929	120.720748	CBSL	8.6800%	10.0800%	
6/28/2013	77	182	3/15/2013	9/13/2013	10,000.00	9,466.210000	9,820.510000	354.300000	CBSL	8.6400%	10.1500%	
6/28/2013	91	177	4/3/2013	9/27/2013	3,243.50	3,074.086762	3,174.786992	100.678240	CBSL	8.6600%	10.2000%	
6/28/2013	154	182	5/31/2013	11/29/2013	3,300.00	3,127.961100	3,174.039000	46.077900	CBSL	9.3800%	9.9900%	
6/28/2013	168	179	6/17/2013	12/13/2013	4,307.00	4,088.945204	4,125.366682	36.411378	CBSL	9.5400%	9.7600%	
6/28/2013	126	151	6/3/2013	11/1/2013	1,500.00	1,437.073500	1,454.388000	17.314500	CBSL	9.0600%	9.5000%	
6/28/2013	133	158	6/3/2013	11/8/2013	1,500.00	1,433.688000	1,451.524600	17.836500	CBSL	9.1400%	9.5900%	
6/28/2013	147	182	5/24/2013	11/22/2013	4,247.80	4,026.349443	4,094.038136	67.688693	CBSL	9.3000%	9.9000%	
7/1/2013	137	364	11/16/2012	11/15/2013	5,500.00	4,818.466500	5,316.124000	497.657500	CBSL	9.1900%	12.7300%	
7/1/2013	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	CBSL	9.5300%	9.7600%	

MO 20 – Public Debt Service Payments Workbook



Last Amended 7/16/2013

Public debt Debt Service Payments 2013 a/

Rs. Million

	January	February	March	April	May	June	Jan-Jun Total	July	August	September	October	November	December	Jan-Dec
	ACTUAL													
T-Bonds	41,379.3	28,187.9	15,353.8	26,541.6	10,066.3	12,399.7	134,128.6	37,309.0	30,326.7	19,190.6	14,476.2	25,026.9	10,376.3	270,864.2
Coupon Payments	29,406.4	24,869.8	16,326.3	19,232.8	10,741.9	11,938.5	112,573.7	27,390.1	19,017.3	17,364.6	14,763.2	13,513.7	10,536.3	215,770.9
Less: Acc Int & Premium	- 2,769.3	- 2,170.8	- 942.5	- 2,429.5	- 675.8	- 389.5	- 9,376.9	- 2,000.0	- 2,280.0	- 1,800.0	- 300.0	- 1,540.0	- 160.0	- 17,456.9
Discount on maturity	14,742.2	5,488.7	-	9,678.3	-	1,052.7	30,961.9	11,919.8	13,589.4	3,626.0	6.9	13,047.2	-	73,550.2
R-Loans	223.5	1,443.3	-	1,369.5	64.9	-	3,101.3	223.5	1,445.3	0.0	1,233.0	64.9	0.0	6,072.1
OBU b/	14.4	168.1	13.4	44.3	20.2	312.1	572.6	13.5	164.0	13.8	13.1	13.5	13.1	803.5
o/w HNB	14.4	14.1	13.4	13.7	24.9	21.3	101.9							101.9
SLDB	2,446.7	479.8	1,479.3	-	-	-	4,401.8	1,734.5	437.6	1,403.4	-	-	764.2	8,511.4
Other Domestic a/	699.9	699.9	699.9	699.9	699.9	699.9	4,199.5	366.7	366.7	366.7	366.7	366.7	366.7	6,399.5
o/w Overdraft	633.5	633.5	633.5	633.5	633.5	633.5	3,920.8							3,920.8
Foreign Interest /c	13,028.3	1,813.9	8,244.9	5,312.1	1,871.6	1,505.3	30,270.8	17,638.5	2,706.0	7,563.6	5,497.8	2,191.2	1,966.8	69,340.0
o/w Loan Floatation	186.4	4.4	2,990.6	147.9	545.0	47.2	5,877.4	211.2	264.0	158.4	26.4	66.0	13.2	6,663.8
	12,841.9	1,809.4	5,254.2	5,164.2	1,323.6	1,458.1	26,393.4							27,851.9
Principal Payments	45,800.0	78,391.3	16,264.7	79,683.0	3,239.3	61,325.2	307,293.3	151,997.0	71,887.2	51,215.5	424.4	46,484.9	13,233.3	693,211.7
Domestic Principal	38,192.4	71,518.0	7,073.8	73,448.8	-	55,075.4	245,308.4	131,363.7	71,853.9	60,982.1	391.0	46,453.6	13,200.0	569,552.7
T-Bonds	38,192.4	71,518.0	-	70,560.8	-	54,991.4	235,262.6	53,073.5	65,253.9	60,982.1	391.0	46,453.6	-	481,441.7

Debt Servicing 2013 | Deviation from Estimate 2013 | 2013 Annual Estimates

MO 21 – Daily Report (Secondary Market Yield Rates)



Secondary Market Yield Rates (Average)

Date	Treasury Bills			Treasury Bonds							
	< 91 Days	< 182 Days	<364 Days	<2 Year	<3 Year	< 4 Year	<5 Year	<6Year	<10Year	<15Year	<20Year
12-Jun-13	8.85%	9.91%	10.86%	10.74%	11.02%	11.02%	11.11%	11.20%	11.46%	12.05%	0.1196875
13-Jun-13	8.81%	9.88%	10.86%	10.71%	11.01%	11.05%	11.10%	11.20%	11.55%	12.20%	0.11975
14-Jun-13	8.80%	9.87%	10.82%	10.74%	10.95%	11.02%	11.11%	11.20%	11.46%	12.05%	0.1196875
17-Jun-13	8.82%	9.90%	10.87%	10.74%	11.03%	11.04%	11.15%	11.24%	11.46%	12.05%	0.1196875
18-Jun-13	8.84%	9.89%	10.87%	10.82%	11.04%	11.05%	11.18%	11.31%	11.56%	12.02%	0.1196875
19-Jun-13	8.85%	9.91%	10.88%	10.78%	11.04%	11.05%	11.18%	11.31%	11.56%	12.02%	0.1196875
20-Jun-13	8.85%	9.90%	10.88%	10.83%	10.98%	10.98%	11.20%	11.31%	11.56%	12.02%	0.1196875
21-Jun-13	8.85%	9.90%	10.88%	10.87%	11.07%	11.14%	11.28%	11.37%	11.56%	12.02%	0.1196875
24-Jun-13	8.84%	9.89%	10.87%	10.91%	11.06%	11.14%	11.37%	11.45%	11.60%	12.08%	0.1211875
25-Jun-13	8.80%	9.85%	10.84%	10.91%	11.13%	11.14%	11.44%	11.45%	11.60%	12.05%	0.1211875
26-Jun-13	8.79%	9.83%	10.79%	10.90%	11.05%	11.14%	11.44%	11.45%	11.60%	12.05%	0.1211875
27-Jun-13	8.83%	9.77%	10.75%	10.90%	11.00%	11.14%	11.33%	11.38%	11.52%	11.94%	0.1193125
28-Jun-13	8.83%	9.79%	10.76%	10.86%	10.98%	11.00%	11.33%	11.40%	11.65%	11.90%	0.1193125
1-Jul-13	8.77%	9.74%	10.71%	10.98%	11.25%	11.30%	11.30%	11.48%	11.60%	11.75%	0.119
2-Jul-13	8.77%	9.74%	10.72%	10.88%	10.99%	11.30%	11.37%	11.48%	11.59%	11.96%	0.119
3-Jul-13	8.77%	9.74%	10.72%	10.88%	11.02%	11.30%	11.37%	11.48%	11.59%	11.96%	0.119
4-Jul-13	8.76%	9.73%	10.70%	10.88%	10.99%	11.30%	11.37%	11.48%	11.59%	11.96%	0.119
5-Jul-13	8.79%	9.72%	10.72%	10.88%	10.96%	11.30%	11.33%	11.48%	11.59%	11.96%	0.119
8-Jul-13	8.74%	9.70%	10.67%	10.88%	10.99%	11.30%	11.33%	11.48%	11.59%	11.96%	0.119
9-Jul-13	8.74%	9.70%	10.67%	10.88%	10.99%	11.30%	11.34%	11.48%	11.59%	11.96%	0.119
10-Jul-13	8.74%	9.70%	10.67%	10.87%	10.96%	11.30%	11.33%	11.38%	11.59%	11.96%	0.119
11-Jul-13	8.74%	9.69%	10.67%	10.84%	10.96%	11.30%	11.32%	11.48%	11.59%	11.96%	0.1201875
12-Jul-13	8.77%	9.74%	10.70%	10.75%	10.97%	11.14%	11.32%	11.38%	11.52%	12.00%	0.1201875
15-Jul-13	8.77%	9.72%	10.70%	10.71%	10.92%	10.98%	11.29%	11.39%	11.52%	12.00%	0.1201875

MO 22 – Selected Information (Domestic)



CONFIDENTIAL

Public Debt

Selected Information Series - As at end March 2013

Table 1

Composition of Public Debt -Face Values (Rs. mn)

Category	Balance as at end Dec-12	Change of Debt Jan-Feb-13	Change of Debt Mar-13	Outstanding as at end Mar-13	Per cent
Domestic Debt	2,223,013	59,532	82,448	2,364,993	93%
o/w Treasury bills	523,071	48,736	62,938	634,745	25%
Treasury bonds a/	2,095,054	1,857	94,570	2,191,481	86%
Rupee loans	56,886	0	0	56,886	2%
SLDBs	222,994	20,238	5,370	248,602	10%
Borrowing from CBSL	15,074	0	0	15,074	1%
CBSL Advances	111,252	-4	16,516	127,764	5%
Other (net of deposits)	96,543	-11,894	11,252	95,901	4%
Foreign Debt b/	417,081	306,364	194,097	917,542	36%
o/w Treasury bonds & bills	397,769	48,933	30,203	476,904	19%
Total	6,000,712	367,896	288,685	6,657,293	100%

Figure 1

Government Debt Outstanding (End Year)

% of GDP 0.5319

	Total
Tbond	
Tbill	
Total	

0.4339 Foreign Curr

Total 0.9657

21 The depreciation and appreciation of Rupee against other currencies resulted in a net increase of the debt stock by Rs. 336 billion during Jan-May 2012

22 a/ Excludes T-bonds of Rs. 4,357 million issued to CWE in 2003

23 b/ Includes outstanding defence loans of the government and excludes loan involving the Phase I of the Puttalam Coal Power Project

Domestic Debt of the Government

Table 2

Future Maturity Profile - Domestic Debt a/

Maturity Year	Amount Rs. mn	Per cent
2012 (May-Dec)	825,284	28%

Table 3

Govt. Securities - Net Issues - 2012 (Rs. mn) a/

Instrument	Issues			Repayments			Net Issues		
	Jan-Apr	May	Total	Jan-Apr	May	Total	Jan-Apr	May	Total
T-Bill	694,832	141,257	836,089	538,672	168,232	705,204	156,161	-25,276	130,885
T-Bond	333,870	45,200	439,070	219,932	98,457	318,388	173,938	-51,257	122,682

MO 23 – Selected Information (Foreign)



External Debt of the Government

As at End December 2012

Table 7

Outstanding Debt by Creditor Category & Use of Funds (Rs.mn)

Creditor Category / Use of Funds	Bilateral	Multilateral	Commercial	Export Credit	Total Debt	% of Total
Cash	476	91	445,063	0	445,630	16.1
Commodity	9,477	0	0	16	9,493	0.3
Food	25,356	0	0	0	25,356	0.9
Goods & Services	17,331	0	0	4,420	21,750	0.8
Programme	11,290	92,595	0	0	103,885	3.8
Project	791,391	739,890	3,775	208,581	1,742,327	63.0
Other a/	715	12,695	403,040	1709	418,259	15.1
Total Debt	855,996	844,292	851,677	215,135	2,767,300	100.0
%	30.9	30.5	30.8	7.8	100.0	

a/ Includes foreign investments in Treasury bills, Treasury bonds and defence loans (Rs. 5,251.8 mn) and excludes loans involving Puttalam Coal Power Project phase I (Rs. 53,858.6 mn) & phase II (Rs. 61,379.4 mn), Mattala Hambantota International Airport Project (Rs. 20,861.1 mn) and Hambantota port Development Projects phase I (Rs. 38,680.3 mn) and phase II (Rs. 20,552.7 mn)

Table 8

Currency Composition a/

Currency	In Foreign Curr. (mn)	In SL Rs.mn	% of Total Debt
SDR	0.492	992.065	24.6
Jap.Yen	388,672	575.196	20.8
USD	6,774	853,832	30.9
EURO	1038	174,563	6.3
LKR b/		397,798	14.4
Other		83,850	3.0
Total Debt		2,767,300	100.0

a/ Based on agreements

b/ Foreign investments in Treasury bills and Treasury bonds

Table 9

Major Creditors a/

	Outstanding (Rs.mn)	% of Total
Total	2,463,851	89.0
Bilateral	719,386	26.0
Japan	547,515	19.8
India	78,322	1.9
Germany	51,164	2.8
USA	41,386	1.5
Multilateral	798,417	28.9
ADB	448,421	16.2
IDA	349,997	12.6
Commercial/Exp Cr	549,261	19.8
Sovereign Bonds	445,063	16.1
Exim Bank of China	78,276	2.8
HSBC (UK)	25,922	0.9
Tbond/Bill Holdings	397,789	14.4

a/ Figures on Major Creditors only

Table 10

Major Economic Sectors

Economic Sector	Outstanding (Rs. mn)	% of Tot.Debt
Total	1,326,365	47.9
Energy (Electricity)	226,414	8.2
Ground Transport	205,324	7.4
Water Supply	159,580	5.8
Finance & Insurance	88,279	3.2
Private Sector Dev	75,089	2.7
Ports & Shipping	100,080	3.6
Irrigation	73,285	2.6
Roads and Bridges	266,369	9.6
Rural Development	69,019	2.5
Education & Training	62,330	2.3

Table 11

Concessionality a/

Category	Outstanding Debt Amount (Rs mn)	(%)
Concessional	1,366,805	49.4
Non-concessional	1,400,495	50.6
Total Debt	2,767,300	100.0

a/ Grant Element >= 35%

Figure 3

Exchange Rate Variation a/

(End Dec 11-End Dec 12)

Exchange Rate	Dec-11	Dec-12
USD		
EURO		

Table 12

Debt Service Payments in Foreign Currency (as per end December 2012) (USD mn)

Year	Amortization			Interest			Total
	Foreign	FCBU/SLDB a/	Total	Foreign	FCBU/SLDB	Total	

MO 24 – Information on Outstanding Defense Loans

1. Total Interest payments on overdrafts, import bills and administrative borrowings.

(Amount in Rs)

Vote Particulars		01/01/2012 to 30/11/2012	01/12/2012 to 31/12/2012	01/01/2012 to 31/12/2012
249-01-2-1601(11)	Overdraft interest	6,611,628,296.46	992,085,819.57	7,603,714,116.03
	Administrative Borrowing	74,386,096.35	-	74,386,096.35
	C.W.E Interest	323,812,668.00	-	323,812,668.00
	Ceylon Fertilizer	397,852,666.03	-	397,852,666.03
	State Pharmaceuticals	142,350,143.36	-	142,350,143.36
	Total	7,550,029,870.20	992,085,819.57	8,542,115,689.77

2.1 Deffered payments on imports for defence services.

(Amount in Rs)

Institutions	Settled up to 30.11.2012	Settled during Dec.	Cash Released Settlement	Amount Accounted
S.L Army	2,004,395,000.00	0.00	2,004,395,000.00	2,002,857,160.14
S.L Navy	416,200,000.00	0.00	416,200,000.00	415,501,467.10
S.L Air Force	2,635,226,000.00	245,100,000.00	2,880,326,000.00	2,876,526,087.24
Total	5,055,821,000.00	245,100,000.00	5,300,921,000.00	5,294,884,714.48

2.2 Outstanding Amount of deferred defence Loans

(Rs. Mn.)

Institutions	As at 31/12/2012
S.L Army	16,981.33
S.L Navy	4,139.91
S.L Air Force	2,470.13
Total	23,591.37

Banks – 18,339.57

Novinco – 5,251.80

23,591.37

MO 25 – Actual Foreign Debt Service Payment Report



Annex Y

DETAILS OF FOREIGN LOAN PAYMENTS - JUNE 2013

	KE	ments DU	yments	ents	ents TYP	yments CRE	Payments_L...R	ents PM	ayments PMT	ayments PMT	yments PMT_TI	yments EX	ints	Payments RS	Payments RS	Payments RS TOTA	SELL CURR	ELL CURR
5	2010104	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 299 SR(SF)	03/06/2013	781,460.79	24,985.49	726,446.28	126.4769	1	98,718,586.19	3,160,087.32	91,878,673.51	0	0
6	2010106	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 369 SR(SF)	03/06/2013	1,019,468.35	51,551.65	1,071,040.00	126.4769	1	128,941,726.10	6,520,092.88	135,461,818.96	0	0
7	1993003	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 1204 SR(SF)	03/06/2013	561,948.70	110,747.28	672,695.98	126.4769	1	71,073,529.53	14,006,972.66	85,080,502.19	0	0
8	1998019	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 1535 SR(SF)	03/06/2013	287,317.97	91,021.21	298,339.18	126.4769	1	36,220,934.16	11,512,080.47	37,733,014.63	0	0
9	1998059	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 1692 SRI	03/06/2013	699,360.61	313,934.92	1,013,295.53	126.4769	1	88,452,961.94	39,705,515.48	128,158,477.42	0	0
10	2000044	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 1756-	03/06/2013	1,182,070.94	339,323.92	1,521,394.86	126.4769	1	149,504,888.07	42,916,637.50	192,421,305.57	0	0
11	2000055	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 1767 SR(SF)	03/06/2013	256,523.40	74,211.43	332,734.83	126.4769	1	32,697,235.21	9,386,031.61	42,083,269.82	0	0
12	2004005	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 2096 -	03/06/2013	724,147.26	251,441.43	975,588.69	126.4769	1	91,587,900.59	31,801,532.60	123,389,433.19	0	0
13	2004010	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 2131-	03/06/2013	205,492.57	35,896.99	244,389.56	126.4769	1	26,369,493.93	4,540,140.01	30,909,633.94	0	0
14	1987010	06/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Bilateral	AD	AID 383-T-039	06/06/2013	48,775.08	33,356.36	82,131.44	126.5028	1	6,170,184.19	4,219,672.94	10,389,857.13	0	0
15	1988087	07/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Bilateral	AD	AID 383-T-039B	07/06/2013	9,365.58	5,942.27	15,307.85	126.4919	1	1,184,670.01	751,649.02	1,936,319.03	0	0
16	1990003	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	IDA	IDA 2072 CE	03/06/2013	1,157,817.40	142,998.91	1,300,816.31	126.4769	1	146,335,974.00	18,086,658.84	164,422,632.84	0	0
17	1991030	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	IDA	IDA 2297 CE	03/06/2013	956,949.58	129,000.57	1,085,950.13	126.4769	1	121,032,013.61	16,315,592.19	137,347,606.60	0	0
18	1999056	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	IDA	IDA 3301 CE	03/06/2013	280,265.21	97,487.96	377,773.17	126.4769	1	35,449,604.48	12,329,974.97	47,779,579.45	0	0
19	2000036	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	IDA	IDA 3384-CE	03/06/2013	177,411.91	62,369.64	239,781.55	126.4769	1	22,438,508.40	7,888,318.72	30,326,827.12	0	0
20	2004009	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 2130-SRI	03/06/2013	1,659,836.83	119,858.89	1,779,495.72	126.4769	1	209,905,721.38	15,159,380.85	225,065,102.23	0	0
21	2004011	01/06/2013	USD	PRIN	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 2132-SRI	03/06/2013	130,179.08	40,779.68	170,958.76	126.4769	1	16,464,646.48	5,157,687.51	21,622,333.99	0	0
22	2004011	01/06/2013	USD	CMMT	Multilateral	ADB	ADB 2132-SRI	03/06/2013	0.00	13,919.11	13,919.11	126.4769	1	0.00	1,760,445.88	1,760,445.88	0	0
23	2002046	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-189 -	28/06/2013	4,803.06	72.34	4,875.40	168.5244	1	809,432.60	12,191.06	821,623.66	0	0
24	2002041	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-195 -	28/06/2013	15.70	0.24	15.94	168.5244	1	2,645.83	40.45	2,686.28	0	0
25	2002047	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-200 -	28/06/2013	22,370.06	647.75	23,017.81	168.5244	1	3,769,900.94	109,161.68	3,879,062.62	0	0
26	2002048	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-269 -	28/06/2013	151,981.92	8,989.53	160,971.45	168.5244	1	25,612,661.88	1,514,955.15	27,127,617.03	0	0
27	2002049	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-276 -	28/06/2013	93,285.53	2,848.80	96,134.33	168.5244	1	15,720,887.97	480,092.31	16,200,980.28	0	0
28	2002052	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-305 -	28/06/2013	151,835.39	16,166.80	170,002.19	168.5244	1	25,587,966.00	3,061,549.07	28,648,517.07	0	0
29	2002053	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-339 -	28/06/2013	171,070.65	22,487.19	193,557.85	168.5244	1	28,829,586.34	3,789,640.20	32,619,226.54	0	0
30	2002054	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-390 -	28/06/2013	171,594.84	22,222.75	193,727.59	168.5244	1	28,902,750.26	3,745,075.61	32,647,825.87	0	0
31	2002055	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-398 -	28/06/2013	131,476.17	21,707.05	153,183.22	168.5244	1	22,156,942.68	3,658,167.58	25,815,110.24	0	0
32	1997081	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-876-	28/06/2013	6,679.00	765.38	7,444.38	168.5244	1	1,125,574.47	128,985.20	1,254,559.67	0	0
33	1997082	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-876-	28/06/2013	4,076.00	446.53	4,526.53	168.5244	1	687,242.50	75,588.25	762,830.75	0	0
34	1997086	30/06/2013	EUR	PRIN	Bilateral	FRENCH	FRENCH TY-876-	28/06/2013	4,724.42	639.78	5,364.20	168.5244	1	796,180.05	107,818.54	903,998.59	0	0

MO 26 – Report on Month End Exchange Rates

33/04/001/0012/009(6)

International Operations Department
28-Jun-2013

TO: ALL OFFICERS HANDLING FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS

Indicative exchange rates for the month-end of June 2013 (as at 28.06.2013) are given below. These rates are based on the Inter Bank Weighted average US$/Rupee exchange rate of the previous day and cross currency rates vis-a' - vis the US Dollar appearing on Reuters system at 8.00 a.m. on the current day.

CURRENCY	RATES OF EXCHANGE (SL. RS.)
Australian Dollar	120.2266
Bahrain Dinar	344.7231
Canadian Dollar	123.9964
Chinese Renminbi	21.1492
Chinese (Offshore)	21.1648
Russian Rouble	3.9602
Danish Kroner	22.7755
Hongkong Dollar	16.7537
Indian Rupee	2.1620
Japanese Yen	1.3135
Korean Won	0.1135
Kuwait Dinar	455.6025
Malaysian Ringgit	40.8874
New Zealand Dollar	101.3108
Norwegian Kroner	21.5509
Omani Riyal	337.5644
Pakistan Rupee	1.3134
Qatar Riyal	35.6907
Saudi Arabian Riyal	34.6538
Singapore Dollar	102.6869
South African Rand	13.0426
Swedish Kroner	19.3246
Swiss Franc	137.7869
Taiwan Dollar	4.3349
Thailand Baht	4.1687
UAE Dirham	35.3827
UK Pound	198.4433
US Dollar	129.9606
Euro	169.8780
Gold (per Troy OZ)	155,465.37

H A Karunaratne
Director, International Operations

SDR = 195.4550

MO 27 – Outstanding Loan Details



Government of France

Number	Title	Creditor Reference	Agreement Date	Currency	CS-DRMS Outstanding Amount	Reported Outstanding Amount	Difference	Difference as a percentage of CS-DRMS	
1997077	Expan.of Telephone exchanges in Colombo	876-OEI	2/5/1997	EUR	944,594	944,594	(0)	0.00%	19819.59
1997078	TA/Mainten.Water treatment Plant Colombo	876-OAI	5/2/1997	EUR	230,985	230,985	0	0.00%	4274.82
1997080	Cardio Thoracic Equipment for Kandy Hospital	876-ODI	2/5/1997	EUR	1,061,751	1,061,751	(0)	0.00%	2613.63
1997081	Elihouse & F/S on Colombo North Water Sp	876-OBI	2/5/1997	EUR	550,305	550,305	-	0.00%	6679
1997082	Modenisation-Colombo Water Distrib.Netwo	876-OCI	2/5/1997	EUR	216,594	216,594	-	0.00%	4078
1997084	Improvement of Govt.Film Unit	876-OGI	5/2/1997	EUR	288,368	288,368	0	0.00%	3865
1998021	Water Treatment Plant at Anuradhapura	972-OAI	9/4/1998	EUR	4,402,382				
1998083	Modern.Ratmalana Air Traffic contro syst	924-OA1	1/28/1998	EUR	1,237,500				
1998084	Expansion of E 10B Telecom Exchange-1996	924-OB1	1/28/1998	EUR	1,052,585				
1998090	Improvement of Govt.Film Unit	924-ODI	1/28/1998	EUR	414,328				
1999100	Extension of Colombo Telecommunica.Units	816-OBI	3/31/1999	EUR	941,002	941,002	(0)	0.00%	19844.14
1999102	Ambatale Water Treatment Plant Project	561-OAI	3/31/1999	EUR	5,717,896	5,717,896	0	0.00%	183056.7
1999103	Samanalawewa Transmission Project	471-OB1	1/1/1999	EUR	2,821,112	2,821,112	0	0.00%	153287.6
1999104	Mixed Credit for Telecomm & CEB	529-OAI,OBI	3/30/1999	EUR	1,910,864	1,910,864	(0)	0.00%	53332.14
1999105	Mixed Credit for Irri.,Telecom.,CEB	428-OAI	1/1/1999	EUR	1,862,068	1,862,069	1	0.00%	85382.87
2000100	Rehabilitation of Ambatale Water Plant	816-OAI	12/31/2000	EUR	1,710,213	1,710,213	0	0.00%	10911.26
2000101	Water Supply Network of Colombo	746-OAI	12/31/2000	EUR	1,937,068	1,937,068	(0)	0.00%	37880.22
2002041	Import of Commodities	195-OAI	1/1/2002	EUR	15				15.7

MO 28 – Loan Details Summary



Difference Range	Count
Less than -100%	0
Between -99% and -10%	3
Between -9% and -2%	3
Between -1% and 1%	357
Between 2% and 9%	2
Between 10% and 99%	2
More than 100%	2
Not reported	342
Total	711

Creditor	Data outstanding	Reported
AB Svensk Export Credit	5	
Agence Francaise De Developement	1	
Asian Development Bank	143	1
Australian & New Zealand Investment Bank	2	
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.	2	
Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG	7	7
Banker's Trust Company U.S.A.	1	
Banque Francaise du Commerce Ext. COM	1	
Bear Steans & Company Inc.	1	
BNP Paribas	1	1
Calyon Credit Agricole CIB	1	
China Development Bank Corporation	3	3
City Bank International Plc.	1	1
Co-op Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank	9	
Danske Bank A/S	1	
European Investment Bank	4	
Export Development Bank of Iran	2	
Export Import Bank of Malaysia	1	1
Fortis Bank NV/Fortis Banque SA	1	
Government of Canada	23	23
Government of Denmark	4	2

MO 29 – R861_1 Report (Project Loan Disbursements)



CS-DRMS Report 861 — MONTHLY DISBURSEMENT BY CREDITOR & TITLE

for year 2013 in millions of Sri Lanka Rupees

Page 1 of 6

Creditor Name	Instrument	Description	Jan 2013	Feb 2013	Mar 2013	Apr 2013	May 2013	Jun 2013	Jul 2013
AB Svensk Export Credit	2007029	Ratmalana & Ja-Ela Wastewater Treatment Facilities Pj (Sweden)	64		171	260	102	75	
AB Svensk Export Credit Total			64		171	260	102	75	
Agence Francaise De Developeme	2011036	Implementation of Jaffna Killinochchi Water Supply and Sanitation Project (France			45				
Agence Francaise De Developement Total					45				
Asian Development Bank	2003004	Secondary Towns & Rural Community Water/Sanitation	6						
	2004006	TA Loan-Road Project Preparatory Facility			4				
	2005002	North East Community Restoration & Development (II)				15			
	2006003	National Highways Sector Project	2	225	286	96			
	2006004	Secondary Towns & Rural Community Water/Sanitation Supp. 1	2						
	2007007	Colombo Port Expansion Project	531	12	242	6	15		
	2007012	Secondary Towns & Rural Community Water/Sanitation (OCR)	36		17	7			
	2007031	Education for Knowledge Society Project		82	135	122			
	2008003	Southern Transport Development Project - Supplementary	7						
	2008006	Clean Energy and Access Improvement Project	550	363	208	198	263		
	2008007	Clean Energy and Access Improvement Project	44	146	11	5	26		
	2008008	Dry Zone Urban Water and Sanitation Project	25	66	20				
	2008018	Eastern & North Central Provincial Road Project	73	41	200				
	2008028	Greater Colombo Wastewater Management Project (OCR)	8	31	45	127			
	2008029	Greater Colombo Wastewater Management Project (ADF)	15	33	10	97			
	2010019	ADB Funded Fiscal Management Efficiency Project		12	13				
	2010020	N-E Community Restoration & Development Project II Supplementary	16						
	2010021	Conflict-Affected Region Emergency Project	152	226	465	289	340		
	2010025	Northern Road Connectivity Project (OCR)	337	459	396	481	392		
	2010026	Northern Road Connectivity Project (ADF)	80		68	7			
	2011001	Jaffna & Kilinochchi Water Supply & Sanitation Project OCR	19			3			
	2011002	Jaffna & Kilinochchi Water Supply & Sanitation Project ADF		30	34	2			
	2011012	Sustainable Power Sector Support Project (OCR)	76	49	66	243	488		
	2011013	Sustainable Power Sector Support Project (ADF)	60	18	3	17	6		
	2011015	Secondary Towns & Rural Com-Based Water Supply Add.				1			

MO 30 – Gross Borrowing Limit Table



Gross Borrowing Limit as per Appropriation Act - 2013

as at 15-Jul-13

Rs. million

	Approved Limit for 2013 Book Value	Usage up to 15-Jul-13 Book Value (Provisional)	Balance 16-Jul to 31-Dec Book Value	Usage up to 15-Jul-13 (%)
1 Gross Borrowing Limit (net of contingency provision)				
Total	1,267,500	841,994	425,506	66.4%
Domestic	884,100	534,412	349,688	60.4%
Foreign	383,400	307,582	75,818	80.2%
One Foreign Investments in Tbills/Thond	182,000	204,772	(42,772)	126.4%
2 Sources of Financing	Proposed Prog	Usage up to 15-Jul-13	Lee-way 16-Jul to 31-Dec	
1 Domestic Financing	884,100	534,412	349,688	60.4%
a. Rupee Loans	-	-	-	
b. Treasury bonds /a	720,000	416,983	303,017	57.9%
c. Treasury bills (Net) /b	50,000	9,823	40,177	19.6%
d. CBSL Advances	15,100	16,813	(1,713)	111.3%
e. SLDBs	99,000	70,078	28,922	70.8%
f. OBUs	-	-	-	
g. Bank OD	-	1,911	(1,911)	
h. Other (Admin borrowings, import bills, etc..)	-	18,805	(18,805)	
2 Foreign Financing	383,400	307,582	75,818	80.2%
a. Project / Programme Loans /c	121,400	102,810	18,590	84.7%
b. Commercial Loan	142,000	204,772	(62,772)	144.2%
Syndicated Loan	-	-	-	
International Bond	-	-	-	
Treasury Bonds	142,000	141,679	321	99.8%
Treasury Bills	-	63,093	(63,093)	
Other	-	-	-	
Total Domestic + Foreign financing	1,267,500	841,994	425,506	66.4%
Memo - Total T bill/ T bond borrowings				
Treasury bonds	882,000	558,662	323,338	63.3%

MO 31 – NCD Report (ERD)



Net Credit to Government (for budgetary financing purposes)

Item	2011	2012				2013					Change	
	December	March	June	September	December	January	February	March	April	May	Dec 12-May 13	Apr 13- M
MB					806,807.6	849,879.7	855,980.0	912,285.6	948,512.2	957,106.9		
PF					724,795.7	768,413.8	774,447.1	831,586.2	867,907.7	877,222.9		
Central Bank	262,742.3	327,007.3	324,186.0	332,041.2	278,842.9	266,349.1	245,135.5	265,095.3	224,360.6	238,553.4	-40,289.5	14,
Loans & advances to Govt.1/(Provisional Advances)	94,743.0	110,197.4	96,744.5	112,760.4	111,291.8	128,109.9	128,100.4	127,806.0	128,078.1	128,060.7	16,768.8	
Less: Loan to IMF No. 1 account												
Treasury bills (OMO)	169,796.6	217,773.5	228,300.2	219,969.8	168,236.8	138,955.6	117,676.1	137,865.1	96,767.0	110,936.7	-57,300.0	14,
Treasury bonds	-	-	-	-	-							
Cash items in process of collection	-	-	-	-	-							
Less: Govt. deposits	-1,797.3	-963.7	-858.7	-689.0	-685.7	-710.3	-641.0	-575.8	-484.5	-444.0	241.7	
Govt. currency holdings												
Commercial Banks (DBUs/OBUs/SLDB)	535,119.5	594,466.9	581,123.7	572,902.0	650,546.3	706,658.2	754,142.7	800,600.2	877,656.4	872,778.8	222,232.4	-4,
DBUs	348,884.5	402,830.1	389,486.9	368,508.5	445,952.8	502,064.7	529,311.6	566,490.9	643,547.2	658,669.5	192,716.7	-4,
Cash items in process of collection	9,712.5	465.6	4,787.2	173.8	779.6	822.6	110.3	453.0	57.3	118.2	-661.4	
Treasury bills	175,643.9	218,818.9	189,307.6	171,867.0	200,718.0	258,191.0	300,509.2	297,164.1	314,206.3	297,613.4	96,895.4	-16,
Treasury bonds 2/	159,814.8	156,847.2	198,468.3	196,802.8	183,004.0	72,476.6	167,294.2	205,021.3	262,409.3	276,317.9	93,327.9	8,
Other Securities Guaranteed by Government					27,000.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	-	-27,000.0	
Short term US dollar loans	-	-	-	-								
Govt. securities	-	-	-	-								
Trust receipts	-	-	-	-								
Govt. import bills	11,478.6	13,953.6	14,387.6	16,374.9	16,141.6	16,048.9	18,189.7	18,089.7	18,093.8	18,084.1	1,942.5	
DST loans												
Short term loans (Textile loans)	6,590.9	4,265.7	6,977.2	9,344.2	9,560.1	9,775.7	9,863.9	11,906.7	11,839.1	12,253.8	2,693.7	
Long Term Loans (Projects)	-											
Overdraft to Govt.	50,174.6	56,041.4	40,876.4	73,025.1	96,782.7	104,995.3	94,751.6	94,491.3	93,375.2	94,641.6	-2,141.1	1,
Less: Govt. demand deposits	-55,690.9	-23,099.2	-24,700.9	-25,746.7	-25,398.3	-24,244.7	-25,259.6	-24,542.9	-24,697.7	-24,280.8	1,117.4	
Time & savings deposits	-30,839.9	-24,463.1	-28,907.4	-27,952.6	-54,400.9	-27,312.9	-27,893.0	-28,701.0	-29,608.4	-29,486.5	24,914.4	
FCBU Deposit (CDB Loan; $ 152 mn; Dec 10)			-11,209.3	-9,579.9	-8,234.0	-8,188.1	-8,255.1	-7,421.5	-7,126.6	-6,606.2	1,627.8	
Govt. import deposits												
OBUs/SLDB	186,285.0	191,636.8	191,636.8	204,593.6	204,593.6	204,593.6	224,831.1	234,109.3	234,109.3	234,109.3	29,515.7	
Borrowing from OBUs (Actual Borrowing)	10,926.5	10,926.5	10,926.5	10,926.5	10,926.5	10,926.5	10,926.5	10,834.3	10,834.3	10,834.3	-92.2	

MO 32 – Statement on Domestic Debt



Statement on Domestic Public Debt

June-2013

Amounts in Rs.

	As at End of May-2013	During the Month of June-2013			As at End of June-2013
	Outstanding Debt	Issues	Capital Repayment	Conversion/ Consolidation	Outstanding Debt
(A) Domestic Currency Debt	3,660,772,065,683.45	184,278,500,000.00	146,036,260,000.00		3,699,014,305,683.45
Rupee Loans [1]	55,517,766,290.00	-	-	-	55,517,766,290.00
Treasury Bills [2]	766,640,840,000.00	128,378,800,000.00	89,992,240,000.00		805,027,400,000.00
Treasury Bonds [3]	2,838,606,177,182.00	55,899,700,000.00	56,044,020,000.00		2,838,461,857,182.00
Tax Reserve Certificates	7,208,372.45	-	-		7,208,372.45
National Development Bonds	73,839.00	-	-		73,839.00
(B) Foreign Currency Debt [4]	270,248,857,760.00	-	-		277,694,611,656.00
SLDBs - (USD 1,986.76 mn) [5]	251,277,457,760.00	-	-	6,925,063,896.00	258,200,521,656.00
OBUs - (USD 150.00 mn)	18,971,400,000.00	-	-	522,690,000.00	19,494,090,000.00
Total	3,931,020,923,443.45	184,278,500,000.00	146,036,260,000.00	7,447,753,896.00	3,976,708,917,339.45

Note:

(1) Includes Restructuring Bonds amounting to Rs. 24,088 million issued to two state banks in 1993.

MO 33 – Net Domestic Finance (NDF) Table



MO 34 – Parity Variance



Month	Foreign		Tbills and Tbonds Outstanding as at end month		Defence Out as at end month		Disbursements	Repayments	Parity variance	Outsatnding				Exchange Rate		Out
	Beginning Outstanding	End Outstanding	Beginning Outstanding	End Outstanding	Beginning Outstanding	End Outstanding				OBU		SLDB				
										USD mn	EURO mn	USD mn		USD	EURO	
Dec-Jan	2,767,300	2,781,063	397,788	397,788	5,252	4,612	17,673	8,871	5,602	150		1,753.6		127.1808		19
Dec-Feb	2,767,300	2,818,322	397,788	474,029	5,252	4,124	37,066	15,684	-44,470	150		1,753.6		126.4512		19
Dec-Mar	2,767,300	2,833,515	397,788	476,984	5,252	3,527	58,869	25,612	-44,314	150		1,912.8		127.4858		19
Dec-Apr	2,767,300	2,805,413	397,788	486,966	5,252	2,786	73,573	31,846	-90,326	150		1,986.8		126.8528		19
Dec-May	2,767,300	2,819,915	397,788	497,749	5,252	2,522	81,353	37,085	-88,883	150		1,986.8		126.8005		19
Dec-Jun	2,767,300		397,788		5,252				-2,364,260	150		1,986.8		126.4760		18
Dec-July	2,767,300		397,788		5,252				-2,364,260							
Dec-Aug	2,767,300		397,788		5,252				-2,364,260							
Dec-Sep	2,767,300		397,788		5,252				-2,364,260							
Dec-Oct	2,767,300		397,788		5,252				-2,364,260							
Dec-Nov	2,767,300		397,788		5,252				-2,364,260							
Dec-Dec	2,767,300		397,788		5,252				-2,364,260							

MO 35 – Individual Daily Summary Report (T-bill Information)



DAILY REPORTING FORM: PDD-DR2

TWO WAY QUOTES (TREASURY BILLS)

REPORTING DATE : 15-Jul-13

Remaining Maturity	Average Buying Price	Yield	Average Selling Price	Yield	Buying & Selling Spread
1-7 Days	99.8322	8.75%	99.8418	8.25%	0.0096
1 Month	99.2603	9.00%	99.3014	8.50%	0.0411
2 Month	98.5205	9.00%	98.5627	8.50%	0.0822
3 Month	97.7808	9.00%	97.9041	8.50%	0.1233
4 Month	96.9589	9.25%	97.0411	9.00%	0.0822
5 Month	96.0959	9.50%	96.1986	9.25%	0.1027
6 Month	95.1518	9.75%	95.3151	9.50%	0.1233
7 Month	94.2466	10.00%	94.3904	9.75%	0.1438
8 Month	93.2603	10.25%	93.4247	10.00%	0.1644
9 Month	92.4178	10.25%	92.5027	10.00%	0.1849
10 Month	91.3699	10.60%	91.5753	10.25%	0.2055
11 Month	90.4164	10.60%	90.5068	10.60%	0.0904
12 Month	89.4959	10.65%	89.5945	10.55%	0.0986

Return by12.00 Noon daily to:

Department of Public Debt — Fax 2477718

Central Bank of Sri Lanka — Phone 2477252

E-Mail pdebt@cbsl.lk

MO 36 – Individual Daily Summary Report (T-bond Information)



DAILY REPORTING FORM: PDD-DR3

TREASURY BONDS DAILY TRANSACTIONS

AS OF CLOSE OF TRADING ON 12-Jul-13 Reporting Date 15-Jul-13

Treasury Bond By Series	Maturity Period (Years)	Maturity Date (DD/MM/YY)	Days to Maturity	Average Buying Price	Yield	Average Selling Price	Yield	Buying & Selling Spread	Opening Stock (Rs.'000)	Purchased (Rs. '000)	Sold (Rs.'000)	Stock held (Rs. '000)	Number of Transactions
08.50%2013B	10	15-Jul-13	1						6,000			6,000	
07.50%2013A	10	1-Aug-13	16										
06.75%2013A	3	1-Sep-13	47										
08.84%2013A	2	5-Oct-13	81										
07.50%2013B	10	1-Nov-13	108						50,000			50,000	
09.25%2013A	2	21-Nov-13	128										
06.60%2014A	2	1-Feb-14	200										
07.00%2014A	4	1-Mar-14	228						11,000			11,000	
11.75%2014B	6	1-Apr-14	259	100.9029	10.35%	100.9369	10.30%	0.0340	1,050,000	500,000	450,000	1,100,000	3
06.60%2014B	4	1-Jun-14	320										
11.25%2014A	5	15-Jul-14	364										
09.00%2014A	2	1-Oct-14	442										
06.30%2015A	4	15-Jan-15	548										
11.75%2015A	6	15-Mar-15	607						7,310			7,310	
06.30%2015B	4	15-Jun-15	699										
06.50%2015A	5	15-Jul-15	729										
11.00%2015A	6	1-Aug-15	746						2,000			2,000	
11.00%2015B	6	1-Sep-15	777						300			300	
08.50%2015A	3	1-Nov-15	838										
07.75%2016A	6	1-Apr-16	990										

MO 37 – Pooled Report generated from Individual Daily Summary Reports



GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET
DAILY SUMMARY OF SECONDARY MARKET TRANSACTIONS
FOR 15-Jul-13

Weighted Average Yield Rates (% Per Annum)		Last Primary Auctions (After Tax)	Last Transacted		Two Way Quotes for 16-Jul-13	
			Buying	Selling	Bid	Offer
Treasury Bills	< 91 Days	8.65%	8.59%	8.35%	8.00%	8.64%
	< 182 Days	9.70%	9.35%	8.63%	9.79%	9.65%
	< 364 Days	10.66%	10.78%	10.41%	10.80%	10.59%
Treasury Bonds	< 2 Year	13.62%	10.40%	10.05%	10.79%	10.63%
	< 3 Year	10.98%	10.71%	10.70%	11.00%	10.84%
	< 4 Year	14.10%	11.37%	11.28%	11.07%	10.89%
	< 5 Year	11.45%	11.35%	11.27%	11.34%	11.24%
	< 6Year	10.97%	11.45%	11.40%	11.47%	11.31%
	<10Year	11.80%	11.73%	11.54%	11.58%	11.45%
	< 15Year	12.21%	12.10%	12.00%	12.16%	11.95%
	< 20Year	12.50%	12.33%	11.80%	12.13%	11.91%

Repo Transactions Yield Rates		Treasury Bills	Treasury Bonds
Repurchase	Overnight	8.37%	8.49%
	< 7 Days	8.60%	8.55%
Reverse Repurchase	Overnight	8.92%	10.67%
	< 7 Days	9.37%	10.00%

Secondary Market Transactions (Rs. Million)		Treasury Bills	Treasury Bonds
Outright Transactions	Purchased	4,520	4,402
	Sold	220	5,864
Repo Transactions	Repurchase	6,725	14,018
	Reverse Repurchase	1,633	1,657

Daily Yield Curve For 15-Jul-13

Secondary Market Yield Rates

MO 38 – Actual Foreign Debt Service Payment Summary



FOREIGN DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS 2012
In Rupees

Principal Payments	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November
Bilateral	1,615,909,310	3,993,476,832	6,758,288,693	3,389,006,956	2,028,673,400	2,690,602,879	4,453,526,320	4,575,330,201	8,122,413,258	3,795,481,324	2,576,364,264
Multilateral	998,982,858	2,080,355,063	2,890,589,624	1,116,306,552	3,405,228,865	2,797,906,636	2,555,106,165	1,326,739,965	2,670,946,034	1,535,111,342	3,685,105,842
Commercial	42,712,500	83,405,980	7,316,068	32,727,850	0	143,593,956	531,655,163	-	8,236,257	64,488,181,500	0
Export Credit	1,934,500,827	416,463,069	1,340,830,286	1,271,054,240	726,551,853	926,843,316	2,125,484,760	416,439,530	1,347,752,517	1,217,778,807	356,874,398
Total Foreign	4,792,105,496	6,572,700,944	10,997,024,672	5,809,097,598	6,160,453,918	6,560,948,791	9,665,774,407	6,320,508,687	12,149,348,066	70,988,553,572	6,622,344,504
SLDB	-	-	5,868,535,500				23,577,206,400	-	12,619,893,370	12,876,170	-
FCBU	-	-	-					-	-	-	-
Total Domestic Foreign Currency	-	-	5,868,535,500	-	-	-	##########	-	12,619,893,370	12,876,170	-
Grand Total	4,792,105,496	6,572,700,944	16,865,560,172	5,809,097,598	6,160,453,918	6,560,948,791	33,242,980,807	6,320,508,687	24,769,241,436	70,989,429,742	6,622,344,504
Interest Payments											
Bilateral	1,791,386,161	1,339,173,840	6,000,140,743	894,325,858	342,633,649	793,031,011	2,256,142,563	1,510,906,160	4,528,154,235	1,356,584,714	427,551,782
Multilateral	330,569,771	442,263,519	781,407,149	264,385,555	659,794,304	681,957,560	803,685,212	247,958,562	788,303,018	280,625,501	777,930,690
Commercial	5,713,586,631	2,637,357	531,795,736	6,691,866,633	0	5,885,349	6,851,684,572	2,212,813	18,351,761	6,754,609,467	0
Export Credit	1,716,843,264	118,886,985	284,150,275	101,936,414	317,325,330	164,830,071	2,154,306,475	68,647,736	251,775,375	95,724,450	319,434,518
Total Foreign	9,552,385,827	1,982,942,079	7,597,493,902	7,952,516,461	1,319,753,283	1,645,703,991	11,865,818,823	1,829,765,270	5,586,584,386	8,487,544,132	1,524,976,990
SLDB	1,448,496,307	428,316,709	1,169,422,470			390,379,271	2,801,541,814	488,613,075	1,430,963,159	0	17,302,876.95
FCBU		127,982,444	123,202,979			135,265,657		151,615,586	133,716,007	21,559,640	-
Total Domestic Foreign Currency	1,448,496,307	556,301,153	1,292,625,449	0	0	525,644,929	2,801,541,814	650,228,661	1,564,685,165	21,559,640	17,302,876.95
Grand Total	11,000,882,134	2,539,243,233	8,890,119,351	7,952,516,461	1,319,753,283	2,171,348,920	14,667,360,637	2,479,993,931	7,151,269,551	8,509,103,780	1,542,279,867
HNB Loan Payments - Interest	13,437,708	13,620,296	14,021,341	14,764,517	14,972,079	15,224,892	14,731,998	15,015,083	15,048,316	14,422,417	14,838,960
HNB Loan Payments - Principal	0	0	0			85,781,921	0	0	0	0	0
Interest+Principal	15,732,987,630	9,051,944,177	25,755,679,523	13,761,614,059	7,480,207,201	8,732,297,710	47,910,341,445	8,800,502,818	31,920,510,987	79,498,533,522	8,184,624,371
NOROCHCHOLAI	748,988,821	17,570,966									
Interest	689,315,038	0	0	0	0	0	854,640,039	0	0	0	0
Principal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mahthaia											
Interest	0	0	168,600,948	0	0	0	0	0	192,641,126	0	0
Principal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

MO 39 – EURIBOR Rates



EURIBOR rates for June 2013

Dates		1W	15D	3W	1M	2M	3M	4M	5M	6M	7M	8M	9M	1Y
F	6/28/13	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.18	0.22	0.26	0.29	0.34	0.37	0.4	0.44	0.53
T	6/27/13	0.1	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.18	0.22	0.26	0.29	0.34	0.37	0.4	0.44	0.53
W	6/26/13	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.18	0.22	0.26	0.3	0.34	0.38	0.41	0.44	0.54
T	6/25/13	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.18	0.23	0.27	0.3	0.35	0.38	0.41	0.45	0.54
M	6/24/13	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.18	0.22	0.26	0.3	0.34	0.38	0.41	0.44	0.54
F	6/21/13	0.1	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.22	0.26	0.29	0.33	0.37	0.4	0.43	0.52
T	6/20/13	0.1	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.29	0.33	0.36	0.39	0.43	0.52
W	6/19/13	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.42	0.51
T	6/18/13	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.41	0.5
M	6/17/13	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.41	0.5
F	6/14/13	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.42	0.5
T	6/13/13	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.41	0.5
W	6/12/13	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.41	0.5
T	6/11/13	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.21	0.24	0.28	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.41	0.5
M	6/10/13	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.2	0.24	0.27	0.31	0.34	0.37	0.41	0.5
F	6/7/13	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.2	0.24	0.27	0.31	0.34	0.37	0.4	0.49
T	6/6/13	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.16	0.2	0.23	0.27	0.3	0.33	0.36	0.39	0.48
W	6/5/13	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.16	0.2	0.23	0.27	0.3	0.33	0.36	0.39	0.48
T	6/4/13	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.16	0.2	0.23	0.27	0.3	0.33	0.36	0.39	0.48
M	6/3/13	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.16	0.2	0.23	0.26	0.3	0.33	0.36	0.39	0.48

source: Bloomberg, 2013

MO 40 – ATM Monthly Profile



	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
1	auctic	bondseric	ettlement	issuedat	Matdati	Peri	facevalue	yie	couponra	amtpayable		=SUMP	Next Cou	to next	A=FV		
2	6182	09.00%2048A	3-Jun-13	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-43	30	3,000,000,000.00	13.89	9.00	1,962,765,000.00	30	0	1-Dec-13	181	543,000,000,000		
3	6183	09.00%2021A	3-Jun-13	1-May-12	1-May-21	8	207,600,000.00	12.31	9.00	173,425,303.20	8	0	1-Nov-13	151	31,347,600,000		
4	6184	09.00%2043A	4-Jun-13	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-43	30	500,000,000.00	13.89	9.00	327,124,500.00	30	0	1-Dec-13	180	90,000,000,000		
5	6185	08.00%2017B	7-Jun-13	15-Jun-12	15-Jun-17	4	250,000,000.00	12.01	8.00	218,725,250.00	4	0	15-Jun-13	8	2,000,000,000		
6	6186	09.00%2043A	7-Jun-13	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-43	30	500,000.00	13.89	9.00	327,116.50	30	0	1-Dec-13	177	88,500,000		
7	6187	09.00%2028B	7-Jun-13	1-May-13	1-May-28	15	1,260,000,000.00	13.41	9.00	905,186,520.00	15	0	1-Nov-13	147	185,220,000,000		
8	6188	09.00%2028B	11-Jun-13	1-May-13	1-May-28	15	1,250,200,000.00	13.41	9.00	898,207,440.20	15	0	1-Nov-13	143	178,778,600,000		
9	6189	05.65%2019A	17-Jun-13	15-Jan-11	15-Jan-19	6	3,755,800,000.00	12.42	5.65	2,753,313,131.40	6	0	15-Jul-13	28	105,162,400,000		
10	6190	08.00%2018A	17-Jun-13	15-Nov-11	15-Nov-18	5	3,404,500,000.00	12.4	8.00	2,825,939,270.00	5	0	15-Nov-13	151	514,079,500,000		
11	6191	09.00%2021A	17-Jun-13	1-May-12	1-May-21	8	1,733,300,000.00	12.59	9.00	1,427,707,076.90	8	0	1-Nov-13	137	237,462,100,000		
12	6192	08.50%2018D	17-Jun-13	1-Jun-12	1-Jun-18	5	3,313,300,000.00	12.37	8.50	2,848,558,348.90	5	0	1-Dec-13	167	553,321,100,000		
13	6193	09.00%2043A	17-Jun-13	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-43	30	13,676,000,000.00	13.89	9.00	8,946,620,384.00	30	0	1-Dec-13	167	2,283,892,000,000		
14	6194	09.00%2043A	17-Jun-13	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-43	30	5,050,000,000.00	13.89	9.00	3,303,629,200.00	30	0	1-Dec-13	167	843,350,000,000		
15	6195	09.00%2028B	17-Jun-13	1-May-13	1-May-28	15	8,735,000,000.00	13.41	9.00	6,276,333,345.00	15	0	1-Nov-13	137	1,196,695,000,000		
16	6196	09.00%2033A	17-Jun-13	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-33	20	8,050,000,000.00	13.5	9.00	5,563,628,700.00	20	0	1-Dec-13	167	1,344,350,000,000		
17	6197	09.00%2021A	20-Jun-13	1-May-12	1-May-21	8	4,500,000.00	12.59	9.00	3,707,059.50	8	0	1-Nov-13	134	603,000,000		
18	6198	08.00%2017B	27-Jun-13	15-Jun-12	15-Jun-17	4	100,000,000.00	12.17	8.00	87,181,100.00	4	0	15-Dec-13	171	17,100,000,000		
19	6199	06.20%2020A	28-Jun-13	1-Aug-10	1-Aug-20	7	9,000,000.00	12.61	6.20	6,344,910.00	7	0	1-Aug-13	34	306,000,000		
20	6200	09.00%2033A	28-Jun-13	1-Jun-13	1-Jun-33	20	1,600,000,000.00	13.61	9.00	1,096,974,400.00	20	0	1-Dec-13	156	249,600,000,000		
21							55,899,700,000.00								8,376,355,800,000		
22							19.71							Days	149.85		
23														Months	4.83		
24														Yrs	0.41		

MO 41 –Interest and Amortization Payments of Domestic Debt



Due Payments Daily-Forecast.pdf - Adobe Reader

File Edit View Window Help

Zoom out (Ctrl+Minus)

Tools | Sign | Comment

Payments by Type of Obligation

Month	Date	Payment Type	Amount
August 2013			
Rupee Interest			
	8/1/2013	Rupee Interest	1,445,280,000.00
Rupee Interest Total			1,445,280,000.00
Tbills Interest			
	8/2/2013	Tbills Interest	1,157,586,517.10
	8/9/2013	Tbills Interest	1,329,982,746.64
	8/16/2013	Tbills Interest	1,262,596,890.00
	8/23/2013	Tbills Interest	620,512,136.60
	8/30/2013	Tbills Interest	1,164,908,336.00
Tbills Interest Total			5,535,586,626.34
Tbills Principle			
	8/2/2013	Tbills Principle	13,268,263,482.90
	8/9/2013	Tbills Principle	15,827,337,253.36
	8/16/2013	Tbills Principle	20,707,903,110.00
	8/23/2013	Tbills Principle	11,292,087,863.40
	8/30/2013	Tbills Principle	15,433,091,664.00
Tbills Principle Total			76,528,683,373.66
TBond discount			
	8/1/2013	TBond discount	13,638,730,973.30

MO 42 – Currency wise Statement of Foreign Loans



Foreign Payment Forecast August 2013 [Compatibility Mode] - Microsoft Excel

Name of the Loan	Loankey	Rupee Interest	Rupee Principal	Rupee Total
ADB 1090 SRI(SF)	1991029	23,534,490.98	125,501,812.97	149,036,303.94
ADB 1183 SRI(SF)	1992039	4,355,426.77	10,673,573.11	15,028,999.88
ADB 1716 SRI(SF)	1999002	30,090,150.70	107,382,937.44	137,473,088.15
ADB 1649 SRI(SF)	1999004	56,625,473.52	123,619,383.06	180,244,856.58
ADB 1707 SRI(SF)	1999045	14,731,595.44	52,572,587.23	67,304,182.67
ADB 2167 SRI(SF)	2005001	4,173,297.39	-	4,173,297.39
ADB 2168 SRI(SF)	2005002	16,117,909.85	-	16,117,909.85
ADB 472 SRI(SF)	2010111	3,873,179.37	50,107,573.85	53,980,753.22
IDA 133 CE	1968002	82,477.00	1,473,842.36	1,556,319.36
IDA 174 CE	1970016	1,922,363.90	30,242,802.58	32,165,166.48
IDA 585 CE	1975002	3,776,075.41	40,278,149.42	44,054,224.83
IDA 818 CE	1978001	3,545,336.56	31,513,885.97	35,059,221.54
IDA 942 CE	1979004	3,527,291.84	29,393,838.71	32,921,130.54
IDA 1182 CE	1982001	11,281,277.97	77,465,786.39	88,747,064.36
IDA 2128 CE	1990009	41,775,390.40	311,033,974.90	352,809,365.31
IDA 2837 CE	1998011	4,863,620.80	14,716,487.52	19,580,108.32
IDA 4575	2009014	11,329,229.53	-	11,329,229.53
INDIA 2001 USD 45 mn	2001041	19,405,381.49	157,252,326.00	176,657,707.49
NETHERLAND RABO BANK	2006065	7,222,077.77	-	7,222,077.77
NETHERLAND RABO BANK	2007032	5,707,583.13	38,222,550.00	43,930,133.13
NETHERLANDS*	2013001	2,450,507.18	-	2,450,507.18
PAKISTAN	2006071	4,781,900.26	23,909,501.39	28,691,401.66
AID 383-T-028D	1984006	24,741,015.30	54,864,776.41	79,605,791.71
AID 383-T-021	1978018	2,327,699.61	13,080,716.33	15,408,415.95
HSBC 53/FC1161	2008037	121,065,406.67	286,658,422.69	407,723,829.36
UNI CREDIT BANK AUST 229.7*	2010004	-	292,934,565.40	292,934,565.40
AID 383-T-038	1987009	3,853,695.68	6,314,178.64	10,167,874.32
HNB 4	2010027	7,986,581.82	-	7,986,581.82
HNB 5	2010039	530,727.75	-	530,727.75
ADB 868 SRI(SF)	1988013	6,265,024.29	41,775,634.87	48,040,659.16
ADB 896 SRI(SF)	1988063	17,690,543.58	110,570,478.48	128,261,022.06
ADB 993 SRI(SF)	1989067	9,468,117.71	59,184,057.24	68,652,174.95

Sum of Rupee Interest	Type		
Date	D	F	Grand Total
1-Aug		275,172,036.31	275,172,036.31
2-Aug		148,134,121.58	148,134,121.58
7-Aug		-	-
8-Aug	7,986,581.82	3,853,695.68	11,840,277.50
13-Aug	530,727.75	-	530,727.75
15-Aug		532,930,912.35	532,930,912.35
16-Aug	1,890,937.50	-	1,890,937.50
19-Aug	530,184,810.39	929,429,730.49	1,459,614,540.88
21-Aug		389,881.80	389,881.80
22-Aug		1,501,681.74	1,501,681.74
28-Aug		1,380,429.80	1,380,429.80
30-Aug	9,892,564.48	28,105,070.12	37,997,634.60
29-Aug	72,402,674.77	831,553.28	73,234,228.05
Grand Total	622,888,296.71	1,921,729,113.13	2,544,617,409.85

Sum of Rupee Principal	Type		
Date	D	F	Grand Total
1-Aug		1,225,361,012.88	1,225,361,012.88
2-Aug		354,603,915.43	354,603,915.43
7-Aug		292,934,565.40	292,934,565.40
8-Aug	-	6,314,178.64	6,314,178.64
13-Aug	-	-	-
15-Aug		1,924,985,894.10	1,924,985,894.10
16-Aug	-	-	-
19-Aug	3,249,015,000.00	3,287,135,987.00	6,536,150,987.00

MO 43 – Tentative Forecast Statement on Payments Due



HEAD - 249 - PUBLIC DEBT

PROJECT - I

FOR THE MONTH OF August 2013

Rupees Mn.

DATE OF PAYMENT	PAYMENTS ON DOMESTIC CURRENCY DEBT: (I)-1601 EXPENDITURE HEAD: INTEREST PAYMENTS					(I)-1601 EXPENDITURE HEAD: REPAYMENTS					PAYMENTS ON FOREIGN CURRENCY DEBT: (II)-1602 EXPENDITURE HEAD: INTEREST PAYMENTS			(II)-1602 EXPENDITURE HEAD: REPAYMENTS			PUBLIC DEBT: GRAND TOTAL (I)+(II)	MEMO ITEMS	
	Treasury Bills	Rupee Loans	Treasury Bonds Coupon Payments	Treasury Bonds Discount Payments	INTEREST TOTAL	Treasury Bills	Rupee Loans	Treasury Bonds (Face Value)	REPAYMENT TOTAL	Total Payments (I)+(II)	Interest	Charges	Foreign Currency Debt Total (II)	Foreign Currency Debt	Charges	Foreign Currency Debt Total (II)		Treasury Bills (Face Value)	Treasury Bonds (Face Value)
1-Aug-13	-	1,445.28	18,537.55	13,638.73	●●●●●●●	-	-	65,954.57	●●●●●●●	●●●●●●●	-	275.17	-	1,225.36	●●●●●●●	●●●●●●●	79,593.30	-
2-Aug-13	1,157.59	-	-	-	1,157.59	-	-	-	-	1,157.59	-	148.13	-	354.60	502.74	●●●●●●●	-	14,425.85
5-Aug-13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6-Aug-13																		
7-Aug-13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	292.93	292.93	292.93	-	-
8-Aug-13	1,329.98	-	-	-	●●●●●●●	-	-	-	-	●●●●●●●	7.99	3.85	-	6.31	18.15	1,348.14	-	17,157.32
12-Aug-13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13-Aug-13											0.53				0.53	0.53		
14-Aug-13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15-Aug-13	-	-	669.21	-	●●●●●●●	-	-	-	-	●●●●●●●	1.69	532.93	-	1,924.89	●●●●●●●	6,127.12	-	21,970.50
16-Aug-13	1,282.60	-	-	-	●●●●●●●	-	-	-	-	●●●●●●●	1.69	-	-	-	1.69	●●●●●●●	-	
19-Aug-13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	530.16	928.43	3,249.02	3,281.14	●●●●●●●	●●●●●●●	-	
21-Aug-13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.39	-	-	0.39	0.39	-	-
22-Aug-13												150		3.67	5.17	5.17		
23-Aug-13	620.51	-	-	-	620.51	-	-	-	-	620.51	-	-	-	-	-	620.51	-	11,912.60
26-Aug-13	-				-					-						-		
27-Aug-13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
28-Aug-13												1.66		2.45	3.83	3.83		

MO 44 – Calculation of Monthly WAY Rates for T-bills



S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF
After Ti	W&Y1	W&Y2					Maturity Period						
9.729	7469.71	6,722.74											
9.729	972.9	875.61		Years	Issue_Date	Data	91	182	364	Grand Total			
9.711	776.88	699.19		⊟2013	Jan	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted	6278	22516	85709	114503			
9.558	7168.5	6,451.65				Sum of W&Y1	68565.7904	269588.2248	1077053.288	1415207.304			
8.91	18414	16,572.60				Sum of W&Y2	61709.21136	242629.4023	969347.9596	1273686.573			
8.91	1019.7	917.73			Feb	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted	8571	11080	75973	95624			
8.91	4554	4,098.60				Sum of W&Y1	87741.4141	124960.0025	937627.7493	1150329.166			
8.928	23976.64	21,578.98				Sum of W&Y2	78967.27269	112464.0023	843864.9744	1035296.249			
8.928	2331.2	2,098.08			Mar	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted	10334	7670	56290	74494			
8.874	15480.2	13,932.18				Sum of W&Y1	104999.4288	88514.8144	699191.4474	892705.6906			
8.874	4496.16	4,046.54				Sum of W&Y2	94499.48592	79663.33296	629272.3027	803435.1215			
8.883	4402.02	3,961.82			Apr	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted	3775	2340	35736	41850			
8.91	21215.7	19,094.13				Sum of W&Y1	36784.69	26520.87	450425.5407	515831.1007			
8.91	1702.8	1,532.52				Sum of W&Y2	34906.221	23958.783	405382.9866	464247.9906			
8.757	30892.75	27,803.48			May	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted	6688	16841	74107	97636			
8.757	418.39	376.55				Sum of W&Y1	65956.1632	187343.0603	909363.3553	1162662.579			
8.838	8592.5	7,733.25				Sum of W&Y2	59360.54688	168608.7543	818418.0198	1046387.321			
8.892	20313.28	18,281.95			Jun	Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted	4474	15495	72840	92809			
8.739	18740.3	16,866.27				Sum of W&Y1	43122.0397	167891.0071	870981.7929	1081994.84			
8.739	2913	2,621.70				Sum of W&Y2	38809.83573	151101.9064	783883.6136	973795.3557			
8.793	5969.47	5,372.52		Total Sum of Amount_Bids_Accepted			40120	76142	400654	516916			
8.793	1954	1,758.60		Total Sum of W&Y1			409169.5262	864917.9791	4944633.174	6218720.679			
8.847	24997.69	22,497.92		Total Sum of W&Y2			368252.5736	778426.1812	4450169.857	5596848.611			
8.847	5898	5,308.20											
8.793	24024.43	21,621.99											
8.793	9310.81	8,379.73											
8.847	27641.96	24,877.76				January	10.92	11.97	12.57	12.36			
8.865	26614.7	23,953.23					9.83	10.78	11.31	11.12			
8.865	985	886.50											
8.856	5589.12	5,030.21				February	10.24	11.28	12.34	12.03			
8.874	27253.04	24,527.74					9.21	10.15	11.11	10.83			
8.874	1626.9	1,464.21											
8.964	18814.44	16,933.00				March	10.16	11.25	12.42	11.98			
8.964	8097.48	7,287.73					9.14	10.12	11.18	10.79			

MO 45 – Calculation of Monthly WAY Rates for T-bonds



Remarks	Auctic												
			Matu_Period										
Years	Sett	Data	3	5	6	8	9	10	11	13	12	15	20
2013	Jan	Sum of W*Y(Before tax)	48820	198556.296		143696.831						289947.9	
		Sum of W*Y	43938	178700.6664		129327.1479						260953.11	
		Sum of Amou_Acce	4000	16392		11107						21300	
	Feb	Sum of W*Y(Before tax)		174153		317775						137745.65	
		Sum of W*Y		156737.7		285997.5						123971.085	
		Sum of Amou_Acce		14600		25000						10150	
	Mar	Sum of W*Y(Before tax)			24378				26134				
		Sum of W*Y			21940.2				23520.6				
		Sum of Amou_Acce			2000				2000				
	Apr	Sum of W*Y(Before tax)		38166				78666		81000			
		Sum of W*Y		34349.4				70799.4		72900			
		Sum of Amou_Acce		3000				6000		6000			
	May	Sum of W*Y(Before tax)					13078				26870		
		Sum of W*Y					11770.2				24183		
		Sum of Amou_Acce					1000				2000		
	Jun	Sum of W*Y(Before tax)											1086
		Sum of W*Y											9780
		Sum of Amou_Acce											80
Total Sum of W*Y(Before tax)			48820	410875.296	24378	461471.831	13078	78666	26134	81000	26870	427693.55	1086
Total Sum of W*Y			43938	369787.7664	21940.2	415324.6479	11770.2	70799.4	23520.6	72900	24183	384924.195	9780
Total Sum of Amou_Acce			4000	33992	2000	36107	1000	6000	2000	6000	2000	31450	80

MO 46 – 300 Report (Foreign Debt Service payment Forecast)



CS-DRMS Report 300						
					Sri Lanka	
					Page 1 of 28	
	Title/Description					
Date Due			Amount in Loan Currency			
	Loan Key					
	Creditor					
	Primary Executing Agency	Payment Details		Amount in LKR	Total Paid in LKR	
2013/08/01	Highway Development Project					
	1968002					
	IDA					
	DHI , MH					
	Tranche 1	Interest Forecast	466.12 USD	58,952.98		
		Principal Forecast	11,299.84 USD	1,429,158.56	########	
2013/08/01	Mahaweli Ganga Development Project					
	1970016					
	IDA					
	MASL, MMRB					
	Tranche 1	Interest Forecast	11,303.63 USD	1,429,637.87		
		Principal Forecast	######## USD	29,325,904.12	########	
2013/08/01	Agricultural Development Project					
	1975002					
	IDA					
	DA , MALI					
	Tranche 1	Interest Forecast	29,055.55 USD	3,674,829.55		
		Principal Forecast	######## USD	39,198,181.83	########	
2013/08/01	Tree Crop Rehabilitation [Tea] Project					
	1978001					
	IDA					
	MPI, SLSP					
	Tranche 1	Interest Forecast	27,280.06 USD	3,450,272.84		
		Principal Forecast	######## USD	30,668,912.28	########	

MO 47 – Report on SLDB Outstanding (Access)



Reports

- Coupon_Payments
- myQryCouponMonthly
- myQryMaturities_for_a_period
- myQryMaturity_Profile
- myrptCouponPayments for a Period
- Outstanding

Outstanding

SLDB Outstanding as at 7/15/2013

3/16/2014	3/16/2011	SLDB2014A	LKG00314C169	3	99,000,000	375.00	Auction
3/16/2014	3/16/2011	SLDB2014A	LKG00314C169	3	85,000,000	375.00	Placement
6/29/2014	6/29/2011	SLDB2014B	LKG00314F295	3	106,000,000	365.00	Auction
8/18/2014	8/18/2011	SLDB2014C	LKG00314H184	3	81,000,000	365.00	Auction
3/16/2015	3/26/2012	SLDB2015D	LKG00315C166	3	72,000,000	385.00	Auction
3/16/2015	3/26/2012	SLDB2015D	LKG00315C166	3	2,500,000	385.00	Placement
3/16/2015	3/16/2011	SLDB2015A	LKG00415C164	4	93,000,000	385.00	Auction
6/29/2015	7/2/2012	SLDB2015E	LKG00315F292	3	229,020,000	410.00	Auction
6/29/2015	6/29/2011	SLDB2015B	LKG00415F290	4	23,000,000	375.00	Auction
8/18/2015	9/24/2012	SLDB2015F	LKG00315H181	3	121,050,000	400.00	Auction
8/18/2015	9/24/2012	SLDB2015F	LKG00315H181	3	20,000,000	400.00	Placement
8/18/2015	8/18/2011	SLDB2015C	LKG00415H189	4	80,000,000	375.00	Auction
3/26/2016	2/22/2013	SLDB2016E	LKG00316C263	3	152,120,000	400.00	Auction
3/26/2016	2/22/2013	SLDB2016E	LKG00316C263	3	7,000,000	400.00	Placement
3/26/2016	2/12/2013	SLDB2016E	LKG00316C263	3	129,000,000	400.00	Re-issue_1

Records can't be deleted from a report.

MO 48 – Monthly Detailed Foreign Debt Service Payment Forecast



A144: 15/07/2013 for Superintendent of Public Debt

FOREIGN LOANS
INTEREST & PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
MONTH OF AUGUST - 2013

Date		Name of the Loan	Loankey	Currency	Interest	Principal	Total	Ex. Rate	Rupee Interest	Rupee Principal	Rupee Total
1-Aug		ADB 1090 SRI(SF)	1991029	USD	181,089.43	965,691.24	1,146,780.67	129.9606	23,534,490.98	125,501,812.97	149,036,303.94
		ADB 1183 SRI(SF)	1992039	USD	33,513.44	82,129.30	115,642.74	129.9606	4,355,426.77	10,673,573.11	15,028,999.88
		ADB 1716 SRI(SF)	1998002	USD	231,532.87	826,273.02	1,057,805.89	129.9606	30,090,150.70	107,382,937.44	137,473,088.15
		ADB 1649 SRI(SF)	1998004	USD	435,712.82	951,206.62	1,386,919.24	129.9606	56,625,473.52	123,619,383.06	180,244,856.58
		ADB 1707 SRI(SF)	1998045	USD	113,354.32	404,527.12	517,881.44	129.9606	14,731,595.44	52,572,587.23	67,304,182.67
		ADB 2167 SRI(SF)	2005001	USD	32,112.02	0.00	32,112.02	129.9606	4,173,297.39	-	4,173,297.39
		ADB 2168 SRI(SF)	2005002	USD	124,021.51	0.00	124,021.51	129.9606	16,117,909.85	-	16,117,909.85
		ADB 472 SRI(SF)	2010111	USD	29,802.72	385,559.73	415,362.45	129.9606	3,873,179.37	50,107,573.85	53,980,753.22
		IDA 133 CE	1968002	GBP	415.62	7,427.02	7,842.64	198.4433	82,477.00	1,473,842.36	1,556,319.36
		IDA 174 CE	1970016	GBP	9,687.22	152,400.22	162,087.44	198.4433	1,922,363.90	30,242,802.58	32,165,166.48
		IDA 595 CE	1975002	USD	29,055.54	309,825.85	338,881.39	129.9606	3,776,075.41	40,278,148.42	44,054,224.83
		IDA 818 CE	1979001	USD	27,280.06	242,488.00	269,768.06	129.9606	3,546,335.56	31,513,885.97	35,059,221.54
		IDA 942 CE	1979004	USD	27,141.24	226,175.00	253,316.24	129.9606	3,527,291.84	29,393,838.71	32,921,130.54
		IDA 1182 CE	1982001	USD	86,805.37	596,071.32	682,876.69	129.9606	11,281,277.97	77,465,786.39	88,747,064.36
		IDA 2128 CE	1990009	USD	321,440.58	2,393,294.39	2,714,740.97	129.9606	41,775,390.40	311,033,974.90	352,809,365.31
		IDA 2837 CE	1999011	USD	37,423.81	113,238.07	150,661.88	129.9606	4,863,620.80	14,716,487.52	19,580,108.32
		IDA 4575	2008014	USD	87,174.34	0.00	87,174.34	129.9606	11,329,229.53	-	11,329,229.53
		INDIA 2001 USD 45 mn	2001041	USD	149,317.42	1,210,000.00	1,359,317.42	129.9606	19,405,381.49	157,252,326.00	176,657,707.49
		NETHERLAND RABO BANK	2006085	EURO	42,513.32	0.00	42,513.32	169.8780	7,222,077.77	-	7,222,077.77
		NETHERLAND RABO BANK	2007032	EURO	33,598.13	225,000.00	258,598.13	169.8780	5,707,583.13	38,222,550.00	43,930,133.13
		NETHERLANDS*	2013001	USD	18,855.77	0.00	18,855.77	129.9606	2,450,507.18	-	2,450,507.18
		PAKISTAN	2006071	USD	36,795.00	183,975.00	220,770.00	129.9606	4,781,900.28	23,909,501.39	28,691,401.66
									275,172,036.31	1,225,361,012.88	1,500,533,049.19
2-Aug		AID 383-T-02BD	1984006	USD	190,373.20	422,154.69	612,527.89	129.9606	24,741,015.30	54,864,775.41	79,605,791.71
	Due on 3	AID 383-T-021	1978018	USD	17,910.81	100,651.40	118,562.21	129.9606	2,327,599.61	13,080,716.33	15,408,315.95
	Due on 3	HSBC 53/FC1161	2008037	EURO	712,660.89	1,687,437.00	2,400,097.89	169.8780	121,065,408.67	286,658,422.69	407,723,829.36
									148,134,121.58	354,603,915.43	502,738,037.01

MO 49 – Information on T-bills and T-bonds for dissemination to IMF/WB



Treasury Bills

Week Ending	Amount Tendered				Bids Received				Auction Results							
									Amount Accepted (Face Value)				Amount Accepted (Book Value)			
	91 day	182 day	364 day	Total	91 day	182 day	364 day	Total	91 day	182 day	364 day	Total	91 day	182 day	364 day	To
End February	8,000.00	13,000.00	55,000.00	76,000.00	18,792.00	25,084.00	133,008.00	176,884.00	8,571.00	11,080.00	75,973.00	95,624.00	8,357.12	10,488.56	67,625.76	86,4
3/1/2013	2,000.00	3,000.00	10,000.00	15,000.00	4,797.00	7,322.00	20,668.00	32,787.00	3,027.00	4,172.00	11,573.00	18,772.00	2,952.41	3,950.71	10,301.89	17,2
3/8/2013	3,000.00	4,000.00	13,000.00	20,000.00	7,125.00	5,638.00	32,738.00	45,501.00	2,425.00	1,270.00	24,288.00	27,983.00	2,365.16	1,202.55	21,613.19	25,1
3/15/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	13,000.00	16,000.00	3,892.00	2,626.00	19,722.00	26,240.00	2,920.00	1,076.00	8,451.00	12,447.00	2,847.51	1,018.54	7,516.09	11,3
3/22/2013	2,000.00	3,000.00	10,000.00	15,000.00	2,737.00	3,822.00	14,066.00	20,625.00	1,137.00	1,352.00	3,971.00	6,460.00	1,108.61	1,279.19	3,529.40	5,9
3/29/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	7,000.00	10,000.00	1,875.00	2,645.00	16,407.00	20,927.00	825.00	-	8,007.00	8,832.00	804.31	-	7,110.06	7,9
End March	9,000.00	14,000.00	53,000.00	76,000.00	20,426.00	22,053.00	103,601.00	146,080.00	10,334.00	7,670.00	56,290.00	74,294.00	10,078.00	7,450.99	50,070.63	67,5
4/5/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	9,000.00	12,000.00	3,430.00	4,600.00	22,367.00	30,397.00	775.00	-	8,062.00	8,837.00	755.57	-	7,159.07	7,9
4/12/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	6,000.00	9,000.00	3,697.00	4,695.00	21,901.00	30,293.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	6,000.00	8,000.00	974.94	946.12	5,327.86	7,2
4/19/2013	1,000.00	1,000.00	6,000.00	8,000.00	2,477.00	1,625.00	20,143.00	24,245.00	1,000.00	340.00	12,683.00	14,023.00	974.97	321.69	11,263.88	12,5
4/26/2013	1,000.00	1,000.00	5,000.00	7,000.00	4,782.00	7,233.00	17,360.00	29,375.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	8,990.00	10,990.00	974.99	946.24	7,984.14	9,9
End April	4,000.00	6,000.00	26,000.00	36,000.00	14,386.00	18,153.00	81,771.00	114,310.00	3,775.00	2,340.00	35,735.00	41,850.00	3,680.47	2,214.06	31,734.95	37,6
5/3/2013	1,000.00	3,000.00	7,000.00	11,000.00	4,378.00	7,680.00	25,805.00	37,863.00	1,000.00	3,000.00	18,530.00	22,530.00	975.08	2,838.85	16,458.72	20,2
5/10/2013	1,000.00	3,000.00	8,000.00	12,000.00	4,740.00	7,915.00	26,792.00	39,447.00	1,000.00	3,000.00	12,082.00	16,082.00	975.14	2,839.17	10,735.56	14,5
5/17/2013	1,000.00	3,000.00	11,000.00	15,000.00	5,416.00	7,576.00	29,641.00	42,633.00	1,000.00	2,923.00	15,191.00	19,114.00	976.28	2,770.48	13,557.93	17,3
5/24/2013	1,000.00	3,000.00	11,000.00	15,000.00	4,128.00	8,304.00	18,701.00	31,133.00	2,258.00	3,000.00	11,000.00	16,258.00	2,204.44	2,843.58	9,815.28	14,8
5/31/2013	1,000.00	3,000.00	11,000.00	15,000.00	6,860.00	9,368.00	24,004.00	40,232.00	1,430.00	4,918.00	17,304.00	23,652.00	1,396.14	4,661.58	15,440.19	21,4
End May	5,000.00	15,000.00	48,000.00	68,000.00	25,522.00	40,843.00	124,943.00	191,308.00	6,688.00	16,841.00	74,107.00	97,636.00	6,527.08	15,953.65	66,007.68	88,4
6/7/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	10,000.00	13,000.00	5,019.00	12,775.00	34,799.00	52,593.00	1,314.00	3,000.00	20,359.00	24,673.00	1,282.99	2,844.95	18,168.00	22,2
6/14/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	9,000.00	12,000.00	2,038.00	5,267.00	18,636.00	25,941.00	943.00	2,767.00	11,236.00	14,946.00	920.83	2,624.12	10,026.66	13,5
6/21/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	9,000.00	12,000.00	2,492.00	3,768.00	23,978.00	30,238.00	1,590.00	2,016.00	7,145.00	10,751.00	1,552.64	1,911.86	6,375.99	9,8
6/28/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	9,000.00	12,000.00	1,620.00	8,717.00	44,400.00	54,737.00	627.00	7,712.00	34,100.00	42,439.00	612.26	7,317.75	30,489.79	38,4
End June	4,000.00	8,000.00	27,000.00	39,000.00	11,169.00	30,527.00	121,814.00	163,509.00	4,474.00	15,493.00	77,840.00	97,809.00	4,366.73	14,698.58	65,060.44	84,1
7/5/2013	1,000.00	2,000.00	9,000.00	12,000.00	1,534.00	4,950.00	24,875.00	31,359.00	579.00	500.00	9,539.00	10,618.00	565.41	474.43	8,528.39	9,5
7/12/2013	1,000.00	1,000.00	10,000.00	12,000.00	2,716.00	4,387.00	35,803.00	42,906.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	11,742.00	13,742.00	976.59	948.99	10,500.44	12,4

Treasury Bills / Treasury Bonds / SLDBs / Other Data

MO 50 – T-bill Maturity Profile



	Isin	MaturityDate	Period	SumOffacevalue	SumOfamtpayable
2	LKA09113G056	5-Jul-13	91	775,000,000.00	755,567,925.00
3	LKA18213G053	5-Jul-13	182	7,350,000,000.00	6,927,035,800.00
4	LKA36413G057	5-Jul-13	364	1,331,470,000.00	1,164,049,206.84
5	LKA09113G122	12-Jul-13	91	1,000,000,000.00	974,939,532.00
6	LKA18213G129	12-Jul-13	182	11,696,200,000.00	11,033,538,149.40
7	LKA36413G123	12-Jul-13	364	2,711,090,000.00	2,366,510,504.51
8	LKA09113G197	19-Jul-13	91	1,000,000,000.00	974,965,588.00
9	LKA18213G194	19-Jul-13	182	9,198,300,000.00	8,687,634,996.50
10	LKA36413G198	19-Jul-13	364	2,282,000,000.00	1,990,837,977.00
11	LKA09113G262	26-Jul-13	91	1,000,000,000.00	974,992,557.00
12	LKA18213G269	26-Jul-13	182	3,149,000,000.00	2,976,803,826.00
13	LKA36413G263	26-Jul-13	364	6,148,000,000.00	5,367,792,465.00
14	LKA09113H021	2-Aug-13	91	1,000,000,000.00	975,081,494.00
15	LKA18213H028	2-Aug-13	182	7,840,000,000.00	7,416,503,511.00
16	LKA36413H022	2-Aug-13	364	5,585,850,000.00	4,876,678,477.90
17	LKA09113H096	9-Aug-13	91	1,000,000,000.00	975,143,060.00
18	LKA18213H093	9-Aug-13	182	10,052,640,000.00	9,526,066,986.20
19	LKA36413H097	9-Aug-13	364	6,104,680,000.00	5,326,127,207.16
20	LKA09113H161	16-Aug-13	91	1,000,000,000.00	976,275,752.00
21	LKA18213H168	16-Aug-13	182	19,284,500,000.00	18,261,723,929.00
22	LKA36413H162	16-Aug-13	364	1,686,000,000.00	1,469,903,429.00
23	LKA09113H237	23-Aug-13	91	2,258,000,000.00	2,204,437,212.00
24	LKA18213H234	23-Aug-13	182	8,296,900,000.00	7,904,449,413.00
25	LKA36413H238	23-Aug-13	364	1,357,700,000.00	1,183,201,238.40
26	LKA09113H302	30-Aug-13	91	1,430,000,000.00	1,396,139,842.00
27	LKA18213H309	30-Aug-13	182	10,861,000,000.00	10,284,990,015.00
28	LKA36413H303	30-Aug-13	364	4,307,000,000.00	3,751,961,807.00
29	LKA09113I060	6-Sep-13	91	1,314,000,000.00	1,282,993,856.00
30	LKA18213I067	6-Sep-13	182	7,670,000,000.00	7,308,363,193.00

MaturityDate	SumOfFacevalue	6/30/2013
5-Jul-13	775,000,000.00	5
5-Jul-13	7,350,000,000.00	5
5-Jul-13	1,331,470,000.00	5
12-Jul-13	1,000,000,000.00	12
12-Jul-13	11,696,200,000.00	12
12-Jul-13	2,711,090,000.00	12
19-Jul-13	1,000,000,000.00	19
19-Jul-13	9,198,300,000.00	19
19-Jul-13	2,282,000,000.00	19
26-Jul-13	1,000,000,000.00	26
26-Jul-13	3,149,000,000.00	26
26-Jul-13	6,148,000,000.00	26
2-Aug-13	1,000,000,000.00	33
2-Aug-13	7,840,000,000.00	33
2-Aug-13	5,585,850,000.00	33
9-Aug-13	1,000,000,000.00	40
9-Aug-13	10,052,640,000.00	40
9-Aug-13	6,104,680,000.00	40
16-Aug-13	1,000,000,000.00	47
16-Aug-13	19,284,500,000.00	47
16-Aug-13	1,686,000,000.00	47
23-Aug-13	2,258,000,000.00	54
23-Aug-13	8,296,900,000.00	54
23-Aug-13	1,357,700,000.00	54
30-Aug-13	1,430,000,000.00	61
30-Aug-13	10,861,000,000.00	61
30-Aug-13	4,307,000,000.00	61
6-Sep-13	1,314,000,000.00	68
6-Sep-13	7,670,000,000.00	68

T-bond Issues Monthly / T bill / T bond / R loan / Total / Enoka misc / Jan-Mar Bond Issues / ATM (Jan-Sep) / ATM (Jan-Oct) / ATM (Jan-Dec)

MO 51 – T-bond Maturity Profile



	ISIN	Bond Series	Maturity Date	couponrate	SumOffacevalue	SumOfamtpayable	Issuedate
2	LKB01013G154	08.50%2013B	15-Jul-13	8.50	64397300000	53078464263	15-Jul-03
3	LKB01013H012	07.50%2013A	01-Aug-13	7.50	79593300000	65973153927	01-Aug-03
4	LKB00313I015	06.75%2013A	01-Sep-13	6.75	70270310000	66198279359	01-Sep-10
5	LKB00213J056	08.84%2013A	05-Oct-13	8.84	397969682	391025111.1	05-Oct-11
6	LKB01013K016	07.50%2013B	01-Nov-13	7.50	59449600000	46378102329	01-Nov-03
7	LKB00213K211	09.22%2013A	21-Nov-13	9.22	467377000	4589123352	21-Nov-11
8	LKB00414B016	06.60%2014A	01-Feb-14	6.60	53752440000	49743125946	01-Feb-10
9	LKB00414C014	07.00%2014A	01-Mar-14	7.00	1.00302E+11	92399785562	01-Mar-10
10	LKB00614D017	11.75%2014B	01-Apr-14	11.75	1.03271E+11	98514844310	01-Apr-08
11	LKB00414F017	06.60%2014B	01-Jun-14	6.60	79206000000	72945520688	01-Jun-10
12	LKB00514G152	11.25%2014A	15-Jul-14	11.25	88623340000	83289508533	15-Jul-09
13	LKB00314J011	09.00%2014A	01-Oct-14	9.00	26946960000	24467151552	01-Oct-11
14	LKB00415A155	06.20%2015A	15-Jan-15	6.20	50926500000	45542642895	15-Jan-11
15	LKB00615C156	11.75%2015A	15-Mar-15	11.75	77458370000	71168650037	15-Mar-09
16	LKB00415F154	06.20%2015B	15-Jun-15	6.20	39782520000	34834286434	15-Jun-11
17	LKB00515G159	06.50%2015A	15-Jul-15	6.50	83665980000	71931502994	15-Jul-10
18	LKB00615H015	11.00%2015A	01-Aug-15	11.00	84054400000	76176597858	01-Aug-09
19	LKB00615I013	11.00%2015B	01-Sep-15	11.00	69614380000	67671920911	01-Sep-09
20	LKB00415K014	08.50%2015A	01-Nov-15	8.50	7665550000	6535032293	01-Nov-11
21	LKB00616D012	07.25%2016A	01-Apr-16	7.25	79804140000	69849797177	01-Apr-10
22	LKB00516F019	08.00%2016B	01-Jun-16	8.00	48819420000	39371684803	01-Jun-11
23	LKB00616H013	05.40%2016A	01-Aug-16	6.40	79771150000	67282724838	01-Aug-10
24	LKB00516I013	08.00%2016A	01-Sep-16	8.00	21208000000	18000103662	01-Sep-11
25	LKB00616J019	06.40%2016B	01-Oct-16	6.40	34533000000	29781566877	01-Oct-10
26	LKC01316K103	00.00%2016A	10-Nov-16	0.00	4397000000	4397000000	10-Nov-03
27	LKB00517A018	08.00%2017A	01-Jan-17	8.00	67207995000	57718895849	01-Jan-12
28	LKB00617A156	05.80%2017A	15-Jan-17	5.80	50890850000	38110640097	15-Jan-11
29	LKB00517F157	08.00%2017B	15-Jun-17	8.00	22582540000	17226382301	15-Jun-12
30	LKB00617G153	05.80%2017B	15-Jul-17	5.80	82084140000	58174255355	15-Jul-11

Maturity Date	SumOfFacevalue	6/30/2013
15/Jul/13	64397300000	15
1/Aug/13	79593300000	32
1/Sep/13	70270310000	63
5/Oct/13	397969682	97
1/Nov/13	59449600000	124
21/Nov/13	467377000	144
1/Feb/14	53752440000	216
1/Mar/14	1.00302E+11	244
1/Apr/14	1.03271E+11	275
1/Jun/14	79206000000	336
15/Jul/14	88623340000	380
1/Oct/14	26946960000	458
15/Jan/15	50926500000	564
15/Mar/15	77458370000	623
15/Jun/15	39782520000	715
15/Jul/15	83665980000	745
1/Aug/15	84054400000	762
1/Sep/15	69614380000	793
1/Nov/15	7665550000	854
1/Apr/16	79804140000	1006
1/Jun/16	48819420000	1067
1/Aug/16	79771150000	1128
1/Sep/16	21208000000	1159
1/Oct/16	34533000000	1189
10/Nov/16	4397000000	1229
1/Jan/17	67207995000	1281
15/Jan/17	50890850000	1295
15/Jun/17	22582540000	1446
15/Jul/17	82084140000	1476

MO 52 – Rupee Loan Maturity Profile



due date	Sum Of amount	4/30/2011		due date	Sum Of amount	5/31/2011			due date	Sum Of amounts	6/30/2011			due date	Su
7/1/2011	377,703,540.00	62		7/1/2011	377,703,540.00	31			7/1/2011	377,703,540.00	1			8/30/2011	18,
10/1/2011	1,200,000.00	154		8/30/2011	18,831,666,000.00	91			8/30/2011	18,831,666,000.00	61			10/1/2011	
4/1/2012	3,575,000,000.00	337		10/1/2011	1,200,000.00	123			10/1/2011	1,200,000.00	93			4/1/2012	3,
4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	702		4/1/2012	3,575,000,000.00	306			4/1/2012	3,575,000,000.00	276			4/1/2013	2,
10/1/2013	5,680,000.00	885		4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	671			4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	641			4/1/2015	26,
10/1/2014	2,400,000.00	1250		4/1/2015	26,000,000,000.00	1401			4/1/2015	26,000,000,000.00	1371			5/3/2015	1,
4/1/2015	26,000,000,000.00	1432		5/3/2015	1,366,369,100.00	1433			5/3/2015	1,366,369,100.00	1403			7/1/2015	4,
5/3/2015	1,366,369,100.00	1464		7/1/2015	4,063,397,190.00	1492			7/1/2015	4,063,397,190.00	1462			2/1/2023	24,
7/1/2015	4,063,397,190.00	1523		2/1/2023	24,088,000,000.00	4264			2/1/2023	24,088,000,000.00	4234				80,
10/1/2017	18,823,586,000.00	2346			81,171,335,830.00	1,871.37	5.13			81,171,335,830.00	1,841.37	5.04			
2/1/2023	24,088,000,000.00	4295													
	81,171,335,830.00	2,418.20	6.63												

due date	Sum Of amount	1/31/2012		due date	Sum Of amount	2/29/2012		due date	Sum Of amount	3/31/2012		due date	Su
4/1/2012	3,575,000,000.00	61		4/1/2012	3,575,000,000.00	32		4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	366		4/1/2013	2,
4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	426		4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	397		4/1/2015	26,000,000,000.00	1096		4/1/2015	26,
4/1/2015	26,000,000,000.00	1156		4/1/2015	26,000,000,000.00	1127		5/3/2015	1,366,369,100.00	1128		5/3/2015	1,
5/3/2015	1,366,369,100.00	1188		5/3/2015	1,366,369,100.00	1159		7/1/2015	4,063,397,190.00	1187		7/1/2015	4,
7/1/2015	4,063,397,190.00	1247		7/1/2015	4,063,397,190.00	1218		2/1/2023	24,088,000,000.00	3959		2/1/2023	24,
2/1/2023	24,088,000,000.00	4019		2/1/2023	24,088,000,000.00	3990			58,385,766,290.00	2,248.40	6.16		58,
	61,960,766,290.00	2,178.73	5.97		61,960,766,290.00	2,149.73	5.89						

due date	Sum Of amount	1/31/2013	due date	Sum Of amount	2/28/2013	due date	Sum Of amount	3/31/2013	due date	Su
4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	60	4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	32	4/1/2013	2,868,000,000.00	1	4/1/2015	26

MO 53 – Summary of Maturity Profiles (T-bills, T-bonds and Rupee Loans)



	6/30/2013				12/31/2012				12/31/2011			
T bills	805,027,400,000.00	186.73	0.51	T bills	709,254,130,000.00	136.96	0.38	T bills	661,007,980,000.00	112.06	0.31	
T bonds	2,838,461,857,182.00	1,826.11	5.00	T bonds	2,495,494,827,182.00	1,454.94	3.99	T bonds	2,023,178,736,682.00	1,059.70	2.90	
R loans	55,517,766,290.00	1,889.64	5.18	R loans	58,385,766,290.00	1,973.40	5.41	R loans	61,960,766,290.00	2,209.73	6.05	
Total	3,699,007,023,472.00	1,470.28	4.03	Total	3,263,134,723,472.00	1,177.75	3.23	Total	2,746,147,482,972.00	857.54	2.35	
	5/31/2013				11/30/2012				11/30/2011			
T bills	766,640,840,000.00	184.78	0.51	T bills	737,856,260,000.00	132.35	0.36	T bills	679,755,260,000.00	119.26	0.33	
T bonds	2,838,606,177,182.00	1,714.67	4.70	T bonds	2,495,424,827,182.00	1,485.91	4.07	T bonds	2,016,786,136,682.00	1,087.95	2.98	
R loans	55,517,766,290.00	1,919.64	5.26	R loans	58,385,766,290.00	2,004.40	5.49	R loans	61,960,766,290.00	2,240.73	6.14	
Total	3,660,764,783,472.00	1,397.39	3.83	Total	3,291,666,853,472.00	1,191.69	3.26	Total	2,758,502,182,972.00	875.14	2.40	
	4/30/2013				10/31/2012				10/31/2011			
T bills	762,792,800,000.00	171.61	0.47	T bills	732,486,510,000.00	115.87	0.32	T bills	686,546,060,000.00	127.70	0.35	
T bonds	2,793,380,217,182.00	1,690.60	4.63	T bonds	2,494,920,727,182.00	1,515.65	4.15	T bonds	2,010,236,559,682.00	1,117.69	3.06	
R loans	55,517,766,290.00	1,950.64	5.34	R loans	58,385,766,290.00	2,034.40	5.57	R loans	61,960,766,290.00	2,270.73	6.22	
Total	3,611,690,783,472.00	1,373.79	3.76	Total	3,285,793,003,472.00	1,212.82	3.32	Total	2,758,743,385,972.00	897.21	2.46	
	3/31/2013				9/30/2012				9/30/2011			
T bills	792,466,800,000.00	180.78	0.50	T bills	704,491,490,000.00	111.76	0.31	T bills	693,634,520,000.00	136.86	0.37	
T bonds	2,689,579,017,182.00	1,660.89	4.55	T bonds	2,480,017,727,182.00	1,399.28	3.83	T bonds	1,999,283,790,000.00	1,093.41	3.00	
R loans	58,385,766,290.00	1,883.40	5.16	R loans	58,385,766,290.00	2,065.40	5.66	R loans	61,961,966,290.00	2,301.69	6.31	
Total	3,540,431,583,472.00	1,333.26	3.65	Total	3,242,894,983,472.00	1,131.57	3.10	Total	2,754,880,276,290.00	879.74	2.41	
	2/28/2013				8/31/2012				8/31/2011			

MO 54 – File Index of the Middle Office



UNIT 3 - MIDDLE OFFICE (08/22)			
S/N	Old Number	New Number	File Name
Subject: Treasury Bills (08/22/001)			
1	08/06/001/0001/001	08/22/001/0001/001	Issues Maturity & Outstanding (Treasury Bill)
2	08/06/001/0002/001	08/22/001/0002/001	Maturities of Treasury Bills
3	08/06/001/0003/001	08/22/001/0003/001	Treasury Bill Bidding & Acceptance Pattern - MOU
4	08/06/001/0004/001	08/22/001/0004/002	Treasury Bill Tender Committee Attendance Sheet
5	08/06/001/0005/001	08/22/001/0005/001	Summaries of Treasury Bill Issues
6	08/06/001/0006/001	08/22/001/0006/001	Ranked Tender Information on Treasury Bills 97/98
7	08/06/001/0007/001	08/22/001/0007/001	Classification of Bids Accepted(Treasury Bills)
8	08/06/001/0008/001	08/22/001/0008/001	Graphs
9	08/06/001/0009/001	08/22/001/0009/001	Investments in Treasury Bills by Captive Sources
10	08/06/001/0010/001	08/22/001/0010/001	Yield Rates of Treasury Bills
11	08/06/001/0011/001	08/22/001/0011/001	Treasury Bill Balance Verification
12	08/06/001/0012/001	08/22/001/0012/001	Maturities of Treasury Bills held by Captive Sources
13	08/06/001/0013/001	08/22/001/0013/001	Summaries of Treasury Bill Auctions
14	08/06/001/0014/001	08/22/001/0014/001	Trading in Treasury Bills on the CSE
15	08/06/001/0015/001	08/22/001/0015/001	Treasury Bills Early Retirements
16		08/22/001/0015/002	Treasury Bills Early Retirements
17		08/22/001/0015/003	Treasury Bills Early Retirements
18		08/22/001/0015/004	Treasury Bills Early Retirements
19	08/06/001/0016/001	08/22/001/0016/001	Review of T-Bills, Information Series Board Papers

MO 55 – Monthly Risk Profile



Risk Profile (Full Document) – Current and Future Risks Faced by the CBSL – (updated as of 06.06.2013)

Area of Risk	Responsibility	Risk and Risk Description	Extent of the Risk impact (Serious/ Moderate /Low	Mitigation measures taken/ proposed	Outcome/implementation of such proposals
5. Debt management (Updated as of 06June 2013)	SPD/Guided by AG(A)	(1) Front loading of the 2013 Borrowing Programme of the Government. The leeway available for domestic borrowing as at 31.05.2013 was Rs 51.2 billion. (2) With the issuance of 30 yr T-bond on 03.06.2013, the yield curve got extended. However, if the PDD cannot continue to issue longer-tenure bonds due to borrowing limit constraints, there is risk of yield curve contraction in latter part of the year. (3) Foreign participation in the local market would not expand due to limited primary issuances. (4) Due to low supply of securities in the latter part of the year, there is possibility of further reduction of interest rates. However, such low returns might result in foreign investors reverting to shorter end by selling longer-tenure T-bonds.	Moderate	(i) The Monetary Board and the Treasury has already been informed of the situation	(i) Expect the Treasury to maintain its borrowings within the limits during latter part of the year or alternatively obtain approval to increase the limit.

Appendix
Back Office

BO – 1	Statement of Net Settlement due from Participants of the SSSS/ RTGS
BO – 2	Issue of Treasury Bills Allocation to Central Bank
BO – 3	Total Net Settlements and Tax
BO – 4	DOD Daily Statement – PDD Current Account No.4203
BO – 5	RTGS Outward Payment Request
BO – 6 (i)	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bills Issues – Fund Transfer to DST
BO – 6 (ii)	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bonds Issues – Fund Transfer to DST
BO – 7 (i)	Paying- In Voucher – Sale Proceeds of Treasury Bills
BO – 7 (ii)	Paying- In Voucher - Sale Proceeds of Treasury Bonds
BO – 8 (i)	Details of the tax collection on Treasury Bills
BO – 8 (ii)	Details of the tax collection on Treasury Bonds
BO – 9 (i)	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bills Tax Payments
BO – 9 (i)	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bonds Tax Payments
BO – 10	Issuance of Treasury Bills – Letter to Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury (Sinhala)
BO – 11	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bills Maturity Payments – Fund Transfer from DST
BO – 12	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bonds Maturity Payments – Fund Transfer from DST
BO – 13	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bonds Interest Payments – Fund Transfer from DST
BO – 14	Maturity Payments of Treasury Bills - Letter to Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury
BO – 15	Coupon Payments of Treasury Bonds - Letter to Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury
BO – 16	Maturity Payments of Treasury Bonds - Letter to Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury
BO – 17	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bill Early Retirement – Fund Transfer from DST
BO – 18	Data Input Sheet – Treasury Bill Early Retirement
BO – 19	Early Retirement Payments of Treasury Bills - Letter to Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury
BO – 20	Redemption Warrant – Rupee Loans
BO – 21	Data Input Sheet – Fund Transfer – Rupee Loan Maturity
BO – 22	Maturity Payments of Rupee Loans - Letter to Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury

BO – 23	Interest Warrant – Rupee Loans
BO – 24	Data Input Sheet – Fund Transfer – Rupee Loan Interest Payment
BO – 25	Data Input Sheet –Rupee Loan Interest Tax
BO – 26	Rupee Loan Interest Tax Payments - Memo to CA
BO – 27	Interest Payment of Rupee Loans - Letter to Director General of Government Accounts, General Treasury
BO – 28	Memo to Paying Agent – SLDB – Semi Annual Interest Payments
BO – 29	LIBORr Notification to Designated Agents
BO – 30	Payment Advice of Foreign Loans
BO – 31	Paying Voucher of Foreign Loans
BO – 32	Detailed Breakdown of the Payment Form of Foreign Loans
BO – 33	Early Redemption of Housing Bonds - Memo to National Housing Development Authority
BO – 34	Redemption Warrant – Housing Bonds
BO – 35	Interest Warrant – Housing Bonds
BO – 36	Monthly Flash Report
BO – 37	Monthly Expenditure Report
BO – 38	Monthly Foreign Debt Service Payments

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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் **Public Debt Department**

NET SETTLEMENT DUE FROM PARTICIPANTS OF THE SSSS/RTGS

Dealers Name:

Value date:

TREASURY BILLS	Maturity - Due from CBSL	
	Issues - Due from PDs	
	NET	
TREASURY BONDS	Maturity - Due from CBSL	
	Issues - Due from PDs	
	Coupons- Due from CBSL	
	NET	
RUPEE LOANS	Maturity - Due from CBSL	
	Issues - Due from PDs	
	Interest - Due from CBSL	
	NET	
1.Total Net Amount Payable		#Name?
WITHHOLDING TAX- Due from PDs	Treasury Bills	
	Treasury Bonds	
	Rupee Loans	
2.Total Tax Amount Payable		#Name?

Please make sure that your payments are credited to the PDD Current Account No.4203.

ForTotal Net Amount Payable as indicated under item 1 and Total Tax Amount Payable indicated under item 2, two separate SWIFT massages have to be generated. The relevant SWIFT massage is MT 202.Please indicate the type of payment in line 1 of the field 72, i.e., "Securities Net Settlement" for Total Net Amount Payable and "Tax on Securities" for Total Tax Amount Payable.

Securities will be credited to your CDS account once the settlement is completed.

Senior Manager(Back Office)

Public Debt Department

Fax

16/07/2013 02:29:01

10 වන මහල, අංක 30, ජනාධිපති මාවත, තැ. පෙ. 590, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
10 ஆம் மாடி, இல. 30 சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை கொழும்பு 1 த. பெ. இல. 590, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை
Level 10, No. 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha,Colombo 1 P. O. Box. 590, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka.
94 11 2477277/574 94 11 2477718 pdebt@cbsl.lk www.cbsl.gov.lk

BO-

අභ්‍යන්තර ලිපිය
INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

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Public Debt Department

16 July 2013

ISSUE OF TREASURY BILLS
ALLOCATION TO CENTRAL BANK

Date of Settlement:

The above allocation has been made to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and details are as follows.

Date of Issue	Date of Maturity	Days	ISIN	Face Value	Amount Payable	Tax Payable	Price	Discount Rate	Yield Rate
Total				#Error	#Error	#Error			

Please be good enough to credit Rs. #Error and Rs. #Error the Public Debt Current A/c no. 4203 on under advice to us.

For Superintendent of Public Debt

Copy : DOD
Finance

Total Net Settlement and Tax

Value 09/09/2011

Dealers Name	Face Value	Net	Tax Total
Acuity Securities Ltd	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Bank of Ceylon	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Capital Alliance Ltd	0.00	-0.00	0.00
CBSL	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Commercial Bank of Ceylon	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Employees Trust Fund	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Entrust Securities PLC	0.00	-0.00	0.00
First Capital Treasuries Ltd	0.00	-0.00	0.00
NatWealth Securities Ltd	0.00	-0.00	0.00
NSB Fund Management Co,	0.00	-0.00	0.00
People's Bank	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Sampath Bank PLC PDU	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Seylan Bank PLC	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Grand Total	0.00	-0.00	0.00

16 July 2013

Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Domestic Operations Department - Domestic Banking Division
Daily Statement of Account

From 10-MAY-13 To 10-MAY-13

Account Name : 4203 - PDD Current Account

Opening Balance : (338,979,401.07)

Voucher No	Date	Category	Description	Debits (Rs.)	Credits (Rs.)
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f70021cMT900 Redemption Advice	6,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f70023aMT900 Redemption Advice	10,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f70020dMT900 Redemption Advice	20,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700208MT900 Redemption Advice	43,500,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700235MT900 Redemption Advice	50,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700249MT900 Redemption Advice	50,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f70022bMT900 Redemption Advice	55,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700267MT900 Redemption Advice	60,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f70025dMT900 Redemption Advice	100,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700217MT900 Redemption Advice	100,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700212MT900 Redemption Advice	145,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700258MT900 Redemption Advice	180,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700244MT900 Redemption Advice	400,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f70026cMT900 Redemption Advice	507,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700230MT900 Redemption Advice	550,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700226MT900 Redemption Advice	660,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700221MT900 Redemption Advice	787,500,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700262MT900 Redemption Advice	1,000,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f70023fMT900 Redemption Advice	2,970,000,000.00	

Account Name : 4203 - PDD Current Account

Voucher No	Date	Category	Description	Debits (Rs.)	Credits (Rs.)
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f700253MT900 Redemption Advice	3,500,000,000.00	
	10/05/2013	REDEMPTION	130510012f70024eMT900 Redemption Advice	4,055,000,000.00	
100513412	10/05/2013	FUND TRANSFER	TREASURY BILLS MATURITY PAYMENTS FUND TRANSFER FROM D S T		15,249,000,000.00
100513501	10/05/2013	FUND TRANSFER	TREASURY BILLS ISSUES - FUND TRANSFER TO DST	15,882,672,000.00	
100513501	10/05/2013	FUND TRANSFER	TREASURY BILLS TAX PAYMENTS	153,742,354.00	
100513502	10/05/2013	FUND TRANSFER	TREASURY BONDS ISSUES - FUND TRANSFER TO DST	6,619,800.00	
100513502	10/05/2013	FUND TRANSFER	TREASURY BONDS TAX PAYMENTS	583,270.00	
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		7,016,900.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		9,823,470.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		4,496,550.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		6,996,500.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		6,514,350.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		3,749,275.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		33,762,819.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		17,027,400.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		6,990,900.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		5,011,500.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		26,970,840.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		18,172,320.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		5,116,358.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		621,679.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		1,003,700.00
32089	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEAR TAX ON SECURITIES		1,051,063.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		1,510,505,750.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		621,902,000.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		910,871,990.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		399,973,650.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		622,160,700.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		222,134,500.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		709,745,575.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		622,222,300.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		444,225,000.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		2,423,208,960.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		577,496,900.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		463,681,319.00

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Account Name : 4203 - PDD Current Account

Voucher No	Date	Category	Description	Debits (Rs.)	Credits (Rs.)
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		60,112,945.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		1,410,726,780.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		4,606,935,578.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		88,827,500.00
32090	10/05/2013	RTGS_Receipts	IW CLEARING SECURITIES NET SETTLMENT		194,560,353.00
			Total :	31,292,617,424.00	31,292,617,424.00
			Closing Balance :		(338,979,401.07)

511

B0

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
RTGS OUTWARD PAYMENT REQUEST

Requesting Department : PDD Date : 10-Jul-13

Dealers Name: Bank of Ceylon

Beneficiary Details

Dealers Name	:	Bank of Ceylon
Value date	:	05 July 2013
Amount (Rs)	:	650,000.00
Account No	:	4401
Purpose	:	Refund the over Payment of T Bills Issues

A/c Name : PDD Current A/c

A/c No : 4203

....

Authorized Signature Authorized Signature

For use by DOD only

Date Received :

GLS Update by :

Authorized by :

Remarks :

CBSL- GLS
DATA INPUT SHEET

16-Jul-13

Document No .....

Originating Department/Division	Public Debt
Input Department/Division	DOD
Transaction Discription	Treasury Bills Issues - Fund Transfer to DST

Value date:

Discription	A/c No	Debit	Credit
PDD Current Account	4203	#Error	
DST's Account	4201		#Error

Prepared by .....

Checked by .....

Authorized Signature .....

CBSL- GLS
DATA INPUT SHEET

16-Jul-13

Document No .....

Originating Department/Division	Public Debt
Input Department/Division	DOD
Transaction Discription	Treasury Bonds Issues - Fund Transfer to DST

Value date:

Discription	A/c No	Debit	Credit
PDD Current Account	4203	#Error	
DST's Account	4201		#Error

Prepared by .....

Checked by .....

Authorized Signature .....

BO-7
226

මුදල් බාරදෙන වවුචරය

பொது/General 118
(M 8 S., T. & E.) 1/58

பணம் கட்டும் பத்திரம் / PAYING-IN VOUCHER

දිනය/தேதி/Date .....

ලැබීම් ශීර්ෂය/வருமானத் தலைப்பு/Head of Receipt:
උප ශීර්ෂය/உப-தலைப்பு/Sub-head

To Deputy Secretary to Treasury ..... { වෙතටයි / க்கு

(මුදල් ගෙවන්නේ යම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවකට හෝ බැංකුවකට නම් එහි නම මෙහි ලියන්න. /எந்த வங்கியில் அல்லது அரசாங்கத்துறையில் பணம் கட்டப்படுகின்றதோ அப்பெயரை இங்கே குறிப்பிடுக. / Here state the name of Bank or Department to which payment is made.)

ගෙවන අයගේ නම / பணம் கட்டுபவரின் பெயர் / Name of Payee : .....
Superintendent of Public Debt

ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ අය මුදල පදහා පහත විස්තර වන මුදල බාරගත මැනවි. / இத் தொகையைக் கீழே விபரிக்கப்பட்டபடி இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தின் கணக்கில் வரவு வைக்கவும். / Please receive to the credit of the Government of Sri Lanka the sum of money described below:

රුපියල්/ரூபா/Rupees Three million one hundred twenty eight thousand three hundred four only.
..... ශත/சதம்/cents .....

මුදල් ගෙවන්නේ කුමක් පිණිසද යන වග/பணம் கட்டும் விபரம்/Reason for Payment :
Sale Proceeds of Treasury Bills

රු./ரூபா/Rs ....
(අත්සන/கையொப்பம்/Signature)

(බාරගන්නා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සරප්ගේ භාවිතය පදහා පමණයි)
(பணம்பெறும் அரசாங்கத்துறையின் சிறாப்பர் பாவிப்புக்கு மாத்திரம்)
(For the use of the Shroff of the Receiving Department only)

පූර්වෝක්ත මුදල ලදිමි./மேற்கண்ட தொகையைப் பெற்றுக் கொண்டேன்./Received the above amount.

.....
සරප්/சிறாப்பர்/Shroff

දිනය/தேதி/Date: .....

Central Bank Press / 92125(1,000)

BO-7(

මුදල් බාරදෙන වවුචරය

பொது/General 118
(M & S., T. & E.) 1/58

பணம் கட்டும் பத்திரம் / PAYING-IN VOUCHER

දිනය/தேதி/Date 02 September 2013

ලැබීම් ශීර්ෂය/வருமானத் தலைப்பு/Head of Receipt:
උප ශීර්ෂය/உப-தலைப்பு/Sub-head

To Deputy Secretary to Treasury ..... වෙතටයි/க்கு

(මුදල් ගෙවන්නේ යම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවකට හෝ බැංකුවකට නම් එහි නම මෙහි ලියන්න. /எந்த வங்கியில் அல்லது அரசாங்கத்துறையில் பணம் கட்டப்படுகின்றதோ அப்பெயரை இங்கே குறிப்பிடுக. / Here state the name of Bank or Department to which payment is made.)

ගෙවන අයගේ නම / பணம் கட்டுபவரின் பெயர் / Name of Payee : Superintendent of Public Debt

ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ අය මුදල සඳහා පහත විස්තර වන මුදල බාරගත මැනවි. / இத் தொகையைக் கீழே விபரிக்கப்பட்டபடி இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தின் கணக்கில் வரவு வைக்கவும். / Please receive to the credit of the Government of Sri Lanka the sum of money described below:

රුපියල්/ரூபா/Rupees One hundred million nine hundred twenty two thousand only.

ශත/சதம்/cents

මුදල් ගෙවන්නේ කුමක් පිණිසද යන වග/பணம் கட்டும் விபரம்/Reason for Payment : Sale Proceeds of Treasury Bonds

රු./ரூபா/R 42,291,679,804.40

(අත්සන/கையொப்பம்/Signature)

(බාරගන්නා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සරප්ගේ භාවිතය සඳහා පමණයි)
(பணம்பெறும் அரசாங்கத்துறையின் சிறாப்பர் பாவிப்புக்கு மாத்திரம்)
(For the use of the Shroff of the Receiving Department only)

පූර්වෝක්ත මුදල ලදිමි./மேற்கண்ட தொகையைப் பெற்றுக் கொண்டேன்./Received the above amount.

සරප්/சிறாப்பர்/Shroff

දිනය/தேதி/Date: .....

Central Bank Press / 92125(1,000)

BO- 80
228

Chief Accountant
Finance Department

16-Jul-13

Details of the tax collection on Treasury Bills are as follows

Value date 09/09/2011

	Institution	Amount (Rs.)
1	Employees Trust Fund	
2	NatWealth Securities Ltd	
3	CBSL	
4	Capital Alliance Ltd	
5	Seylan Bank PLC	
6	Sampath Bank PLC PDU	
7	People's Bank	
8	NSB Fund Management Co, Ltd	
9	Acuity Securities Ltd	
10	First Capital Treasuries Ltd	
11	Commercial Bank of Ceylon	
12	Entrust Securities PLC	
13	Bank of Ceylon	
	Total	

For Superintendent of Public Debt

BO-8(ii

Chief Accountant
Finance Department

16-Jul-13

Details of the tax collection on TBonds are as follows

Value date 09/09/2011

Institution

	Institution	Amount (Rs.)
1	NSB Fund Management Co, Ltd	00.00
2	Bank of Ceylon	00.00
	Total	**00.00**

For Superintendent of Public Debt

80-9

CBSL- GLS
DATA INPUT SHEET

16-Jul-13

Document No .....

Originating Department/Division	Public Debt
Input Department/Division	DOD
Transaction Discription	Treasury Bills Tax Payments

Value date:

Discription	A/c No	Debit	Credit
PDD Current Account	4203	#Error	
Financial Entry Clearing Account	5552		#Error

Prepared by .....

Checked by .....

Authorized Signature .....

DO-3

CBSL- GLS
DATA INPUT SHEET

16-Jul-13

Document No .....

Originating Department/Division	Public Debt
Input Department/Division	DOD
Transaction Discription	Treasury Bonds Tax Payments

Value date:

Discription	A/c No	Debit	Credit
PDD Current Account	4203	#Error	
Financial Entry Clearing Account	5552		#Error

Prepared by .....

Checked by .....

Authorized Signature .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் **Public Debt Department**

2013.07.16

මගේ අංකය : 08/04/002/0019/002

ඔබේ අංකය :

අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජෙනරාල්
භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය
කොළඹ 01

මහත්මයාණෙනි

භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම -
නිකුත් කළ මුදල (මුහුණත අගය) රු. .....

ඉහත දැක්වෙන භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුතුවේ ලද මනාව රු. ..... කි. මෙම මුදල 2013.07.16 දින භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්ගේ අංක 4201 දරන ගිණුමට බැර කරන ලදී.

මෙම මුදල් භා.නි.බිල්. ගේ අංක 4201 දරන ගිණුමට බැර වී ඇත්දැයි ඔබගේ ප්‍රකාශන සමග සසඳා බලා, යම් අයිතමයක් බැරවී නැත්නම් ඒ බව නොපමාව අප වෙත දන්වන මෙන් කරුණාවෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිමු.

මෙයට විශ්වාසී

රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී වෙනුවට

BO-

CBSL - GLS

Document No. ..... Date: 12/07/2013

Originating Dept/Division : Public Debt

Input Dept/Division : DOD

Transaction Description : Treasury Bills Maturity Payments- Fund Transfer from DST

Value Date : 12-Jul-2013

Description	A/c No.	Debit (Rs.)	Credit (Rs.)
DST's A/c	4201	0.00	
PDD Current A/c	4203		

.....
Prepared By

.....
Checked By

.....
Authorized Signature
(DSPD)

CBSL - GLS

Document No. ..... Date: 15/07/2013

Originating Dept/Division : Public Debt

Input Dept/Division : DOD

Transaction Description : Treasury Bonds Maturity Payments- Fund Transfer from DST

Value Date : 15-Jul-2012

Description	A/c No.	Debit (Rs.)	Credit (Rs.)
DST's A/c	4201	0.00	
PDD Current A/c	4203		

.....
Prepared By

.....
Checked By

.....
Authorized Signature
(DSPD)

CBSL - GLS

Document No. ..... Date: 15/07/2013

Originating Dept/Division : Public Debt

Input Dept/Division : DOD

Transaction Description : Treasury Bonds Interest Payments- Fund Transfer from DST

Value Date : 15-Jul-2013

Description	A/c No.	Debit (Rs.)	Credit (Rs.)
DST's A/c	4201	0.00	
PDD Current A/c	4203		-

.....
Prepared By

.....
Checked By

.....
Authorized Signature
(DSPD)

BO-

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

12 July 2013

Director General of Government Accounts
Department of Treasury Operations
General Treasury
Colombo 01

Dear Sir

Maturity Payments of Treasury Bills

This is to inform you that a sum of Rs.xx,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx (amount inwords) has been debited on 12 July 2013 to the Deputy Secretary to the Treasury A/C No. 4201 and credited the Public Debt Current A/c No. 4203 to effect maturity payments of Treasury Bills due on 12 July 2013. The details of the payments are as follows.

Details of Payments	Central Bank of Sri Lanka	Others	Total
Book Value (Rs.)	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx
Interest (Rs.)	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	X,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx
Total (Rs.)	**xxx,xxx,xxx.xx**	**xx,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx**	**xx,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx**

Please note that the payments to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and others are stated as recorded in the Public Debt Department's database on the date of Primary Issue and due to subsequent secondary market transactions the composition would be changed while the total maturity payment remains unchanged.

For Superintendent of Public Debt

Copy: Domestic Operation Department

15 July 2013

Director General of Government Accounts
Department of Treasury Operations
General Treasury
Colombo 01

Dear Sir

Maturity Payments of Treasury Bonds

This is to inform you that a sum of Rs.xxx,xxx,xxx.xx (Amounts in words) has been debited on 15 July 2013 to Deputy Secretary to the Treasury A/c No 4201 and credited Public Debt Current A/c No 4203 to effect maturity payment of Treasury Bonds due on 15 July 2013. The details of the payment are as follows.

Series	Due Date	Payment Date	Amount (Rs.)	Discount (Rs.)	Total (Rs.)
			xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	xx,xxx,xxx.xx	xxx,xxx.xxx.xx
Total					**xxx,xxx,xxx.xx**

For Superintendent of Public Debt

Copy: Domestic Operation Department

228 BO -

CBSL - GLS

Document No. ..... Date: 22/02/2013

Originating Dept/Division : Public Debt

Input Dept/Division : DOD

Transaction Description : Treasury Bill Early Retirement - Fund Transfer from DST

Value Date : 22-Feb-2013

Description	A/c No.	Debit (Rs.)	Credit (Rs.)
DST A/c	4201	0.00	
PDD Current A/c	4203		0.00

.....	.....	.....
Prepared By	Checked By	Authorized Signature (DSPD)

CBSL - GLS

Document No. Date:22/02/2013

Originating Dept/Division : Public Debt

Input Dept/Division : DOD

Transaction Description : Treasury Bill Early Retirement

Value Date : 22-Feb-2012

Description	A/c No.	Debit (Rs.)	Credit (Rs.)
PDD Current A/c	4203	0.00	
Financial Entry Clearing A/c	5552		0.00

.....	.....	.....
Prepared By	Checked By	Authorized Signature (DSPD)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் **Public Debt Department**

01 July 2013

Director General of Government Accounts
Department of Treasury Operations
General Treasury
Colombo 01

Dear Sir

Early Retirement Payments of Treasury Bills

This is to inform you that a sum of Rs.x,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx (Amount in words) as been debited on 01 July 2013 to Deputy Secretary to the Treasury A/C No.4201 and credited Public Debt Current A/c No. 4203 to effect early retirement payment of treasury bills due on 01 July 2013. The details of the payment are as follows.

Details of Payment	Central Bank of Sri Lanka	Others	**Total**
Book Value (Rs.)	x,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	xxx,xxx.xx	x,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx
Interest (Rs.)	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx		xxx,xxx,xxx.xx
Total (Rs.)	**x,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx**	**0.00**	**x,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx**

For Superintendent of Public Debt

Copy: Domestic Operation Department

10 වන මහල, අංක **30**, ජනාධිපති මාවත,
තැ. පෙ. **590**, කොළඹ **01**, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
94 11 2477277/574 94 11 2477718 publicdebt@cbsl.lk

10 ஆம் மாடி, இல. 30 சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை கொழும்பு .1
த. பெ. இல. 590, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை

Level 10, No. 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1
P . O. Box. 590, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka.
www.cbsl.gov.lk

උපදෙස්

මෙම නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍රය, ආදායකයා විසින් විධිමත්ව සම්පූර්ණ කරන ලදුව, අය ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා නියමිත දින හෝ ඊට අනතුරුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ හැකිය. මෙම බලපත්‍රයක් සමඟ අදාල ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු කොටස් සහතිකය / සහතික හෝ පොරොන්දු නෝට්ටුව / නෝට්ටු, ඒ ඒ ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු කොටස් සහතිකයේ / සහතික වල හෝ පොරොන්දු නෝට්ටුවේ / නෝට්ටු වල පසුපස, ලැබුණු බව විධිමත්ව ලකුණු කොට, එයද, විධිමත්ව අත්සන් කොට එවා තිබිය යුතුය. මේ ආකාරයට ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු කොටස් සහතික හෝ පොරොන්දු නෝට්ටු භාර නුදුනහොත්, ආපසු ගෙවීම් කරනු නොලැබේ.

ආදායකයාට බැංකු ගිණුමක් නොමැති නම්, ඉහත දක්වා ඇති පරිදි, ලැබුණු බව විධිමත්ව සලකුණු කරන ලද කොටස් සහතික පත්‍රය ද, නියමිත දින දී වෙක්පතක් මඟින් අය ආපසු ගෙවීමට හැකි වනු වස්, නියමිත දින හෝ ඊට අනතුරුව යථා පරිදි සම්පූර්ණ කරන ලද නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍රය ද සමඟ මෙම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට කෙලින් ම එවිය යුතුය.

නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍රය සහ අදාල ලියකියවිලි කාල වේලා ඇතිව ඉදිරිපත් නොකළ හොත්, ආපසු ගෙවීම නියමිත දිනයට වඩා ප්‍රමාද විය හැකි අතර, ආපසු ගෙවීමට නියමිත දිනය පසු වූ විට, තිබෙන මුදලට පොලී ගෙවනු නොලැබේ.

ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු කොටස් වශයෙන් තිබෙන මුදල් අලුත් ණයක් සඳහා භැර වූ විට, අලුත් ණය සඳහා එවන අයැදුමත් සමඟ නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍රය සහ ලැබුණු බව විධිමත්ව සලකුණු කරන ලද ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු කොටස් සහතික හෝ පොරොන්දු නෝට්ටු හෝ එවිය යුතුය.

பணிப்புரைகள்

இம்மீட்பாணை, உரிய திகதியன்று அல்லது அதன்பின்னர், இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி, பொதுப்படு கடன் திணைக்களத்திலிருந்து பணம் பெறுதற்காக பணம் பெறுபவரினால் முறையாகப் பூரணப்படுத்தப்பட்டு வங்கி யொன்றின் மூலமாகச் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படலாம் இவ்வாணை பொருத்தமான பங்குத்தொகுதிச் சான்றிதழ்(களை) அல்லது வாக்குறுதிப் பத்திரங்(களைக்) கொண்டிருத்தல் வேண்டும். ஒவ்வொரு பங்குத்தொகுதிச் சான்றிதழின் அல்லது வாக்குறுதிப் பத்திரத்தின் பின்புறத்திலும் முறையாகப் பெற்றமை பற்றிக் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டிருத்தல் வேண்டும். இவ் வாறாகப் பங்குத்தொகுதிச் சான்றிதழ்கள் அல்லது வாக்குறுதிப் பத்திரங்கள் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டாலொழிய மீளக்கொடுப்பனவு செய்யப்படமாட்டாது.

பணம் பெறுபவருக்கு வங்கிக் கணக்கில்லையாயின் முறையாகப் பூரணப்படுத்தப்பட்ட மீட்பாணை மேலே தேவைப் படுத்தப்பட்டவாறாக முறையாகப் பெற்றுக்கொண்டமைபற்றிக் கூறும் பொறுத்தமான பத்திரங்களோடு இத்திணைக்களத்திற்கு நேரடியாக அனுப்பப்படுதல் வேண்டும். அத்துடன் உரிய திகதியன்று காசோலை மூலம் மீளக்கொடுப்பனவு செய்ய இயலக்கூடியதாக உரிய திகதியன்று அல்லது அதற்கு முன்னர் அனுப்பப்படுதல் வேண்டும்.

மீட்பாணையும் அதனோடு தொடர்புடைய ஆவணங்களும் நோத்திற்குச் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படாவிடின் உரிய திகதியையும் கடந்து மீளக் கொடுப்பனவு தாமதிக்கப்படலாம். அத்துடன் அப்பற்று மீளக்கொடுப்பனவிற்குரிய பின்னர் எத்தகைய வட்டியும் பெறமாட்டாது.

பற்றானது புதுக்கடனொன்றில் பங்குத்தொகுதியாக மாற்றப்படுமிடத்து முறையாகப் பற்றுச் சீட்டளிக்கப்பட்ட பங்குத்தொகுதிச் சான்றிதழ்கள் அல்லது வாக்குறுதிப் பத்திரங்களோடு கூடிய மீட்பாணை புதுக்கடனுக்கான விண்ணப்பத்துடன் சேர்த்து அனுப்பப்படல் வேண்டும்.

DIRECTIONS

This redemption warrant may be presented through a Bank duly completed by the payee for collection from the Department of Public Debt, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, on or after the due date. The warrant must be accompanied by the relevant stock certificate/s or promissory note/s duly receipted on the reverse of each stock certificate or promissory note. Repayment will not be made unless the stock certificates or promissory notes are surrendered in this manner.

If the payee has no bank account, the redemption warrant duly completed must be sent direct to this Department together with the relevant scrip duly receipted as required above on or before the due date to enable repayment to be made by cheque on the due date.

Repayment may be delayed beyond the due date if the redemption warrant and the connected documents are not forwarded in time and the holding will not bear any interest after the due date of repayment.

Where the holding is converted into stock in a new loan, the redemption warrant together with the stock certificates or promissory notes duly receipted should accompany the application for the new loan.

Central Bank Press / 92122(3,000)

නියමිත දින සිට දින 30 කට වලංගුයි.
රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ දී.ගෙවීම් පිණිසයි.
உரிய திகதியிலிருந்து 30 நாட்களுக்குச் செல்லுபடியாகும்.
பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களத்தில் கொடுபடற்பாலது.
Valid for 30 days from due date.
Payable at the Department of Public Debt.

රු. ශ.
ப. சா.
P. D. } 35

නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍ර අංකය
மீட்பாணை இலக்கம்
REDEMPTION WARRANT NO. .....

ප්‍රමාණය රු.
தொகை ரூபா
Amount Rs. 13,500,000.00

Loan No. 482

Maturity Date. 2010/11/01

ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජයේ
இலங்கை அரசாங்க
Govt., of Sri Lanka .....

Payable to DIRECTOR & ACCOUNTANT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT WIDOWERS & ORPHANS PEN. FUND
LOCAL GOVT SERVICE PEN. UNIT, SECRETARIAT, 4TH FL. DEPT. OF PENSIONS MALIGAWATTE
COLOMBO 10 .....ගෙවීම් කළහොත. / என்பவருக்குக் கொடுபடற்பாலது.

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව,
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව,
ජනතා විදිය,
කැ. පෙ. 1149,
කොළඹ 1.

பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம்,
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி,
ஜனாதி வீதி,
அ. பெ. இல: 1149,
கொழும்பு 1.

Department of Public Debt,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
Queen Street,
P.O. Box 1149,
Colombo 1.

රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර් වෙනුවට
பதிவாளருக்காக
for Registrar

2013/07/12 19

19 ..... මස ..... වැනි දින, මෙම බලපත්‍රයේ ගෙවීම් විෂයෙන් රුපියල් ..... ලැබිණි.
19 ..... ஆம் ஆண்டு ..... மாதம் ..... ஆம் திகதியன்று இன்று. இவ்வாணையின் கொடுப்பனவாக ரූපා ..... பெற்றுக்கொண்டேன்.
Received this ..... day of ..... 19.....
in payment of this warrant the sum of Rupees .....

විරිමැවි ලැබුණු බව පසුපසයෙහි දක්වා, රුපියල් ..... සඳහා වූ අදාළ විෂයභාර වස්තු කොටස් සහතිකය / සහතික / පොරොන්දු නෝට්ටුව / නෝට්ටු මෙයට අමුණා ඇත. ரූපා ..... தொகைகொண்ட வரவுபட்ட பங்குத்தொகுதிச் சான்றிதழ்(கள்) /வாக்குறுதிப் பத்திரம்(ங்கள்) அவற்றின் பிறப்புறத்தில் பெற்றமையற்றி முறையாகக் குறித்து, இத்துடன் இணைக்கப்பட்டுளன.
The relevant Stock Certificate/s Promissory Note/s amounting to Rupees .....
.....is/are herewith attached duly receipted on the reverse.

*(ඇ) ..... ශ්‍රී ඇති මගේ නියමිත ගිණුමට බැර විය හැකි බවට මෙවනු ඇතැවි.
(මැතවි නම)
(අ) ..... එහි කළෙක්හි වරාවු වෙක්ක් කොටුක්කවුම්.
(වங்கியின் பெயர்)
*(a) Please pay to the credit of my account in .....
(Name of Bank)
හෝ / அல்லது / or
*(ආ) මා නමින් වූ චෙක්පතකින් ගෙවනු මැනවි.
(ஆ) என் பெயரில் காசோலை மூலம் கொடுக்கவும்.
*(b) Please pay by cheque in my favour.
හෝ / அல்லது / or
*(ඇ) රු. ..... සඳහා ..... ලංකාවේවුවේ ..... ණය විෂයභාර වස්තු සහතිකයක් නිකුත් කරනු මැනවි.
(இ) இலங்கை அரசாங்க ..... கடன் ..... இல் ரூபா ..... பங்குத் தொகுதி வழங்கவும்.
*(c) Please issue stock for Rs. ..... in the Sri Lanka Govt. ..... Loan .....

* අදාළ නැති වගන්ති කපා හරින්න. අනික් පිටුවේ ඇති උපදෙස් බලන්න.
* பொருத்தமல்லாதனவற்றைக் கிறிக்கிடவும். மறுபக்கத்திலுள்ள பணிப்புரைகளைப் பார்க்கவும்.
* Delete clauses which are inapplicable–see directions overleaf.

..... ලාභයාගේ අත්සන / பணம்பெறுபவரின் கையொப்பம் / Signature of Payee

CBSL – GLS

DATA INPUT SHEET

.....
Document No.

Date. 30.08.2011

Originating Dept/Division : Public Debt

Input Dept/Division : DOD

Transaction Description : Fund Transfer-Rupee Loan Maturity

Value Date : 30th August - 2011

Description		**Dr.**	**Cr.**
DST's Account	4201	18,831,666,000.00	
PDD Current A/C	4203		18,831,666,000.00

.....
Prepared by

.....
Checked by
(H/BO)

.....
Authorized Signature
(DSPD)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் **Public Debt Department**

Director General
Department of Treasury Operations
General Treasury
Colombo 01

30 August 2011

Dear Sir

Maturity Payments of Rupee Loans

Transfer of Funds on 30 August 2011

This is to inform you that a sum of Rs. 18,831,666,000.00 (Eighteen billion eight hundred thirty one million six hundred sixty six thousand only) transferred on 30 August 2011 from the Deputy Secretary to the Treasury A/C No.4201 to the Public Debt Current A/C No.4203 to effect the Maturity Payment of Rupee Loan due on 30 August 2011.
Details of this payment are as follows.

Loan No.	Series	Amount (Rs)
540	19.00 % 2010 – 2017	18,823,586,000.00
541	18.70 % 2010 – 2014	2,400,000.00
542	18.60 % 2010 – 2013	5,680,000.00
TOTAL		**18,831,666,000.00**

Due Date : 30 August 2011
Transaction Date : 30 August 2011

For Superintendent of Public Debt
Copy to : Domestic Operations Department

10 වන මහල, අංක 30, ජනාධිපති මාවත, තැ. පෙ. 590, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
10 ஆம் மாடி, இல. 30 சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை கொழும்பு 1 த. பெ. இல. 590, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை
Level 10, No. 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1 P. O. Box. 590, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka.
94 11 2477277/574 94 11 2477718 publicdebt@cbsl.lk www.cbsl.gov.lk

වලංගු කාලය දින 30ක් පමණයි.
செல்லுபடியாகும் காலம் 30 நாட்கள் மாத்திரம்
VALID FOR 30 DAYS ONLY

පොලී බල පත්‍රය

வட்டி ஆணைப்பத்திரம்

INTEREST WARRANT

සම්බන්ධ අංකය / தொடர்பு எண் / REFERENCE NO. 015/362/001	පොලිය ගෙවිය යුතු දින / வட்டி கொடுபடவேண்டிய திகதி / INTEREST DUE DATE 2013/08/01

පොලී ගෙවන කාලපේදය / வட்டிக்குரிய காலம் / Period of Interest
2/1/2013 - 7/31/2013

ගෙවිය යුත්තේ / கொடுக்கப்பட வேண்டியவர் / Payable to

THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT
BANK OF CEYLON
ACCOUNTS DEPT., BOC, 10TH FLOOR
NO.4, BANK OF CEYLON MAWATHA
COLOMBO 1

COPY

ණය මුදලේ නම / கடனின் பெயர் / Name of Loan: Government of Sri Lanka 12% 2023

ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු කොටස් ප්‍රමාණය / பங்கின் தொகை / AMOUNT OF STOCK	ගෙවිය යුතු පොලිය / உரிய வட்டி / INTEREST DUE	අයබදු % / வருடான வரி % / INCOME TAX %	ගෙවිය යුතු ඉද්ධ ප්‍රමාණය / உரிய தேறிய தொகை / NETT AMOUNT DUE
8547000000.00	512,820,000.00	0.00	512,820,000.00

ගෙවීම් කරන ස්ථානය, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් නොවේ නම් / கொடுப்பனவு செய்யப்படும் இடம், இ. மத்திய வங்கி இல்லையாயின் / Place of payment, If not from Central Bank of Sri Lanka — කච්චේරිය / கச்சேரி / Kachcheri

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව,
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව,
තැ.පෙ. ~~1149~~, 590
කොළඹ 1.

பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம்,
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி,
த.பெ. ~~1149~~, 590
கொழும்பு 1.

DEPT. OF PUBLIC DEBT,
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA,
P.O. BOX ~~1149~~, 590
COLOMBO 1.

ලේඛනාධිකාරී, රාජ්‍ය ණය / பதிப்பாளர், பொதுப்படுகடன் / Registrar, Public Debt

பிரதி

පිටපත

COPY

සම්බන්ධ අංකය / தொடர்பு எண் / REFERENCE NO. 015/362/001	පොලිය ගෙවිය යුතු දින / வட்டி கொடுபடவேண்டிய திகதி / INTEREST DUE DATE 2013/08/01

පොලී ගෙවන කාලපේදය / வட்டிக்குரிய காலம் / Period of Interest
2/1/2013 - 7/31/2013

ගෙවිය යුත්තේ / கொடுக்கப்பட வேண்டியவர் / Payable to

THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT
BANK OF CEYLON
ACCOUNTS DEPT., BOC, 10TH FLOOR
NO.4, BANK OF CEYLON MAWATHA
COLOMBO 1

COPY

ණය මුදලේ නම / கடனின் பெயர் / Name of Loan: Government of Sri Lanka 12% 2023

ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු කොටස් ප්‍රමාණය / பங்கின் தொகை / AMOUNT OF STOCK	ගෙවිය යුතු පොලිය / உரிய வட்டி / INTEREST DUE	අයබදු % / வருடான வரி % / INCOME TAX %	ගෙවිය යුතු ඉද්ධ ප්‍රමාණය / உரிய தேறிய தொகை / NETT AMOUNT DUE
8547000000.00	512,820,000.00	0.00	512,820,000.00

මුදල් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා පොලී බලපත්‍රයෙහි පසු පිටෙහි ඇති කුවිතාන්සිය විධිමත් ලෙස සම්පූර්ණ කොට පොලිය ගෙවිය යුතු දින සිට දින 30 ක් ඇතුළත ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුය. එම පිටපත ලබන්නා වෙත රඳවා ගත හැක.

சேகரிப்பதற்கு இவ்வட்டி ஆணைப்பத்திரத்தின் பின்புறத்தில் இருக்கும் பற்றுச்சீட்டினை உரிய முறையில் நிரப்பி வட்டிக்குரிய திகதியிலிருந்து 30 நாட்களுக்குள் சமர்ப்பித்தல் வேண்டும். இப்பிரதி பெற்றுக்கொள்பவரால் வைத்திருக்கப்படலாம்.

For collection, the receipt appearing on the reverse of the interest warrant should be duly completed and submitted within 30 days of the interest due date. The copy may be retained by the recipient.

සටහන්

ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු හෝ පෙරොන්දු නෝට්ටු දරන්නන්ගේ ඉල්ලීම පරිදි පොළී බලපත්‍ර ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් හෝ ඕනෑම කච්චේරියකින් හෝ මාරුකර ගැනීමට සැලැස්විය හැකිය. එම පොළී බලපත්‍රය තමාම පැමිණ හෝ විධිමත් ලෙස බලය ලත් නියෝජිතයෙකු විසින් හෝ වැක්පතකින් හෝ මුදල් ඇණවුමකින් ගෙවීම සඳහා තැපෑලෙන් හෝ ඊයේ නැතිනම්, බැංකුවක් මගින් හෝ මාරුකර ගැනීම සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කළ හැකිය.

මෙම පොළිය ලංකාවේ දේශීය ආදායම් බදු ආඥා පනත යටතේ බද්දට යටත්වන අතර, ආදායම් බදු වාර්තාවල මෙය ඇතුළත් කළයුතුය. මෙම ආඥා පනත යටතේ කිසියම් සහනයක් සඳහා හිමිකම් පෑමකදී එම පිටපත ඉදිරිපත් කළ හැකිය.

குறிப்பு

பதிவுசெய்யப்பட்ட பங்குத்தொகுதி அல்லது வாக்குறுதிப் பத்திரங்களையுடையோர்களின் வேண்டுகோளின்படி வட்டி ஆணைப்பத்திரங்கள் கொழும்பு, இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி, பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களத்தில் அல்லது ஏதேனும் கச்சேரியில் கொடுபடற்பாலதாக ஆக்கப்படலாம். பணம் பெறுவதற்கு இவ்வாணைப்பத்திரம் நேர்முகமாக அல்லது உரிய அதிகாரமளிக்கப்பெற்ற முகவரால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படலாம். அல்லது காசோலை மூலம், அல்லது காசுக்கட்டளை மூலம் கொடுப்பனவு செய்யப்படுவதற்கு அஞ்சல் மூலம் அனுப்பப்படலாம் அல்லது வங்கி மூலம் செலுத்துவிக்கப்படலாம்.

இவ்வட்டி இலங்கை உள்நாட்டு இறைவரிச் சட்டத்தின் கீழ் வரிக்கு இலக்கானதாகும் எனவே இது வருமானவரித்திரட்டிற் சேர்க்கப்பட வேண்டும். இப்பிரதி இச்சட்டத்தின் கீழ் ஏதேனும் சலுகையைக் கோருவதற்குச் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படலாம்.

NOTES

Interest warrants can, at the request of holders of Registered Stock or Promissory Notes be made payable at the Department of Public Debt, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, or at any Kachcheri. For collection, the warrant may be presented in person or by a duly authorised agent or sent by post for payment by cheque or money order, or passed through a Bank.

This interest is liable to tax under the Ceylon Inland Revenue Act and should be included in Income Tax Returns. The copy may be produced to claim any relief under this Act.

කුවිතාන්සිය

200 _____ දින රුපියල් _____

_____ ශත _____ ක මුදලක් මෙම

බලපත්‍රය සඳහා ගෙවීම් වශයෙන් ලබා ගතිමි.

_____
ලබාගන්නාගේ අත්සන

பற்றுச்சீட்டு

இவ் ஆணைப்பத்திரத்தின் கொடுப்பனவாக ரூ. _____

ச. _____ கொண்ட தொகையினை 200 _____

ஆம் மாதம் _____ ஆம் நாளன்று பெற்றுக்

கொண்டேன்.

_____
பெறுபவரின் ஒப்பம்

RECEIPT

Received this _____ day of _____

_____ 200 _____ the sum of Rupees _____

_____ and cents _____

in payment of this warrant.

_____
Signature of Recipient

246

CBSL – GLS

DATA INPUT SHEET

.....
Document No.
Originating Dept/Division : Public Debt

Date. DD.MM.YYY

Input Dept/Division : DOD

Transaction Description : Fund Transfer - Rupee Loan Interest PMT

Value Date : 02nd July - 2012

Description	**Dr.**	**Cr.**
DST's Account 4201	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	
PDD Current A/C 4203		xxx,xxx,xxx.xx

..... Prepared by

..... Checked by

..... Authorized Signature
(DSPD)

CBSL – GLS

DATA INPUT SHEET

.....

Document No. Date. DD.MM.YYYY

Originating Dept/Division : Public Debt

Input Dept/Division : DOD

Transaction Description : Rupee Loan Interest Tax

Value Date : 02nd July - 2012

Description	**Dr.**	**Cr.**
PDD Current a/c 4203	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	
Financial Entry Clearing A/C 5552		xxx,xxx,xxx.xx

.....	.....	.....
Prepared by	Checked by	Authorized Signature **(DSPD)**

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
Public Debt Department
2011.08.30

Rupee Loan Interest Tax Payments

Date of Payment 30/8/2011

Series	Investor	Tax (Rs.)
019/540/003	National Savings Bank	7,860,273.97
	Sub Total	**7,860,273.97**
019/540/001	Employees Provident Fund	121,606,298.63
019/540/004	Employees Provident Fund	4,323,150.69
019/540/005	Employees Provident Fund	14,148,493.15
	Sub Total	**140,077,942.47**
019/540/002	Mr.Nilamuni Manoj and Mrs.K. Jayasinghe	12,466.40
	Sub Total	**12,466.40**
019/540/006	Mr.M.A.N.Pathmasiri Perera and Mrs.H.C.Perera	7,860.27
	Sub Total	**7,860.27**
019/541/002	Mr.S.A.Cabraal and Mrs.M.J.Cabraal	7,736.16
019/541/003	Mr.S.A.Cabraal and Mrs.M.J.Cabraal	7,736.16
	Sub Total	**15,472.32**
019/542/003	New Kathiresan Temple	38,473.97
	Sub Total	**38,473.97**
	Total	**148,012,489.40**

For Superintendent of Public Debt

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் **Public Debt Department**

Director General
Department of Treasury Operations
General Treasury
Colombo 01

30 August 2011

Dear Sir

Interest Payment of Rupee Loans

Transfer of Funds on 30 August 2011

This is to inform you that a sum of Rs 1,480,208,163.35 (One billion four hundred eighty million two hundred eight thousand one hundred sixty three and cents thirty five only) transferred on 30 August 2011 from the Deputy Secretary to the Treasury A/C No.4201 to the Public Debt Current A/C No.4203 to effect the Interest Payments of Rupee Loans due on 30 August 2011.

Details of these payments are as follows.

Loan No.	Series	Amount (Rs)
540	19.00 % 2010 – 2017	1,479,585,431.07
541	18.70 % 2010 – 2014	185,667.95
542	18.60 % 2010 – 2013	437,064.33
TOTAL		**1,480,208,163.35**

Due Date : 30 August 2011

Transaction Date : 30 August 2011

For Superintendent of Public Debt

Copy to : Domestic Operations Department

10 වන මහල, අංක 30, ජනාධිපති මාවත, තැ. පෙ. 590, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
10 ஆம் மாடி, இல. 30 சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை கொழும்பு 1 த. பெ. இல. 590, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை
Level 10, No. 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1 P. O. Box. 590, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka.
94 11 2477277/574 94 11 2477718 publicdebt@cbsl.lk www.cbsl.gov.lk

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் **Public Debt Department**

26 June 2013

The Chief Dealer
Treasury Division
Bank of Ceylon
4, Bank of Ceylon Mawatha
Colombo 01.

Dear Sir,

Sri Lanka Development Bonds - Issue 2014B and 2015B
Semi Annual Interest Payments for the period from 29/12/2012 to 29/06/2013

Semi annual interest payments on Sri Lanka Development Bonds (SLDBs) for series' 2014B and 2015B, issued on 29 June 2011, fall due on 29 June 2013, which is a Saturday. Therefore, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka will credit US$ 2,724,804.35 (in total) to Bank of Ceylon (BCEYLKLX) account No. 3582037537001 with Standard Chartered Bank (SCBLUS33), New York on the following working day, i.e., on 01 July 2013. Therefore, please make necessary arrangements to credit the interests to the accounts of registered holders of the aforesaid SLDBs, as per the attached schedules 1, 11, & 11I and confirm the payments immediately after the transactions.

Please note that the accounts of the registered holders of SLDBs shall be credited with interests on 01 July 2013.

Yours faithfully,

For Superintendent of Public Debt

10 වන මහල, අංක **30**, ජනාධිපති මාවත,
තැ. පෙ. **590**, කොළඹ **01**, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
94 11 2477277/574 94 11 2477718 publicdebt@cbsl.lk

10 ஆம் மாடி, இல. 30 சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை கொழும்பு 1
த. பெ. இல. 590, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை

Level 10, No. 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1
P. O. Box. 590, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka.
www.cbsl.gov.lk

DD Month (inword) YYYY

To : Chief Managers of All Designated Agents.

Dear Sir,

SRI LANKA DEVELOPMENT BONDS (SLDBs) – 2015E(eg:)

Issue Date: DD/MM/YYYY

Interest Rate for the period of DD/MM/YYYY- DD/MM/YYYY

We wish to inform you that in terms of Offer Document of SLDBs 2015E(eg:), the rate of interest applicable for the semiannual interest period starting from DD month(inword) YYYY is the six-month LIBOR on ddth month(inword) YYYY plus the margin.

Accordingly, you are requested to use six-month LIBOR as x.xxxxx% for the period DD/MM/YYYY – .DD/MM/YYYY

Yours faithfully

For Superintendent of Public Debt

BO-3

Internal Memorandum

Central Bank of Sri Lank

Public Debt Departmer
DD/MM/YY

To : C. A
From : S/PDD

Ref: 08/23/004/0007/00

We give below details on Foreign loan/s due for payment of interest & repayment of principal. Please make payment/s as per details given.

Date of Payment	Due Date	Name of the Loan	Cur	Interest	Principal	Tot
DD/MM/YYYY	DD/MM/YYYY	Hatton National Bank PLC	EUR	xx,xxx.xx	0.00	xx,xxx.x
				xx,xxx.xx	**0.00**	**xx,xxx.x**

Yours faithfully,

For Superintendent / Registrar of Public Debt

Checked By CFDSP

DSPD : _____
SM(BO) : _____
AM(BO) : _____
AM(BO) : _____

BO – 2

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

No: PD 22/A

Public Debt Department

No **08/23/004/0006/001**

Debit ... **A/c Deputy Secretary to the Treasury - 4201**

Description of service rendered, work executed or goods supplied	AMOUNT	
	Rs	Cts
Interest & Principal Payment and Payments of Commitment Fee for **ADB Loans** due on **15/02/2007** USD x,xxx,xxx.xx PAY / CREDIT	xxx,xxx,xxx	xx
TOTAL	xxx,xxx,xxx	xx

Rupees Four hundred thirty-seven million, eight hundred eighty thousand, two hundred twenty and seventeen cents only

Date: 15/02/2007

CERTIFIED AS CORRECT

.....
For Superintendent / Registrar
Public Debt Department

.....
For Superintendent / Registrar
Public Debt Department

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

Public Debt Department
P.O.Box 1149, Colombo 1
21/02/2007

No: PD/A2/7

Director General
Department of Treasury Operations
General Treasury
Colombo 1

Dear Sir

Head 803 - Public Debt

Payment of Interest and Principal for
ADB Loans
Due on 20/02/2007

The Account of Deputy Secretary to the Treasury with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka was debited on **21/02/2007** to Rs **xxx,xxx,xxx.xx**. This amount represents the interest payment and principal repayment equivalent in **USD** of above loan due on **20/02/2007** and should be accounted as follows.

Expenditure Head 803- 1802 - Interest payments

xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	X Rs. xxx.xx	= Rs.	xx,xxx,xxx.xx

Expenditure Head 803-3002 - Principal payments

x,xxx,xxx,xxx.xx	X Rs. xxx.xx	= Rs.	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx
	Total	= Rs.	xxx,xxx,xxx.xx

Yours faithfully,

For Superintendent / Registrar of Public Debt

Cc: i. Treasury Operations Department / S.A.D
ii. C.A. Ref.no.BD/F

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் **Public Debt Department**

මගේ අංකය : රාණ/ඒ3/නිඇ/ආ.ගෙ.
My No. :
ඔබේ අංකය :
Your No. :

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
10 වන මහල (උතුර)
නව ගොඩනැගිල්ල
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
කොළඹ 01.
..... මය ..... වැනි දින

ජාතික නිවාස කොමසාරිස්
2 වන මහල
සෙත්සිරිපාය
බත්තරමුල්ල

මහත්මයාණෙනි,

1973 අංක 01 දරන නිවාස දේපල උපරිමය පණත යටතේ
ජාතික නිවාස ඇපකර සල් පිරීමට මත්තෙන් මුදල් කර ගැනීම
ඇපකර අංක : .....

ඉහත කරුණ සම්බන්ධව ඔබගේ අංක නි.දේ.උ./ගිණුම්/1 හා ..... දින දරන ලිපි/ලිපිය සම්බන්ධවයි.

පහත සඳහන් නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍ර මේ සමග ඔබ වෙත එවමු. නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍ර සඳහා මුදල් ගෙවීමට පෙරාතුව එහි පසුපිටෙහි දැක්වෙන උපදෙස් පරිදි ආදායකයන් විසින් අදාල ඇපකර සහ නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍ර විධිමත් පරිදි සම්පූර්ණ කර නිවාස ඇපකර සමග ඔබ විසින් ලබා ගත යුතුබව සටහන් කර ගන්න.

මුදල් ගෙවීමෙන් පසු අදාල නිවාස ඇපකර ආපසු අප වෙත එවීමට කටයුතු කරන මෙන් ද ඉල්ලා සිටිමු.

ආදායකයාගේ නම	නිවාස ඇපකර අංකය	මුල් මුදල	පොළී	ආපසු දීමේ වටිනාකම
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මෙයට - විශ්වාසී

රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී වෙනුවට.

ඇමුණුම් : නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍ර.

නිකුත් කළ දින සිට දින 30 කට වලංගුය

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තර්තමේන්තුව
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
කොළඹ 01
දිනය :.....

ගෙවිය යුත්තේ : ජාතික නිවාස කොමසාරිස්
සෙත්සිරිපාය, බත්තරමුල්ල

නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍ර අංකය : ..... මුදල් රු: .....

ගෙවිය යුතු මයා/මිය/මෙනෙවිය .....

ඇපකර අංකය..... වටිනාකම් රු: .....

ඇපකරුගේ නම සහ ලිපිනය : .....

.....

ආපසු ගෙවීමේදී ඇපකරයේ වටිනාකම :: .....

මුල් මුදල රු: .....

පොලිය රු: .....

===========

ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙනුවෙන්.

200 ..... මස ..... වැනි දින, මෙම බලපත්‍රයේ ගෙවීම වෙනුවෙන් නිවාස ඇපකරයේ මුල් මුදල සහ පොලිය වන, ආපසු ගෙවීමේ වටිනාකම වශයෙන් රුපියල් .....

..... සහ ශත ..... ක් ලැබිණි. (.....)

විධිමත්ව ලැබුණු බව පසු පිටෙහි දක්වා, අදාළ නිවාස ඇපකර සහතිකය /සහතික මෙයට අමුණා ඇත. මගේ ..... අංක දරන ගිණුමට බැර වන පරිදි ගෙවනු මැනවි.

.....

(බැංකුවේ නම සහ ලිපිනය)

මා නමින් වූ වෙක්පතකින් ගෙවනු මැනවි.

දිනය : .....

ආදායකගේ අත්සන.

සටහන.

1 මෙම නිදහස් කිරීමේ බලපත්‍රය ආදායකයා විසින් විධිමත්ව සම්පූර්ණ කර නියෝජ්‍ය අධ්‍යක්ෂ (මුදල්) වෙත (ජාතික නිවාස කොමසාරිස්, සෙත්සිරිපාය, බත්තරමුල්ල) ඔහුට ගෙවීම් කළ හැකි වන පරිද්දෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුය. බලපත්‍රය සමග අදාළ නිවාස ඇපකරය ලැබුණු බව විධිමත්ව සලකුණු කොට ඒවිය යුතුය.

2 පොලිය දේශීය ආදායම් ආඥා පනත යටතේ බද්දට යටත් වන අතර, ආදායම් බදු වාර්තාවල මෙය අතුලත් කළ යුතුය.

වලංගු කාලය දින 30 ක පමණයි.
செல்லுபடியாகும் காலம் 30 நாட்கள் பாத்திரம்.
VALID FOR 30 DAYS ONLY.

පොලී බලපත්‍රය

வட்டி ஆணைப்பத்திரம் INTEREST WARRANT

සම්බන්ධ අංකය தொடர்பு எண் REFERENCE NO.	නිකුත් කළ දිනය வழங்கப்பட்ட திகதி DATE OF ISSUE

පොලී ගෙවන කාලවේදය / வட்டிக்குரிய காலம் / Period of interest

ගෙවිය යුත්තේ / கொடுக்கப்படவேண்டியவர் / Payable to

ඇපකරයේ නම: ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ නිවාස දේපල උපරිමය ඇපකරය.
முறியின் பெயர்: இலங்கை அரசாங்க வீட்டாதன உச்சவரம்பு முறி.
Name of Bond: Government of Sri Lanka Ceiling on Housing Property Bond.

ඇපකරයේ ප්‍රමාණය முறியின் தொகை AMOUNT OF BOND	ගෙවිය යුතු පොලිය உரிய வட்டி INTEREST DUE	අය බදු % வருமான வரி % INCOME TAX %	ගෙවිය යුතු ශුද්ධ ප්‍රමාණය உரிய தேறிய தொகை NETT AMOUNT DUE

ගෙවීම් කරන ස්ථානය :
கொடுப்பனவு செய்யப்படும் இடம்:
PLACE OF PAYMENT:

පිටපතේ පිටුපස ඇති 1 වැනි සටහන බලන්න.
பிரதியின் பின்பக்கத்தில் குறிப்பு 1ஐப் பார்க்கவும்.
PLEASE SEE NOTE 1 ON THE REVERSE OF COPY.

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව,
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව,
තැ.පෙ. 590,
කොළඹ 1.

பொதுப்படு கடன் திணைக்களம்,
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி,
த. பெ. 590,
கொழும்பு 1.

DEPT. OF PUBLIC DEPT.,
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA,
P. O. BOX 590,
COLOMBO 1.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී / பதிப்பாளர் / Registrar

579

பிரதி පිටපත

සම්බන්ධ අංකය தொடர்பு எண் REFERENCE NO.	නිකුත් කළ දිනය வழங்கப்பட்ட திகதி DATE OF ISSUE

පොලී ගෙවන කාලවේදය / வட்டிக்குரிய காலம் / Period of interest

ගෙවිය යුත්තේ / கொடுக்கப்பட வேண்டியவர் / Payable to

ඇපකරයේ නම: ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ නිවාස දේපල උපරිමය ඇපකරය.
முறியின் பெயர்: இலங்கை அரசாங்க வீட்டாதன உச்சவரம்பு முறி.
Name of Bond: Government of Sri Lanka Ceiling on Housing Property Bond.

ඇපකරයේ ප්‍රමාණය முறியின் தொகை AMOUNT OF BOND	ගෙවිය යුතු පොලිය உரிய வட்டி INTEREST DUE	අය බදු % வருமான வரி % INCOME TAX %	ගෙවිය යු உரிய NETT

මුදල් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා පොලී බලපත්‍රයෙහි පසු පිටෙහි ඇති කුවිතාන්සිය විධිමත් ලෙස සම්පූර්ණ
දින සිට දින 30ක් ඇතුලත ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුය. එම පිටපත ලබන්නා වෙත රැඳවා ගත හැක.

சேகரிப்பதற்கு இவ்வட்டி ஆணைப்பத்திரத்தின் பின்புறத்தில் இருக்கும் பற்றுச்சீ
முறையில் நிரப்பி வழங்கப்பட்ட திகதியிலிருந்து 30 நாட்களுக்குள் சமர்ப்பித்த
இப்பிரதி பெற்றுக் கொள்பவரால் வைத்திருக்கப்படலாம்.

For collection, the receipt appearing on the reverse of the interest warrant sh
completed and submitted within 30 days of the date of issue. The copy may be re
recipient.

සටහන්

මෙම පොලී බලපත්‍රය ඉදිරිපත් කොට භාරදෙනු ලැබුවායින් පසු, ජාතික නිවාස කොමසාරිස් විසින් ජාතික නිවාස දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහිදී (නිවාස දේපල උපරිමය ශාඛාව-'සෙත්සිරිපාය' බත්තරමුල්ල.) හෝ ඔහු විසින් නම් කරනු ලබන වෙනත් ස්ථානයකදී මෙම කාර්යය සඳහා ඔහු විසින් ප්‍රතිපාදිත මුදල් වලින් ගෙවීම් කරනු ලැබේ. නිවාස දේපල උපරිමය (නිවාස ඇපකර) නියෝග අංක 7.

මෙම පොලිය දේශීය ආදායම් ආඥා පනත යටතේ බද්දට යටත්වන අතර, ආදායම් බදු චාර්තාවල මෙය ඇතුලත් කළ යුතුය. මෙම ආඥාපනත යටතේ කිසියම් සහනයක් සඳහා හිමිකම් පෑමකදී එම පිටපත ඉදිරිපත් කල හැක.

குறிப்பு

இவ்வாணைப்பத்திரத்தில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட வட்டியின் கொடுப்பனவு, தேசிய வீடமைப்பு ஆணையாளரால் இவ்வட்டி ஆணைச்சீட்டைக் காண்பித்து ஒப்படைக்கப்பட்டதும் இதன் நோக்கத்திற்கென ஒதுக்கப்பட்ட பண நிதியிலிருந்து தேசிய வீட மைப்புத் திணைக்களத்தில் (வீட்டாதன உச்சவரம்புக்கிளை, மாளிகாவத்தை, கொழும்பு - 10) அல்லது அவரால் நியமிக்கப்பட்ட வேறோர் இடத்தில் செய்யப்படும் - வீட்டாதன உச்சவரம்பு ஒழுங்கு விதிகளின் விதி 7.

இவ்வட்டி உள்நாட்டு இறைவரிச் சட்டத்தின் கீழ் வரிக்கு இலக்கானதாகும். எனவே இது வருமானவரித்திரட்டிற் சேர்க்கப்பட வேண்டும். இப்பிரதி இச்சட்டத்தின் கீழ் ஏதேனும் சலுகையைக் கோருவதற்குச் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படலாம்.

NOTES

Payment on the production and surrender of this Interest Warrant shall be made by the Commissioner of National Housing at the National Housing Department (Ceiling on Housing Property Branch, Maligawatta, Colombo 10) or at any place designated by him, out of moneys provided for that purpose by the Commissioner Regulation 7 of the Ceiling on Housing Property (Housing Bonds) Regulations.

This Interest is liable to tax under the Inland Revenue Act and should be included in Income Tax Returns. The copy may be produced to claim any relief under this Act.

කුවිතාන්සිය

200.... .....දින රුපියල් .....

.....ශත.....ක මුදලක් මෙම බලපත්‍රය සඳහා ගෙවීම් වශයෙන් ලබා ගනිමි.

.....

ලබන්නාගේ අත්සන

பற்றுச்சீட்டு

இவ்வாணைப்பத்திரத்தின் கொடுப்பனவாக ரூ. .....

ச. ..... கொண்ட தொகையினை 200 .....

ஆம்மாதம் ..... ஆம் நாளன்று பெற்றக்கொண்டேன்.

.....

பெறுபவரின் கையொப்பம்

RECEIPT

Received this ..... day of .....

..... 200 ..... the sum of Rupees .....

..... and cents .....

in payment of this warrant.

.....

Signature of Receipient

HEAD - 803-PUBLIC DEBT
PROGRAMME - II, PROJECT - I
PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT

June 2013

Category/Object Title		Actual Expenditure(Rs)
RECURRENT EXPENDITURE		
INTEREST PAYMENTS ON DOMESTIC DEBT - 1601		**17,943,229,834.26**
SPECIAL LAW	**Domestic Currency Debt**	
	(1)Treasury Bills	5,031,484,711.14
	(2) Medium and Long Term Rupee Loans	0.00
	(3) Treasury Bonds (Coupon Payments)	11,936,477,670.00
	Less Accrued Interest and Premium (T.Bonds)	- 389,459,132.00
	(4) Treasury Bonds (Discount on Maturity)	1,052,665,093.50
	(5) Tax Reserve Certificates	0.00
	(6) Treasury Certificates of Deposits	0.00
	(7) Project Loans	0.00
	Foreign Currency Debt	
	(8) Foreign Currency Banking Unit	312,061,491.62
	- *Of which Other Domestic Interest - HNB*	*21,458,503.71*
	(9) Sri Lanka Development Bonds	0.00
DOMESTIC FUNDS	(1) Administrative Borrowings (KFW AL556)	0.00
	(2) National Development Bonds	0.00
INTEREST PAYMENTS ON FOREIGN DEBT -1802		**1,458,094,836.03**
SPECIAL LAW	(1) Medium Term Foreign Loans	19,945,865.45
	(2) Long Term Foreign Loans	1,438,148,970.58
LOAN FLOTATION EXPENDITURE AND OTHERS - 1405		**47,219,599.62**
	(1) Management Charges and Commissions	0.00
	(2) Foreign Loan Flotation Expenses	47,219,599.62
	(3) Domestic Flotation expenses	0.00
TOTAL RECURRENT EXPENDITURE		**19,448,544,269.91**
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE		
REPAYMENTS OF DOMESTIC DEBT - 3001		**55,075,428,661.83**
SPECIAL LAW	**Domestic Currency Debt**	
	(1) Medium and Long Term Rupee Loans	0.00
	(2) Treasury Certificates of Deposits	0.00
	(3) Treasury Bonds (Book Value)	54,991,354,906.50
	(4) Project Loans	0.00
	Foreign Currency Debt	
	(5) Foreign Currency Banking Unit	84,073,755.33
	- *Of which Other Domestic Capital - HNB*	84,073,755.33
	(6) Sri Lanka Development Bonds	0.00
DOMESTIC FUNDS	(1) Administrative Borrowings (KFW AL556)	0.00
	(2) National Development Bonds	0.00
	(3) Redemption of Tax Reserve Certificates	0.00
REPAYMENTS ON FOREIGN DEBT - 3002		**6,249,790,868.24**
SPECIAL LAW	(1) Medium Term Foreign Loans	336,536,948.67
	(2) Long Term Foreign Loans	5,913,253,919.57
OTHER REPAYMENTS - 3003		**0.00**
SPECIAL LAW	(1) Redemptions of National Development Bonds	0.00
	(2) Repayments of Treasury Bills	0.00
	(3) Repayments of Advances Obtained from CBSL	0.00
TOTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURE		**61,325,219,530.07**
	Fund Transfered to Special.Accounts No. 4222	0.00
TOTAL RECURRENT AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE		**80,773,763,799.98**

TOTAL EXPENDITURE

For **June 2013**

of nts	DOMESTIC DEBT								FOREIGN DEBT					
	1601 - INTEREST PAYMENTS				3001 - REPAYMENTS				1802-INTEREST PAYMENTS		3002 - REPAYMENTS		1405-OTHER	Transfer of funds to A/c 4222
	Treasury Bills (b)	Rupee Loans (a)	Treasury Bonds (c)	Project Loans	Treasury Bills (b)	3001 (1) Rupee Loans (a)	3001 (3) Treasury Bonds (c)	3001 (4) Project Loans	1601 FCBU/SLDB	1602 Long and Medium Term (d)	3001(5) FCBU/ SLDB	3002 (2) Long and MediumTerm (d)	Loan Flotation Expenses (e)	
-13	0.00	0.00	6,581,386,800.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	262,252,423.42	0.00	1,415,171,275.90	1,760,445.88	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4,219,672.94	0.00	6,170,184.19	0.00	0.00
-13	1,574,468,210.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	21,637,096,717.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3,457,792.70	0.00	31,376,920.43	0.00	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	10,036,564.87	0.00	3,048,572.16	711,101.29	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,321,484.35	0.00	7,100,405.86	0.00	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6,332,973.95	0.00	168,395,107.42	0.00	0.00
-13	679,489,098.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	10,580,010,901.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	290,602,987.91	8,984,573.32	0.00	11,657,189.93	7,465,799.67	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	5,355,090,870.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	56,044,020,000.00	0.00	0.00	288,677,140.18	0.00	1,253,692,029.59	2,819,277.07	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,643,691.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4,525,915.12	0.00	18,086,872.38	0.00	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	435,093,514.36	0.00	505,191,658.93	0.00	0.00
-13	984,198,794.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	11,080,801,206.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	21,833,655.72	0.00	64,962,746.71	0.00	0.00
-13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,530,628.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
-13	1,793,328,607.84	0.00	0.00	0.00	40,805,034,601.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	427,643,308.35	0.00	2,849,011,660.07	34,462,975.71	0.00
	5,031,484,711.14	0.00	11,936,477,670.00	0.00	84,102,943,426.56	0.00	56,044,020,000.00	0.00	290,602,987.91	1,479,553,339.74	0.00	6,333,864,623.57	47,219,599.62	0.00

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(a) No Rupee Loan payments for the period.

(b) Refer annex II and annex III for detalied information on Treasury Bill repayments and interest payments respectively.n

(c) Refer annex IV for detalied information on repayments and interest payments of Treasury Bonds.

(d) Refer annex V for detalied information on Actual Foreign Loan payments.

(e) Refer annex VI for detalied information on Foreign Loan flotation expenses.

Foreign Debt Service Payments for the Month of June 2013 Rs. Mn

Date of Payment	Interest Payments		Principal Payments			Loan Flotation Expenses
	SLDB/FCBU	Long - Term Loans	SLDB	FCBU	Long - Term Loans	
03-Jun-13	-	262.25	-	-	1,415.17	1.76
06-Jun-13	-	4.22	-	-	6.17	-
07-Jun-13	-	3.46	-	-	31.38	-
10-Jun-13	-	10.04	-	-	3.05	0.71
11-Jun-13	-	2.32	-	-	7.10	-
13-Jun-13	-	6.33	-	-	168.40	-
14-Jun-13	290.60	8.98	-	-	11.66	7.47
17-Jun-13	-	288.68	-	-	1,253.69	2.82
18-Jun-13	-	1.64	-	-	-	-
19-Jun-13	-	4.53	-	-	18.09	-
20-Jun-13	-	435.09	-	-	505.19	-
21-Jun-13	-	21.83	-	-	64.96	-
24-Jun-13	-	2.53	-	-	-	-
28-Jun-13	-	427.64	-	-	2,849.01	34.46
TOTAL	290.60	1,479.55	-	-	6,333.86	47.22

Prepared By

Checked By

Information of Treasury bill Retirement on 01-Jul-13
Based on the Information of Treasury bill Issue on* 17-Jun-13

Basic Information :	Face Value	Book Value	Interest
Total Retirement	9,054,900,000.00	8,724,110,647.70	330,789,352.30

Allocation :			
Primary Dealers	-	-	-
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	-	-	-
CBSL	9,054,900,000.00	8,724,110,647.70	330,789,352.30
Total Issues	9,054,900,000.00	8,724,110,647.70	330,789,352.30

*

					16/11/2012	17/06/2013	
ISIN					LKA36413K158	LKA18213L137	
Maturity Period (Days)		91	182	364	137	165	Total
Maturity Date		30-Sep-13	30-Dec-13	30-Jun-14	15-Nov-13	13-Dec-13	
Primary Dealers	Face Value				-		-
	Book Value						-
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	Face Value	-	-	-	-		-
	Book Value				-		-
CBSL	Face Value	-	-	-	5,500,000,000.00	3,554,900,000.00	9,054,900,000.00
	Book Value	-	-	-	5,316,124,000.00	3,407,986,647.70	8,724,110,647.70
Placements	Face Value	-	-	-			-
	Book Value	-	-	-			-
Total Issues	Face Value	-	-	-	5,500,000,000.00	3,554,900,000.00	9,054,900,000.00
	Book Value	-	-	-	5,316,124,000.00	3,407,986,647.70	8,724,110,647.70
Total Interest		-	-	-	183,876,000.00	146,913,352.30	330,789,352.30
Weighted Average	Bid Price	97.6510	94.8867	89.4099	96.6568	95.8673	
	Discount Rate	9.3960	10.2266	10.5901	8.8827	9.1170	
	Yield Rate (With tax)	9.6222	10.7778	11.8444	10.2111	10.5667	
	Yield Rate (After tax)	8.6600	9.7000	10.6600	9.1900	9.5100	
	Tax Rate per Rs.100/=	0.2299	0.4876	0.9570	-		
		Last auction data					

Tax Payments :						
Primary Dealers				-	-	-
Inst. Investors / CBSL Manage Funds	-	-	-		-	-
CBSL	-	-	-		-	-
Placements	-	-	-		-	-
Total Tax	-	-	-		-	-

Note:

Early Retirement of Treasury bills issued to the Central Bank

PDD/MO/AD/001

Treasury bill Early Retirement on Monday, 01 July, 2013

ISIN	LKA36413K158	LKA18213L137
Retirement Date	01-Jul-13	01-Jul-13
Remaining Maturity Period (Days)	137	165
Original Maturity Period (Days)	364	179
Original Issue Date	16-Nov-12	17-Jun-13
Original Maturity Date	15-Nov-13	13-Dec-13
Face Value (Rs.)	5,500,000,000.00	3,554,900,000.00
Original Book Value (Rs.)	4,818,456,500.00	3,374,922,522.80
Retirement Book Value (Rs.)	5,316,124,000.00	3,407,986,647.70
Interest (Rs.)	497,667,500.00	33,064,124.90
Investor	CBSL	CBSL
Retired Yield Rate (After Tax)	9.19%	9.51%
Original Issue Rate (After Tax)	12.73%	9.76%

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epared by:

Checked by:

07/01/13

Appendix

Central Depository System Division

Reports and Documents related to the Central Depository System

Report No.	Name of the report/ document
CDS - 01	Match Trade Feed (Settlement of CSS Trades)
CDS - 02	Holding Update
CDS - 03	Match Trade Feed for Government Securities Auction
CDS - 04	Match Trade Feed for Government Securities Placement
CDS - 05	Primary Issues 2
CDS - 06	Primary Issues 3
CDS - 07	Payments on Government Securities for PSD
CDS - 08	Statement of payments (Due coupon and maturity)
CDS - 09	Transaction Summary
CDS - 10	Statement of Payments
CDS - 11	Statement of Holdings
CDS - 12	Application for LankaSecure access for a Individual investor
CDS - 13	Application for LankaSecure access for a Corporate Cutomer
CDS - 14	Outright transactions volumes in T-Bonds - ISIN-wise
CDS - 15	Central Bank Maturities
CDS - 16	ISIN wise outstanding of T-Bills and T-Bonds
CDS - 17	CSS billings report
CDS - 18	Format for FoiegnTansactions
CDS - 19	Maturity profile of Foreign Holdings of T-bills and T-bonds
CDS - 20	Foreign Holdings of T-Bills and T-Bonds (In USD)
CDS - 21	T - 6 Daily Inflows and outflowss (Provisional)
CDS - 22	Net Bill/Bond foreign issues
CDS - 23	Eligible securities for foreiners

Matched Trade Feed

Settlement of CSS Trades Authorised by the Participants, Batch ID - mXXXXXXX, Server - rtgs1, Location - /cssdata/cssl/unix/, Created on - Friday, mmmm dd yyyy at 16:10:02

Printed on: dd/mm/yyyy

ISIN \ Settlement Date\ SRN LKA18213G053 YYYYMMDD	Seller Transaction Reference	Seller BIC	Seller Account	Sourc. Ben. Own.	Buyer BIC	Buyer Account	Dest. Ben. Owner	Quantity	Payment Value	Return Price	Return Date	REP. Typ	Slr ret ref
23.00	2519875	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CRR	XXX	xxx			20130607	REPC	N
								xxx	xxx	xxx			
LKA36414E308 YYYYMMDD													
1.00	Inv2013060003	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
2.00	Inv2013060004	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
3.00	Inv2013060005	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
4.00	Inv2013060006	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
5.00	Inv2013060007	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
6.00	Inv2013060008	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
7.00	Inv2013060009	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
8.00	Inv2013060010	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
18.00	Inv2013060020	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
19.00	Inv2013060021	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
12.00	Inv2013060014	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
13.00	Inv2013060015	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
14.00	Inv2013060016	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
15.00	Inv2013060017	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
16.00	Inv2013060018	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
17.00	Inv2013060019	BICXXXXXXXX	OWN		BICXXXXXXXX	CSL	XXX	xxx					N
								xxx	0.00	0.00			
							Grand Total	xxx	0.00	0.00			

Legend: REPO - REPO Opening Leg ; REPC - REPO Closing Leg

Holding Update

Holding Update, Batch ID - hXXXXXXX, Server - rtgs1, Location - /cssdata/cssl/unix/, Created on - Monday, dddd mm yyyy at 12:38:42

Printed on: 15/07/2013

ISIN	Maturity Date	Account Type	Change Amount	Update Type	Beneficial Owner
LKA36414G113	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB00618F013	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB00718K151	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB00819A158	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB01022A018	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB01518B013	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB01518G152	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB01528E016	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB02032J017	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
LKB02033F013	dd/bb/yyyy	PAP	xxxx	Add	
		Total Volume	xxxx		

Matched Trade Feed

Treasury Bond Auction, Batch ID - BXXXXXXX, Server - rtgs1, Location - /cssdata/cssl/unix/, Created on - Monday, mm dd yyyy at 14:00:40

Printed on: dd/mm/yyyy

ISIN \ Srs\Matu \ Settlement Date\ SRN LKB00718K151 08.00%2018A	Seller Transaction Reference	Seller BIC	Seller Account	Sourc. Ben. Own.	Buyer BIC	Buyer Account	Dest. Ben. Owner	Quantity	Payment Value	Return Price	Return Date	REP. Typ	Slr ret ref
YYYYMMDD													
113.00	201307150030001S	BICXXXXX	PAP		BIC	OWN		XXX					N
107.00	201307150030002S	BICXXXXX	PAP		BIC	OWN		XXX					N
112.00	201307150030003S	BICXXXXX	PAP		BIC	OWN		XXX					N
	Total for LKB00718K151 (08.00%2018A)							XXX	0.00	0.00			
							Grand Total	XXX	0.00	0.00			

Legend: REPO - REPO Opening Leg ; REPC - REPO Closing Leg

Matched Trade Feed

Treasury Bill/Bond Private Placement, Batch ID - BXXXXXXX, Server - rtgs1, Location - /cssdata/cssl/unix/, Created on - Monday, dddd mm yyyy at 14:06:56

Printed on: 15/07/2013

ISIN \ Srs\Matu \ Settlement Date\ SRN	Seller Transaction Reference	Seller BIC	Seller Account	Sourc. Ben. Own.	Buyer BIC	Buyer Account	Dest. Ben. Owner	Quantity	Payment Value	Return Price	Return Date	REP. Typ	Slr ret ref
LKB00618F013 08.50%2018D 20130715													
10.00	201307150040006S	XXXX	PAP		BIC	OWN		XXX					N
Total for LKB00618F013 (08.50%2018D)								XXX	0.00	0.00			
LKB00718K151 08.00%2018A 20130715													
7.00	201307150040002S	XXXX	PAP		BIC	OWN		XXX					N
Total for LKB00718K151 (08.00%2018A)								XXX	0.00	0.00			
LKB00819A158 05.65%2019A 20130715													
9.00	201307150040001S	XXXX	PAP		BIC	OWN		XXX					N
Total for LKB00819A158 (05.65%2019A)								XXX	0.00	0.00			
LKB01022A018 08.00%2022A 20130715													
12.00	201307150040003S	XXXX	PAP		BIC	CSL	ETFBOARD	XXX					N
Total for LKB01022A018 (08.00%2022A)								XXX	0.00	0.00			
LKB01518B013 08.50%2018A 20130715													
8.00	201307150040004S	XXX	PAP		BIC	OWN		XXX					N
Total for LKB01518B013 (08.50%2018A)								XXX	0.00	0.00			
LKB01518G152 08.50%2018B 20130715													
11.00	201307150040005S	XXX	PAP		BIC	OWN		XXX					N
Total for LKB01518G152 (08.50%2018B)								XXX	0.00	0.00			
							Grand Total	XXX	0.00	0.00			

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Legend: REPO - REPO Opening Leg ; REPC - REPO Closing Leg

Primary Issues- Participant wise

sett_date	bank_name	seller_imt	security_id	SumOfExpr1	dest_sat
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB00618F013	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKA36414G113	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB00718K151	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB00718K151	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB01518B013	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB00718K151	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB01022A018	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB02033F013	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB01022A018	xxx	CSL
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB01518G152	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKA36414G113	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB02032J017	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB02033F013	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB00819A158	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB00718K151	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB01528E016	xxx	OWN
dd-mmm-yy	Name	DVF	LKB00718K151	xxx	OWN

Primary Issues- ISIN wise

sett_date	seller_imt	security_id	SumOfSumOfExpr1
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKA36414G113	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB00618F013	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB00718K151	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB00819A158	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB01022A018	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB01518B013	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB01518G152	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB01528E016	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB02032J017	xxx
dd-mmm-yy	DVF	LKB02033F013	xxx

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம்
Public Debt Department

අභ්‍යන්තර ලිපිය | உள்ளக விஞ்ஞாபனம் | Internal Memorandum

Date

Ref: 08/25/001/0007/003

To : D/PSD

From : SPD

Subject : Payments on Government Securities

A file with the following information has been created by the SSSS for payments on Central Bank securities to be effected on dd/mm/yyyy. Please take necessary action to run the above file in the RTGS system in order to effect the relevant payments.

Effective Date - xx/xx/xxxx
File name - redemption_file.ext
- coupon_file.ext

Sent Time:

Signature:

Received Time:

Signature:

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Statement of Payments

Report Date / Time: dd/mm/yyyy 09:26:25

Treasury Bond On Maturity	Participant	ISIN	Amount in Rs.
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
Total	Treasury Bond	Maturity Payments	xxx
Treasury Bond Interest	Participant	ISIN	Amount in Rs.
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01518G152	xxx
	Name	LKB00617G153	xxx
	Name	LKB00415A155	xxx
	Name	LKB00514G152	xxx
	Name	LKB00515G159	xxx
	Name	LKB00617A156	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB01518G152	xxx
	Name	LKB00514G152	xxx
	Name	LKB00515G159	xxx
	Name	LKB00617G153	xxx
	Name	LKB00819A158	xxx
	Name	LKB01013G154	xxx
	Name	LKB00514G152	xxx
	Name	LKB00515G159	xxx
Total	Treasury Bond	Interest Payments	xxx
Total Payments on	Treasury Bond dd/mm/yyyy		xxx

CDS - 09

Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Public Debt Department
LankaSecure
TEL : 2477489, 2477278, 2398740
FAX : 2477704, 2477718

Transaction Summary

Beneficial Owner Code :
Additional Owner Code :

Participant :
Owner Type :

Outright Transaction/s

Transaction Reference	Settlement Date	Maturity Date	ISIN*	Transaction Type	Account Type	Credit	Debit/Maturity

(All values are in Rupees on Face Value basis)
* ISIN - International Securities Identification Number
Serial Number:

This is a computer generated statement and no signature is required

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Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Public Debt Department
LankaSecure
TEL : 2477489, 2477278, 2398740
FAX : 2477704, 2477718

Statement of Payments

Beneficial Owner Code :
Additional Owner Code :

Participant :
Owner Type :

Interest Payment

Date	ISIN*	Amount (Rs.)
	Total	

* ISIN - International Securities Identification Number

Serial Number:

This is a computer generated statement and no signature is required

Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Public Debt Department
LankaSecure
TEL : 2477489, 2477278, 2398740
FAX : 2477704, 2477718

Statement of Holdings

Balance as at:

Benificial Owner Code :
Additional Owner Code :

Participant :
Owner Type :

ISIN*	Maturity Date	Security Type	Account Type	Face Value
Total				
Grand Total				

(All values are in Rupees on Face Value basis)
* ISIN - International Securities Identification Number

Page Ref:

This is a computer generated statement and no signature is required

Form 1

LankaSecureNet CONFIDENTIAL

APPLICATION FOR INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

Section A - Details of the Applicant/s

1. Full Name: i). Mr./Mrs./Miss/Rev .....
   ii). Mr./Mrs./Miss/Rev .....
2. Address: i).....
   ii).....
3. Date of Birth: i) .....
   ii) .....
4. Residence i) Telephone: ..... E mail: .....
   ii)Telephone: ..... E mail: .....
   Office i)Telephone: ..... E mail: .....
   ii) Telephone: ..... E mail: .....
5. NIC i)..... ii)..... .....
   Passport i)..... ii).....
   Driving License i)..... ii).....
6. Mother's Maiden Name: i)..... ii).....

(We required for identification of telephone caller)

We declare that the above information is true and correct and we have read and understood the terms and conditions and agree to abide by them.

i).....

ii).....

Date: Signature of Applicant/s

Section B - Details of Account/s (To be completed by Participant/s who maintain/s security account/s on behalf of the applicants)

a) Name of the Participant: .....
b) BIC: .....
c) Beneficial Owner/s (Customer)Code: .....
d) Names of the Beneficial Owners i).....
   ii).....
e) Address: i).....
   ii).....
f) Additional Owner/s Code: .....

We certify that the above information is true and correct according to our records.

Date

Authorized Officer
(Official Stamp)

Form 1 (A)

AGREEMENT FOR LANKASECURENET -
TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
P.O.Box 590,
Colombo 01.

Dear Sir/ Madam,

I/We..... of .....
..... request you to issue me/us a User Identification Number (User ID) and allow me/us the use LankaSecureNet, Internet Based Account Verification Facility and hereby agree to be bound by the following terms and conditions:

1. Facility

I/We acknowledge and accept that the facility available to me/us under this agreement is to view my/our personal scripless securities account in the central depositary system of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka through the use of operational instructions as contained in the user guide annexed hereto.

2. Responsibilities for Security.

a) I/We agree to duly acknowledge the receipt of my/our Password and also agree to retain my/our User ID in disabled status till LankaSecureNet receives proper acknowledgement of receipt of the password by me/us.

b) I/We undertake not to access LankaSecureNet using defective or insecure equipment or in any manner which might adversely affect LankaSecureNet.

c) I/We hereby agree to change the password assigned to me/us immediately after accessing LankaSecureNet for the first time and at regular intervals thereafter.

d) I/We shall inform LankaSecureNet immediately if I/we become aware of any unauthorized access to or use of the User ID and Passwords by anyone. I/We acknowledge that the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka shall not be liable for any loss or damage that I/we may suffer on account of any unauthorized use of my/our User ID and Password.

e) I/We shall keep my/our User ID and Password strictly confidential and undertake not to reveal them to any person at anytime or under any circumstances.

f) I/We shall keep all information, techniques, data and designs relating to LankaSecureNet completely confidential. I/We shall not disclose any of them to any other party.

g) My/Our obligations relating to confidentiality will continue indefinitely. They will not end with the expiry or termination of this agreement.

3. Changing the Terms and Conditions.

a) LankaSecureNet shall at any time be entitled to amend, supplement or vary any of these terms and conditions at its absolute discretion with or without notice to me/us and such amendment supplement or variation shall be binding on me/us.

b) LankaSecureNet shall determine the previleges attached to the use of LankaSecureNet and shall have absolute discretion to change, vary, add or amend these privilages and conditions attached thereto, from time to time as the LankaSecureNet deems necessary.

c) LankaSecureNet may time to time introduce new facilities/options into LankaSecureNet service. I/We hereby agree to abide by the terms and conditions applicable to such newly added services, facilities/options though added subsequently to the activation of the User IDs whether or not I/We register myself/ourselves to avail such services.

4. Indemnity

I/We do hereby agree and save harmless against any losses, charges, expenses and damages that LankaSecure shall or may be caused or sustain incurr or suffer by reasons of my/our using LankaSecureNet in any manner whatsoever and for any loss and/or misdirection of data in transit electronically and by reasons of LankaSecure generating and/or issuing and/or dispatching the original password/s according to my/our requests and/or subsequent passwords to my/our User ID, at my/our written request and any substitution effected by me/us or by reason of access to my/our password or ID number by any person other than me/us.

5. Governing law

This agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of Sri Lanka.

I/We have read and understood the forgoing and agree to be bound by the above terms and conditions and the Indemnity.

i)

ii)

Date Signature/s

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CONFIDENTIAL

LankaSecureNet

APPLICATION FOR CORPORATE CUSTOMERS

Section A - Details of the Applicant

1. Name of the Company: Messers .....

2. Registered Address: .....
.....
.....

3. Company Registration Date and No. .....
.....

4. Office I)Telephone: ..... E mail: .....

We .....
(names and designations of authorized persons to sign on behalf of the company by a resolution*) declare that the above information is true and correct and we have read and understood the terms and conditions annexed hereto and agree to abide by them.

i).....

ii).....

(Signatures and Stamps)

Date:

*Must annexed a copy of the resolution

Section B - Details of Account/s (To be completed by Participant/s who maintain/s security account/s on behalf of the applicant)

a) Name of the Participant: .....
b) BIC: .....
c) Beneficial Owner (Customer)Code: .....
d) Address: .....
.....
e) Additional Owner Code: .....

We certify that the above information is true and correct according to our records.

Date

Authorized Officer
(Official Stamp)

Form 2 (A)

AGREEMENT FOR LANKASECURENET -
TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
P.O.Box 590,
Colombo 01.

Dear Sir/Madam,

We.....&..... (names and designations)
of ..... request you to issue us a
User Identification Number (User ID) and allow us the use LankaSecureNet, Internet Based Account Verification Facility and hereby agree to be bound by the following terms and conditions:

1. Facility

We acknowledge and accept that the facility available to us under this agreement is to view our scripless securities account in the central depositary system of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka through the use of operational instructions as contained in the user guide annexed hereto.

2. Responsibilities for Security.

a) We agree to duly acknowledge the receipt of our Password and also agree to retain our User ID in disabled status till LankaSecureNet receives proper acknowledgement of receipt of the password by us.

b) We undertake not to access LankaSecureNet using defective or insecure equipment or in any manner which might adversely affect LankaSecureNet.

c) We hereby agree to change the password assigned to us immediately after accessing LankaSecureNet for the first time and at regular intervals thereafter.

d) We shall inform LankaSecureNet immediately if we become aware of any unauthorized access to or use of the User ID and Passwords by anyone. We acknowledge that the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka shall not be liable for any loss or damage that we may suffer on account of any unauthorized use of our User ID and Password.

e) We shall keep our User ID and Password strictly confidential and undertake not to reveal them to any person at anytime or under any circumstances.

f) We shall keep all information, techniques, data and designs relating to LankaSecureNet completely confidential. We shall not disclose any of them to any other party.

g) Our obligations relating to confidentiality will continue indefinitely. They will not end with the expiry or termination of this agreement.

3. Changing the Terms and Conditions.

a). LankaSecureNet shall at any time be entitled to amend, supplement or vary any of these terms and conditions at its absolute discretion with or without notice to us and such amendment supplement or variation shall be binding on us.

b) LankaSecureNet shall determine the previleges attached to the use of LankaSecureNet and shall have absolute discretion to change, vary, add or amend these privilages and conditions attached thereto, from time to time as the LankaSecureNet deems necessary.

c) LankaSecureNet may from time to time introduce new facilities/options into LankaSecureNet service. We hereby agree to abide by the terms and conditions applicable to such newly added services, facilities/options through added subsequently to the activation of the User IDs whether or not we register ourselves to avail such services.

4. Indemnity

We do hereby agree and save harmless against any losses, charges, expenses and damages that LankaSecure shall or may be caused or sustain incurr or suffer by reasons of our using LankaSecureNet in any manner whatsoever and for any loss and/or misdirection of data in transit electronically and by reasons of LankaSecure generating and/or issuing and/or dispatching the original password/s according to our requests and/or subsequent passwords to our User ID, at our written request and any substitution effected by us or by reason of access to our password or ID number other than a person authorized by us.

5. Governing law

This agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of Sri Lanka.

We have read and understood the forgoing and agree to be bound by the above terms and conditions and the Indemnity.

i)

ii)

Date Signatures and Stamps

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Outright Treasury Bond Transaction volumes as at dd.mm.yyyy

ISIN	Date of Maturity	Remaining Maturity (Years)	Face Value (Rs.Mn)
LKB00414C014	dd-mmm-yy	X	XXX
LKB00414F017	dd-mmm-yy	X	XXX
LKB00517F157	dd-mmm-yy	X	XXX
LKB00614D017	dd-mmm-yy	X	XXX
LKB00615C156	dd-mmm-yy	X	XXX
LKB00618D018	dd-mmm-yy	X	XXX
LKB01518H150	dd-mmm-yy	X	XXX
Total			XXX

Central Bank Maturities

maturity_date	security_id	Total
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA36413K158	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213G129	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213G194	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213H028	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213H093	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213H168	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213H234	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213H309	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213I067	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213I133	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213I208	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA36414E167	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213K014	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213K089	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213K220	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213K295	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213L061	XXX
dd/mm/yyyy	LKA18213L137	XXX
Grand Total		XXX

ISIN wise outstandings of T-bill and T-bonds

security_id	security_type	issue_date	maturity_date	qty_in_css
LKA09113H237	BILL	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKA18213G269	BILL	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKA18213I273	BILL	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKA18213K220	BILL	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKA36413K158	BILL	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKA36413H303	BILL	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKA36414A249	BILL	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKA36413G198	BILL	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKB01123I017	BOND	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
LKB00414B016	BOND	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx

CSS Billing Report

dest_bic_code	bank_name	SumOfCountOfbuyer_emt
HNBSLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
AXISLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
BCEYLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
CALDLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
CITILKLXXXX	Name	XXX
CCEYLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
DEUTLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
DFCCLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
CBCELKLXEPF	Name	XXX
CSSLLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
FCTLLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
HABBLKLCXXX	Name	XXX
HBLILKLXXXX	Name	XXX
HSBCLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
ICICLKLXXXX	Name	XXX
IOBALKLCXXX	Name	XXX
MUCBLKLCXXX	Name	XXX
NDBSLKLXXXX	Name	XXX

Format for Foreign Transaction

Transaction type		Value date/Settlement date (5)	ISIN (6)	Counterparty (7)	Face value in LKR (8)	Book value/ Settlement value - LKR (9)	Book value/ Settlement value USD (10)
New investments by foreign parties (OWN to CSF)	T Bills (1)						
	T Bonds (2)						
Withdrawals by foreign parties (CSF to OWN or CSF to CSL)	T Bills (3)						
	T Bonds (4)						

(1) Treasury Bills issued by your Bank/PD to the foreign counterparty, or Treasury Bills sold by a resident customer to a foreign party
(2) Treasury Bonds issued by your Bank/PD to the foreign counterparty, or Treasury Bonds sold by a resident customer to a foreign party
(3) Treasury Bills sold by the foreign counterparty to your Bank/PD, or to a resident customer
(4) Treasury Bonds sold by the foreign counterparty to your Bank/PD, or to a resident customer
(5) State the value date for EACH transaction (even if the value date is the same for one or more transactions)
(6) State the ISIN for EACH transaction (even if the ISIN is the same for one or more transactions)
(7) Name the counterparty. (Please do NOT state the BIC Code, Beneficiary Owner Code or your own short-codes and acronyms for the counterparty)
(8) State the Face Value of the security in LKR
(9) State the amount of LKR inflow/outflow (including cents). If only a part of the investment was made in LKR, state the LKR portion only.
(10) State the amount of USD inflow/outflow (including cents). If only a part of the investment was made in USD, state the USD portion only.

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Maturity Profile of Foreign Holdings (Treasury Bills and Bonds) as at dd/mm/yyyy

Maturity	Account	Treasury Bill Face Value (Rs.)	Treasury Bond Face Value (Rs.)	Total Face Value -Bill and Bond (Rs.)
2013				
	CFD	133,133,572	15,967,893	149,101,465
	CSF	23,841,958,906	41,858,011,589	65,699,970,495
		23,975,092,478	41,873,979,482	65,849,071,960
2014				
	CFD	105,257,576	35,997,904	141,255,480
	CSF	52,529,382,378	57,398,930,000	109,928,312,378
		52,634,639,954	57,434,927,904	110,069,567,858
2015				
	CFD		31,152,029	31,152,029
	CSF		91,004,050,000	91,004,050,000
			91,035,202,029	91,035,202,029
2016				
	CFD		44,654,895	44,654,895
	CSF		40,556,930,000	40,556,930,000
			40,601,584,895	40,601,584,895
2017				
	CFD		8,338,000	8,338,000
	CSF		35,709,060,000	35,709,060,000
			35,717,398,000	35,717,398,000
2018				
	CFD		61,015,700	61,015,700
	CSF		97,544,292,500	97,544,292,500
			97,605,308,200	97,605,308,200
2019				
	CSF		4,918,500,000	4,918,500,000
			4,918,500,000	4,918,500,000
2021				
	CFD		2,280,000	2,280,000
	CSF		52,141,000,000	52,141,000,000
			52,143,280,000	52,143,280,000
2028				
	CSF		2,150,000,000	2,150,000,000
			2,150,000,000	2,150,000,000
2032				
	CFD		39,400,000	39,400,000
			39,400,000	39,400,000
Total Outstanding Stock		795,468,740,000	2,847,612,937,182	3,643,081,677,182
*Provision for Non-residents (12.5% Total Outstanding Stock)		99,433,592,500	455,385,209,648	455,385,209,648
Current Non-residents' Holdings		*76,609,732,432*	*423,519,580,510*	*500,129,312,942*
Foreign Holdings (CSF) Outstanding		*76,371,341,284*	*423,280,774,089*	*499,652,115,373*
Diaspora Holdings (CFD) Outstanding		*238,391,148*	*238,806,421*	*477,197,569*
**Current Non- residents' Holdings as a % of Total Outstanding Stock*		*9.63*	*11.63*	*13.73*
Current Leeway for Non-residents		*-44,744,103,294*	*-44,744,103,294*	*-44,744,103,294*
Current Leeway for Non-residents as a %		*-1.23*	*-1.23*	*-1.23*

* Incase of bonds, the provision is 12.5% of the total outstanding bill and bond stock. Incase of bills, the provision is 12.5% of the outstanding bill stock.
** This figure could exceed 12.5% when part of the outstanding balance of TBills and Bonds matu

Stock allocated to non-residents with a value date for future settlement does not appear in this report. Thus, great care must be taken at the time of new allocations
Includes Bonds held in scrip form and Bonds issued to CWE amounting to Rs. 4,408,000,000 Maturing in 2013 and 2016 respectively.
This printout should be taken close to SSSS closure for business (around 4.30pm). Or else, any securities maturing on the next business day will be removed from the balance displayed in this report, as closing balances in SSSS will be zeroized for secur

DG(.....)
AG(.....)

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Public Debt Department
Foreign Holdings of T-Bills & T-Bonds as at .....
(Book Value in US$ Millions)

Year	Month	Date	T-bills			T-bonds			Total			Year-to-Date
			Inflow	Outflow	Net Inflow	Inflow	Outflow	Net Inflow	Inflow	Outflow	Net Inflow	
2010												
2011												
2012												
2013	Jan											
	Feb											
	Mar											
	Apr											
	May											
	Jun											
	Jul	1										
		2										
		3										
		4										
		5										
		8										
		9										
Grand Total			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Leeway for Investment by foreigners in T-bills and T-bonds as at ..... *(Rs Million)*

Particular	T-bills	T-bonds	Overall
Total O/S			
Limit (12.5%)			
Current O/S			
Leeway			
Leeway %			



Future Maturities and Coupon Payments of Foreign Holdings *(US$ Million)*

Value Date	Maturities	
	Tbill	Tbond
Total		

Calculated using the Exchange Rate on .....

..... SPD

..... H/CDS

T6 - Daily Inflows and Outflows (Provisional) -2013

- As at: 17-06-2013

Years	Months	Settlement Date		Sum of Net Investment (FV,Rs. mn) (a)	Sum of Inflow (USD mn) (a)	Sum of Outflow: Sales /Maturities (USD mn) (a)	Sum of Net Inflow (USD mn) (a)
2007				49,646.95	469.47	97.00	372.47
2008				(25,641.90)	509.32	719.47	(210.15)
2009				161,131.04	1,791.44	446.11	1,345.33
2010				55,096.64	1,178.12	711.42	466.70
2011				28,741.09	1,147.64	920.35	227.29
2012				128,111.32	2,236.34	1,393.01	843.34
2013	Jan			42,280.42	676.21	387.26	288.95
	Feb			34,113.15	567.64	355.26	212.38
	Mar			2,959.42	193.11	159.62	33.49
	Apr			10,011.14	144.90	68.03	76.86
	May	10-May		894.82	16.64	10.93	5.72
			BOND	161.20	3.65	2.00	1.64
		15-May		340.27	2.43	-	2.43
			BOND	5,400.00	37.33	-	37.33
		16-May	BOND	538.80	7.14	-	7.14
		23-May		46.03	0.36	-	0.36
		24-May		(45.62)	-	0.36	(0.36)
		27-May		4.08	0.03	-	0.03
		28-May		(21.05)	0.01	0.18	(0.17)
		31-May		242.69	1.79	0.06	1.73
			BOND	(450.00)	-	1.36	(1.36)
		02-May		380.50	3.55	0.92	2.63
			BOND	230.00	1.71	-	1.71
		03-May		-	11.70	12.47	(0.77)
			BOND	(150.00)	8.48	8.75	(0.26)
		06-May		500.00	3.56	-	3.56
			BOND	800.00	9.42	3.38	6.04
		07-May	BOND	250.00	1.70	-	1.70
		09-May		800.00	5.72	-	5.72
			BOND	700.00	10.61	5.38	5.23
	Jun	10-Jun		9.58	0.07	-	0.07
		11-Jun	BOND	(210.00)	-	1.46	(1.46)
		12-Jun		1,400.00	10.01	-	10.01
			BOND	(1,045.70)	15.07	23.13	(8.06)
		13-Jun		450.00	3.18	-	3.18
			BOND	(1,993.53)	-	15.21	(15.21)
		14-Jun		500.00	3.54	-	3.54
			BOND	82.22	7.36	6.88	4.08
		17-Jun	BOND	-	3.69	3.60	0.08
		18-Jun		2,501.41	17.76	-	17.76
			BOND	(1,500.00)	3.70	13.96	(10.26)
		19-Jun	BOND	1,000.00	7.19	-	7.19
		20-Jun		917.50	6.48	-	6.48
			BOND	(1,500.00)	-	10.38	(10.38)
		21-Jun		1,076.30	7.64	0.08	7.56
			BOND	(1,500.00)	-	10.38	(10.38)
		24-Jun	BOND	(2,463.77)	3.60	21.82	(18.22)
		25-Jun	BOND	(150.00)	-	1.19	(1.19)
		26-Jun		(41.00)	-	0.29	(0.29)
			BOND	(400.00)	-	3.21	(3.21)
		27-Jun	BOND	50.00	0.72	0.36	0.37
		28-Jun		(700.00)	6.28	11.75	(5.47)
		03-Jun		1.44	0.01	-	0.01
		04-Jun		500.00	3.59	-	3.59
			BOND	(500.00)	-	3.57	(3.57)
		05-Jun		242.00	1.74	-	1.74
			BOND	(250.00)	-	1.74	(1.74)
		06-Jun		774.00	5.55	-	5.55
			BOND	(800.00)	-	5.55	(5.55)
		07-Jun		50.27	3.68	3.68	0.00
2013 Sum				96,486.57	1,818.54	1,154.18	667.96
a				493,571.70	9,150.88	5,441.54	3,712.93

Net Tbill/Tbond Foreign Issues (Annual cumulative)

As at DD-MM-YYYY

		Bill		Bond		Toal	
Year	Month	Net FV	Net BV	Net FV	Net BV	Net FV	Net BV
2011	Jan	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Feb	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Mar	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Apr	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	May	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Jun	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Aug	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Sep	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Oct	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Nov	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Dec	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
2012	Jan	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Feb	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Mar	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Apr	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	May	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Jun	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Jul	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Aug	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Sep	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Oct	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Nov	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Dec	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
	Jan						
	Feb						
	Mar						
	Apr						
	May						
	Jun						
	Jul						
	Aug						
	Sep						
	Oct						
	Nov						
	Dec						

Eligible Treasury Bonds for Foreign Investors
As at dd/mm/yyyy

No	security_id	security_name	issue_date	maturity_date	Outstanding Qty. (Rs.)
1	LKB01013H012	07 50 2013 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
2	LKB00313I015	06 75 2013A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
3	LKB00213J056	08 84 2013A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
4	LKB01013K016	07 50 2013 B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
5	LKB00213K211	09 22 2013A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
6	LKB00414B016	06 60 2014A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
7	LKB00414C014	07 00 2014 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
8	LKB00614D017	11 75 2014 B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
9	LKB00414F017	06 60 2014B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
10	LKB00514G152	11 25 2014 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
11	LKB00314J011	09 00 2014A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
12	LKB00415A155	06 20 2015 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
13	LKB00615C156	11 75 2015 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
14	LKB00415F154	06 20 2015B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
15	LKB00515G159	06 50 2015A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
16	LKB00615H015	11 00 2015A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
17	LKB00615I013	11 00 2015 B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
18	LKB00415K014	08 50 2015A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
19	LKB00616D012	07 25 2016A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
20	LKB00516F019	08 00 2016B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
21	LKB00616H013	06 40 2016A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
22	LKB00516I013	08 00 2016A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
23	LKB00616J019	06 40 2016B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
24	LKB00517A018	08 00 2017A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
25	LKB00617A156	05 80 2017 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
26	LKB00517F157	08 00 2017B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
27	LKB00617G153	05 80 2017B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
28	LKB01518B013	08 50 2018 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
29	LKB00618D018	08 50 2018 C	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
30	LKB00618F013	08 50 2018 D	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
31	LKB01518G152	08 50 2018 B	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
32	LKB01518H150	07 50 2018 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
33	LKB00718K151	08 00 2018A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
34	LKB00819A158	05 65 2019A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
35	LKB01019E016	08 50 2019 A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
36	LKB00819K017	08 00 2019A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
37	LKB00820F015	08 00 2020A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx
38	LKB01020H017	06 20 2020A	dd-mmm-yy	dd-mmm-yy	xxx

Appendix
Supervision Division

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SU1 (a)

Weekly Financial Return (Rs. Mn)
PDD-WF-07-TBD - Outright Transactions of Treasury Bonds
Company Name : Date:

Code	Description	< 1 Year	1+ years	2+ years	3+ years	4+ years	5+ years	10+ years	15+ years	Total
7.1.0.0.0.0	**Holdings as of last reporting**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.0.0.0.0	**Purchases**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.1.0.0.0	Purchased from Primary Auction	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.0.0.0	**Purchased from Secondary Market**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.1.0.0	**Government**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.1.1.0	Central Bank	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.1.2.0	Institutional Investors	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.2.0.0	**Public Sector**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.2.1.0	Primary Dealers	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.2.2.0	Corporate	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.2.3.0	Domestic Banks	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.2.4.0	Foreign Banks	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.2.5.0	Institutional Investors	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.2.6.0	Non-bank Financial Institutions	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.2.2.3.0.0	**Individual Investors**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.0.0.0.0	**Sales**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.1.0.0.0	**Government**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.1.1.0.0	Central Bank	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.1.2.0.0	Institutional Investors	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.2.0.0.0	**Public Sector**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.2.1.0.0	Primary Dealers	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.2.2.0.0	Corporate	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.2.3.0.0	Domestic Banks	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.2.4.0.0	Foreign Banks	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.2.5.0.0	Institutional Investors–	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.2.6.0.0	Non-bank Financial Institutions	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.3.3.0.0.0	**Individual Investors**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.4.0.0.0.0	**Redemption of Owned Holdings**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.5.0.0.0.0	**Reclassifications/Transfers (+/-)**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
7.0.0.0.0.0	**Total Holdings At Time Of Submission**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#

Weekly Financial Return (Rs. Mn)
PDD-WF-06-TBL - Outright Transactions of Treasury Bills

Company Name : Date:

Code	Description	< 91 Days	< 182 Days	< 364 Days	Total
6.1.0.0.0.0	**Holdings as of last reporting**	#	#	#	#
6.2.0.0.0.0	**Purchases**	#	#	#	#
6.2.1.0.0.0	Purchased from Primary Auction	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.0.0.0	**Purchased from Secondary Market**	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.1.0.0	**Government**	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.1.1.0	Central Bank	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.1.2.0	Institutional Investors	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.2.0.0	**Public Sector**	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.2.1.0	Primary Dealers	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.2.2.0	Corporate	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.2.3.0	Domestic Banks	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.2.4.0	Foreign Banks	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.2.5.0	Institutional Investors	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.2.6.0	Non-bank Financial Institutions	#	#	#	#
6.2.2.3.0.0	**Individual Investors**	#	#	#	#
6.3.0.0.0.0	**Sales**	#	#	#	#
6.3.1.0.0.0	**Government**	#	#	#	#
6.3.1.1.0.0	Central Bank	#	#	#	#
6.3.1.2.0.0	Institutional Investors	#	#	#	#
6.3.2.0.0.0	**Public Sector**	#	#	#	#
6.3.2.1.0.0	Primary Dealers	#	#	#	#
6.3.2.2.0.0	Corporate	#	#	#	#
6.3.2.3.0.0	Domestic Banks	#	#	#	#
6.3.2.4.0.0	Foreign Banks	#	#	#	#
6.3.2.5.0.0	Institutional Investors	#	#	#	#
6.3.2.6.0.0	Non-bank Financial Institutions	#	#	#	#
6.3.3.0.0.0	**Individual Investors**	#	#	#	#
6.4.0.0.0.0	**Redemption of Owned Holdings**	#	#	#	#
6.5.0.0.0.0	**Reclassifications/Transfers (+/-)**	#	#	#	#
6.0.0.0.0.0	**Total Holdings At Time Of Submission**	#	#	#	#
		#	#	#	#

SU1 (c)

Weekly Financial Return (Rs. Mn)
PDD-WF-08-RRP - Summary of Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions

Company Name : Date:

Code	Description	< 91 Days	< 182 Days	< 364 Days	Total	< 1 Year	1+ years	2+ years	3+ years	4+ years	5+ years	10+ years	15+ years	Total
8.1.0.0.0.0	**Repurchase Transactions**													
8.1.1.0.0.0	Sold Overnight	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.1.2.0.0.0	Sold Term	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.1.3.0.0.0	Sold Open	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.1.4.0.0.0	Reversal Overnight	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.1.5.0.0.0	Reversal Term	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.1.6.0.0.0	Reversal Open	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.2.0.0.0.0	**Reverse Repurchase Transactions**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.2.1.0.0.0	Purchased Overnight	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.2.2.0.0.0	Purchased Term	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.2.3.0.0.0	Purchased Demand	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.2.4.0.0.0	Reversal Overnight	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.2.5.0.0.0	Reversal Term	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.2.6.0.0.0	Reversal Open	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.3.0.0.0.0	**OMO Window Repurchase Transactions**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.3.1.0.0.0	Sold	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.3.2.0.0.0	Purchased	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.4.0.0.0.0	**OMO Window Reverse Repurchase Transactions**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.4.1.0.0.0	Purchased	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.4.2.0.0.0	Sold	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.1.0.0.0.0	**Total Repurchase Transactions**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
8.1.0.0.0.0	**Total Reverse Repurchase Transactions**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#

Weekly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-WF-05-MP - Assets & Liabilities - Maturity Profile

Company Name : **Date:**

Code	Description	Overnight	2-7 Days	8-30 Days	Over 1 Month and upto 3 Months (Including 3 Months)	Over 3 Months and upto 6 Months (Including 6 Months)	Over 6 Months and upto 12 Months (Including 12 Months)	Over 1 Year and upto 2 Years (Including 2 Years)	Over 2 Years and upto 5 Years (Including 5 Years)	Above 5 Years	Total (i)
5.1.0.0.0.0	**Assets**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.1.1.0.0.0	Resale Agreements	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.1.2.0.0.0	Treasury Bills	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.1.3.0.0.0	Treaury Bonds	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.1.4.0.0.0	Other Assets	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.2.0.0.0.0	**Liabilities**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.2.1.0.0.0	Repurchase Agreements	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.2.2.0.0.0	Other Liabilities	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.3.0.0.0.0	**Maturity Gap**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
5.4.0.0.0.0	**Cumulative Gap**	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#

SU2 (a)

Monthly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-MF-01-BS - Balance Sheet
Company Name : Date:

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000 (b)
1.1.0.0.0.0	**On-Balance Sheet Assets**	#
1.1.1.0.0.0	**Cash in Hand and Bank**	#
1.1.1.1.0.0	Cash in Hand	#
1.1.1.2.0.0	Cash Items in Process of Collection (CIPC)	#
1.1.1.3.0.0	Cash at Bank	#
1.1.1.4.0.0	Balances with Central Bank	#
1.1.2.0.0.0	**Receivables under Resale Agreements**	#
1.1.2.1.0.0	Resale Agreements- with CBSL	#
1.1.2.2.0.0	Resale Agreements- with Participants	#
1.1.2.3.0.0	Resale Agreements- with Customers	#
1.1.3.0.0.0	**Trading Government Securities**	#
1.1.3.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.3.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.3.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.4.0.0.0	**Trading CBSL Securities**	#
1.1.5.0.0.0	**Investment in Government Securities - Held to Maturity**	#
1.1.5.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.5.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.5.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.6.0.0.0	**Investment in Government Securities Available for Sale**	#
1.1.6.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.6.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.6.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.7.0.0.0	**Other Investments**	#
1.1.7.1.0.0	CBSL Securities	#
1.1.7.2.0.0	Other Investments at Cost	#
1.1.7.3.0.0	Provision for Decline in Value of Other Investments (-)	#
1.1.8.0.0.0	**Other Assets**	#
1.1.8.1.0.0	Principal & Interest Receivable	#
1.1.8.2.0.0	Deferred Tax	#
1.1.8.3.0.0	Corporate Tax paid in Advance	#
1.1.8.4.0.0	Group/ Head Office Receivables	#
1.1.8.5.0.0	Deposits, Advances and Prepayments	#
1.1.8.6.0.0	Other Receivables	#

1.1.9.0.0.0	**Intangible Assets**	#
1.1.9.1.0.0	Computer Systems	#
1.1.9.2.0.0	Other Intangible Assets	#
1.1.9.3.0.0	Amortization (-)	#
1.1.10.0.0.0	**Fixed Assets**	#
1.1.10.1.0.0	Land and Building	#
1.1.10.2.0.0	Vehicles	#
1.1.10.3.0.0	Furniture and Fittings	#
1.1.10.4.0.0	Computers	#
1.1.10.5.0.0	Other Equipments	#
1.1.10.6.0.0	Provision for Depreciation (-)	#
1.2.0.0.0.0	**Total On-Balance Sheet Liabilities and Equity**	#
1.2.1.0.0.0	**On-Balance Sheet Liabilities**	#
1.2.1.1.0.0	**Borrowings**	#
1.2.1.1.1.0	**Payables under Repurchase Agreements**	#
1.2.1.1.1.1	Repurchase Agreements- with CBSL	#
1.2.1.1.1.2	Repurchase Agreements- with Participants	#
1.2.1.1.1.3	Repurchase Agreements- with Customers	#
1.2.1.1.2.0	Medium Term Subordinated Debt (> 3 Years)	#
1.2.1.1.3.0	Long Term Subordinated Debt (> 5 Years)	#
1.2.1.1.4.0	Perpetual Subordinated Debt	#
1.2.1.1.5.0	Others	#
1.2.1.2.0.0	**Other Liabilities**	#
1.2.1.2.1.0	Overdrawn Accounts with Banks	#
1.2.1.2.2.0	Interest Payables	#
1.2.1.2.3.0	Deferred Tax	#
1.2.1.2.4.0	Income Taxes Payable	#
1.2.1.2.5.0	Group/ Head Office Payables	#
1.2.1.2.6.0	Accrued Expenses & Other Payables	#
1.2.1.2.7.0	Provision for Retirement Gratuity	#
1.2.1.2.8.0	Others	#
1.2.2.0.0.0	**Total Equity**	#
1.2.2.1.0.0	Ordinary Share Capital/Assigned Capital	#
1.2.2.2.0.0	Non Cumulative Irredeemable Preference Shares	#
1.2.2.3.0.0	Other Preference Shares	#
1.2.2.4.0.0	Special Risk Reserves	#
1.2.2.5.0.0	Retained Earnings	#

SU2 (a) Contd....

1.2.2.6.0.0	Total Other Reserves	#
1.3.0.0.0.0	**Off-Balance Sheet Assets**	#
1.3.1.0.0.0	Forward Contracts	#
1.3.1.1.0.0	Forward Purchases-With Participants	#
1.3.1.2.0.0	Forward Purchases-With Customers	#
1.3.1.3.0.0	Forward Sales-With Participants Institutions	#
1.3.1.4.0.0	Forward Sales-With Customers	#
1.3.2.0.0.0	Intrest Rate Swaps	#
1.3.2.1.0.0	Long Fixed Leg	#
1.3.2.2.0.0	Long Floating Leg	#
1.3.2.3.0.0	Short Fixed Leg	#
1.3.2.2.0.0	Short Floating Leg	#
1.3.3.0.0.0	Others	#
1.4.0.0.0.0	**Details of Collaterals for Repurchase Agreements**	#
1.4.1.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Market Value	#
1.4.2.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Facet Value	#
1.4.3.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Cost	#
1.5.0.0.0.0	**Details of Collaterals for Resale Agreements**	#
1.5.1.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Market Value	#
1.5.2.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Facet Value	#
1.5.3.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Cost	#
1.6.0.0.0.0	**Memorandum Information**	#
1.6.1.0.0.0	Number of Employees	#
1.6.2.0.0.0	Number of Branches	#
1.6.3.0.0.0	Number of CDS Accounts	#

Monthly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-MF-03-CE - Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves

Company Name: Date:

Code	Item	Equity Capital - Ordinary Voting Shares	Equity Capital - Ordinary Non-Voting Shares	Equity Capital - Non Cumulative Irredeemable Preference Shares	Equity Capital - Other Preference Shares	Equity Capital - Assigned Capital	Special Risk Reserve	Reserves - Share Premium	Reserves - Revaluation Reserve	Reserves - General Reserves	Reserves - Other Reserves	Reserves - Retained Earnings	Total (i)
3.1.0.0.0.0	Opening Balance (as at the end of last month)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.2.0.0.0.0	Issue of Share/Increase of assigned capital (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.3.0.0.0.0	Bonus Issue (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.4.0.0.0.0	Rights Issue (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.5.0.0.0.0	Surplus on revaluation of property (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.6.0.0.0.0	Net profit for the period (-/+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.7.0.0.0.0	Transfer to Risk Reserves during the period (-/+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.8.0.0.0.0	Transfer to Head Office (-)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.9.0.0.0.0	Dividend Paid YYYY (-)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.10.0.0.0.0	Others	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.0.0.0.0.0	(Closing Balance) as at the end of the reporting period	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#

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SU2 (b)

SU2 (c)

Monthly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-MF-02-PL - Profit & Loss Account
Company Name : Date:

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000
2.1.0.0.0.0	**Total Income**	#
2.1.1.0.0.0	**Intrest Income on -**	#
2.1.1.1.0.0	Trading & Investment Securities	#
2.1.1.2.0.0	Resale Agreement	#
2.1.1.3.0.0	IRS Income	#
2.1.1.4.0.0	Others	#
2.1.2.0.0.0	**Other Operating Income**	#
2.1.2.1.0.0	Trading Gains/(Loss) on Sale of Securities	#
2.1.2.2.0.0	Commission and Fees	#
2.1.2.3.0.0	Dividend Income from Investment in Shares	#
2.1.2.4.0.0	Revaluation Gains/(Loss) of Trading Securities	#
2.1.2.5.0.0	Others	#
2.1.3.0.0.0	**Other Income**	#
2.1.3.1.0.0	Charges on Services	#
2.1.3.2.0.0	Profit/(loss) on Sales of Fixed Assets	#
2.1.3.3.0.0	Others	#
2.2.0.0.0.0	**Total Expenses**	#
2.2.1.0.0.0	**Intrest Expense on -**	#
2.2.1.1.0.0	Resale Agreement	#
2.2.1.2.0.0	IRS Expenses	#
2.2.1.3.0.0	Other Related Expenses	#
0.0.0.0.0.0	**Net Intrest Income**	#
2.2.2.0.0.0	**Other Operating Expenses**	#
2.2.3.0.0.0	**Personnel Cost**	#
2.2.3.1.0.0	Director's Renumeration	#
2.2.3.2.0.0	Director's Fees	#
2.2.3.3.0.0	Staff Salaries and Wages	#
2.2.3.4.0.0	Bonus to Staff	#
2.2.3.5.0.0	Employer's Contribution to EPF	#
2.2.3.6.0.0	Employer's Contribution to ETF	#
2.2.3.7.0.0	Other Employee Related Cost	#
2.2.4.0.0.0	**General and Administrative Expenses**	#
2.2.4.1.0.0	Auditor's Renumeration	#
2.2.4.2.0.0	Professional Charges	#

2.2.4.3.0.0	Premises, Equipment and Establishment Expenses	#
2.2.4.4.0.0	Depreciation of Fixed Assets	#
2.2.4.5.0.0	Amortization of Intangible Assets	#
2.2.4.6.0.0	Other General & Administration Expenses	#
2.2.5.0.0.0	**Marketing Expenses**	#
2.2.6.0.0.0	**Finance and Other Expenses**	#
2.3.0.0.0.0	**Provision for Decline in Value of Investments (net)**	#
2.4.0.0.0.0	**Operating Profit/Losses on Ordinary Activities Before Taxes**	#
2.5.0.0.0.0	Value Added Tax on Financial Services	#
2.6.0.0.0.0	**Operating Profit/Losses on Ordinary Activities Before CorporateTax**	#
2.7.0.0.0.0	Tax on Profits	#
2.8.0.0.0.0	**Net Operating Profit/Losses on After CorporateTax**	#
2.9.0.0.0.0	**Extraordinary Items (Net of Tax)**	#
2.9.1.0.0.0	Gains	#
2.9.2.0.0.0	Losses (-)	#
2.10.0.0.0.0	**Net Operating Profit/Losses for the Period**	#

SU2 (d)

Monthly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-MF-04-CF - Cashflow Statement
Company Name : Date:

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000
4.1.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities**	#
4.1.1.0.0.0	**Cash Flow from Operating Activities before Changes in Operating Assets & Liabilities**	#
4.1.1.1.0.0	Interest Received	#
4.1.1.2.0.0	Commission & Fees Received	#
4.1.1.3.0.0	Interest Payments (-)	#
4.1.1.4.0.0	Disposal of Treasury Bills & Bonds	#
4.1.1.5.0.0	Purchase of Treasury Bills & Bonds (-)	#
4.1.1.6.0.0	Receipts from Other Operating activities	#
4.1.1.7.0.0	Payments for Other Operating Activities (-)	#
4.1.1.8.0.0	Cash Payments to Employees (-)	#
4.1.1.9.0.0	VAT Paid (-)	#
4.1.2.0.0.0	**Changes in Operating Assets & Liabilities**	#
4.1.2.1.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Receivable under Resale Agreement (+/-)	#
4.1.2.2.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Counter-party Accountst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.3.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Other Assetst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.4.0.0	Increase/(Decrease) in Payable under Repurchase Agreementst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.5.0.0	Increase/(Decrease) in Other Liabilitiest (+/-)	#
4.1.3.0.0.0	**Income Tax Paid**	#
4.2.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Inflow /(Outflow) in Investing Activities**	#
4.2.1.0.0.0	Proceeds from Sale of Property, Plant & Equipment	#
4.2.2.0.0.0	Purchase of Property, Plant & Equipment (-)	#
4.2.3.0.0.0	Acquisition of Investment Securities (-)	#
4.2.4.0.0.0	Disposal of Investment Securities	#
4.2.5.0.0.0	Acquisition of Other Investments (-)	#
4.2.6.0.0.0	Disposal of Other Investment	#
4.2.7.0.0.0	Dividends Received	#
4.3.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Used in Financing Activities**	#
4.3.1.0.0.0	Proceeds from Ordinary Share Issue	#
4.3.2.0.0.0	Proceeds from Debenture Issue	#
4.3.3.0.0.0	Redemption of Debentures (-)	#
4.3.4.0.0.0	Proceeds from Preference Shares	#
4.3.5.0.0.0	Redemption of Preference Shares (-)	#
4.3.6.0.0.0	Dividend Paid (-)	#

4.3.7.0.0.0	Share Re-purchase (-)	#
4.3.8.0.0.0	Interest Paid on Debt Capital (-)	#
4.3.9.0.0.0	Other Long-term borrowings (-)	#
4.4.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Inflow /(Outflow) for the Year**	#
4.5.0.0.0.0	**Cash and Cash equivalents at the Beginning of the Year (+/-)**	#
4.6.0.0.0.0	**Cash and Cash equivalents at the End of the Year**	#
4.7.0.0.0.0	**Cash and Cash equivalents as per the Balance Sheet (+/-)**	#
4.8.0.0.0.0	**Difference**	#

Monthly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-MF-05-TL - T-Bill Trading Portfolio
Company Name : Date:

(5.1.1.0.0.0) ISIN	(5.1.2.0.0.0) Maturity Date	(5.1.3.0.0.0) Remaining Period to Maturity (Days)	(5.1.4.0.0.0) Coupon Rate (%)	(5.1.5.0.0.0) Yield Rate (%)	(5.1.6.0.0.0) Clean Price (Rs.)	(5.1.7.0.0.0) Face Value	(5.1.8.0.0.0) Cost	(5.1.9.0.0.0) Cost+Accrued Interest	(5.1.10.0.0.0) Market Value-Without Accrued Interest	(5.1.11.0.0.0) Market Value-With Accrued Interest	(5.1.12.0.0.0) Gain\(Loss)	(5.1.13.0.0.0) Benchmark Yield Rate (%)

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Monthly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-MF-06-SL - T-Bill Forward Sales
Company Name : Date:

(6.1.1.0.0.0) ISIN	(6.1.2.0.0.0) Value Date	(6.1.3.0.0.0) Maturity Date	(6.1.4.0.0.0) Remaining Period to Maturity (Days)	(6.1.5.0.0.0) Coupon Rate (%)	(6.1.7.0.0.0) Yield Rate (%)	(6.1.6.0.0.0) Clean Price (Rs.)	(6.1.8.0.0.0) Face Value	(6.1.9.0.0.0) Cost	(6.1.10.0.0.0) Cost+Accrued Interest	(6.1.11.0.0.0) Market Value-Without Accrued Interest	(6.1.12.0.0.0) Market Value-With Accrued Interest	(6.1.13.0.0.0) Gain\(Loss)	(5.1.14.0.0.0) Benchmark Yield Rate (%)

SU2 (e)

Quarterly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-QF-01-BS - Balance Sheet
Company Name : **Date:**

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000 (b)
1.1.0.0.0.0	**On-Balance Sheet Assets**	#
1.1.1.0.0.0	**Cash in Hand and Bank**	#
1.1.1.1.0.0	Cash in Hand	#
1.1.1.2.0.0	Cash Items in Process of Collection (CIPC)	#
1.1.1.3.0.0	Cash at Bank	#
1.1.1.4.0.0	Balances with Central Bank	#
1.1.2.0.0.0	**Receivables under Resale Agreements**	#
1.1.2.1.0.0	Resale Agreements- with CBSL	#
1.1.2.2.0.0	Resale Agreements- with Participants	#
1.1.2.3.0.0	Resale Agreements- with Customers	#
1.1.3.0.0.0	**Trading Government Securities**	#
1.1.3.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.3.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.3.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.4.0.0.0	**Trading CBSL Securities**	#
1.1.5.0.0.0	**Investment in Government Securities - Held to Maturity**	#
1.1.5.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.5.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.5.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.6.0.0.0	**Investment in Government Securities Available for Sale**	#
1.1.6.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.6.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.6.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.7.0.0.0	**Other Investments**	#
1.1.7.1.0.0	CBSL Securities	#
1.1.7.2.0.0	Other Investments at Cost	#
1.1.7.3.0.0	Provision for Decline in Value of Other Investments (-)	#
1.1.8.0.0.0	**Other Assets**	#
1.1.8.1.0.0	Principal & Interest Receivable	#
1.1.8.2.0.0	Deferred Tax	#
1.1.8.3.0.0	Corporate Tax paid in Advance	#
1.1.8.4.0.0	Group/ Head Office Receivables	#
1.1.8.5.0.0	Deposits, Advances and Prepayments	#

SU3 (a) Contd....

1.1.8.6.0.0	Other Receivables	#
1.1.9.0.0.0	**Intangible Assets**	#
1.1.9.1.0.0	Computer Systems	#
1.1.9.2.0.0	Other Intangible Assets	#
1.1.9.3.0.0	Amortization (-)	#
1.1.10.0.0.0	**Fixed Assets**	#
1.1.10.1.0.0	Land and Building	#
1.1.10.2.0.0	Vehicles	#
1.1.10.3.0.0	Furniture and Fittings	#
1.1.10.4.0.0	Computers	#
1.1.10.5.0.0	Other Equipments	#
1.1.10.6.0.0	Provision for Depreciation (-)	#
1.2.0.0.0.0	**Total On-Balance Sheet Liabilities and Equity**	#
1.2.1.0.0.0	**On-Balance Sheet Liabilities**	#
1.2.1.1.0.0	**Borrowings**	#
1.2.1.1.1.0	**Payables under Repurchase Agreements**	#
1.2.1.1.1.1	Repurchase Agreements- with CBSL	#
1.2.1.1.1.2	Repurchase Agreements- with Participants	#
1.2.1.1.1.3	Repurchase Agreements- with Customers	#
1.2.1.1.2.0	Medium Term Subordinated Debt (> 3 Years)	#
1.2.1.1.3.0	Long Term Subordinated Debt (> 5 Years)	#
1.2.1.1.4.0	Perpetual Subordinated Debt	#
1.2.1.1.5.0	Others	#
1.2.1.2.0.0	**Other Liabilities**	#
1.2.1.2.1.0	Overdrawn Accounts with Banks	#
1.2.1.2.2.0	Interest Payables	#
1.2.1.2.3.0	Deferred Tax	#
1.2.1.2.4.0	Income Taxes Payable	#
1.2.1.2.5.0	Group/ Head Office Payables	#
1.2.1.2.6.0	Accrued Expenses & Other Payables	#
1.2.1.2.7.0	Provision for Retirement Gratuity	#
1.2.1.2.8.0	Others	#
1.2.2.0.0.0	**Total Equity**	#
1.2.2.1.0.0	Ordinary Share Capital/Assigned Capital	#
1.2.2.2.0.0	Non Cumulative Irredeemable Preference Shares	#
1.2.2.3.0.0	Other Preference Shares	#
1.2.2.4.0.0	Special Risk Reserves	#

1.2.2.5.0.0	Retained Earnings	#
1.2.2.6.0.0	Total Other Reserves	#
1.3.0.0.0.0	**Off-Balance Sheet Assets**	#
1.3.1.0.0.0	Forward Contracts	#
1.3.1.1.0.0	Forward Purchases-With Participants	#
1.3.1.2.0.0	Forward Purchases-With Customers	#
1.3.1.3.0.0	Forward Sales-With Participants Institutions	#
1.3.1.4.0.0	Forward Sales-With Customers	#
1.3.2.0.0.0	Intrest Rate Swaps	#
1.3.2.1.0.0	Long Fixed Leg	#
1.3.2.2.0.0	Long Floating Leg	#
1.3.2.3.0.0	Short Fixed Leg	#
1.3.2.2.0.0	Short Floating Leg	#
1.3.3.0.0.0	Others	#
1.4.0.0.0.0	**Details of Collaterals for Repurchase Agreements**	#
1.4.1.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Market Value	#
1.4.2.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Facet Value	#
1.4.3.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Cost	#
1.5.0.0.0.0	**Details of Collaterals for Resale Agreements**	#
1.5.1.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Market Value	#
1.5.2.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Facet Value	#
1.5.3.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Cost	#
1.6.0.0.0.0	**Memorandum Information**	#
1.6.1.0.0.0	Number of Employees	#
1.6.2.0.0.0	Number of Branches	#
1.6.3.0.0.0	Number of CDS Accounts	#

Quarterly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-QF-03-CE - Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves

Company Name: Date:

Code	Item	Equity Capital - Ordinary Voting Shares	Equity Capital - Ordinary Non-Voting Shares	Equity Capital - Non Cumulative Irredeemable Preference Shares	Equity Capital - Other Preference Shares	Equity Capital - Assigned Capital	Special Risk Reserve	Reserves - Share Premium	Reserves - Revaluation Reserve	Reserves - General Reserves	Reserves - Other Reserves	Reserves - Retained Earnings	Total (i)
3.1.0.0.0.0	Opening Balance (as at the end of last month)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.2.0.0.0.0	Issue of Share/Increase of assigned capital (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.3.0.0.0.0	Bonus Issue (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.4.0.0.0.0	Rights Issue (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.5.0.0.0.0	Surplus on revaluation of property (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.6.0.0.0.0	Net profit for the period (-/+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.7.0.0.0.0	Transfer to Risk Reserves during the period (-/+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.8.0.0.0.0	Transfer to Head Office (-)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.9.0.0.0.0	Dividend Paid YYYY (-)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.10.0.0.0.0	Others	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.0.0.0.0.0	(Closing Balance) as at the end of the reporting period	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#

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SU3 (b)

SU3 (c)

Quarterly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-QF-02-PL - Profit & Loss Account
Company Name : Date:

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000
2.1.0.0.0.0	**Total Income**	#
2.1.1.0.0.0	**Intrest Income on -**	#
2.1.1.1.0.0	Trading & Investment Securities	#
2.1.1.2.0.0	Resale Agreement	#
2.1.1.3.0.0	IRS Income	#
2.1.1.4.0.0	Others	#
2.1.2.0.0.0	**Other Operating Income**	#
2.1.2.1.0.0	Trading Gains/(Loss) on Sale of Securities	#
2.1.2.2.0.0	Commission and Fees	#
2.1.2.3.0.0	Dividend Income from Investment in Shares	#
2.1.2.4.0.0	Revaluation Gains/(Loss) of Trading Securities	#
2.1.2.5.0.0	Others	#
2.1.3.0.0.0	**Other Income**	#
2.1.3.1.0.0	Charges on Services	#
2.1.3.2.0.0	Profit/(loss) on Sales of Fixed Assets	#
2.1.3.3.0.0	Others	#
2.2.0.0.0.0	**Total Expenses**	#
2.2.1.0.0.0	**Intrest Expense on -**	#
2.2.1.1.0.0	Resale Agreement	#
2.2.1.2.0.0	IRS Expenses	#
2.2.1.3.0.0	Other Related Expenses	#
0.0.0.0.0.0	**Net Intrest Income**	#
2.2.2.0.0.0	**Other Operating Expenses**	#
2.2.3.0.0.0	**Personnel Cost**	#
2.2.3.1.0.0	Director's Renumeration	#
2.2.3.2.0.0	Director's Fees	#
2.2.3.3.0.0	Staff Salaries and Wages	#
2.2.3.4.0.0	Bonus to Staff	#
2.2.3.5.0.0	Employer's Contribution to EPF	#
2.2.3.6.0.0	Employer's Contribution to ETF	#
2.2.3.7.0.0	Other Employee Related Cost	#
2.2.4.0.0.0	**General and Administrative Expenses**	#
2.2.4.1.0.0	Auditor's Renumeration	#
2.2.4.2.0.0	Professional Charges	#

SU3 (c) Contd...

2.2.4.3.0.0	Premises, Equipment and Establishment Expenses	#
2.2.4.4.0.0	Depreciation of Fixed Assets	#
2.2.4.5.0.0	Amortization of Intangible Assets	#
2.2.4.6.0.0	Other General & Administration Expenses	#
2.2.5.0.0.0	**Marketing Expenses**	#
2.2.6.0.0.0	**Finance and Other Expenses**	#
2.3.0.0.0.0	**Provision for Decline in Value of Investments (net)**	#
2.4.0.0.0.0	**Operating Profit/Losses on Ordinary Activities Before Taxes**	#
2.5.0.0.0.0	Value Added Tax on Financial Services	#
2.6.0.0.0.0	**Operating Profit/Losses on Ordinary Activities Before CorporateTax**	#
2.7.0.0.0.0	Tax on Profits	#
2.8.0.0.0.0	**Net Operating Profit/Losses on After CorporateTax**	#
2.9.0.0.0.0	**Extraordinary Items (Net of Tax)**	#
2.9.1.0.0.0	Gains	#
2.9.2.0.0.0	Losses (-)	#
2.10.0.0.0.0	**Net Operating Profit/Losses for the Period**	#

Quarterly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-QF-04-CF - Cashflow Statement
Company Name : Date:

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000
4.1.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities**	#
4.1.1.0.0.0	**Cash Flow from Operating Activities before Changes in Operating Assets & Liabilities**	#
4.1.1.1.0.0	Interest Received	#
4.1.1.2.0.0	Commission & Fees Received	#
4.1.1.3.0.0	Interest Payments (-)	#
4.1.1.4.0.0	Disposal of Treasury Bills & Bonds	#
4.1.1.5.0.0	Purchase of Treasury Bills & Bonds (-)	#
4.1.1.6.0.0	Receipts from Other Operating activities	#
4.1.1.7.0.0	Payments for Other Operating Activities (-)	#
4.1.1.8.0.0	Cash Payments to Employees (-)	#
4.1.1.9.0.0	VAT Paid (-)	#
4.1.2.0.0.0	**Changes in Operating Assets & Liabilities**	#
4.1.2.1.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Receivable under Resale Agreement (+/-)	#
4.1.2.2.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Counter-party Accountst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.3.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Other Assetst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.4.0.0	Increase/(Decrease) in Payable under Repurchase Agreementst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.5.0.0	Increase/(Decrease) in Other Liabilitiest (+/-)	#
4.1.3.0.0.0	**Income Tax Paid**	#
4.2.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Inflow /(Outflow) in Investing Activities**	#
4.2.1.0.0.0	Proceeds from Sale of Property, Plant & Equipment	#
4.2.2.0.0.0	Purchase of Property, Plant & Equipment (-)	#
4.2.3.0.0.0	Acquisition of Investment Securities (-)	#
4.2.4.0.0.0	Disposal of Investment Securities	#
4.2.5.0.0.0	Acquisition of Other Investments (-)	#
4.2.6.0.0.0	Disposal of Other Investment	#
4.2.7.0.0.0	Dividends Received	#
4.3.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Used in Financing Activities**	#
4.3.1.0.0.0	Proceeds from Ordinary Share Issue	#
4.3.2.0.0.0	Proceeds from Debenture Issue	#
4.3.3.0.0.0	Redemption of Debentures (-)	#
4.3.4.0.0.0	Proceeds from Preference Shares	#
4.3.5.0.0.0	Redemption of Preference Shares (-)	#
4.3.6.0.0.0	Dividend Paid (-)	#

SU3 (d) Contd...

4.3.7.0.0.0	Share Re-purchase (-)	#
4.3.8.0.0.0	Interest Paid on Debt Capital (-)	#
4.3.9.0.0.0	Other Long-term borrowings (-)	#
4.4.0.0.0.0	Net Cash Inflow /(Outflow) for the Year	#
4.5.0.0.0.0	Cash and Cash equivalents at the Beginning of the Year (+/-)	#
4.6.0.0.0.0	Cash and Cash equivalents at the End of the Year	#
4.7.0.0.0.0	Cash and Cash equivalents as per the Balance Sheet (+/-)	#
4.8.0.0.0.0	Difference	#

Yearly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-YF-01-BS - Balance Sheet
Company Name : Date:

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000 (b)
1.1.0.0.0.0	**On-Balance Sheet Assets**	#
1.1.1.0.0.0	**Cash in Hand and Bank**	#
1.1.1.1.0.0	Cash in Hand	#
1.1.1.2.0.0	Cash Items in Process of Collection (CIPC)	#
1.1.1.3.0.0	Cash at Bank	#
1.1.1.4.0.0	Balances with Central Bank	#
1.1.2.0.0.0	**Receivables under Resale Agreements**	#
1.1.2.1.0.0	Resale Agreements- with CBSL	#
1.1.2.2.0.0	Resale Agreements- with Participants	#
1.1.2.3.0.0	Resale Agreements- with Customers	#
1.1.3.0.0.0	**Trading Government Securities**	#
1.1.3.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.3.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.3.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.4.0.0.0	**Trading CBSL Securities**	#
1.1.5.0.0.0	**Investment in Government Securities - Held to Maturity**	#
1.1.5.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.5.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.5.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.6.0.0.0	**Investment in Government Securities Available for Sale**	#
1.1.6.1.0.0	Treasury Bills	#
1.1.6.2.0.0	Treasury Bonds	#
1.1.6.3.0.0	Other Securities	#
1.1.7.0.0.0	**Other Investments**	#
1.1.7.1.0.0	CBSL Securities	#
1.1.7.2.0.0	Other Investments at Cost	#
1.1.7.3.0.0	Provision for Decline in Value of Other Investments (-)	#
1.1.8.0.0.0	**Other Assets**	#
1.1.8.1.0.0	Principal & Interest Receivable	#
1.1.8.2.0.0	Deferred Tax	#
1.1.8.3.0.0	Corporate Tax paid in Advance	#

SU4 (a) Contd....

1.1.8.4.0.0	Group/ Head Office Receivables	#
1.1.8.5.0.0	Deposits, Advances and Prepayments	#
1.1.8.6.0.0	Other Receivables	#
1.1.9.0.0.0	**Intangible Assets**	#
1.1.9.1.0.0	Computer Systems	#
1.1.9.2.0.0	Other Intangible Assets	#
1.1.9.3.0.0	Amortization (-)	#
1.1.10.0.0.0	**Fixed Assets**	#
1.1.10.1.0.0	Land and Building	#
1.1.10.2.0.0	Vehicles	#
1.1.10.3.0.0	Furniture and Fittings	#
1.1.10.4.0.0	Computers	#
1.1.10.5.0.0	Other Equipments	#
1.1.10.6.0.0	Provision for Depreciation (-)	#
1.2.0.0.0.0	**Total On-Balance Sheet Liabilities and Equity**	#
1.2.1.0.0.0	**On-Balance Sheet Liabilities**	#
1.2.1.1.0.0	**Borrowings**	#
1.2.1.1.1.0	**Payables under Repurchase Agreements**	#
1.2.1.1.1.1	Repurchase Agreements- with CBSL	#
1.2.1.1.1.2	Repurchase Agreements- with Participants	#
1.2.1.1.1.3	Repurchase Agreements- with Customers	#
1.2.1.1.2.0	Medium Term Subordinated Debt (> 3 Years)	#
1.2.1.1.3.0	Long Term Subordinated Debt (> 5 Years)	#
1.2.1.1.4.0	Perpetual Subordinated Debt	#
1.2.1.1.5.0	Others	#
1.2.1.2.0.0	**Other Liabilities**	#
1.2.1.2.1.0	Overdrawn Accounts with Banks	#
1.2.1.2.2.0	Interest Payables	#
1.2.1.2.3.0	Deferred Tax	#
1.2.1.2.4.0	Income Taxes Payable	#
1.2.1.2.5.0	Group/ Head Office Payables	#
1.2.1.2.6.0	Accrued Expenses & Other Payables	#
1.2.1.2.7.0	Provision for Retirement Gratuity	#
1.2.1.2.8.0	Others	#
1.2.2.0.0.0	**Total Equity**	#
1.2.2.1.0.0	Ordinary Share Capital/Assigned Capital	#
1.2.2.2.0.0	Non Cumulative Irredeemable Preference Shares	#

Reports to be submitted by Primary dealers and reports prepared by PDD

Report No.	Name of the report	Frequency of Submission	Report through	Description
	Daily Report	Daily	Excel	Two way quotes and daily transactions of Tbills, Tbonds, Repo and Re-Repo are submitted to PDD using the Daily report.
PDD-WF-06-TBL	Outright Transactions of Treasury Bills	Weekly : Thursday to Wednesday By 10.00 a.m. on following Thursday	FInNet	Weekly transaction volumes of sales and purchase of T bills are submitted to PDD using this report.
PDD-WF-07-TBD	Outright Transactions of Treasury Bonds	Weekly : Thursday to Wednesday By 10.00 a.m. on following Thursday	FInNet	Weekly transaction volumes of sales and purchase of T bonds are submitted to PDD using this report.
PDD-WF-08-RRP	Summary of Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions	Weekly : Thursday to Wednesday By 10.00 a.m. on following Thursday	FInNet	Weekly transaction volumes of repo and reverse repo of T bonds and T bills are reported using this report.
PDD-WF-05-MP	Asset and Liability – Maturity Profile	Weekly : Monday to Friday By 10.00 am on following Monday	FInNet	Assets and Liabilities maturing over night to over 5 years to be fed to the system through this report.
PDD-MF-01-BS	Balance Sheet	Monthly : Not later than 15th day of the following month	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-MF-03-CE	Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves	Monthly : Not later than 15th day of the following month	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-MF-02-PL	Profit and Loss Account	Monthly : Not later than 15th day of the following month	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-MF-04-CF	Cash Flow Statement	Monthly : Not later than 15th day of the following month	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement

Report No.	Name of the report	Frequency of Submission	Report through	Description
PDD 13	Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Return	Monthly : Not later than 15th day of the following month	Excel	By using market value, maturity date, yield and coupon, this report include the Risk Weighted Assets and Risk weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio for the period.
PDD-MF-05-TL/06-SL	Mark to market report	Monthly : Not later than 15th day of the following month	FInNet	Trading portfolio and off balance sheet items to be fed to the system in order to arrive at the market value of the portfolio. It is used to perform the Stress testing analysis for the particular company.
PDD-QF-01-BS	Balance Sheet	Quarterly : Not later than one month following the each quarter.	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-QF-03-CE	Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves	Quarterly: Not later than one month following the each quarter.	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-QF-02-PL	Profit and Loss Account	Quarterly : Not later than one month following the each quarter.	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-QF-04-CF	Cash Flow Statement	Quarterly : Not later than one month following the each quarter.	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD 11	Code of Conduct	Quarterly : Not later than one month following the each quarter.	Word	A check list and clauses to be marked, agreed and signed by CEO.
PDD-BAF-01-BS	Balance Sheet	Bi-Annually : Un-audited Financial Statements - Not later than 2 months following the end of the firm's financial half year	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD- BAF - 03-CE	Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves	Bi-Annually : Un-audited Financial Statements - Not later than 2 months following the end of the firm's financial half year	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD- BAF - 02-PL	Profit and Loss Account	Bi-Annually : Un-audited Financial Statements - Not	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement

Report No.	Name of the report	Frequency of Submission	Report through	Description
		later than 2 months following the end of the firm's financial half year		
PDD- BAF - 04-CF	Cash Flow Statement	Bi-Annually : Un-audited Financial Statements - Not later than 2 months following the end of the firm's financial half year	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-YF-01-BS	Balance Sheet	Annually *	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement.
PDD-YF-03-CE	Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves	Annually *	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-YF-02-PL	Profit and Loss Account	Annually *	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
PDD-YF-04-CF	Cash Flow Statement	Annually *	FInNet	Standard format of the financial statement
	Fact Sheet	If any changes in corporate details or annually	Excel	This is a summary report of the details of BOD, corporate address, name etc…
* 1. Un-audited Financial Statements - not later than 3 months following the end of the firm's financial year 2. Audited Annual Financial Statements - not later than 5 calendar months (Audited Annual), 6 calendar months (Audited Annual Report) following the end of the firm's financial year.				
Reports on financial position and performance of PDs which are prepared by the Supervision Division				
PDD 14	Evaluation of financial performance of PDs	Monthly		Summary note on performance of the PD industry including a risk analysis and strengths of the industry.

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Report No.	Name of the report	Frequency of Submission	Report through	Description
PDD 15	Gap Analysis	Weekly		This report analyses the asset and liability maturity mismatch for all PDs, for overnight, 2-7 days and 8-30 days.
PDD 16	Stress Testing	Monthly		This report evaluate the impact of change of interest rate on the total Portfolio and on the capital, calculate the capital erosion, capital remaining and Capital Adequacy Ratio after the impact of the movement in interest rate
PDD 17	Secondary Market Transaction Summary	Weekly		This report include the T-bill and T-bond purchases, sales, Repo and Re- repo and the trading portfolio balances of the each PD and the industry. The report is also used by the Front Office to prepare their weekly reports.
PDD 18	Secondary Market Yield Curve and Table	Monthly		The report shows the monthly average yield rate and the yield change for T-bill and T-bonds to generate the yield curve for the same period.
PDD 19	Auction Summary	Weekly		The report includes the bids offered, received & accepted and Weighted Average Yield Rate for the weekly T-bill auction. Subscription level, effective participation and success rate for each PD, also calculated on this report.
PDD 20	Industry Financial Performance Analysis	Quarterly and Annually		Detail paper on performance of the PD industry including a risk analysis and strengths of the industry.
PDD 21	Off Site Surveillance Report	Monthly		The report includes asset, liability and profitability figures for the reporting month, comparative previous month, comparative last year same month and year to date. It also includes relevant ratios, performance targets and other parameters such as bidding pattern at the auctions, secondary market transactions compared to industry average, transactions recorded at e-trading platform, timely submission of financial statements, submission of two-way quotes, and compliance with directions.

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Appendix 3

Glossary of Terms

Code of Conduct

A formal statement of the core values relating to the legal and ethical conduct of the company's business

Customer Charter

A customer charter sets the standards for a company regarding customer service. A charter is shared with all employees so they work under the customer charter to assure the best customer service possible.

E-trading

Trading of securities via computerized trading systems that centralize, match, cross, and execute trades

FInNet

A web based system to input and upload financial data and reports, which enable downloading reports in word and excel formats

Mark to Market

To re value securities, a financial statement line item, a position, etc... at its traded market price.

Non-bank financial institution

An entity that is not registered specifically as a commercial bank, investment bank, merchant bank or development bank. NBFI incudes PDs, Finance Companies, etc...

Standalone Primary Dealer

Standalone Primary Dealer is a non-bank firm which buys government securities directly from a government, with the intention of reselling them to others, thus acting as a market maker of government securities

Work Papers

Appendix 3

Written papers prepared during the on site examination process that document the procedures followed, the information obtained, and the initial conclusion reached.

1.2.2.3.0.0	Other Preference Shares	#
1.2.2.4.0.0	Special Risk Reserves	#
1.2.2.5.0.0	Retained Earnings	#
1.2.2.6.0.0	Total Other Reserves	#
1.3.0.0.0.0	**Off-Balance Sheet Assets**	#
1.3.1.0.0.0	Forward Contracts	#
1.3.1.1.0.0	Forward Purchases-With Participants	#
1.3.1.2.0.0	Forward Purchases-With Customers	#
1.3.1.3.0.0	Forward Sales-With Participants Institutions	#
1.3.1.4.0.0	Forward Sales-With Customers	#
1.3.2.0.0.0	Intrest Rate Swaps	#
1.3.2.1.0.0	Long Fixed Leg	#
1.3.2.2.0.0	Long Floating Leg	#
1.3.2.3.0.0	Short Fixed Leg	#
1.3.2.2.0.0	Short Floating Leg	#
1.3.3.0.0.0	Others	#
1.4.0.0.0.0	**Details of Collaterals for Repurchase Agreements**	#
1.4.1.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Market Value	#
1.4.2.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Facet Value	#
1.4.3.0.0.0	Encumbered Securities-Cost	#
1.5.0.0.0.0	**Details of Collaterals for Resale Agreements**	#
1.5.1.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Market Value	#
1.5.2.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Facet Value	#
1.5.3.0.0.0	Securities Obtained-Cost	#
1.6.0.0.0.0	**Memorandum Information**	#
1.6.1.0.0.0	Number of Employees	#
1.6.2.0.0.0	Number of Branches	#
1.6.3.0.0.0	Number of CDS Accounts	#

Yearly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-YF-03-CE - Statement Changes in Equity & Reserves

Company Name: Date:

Code	Item	Equity Capital - Ordinary Voting Shares	Equity Capital - Ordinary Non-Voting Shares	Equity Capital - Non Cumulative Irredeemable Preference Shares	Equity Capital - Other Preference Shares	Equity Capital - Assigned Capital	Special Risk Reserve	Reserves - Share Premium	Reserves - Revaluation Reserve	Reserves - General Reserves	Reserves - Other Reserves	Reserves - Retained Earnings	Total (i)
3.1.0.0.0.0	Opening Balance (as at the end of last month)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.2.0.0.0.0	Issue of Share/Increase of assigned capital (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.3.0.0.0.0	Bonus Issue (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.4.0.0.0.0	Rights Issue (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.5.0.0.0.0	Surplus on revaluation of property (+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.6.0.0.0.0	Net profit for the period (-/+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.7.0.0.0.0	Transfer to Risk Reserves during the period (-/+)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.8.0.0.0.0	Transfer to Head Office (-)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.9.0.0.0.0	Dividend Paid YYYY (-)	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.10.0.0.0.0	Others	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
3.0.0.0.0.0	(Closing Balance) as at the end of the reporting period	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#

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SU4 (b)

SU4 (c)

Yearly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-YF-02-PL - Profit & Loss Account
Company Name : Date:

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000
2.1.0.0.0.0	**Total Income**	#
2.1.1.0.0.0	**Intrest Income on -**	#
2.1.1.1.0.0	Trading & Investment Securities	#
2.1.1.2.0.0	Resale Agreement	#
2.1.1.3.0.0	IRS Income	#
2.1.1.4.0.0	Others	#
2.1.2.0.0.0	**Other Operating Income**	#
2.1.2.1.0.0	Trading Gains/(Loss) on Sale of Securities	#
2.1.2.2.0.0	Commission and Fees	#
2.1.2.3.0.0	Dividend Income from Investment in Shares	#
2.1.2.4.0.0	Revaluation Gains/(Loss) of Trading Securities	#
2.1.2.5.0.0	Others	#
2.1.3.0.0.0	**Other Income**	#
2.1.3.1.0.0	Charges on Services	#
2.1.3.2.0.0	Profit/(loss) on Sales of Fixed Assets	#
2.1.3.3.0.0	Others	#
2.2.0.0.0.0	**Total Expenses**	#
2.2.1.0.0.0	**Intrest Expense on -**	#
2.2.1.1.0.0	Resale Agreement	#
2.2.1.2.0.0	IRS Expenses	#
2.2.1.3.0.0	Other Related Expenses	#
0.0.0.0.0.0	**Net Intrest Income**	#
2.2.2.0.0.0	**Other Operating Expenses**	#
2.2.3.0.0.0	**Personnel Cost**	#
2.2.3.1.0.0	Director's Renumeration	#
2.2.3.2.0.0	Director's Fees	#
2.2.3.3.0.0	Staff Salaries and Wages	#
2.2.3.4.0.0	Bonus to Staff	#
2.2.3.5.0.0	Employer's Contribution to EPF	#
2.2.3.6.0.0	Employer's Contribution to ETF	#
2.2.3.7.0.0	Other Employee Related Cost	#
2.2.4.0.0.0	**General and Administrative Expenses**	#
2.2.4.1.0.0	Auditor's Renumeration	#
2.2.4.2.0.0	Professional Charges	#

2.2.4.3.0.0	Premises, Equipment and Establishment Expenses	#
2.2.4.4.0.0	Depreciation of Fixed Assets	#
2.2.4.5.0.0	Amortization of Intangible Assets	#
2.2.4.6.0.0	Other General & Administration Expenses	#
2.2.5.0.0.0	**Marketing Expenses**	#
2.2.6.0.0.0	**Finance and Other Expenses**	#
2.3.0.0.0.0	**Provision for Decline in Value of Investments (net)**	#
2.4.0.0.0.0	**Operating Profit/Losses on Ordinary Activities Before Taxes**	#
2.5.0.0.0.0	Value Added Tax on Financial Services	#
2.6.0.0.0.0	**Operating Profit/Losses on Ordinary Activities Before CorporateTax**	#
2.7.0.0.0.0	Tax on Profits	#
2.8.0.0.0.0	**Net Operating Profit/Losses on After CorporateTax**	#
2.9.0.0.0.0	**Extraordinary Items (Net of Tax)**	#
2.9.1.0.0.0	Gains	#
2.9.2.0.0.0	Losses (-)	#
2.10.0.0.0.0	**Net Operating Profit/Losses for the Period**	#

SU4 (d)

Yearly Financial Return (LKR '000)
PDD-YF-04-CF - Cashflow Statement
Company Name : Date:

Code	Name of Account (a)	Amount Rs.'000
4.1.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities**	#
4.1.1.0.0.0	**Cash Flow from Operating Activities before Changes in Operating Assets & Liabilities**	#
4.1.1.1.0.0	Interest Received	#
4.1.1.2.0.0	Commission & Fees Received	#
4.1.1.3.0.0	Interest Payments (-)	#
4.1.1.4.0.0	Disposal of Treasury Bills & Bonds	#
4.1.1.5.0.0	Purchase of Treasury Bills & Bonds (-)	#
4.1.1.6.0.0	Receipts from Other Operating activities	#
4.1.1.7.0.0	Payments for Other Operating Activities (-)	#
4.1.1.8.0.0	Cash Payments to Employees (-)	#
4.1.1.9.0.0	VAT Paid (-)	#
4.1.2.0.0.0	**Changes in Operating Assets & Liabilities**	#
4.1.2.1.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Receivable under Resale Agreement (+/-)	#
4.1.2.2.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Counter-party Accountst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.3.0.0	(Increase)/Decrease in Other Assetst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.4.0.0	Increase/(Decrease) in Payable under Repurchase Agreementst (+/-)	#
4.1.2.5.0.0	Increase/(Decrease) in Other Liabilitiest (+/-)	#
4.1.3.0.0.0	**Income Tax Paid**	#
4.2.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Inflow /(Outflow) in Investing Activities**	#
4.2.1.0.0.0	Proceeds from Sale of Property, Plant & Equipment	#
4.2.2.0.0.0	Purchase of Property, Plant & Equipment (-)	#
4.2.3.0.0.0	Acquisition of Investment Securities (-)	#
4.2.4.0.0.0	Disposal of Investment Securities	#
4.2.5.0.0.0	Acquisition of Other Investments (-)	#
4.2.6.0.0.0	Disposal of Other Investment	#
4.2.7.0.0.0	Dividends Received	#
4.3.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Used in Financing Activities**	#
4.3.1.0.0.0	Proceeds from Ordinary Share Issue	#
4.3.2.0.0.0	Proceeds from Debenture Issue	#
4.3.3.0.0.0	Redemption of Debentures (-)	#
4.3.4.0.0.0	Proceeds from Preference Shares	#
4.3.5.0.0.0	Redemption of Preference Shares (-)	#
4.3.6.0.0.0	Dividend Paid (-)	#

4.3.7.0.0.0	Share Re-purchase (-)	#
4.3.8.0.0.0	Interest Paid on Debt Capital (-)	#
4.3.9.0.0.0	Other Long-term borrowings (-)	#
4.4.0.0.0.0	**Net Cash Inflow /(Outflow) for the Year**	#
4.5.0.0.0.0	**Cash and Cash equivalents at the Beginning of the Year (+/-)**	#
4.6.0.0.0.0	**Cash and Cash equivalents at the End of the Year**	#
4.7.0.0.0.0	**Cash and Cash equivalents as per the Balance Sheet (+/-)**	#
4.8.0.0.0.0	**Difference**	#

SU 5
PDD 11

Quarterly Report on Code of Conduct

Period covered by report:

.... Primary Dealer (PD) appointed to act in the government debt securities market in Sri Lanka hereby certifies to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka that, for the period set out above,

1. It maintained the necessary policies, procedures and internal controls to ensure that the PD complied with the Code of Conduct issued by the Central Bank except in the areas specified in annexure 1, and
2. The dealer has no knowledge of any material event of non-compliance with the Code of Conduct by the Dealer or any of its directors or employees, other than those reported in annexure 2.

The undersigned, Chief executive Officer and Compliance Officer are duly authorized to provide this Certificate of Compliance on behalf of the Dealer and, has obtained reasonable assurance that the statement on this Certificate and any attached annexures are true and complete in all material respect.

Dated.....

Authorized Signature 1
Name
Title
Telephone Numbers

Authorized Signature 2
Name
Title
Telephone Numbers

1 All the terms in this certificates shall have the same meaning as those terms as used in the Code

The PD has not formulated written policies in respect of the following (Delete whichever is not applicable)

1. Disciplinary process that will apply when breaches of the Code have been committed.
2. Personal trading by directors, officers and employees in government debt securities.
3. Dealing with confidentiality of information.
4. Risk management policies and procedures for trading activities of dealers.
5. Hiring and training staff.
6. Dealer's written code of conduct, ethical standards and related policies, procedures and guidance.
7. Fair treatment of client, including certain special prohibited behavior i.e. front running, churning, market manipulation and insider dealings.
8. Reverse re-purchase & repurchase agreements.
9. Sales representative and advertisements.
10. Conflict of interests of dealers.
11. Policies and procedures in place to prevent the dealer's services from being used by customers for inappropriate or illegal activities.

Please give reasons for not formulating the required policies and procedures.

Annexure 2

1. Details of none compliance with the Code of Conduct:

Nature of breach	Date reported to PDD	Action taken by the PD
1. Personal trading by directors and employees		
2. Confidentiality of information		
3. Risk management for trading activities		
4. Inducement		
5. Proper accounting, segregation & safeguarded of customers		
6. Discretionary management service to customers		
7. Dealing with front running, churning, market manipulation and insider dealings.		
8. Any improper conduct by directors or employees that may damage the confidence of investors		
9. Reverse re-purchase & repurchase agreements.		
10. Sales representative and advertisements		
11. Any other matter non-compliance (pl, specify)		

2. Changes in the senior management including the compliance officer

Position	Date of change	Date reported to PDD	Reason for the change

SU 6
PDD 13

Report on Capital Adequacy

Settlement Date

Rs Mn

	Risk Weighted Assets	
1. Available Capital		
2 Less : Capital utilization by Counterparty credit		
3. Net Capital (1+ 2)		
4. Capital Charge For Trading & Reverse Repo		
5. Capital charge for disallowances		
6. Total Capital Charge (4+5)		
7. Regulatory Minimum Capital		
8. Unused Capital (3 - 6) if 3>=6		
9. Required minimum capital		
(higher of Rs. 300 M or sum of capital charge and counter party risk)		
10. Whether the total Capital in excess of required minimum capital		
11. Npv of Portfolio (Trading & Reverse Repo)		
12.Total Risk Weighted Capital (Total Capital charge + Counterparty risk) 2+6		
13.Risk weighted other assets (Weighted Assets in balance sheet without trading portfolio and reverse repo)		
14.Total Risk Weighted Assets (2+6+13)		
15.Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio (Minimum 8%) 1/14		
16. Capital Ratio (Avilable Capital/ higher of Rs. 300 M or sum of capital charge and counter party risk)		

Risk Weighted Assets

Amounts in Rs million

1. Capital Charge For Trading & Reverse Repo		
2.Capital charge for Disallowances	-	
3.Risk weighted Assets for total Capital Charge	(1+2)/8%	
4.Risk Weighted Assets for Counter Party		
5. Risk weighted other assets (Weighted Assets in balance sheet without trading portfolio and reverse repo)		-
6.Total Risk Weighted Assets	3+4+5	-
7.Available Capital		-
8.Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio (Minimum 8%)	7/6	

Financial Indicators of Primary Dealers
(Evaluation)

Primary Dealer	Capital Base					Total Portfolio								Profit Before Tax						
	2011	2012				###	2012							2011		2012				
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				Q4	Year	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Year
										Trading	Investment	Reverse Repo	Total Portfolio							
Industry Total																				
Industry Average																				

Primary Dealer	ROE					ROA					Repo/Assets					Capital Leveraging(Times)				
	2011	2012				###	2012				2011	2012				2011	2012			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Industry Total																				
Industry Average																				

694

SU 7 (a)
PDD 14

Primary Dealer	CAR					Total Income							Net Interst Margin					Total Assets				
	2011	2012				2011		2012					2011	2012				2011	2012			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q4	year	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	year	Q4	Q1	Q 2	Q3	Q 4	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Industry Total																						
Industry Average																						

Primary Dealer	Trading Gain Ratio					Cost Income Ratio					REPO					Repo/ Total Portfolio				
	2011	2012				2011	2012				2011	2012				2011	2012			
	Q4	Q 1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q4	Q 1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q 4	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Industry Total																				
Industry Average																				

SU 7 (a) Contd...
PDD 14

695

Gap Analysis

Rs. Million

Primary Dealer	Maturity Gap			Cumulative Gap			Cum. Gap as a % of Total Portfolio			Cum. Gap as a % of Total Portfolio		
	As at:			As at:			As at:			As at:		
Bank Primary Dealer Units	Overnight	2-7 Days	8-30 Days	Overnight	Up to One Week	Up to One Month	Overnight (One Day)	Up to One Week	Up to One Month	Overnight	Up to One Week	Up to One Month
Sub Total												
None Bank Primary Dealer Companies												
Sub Total												
Grand Total												

SU 7 (b)
PDD 15

Stress Test

Month

Amounts in Rs Mn

Primary Dealer	Market Value of Total Portfolio as at 31.12.2012	Modified Duration	Impact of change of interest rate on the total Portfolio			Total Capital	Capital Erosion %			
			1 Basis point	100 Basis points	200 Basis points		100 Basis	200 Basis	300Basis	500 Basis
Bank Primary Dealer Units										
Sub Total										
Bank Primary Dealer Companies										
Sub Total										
Non Bank Primary Dealers										
Sub Total										
Grand Total										

SU 7 (c)
PDD 16

Primary Dealer	Total Capital	Capital remaining, after the impact of the movement in interest Rate		RWCAR	Capital Adequacy Ratio, after the impact of the movement in interest Rate				RW CAR =8% at capital	RW CAR =8% at BP
		100 BP	200 BP		100 BP	200 BP	300 BP	500 BP		
Bank Primary Dealer Units										
Sub Total										
Bank Primary Dealer Companies										
Sub Total										
Non Bank Primary Dealers										
Sub Total										
Grand Total										

SU 7 (c) Contd...
PDD 16

698

Secondary Market Transactions - <date> *(for the quarterly Board paper)*

Rs. Million

Primary Dealer	Treasury Bills					Treasury Bonds					Grand Total	Share %
	Purchases	Sold	Repo	Rev.Repo	Total	Purchase	Sold	Repo	Rev.Repo	Total		
Bank Primary Dealer Units												
Sub Total												
Bank Primary Dealer Companies												
Sub Total												
Non Bank Primary Dealers												
Sub Total												
Grand Total												

699

SU 7 (p)
PDD 17

Secondary Market Transactions - <Date>

Rs. Mn

Primary Dealer	Treasury Bills					Treasury Bonds					Grand total	Trading portfolio	
	Purchased	Sold	Repo	Rev.Repo	Total	Purchased	Sold	Repo	Rev.Repo	Total		bill	bond
Total													

Outright

Bond outright total	#
Bill outright total	#
	0

Repo

Bond repo total	#
Bill repo total	#
	#

700

SU 7 (e)

Secondary Market Weighted Average Yield Rates
month

Instrument	Average Yield Rates %				Yeild Change %	
	Maturity	20..-Q4	20..-Q3	20..-Q4	Q4'20... - Q4'20....	Q3'20... - Q4'20....
Treasury Bills	<=91 days					
	<182 days					
	<364 days					
Treasury Bonds	< 2 yrs					
	< 3 yrs					
	< 4 yrs					
	< 5 yrs					
	< 6 yrs					



SU 7 (g)
PDD 19

Auction Summary

Treasury Bills - Primary Auction
Auction Date : **Settlement Date :**

1 (a). Bids Offered, Received & Accepted

(Rs.Mn)

Tenor	Offered	Received	CBSL/Arranged	Accepted	Total
91 days 182 days 364 days					
Total					

1 (b). Weighted Average Yield Rate

Yield Rate (After tax)		
Tenor	Current Rate	Previous Rate 182 days
91 days 182 days 364 days		

2. Subscription level

Primary Dealer	Bids Received (Rs.Mn)				%			
	91 days	182 days	364 days	Total	91 days	182 days	364 days	Total

3. Effective participation

Primary Dealer	Bids Accepted (Rs.Mn)				%			
	91 days	182 days	364 days	Total	91 days	182 days	364 days	Total

4. Success Rate

Primary Dealer	Bids Accepted (Rs.Mn)				%			
	91 days	182 days	364 days	Total	91 days	182 days	364 days	Total

SU 7 (h)
PDD 21

Name of the Institution INDUSTRY, EACH PD

MONTHLY OFF-SITE SURVEILLANCE REPORT (MOSSR)

REPORTING PERIOD: JAN 2013

Code	Item (LKR' in Million)	Year End (31.12.12)	Month		Change			
			Reporting (Jan' 13)	Previous (Jan' 13) month	In Report. Month		Year to Date	
					Amount	%	Amount	%
1	**Key Assets and Liabilities- Volume and Trend**							
1.1	**Total Assets (Net)**							
1.3	**Investments**							
1.3.1	Total Portfolio, (Exclude item 1.3.8)							
1.3.2	Trading Account							
1.3.3	*% of Total Portfolio*							
1.3.4	Investments in Held to Maturity							
1.3.5	*% of Total Portfolio*							
1.3.6	Reverse Repo							
1.3.7	*% of Total Portfolio*							
1.3.8	Investments in Available-for-Sale							
1.3.9	*% of Total Portfolio*							
1.3.10	Investment in quoted shares/quoted debentures or bonds and commercial papers							
1.4	**Fixed Assets and Other Assets**							
1.4.1	Fixed Assets (Net)							
1.4.2	Other Assets							
1.7	**Borrowings**							
1.7.1	Total Borrowings							
1.7.2	*% of Total Capital Funds*							
1.8	**Other Liabilities**							
1.9	**Off Balance Sheet Activities**							
1.9.1	Total Contingencies & Commitments							
	Forward Sales and Purchases							
	Interest Rate Swaps							

1.9.2	*% of On-Balance Sheet Assets*							
1.10	**Market Share,%**							
1.10.1	Total Assets							
1.10.2	Total Portfolio							
1.10.3	Total Capital Funds							
3	**Liquidity and Funding Risk**							
4	**Market Risk**							
4.1	**Market Risk Indicators-In Volume**							
4.1.1	Stress Testing							
4.2	**Market Risk Indicators**							
4.2.1	Modified Duration of the portfolio							
	Liquidity Risk							
3.1	**Liquidity Indicators-In Volume**							
3.1.1	Overnight							
3.1.2	2 to 7 days							
3.1.3	7 to 30 days							
3.1.4	Cumulative Gap upto 7 days							
3.1.5	Cumulative Gap upto 30 days							
3.2	**Liquidity Indicators-(Ratios) (%)**							
3.2.1	Repo to Assets Ratio, %							
3.2.2	Cumulative Gap as a % of Total Liabilities, (%)							
	Overnight							
	2 to 7 days							
	7 to 30 days							
3.2.3	Cumulative Gap as a % of Total Portfolio, (%)							
	Overnight							
	2 to 7 days							
	7 to 30 days							
5	**Capital Adequacy**							
5.1	**Capital Adequacy Indicators-In Volume**							
5.1.1	Total Capital Funds							
	Share Capital							
	Special Risk Reserve							
	Retained Earnings							
5.1.2	Audited Capital Base							
5.1.2	Risk Weighted Assets							
5.2	**Capital Adequacy Indicators-(Ratios) (%)**							

5.2.1	Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio, % - Monthly Basis **(Minimum 8%)**								
5.2.2	Capital Leveragring Times								
6	**Earnings**								
6.1	**Earnings Indicators-In Volume**								
6.1.1	Interest Income								
6.1.2	Interest Expenses								
6.1.3	*Net Interest Income*								
6.1.4	*Capital Gains*								
6.1.5	*Revaluation Gains*								
6.1.6	*Other Income*								
6.1.7	Total Income								
6.1.8	Operating Expenses								
6.1.9	Net Profit Before Tax								
6.1.10	Taxation								
6.1.11	Net Profit After Tax								
6.1.12	Dividends								
6.1.13	Accumulated Profit								
6.2	**Earning Indicators-(Ratios) (%) (Annualised)**								
6.2.1	Net Interest Margin, %								
6.2.2	Return on Assets (ROA)-BT, %								
6.2.3	Return on Equity (ROE)-AT, %								
6.2.4	Earnings per Share,								
7	**Participation Ratios (%)**								
7.1.1	Subscription Level at Primary Auctions								
	T/Bills								
	T/Bonds								
7.1.2	Primary Auction Participation Ratios, %								
	Effective Auction Participation Ratio (T/Bills), %								
	Effective Auction Participation Ratio (T/Bonds), %								
7.1.3	Secondary Market Participation Ratios, %								
	Outright								
	Repo								
	Total								

8	**Other Parameters**						
8.1.1	Bidding pattern at the Auctions						
8.1.2	Secondary Market Transactions compared to Industry Average						
8.1.3	Transactions recorded at Bloomberg						
8.1.4	Timely submission of Financial Statements						
8.1.5	Submission of Two-way quotes						
8.1.6	Compliance with Directions						
8.1.7	Responses to the queries						
9	**Performance Targets**	**Target**	**Actual**				
9.1.1	T/Bill Primary Auctions						
	Bidding Commitment						
	Success Ratio						
9.1.2	T/Bond Primary Auctions						
	Minimum Underwriting Commitment						
	Additional Competitive Bidding						
	Underwriting commission based success rate						
9.1.3	Secondary Market Performance Targets						
	Minimum Turnover Ratio						
	Daily Balance of Investments						

The list sent to PD CEO requesting documents and information

..... Plc – Primary Dealer Unit
On-site Examination as at .....

Reference to the letter dated ....., addressed to you by Superintendent of Public Debt, I am glad to receive the following information/data as at ..... to facilitate the scheduled examination work.

1 General Information

1.1 Balance Sheet as of the examination date.
1.2 Income and Expenditure Statement as of the examination date.
1.3 Cash Flow Statement as of the examination date.
1.4 Trial Balance (or General Ledger abstract) as of the examination date.
1.5 Monthly Budget and Variance Reports for .... and ....
1.6 A list of all policies and procedures relating to operations and risk management and operational manuals (including date reviewed/ approved by the Board/Senior Management). Submit all Board approved policy documents and operational manuals for perusal only.
1.7 Copies of the management letters issued by the external auditors (with responses) for last two years.

2 Market Risk Assessment

2.1 List of Trading, Available-for-Sale and Investment portfolios as of the examination date in following format;

ISIN No	Face Value (Rs)	Cost (Rs)	Market Value (Rs)	Accrued Interest (Rs)	Encumbered
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Yes/No
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Yes/No

2.2 List of outstanding Reverse Repurchase transactions (Reverse Repos) as of the examination date including customer name, principal amount, maturity amount, interest rate, interest accrued, settlement date, ISIN of securities involved, and market value of such securities and haircut applied.
2.3 List of outstanding Repurchase transactions (Repos) as of the examination date including customer name, principal amount, maturity amount, interest rate, interest accrued, settlement date, ISIN of securities involved and market value of such securities.
2.4 Details of Interest Rate Swaps including amount, period and other terms and conditions (if any).
2.5 Details of Forward Rate Agreements including amount, period and other terms and conditions (if any).
2.6 Details of Repos (as per 2.3 above) against securities under Reverse Repurchase transactions.
2.7 List of Securities held on behalf of customers, containing inter alia, customer name, ISIN and face value.

2.8 List of all limits fixed for primary dealer operations (counterparty limits, stop loss limits, dealer limit, deals wise limit etc.). State the procedure for monitoring them.

2.9 A copy of the latest Board approval for the above limits.

2.10 Have these limits been exceeded in the examination period (limit violation reports) and what actions have been taken?

2.11 What are the reporting and authorization procedures in place for exceptions for market risk exposure limits? (eg. Exception Reports)

2.12 What is the organizational set up with the Primary Dealer (PD) to monitor market risk? Is there an independent middle office, with skilled personnel?

2.13 Specify the systems and procedures that the PD has put in place to identify, measure, monitor and manage market risks.

2.14 Please list out the analytical reports prepared to manage market risk and furnish copies of such two latest reports.

2.15 Provide details of segregation of duties in front office, middle office and back office.

2.16 What is the PD's policy regarding segregating government securities portfolio into Trading, Available-for-Sale and Investment categories?

2.17 Please furnish a list of top 5 counter-parties with whom repo transactions have been conducted and the value of such repo transactions along with percentage of such repos out of total repos.

2.18 Deal Tickets for ... and ... for perusal only.

2.19 Details of transactions carried out during ....

3 Liquidity Risk Assessment

3.1 Asset and Liability Management Policy document covering aspects such as market risk management, funding strategies and liquidity planning.

3.2 Does the PD have an Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO)? Please furnish details/ copies of its terms of reference, composition, frequency and dates of meetings. Please furnish copies of minutes for perusal.

3.3 Please list out the reports, which are submitted on a regular basis to the ALCO. Also, furnish sample copies of the same.

3.4 Does the PD use Maturity Gap Analysis for liquidity risk management? If yes, please furnish details of the prudential limits set by the PD for liquidity mismatches.

3.5 Does PD have a contingency funding plan including lines of credit facilities to withstand in a liquidity crisis?

4 Operational Risk and Compliance

4.1 Internal Audit:

4.1.1 Copies of internal audit plans for ... and ....

4.1.2 List of internal audits conducted during .... and .... and furnish copies of Internal Audit Reports, including Management responses.

4.1.3 Is the PD outsourced internal audit service, if so, please notify outsourcing arrangements.

4.2 **Information Technology:**

4.2.1 List the details of IT related policies and procedures adopted by the PD, including IT Security policy and IT manual for perusal.

4.2.2 Provide details of internal audit coverage of IT function. Furnish copies of latest internal audit reports, including IT Security Audit.

4.2.3 Board approved Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) for primary dealer operations for perusal.

4.2.4 IT Strategic Plan, if any for perusal.

4.2.5 The plan for adopting the e-trading platform for government securities and progress on implementation.

4.2.6 Is the PD outsourced IT Services, if so, please notify outsourcing arrangements.

4.2.7 Copy of the latest report of the Director of Payments and Settlements of Central Bank on Evaluation of Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and Disaster Recovery Site (DRS).

4.2.8 Does the PD use Wide Area Network (WAN) facility to settle transactions, which are less than Rs. 5 million in value?

4.2.9 Does the PD use Intra-day Liquidity Facility? If so, please provide transaction details for last 3 months.

4.3 **Compliance Function**

4.3.1 Has the PD appointed an independent compliance officer? Please indicate the reporting line of the compliance officer.

4.3.2 Has the PD submitted Quarterly Report on Code of Conduct? If yes, a copy of the same please made available for perusal.

4.3.3 Does the PD maintain a Customer Complaint Register?

4.3.4 Does the PD maintain a file on Regulations and Directions issued by the Central Bank?

4.3.5 Does the compliance function monitor compliance with the PD's code of conduct and report any non-compliance?

5 **Strategic and Legal Risk**

5.1 Strategic business plan along with review note on progress of achievement for perusal.

5.2 Master Repurchase Agreements (MRAs) signed with customers for Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions for perusal.

6 **Corporate Governance**

6.1 Composition of the Board of Directors and Board/Senior Management appointed Sub Committees (including Audit Committee).

6.2 Copies of Terms of Reference (TOR), for all Board/Senior Management appointed sub Committees (including Audit Committee).

6.3 Minutes of Board meetings including Board Sub Committees for last two years (perusal only).

6.4 List of regular MIS Reports and periodic reports submitted to the Board.

7 **Human Resource Management**

7.1 The organizational chart of the Primary Dealer Company.
7.2 HR Policy, training and promotion policies and succession plan of the senior management, if any.

You are kindly requested to provide us the above documents/information as soon as possible and any other relevant information when required.

Yours faithfully

.....
Examiner-in-Charge

The detail questionnaire

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – A)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Board Structure, Organization and Directors			
1. Is the Board in compliance with the Article of Association with respect to number of Directors and criteria for being a Director?			
2. Does the Board maintain complete records of the Directors, CEO, including the related interest of those persons?			
3. Has the Board notify the PDD in writing of any changes in the number of Directors as well as the profile qualifications and/or activities of the individual Directors since the last on-site examination?			
4. Are Directors rotating in accordance with the Article of Association?			
5. Is there a mechanism in place for nominating Directors?			
6. Have all transactions in the government securities involving Directors and/or the CEO been made known to the Board?			
7. Is there any evidence of these insiders being offered terms more favorable than those offered to outside customers?			
Board Meetings			
8. Review the minutes of all Board meetings since the last examination to determine if the minutes record: • any actions were taken that breach the Articles of Association • discussion/resolutions regarding new product development, customer management, capital structure, etc. • the establishment of any committees, • review and ratifications by the full Board of any actions taken by committees.			

Board Responsibilities			
9. Has the Board developed/approved/reviewed policies and procedures governing PD operations?			
10. Are any major functional areas not covered by formal policies and procedures? (If so listed)			
11. Is the CEO's performance reviewed at leased once per annum by the Board or a committee of the Board?			
12. Does the Board have a reasonable procedure to determine the CEO's remuneration?			
13. Has the Board made provisions for a successor to the CEO?			
Reporting			
14. Review all reports received by the Board at its most recent meeting to determine whether the following report were provided • Monthly balance sheet and income statements • Monthly statement of changes in equity and reserve accounts • Audit and/or on-site examination report released since last Board meeting • Correspondence addressed to the Board by the CBSL-PDD • Monthly analysis of the PD's liquidity position			
15. Are all major functional areas covered by formal policies and procedures? If so note the areas			

AUDIT COMMITTEE
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – B)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
1. If the Board has determined not to establish an Audit Committee, has this been disclosed to the PDD?			
2. If an Audit Committee has been established, has it been provided with a written TOR?			
3. Are members of the Audit Committee independent, outside directors?			
4. Does the Audit Committee meet regularly and how often?			
5. Are minutes of Audit Committee meetings kept and reports made regularly to the Board?			
6. Does the Audit Committee ensure that internal and external audits are conducted routinely in keeping with established policies and the requirements of the supervisory authorities?			
7. Does the internal auditor report directly to the Audit Committee?			
8. Does the Audit Committee monitor the following functional area in an effective manner • Accounting • Internal controls • Information technology systems • Internal auditing			
9. Does the Audit Committee monitor Board expenditures and other company perquisites?			
10. Does the Audit Committee perform the following duties: • Review the PD's risk profile on a monthly basis • Maintain an on-going check on the PD's financial performance			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
• Review compliance with the PD's corporate governance policies and the Code of Ethics, in co-ordination with the external and internal auditors. • Monitor the IT systems with specific regard to financial reporting • Ensure the accuracy of all publicly reported financial statements and their conformity with generally accepted accounting principles as well as the PDD • Recommend the selection of the external auditor, review the proposed compensation and the TOR for the assignment. • Oversee and monitor any special investigations • Review all expenses of the executive officers • Review the PD's benefit policies • Review any pending litigation or regulatory proceedings in which the PD is a party. • Advised the Board of any new or proposed regulations or Directives that are relevant to PD operations			
11. If the Board has not established an Audit Committee, who is performing the tasks identified in Question 10 above?			

THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – C)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Organization and Management Structure			
1. Has the Board established an internal Audit faction?			
2. Do PD Policies established by the Board ensure the independence of the internal auditors, as reflected in the separation of the internal audit function from other operating units in the company?			
3. To ensure the independence of the internal auditors at the practical, operating level, do internal auditors report to the Audit Committee or in the absence of an Audit Committee to the Board?			
4. Are reporting procedures such that internal auditors are subject to the influence of PD executive management and other personal?			
5. Are internal auditors precluded from performing work assigned to operations staff, such as accounting and accounting reconciliation?			
6. Are there enough internal auditors to perform their work effectively and ensure an appropriate level of coverage?			
Qualifications of Internal Auditors			
7. In view of their responsibilities, do the internal auditors have appropriate qualifications?			
8. Do the internal auditors have audit experience and are they able to communicate well, verbally and in writing?			
Internal Audit Planning and Implementation			
9. Is an internal audit program prepared on annual basis and does it ensure coverage of all PD functions and activities?			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
10. Does the Board or the Audit Committee approve the internal audit program and oversee its implementation?			
11. Do internal auditors have access to all reports, records and information?			
12. Is the depth of coverage of the internal audit adequate?			
13. Are activities not specifically reflected in the general ledger such as compliance reporting included in the internal audit program			
14. Has an internal audit manual been developed and is it in use?			
15. Does the internal audit manual provide procedures and comprehensive guideline for conducting the internal audit?			
16. Are working papers prepared and maintained by the internal auditors?			
17. Do the internal auditors prepare and submit a formal report to the Audit Committee and the Board?			
18. Does the internal audit report contain the opinions of the internal auditors with respect to the operational effectiveness, efficiency and quality?			
19. Do the internal auditors receive and review the results of the PDD Supervision Unit on-site examination and do they investigate any adverse comments and recommendations contained in the report?			
20. Do the internal auditors monitor progress in responding to the recommendations of the PDD Supervision Unit?			

INTERNAL CONTROL – FRONT-OFFICE OPERATIONS
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – D)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Policies and Procedures			
1. Are there guidelines and procedures to ensure that new products are reviewed and approved before their introduction into the market place?			
2. Is the PD operating in accordance with the rules governing the use of new products as set for in the PDD Directive			
3. Are all trading activities conducted by the PD covered in written procedures and guidelines and have appropriate internal controls been put into place to reduce risk relating to front-office operations?			
4. Are the responsibilities of the trader(s) with respect to initiating and consummating trade deals clearly set forth in written guidelines particularly with respect to market making?			
5. Is there adequate segregation of duties between the front and back offices?			
Transaction Flow			
6. Are traders providing the requisite information in the trade tickets?			
7. Are traders completing and forwarding trade tickets in a timely manner?			
8. Is the PD able to deal with disputes and discrepancies effectively and without the active involvement of the traders?			
9. Are traders maintaining manual or automated blotters and providing enough information to permit back-office reconciliation as needed?			
10. Are traders providing reports to management to permit effective and timely monitoring of risk?			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Behavior and Ethics of Traders			
1. Are traders familiar with and operating in compliance with the PD's Code of Ethics?			
2. Are issues relating to ethical behavior brought to the attention of management and dealt with in a timely and equitable fashion?			
3. Are counterpart / trader relationships monitored and complaints dealt with by somebody other than the traders?			
4. Did the external and / or internal audits reveal unacceptable trading practices?			
5. If the answer to question 14 was yes, were the problems identified dealt with in a timely and equitable manner?			
6. Does internal supervision of front-office activities appear to be adequate?			

INTERNAL CONTROL – BACK-OFFICE OPERATIONS

On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – E)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Segregation of Duties			
1. Is the trading function separate from all activities involving the confirmation, reconciliation, revaluation and clearing of transactions along with receipt and/or disbursement of funds or securities?			
2. Are traders activities confined to the initiation of trades, deal making and maintaining the dealing position and are these observed practices?			
3. With in the back-office, is there clear cut segregation of duties with respect to confirmation and reconciling, accounting payment receipts and disbursement/receipt of funds and are these procedures being observed in practice?			
4. Are transactions reviewed on a daily basis by a person other than the trader(s) to ensure transactions remained within approved limits? Is this being carried out in practice?			
Ticket Flow Procedures			
5. Is there adequate control of all trading tickets used to record purchases, sales and trading transactions well controlled?			
6. Are tickets marked in sequential order, verified and time-dated?			
7. Is there a system in place to ensure that deals are being conducted at market rates?			
8. Are transactions conducted with affiliated counterparties being carried out at rates comparable to rates used with non-affiliated parties?			
Confirmation Procedures	—	—	—
9. Is the confirmation process controlled by the back-office?			
10. Are all incoming confirmations checked against internal records (i.e. trade tickets and/or contracts)?			
11. Are discrepancies recorded and steps taken to deal with differences immediately?			
12. Is a discrepancy register maintained and it is reviewed regularly by manager to ensure resolution of outstanding items?			

SU 9 Contd...

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
. Are outgoing confirmations send within one business day after the transaction date?			
. Is there an unusual amount of discrepancies involving one particular trader and/or one particular counterparty?			
ttlement Procedures			
5. Are standardized settlement instructions used?			
6. Are settlements ageing reports prepared and monitored?			
7. Where legally binding netting arrangements are in place, receipts and disbursements carefully reviewed to ensure correct numeracy?			
8. Are all balances reconciled between sub-ledgers and/or registers and the general ledger?			
9. Are all reconciliation entries supported by an adequate audit trail?			
0. Are all reconciliations carried out in a timely manner?			
1. Are reconciliations involving front-office transactions and positions conducted by a back-office member of staff?			
Trade Discrepancies and Disputes Procedures			
22. Is a register kept of trade investigations?			
23. Is an analysis performed of the trade investigations to assess the volume and amount of outstanding trade, the number of resolved but unpaid discrepancies and disputes, trends in discrepancies and disputes with respect the party at fault, any pattern with respect to individual to PD versus			
24. Are counter party complaints dealt with by somebody other than the person who executed the contract?			
Revaluation Procedures			
25. Are front-office staffs precluded from revaluing the proprietary accounts?			
26. Are CBSL market rates used to revalue the accounts?			
Internal Audit of Back-office Operations			
27. Does the internal audit program include a risk assessment of			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
back-office operations?			
28. Are findings of the internal audit brought to the attention of senior management and the Audit Committee?			
Documentation and Record-Keeping Procedures			
29. Are appropriate documents used for all aspects of trading, confirmation, contracts and so forth?			
30. Are appropriate documents maintained in a well-organized filing system and one that provide for a good audit trail?			
31. Is record-keeping guided by appropriate records-retention policy?			

INTERNAL CONTROL – OUTSOURCING
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – F)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
. Is the PD presently outsourcing any tasks and/or functions and if so has the PD notified the Supervision Unit? (Note: if the answer is no, skip to question 12 below)			
.. Has the PD notified the supervision unit of its outsourcing arrangements?			
. Is the service provider an affiliated institution or an independent extra-group company?			
4. Has the PD has a negotiated and implemented contract with the service provider?			
5. By terms of agreement, can the PD terminate the contract if the performance level targets are not met, the ownership of the service provider changes and/or the service provider becomes insolvent or goes into receivership?			
6. Has all information relevant to the outsourced activity been made available to the examination officer?			
7. Do the PD's internal and external auditors have access to all information about the service provider as required to carry out their respective responsibilities?			
8. Has the PD established a mechanism to ensure it is managing the outsourced tasks in a responsible manner so that the integrity of the PD's system and controls are being maintained?			
9. Have PD operations been interrupted in any way and if so, what steps have been taken to overcome the problems and ensure they are not repeated in the future?			
10. Has the PD put a contingency plan in place to ensure that any disturbance or disruption in the performance of outsourced tasks and/or functions would be kept to a minimum?			
11. Is the PD intending to outsource any tasks or functions in the near future and if so has it advised the Supervision Unit?			

OPERATIONAL RISK – INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – G)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
1. Has IT risk been integrated into the overall risk management system?			
2. Have policies and procedures been developed to ensure basic controls and supervision of automated processes?			
3. Has provision been made for routine audits of automated systems?			
4. Has the assessment of IT risk been included in the work program of the internal auditor or special system auditor?			
5. Are data entry controls in place?			
6. Have preventive measures been taken such as using security devices and passwords?			
7. Is access to computers restricted to authorize personal?			
8. If more than one data base is used, are data reconciliations performed?			
9. Are processes involving both automated and manual inputs evaluated frequently enough to ensure data integrity?			
10. Are front-office personal (traders) precluded from having responsibility for report generation?			
11. Determine whether the reports generated by the IT systems are well documented in terms of inputs, computational features and outputs?			
12. Are there sufficient audit trails to evaluate and ensure data integrity for the range of functional applications provided by the IT systems?			
13. Do relevant personal understand the inputs, outputs and reports generated by the IT systems well enough to detect irregularities?			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
4. Is a member of staff responsible for verifying report content prior to its release to report users within and outside of the PD?			
5. In cases where financial modeling is used, is the documentation to support the model adequate and are users within and outside of the PD?			
6. In cases where financial modeling is used, is the documentation to support the model adequate and are users' guidelines available?			
7. Are the assumptions, equations and other computational features built into the financial models reviewed and tested regularly?			

COUNTERPARTY RISK
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q –H)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Organization and Management Structure			
1. Has the Board assigned responsibility for managing counterparty risk to specific individuals?			
2. Do staffs responsible for managing counterparty risk have enough authority and credibility to carry out their risk?			
3. Are staffs responsible for managing counterpart risk familiar with risk associated with various types of counterparties and financial instruments?			
4. Do staff responsible for managing counterparty risk report independently of traders?			
Policies and Procedures			
5. Have comprehensive, Board approved policies and procedures to manage counterparty risk been put into place?			
6. Has senior management established risk profiles for counterparty types and different financial instruments?			
7. Are policies and procedures relating to counterparty risk reviewed at least annually?			
8. Are counterparty risk assessments routinely performed?			
9. Are there strict procedures in place with respect to trading for one's own account and/or for related parties?			
10. Have counterparty trading limits been established and if so, are they been adhered to?			
11. Is a counterparty register being maintained?			
12. Are individual traders assigned counterparty trading limits?			
13. Does the PD have policies to govern the use of collateral?			
14. If collateral is used, is it marked to market on a weekly basis?			
15. Have there been instances of traders exceeding their authorized trading limits and, if so what action has been taken?			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Does the PD make routine use of master agreements?			
Have all master agreements been duly signed and certified?			
Are files maintained for all counterparties, are they kept current and do they contain adequate information?			
Are there procedures in place for approving over-limit trades?			
If over-limit trades have taken place, have they been documented and approved?			
. Is there any evidence that the PD is trading with unknown counterparties?			
. Are personnel provided with training on counterparty risk, particularly with respect to money laundering?			
. Are new products assessed with a view to counterparty risk?			
ounterparty Risk Measurement and Exposure			
4. Has the Board established counterparty risk exposure limits?			
5. Is there a system in place to monitor counterparty risk exposure against the established exposure limits?			
6. How is the PD measuring counterparty risk, if at all?			
7. Are reports prepared for senior management on counterparty risk exposure on a routine basis?			
28. Are the reports sufficiently comprehensive and does the level of risk analysis appears to be accurate and satisfactory?			

LIQUIDITY RISK
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – I)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Market Liquidity Risk Management			
1. Does the PD have a liquidity risk management function in place?			
2. Has responsibility for liquidity risk management been assigned to someone other than traders and front-office staff?			
3. Is the person tasked with managing liquidity risk routinely involved in discussions on new financial instruments and products?			
4. Do the staffs involved in liquidity risk management appear to be knowledgeable with the subject matter and with the risk associated with the various types of financial instruments?			
5. Is there a written and comprehensive Board approved policy to guide liquidity risk management?			
6. Have procedures been developed to operationalize PD policy in this area?			
7. Are policies and procedures routinely reviewed and updated as may be appropriate?			
8. Has a contingency plan been developed to deal with liquidity risk?			
rocedures and Performance			
9. Are the PD's policies and procedures to control liquidity risk being implemented and complied with?			
10. Are senior management and those responsible for managing liquidity risk provided with relevant, accurate market information on a routine basis and in a timely manner?			

1. If the answer to (12) above is yes, how have the disruptions been handled and resolved?

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
2. Are accounting and revaluation activities performed regularly enough to permit daily monitoring of the PD's liquidity position?			
3. Does there appear to be an over reliance on funds purchased in the inter-bank market?			
4. Are there any arrangements in place for emergency lines or credit?			
5. If the PD is bank owned, are parent bank funds available to resolve liquidity problems?			
16. If the answer to (17) above is yes, is the arrangement formal or informal, and if formal, has documentation been prepared and signed?			
17. What informal agreements, if any, have been reached with the parent bank?			
18. What techniques are used to monitor overall liquidity? For example, are maturity ladder schedules prepared to help forecast liquidity requirements?			

ACCOUNTING
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – J)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
Policies, Procedures and the Accounting System			
1. Are the accounting guidelines and procedures in conformity with regulatory requirements, as per the PDD directive and the accounting principles generally accepted in Sri Lanka?			
2. Is the accounting function subject to routine review by the internal and external auditors?			
3. Does the Audit Committee or in its absence, the Board monitor the performance of the accounting function?			
4. Does the accounting system record the results of operations in a cumulative manner, by discrete periods, and permit actual to budget and current with prior period comparative analysis?			
Accounting Personnel			
5. Is the accounting unit staffed in sufficient numbers to carry out its responsibilities in a timely manner?			
6. Is the accounting staff properly trained and familiar with basic accounting principles as well as company procedures and guidelines for accounting recordation?			
Accounting Procedures			
7. Are procedures in place to ensure a proper review of account revaluations, portfolio transfers, accounting reversals and account reconciliations by an appropriate manager or senior staff person, other than the accounting staff?			
8. Have all accounting transactions requiring authorization been duly authorized and the necessary documents placed in the files?			
9. Is there an appropriate degree of segregation of duties so that front-office staff and personnel handling receipts and disbursements are precluded from performing accounting functions?			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
10. Are government securities acquired properly classified with respect to Trading, Investment and Securities Available-for-Sale accounts?			
11. Is the number of transfers of securities between the Investment and the Trading accounts high?			
12. If the answer to question 13 is yes, have the transfers been based upon justifiable circumstances? (if the answer is no, make a separate note and include in the report)			
13. Have portfolio transfers been authorized and documented?			
14. Have the accounts that should be marked to market been revalued in a timely manner?			
15. Have correct market rates been used to revalue the accounts?			
16. Are sub ledgers and registers maintained that provide details for each transactions, regarding *inter alia,* counterparties and customers, types amounts and prices of securities, trade settlement and repurchase dates (as applicable), interest rates, commissions and fees?			
17. Can information be extracted promptly as may be required for risk management purposes?			
18. Are there sufficient audit trails to evaluate and ensure the integrity of the accounting data?			

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – K)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
1. Are internal reports on revenue and expenses prepared in a manner that accurately reflects the results of trading?			
2. Is income allocated to the appropriate line items?			
3. Do the financial statements tie into (i.e. reconcile with) the G/L and other registers maintained by the accounting staff?			
4. Does a sizeable sampling of making to market accounting entries indicate this activity is being performed accurately, on a weekly basis at a minimum, and that the appropriate CBSL market rates are being used?			
5. Is the gain or loss due to account revaluation being recognized in the proper accounting period and is this reflected in the financial statements?			
6. Does a senior officer or manager routinely review the disposition of all cash items relating to trading activities (at least once per month)?			
7. How is trading income defined? If the definition of income includes interest and other items, is this being reflected properly in the income statement?			
8. Are earnings being reported to senior management and the Board with enough frequency and are the reports comprehensive?			
9. Do the financial statements for the period under review indicate the booking of large and unusual income or expense items? Is so, can these be explained?			
10. Are suspense accounts in the "Other Assets" line item, being monitored to ensure 1) proper accounting for the assets 2) routine analysis and clearing of items in the suspense account and 3) transactions are not being shifted between line items?			
11. Is the PD allocating the accounts in its G/L to the appropriate line items in the financial statements?			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
12. Are Trading Receivables reviewed at least weekly for clearance of outstanding items?			
13. Are Accounts Receivables reviewed at least quarterly for collectability of outstanding items?			
14. Are all financial statements reviewed for accuracy by a member of staff independent of the preparer prior to submission of the reports?			

SU 9 Contd...

LEGAL RISK

On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – L)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
1. Do policies and procedures exist to ensure legal review with respect to documentation, counterparties and new-product development?			
2. Is there a legal review of new counterparties to ensure that the institution and/or the person acting on behalf of the counterparty has appropriate authority to engage in transactions?			
3. Is there a legal review of counterparty authority to enter into transactions involving new products?			
Documentation			
4. Has the PD established document requirements covering all aspects of trading operations?			
5. Do documents clearly indicate the information required and is that information adequate?			
6. Do documents clearly indicate all the necessary terms and conditions of the trade transactions or in the case of master agreements, Subsequent trade transactions?			
7. Are new documents, master agreements and contracts routinely subjected to legal review?			
8. Is authority to approve the use of new documentation specifically delegated to a senior manager or the CEO?			
9. Have controls been put into place to minimize risk situation where transaction documentation has not been fully completed (i.e. signed by appropriate, authorized parties) and/or transferred?			
10. Has authority to approve exceptions to the documentation requirements been delegated to a senior member of staff?			
11. Is existing documentation periodically reviewed to ensure consistency with current practices as well as PD policies and			

procedures?			
[aster Agreements			
2. Have existing master agreements been signed by duly authorize personnel?			
3. Are master agreements maintained properly in files along with relevant legal opinions and guidelines?			
4. Have master agreements been subject to legal review in keeping with the PD's policies and procedures?			
ew Product Development			
5. Is a new product review process in place and does it provides for the consideration of legal counsel opinions?			
6. Are existing products periodically subject to legal review?			
7. Is legal counsel sought prior to entering into the PD engaging in trading arrangements involving new products developed by counterparties?			

CODE OF CONDUCT
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – M)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
1. Has the PD established and institutionalized a Code of Conduct (Code)?			
2. Has the PD established and institutionalized additional codes and/or guidelines for specific activities that are unique to PD operations?			
. If the answer to (2) above is yes, note the specific codes that have been introduced and assess their effectiveness in promoting the good reputation of the PD.			
Confidentiality and insider Information			
. Does the code and any additional codes address issues relating to employee-counterparty relationships, including: a. Safeguarding confidentiality b. Appropriate restrictions on sharing information specific to counterparties within and outside of the PD c. Are employees required to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with legal and regulatory restrictions with respect to the use of insider information?			
onflict of Interest			
5. Are there specific restrictions to limit or preclude trading for an employee's personal account?			
6 Are borrowings favors acceptance of gifts, bribes and other remunerations by an employee strictly prohibited			
Trading and marketing Practices			
7. Do the Code and/or associated guidelines ensure that any traders and marketing staff avoid creating unjustified expectations on the part of the counterparties?			
8. Are there guidelines and procedures to ensure that any agency relationship are conducted on the basis of a formal agreement that outline the authority, right and responsibility of both the			

PD and the counterparty			
Compliance Measures			
. Is all staff made aware of the existence of the code and its importance in their daily activities?			
0. Are procedures and mechanisms in place to monitor compliance with the code?			
1. Are PD personnel required to confirm in writing on an annual basis that they have read the code and agree to abide by its principles?			
2. Are mechanisms in place to report a breach of the code?			
3. Does the internal auditor review the compliance of PD staff with code?			
4. Does the internal auditor review the effectiveness of monitoring staff compliance with the code?			
5. Are there mechanisms in place for staff to report activities that might be in breach of the code?			
6. Does the Board review the code and related guidelines from time to time update the document(s) if necessary?			

MARKET RISK

On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – N)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
1. Does the PD have a market risk management function in place?			
2. Has responsibility for market risk management been assigned to someone other than traders and front-office staff?			
3. Is the person tasked with managing market risk involved in discussions on new financial instruments on a regular basis?			
4. Do the staff involved in market risk management appear to be knowledgeable with the subject matter and the market risks associated with the various types of financial instruments			
5. Is there a written, comprehensive Board-approved policy to guide market risk management?			
6. Have procedures been developed to operationalize PD policy in this area?			
7. Are policies and procedures routinely reviewed and updated as may be appropriate?			
8. Is there contingency plan to deal with market risk?			
Procedures and Performance			
9. Have market risk limits been defined?			
0. Are senior management and those responsible for managing market risk provided with relevant accurate market information on a routine basis and in a timely manner?			
1. Are meaningful management information reports on market risk generated and distributed in a timely manner?			
2. Have there been instances of market disruptions related to market risk that have affected the ability of the PD to conduct its trading operations?			
3. If answer to (12) above is yes, what has been the response of the PD?			
4. Do the trading limits established to manage market risk appear to be adequate?			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
5. Are there specific procedures in place for expectations to market risk exposure limits?			

COMPLIANCE REPORTING
On-Site Examination Questionnaire (Q – O)

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
1. Are the compliance reports reviewed for accuracy by a senior manager other than the person who prepared the reports prier to their submission to the PDD?			
2. Is the preparation of the compliance reporting package subject to evaluation by the internal auditor?			
3. Are there controls in place to ensure that the compliance reports are accurate complete and that the information is reliable?			
4. Is there clear and concise supporting documentation on file to back up the contents of the reports?			
5. Do the reports reconcile to the GL and other sub-ledgers maintained by the PD?			
6. Do the staffs responsible for report compilation have enough understanding of the material they are dealing with, particularly the different types of trading instruments?			
7. Are the reports reviewed by a member of staff from the accounting department for accuracy?			
8. If material post-statement adjustments have been made, are these properly documented and is the PDD notified?			
9. If the PD outsourcers the accounting function, have procedures been put in place to ensure the reporting information reconciles to the accounting data?			
10. Does the person signing off on the reports review and confirm the accuracy of the information?			
11. If new products have been introduced, are staffs responsible for report generation made aware of any changes to be introduced into the reporting formats?			
12. Does the data contained in the reports conform to the PDD guidelines in terms of content and presentation?			

Examination Questions	Yes	No	Comments
3. Is a procedure in place to ensure that the changes introduced by the PDD are implemented by the appropriate PD personnel?			

Formulas used to evaluate Financial Position and Performance of Primary Dealers.

1. Net Interest margin

$$\text{Net Interest margin} = \frac{\text{Average Net Interest Income or Loss}}{\text{Average Total Portfolio}} * 12$$

E.g. - Net Interest Margin calculation for the month of June

$$= \left[\frac{\text{Cumulative Net Interest Income or Loss (Jan to June) /6}}{\text{Sum of Total Portfolio at each month end (Jan to June) /6}} \right] * 12$$

- Net Interest income/Loss = Interest Income - Interest Expenses
- Total Portfolio =Trading Securities + Investment Securities + Reverse repo + Available For sale

2. Trading Gain Ratio

$$\text{Trading Gain Ratio} = \frac{\text{Capital Gains or Losses + Revaluation Gains or Losses}}{\text{Trading Portfolio}}$$

- Capital Gain /Loss – Gain / Loss from disposing capital assets at a higher or lower value from its cost.
- Revaluation Gain/Loss – Increase or Decrease in market value of trading and available for sale portfolio

3. Cost to Income

$$\text{Cost to Income} = \frac{\text{Total Operating Expenses}}{\text{Net Interest Income or Loss + Capital Gains or Losses + Revaluation Gain/Loss}}$$

- Total Operation Expenses = (Personal cost + General & Administration Expenses + Marketing Expenses + Finance and Other Expenses) – (Commission & fees or brokerage)

4. Repo/Assets

$$\text{Repo/Assets} = \frac{\text{Outstanding Repurchase Transactions Balance}}{\text{Total Assets}}$$

- Total Assets = Total Portfolio + Other Assets
- Other Assets Includes Fixed Assets, Intangible Assets, cash, other Investments & etc...

5. Leveraging times

$$\text{Leveraging times} = \frac{\text{Outstanding Repurchase Transactions Balance}}{\text{Unimpaired Capital}}$$

6. Repo/Total Portfolio

$$\text{Repo/Total Portfolio} = \frac{\text{Outstanding Repurchase Transactions Balance}}{\text{Total Portfolio}}$$

7. ROE - Return on Equity (Annualized)

$$\text{ROE} = \left[\frac{\text{Average Net Profit after Tax}}{\text{Average Unimpaired Capital}^{a/}}\right] *12$$

E.g. - ROE calculation for the month of June

$$= \left[\frac{\textit{Cumulative Net Profit after Tax (Jan to June) /6}}{\textit{Sum of Unimpaired Capital at each month end (Jan to June) /6}}\right] *12$$

- [a]/ - Unimpaired Capital = Equity Capital; i.e.:- Share Capital and Reserves(Reserves includes SRR, Retained Earnings and Other Reserves)

8. ROA - Return on Assets (Annualized)

$$\text{ROA} = \left[\frac{\text{Average Net Profit before Tax}}{\text{Average Total Assets}}\right] *12$$

E.g. - ROA calculation for the month of June

$$= \left[\frac{\textit{Cumulative Net Profit before Tax (Jan to June) /6}}{\textit{Sum of Total Assets at each month end (Jan to June) /6}}\right] *12$$

9. RWCAR- Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio

$$\text{RWCAR} = \frac{\text{Audited Capital}^{b/}}{\text{Risk Weighted Total Assets}^{c/}}$$

- b/ - If the PD has incurred a cumulative loss after the last audit, the cumulative loss has to be deducted from the audited capital. Audited Capital contains audited Share Capital and Reserves(Reserves includes SRR, Retained Earnings and Other Reserves)
- c/ - Risk weighted assets consists of Risk weighted assets for capital charge, risk weighted assets for counterparty risk and risk weighted other assets

Formulas used to evaluate the Market Participation of PDs

Primary Auction

1. Subscription Level

$$\text{Subscription level} = \frac{\text{Amount Bid by PD}}{\text{Amount Offered by Central Bank}}$$

2. Effective Participation

$$\text{Effective Participation} = \frac{\text{Successful bids of PD}}{\text{Total Bids Accepted}}$$

3. Rate of Success

$$\text{Rate of Success} = \frac{\text{Successful bids of PD}}{\text{Amount Bid by PD}}$$

- The above three ratios are calculated for the each maturity of every auction as well as for cumulative periods.

Secondary Market

1. Participation level by Individual PDs

$$\text{Participation level} = \frac{\text{Total value of the secondary market transactions done by PD}}{\text{Total value of the secondary market transactions done by all PDS}}$$

2. Percentage of Outright Transactions

$$\text{Percentage of Outright Transactions} = \frac{\text{Total value of outright transactions done by PD}}{\text{Total value of secondary market transactions done by PD}}$$

Formulas used to evaluate the Liquidity Position in terms of Asset and Liability Mismatch

1. Mismatch of Assets and Liabilities as a % of Total Portfolio

$$= \frac{\text{Market Value of Financial Assets}^{a/} - \text{Market Value of Financial Liabilities}^{b/}}{\text{Trading Portfolio+ Reverse Repo Portfolio}}$$

2. Mismatch of Assets and Liabilities as a % of Liabilities

$$= \frac{\text{Market Value of Financial Assets}^{a/} - \text{Market Value of Financial Liabilities}^{b/}}{\text{Total Value of Repo Balance}}$$

a. Financial Assets includes Reverse Repo portfolio, Trading Portfolio and Other Assets
b. Financial Liabilities includes Repo Agreements and Other Liabilities

Formulas used for Stress Testing

1. Impact of change of interest rate on the total Portfolio (For 100bps)

= Total Market Value * Modified Duration * (0.01)

E.g. - Impact of change of interest rate on the total Portfolio (For 100bps)
Total Market value=5,000Mn
Modified Duration = 0.3
*Impact = 5,000*0.3*(0.01)*

- Modified duration of an Instrument = $\frac{\text{Macaulay Duration}^{a/}}{1+\left[\frac{\text{Benchmark Yield Rate of the security\%}}{\text{Coupon payments Per Year}}\right]}$

- a/ Macaulay Duration $= \frac{\sum_{t+1}^{n} \frac{t*C}{(1+y)^t} + \frac{n*M}{(1+y)^n}}{\text{Current Bond Price}}$

  - t = Time period at which coupon payments will occur (In Years)
  - C= Periodic coupon payment
  - Y= Bench mark Yield Rate
  - n= no of years remaining to maturity
  - M= Maturity Value

2. Capital Erosion %

$= \frac{\text{Impact of change of interest rate on the total Portfolio} * 100}{\text{Audited Capital}}$

Appendix 4

Formulas used to evaluate Financial Position and Performance of Primary Dealers.

1. Net Interest margin

$$\text{Net Interest margin} = \frac{\text{Average Net Interest Income or Loss}}{\text{Average Total Portfolio}} * 12$$

E.g. - Net Interest Margin calculation for the month of June

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- Total Portfolio =Trading Securities + Investment Securities + Reverse repo + Available For sale

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$$\text{Leveraging times} = \frac{\text{Outstanding Repurchase Transactions Balance}}{\text{Unimpaired Capital}}$$

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$$= \left[\frac{\textit{Cumulative Net Profit after Tax (Jan to June) /6}}{\textit{Sum of Unimpaired Capital at each month end (Jan to June) /6}}\right] * 12$$

- [a]/ - Unimpaired Capital = Equity Capital; i.e.:- Share Capital and Reserves(Reserves includes SRR, Retained Earnings and Other Reserves)

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Formulas used to evaluate the Liquidity Position in terms of Asset and Liability Mismatch

1. Mismatch of Assets and Liabilities as a % of Total Portfolio

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E.g. - Impact of change of interest rate on the total Portfolio (For 100bps)
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- Modify duration = $\dfrac{\text{Duration}}{1+\left[\dfrac{\text{Market Yield}}{\text{Coupon payments Per Year}}\right]}$

2. Capital Erosion %

$$= \frac{\text{Impact of change of interest rate on the total Portfolio} * 100}{\text{Total Capital as per CAR}}$$

Report tabled on 19.05.2016 by
Hon Lakshman Kiriella, M.P.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO LOOK INTO THE BOND ISSUES OF THE CENTRAL BANK 2015

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO LOOK INTO THE BOND ISSUES OF THE CENTRAL BANK 2015

The Honourable Prime Minister who is also the Minister of Policy Planning, Economic Affairs, Child, Youth and Cultural Affairs appointed the Committee based on the following terms of Reference;

The Terms of Reference of the Committee are to investigate into;

1) The reason for the Department of Public Debt of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to make an announcement to issue a total of LKR 1 Billion;

2) The sequence of events and key statistics associated with the said Bond Issue with respect to each Primary Dealer;

3) The bids received and allocations made by the Public Debt Department of the Central Bank in every Bond issue beginning from January 1st 2012 by Auctions and Private Placements.

The Prime Minister who is the Minister of Policy Planning made available the services of Mr. W A Wijewardena the former Deputy Governor of the CBSL. Mr. W A Wijewardena assisted the Committee in technical aspects.

The reason for the Department of Public Debt of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to make an announcement to issue a total of LKR 1 Billion

The Committee interviewed the Superintendent of Public Debt Department (PDD), Mrs. Deepa Seneviratne and the Assistant Superintendent of the Public Debt Department (PDD) Dr. Aazim.

According to the said officials of the Public Debt Department the following sequence of events were revealed;

1. The Government debt requirement is estimated one month prior by the Public Debt Department (PDD) of the Central Bank (CBSL) in consultation with the Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC). We have also been furnished with a copy of letter dated 20/02/2015 sent to the Superintended of PDD by the Director General of Department of Treasury Operations (Mr. M. S. D. Ranasiri). The cash flow and borrowing requirement for the month of March has been annexed to the said letter. In terms of the said annexure the borrowing requirement as at 02/03/2015 was Rs.13,550,000,000/- (Rs Thirteen point five hundred and fifty billion). In terms of the said document the entirety of funding has to be through Treasury Bonds. A Copy is annexed marked as "X1" for easy reference.

2. The Monetary Board at it's meeting held on 23. 02. 2015, copy of which is annexed as "X2" (Meeting No 4/2015), decided the following:

"2.3. The board was of the view that issuing 30 year treasury bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and re-profile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors. Accordingly the board instructed the SPD to conduct a thirty year Treasury Bond Auction during the week and arrange to list Sovereign Bonds in Euro Clear Exchange in future".

3. The Monetary Board had intimated prior to the 23rd February 2015 of the desire to raise funds through the Bond Auctions and depending on the

market appetite, to discourage direct placements. In fact this is in line with the Operational Manual of the PDD (paragraph 3(a) page 10).

Direct Placement (private placement)

3.1 At this stage it is pertinent to define the method of direct placement, which is commonly known as private placement. As p the information obtained through the Public Debt Department, th bonds are issued to a value that is lower than the actual Government Funding requirement. The reason for this, as explain by the officials of the PDD, is on the basis that if the market is aware of the actual debt requirement of the Government, the market will forward bids with competitively higher interest rates.

3.2. Therefore the PDD announces a bond, which is lesser than the actual fund requirement of the Government and usually accepts around two to two and a half times more than the value of the bond Auctioned. Thereafter the PDD was planning to call for Direct Placement (private placement) to satisfy the balance requirement of Government funding.

3.3. The Committee observed that the monies raised through Private Placements are far greater than the Bond Auctions. Even though the officials of the PDD were of the opinion that the Private Placement is a healthy mechanism, the Primary Dealers interviewed by the Committee were of the opinion that the Private Placement lacks transparency. Mr. Samarasiri who is the acting Governor and the Chairman of the Tender Board ratified the said sentiments.

3.4. The Committee observes that there is no proper mechanism with regard to private placement. There is no record as to how the decisions with regard to the private placements are made other than records pertaining to the private placements issued on special instructions. As per the document annexed hereto as "X3", the Committee observes that an average of over 90 percent of the Government debt requirement have been through private placement. The Committee observes that this has affected effective participation by the Primary Dealers at auctions. In fact prior to 27/02/2015 the usual bids by Primary Dealers range between 30 to 50, occasionally going slightly higher. After 27/02/2015 (upon suspension of private placements) the bids received by the CBSL is ranging between 130 to 170.

4. When the Governor was interviewed by the Committee he explained that he made it clear that the restart of auctions was important. He explained that the previous Government had borrowed large sums of money both locally and internationally and it had reached beyond the spill level of debt. He opined that the said maximum levels had been reached in early 2014 and the previous Government had resorted to borrowing through commercial banks. He further pointed out that the previous Governor borrowed from EPF and invested in commercial banks and instructed commercial banks to borrow from overseas. In this context he stated that BOC had raised one billion dollars. NSB had raised 1 billion dollars and DFCC had raised 200 million dollars. The Governor also stated that when he assumed duties on the 23rd of January there was a repayment of 500 million dollars and the Central Bank did not have enough foreign currency to meet such payment and that itself created some volatility in the market.

5. Answering the reason to go for a 30-year bond he said the monetary board and the PDD decided to start with the longest tenure bond and work backwards. He explained that if you start at a shorter end, the interest rate will shoot up due to the duration of the curve and market wil start building up the interest rates.

6. When questioned about the effect on the interest rates rising sharply, he explained that the previous Governor's practice of controlling interest rates at 5 % for the whole month except for three days was actually confusing the market. However the market was unclear at that time because the CBSL had not been clear in declaring its Monetary Policy. He also said that he believes that the market should determine the interest rates and was not agreeable with the artificial depression of interest rates from September 2014 up until the elections. So his instructions to the staff of CBSL has been to ensure that they move towards a market based system to raise funds and the price determined to pay for that funding is market driven.

7. When questioned about the success of new Monetary Policy, he said that there is effective participation in the market and that CBSL are raising record amounts of money in the market. When he was asked if he acted in a manner, which favoured any particular Primary Dealer, his answer was that he did not do so and that his concern was to raise money for the Government and not to see who is funding it. He said that the prior month failures and additional funding requirements of the Government were the main objectives he wished to fulfill.

8. Therefore given the fact that the funding requirement of the Government as at 02/03/2015 was 13.550 billion rupees the PDD had decided to announce the said 30-year bond upto an amount of 1 billion rupees. Even

though the minutes of the Monetary Board number 4/2015 specifies to issue a 30-year treasury bond, the amount of the bond has not been decided by the Monetary Board. This exercise is vested with the PDD as per the Operational Manual of the PDD.

The sequence of events and key statistics associated with the said Bond Issue with respect to each Primary Dealer

9. The advertisement and press release with regard to the 30-year bond (12.50% 2045 A) had been published. At the time of closing the bids on 27/02/2015, the PDD had received 36 bids and the statistics of the same are as follows:

BIDS SUBMITTED BY PRIMARY DEALERS FOR THE AUCTION HELD ON 27TH FEBRUARY 2015

Name of the Primary Dealer	Bid (Mn)	Price	Yield Net of Tax	Accepted bids (Mn)	Bid %
Acuity Securities Ltd	50 100	112.01 86.74	9.99 13.00	50 -	15%
First Capital Treasuries Ltd	100	110.95	10.09	100	10%
Entrust Securities PLC	50 50	104.5 103.11	1074 10.89	50 50	10%
Employees Provident Fund	500 1000 500	104.5 104.2 99.99	10.74 10.99 11.29	500 100 500	200%

Peoples Bank	100	102.2	10.99	100	10%
Natwealth Securities ltd	50 50	102.20 99.99	10.99 11.25	50 50	10%
Seylan Bank PLC	1250	95.8	11.75	1250	125%
Wealth Trust Securities PLC	50 50	93.87 90.17	11.99 12.50	50 50	10%
HSBC	100	90.17	12.50	100	10%
Pan Asia Banking Corporation	250 150 100	90.17 88.42 86.74	12.50 12.75 12.99	250 - -	50%
Capital Alliance	100	90.17	12.50	100	10%
Commercial Bank of Ceylon	50 50	86.74 86.08	12.99 13.10	- -	10%
Union Bank	50 50	76.48 74.21	14.75 15.20	- -	10%
Sampath Bank PLC	100	62.62	18.00	-	10%
Perpetual Treasuries	250 250 500 1000	97.87 95.83 93.87 91.99	11.50 11.75 11.99 12.24	250 500 500 1000	200%
Bank of Ceylon	8 500	119.33 109.39	9.35 9.99	8 500	
On behalf of Perpetual Treasuries	3000 5000 5000	90.16 88.40 86.76	12.50 12.75 12.99	3000 - -	

10. In terms of the aforesaid, the cumulative amount tendered was amounting to Rs. 20,708, 000, 000/-. Since the earlier instructions of the Monetary Board in line with the manual of PDD (page 10, para 3 (a)) the Governor had requested to seek the possibility to accept the Government funding requirement from the market.

11. The Public Debt Department thereafter forwarded a document to the Tender Board, which is annexed to this report for easy perusal marked as X4 together with their recommendations. In terms of that report, The Tender Board at its meeting held on 27/02/2015 (meeting no: 02/2015) considered the options and granted the approval for accepting Rs.10,058,000,000/ at the net of tax WAYR of 11.73%, Upon considering;

a.) Tight financial requirement of the Government;
b.) Prevailing high liquidity level in the market as reflected in the bids;
c.) The term structure of interest rates prevailed prior to September 2014.

12. The Committee considered the structure of the Auction Committee (Tender Board) members from 01.01.2012 to date:

The Treasury Bond Tender Board is comprised of the following members:

1. Deputy Governor In Charge of the PDD- Chairperson
2. Assistant Governor in Charge of PDD
3. Assistant Governor in Charge of Price Stability Sector
4. Superintendent of Public Department
5. Director, Economic Research Department
6. Director, Domestic Operations Dept.

C/ DGG

7. Additional Superintendent of Public Debt.

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13. In terms of the minutes of meeting number 2/2015 the decision to acce Rs.10,058,000,000/- has been approved by the members of the Treasu Bond Tender Committee meeting and the attendance of the same as reflected by the attendance sheet are as follows:

1.) Mr. P. Samarasiri DG (S)
2.) Mrs S. Rathnayake AG (S)
3.) Mr. C. P. A. Karunathilake AG (KL)
4.) Mrs. C. M. D. N. K. Seneviratne SPD (PDD)
5.) Mr. P. W. V. N . R. Rodrigo DDO (DOD)
6.) Mrs. S. Gunaratne DER (ERD)
7.) Mrs. U. L. Muthugala ASPD (PDD)
8.) Dr. M. Z. M Aazim ASPD (PDD)

14. The Committee observes that the Bank Of Ceylon being a Primary Dealer had placed bids amounting to Rs. 13,000,000,000/- for and on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries. At the interviews, both the Chief Dealer of BOC and the CEO of Perpetual Treasuries stated that this is the first time ever that a Primary Dealer had forwarded bids at an auction for and on behalf of another Primary dealer to the best of their knowledge.

15. The Chief Dealer of BOC informed the Committee that no Board approval was sought in forwarding bids on behalf of another Primary Dealer amounting to Rs. 13,000,000,000/- and failed to apprise the board of BOC even thereafter. He further stated that this is not a credit facility. When the Committee questioned the Chief Dealer of BOC he further stated that Perpetual Treasuries made a call with regard to placing the said bids and mentioned that the funding for such bid is by an Insurance Company. The

Chief Dealer of BOC also stated that he inquired from the CEO of Perpetual Treasuries as to the reason of high amount of yield net of tax and the reply he received from the CEO of Perpetual Treasuries was " awoth atha thamai" (The rough meaning is a colossal profit, if successful).

16. However answering questions by the Committee, the CEO of Perpetual Treasuries denied that he mentioned that their source of funding is by an Insurance Company. He also disputed that it is he who said "Awoth atha thamai" and said that it is the Chief Dealer of BOC who said " Awoth atha thamai". The Committee observes the said discrepancies in the following context.

a.) Though there is no legal bar, it is unusual for a Primary Dealer to forward bids through another Primary Dealer;

b.) The Chief Dealer of BOC has acted without Board approval and has failed and neglected to apprise the Board of BOC thereafter.

c.) The Chief Dealer of BOC had failed to exercise due diligence in checking the source of funding;

d.) The lack of transparency and disparity in statements of the Chief Dealer of BOC and CEO of Perpetual Treasuries;

e.) The discrepancy of statements made by each other.

17. The Committee further observes that the bidding pattern of Perpetual Treasuries at this bond auction is unusual for two reasons.

a.) Considering their previous bidding patterns, bids amounting to Rs.2,000,000,000/- when the value of the Bond is Rs. 1,000,000,000/

b.) Seeking the assistance of BOC to forward bids amounting to Rs.13,000,000,000/- given the fact that the value of the bond announced was 1 billion.

18. When the Committee interviewed the CEO of Perpetual Treasuries specifically of the unusual bidding pattern at this auction by Perpetual Treasuries, his explanation was as follows:

a.) They were well aware that the Government would be raising unusually high funds for payments of several projects.

b) Answering the questions by the Committee as to whether they possessed any inside information to that effect, his answer was that the said information was available in the public domain and does not amount to insider information.

c.) The reason to request BOC to forward bids on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries, he said, that due to the cash influx needed for settlement and the capacity of BOC that he thought fit to seek the support of BOC. He further said that he sought the assistance of Acuity Holdings but failed to do so due to the unavailability of the Director.

d.) Perpetual Treasuries always had an aggressive approach and this was no different. He also said that the Central Bank had, at times, rejected Perpetual Treasuries, because they were too aggressive on TAP issues.

e.) They were successful of securing 50% of the accepted bids due to their careful analysis of the market elements and all factors considered.

19. The Committee at this stage can only make an observation that the bidding pattern of Perpetual Treasuries and securing 50% of the accepted bids as unusual. Given the limited scope of the TOR this Committee is not empowered to make any assumption with regard to the aforesaid. However, in the interest of the public since the said transaction involves public funds and fiscal regulations of the Government, the Committee observes that a full-scale investigation by a proper Government Authority is warranted.

20. The Committee further observes that the Board of Directors of BOC shall initiate a full-scale investigation and if necessary a forensic audit into the activities of the Dealer room of BOC given the fact that it is a State Bank. The Committee further observes that the Board of Directors of BOC may call for explanation from the Chief Dealer and his superior officers with regard to ad-hoc decisions made considering the large portfolio of BOC funds that are involved as stated above.

21. Though not directly within the mandate of the TOR the Committee questioned Mrs. Deepa Seneviratne, the Superintendent of PDD, Dr. Aazim, The Assistant SPD of PDD, and Mr. Samarasiri the Acting Governor of the CBSL whether this bond issue had caused any loss to the

Government and if so a rough estimate of the same. All three stated tha they do not agree that there is a loss to the Government given the fact that market conditions vary with regard to the Treasury Bonds dependi on various factors and the volume of funds raised. Mr. Samarasiri furnished a copy of the judgment of Supreme Court in Case no: SC FR 457/2012 (The Greek Bonds case). He requested the Committee to take note of a particular paragraph which the Committee thinks fit to quote i verbatim;

Sri Pavan J (as he was then)
" We must not forget that in complex economic policy matters, every decision is necessarily empiric and therefore its validity cannot be tested on any rigid formula or strict consideration....."

22. The Committee observes that there is no impediment for the Governme and or Parliament and or any Organization with public interest to engage in necessary mechanism in establishing the loss to the Government, if existent.

23. The Committee also observes, from the information placed before the Committee, that there is a serious lack of transparency pertaining to the activities of the PDD of the CBSL. There is no proper supervision of the activities between the Primary Dealers and the PDD. There is no recordir of calls, there is no log of any documents received, no supervision of electronic footprint; such as text messages and emails between the officials of the PDD and the Primary Dealers.

24. Since the PDD is dealing with the most sensitive information of the Government, the Committee is of the opinion that a proper supervisory

and monitoring mechanism has to be immediately implemented with regard to the activities of the PDD and the Primary Dealers.

25. The Committee also observes that an internal document of the Central Bank that contains statistics that are highly confidential is in the public domain. The availability of the said document on the web, newspapers, private circulation, complete with all signatures of the CBSL officials leaves room to doubt the sanctity of sensitive confidential information within a secure environment of the CBSL. The Committee had been informed by the officials of the CBSL that no internal inquiry had been initiated upto date with regard to the question of the said document appearing in the public domain.

26. The Committee further observes that the sentiments expressed by several Primary Dealers establishes a conjecture that sensitive information of the Central Bank and the secrecy of the same may have been compromised on occasions. The Committee is very careful to take note that this is only an assumption bordering on an allegation and nothing more. However, given the fact that a document containing sensitive information is available in the public domain, there may be a possibility of the secrecy of information possessed by the CBSL being compromised. In view of the aforesaid the Committee observes that a full-scale investigation by a proper Government Authority is warranted upon the activities of the PDD and its officials and any other Department of CBSL and its officers, to ascertain whether there is any truth in the assumptions pertaining to the sensitive information of the CBSL being compromised.

27. Given the sanctity and the obligations vested with the CBSL in managing the lifeblood of commerce in Sri Lanka and the onerous responsibility that calls for conduct beyond reproach, the Committee observes that it is not

unfair for the general public to expect a high level of integrity in the conduct of the officials of the CBSL that includes the Deputy Governors and the Governor. Therefore the monitoring of the digital footprints of t officials of the CBSL will espouse the cause in maintaining public trust.

The bids received and allocations made by the Public Debt Departme of the Central Bank in every Bond issue beginning from January 1st 2012 by Auctions and Private Placements.

28. The Committee observed that whilst there is only one volume of papers with regard to bond issues by auction for the period of 2012 upto date, there were over four volumes of files available with regard to direct placements.

29. The Committee also took note of a composite document given by Mr. Samarasiri that contained the following statistics.

Year	Auction	Private Placements	Total	Total/ Auction ratio	Auction	Privat
2012	59.3	788.6	847.9	14.3	7.0	93.0
2013	201.2	815.9	1017.1	5.1	19.8	80.2
2014	27.8	832.9	860.7	31.0	3.2	96.8

30. In terms of the said chart Mr. Samarasiri explained that majority of the Treasury bond issues had been through private placement thus hindering the effective participation of the Primary Dealers. He further explained that the practice of direct placement servicing the financing needs does not comply with the policies of the CBSL.

31. The Committee observes that the Operational Manual of the PDD specifies that arrangement to meet financing needs has to be through auction as much as possible. Even the Primary Dealers confirmed that private placement overtaking the auctions may not be good practice due to issues of transparency and effective market participation.

32. In another event of concern Mr. Samarasiri in stating that the practices prior to 2015 did lack transparency and undermined the effectiveness of the Tender Board Committee. He furnished a document (marked as "X5") with regard to the issuance of Treasury bond auctions held on 27th May 2014 wherein there had been no discussion or participation by the members of the Tender Committee. Whereas the document containing the observations had been signed only by the Superintendent of PDD and the Governor. Mr. Samarasiri pointed out that the Tender Board Committee had not been privy to the content of this document since ex facie the signatures of the members of the Tender Board is not on record nor is there a minute of the meeting of the Tender Board Committee.

33. The Committees observed that the private placements (Direct Placements) when made are erratic and has no rationale. Prior bonds issued through auction are placed as direct placement sometimes many years later, thus creating issues of consistency, transparency, and

effective participation. Even though the PDD explained to the Committ that all Dealers are given the opportunity for direct placement they we unable to furnish any proof of such claim due to the absence of the availability of phone records, e-mails or any other documentation. The Committee takes serious note of the lack of paper trail with transaction running up to 2012.

34. The Committee having observed the nature, in which the auctions had been carried out without the proper function of the Tender Board Committee and the lack of paper trail and or recorded calls with regard t Direct Placements, thinks prudent that a full-scale investigation has to b done with regard to direct placements up to 2012.

35. Due to the enormity of the documents involved in direct placements from 01. 01. 2012 up to date, it is vexatious and an exercise in futility to reproduce the statistics in this report. However the Committee has carefully studied the direct placements from;

a.) 01st January 2012 up to June contained in volume 11.

b.) 2012 July to December contained in volume 12.

c.) 2013 January to December contained in volume 13.

d.) 2014 January to December contained in volume 14.

36. The Committee also perused documents containing bids received and accepted in bond issues by auctions;

a.) 2012 January to July contained in volume 16

b.) 2013 till 17. 03. 2015 contained in volumes 2 and 3

37. The Committee reiterates that the bonds that are issued are never closed, and the bonds issued several years before are re-adjusted on maturity period and privately placed many years later. This amounts to lack of transparency and opening out for manipulation and suspicion.

38. The Committee re-iterates that this is only a fact finding Committee with a limited mandate granted on the Terms of Reference as above. The Committee makes a humble request to the Hon. Prime Minister who is also the Minister of Policy Planning, Economic Affairs, Child, Youth and Cultural Affairs to take all necessary steps within the powers vested in him in taking further remedial measures that may be necessary.

39. The Chairman and the Members of the Committee extends sincere gratitude to all those who appeared before the Committee and the documents submitted upon request. The Chairman and the Members of the Committee further appreciates the invaluable assistance rendered by Mr.W A Wijewardena who guided the Committee with regard to the technical aspects of the investigations.

40. A word of gratitude has to be said about the staff at the Prime Minister Secretariat, particularly Mr. Saman Ekanayake, Ms. Damayanthi Wijesinghe, Ms. Razeena Sheriff and Ms. Anusha Cooray. The Committe also thanks Prof. Kithsiri Liyanage, the Secretary to the Ministry of Polic Planning and Economic Affairs and his staff.

GAMINI PITIPANA
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
CHAIRMAN

MAHESH KALUGAMPITIYA
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
COMMITTEE MEMBER

CHANDIMAL MENDIS
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
COMMITTEE MEMBER

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SPECIAL SUB COMMITTEE OF COPE TO LOOK INTO THE BOND ISSUES OF THE SRI LANKA CENTRAL BANK

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

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SPECIAL SUB COMMITTEE OF COPE TO LOOK INTO THE BOND ISSUES OF THE SRI LANKA CENTRAL BANK

Tuesday, 26th May, 2015.

PRESENT:

The Hon. DEW Gunasekara (Chairman)
The Hon. Arjuna Ranatunga
The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake
The Hon. A.D. Susil Premajayantha
The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna
The Hon. Weerakumara Dissanayake
The Hon. M.T. Hasen Ali
The Hon. E. Saravanapavan
The Hon. Mahinda Amaraweera - Observer

Mr. W.M.N.P. Iddawala - Deputy Secretary-General of Parliament, Secretary to the Committee
Mr. J.R. Gajaweera Arachchige, Director, (Legislative Services), Parliament
Mr. M.E. Lionel Fernando, Advisor to the Chairman

In attendance:
Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne, Acting Auditor-General
Ms. L.S.I. Jayaratna, Superintendent of Audit
Ms. E.A.N.P. Edirisinghe, Superintendent of Audit

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena, Former Senior Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Sri Lanka; Dr. R.H.S. Samaratunga, Secretary to the Treasury and Mr. M.S.D. Ranasiri, Director General, Department of Treasury Operations, examined.

The Chairman: Good morning, Dr. Wijewardena.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Good morning.

The Chairman: Thank you very much for having responded to our kind invitation. On behalf of the Committee, I must first thank you.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It is my pleasure to be present here.

The Chairman: Dr. W.A. Wijewardena was the former Senior Deputy Governor of the Central Bank. He was the authorityon the subject and there is no one else in Sri Lanka today to speak aboutTreasury Bills and Treasury Bonds better than him. So that is why we thought of inviting him to brief us about the working of theTreasury as well as the Central Bank with regard to Treasury Bonds and Treasury Bills. It is only an awareness programme. After that, the Secretary to the Treasury will come before the Committee. Then, we will start the formal inquiry. ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු ජොෂ්ඨ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ලංකාවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර හා බිල්පත් පිළිබඳව අත්දැකීමක් තිබෙන සහ විශේෂඥ දැනුමක් තිබෙන කෙනෙක්. මේක තාක්ෂණික විෂයයක්- technical subject එකක් නිසා අපේ විභාගය/ පරීක්ෂණය ආරම්භ කිරීමට ප්‍රථම එතුමා කැඳවලා, ගරු සාමාජික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට ඒ පිළිබඳව අවබෝධයක් ලබා දීමට අපි කල්පනා කළා. .Dr. Wijewardena, you can start explaining now in English.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Thank you very much for inviting me to speak before this COPE Subcommittee. I will start with an explanation of what a Treasury Bond is because most of us, who are outside the Central Bank, are not in a position to know what a Treasury Bond is. Government wants to raise money to finance the Government expenditure programmes. There are usually two instruments used by the Government. One is called a "Treasury Bill", which is a short-term instrument that would mature within a year. So, whenever the Government wants to raise short-term funds, it issues Treasury Bills. The total limit of the Treasury Bills the Government can issue is controlled by Parliament, and Parliament fixes the total limit. The Government cannot go beyond that. Now, the limit is Rs. 400 billion. It has fully been subscribed by the country today.

If the Government wants long-term funds, they issue Treasury Bonds. A Treasury Bond matures beyond one year and can go up to any

number of years. In Sri Lanka, the Bond with the longest maturity today is the 31-year Bond, which was issued in the particular Bond in question now. The objective of issuing long-term Bonds is to allow the Government to get long-term funds so that it does not have to repay immediately. At the same time, the investors will also have an opportunity to invest in long-term funds. So, it meets the two objectives: the Government wants long-term funds and people in the market also want to invest in long-term funds. If somebody wants to put his money in a bank deposit, the deposit of a bank with the maximum maturity today is a one-year fixed deposit. But, if he has money for a longer period- for five or ten years- he can always buy a Treasury Bond from the Government. The advantage of a Treasury Bond compared to a fixed deposit is, you can sell it in the market at any time. After the Government issues Treasury Bonds to the primary market, there is a secondary market where the subsequent investors can buy it from the existing investors.

As a result, the market price of a Treasury Bond is determined by the market and not by the Government. For example, a Rs. 100 Treasury Bond issued by the Government today, can have a market price above Rs. 100 or below Rs. 100 depending on the demand for that particular Treasury Bond. Therefore, the problem here is that when the price of the Treasury Bond moves above the face value, the interest rate on the Treasury Bond becomes lower than the interest rate paid by the Government. Similarly, if the price of the Bond is below the face value, the interest rate in the market goes above the interest rate offered by the Government.

As a result, the yield, which we will call "the interest rate" in the market for a Treasury Bond, varies in the market depending on the demand for and the supply of the Treasury Bonds. This is the normal situation with respect to Treasury Bonds.

What we read in the newspapers as the interest rate of the Treasury Bonds is this market determined interest rate. It is not the one which the Government has announced. Every Treasury Bond has a coupon interest rate, which is the fixed interest rate. For example, for the thirty-year Bond that was issued by the Government, the particular bond in question, the coupon rate was 12.5 per cent. It means, over the thirty- year period, the Government of Sri Lanka is committed to pay the investors for the Treasury Bonds at the rate of 12.5 per cent. It is a very high interest rate. If somebody can get a Treasury Bond at this rate of interest offered by the Government for a thirty- year period, he is remunerated by the Government at the rate of 12.5 per cent. But, the actual interest rate in the market depends on the price of the Bond. What happens normally is, when the Government offers these Treasury Bonds in the market, there will be a higher demand or a lower demand for Treasury Bonds. If the demand is higher, what the investors do is, they bid a higher price for the Treasury Bond. For example, they might say, "We want the Rs. 100 Treasury Bond for a price of Rs. 105." This means the interest rate will immediately come below the 12.5 per cent. If there is no demand for the particular Treasury Bond, then the price of the Treasury Bond will be lower than Rs.100 and the interest rate will be above the 12. 5 per cent. So, it all depends on the market appetite.

Then, the Committee might be interested in knowing why the Government of Sri Lanka should issue Treasury Bonds for a thirty-year period because thirty years is a very long period. That is because the Bonds for thirty years are demanded not by individual investors like us. We do not want to place our money for a thirty-year period. Therefore, these bonds are demanded specifically by the Provident Fund, insurance companies and the Pension Fund because they have to maintain in their investment portfolio sufficiently longer period Treasury Bonds. As a result, the demand comes from there. That is why in this particular Treasury Bond issue, the Central Bank has offered only Rs. 1 billion to the market. There is no appetite for any other person. There is no appetite for people like us. We do not want to invest our money for a thirty-year period. Therefore, the demand comes only from the Provident Fund, insurance companies and the Pension Fund and that demand is very low. So, to meet that demand, the offer was made for Rs. 1 billion, and the expectation was that the Pension Fund would buy this Bond. Actually, what happened was, even though this was offered to the Pension Fund, the rest of the market also immediately got to know somehow that the Government needed more money and they started bidding. When they started bidding, the bid price was lower than Rs.100. The original price quoted by the Central Bank when it offered the Bond to the market was 9.5

per cent. That means, the Central Bank expected the investors to buy it above the face value. Most of the bids that the Central Bank had received for this particular Bond were above Rs.100. That means, the Government is getting a premium.

The particular decision of the Tender Board had leaked to the media. I have my iPad and I can read the bid pattern, which the Central Bank has accepted. You will notice the original smaller bids that had been offered. They had been bid by the investors above Rs.100 so that the Government would have got a premium out of that. But, the subsequent bids that have come for the particular auction have been bid above the interest rate of 12.5 per cent. Therefore, they were issued at a discount. So, the Government, after it had accepted the Rs. 10 billion from the investors, had lost about Rs. 532 million immediately according to my calculation. For the Rs. 10 billion, the investors had paid Rs. 532 million less. So, the Government has immediately lost Rs. 532 million. That was my calculation.

What happens Hon. Members is that you pay less than the face value. I have got a printout of the particular leaked document. I can pass it on to the Chairman.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම document එකේ පිටපත් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට ලබා දෙන්න.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: What do you mean by"leaked document"?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Hon. Member, this is a confidential document to be kept in the Central Bank. Somehow, this document had been leaked to the media. I got it from the media. It has the signature of the Chairman of the Tender Board, the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, Superintendent of the Department of Public Debt Management, Mrs. Deepa Seneviratne and the person who had prepared it. The Central Bank had not denied that it does not belong to them. It is a funny situation. Some of the confidential documents in the Central Bank had been leaked to the media. This is in the public domain now. This document is with the Superintendent of the Department of Public Debt. This particular document gives the decision of the Tender Board where they have approved up to Rs. 10 billion. It gives the bid price, the interest rate and so forth. I can take the Committee through each and every section so that the Committee can familiarize itself with what has actually happened.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Let me get this cleared. Originally, as an organization, the Central Bank decides to issue Bonds for Rs. 1 billion. Who took that decision?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: That decision was taken by the Department of Public Debt Management in consultation with the Governor of the Central Bank because there is a Committee called "Public Debt Management Committee." When the Secretary to the Treasury comes here, you can ask him that question. It is the Secretary to the Treasury who informs the Central Bank about the cash flow requirements of the Treasury. Based on the cash flow, the Domestic Debt Management Committee- DDMC decides on that, gets the approval of the Governor and then it goes to the Monetary Board for ratification. That decision is made long before the decision to issue it at the auction.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Can you tell me in short, what that Committee is?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: That is called, the "Domestic Debt Management Committee" DDMC.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Is it under the Governor of the Central Bank. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: No, it is under the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, where there is a representative from the Treasury because he is the person who would tell the DDMC about the amount of their requirement.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, ultimately, who has to approve the DDMC decision?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It has to be approved by the Governor and finally, it has to be ratified by the Monetary Board. The normal decision-making process in the Central Bank is, every decision made by the officers will finally have to be ratified by the Monetary Board.

The Hon. Arjuna Ranatunga: Is this made of one person or a group?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It is a Committee. The Members of the DDMC are, the Deputy Governor, Assistant Governor and the Treasury Representative.

The Hon. Arjuna Ranatunga: Then, what about the approval part?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: The approval part is done by the Governor and after that, it goes to the Monetary Board.

The Hon. Arjuna Ranatunga: Does the Governor alone take that decision?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: No, no. Once the recommendation is made, normally, the Governor approves it. I mean, if the Governor has some valid reasons to question it, he will do so, but if he does not have valid reasons, he just approves it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Dr. Wijewardena, I just want to ask a question. You said that the Government's requirement was Rs. 10 billion.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Actually, it was more than that because the Government had indicated that they needed Rs. 13 billion, according to the information in the public domain.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, what was offered to the market was Rs. 1 billion expecting the rest would come through the Employees Provident Fund, insurance and the pension scheme. Is that what you say?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: No. Rupees 1 billion was offered to the market.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: From where were they going to get the rest?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: To get the rest, they have to offer a different bill. Hon. Minister, what happens is, when you get Rs. 13 billion through a 30-year Bond, the interest rate will immediately go up. That means, you are actually forcing the Government to incur an additional cost. So, they have to have a different type of an instrument for that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is the mechanism and the practice that they use. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Exactly.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Dr. Wijewardena, as you said, originally, the DDMC decided to raise Rs. 1 billion. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: The DDMC decided to offer a 30-year Bond amounting to Rs. 1 billion to the market.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then, of course, they called for tenders. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then, the Tender Board decided to go up to Rs. 10 billion. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: The Tender Board decided to accept up Rs. 10 billion because they had got bids up to Rs. 20 billion and out of Rs. 20 billion, since the Government's requirement was Rs. 13 billion, they limited it to Rs. 10 billion. It has not happened in the past because normally, what happens, Hon. Member, is that they would offer Rs. 1 billion but they may go up to, maybe, Rs. 2 billion. This is the first time it has gone up to Rs. 10 billion.

The Hon. Arjuna Ranatunga: When this DDMC came out with Rs. 1 billion, can the Tender Board go up to –

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: They can go up in consultation with the Treasury because the borrower is the Treasury.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The reason is, if they put Rs. 10 billion, the bidders will bid for a very high interest rate. But, if they put Rs. 1 billion, everybody will bid for a low interest rate. That is the reason and that is the tactic that is used.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Dr. Wijewardena, after the Tender Board decides to go up to Rs. 10 billion, how can they get the approval for that Rs. 10 billion?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Actually, before they make the decision, they normally consult the Governor. On this occasion also, probably they would have consulted and the Committee can inquire from the officers of the Central Bank as to how they had done that. So, once the Governor approves it only they make it public.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That means, with the approval of the Governor, they issued Rs. 10 billion. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes, because it depends on the cash requirement of the Treasury.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Advertise කළේ Rs. 1 billion.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. Rupees.20 billion ලැබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Rs. 1 billion නේ advertise කළේ. ඊට වැඩියෙන් ගන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද? මුලින්ම භාණ්ඩාගාරය මහ බැංකුවෙන් අවශ්‍ය මුදල ඉල්ලුවා.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: භාණ්ඩාගාරය රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් ඉල්ලුවා. ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන දහතුනෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන දහයක් හරි මේ bond එකෙන් අරගෙන දෙන්න තමයි උත්සාහ කළේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ගන්න තීරණය කළේ මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමාද, එහෙම නැත්නම් Tender Board එකද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි,Tender Board එකේ නිර්දේශය මත මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒක අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි සම්පූර්ණ system එක.

ගරු රෝහිත දේශානායක මහත්මයා: ඒ කියන්නේ නිර්දේශයෙන් පිට ගිහින් නැහැ.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Tender Board makes the recommendation. The final decision is made by the –

The Hon. Arjuna Ranatunga: Is it an individual decision taken by the Governor?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes. I think I will have to read to you the relevant Section in the Monetary Law Act.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I think you should.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Then, it will be very clear to the Committee, what the role of the Governor of the Central Bank is. The Governor is the CEO of the Central Bank in terms of Section 19 of the Monetary Law Act. Section 19 (1) states, "The Governor shall be the chief executive officer of the Central Bank….."

That is, CEO

"…..and shall accordingly be charged with the following powers, duties, and functions."

They have listed out the powers and functions because there is no other authority in the Central Bank but the Governor. So, we will have to remember that fact. Governor is the Chief Executive Officer.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We can have a copy of the Monetary Law Act.

The Chairman: We can get it.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Hon. Minister, it is in the website. You can download it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Act එකේ copy එකක් ගත්තා නම් හරි. Then, we can know whether he is acting within his purview or otherwise.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: That is Chapter 422.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Whatever the Tender Board recommends, he has the power either to veto it or accept it. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes. Now, the important Section here is Section 21. The Governor can delegate his powers to any officer in the Central Bank, but still, Section 21 states, "Subject to and in accordance with such rules, if any, as maybe made by the Monetary Board in that behalf, the Governor may delegate to any other officer of the bank his authority to represent the bank for any purpose mentioned in section 20, so however that the Governor shall remain and continue to be responsible …."

"Continue to be responsible", that is the most important thing.

"…..to the board for and in respect of any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any such delegate." So, for any lapse of the officers, the Governor is responsible and for any good thing also, the Governor is responsible.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is because he is the Chief Executive Officer.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes, he is the CEO. Therefore, in the case of the Central Bank, the Legislation has been framed in such a way that the Governor is the CEO but he cannot do everything. He can delegate his powers to other officers. So, this Tender Board is such a delegation of powers. So, whether the Tender Board does a good thing or a bad thing, the Governor is still responsible. That is why it has to go back to the Governor for his approval. So, the Governor has to use his brain.

The Chairman: Is it necessary to go back to the Monetary Board?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: The Monetary Board meets only twice a month; once in two weeks. Therefore, it goes to the Monetary Board only for ratification. At that level, even the Monetary Board can question.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Dr. Wijewardena, you explained that it was originally decided to have Rs. 1 billion and then the Tender Board decided to raise it up to Rs. 10 billion in consultation with the Treasury. But, the Government's requirement was Rs. 13 billion. So, why did they limit it to Rs. 10 billion rather than going for Rs. 13 billion?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: You would have got the document which has the interest rates.

The Chairman: Yes.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: They wanted to cut the interest rate. The one before the last column gives the "Weighted Average", the rate of return. The one after that is the "Weighted average yield to Maturity." That is, 13.03. That is because they wanted to fix it at 13.03. If they had gone up to Rs. 13 billion, the rates would have been further high.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Why is there a high rate?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: The market had somehow come to know that the Government is in need of money. The normal practice in the Central Bank is, if you offer Rs. 1 billion, you only accept up to Rs. 2 billion. But, in this case, some information would have gone to the market that the Central Bank would accept more than that. So, they bid immediately. So, to find this out –

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: "කොහොම හරි ගියා" කියන එක අපට උපකල්පනය කරන්න පුළුවන් මොන විධියටද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මෙතැනbids ලැබුණු වෙලාව නැහැ. Time log කියලා වෙනම එකක් තිබෙනවා.Central Bank එකෙන් certify කරලා ඒ time log එක COPE එකට ගෙන්වා ගන්න ඕනෑ. Time log එක දැකපු නිසා මම කියන්නම්. මෙතැන හරිම particular situation එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. නවයයි විනාඩි පනස්හයට Bank of Ceylon එක bid එකක්offer කරලා තිබෙනවාRs. 8 millionවලට. ඒගොල්ලෝ කියන්නේ කළුතර බෝධියට 9.5යි කියලායි. නවයයි විනාඩි පනස්හයයි තත්පර තිහට Bank of Ceylon එක Rs. 500 millionවලට bid එකක් එවලා තිබෙනවා Ceylinco Insurance PLC එකට. මොකද, මේක insurance fundsවලට නේ එන්නේ. ඒකත් 9.5යි. නවයයි විනාඩි පනස්හතට Bank of Ceylon එකPerpetual Treasuries Limitedවලට bid එකක් offer කරලා තිබෙනවා Rs. 3 billion.ඒක12.5යි. නවයයි විනාඩි පනස්හතයි තත්පර තිහට නැවත එකක් ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා Bank of Ceylonවලින් Rs. 5 billion. ඒක 12.56ක්. ඒක ටිකක් වැඩියි.

ආයෙත් පෙ.ව. 9.57 9.58 අතරේ another Rs. 5 billion from Bank of Ceylon-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Another Rs. 5 billion?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It was for Rs. 13 billion, on behalf the Perpetual Treasuries Limited. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ

The Chairman: What is the time gap?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Time gap is just one minute. සභාපතිතුමනි, පෙ.ව. 9.56ට රුපියල් මිලියන 9.5ට bid කරපු Bank of Ceylon එකම, පෙ.ව. 9.57- 9.58යි අතරේ Rs. 13 billion bid කරනවා. අන්තිම දෙක approve කළේ නැහැ. පළමුවැනි තුන විතරක් Central Bank එක approve කළා.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: Dr. Wijewardena, I just want to get this clarified. I was made to understand that sometimes, the same organization would bid at different interest rates?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes, that is true.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: So, was it that kind of a scenario?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: No, Hon. Minister, it cannot be. The reason is this. The same Bank of Ceylon dealer has to bid on behalf of his customers. So, Kaluthara Bodhi and Ceylinco Life Fund are normal customers. But, this Perpetual Treasuries Limited is another primary dealer.

The Chairman: It is not a customer? It is another primary dealer.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes. It is not a customer, it is another primary dealer. So, when the Perpetual Treasuries Limited has approached the Bank of Ceylon, the dealer should make a due diligence study immediately. The due diligence study means, if I am the dealer, I would ask the question, "Since the Central Bank has offered only Rs. 1 billion, why are you asking me to withdraw 13 billion?" That is, question number one. The second one is, -

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: In general, the same company would bid at different rates. That is not an unethical thing. The fact that this is a primary dealer-

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Offering for a primary dealer. So, the Bank of Ceylon has not done a due diligence study because the first thing is that it is only Rs. 1 billion offered to the market and you have submitted bids for Rs. 13 billion. The second thing is that the Central Bank had said that the interest rates should be Rs. 9.5 billion. Then, why should you bid above Rs. 12.5 billion? That is what the Lawyers' Committee says when they asked this question from the Bank of Ceylon dealer. He was advised by the CEO of the Perpetual Treasuries Limited, "ආවොත් අතේ තමයි." That means, if it is successful, you will make profits. ඒකයි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මම කියන්නේ කාගෙන් හරි මේ information එක පිටට ගියාය කියලා.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is how they immediately made money.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට තේරෙනවා ඇති නේ විනාඩියක් ඇතුළත රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් offer කරලා තිබෙන බව. You can get the time log down from the Central Bank.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So according to your experience, if they do not have such experience in bidding, can you explain how the Perpetual Treasuries Limited bid like that?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: The problem is, the Perpetual Treasuries Limited had bid Rs. 2 billion in its own name. The reason, Hon. Member, is that all these primary dealers have only a small capital like Rs. 300 million. They do not have money.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, they asked the Bank of Ceylon to do that on behalf of them. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, it is not a loan.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It is not a loan. Actually, the Bank of Ceylon has taken a huge risk. The risk is, if all Rs. 13 billion- bids were successful in this particular issue and if the Perpetual Treasuries Limited had not delivered money to the Bank of Ceylon, the Bank of Ceylon has to use its own money.

The Chairman: Can the Bank of Ceylon give an amount like Rs. 3,000 million over its funds?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It cannot do that. Mr. Chairman, these types of desicions are taken at the highest level in the Bank of Ceylon. Because, you cannot just give Rs.3,000 million to a person.

The Chairman: According to that report, it had not even gone to the Board.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: That is the thing. This is done by the chief dealer without the authority of the top management of the Bank of Ceylon. That is the issue here. It is Rs. 13 billion.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: Have they put the money to the Bank of Ceylon?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක ක්ෂණිකව වේච්ච දෙයක් නොවෙයි නේද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: විනාඩි දෙකක් ඇතුළත.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ආයතනයකට එහෙම තීරණ ගන්න බැහැ නේ. මේ ආයතනවලට නීත්‍යානුකූලව එහෙම තීරණ ගන්න පසුබිමක් නැහැ නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධනමහතා: එහෙම එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ වාගේ එකක් කරන්න එක්කෝ පූර්ව සැලැස්මක් -පෙර සුදානමක්- තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ලංකා බැංකුව ගැනයි මම මේ විස්තර කියන්නේ. ලංකා බැංකුවේ වෙනම Credit Committee එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක Board of Directorsලාගේ Credit Committee එකක්. ඒ ගොල්ලන් තමයි ලොකු ණය approve කරන්නේ. ඒ Credit Committee එකට යන්න කලින් Management Committee එකක් තිබෙනවා. Management Committee එකෙන් approve වෙලා Higher Management Committee එකට යන්න ඕනෑ. එතැනින් පසුව තමයි Credit Board එකේ Credit Committee එකට යන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් රුපියල් මිලියන 100ක ණයක් approve කරන්න වුණත් ලංකා බැංකුවට මාස දෙක, තුනක කාලයක් යනවා. ඒ මිසක් විනාඩියෙන් කරන්න බැහැ, ඒ වැඩේ. මේ system එක පෙරවරු 11.00ට වහනවා. 11.00ට වැහුවාම ඊට පසු පහළට system එකෙන් කිසිම bid එකක්accept කරන්න බැහැ. මම මේක දැනපු නිසා තමයි කියන්නේ. 11.04ට ආපු bid එකකුත් Central Bankඑක හාර අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. It is totally unusual.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, bidding process closes at 11.00 clock. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Eleven o' clock, system එකේ-

ගරු රෝහිත සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සම්ප්‍රදාය ඒකයි.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: Not "සම්ප්‍රදාය."Closing time of the auction is 11 o' clock in the morning. Computer system closes it down. Nobody can intervene with that after that. But what had happened is, even a bid that had been submitted by the HSBC at 11.04 a.m. had been accepted.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරගන්න තිබෙනවා, අපටත් මේ ගැන අවබෝධයක් ලබා ගන්න ඕනෑ නිසා. ලංකා බැංකුව මේ ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්නේ ගනු දෙනුකරුවෙක් වෙනුවෙන් නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකුත් නොවේයි. ගරු මන්ත්‍රී-තුමනි. ඒ ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්නේ වෙනත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ණයක් දෙනකොට security එකක් බලනවා නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. මෙතැනදී වෙන්නේ එහෙම නොවෙයි මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. මෙතැනදී කියන්නේ, margin එකක් ගන්නවාය කියලයි. පිටරටින් කාර් එකක් ගෙන්වනකොට අපි LC එකක්open කරනවා නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: එහෙම LC එකක් open කරනකොට මම හොඳින් දන්නේ නැති ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් නම් LC එකේ value එක margin එකක් විධියට, සියයට සියයක්ම ලංකා බැංකුවේ තැන්පත් කරන්න එපායැ. ඒ වාගේ කළුතර බෝඩියයි, Ceylinco Insurance එකයි Rs. 500 million and Rs.8 million margin එක ලංකා බැංකුවේ තැන්පත් කරන්න ඇති. Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකඑහෙම එකක් කරලා නැහැ. ඒක නේ මෙතැන ගැටලුව තිබෙන්නේ. අපි මෙතැනදී ආපස්සට ගිහින් බැලුවොත් Treasury Bond market එකේ short selling කියා එකක් තිබෙනවා. Short selling කියන්නේ මා ළඟ නැති දෙයක් මම අද විකුණනවා, ලබන සතියේ ඒක market එකෙන් අරගෙන දෙන පොරොන්දුව පිට. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන් දැනට මා ළඟ කාර් එකක් නැති වුණත්, මම ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට කාර් එකක් විකුණනවා. ලබන සතියේ market එකෙන් කාර් එක අරගෙන දෙන පොරොන්දුව පිට. නමුත් ඒක අද තමයි විකුණන්නේ. ඒකට කියන්නේ short selling කියලා. Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ ළඟ නැති Bonds දවස් දෙකකට කලින් short selling කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ ළඟ නැති Bonds, market එකේ විකුණා Rs. 3 billion අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඒ Rs. 3 billion තමයි ලංකා බැංකුවට ගෙව්වේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මේක වෙන්නේ 25th නේද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: 27 වැනි දා.

ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 27 වැනි දා Tender Board එක රැස් වෙනකොට කියා Rs. 1 billion, Rs. 10 billion එකට යනවාය කියා කවුරුවත් දන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට කොහොමද Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක දවස් දෙකකට කලින් Rs. 3 billionවලට විකුණුවේ?

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: If we can get them down, we can question them.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක දැනගත්තේ කොහොමද කියන එක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක කමිටුවේ රාජකාරියක්. නීතිඥයන්ගේ කමිටුවට බලයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ, ඒ අය කැඳවා ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න. බලය තිබුණා නම් ඒ ගොල්ලොන් ඒක අහනවා. පාර්ලිමේන්තු කමිටුවක් එහෙම නොවෙයි. පාර්ලිමේන්තු කමිටුවකට ඕනෑම witness කෙනෙක් ගෙන්වලා ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට අහන්න පුළුවන් දවස් දෙකකට කලින් short selling එකකට ගියේ කොහොමද, නැති Bond එකක් විකුණුවේ කොහොමද කියලා. ඊට පසුව, විනාඩියක් ඇතුළත Rs. 13 billion bid කරන්න ලංකා බැංකුවට උපදෙස් දුන්නේ කොහොමද කියා අහන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: විජේවර්ධන මහත්මයා, මට ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව පැත්තෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න තිබෙනවා. Monetary Board එක පෙබරවාරි 24 වැනි දා රැස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. තීරණ ගැනීමේදී කියා තිබෙනවා, inflation rate එක අඩුයි-

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: දශම එකයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හුහාක් පහළින් තිබෙන්නේ, ඒ නිසා interest rate එක වැඩි කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියා , policy decision එකක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක ඇත්තයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හැබැයි 27 වැනි දා ඒ policy decision එක වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ දවස් තුන ඇතුළත inflation එක වැඩි වුණාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, ඒකcontradictory. මේ Lawyers Report එකේ මම හැම තැනම mark කළා. මම ඒක ඔබතුමාට දැනුම් දෙන්නම්. ඒ විධියේ contradictory statements හරියට තිබෙනවා. රටේ පරමාර්ථය තිබෙන්නේ අඩු පොලී ක්‍රමයකට යන්නයි. උද්ධමනය අඩු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම අපි කල්පනා කරන්න ඕනෑ, මේ පොලිය ගෙවන්නේ මහ බැංකුවවත් කවුරුවත් නොවෙයි රටේබදු ගෙවන්නන්ය කියන එක. ඒක නිසා මහ බැංකුව කවදාවත් බදු ගෙවන්නන්ට මෙවැනි බරක් දමන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල්ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඒක public property එකක්.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක public property එකක්. ඒක නිසා ගරු සභාපතිතුමා කියපු කාරණයේ පොඩි පරස්පර විරෝධීභාවයක් තිබෙනවා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීන්දු කර තිබෙනවා, පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු කරන්න ඕනෑය කියලා. නමුත් Tender Board එක තීන්දු කර තිබෙනවා,- මම දී තිබෙන ලැයිස්තුව අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලාට පෙනෙනවා ඇති දෙවැනි column එකේ "bid price" කියා තිබෙනවා. Bank of

Ceylon එක කළුතර බෝධියට Rs. 8 billion submit කරලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: රුපියල් සියයේ Bond එක රුපියල් 119ට ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගන්න යන්නේ. ඒකෙන් ආණ්ඩුවට රුපියල් 19ක ලාභයක් තිබෙනවා.

Acuity Securities Ltd එකේ bid price එක තිබෙනවාRs. 112ට. Natwealth Securities Ltd තමයි Rs.100ට තිබෙන්නේ.අනෙක් සියල්ලම රුපියල් 100ට අඩුයි.

ගරු. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: රුපියල් 90ටත් ගිහින් තිබෙනවා.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. අන්තිම එක ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ රුපියල් 90ට.

ගරු. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒකත් Bank of Ceylon එක?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.Bank of Ceylonවල Rs. 3 billion එක. එතැන රුපියල් 100 එක රුපියල් 90ට දීලා තිබෙනවා, Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක. එතැන ලාභය රුපියල් 10ක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: රුපියල් මිලියන 10,000න් පළමුවෙනි මිලියන 5,000 interest rate එක සියයට 9-10න් අතරේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉන් පසුව එන මිලියන 5,000 සියයට 10-12න් අතර තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ අනුව Central Bank එක interest rate එක ගැන හොඳටම දන්නවා. ඉතින් ඇයි interest rate එක වැඩි වෙන්නේ, වැඩි කරන්නේ?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක වෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. අපි ඒ ගැන මහ බැංකුවෙන්ම අහන්නට ඕනෑ. මොකද, ඒකට හේතුව විධියට ඒ අය කියන්නේ මේක සල්ලි හදිසියක් කියලා. හදිසියක් වුණු නිසා අපි පොලිය නොවෙයි, ආණ්ඩුවට සල්ලි අරන් දෙන්නයි බැලුවේ කියලා කියන්නේ. ඒකයි ඒ අය කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අඩු පොලියට සල්ලි එනවානේ?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මම ඔය Tender Board එකේ හිටියා නම් මම අනුගමනය කරන්නේ ඔයිට වඩා වෙනස් ක්‍රමයක්. මම අවුරුදු 30කට ලංකා ආණ්ඩුව සියයට 12.5කට commit කරන්නේ නැහැ. මගෙන් ඔය රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ඉල්ලුවා නම් මම කරන්නේRs. 1 billion හෝ Rs. 2 billion මේ Bond එකෙන් ගන්නවා. ඉතිරි රුපියල් බිලියන 8 සඳහා අපට වෙනත් උපක්‍රමයක් පාවිච්චි කරන්නට පුළුවන්. දැන් ලංකා බැංකුවම කියනවානේ ඒ අය ළඟ excess liquidity නිබුණා කියලා. ලංකා බැංකුවේ තිබෙනවා overdraft facility එකක්, Treasury එකට. ඒකෙන් Rs. 8 billion ගන්න පුළුවන් immediately. ඊළඟ සතියේ TreasuryBill එකක් issue කරලා ඒ මුදල ගෙවන්නට පුළුවන්.මොකද, ඒ Treasury Bill එකේ පොලිය සියයට 6.5යි. ඒ නිසා මේ විධියට අවුරුදු 30කට commit කරන්නට ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්න ඒකයි.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. ඇයි එහෙම නොකළේ කියන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල් පත් exceed වෙලා නේද? රුපියල් මිලියන 400නේ පුළුවන්?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, රුපියල් මිලියන 400 වුණාට, අපට අවුරුදු 2ක් සඳහා Treasury Bond එකක් issue කරන්න පුළුවන්නේ. මම ඉදිරිපත් කළ report එකේදී මම ඒ කාරණය දැනුම් දුන්නා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් යන්නේ කොහොමද, අවුරුදු 2ටද, 5ටද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා. ඒක මෙහෙමයි. අපි market එකට දැනුම් දෙන්න ඕනෑ, අවුරුදු 30 bonds අපි issue කරනවා, ඒකටත් පොලියක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒ අවශ්‍යතාව නිසා තමයි අවුරුදු 30ක් සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කළේ. නමුත් එහෙම වෙන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. මේ කියන දවසේදී, -පෙබරවාරි 25වෙනි දා- අවුරුදු 2ක් සඳහා Bond එකක් issue කළා නම් සියයට 6.29යි පොලිය.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: මීට පෙරත් මේ විධියට දීර්ඝ කාලීන Bonds issue කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: තුන් හතර පාරක් issue කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: කොපමණ කාලයකටද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: අවුරුදු 30 ඒවා. අවුරුදු 30 ඒවා නමයි වැඩිපුරම නිකුත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ඒ කොයි කාලයේද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: අවුරුද්දක් වාගේ ඇතුළත. එක issue එකක Rs. 1 billion ඒ වාගේ තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට වඩා ලොකු ඒවා issue කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ පසුගිය කාලයේත් අවුරුදු 30ක bonds issue කරලා තිබෙනවා?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.Bonds issue කරලා තිබෙනවා.ගරු

ඇමතිතුමා, මම කිව්වේ මේවාට ඉල්ලුමක් තිබෙනවා insurance companiesවලින් සහ provident fundsවලින්. ඒ අයට අපි මේවා දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ නිසා අවුරුදු 30 ඒවා දෙනවා.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ඒ කියනනේ අවුරුදු 30කට දීම අලුත් දෙයක් නොවෙයි?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. අලුත් දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ විධියට තුන් හතර පාරක් නිකුත් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: පසු ගිය අවුරුදු 2 ඇතුළත අවුරුදු 30ක් සඳහා දීලා තිබෙනවා?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක අලුත් දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් long-term ඒවා සියල්ලම යන්නේ fundsවලට.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒවා පුද්ගලයන්ට නොවෙයි යන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාගේ ඒවා private sector එකට යන්නේ නැහැ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is a good question. ඉතිහාසයේදී අවුරුදු 30කට නිකුත් කළ ඒවා primary dealersලාට දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමිය, මෙහෙමයි.Primary dealersලාත් bid කරනවා ඒ අයගේ නමින් සහcustomersලාගේ නමින්. තමන්ගේ නමින් කවදාවත් ගන්නේ නැහැ අවුරුදු 30ක් සඳහා වන එකක්. අවුරුදු 30 එකක් ගත්තා කියන්නේ මහා liability එකක්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා කියන මේ රාජ්‍ය ආයතන තුන හැරෙන්නට primary dealersලා bid කරලා අවුරුදු 30 ඒවා අරගෙන තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: අරගෙන තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්, ඒ ගැන කියන්න නම් සම්පූර්ණ ලැයිස්තුව බලන්නට ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මේක සම්ප්‍රදාය කඩ කිරීමක්ද කියලා දැන ගන්න ඕනෑනේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක rate එක අනුවයි තීරණය වෙන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එක එක rateතියෙයිනේ. අවුරුදු 30 unusual කියලා කියනවානේ. ඉතිහාසයේ එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා බලා ගන්න පුළුවන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක බලා ගන්න පුළුවන් මහ බැංකුවෙන් issue කළ ලැයිස්තුව ගත්තාම, කවුද අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. සාමාන්‍ය ස්වභාවය තමයි primary dealerකෙනෙක් වුණත් මේ වාගේ දීර්ඝ කාලීන Bond එකක් ගන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒක තමන්ට ලොකු liability එකක්.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: විජේවර්ධන මහත්මයා, අපට පසු ගිය කාලයේ සිදු වුණ ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධ පොඩි report එකක් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?Specially, primary dealersලාට දීලා තිබෙනවාද, ඒ කුමන කාලයේද වාගේ විස්තර ඇතුළත්ව.

The Hon. (Mrs.) RosySenanayake: We requested it the other day.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ තොරතුරු අරගෙන දෙන්නම්.

ගරු. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Thirty yearsවලට provident funds and insurance companies වාගේ ඒවාට දෙන්නේ ඒ අයගේ funds idling නිසා.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ වාගේම ඒ අයගේ investments long-term නිසා.

ගරු. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මිනිස්සු එක පාර ගිහින් provident fund ගන්නේත් නැහැ, insurance claim කරන්නේත් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා තමයි ඒ අය එවැනි-

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ අයට stable investment එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Tenders call කරන විට මේවා දෙන්නේ අවුරුදු 30කටයි කියලා දැනුවත් කළාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. ඇත්තටම මේවා අවුරුදු 30කට කියලාමයි කැඳෙව්වේ.Notice එකේ සඳහන් කරනවා. Notice එකේ සඳහන් කරනවා කාලය අවුරුදු 30යි, පොලිය මේකයි කියලා. කලින් issue කළ Bond එකේ පොලිය මේකයි. ඒ සියලුම තොරතුරු මේ primary dealersලාට දෙනවා.Lawyersලාගේ report එකේත්ඒ notice එක ඒ අය reproduce කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේ තිබෙන්නේ ඒ notice එක.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Period, interest rate and amount.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එතකොට මිනිස්සු bid කරන්නේ ඒක අනුව?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක අනුව.ඒකේ interest rate එක තිබෙනවානේ. මොකද, ඒ අයට indication එකක් තිබෙනවානේ මෙන්න මේ rate එකයි දැන් market එකේ පවතින්නේ කියලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මේ rate එකට මීට කලිනුත් bid කරලා තිබෙනවාද? එහෙම නැතිව මේ rate එකට වැඩිය ඉහළින් bid කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ දැන් මේ ගිය rate එකටද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම එකක් වෙලා නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව රුපියල්

බිලියන එකක් නිකුත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකකට වඩා අරගෙන නැහැ. කොහොමත් රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට ගිහින් නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එකක්ද, දෙකක්ද, දහයක්ද කියන එක නොවෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය. rateඑකේ ප්‍රශ්නය?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමිය, rate එක ගන්න පුළුවන්. අරගෙන තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ඔබතුමාට මතකයක් තිබෙනවාද මේ වාගේ rate එකකට පසු ගිය කාලයේ ලබා ගත්තා කියලා?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මම මහ බැංකුවේ හිටියේ 2009ට පෙර. 2009ට පෙර මම මේ Tender Board Committee එකේ Chairman වෙලා හිටියා. අපට තිබෙන වගකීම තමයි අඩුම පොලියට ආණ්ඩුවට සල්ලි සොයලා දෙන එක. අපි කවදාවත් මේ වාගේ ඉහළ පොලියකට ගියේ නැහැ.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: පසු ගිය කාලයේ මේ වාගේ ඉහළ පොළියක් වන 12යි දශම ගණනකට ගිහින් නැහැ නේද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ගිය අවුරුද්දේත් ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. මීට වැඩි rate එකක් දීලා තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It was 11.73 per cent.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It was more than this.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Twelve point five per cent තමයි benchmark එක.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට පසු ගිය කාලයේ දීලා තිබෙන rates ගැනත් වාර්තාවක් ඉල්ලා ගන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කාලයේ රටේ නිබුණු උද්ධමනය වාගේ සාධකත් සමඟ තමයි rate එක තීරණය කරන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔව්, එහෙම තමයි. නමුත් දීලා තිබෙනවාද

, නැද්ද කියලා දැන ගන්න ඕනෑනේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Rates දෙක compare කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: Policy එකක් හැටියටයි, උද්ධමනය හැටියටයි දෙකම analyse කරලා බලන්න ඕනෑ. පසු ගිය කාලයේ දීලා තිබෙනවාද කියන එකයි, මොන කාලයේදී දීලා තිබෙන්නේ කියන එකයි ගැනanalysis එකකට යන්න පුළුවන්. අපට ඒ විස්තර ගත්තා නම් හොඳයි.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We need to know about the previous practices and whether they went along with the previous practices or not.

Dr. W. A.Wijeyawardena: What I mean is this. This Committee will have to call for the time log of the bid pattern so that the Committee can know when these critical bids were received by the Public Debt Department. Then you can come to know why there was this hurry and within one minute, how can the Bank of Ceylon submit bids amounting to Rs. 13 billion which are above, at the rate of 12.5 per cent. That is an issue to which the Bank of Ceylon has to answer?

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ඒ තීරණය ගන්නේ කුමන පුද්ගලයාද, ඒ වෙලාවට?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකේ එක්කෙනා.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට සියයට 9ට ගිහින් එක පාරටම අන්තිම විනාඩි දෙකේදී සියයට 12ට දෙන්න කවුරුන් හෝ decide කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ තීන්දුව ගන්නේ Tender Board එක.Bank of Ceylon එක තමයි bids submit කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. සියයට 9.5ට bid කළ Bank of Ceylon එක, විනාඩියක් ඇතුළත bid කරනවා සියයට 12.5ට.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: There is a tendency where sometimes the same company bids at different interest rates. That is an accepted thing. So, the Bank of Ceylon has that right. But the question here is that they had bid here for the primary dealer. ඒකද ප්‍රශ්නය? මම කියන එක හරිද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය. එක්කෙනෙක් primary dealer කෙනෙක්. Normally, a person with due diligence will ask the question, "Why should you ask me to bid?" It was the Perpetual Treasuries Ltd that had asked the Bank to bid at that particular rate. So, the Bank should have asked, "Why do you ask me to bid at 12.5 per cent?"

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, this is the fault of the Bank of Ceylon.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: That is the fault of the Bank of Ceylon.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Any primary dealer will want to get a bigger stake. They would have asked it.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Naturally, they have to bid at a higher rate.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The Bank of Ceylon should have thought, "We should be doing this as a State entity." That is the question.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Exactly. There is nothing wrong in that. This is an auction.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Dr. Wijewardena, can you explain to us about this fact also? You said that there were two ways to raise money. That is, by Treasury Bonds and Treasury Bills. So, even to raise Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds- මෙතැන tender procedure එකේ වරදක් වෙලානේ. වරදක් වෙලා කියලා අපි මේ කියන දේවල් හැරෙන්නට tender procedure එකේ අනෙක් steps ටික කියන්න.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: I think the Hon. Minister is asking about the normal procedure within the Central Bank. Is it not?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Public debt is actually controlled by Parliament.

When you approve the Appropriation Bill along with the Budget, you fix the total amount the Government can borrow from domestic sources. The Pubic Debt Department acts on that. Within that total amount, we have the Treasury Bill limit, where the Government can go up to Rs. 400 billion. For anything above, the Public Debt Department will have to issue Treasury Bonds to raise that money. That is the procedure. But, the actual timing, the rate of interest and all that will be determined in consultation with the Treasury because the Treasury is the borrower.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: My question is, how does the Treasury raise these Treasury Bonds? Is it through the tenders or primary placements? Explain that.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: The question is, whether it is done through auctions or through primary placements. It is done through both; it is a combination of both because the reason is, as the Hon. Minister very correctly said, the interest of the primary dealer is to get the highest rate of return. When he knows that the Government needs more money, he will actually bid at a very high price. So, the Public Debt Department will have to moderate this. How do we moderate is, at the auction, we accept only up to the level of interest acceptable to us. We do not go beyond that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do you agree that this has been an acceptable interest rate below the normal cut-off rate and this acceptable rate has been done-

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: That was the practice. But, if the Treasury wants more money and we cannot raise that money through the auction, then we go for the private placement business.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, what was the practice before? Was it done through tenders or through private placements? Can we also have a report as to how, for the last couple of years, they raised money?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Not only in the last couple of years.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Whatever it maybe, we need to look into it.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Actually, it was started from 1998 onwards, when we went for the primary dealer system. It was not a new thing. Even during my time, we did that. But, the practice is this. What we do is, we accept the amount that we can safely raise from the auction. If the Treasury wants the balance money, we get the EPF and various other captive sources to subscribe to the balance at the weighted average. The weighted average is below the cut-off point.

The Chairman: That has been the practice. Has not it been?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes, that was the practice. That has been there throughout. It is not a new thing.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Now, the limit is Rs. 400 billion.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: That is the Treasury Bill limit.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes. So, they could not raise beyond Rs. 400 billion.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Whatever the Treasury Bills mature they can reissue.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: They can reissue, but as it is you have to limit it to Rs. 400 billion.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It is now fixed.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then the Treasury and the Central Bank were not in a position to go beyond Rs. 400 billion at that time.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: You cannot go beyond that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is why they looked for this alternative. Is not that?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes. Actually, we have Treasury Bonds maturing between two years and 30 years. You can go for any combination depending on the rate of interest. You do not have to go for this 11.36 because two-year Bonds are available at 6.29.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 400ක් raise කරන්න ගියා. Parliament එක එය pass කළේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා යන්න වුණා මේ කටයුත්තට.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: එය සිදු වුණේ, මෙයින් පසුව නේද ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා?

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙයින් පසුවයි.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: එය සිදු වුණේ මීට පෙර නොවෙයි නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එය block වන විටයි ආපසු billsවලට ආවේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්, ඔව්.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: එය සිදු වුණේ පසුවයි. එය මෙයට බලපාන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Dr. Wijewardena, මා ළඟ තිබෙනවා document එකක්.Perpetual Treasuries Limited Rs. 3 billion ඉල්ලුවා.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊට පසුව තවත් ඉල්ලුවා Rs.5 billion.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: Rs.5 billion දෙකක් ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: දුන්නේ නැහැ නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ආයෙත් වතාවක් ඉල්ලුවා, තවත් Rs.5 billion at 12.75 per cent. එය නතර කළේ නැත්නම් විනාසයි.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The primary dealer will go to the maximum. A primary dealer's interest is to get the maximum. But, the Government officials- the Tender Board and some other Government institutions – need to act with the best interest of the country.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: The primary dealer was given like Rs. 3 billion, Rs.5 billion.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: The detailed investments, of course, you have to get from the Central Bank. We cannot comment on that right now. When I was there as the Chairman of the Tender Board what we did wasල if there was a shortfall of the money for the Government, we got the EPF, the ETF and the Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation to subscribe; all Government's captive sources.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: Primary dealers කියන අය register වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: Register වෙන්න ඕනෑ. Central Bank එකේ register වෙන්න ඕනෑ. Bid කරන වෙලාවේ අපි දන්නේ නැහැ, කවුද customer කියා.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: එහෙම නම් කොහොමද නිරණයක් ගන්නේ, "අපි මේ අයගේ එක භාරගන්නවා." කියලා? මහ බැංකුව දන්නවාද, ඒ අය කවුරුන්ද කියන එක?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: Primary dealer මහ බැංකුවත් සමඟ අත්සන් කර තිබෙන ගිවිසුමේ හැටියට, ඒ අය bid කරනවා නම් ඒ bid කරන price එක ඒ system එකට ඇතුළත් කළාට පසුව වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. දෙවැනි කාරණය මෙකයි. Settlement date එක කියලා එකක් එනවා. එය එන්නේ, working days දෙකකට පසුවයි. එදාට ගෙවන්නම ඕනෑ. ගෙවීවේ නැති නම් default කරනවා. Default කළොත්, ඒ අයගේ licence එක cancell කරනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එය ගෙවලාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: එය ගෙවලා. ගෙවා තිබෙනවා නේ-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මා අහන්නේ මෙයයි. මේ Primary dealersලාම කලිනුත් 30 yearsවලටයි.මේ interest එකටයි, either through tenders or private placements, කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: Private placements නැහැ. Private placements නැතිව ඇති. මා හිතන්නේ නැහැ, 30 yearsවල private placements කරනවා කියලා. කවුරුවත් දන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Primary dealersලා ලියා පදිංචි වෙන්න ඕනෑ මහ බැංකුවේ නේද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම නම්, ඒ අයට මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. පසුව ඒ අයගේ තොරතුරු මොකවත් බලන්නේ නැද්ද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: බලන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: මේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්නයම තමයි මාත් ඉස්සර වෙලා ඇහුවේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: Primary dealer system එක. වාණිජ බැංකු ක්‍රමය

වාගේමයි. මහ බැංකුව primary dealersලා supervise කරනවා; regulate කරනවා. ඒ අයගේ වැඩ on-site සහ off-site යනුවෙන් දෙවිධියකට පරීක්ෂා කරනවා. වාණිජ බැංකුවක් වාගේ තමයි. කිසිදු primary dealer කෙනකුට ඒ අයට කැමැති විධියට වැඩ කරන්න බැහැ. Licence එක cancell කරන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This primary dealer has been dealing and bidding for quite a long time. He is not a newcomer.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: He is not a newcomer. But, what you have to do is, you have to find out from the Central Bank his track record in the past, as to how many times he had bid and for how much.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: අන්න ඒක තමයි කාරණය. ඔහොම bid කරන කොට, එය ගන්න ඉස්සර වෙලා Central Bank එක දන්නේ නැද්ද bid කර තිබෙන පුද්ගලයා මොන වාගේ පුද්ගලයකුද කියන එක? ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒ අයට අදහසක් නැද්ද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමා, මෙය "ලංකා බැංකුව" නේ. "ලංකා බැංකුව" කිව්වාම, අපි කවදාවත් suspect කරන්නේ නැහැ. මෙය First Capital වාගේ තැනකින් ආවා නම් අපි suspect කරනවා. ලංකා බැංකුව කිව්වාම, a premier bank in the country. So, why should you suspect it?

සභාපතිතුමා: Central Bank එකට contact කරන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එකයි.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Bank of Ceylon එකට නේ ඒ අය Treasury එකත්-

The Chairman: The identity is concealed.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුව ගැන මම කියන්නම්. මම Deputy Governor ලෙස සිටි කාලයේ, ලංකාවේ ආණ්ඩුවට බැහැ. US Dollars 100 million raise කරන්න. නමුත් ලංකා බැංකුවට telephone call එකක් විතරයි දෙන්න ඕනෑ. US Dollars 100 million raise කරලා දෙන්න කිව්වොත්, විනාඩි 10ක් යන්න කලින් ලංකා බැංකුව අපට US Dollars 100 million raise කර දෙනවා. ඒ තරම් worldwide reputation එකක් තිබෙන බැංකුවක් තමයි ලංකා බැංකුව කියන්නේ. ඒ නිසා කවුරුවත් ලංකා බැංකුව suspect කරන්නේ නැහැ. එය කවදාවත් බිඳ වැටෙන්න බැහැ. Funds තිබෙනවා. අනෙක් අතට අපි සලකනවා, ඒ බැංකුව කවදාවත් නරක වැඩක් කරන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. මොකද, එය රජයේ බැංකුවක්. එය control වෙනවා. මූදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය මගින්. Reputation එකක් තිබෙන බැංකුවක් එය.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: "නරක වැඩක්" කියලා ඔබතුමා හිතන්නේ මොකක්ද? විවිධ පාර්ශ්වයන්ට ගත් interest rates නරක වැඩක් විධියට දකිනවාද? Do you see there is anything unethical in this?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: I see that on the part of the dealer in the Bank of Ceylon. I mean, we have to use our due diligence. When you ask me to do something improper, it is my duty to question you back.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Why was it improper?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It is improper because there is a code of ethics.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Because he was not a customer.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: One thing is, he had bid for another primary dealer. If he has to do that, he has to get the approval from his management.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What happens if the primary dealer is a customer of the Bank?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: No, still you cannot because primary dealers are supposed to bid on their own. The Bank can do that on behalf of their customers, but not on behalf of anther primary dealer.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If this particular organization is a big stakeholder of the Bank of Ceylon?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Still, no. In that case, you have to get the margin.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what I want to get cleared. ඔහු customer කෙනෙකු නම්, අර දෙදෙනාත් customersලා දෙදෙනෙක් නේ. මේ customer කියනවා, "මට මේ ගණනට bid කරලා දෙන්න" කියලා.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. එහෙම කරන්න බැරි හේතුව මෙකයි. පළමුවැනි කාරණය තමයි, ලංකා බැංකුවේ customer කෙනකු වූ පළියටම ඔහු Treasury Bond Market එකේ customer කෙනෙකු වන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එහෙම නම් අනෙක් investorsලා දෙදෙනා කොහොමද-

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ දෙදෙනා ලංකා බැංකුවේ-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ලංකා බැංකුවේ ඉස්සර වෙලාම invest කළේ, කළුතර බෝධිය සහ Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මම තවත් පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්, ඒ ගැන මේ කමිටුවට දැනුවත් වෙන්න.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එය පැහැදිලි නැහැ තමයි.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ඉස්සර වෙලා නහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මා ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තරයක් දෙන්නම්. Share market එක වාගේම, Central Depository System කියලා එකක් Central Bank එකේ තිබෙනවා. මට බැහැ, ගිහිල්ලා එක පාරට Treasury Bond එකක් මිලදී ගන්න. මම එහි account එකක් open කරන්න ඕනෑ. මා ඒ account එක open කරන්නේ primary dealer කෙනකු යටතේයි.

අනෙක් දෙදෙනාම- කළුතර බෝධිය සහ සෙලින්කෝ ඉන්ෂුවරන්ස් ආයතනය- ලංකා බැංකුව යටතේ අපේ CDS එකේ accounts open කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ ගොල්ලනුත් primary dealersලාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් investorsලා. Accepted investorsලා. මහ බැංකුවෙන් Treasury Bonds issue කළාම,CDS එකේ තිබෙන එයාගේ account එක credit කරනවා. එහෙමයි වෙන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එතකොට මට කියන්න, මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited-

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ ආයතනය මේ ගොල්ලන්ගේ customer කෙනෙක් නොවෙයි නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එහෙම කියන්නේ කොහොමද? ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් අපට අහන්න වෙනවා,register කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: අහන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් අහන්න පුළුවන්,CDS එකේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ account system එක යටතේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක customer කෙනෙක්ද කියලා. එහෙම අහන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That, we have to ask from the Bank of Ceylon.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න. ඒක වෙන්න බැහැ. මොකද හේතුව,primary dealer කෙනෙකුට බැහැ. තමන්ගේ customer විධියට තව primary dealer කෙනෙකුගේ accounts CDS එකේ open කරන්න.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Primary dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට නොවෙයි නේ එන්නේ. ඒ organization එකේ customer කෙනෙක් හැටියට නේ එන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: බැහැ, එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We have to ask from the Bank of Ceylon.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මොකද, දැන් මේවා පුද්ගලයෙක් open කරනවා නම්,NIC එක යටතේ තමයි open කරන්නේ. ඒ නිසා තව නැනක ඒ account එක open වෙන්න බැහැ. Limited Liability Company එකක් නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ registration number එක යටතේ තමයි open කරන්නේ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, have they come under a different name?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: No, they cannot.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The Bank of Ceylon will have to answer all those questions.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: I think this Committee can ask about the way they submitted the bid on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries Limited, when it was done and if that was so, whether they have an account with the Bank of Ceylon.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. Now, we have to get down all these people to investigate into this issue.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක අහන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා:Dr.Wijewardena, නීතීඥ මහත්වරුන් තුන් දෙනාගේ committee එකට assist කරපු නිසා සහ තිබෙන අවබෝධය අනුව Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ CEO කවුද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම නම් ඒක දන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, මම ඒ ගැන හෙව්වේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Auditor-General ඒක ගෙන්වා ගන්න. Database එකේ ඔක්කෝම විස්තර තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Department ofRegistrar of Companies එකෙන් විස්තර ගන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

Mr.M.E. Lionel Fernando: Can a primary dealer submit a bid through another primary dealer?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: No. That has not been the practice. To my knowledge, this is the first time it has happened.

සභාපතිතුමා: Auditor-General කියනවා, first time කියලා.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes. කවදාවත් ඒක වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද හේතුව,both are competitors. So, why should I bid on your behalf when you are also one of my competitors? It is a totally illogical perception.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Yes, but, there is no legal bar.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: There is no legal bar, but, ethically why should I submit a bid on behalf of one of my competitors? That cannot happen. Can it?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is unethical. That was my question. That was what I was thinking, as to whether there was anything illegal in their doing that.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It is not illegal, but it is-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Unethical?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: It is not unethical. It is not businesslike.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is not a done practice; a done deal. Is it?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Yes. It is not done.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ කරුණට පරිබාහිර දෙයක් මම මේ අහන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහ බැංකු පනතට අනුව මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයා නේද-

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට දැන් මහ බැංකුව වෙනත් අමාත්‍යාංශයක් යටතේ තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒක මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සල්ලි කොළයට අත්සන් කරන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමායි-

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා:- මුදල් ඇමතිතුමායි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අත්සන් කරන අනෙක් කෙනා ආර්ථික කටයුතු ඇමතිතුමාද, මුදල් ඇමතිතුමාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මෙහෙමයි, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. කුමන අමාත්‍යාංශයක් යටතේ මහ බැංකුව ගැසට් කළත්.- මම මේ ගැන ලිපියකුත් ලිව්වා, මේක unworkable කියලා. Unworkable වෙන්න හේතුව තමයි සියලුම legislations යටතේ, මුදල් පනත, බැංකු පනත, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ආඥා පනත ආදී ඔක්කෝම යටතේ නමින් සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ නියම boss මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා. නමුත් අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් මහ බැංකුව register කළාම ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා යටතේ, මහ බැංකුවට දැන් bossesලා දෙදෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඉතින් බොහොම අමාරුයි, bossesලා දෙදෙනෙකුට වැඩ කරන්න. මම කිව්වා, මේක කරන්න අමාරුයි කියලා. ඒ නිසා it is unworkable. අනෙක් එක කවුරුවත් මේ කරුණ raise කරලා නැහැ. කවුරු හරි කෙනෙක් Supreme Court එකට ගියොත් මේක annul කරන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, එහෙම වෙනම අමාත්‍යාංශයක් යටතේ register කරනවා නම්, ගැසට් කරන්න ඕනෑ. Interpretation Ordinance කියලා එකක් ලංකාවේ තිබෙනවා. ඒ Interpretation Ordinance එක යටතේ තව ගැසට් නිවේදනයක් නිකුත් කරන්න ඕනෑ, Interpretation Ordinance එකේ කෙසේ සඳහන් වුවත්, මෙම ආයතනය මින් පසු මේ අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ තිබෙනවා කියලා. එහෙම දෙවැනි ගැසට් එකක් පළ වුණේ නැහැ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We need the Supreme Court decision also.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මේ තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය ගැන මම ප්‍රසිද්ධියේ ලිව්වා. ඒ වුණාට ඒ ගැසට් එක නිකුත් කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමාගෙන් මේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් අපට ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කරලා දුන්නා නේ, කොහොමද මේවා වෙන්නේ කියලා. ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස අනුව අපට පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න, මෙතැන සිදු වූ අක්‍රමිකතාවක් හැටියට ඔබතුමා දකින්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමියනි, ඒ සඳහා මේ කමිටුව වැඩි දුර සාක්ෂි කැඳවන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස මොකක්ද කියලායි මම මේ අහන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මගේ අදහස මේකයි. එතැනදී මම මේ කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් වුණොත් මේ කමිටුවට මහ පෙන්වීමක් වෙනවා.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Just now, you said that the Bank of Ceylon is at-

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මම දන්නා කරුණු අනුව මෙහෙමයි. සියලුම dealersලාට a Code of Ethics තිබෙනවා. ඒ Code of Ethics අනුව කුමන කාර්යයක් කළත් මේ ගොල්ලන් due diligence study එකක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. Due diligence study කියන්නේ, ක්ෂණයකින් තමන්ගේ ඥානය අනුව මෙතැන වැරැද්දක් වෙනවා නම් ඒ වැරැද්දට තමන්ට අනුබල දෙන්න බැහැ කියන එකයි. ඒකයි මෙතැන ගැටලුව තිබෙන්නේ. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා ඒ due diligence study

එක මාගේ මතය අනුව නම් Bank of Ceylon dealer කරලා නැහැ. ඒක තමයි පළමු වැනි එක.

දෙවැනි එක, Bank of Ceylon එකේ approval structure එකේ ලොකු gap එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ gap එක තමයි,dealer කෙනෙකුට Bank of Ceylon එකේ මේ වාගේ විශාල මුදලක් commit කරන්න අවසර දීම. ඒක ලොකු gap එකක්. ඔබතුමාට මතක ඇති, 1994 අවුරුද්දේ සිංගප්පූරුවේ Barings Bank කියලා එකක් බිඳ වැටුණා. ඒ Barings Bank එක බිඳ වැටෙන්න හේතුව තමයි නික් ලීසන් කියන dealer,Barings Bank එකේ ප්‍රධාන පරිපාලකයින්ගේ අවසරය නැතුව ජපානයේ Nikkei Index එකට bid කිරීම. දවසින් දවස වැඩි කරලා bid කළා. ඒ කියන්නේ එයා Barings Bank එකේ සියලුම වත්කම් සිංගප්පූරුවේ තිබෙන- Singapore Exchange එකට- Electronic Trading System එකට බැන්දා, අර ගොල්ලන් දන්නේ නැතුව. අන්තිමේදී Kobe earthquake එක ඇති වුණු ගමන්ම Nikkei Index එක බින්දුවට බැස්සා. අර වත්කම්වල වටිනාකම බින්දුවට බැස්සා. Barings Bank එක බංකොලොත් වුණා. ඒකයි ගැටලුව. මේවා risk management techniques. බැංකු අධිපති කෙනෙක් මේවා ඔක්කෝම දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. අන්තිමේදී ING කියන බැංකුව Barings Bank එක ස්ටර්ලිං පවුම්වලට- සල්ලිවලට- ගත්තා. මොකද, ඒක කර ගන්න විධියක් නැහැ, බිඳ වැටිලා නිසා. වත්කම් නැහැ. දැන් මෙතැන Rs. 13 billion commit කළා කියන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එකේ dealer, ලංකා බැංකුවේ වත්කම් නැත්නම් මගේ account එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් ලංකා බැංකුවේ, මම පහුවදාම ඒක ඉවත් කරනවා. මොකද, මම මේ management එක trust කරන්නේ නැහැ. එතැන risk management technique එකක් නැහැ නේ. රජයේ බැඳුම්කර වුණත්, නමුත් risk එකක් එනවා. මේවායේ මීල පහළ බැස්සොත්, එක පාරටම වෙළෙඳ පොළේ පොලිය ඉහළ නැගලා වටිනාකම බිමට බහිනවා. ඒක තමයි පළමු වැනි කාරණය. එහෙම වුණොත් ලංකා බැංකුවට අලාභයි.

Mr.M.E. Lionel Fernando: May I ask whether there is a chief dealer for the Bank of Ceylon?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: There is.

Mr.M.E. Lionel Fernando: Now do you take the position that he had taken the Board approval for this?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: No. It was disclosed at the Lawyers' Committee also that he did not have the approval. It is in the Report.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He has acted on his own accord. Has he not?

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: He has acted on his own.

සභාපතිතුමා: Dr. Wijewardena, මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න තිබෙනවා.That is regarding excess funds.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: Commercial banksවල excess funds තිබෙනවා නේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මාසයකට දවස් තුනක් තිබෙනවා නේ deposit කරන්න.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් ඒ restriction එක relax කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා අධිපති වශයෙන් ඉන්න කාලයේ ඒක-

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. ඇත්තටම දැන් මුදල් ප්‍රතිපත්ති- Monetary Policy- මුදල් ක්‍රමය පවත්වන ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කළා, 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ මහ බැංකුව විසින්. සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමය තමයි, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ excess funds තිබෙනවා නම් රජයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් වෙළෙඳ පොළට විකුණන එක. එතකොට පොලිය හෝ මොනවා හරි වියදමක් තිබෙනවා නම් මහ බැංකුව නොවෙයි දරන්නේ. මොකද, රජය දැනටමත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වල පොලිය ගෙවන නිසා රජයයි ඒක දරන්නේ. දැන් 2014 වසරේ කරපු වෙනස අනුව රජයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම වෙනුවට වාණිජ බැංකුවලට කිව්වා, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ excess funds මහ බැංකුවේ තැන්පත් කරන්න, අපි පොලියක් ගෙවන්නම් කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අන්න ඒක තමයි මම කිව්වේ.

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක ප්‍රතිපත්ති වෙනස් කිරීමක්. ඒ වෙනස නිසා 2013 සහ 2014 වසරවල විශාල පාඩුවකින් තමයි මහ බැංකුවේ කටයුතු පවත්වා ගෙන ගියේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ප්‍රතිපත්ති වෙනස් කිරීමක් කියලා ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් පාවිච්චි කරනවා වෙනුවට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට කිව්වා, ඔය ගොල්ලන්ගේ සල්ලි අපේ ළඟ තැන්පත් කරන්න, අපි පොලියක් ගෙවන්නම් කියලා. ගරු ඇමතිතුමියනි, ඒකට මහ බැංකුවෙන් තමයි පොලිය ගෙවන්නේ. සියයට හයක පොලියක්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it unethical?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: Unethical නැහැ. නමුත් මහ බැංකුවට සල්ලි තිබෙන්නේ ඕනෑ නේ සියයට හයහමාරක් පොලී ගෙවන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම අහන්නේ ඒ restriction එක හරියට මේ දවසේ relax කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලායි. ඒකේ සම්බන්ධයක් තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: **සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි.** මහ බැංකුව **තැන්පතුවලට සියයට භයහමාරක පොලියක් ගෙවනවා. අන්තිමට** බැංකු කළේ, ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට ණය දෙන්නේ නැතුව මහ බැංකුවේ සල්ලි තැන්පත් කරලා සියයට භයහමාරක පොලිය ගන්න පුරුදු වුණා. ඒක සීමා කිරීම සඳහා මහ බැංකුව කිව්වා, **මාසයකට තුන් වතාවක් විතරයි සියයට භයහමාරක පොලිය** යටතේ මුදල් තැන්පත් කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්නේ, ඊට වඩා වැඩි වාර සඳහා සියයට පහක අඩු **පොලියක්** තමයි දෙන්නේ කියලා. එහෙම වුණාමවෙළෙඳ පොළේ පොලී අනුපාතය පහළ බැස්සා. ඒ ක්‍රමය ඉවත් කරපු නිසා ආපසු පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ නැග්ගා. ඉහළ නැග්ගාම Treasury Bond market එකටත් ඒක බලපෑවා. වෙනදා තිබුණේ එක පොලී අනුපාතයක්. එතැනයි සම්බන්ධය තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: වෙන මොකුත් අහන්න තිබෙනවාද?

අවශ්‍ය නම් අපි ආපසු ඔබතුමා කැඳවන්නම්. Thank you very much. අපි ගොඩක් දේවල් දැන ගත්තා.

ආචාර්යඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: මම lawyersලගේ committee එකට submit කරපුවාර්තා දෙකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එයින් copy එකක් දෙනවා නම් හොඳයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එයින් copy එකක් අපිට දෙන්න.

ආචාර්යඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: එම copy එකක් මම සභාපතිතුමාට දෙන්නම්. මෙක confidential document එකක් නොවෙයි. ඒගොල්ලෝ මගෙන් ඇහුවා අලාභයක් වුණා ද කියලා. මම සිදු වූ අලාභය calculate කරලා තිබනවා. සෘජු අලාභය රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හොඳයි. එතකොට අපිට දැනගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එක එක ගණුන් එක එක්කෙනා කියනවානේ.

ආචාර්යඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: සෘජු අලාභය රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක්. ඒ කියන්නේ අවුරුදු 30ක් දක්වා. Immediate loss is Rs. 532 million. ඒ කියන්නේ අඩුමිලට දීමෙන් සියයට දොළහමාරක පොලියක් ගෙවන්න එපායැ,alternative එකට නොගිහින් මෙයට ගිය නිසා.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: If you calculate that for 30 years, the loss is Rs. 13 billion.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: කලින් කරපු ඒවායෙක් අලාභය අපට සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් නේද? ඒවාත් බලන්න එපායැ.

ආචාර්යඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා: ඒවාත් හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් ගරු ඇමතිතුමියනි. මහ බැංකුවෙන් තොරතුරු අරගෙන ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා : අපේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන කිසිදු දෙයක් මාධ්‍යයට දෙන්න එපා කියලා. මොකද, මේ විභාගය අතරවාරයේ දී පරීක්ෂණ තිබෙන නිසා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මම මේ විෂය පිළිබඳව දන්නේ නැහැ. මම තවම මේ ගැන අධ්‍යයනය කරගෙන යනවා.

සාක්ෂිකරු නික්ම ගියේය.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහි proceedings ඊළඟ දවසට කලින් දවසේ අපට ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා නම් හොඳයි. Immediately, උසාවියේ විධියට proceedings දුන්නා නම් අපිට මේ ගැන study කරලා ඊළඟ දවසේ එන්න පුළුවන්. මම නම් note එකක් දා ගත්තා important points ටික.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව් . අපි ඉල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We better outline, Mr. Chairman, who are the people we need to summon for this investigation.

The Chairman: Yes. We will discuss about that.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම් ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා සහ මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල් එම්.එස්.ඩී.රණසිරි මහතා කැඳවන ලදී.)

භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම් ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල් එම්.එස්.ඩී.රණසිරි මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමා තමයි විමර්ශනයේ පළමුවෙනි සාක්ෂිකාරයා විධියට ඉන්නේ. මධ්‍යම බැංකුවට මුදල් අවශ්‍යයි කියලා භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් යවපු ආරාධනය මත ණය මුදලක් ලබා දීම

සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ කොහොමද, ඒ තීරණය පිළිබඳ ලේඛන තිබෙනවාද, රුපියල් කීයක මුදලක් ඉල්ලා සිටියා ද, කියන මූලික කාරණා ටික දැන ගන්න තමයි විශේෂයෙන්ම කැඳෙව්වේ.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: අපේ බැදුම්කර සඳහා මුදල් ඉල්ලා සිටීමේ කථාව ආරම්භ වන්නේ මේ ආකාරයටයි. අය වැය ලේඛනයකින් භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්වරයාට පැවැරෙනවා වර්ෂයකට උපරිම ණය සීමාවක්. 2015 අය වැය ප්‍රකාශය ප්‍රකාරව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් අපට අනුමත කරලා තිබෙන ණය සීමාව රුපියල් බිලියන 1,780යි. එයින් අදහස් වෙන්නේ නැහැ, ඒ සියලුම ණය ගන්නවාය කියන එක. මේක තමයි අපිට යන්න පුළුවන් උපරිම සීමාව. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට යළින් නොපැමිණ අපට ණය ලබා ගැනීමට උපක්‍රම කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්. භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වලටත් සීමාවක් තිබෙනවා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පනවන ලද. ඊට අමතරව භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැදුම්කර තිබෙනවා- Sri Lanka Development Bonds- ඊළඟට ස්වෛරීත්වය බැදුම්කර තිබෙනවා- Sovereign Bond- ඊටත් අමතරව, පරිපාලනමය වශයෙන් සෘජුව අපට ණය ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්. අපි කලාතුරකින් තමයි ඒ විකල්පයකට යන්නේ. මේ උපරිම සීමාවට යටත්ව දේශීය වශයෙනුත්, විදේශීය වශයෙනුත් ණය ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපේ දැනුමේ හැටියට ණය ගන්න තිබෙන මෙම උපක්‍රම අතරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් තමයි පොලිය අඩුම උපක්‍රමය. එයට පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසින් සීමාවක් පනවලා වරින් වර පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසින් එය සංශෝධනය කරලා තිබෙනවා. අතීතයේ සිටම එවැනි සීමාව වරින් වර පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසින් සංශෝධනය කරලා, දැනට තිබෙන සීමාව තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 850ක ප්‍රමාණය. රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවන් මතු වෙන්නේ මෙන්න මේ ආකාරයටයි. අය වැය ලේඛනය සකස් කරන වෙලාවට අපි වාර්ෂික ආදායම් ඇස්තමේන්තුවක් සකස් කර ගන්නවා. ඒ වාගේම වියදම් ඇස්තමේන්තුවක් සකස් කර ගන්නවා. එහි තිබෙනවා අපිට අදායමට වඩා විශාල වියදමක් පසු ගිය අවුරුදු කිහිපය පුරාම දරන්න වෙනවා කියලා. එම නිසා අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ණය ප්‍රමාණයක් ගැනීමට සිදු වෙනවා. ඊටත් අමතරව අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වන ආදායම් සීමාවට ළඟා වෙන්නේ නැති බොහෝ අවස්ථා දකිනවා. එතකොට, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් අනුමත කරලා තිබෙන ණය ගැනීමේ සීමාව අනුව කිසියම් උපක්‍රමයක් පාවිච්චි කරලා අපිට ඒ මාසයට හෝ නැතිනම් ත්‍රෛමාසිකව අවශ්‍ය වන මුදල් ලබා ගන්න සිදු වෙනවා. දැනට භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව ආදායම් සහ වියදම් පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනයක් සති දෙකකට සැරයක් කරනවා. ඒ අනුව තීරණය කර ගන්නවා ඒ දක්වා වර්ෂය ඇතුළත ලැබුණු ආදායම් කොපමණ ද. මේ දක්වා වැය වේලා තිබෙන වියදම් කොපමණ ද කියලා. Commitment වශයෙන් ඉදිරියට කරන්න තිබෙන වියදම් කොපමණදැයි බලලා ආදායම් සහ වියදම් පරතරය පියවා ගැනීම සඳහා අපි කිසියම් ණය උපක්‍රමයක් පාවිච්චි කරන්න තීරණය කර ගන්නවා. ඒ අනුව අපට තිබෙන මූලාශ්‍ර අනුව අපට තිබෙන මූලාශ්‍ර අනුව මහ බැංකුවට මේ ගැන දැනුම් දෙනවා. අපේ රජයට ණය ලබා ගන්න තිබෙන ප්‍රධානම මූලාශ්‍රය තමයි මහ බැංකුව. මහ බැංකුවට ප්‍රකාශ කරනවා ඉදිරි වියදම් කටයුතු සඳහා මෙතරම් මුදලක හිඟයන් තිබෙනවා, එම මුදල අපට ලබා දෙන්න කියලා. මේ අදාළ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් එම්.එස්.ඩී.රණසිරි මහතා විස්තර කරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා handle කරන්න. Subject එක දන්නවානේ.

එම්.එස්.ඩී.රණසිරි මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දේශීය සහ විදේශීය ණය ආපසු ගෙවීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් හැම මාසයකදීම වාර්තාවක් අපට එවනවා. එතකොට, අපේ ආදායමෙන් ඒවා ගෙවන්න නොහැකි නම් අපි බැංකුවට දැනුම් දෙනවා ණය සීමාව ඇතුළත ණය අරගෙන ඒ ණය ගෙවන්න කියලා. ඒ අනුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මාර්තු මාසයට අදාළ ණය වාර්තාව අපිට එවලා තිබුණා. ඒ අනුව, රුපියල් බිලියන දහතුන්දහස් පන්සීය පනහක් ණය සහ පොලී ගෙවන්න කියලා තිබුණා. එතකොට, ඒ දවසට අදායමක් ලැබෙන්නේ නැති නිසා මුදල් ප්‍රකාශයේ- cash flow forecast- අපි ලිව්වා ඒ මුළු මුදලම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර මඟින් අපට ලබා දීලා එම ණය ගෙවන්න කියලා. ඒ විධියට තමයි අපි වාර්තාව යැව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මුළු amount එකම තිබෙනවාද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී.රණසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. 13550ම.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකේ තිබෙනවා ලිඛිතවම ...

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකේ පිටපතක් අපට දෙන්න.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක යැව්වේ කවදාද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: අපි ඒක යැව්වේ, පෙබරවාරි 20වැනි දා.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Rs. 13.5 billionවලට?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. Rs. 13.5 billion- රුපියල් බිලියන 13,550යි. අපි ඉල්ලීම යැව්වේ පෙබරවාරි 20වැනි දා. ගෙවීම් තිබෙන්නේ මාර්තු වැනි දාට.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකේ පිටපත් Auditor-General ළඟ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ ණය ගන්න කිව්වේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කරවලින්ද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: අපි ලියලා යැව්වේ, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කරවලින් ලබා දෙන්න කියලා.

නමුත් එදිනට තිබෙන වෙළෙඳ පොළ තත්ත්වය අනුව එය වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක තීරණය කරන්නේ මහ බැංකුව ද, භාණ්ඩාගාරයද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: Instrument එක මොකක්ද කියලා බොහෝ විට අපලියලා යවනවා. නමුත් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට එදාට ඒ ක්‍රමයට ගන්න බැරි නම් ඒ අය වෙන ඒවා පාවිච්චි කරනවා. ඒක ඒගොල්ලන්ගේ තීරණය.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක සම්ප්‍රදායද, නැත්නම්-

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: ඒක සම්ප්‍රදාය.

සභාපතිතුමා: Treasury Billsවලට limit එකක් තිබෙන නිසා, එහෙම බැරිනම්, ඊළඟට Treasury Bondsවලට යනවා. ඒක එක හේතුවක් වෙන්න ඇති නේද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඒ වන කොට Treasury Billsවලින් ණය ගන්න පුළුවන් සීමාවට කිට්ටු කරලායි තිබුණේ. ඒ instrument එකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන් සීමාව ඒ වන කොට තිබුණේ නැතුව ඇති. කොහොම නමුත් ගන්න පුළුවන් හොඳම උපකරණය ඒ ගොල්ලෝ පාවිච්චි කරනවා. අපිත් ඒ බව සඳහන් කරලා යවනවා. අපිත් දන්නවා ඒ තොරතුරු. Treasury Billවලින් ගන්න පුළුවන් නම්, Treasury Billවලින්ම ගන්න කියලා අපි කියනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වගකීම අයිති මහ බැංකුවට නේද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ලේකම්තුමනි, පොඩි පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමක් අවශ්‍ය යයි. ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේ දී කියැවුණා, ඇස්තමේන්තු ආදායම හා වියදම අතර වෙනස. ඒ කියන්නේ, රටේ මූලික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව තමයි මහ බැංකුවෙන් ඉල්ලන්නේ කියලා. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, පිටරටවලට ගෙවන්න තිබෙන ණය වාරිකවල මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව මත තමයි ඒ ඉල්ලීම කළේ කියලා. එතකොට රටේ මූලික අවශ්‍යතාව මත ද ඒ ඉල්ලීම කළේ, ණය ගෙවීමේ අවශ්‍යතාව මතද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: දෙකම එකයි. ණයවලට කරන වියදමත් රජයේ වියදමක් තමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි, වියදම් වර්ග ගොඩක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඇස්තමේන්තු ආදායම අඩුවීමත් එකක්.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඇස්තමේන්තු ආදායම විශේෂයෙන් සඳහන් කළ යුතු කාරණයක්. රජයේ වියදමේ කොටසක් තමයි ණය installments ගෙවීම. ඒකත් එක්ක තමයි අපි බලන්නේ අපට ලැබෙන ආදායමත් එක්ක කොච්චර පරතරයක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා. ඒ අනුව එදාට තිබුණු තත්ත්වය තමයි අපට විදේශ ණය ගෙවීම සඳහා එපමණ මුදලක් අවශ්‍ය වුණාය කියන එක.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ඒ සල්ලි ඉල්ලුවේ විදේශ ණය ගෙවීම සඳහා.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ ඉල්ලුවේ ඒකට තමයි.

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: ණය ආපසු ගෙවීම සඳහා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හොඳයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් ඒ මණ්ඩලයේ ඉන්නේ කවුද? නිලධාරියෙක්ද, අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්ද? කවුද රැස්වෙලා එය තීරණය කරන්නේ?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: ඒගොල්ලෝ එච්චාම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මම තමයි ඒක ලේකම්තුමාට, නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්තුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කමිටුවක් මොකවත් නැහැ, ඔබතුමා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාට දැනුම් දෙනවා?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, දැනුම් දෙනවා.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ ගැන පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. ණය පිළිබඳව වාර්තා තබා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව. විදේශවලට ගෙවන්න තිබෙන ණය, දේශීය බැංකුවලට ගෙවන්න තිබෙන ණය වාර්තා තිබෙන්නේ ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ළඟ. මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැනුම් දෙනවා, "ඒ වියදම් අහවල් දින අපට දරන්න තිබෙනවා" කියලා. ඒක අපේ වියදමක්; මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ වියදමක්. නමුත් වරින් වර දැනුම් දෙනවා අහවල් දවසට මෙන්න මෙපමණ ණය සහ පොලී ගෙවන්න තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව දත්ත තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 13,550ම ණයද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට තව පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමක් තිබෙනවා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් ඒ ඉල්ලීම මහ බැංකුව කරනවා නේ. ඒ ඉල්ලීම කළාම ඔබතුමා- අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්තුමා- ලේකම්තුමාට දන්වලා යවනවා. ඒකට කමිටුවක් මොකවත් නැහැ. කමිටුවක අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැද්ද? කලින් එහෙම committees තියලා, තීරණය-

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: අපි දන්න කාලයේ ඉඳලා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ රැස්වීමක්- cash flow meeting එකක්- සතියට නැත්නම් දෙකකට වතාවක් පවත්වනවා. අපි ඒකෙන් බලන්නේ අපට කොතරම් cash receipt එකක් තිබෙනවාද සහ කොතරම් වියමක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ meeting එකේ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ සියලුම ප්‍රධානීන් ඉන්නවා. දෙපාර්තමේන්තු ප්‍රධානීන් ඉන්නවා. භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයා විධියට මම තමයි රැස්වීම පවත්වන්නේ. දැනට ඉන්න නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරු තුන්දෙනාත්, භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ප්‍රධාන නිලධාරීන් සියලුම දෙනාත් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ ඔය කියන meeting එකෙන්ද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මේ අවශ්‍යතාව සඳහා?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මේ specific කාරණයට විතරක් නොවෙයි. රටේ සමස්ත වියදම සහ රටේ සමස්ත ආදායම, කාල වකවානුව පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනයක් තමයි සති දෙකකට වතාවක් තිබෙන රැස්වීමෙන් දැනට කරන්නේ. ණය වාරික ගෙවීම් ගැනත් එහිදී සාකච්ඡා කෙරෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, හැම දාම වන විධිය පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න. අපි අහන්නේ හැම දාම සිදුවන විධිය.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: හැම දාම වන විධිය තමයි ඒ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ meeting එකේ සංයුක්තිය මොකක්ද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: රැස්වීමේ සංයුතිය, භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්ගේ ප්‍රධානත්ව-යෙන් නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරු තුන් දෙනායි, භාණ්ඩාගාරයට අයිති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවල ප්‍රධානීන් සියලු දෙනාම සහභාගි වනවා. රටේ තිබෙන ආදායම සහ වියදම් සති දෙකකට වරක් විමර්ශනය කරනවා. එහිදී ණය ගෙවීම් සහ ණයවලට අදාළ පොලිය ගෙවීමත් වියදමක් විධියට අපි සලකා බලනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මේ ඉල්ලීම කළේත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් නේද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ ඉල්ලීම කරන්න කලින් ඒ meeting එක තිබුණාද, නැද්ද? ඒ meeting එකට කවුද සහභාගි වුණේ?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපි එදා ඉඳලා කරන්නේ එහෙමයි. ණය ආපසු ගෙවීම් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ වගකීමක්. ඒක අපි අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් කරපු ඉල්ලීමක් අනුව යෝජනාවක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමිය, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමාට මම අහන දේ තේරෙනවාද? කෙරෙන සම්ප්‍රදාය ඔබතුමා දැන් කිව්වා නේ. ඒ සම්ප්‍රදාය අනුව රැස්වෙලාද මේ ඉල්ලීමත් කළේ?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: ඒ ඉල්ලීම නිසා කියලා විශේෂයෙන් meeting එකක් තියන්නේ නැහැ. සම්ප්‍රදායයක් වශයෙන් අපි කරන්නේ ඊළඟ මාසයේ වියදම් සහ ආදායම්-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ ඉල්ලීම කරන්න කලින් අවසාන වරට රැස් වුණේ කවදාද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඒක කවදාද තිබුණේ කියලා මට මතක නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Is it a routine matter?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is a routine matter.

Dr. W.A. Wijewardena: Sir, it is a routine matter that the whole expenditure relating to the Government-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If you have to pay, you have to pay. So, you have to find money to pay it and you have to inform that. It is a routine practice. You will have to convene a separate meeting to discuss that.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේක එච්චර කලබල වෙන්න දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමන්ලා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ඒ අවශ්‍යතාව ඉල්ලුවා නේ. ඒක සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් නේ. ඒ සාමාන්‍ය දේ වුණ විධිය, කවදාද ඒ රැස්වීම තිබුණේ, ඒකට කවුද සහභාගි වුණේ, ඒකේ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද, පැමිණීමේ ලේඛන තිබෙනවා ද කියන තොරතුරු අපට දෙන්න.

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: දැනට නම් විස්තර නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මාසයකට වතාවක් cash flow එක පිළිබඳව රැස්වීමක් පවත්වනවා නේද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: දැනටත් මාසයකට දෙවරක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: රැස් වන කොට එහි තිබෙන තත්ත්වය පැහැදිලි වෙනවා නේ.

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: මේ ණයට කියලා විශේෂ රැස්වීම් තියන්නේ නැහැ. සමස්ත වියදම තමයි බලන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 13,550 ගත්තේ ණය ගෙවීම සඳහාම නොවෙයි නේද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: ණය ගෙවීම් සඳහා පමණයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: "ණය ගෙවීම සඳහා පමණයි" කියලා තීරණය කරලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට දැන්වුයේ මහ බැංකුව නේද?

එම්.එස්.බී. රණසිරි මහතා: මේ දවසට මෙච්චර ගෙවන්න තිබෙනවා කියලා ඊළඟ මාසයේ ණය ගෙවීම පිළිබඳව අපට වාර්තාවක් එවනවා. එතකොට අපි තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ ඒවා ණය අරගෙන ගෙවනවාද, ආදායම හොයලා ගෙවනවාද කියලා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒකේ loan එක due වන කොට-

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: අපි එදාට සල්ලි ලෑස්ති කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක අපේ වග කීමක්. Procedure එක ඒකයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒක ණය දෙපර්තමේන්තුවේවැටුප් ගෙවනවා වාගේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මා කලින් අහපු තොරතුරු ටික අපිට අවශ්‍යයි.

එම්.එස්.බී. රණසිරි මහතා: දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සම්ප්‍රදායානුකූලව ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ ඉල්ලීමට කලින්-

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා cash flow පිළිබඳව නිබුණු රැස්වීමේ වාර්තාවක් අපට එවන්න.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම් නිසා කියන්න, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ තිබෙන මූල්‍ය ආයතන මොනවාද කියලා.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව හැර රජයට අයිති සෑම බැංකුවක්ම. වාණිජ සහ සංවර්ධන බැංකු වර්ග දෙකම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුවත් ඔබතුමාගේ අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ තිබෙන බැංකුවක්ද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මේ පරීක්ෂණයට අදාළ ප්‍රධාන සිද්ධිය, ඒ කියන්නේ ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් මේ පරීක්ෂණය පැවැත්වෙන රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් විටිනා බැදුම්කර නිකුත්ව සම්බන්ධයෙන් නේ. එතකොට ලේකම්තුමා හැටියට ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද, ඒකට අදාළව ලංකා බැංකුව primary dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙන බව?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුවත් අනෙකුත් වාණිජ බැංකුත් primary dealers ලා විධියට වැඩ කරන බව පොදුවේ දන්නවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා හැටියට ඔබතුමාට අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවාද ලංකා බැංකුව තවත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් Rs. 13.5 billion වෙන් කරලා තිබුණාය කියලා.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: නැහැ, ලංකා බැංකුවේ අභ්‍යන්තර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව නම් මට දැනුමක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ නියෝජිත-යෙක් ලංකා බැංකුවේ ඉන්නවා නේද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලයේ අපේ DST කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: කවුද ඒ?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: පුෂ්පා වෙල්ලප්පිලි මහත්මිය.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, මේ සිද්ධියෙන් පස්සේ ඔබතුමා හොයලා බැලුවේ නැද්ද මේකට තිබෙන ලංකා බැංකුවේ සම්බන්ධය ගැන. ඒ ගැන දිගටම වාර්තා වුණා නේ.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුවේ අභ්‍යන්තර වාණිජ කාර්යයක් පිළිබඳව අප විමසීමක් කරන්නේ නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව කියවන කොට තමයි ඒ සිද්ධිය පිළිබඳව නිශ්චිත තොරතුරක් ලැබුණේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම අහන්නේ මේකයි. මේකට සම්බන්ධව ලංකා බැංකුවේත් යම් ගැටලුවක් මතු වුණා කියලා වාර්තා වුණානේ.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: බැංකුවේ වාණිජමය කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි විමසීමක් කරන්නේ නැහැ. ගැටලුවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මැදිහත් වෙන්න කියලා බැංකුව අපට කිව්වා නම්, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒ පිළිබඳව **විමර්ෂණය** කරන ආයතනයකින් අපට කිව්වා නම් අපි මැදිහත් වීමක් කරනවා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වාණිජ කටයුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි මැදිහත් වීමක් කරන්නේ නැහනෑ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්න හැටියට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව අයත් වන්නේ කුමන අමාත්‍යාංශයකටද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඒ අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නම ටිකක් දීර්ඝ වැඩියි. ගරු අගමැතිතුමා යටතේ තිබෙන අමාත්‍යාංශයකට තමයි ඒක අයත් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නම සෑහෙන දිගයි.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: Ministry of Policy Planning, Economic Affairs කියලා තමයි ඒකේ නම කෙටියෙන් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: නැහැ, කෙටියෙන් හැඳින්වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මහ බැංකුව ඒ අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතට තමයි අයිති වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Policy Planning and Economic Affairs.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ලේකම්තුමා, ඒ නිකුත් කළ බැදුම්කරවලට පොලී අනුපාතය ගෙවන්නේ මහ බැංකුවද, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඔබතුමා යටතේ තිබෙන අමාත්‍යාංශයද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඒක රජයේ වියදමක්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ පොලී අනුපාතය තීරණය කළේ ඔබතුමාගේ අමාත්‍යාංශයත් දැනුවත්වද? මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? ඔබතුමානේ ණය ගන්නේ. මහ බැංකුව අරගෙන දෙන්නේ ඔබතුමාටනේ.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: අපේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාව පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දුන්නාට පස්සේ එහි අභ්‍යන්තර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව අපේ මැදිහත් වීමක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඇත්තටම ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය මොකක්ද කියලා අපි දන්නේත් නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සල්ලි ටික ගන්නවා විතරයි?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඔව්, සල්ලි ටික ගන්නවා විතරයි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: පොලී අනුපාතය කීයද, කවුද ගෙවන්නේ කියන එක ගැන දන්නේ නැද්ද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: පොලිය අපි ගෙවන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කියන්නේ රජය විසින් තමයි පොලිය ගෙවන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේද තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ, එහෙම නැතිව ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ අමාත්‍යාංශයක් යටතේද තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මගේ දැනුමේ හැටියට මහ බැංකුව කියන්නේ ස්වාධීන ආයතනයක්. කුමන අමාත්‍යාංශයක් යටතේ ගැසට් කළත්, ඒක ස්වාධීන ආයතනයක් හැටියට තමයි ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මහ බැංකුව කියන්නේ ස්වාධීන ආයතනයක්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: වාර්තා කිරීමේ කටයුතු මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා හරහා MLA එක යටතේ තමයි කෙරෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒක මෙතුමාගෙන් අහලා වැඩක් නැහැනේ. ඒක අහන්න ඕනෑ ජනාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් හෝ අගමැතිතුමාගෙන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක අපි දැනගන්න එපායැ. ඊට පස්සේනේ මේකේ වංචනික පැත්ත අනිත් පැත්තෙන් එන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: පැහැදිලි කරගන්න ඕනෑ, මේ පොලිය ගෙවන්නේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින්ද කියලා.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: රජයේ වියදමක් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින් තමයි ගෙවිය යුත්තේ. බැදුම්කරයට අදාළ පොලිය, ඒ වාගේම බැදුම්කරය කල් පිරුණාට පස්සේ කරන ගෙවීමත් භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ වග කීමක්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ වගකීමක්? එතකොට ලේකම්තුමා, පොලී අනුපාතය පිළිබඳව සහ කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක් ගන්නවාද කියන එක තීරණය කරන කොට කොයි වෙලාවක හෝ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ මැදිහත් වීමක් තිබෙනවාද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය පිළිබඳව අපි දැනුම් දෙනවා. කෙලෙස ගන්නවාද කියන එක මහ බැංකුවේ වග කීමක්. ඒ හැර මහ බැංකුවේ සිදු වන අභ්‍යන්තර කටයුතුවලට අපේ මැදිහත් වීමක් සිදු වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මූල්‍ය පනත- Monetary Act එක- යටතේනේ Central Bank එකේ කටයුතු මෙහෙයවෙන්නේ. හැබැයි, වාණිජ බැංකුවල සහ සංවර්ධන බැංකුවල කටයුතු සිදු වෙන්නේ කුමන Act එක යටතේද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුව සහ මහජන බැංකුව පිහිටුවීමේදී ඒවා පිහිටුවන්න සකස් කළ පනත් අනුව තමයි ඒවායේ කටයුතු කෙරෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Bank supervision එක ගැන එකඟ වුණාද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: බොහෝ රටවල්වල තිබෙන විධියට මධ්‍යම බැංකුවකින් තමයි නියාමනය සිදු විය යුත්තේ. මෙහේ කෙරෙන්නේත් ඒ ආකාරයටයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අවසාන වශයෙන් රාජ්‍ය වාණිජ බැංකු සහ අනෙකුත් වාණිජ බැංකුවල කටයුතු වෙන්නේත් මහ බැංකුව අයත් වන supervision එකකින්ද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඒ නියාමනයට යටත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්න හැටියට මහ බැංකුවේ විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා කවුද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: පරිපාලනමය වශයෙන් ගරු අගමැතිතුමා යටතේ තමයි දැනට තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට දැනට මහ බැංකුව අයත් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා ඉන්නේ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා යටතේද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඔව්. Ministry of Policy Planning, Economic Affairs එකේ ලේකම්වරයා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කවුද ඒ අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරයා?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මහාචාර්ය කිත්සිරි ලියනගේ මහතා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉල්ලීම් කරන්න ඕනෑ කෙලින්ම මුදල්

අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් හෝ මහ බැංකුවෙන්ද? එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒ අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් හරහාද ඉල්ලන්නේ?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් හරහා නොවෙයි. කෙළින්ම මහ බැංකුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ.

ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංග මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ Treasury එකට අවශ්‍ය මුදල ඉල්ලන්නේ කෙලින්ම මහ බැංකුවෙන්. එහෙමද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් පත් කරපු කමිටුවට ඔබතුමන්ලා කැඳෙව්වාද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: නැහැ, අපව කැඳෙව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Dr. Samaratungaසැහෙන කාලයක් Treasury එකේ වැඩ කළානේ. එහෙම නේද? මම අතිරේක ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ ආචාර්ය උපාධියට අදාළ විෂය මොකක්ද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නා පරිදි කිත්සිරි ලියනගේ ලේකම්තුමා කුමන විෂය ක්ෂේත්‍රයකින්ද උපාධිය හදාරලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඒක නම් මම කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා Monetary Board එකේ සාමාජිකයෙක් නේද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඔව්, සාමාජිකයෙක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: නිල බලයෙන් සාමාජිකයෙක්?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඔව්. භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයා නිල බලයෙන් සාමාජිකයෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 24වැනිදා Monetary Board එකේ රැස්වීමට ගියාද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මම පත් කළාට පස්සේ එක රැස්වීමකට හැර අනෙක් සියලුම රැස්වීම්වලට දිගටම සහභාගී වුණා. මම හිතනවා එදා මම සහභාගී වෙන්න ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: රටේ උද්ධමනයක් තිබෙනවාද නැද්ද කියලා 24වැනිදා සමාලෝචනයක් කළා. උද්ධමනයක් නැහැ කියලා එදා නිගමනයකට බැස්සා. එතකොට නිගමනයකට ආවා, පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩි කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ කියලා. අපට දැනගන්න තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 24වැනිදා. කොහොම වුණත් ඒ තොරතුරු සනාථ කරගන්න අපි ඔවුන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා කාරක සභාවට ආවට පස්සේ. ආපහු 27වැනිදා, ඒ කියන්නේ දවස් 3ක් ඇතුළත පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩි කිරීමට තීරණයක් ගත්තා. නමුත් දවස් තුනක් ඇතුළත උද්ධමනයේ වෙනසක් වෙලා නැහැ. ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් වෙනස් කිරීමට බලපෑ සාධක මොනවාද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කරුණු සොයා බලා මිසක් මට මේ පිළිබඳව අදහස් දක්වන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කමක් නැහැ. පස්සේ වෙලාවක කියන්න.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මට වෙන වෙලාවක ඒකට උත්තරයක් ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපි Reserve requirements පස්සෙ කාලයේ අඩු කළා. මොකද, මෑත කාලයේදී පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළක් පහළට බැස්සා. සෑහෙන ද්‍රවශීලතාවක් බැංකුව ඇතුළේ තිබෙන නිසා සහ credit demand එකත් ඒ ප්‍රමාණයට වැඩි වුණේ නැති නිසා පසු ගිය කාලයේ historical low levelsවලට බැස්සා. අර කාරණය පිළිබඳව නිශ්චිතව සොයා බලා තමයි මට ඒක කියන්න වෙන්නේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: දිනය වෙන්නේ 2015 පෙබරවාරි 24 සහ 27.Policy එකක් කරලා තිබෙනවා, මොන හේතුවක් නිසාද දන්නේ නැහැ. පොඩ්ඩක් බලන්න. අවශ්‍ය නම් අපි පසුව කියන්නම්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා "පසු ගිය කාලයේ" කියලා කිව්වේ කොයි කාලයේද? කාල වකවානුව මොකක්ද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: පසු ගිය කාලයේ පොලී අනුපාතය පහළ බැස්සා කියලා කිව්වානේ. ඒ කොයි කාල වකවානුවේද?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2014 ඉඳලාම ලංකාවේ පොලී අනුපාතය පහළට එනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒක මහ බැංකු වාර්තාවේත් සඳහන් වෙලා ඇතිනේ?

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා:ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට තව මොනවා හෝ අහන්න ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවාද? Thank you very much. අවශ්‍ය වුණොත් අපි නැවත කැඳවනවා.

ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: හොඳයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: බොහොම ස්තුතියි පැමිණීම පිළිබඳව.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කාර්ය බහුලයි. අපි මිනිත්තු 15ක් ප්‍රමාද වුණා. ඒ පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේද? 29වන සිකුරාදා පෙ.ව.10.30ට මීළඟ කාරක සභාව රැස්වෙනවා. එදින අපි Bank of Ceylon කැඳවමු.ඊට පස්සේ ජූනි 03, 04 සහ 05වැනිදා කාරක සභාව රැස් වෙනවා. ඉතිරි දින පිළිබඳව අපි සිකුරාදා තීරණයකට එමු. බොහොම ස්තුතියි

යාන්ත්‍රිකාරුවෝ නික්ම ගියහ.

කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණ.

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF COPE TO LOOK INTO THE BOND ISSUES OF THE SRI LANKA CENTRAL BANK

Friday, 29th May, 2015

PRESENT:

The Hon. DEW Gunasekara (Chairman)
The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne
The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake
The Hon. A.D. Susil Premajayantha
The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna
The Hon. Sunil Handunnetti
The Hon. M.T. Hasen Ali

Mr. W.M.N.P. Iddawala - Deputy Secretary-General of Parliament, Secretary to the Committee
Mr. J.R. Gajaweera Arachchige, Director (Legislative Services), Parliament
Mr. M.E. Lionel Fernando, Advisor to the Chairman

In attendance:

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne, Acting Auditor-General
Ms. L.S.I. Jayaratna, Superintendent of Audit
Ms. E.A.N.P. Edirisinghe, Superintendent of Audit
Mr. E.M.K.M. Padmalal, Superintendent of Audit

Mr. Ronald C. Perera, Chairman, Bank of Ceylon sworn and examined.

The Chairman: Mr. Perera, when did you assume duties as Chairman?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: On the 28th of January, this year.

The Chairman: Are you aware of the Central Bank's issue?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: Only too well now, Sir.

The Chairman: Can you tell us really the day you came to know about this?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: As I told you Sir, I took office on the 28th of January this year. The balance three other members were appointed to the Board towards the middle or the end of February. We had the first board meeting on the 27th of February at 2 O'clock. Coincidentally it was the same day that we had the auction.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That happened in the morning.

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Was it an auspicious day?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: It must have been an auspicious day.

So, we had our first Board Meeting on the 27th of February at 2.00 p.m. and we carried on our business. We were not aware of the bond auctioned or the bids placed by us on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries Limited. In fact, to be frank, Sir, I had not even heard of the company called, "Perpetual Treasuries Limited."

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Neither had we.

The Chairman: We also came to know after this issue.

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: So, after week or so, this issue came to the public knowledge. Then, I inquired the Treasury Divison and my officers as to what happened and what kind of involvement the Bank of Ceylon had in this regard. So, Mr. Dharmapala, the Chief Dealer at that time, came out with an explanation – I have that written explanation with me -- saying that it was placed on market risk and that it was a commercial decision. But I asked, "Look! You have placed Rs. 30 billion on behalf of another primary dealer. Has this been done before?" Then he said, "No" and he also drew attention to the fact that the request made by Perpetual Treasuries Limited came at 10.48 in the morning by way of an email when the bids were to be closed a few minutes later- that was at 11 o' clock. So, this explanation was given and we were not satisfied. Thereafter we, the Board and the Audit Committee, decided that

we must inquire into this and commissioned our external auditors, Ernst & Young, to do an audit on this transaction. We got permission from the Auditor-General and Ernst & Young did the audit by going into the entire transaction. They questioned the relevant officers and gave us an interim report and the final report dated 10th April, 2015 was handed over to the Board. I have got a copy of that which I can hand over to you.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒවායේ පිටපත් ටිකත් දෙන්න.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: When was this report submitted?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: On the 10th of April.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Perera, in the Bank, to whom does the dealer report? To whom does the dealer come directly? I mean, if the Chairman and the Board did not know about this, obviously the dealer should work under somebody?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: According to the ordinance of the Bank of Ceylon, the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank of Ceylon is the General Manager and there are Deputy General Managers under him. There is a DGM in charge of the Treasury under whom there is an Assistant General Manager. Under the AGM, there is the dealing room. So, the chief dealers' reporting structure will be from AGM to DGM and from DGM to GM.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, was the GM aware of this transaction? Did the GM give the approval or did he act on his own accord? What does the report state?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: The report of the Ernst & Young states that he has acted on his own and the original explanation given to me by the chief dealer is also there as part of the report where he says he took these things and he has made money for the Bank of Ceylon and so on and so forth.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can an employee of an institution take a decision on his own accord or do you think that there would have been some influence from the CEO or whoever?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: Madam, I cannot surmise. But, when reasonably looking at this bidding pattern of Rs. 13 billion, one would feel that he must be having approval from somebody. Even to get a loan of Rs. 10 million from the Bank, we need the approval. Anyone who wants to get a loan of Rs. 10 million will know the difficulties to get that money. So, Rs. 13 billion was placed on the spur of the moment.

So, I must also apprise the Committee that after having this report, we considerably went into it; the Board decided to call for explanation from the chief dealer and also we immediately shifted him out of the dealing room. Now, he is in the research department. He has responded to the so-called letters and the letter came yesterday. So, we will go into his explanation and take appropriate action in the near future.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව chief dealer ගේ වගකීම අනුව business එකට directly involve වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. එයා authority එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ AGMගෙන් හරි, DGMගෙන් හරි, GMගෙන් හරි, මේ කාගෙන් හෝ. එහෙම authority එකක් ලිඛිතව අරන් තිබෙනවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතුමාගේ Ernst & Young වාර්තාව අනුව එහෙම කිසිම අනුමැතියක් අර ගෙන නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම chief dealer තමයි Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකත් එක්ක directly මේ deal එක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙමයි පවසා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳව අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල තීරණයක් තිබෙනවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මෙම සිද්ධිය වුණාට පස්සේද?

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: නැහැ.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සිද්ධිය වෙන්න ඉස්සරද?

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: සිද්ධිය වුණාට පසුව තිබෙනවා?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පසුව කියන්නේ අපි මේ ගැන-

සභාපතිතුමා: පසුව කියන්නේ, එදා තමයි මෙතුමා වැඩ භාර අර ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එදා තමයි-

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑකම තිබෙන්නේ, primary dealers' business වලට authority එකක් primary dealerට තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, මෙය විශේෂ ගනුදෙනුවක් නිසා බැලූ බැල්මට රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් පෙනෙන නිසා එයා කාගෙන් හෝ වෙන අවසරයක්, අනුමැතියක් අර ගෙන තිබෙනවාද, නැත්නම් කිසිම කෙනෙකුගෙන් අවසරයක් අර ගෙන නැතිද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙම වාර්තාවේ හැටියට, එතුමා එවා තිබෙන show cause එකට පැහැදිලි කිරීම තවම අධ්‍යයනය කරන්න බැරි වුණා. එය ඊයේ සවස එවා තිබෙන්නේ. මෙම වාර්තාව අනුව ඔහු කාගෙන්වත් අනුමැතියක් ලබා ගෙන නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා පිළි ගන්නවාද, primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් තවත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට බැංකුව- ඔබතුමා එය පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදීත් කිව්වා. මම තවත් තහවුරු කර ගන්නයි අහන්නේ- පළමු වතාවටයි මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනුවකට සම්බන්ධ වුණේ කියලා?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මමත් ප්‍රශ්න කළා. මෙම වාර්තාවේත් එය සඳහන් වෙනවා. පළමු වතාවට තමයි එක primary dealer කෙනෙක් තව primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් bid එකක් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මම අහනවා මේ ප්‍රශ්නය. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් බැංකුවෙන් ණය මුදලක් ලබා ගන්නවා නම්, බැංකුවේ ගිණුමක් ආරම්භ කර කොපමණ කාලයක් තබා ගෙන ඉන්න ඕනෑද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමහර වෙලාවට අවස්ථානුකූලව ගිණුම ආරම්භ කරලා කෙටි කාලයකින් ණයක් ගන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මම මුලින්ම කියා හිටියා වාගේ ණයක් ගැනීමේදී යම්කිසි විශ්ලේෂණයක් සහ අධ්‍යයනයක් කරනවා, ඔහුගේ ගිණුම ගැන, ඔහුගේ වත්කම් ගැන, ඔහුට මෙම ණය ගෙවීමට පුළුවන් හැකියාව සහ ඒ වෙනුවෙන් තිබෙන සුරැකුම් පිළිබඳව. ඒ පිළිබඳව අධ්‍යයනයක් කරලා තමයි ණය ප්‍රදානය කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited කියන ආයතනය ලංකා බැංකුවේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙලා කොච්චර කල්ද? ඒ කියන්නේ, customer කෙනෙකු හැටියට?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාර්තාවේ හැටියට ඔවුන්ට ජංගම ගිණුමක් තිබිලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: කවදා ඉඳලාද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ ගැන වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ක්‍රියාත්මක ගිණුමක් තිබුණාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ක්‍රියාත්මක ගිණුමක් තිබුණා කියලා වාර්තා වෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: හැබැයි, ඒ කවදා ඉඳලාද කියලා අපි හරියටම දැනගන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අනික් නිලධාරිනුත් කැඳවනවා නේ. ඒ නිසා සභාපතිතුමාට අදාළ ප්‍රශ්න විතරක් අහන්න.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Chairman, you said that he got an email from the primary dealer. At what time was it?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: It was at 10.48 in the morning.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: To whom was this email sent? Was it directly chief dealer or was it sent to somebody else?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: It has come to the dealer. It is there in the report.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: At what time did they bid for it?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: The bid was closed at 11 in the morning. That is at 10.48 a.m.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: For how much is it? What was the amount?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: It was in three lots. That is Rs. 3, Rs. 5 billion and Rs. 5 billion. They were also at different interest rates.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමා දිගින් දිගටම කිව්වේ මේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධව බාහිර ආයතනයකින් ගත්ත වාර්තාවක් පිළිබඳවයි. බැංකුව පැත්තෙන් මේ පිළිබඳව මොන වාගේ,-

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: M/s Ernst & Youngලා තමයි අපේ auditorsලා. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට තමයි අපි වාර්තාව දුන්නේ. මොකද, මේක බැංකුව ඇතුළේ වෙච්ච සිද්ධියක් නිසා අපි හිතුවා, internal audit එකට කියලා කරනවාට වැඩිය,-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Internal audit එකත් එක්ක මේක කළේම නැද්ද? ඔය වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු කීම මම හිතන විධියට ප්‍රමාණවත් නැහැ. මොකද, බැංකුව පැත්තෙනුත් මේ පිළිබඳව කරුණු කියන්න ඕනෑ.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තමයි, M/s Ernst & Young ආයතනය Auditor-General ගෙනුත් අවසරය ඇතිව මේ වාර්තාව දුන්නේ, මේ ඇතුළේ වෙලා තිබෙන සිද්ධිය හරියට කෙරිලා තිබෙනවාද. ඒකේ තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්න මොනවාද කියලා සෙවීමටයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අභ්‍යන්තර ප්‍රශ්නයක් ගැන අභ්‍යන්තර පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වීම සුදුසු නැහැ තමයි. නමුත් එය සුදුසු නැති වුණත් මම හිතන්නේ ඒකත් විය යුතුයි. එහෙනුත් වාර්තාවක් අපි ගන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Audit committee එක meet වුණාය කිව්වානේ.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Audit committee එකෙන් තමයි තීරණය ගත්තේ M/s Ernst & Young ආයතනයට දෙන්න ඕනෑය කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මොකද, අපි පිටස්තර auditorsලා නිසයි ඔවුන්ට වාර්තාව කිරීමට අණ

දුන්නේ. We got permission from the Auditor-General to give this specific audit to the M/s Ernst & Young.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මම අමතර ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නේ. මේ issue එක දැන් වෙලා ඉවරයිනේ. මේක රටේ ගොඩක් ආන්දෝලනයට ලක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ලංකා බැංකුවත් මේකට Rs. 13 billion bid කළා කියලා කතා බහ තිබෙන නිසයි මම මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා සම්පූර්ණයෙන් මේකේ ලියකියවිලි, transaction එකට අදාළ දේවල් ටික පිළිබඳව අධ්‍යයනයක් කළාද? මොකද, ඔබතුමන්ලාත් එයින් අපහසුතාවකට පත් වන අවස්ථාවක් තිබෙන නිසයි මම මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. මම අධ්‍යයනයක් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේ Treasury Bond auction එකට අවසර දීලා AGM කෙනෙකු අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවානේ.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. AGM කෙනෙකු සහ තව manager කෙනෙකු අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් bid එක දෙන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා නොවෙයි අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, ඊට පස්සේයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවාම ඒකට දුන්නු උත්තරය තමයි, bid එක කරන කොට නොවෙයි අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කියන උත්තරය.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: හැබැයි, මේ වාර්තාවේ නම් තිබෙන්නේ නම් date එක 27th කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: දිනය බලන්න.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: දිනය එදා තමයි. නමුත් අත්සන පස්සේ ගහලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට ඉස්සෙල්ලා නොවෙයි අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. Bid එක දැම්මාට පස්සේ තමයි ඔය ලියවිල්ල හදලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි අනික් නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ඒ ගැන අහමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් බැංකුවෙන් ණයක් ගැනීමේදී අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ක්‍රියා පිළිවෙත සහ මේ ගනුදෙනුවේදී bond එකකට ඔබතුමන්ලා දෙන ක්‍රමය වෙනස් ඇතිනේ.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ණය ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදයට වඩා මේ ක්‍රමවේදය වෙනස් ඇති. බැංකුවේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් හෝ manual එකක් තිබෙනවාද, මෙවැනි ආකාරයෙන් bond issueවලදී ඔබතුමන්ලා කටයුතු කළ යුතු ආකාරය පිළිබඳව?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Primary dealers' Customer Charter එකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒකට අනුව මේ ගනුදෙනුවේ වෙනසක් තිබෙනවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එක primary dealer කෙනෙක් තව කෙනෙකු වෙනුවෙන් දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද, නැද්ද කියන එක ඒකේ සඳහන් වෙලා නැහැ. පළමුවැනි වතාවට තමයි එවැනි දෙයක් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ manual එකක් තිබෙනවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ manual එකට අපි මේ සිද්ධිය ආදේශ කළාම මේකේ වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මෙන්න මේ කාරණයට ඔබතුමාගේ දැනීමට අදාළව හෝ ඔබතුමා සභාපතිතුමා වුණාට පස්සේ ගත්ත අවබෝධය අනුව හෝ පිළිතුරු දෙන්න. මේ කට්ටිය, primary dealer කෙනෙකු තවත් primary dealer කෙනෙකු හැටියට Bank of Ceylon එකට මේ offer එක දෙන්නේ, තෝරා ගැනීම කරන්නේ ඒගොල්ලන්ට සල්ලි නැති නිසානේ.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ, ඒගොල්ලන්ට මේ වෙනුවෙන් ඇප වෙන්න මුදල් නැති නිසානේ. Bank of Ceylon එකත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් නිසා මේ තරම් ලොකු offer එකක් මේ කට්ටිය ගන්න යන්නේ මොන හේතු නිසාද කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට මොකක් හරි සැකයක් හිතුණේ නැද්ද? ඒ ගැන හොයලා බලලා නැද්ද? මොකද, බැංකුවටත් පුළුවන්නේ මේ offer එක ගන්න. සල්ලි තිබෙන්නේ බැංකුවේ නම් බැංකුවට තමයි මේ වාසිය ගන්න පුළුවන්.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකට දීලා තිබෙන උත්තරය තමයි, බැංකුවට ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී මෙවැනි ආයෝජනයක් කිරීමට අවශ්‍යතාවක් නිබුණේ නැති නිසා බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් කිසිම bid එකක් දැම්මේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට primary dealer කියන වචනයේ තේරුම මොකක්ද? Deal කියන්නේ අවස්ථාවක් නිබුණොත් අවස්ථාව ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන එකනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතුමාගෙන් ඒ ගැන අහලා වැඩක් නැහැ. අපි අදාළ නිලධාරියාගෙන් මේ ගැන අහමු.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We should summon the GM and the dealer.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මට ප්‍රශ්න කීපයක් අහන්න අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න. Mr. Ronald C. Perera, ඔබතුමා ජනවාරි මාසයේ 28 වැනිදා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට වැඩ බාර ගත්තා. මම දන්නවා,

ඔබතුමා legal field එකේ බොහොම දක්ෂ, දීර්ඝ කාලීන පළපුරුද්දක් තිබෙන අධිනීතිඥයෙක් බව. ඔබතුමාට බැංකුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් තිබෙන දැනුම සහ ලබා ගත් පරිචයත් එක්ක කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් බැංකුවේ දෛනික කටයුතු පිළිබඳව. බැංකුවක් කිව්වාම බැංකුවේ ශාඛා ගණනාවක් තිබෙනවා; අංශ ගණනාවක් තිබෙනවා. මේ සියල්ලම ගත්තාම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මාසිකව හැම department එකකම, හැම branch එකකම internal auditing එකක් කරනවා.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මාසිකව වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මාස තුනකට සැරයක් විතර කරනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මාස තුනකට සැරයක් කරනවා. ඒක Internal Audit Division එකෙන් කරනවා. ඒක කරන්නේ බැංකුවේ කාර්යක්ෂමතාව සහ,- ඔබතුමාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට ලංකා බැංකුව තමයි ලංකාවේ ප්‍රධානම වාණිජ බැංකුව. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් බැංකු ක්ෂේත්‍රයේ කොයි තරම් share එකක් Bank of Ceylon එක represent කරනවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සියයට 30කට කිට්ටු ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එහෙම ගත්තාම වැඩිම Bank of Ceylon එක. ඒ නිසා තමයි ලංකා බැංකුවේ මාස තුනකට වතාවක් internal audit එකක් කරලා තියා ගන්නේ. කිසිම ආකාරයක දුෂණයක්, වංචාවක් හෝ වෙනස් කිරීමක් සිදු නොවන තැනට තමයි internal audit එක තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට external audit එක කරන්නේ, at the end of the financial year, the registered auditorsලා හැටියට submit කරන්න. That is other than the internal audit. Internal audit එක බැංකුවේ ඉහාම වැදගත් අංශයක්. මේ particular transaction එක ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා, M/s Ernst & Young ආයතනයට දෙන්න. ඒගොල්ලන් තමයි external auditors. ඒ වුණාට බැංකුවේ තිබෙන Internal Audit Division එක මේ වන තුරු මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් audit එකක් කළාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඇයි, ඒ?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: බැංකුවෙන් internal audit එක කරන එකට මේක අහු වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේක විශේෂ audit එකක්. අපට තීරණයක් ගන්න වුණා, internal audit එකෙන් කරනවාද, නැත්නම් පිට කට්ටිය යොදාගෙන කරනවාද කියලා. Audit committee එකේ Chairman ඉන්නවා. ඔහු අපේ අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයෙක්. ඔහු සහ audit committee එක තීරණයක් ගත්තා. අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලයත් අනුමත කළා, අපි external auditorsලාගෙන් මේක කරමු කියලා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒක හරි. External auditorsලා කරන එකේ කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ annual auditing එක කරන්නේත් M/s Ernst & Young ආයතනය. නමුත් මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. ඔබතුමාම කිව්ව ආකාරයට මාස තුනකට වතාවක් internal audit division එකෙන් මේ හැම section එකක්ම, හැම branch එකක්ම audit කරනවා වාගේ,-

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ audit එක එච්චරම විශ්ලේෂණාත්මකව කරන එකක් නොවෙයි. මාස තුනකට සැරයක් විශ්ලේෂණාත්මකව හැම ගනුදෙනුවක්ම audit කිරීමක් කෙරෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Auditing කියන එකේ තේරුම මොකක්ද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Audit කරන එක ගැන මම දන්නවා. අපට ශාඛා 630ක් තිබෙනවා.

එවැනි දෙයක් මාස තුනකට වරක් කරන්න අමාරුයි. නමුත් ඒක ඒ අය සාමාන්‍ය ...-

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද මාසයකට වතාවක් ලංකා බැංකුව audit කළාය කියලා?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම දන්නවා. නමුත් ඒ වාර්තා-

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය ඒක නොවෙයි. පිටින් audit එකක් කළාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. නමුත් මම අහන්නේ ඇතුළේ Internal Audit Department එකටත් parallel ඒක කරන්න ඉඩ නොදුන්නේ ඇයි කියන එකයි.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි හිතුවා මේක ස්වාධීන පිට-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: How can you decide that? It is a normal practice of any bank to perform an audit on a monthly or quarterly basis. රාජ්‍ය වාණිජ බැංකුවල Internal Audit එකෙන් audit කරන ක්‍රමයක් ගැන ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද කියන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මොකද, Central Bank එකටත් monthly report එකක් මේ අය යවන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Three months නොවෙයි, monthly audit එකක් තිබෙනවා. සමාවන්න. මම හිතන විධියට ඔබතුමා ඒ ගැන තවම in detail සාකච්ඡා කරලා නැතිව ඇති. ඒ පිළිබඳව මම ඊට වඩා ප්‍රශ්න කරන්නේ නැහැ.

නමුත් මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ three months නොවෙයි, monthly audit එකක් තිබෙනවා, හැම බැංකුවකම. ඒ monthly audit එක තිබෙන්න එක හේතුවක් තමයි කුඩා හෝ වෙනසක් වෙනවා නම්; ශතයක හෝ වෙනසක් වෙනවා නම් ඒ audit එකෙන් ඒක අහු වෙනවා. ඒක නිසා තමයි බැංකු වෙනත් ආයතනවලට වඩා විශ්වසනීයභාවයෙන් පවත්වා ගෙන යන්නේ. එවැනි ක්‍රියා දාමයක් ඇතුළේ තිබියදී පිටින් කරන audit එකට සමාන්තරව ඇතුළේ audit එකක් නොකළේ ඇයි කියන එකයි මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය. මීට parallel audit එකක් Internal Audit Department එකෙන් නොකළේ ඇයි?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Can I add to that? දැන් එතුමා කියන විධියට ඒක ඇත්ත. සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් ඔබතුමා කියනවා Audit Committee එක තමයි තීරණය කර තිබෙන්නේ මේක එළියට දෙන්න කියලා. ඒකට හේතුවක් තිබෙනවාද? So, what was the reason? Why did the Audit Committee not permit the Internal Auditors to do that?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: It was a decision to be taken by the Audit Committee. The Audit Committee's decision was that it be submitted to the External Auditors because it was felt that we did not want the involvement of the persons inside the bank. So, it was decided that it is prudent in this case to have an External Auditor to go into this to see whether there were any influences on the persons concerned.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: We appreciate the decision to get an involvement with your registered External Auditor. But my position is, you should have had a parallel internal audit inquiry regarding this particular matter.

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: But Sir, it could not be done parallely for the simple reason the documents were going with the-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Parallely or even after the external audit is done or even it should have done before the external audit is performed.

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: We did it because- as you may understand, we got to know this too later and then as soon as this was done, we went into it. We found that it was not very satisfactory and decided that we must have a committee to go into this matter in detail and to see what has gone wrong. Then, the Audit Committee went into it and the Audit Committee felt it was-

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මට නව ප්‍රශ්න දෙක තුනයි තිබෙන්නේ, රොනල්ඩ් පෙරේරා මහත්මයා, ඔබතුමාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට හෝ ඔබතුමා ලබා ගත් තොරතුරු අනුව ප්‍රථම වතාවට තමයි Rs. 13 billion deal එකකට chief dealer නැත්නම් Bank of Ceylon එකේ Treasury Division එක ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ.

රොනල්ඩ් පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නවා මේක සාමාන්‍ය ණයක් ගැනීමට හෝ අනුමත කිරීමට වඩා වෙනස් dealing එකක් කියන එක. මොකද, ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුමේ හැටියට deal එකක් කරද්දී dealerට අවස්ථාවක් තිබෙනවාද, වෙනත් කාගෙන් හරි උපදෙස් ලබා ගන්න.

රොන්ල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක ඉත්මනින් ගත යුතු තීරණයක්. නමුත් මගේ අදහස නම් දමන bid එකේ ප්‍රමාණය අනුව දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ- දැන් රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට දෙමොත්- එදාම දමලා තිබුණා Kalutara Bodhi Trust එක වෙනුවෙන් Rs. 8 million. ඒක කාගෙන්වත් අහන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. සල්ලි තිබෙනවා. ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. Ceylinco Insurance එක වෙනුවෙන් Rs. 500 million bid එකක් දමලා තිබුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අය customersලා නේද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Customers ලා. ඒගොල්ලොත් එක්ක නිතරම මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනු කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක primary dealer කෙනෙක් තමයි , ඒගොල්ලන් වෙනුවෙන් කිසිම bid එකක් මීට කලින් දමලා නැහැ. ඒ නිසා එවැනි අවස්ථාවක, මම කියන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් නොවෙයි, රුපියල් මිලියන 13ක් හරි පොඩි මුදලක් දැම්මා වුණත් ඒ පිළිබඳ යම්කිසි අධ්‍යයනයක් කර අනුමැතියක් ගත යුතුව තිබුණා. මොකද, primary dealer කෙනෙක් පළමුවැනි වතාවට තමයි අපට කියන්නේ මේ bid එකක් දමන්න කියලා, දෙවනුව, එයා වෙනුවෙන් අපි මීට කලින් කිසිම deal එකක් කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැනට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමා දන්නා වූ කරුණු අනුව මේ රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් සඳහා තව primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් Bank of Ceylon එක act කිරීම අසාමාන්‍ය සිදු වීමක්.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක සිදුවෙලා තිබෙන්නේ පළමුවැනි වතාවටයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: අනවශ්‍ය අවදානමක් ගැනීමක්.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, පැහැදිලිවම.

ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුනිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, නිලධාරීන් එක්ක කථා කළා නම්, ඔබතුමාට තොරතුරු ලැබුණාද කියන්න මම දන්නේ නැහැ. යම් විධියකින් ලංකා බැංකුව- chief dealer- මෙවැනි විශාල මුදලක් ආයෝජනයට ගිහිල්ලා මේකේ interest rate එක අඩු වුණා නම්

bank එකට එතැනින් එන loss එක පිළිබඳව යම් තක්සේරුවක් තිබුණාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම වුණා නම් විශාල දෙයක් වෙනවා. නමුත් වාසනාවට ඒක වුණේ නැහැ. රුපියල් බිලියන 3යි, අපෙන් ගියේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒක වුණත් interest rate එක අඩුවට ගියේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේක අහන්නේ recordsවලට අවශ්‍ය නිසායි. සභාපතිතුමනි, බැංකුවේ guidelinesවල තිබෙනවාද chief dealerට transactionsවලට මෙන්න මෙතරම් authority එකක් තමයි පැවරෙන්නේ කියලා. මොනවා හරි guidelines තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ, එක එක අයට authority එක තිබෙන්නේ මේ ප්‍රමාණයටයි කියලා. එහෙම guidelines තිබෙනවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: M/s Ernst & Young වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා tradingවලට දෙවැනි වතාවට විකුණන කොට-secondary market එකේදී- limits තිබෙනවා කියලා. නමුත් auctionවලින් ගැනීමේදී එවැනි limits නැහැ කියලායි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒකත් බරපතළ තත්ත්වයක්.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකත් ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, he has acted unlawfully or unethically or illegally?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: I will say that he has acted imprudently because he should have acted prudently when he was placing a bid for the reasons: firstly, for the first time; secondly, on behalf of another primary dealer and also thirdly and most importantly the amount-Rs. 13 billion.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, there is nothing to say in the Act that he cannot act on another primary dealer. Is it just unethical or illegal?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: Nothing. There is no legal bar to say it is unethical. But, it is not correct. This is the first time we have done this.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා දන්නා තරමට මේ bid එක close කළේ කීයටද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එදින 11.00ට තමයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එකතොට Bank of Ceylon එක රුපියල් බිලියන 13කට නේ, මේක bid කළේ. Rs. 13 billion bid කළ වෙලාව කීයද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 10.48ට තමයි email එක ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: 11.00ට close කරන ගනුදෙනුවකට රුපියල් බිලියන 13 1/2ක වටිනාකමක් 10.45ට bid කරන එක අස්වාභාවික නැද්ද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 10.48ට.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මම කියන්නේ ඒ වාගේ අවදානමක්-

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: බැලූ බැල්මට අසාමාන්‍ය සිද්ධියක්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඇත්තටම bank එකේ මොකක් හරි අවශ්‍යතාවකට හරි, නැත්නම් bank එකට වාසියක් වන ආකාරයට හරි ගනුදෙනුවක් හැටියට සහතික කරලා යන ක්‍රියාවලියකට වඩා අවසාන මොහොතේ හදිසියේම තීරණය වීමක් මෙහි තිබෙනවා කියලා හිතනවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අනෙක් කාරණය තමයි 10.48ට මේ bid එක ඇවිල්ලා 11.00ට කලින් මේක දැනුම් දුන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ bank එකේ liquidity position එක කොහොමද කියලා ඔබතුමා බැලුවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ කියනවා liquidity position එක හොඳයි කියලා. නමුත් රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක්. බැංකුවක් එක්ක ගනුදෙනු කරන ඕනෑම-

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ වෙලාව වන විට Central Bank එකේ depositsවල රුපියල් බිලියන 13.5ක balance එකක් තිබුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගණන හරිද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකේ deposit එක Rs. 13.5 billion තිබුණා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හරියටම දැන ගෙන ඉඳලා නිබෙනවා Rs. 13.5 billion තිබෙනවා කියලා.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is also coincident. ඒ කියන්නේ අපේ account එකක රුපියල් 10,000ක් තිබෙනවා කියලා දන්නවා නම්, අපි රුපියල් 9,500කට වෙක් එකක් දමලා ගන්නවා වාගේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරියටම ඒ figure එක.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How much of experience he has and how long the chief dealer has worked for the bank?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: He has a long experience. That is why he is the chief dealer of the Bank.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What is the time period that he has been working there?

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: I cannot recollect, but, he has been in the Department for a long time.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මෙහෙම හිතන්න පුළුවන්, බැංකුවේ තිබෙන මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය නොදැනdealerකෙනෙක් යන්නේ නැහැයි කියලා.

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: According to the Ernst and Young audit Report-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He must have known exactly that this amount was there.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: He knew the amount exactly. He went up to the limit.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුව කිසිම ගැටලුවකින් තොරව අවසන් වුණාය කියා හිතමු. එහෙම වුණා නම් බැංකුවට ලැබෙන මූල්‍යමය ලාභය පිළිබඳව තක්සේරුවක් කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වෙනත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු වෙනුවෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා පෙනී සිටින්නේ නැතුව ඔබතුමන්ලාම මෙයට bid කළා නම් ලැබෙන ලාභය කොපමණද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ දවස්වල සියයට 9.5ක පමණ පොලී අනුපාතයක් තමයි තිබුණේ. මෙය සියයට 12.5කට නේ ගිහින් තිබුණේ. බැංකුව පැත්තෙන් නිලධාරින් කියන්නේ,සියයට 12.5ට යනවාය කියාඒ ගොල්ලෝ දැන ගෙන සිටියා නම් ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු නැතුව බැංකුවෙන් මුදල් ආයෝජනය කරනවාය කියලායි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි මා ඇහුවේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සභාපති-තුමනි, බැංකුවෙන් ආයෝජනය කරන්න හැකියාව තිබුණා. මොකද, බැංකුවට කිසිම පාඩුවක් වන්නේ නැහැ නේ ආයෝජනය කළාය කියලා. තුන්වන පාර්ශ්වයකින් ආයෝජනය කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. බැංකුවට හැකියාව තිබෙනවා නම්, මුදලුත් තිබෙනවා නම් බැංකුවට ආයෝජනය කරන්න තිබුණා නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අවසාන තීන්දු තීරණය ගත්තේ කවුද? ඒක ඔබතුමාත් දන්නේ නැද්ද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Chief Dealer කියන්නේ තීරණය ගත්තේ ඔහු කියලායි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔහු දැන් මෙම කාරක සභාවට එනවා නේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: බැංකුව දැන ගෙන සිටියා නේ, Rs. 1 billion offer එකට, අවශ්‍යතාවට තමයි bid කරන්නේ කියලා.

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දැනගෙන සිටියාය කියා කියනවා. අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය දන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් Dealer කියනවා, Rs. 1 billionවලට තමයි Central Bank එකෙන් ඉල්ලා තිබුණේ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එය publish කරලා තිබුණාද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Public notice එකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: Rs. 13 billion offer එකකටprimary dealer කෙනකු හැටියට පළමුවන වතාවට ආගන්තුකව එන කෙනෙක් Bank of Ceylonඑකට-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය Chairmanගෙන් අහලා වැඩක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ පිළිබඳව ලංකා බැංකුවේ අභ්‍යන්තර විගණන අංශයෙනුත් වාර්තාවක් ගෙන්වා ගනිමුද?

රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියනවා නම් මා කරන්නම්.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is good that we have the internal audit report.

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: We did not want a report of the Internal Audit. Since the Committee has asked that I will get that. When do you want that report?

සභාපතිතුමා: ලබන සතියේ ඒ වාර්තාව එවන්න.

Mr. Ronald C. Perera: As soon as possible I will do that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You can submit a copy of the report.

The Chairman: Thank you.

(Witness withdrew.)

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් audit system එක මාරු වෙලායි තිබෙන්නේ. බොහෝ දේවල් audit කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ risk assessment එකක් කරනවා. සමහර ඒවා, once in three months, six months, one year,once in two years විතර දෙන්න පුළුවන්.It is depending on the risk assessment. අනික් කාරණය, විශාල ආයතනවල External Auditorsලා permanently ඉන්නවා. Now they are doing rolling audits. They are like internal auditors. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ තීරණය based on that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is fair enough.

(මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ඉල්ලුම්කරු ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා සාක්ෂියට කැඳවයි.)

ජයකවුතන්ත්‍රී දේවයලාගේ ධර්මපාල,ප්‍රධාන ඉල්ලුම්කරු, ලංකා බැංකුව ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව, විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා:ඔබතුමා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සේවයට පැමිණියේ කොයි කාලයේදිද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා 1991 අප්‍රේල් 22වන දා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සේවයට බැඳුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා:කවුරුන් වශයෙන්ද සේවයට බැඳුණේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කළමනාකරණ පුහුණුවන්නකු වශයෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාදැන් දරන Chief Dealer තනතුරට පත් වුණේ **මොන අවුරුද්දේද?**

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ අවුරුද්දේ අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ 28වන දා දක්වා මා Chief Dealer තනතුරේ සිටියා. දැනට මා එතැනින් වෙනත් ස්ථානයකට ස්ථාන මාරු කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා ඇහුවේ, ඔබතුමා දැනට දරන තනතුරට පත් වුණේ කවදාද කියලායි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Chief Dealer තනතුරට පත් වුණේ 2013 ජනවාරි මාසයේ 01වන දා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම පළමුවන අවස්ථාව කථිටුව දැනුවත් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ primary dealer කෙනකු වෙනුවෙන් තවත් primary dealer කෙනකු bid කරන එක සම්බන්ධයෙනුයි. ඔය bid එක ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට, ඒ request එක කරන කොට ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන සිටියාද,මේ ඉල්ලන්නේ primary dealer කෙනකුගෙන්ය කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා දැන ගෙන සිටියා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැයි කියලා නීතියේ නැති වුණාටprimary dealer කෙනකුගෙන් තවත් primary dealer කෙනකු ඉල්ලීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒවෙලාවේ සැකයක් මතු වුණේ නැද්ද, මේ පුද්ගලයාටඑය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හැකියාව තිබියදී, Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ඇයි කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ පුද්ගලයා කථා කරන අවස්ථාවේදී මා ඇහුවා, ඔබට හැකියාව තිබියදී අපේ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා මේ ලංසුව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ඇයි කියලා. එයට ඔහු දුන් පිළිතුර වුණේ. දැනටමත් ඒ අයටකෙළින්ම-යෘජුවම- ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න bids කිහිපයක් තිබෙන නිසා. ඒ පැත්තෙනුත් ටිකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑය කියන එකයි. නමුත් රාජ්‍ය බැංකුවක Chief Dealer කෙනකු විධියට විශේෂයෙන්ම මට වග කීමක් තිබෙනවා, රජයේ ණය ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සෑම සහයෝගයක්ම දෙන්න. හැම වෙලාවේම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව primary dealersලා විධියට අපෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන්නා වූ ඉල්ලීම්. විශේෂයෙන්ම වෙන්දේසියක් තිබෙන අවස්ථාවේදි ඒ අයට යොමු කරන්න කියලායි. ඒ වගකීම මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා.

අනික් කාරණය, මෙම ගනුදෙනුකරු-ඔය කියන primary dealer- අපිත් සමඟ හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකාර සම්බන්ධයක් තිබෙනprimary dealer කෙනෙක්. මේ bids තුනම, සියයට 12.50ට, සියයට 12.75ට හා සියයට 13ටයි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. මේ අවස්ථාව වන කොට වෙළෙඳ පොළේ මෙවැනි, මීට සමාන අවුරුදු නිහේ බැඳුම්කරයක් වෙළෙඳාම වුණේ සියයට 9.50ක් වැනි rate එකකටයි. එතකොට සියයට 9.50ත්, සියයට 12.50ත් අතර සියයට 3ක පමණ විශාල වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. දැනට මා භාණ්ඩාගාර අංශයේ අවුරුදු 18ක් සේවය කරලා තිබෙනවා.

මගේ අත්දැකීම අනුව මේ නවයයි පනහට තිබෙන bond එක උපරිම වශයෙන්- basis point- ඒ කියන්නේ සියයට දශම දෙකයි පහක්, දශම පහක් වාගේ තත්ත්වයකින් ඉහළ සහ පහළ යෑමේ ප්‍රවණතාවක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. මීට පෙර auctionsවලදී මම ලබා තිබෙන අත්දැකීම අනුවයි මම එහෙම කියන්නේ. එම නිසා මම කවදාවත් විශ්වාස කළේ නැහැ, නවයයි පනහට තිබෙන rate එක දොළහයි පනහට accept කරන්න. අනිත් එක, මෙතැනදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් තමයි වෙන්දේසියට ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණේ. එතකොට මගේ පූර්ව අත්දැකීම් අනුව කියනවා නම්, විශේෂයෙන් මහ බැංකුව සමහර විට Rs. 1 billion හාර ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; Rs. 2 billion ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; තව ඒ වාගේ දෙගුණයක් ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; Rs. 3 billion විතර වාගේ වෙනකම් යන්නත් පුළුවන්. අන්න එහෙම ගත්තත්, කවදාවත් මොනම හේතුවකටවත් දොළහයි පනහේ rate එකට මේවා වදින්නේ නැති වෙයි කියන විශ්වාසය මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා. මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මේක වදින්නේ නැති වෙයි කියලා. මේක මහ බැංකුව පිළිගන්නේ නැති වෙයි කියලා මට හිතුණා. ඒ වාගේම මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා, මේ bids ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් මගේ බැංකුවට කිසිම අවදානමක් නැති වෙයි කියලාත්. අනිත් එක මොහූ ලිඛිතව මට මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණා, මෙය දමන්න කියලා. එම නිසා මට හිතුණා මෙය නොදා ඉන්න එක සදාචාරාත්මක නැහැ කියලා. මොකද, නීතිමය පැත්තෙන් බැලුවත් ඇත්තවශයෙන්ම primary dealer කෙනෙකුගෙන් තව primary dealer කෙනෙකු bid එකක් දමනවා කියන එක කොහේවත් එපා කියලා නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම ඒ සම්බන්ධව මොකුත් තහනමක්වත්, මොකක්වත් නැහැ. මම මුලින් කිව්වා වාගේ මගේ

යුතුකම වෙන්නේ, මම රාජ්‍ය බැංකුවක chief dealer විධියට දැනට market එකේ තිබෙන්නා වූ බැඳුම්කර ඉල්ලීම් මහ බැංකුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමයි. ඒකයි මගේ යුතුකම වෙන්නේ. ඒ විධියට තමයි, මම කල්පනා කළේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා පළමුවැනි වතාවටනේ, primary dealer කෙනෙකු විධියට primary dealer කෙනෙකු වෙනුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතැනදී ඔබතුමාට නිකමටවත් හිතුණේ නැද්ද, "මම මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ නැතුව, මේ සඳහා මම ඉහළ නිලධාරියෙකුගෙන් approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑද, නැද්ද" කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ මට එහෙම හිතුණේ නැහැ, මැතිතුමනි. මෙය තනිකරම market assessment එක උඩ ගන්නා තීරණයක්. As the chief dealer, I have the authority to take business decisions. So, I accepted this only on that market assessment.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: Is there any limit for that?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: There are not limits for primary biddings. Primary auction එකට යන්න, මෙන්න මේ මේ limits තිබෙනවා කියලා නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේකේ guideline එකකුත් නැද්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Guideline එකකුත් නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය ටිකක් ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, පුළුවන්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හොඳයි. Primary dealersලා සහ primary dealersලා අතර සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගනුදෙනු වෙන්නේ නැහැනේ. මේක පළමුවැනි වතාව.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්, නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් primary dealerට ගනුදෙනුව තිබෙන්නේ customer සමහයි. එක එක customersලා ඉන්නවා. එම customersලා bid එක දුන්නාම ඒ customersලාට dealing limits තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ලංකා බැංකුවේ customersලාට dealing limits නැහැ. අනෙක් primary dealersලාට, බැංකුවලට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සහ බිල්පත් වෙළඳාම් කිරීමේදී trading limits තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, secondary market එකේ අපි trade කරනවා. Trade කරනවා කියලා කියන්නේ- In order to make a capital gain, we engage in buying and selling activities and allocate those bonds or bills to the customer without going for auction. That is not treated as a trade.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Who are your customers who come for the auction?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Mainly, some insurance companies like the Ceylinco Insurance Company.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne:. So, we will take that the example that Ceylinco Insurance Company comes and gives you a bid for Rs. 10 billion.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: On what basis do you accept it?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: If that company comes for Rs. 10 billion, I do not accept, because their acceptance is not stronger than the primary dealer. සෙලින්කෝ ඉන්ෂුවරන්ස් කිව්වාම, ඒ වාගේ කෙනෙකු Rs. 10 billion දෙනවා නම් අනිවාර්යයෙන් මම ඒ ගැන concern වෙන්න ඕනෑ. Transaction settlement එක ගැන මම ගොඩක් concern. මොකද transaction settlement එකේදී වෙන්නේ, DVP, RVP basis- DVP, RVP basis කියලා කියන්නේ, if I have the bond and the particular company has the money- මේ දෙපැත්තම එක විධියට සම්බන්ධ වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කියන්නේ මම ළඟ bond එක තිබුණොත් විතරයි, ඔහුගේ සල්ලි account එක debit වෙන්නේ. Simultaneously, it is settled. නැත්නම් එක පාර්ශ්වයක සල්ලි නැතුව අනෙක් පාර්ශ්වයේ bond එකක් තිබුණාට මෙය transact වෙන්නේ නැහැ through the system.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, precisely, we will use the same example that you have a Rs. 10 billion bid. Let us say on the customer rates, as per the Central Bank system. The bid is given to you, the Bank of Ceylon account will be debited for the Rs. 10 billion and the bond will be credited to you. Suppose that your customer walks away from the transaction. If your customer walks away from the transaction, you are exposed on to a risk. There is a settlement risk and a rate risk. So, are you telling us that you do not have any kind of pre-approved limit or if it is absolutely a new customer that somebody other than the people in the dealing room are actually approving that limit? We just want to know the process in Bank of Ceylon.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: As I said earlier, there are no limits for bidding transactions.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, in that example, Ceylinco Insurance Company can walk in, give you a Rs. 10 billion bid and you will decide for the Bank of Ceylon whether to accept that bid or not. Is that correct?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: I do not accept that.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Then, how would that work?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: I do not accept that Rs. 10 billion, because the amount is high.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is what I am saying. You do not accept the bid means you are making the decision. You are the sole decision maker. Is that the situation in Bank of Ceylon?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay. That is fine.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ධර්මපාල මහත්මයා, ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට එහෙම guideline එකක් නැහැ; ඔබතුමා තමයි, තනිකරම තීරණය කරන්නේ ඔතැන bid එකේදී කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයකට යනවාද කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමාගේ අත්දැකීමේ හැටියට දැන් වන විට උපරිම වශයෙන් ගිහින් තිබෙන bid එක කීයද? මේ කියන incident එකේදී ඔය Perpetual Treasuries කියන කොම්පැණිය Rs. 13 billionවලට ගියා. එතකොට ඔබතුමාගේ අත්දැකීමේ හැටියට ඔබතුමා ගිහින් තිබෙන maximum amount එක මෙකද? Primary නොවෙයි, ඕනෑම එකක. Primaryනේ, කොහොමටත් යන්නේ පළමුවැනි එකේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: 29.01.2013 දින, on account of HSBC, we have sent our bids of Rs. 16 billion, Rs. 29.7 billion and Rs. 2.1 billion.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, all those numbers that you are saying were taken place on the same day.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes, on 29th January, 2013.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: In that same day?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is, on behalf of the HSBC.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: Are they billions or millions?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: They are billions.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: So, altogether, it was Rs. 16 billion-

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Rs. 16 billion, Rs. 29.7 billion and Rs. 2.1 billion.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: Was that taken place on the same day?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What he is saying is all those bids have been made on the same day.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You have the discretion on doing this.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: It is nearly Rs. 48 billion.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: What are the amounts accepted?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: I think the amounts accepted are lesser than that. I cannot remember the exact figures. I think out of Rs. 16 billion, they accepted Rs. 10 billion; out of Rs. 29.7 billion, they accepted 25 billion.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Then, out of Rs. 2.1 billion?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Out of that Rs. 2.1 billion, I think they accepted Rs. 2 billion.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට nearly 48 billion විතර bid කරන්න ඔබතුමා accept කළා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: වැරදිලා හරි මේ 48 billion අපට ගන්න ඩුණා නම් liquidity එක තිබුණාද, ඒ වෙලාවේ බැංකුවේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ වාගේ ලොකු bids දමන එකේ මේ වාගේ තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. HSBC එක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ related transaction එක back කරන්නේ foreigner කෙනෙක්. ඒ කියන්නේ foreign exchange ලංකාවට ඇවිල්ලා තමයි බොහෝ විට මේ ගොල්ලන්ට bids දමන්නේ. එතකොට Central Bank එකත් එක්ක free arrange කර ගෙන තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඒ bids අපි හරහා එවන්නේ. ඒ නිසා අපට ඒකෙදී ලොකු risk එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මෙකෙදින් එහෙම Central Bank එකත් එක්ක free arrangement එකක් තිබුණාය කියා හිතෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ. මම එහෙම හිතන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: HSBC ගනුදෙනුවේදී ඔබතුමා ඉහළ නිලධාරියෙකු-ගෙන් මොකක් හරි අනුමැතියක් ගත්තාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඉහළ නිලධාරියෙකුට මම මේක කියන්නේ මේ transaction එක කළාට පස්සෙදියි. මේ transaction එකේදි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් customersලා bids එවන්නේ දහයහමාරත්, එකොළහත් අතරෙදියි. එකොළහ වනකොට මේ electronic systems එක automatically close වෙනවා. එතකොට මේ පැය භාගය ඇතුළතදී මේ decision එක ගන්න ඕනෑ. **Mr. Lionel Fernando:** You may explain it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Explanations are there.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ auction එකේදි ඒ කියන්නේ වෙන්දේසියේ ගනුදෙනුවලට bid කරන customersලා එන්නේ auction date එකේ දහය හමාරත්, එකොළහත් අතර වාගේ පොඩි කාලයකදියි. මම කිව්වා වාගේ HSBC එක primary dealer කෙනෙක් නොවෙයි. එතකොට HSBC එකේ ගනුදෙනුකාරයෝ ගොඩාක් Treasury Bills and Bonds transactions ආවේ foreignersලා back කරන ඒවා අරගෙනයි. එතකොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒ ගොල්ලන් auction එකට එන්න කලින් Central Bank එකත් එක්ක කථා කරනවා. එහෙම කථා කරලා තමයි අපි හරහා දමන්නේ. Central Bank එක අපිව primary dealer කෙනෙක් විධියට තෝරා ගෙන තිබෙනවා. විශේෂයෙන්ම ඒ වාගේ foreignersලාගේ transactions කරන්න අනික් බැංකුවලට දෙන Bonds සහ Bills අපි හරහා තමයි කරන්නේ. දිගටම ඒ practice එක තිබුණා. ඒ නිසා තමයි ඒ වාගේ ලොකු ගණන් අපි හරහා ගියේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේ closing time එක එකොළහ වෙනකොට primary dealersලා මේකට එන්නේ දහය හමාරටය කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ තරම් කෙටි වෙලාවක් තියලා bid කරන්න එන හේතුව මොකක් කියලාද ඔබතුමා හිතන්නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ මේ bid කරන කට්ටිය රුපියල් ලක්ෂයක් දෙකක් දමන කට්ටිය නොවෙයි. ලොකු ගණන්වලින් තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන් bid කරන්නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගන්නේ investment decision එකක්. Investment decision එකක් ගන්නකොට වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන සෑම තොරතුරක් ගැනම ඒ ගොල්ලන් සෙවිල්ලෙන් ඉන්නවා. අවසාන මොහොත දක්වාම වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන්නා වූ තත්ත්වය- ඒ කියන්නේ interest එක ඉහළ යාවිද?, පහළ යාවිද? තොරතුරු මොනවාද කියන කරුණු- analyze කරලා තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඒ තීරණය ගන්නේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි අවසාන මොහොත දක්වාම ඒ ගොල්ලන් කල් ගන්නේ මේ auction එකට එන්න.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා තීරණය ගන්නේ රජයේ බැංකුවක් වෙනුවෙන් නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන තත්ත්වයන් ගැන හදිසි තීරණයක් ගන්න වුණොත් ඔය තොරතුරු මත ගන්නා තීරණය හදිසි තීරණයක් වුණොත් ඒකෙදි වාසියක් වාගේම අවදානමකුත් තිබෙනවාය කියා ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අවදානමක් තිබෙනවාය කියා පිළිගන්නවා. මම ඒ වෙලාවට bid කරන rate එක හොඳටම බලනවා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට මේ සිද්ධියේදී වුණත් සියයට 9.50ට යන bond එක මේ පුද්ගලයා ඇවිල්ලා ඒක සියයට 9.75ට bid කරනවාය කිව්වට මම ඒක ගන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, three and half per centවල risk එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැන කල්පනාවෙන් ඉඳලා තමයි මම මේක කරන්නේ. මොකද market risk එක ගැන හැම වෙලාවේම calculated risk එකක් අපි ගන්න ඕනෑ, dealersලා විධියට. Government security හරි ඒ වාගේ market එකට expose වෙන දේවල් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි risk එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ, dealersලා විධියට. නමුත් අර සියයට 9.50ත්, සියයට 12.50ත් අතර ලොකු risk cover එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ- risk cover එක මට පුළුවන්- සියයට තුන අතර ඒක කොහොමටත් එන්නේ නැහැ. දශම පහ, දශම අටයි පහ වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක මම දන්නවා. අර වාගේ ලොකු ගණනක්, ඒ කියන්නේ සියයට 9.50යි කිව්වාට මම සියයට 9.50ට bid කරන්න ගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේකෙදි ගනුදෙනුව close කළේ එකොළහට?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එකොළහට close කරනවා. මේ කියන දවසේ එකොළහයි දහය වනකම් මේ system එක ඇරලා තිබුණා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේකෙදි bid කළේ කොයි වෙලාවේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: දහයයි පනස් හත වනකොට අපි bid කරලා ඉවරයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: දහයයි පනස් හත වනකොට ඉවරයි කියන්නේ පටන් ගත්තේ කීයටද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපි තව bids දෙකක් දමලා තිබුණා. එකක් කළුතර බෝධිය වෙනුවෙන් දමපු මිලියන අටක එකක්. මිලියන 500ක තව bid එකක් දමා තිබුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: කළුතර බෝධිය වෙනුවෙන් දමපු ඒ bid එක දමපු වෙලාව කීයද? ඒක තේ පළමු වැනි bid එක?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. මට මතක විධියට දහය හමාරට කලින් මම ඒක දමලා ඉවරයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: හරි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අවසානයට ආපු bids තුන සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි මහ බැංකුවට කථා කළා. ඒ වනකොට විනාඩි දහතුනක් වාගේ කාලයක් තමයි තිබුණේ. අදාළ පුද්ගලයා මට කථා කරන කොට දහයයි හතළිස් පහට විතර ඇති. Email එක මට හම්බ වෙනකොට දහයයි හතළිස් අටට විතර ඇති. දහයයි හතළිස් අටයි ඒකෙ time එක තිබෙන්නේ. මේ bond එකේ rate එක නොවෙයි enter කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ; manually I have to calculate the price and enter it into the system. එතකොට මට ඒකට time එකක් ඕනෑ. මගේ අනික් assistant dealer, Central Bank එකට කථා කළා, මෙවැනි ලොකු bids වගයක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාය; අපට තව ten minutes කාලයක් ඕනෑය කියා. එතකොට තව ලොකු bids වගයක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාය කියන එකෙන්ම ගම්‍ය වෙනවා, මේවා අපේ ලංකා බැංකුවේ bids නොවන බව. කොහොම හරි ඒ ගොල්ලන් අපට ten minutes allow කරලා තිබුණා. Before ten minutes ඒ කියන්නේ- 10.57 විතර වනකොට අපි මේක දමලා ඉවර කළා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: දහයයි හතළිස් පහට අදාළ පුද්ගලයා කථා කළාය කිව්වා. කවුද ඒ අදාළ පුද්ගලයා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අදාළ පුද්ගලයා තමයි Perpetual Treasure Limited එකේ කසුන් පලිසේන.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එයාගේ තනතුර මොකක්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එයා CEO කියා තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනුවේදී මුලින්ම කථා කළේත් එයාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මුලින්ම කථා කළේත් එයා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මුලින්ම කථා කළේ කොයි වෙලාවේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මුලින්ම දහයයි හතළිස් පහට තමයි කථා කළේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: දහයයි හතළිස් පහට කලින් Perpetual Treasure Limited වෙනුවෙන් ඔහු කිසිම අවස්ථාවක ඔබතුමාට කථා කරලා නැද්ද, මේ ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන්?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් කථා කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට දහයයි හතළිස් පහට තමයි ඔබතුමා දන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා 13 billion ගන්න යනවාය කියා? දහයයි හතළිස් පහේ සිට දහයයි හතළිස් අට වෙනකොට ඒ තීරණය ගත්තා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: සැලකිය යුතු අවදානමක් නේ. විනාඩි තුනකදී ඔබතුමා බිලියන 13ක් ගැන තීරණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. මම ඔබතුමාට කලින් පැහැදිලි කළා වාගේ ඒ අවදානම-

ගරු රෝහිත බෝගොල්ලාගම මහතා: මේ auctions යන වෙලාවේදි dealer කෙනෙකුගේ රාජකාරිය අපට හරියටම පහදා දුන්නොත් හොඳයි.

It is a quick decision that you have to take because you are given only a bit second to make a decision, before the closing time. ඒක කෙරෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියා පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කළොත් හොඳයි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: තනිකරම මගේ experience එක මත තමයි මේ bidding කටයුතු සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ. ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේදී මගේ ඉහළ නිලධාරියාට මම ඒක දැනුම් දෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, ඔබතුමාට telephone calls ආවාය කියා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කොහොමද මේ telephone calls ආවේ? කොතැනටද ආවේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේකෙදි request එක ආවේ මගේ mobile phone එකට. ඊට පසු මම කිව්වා, කරුණාකරලා මේක email එකෙන් එවන්නය කියා. Email එකෙන් ඒක ආවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද Central Bank guideline එකක් තිබෙනවාය කියා කිසිම අවස්ථාවකදී mobile phones, dealing room එකක පාවිච්චි කරන්න බැහැ කියා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. මම දන්නවා

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් mobile phone එකක් ඇතුළට අරගෙන ගිහිල්ලා ඔබතුමා කර තිබෙන්නේ වරදක් නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Mobile phones ඇතුළේ තබා ගැනීම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් හැම dealer කෙනෙක් එක්කම කරනවා. අපට දීලා තිබෙන phones ටික හැම වෙලාවෙම busy. ඒවා අපේ

ශාඛාවන් සමඟ, තවත් බැංකු සමඟ, බාහිර පුද්ගලයන් සමඟ හැම වෙලාවේම සම්බන්ධ වෙනවා. නමුත් අර පුද්ගලයා mobile phone එකට කථා කරලා කිව්වා, අපට මෙහෙම bids ටිකක් දා ගන්න තිබෙනවාය කියා. නමුත් ඒක email එකෙන් confirm කරලා තිබෙනවා. Phone එකටත් වැඩිය ඒක විශ්වාසයි.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: On the floor, there are phones to gives-

Mr. G.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ ඔය mobile phone එකට තවත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් ඔය වාගේ calls එනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් calls එනවා.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: ඒ Tie Lines තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමාට ඔය call එක ආපු mobile phone number එක කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා ළඟ දැන් mobile phone එක නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමාට phonenumber එක මතක නැද්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ වාහනයේ තමයි mobile phone එක තියෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ personal phone එකට නොවෙයිද ආවේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට office එකෙන් දීලා තිබෙන,phone එකට.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, we can move on for another question.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කාරණයම පොඩ්ඩක් ඇහුවා නම් හරි. හොඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඒ ඇහුවේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පළමුවැනි කාරණය මේකයි. ඒ mobile phone එකේ number එක ඕනෑ. ඒක Mobitel එකක්ද,Dialog එකක්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒක Dialog එකක්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: DialogCompany එකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන් නේ,that particular day ආපු calls මොනවාද කියලා.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: We will call for that also. First, we will get the phone number, the date and then the call schedule from Dialog.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: I do not have the authority. It is better to-

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කරුණටම සම්බන්ධ දෙයක් මම මේ අහන්නේ. Treasury එකයි primary dealersලායි, අතරේ tie line එකක් තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Tie lines නැහැ. එකකොට ගනු දෙනුව කොහොමද කරන්නේ? කොහොමද ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ? ඔය mobile phone එක ඇරෙන්න වෙන මොනවා හරි ක්‍රම තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අපේ direct phone linesවලින් ඒ අයට එන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා:SLT direct phone lines විතරයි. එච්චරයි. වෙන මොනවත් නැහැ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Fax and e-mail එනවා.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Fax and e-mail එන්නෙත් floor එකටද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා සඳහන් කළා, මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා ඉතාම විශ්වාසවන්ත ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න, ඒක කියන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒකට එකතු කිරීමක් එක්ක මා මේ කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී කිව්වා, මේ ආයතනයත් එක්ක හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකාර සම්බන්ධයක් තිබුණාය කියලා. මේ ආයතනයත් එක්ක තිබුණු හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකාර සම්බන්ධය මට පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, that is important.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා:ඔබතුමා පෞද්ගලිකව නොවෙයි, බැංකුවක් හැටියට.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුකරුවා සමඟ අපි Repo transaction කියන එක කරනවා. Repo කියන්නේ, Repurchase Agreement කියන එකයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැනට මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් කී දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවාද, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ බැංකුවේ?

The Chairman: We have all the Governors of the Central Bank here. Acting Superintendent විතරක් තියාගෙන අනික් කට්ටියය යන්නකියන්න.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය නැවත කරුණාකර යොමු කරන්න.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා කලින් පැහැදිලි කළා, මේ ආයතනය Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt.) Ltd එක්ක හොඳ සම්බන්ධයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. මොකක්ද, ඒ හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකාර සම්බන්ධය? ඒක ඔබතුමා එක්ක තිබෙන පෞද්ගලික සම්බන්ධයක් නොවෙයි නේ. Bank of Ceylon එකත් එක්ක තිබෙන හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකාර සම්බන්ධය මොකක්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අපේ බැංකුවේ තිබෙන ලාභයට-අප ලබන ලාභයට- දෙන contribution එක. 2014 වසරේ සහ ඊට පසුව මේ company එකත් එක්ක ගනුදෙනු කිරීමෙන් මිලියන 36ක විතර අමතර ආදායමක් අපට ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: බිලියන 36ක්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මිලියන 36ක විතර.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ ගනුදෙනු බැංකුවත් එක්ක කරපු ගනුදෙනු? මේ ආයතනය බැංකුවත් එක්ක තිබෙන accounts මොනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Treasury transactions සම්බන්ධයෙන් මෙම ගනුදෙනුකරුවාගෙයි, අපෙයි corporate ශාඛාවේ ගිණුමක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගිණුම හරහා කිසිම transaction එකක් කරන්නේ නැහැ. Treasury එක කරන සියලුම transactions settle වන්නේ- පිය වන්නේ- ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවත් එක්ක තිබෙන ගිණුම සමහයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt.) Ltd. කියන ආයතනය ලංකා බැංකුවත් එක්ක තිබුණු ගිණුම් මොනවාද? දැන් මම උදාහරණයක් කියන්නම්. මම ලංකා බැංකුවේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් නම් ලංකා බැංකුවට මාව විශ්වාසවන්තයෙක් වන්නේ එම බැංකුවත් තිබෙන එක්ක තිබෙන මගේ ගිණුම් හරහා නේ. ඒක පිළිගන්නවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මට ණයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ වුණොත්, පළමුවෙනි විකාවට අද ගිහින් මම ණයක් ඉල්ලුවොත් ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් මට ණයක් දෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මට ඔවුන් ණයක් දෙන්න නම් මම ලංකා බැංකුවත් එක්ක විශ්වාසනීයත්වයක් ගොඩනඟා ගෙන තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ company එක අපේ බැංකුවේ customer කෙනෙක්- සහාපති. ඒ company එක අපේ corporate ශාඛාවේ සාමාන්‍ය ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක්. ඒ අයට current account එකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: Current account එක කවදාද විවෘත කර තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Central Bank එකේ license එකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අප එදා ඔක ඇහුවා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගිණුම ආරම්භ කළ දිනය, ඒ mandate එක ආදී තොරතුරු මා ළඟ නැහැ. නමුත්,KYC කියන form එක අප 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ 12වැනි දා අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඒක අප නොවෙයි අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. ඒක අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ අපේ corporate branch එකෙන්. Treasury එකත් එක්ක කරන ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධයෙන් මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා- Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt.) Ltd.කියන company එක- introduced by the Central Bank to the whole market and they have taken the KYC document when the company opened their current account with the Central Bank.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: Central Bank එක දීපු සහතිකයට අමතරව මේ ගනුදෙනුවට යන මොහොත වන විට ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන හිටියාද, මේ ආයතනයේ තිබුණු ජංගම වත්කම් ප්‍රමාණය කොපමණද කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: අර විනාඩි ගණනින් තීරණයක් ගන්න කොට ඒ තීරණය ගන්න ඔබතුමාට පාදක වන හේතු අතරේ තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ, මෙයාට තිබුණු ජංගම වගකීම් ප්‍රමාණය, මේ මේ අයට තිබෙන ඇත්ත මුදල් වටිනාකම් ප්‍රමාණය. ඒ වගකීම් ප්‍රමාණය ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන හිටියාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ වගකීම් ප්‍රමාණය නම් දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මිලියන 300 capital එක තමයි primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙන්න තිබෙන qualification එක. නමුත්,Government Security transactions කරන කොට අප බලන්නේ ඒ company එකේ තිබෙන capacity එක නොවෙයි. මොකද, අප deal කරන්නේ Government Security එකක්. ඒ Government Security එක බැරි වෙලාවත් ඔය කියන company එක default කළා නම්-ගෙව්වේ නැත්නම්- ඒ Government Security එක අපෙයි. අපට තිබෙන්නේ market එකේ අනුපාතය ඉහළ පහළ යෑමේ බලපෑම් මත ඇති වන්නා වූ වෙළෙඳ පොළ අවදානම් පමණයි. ඒ වෙළෙඳ පොළ අවදානම් කියන එක අප අනිවාර්යයෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ. අනිවාර්යයෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන්නේ, පල්ලෙහා තිබෙන rate එක්ක ගන්නවා කියන එක නොවෙයි. අප බලන්න ඕනෑ market එකේ තිබෙන හොඳ rate එකකට යන්න. ඒ ඇරුණු කොට ඒ අයගේ වත්කම සහ වගකීම් කොපමණක් තිබෙනවාද, ඒක උඩ නේද deal කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා දෙයක් නැහැ,primary

dealer කෙනෙකුට. Government Security එකක් deal කරන නිසා ඒකේ credit risk එකක් නැහැ. මොකද, රජයේ සුරැකුමක ණය අවදානම බින්දුවයි. ඒ කියන්නේ, අර ගනුදෙනුකරුවා වෙනුවෙන් Treasury Bond එකක් හෝ Treasury Bill එකක් මම ගත්තා නම් එයාට මම ඒක pass කරන්නේ නැහැ, එයා මට මුදල් ගෙවනතුරු. එතකොට,until then, අර Security එක මගේ. එතකොට මට හොඳ security එකක් හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවා,ඒක කවදා හරි මට ආපසු ගෙවන්නේ ආණ්ඩුවයි කියලා. ආණ්ඩුව කවදාවත් default කරන්නේ නැහැ. Credit risk එක zero කියලා තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය පැහැදිලි කිරීම හරි. ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී කිව්වා, මේකට bid කරන්න හේතූන් අතර එක ප්‍රධානතම හේතුවක් තමයි ගනුදෙනුකරුවා සහ බැංකුව අතර තිබෙන විශ්වාසවන්තභාවය කියලා; බැංකුවට මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා විශාල දායකත්වයක් ලබා දුන් කෙනෙක් කියන එක. අන්න ඒකට මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමා තියපු විශ්වාසය; මෙයා හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් කියන එකට අවශ්‍ය කරුණු ටික පැහැදිලි කරන්න, මෙන්න මේ හේතු ටික නිසා තමයි බැංකුව පිළිගත්තේ මෙයා හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම ගනුදෙනුකරුවා විශේෂයෙන්ම මා කිව්වා වාගේ Repo transactionsවලට අපත් එක්ක එනවා. Repo transaction එකක් කියන්නේ, Repurchase Agreement එකක්,-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කළා, එක අවුරුද්දක මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා නිසා මූල්‍යමය වශයෙන් මිලියන 36ක ලාභයක් තමයි හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ලංකා බැංකුවට ලාභ ලැබුණු ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් list කළොත්, මෙයා දෙක, තුන ස්ථානයේ ඉන්න ඕනෑ, ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව. දැන් ඔබතුමාම කිව්වා මිලියන 36ක් තමයි මෙයාගෙන් ලැබිලා තිබෙන contribution එක,bank එක පැත්තෙන් කියලා. අන්න ඒ වාගේ මෙවැනි විශාල මුදල් වටිනාකමක වගකීම ඔබතුමන්ලා භාර ගන්න මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා කෙරෙහි විශ්වාස කරන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුකරුවා සමඟ මීට පෙර කරපු කිසිම transaction එකක් මේ අය default කරලා හෝ පරක්කු කරලා හෝ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැනට කොච්චරක් විතර කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට හරියටම ගණන් මතක නැහැ. Billions වලින් අප කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට ඒ වෙලාවේ ඒක මතක තිබුණාද? ඔබතුමා මේ තීන්දුව ගන්න කොට මතක තිබුණාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: තීන්දුව ගන්න කොට මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා මේ levelsවල මේක කළාට,-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කොයි කොයි levelsද? ඔබතුමා ඒ වාගේ විශාල තීන්දුවක් ගන්න වෙලාවේ මතක තිබුණාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Rupees 500 million, Rs. 800 million, ඒ වාගේ අපි ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට Repo basis අපි lend කරලා තිබෙනවා. Repo basis කියන්නේ ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් Government Security එක අපි ගන්නවා. අපි අරගෙන-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ කියන්නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ.- ධර්මපාල මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries Limited කියන ආයතනයට අපි මුදල් දෙනවා. එතකොට ඒ අවස්ථාවේම ඒ ගොල්ලෝ Government Security එක අපිට assign කරනවා. ඉතින් දවසකට හරි දෙකකට හරි පස්සේ ආපසු මුදල් සමඟ පොලිය අපිට ගෙවනවා සහ අපි ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට අර Government Security-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්. එහි අවසාන ප්‍රතිඵලය ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේ. බැංකුවට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ රුපියල් මිලියන 36යි කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතින් රුපියල් මිලියන 36ක් ලැබෙන ගනුදෙනුවක් නේ සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා පිළිබඳව තිබෙන විශ්වාසය ඒ ටිකද තිබෙන්නේ? ඊට වඩා වැඩි විශ්වාසයක් නැද්ද? මෙන්න මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා නිසා තමයි මම මේකට ඉදිරිපත් වුණේ කියලා, ඒ ගැන ඔබතුමා දැඩිලෙස පැහැදිලි කරන්න?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. විශේෂයෙන්ම primary dealersලා 14 දෙනයි ඉන්නේ. ඒ 14දෙනාගෙන් එක්කෙනෙක් මේ ආයතනය කියනකොට market එකේ හොඳ පිළිගැනීමක් තිබෙන ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ primary dealersලා 14 දෙනාම ඔබතුමන්ලා එක්ක සම්බන්ධයි නේද? Bank of Ceylon එකත් සමඟ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ එහෙම එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේකෙන් බැංකුවට ලොකු risk එකක් නැහැ කියලා ඔබතුමා දැන් පැහැදිලි කළා නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මෙහි තිබෙන්නේ market එකේ fluctuation risk එක විතරයි කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට බැංකුවට මුදලුත් තිබුණා නම්, දැන් බැංකුවත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට මේ offer එකේ ඔබතුමාට මොකක් හෝ විශ්වාසයක් හැදෙනවා නේ මේ වාගේ ගනුදෙනුවකින් බැංකුවට යම්කිසි ගණනක් ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ වාසිය බැංකුව ගත්තේ නැත්තේ ඇයි?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: බැංකුව ඒ වාසිය ගන්න ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි,-

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මොකද බැංකුවටත් තිබුණා නේද මේ chance එක ගන්න?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි. නමුත් මගේ අත්දැකීම් විධියට මම කවදාවත් හිතුවේ නැහැ 9.50ට තිබෙන rate එක 12.50ට යයි කියලා මම කීයටවත් හිතුවේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා primary dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට හිතුවේ නැති එක, ඒ ගැනුම්කරු හිතන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා හිතුණේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මට ඒක හිතුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: නැහැ මම මේ කියන්නේ එයත් primary dealer කෙනෙක්, ඔබතුමාත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් නේ. දැන් ඔබතුමාට ඒක හිතෙන්නේ නැහැ. එතකොට අර ගැනුම්කරුට හිතුණේ කොහොමද කියලා හිතෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒක මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා අසාර්ථක dealer කෙනෙක්. ඔබතුමාත් එතැනදී විනාඩි ගණනක decision ගන්නවා. ඔබතුමාම දැන් කිව්වා, මේ තීරණය විනාඩි ගණනකින් ගන්නා තීරණයක් කියලා. ඒ තීරණය ඔබතුමාගේ ආයතනයට වාසි වෙන්න නේ ඔබතුමා හැම වෙලාවේම ගන්නේ. එතකොට Perpetual Treasuries Limited කට්ටිය ගන්නේ, ඒ කට්ටියගේ වාසියටයි. දැන් එතුමාට පෙනෙන දේ ඔබතුමාට පෙණුනේ නැත්තේ ඇයි? එතකොට මුදලුත් නිබිලා තිබෙනවා. ඔහුට මුදල් නැතුවත් ජේනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමාට බලය තිබෙනවාද බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් එහෙම decision එකක් ගන්න, නැත්නම් බැංකුව කලින් තීරණය කරලා තිබෙන්න ඕනෑද, අද අපි මේකට bid කරනවා කියලා. විශේෂයෙන්ම ඔබතුමාට ඒ බලය තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අපි බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් ඒ කියන්නේ බැංකුවේ investment purpose එකට හරි , බැංකුවේ trading purpose එකට හරි අපි invest කරනවා නම්, මගේ කළමනාකරණයත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරලා තමයි ඒ ගැන තීරණය කරන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමාට බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම ඒක කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන් පිළිගන්නවා නේද, මේ ගනුදෙනුව ගැන අද මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ගෙනැල්ලා කථා කරන්නේ විශේෂ හේතු නිසා කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ විශේෂ හේතු අතරේ තිබෙන එක දෙයක් තමයි, මෙහි යම් සැක සහිත තොරතුරු හෙළිදරවු වීම මත ඇති වුණ ආන්දෝලනාත්මක තත්ත්වයකුත් තිබෙනවා කියන කාරණය. ඒක ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම ඒ කාරණය පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට අර අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබට 10.45ට පමණ කථා කරලා කියනකොට අපට තවත් bids තිබෙනවා, මේක bid කරන්න කියලා කියද්දී, මම අහන්නේ දැන් තත්ත්වය අනුව නොවෙයි, ඔබතුමාට කිසිම සැකයක් ඇති වුණේ නැද්ද යම් විශ්වාසනීයත්වයක් මතයි එම ගනුදෙනුව ගැන ඒ තරගකරුවා මෙහෙම කියන්නේ කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මට එහෙම එකක් හිතුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: හිතුණේ නැහැ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට ඔයාට හිතුණේම මේ කාරණයේදී මේක මේ අයට නොලැබෙනවා කියන හැඟීම විතරයි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ අයට නොලැබෙනවා කියන එක තමයි මට හිතුණේ. උදාහරණයක් විධියට 10.25ට සෙලින්කෝ ඉන්ෂුරන්ස් කියන Company එක Rs. 500 million වලට bid කරනකොටත් මම ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට කිව්වේ ඔපමණ නම් ඉහළ යන්නේ නැතිවෙයි කියලා. මම තදින්ම විශ්වාස කළා මේක 9.75 පමණ වාගේ වෙනකම් යයි. එතනින් ඉහළට නම් යන්නේ නැති වෙයි කියලා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ නැතිවෙයි කියලා ඔබතුමා කථා කළේ වාචිකවද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: වාචිකව කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එහෙම නැතුව telephone වලින් එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ. නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Mr. Dharmapala, මට ප්‍රශ්න දෙකක් තිබෙනවා එකක් තමයි ඔබතුමා ඒ වෙනකොට දැන ගෙන හිටියාද Perpetual Treasuries Limited බිලියන දෙකකට bid කරලා ඉවරයි කියලා. ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඊට කලින් නේ bid කළේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Amount එක මට කිව්වේ නැහැ ගරු අමාත්‍යතුමියනි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන හිටියාද මෙගොල්ලන් කලින් bid කළා කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ එයා මට කීවේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited ළඟ තව දාන්න ලොකු bids තියෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මට දැන ගන්න වුවමනා ඒ කාරණය තමයි. ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන සිටියාද, මේකේ වෙලාව අනුව ඔබතුමා මේක ඒ ගොල්ලන් වෙනුවෙන් bid කරන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් bids ගණනාවකට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා නේ. දෙකකටද තුනකට වාගේ. ඔබතුමා ඒක දැනගෙන සිටියාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ. මම ඒක දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක එක් කාරණයක්. අනිත් එක ඔබතුමාට ඒ කාලපරිච්ඡේදය ඇතුළත දී බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධානියෙක්, එක්කෝ CEO ගෙන් හරි Assistant Manager ගෙන් හරි කාගෙන් හරි calls ආවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: කාගෙන්වත් calls ආවේ නැහැ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මට දැන ගන්නට වුවමනා කළේ ඒ කාරණය තමයි. I wanted to establish that. You did not know that the Perpetual Treasuries Limited had bid so much before. Is it?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මට තව එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා dealing room එකේ සිටි වෙලාවේදී, ඔය කියන පෙ.ව.10.45ට හෝ ඔය ගනුදෙනු සිද්ධ වෙන වෙලාවේදී වෙන කවුද සිටියේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Dealing room එකේ cadre එක 15 දෙනෙක් වාගේ ඉන්නවා. එතැන dealersලා 15 දෙනෙක් වාගේ ඉන්නවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ primary dealersලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ. Bank of Ceylon එකේ අය.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ ඇරෙන්න වෙන primary dealersලා එතැන නැහැ නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන් කිව්වා, ඔබතුමා එක ආයතනයකට කිව්වා කියලා "ඔපමණ ඉහළ යන්නේ නැහැ" කියලා. ඒක කිව්වේ කොහොමද? 12.25ට වඩා වැඩියෙන් යන එකක් නැහැ කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වා කියලා දැන් කිව්වා නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: සෙලින්කෝ ලයිෆ් ආයතනයට. මම හිතන්නේ සෙලින්කෝ ලයිෆ් ආයතනයත් සමඟ මම නොවෙයි කථා කළේ. මට ඒක හරියටම මේ වෙලාවේ කියන්න අමාරුයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මගේ Assistant කථා කළා වාගේ තමයි මට මතක.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා මේ ගනුදෙනුව ගැන කියද්දී records වල තිබෙනවා "මම කිව්වා කියලා මෙච්චර නම් ඉහළ යන්නේ නැහැ කියලා" ඊට පස්සේ මම ඇහුවා කිව්වේ කොහොමද කියලා? වාචිකවද? Telephone එකෙන්ද කියලා, එතකොට ඔබතුමා කිව්වා වාචිකව කිව්වේ කියලා. එතකොට වාචිකව කියන්න නම් ඒ dealing room එකේ එතැන ඉන්න එපැයි. එහෙම හිටියාද කියලායි මම අහන්නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එතැන කවුරුවත් හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එහෙම නම් කොහොමද කිව්වේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම විතරක් නොවෙයි එතැන තව ගොඩක් dealersලා ඉන්නවා. Government Securities සම්බන්ධයෙන් සමහර විට මගේ Assistantට කථා කළාම එයා මගෙන් අහනවා, සෙලින්කෝ ලයිෆ් මේ වාගේ ගණනකට bid කරන්න එනවා, කීයද rate එක කියන්නේ කියන එක. මම හිතන්නේ මම එයාට කිව්වා වාගේ තමයි මට මතක.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: නැතුව වෙන primary dealer කෙනෙකුට කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: වෙන primary dealersලාට මම කියලා නැහැ. Primary dealersලා එතැනට එන්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් ඔය dealing room එකේ voice recording තිබෙනවා නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Voice recording තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒකේ restrictions නැද්ද? ඕනෑම පුද්ගලයෙකුට, පිට අයට කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Dealersලාට විතරයි පුළුවන් කථා කරන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පිටට කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්? ඕනෑම call එකක් ගන්න පුළුවන්?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පුළුවන්. Customersලාට කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒවා land phonesවලට විතරයි restrict කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒවා record වෙනවා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා mobile phone එකටයි Perpetual Treasuries Limitedලාගේ request එක ආවේ කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ ඒ පුද්ගලයා ඔබතුමාගේ mobile phone එකේ number එක දැනගෙන ඉන්න ඕනෑ නේද කථා කරන්න. එතකොට ඔය වාගේම තවත් dealersලා ඔබතුමාගේ number එකට ඔය වාගේ කථා කරලා තිබෙනවාද? ඔබතුමා dealing room එක ඇතුළේ ඉන්නකොට කථා කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔබතුමා අහන්නේ primary dealersලා ගැනද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ. ඔබතුමාගේ primary dealer. ඔබතුමාට request එනවාද ඔය විධියට තවත් පුද්ගලයන්ගෙන් mobile phone එකට මේ bid එක දාන්න කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ එහෙම නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේක තමයි පළමුවෙනි අවස්ථාව.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පළමුවෙනි අවස්ථාව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කථා කළා කියන්නේ කවුද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ CEO. කසුන් පළිසේන. එයා CEO.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔහු CEO කියලා ඔබතුමාට විශ්වාසද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: CEO කියලා මට විශ්වාසයි. ඔහුගේ ලියුමෙත් දාලා තිබෙන්නේ CEO කියලා තමයි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපි මෙහෙම වාර්තා කළොත් හරිද? මම ඉස්සෙල්ලා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය, dealersලා එක්ක deal කරන්න මොනවත් limits set කරලා නැහැ. Pre-set limits නැහැ. That is completely at the discretion of the Chief Dealer. ඒක එකක්. හරිද ඒ කාරණය?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: හරි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දෙවෙනි ප්‍රශ්නය dealing room එකේ telephone conversations record වෙන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා ටෙලිකොම් එකේ තිබෙන fixed linesවල විතරයි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: වෙන එක conversation එකකවත් record වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඉතින් ඒකත් අපි record කරනවා. ඒක ලොකු අඩුපාඩුවක් මොකද, dealing room එකක conversations should be available. ඒකෙන් තමයි අපිට establish කරන්න පුළුවන් මොනවාද වුණේ සහ නැත්තේ කියන එක සම්බන්ධව. මගේ තුන්වෙනි ප්‍රශ්නය කසුන් පළිසේන කියන පුද්ගලයා telephone එකෙන් කථා කරනවාට අමතරව ඔබතුමා මුණගැසිලා තිබෙනවාද ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මුණගැසිලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මුණගැසිලා තිබෙනවා. කොපමණ කාලයක් අඳුනනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම දැන් අවුරුද්දක් දෙකක් විතර වාගේ අඳුනනවා. මොකද මට ඔහු හමුවෙනවා Central Bank එකේ meetings වලදී. ඊට අමතරව Corporate Branch එකේ account එක විවෘත කරන්න එන වෙලාවේ dealing room එකට දවසක් ආවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, එදා විතරද හමු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ දවස්වල විතරයි මට මතක.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මතකය අනුව?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔය Perpetual Treasuries Ltd එකට සම්බන්ධ ඇලෝෂියස් කියලා පුද්ගලයකු හඳුනනවා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා ඒ පුද්ගලයා ගැන අහලා තිබෙනවා. මා ඒ පුද්ගලයාව හඳුනන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කථා කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කවදා හෝ හමු වෙලා තිබෙනවා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කවදාවත් හමු වෙලා නැහැ. මම ඒ පුද්ගලයා ජීවමානව කවදාවත් දැකලා නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හැබැයි, ඔය Perpetual Treasuries Ltd එකට සම්බන්ධ එහෙම පුද්ගලයකු ඉන්නවා කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට-

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Excuse me,ඔබතුමා දැන් පළමුවන ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවානේ, limits සම්බන්ධව. එතකොට මා කිව්වේ, primary auctionsවලට යන්න මට limits නැහැ කියලා විතරයි. අනෙක් trading purposesවලට limits තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Primaries වලට නැහැ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හරි. ඊළඟට- දැන් මා අහන්නේ මේ කොම්පැනියයි, Bank of Ceylon එකයි අතර තිබෙන සම්බන්ධතාව ගැන- ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, මේක බොහොම වැදගත් සම්බන්ධතාවක්. ඒ සම්බන්ධතාව තුළින් 2014 Bank of Ceylon එක රුපියල් මිලියන 36ක ලාභයක් ලබා ගත්තායි කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා : ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට- මේක ගැන දැන ගන්නයි මා මේ අහන්නේ- තවත් deal කරනවානේ customersලා එක්ක. එහෙම නම් තවත් වැදගත් customersලා ඇතිනේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඒ අය කවුද, ඒ අයගෙන් කොච්චර ලාභ ලබා තිබෙනවාද කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? එතකොට අපට මේ රුපියල් මිලියන 36 ගැන මොනවා හෝ නිගමනයකට එන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැතිව අපට මේ ගැන නිගමනයකට එන්න බැහැ.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Customer wise-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි Bank එකෙන් ඉල්ලා ගනිමු report එක.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. අපි ඒක වෙනමත් ගනිමු. දන්නා තරමට Chief Dealer ඒකත් අපි ලබා ගනිමු.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන් කිව්වා නේද, Dealing Room එකට කෙනකු ආවායි කියලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Dealing Room එකට කවුරු හෝ ආවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේද, CEO කසුන් කියන පුද්ගලයා හඳුනා ගත්තේ Dealing Room එකේදි කථා කරලයි කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. හැබැයි, මේ කියන දවසේ නොවෙයි. දින වකවානු හරියටම මට මතක නැහැ. Corporate Branch එකේ ගිණුම විවෘත කරන්න ආසන්න දවසක ඇවිල්ලා මා සමඟ කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, Dealing Room එකට ඇවිල්ලා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Dealing Room එකට එන්න පුළුවන්ද?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. He is talking about the his section in the Bank

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But the Dealing Room is restricted only to the leaders.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. He is talking about the his section in the Bank

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But the Dealing Room is restricted only to the leaders, not for others.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Outsiders ලාට එන්න පුළුවන්ද, Dealing Room එකට.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: පිට කෙනකුට එන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එකයි අපි ඉස්සෙල්ලාම අහ ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Dealing Room එකෙන් එළියේ settee එකක් දාලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ settee එකේ වාඩි වෙලා තමයි අපි කථා කළේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ කියන්නේ, ඇතුළට ඇවිත් නොවෙයි නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Not the dealing area.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මා කලින් අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තරයක් තිබෙනවා ද? ඒ කියන්නේ වෙන ඉන්න customersලා කවුද? ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ profitability එක මොකක්ද? ඒ කියන්නේ- Now you are saying that the profitability of the Perpetual Treasuries Ltd is

Rs. 36 million. You must be having a table indicating who your customers are and how much profit you can earn et cetera. I want to see where Perpetual Treasuries Ltd is there in that lead table.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒක analyze කරලා වෙනම ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙනම් ඒක ඔබතුමා ළඟ ඇති නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අපි එහෙම analyze කරන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් දැන් මේ ඇති වෙලා තිබෙන සිද්ධිය නිසා විශේෂයෙන් මා ඒක analyze කරලා බැලුවා මේ අයගෙන් ලැබිලා තිබෙන gain එක මොකක්ද කියලා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හොඳයි. අපට මේක ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද ?

The Chairman: Auditor-General will find it out.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: We need to know about primary dealers and other dealers.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් ඔය කීන්දුව ගන්න කොට රුපියල් මිලියන 36 හම්බ වුණාය කියලා දැන ගෙන හිටියේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: දැන ගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, මේ සිද්ධියට පස්සේයි දන්නේ. එතකොට වැදගත් ගනු දෙනු කරුවකු කියන එක ඔබතුමා දැන ගත්තේ කොහොමද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ ගොල්ලන්ගේ transactions volumes වැඩි නිසා මා දන්නවා මේ ගොල්ලන්ගේ profitability එකත් වැඩියි කියන එක.

ගරු රෝහිණ සේනානායක මහත්මයා: Exact amount එක දැන ගෙන හිටියා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Exact amount එක මා දැන ගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can we get the table which indicates the profitability of each primary dealer? Because that will also help us. මොකද, අපි මේක Relatively බලන්න එපායැ.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Hon. Minister, we can ask about it from him also because he has also made an analysis.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes, get one from him also and do your one separately.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: 27 වැනිදා මේ ගනු දෙනුවට එනකොට Perpetual Treasuries Ltd, primary dealersලා තවත් ඒ අය නමින්ම කොච්චර deal කරලා තිබෙනවා ද කියලා ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන හිටියා ද? ඒ කියන්නේ, මේකට කොච්චර ලංසු තබා තිබෙනවා ද කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා දැන ගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

Mr. Lional Fernando: Mr. Dharmapala, you mentioned about the KYC form on a question raised by an Hon. Member. Then you mentioned a date as, 'September, 2014.' In what context you mentioned about the KYC form and the date as, 'September, 2014' which was just last year? Was it with regard to the Perpetual Treasuries Ltd?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: This KYC form was not obtained by me.

Mr. Lional Fernando: No, you refereed to the file and said, "I do not know the year that they started transacting with us." Thereafter you said, "September, 2014." Do you admit that?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: There was an audit check done after this issue. For the purpose of audit check, I got the photocopies from the Corporate Branch. Then I came to know about that date.

Mr. Lional Fernando: Right. Then, your knowledge about the Perpetual Treasuries Ltd begins, may I say, from September, 2014?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: It was end of 2013.

Mr. Lional Fernando: You say it now. But at that moment you said, "September, 2014." I have written it down. It is less than one year.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: That is KYC-

Mr. Lional Fernando: I know what is meant by 'KYC'. That is, you give very confidential information to a particular finance company, when you want to open a particular account. Everybody knows what KYC is. My argument is that you say that the Perpetual Treasuries Ltd is a good customer. Did you come to know about it only within the period – that is from September, 2014 to to-date- ?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Yes, because we deal with Perpetual Treasuries Ltd only on

Treasury transactions such as Repo transactions and Swap transactions.

Mr. Lional Fernando: Very well. To support your position, could you tell us the exact date, according to your memory, that you came to know about the initial transaction with the Perpetual Treasuries Ltd?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: I cannot remember that.

Mr. Lional Fernando: Okay.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා 1991 ලංකා බැංකුවට සම්බන්ධ වුණේ කළමනාකාර සහායක වශයෙන් ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කළමනාකාර පුහුණු වන්නෙක් හැටියටයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ උපාධිය මොකක්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: විද්‍යාවේදී ව්‍යාපාර පරිපාලන උපාධිය.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කොයි විශ්වවිද්‍යාලයේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ශ්‍රී ජයවර්ධනපුර විශ්වවිද්‍යාලයේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හොඳයි. ඔබතුමා 2013 ජනවාරි 01 වැනිදා ඉඳලා Chief Dealer වෙලා තිබෙනවා නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඊට කලින්- ඒ කියන්නේ, 1991 join වුණාට පස්සේ Chief Dealer වෙන්න කලින්- වෙනත් dealersලා හැටියට කටයුතු කර තිබුණා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කටයුතු කරලා තිබුණා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කොයි කාලයේද Dealing Room එකට attach වුණේ? Treasury Department එක නේ, ඒවා කරන්නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Treasury එකට මා enter වුණේ 1996 අවුරුද්දේයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එදා ඉඳලා දිගටම හිටියේ Treasury Department එකේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. මා අවුරුදු තුනක් වැඩ කළා ලන්ඩන් ශාඛාවේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා Banking exams කරලා තිබෙනවා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම banking exams partly qualified.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Part I?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Part I.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Part Iවල foreign trades ගැන subject තිබුණේ නැහැනේ? දැන් තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා : Part IIවල subjectsවල තිබුණා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Part IIවල subject එකක් තමයි foreign trades කියන්නේ. Part Iවල නැහැ. ඔබතුමා අවුරුදු කීයක් Treasury Department එකේ හිටියා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා : අවුරුදු 18ක් හිටියා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අවුරුදු 18ක් ඉඳලා dealer විධියට කටයුතු කරලා තමයි Chief Dealer වුණේ. එහෙම නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා : ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමාට අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවානේ dealings පිළිබඳව. එහෙම නැත්නම් Bank of Ceylon එකේ dealings පිළිබඳව. එහෙම නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා විදේශ පුහුණුවීම්වලටත් ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: විදේශ පුහුණුවීම් ගණනාවකට සම්බන්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කොයි රටවලද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: විශේෂයෙන් ඉන්දියාවේ පැවැති පුහුණුවීම් .හතරකට විතර ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. මැලේෂියාවට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හොඳයි. ඔබතුමාගේ ඒ අත්දැකීම් එක්ක තමයි ඔය කියන දින වකවානු වන විට ඔබතුමා ලංකා බැංකුවේ Chief Dealer වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, 2013 ජනවාරි 01 වැනිදා වනකොට. දැන් මේ transaction එක වන අවස්ථාව වන විට ඔබතුමා Chief Dealer හැටියට අවුරුදු දෙකකට මදක් වැඩි වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා : ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුව primary dealer කෙනෙක්. ඔබතුමා දන්නා තරමින් මේ වන විට primary dealersලා කොච්චර ඉන්නවා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: දැනට 15දෙනකු ඉන්නවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් primary dealer කෙනකුගේ capital එක කොච්චරක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මිලියන 300ක් කියලා තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට මිලියන 300ක් capital තිබෙන primary dealer කෙනකුට මොන වගේ limit එකක් දක්වා bid කරන්න පුළුවන් ද? How many times a primary dealer can bid? For an example, if your capital is Rs. 300 million, how many times you can bid? Is it Rs. 300 million x 10 or Rs.300 million x 15 or Rs. 300 million x 20?

Mr. J.D.K. Darmapala: I think 20 times.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ බිලියන 6 දක්වා-Rs. 6 billion දක්වා- bid කරන්න පුළුවන් primary dealer කෙනෙකුට. මොකද, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ capital එක Rs. 300 million නිසා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට හැම bid එකකදීම 10 per cent margin එකක් තියන්න ඕනෑ නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: 10 per cent margin එකක් නොවෙයි, minimum bid කරන්න ඕනෑ 10 per cent.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් මේ transaction එක ගන්න කොට ඔබතුමා කිව්වා e-mail එකක් ආවා කියලා 10.48 වෙනකොට 3, 5, 5 different interest rates වලට Perpetual Treasuries වලින් මෙන්න මේ ගාණට ඒ ගොල්ලන් එනවා කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමාට පේනවා ද Rs. 300 million වාගේ Rs. 6 billion 20 times නම්, ඒ ගොල්ලන් කොහොමද Rs. 13 billion reserve කරන්නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒක මෙහෙමයි. මට bid එක දමන්න කියලා කථා කරන කොට ඒ පුද්ගලයා කීවේ ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට bid කරනවා කියලා නොවෙයි, "There is a customer behind."කියලා. Insurance customer කෙනෙක් කියලා තමයි මට කීවේ. එතකොට මගේ experience එකෙන් මම දන්නවා insurance customers ටිකක් ලොකු bids දානවා කියලා. විශේෂයෙන්ම මම ඒ අවස්ථාවේදි කථා කරලා කිව්වා ශ්‍රී ලංකා ඉංෂුවරන්ස් ආයතනය නම් අපිත් එක්කයි ඉන්නේ, ඇයි ඒක ඔබතුමා අපි හරහා දමන්නේ නැත්තේ කියලා? නැහැ, නැහැ, ඒක ශ්‍රී ලංකා ඉංෂුවරන්ස් ආයතනය නොවෙයි, වෙනත් ආයතනයක් කියලා තමයි එතුමා කිව්වේ. එතකොට ඔබතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ 20 times bidding capacity තිබෙන්නේ own portfolio එකට bid කරන්න කියලා විතරයි. එතකොට customer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් bid කරනවා නම්, ඒ සීමාවෙන් මහ හරින්න වෙනවා. ඉවතට යන්න වෙනවා.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මීට පෙර එහෙම ගිය අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා ද? ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලිව දන්නවා Perpetual Treasuriesවල සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට යන්න පුළුවන් limit එක Rs. 6 billion කියලා. හරිද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට මෙනැනදී Rs. 13 billionවලට යන්නෙයි කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලිව දැනගෙන සිටිද්දී limit එක Rs. 6 billion නම්, ඇයි Rs. 13 billionවෙනකම් යන්න ඉඩ දුන්නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී කල්පනා කළේ customer කෙනෙකුගේ විශ්වාසය.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: නැහැ, ඒක presumption කරන්න බැහැනේ. ඒක පූර්ව නිගමනයක් විතරයිනේ. ඔයාගේ normal practice එකෙන්-

සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති : ඔයා ඇහුවාද ඒ insurance company එක මොකක්ද කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම කථා කළා. ඒ ගොල්ලන් නම කීවේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ නම තවදුරටත් හාර හාර අවුස්සන එක business ethicsවලට සම්බන්ධ වෙන නිසා.

සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති : ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ business ethicsවලට ඒක සම්බන්ධයි. හැබැයි ඔබතුමා මේ assurance එක දෙනවා limit එකෙන් එහා insurance company එක ගැනවත් දන්නේ නැතිව? මොකුත් document තිබෙනවා ද insurance company එක ගැන?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Document එකක් නැහැ.

සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති : මේක බොරුවක් කියනවා කියලා හිතෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හැබැයි මේ e-mail එකේ ඔය කියන කිසිම දෙයක් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැනේ. මේ තිබෙන්නේ-

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Details මොනවත් නැහැනේ.

ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Business ethics කියන එක නම් පිළිගන්නම බැහැ. මෙතුමා risk එකක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා Bank of Ceylon එක වෙනුවෙන් capital cover එකක් නැතිව, අර company එකෙන් guarantee එකක්, insurance එකක්, තව bank එකකින් statement එකක් මොනවත් නැතිව.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මම ඒකයි ඇහුවේ, ඔබතුමාගේ බැංකුවේ තිබෙන පළපුරුද්දයි, chief dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට two years ඉඳලයි, Treasury Department එකේ ඔබතුමා අවුරුදු 15කට වැඩියෙන් පළපුරුද්දකුත් තිබෙන නිසායි. එතකොට මේ තිබෙන ඔක්කෝම experience එකත් එක්ක first time එන මේ වාගේ එකක ඔබතුමා කොහොමද- දැන් ඔබතුමාගේ බැංකුව කියන්න. ඔබතුමාටත් තිබෙන්නේ මේ ක්‍රමයම නේ. ඔබතුමාටත් යන්න පුළුවන් Rs. 6 billionනේ. ඔබතුමාගේ බැංකුවට යන්න පුළුවන් Rs. 6 billion නම්, ඔබතුමා කොහොමද වෙනත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන්- Perpetual Treasuries වෙනුවෙන්- Rs. 13 billion වලට ගියේ?

රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: 2013 ජනවාරි 29 වැනිදා Rs. 16 billion Rs. 29.7 billion, Rs. 2.1 billion වලට bid කරා කියන්නේ ඒ කියන්නේ අර Rs. 300 million limitation එකට එහා ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවානේ. මේ විධියට මීට කලිනුත් ඔබතුමා bid කරලා තිබෙනවා ද වෙනත් customerලට?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම මීට කලින් 2013 වර්ෂයේ විස්තර ටිකක් කිව්වා. ඒ ටික තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක තමයි මට දැන ගන්න ඕනේ. ඔබතුමාට කරලා පුරුද්දක් තිබෙනවා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පුරුද්දක් තිබෙනවා.

රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: දැන් මෙතැන,- There was no default at all in 2013.

Mr. J.D.K. Darmapala: Yes, there was no default at all.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it based on trust? Really, what was the matter that made you to do it?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Just to clear, in 2013, from what I understood, is that he had some assurance from the HSBC. This is different. That we can understand.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That we can understand because HSBC is a reputed bank and it is a chain and you have consulted the Central Bank. But, in this particular case-දැන් මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලිව දැනගෙන සිටියා Perpetual Treasuriesවලට යන්න පුළුවන් limit එක Rs. 6 billion කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හැබැයි එහෙම දැනගෙන නිබියදීත් ඔබතුමා Rs. 13 billion වලට ගියා. හරිනේ. ඔබතුමා එහෙම ගියානේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ Rs.13 billion වලට යද්දී ඔබ Central Bank එක consult කළාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඉස්සෙල්ලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහද්දී ඔබතුමා කිව්වා Rs.1 billion වලටනේ bond issue එක තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. Advertise කරලා තිබුණේ Rs.1 billion වලට. දැන් එතකොට Rs. 13 billion වලට යනවා කියලා ඔබතුමා Central Bank එකට කථා කරලා දැන ගත්තා කිව්වා.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Sir, I beg your pardon.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් Rs. 1 billion වලටනේ bond issue එක තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා පිළිතුරක් දෙනකොට කිව්වා මේක Rs. 2 billion වලට maximum Rs. 3 billion වලට යන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන ගත්තා ද කොතැන හරි අවස්ථාවකදී මේ 11 වෙන්න පෙර මේක ඉන් එහාට යනවා කියලා Rs. 13 billion දක්වා? Requirement එක දැන ගත්තා ද 13 billion වල?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ, මම දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ. එතකොට අර 10.45 වලට ඔබතුමාගේ නව assistant dealerකෙනෙක් contact කළා කිව්වානේ ඔබතුමා මේ dealing room එකේ මේ කටයුතු කරන අතරතුර Central Bank එකට. මොනාක්ද ඒ communication එකෙන් ගත්තේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කථා කළේ වැඩිපුර bids වගයක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා අපිට ඒක දාගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. අමතර වේලාවක් දෙන්න පුළුවන් ද කියලා. එතකොට වැඩිපුර bids කියන එකෙන් තේරුම් යනවා Central Bank එකට අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ඒවා අපේ bids නොවෙයි, පිට කෙනෙකුගේ bids කියන එක.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ වේලාව අර ගන්න තමයි Central Bank එකට කථා කළේ වැඩිපුර bids ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Central Bank එකේ කුමන department එකට ද මේ වාගේ වේලාවක කථා කරන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැනටමත් දන්නවා ඇති මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් අල්ලස් හෝ දූෂණ වංචා විමර්ශන කොමිෂන් සභාව, ඊළඟට ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා පත් කරපු ත්‍රිපුද්ගල කමිටුවකින් වගේම රහස් පොලීසියෙනුත්

පරීක්ෂණ පවත්වා ගෙන යන බව. මේ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කිරීම් කරලා නීතීඥ මහත්වරුන් තුන්දෙනෙක් පත් කරපු කමිටුව ඉදිරියේ ඔබතුමා පිළිතුරු දුන්නා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පිළිතුරු දුන්නා.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා එහි වාර්තාව දැක්කා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: දැක්කා.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එහි සිංහලෙන් හදලා තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ 7වැනි පිටුවේ 15වැනි ඡේදය ඔබතුමා ළඟ තිබෙනවා ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්, මම ඒක කියෙව්වා.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එහි මෙන්න මෙහෙම සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා. "ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැණුම්කරු ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට කියා සිටියේ වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් සඳහා ඉල්ලුම් කිරීමේදී බැංකු පාලක මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් ලබා නොගන් බවත්, ගනුදෙනුවෙන් පසුව වුවද, මේ පිළිබඳව පාලක මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් නොකළ බවයි." ඒක හරිද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පාලක මණ්ඩලය කියලා කියන්නේ අපේ Director Board එක.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හරි, ඒ කියන්නේ ඔවුන්ව දැනුවත් කළේ නැහැ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් දැනුවත් කළේ නැහැ.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් දැනුවත් කරන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මෙතැනදී ඔබතුමා කියලා තිබෙනවා, ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැණුම්කරු කියා සිටියේ- chief dealer- සමාගම බැදුම්කර ඉල්ලුම් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා දුරකථන ඇමතුමක් දුන් බවත්, එබදු ඉල්ලුමක් සඳහා අරමුදල් ලබා ගැනීම රක්ෂණ සමාගම හරහා බවත් කියන දැන් කිව්ව කාරණය?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඊළඟට ඔබතුමා කියනවා "මේ තරම් විශාල ඉල්ලුමක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ඇයි දැයි Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කළ බව."

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා. ඊළඟට ඔහු කිව්වා කියලා පිළිතුරු දීලා තිබෙනවා "ආවොත් අතේ තමයි කියලා."

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ආවොත් ඇතා තමයි.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ආ....මේ අතේ නෙවෙයි, "ආවොත් ඇතා තමයි." මේක වැරැදියට print කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. "ආවොත් ඇතා තමයි" කියන එකෙන් ඔබතුමා අදහස් කළේ මොකක්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එතැන පොඩි misunderstanding එකක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. "ආවොත් ඇතා තමයි" කියන එක මම තමයි කිව්වේ. අපි deals කරන විට, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් dealers ලත් එක්ක කථා කරන කොට විහිළු තහළුත් කරනවා. එතකොට මගේ ප්‍රබල විශ්වාසයක් තිබුණා මේක අනිවාර්යෙන් හම්බවෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක. ඒ වෙලාවේ තමයි මම කිව්වේ "ආවොත් ඇතා නේද" කියලා.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ වාගේ ලොකු එකක් ආවොත් ඇතා කියනවා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පොඩි එකක් ආවොත්?

සභාපති : අලියා.

සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති : "ආවොත් ඇතා තමයි" කියලා කිව්වේ ඔයා නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒක මම කිව්වේ.

සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති : ඉතින් මට හිතෙන්නේ ඒ හැඟීම ඔබතුමාට ආවා නම්, ඔබතුමාට තිබෙනවා නේද මේක ලැබුණොත් වාසියක් තිබෙනවා කියන හැඟීම?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම අනිවාර්යෙන්ම දන්නවා මේක ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මෙපමණ කාලයක පළපුරුද්දක් තිබෙන, chief dealer කෙනෙක් වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙන ඔබට තව primary dealer කෙනෙක් තමයි Rs. 13 billion reserve කරන්න, ඒ අය වෙනුවෙන් bid කරන්නයි කියලා ඔබට කියන්නේ. දැන් මෙතුමාත් ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇසුවා. ඔබතුමාගේ පළපුරුද්ද සහ මේ සියල්ල සමඟ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් chief dealer කෙනෙක් ඕක විතරක් නොවෙයි නේ කරන්නේ, foreign exchange dealings විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් දවසකදී කරනවා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කරනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: බැංකුවේ දවසක transaction එක අන්තිමට report වුණාම සම්පූර්ණ sales and purchasesවල difference එක ගත්තාම ඔබතුමන්ලාට හිඟ නම් මොනවාද ඔබතුමන්ලා කරන්නේ? මිලදී ගන්නවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට වැඩි නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා invest කරනවා. ඒක ලංකාවේ තිබෙන local banks සමඟ විතරක් නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවශ්‍ය නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා විදේශවලටත් යනවා. එහෙම නේ dealings කරන්නේ. බැංකුවට profits සොයලා දෙන එක තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කාර්ය භාරය. ඊළඟට බැංකුවට අවශ්‍ය විදේශ විනිමය හෝ මුදල් සොයා

ගැනීම, ආයෝජනය කිරීම් ආදී මේ සියල්ල. විශාල වගකීමක් ඔබතුමාට තිබෙනවා. හරිද? ලොකු වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා කියලා පිළිගන්නවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ වගකීමත් සමඟ ඔබතුමා මේ කටයුතු කරද්දි මේ Rs. 13 billion වලට- ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාට හොඳ පරිචයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ බැංකුවේ විශේෂයෙන්ම Treasuryය ගැන. තත්පර ගණනකින් මේ තීන්දු අරගෙන ඒ deal එකට අවශ්‍ය rate එක fix කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ වාගේම deal කරන ප්‍රමාණය කොපමණද කියලා තීන්දු කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමාට සිතුණේ නැද්ද වෙන primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් Rs. 13 billion bid කරලා "ආවොත් ඇතා තමයි" කියන එක ඔබතුමාම නම් කිව්වේ, ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලිව දන්නවා ආවොත් ඇතෙක් තමයි කියලා. ඔබතුමාගේ කාර්ය භාරය බැංකුවට උපරිම ලාභය ලබා දීම. මම කියන දේ හරිද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මට පිළිතුරු දීලා පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න. එතකොට මෙතුමා ඇසුවා වාගේම මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි ඒ ඇතාව ලංකා බැංකුවට ගන්නේ නැතිව ඇයි Perpetual Treasuries Ltd.වලට ගන්න ඉඩ ඇරියේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එතැන කථාවට "ආවොත් ඇතා තමයි" කිව්වාට මගේ පැහැදිලි විශ්වාසයක් තිබුණා මේ deal එක කීයටවත් සියයට තුනකට වැඩිය උඩට යන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ ඔබතුමාගේ සිතේ තිබුණ විශ්වාසය අපිට count කරන්න බැරිකමයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා අසමත් නේ chief dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට.

සභාපතිතුමා: Interpretation එක- ඇතා කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරපු එක- a colossal profit කියන එක නේද?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes.

සභාපතිතුමා: මහා විශාල ලාභයක් කියන එක නේද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: බලන්න ඇමතිතුමිය, මෙතුමන්ලා පාවිච්චි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ නරක වචනයක්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මම එතුමාගෙන් ඔය ප්‍රශ්නයම මීට කලින් ඇසුවා. එතුමාට තීරණයක් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් ඒ split-second timing එකේ without the Bank, he said, "No".

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: He can.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. He said, the Bank has to bid.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Why can he not?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what he said; the Board has to decide that.

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: No, Madam, it is not the Board. For investment purpose, when we are investing money, we have to consult our Deputy General Manager and Assistant General Manager as a practice.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. That is what. I asked this question earlier. Then, he explained to me that he cannot take the decision. ඒක නැවත explain කරන්න. නැත්නම් මෙතැන වැරදි වැටහීමක් ඇති වෙනවා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මෙහෙමයි. Investment purpose එකට හරි, trading purpose එකට හරි ලොකු ගණනක් ගන්නවා නම් අපේ DGM හරි, AGM හරි consult කරලා තමයි ගන්නේ. නමුත් මෙතැන customer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් bid කරන කොට අපි ඒ අය consult කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මෙතැනදී අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් එයාට බැරිද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හරි. ඒ කියන්නේ බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් මේ bond issue එකට ඔබතුමා Rs. 13 billion investment කරන්න ගියා නම්, ඔබතුමාට ඒක කරන්න බැහැ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට කරන්න බැහැ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He explained that. I wanted to know that.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හැබැයි වෙන primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකද කියන්නේ?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. That is what he explained to me.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: වෙන ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් ලොකු ගණන් අපට bid කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මේ අවස්ථාවේදී Perpetual Treasuries Ltd. වෙනුවෙන් ඒක කරපු එක හරිද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: හරි කියලා තමයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතැන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, ඔබතුමාට ඒ approval එක අරගෙන කරන්න අවස්ථාව ලැබුණා නම් වෙන කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් primary deal එකකට යන්නේ නැතිව බැංකුවට ඒ වාසිය ගන්න තිබුණා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම දන්නවා මේක යන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එහෙම නම් කොහොමද ඒ අය ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ? Issue වුණු bond ප්‍රමාණය Rs. 10.58 billion කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒකෙන් Rs. 5 billion අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries Ltd. හරියටම භාගයක්.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එකේ Rs. 2 billion ඒ අයගේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Rs. 3 billion ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා තමයි Rs. 3 billion ඒ අයට සොයලා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මට සමා වෙන්න. දැන් ඔබතුමා තදින් චරිත්වර කියනවා "මම දන්නවා ඒ අයට යන්නේ නැහැ" කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාගේ පළපුරුද්ද, අත්දැකීම්, මෙපමණ කාලයක් සේවය කරලා, chief dealer හැටියට ඉඳලා ලබා තිබෙන විශ්වාසයේ හැටියට තමයි එහෙම කියන්නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මම දැන් මේක අමතර ප්‍රශ්නයක් විධියට අහනවා. දැන් ඒ අයට ගිහින් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඔබතුමා හිතන විධියට, business පළපුරුද්ද අනුව මොකක් නිසා යන්න ඇති කියලා සිතනවාද? වාසනාව නිසාද? ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුව අපට කියන්නකෝ. අපි නොදන්න අය නිසා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මොකක් හරි information එකක් ඒ අයට ඇවිත් ඇතියි කියලා මම විශ්වාස කරනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මොකක් හරි තොරතුරක් ඒ අයට ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා තමයි-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is a very good question.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes, a very good question.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: හරි. ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය, ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නවා කුමක් හෝ තොරතුරක් ලැබිලා තිබෙන නිසා යන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඔබතුමාගේ විශ්වාසය, ඔබතුමාගේ අවබෝධය අනුව එහෙම කියන්නේ. සහතික නැහැ. හරි නේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමාට මේ ගනුදෙනුව Rs. 13.5 billionවලට bid කරන්න කියලා ඔහු කියද්දි ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන සිටියාද බැංකුවේ liquidity එක කොපමණද කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම දැනගෙන සිටියා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: කොපමණද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 17ක් තිබුණා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: Central Bank එකේ balance එක?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Central Bank එකේ balance එක ඊටත් වැඩියි. බිලියන 17 plus තව බිලියන 36ක් විතර තිබුණා Central Bank එකේ. අපි reserve එකක් maintain කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා නිශ්චිතවම කියනවාද ඒ reserve එකේ එදාට තිබුණ value එක ඔය ගණන කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒක ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන සිටියේ කොහොමද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Money market dealer මගේ අල්ලපු desk එකේ ඉන්නේ. Money market dealer තමයි reserve එක maintain කරන්නේ. බිලියන තිස් ගණනක් විතර වාගේ මට මතක. බිලියන 17ක් උදේ වෙනකොට liquidity තිබුණා. මේ auction එකේ value date එක- value date එක කියන්නේ settlement වෙන දවස. Settlement වෙන දවසට බිලියන 17ක් තිබුණා කියලා මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: 27 වැනිදාටද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: 27 වැනිදාට තිබුණා කියලා ඔබතුමා දැන ගත්තේ කොහොමද? දුරකථනයෙන්ද, document එකක් ගෙනැත්ද, e-mail එකකින්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ. Chief dealer හැටියට මම මෙතැන වාඩි වෙලා ඉන්නවා, මගේ money market dealer එහා පැත්තේ

ඉන්නවා. එතුමාගේ liquidity position එක එතුමා දන්නවා. 27 වැනි දින උදයේ බිලියන 32.9ක් අපි හාව තිබුණා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන සිටියාද Central Bank එකේ වුවමනාව Rs. 13 billion කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Rs. 1 billionවලට advertise කළාට, මේකයි requirement එක කියලා ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන සිටියාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමාට සිතුණේ නැද්ද, Rs. 1 billion advertise කරලා තිබියදී එක company එකක් Rs. 13 billion ගොයන්නේ ඇයි කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට ඒ ගැන සිතුණේ නැහැ. මම පැහැදිලිවම සිතුවේ මේ bids එකක්වත් වදින්නේ නැහැ කියලායි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නවා ඔබතුමාගේ පූර්ව නිගමනය වැරදුණා කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පූර්ව නිගමනය වැරදුණා කියලා පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පූර්ව නිගමන වැරදුණොත් හරි අමාරුයි නේ dealing room එකේ වැඩ කරන්න.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is why he feels that they have got some information.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes. If not for some information it should have taken place.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ සම්බන්ධව ගත්තු තීන්දු, තීරණ ලංකා බැංකුවේ තිබෙන නීතිරීතිවලට අනුව තමයි ගත්තේ. එයින් පරිබාහිරව තීන්දු තීරණ ගත්තේ නැහැ කියලා ඔබතුමා කියනවාද? ලංකා බැංකුවේ තිබෙන නීතිරීති, සම්ප්‍රදාය, manuals ආදි සියල්ලට අදාළව තමයි ඔබතුමා තීන්දු තීරණ ගත්තේ කියලා ඔබතුමා කියනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. මම එහෙම කියනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පැහැදිලිවම ඒ පිළිබඳව වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ බාහිර විගණන සමාගමක් මගින් වාර්තාවක් ගෙන්වා ගත්තා නේ. එම වාර්තාව ඔබතුමා බැලුවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එම වාර්තාව මට බලන්න දුන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එම වාර්තාව හදන්න ඔබතුමාගෙන් කරුණු ගත්තෙත් නැහැ, මොකුත් නැහැ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: විගණනය කරන අවස්ථාවේ මම සේවයේ සිටියා. විගණනයෙන් පසුව මාව එතැනින් ඉවත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම වෙනුවෙන් Rs. 13 billion bid කරන්න තීරණය කළේ Perpetual Treasuries Ltdවල CEO, කසුන් පළිසේන කියන අය e-mail එක මඟින් ඔබතුමාට කරන ලද දැන්වීම සහ ඊට පෙරාතුව කළ දුරකථන දැන්වීම නිසායි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එම නිසා තමයි මේකට ගියේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේ 27 වැනි දින සිදුවූ ගනුදෙනුවෙන් පසුව Perpetual Treasuries Ltdවල වෙනත් ගනුදෙනුවලට, ඒ කියන්නේ primary dealer ගනුදෙනුවලට ඔබතුමා සම්බන්ධ වුණාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: සම්බන්ධ වුණා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කවදාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුව settle කර ගන්න තිබුණා දෙවැනිදා. 27 වැනිදා තමයි auction එක තිබුණේ. දෙවැනිදා තමයි මේක settle කර ගන්න තිබුණේ. දෙවැනිදා උදයේ ආපසු කසුන් පළිසේන මහතා මට කථා කළා. කථා කරලා bond swap transaction එකක් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මට කිව්වා.

Swap transaction එකකදී කරන්නේ, Treasury Bond එකක් ලංකා බැංකුවට පවරලා දවස් හතරකට ඒ ගොල්ලෝ මුදල් ගන්නවා. දවසකට වෙන්න පුළුවන්, දවස් දෙකකට වෙන්න පුළුවන්, කොහොම නමුත් short-term එකකට මුදල් ගන්නවා. Rs. 2.3 billion එකක් අපි කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කීයක්ද?

Mr. J.D.K. Dharmapala: Rs. 2.3 billion.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කවදාද ඒක කළේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒක කළේ 02 වැනිදා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 02 වැනිදා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 02 වැනිදා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එදාම තමයි මේක settle වෙන දවස?

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මාර්තු 02වැනිදා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මාර්තු 02 වැනිදා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Sorry, මාර්තු 02වැනිදා. පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා තමයි auction එක පවත්වන්නේ. Auction එකට මුදල් ගෙවීම සහ Bond transaction කරන්නේ මාර්තු 02 වැනිදා. මාර්තු 02 වැනිදා උදේ තමයි transaction ඒකට අපි ගියේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries කියන එක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ Rs. 2 billion bid කරන්න raise කළේ ඔය කියන transaction එක.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබගේ අදහසේ හැටියට සහ පළපුරුද්ද ආදී මේ සියල්ලත් එක්ක Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම මේ bids, Rs. 1 billionවලට වඩා වැඩි වෙනවාය කියලා වෙනත් අයට වඩා යම් දැනීමක් ඇතිව හිටියාය කියලා ඔබතුමාට හිතෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ auction එකෙන් පස්සේ තමයි මට ඒක දැණුනේ. Auction එකට කලින් මට එසේ දැනුමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ'

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හැබැයි ඒක අනුමාන කළේ, ඔබගේ පළපුරුද්ද ආදී සියල්ලත් එක්ක ඔබ හැම විටම විශ්වාස කළා Rs. 13 billionවලට මේක raise කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ, මේක ලැබෙන එකක් නැහැ කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ලැබෙන්නේම නැහැ කියලා තමයි මගේ විශ්වාස තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒකෙන්ම පැහැදිලි වෙනවා නේද මේ Perpetual Treasuries කියන company කියන එකට මොකක් හෝ අමතර තොරතුරක් ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අමතර තොරතුරක් ලැබෙන්න ඇතැයි කියලා මටත් දැන් විශ්වාසයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, මාර්තු 02 වැනිදා තමයි නැවත කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා කථා කළේ කියලා. එතකොට පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදායින් පසුව මාර්තු 02 වෙනතුරු කිසිම ආකාරයකින් හෝ කථා නළේ නැහැ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Auction එක දවසේ හවස කථා කළා වාගේ මට මතකයි. ඒ කියන්නේ auction එක ලැබුණා ද කියලා දැන ගන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ලැබුණා කියලා අපි confirm කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතකොට Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් මුදල් අරගෙන ඒකෙන්ම මේ ගනුදෙනුවට ගෙවීම් කරන්න ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ක්‍රියා කළා කියලා, මාර්තු 02 වැනිදා වෙන කොට ඔබතුමාට අවබෝධයක් ලැබුණාද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. එහෙම අවබෝධයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ටත් auction එකෙන් two billion ලැබිලා තිබුණා නේ. ඒ වාගේම පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා සහ මාර්තු 02 වැනිදා කියන දවස් දෙක අතර secondary market එකෙදී මේ bond එක trade වුණා. එතකොට swap transaction එක settle කර ගන්න ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ළඟ අවශ්‍ය තරම් bonds තිබුණාය කියලා මම විශ්වාස කරනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේක ඒ සඳහා පාවිච්චි කළා කියලා සැකයක් ඇති වෙන්නේ නැහැ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: සැකයක් ඇති වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලෂන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට තීන්දුව ගන්න පුළුවන් ලංකා බැංකුවේ Credit Committee එකෙන් හෝ සභාපතිතුමාගෙන් හෝ කාගෙන් හෝ අනුමැතියක් ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Treasury transactions සම්බන්ධව අපි එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලෂන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Circular එකක් හෝ කිසිදු නීතියක්, සම්ප්‍රදායක් නැහැ මේ සම්බන්ධව අවසාන තීන්දු- තීරණ ඔබතුමාට ගන්න පුළුවන්. Limit එක පිළිබඳවත් ගැටලුවක් නැහැ, Credit Committee දාන්න ඕනෑත් නැහැ, GMට කියන්න ඕනෑත් නැහැ, කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ, නිකම්ම ඔබතුමාට කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Primary biddingවලට සහ money market transactions වලට ඕනෑ නැහැ. Money market, transaction කියන්නේ, මේක repo transaction එකක් වාගේ නේ. ඒවාට Credit Committee meetings ගන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි, fixed deposit එකක් against දෙන facility එකක් වාගේ. අපේ බැංකුවේ FD එකක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ FD එකට against ගන්න facility එකක් වාගේ. ඒ කියන්නේ fully secured. FD එකට against-

ගරු ලෂන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: FD එකට against-

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: FD එකට against අපි customer කෙනෙකුට loan එකක් දෙනවා නම් අන්න ඒ වාගේ තමයි මේ bond swap එක හා repo transaction එක.

ගරු ලෂන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් මේ Rs. 13 billionවලට bank එකට තිබෙන සම්බන්ධය මොකක්ද? මොකක්ද security එක? ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේ FD එකට against OD එකක් ගන්නවා

කියලා. ඒ වාගේ මේකට මොකක්ද සිද්ධ වෙන ක්‍රියාවලිය? අපි දන්නේ නැති නිසා අහන්නේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Rs. 13 billionවලට අපි security එකක් ගන්නේ නැහැ ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් බැංකුවට ලැබෙන මූල්‍ය ලාභය මොකක්ද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Three billion එක අපට 12.50ට තමයි එයා bid කරන්න කියන්නේ. අපිට ඕනෑ නම් speculate කරලා 12 හෝ ඊට වැඩි rate එකට දාන්න පුළුවන්. දාලා එන difference එක ගන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැත්නම් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ආණ්ඩුවේ මුදල් Government fundingවලට support කරන එකක් නිසා, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා දාන bid එකකට රුපියල් 1,000ක commission එකක් තමයි අපි ගන්නේ. නමුත්, මේ transaction එකෙන් රුපියල් 234,000ක profit එකක් අපට ලැබුණා. හේතුව, Central Bank එකට යවන කොට අපි rate එකෙන් නොවෙයි bid කරන්නේ, අපි bid කරන්නේ price එකෙන්. ඒ price එකෙන් bid කරන කොට, අපේ bid එක ගිහිල්ලා තිබුණේ 12.5009කට. එතකොට ඒකෙන් අපිට රුපියල් 234,000ක gain එකක් තිබුණා.

The Chairman: Mr. Dharmapala, ස්තූතියි ඔබතුමා පැමිණියාට. ඔබගේ පැමිණීම අවශ්‍ය වුණොත් නැවත දැනුම් දෙන්නම්.

(සාක්ෂිකරු නික්ම ගියේය.)

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Sir, I felt that- අපි නිකම් අදුරේ අතපත ගානවා වාගේ මට හිතුණා. I think we should have got the Audit Report of Ernst & Young and studied that. Then, we could have been in a better position.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අද ඒක අපිට ලැබෙනවා නේ?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. But, I think before questioning them, we should have had the auditors brief us because I felt that that is absolutely important. නැත්නම් අපි වටේ යනවා වාගේ. In all fairness giving them the benefit of the doubt, maybe he would have gone on his gut-feeling thinking that they do not come and just to give it a try- I think the auditor's audit report is important for us to study before we question them.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: He has experience and-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, lot of these dealers deal on gut-feeling. So, in all fairness to him-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: They do not have much time.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, exactly. In quick seconds, they have to make a decision. So, we have to get a very good understanding. If the auditors brief us and tell us exactly the picture, we would be in a better position to question.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: අනෙක් එක මෙන්න මෙහෙම් දෙයක් තිබෙනවා, අපි මෙතැනට කෙනෙක් ගෙන්වලා සාකච්ඡා කරලා ගියාට පසුව, ඒත් එක්කම තවත් කෙනෙක් ගෙන්වනවාට වඩා, මේ පිළිබඳව අපි අතරත් යම් කිසි සාකච්ඡාවක් පවත්වලා, මොකක්ද අපි ඊළඟට මතු කර ගන්නේ කියන එක පිළිබඳව සැලැස්මක් කථා කර ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අපිත් හරි සැලැස්මකට යන්න වෙනවා. එහෙම නැති වුණොත් අපිටත් අගක්-මූලක් නැහැ, අදුරේ අතපත ගානවා වාගේ තත්ත්වයකට යනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඇත්තටම, ඒ සාකච්ඡාවෙන් ආව වැදගත්ම දෙයක් නම් එයාගේ judgment එක පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ගරු ජී.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහපු එකේදී එයාගේ judgment එක වැරදිලා තිබෙනවා. මොකද, රුපියල් බිලියන 6කට වැඩිය- he cannot entertain it. Just through his experience he should know even if there is no stipulated line based on the capital that has been put in. But, he allowed 13. ඒක අපට, then, we can say that it is definitely a judgmental error. Whether that led to corruption or not, we have to establish that that is a judgmental error.

The Chairman: Wide discretionary powers.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒක Bank of Ceylon එක ඇතුළේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදයක් නේ. Then the huge problem is, in any dealing room now, even internationally, the conversations are recorded. Insider trading එක කඩන්නේ එහෙම නේ. රාජ් රාජරත්නම් මහතාගේ ගත්තෙත් telephone එක හරහා නේ. So, insider dealing එක කඩන්න, you have to record the transaction. අපි එක එක ප්‍රශ්න කරන කොට අපි assumptions කරලා නේ ප්‍රශ්න කරන්නේ. නමුත්, මම dealerගේ පැත්තෙන් බැලුවොත් එයා කියන explanations are fairly reasonable. මොකද, primary dealer and the Bank of Ceylon are too

different entities. ඒක අපි මතක තියාගන්න ඕනෑ. He cannot decide for Bank of Ceylon. Even if he sees a bid coming at a higher rate, he cannot tell the Bank of Ceylon, "Now you bid" කියලා. That is a different thing.

The Bank of Ceylon is separate, primary dealer is separate. ඒක එකක්. අපි ඇහුවා නේ ඇයි Bank of Ceylon එක දැම්මේ නැත්තේ කියලා.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He cannot decide that.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: He cannot decide that.

සභාපතිතුමා: The secondary market operations ගැන දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, this is primary market auction එක නේ. Then he gets the deals at the last minute and it is also, I think, this whole primary dealership is now automated. I think now you are getting it automated. එතකොට deal එක එන්නේ screen එකේ. එකොළහ වෙනකම්ම වදින්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are you telling that he did not see the Perpetual Treasuries Limited admitted has bid-

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: He saw. That is why I think it was fair.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When I asked him whether he knew that and saw he said "No."

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I do not know. මට ඒක පැහැදිලි වුණේ නැහැ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I asked him. "Did you see that?" I have specifically asked him that question. At a particular time the Perpetual Treasuries Limited had bid before that twice. I asked that and he said that he did not know.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක හරි. අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම එතැන අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. නැත්නම් primary dealer කෙනෙක් primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා දමන්නේ නැහැ නේ. සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ඒක අසාමාන්‍යයි. That is why we have to inquire this. But, එතුමාගේ explanation එක වුණේ- උදාහරණයක් විදියට කිව්වොත්, it is a bid- කවුරුහරි bid එකක් දැම්මොත් ඒක අපට පෙනෙනවා. හැබැයි අපි ඒක දමන්නෙත්, "වැදුනොත් හරි" කියලා නේ. මෙතන, speculation කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ. This is speculative. That is sure. "ආවොත් ඇතා" කියන එකෙන් dealer කියන දේ මට තේරෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒක genuine.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක genuine කියන එකයි මම කියන්න හදන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම යෝජනා දෙකක් කරනවා. ඒ ගැන සලකා බලන්න. මගේ පළමු යෝජනාව වන්නේ, to establish the corruption part,- ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක corruption වෙන්නේ එක deal එකකින් නොවෙයි. ඒ නිසායි මම ඔක්කෝම brokersලාගේ profitability ඉල්ලුවේ. අපි එතැනින් තමයි පටන් ගන්න ඕනෑ.

අනෙක් එක අපි ඇත්තටම මේ ගැන සොයා බලනවා නම් asset liability statements ගැනත් බලන්නම ඕනෑ. මොකද, අපට මේ discussion එකෙන් ඒක establish කරන්න බැරි වුණාට ඒකෙන් ඒක establish කරන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But are we going on that road? That is what we need to decide.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, අපි ඉදිරියට යනවා නම් ඒක බැලිය යුතුයි කියලායි. එතකොට අපට ඒ ගැන fairly and accurately කියන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි. Assets ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා නම්, සෑහෙන්න ඉක්මවා ගිහින් තිබෙනවා නම්, dealing community එකේ අපිට මේක බලන්න වෙනවා කියන එක ගැන මගේ gut feeling එකක් තිබෙනවා. මේක විතරක් නොවෙයි මම හිතන විදියට කවත් ඒවා ඇති.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දෙවන කරුණ වන්නේ අපට dealing background එකකින් expert group එකක් හෝ පුද්ගලයෙක් ඉන්නවා නම් හොඳයි. මේක මට හොඳයි කියලා හිතුණ දෙයක්. ඒ පිළිබඳ සෑහෙන පළපුරුද්දක් තිබෙන කෙනෙක් Mr. Lionel Fernando වාගේ මෙතැන ඉඳගෙන ඉන්නවා නම් එහි වාසියක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, ඒගොල්ලන්ට හරියට relevant question එක අහන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ සඳහා මට යම් පුද්ගලයෙකුගේ නමකුත් මතක් වුණා. මට එය ප්‍රසිද්ධියේ ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නත් පුලුවන්. නමුත් ඊට කලින් කියන්න ඕනෑ මම මේ පුද්ගලයා හඳුනන බවත්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කවුද?

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔහුගේ නම සංජීව සේනානායක. ඔහු ආනන්ද විද්‍යාලේ ක්‍රිකට් Captain වෙලාත් සිටියා. ඔහු Bank of Ceylon එකේ City Bank එකේ Vice President වශයෙන් සිටි නිසායි මම හඳුනන්නේ. මම ඔහු ගැන කියන්න හේතුව මේකයි. මේ තැනැත්තා dealerslා බොහෝ පිරිසක් train කළ කෙනෙක්. ඔහු City Bank එකේ ඉඳලා ඊට පසුව ජාත්‍යන්තර වශයෙන් ඒ කටයුතු කළා. ඔහු IFC එකේ වැඩ කරලා ලංකාවේ IFC එකේ Head ගැටියටත් රාජකාරී කළා. ඔහු හෝ වෙනත් එවැනි පුද්ගලයෙක්- එයාම වෙන්න ඕනේ නැහැ- මෙතැන ඉන්නවා නම් ඒ අයට පුළුවන් අපට මහ පෙන්වන්න calculation එක, important questions තිබෙනවා නම් අහන්න. මම හිතන විදියට, Mr. Lionel Fernando

ඉන්න එකත් හොඳයි මේ conversation එක අහන්න. එතකොට ඔහුට තේරෙනවා dealer නිතන විධිය. මොකද, අපි ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නේ එක එක කෝණවලින් නේ. මේ තමා මගේ යෝජනා දෙක, one is assets liability statement, අනිත් එක to get somebody in.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: I also can suggest a person. But, I have to, of course, ask him whether he likes to come. I do not want to mention the name, because you all would know him. මම කියන එක්කනා, he was the chief dealer of the Bank of Ceylon for many years. Now he is retired.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is important, because we do not know this subject.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: He is also a primary dealer.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒගොල්ලන් ඉන්නවා නම් හොඳයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එවැනි පුද්ගලයන් තුන් දෙනෙක්වත් ඉන්න එක හොඳයි. මොකද, dealing room කියන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලාවත් අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. ඒවායේ record වෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා දන්නෙත් නැහැ. COPE එක ගැන නම් අපි දන්නවා.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Also, Sir, we will have to first analyze the Auditor-General's Report before we start asking questions. So, we will know that dealerට වඩා නවත් අය මේකට involved ද යනාදී සියලුම දේ දැන ගන්න පුළුවන් මේකෙන්. We will first do that.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට එතැන basis එකකුත් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔව්, තිබෙනවා. Then, we will know it exactly.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: අපේ එකට හෝ වෙන එකකට හරි investigation එකක් ගියොත් එහෙම, ඒ dealing room එකේ voice recorders තිබෙනවා කියලා කියනවා නේ. එතකොට ඒ වෙලාවේ වුණු සිද්ධිය ගන්න පුළුවන් ඇතිනේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒවා ගන්න ඕනෑ දැන්. පස්සේ නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ date එකට අදාළ ඒවා ටික ගන්න අපි fix කරමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ආයතනයේ සභාපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම සහ මෙතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අතර පරස්පර විරෝධී තත්ත්වයන් තිබෙනවා නේ. විගණනය පැත්තෙන් තිබෙන විශේෂඥ දැනුම ගැන නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මට නම් එහෙම දෙයක් තේරුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ නිලධාරියා කථා කළේ ඔහු මෙයට genuinely involve වුණා කියන idea එකකින්. ආයතනයේ සභාපතිතුමා ඒක ඒ විධියටම විශ්වාස කරන්නේ නැති තත්ත්වයකයි ඉන්නේ. ඒක තමයි වෙනස.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආයතනයේ සභාපතිතුමා subject එක දන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්. එතුමාට කියපු දේ විතරයි එතුමා දන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔහුගේ ඉතිහාසයේ සිදුවීම් වලට අනුව, Rs. 6 million වෙනකම් යන්න පුළුවන් බව ඔහු දන්නවානේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න-මහතා: ඒක judgement call එකක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතින් එතකොට කොහොමද මේ පුද්ගලයා-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නැහැ, ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න ඇමතිතුමා, ඒ නිසා තමයි අපට බලන්න වෙන්නේ ඉතිහාසයේ මීට වඩා වැඩියෙන් bid කරලා තිබෙනවාද, මේ risk එක අරන් තිබෙනවාද කියලා. So, we will have to go back to their past dealings.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: HSBC එකේ එක් අවස්ථාවක් ගැන කිව්වා නේ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, we will have to look at many other cases that they have done. That is why it is important to go to the Auditor General's Report also and see-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හැබැයි Auditor-General's Report එකේ ඒවා නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නමුත් ඒගොල්ලන් ඒ ගැන කියාවි නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ වුණත් අපි අද ඒ ගැනත් කථා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: අද Superintendent of Audit ඇවිත් ඉන්නවා නේ. එතුමියගෙන් ඒ පිළිබඳ information ටික ගන්න පුලුවන්. Public Debt Department එක ගැන අපි එතුමියට කථා කරන්න දෙමු, in order to get an idea as to what they are doing.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අතිරේක අධිකාරී උපුල්ලතා මුතුගල මහත්මිය කැඳවන ලදී)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අතිරේක අධිකාරී උපුල්ලතා මුතුගල මහත්මිය ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව, සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රථමයෙන්ම අපි ඔබතුමිය-ගෙන් සමාව ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා, ඔබතුමිය බොහෝ වේලාවක් රඳවාගෙන සිටීමට සිදුවීම සම්බන්ධව. මීට පෙර සාක්ෂිකරුවන්ගෙන් වැඩි වේලාවක් ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමට අපි අපේක්ෂා කළේ නැහැ.

පළමුවෙන්ම ඔබතුමියගේ නම, තනතුර සහ පළමුවෙන් රැකියාවට පැමිණි දිනය ආදී විස්තර සහිතව හඳුන්වාදීමක් කරන්න.

උපුල්ලතා මුතුගල මහත්මිය: මම උපුල්ලතා මුතුගල. මම මහ බැංකුවට ඉස්සෙල්ලාම සම්බන්ධ වුණේ 1991දී. දැන් සේවය කරන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ආවේ 2012 ජනවාරි 01වෙනි දා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මොකක්ද දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: Public Debt Department එක.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ තනතුර මොකක්ද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: Additional Superintendent.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ඔබතුමියට ඉහළින් සිටින නිලධාරියා කවුද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: මට ඉහළින් ඉන්නේ Superintendent.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා ආවේ නැද්ද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: අද Superintendent පිට රට ගිහින්. ඇත්තෙන්ම අපේ Additional Superintendentලා දෙන්නෙක් ඉන්නවා. අපි sections බෙදාගෙන තමයි කරන්නේ. මේ සුමාන දෙකේ Superintendent නැති නිසා මම තමයි වැඩ බලන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉස්සෙල්ලාම ඔබතුමියගේ Department එක ගැන අපට පොඩි අදහසක් දෙන්න.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: අපේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව කරන ප්‍රධානම කාර්යය තමයි රජයට අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සැපයීම. එහිදී දෙවිධියකට ඒ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සිදු කෙරෙනවා, දේශීය සහ විදේශීය වශයෙන්. අපි හුඟාක් වේලාවට කරන්නේ දේශීය වශයෙන් අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම. එහිදී අපි ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් අරමුදල් රැස් කර ගැනීම සිදු කරනවා. ඊට අමතරව Dollarsවලින් දේශීය වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් මුදල් රැස් කරනවා SLDBවලින්. ඒ කියන්නේ Sri Lanka Development Bondsවලින්. ඒ විධියට මුදල් රැස් කිරීම වාගේම පැහැර හරින්නේ නැතිව ආපසු ගෙවීමේ වගකීමත් අපේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ කාර්ය භාරයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වැඩිපුර නිකුත් කරන්නේ Bondsද, Billsද? ඒ පිළිබඳව අපට අදහසක් දෙන්න.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: අපි borrow කරන්නට ඕනෑ Gross Borrowing Limit එක ඇතුළේයි. Parliament එකෙන් අවුරුද්දකට Gross Borrowing Limit එකක් approve. කරනවා. අපි ඒ තුළ තමයි කටයුතු කරන්නට ඕනෑ. ඒකේ වැඩි හරියක් තිබෙන්නේ Bonds.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Billsවලට සීමාවක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: Billsවල සීමාව රුපියල් බිලියන 850යි. ඒක, කාලයක ඉඳලා ටික ටික වැඩි වෙලා ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් Treasury Billsවල limit එකටම ගිහින්ද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: දැන් 825ක වාගේ ඉන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ නිසා වැඩිපුරම Bondsවලට තමයි යන්න වෙන්නේ?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: කොහොමත් අපි prefer Bondsවලට. මොකද, long termනේ. එහෙම වුණාම නැවත නිකුත් කිරීමේ අවදානම ගොඩාක් අඩු වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමියට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද Thirty Year Bond එකකට අවසාන වතාවට ගියේ කොයි කාලයේද කියලා. Thirty Year Bond එකකටනේ ඊයේ පෙරේදා ගියේ, ඒ වාගේ අවස්ථා මීට පෙරත් තිබ්ලා තිබෙනවාද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: Thirty Year Bondsවලට,- Long Term Bondsවලට- ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. 2012 හෝ 2013 තමයි අපි ඉස්සෙල්ලාම Thirty Year Bond එකකට ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට හරියටම විස්තර ටික කියන්න.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඉස්සෙල්ලාම අපි issue කළා coupon එක රුපියල් 12.50 ගණනේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නැහැ, අපි අහන්නේ කාල පරිච්ඡේදය ගැන? මේ විධියට Thirty Year Bondවලට,-Long Term

Bondsවලට- මීට කලින් කුමන අවුරුද්දේද ගියේ කියලා අහන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Additional Superintendent කෙනෙක් නිසා දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ, සමහර දේවල් අපිත් දන්නවානේ.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: මීට පෙර තුන් පාරක් විතර Thirty Year Bondවලට ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. ඇත්තටම bonds issue කරන Front Office එක මගේ යටතේ නොවෙයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක පාලනය කරන්නේ Dr. Azim ඔහු අද දින ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්වා. මම ඒ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ වැඩ බලන නිසායි මට අද එන්න කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පිළිතුරුදීමට සුදුසුම පුද්ගලයා ඔහුයි. ඔහු සතුව in and out සියලුම details තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ සාක්ෂිකරු කැඳවන්න.

(Dr. M. Z. M. Azim, Additional Superintendent, Debt Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka was called in.)

Dr. M. Z. M. Azim, Additional Superintendent, Debt Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka affirmed and examined.

සභාපතිතුමා: Thirty Year Long Term Bonds ගැන කථා කරන්න.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, we started issuing Thirty Year Bonds since 2013. That was the first time that we extended the maturity structure of Government Bonds from twenty years to thirty years. In 2014, we had a few issues. The last auction was on 27th May, 2014. The settlement date was 2nd June, 2014 where we accepted at the weighted average yield rate of 11.75 per cent. Then, the next auction was the recent one on 27th February, 2015 auction where we offered Rs.1 billion and accepted at the weighted average yield rate of 11.73 per cent.

The Chairman: That means, since the inception there have been two or three auctions?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We had five auctions. I did not explain the 2013 auctions that we had.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: From 2013 until now, before this last auction, how many long term bond auctions did you have?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Volume-wise we have offered about Rs.80 billion as of now.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you be very precise and give us the dates on which long term bonds were issued.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The first Thirty Year Bond was on, 3rd June 2013. We offered Rs.2 billion. We accepted Rs.3 billion. The weighted average yield rate was 12 ½ per cent.

Again on 17th June 2013 we offered a Thirty Year Bond. We offered Rs.5 billion.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Thirty years again?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. We accepted Rs.5.05. That is Rs.5050 million.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How much did you offer?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Offered Rs.5 billion and accepted Rs.5.05 that is Rs.5050 million at 12 ½ per cent. Since then, in 2013 we have not auctioned Thirty Year Bonds.

Again on 1st April 2014 the precise maturity is twenty nine years and nine months, we broadly take that into a thirty year maturity horizon, we offered Rs.2 billion and accepted Rs.2 billion at the weighted average yield rate of 11.75 per cent. This is-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake:- April 2014.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Thereafter.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: After that the bond issue on 2nd June 2014. I referred to it a little while ago. That was a precise thirty year. We offered Rs.2 billion and accepted Rs. 2 billion.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is 2014. There was one on 3rd June 2013. This is 2nd June 2014 that you are talking about.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Thirty years again.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Rs. 2 billion offered and Rs.2 billion accepted at the weighted average yield rate of 11.75 per cent.

The other auction was the 27th of February 2015. We offered Rs. 1 billion and accepted Rs.10.058 million at the weighted average yield rate of 11.73 per cent.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Less than all the others.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The latest one was the lowest ineffective yield rate.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Anywhere close to thirty years that you have had in the past.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: One was the 29 years and nine months I referred to.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That you take as thirty years. Anything for twenty years.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We do twenty years also.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You have a history of having these long term bond issues. This is not a new thing?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you give us a record of long-term bonds that are beyond 20 years or beyond 15 years.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Considering long-term bonds that are beyond 15 years, I do not have precisely the maturity details.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You can give those to us later.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We can give you the details later and details are also provided with the-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: I have a question. Now you mentioned about five occasions – from June, 2013 to 27th February, 2015 – where long-term bonds were issued. Other than the last bond issue, all other instances – say for example, in June 2013 you wanted to issue Rs. 2 billion, so you raised Rs. 3 billion and then it is Rs. 5 billion. In 2014, it was Rs. 2 billion which was the same amount as in 2013 and it was again raised up to Rs. 2 billion. Considering the last bond issue, Rs. 1 billion went up to Rs. 10.58 billion. Why is that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The funding modality in terms of meeting the gross borrowing requirements specified in the Government Appropriation Act is managed through direct issuances as well as auctions and up until the recent 30-year bond issue, we had both avenues available. So, at times we do not raise the total fund requirement by the Treasury, we raised part of the requirement through auctions and the balance requirement was offered through direct placements channel. Recently, of course, there were discussions internally in the Bank also that we should be gradually moving away from direct issuances channel, that we should be looking at more market-based, market-oriented mechanism of financing and the proposal was to go into the full-scale public auctions. So, in this particular instance, this took place on the 27 of February and that was a Friday. Next day was 28th Saturday, 01st is Sunday and the 02nd March is the first business day of the month of March where the Treasury requested Rs. 30.5 billion in their cash flow and this Rs. 30.5 billion by that time, Sir, we have funded about Rs. 3.5 billion as prefunds to the Treasury and the balance requirement was something like Rs. 10 plus billion precisely. Then, on the particular auction announcement day, we published the auction announcement on 25th in Central Bank's website and in international newswires like Bloomberg, Reuters or whatever and the national newspapers carried the press advertisement on 26th where we announced Rs. 1 billion. At that time, the direct placement channel was available for us and that was not suspended or requested to stop. On the day of the auction -- of course, on the 26th also we were told possibly we had to make a call on this, but on 27th the auction day – we were told that it would be better if we could seriously look at this arrangement and that we should go through public auctions and raise the funds. Upon realizing that we have received bids up to Rs. 20 plus billion, 20 times oversubscribed, the senior management highlighted the fact that this is an ideal opportunity that we should be moving into public auction and the requirement was Rs. 10 plus billion – the balance requirement of 2nd of March. We have been asked to consider this as an option and proposed this balance requirement through the 30-year bond that we have offered, and we took that message to the Tender Board. This was the reason why we have gone to the entire amount.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: From Rs. 1 billion to Rs. 10 billion?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That was because you had the opportunity and you thought that you grab the opportunity. Am I clear?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly.

The other thing, Sir, we also had to factoring that we had no business in between Friday to Monday. So, if we do not accept that, we will not be able to conduct another fresh auction.

So, we have factored all these things into consideration and then the management's view also has been factored in and based on that, we suggested to the Tender Board and the Tender Board basically after deliberations – as the usual process in the Tender Board when it come to issuances of Treasury bonds or Treasury bills – decided, "Okay, we should be meeting the entire requirement of the Treasury from the auction itself.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Because it was an offer.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it ethical to make the general public know that the requirement is this? Is it a normal practice?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is not necessarily a strange practice because there were instances that even we have accepted 11 times of the offer.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: In the past?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you just give us some details on those? I mean, it is not now but we will need some-

The Chairman: They have given those details.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Probably those details are also there. In 2014, I remember, considering 182-day Treasury bills, we have accepted more than 11 times of the offer. Probably the month is-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, it is a normal practice?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is like three, four times we usually accept that based on the bids that we receive and also market knows the kind of arrangement from the very long time – since the day that probably I have been posted to the Department of Public Debt. We see that the bidders – the primary dealers- sometimes come and bid one and half times of the auction itself. So, they themselves are ready to accept one and half times of the auction and there may be institutions which sometimes come in three, four times of the auction offered expecting the entire amount been accepted.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is an accepted norm.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But, in this instance, one particular company bid for 13 times.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly, because for us, we have seen the total bids. The usual practice is, before we decide all these things, it is a matter of one hour, Sir. We open the auction around 8.30 in the morning and the closing time of it is 11 o' clock. After that, we download all the electronic bidding that they submit; we do not have any manual intervention. Everything comes through the secured systems that we are having in place. So, they submit the bids and based on those, we usually see the aggregate at first.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Is it only the Treasury, the Department of the Public Debt of the Central Bank and the hierarchy of the Central Bank know that you need Rs. 13.3 billion?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The precise cash flow requirement is known by these parties.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Is it strange that a primary dealer – one particular company – offers 75 per cent of the total offer?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is subsequent information for us.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it an unusual thing or has this happened before?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I cannot recall exactly, but it might be 13 times or 15 times by a particular primary dealer. But, there are instances where big institutional investors like EPF, they are the biggest institutional investor.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is the normal practice. The EPF, the ETF and the Sri Lanka Insurance bid for long-term Treasury bonds. Normally primary dealers never bid for long-term bonds.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: But, institutions like the Bank of Ceylon-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Those are government institutions.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: But, the fact here is, Sir, the subsequent information for us that another primary dealer has come through the Bank of Ceylon is not immediately after the option available for us. At that time what we have seen is the Bank of Ceylon is bidding.

The Chairman: You are under the impression of that it was Bank of Ceylon who is bidding.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: The name appears in the screen-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා නේ මෙය යන්නේ.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Primary dealer, Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා නේ යන්නේ.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is why Perpetual Treasuries Limited asks Bank of Ceylon to bid on behalf of them. Suppose, Perpetual Treasuries Limited bid themselves, then what would be the position, of course?

The Chairman: Identity was concealed.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes. It has been done purposely.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact the liability, when it comes to public auctions, government security auction is the bidder because we have the arrangement where delivery vs. payments. Delivery is the government security when the party who bid for the auction settled the dues coming from the auction itself. So, whoever comes through another primary dealer is a secondary matter and the supervision will follow what subsequently the details because we have the so-called the participation requirement and then another performance measure is there by the supervision unit that is called, "effective participation."

The Chairman: Are they physically present at the auction?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: They are never present. It is an electronic bidding system, Sir. Even the Public Debt Department will not see anything until the time they download the details and also initially, it does not require to go into to the kind of individual bids' details because for them, what is required is the aggregate requirement. They require the cumulative numbers, not the individual numbers. When it comes to funding requirments of the balance of Rs. 10 billion, they look at the cumulative numbering column and they compare it with all the other macrodetails available because these are very much related with all the other macrodetails required to be considered and these are being factored by the tender board.

So, they look at that and then, go with their own views and sometimes the recommendations of the Public Debt Department get accepted and sometimes the recommendations of the Public Debt Department will not be accepted, but the tender board will have a different view. Their senior management will come up with other details that they have; they must be thinking even at the policy direction; they must be thinking even at the exchange rate direction. There maybe all types of things. They bring in these things into the tender board discussion; they either accept or reject the recommendation of Public Debt Department or they might suggest, "Okay, we should be going like this." So, ultimately, after all these deliberations, we go ahead. But, the very important fact is that, we have to meet the cash flow requirement of the General Treasury. If we do not meet it, it is tantamount to the Government of Sri Lanka defaulting its obligations. We have a history of more than sixty years where we never defaulted. So, that unblemished record of debt service payment should be maintained. That is the credibility we have.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Does the tender board make that decision between 11 a.m. and noon?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Usually the meeting of the tender board starts one hour after the auction is closed unless for other reasons.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, at what time is it done?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The duration is between 12.15 p.m. to 1.00 p.m.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Shall I ask you one question because you gave us some data that this is about long term such as thirty years and these are basically on auctions. Is it possible for you to give us some data on as to what was the requirement at that particular point as the bonds were offered at a rate of 2 or 2.5? You said the rest came through private placements as you said.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That was before 27th of February.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you give us some history from 2012 onwards?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I will table the details straightaway.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So that we can get an idea of that is how the Central Bank has acted in the past even though it is not through the auctions. But, they have made hat requirement by the means of both. Th is what I have understood.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, they had these both methodologies. They had the direct issuances.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is unusual that they have gone straightaway with more transparent auction.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is not necessarily unusual because, if you look at of 2014, the Public Debt Department had funding. Of course, we had greater details of funding coming from direct placement channels in the treasury bonds. That is for reasons of debt management strategy because we wanted to maintain an average term to maturity of a reasonable length. It was only 2.8 per cent somewhere in 2010 and in 2014, we increased the average term to maturity to almost to six years. What it means is, on a single financial year, the amortization requirement of the government in government's budget being spreading out for a long period of time rather than letting it falling on a single particular financial year where that would be a great burden for a country which is persistently having a budget deficit.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When did you take this decision? That is in 2013. Is it not?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is a continuous process because other instruments of financing were more market-oriented in 2013. We were basically not giving the treasury bills through private placements very much from 2014 itself. We have basically stopped issuances except for the Central Bank as the Central Bank buys it for monetary policy purposes. We issued international sovereign bonds of Rs. 195 billion in January and April of 2015. So, the entire amounts were raised through the auctions in international capital markets.

We were gradually phasing out the strategy that we wanted to go and we had the desire that we should be moving to the private auction arrangement with regard to the treasury bonds also. With that direction in mind and also with these debt-related risk parameters that we keep a very close eye on, like average time to maturity, the rollover risk and the impact of the rollover on government's budgetary operations because we do not have primary surplus in the first place. If we do not have that, if we put a huge debt maturing on a single particular year, we will have a significant interest rates pressure. That interest rates pressure will again cascade across long periods from now. We saw all these and we were planning to phase out the placement arrangement and came up with this 30-year bond and since then, we were operating. For that matter, for the month of March alone the Treasury requested Rs. 172 billion and Rs. Rs. 13.5 billion on 2nd of March; the month has of Rs. 172 .billion. All the details are there available in the documents we have provided, Sir. This Rs. 172 billion is in addition to the rollover of treasury bills amounting to like Rs. 90 billion during the month. So, it is altogether about Rs. 260 billion, So, we have a significant amount to roll over.

If we do not discipline our future amortization on a monthly basis, you must be raising Rs. 250 to Rs. 300 billion from the market. This would have a huge interest burden on future governments' budgets. So, we were planning these things and we were stepping into a direction and this came out in the 27th auction itself because that provided an opportunity when we saw that long-tenure instrument being requested by the market participants 20 times more than what we offered.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Private placement was closed at the same rate. Is it not?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We have provided all the details in the document.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What was the highest rate?

The Chairman: Your decision to shift to private placement was really taken either by the Monetary Board or is it a policy decision? Are you changing the policy?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the Monetary Board informed us that the decision and the minutes of the Monetary Board are also submitted to you with the documents we have submitted. But, internally, we had a discussion because as the Central Bank, we sit down and look at the policy committees and the tender board and the arrangements to private placement being well documented in the operational manual of the Public Debt Department itself.

The mechanism and the procedures that we should follow are again provided in the documents that we have submitted. The placements being usually done at the weighted average yield rate of the auction or few basis points below, but there maybe circumstances where we might give one or two basis points more. But, then the consideration is significantly high volume of acceptance. For instance, we offer Rs. 2. 3 or Rs. 5 billion in the auction. But, when the EPF or someone

comes and buys Rs. 45 billion, you probably be giving two more basis points more. Simply, assume if we accept that entire Rs. 45 billion in the auction itself, the weighted average might have gone by 200 basis points. What we give is only two basis points because the ultimate target is to maintain the orderly condition in terms of debt service payments and in debt strategies and average time to maturity and all kinds of details. This has been very seriously looked by the middle office of the Public Dept Department and we report to the Monetary Board and relevant assistant governor, the deputy governor and the relevant committees on a regular basis overseeing the debt management practice in the Central Bank. So, this is a continuous process and in that drive, it is a move.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do you not see anything irregular in the usual practice and whatever in this particular issuance of bonds?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I mean these are beyond our knowledge, but within our purview, we do not see anything strange.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It is the responsibility of the Public Debt Department and the Central Bank to supply funds for the requirement of the government. That is why you go for either treasury bills or some other instrument time to time. You knew very well in advance that you need to raise so much of funds by the end of March or by the end of April. So, do you have any plan to raise those funds?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes, Sir. One of the documents we have provided which I believe I have probably highlighted the file number, indicates the annual borrowing programm of 2015 approved by the Monetary Board. The beginning of this borrowing programme is the Appropriation Act. The Appropriation Act set borrowing requirement for 2015 as Rs. 1.78 trillion.

Excluding provisions for all other kinds of things as per the Appropriation Act, we have to raise Rs.1.64 trillion in 2015 according to the Budget. This Rs.1.64 trillion separate it out to; foreign sources, external sources and domestic sources. This time the Budget provides for international capital market financing. That is a sovereign bond issue by which we raised US Dollars 650 million yesterday. The value date is 03rd of June.

Then, we recognized a different instrument, Sri Lanka Development Bonds. Yesterday, we raised US Dollars 339 million and these were not only helping to maintain the domestic resource availability in the country but also in stabilizing the country's reserves as well as the overall exchange rate and the interest rate structure.

We have proposed how much we will raise through new Treasury Bills. Also we propose that within Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds the foreigners can own up to twelve and half per cent of outstanding. What would be the incremental foreigners' investments in Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds for 2015? It is about Rs. 40 billion. We have specified that and all the balance we proposed to raise through Treasury Bonds because Treasury Bills are local in the domestic market. The breakdown details are available in the Board Paper. A copy of that is submitted for the Hon. Members.

The Chairman: Foreigners come for short-term or medium-term?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Foreigners, there are different type of investors.

The Chairman: What about the tendency?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The tendency is, for instance now the international market expectation –

The Chairman: Depending on the financial climate?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. US interest rate reversal is now picking up. On that basis, most of the foreigners prefer to kind of log-short term. Log-short term in the sense, short-term instruments. But, there are certain investors like big institutional investors and global leading big institutional investors. They still prefer long-term instruments simply because one or two basis points adjustment in yield rate will have a higher price difference for long-term instruments compared to short-term instruments. So, in short-term instruments a two-three basis point adjustments will not have a big price difference but when it comes to long-term instruments two-three basis point adjustments will have a big price difference. So, they can make a big capital gain if they want to exit from the market at that time. So, that type of investor. they retain their investments in medium-term to long-term horizons. But overall, we have foreign investments in rupee-denominated Treasury

Bills and Treasury Bonds at this moment, Rs. 453 billion out of –

The Chairman: Percentage-wise.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Percentage-wise 10.4 per cent of rupee-denominated Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds outstanding.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Dr. Azim, in this particular issue, originally the decision taken by the DDMC was to issue Treasury Bonds worth at Rs. 1 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the DDMC proposes a total to be issued through Treasury Bonds by way of both auctions and a placement channel – direct issuances channel. The precise offer details will be another strategy kind of arrangement that the middle office comes and decides what would be based on market conditions because we have to factor in – now we have the Appropriation Act, which sets the overall borrowing limit that we should be looking at for the financial year. But precise details of financing on a daily requirement will only be known when we receive the cash flow from the Ministry of Finance. Sometimes, we get this cash flow two weeks in advance. Sometimes we get-

The Chairman: Who handles that? Is it your department or-

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact the Treasury Operations Department of the Ministry of Finance. They send the cash flow and they send it in a covered seal. Then, based on those precise cash flow requirements, we plan. Those details sometimes come in two weeks and sometimes three weeks before the particular month or sometimes the last year of the month. So, the next year itself we need to raise finances. That is something that the Treasury Operations cash flow management concern. But, if we do not receive this type of a cash flow, what we plan in advance is, based on the debt service payment cycle that we have. The maturities we have in front of us. This is public knowledge.

The Chairman: Normal cycle.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. The Central Bank website provides all the Treasury Bond outstanding series the people can access. The issue date, the maturity date, coupon payment date are all there. They can calculate what will be the rough amount that they wanted to raise from this. Based on that Sir, we prepare the precise borrowing requirement and DDMC, at times do not have the cash flow. They subsequently ratify the arrangement or if we have the cash flow in advance, they go by and propose this to the higher-ups for approval and this approval entire sets from 2014 January to May 2015 is submitted where –

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: My precise question is, in this particular issue DDMC recommended to issue bonds worth at Rs. 1 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: On this particular issue? Let me see the DDMC recommendation. Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: They recommended. Who approved this?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the recommendation goes to the Assistant Governor overseeing Public Debt, Deputy Governor overseeing Public Debt and finally to the Governor of the Central Bank.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Finally, the Governor approves the bond issue?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Not the bond issue. The proposed plan recommended by the Assistant Governor and the Deputy Governor.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: The Governor is the CEO of the institution. So, according to the Monetary Law Act, he has to approve it. He is responsible for approving.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Approval and implementation often differs. Implementation could differ and he again –

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: In this particular incident, has the Central Bank Governor approved the bond issue or the recommendations?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: And then at the DDMC, who decided to raise it up to Rs. 10.58 billion?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It has already explained. I mean, the Tender Board having considered the details of the auction, 20 times it is over subscribed-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: They have offered for more than Rs. 20 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We offered Rs.1 billion. We had a plan that balance being accepted through Direct Issuances Channel. But then the Direct Issuances Channel was requested to be- I mean, the management was in consideration of stopping it and they seized this opportunity and they also informed us we should be

considering the cash flow requirement entirely from the auction's channel and we took this-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: They followed the procedure and ultimately they send it to the Governor of the Central Bank?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No. In fact the Tender Board first decides and the Tender Board makes the decision.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: I just want to know by whom the final approval was given?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The final approval is usually certified by the Governor. But the decision is made by the Tender Board.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: We know all that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And that decision is made within one hour of or after one hour of the closing of the auction?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: At 11.00 a.m. they finished and by 12.30 p.m. they made the decision that-

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the meeting went from 12.30 p.m. to 1.10 p.m. on that particular day. Those details are also there. The minute sheet is also there and it says the time from which hour to which hour.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That we can go through. The rate is 9.5 per cent before issuing the bonds.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: What do you mean by 9.5 per cent, Sir?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Interest rate.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: For what maturity?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: I mean, you set the rate as 12.5 per cent.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is the coupon rate.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Earlier what was the coupon rate?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Prior to this auction, I referred on 27th of May, 2014 the settlement is 02nd of June, 2014 and the coupon rate was 13.5 per cent. Then we have seen in 2014 towards third quarter, gradually the interest rates were brought down. Because if you see the historical pattern of interest rates behaviour in Sri Lanka, in the first quarter usually interest rates tend to go up. One reason is, seasonality and the other reason is the market is very well aware of the skew nature of the government's borrowing programme. In the first few months they have a significant amount to raise.

In 2014, we consciously planned to go to the International Capital Market at the very beginning of the year and keep the resource availability with the Government thereby reducing the domestic market borrowing.

In 2015 also, we proposed that and you probably know before the election we were almost ready to go to the International Capital Market.

Then, with the changes we have seen we had to keep a close eye on the International Capital Market developments. The interest rate structure is not necessarily the same that we have seen before. It is usually tendered up. Also, we have seen the Central Bank announcing so-called floor interest rate. That is for overnight excess funds that the banks come and park in the Central Bank at five per cent. After three times, they access the overnight deposit facility in the open market window. So the five per cent basically set the floor rate. There were discussions. The purpose of introducing that was to enable the credit cycles becoming active and the numbers that the Central Bank was seeing from December last year was, the credit cycle was picking up. They had discussions to reverse and get back to the original corridor and this was, I believe, announced through the press on 2nd of March.

The Chairman: That restriction was lifted? The interest rate went up.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly. On 27th, itself OMO basically signaled that to the market. Their intention. They have informed most of the people who come and park excess money in the OMO's window that they probably will be moving away from the so- called floor corridor which again pushed up-

The Chairman: But the Monetary Board on the 23rd February took a decision; that on the prevailing situation in the country, inflation is going down and there is no need to increase the rate of interest. This decision was taken on 23rd February.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Sir, in fact the Monetary Board views-

The Chairman: A radical change in the policy. What are the factors that have changed?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is a Monetary Board decision. I prefer the Deputy Governor who is

overseeing the monetary policy- They are privy to why –

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: They are in a position to explain it.

The Chairman: Right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: We will leave it.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can I ask a few questions?

The Chairman: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Thank you for the detailed explanation. I am moving away from the amount and the rates. Because, I think, we understood from the Central Bank's side that normally, if I were to summarize according to my understanding, you may get three four times but in this situation they took ten times. That is one of the issues.

You look at the weighted average rates and you look at the borrowing requirement, you have aggregate numbers and from your side you seem to have made a reasonably good decision in terms of funding, actually. The precise issues about Perpetual Treasuries and how they bid and all which you all were not privy to at that point in time is a separate thing which we are investigating. We will look at that in detail. I just want to know a little bit more about the process. The borrowing requirement is known. The Treasury people are actually funding themselves. Then, the bids are in. Then, the Tender Committee meets. Then, the Tender Committee makes a recommendation or they make a decision.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: They make a decision.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: When they make that decision who are the Members of that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The Chairman of the Tender Committee is the Deputy Governor overseeing the public debt function and the other members are two Assistant Governors- one is the Assistant Governor overseeing the public debt and the other is the Assistant Governor overseeing the price stability cluster. We have the Superintendent of Public Debt and other Directors: Director of Economic Research, Director of Domestic Operations Department and then we have an Additional Superintendent of Public Debts including me and Ms. U.L. Muthugala. These are the Members in the Tender Board and of course the few technical staff probably walk in if requirement arise. Apart from that, this is the composition.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who heads the Tender Board?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Deputy Governor overseeing-

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: When that decision is made in that meeting within half an hour or forty five minutes or whatever, then that decision is conveyed to the operations people immediately?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No. First when the decision is made we inform that to the Governor. When the Governor signs –

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Then, it is made official?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Once that is signed only we will make the so-called press release/announcement.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: My question is, did the Governor alter the decision of your recommendation or he went along with your recommendation in this situation?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is basically the Tender Board decision. The Tender Board communicated that to the Governor?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, it is the same decision that he approved?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: He approved it on that particular day.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මේ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුව වෙලාවේ ඒ Tender Board එකේ ඔබතුමියත් සිටියා නේද? මීට කලින් ගත් bond issuesවලට වඩා අසාමාන්‍ය ඉල්ලුමක් මේකේ තිබෙනවානේ. බැලූ බැල්මට ඒක පෙනෙනවා. මීට කලින් රුපියල් බිලියන 5කට issue කළා නම්, බිලියන 5ක, 6ක, 8ක offer එකක් ඇවිල්ලා තියේවි. ඒකෙන් තමයි ඔක්කෝම ඒවා select කරන්නේ. මෙතැන එකපාරම Rs. 20 billion තිබෙනවා. ඒ වෙලාවේ සැකයක් ඇති වුණේ නැද්ද?

ඒ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: නැහැ. ඇත්තටම එතැනදී වැඩිම bids ප්‍රමාණය දාලා තිබුණේ Bank of Ceylon එක. සමහර වෙලාවට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඒ වගේ ලොකු bids ගන්න අවශ්‍යතා ඇති වෙනවා, Funds වැඩිපුර තිබෙනවා වෙන්න පුළුවන්, ඒ වගේ අවස්ථාවල.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ Central Bank එකේ Bank of Ceylon balance එක කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබුණාද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඇත්තටම ඒක අපේ Department එකෙන් නෙමෙයි කරන්නේ. ඒ වගේ දත්ත අපි ළඟ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: නමැත් Bank of Ceylon එක එක්වරම ලොකු bid එකක් කරලා තිබෙන කොට ඔබතුමියලාගේ Tender Board බලන්නේ නැද්ද ඒ වගේ දේකට යන්න Bank of Ceylon එකේ capacity එක කොහොමද කියලා?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: Bank of Ceylon එක ඒ තීරණය ගන්නේ ඒ ගොල්ලන් වෙනුවෙන්ම වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්, එහෙම නැත්නම් තව කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: නමුත් ඒක පේන්නේ නැහැනේ.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඔව්, ඒක එතැනදී පේන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒක 11ට close කළාට පස්සේ 12ට, 12.30 ඔබතුමියලාගේ Tender Board එක රැස් වෙනවා. රැස් වෙන කොට screen එකේ පෙනෙන්නේ නැහැනේ behind person.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: Bank of Ceylon තමයි එතකොට පේන්නේ. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමියලාගේ Tender Board එක decision එක ගන්නේ Bank of Ceylon දැකලානේ. ඒ කියන්නේ අදාළ ආයතනයේ නම දැකලානේ. එතකොට දැන් තමයි දන්නේ Bank of Ceylon මේ purchasing එක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries කියලා. ඒක ඒ වෙලාවේ දන්නේ නැහැනේ.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම කියනවා නම් අපි Department එකේදී data analyze කරන කොට වුණත් party එක කවුද කියන එක immaterial. ඇත්තටම ඒක අපි බලන්නේම නැහැ. අපට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ quantity එකයි, rate එකයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: බලන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ, ඒක දන්නේම නැද්ද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: නැහැ, නැහැ. නම් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් ඇත්තටම නම් තිබුණාට ඒක අපට වැදගත් නැහැ. කවුද, කොච්චරද දාලා තිබෙන්නේ,- මොකද, ඒ වෙලාවේ party එක අපට වැදගත් නැහැ. අපට අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් ටික සපයා ගන්න එක විතරයි. එතැනදී quantity එකටයි, rate එකටයි තමයි අපේ ඇහැ යන්නේ.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bid කරන්නේ dealersලානේ. Dealers are registered and they have enough reserves. That is why you have no fear. The question he is asking is, "Why did you approve Bank of Ceylon for such a huge amount? What was the confidence you had?" Did they have the money? That is what the Hon. Member is asking.

Ms. U.L. Muthugala: One thing is, we do not mind whether they have put a small amount or a big amount because it can be for themselves or even for somebody else. If it is for somebody else, Bank of Ceylon need not have all that money.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක ඔබතුමියලා දන්නේ නැහැනේ.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඔව්, අපි ඒක දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එතකොට මොන පදනමක් මතද මේක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට දෙනවා කියලා නිගමනයකට එන්නේ? ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට දෙන්න සල්ලි තිබෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා දන්නේ නැහැනේ.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඒක අපට එතැනදී බලන්න බැහැ. එතැනදී ඒක material factor එකක් නොවෙයි.

මොකද, අවුරුදු 60ක් විතර එන අතීතයේ අත්දැකීම් ගත්තොත් කවදාවත් auction එකකදී bid කරපු කෙනෙක් default කරලා නැහැ. ඒ confidence එක අපට තිබෙනවා. මේ වතාවේ තමයි ඔහොම issue එකක් ආවේ මුළු history එකේම. ඒ නිසා අපට කිසි සේත්ම අවශ්‍යතාවක් පැන නඟින්නේ නැහැ කවුද bid කරන්නේ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: "ඔහොම issue එකක්" කිව්වේ මොකක්ද?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: දැන් කියනවා නේ, ලොකු ප්‍රමාණයක් bid කරලා තිබෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක unusual issue එකක්ද?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: Unusual එකක් කියන්නේ-

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමිය දැන් කියනවා නේ "මෙහෙම issue එකක් history එකේම සිදු වෙලා නැහැ" කියලා. මොකක්ද මේ "මෙහෙම issue එකක් සිදු වෙලා නැහැ" කියන්නේ?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: Bank of Ceylon එක Rs. 13 billion bid කර තිබෙනවා. Perpetual Treasuries තමයි ඔක්කෝම bid කර තිබෙන්නේ ක්‍රියා පසුවයි අපි දැන ගත්තේ.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමියම කියනවා නේ ඒක අසාමාන්‍ය නැහැ, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඔව්, කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මොන පදනමක් මතද එහෙම කියන්නේ?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: එහෙම කිව්වේ, දැන් සමාජයේ ඔය issue එක ගැන ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වී තිබෙන නිසා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සමාජයේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වුණාට ඒකෙන් අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමිය කිව්ව විධියට අපට හිතෙන්නේ ඔබතුමියන්ටත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙලා කියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ සමාජයේ දැන් ඇති වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ වැරැදි දෙයක්ද? අපිත් වෙන වැඩ තියෙද්දියි මේ කමිටුවට ගෙනැල්ලා මේවා කථා කරන්නේ. දවස් 10ක් විතර මේ සඳහා වෙන් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා "මේක වැඩක් නැහැ. කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් සිදු වෙලා නැහැ" ඔබතුමියට එහෙම කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: එහි වෙන ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියන්න අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් අපේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පැත්තෙන් බැලුවොත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Tender Board එකේ සංයුක්තිය ආචාර්ය හසීම් මහතා පැහැදිලි කළා. මේ සියලුම අය Tender Board එකට පත් කරලා ඉන්නවාද?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ අය **පත්** කළේ කවදාද?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: අහවල් දවසේ පත් කළා කියන්න අපහසුයි.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: These are designation based appointments.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Act එකෙන් එන එක?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ අය appoint කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ, automatically එනවා?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: එහෙමයි. ඒ තනතුරෙන් තමයි එන්නේ.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: They are Ex-officio arrangements. The Monetary Board uses the consent on and off.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක Act එකෙන් එන එකද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I am not sure whether it is coming from the Act, but, there is a definition in terms of operational arrangements by the Central Bank. So, the Central Bank based on RSSO and LTBO- Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance and the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance- all these being considered, the Monetary Board makes this call.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Membersලා change වෙලා තිබෙනවාද, Act එකට හරි එක එක ආයතනවලට?

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: පුද්ගලයන් change වෙලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් position එක ඒකම තමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Designation එක එකයි.

යූ.එල්.මුතුගල මහත්මිය: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ පුද්ගලයන්- දැන් ඉන්න Tender Board එක- කවදාද ඒ සිටින පුද්ගලයන් මේකට කවදාද ආවේ කියා වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න මහ බැංකුවෙන්.

ඊළඟට ආචාර්ය ආසිම් මහතාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී සඳහන් කළා,- එය සම්ප්‍රදායානුකූලව කරනවාද දන්නේ නැහැ- මේ අවුරුද්දේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාව ට්‍රිලියන් කීයද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Rs. 1.71 trillion.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ අය වැයට අනුව ඔබලා forecast කරනවා ඇති 2015 වෙන විට. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒක පසු ගිය අවුරුදුවලත් එහෙම කළාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: ගිය අවුරුද්දේ-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සෑම අවුරුද්දකම ඒක කරනවා?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: එහෙමයි. Appropriation Act එක්ක අපට borrow කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි, හරි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න මම කියන්නම්. සෑම අවුරුද්දකම ඔබලා forecast එකේ report එක දෙනවා?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 2015 වාර්තාව කවදාද දුන්නේ?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් "September 15th Report" කියලා Ministry of Finance එකට document එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා pre-Budget preparation cycle එකේදී. ඒකේදී අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ Government එකේ Budget Deficit ගැන කිසිම අදහසක් නැතිව, debt service payments ලබන අවුරුද්දට එදා ඉඳලා. අද ඉඳලා මට 2063 වෙන කල් debt service payments අවුරුද්දට කොපමණ තිබෙනවාද කියන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක හෙට exchange rate එක වෙනස් වෙන විට, policy interest rate එක වෙනස් වෙන විට වෙනස් වෙයි. ඒ picture එක අපි Ministry එකට communicate කරනවා "September 15 Report" එක යවන කාලයේදීම. ඒ Report එක අපේ statutory obligation එකක්.

MLA – Monetary Law Act එකේ හැටියට. Ministry එකට communicate කරන්නේ. ඒකේ අපි ඉදිරි වසරේ, උදාහරණයක් හැටියට debt service payments 2015 මුළු වසරටම පොලිය සහ වාරික ගෙවන්න, දේශීය සහ විදේශීය දෙකේම එකතුව ට්‍රිලියන 1.3ක් විතර වෙනවා. ඒක අපි communicate කරනවා Budget process එක prepare කරන කොට. The Department of Fiscal Policy of Ministry of Finance is very keen and they are keeping a very close track with the Central Bank. Every month, we send them the more detailed precise report based on exchange rates changes and other macroeconomic factors changes. The precise cash debt service requirement is usually sent to the Ministry on 15th of each month. Then, they prepare the cash flow on that basis. But, annually, we give them before the Budget.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඔය තනතුරට පත් වුණේ කවදාද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I became as the Additional Superintendent on 28th August, 2014.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදීත් කිව්වා ඔය manual එකට අනුව ඔබතුමාලා කටයුතු කර නිබෙනවා කියා. අපි මේ කථා කරන සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙනුත් ඔය manual එකේ සඳහන් ආකාරයට තමයි කටයුතු කර නිබෙන්නේ කියා ඔබතුමන්ලා වගකීමක් ඇතිව කියනවා.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊළඟට, මේ සම්බන්ධව පරීක්ෂණවලට වෙනත් ආයතනවලින් ඔබතුමන්ලා කැඳවූවාද? අල්ලස් හෝ දූෂණ චෝදනා විමර්ශණ කොමිෂන් සභාවෙන් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අගමැතිතුමාගේ කමිටුවෙන් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ කමිටුවලට ඔබ දෙපල සහභාගි වුණාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: මාව කැඳවුවා අල්ලස් හෝ දූෂණ චෝදනා විමර්ශණ කොමිෂන් සභාවට. හැබැයි ඒ අය මාව හුඟක් වෙලාවට කැඳවුයේ-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කැඳවුවාද, නැතිද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: කැඳවුවා. ඊට පස්සේ අගමැතිතුමා පිහිටුවා තිබුණු කමිටුවටත් කැඳවුවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහිදීත් මෙයට සමාන කරුණුමයි ඔබතුමාලා-

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: මගේ දැනුමේ හැටියට මා පැවසූ දේ කිසිම වෙනසක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ස්ථාන තුනේදීම එක හා සමානයි.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: තව පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය නේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලාව දැනුවත් කිරීමක් කරන්නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදීත් එය කළා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය ඒ අයට මෙපමණ මුදලක් ඕනෑ කියා මේ අදාළ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධව දැනුවත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ලිඛිතව වාර්තාවක් ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙම කමිටුවට ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කොපමණ මුදලක් අවශ්‍යයි කියා සඳහන් කර තිබුණාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා මුළු අවශ්‍යතාව නව මුදල් වශයෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 172යි. මාර්තු 2වැනිදා අවශ්‍යතාව රුපියල් බිලියන 13.55ක්. The cash flow statement was submitted. The report of the DDMC was also submitted. We have submitted them. This cash flow requirement was communicated to us from the Treasury Operations Department- if I am not mistaken- on 20th of February, 2015. And, the Monetary Board also instructed the Department of Public Debt to go for a 30-year bond auction during that particular week itself. We provided that document also. Also, the Department of Public Debt, in advance, published a so-called tentative bond issuance calendar. That can be accessed in the Central Bank website. That was loaded for 2015 in December, 2014 itself. That was also proposed as a 30-year bond which was planned during the month of March. These details were there.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය රෑස් වෙලායි මෙම අවශ්‍යතාව ගැන දැනුවත් කිරීමක් කරන්නේ. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ඒ කමිටුවට මහ බැංකුවේ නියෝජිතයෙක් සිටිනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් අපට දැනුම් දෙන්නේ cash flow requirement එක-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Finance Ministry එකේ Operations Department එකෙන් නේ මහ බැංකුවට දැනුවත් කිරීමක් කරන්නේ?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ එක පුද්ගලයෙක් නොවෙයි නේ මෙය දැනුවත් කරන්නේ. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ මොකක් හෝ කමිටුවක් ඇති. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ඒ කමිටුවේ minutes අපි ඉල්ලුවා. ඒ කමිටුවට මහ බැංකුවෙන් කවුරු හෝ නියෝජිතයන් ඉන්නවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.ආසිම් මහතා: නියෝජිතයන් කවුරුත් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නියෝජිතයන් කවුරුවත් නැහැ.

එතකොට ඒක කෙළින්ම එන්නේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: නැහැ. ඒක ඇත්තටම Treasury එකෙන් decide කරලා තමයි අපේ Public Debt Department එකට එවන්නේ.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Treasury Operations Department එකෙන් තමයි Superintendent of Public Debt Departmentට communicate කරන්නේ. Treasury Secretary සමහර වෙලාවට ඒක එවනවා නම් Treasury Secretary writes to the Governor. If the Deputy Secretary to the Treasury informs that, he writes to the Deputy Governor. These are protocol, I believe. But, the fundamental or the basic is, the Treasury Operations Department is the Department which provides the cash flow to the Central Bank. On that basis, we fix the DMCC-Domestic Debt Management Committee. There, the Director General of the Department of Treasury Operations is a member.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අවසාන වශයෙන් මේ කාරණයත් අහන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමිය කියපු විධියට මේ ගනුදෙනුව නිසා බිලියන 13ක පාඩුවක් සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවාය කියලා රටේ වැරදි මතයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමියන්ලාගේ අත්දැකීම් අනුව එහෙම දෙයක් වෙන්නේ නැද්ද, පාඩුවක් නැද්ද? නමුත් රටේ මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් වැරදි මතයක් තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නේද, ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මන්ත්‍රීතුමා?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, my observations on this matter has been recorded in the Hon. Prime Minister's Subcommittee also. To me, it is a hypothetical assumption base because you cannot compare macroeconomic circumstances and justify your borrowings of a previous period to the current and future periods. Some of these justifications are on the basis of interest rates that prevailed prior to this particular auction. Then, subsequent adjustment in interest rate structure.

The Chairman: Factors are so variable.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Precisely. I believe, there were judgments by the Supreme Court itself on this matter at many instances. More than that my economic knowledge says it is not at all comparable because market circumstances change drastically. And whatever country that you see, even in the US for that matter the circumstances are different and the expectations are different. Also, debt management is not only cost management. It is the costs and risks management. So, if you do not address the concern of risk, you may issue everything short-term, because short-term in terms of structure of interest rates is lower than medium to long-term interest rates. If you want to issue short-term instruments, you can raise funds at cheaper rates. But, unfortunately, that will pile up your obligations immediately, that will cascade your costs hold, it will increase and push you to default in the future and thereby again cascade your interest rates to jump up and this is an unending process. So, the countries is that strict to this short-time side faced these types of problems. I mean, it is an example. That is why we are consciously planning to increase our ATM planning – Average Time to Maturity of the debt stocks, the domestic debt stocks and the foreign debt stock which is well written in the Central Bank Annual Report and also the debt bulletin that we published in the Central Bank Website. Last year it was 5.8 years, the domestic debt stock average time to maturity and this year we are planning to make it to six plus eleven. By 2020, we are thinking we should be maintaining at least seven and half, eleven. We are driving towards that. Thereby, we are not only reducing the Government's risks aspects; the rollover risks aspects, also we set the benchmark yield curve for private sector to emulate because if we are expecting the private sector economic growth going forward, private sector should be having a benchmark yield curve to price their assets. Then only they can raise long term finances. So, the default is- Assets rates structure is the government securities interest rates structure. Based on that probably, the private sector based on their risks considerations, they could have a premium adjusted, and they can raise prices. This is also one reason why we are so considerate that we should be looking at that fifteen-year, twenty-year, and thirty-year and we extend the yield curve because the said market will have a long term way. On that basis, any cost assumption to me from my economic understanding is hypothetical.

ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Mrs. Muthugala, මටත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමියන්ලා මේක කරද්දී 27th, 11.00 o'clockවලින් පස්සේ screen එකේ පෙනෙනවානේ, නවුදා ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: Screen එකේ පෙනෙන්නේ නැහැ, කවුද ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. අපි bids download කරලා print කරන තුරු,-

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකනේ primary dealer හැටියට bid කරලා තිබුණේ?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එක bid කරලා තිබුණේ කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක්ද?

Mrs. U.L. Muthugala: Thirteen billion.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් primary dealer කෙනෙකුට bid කරන්න තිබෙන limit එක කොච්චරද?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ඇත්තටම අවම limit එක විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ. Minimum limit එක ten per cent of the offer. ඒක අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම bid කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඊට උඩ ඕනෑ තරම් ප්‍රමාණයක් bid කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් primary dealer කෙනෙකුගේ Capital Fund එක තේ 300 million. ඒ වාගේ twenty timesනේ. එහෙනම් 6 billion.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: නැහැ. මෙහෙමයි. 300 million ඒගොල්ලන්ගේ minimum capital requirement එක. නමුත් Bank of Ceylon එක වාගේ එකක ලොකු Capital fund එකක් තිබෙනවානේ. ඒගොල්ලන්ගේ Capital Fundsවලට අමතරව-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මෙතුමන්ලා බලන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එක ගැන නේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමියගෙන් මම මේ කාරණය ගැන දැනගන්න කැමැතියි. මටත් ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබුණා. ඔබතුමියන්ලාගේ financial requirement එකනේ තිබෙන්නේ. එන්නේ කවුද, ගෙනෙන්නේ කවුද කියලා ඔහුට අදාළ නැහැනේ.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ මෙතැනයි. Bond issue එකේදී ගත්ත අය experience එකෙන් recall කරන්නේ නැති බව ඇත්ත. හැබැයි, ඒ කෙනාට මේ පිළිබඳව හැකියාව තිබෙනවාද කියලා දැන ගන්න එපායැ. ඒකට හේතුව තමයි, බැංකුවල බැංකුව හැටියට Central Bank එකට අනික් banksවලින් ඕනෑ නම් ගන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, එහෙම ගන්නේ නැත්තේ මුදල් අව්වු ගහන්නේත්වත්, බැංකුවලින් ගන්නේවත් නැති නිසයි. ඒ, economy එකේ වෙන පැත්තකට බලපාන නිසයි. මුදල් අව්වු ගැහුවොත් උද්ධමනයට බලපානවා. බැංකුවලින් ගත්තොත් එහෙම බැංකුවල තිබෙන operationsවලට ඒක බලපානවා. ඒ නිසානේ ඔබතුමියන්ලා Bonds වලට යන්නේ. Bonds වලින් ගත්තොත් outside ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා හිතනවා. හැබැයි, outside finance ගන්න නම් ඒගොල්ලන්ගේ ළඟ තිබෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා තහවුරු කර ගන්නේ කොහොමද? මොකක්ද, ඒකට තිබෙන mechanism එක?

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: ආපසු කලින් කියපු කාරණයම තමයි කියන්න වෙන්නේ. Primary Dealer කෙනෙකුට පුළුවන්, ඔහු වෙනුවෙන් හෝ පිටස්තර කෙනෙකු වෙනුවෙන් bid කරන්න. වෙන කවුරු හෝ bid එකක් දෙනවා නම් මට 5 billion දාන්න කියලා Bank of Ceylon එක දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ, අර පාර්ශ්වයට ඒ ගණන settle කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා. ඒක primary dealerගේ duty එක.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එතැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා වුණාට policy wise තිබෙනවා. හේතුව මෙයයි. ඔබතුමියන්ලාට direct Central Bank එකට ගන්න පුළුවන් දේ මේක හරහා එන කොටත් අපරාධයක් වෙනවානේ.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: මට තේරුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: Private Sector එකෙන් ගන්න තිබෙන දෙයක් නම්- primary dealersලාගෙන් ගන්න තිබෙන දෙයක් නම්- private sector එකේ ඉන්න අයගෙන්, Government sector එකේ නොවන අයගෙන්,- අපි government sector කියලා තමයි Government Bank එක සලකන්නේ. මේ අදාළ උදාහරණයම ගනිමු. Perpetual Treasuries Limited වෙනුවෙන් BOC එක ගන්න කොට direct BOC එක හරහා Central Bank එකට එන්න තිබෙන එකම අවස්ථාව නේ මේ පාවිච්චි වෙන්නේ. ඒක Government එක හැටියට අපරාධයක්නේ.

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය: මට ඒ අහන ප්‍රශ්නය පැහැදිලි නැහැ.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: If I understood it properly, what the Hon. Sunil Handunnetti was asking is, why this fund is channeled through the Bank of Ceylon when that party can come directly and buy from us. That is a kind of arrangement in the world known as, "Non-competitive Bidding". So, part of the bid total amount you reserve a fifteen per cent or ten per cent of the auction for this type of bids. But, the focus of such arrangement is to encourage small timers, not big timers. If insurance companies,- I mean, they can come to auctions. But, they should become a primary dealer. This is a system. They cannot just being an institution come into this, because the Central Bank carries a so- called settlement risk if they let the private sector or an individual to come and accept this because settlement risk is

something, when it comes to government securities very minimal. That is simply because they could simply settle their obligations on a block basis. How?- If somebody gets 1 billion, he does not need to settle the entire amount, 1 billion at one go. On the same day, 100 million first buy that and go to the secondary market immediately he sells. Because he buys these for himself or on behalf of his customers. Sometimes this particular bid might have come not necessarily on his own account but on a customer's account, he requires his matured and held money being rolled over. As I have already said, the best example is the debt service payments for the year 2015 is about 1.3 trillion. The Government is asking one point seven plus trillion. That is why the net deficit of the Budget is Rs. 499 billion. That is the deficit. If you precisely get it to numbers, you probably gave about a half billion rupees; that is Rs. 1.3 to 1.8 billion.

So, that is the deficit. Part of these funds that matures goes to the market. We plan our Bond cycles when a Bond matures so that we can reissue that. So, most of the time, the money that goes to them is reinvested. In that case, we see-

The Chairman: I have a highly technical question because I am unable to comprehend it. How do you determine this coupon rate?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is a very interesting question. Coupon is a function of many macroeconomic factors and more than everything, we have to factor the discount element in outstanding Bond stock as well as the premium element in outstanding debt stock. Because, debt recording is done on the basis of face value, if you go by general practices. The IMF defines it in IMF's GFSM-Government Financial Statistics Manual. They say, if you go for cash basis accounting, book basis accounting or face value basis accounting, there are different arrangements. In Sri Lanka, the debt obligations are recorded on the basis of face value. So, the outstanding debt which is 75.5 per cent of GDP is on the basis of face value. There may be a situation, where you want to, gradually, reduce the debt stock because that has advantages in interest rate/interest cost that you will be borrowing. If you can bring that down to 60 per cent of GDP, that would help us to go and attract more international investors for Government Securities and also the people will demand lower interest rates. When you look at these numbers, you plan whether you want to issue a discounted Bond or a premium Bond. Ideally, you should be happy to issue par Bonds: Rs. 100 collected by issuing Rs. 100 obligation/a Bond. But, if you issue a discounted Bond, you issue Rs.100 face value obligation but you collect only Rs. 90 or below Rs. 100. So, if you require, for example, Rs. 10 billion finances, how much you will collect by issuing Bonds at discount is 10,000 divided by collection and at face value, more than 10,000. By that amount, the debt stock will increase although the Government cash flow collection is lower. So in such a scenario, you try to figure it out "Okay, what is the premium probably we want. Is it three, four or five rupees?" By that amount, you issue obligations, for example, Rs. 10 billion but you collect Rs. 11 plus billion or more than Rs. 10 billion. So, thereby the debt stock is also managed. This is also a very important factor that the Middle Office of the Public Debt Department considers in designing what would be the ideal coupon rate. Apart from that, there are rules of thumb that we practice based on international conventions or practices.

The Chairman: That is the basis on which you applied in this particular case as 12.25 per cent.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. Last time, it was 13.5 per cent and this time, it is 12.5 per cent. Here in Sri Lanka, we have to remember that the Government Securities' interest rate carries a 10 per cent withholding tax at source. So, effectively, if somebody wants 11 per cent rate of return, what he does is, at the primary auction, he gets this 11 per cent adjusted for 10 per cent- That is, 110 basis points- and adds that. That means 12.1 per cent price. That is what he bids. So, if it is a 12.5 per cent yield requirement, what he bids is 12.5 per cent plus 125 basis points added. That is the price calculation you will see in the price sheets. So, these things are being factored in. But, more than everything, you can probably see the Treasury Bill yield rate. If it is 7 per cent, as a rule of thumb, for medium term Government Securities, it is about 3 per cent. We are talking about the time premium; for one year to fifteen years. If you are looking at future interest rate structure, which is lower than current interest rate structure, you signal that by gradually reducing long-term coupon arrangement. Also, you look at who is the investors that you are

targeting now. If it is an interest requiring investor community, you probably highlight a higher coupon rate than a lower coupon rate because they are interest dependents. We want to give them a higher coupon. So, we target a higher coupon and issue and collect money possibly at a premium but they will get a return regularly; a higher interest return. These are kind of factors that we very seriously look at apart from other macroeconomic variables; inflation expectation, overall government financial requirements et cetera.

The Chairman: So, do you have a chart or something like on that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Every outstanding carries the coupon in a series itself. That is available in the website and the reports that we provided there contain all Treasury Bond series recognized with, for example, 12 per cent-2020 A, 11.5 per cent- 2025 B and so on. There is a series like that. You can recognize those stuffs in the coupons.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Aazim.

(Witnesses withdrew.)

The Committee adjourned.

Unedited

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

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පැමිණ සිටි:

ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය
ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු ඊ. සරවනපවන් මහතා

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක සේවා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, වැඩබලන විගණකාධිපති
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
ඊ.ඒ.එන්.ජී. එදිරිසිංහ මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
ඊ.එම්.කේ.එම්. පද්මලාල් මහතා, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ සහකාර අධිපති සහ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම් එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑම භාෂාවකින් කථා කරන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පළමු වැනි කාරණය, bond issue එක පිළිබඳව Monetary Board එකෙන් ගත් මූල් තීරණය මොකක්ද කියන එකයි. පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා Monetary Board එක රැස් වුණා නේ. එම රැස්වීමේ minutes අපට ඕනෑ. ඊට අමතරව එම රැස්වීමේදී ගත් තීරණය මොකක්ද කියලා අපට කියන්න. ඔබතුමා කැඳෙවිවේ විශේෂයෙන්ම ඒ ගැන විමසීම සඳහායි. එහිදී ගත් තීරණය මොකක්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා පැවැති Board එකේදී ඇත්තටම තීරණයක් ගැනීමක් නොවෙයි සිදු වුණේ. අධිපතිතුමා විසින් Board එකට inform කළා, thirty-year bond එකක් issue කරන එක වඩාත් යෝග්‍යයි කියලා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ නිබුණු- due to the yield curve shape ඒ වාගේම debt service requirement තිබෙන නිසා and also they have indicated that there is a good interest from the foreigners. So that was the ideal time to issue thirty-year bond කියන එක තමයි ඒ වෙලාවේ අධිපතිතුමා Board එකට පැවසුවේ. ඒ අනුව Board එක තීරණයක් ගත්තා, රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරියට instruct කරන්න, thirty-year bond auction එකක් පවත්වන්න කියලා. ඒකයි එතැනදී සිදු වුණේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ තීරණය විකරද ගත්තේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ තීරණය විකරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Interest rates ගැන මොකුත් තීරණයක් ගත්තේ නැද්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: නැහැ. ඒ වෙලාවේදී එහෙම කිසිම දෙයක් ගැන කථා කළේ නැහැ. නමුත් මෙහෙම දෙයක් කථා කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එදා රැස්වීමේ minutes තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: තිබෙනවා. මගේ ළඟ තිබෙනවා. Shall I read it out?

සභාපතිතුමා: එහි copy එකක් අපට දෙන්න.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: හොඳයි. එතැනදී ගත් තීරණය වාර්තා කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාව අනුව මම සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, "The Board was of the view that issuing thirty-year Treasury Bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and re-profile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors. Accordingly, the Board instructed the Superintendent of Public Debt to conduct a thirty-year Treasury Bond Auction during the week and arrange to list Sovereign Bonds in Euro Clear Exchange in future." So this is the decision taken.

සභාපතිතුමා: Interest rate එකේ වෙනසක් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තීරණයක් එදා ගත්තේ නැද්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එහෙම තීරණයක් ගත්තේ නැහැ.

Edited

සභාපතිතුමා: රටේ inflation එක, interest rate prevailing market rate එක ගැන මොනවත් සාකච්ඡා කළේ නැද්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒක වෙනම paper එකකදී සාකච්ඡා කළා. නමුත් එතැනදී ආර්ථිකය ගැන තමයි කථා කළේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉතින් ඒක minutes වලට ඇතුළත් වන්නේ නැද්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Minutesවල ඒක වෙනම සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අන්න ඒක අපට අදාළයි.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එතැනදී මෙන්න මෙහෙම දෙයක් සාකච්ඡා කළා. මම ඒක කියවන්නම්. "The Board having considered the paper and presentation was of the view that the cut in policy rates as recommended by the Monetary Policy Committee for the purpose of rationalization of two tier standing deposit rate is not appropriate at this stage given the rising trend of market interest rate and rising growth of private sector credit and decided to maintain the policy interest rate at current level, until the next month monetary policy review."

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඔය තනතුරට පත් වෙලා කොච්චර කල් වෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම Monetary Board එකේ Secretary විධියට පත් වුණේ පෙබරවාරි 10 වැනිදා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මොන අවුරුද්දේද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: 2015 වසරේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා මීට කලින් එවැනි රැස්වීම් කීයකට සහභාගි වෙලා තිබෙනවාද? ඔබතුමා මේ තනතුරට පත්වීමට කලින් කොහේද හිටියේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මෙම තනතුරට පත්වීමට කලින් මම සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙක් වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළා. නමුත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම් වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළේ නැහැ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම් විධියට පත්වීම ලැබුවේ පෙබරවාරි 10 වැනිදා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 10 වැනිදා තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම් විධියට පත්වීම ලැබුවේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට කලින් හිටපු ලේකම්තුමා දැන් කොහේද ඉන්නේ? කලින් හිටපු ලේකම්තුමා මාරු කරන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නේ නැද්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒක මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා දැන් කොහේද ඉන්නේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එතුමා දැන් සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙකු වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් අද මේ රැස්වීමට එතුමා සහභාගි වෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අද සහභාගි වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමාගේ නම මොකක්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ.ඒ.ජේ. සිරිවර්ධන.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට පෙබරවාරි 10 වැනිදායින් පසුව Monetary Board එකේ meetings කීයක් තිබුණාද? සාමාන්‍යයෙන් Monetary Board එකේ කාර්ය භාරය මොකක්ද කියන එක පැහැදිලි කරන්න. . .

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 10 වැනිදායින් පසුව Monetary Board එකේ Meetings 10ක් පවත්වලා තිබෙනවා. Monetary Board එකේ ප්‍රධානම කාර්ය භාරය වන්නේ මූල්‍ය ස්ථායිකාව සහ මූල්‍ය පද්ධතියේ ස්ථායිකාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් අදාළ තීරණ ගැනීමට අවශ්‍ය කටයුතු සම්පාදනය කිරීම.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ Monetary Board එකේ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Monetary Board එක පත් කළ සාමාජිකයින් සහ නිල බලයෙන් පත් වන සාමාජිකයින්ගෙන් සමන්විත වෙනවා. නිල බලයෙන් පත් වන සාමාජිකයින් වන්නේ-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මුළු සාමාජිකයන් ගණන කීයද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා, සභාපති වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරනවා. ඊට අමතරව පත් කළ සාමාජිකයන් දෙදෙනෙක් සිටිනවා. අධිපතිතුමා පත් කළ සාමාජිකයන් දෙදෙනෙක් සිටිනවා. ඊට අමතරව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා නිල බලයෙන් පත් වෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අමතර සාමාජිකයන් ඉන්නවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අමතර සාමාජිකයන් නොවෙයි, නමුත් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් Meetingවලට සහභාගි වෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට තීරණ ගන්න බැරිද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් තීරණ ගැනීමට සහභාගි වෙනවා. නමුත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයන් වශයෙන් සැලකෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට තීරණ ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙන්නේ අලුතෙන් පත් වුණු ඔබතුමාටයි, සභාපතිතුමාටයි, සභාපතිතුමා පත් කරන සාමාජිකයන් දෙදෙනාටයිද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මට තීරණ ගැනීමේ බලයක් නැහැ. මම Secretary විධියට කටයුතු කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙතුමා Secretary නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතුමා Secretary.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Membersලා වෙන්නේ සභාපතිතුමායි, අලුතෙන් පත් කරන දෙදෙනායි, සභාපතිතුමා පත් කරන දෙදෙනායි,-

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: නිල බලයෙන් පත් වන සාමාජිකයායි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Meeting එක call කරන්නේ ඔබතුමාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. මම call කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ලියුම් යවනවාද? කොහොමද call කරන්නේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. ලිඛිතව දැනුම් දෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ සියලුම Membersලාට ලියුම් යවනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: සියලුම Membersලාට ලිඛිතව දැනුම් දෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අදාළ දිනයේ එම රැස්වීමට කී දෙනෙක් සහභාගි වුණාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ සිටියේ පත් කළ සාමාජිකයන් එක් කෙනෙකු පමණයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය තීරණය ගත් රැස්වීම කවදාද තිබුණේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: 27 වැනිදා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 27 වැනිදා උදේ කීයටද රැස්වීම තිබුණේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: සමාවෙන්න. පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා තමයි එම රැස්වීම පැවැත්වුණේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා තමයි රැස්වීම තිබුණේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට එම රැස්වීමට කී දෙනෙක් සහභාගි වුණාද? ඔබතුමා කී දෙනෙක් කැඳෙව්වාද, කී දෙනෙක් සහභාගි වුණාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එම අවස්ථාවට පත් කළ සාමාජිකයන් දෙදෙනෙකු සහභාගි වී සිටියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අත්සන් ලේඛනය තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අත්සන් ලේඛනය දැනට මගේ ළඟ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඇයි ගෙනාවේ නැත්තේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: Minutesවල ඇති නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පැමිණීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් minutesවල තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Minutesවල තිබෙනවා. නමුත් මෙම නිකුතුවට- මෙම bond එකට- සම්බන්ධ ඒවා විතරයි මම ගෙනාවේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ. පැමිණීමේ ලේඛනය සහ Meeting එකේ සියලුම minutes අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා. එතකොට ඒ meetingවල minutes ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ ඒ තැන්වලට ආපසු යවන්නේ කවදාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Minutes ගත්තාට පස්සේ සති දෙකකට පස්සේ කැඳවන මූදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී තමයි එය සම්මත කරන්නේ. සම්මත කළාට පස්සේ තමයි circulate කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා නේ meeting එක කැඳවලා තිබෙන්නේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා bond issue එකටත් ගිහින් තිබෙනවා නේ. 23 වැනිදා පැවැති meeting එකෙන් ගත් තීන්දු තීරණ confirm කරන්න වෙලාවක් තිබ්ලා නැහැ නේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ වාගේ හදිසි තීරණයක් ගන්නවා නම් ඒ වෙලාවේදීම ඒ අදාළ නිලධාරීන් ගෙන්වලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් දැනුවත් කරනවා. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණ ගැනීමට, කටයුතු කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට එහෙම meeting එකක් තිබුණාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මේකට සම්බන්ධ අයට - දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලට - මේ හදිසි තීරණ ඉක්මනින් දැනුම් දෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා ඔබතුමන්ලා රැස්වීම් පැවැත්වූවා. Monetary Board එකේ රැස්වීම තිබුණා නේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: රැස්වීම තිබුණේ 23 වැනිදා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට එදා ගත් තීන්දු තීරණ මොනවාද? එතකොට ඔය meeting එකට භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ඉලාඃ අවශ්‍යතාව දැනුම් දුන්නා නේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒක in writing ලැබිලා තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: භාණ්ඩාගාර- යේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව පිළිබඳව මේ minute එකේ සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. Thirty-year bond එකක් issue කිරීම අවශ්‍යයි කියලා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. මුලින්ම භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් මහ බැංකුවෙන් සල්ලි ඉල්ලනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් එවන ලියුම Monetary Board එකේ table කරන්නේ නැද්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: නැහැ. ඒක table කරන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ මොකද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව හරහා තමයි ඒ කටයුත්ත සිදු වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මොකක්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කටයුතු කිරීමට වෙනම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවක් තිබෙනවා, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව කියලා. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි ඒ අවස්ථාව අනුව ක්‍රියා කරන්නේ. ඒ තීරණය මෙතැනට ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට යමක් පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට අවශ්‍යයි. Monetary Board එක Monetary Act එක අනුව සාමාජිකයන් කී දෙනෙකුගෙන් සමන්විතද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ජනාධිපතිතුමා විසින් පත් කළ සාමාජිකයන් තුන්දෙනෙකු සිටිනවා. ඒ තුන්දෙනාගෙන් දෙදෙනෙකු පමණයි දැනට පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැනට සිටින්නේ දෙදෙනාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ දෙදෙනා පත් කළේ කවදාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: දැනට සිටින ජයතිස්ස මහතා පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ -

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පිළිවෙළට උත්තර ටික ලබා දෙන්න. නැත්නම් එහෙන් මෙහෙන් කියලා පැටලෙනවා. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම ඇසුවේ. Monetary Board එකේ Monetary Act එක අනුව එහි සිටින මුළු සාමාජික සංඛ්‍යාව කියද කියලායි. Monetary Act එක අනුව කීයද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පස් දෙනායි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හොඳයි. ඒ පස්දෙනා හැදෙන්නේ මෙහෙමද කියලා බලන්න. එක්කෙනෙක් අධිපතිතුමා. හරිද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා විසින් පත් කරන්නේ දෙදෙනාද, තුන්දෙනාද?

The Chairman: The Secretary to the Treasury is as ex-officio member.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා සිටිනවා. අධිපතිතුමාට අමතරව පත් කළ සාමාජිකයන් තුන්දෙනෙකු සිටිනවා. ඒ තුන්දෙනා පත් කරන්නේත් ජනාධිපතිතුමා විසින්. ඊට අමතරව ex-officio member කෙනෙක් විධියට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්-තුමා සිටිනවා. දැන් මේ පත් කළ සාමාජිකයන්ගෙන් දෙදෙනෙකු පමණයි සිටින්නේ. එක්කෙනෙකු පත් කරලා නැහැ. ඒ අනුව සිටින්නේ හතරදෙනායි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමායි, ජනාධිපතිතුමා විසින් පත් කරන තුන්දෙනායි එකතු වුණාම හතරදෙනායි. එතැනට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා එකතු වුණාම පස්දෙනායි.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පස්දෙනායි. ඒ පස්දෙනාගෙන් දැනට සිටින්නේ හතරදෙනායි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: සරල උත්තරයක්නේ. මම ඇසුවේ Monetary Act එක අනුව සාමාජිකයන් කීයද කියලායි. ඒකට උත්තරය පස්දෙනායි. ඊට පසුව මම ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය විධියට අහන්න සිටියේ, එහි සංයුතිය කීයද කියලායි. මම ඒ අහන්න හිටපු ප්‍රශ්නයටත් එක්කම තමයි, මේ උත්තරය දුන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි, මම මුලිනුත් ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය ඇසුවේ.

ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අපි බොහොම කෙටියෙන් අහන්නේ. Monetary Board එක පහයි. ඒ පස්දෙනා හැදෙන්නේ, අධිපතිතුමායි; ජනාධිපතිතුමා විසින් පත් කරන තුන්දෙනායි; මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමායි එකතු වෙලා. මේකෙන් දැන් ජනාධිපතිතුමා විසින් පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ දෙදෙනායි. හරිද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා එක්කෙනෙක්. අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් දැනට සිටිනවා.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමාගේ නම මොකක්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: සමරතුංග මහතා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හොඳයි. එතකොට පස්දෙනෙකු සිටිය යුතු තැන දැනට සිටින්නේ හතරදෙනායි. ගණපූරණය -quorum එක- කීයද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: තුනයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: තුනයි. එම නිසා හතරදෙනෙකු සිටිනවා. දැන් මට කියන්න, අධිපතිතුමා හැරුණාම අර පත් කර තිබෙන දෙදෙනාගේ නම් මොනවාද කියලා?

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Ms. Mano Ramanathan සහ Mr. R.A. Jayatissa.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Ms. Mano Ramanathan වෘත්තීමය වශයෙන් මනොවා හරි තනතුරක සිටිනවාද, නැත්නම් academic පැත්තෙන් සිටිනවාද, එහෙමත් නැත්නම් පළපුරුද්දක් තිබෙනවාද? එතුමිය පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ මොන පදනම්ින්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එතුමිය නීතිඥවරියක් වශයෙන් කටයුතු කර තිබෙනවා. එතුමිය 2007 දෙසැම්බර් මස 06වැනි දින සිට තමයි මේ තනතුරට පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 2007 ඉඳලා ඉන්නවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. Term එක අවුරුදු හයක්. ඊට පසුව නැවත වරක් 2013දී එය දිගු කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 2013දී දිගු කරලා තිබෙනවා.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හොඳයි. ඊළඟට ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ 2015 අප්‍රේල් 10 වැනි දා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතුමා කවුද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එතුමා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ 2015 වසරේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. මේ සිදුවීමෙන් පසුව පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එතුමා පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මස 10 වැනි දා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේ සිදුවීමෙන් පසුවද පත් කළේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්, ඊයේ පෙරේදා පත් කළේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට මේ සිදුවීම වෙන කොට තුන්දෙනාද සිටියේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, තුන්දෙනායි සිටියේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒකනේ, ඒ දේවල් ගැන තමයි අහන්න ඕනෑ. මම ඒකයි ඇහුවේ. දැන් ඉන්නා ගණන නොවෙයිනේ. දැන් ඉන්නා ගණන ඔබතුමාට කියන්න නිබුණා. මුලින් කියන්න නිබුණා, "මේ සිදුවීම වෙන අවස්ථාවේදී සිටියේ තුන්දෙනායි" කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ සිදුවීම වෙන අවස්ථාව වෙන කොට quorum එකට අවශ්‍ය ගණන විතරමයි, Monetary Board එකේ ඉඳලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට එදා meeting එකට කී දෙනෙකු සහභාගි වුණාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ සියලු දෙනාම සහභාගි වුණා. Meeting එකට ඒ තුන්දෙනාම සහභාගි වුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊට කලින් පස්දෙනෙකු සිටියේ කවදාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මගේ කාලය ඇතුළත ඊට කලින් පස්දෙනෙකු සිටිය නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සිටියේ නැහැ. කොපමණ කල්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම මේ තනතුරට පත් වුණේ 2015 පෙබරවාරි 10 වැනි දා. එදායින් පසුව පස්දෙනෙකු කිසිම අවස්ථාවක සිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හතරදෙනෙක්?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: හතර දෙනෙකු සිටියා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හතරදෙනෙකු සිටින්නේ දැන්. මේ සිදුවීම වෙන අවස්ථාවේ ඉඳලා තිබෙන්නේ තුන්දෙනායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තුන් දෙනෙකු සිටියේ කවදා සිටද? ඒ වාගේම හතරදෙනෙකු වුණේ කවදාද? ඔබතුමා මෙම තනතුරට පත් වුණේ කවදාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම මේ තනතුරට පත් වුණේ, 2015 පෙබරවාරි 10 වැනි දා. පළමුවැනි meeting එක තිබුණේ, ජනවාරි මාසයේ 12 වැනි දා. ඊට පසුව සෑම meeting එකකටම ඉඳලා තිබෙන්නේ තුන්දෙනෙකු පමණයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා පත්වීමට කලින් කී දෙනෙකු සිටියාද කියන එක සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමා ළඟ වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඊට කලින් පස්දෙනාම ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා එන්න කලින්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, මම එන්න කලින්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතුරු දෙදෙනා අයින් කළාද, අයින් වුණාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔවුන් දෙදෙනා කැමැත්තෙන් ඉල්ලා අස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ දෙදෙනා කවුද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එක්-කෙනෙක් Mr. Nimal Welgama.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නිමල් වෙල්ගම කියන්නේ කවුද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එතුමා කලින් සිටි කෙනෙක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමාගේ සුදුසුකම් මොනවාද? ඔබතුමා ඒ ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ නේද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනිත් කෙනා කවුද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඊට අමතරව Mr. Neil Umagiliya සිටියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා මොන sector එකේද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම දන්නා තරමින් එතුමා garment sector එකේ ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මොන sector එකේද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ garment sector එකේ. ඊට අමතරව Ms. Ramanathan දිගටම සිටියා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Monetary Board එකේ තිබෙන ප්‍රධාන වගකීම් මොනවාද කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රී-තුමනි, අපි ඊට පෙර මෙතුමාගෙන් ඇසුවා නම් හොඳයි, මෙතුමා පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ මෙම තනතුර භාර ගන්නා විට සේවය කළේ කුමන තනතුරේද කියලා. Monetary Board එකේද, නැත්නම් වෙනත් අංශයකද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කරුණාරත්න මහත්මයාද?

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: ඔව්.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙකු වශයෙන් තමයි කටයුතු කළේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මෙම තනතුරට එන්න කලින්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය තනතුරට පත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය මොකක්ද? සුදුසුකම් මොනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: Central Bank Service එකෙන් නේද, ගන්නේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මෙම තනතුරට පත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධව තීරණය කරන්නේ අධිපතිතුමායි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මොන වාගේ කෙනෙකුද පත් කරන්නේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙකු තමයි පත් කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හිටපු කෙනාගේ සේවා කාලය කොපමණද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එතුමා මහ බැංකුවේ අවුරුදු තිහක පමණ සේවා -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔහුට සේවය කිරීමට තව කොපමණ කාලයක් තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම දන්නා පරිදි තව අවුරුදු හතරක් පමණ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට කොපමණ සේවා කාලයක් තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මට තව අවුරුදු පහක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට හිටපු කෙනාගේ සහ ඔබතුමාගේ වෘත්තිමය වශයෙන් එකම සුදුසුකම් ද තිබෙන්නේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, එක සමානයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔහු deputy වෙනවාද ඔබතුමාට?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එම තනතුරට ගන්නේ Central Bank Service එකේ අයයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මීට කලින් Board Secretary වෙලා හිටපු Mr. Samarasiri-

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Mr. Samarasiri නොවෙයි, Mr. Siriwardena.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Board Secretary විධියට කටයුතු කළා නේද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Board Secretary විධියට හිටියේ සී.පී.ජේ. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා.

සභාපතිතුමා: සිරිවර්ධන මහතා නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: ඔබතුමා වැඩබලන ලේකම්ද, එහෙම නැත්නම් පෙබරවාරි මාසයෙන් පසුව දැනට ස්ථිරසාර පත්වීමක් ලැබී තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම් වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරනවා. එතකොට ඒක -

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: Continue කරනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, continue කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පත්වීමක් තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පත්වීමේ ලිපියක් තිබෙනවා.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: එතකොට ලේකම් වෙන්න - මෙම තනතුර වැඩබලන -

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මෙහිදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම් විධියට මට පැවරී තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ රැස්වීම්වලට අදාළ කටයුතු සම්පාදනය කිරීම සහ ඊට සම්බන්ධ ලේඛන පවත්වා ගැනීමයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මූලා මණ්ඩලයේ ප්‍රධාන වගකීම් මොනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය තමයි රටේ ආර්ථිකය සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවශ්‍ය තීරණ ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය උපදේශ සපයන්නේ. විශේෂයෙන්ම රටේ මූල්‍ය පද්ධතියේ ස්ථායීතාව, ඒ වාගේම මිල මට්ටම්වල ස්ථායීතාව පවත්වා ගැනීම සඳහා සහ ආර්ථික කටයුතු වර්ධනය සඳහා අවශ්‍ය උපදෙස් ලබා දීම සිදු කරන්නේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයයි. ඒ වාගේම ඒ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදනය කිරීමට අමතරව රජයට අවශ්‍ය උපදෙස් පවා ලබා දෙනවා. ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදනය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි වගකීම පැවරී තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුමේ හැටියට කියන්න, රජයට මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදනය සඳහා උපදෙස් දෙනවා නම් ඒ උපදෙස් දීම සඳහා තිබෙන්නා වූ පසුබිම මොකක් වෙන්න ඕනෑද? මම අහන්නේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මේ අයට ඒ මූල්‍ය ක්ෂේත්‍රය සම්බන්ධව තිබෙන පළපුරුද්ද, ඊළඟට academic background එක කියන මේ සියලු දේ වැදගත් වෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මනා පළපුරුද්දක් තිබෙන, ඒ වාගේම academic background එකක් තිබෙන නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් සමන්විත දෙපාර්ත-මේන්තු රාශියක් පිහිටුවා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ අය මෙතැනදී තමන්ගේ වැඩ කොටස කරනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ අය තමයි අවශ්‍ය සියලුම උපදෙස් සපයන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මේ අය කරන්නේ තීරණ ගැනීම.

සභාපතිතුමා: Departments ටික feed කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කරුණාරත්න මහත්මයා, ඔබතුමා මේ කියන meeting එක කැඳවූ ආකාරය, එම meeting එකේ සම්පූර්ණ minutes ටික සහ පැමිණීමේ ලේඛනය සම්බන්ධව මට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: 23 වැනි දා රැස්වීමෙන් පසුව Monetary Board එක කී වතාවක් රැස් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද? ඒ සියලු රැස්වීම්වල minutes අපට ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: 23 වැනි දා පළමුවැනි රැස්වීමේ ඉඳලා මේ දක්වා.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: දැනට 10ක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 10 ක් තිබෙනවා. ඒවායේ copies නැද්ද? ඒවා ඔබතුමාට දෙන්න බැරිද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම ඒ ටික ලැබෙන්න සලස්වන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පබෙරවාරි 27 වෙනිදා Monetary Board එකේ රැස්වීමක් තිබුණා නේද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 23 තිබුණේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පෙබරවාරි 23ට පස්සේ තිබුණේ කවදාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 23 වෙනිදාට පසුව තිබුණේ මාර්තු 06 වෙනිදා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පෙබරවාරි 27 වෙනිදා තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 27 වෙනිදා තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒ සියලුම ලේඛන ලැබෙන්න සලස්වන්නම්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එම ලේඛන ඉක්මනින්ම ඕනෑ වෙයි නේද සභාපතිතුමා? හෙට අනිද්දා වෙනකොට ඕනෑ වෙයි නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. ගිහින් එවන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Monetary Board එකත් ඒ කියන්නේ Act එක අනුව සංයුතිය කවුද? එතකොට කලින් හිටිය අයගේ නම් සහ ඔවුන් එම තනතුරට පත්වූ දිනය, සහ දැන් සිටින අය පත් වූ දිනය, ඔවුන්ගේ නම්, තනතුරු ආදී විස්තර ටිකක් අවශ්‍යයි.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: හොඳමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙතුමාගෙන් එපමණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට අවශ්‍ය මෙතුමාගෙන් එපමණයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අනිත් දෙදෙනා Monetary Board එකේ අයටද එන්න කියලා තිබෙන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: Mr. Jayatissa සහ Mrs. Ramanathan ට කියන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඒ දෙන්නා ආවා නම් හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අය Members ලා නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. කමක් නැහැ. ඒ අය meeting එකට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ජයතිස්ස ආවේ ඊට පස්සේ. ඊයේ පෙරේදා පත් කළේ. එයාගෙන් වැඩක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කලින් හිටපු කෙනා ගෙන්වනවාද?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: They are formally present at the meeting.

සභාපතිතුමා: Formally නේ ඕන අපට. Governorගෙන් අනික් කාරණා අපට අහගන්න පුළුවන්. අවශ්‍ය නම් කැඳවමු.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: දෙනාම එකට කැඳවමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්. දෙදෙනාම එකට කැඳවමු.

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

සභාපතිතුමා: අනිත් නිලධාරීන් දෙදෙනාට එන්න කියන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට මේ meeting එකේ ඉදලා තිබෙන්නේ අධිපතිතුමායි, අධිපතිතුමා පත් කරපු පුද්ගලයායි, අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමායි නේද? අධිපතිතුමායි, අධිපතිතුමා පත් කළ කෙනායි, අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමාත් තමයි මේ meeting එකේ නිසි බලධරයෝ නේද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා සහ ඒ වාගේම ජනාධිපතිතුමා පත් කරපු නියෝජිතයා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා මේ meeting එකට ආවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා ආවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ මම අහන්නේ ජනාධිපතිතුමා පත් කරපු අයයි. අධිපතිතුමායි. තුන්දෙනයි නේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: තුන්දෙනයි. ඒකෙන් පත්වෙන්නේ අධිපතිතුමා සහ ජනාධිපතිතුමා තමයි අනිත් member පත් කරන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ Memberව පත් කළේ ජනාධිපතිතුමාද? අධිපතිතුමාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා නොවෙයි. ජනාධිපතිතුමා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ජනාධිපතිතුමා.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: තුන්දෙනයි හිටියේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ ජනාධිපතිතුමා පත් කළ කෙනාද රාමනාදන්?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: රාමනාදන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතුමියට කලින් extension ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ විස්තර ගෙන්වා ගන්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජික ආර්.ඒ.ජයතිස්ස මහතා සහ මනෝහාරි රාමනාදන් මහත්මිය කැඳවයි.)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජික ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී. Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan, Member of the Monetary Board of Sri Lanka Central Bank, affirmed and examined.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ජයතිස්ස මහත්මයා තනතුරට පත් වුණේ කවදාද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: අප්‍රේල් 10.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට පෙර ඔබතුමා හිටියේ කොහේද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: මම 2004 මහ බැංකුවේ සිටියා. ඒ කාලයේ හිටියේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මීට කලින් ඔබතුමා මේ Board නියෝජනය කරලා තිබෙනවාද? මේ පළමුවෙනි වතාවද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: පළමු වතාව. ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂ වශයෙන් මම අවුරුදු 5ක් Board එකේ හිටියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ Board එකේ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද? මේ Board එකේ කවුරු කවුරු ද ඉන්නේ?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: Board එකේ Governor ඉන්නවා. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම් ඉන්නවා. තව three appointed members are there.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පස්දෙනයි.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: දැනට ඉන්නේ හැබැයි, only two appointed members.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැනට කී දෙනාද ඉන්නේ?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Only two appointed members.

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: Together with the Governor?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Yes.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට තිබෙන කෙටි අත්දැකීම අනුව, මේ Monetary Board එකේ කාර්යභාරය මොකක්ද? මේ Monetary Board එකේ වගකීම සහ කාර්යභාරය මොකක්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: කාර්යභාරය වෙන්නේ ලංකාවේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමයේ ස්ථාවරත්වය සහ ආර්ථික වර්ධනය සහ සංවර්ධනය පිළිබඳ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් අධීක්ෂණය කරලා, ඒ පිළිබඳව වැඩ කටයුතු කිරීම. විශේෂයෙන්ම මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ පහළින් ලැබෙන උපදෙස් අනුව? ඔබතුමන්ලා පමණක් සම්පූර්ණ අධ්‍යයනය කරලා ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීන්දු කරන්නේ නැහැ නේද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: පහළ සිටින අනිත් නිලධාරීන්ගේත්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සියලුම නිලධාරීන්ගේ ඒ විස්තර අනුව තමයි ඔබතුමාලාට ඒ තීන්දුව ගන්න වෙන්නේ?

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට ප්‍රධාන තීන්දුව ගන්නේ මේ මණ්ඩලය?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ගන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා එන්න කලින්, මේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳව මේ කමිටුව අවධානය යොමු කරලා තිබෙනවා නේ. මැතකදීත් මෙවැනි Treasury Bond එකක් issue කළා නේද? Monetary Board එකේ කාර්යභාරය මොකක්ද? Treasury Bonds issue කිරීමේදී Monetary Board එකේ කාර්යභාරය මොකක්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් කරන්නේ Government එකෙන් අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය මෙපමණයි කියලා කිව්වාට පස්සේ -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් එවනවා මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවය මේකයි කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ අවශ්‍ය මුදල් එකතු කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියන කාරණය පිළිබඳව තීරණයක් ගන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීන්දුවක් ගන්නවා.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්ධව.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි ඒවා ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් එවිපු අවශ්‍යතාවය ඔබතුමන්ලාට එන්නේ කොහොමද? මේ Board එකට එන්නේ කොහොමද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මඟින්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මඟින්. ඊට පස්සේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැනුවත් කරනවා මෙන්න මේ මාසයේ මෙන්න මේ මුදල් අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා කියලා?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා කියලා. එතකොට ඒ අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණය කොපමණද කියලා, කොහොමද නිකුත් කරන්නේ කියලා තීරණය කරන්නේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Monetary Board එක නොවෙයිද? ඔබතුමන්ලා නොවෙයිද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කාර්යභාරය මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගන්නා ක්‍රමවේදය.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ක්‍රමවේදය පිළිබඳව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය කියනවා. එතකොට මෙතුමන්ලා තීරණය කරනවා ඒ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය ලබා ගන්නේ Treasury Bonds මඟින්ද, Treasury Bills මඟින්ද කියන එක මෙතුමන්ලා තීන්දු කරනවා.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඒ ප්‍රමාණය decide කරන්නේ නැහැ ඒ වෙලාවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට ප්‍රමාණය ඔබතුමන්ලාට එන්නේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා පත් වුණාට පස්සේ Treasury Bonds issue කළා නේද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: නැහැ. මම ආවාට පස්සේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කවදාද පත් වුණේ?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: අප්‍රේල් 10. මම පළමුවෙනියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ගියේ අප්‍රේල් 23.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අප්‍රේල් 23?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මේ ඊයේ පෙරේදා දවසක Sovereign Bonds හෝ මොනවා හරි issue කළාද?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: US Dollar 643 million.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: US Dollar 643 ක් Sovereign Bonds.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: What about Development Bonds? දන්නේ නැද්ද? මතක නැද්ද?

ආර්.ඒ.ජයතිස්ස මහතා: හරියට මතක නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: Development Bonds US Dollars මිලියන 643 යි. ඊට අමතරව තවත් ඇමරිකන් ඩොලර් මිලියන 25ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරනවා කියලා ලංකාවේ expatriatesලාට.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මම අහන specific ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තර දෙන්න. මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් වෙනවා නේද යම් ආකාරයකින් ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අවශ්‍ය වන ආකාරයේ සහ Treasury එකට අවශ්‍ය වන ආකාරයේ මුදල් සොයා ගැනීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන්. ප්‍රමාණය තීන්දු කරන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය හැටියට ඔබ තීන්දුවක් ගන්නවා මේ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් රජයට අවශ්‍යයි කියලා. හරිද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: හරි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පසු ගිය දින කිපය තුළ දී එවැනි අවශ්‍යතාවයක් මත- ඒ ගැන ඔබට යම් දැනීමක් තිබෙනවා නම් විතරක් කියන්න.

Uncorrected

නැත්නම් නැහැ කියන්න. ඔබට යම් දැනීමක් තිබෙනවාද Sovereign Bonds issue කළාද කියන කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන්? Sovereign Bonds issue කළාද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: Issue කළා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කවදාද? කොපමණද?

ආර්.ඒ.ජයතිස්ස මහතා: 643ක් issue කළා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හරියටම මතකද 643යි කියලා?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: හරියටම මතක නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පරීක්ෂා කරලා කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා අඩමානයට කියන්න එපා. නැතිනම් ඒ ලියකියවිලි ගෙනැල්ලා කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නා විධියට උත්තර දෙන්න. ඔබතුමා දන්නේ නැතිනම් දන්නේ නැහැ කියන්න.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒක එවන්න. අපිට ඕනෑ මේක record වෙන්න හරියටම ප්‍රමාණය කොපමණ ද කියලා දැන ගන්නයි. එතකොට development bonds issue කළා ද?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Development bonds issue කළා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කොච්චරක් ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ගණන හරියටම කියන්න බැහැ. Check කරලා බලලා කියන්නම්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා හිතන්නේ නැද්ද මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයෙක් හැටියට මේ කමිටුව ඉස්සරහා ඔයිට වඩා specific answer එකක් දෙන්න අවශ්‍යයි කියලා?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: විශේෂයෙන්ම අද මෙතැනට එන බව දන්න නිසා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් දැනුවත් වෙලා එන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You have not answered properly and this is not a satisfactory situation. You are a responsible person. The Members of the Monetary Board are the focal point for the Government or for the country to determine the monetary situation in the country. But, unfortunately, today, you are not in a position to answer to our questions.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: I did not bring these specific numbers -

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You need not bring those. You took only one decision to issue sovereign bonds and the development bonds. Even the ordinary people of this country and all the dealers know how much of US Dollars was raised by the Government by issuing sovereign bonds and development bonds and it appeared in the newspapers also. But, unfortunately you, as a Member of the Monetary Board do not know about that. This is a very unsatisfactory situation.

ගරු ලසන්න අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් මේකෙන් කියැවෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Monetary Board එකට මේ මහ බැංකුව විසින් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සොයා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී ඔබතුමන්-ලාගේ අදහස් යෝජනා ලබා ගැනීම අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ කියන එකයි.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: අනිවාර්යෙන් අත්‍යවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු ලසන්න අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතින් අත්‍යවශ්‍යයි නම් මෑතකදී කරපු ඔබතුමන්ලා දැන ගන්න ඕනෑනේ අපි මෙච්චරක් මේවා දුන්නා කියන එක. දැන් ඔබතුමා මුලින්ම කිව්වේ මෙහෙම දෙයක් සිද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ කියලයි. නමුත් ඊට පස්සේ තමයි ප්‍රශ්න කළේ මෙච්චර, මෙච්චර මුදල් ලබාගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඉතින් ඒ මුදල් ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රියාවලියට Monetary Board එක කොහොමද සම්බන්ධ වුණේ? මොකක්ද ලබාදීපු උපදෙස්? මොකක්ද ලබාදීපු අනුමැතිය කියන එකයි අපිට අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා පත් වුණාට පස්සේ මාස කීයක් මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් හින්දු ගත්තා ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමා ආවේ අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I just want to support him on this. ඔබතුමා ආවාට පස්සේ මාස කීයකට මුදල් සම්බන්ධයෙන් හින්දු ගත්තා ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ණය නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව decisions දෙකක් ගත්තා බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා ආවාට පස්සේ මුදල් කීයක් ඕනෑ කියලා තොරතුරු ලැබුණා ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ අපිට ගණනක් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා ආවට පස්සේ මොකක්ද කළේ? මතක නැද්ද? ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුව යම් කිසි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ඉල්ලනවානේ මෙන්න මේ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය දෙන්න කියලා.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: සැරින් සැරේ මුදල් issue කරනවා. සමහර මුදල් re-issue කරනවා. ඔක්කෝම ඒවා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි. අන්න ඒක තමයි පැහැදිලි වෙන්නේ නැත්තේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය කියන විධියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ඒම අනිවාර්ය නැද්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: සමහර ඒවා තිබෙන procedures අනුව -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා කියන්න මෙතුමා ආවාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමා දිගටම හිටියනේ. එතකොට ඒ නිබුණු Monetary Board එකේ meetings වලදී රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව වෙනුවෙන් එක හෝ තීන්දු තීරණ ගත්තා ද? අවස්ථා කීයකදී ද එහෙම ගත්තේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ සියලුම තොරතුරු මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද,-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපිට ඒකයි දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා ඒ ගැන අපි දන්නේ නැහැනේ. දැන් මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්න අසන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්, ඇමතිවරුන් අපි දන්නේ නැහැ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ මොකක්ද සිදු වන කාර්ය භාරය, මොකක්ද සිදු වන ක්‍රියාවලිය කියලා. අපිට කියලා දෙන්න මොකද, සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්තමන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට මේක වාර්තාගත වුණා නම් ඔබතුමාට ඉතාමත් හොඳ නැති විදියටයි වාර්තා වෙන්නේ. ඉතින් ඔබතුමන්ලා විස්තර කරලා දෙන්න අපිට තිබෙන තේරුම තමයි මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් සහ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් අවශයි කියලා දැනුවත් වෙනවා ඔබතුමන්ලා. එතකොට ඒ දැනුවත් වෙන කොට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් සියලු දේ සොයන්න බාර වෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන එක තමයි අපේ දැනුම අනුව අපිට තේරුණේ. ඒ සියල්ලම ඔබතුමන්ලාට එනවා. මෙන්න මෙපමණ ගණකක් ඕනෑ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ අනුව නොවෙයි, මෙතුමන්ලා පැහැදිලි කළෙන් එහෙම තමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා හිතන්නකෝ මේ මාසයට බිලියන 20ක් අවශ්‍යයි කියලා එනවා. එතකොට ඒ සියලු තීන්දු ගන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ද? නැත්නම් ඒ ක්‍රියාදාමය තුළින්ම සමහර සමහර දේවල්වලට තීන්දු අරගෙන ඒවා ණය ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් පවතිනවා ද? නැත්නම් ඒ හැම දෙයක්ම තීන්දු කරන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් ද? ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට ලේකම්තුමා පිළිතුරු දෙන්න.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: එතැනදී වෙන්නේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ විසර්ජන පනත යටතේ යම් අනුමැතියක් ලබා දෙනවා මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රමාණය තමයි රටෙන් ලබා ගන්නේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් විදේශ මාර්ගවලින් ලබා ගන්නේ මෙච්චරයි කියලා. ඒ තත්ත්වයන් නැවත වරක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒමක් අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ බලය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැවරිලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ තත්ත්වයන් යටතේ ඒකේ වෙනසක් වෙනවා නම් තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, ලේකම්තුමා මේ අහන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය දැන් ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කරපු විධියටම ඒ විසර්ජන පනත් සම්මතවීම ඒ සියල්ලම හරි. හැබැයි කොහොමද මේ මුදල් සොයා ගන්නේ කියලා තීරණය කරන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයනේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්න ඒකයි. ඔබතුමා ඒක පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒ තොරතුරු එන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ක්‍රමවේදය සකස් කරනවා කිව්වේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයනේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ක්‍රමවේදය කියලා අදහස් කළේ මෙතැනදී issue කිරීමේදී භාවිතා කරන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය. ඒ කියන්නේ සෘජු නිකුතුවක් ද කියන එක. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණයක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ගන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලිව කියන්න ඒ අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තු තමන්ගේ නිර්දේශ වාර්තා පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි Monetary Board එක තීරණ ගන්නේ. ඒක ගරියට කියන්නේ නැහැනේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් මේ කරුබාහට ලක්වෙලා තිබෙන ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුව advertisement එකක් දැම්මානේ Rs.1 billion අවශ්‍යයි කියලා. ඒ advertisement එක සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Monetary Board එකෙක් අනුමැතියක් අවශ්‍යයි ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ඒක ඒ අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මඟින් තමයි කටයුතු කරන්නේ. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නමුත් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුවක් ගන්න ඕනෑනේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කමිටුවට පැවරෙනවා කියලා මේ රටේ මූල්‍ය පිළිබඳව යම් කිසි ආකාරයක පාලනයක් එවැනි ආකාරයේ තීන්දු තීරණ ගැනීම. ඉතින් මෙවැනි ආකාරයෙන් මූල්‍ය විවිධ ක්‍රම මඟින් සොයා ගැනීම තුළින් රටේ මූල්‍ය ආර්ථික ස්ථාවරභාවය වෙනස් වෙනවානේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: දැන් මෙතැනදී දැනටමත් අනුමත කරපු ප්‍රමාණය අනුව තමයි මේ ගොල්ලන් මේ ක්‍රියාවලියේ යෙදෙන්නේ. එම නිසා ඒ අනුමැතිය යටතේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට කටයුතු කරගෙන යාමට අවකාශ තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්තුමා එවනවා written communication එකක් අපිට ඕනෑ Rs.13 billion කියලා. ඒක Public Debt Department එකටනේ එන්නේ. දැන් Public Debt Department එකෙන් Monetary Board එකට දමන්න අනුමැතියක් අවශ්‍ය නැද්ද?

Unedited

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකයි අපි අහන්නේ. සමහර විට අනුමැතියක් අවශ්‍ය නැතිව ඇති. එහෙමනම් පෙන්නන්න ඕනෑ, guidelinesවල, manualsවල ඇති ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට බලය තිබෙනවා කියලා. අපි දන්නේ නැහැනේ. ඒකයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Monetary Board එක අනුමත කරන්නේ විසර්ජන කෙටුම්පතට එන බිලියන 1780ක් නේ ගිය චතාවේ නිහය හැටියට තිබුණේ. ඒකද අනුමත කරන්නේ? Monetary Board එකේ කාර්ය භාරය මොකක්ද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ කාර්ය භාරය මෙතැනදී වෙන්නේ ඊට වඩා වැඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ගන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා නම් අන්න ඒ වේලාවට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් වෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: විසර්ජන කෙටුම්පතින් නියම කළ බිලියන 1780ට අමතරව ගන්න වුණොත් විතරයි.

The Chairman: If it is over and above.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණයක් කථා කරනවානේ ලේකම්තුමා. මෙන්න මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණයේදී ඒකනේ මෙතැනට කැඳෙව්වේ. එතකොට මේ ප්‍රශ්නයේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ මොකක්ද කාර්ය භාරය? මේ කථා කරන කාරණය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අදාළ ද, නැද්ද?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It seems that they do not know about their functions.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, අපිට තිබෙන දැනුම අනුව භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හරි, සුරකුම්පත් හරි නිකුත් කරන හැම වෙලේම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අනුමැතිය අනුව නිකුත් වෙනවා කියන තමයි අපිට දැනට තේරෙන්නේ. එහෙම නැතිව අපේ සභාපතිතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයෙන් මට තේරෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට එන්නේ විශේෂ මුදලක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීන්දුවක් ගන්නකොට තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒ කාර්ය භාරය එන්නේ. නැත්නම් සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව ඒ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලින් ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය කරගෙන යනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා පැහැදිලි කරලා කියන්න දැන් Treasury Bills හරි, Bonds හරි, නිකුත් කරන හැම වෙලේම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අනුමැතිය ලැබෙනවා ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් අර අදාළ Rs. 13 billion Monetary Board ඒකට ආවාද, නැද්ද? නැත්නම් නැහැ කියන්න. Public Debt Department එකට බලය තිබෙනවා කියලා කියන්න.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒක ආවේ නැහැ. නමුත් අධිපතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා ඒ නිකුතුවට පෙර අපි 30-year bond එකක් issue කරනවා කියලා. නිකුතුවෙන් පස්සේ නැවත වරක් අධිපතිතුමා දැනුම් දුන්නා Rs.1 billion මෙවා කළාට Rs.10 billion purchase කළා කියලා දැනුම් දුන්නා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඇයි ලේකම්තුමා අධිපතිතුමා එහෙම ප්‍රකාශයක් කළේ? නිකම් කළාද? නැත්නම් එහෙම කරන්න ඕනෑද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අධිපතිතුමාට එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. අධිපතිතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් කිරීම අවශ්‍යයි සලකා එය එසේ කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය සිදුවීම ඉවර වෙලා ද දැනුවත් කළේ? නැතිනම් ඔය සිදුවීමට කලින් ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: සිද්ධියට කලින් කිව්වා 30-year bond එකක් issue කරනවා කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ප්‍රමාණයක් කිව්වා ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහන් කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහන් කරන්නේ නැතිව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා අවුරුදු 30කට මේක issue කරනවා කියලා. එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයින්ගේ අදහස වුණේ මොකක්ද? කමක් නැහැ කියලා කිව්වාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒක අනුමත කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ ඒ යෝජනාව ඒකේ minutes වල තිබෙනවා?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Minutesවල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Minutesවල තිබෙනවා මෙහෙම කිව්වා, මේක අනුමත කළා කියලා. ප්‍රමාණය ගැනඑහිමොනවත් සඳහන් කළේ නැහැ?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ප්‍රමාණය ගැන සඳහන් කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ ඔබතුමිය Board එකේ ඉන්න ඇති. ඔබතුමිය එය පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

The Chairman: Mrs. Ramanathan, you were there on the Board on 23rd February.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Yes, Sir.

The Chairman: There was a request from the Treasury. Did it come to you? What is the procedure?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Sir, the amount of the Treasury bonds has not been decided by the Monetary Board. As you know, the Central Bank is the financial engine of this country. They have to make many minor and

major changes all the times. So, the Monetary Board meets only three times in a month and I am not privy to most of the decisions.

I must also tell you this before you ask me further questions. My discipline is law, Sir, and I am put in there for my legal expertise which is very important and relevant to the Board. I have been in the Monetary Board for seven years and I have a fair knowledge in banking and economics. For important and technical matters, I am guided by the Central Bank officials.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How long have you been a lawyer?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: I had been serving in the Department Legal Draftsman. I rose to be Senior Deputy. I was there for 30 years.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. Thank you. Can you continue what you explain? You meet about three times a month.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Yes, we meet three times a month.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Tell me, with your knowledge, what sort of decisions that you take? Do you take all the decisions there on monetary matters?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: We do sometimes take and other times it is ratified.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is right. That is what we wanted to know. The Governor said that a 30-year Bond is going to be-

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Shall I read that out to you, Sir?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, please.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: This is the minute, dated 23rd February, 2015. "The Board was of the view that issuing 30-year Treasury Bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and re-profile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors. Accordingly, the Board instructed the Superintendent of Public Debt to conduct as 30-year Treasury Bond auction during the week and arrange to list sovereign bonds in Euro Clear Exchange in future.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can I ask a question?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Yes. please.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Does the Central Bank have to get your ratification to go ahead with the 30-year bond? Is that why the Governor asked for your approval?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If you do not agree and if you do not ratify, it cannot be done.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Yes, the amount of the bonds was not decided. This exercise is vested with the PDD, that is the Public Debt Department, as per the operational manual of the PDD.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you explain that further? What is the function of the PDD? To our understanding, what they do is, they decide the amount of money-

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Let me explain, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Private or direct placements has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions and the balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved borrowing programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, that does not come to you. If private placements are made, does it come to your approval as well?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: I am sorry, Sir. I cannot-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: All I want to know is the way in how the money is raised, the period and the interest. Do you determine that or do they determine it and bring it to your notice and then you ratify and then you give the okay for them to go ahead or what? You said that either bonds or private placements. If you explain your functions at the Monetary Board, it will give us a very clear picture.

The Chairman: Do you decide or the Public Debt Department decides or the Tender Board decides?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කළා ඔබතුමාගේ කොමිටි එක ඒ තීරණ ගන්නේ මහබැංකු දත්ත මත කියලා. එතකොට මේ වසර 30ක බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කළොත් -ඔබතුමාගේ minutesවල තිබෙනවා- විදේශිකයන් උනන්දු වෙයි කියලා. ඒ කුමන දත්ත මතද එහෙම විදේශිකයන් උනන්දු වෙයි කියන තීරණය ගත්තේ, මොන දත්තද ඔබතුමාට ආවේ?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: දැනට අපේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර උපකරණ කෙරෙහි

විදේශිකයන්ගේ සෑහෙන උනන්දුවක් තිබෙන බව පෙනෙනවා. මොකද, දැනටත් විදේශිකයන් ආයෝජනය කර තිබෙන නිසා. ඒ වාගේම මා දන්නා පරිදි Public Debt Department එකේ ඒ අය නිතරම market surveillance වාගේ කරනවා. ඒ වාගේම, මේ පිළිබඳව නිතරම road shows පවත්වනවා. ඒවායේදී ඒ අයට ලැබෙන feedbackඅනුව තමයි ඒ අය තීරණය කරන්නේ මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ලොකු demand එකක් පිටරටවල අයගෙන් තිබෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම ආසන්නයේ හෝ දැනුම් දීමක් තිබුණාද මෙහෙම කළොත් වැදගත් වෙයි කියලා?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මේ Board එකට-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Board එකට පෙර නේ ඒවා එන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ දත්ත තිබුණා?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ වාර්තා අපට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ දත්ත වාර්තා මත නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙය තීරණය කරන්නේ. නිකම් තීරණය කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ committee එක. පහළින් එන දත්ත අනුව නේ තීරණය කරන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ.වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ තත්ත්වය අලුතින් ඇති වුණු තත්ත්වයක්ද, එහෙම නැතිනම් මීට කලිනුත් අවුරුද්දක් හෝ පසු ගිය කාලයේ තිබුණු තත්ත්වයමද විදේශිකයන් මේ වෙළෙඳපොලට පැමිණීමට තිබෙන trendඑකේ වැඩි වීම?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අලුතින් ඇති වුණු තත්ත්වයක්ද, දිගටම තිබුණු තත්ත්වයක්ද?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මේක දිගටම පැවතුණු තත්ත්වයක් වාගේ තමයි පෙනෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ.වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් මේ bond එකේදී විශේෂත්වයක් නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ අලුතින් කියන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ, මේtrendඑක දැනටමත් තිබෙනවා?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: දැනටත් මේ trend එක තිබෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ තීරණ අර ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ විදේශිකයන් උනන්දු කරන්න. මම අහන්නේ, එහෙම නම් කලින් තිබුණේ නැති විශේෂත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ සඳහා කලින් විදේශිකයන්ගේ උනන්දුවක් තිබිලා නැහැ. ඒ නිසා විදේශිකයන් උනන්දු කිරීම සඳහායි වසර 30ක බැඳුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියා ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කර තිබෙන්නේ?

එච්.ඒ.කරුණාරත්න මහතා: නැහැ, විදේශිකයන් උනන්දු කරවීම සඳහා නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, මම කියන්නේ මෙතුමියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමඅනුව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. එතුමා කිව්වේ විදේශිකයන්ගේ උනන්දුව තිබෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: රාමනාදන් මහත්මියළඟ තිබෙන minutes වල එතුමිය දැන් පැහැදිලි කළා, මේ තීරණය ගන්න committee එක තීරණය කළේ විශේෂයෙන්ම විදේශිකයන් උනන්දු කිරීම සඳහා කියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතුමියට එය නැවත කියවන්න කියන්න

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැවත කියවන්න කියන්න. ඒකේ කිව්වේ, විදේශිකයන්ගේ උනන්දුවක් තිබෙන බවට කොරතුරු ලැබී තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මේක issue කරන එක-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ. විදේශිකයන්ගේ උනන්දුවක් තිබෙනවා. විදේශිකයන් උනන්දු කිරීමට-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ minutes නැවත කියවන්න.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: "The Board was of the view that issuing a 30-year Treasury Bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and re-profile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors".

Arising from that, there is another minute. That is dated, 06th March, 2015. "The Chairman informed the Board that the Central Bank temporarily suspended the method of direct placements of Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds used to raise funds for the Government with a view to move towards the greater market mechanism based on standard auction system followed alternatively at present. Accordingly, the Central Bank, at the 30-year Treasury Bond auction held on the 27th February, 2015, decided to accept Rs. 10 billion out of Rs. 20 million worth bonds received for Rs. 1 billion announced to the market for bids in order to meet the Government's funding requirements only from the open market bids.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. That is fine.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can we get a copy of that?

The Chairman: Yes. What is the date of that minute?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: The date of this is 06th March, 2015. Madam, you wanted to know what our functions are.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: The monetary policy and the financial systems and stability of those-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We got it. But, what we are not very clear about is your exact functions. For instance, the Hon. Member asked a question about the occasions that you- Now you give us an explanation on this. On Rs. 13 billion one, you got a very clear mandate there from the Governor and then you all also decided that this is the best way to go forward. So, we wanted to know that on each and every occasion, does a request come like this to the Monetary Board. Let us say for Rs. 1 billion or for even lesser amounts or is it for big amounts like this or extraordinary occasions that you get the opportunity or is it a practice that you get every bond issue is through you all? I think, more than you-

ලේකම්තුමා, අහන ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. රජය මුදල් සොයා ගන්න ක්‍රම දෙකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. සුරකුම්පත් සහ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්. හරිද? තව එකක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මූලික වශයෙන් private placements and auctions තමයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සංවර්ධන බැදුම්කර.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් සුරකුම්පත් සහ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වලින් තමයි මුදල් ලබා ගන්නේ. හරිද, ලේකම්තුමා? එතකොට ඒ හැම වේලාවේම ඒ ලබා ගන්න දේවල් ඔය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඉදිරිපත් වෙනවාද කියන එක තමයි මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Auction එක තීරණය කරනවාද -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔය වාගේ හැම එකක්ම 30 yearsද, 20 yearsද, 10 yearsද, ඒ සියලු දේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් approve වෙන්න ඕනෑද? හැම ගණනටම. රජය වීසර්ජන පනතින් හරි මොන පනතකින් හරි මුදල් ලබා ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ. එසේ මුදල් ලබා ගන්න කොට ඒ සියලු දේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මූලා මණ්ඩලයෙන් අනුමත වෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මම දන්නා පරිදි වරින්වර මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට පැමිණීම අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ කාලපරිච්ඡේදය මුලදී එම සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රමාණයන් සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන තිබෙන නිසා. එම නිසා වරින්වර පැමිණීමක් අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Policy change එකක් වෙනවා නම් එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රධාන අවස්ථාවක අත්‍යවශ්‍ය වුණොත් තමයි මේ වාගේ අවස්ථාවක් උදා වෙන්නේ.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: The thing is, Sir, the Monetary Board meets only three times in a month. So, the Central Bank, being an important institution, has to make every moment a decision. They - the Governor and the very able Deputy Governors - make their decisions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, Treasury Bonds and all those are produced day-to-day basis.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: I do not know. I am not aware of all those things.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කිව්වා මාසයකට තුන් වතාවයි මේ Monetary Board එක රැස් වෙන්නේ කියලා.

මනෝහාරි රාමනාදන් මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ දින වකවානු අනුව තුන් වතාවකට වැඩිය රැස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: නීතිමය අවශ්‍යතාව වන්නේ දවස් 14කට වරක් Meeting එකක් පවත්වා ගැනීමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදාට කලින් තිබුණ දිනය කවද්ද? පෙබරමාරි මාසයේ තිබුණ දින ගණන කියන්න.

මනෝහාරි රාමනාදන් මහත්මිය: පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ තිබුණේ දෙවනාවයි. Because it was a short month.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 23 වෙනිදා සහ පෙබරවාරි 9 වෙනිදායි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා 23 වෙනි දින Board එකට මේක inform කළා නේ. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා ඊළඟ Meeting එකේදී මේ Minutes confirm වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. එනකොට confirm වෙන්නේ නැතිව නේ මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කිව්වේ. මේ වාගේ හදිසි තීරණවලදී - ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී කියලා තිබෙනවා රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිතුමාට උපදෙස් දෙන්න ලබන සතිය ඇතුළත මේක කරන්න කියලා. ඒ වාගේ හදිසි අවස්ථාවකදී ඒ වේලාවේම දැනුම් දීමක් සිදු වෙනවා. බොහෝ වේලාවට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අදාළ නිලධාරීන් ගෙන්වා එවලේම උපදෙස් දීම් සිදු කරනවා. ඒ නිසා ඒ වෙනකම් බලාගෙන ඉන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Ramanathan, this is just for my knowledge and clarification, I do not know whether the others will also be interesting. The Central Bank took a decision to temporarily suspend private placements and to go only for open bidding - auctions. What do you think, in your opinion, is the most transparent and most stable and why did the Central Bank take that decision? Is this a more transparent, better method?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why do you think that the Central Bank took that decision? The question is, you said, you all decided to have open bidding. Am I correct?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The Central Bank decided to temporarily suspend private placements and go for auctions.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: That is more transparent.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, they were looking for a better method, because private placements are not so transparent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, why do you say it is more transparent? Can you explain it further, because that is very important?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: I do not know, Sir. I cannot explain it in such technical terms.

The Chairman: Mr. Jayatissa, ඔබතුමා authoritative නේ. ඔබතුමා direct placement එකයි, auction එකයි පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ දෙක ගැන කියන්න. ඉතිහාසය පුරාම ගොඩක් private placementsවලින් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ, direct placementsවලින් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: The decision was taken not by the Monetary Board.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We know that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What we are asking is not that. We are asking about the difference between the private placements and auctions.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Private placements are mainly with the EPF and the Government owned institutions.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it only with the Government institutions or can private dealers also come in?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: As far as I know, it is mainly with the Government owned institutions, but –

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: There is no restriction for that. The private parties also can come in.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: There are no restrictions.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Because in the past - we are looking at the past two years - there have been private placements by private dealers. So, you cannot say it is only restricted to the Government institutions.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: I mean, it was mainly the Government institutions.

The Chairman: Ninety per cent of it is State owned.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Auctions are basically a transparent method of raising funds.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why do you say auctions are more transparent than private placements?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Because the rate is negotiated in the case of private placements, but in auctions, they bid.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, auction is better.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Auction is better. But, as an economist, my personal feeling is, it is much easier also to raise funds when necessary through private placements, because the rate could be lower.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. But, do you not think that can mount to corruption also.

The Chairman: In private placements you offer higher rate of interest. So, they come.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Through our experience, we have seen that in the past, because I have been involved in the Treasury Bond issues those days. I think, sometimes, even the EPF will go with the market trend and then raise with very higher rates. It is a large amount of funds. The Government is compelled to accept those high rates.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, Mr. Jayatissa, do you agree that the Central Bank Governor took a very good decision to temporarily suspend the private placements and go for direct bonds through auctions?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: I do not agree with that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Then, why did you say it was transparent?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Because in this case, going to the marker is okay. But, as a matter of principle, a policy, I do not agree -

The Chairman: It is very important that markets should necessarily be transparent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There were a lot of allegations for private placements earlier, because they can manipulate when the private placement is done. But you cannot manipulate doing auctions.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Definitely, you cannot manipulate auctions. But in the case of -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. Do you agree that you can manipulate private placement?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: There is a possibility.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Right. That is what we wanted to know.

The Chairman: Here is also an allegation that the auctions have been manipulated. That is why we are sitting here.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: In this particular case, have you made any financial assessment when you are moving from private placements to auctions?

ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා නොවෙයි කරන්නේ. මෙතැන private placement එකේ සිට auction එකට යන්න තීරණය ගනිද්දි මොකක් හරි financial assessment එකක් කළාද CBSL එකට මේකෙන් මොකක් හරි loss එකක් වෙනවාද කියන එක සම්බන්ධයෙන්? නැත්නම් directlyම මේම තීරණය ගත්තාද මෙය transparent නිසා?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මා ළඟ තොරතුරු එච්චරම් -

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමාට ඒක කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ Board එක ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කළේත් නැහැ නේ. ඉතින් කොහොමද එතැන assessment එකක් කරන්නේ? ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා මිසක මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව ගන්න කියන එක -මෙයාලා ගන්න ප්‍රමාණයවත් තීරණය කළේ නැත්නම් කොහොමද assessment එකක් කරන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක නමයි, තීරණය කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය කරන්නේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තු-වෙන්. මේ අය කරන්නේ ක්‍රමවේදය චිතරයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ක්‍රමවේදය change කරනවා නම් ඒ වේලාවේ assessment එකක් කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කරලා ඇති.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Board එක ඒ පිළිබඳව දැනුවත් නැහැ. වෙන කවුරු හරි කරලා ඇති කියලා ඔබතුමා සිතනවා.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: Board එකට එම අවස්ථාවේදී එම තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාද ක්‍රමවේදය තීන්දු කරන්නේ, නැත්නම් පහළින් එන උපදෙස් අනුවද එම ක්‍රමවේදය තීන්දු කරන්නේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඒ දෙකම වෙන්න පුළුවන්. පහළින් එන තොරතුරු මත පදනම් වෙලා අධිපතිතුමා තීරණය ගත්තා වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම දැනුවත් නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අධිපතිතුමාට Board එකට පිටින් එහෙම තීරණය කරන්න බලයක් තිබෙනවාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා Board එකේ Chairman විධියට -

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමා Board එකේ Chairman නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, Board එක නැතිව.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පනතේ හැටියට Chief Executive Officer විධියට පුළුවන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා පැහැදිලි කරනවා පස්සේ අධිපතිතුමා වෙනම තීරණයක් ගත්තාද දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට ලේකම්තුමා හෝ කවුරු හෝ පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න. දැන් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මෙවැනි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරලා මුදල් ලබා ගැනීමේ කටයුත්ත සිදු වුණු පළමු අවස්ථාව නොවෙයි නේ මේ. මීට කළිනුත් සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඒක කරන කාරය භාරයක්. එතකොට මහ බැංකුව තුළ මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය වෙනුවෙන් වෙනමම manual එකක් වාගේ තිබෙනවාද, මහ බැංකුව තුළ මේවා නිකුත් කිරීමේදී මෙන්න මේ මේ ආකාරයෙන් කටයුතු කළයුතුයි කියලා.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් අදාළ ලේඛන, manual, අත්පත්‍රිකා පවත්වා ගෙන යනවා.

Mr. W. P. C. Wickramaratne: Is it the approved manual certified by the Monetary Board? What is the last date on which they have approved it?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය manual එක අනුව මෙවැනි ක්‍රියාවලියකදී ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කමිටුවකට පැවැරෙන කාර්ය භාරය මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් තමයි අහන්න ඕනෑ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් Treasury Bond නිකුත් කිරීමේ කටයුත්තකදී ඔය manual එකට අනුව Monetary Board එකට පැවරෙන කාර්ය භාරය මොකක්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා කිව්වා වාගේ රජයට අවශ්‍ය නම් -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම අහන්නේ දැන් මේ manual එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන්න එපායැ මේ සම්පූර්ණ ක්‍රියාවලිය කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක? එතකොට මේ manual එකට අනුව Monetary Board එකට පැවරෙන කාර්ය භාරය මොකක්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: Manual එක change කරනවා නම් විතරයි, Monetary Board එකට එන්න ඕනෑ. Tender Committee එකෙන් තමයි කොපමණ ද කියලා decision ගන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ ගන්න decision ටික inform කරන්න විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Tender Committee එකේ කවුද ඉන්නේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, මේ manual එක තිබෙනවා නේ, මේ manual එකට අනුව මම අහන්නේ, මෙවැනි ක්‍රියාවලියකදී, මෙම කමිටුවට පැවැරෙන කාර්ය භාරය මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන්න එපායැ?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඒක Public Debt දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක Public Debt දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට තිබෙන එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකේ මූදල් ප්‍රමාණය තීන්දු කරන ආකාරය -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට සමස්ත මහ බැංකුව තුළ මෙවැනි ක්‍රියාවලියකට තිබෙන ප්‍රතිපත්තිය මොකක්ද? එතකොට මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සඳහා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ තිබෙන සම්බන්ධතාව මොකක්ද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: වක්‍ර විධියට මෙතැන සම්බන්ධතාවක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, document එක manual එක අනුව කටයුතු කළා ද කියන එක ගැන අභ්‍යන්තර විගණන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මහින්-

සභාපතිතුමා: Tender Board එක එනවා, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් අහමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, අපට දැන ගන්න තිබෙන අවසාන ප්‍රශ්නය වෙන්නේ මේකයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාට මේ මූදල් ප්‍රමාණය අවශ්‍යයි කියලා දැනුවත් වුණා, එතකොට මේ ක්‍රමවේදය අවුරුදු 30ක බැඳුම්කරවලින් තමයි ලබා ගන්නේ කියන එකත් තීන්දු වුණා. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා නිකුත් කළාට පසුවද, auction එක කළාට පසුවද මේක ratify කළේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් ඊට කලින් ද ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ යෝජනාව තීන්දු කළේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අධිපතිතුමා මූදල් මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් කිරීම කළේ 23 වැනිදා. එතකොට auction එක පැවැත්වූයේ 27 වැනිදා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 23 වැනිදා ratify කරලා, 27 වැනිදා auction එක කළා?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 23 වැනි දා කළේ auction එකට යන්න කියලායි. Auction එකට ගිහිල්ලා ඔක්කෝම ඉවර වෙලා ratification එකට ගියේ 06 වැනිදා.

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ 06 වැනිදා අධිපතිතුමා නැවත වතාවක් දැනුම් දුන්නා මේ විධියට අපි auction එකක් පැවැත්වුවා, ඒකට Rs.10 billion ගත්තාය කියන එක.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට issue කරලා ඉවරයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Approval was given on the 23rd?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Yes.

Mr. W. P. C. Wickramaratne: The approval was given only for the Thirty Years Bond.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතකොට ඒකද ක්‍රමවේදය, නැත්නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ approval එක 23 වැනිදා ලැබුණාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමා, 23 වැනිදා අධිපතිතුමා මූදල් මණ්ඩලයට දැනුම් දුන්නා. මූදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනුමත කරලා නේ. අනුමත කියන්නේ, "approval".

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ සාකච්ඡා කළා අනුමැතිය ගන්න. ඊට පස්සේ එකතු වෙලා අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් එක එක්කෙනා කැඳවලා මොකක්ද ක්‍රමවේදයකින් තමයි අනුමත කළා කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 23 වැනිදා අනුමත වුණා නේ?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: 23 වැනිදා තීරණය වුණා රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිතුමාට දැනුම් දෙන්න කියලා. Thirty Year Bondsවලට යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් අපිට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ, Mrs. Ramanadan, you also can give an answer to this. Is that the normal procedure adopted all these years? There is a

problem with this auction. Our question is, "Normally, are the ways and means approved before the auction through the Monetary Board or is this the normal procedure?" දැනුවත් කරනවා අවුරුදු 30කට මෙන්න මෙහෙම මුදලක් අනුමත වෙනවා. ඒ අනුමත වීම මත auction එක පැවැත්වූවාට පස්සේ තමයි ඊට පස්සේ දිනයක ratification එක එන්නේ. මෙන්න මෙහෙම පැවැත්වූවා, මේ ප්‍රමාණයට නිකුත් කළා, මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රමාණයට ලැබුණා කියලා. ඒකද procedure එක? එහෙම නැත්නම් මේකට අදාළ වෙනම procedure එකක් අනුගමනය කරනවාද?

The Chairman: That is over.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, we want to know. My question is, "Is this the normal procedure?"

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: When there is a special request like that the Governor informs the Monetary Board and then decide on the method of raising funds.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you all decide the method?

The Chairman: That is direct placement or auction.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, මෙතුමා කියන විධියට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය සිදු වුණාද?

එච්.ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: මෙතැනදී වුණේ අධිපතිතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිමනත් තොරතුරු වශයෙන් තමයි මේක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා කියන එකේ අපැහැදිලිතාවක් තිබෙනවා. එක්කෝ මට තේරෙන විධියට මම කියන්නේ, මේ කරුණු පිළිබඳව මේ Committee එක පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමා හොඳ අවධානයෙනුත් නොවෙයි ඉන්නේ. මූල සිටම අපට නිවැරදි තොරතුරු නිකුත් කරලා නැහැ. ඔබතුමාටත් වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා, ඔබතුමාත් මේ Committee එකට එන කොට ආයුත්තේ මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පැහැදිලිව සාකච්ඡා කරන්න කියන එක පිළිබඳව අවබෝධයෙන්. එතකොට ඔබතුමා මුලින්ම පැහැදිලි කළා, අධිපතිතුමා කළේ නිකම් දැනුම් දීමක් විතරයි කියලා. නමුත් රාමනාදන් මහත්මිය මේ ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ලේඛනය මීට වඩා පළල් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරලා, තීරණයකුත් අරගෙන තිබුණා. ඒවා Minutesවල ඇති. මෙතැනදී අධිපතිතුමා දැනුම් දීමක් කළා කියලා, එච්චරයි. එතකොට සරලයි, දැනුම් දීමක් කියන්නේ Committee එක වගකීමක් නොගන්න නිසා. නමුත් රාමනාදන් මහත්මියගේ ප්‍රකාශය තුළ ඊට වඩා පළල්ව පැහැදිලි කරලා යම් ක්‍රමවේදයක් සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබෙනවා. දැන් ඔබතුමාත් දිගටම පැහැදිලි කරන කොට කියනවා සාකච්ඡා කරලා, යම් තීරණයකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. හැබැයි ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කරන කරුණු මත තීරණයේදී එතැනින් එහාට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මණ්ඩලයේ ක්‍රමවේදයට අනුව ඉස්සරට නොගිය බවත් තමයි මට වැටහෙන්නේ. රටේ විශේෂ ප්‍රශ්නයක්, ආන්දෝලනාත්මක ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙලා තිබෙන මොහොතක මේ පිළිබඳව මීට වඩා ඔබතුමාත් කැපවෙන්න. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයත් මේකට සම්බන්ධවයි. ප්‍රශ්නයක් ආව වෙලාවක මීට වඩා පළල් අධ්‍යයනයක, අවබෝධයක ඉන්න. නමුත් ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම් අනුව අපිට ඔබතුමා පිළිබඳව එහෙම පැහැදිලි වැටහීමක් ඇතිවෙන්නේ නැහැ.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Given the fact that the funding requirement of the Government as at 02.03.2015 was Rs.13.550 billion -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the date?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: 02.03.2015.

The PDD, Public Debt Department had decided to announce the said Thirty Year Bond –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So they decide? PDD decides?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Yes. PDD had decided -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is not the Governor or the Central Bank?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: PDD.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Be clear about that. That is what we want to know.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: - had decided to announce the said Thirty Year Bond up to an amount of Rs. One billion. Even though the Minutes of the Monetary Board No. 4/2015 specifies to issue a Thirty Year Treasury Bond the amount of the Bond has not been decided by the Monetary Board. This exercise is vested with the PDD as per the Operation Manual of the PDD.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is very clear now. So the amount was decided by the PDD?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And not by the Governor of the Central Bank?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: No.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, the problem was, why it went for thirty years. The direction is towards –

The Chairman: They gave the reasons.

Unedited

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We also want to know why. Is it the Central Bank Governor who decided to go for thirty years or –

The Chairman: Monetary Board. She read the Minutes out.

The Chairman: Is there anything else to be discussed?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Sir, in these matters, issuing Treasury Bonds and various things, you have to take note of a judgment given by the CJ, K. Sripavan when he was a Supreme Court Judge. That is a very valuable quotation. He said, "We must not forget that in complex economic policy matters, every decision is necessarily empiric and therefore its validity cannot be tested on any rigid formula or strict consideration."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay, we understand. Mr. Jayatissa, ඔබතුමා කිව්වා ඉල්ලීමක් ආවාම ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ මුදල raise කරන විධියයි, මේ mechanism එකයි Monetary Board එකෙන් තීන්දු කරනවා කියලා. 23වැනිදා මේ මුදල ආවාට පස්සේ Monetary Board එකෙන් ඒ තීන්දුව ගත්තාද කියන එක තමයි අපට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් අපට හරියට ඒකට උත්තරයක් ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ. ජයතිස්ස මහත්මයා කියනවා මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් අවශ්‍යයි කියලා PDD එකෙන් ආවාට පස්සේ Monetary Board එකෙන් ඒ සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදය තීන්දු කරනවා කියලා. Am I right?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Yes. Treasury Bonds issue කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Monetary Board එකෙන් තීන්දු කළ මුදල කීයද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: මුදල තීරණය කරන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Their job is over. වෙනත් පුද්ගලයන්ගෙන් ඇසිය යුතු ප්‍රශ්න මේ අයගෙන් අහලා වැඩක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, Mr. Jayatissa says PDD එකෙන් ආවාට පස්සේ ක්‍රමවේදය තීන්දු කරන්නේ, the system is decided by them.

The Chairman: Yes, that is correct.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, it does not come from the Secretary.

සභාපතිතුමා: Secretary නොවෙයි ඒක දන්නේ Monetary Board එකේ Membersලා නේ. He is the person who takes down the Minutes. He is the Secretary.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is he not on the Board?

The Chairman: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Jayatissa was not on the Board. I think, he was not on the Board when that decision was taken place. We need somebody to-

The Chairman: Mrs. Ramanadan was there. You ask her.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: She is a lawyer. I do not know whether she can answer that question. She puts it to the Secretary.

The Chairman: Why not? She has been there for seven years. She is very knowledgeable.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Since the Secretary cannot answer this question – As the Hon. Chairman says, he is only the Secretary and takes down the Minutes.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Sir, he is very knowledgeable.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right, but, you can answer. One of you has to answer because the answer is not coming. Mr. Jayatissa is new. What he says is when that amount of Rs. 13 billon comes for 30 years, you get that information from the PDD. Am I right?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: We do not directly get that information from the PDD.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: It is in the Minutes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. Then, you will find the mechanism to raise that money, will you not?

The Chairman: No, that is not their job.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: That is not our function.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, what is your function?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: To look at the overall policy such as the stability of the financial system, the stability of the monetary policy et cetera.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you all do not decide the method; you all do not decide the amount. Then?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: The Public Debt Department knows how to get funds, what amount and what method. Therefore, they will inform the Board that they will raise the funds-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If you are happy with the system, then you will ratify. Am I right?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Yes.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන්- ඔබතුමන්ලා මූල්‍ය ස්ථායීතාවය පිළිබඳව නේ අධ්‍යයනය කරන්නේ. මම අහන්නේ බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් පස්සේ මූල්‍ය ස්ථායීතාවය යහපත්ද, අයහපත්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයෙක් වශයෙන් මම මේ ගැන විමසීමක් කරලා බැලුවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 27වැනිදා සිට නේද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: මම තවම ඒ ගැන අවධානය යොමු කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා අද මෙතැනට පැමිණියාට මේ Committee එකට මේ ගැන වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා නේ. මූල්‍ය ස්ථායීතාවය පිළිබඳ ඔබතුමන්ලා සැහීමට පත් වෙනවාද? රටේ ආන්දෝලනාත්මක තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙන්නේ. මේ Committee එක ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස මොකක්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: කාරණා කිහිපයක් කියන්න තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි 30-year bonds raise කරන එක ලෙහෙසි දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ EPF එකටත් long-term funds තිබුණාට ඒවායේ readily available නැහැ. ඒ නිසා 30-year bonds raise කරන්න foreignersලාට open කරපු එක හොඳ දෙයක්. එතැනදී වඩාත් වැදගත් වන්නේ කුමන rate එකටද raise කරන්නේ කියන එකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම පොඩි බාධා කිරීමක් කරනවා. ඒ 30-year bondsවල වාසිදායක තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද? ඒක දහයක් වුණා නම් තිබෙන තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද, ඒක විස්සක් වුණා නම් තිබෙන තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද, තිහක් වුණා නම් තිබෙන තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද? ඒ තත්ත්වය ගැන අපට ටිකක් පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: අඩු ගණනකට raise කරන්න පුළුවන් 30-year bond එකක්. එතකොට ණය සේවා අනුපාතය අඩු වෙනවා නේ. මෙතැනදී ඒ තත්ත්වය ඇති වෙලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා මම විමසා බැලුවා. මීට ඉස්සරවෙලා 30-year bond එකක් raise කරලා තිබෙන්නේ 30.05.2014. මැයි මස 30 වැනිදා තමයි raise කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, settlement bond එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගණන කීයද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ගණන නම් මම බැලුවේ නැහැ. මම බැලුවේ raise කරපු එක විතරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට ගණනත් බලලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ගණන බලලා කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Issue කරපු ආයතනය මොකක්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: Market එකට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ආයතනයකට නොවෙයි. මෙතැන markets ගොඩක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: බිලියන 27ක් issue කරලා තිබෙනවා. නැවතත් 3rd Juneවල 30-year bond එකක් කරලා තිබෙනවා බිලියන 03ක්. නැවත 17th Juneවල බිලියන 12.50ක් කරලා තිබෙනවා. We had the Central Bank last week and they gave us all these details. So, 30-year bonds have been done.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: හරි. Bonds raise කළාට පස්සේ market එකේ rates ටිට වඩා ටිකක් වැඩි වෙලා තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි ඒ වැඩිවීම මේ Bond එක නිසාද, වෙන හේතුවක් නිසාද කියලා කියන්න අමාරුයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඉපාඩක් වැඩි වෙලා කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන් සාමාන්‍ය rates බැලුවාම පෙබරවාරි 27වැනිදා තිබිලා තියෙන්නේ 613.367 අවුරුද්දක Treasury Bills rateඑක. 06වැනිදා වෙන කොට ඒක වැඩි වෙලා තිබෙනවා 699 දක්වා. එතැන සෑහෙන්න වැඩිවීමක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම ඇහුවේ.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඒ වැඩි කිරීමට හේතුව bond එක issue කිරීම වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒ අතරේ market එකේ expectation එකක් තිබුණා Government එකට විශාල වශයෙන් සල්ලි අවශ්‍යයි කියලා. ඒ ගැන කවුරුත් දන්නවා. ඒ නිසා, there could have been a general increase in rates, anyway. To what extent attributed to the Bond, is not known.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, there is one more question deriving from that. Even if it goes up, you will have to go with the Bond? Sometimes, the market can also react to that increase. Is it?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: No, not necessarily. If the Treasury Bond Tender Committee thinks raising Rs. 10 billion at once is too much and therefore, they can have a separate option or do something- But, the Governments wants funds.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you cannot foresee the future. Is it?

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Yes, you cannot foresee.

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Can I also add why a 30-year bond is important? Thirty-year bond is important to anchor the interest

rates paid on the longest maturity at a time when it was anticipated that there would be a surging Government borrowing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. So, when there is a surging Government borrowing, normally the rates will go up. Is it?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Especially, long-term.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, when the market smells that there is going to be a surging Government borrowing, the rates will go up. That is the normal mechanism. Is it?

Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan: Yes.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: කලින් අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය ගැනයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. බිලියන 01ක් දමලා 10ක් raise කරන්න හේතුවත්, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් බිලියන 01ක් දමන්න හේතුවත් සම්බන්ධව දැනුවත් කරන්න කැමති නැහැ. ආණ්ඩුව බංකොලොත් හරි ආණ්ඩුවට මෙපමණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා කියන හේතුව නිසා, බිලියන 01ක් දැම්මා; 20ක් ආවා ඉතිරි 09ත් ගනිමු කියන අදහසෙන්ද මෙක යන්නේ? ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වෙන්න පුළුවන් දෙයක්ද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔයතරම් ලොකු ගණනක් ගත්තේ Government එකේ තිබුණ අවශ්‍යතාව නිසායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය ඇසුවේ නවයක් පෙන්නන්නේ නැතිව බිලියන 01ක් දැම්මේ පවතින අවදානම නිසාද කියන එකයි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අපි දැනුවත් වුණේ එහෙමයි. සාමාන්‍ය සම්ප්‍රදාය තිබෙන debt එක ගැන කියන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද market එක ඉහළ යනවා නේ.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: මුළු ප්‍රමාණයම දාන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ හේතුව නිසා තමයි මේ වාගේ tactic එකක් පාවිච්චි කළේ කියලා හිතන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලා අවබෝධයකින් හිටියාද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: ඉස්සරත් එහෙම කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා අවබෝධයකින් සිටියාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මීලියන එකක් අරගෙන දෙකක් දාලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ දෙක සංසන්දනය කරන්න එපා. ඔබතුමා එහෙම කරන එක වැරැදියි.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: මම සංසන්දනය කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉස්සරත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒත් එක්කම කියන්න මෙවැනි විශාල ප්‍රමාණයකින් වෙලා නැහැ කියලා.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: මම ඒක ඉස්සෙල්ලා කිව්වා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඉස්සර සිදුවීම ගැන නොවෙයි මම අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වග කීම තිබෙන්නේ දැන් ඒ කාර්යභාරය හරියට කිරීමයි. කලින් සිදුවීමක් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ආදර්ශයට ගන්න පුළුවන්. අපි අහන්නේ, තමුන්නාන්සේලා අවබෝධයක ඉඳලාද ඒ ප්‍රමාණය වැඩි කළේ, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒක නිකම්ම බිලියන නවය වුණාද කියලායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා අහන්නේ, බිලියන දහයේ ගනුදෙනුව ඔබතුමන්ලා දැනුවත් කළාද, නැත්නම් හොර රහසේ එකක් දාලා ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය ගෙනාවද කියන එකයි.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: ඒ ගැන කියන්න මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා මීට කලින් කථා කරන කොට කිව්වා, "අපි එහෙම කරනවා" කියලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Central Bank එක කැඳවපු දවසේ ඔබතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තරයක් දුන්නා. ඔවුන් කිව්වේ, "නිකුත් කරන ප්‍රමාණය කියන්නේ නැහැ. බිලියනයක් දැම්මා විස්සක් ආවා කිව්වා. එතකොට තීරණය කළා, විස්සක් තිබෙන එකේ අපි අනෙක් බිලියන නවයත් අර ගනිමු. ඒ වෙලාවේ රජයට මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණා. Rates හොඳයි. ඒ නිසා ගත්තා" කියලා. Central Bank එක එහෙම උත්තරයක් දුන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කළා නම් හොඳයි. මේ සිද්ධිය නිසා රටේ ඇති වුණු මූල්‍ය තත්ත්වය පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න.

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: මම ඉස්සෙල්ලා කිව්වා වාගේ පොලී අනුපාතය තරමක් දුරට වැඩි වුණා. මේ හේතුව නිසාද, රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව නිසා - market expectations නිසා - පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩි වුණාද කියලා කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේ හරියටම විශ්වාසයක් නැතුවද?

ආර්.ඒ. ජයනිස්ස මහතා: ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවට අනුව හරියටම decision එකක් ගන්න අමාරුයි. Market එකේ expectations එක හරිම වෙනස්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය ගැන. අපට ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය ඒ තීරණ ගන්න කොට බලපාන සාධක, දැන් සාධක ගැන බලනවාද කියන එකයි.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Jayatissa.

Mr. R.A. Jayatissa: Thank you.

(Witnesses withdrew.)

(මේ අවස්ථාවේ ලංකා බැංකුවේ සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී දසනායක මුදියන්සේලාගේ ගුණසේකර.මහතා කැඳවන ලදී.)

ලංකා බැංකුවේ සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී දසනායක මුදියන්සේලාගේ ගුණසේකර.මහතා, ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මේ කාරණයට අදාළ නැති වුණත් අපි ඔබතුමා කැඳෙව්වේ, ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන නිලධාරියා හැටියට එතැන වැඩ කෙරුණු ආකාරය පිළිබඳව යම් අවබෝධයක් තිබෙන නිසා ඒ ගැන දැන ගන්නයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාත් - Bank of Ceylon එකත් - prime dealer කෙනෙක්. තවත් prime dealer කෙනෙක් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. සාක්ෂිවලින් ඔප්පු වුණා, Bank of Ceylon එක ඉතිහාසයේ පළමුවැනි වතාවටයි එහෙම කෙරුවේ කියලා. Central Bank එකෙන් ආපු නිලධාරියාත් කිව්වා. Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් ආපු නිලධාරියාත් කිව්වා. ඔබතුමා General Manager වෙලා ඉන්නවා නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ අත්දැකීම් අනුව මේ ගැන යම් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න. Chairman අලුත් කෙනෙක්. එතුමා කිව්වා, මේ සිද්ධිය සිදු වුණු දිනයේ එතුමා වැඩ භාර ගත්තේ කියලා. ඒ නිසා එතුමාගෙන් මේ ගැන අහලා වැඩක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ඒ ගැන විස්තර කරන්න.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: බැංකුවේ අවුරුදු 32ක පමණ සේවා පළපුරුද්දක් මට තිබෙනවා. General Manager වශයෙන් අවුරුදු දෙකහමාරක් විතර වැඩ කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපි ලොකු බැංකුවක්. ලංකාවේ තිබෙන ලොකුම treasury එක අපි ගාවයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ Treasury Division එක හැදිලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. DGM කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. AGM කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. Chief Dealer කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. Senior Deputy Chief Dealer කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. Senior Dealersලා ඉන්නවා. Dealersලා ඉන්නවා. Assistant Dealersලා ඉන්නවා. Trainee Dealersලා ඉන්නවා. මෙන්න මේ වාගේ විශාල කණ්ඩායමක් එක්ක තමයි මේ වැඩේ කෙරෙන්නේ. මේක කරගෙන යද්දී day-to-day transactions කිසිවක් DGM කෙනෙකුගෙන් ඉහළට refer වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මම හිටපු අවුරුදු දෙකහමාර තුළ කිසිම transaction එකක් මට refer වෙලා නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට delegate කරලා තිබෙන ඒ බලතල යටතේ ඒ departmentsවල තමයි ඒවා කරගෙන යන්නේ. මේ transaction එක සම්බන්ධවත් මම දැන ගත්තේ මේ transaction එක වෙලා සතියකට විතර පස්සේයි. මොකද ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඒ ගැන refer කරන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැති නිසා. මේ ගැන social mediaවල යන කොට, පත්තරවල යනකොට අපි මේ ගැන කථා කළා. Chief Dealerට කථා කරලා අපි ඇහුවා මොකක්ද වුණේ කියලා. මමයි, සභාපතිතුමායි දෙන්නම තමයි ඒ ගැන අහුවේ. ඒ අහපු වෙලාවේ ඔහු අපට කිව්වේ, මේක normal transaction එකක්; මේක Commercial transaction එකක් කියන එක. ඒ කථා කරපු තත්ත්වයන් තුළ අපි දැක්කේ නැහැ ලොකු වෙනසක්. මොකද Central Bank එකට bid කළේ. Central Bank එක accept කළා. එතකොට government security එකක් අපට හම්බ වෙන්නේ. මේ security එක මත deal වෙනවා කියන තත්ත්වය ඔහු අපට පැහැදිලි කළා. නමුත් අපි තවදුරටත් transaction එක විශ්ලේෂණය කරගෙන යන කොට අපි දැක්කා මේකේ කිසියම් අඩු පාඩුවක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන් කියන කාරණය, බැංකුවට risk එකක් එනවාය කියන කාරණය අපට දැනුණා. ඒක දැන ගන්නාට පස්සේ audit committee එක රැස් වුණා. ඒ වෙලාවේ අපි තීරණය කළා, මේ transaction එක වුණා. මේ වාගේ transactions ආපහු දවසක වෙන එක වළක්වා ගන්නත්, අප අතර යම් යම් අඩු පාඩු තිබෙනවා නම් හොයා ගන්නත් ඕනෑ නිසා අපි ඒ සඳහා expert advice එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. අපට මේ වාගේ අඩු පාඩු record වෙලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. මොකද Central Bank එක audit කරනවා. Government එක audit කරනවා. අපේ ආයතනයේ internal audit එක audit කරනවා. නිරන්තරව කෙරෙන ඒ auditsවලදී අපේ dealing unit එක තුළ ලොකු අඩු පාඩු තිබෙනවා කියන එක record වෙලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. එහෙම record වෙලා තිබුණු අවස්ථා තිබුණා නම් අපි නිතර නිතර ඒ policies වෙනස් කරගෙන හදාගෙන යනවා. නමුත් මේ transaction වුණායින් පස්සේ අපි හිතුවා, මේ unit එකේ පසු ගිය මාස තුනේ transactions බැලුවොත් හොඳයි කියලා. ඒ සඳහා අපි E &Y දුන්නා. E &Y මේ transaction එක නොවෙයි audit කළේ. E & Y බැලුවේ process එක හරිද කියන කාරණයයි.

ඒ report එක ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් මම ඒ report එක බැලුවේ නැහැ. නමුත් මම දකිනවා, අඩු පාඩුකම් තිබෙනවා නම් අපි ඒවා හදාගෙන ඉස්සරහාට යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒ සඳහා අපි expert advice එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. Primary Dealer Unit එක strengthen කරන්නට ඕනෑ කියන කාරණය අපි ඒ පැත්තෙන් දකිනවා. මේ transaction එක දිහා බලන විට Primary Dealer Unit එකේ කෙරෙන transactions අපි කරන්නේ අපේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙනුවෙන්. primary

dealer කෙනෙක් එක්ක කරන්න බැහැයි කියලා එකක් නැහැ. කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලාත් කාහේවත් සඳහන්ව නැහැ, කරන්න බැහැයි කියලාත් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: කලින් කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා කිව්වානේ අඩු පාඩු ටිකක් දැක්කා කියලා. මොනවාද ඒ අඩු පාඩු?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: මම හිතනවා මේ වාගේ ලොකු transaction එකක් කරන විට, අපි ඒක කරන්නට පුළුවන් settlement එක පිළිබඳව හිතලා බැලුවා නම් බැංකුවට එන risk එක හුඟක්ම අවම කර ගන්නට තිබුණා. අපි වාගේ බැංකුවකට settlement risk එකක් නැහැ. මොකද, අපි ගාව තිබෙන සල්ලි නිසාත්, අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් ඕනෑම වෙලාවක government security එකක් pledge කරන්න පුළුවන් නිසාත්, swop කරන්න පුළුවන් නිසාත්, එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙනත් තැනකට park කරන්නට පුළුවන් නිසාත් dealer කෙනෙකුට settlement risk එක එතරම් පෙනෙන්නේ නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඇත්තටම මට නම් එකේ risk එකක් පෙනෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද risk එක? කෙහොමද ඒ risk එක එන්නේ කියලා අපිට පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: Risk එක එන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. ඒ වාගේ bid එකක් දාපුවාම ඒ bid එක අපට ආවාට පසුව අපට-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න private bidder කෙනෙක් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ බැංකුව හරහා bid කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා. අපිට ඒ ක්‍රමය පොඩ්ඩක් විස්තර කරලා දෙන්න.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් නම් වෙන්නේ අපේ customer කෙනෙක්ට හෝ අපි දන්නා බැංකුවකට හෝ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ customer කෙනෙක් කියන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ depositor කෙනෙක්ද, කොහොමද customer කෙනෙක් වෙන්නේ?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: Depositor කෙනෙක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙනත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් වුණත් කමක් නැහැ. අපි ඉන්නේ එක්කෝ individualsලාට, එහෙම නැත්නම් corporateලාට, එහෙම නැත්නම් banksවලට. Primary dealersලාටත් limitation එකක් නැහැ. ඒ ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් අපිට bid කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Primary dealer කෙනෙක් ඔබතුමන්ලා හරහා bid කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියන process එක අපට කියන්න.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: අපිට bid එක එව්වාම අපි ඒ bid එක Central Bank එකට යවන්නට ඕනෑ. නමුත් එතැනදී dealerට තිබෙන experience එක හරහා ඔහු decide කරන්න ඕනෑ, මේ bid එක තුළ අපට තිබෙන risk එක මොකක්ද කියන එක. එතැනදී ඔහු බලන්න ඕනෑ අපි ගාව මේක settle කරන්න සල්ලි තිබෙනවාද, එහෙම නැත්නම් මෙයා මේක deposit එකක් දාලා තිබෙනවාද, margin එකක් දාලා තිබෙනවාද, එහෙම නැත්නම් හදිසියේවත් මෙයා ගත්තේ නැත්නම් මොකද වෙන්නේ කියන risk analysis එක ඒ අය කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ සඳහාත් අපේ policy එකේ chief dealerයි, AGM, deputy dealerයි, තවත් assistant dealer කෙනෙකුයි සමඟ පොඩි investment committee එකක් තිබෙනවා. මේ committee එක තමයි ඇත්තටම මේ decision එක ගන්න ඕනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ committee එක ඒ decision එක අරන් තිබෙනවාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඒ committee එක ඒ decision එක අරන් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: කොයි වෙලාවේද ඒ decision එක ගත්තේ?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඒ decision එක ගත්ත වෙලාව, මේ නැත්නම් ඒ decision එක ගත්ත ආකාරය, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒ අය ඒකට සහභාගි වුණාද නැද්ද කියන කාරණය මට කියන්නට බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි, report එක ආවානේ?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමානේ මේ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධානියා. දැන් report එකත් ඇවිත් තිබෙනවානේ. ඔබතුමා ඒ ගැන සොයලා බැලුවේ නැද්ද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: මට ඒ වාගේ detailed report එකක් එන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මේ සිදුවීමෙන් පසුවවත් report එකක් ඉල්ලුවේ නැද්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබට Auditor-Generalගේ report එක ලැබිලා නැද්ද? Ernst & Young ආයතනයේ report එක ලැබුණේ නැද්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලැබුණා කියලා කිව්වා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා ඒ එක බැලුවේවත් නැද්ද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: මට ඒ report එක ලැබුණේ නැහැ. මට ඒ report එක ලැබුණේ එදා හැන්දෑවේ. මොකද, මම පසු ගිය කාලයේ බැංකුවේ හිටියේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ හේතුව දන්නවා ඇති.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාට ඒ දවස්වල compulsory leave දුන්නා.

The Chairman: He was on leave.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඔව්, ඒකයි ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ සිද්ධිය වන විට බැංකුවේ හිටියේ නැද්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, මේ report එක ආවාම ඔබතුමා කියවලා බැලුවේ නැද්ද කියලානේ ඇහුවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට මහ හැරුණු ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: GM, මට මේ කාරණය පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ Rs. 3,000 million, bid එක නේ. තනි නිලධාරියෙක් මේ dealer සම්බන්ධ තීරණය ගන්නේ. ඔබතුමාවත්, - General Managerවත්- දන්නේ නැහැ. මේක විශාල risk එකක් නේ. ඒක තනි පුද්ගලයෙක් තීරණය කරන්නේ, තවත් dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන්.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඇත්තටම ඒ අයට ඒක අපට refer කරන්න තිබුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අදාළ නිලධාරියාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරන විට එතුමා කිව්වා manual එකේ මොනවත් නැහැ, මට ඕනෑ තරම් බලතල තිබෙනවා කියලා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: එහෙම බලතල නැහැ ඇත්තටම. එහෙම බලතල නැහැ. ඕනෑම ගණනකට risk කරන්නට එතුමාට අයිතියක් නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක මේ guideline එකේ නැත්තේ ඇයි? ඔබතුමන්ලා guideline එකක් issue කරලා තිබෙනවානේ. ඒ guideline එකේ thresholds දීලා නැද්ද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඒ අය interpret කරන විධිය සාමාන්‍යයෙන්, primary dealer කියන concept එකේදී අපට ලැබෙන්නේ government security එකක්නේ. ඒක government security එකක් නිසා එතැනදී අපට ලොකු limit එකක් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. නමුත් ඒක secondary transaction එකක් වෙන විට, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒක විකුණන විට, ඒක තවත් දිහාවකට යන විට limits තිබෙනවා. ඒ limitsවල යන්නට ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා primary dealersලාට දෙන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද කියලා ඇහුවා. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, ඒ අය අපට ගෙවලා තිබෙනවා නම් අපි bid කරනවා කියලා. ඒ අනුව මොකක්ද තිබුණු විශ්වාසය තමන්ගේ primary dealerට හෝ තමන්ගේ chief dealerට, මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකට, - අපි මේ කථා කරන්නේ රුපියල් මිලියන රුපියල් මිලියන 3,000ක් bid කරනවා- ඔබතුමා කියනවා ඒ අය කලින් ගෙවලා තිබෙනවා නම් අපිට පුළුවන් කියලා. එහෙම එකක් තිබෙනවාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: රුපියල් මිලියන 3,000ක් නොවෙයි ගරු ඇමතිතුමියනි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Rs. 3 billion නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Rs. 5,000 million ඒවා දෙකයි. Rs. 3,000 million එකයි.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, they have only Rs. 3 billion.

Mr. W.P.C Wickramaratne: But, they have decided to accept the bid. They have bid for that. We should be assured that the money is there.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා කිව්වා සල්ලි ගෙව්වා කියලා. ගෙව්වාම අපට පුළුවන් කියලා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: නැහැ, ගෙව්වා කියලා නොවෙයි. දැන් අපි ඒ විධියට bid එකක් දාන විට ඒ bid එකට support කරන්න තමයි සල්ලි තිබෙන්නට ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එහෙම නම් bid එක දාන කෙනාට, මටත් ඇවිත් කියන්න පුළුන්නේ Rs. 3 billion දාන්න කියලා. ඒ අයගේ සල්ලි තිබුණාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරිතුමා, මේ customerව Bank of Ceylon එක දන්නවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එක වරකට එක මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් පමණක් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා:. මේ හොඳ customer කෙනෙක් කියලා Bank of Ceylon එක දන්නවාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: මට නම් එහෙම අවබෝධයක් නැහැ. මට ඔහු හොඳ customer කෙනෙක් කියන එක ගැන අවබෝධයක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා ලංකා බැංකුවේ හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් කියන කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමා දන්නේ නැහැ. වගකීමක් ඇතිවයි කියනනේ?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වා මේ තීන්දු, තීරණ ගැනීමේදී primary dealer, AGM, DGM ඇතුළු කමිටුවක් විසින් තමයි මේ තීරණ ගන්නේ කියලා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම කිව්වේ ඒ බව circular එකක හෝ manual එකක ඒ බව තිබෙන නිසාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකේ investment policy එකේ ඒ බව තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා:. Bank of Ceylon එකේ investment policy එකේ තිබෙනවා

Vetted

මෙවැනි තීන්දුවක්, තීරණයක් අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ගත යුත්තේ මේ කමිටුවෙන් කියලා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: තිබෙනවා. ඒ තීරණ ගන්නේ ඒ කමිටුවෙන් කියලා පැහැදිලිව තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ manual එකේ දාලා නැද්ද primary dealer කෙනෙකුට ගන්න පුළුවන් maximum ගණනක්? කමිටුවට හෝ dealerට යන්න පුළුවන් උපරිම හෝ අවම ගණනක් තිබෙනවාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඒක තීරණය වෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. සල්ලි තිබෙනවා නම් limit එකක් නැහැනේ. කාට හෝ සල්ලි තිබෙනවා නම් මිලියන 500ක් වුණත් කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ Rs. 13 billion පිළිබඳව මේ කමිටුවට තීන්දුවක් ගන්න පුළුවන්?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: එතැනදී ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, එතැනදී එහෙම සල්ලි තිබුණු බවක් මම දකින්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඕ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ සල්ලි තිබෙනවා නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: සල්ලි තිබෙනවා නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැනේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට පහසු වෙන්නට මම කියන්නම්. ඔබතුමාගේ chief dealerට Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක යැවූ email එක.

"Dear, Sir

Kindly enter the following bids for today's bond."

Bank of Ceylon ඉතිහාසයේම මේ වාගේ request එකක් නැහැ. It states that Rs. 3 billion at the rate of 12.5 per cent, Rs. 5 billion at the rate of 12.7 per cent and another Rs. 5 billion at the rate of about 13 per cent.

මේක ලංකාවේ තිබෙන විශාලම රාජ්‍ය බැංකු ආයතනය. මේකේ risk එකක් නැද්ද? General Manger දන්නෙත් නැහැ, Chairman දන්නෙත් නැහැ. ඒ committee එක දන්නෙත් නැහැ. මේ ගනුදෙනුව නිසා බැංකුව කඩා වැටුණා නම් financial system එකම කඩා වැටෙනවා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: Risk එකක් තිබෙනවා ගරු සභාපතිතුමා. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. ඇත්තටම ඒ පිළිබඳව dealer ගන්න ඕනෑ decision එක විවක්ෂණශීලීව ගන්නට ඕනෑ. ඇත්තටම risk එකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ ආයතනයේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ගාව කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක deposit එකක් තිබුණාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ එපමණ ලොකු ගණනක් තිබුණා කියලා. රුපියල් මිලියන 250ක් 500ක් වාගේ මුදලක් ඕස රුපියල් බිලියන ගණනක් deposits තිබුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Bank account එකක්වත් තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා:. තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රුපියල් මිලියන 500ක් තිබුණා කියලා කිව්වානේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ capital එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Deposit එකක් තිබුණා කියලානේ දැන් මෙතුමා කියන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එදා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ බැංකුවෙන් ආව නිලධාරියා සඳහන් කළේ මේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවා බැංකුවේ ඉතාමත්ම විශ්වාසවන්ත ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක්. එම නිසා ප්‍රායෝගිකව එතුමාගේ ඉල්ලීම අහක දමන්නට බැරි නිසා තමයි මේක දුන්නේ කියන කාරණය තමයි කිව්වේ. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ ගැන පරීක්ෂා කරන්නට බාහිර ආයතනයකට දුන්නා. බැංකුව විධියට තවම මේ පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂණයක් කරලා නැද්ද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඔය ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වුණු වෙලාවේම audit committee එකෙන් decision එකක් ගත්තා අපි මේ විධියේ පරීක්ෂණයක් කරමු කියලා. ඒ audit committee එකේ decision එක අනුව ඒ පරීක්ෂණය කරගෙන යන අතර තුරේ තමයි මම බැංකුවේ හිටියේ නැත්තේ. මම නැවත ආවේ මාසයකට විතර පසුවයි. එහෙම ආවත් මම මේ කටයුතුවලට තවම සම්බන්ධ වන්නේ නැහැ. දැන් internal audit පරීක්ෂණයක් කරගෙන යන බව මම දන්නවා. මොකද audit committee එකත් සමඟ අර decision එක ගත්තාට පසුව ඊට එහායින් ගිහාල්ලා decision එකක් ගන්න මට හෝ වෙනත් කාටවත් බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: There is one more question. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ හා ආසන්න-නැහැ, ඔබතුමන්ලා කලින් කරලා නැහැ කිව්වානේ. මේක first timeනේ? ඒ කියන්නේ දුන්නා. ඔබතුමාට ආරංචි වුණේ නැද්ද මේ විධියට Rs. 13 billion දුන්නා කියලා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: නැහැ. ආරංචි වුණෙත් පසුව. ගනුදෙනු සියල්ලම අවසන් වුණාට පසුව දන්නේ. මේ අය කිව්වෙත් නැහැ, ආරංචි වුණෙන්නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මේ Ernst & Young ආයතනයේ report එක බැලුවේ නැහැ නේද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: මම බැලුවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඕ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේකේ තිබෙන questions සම්බන්ධව උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුමේ හැටියට.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔය ලියවිල්ලේ කියන issues ගොඩක් වෙලාවට procedural reverse.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Internal control එකේ ප්‍රශ්න ගැන කියනවා; thresholds නැහැ. සමහර වෙලාවට KYC නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපි එකඟ වෙනවා. ඊටත් වඩා මේ unit එකේ strengthen කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන කැන තමා මම ඉන්නේ. ඔය report එකත් මදි. ඔයිටත් වඩා තව ටිකක් හොයලා අපි controls දාන්න ඕනෑ කියන කැන තමා මම ඉන්නේ.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: මේ වැඩෙන් පස්සේ unit එක වැටිලා ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාව කැඳෙව්වේ මේවා ගැන දැන ගන්න. Chairman නොදැන සිටී නිසා, General Managerවත් දන්නවා ඇති කියලා හිතුවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තවත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා අහන්න. මේක client ගත්තේ නැත්නම්, මොකක්ද තිබෙන repercussion එක?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: Client ගත්තේ නැත්නම් අපට ගන්න වෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කොහොමටත් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක නේද මේ කරලා තිබෙන්නේ? Structure එකට ගියා කියන්නේ ඇත්තටම එයා ළඟ සල්ලි තිබුණේ නැහැ. එයා වෙනුවෙන් ගත්ත ටික Bank of Ceylon එක නැවතත් අපි එයාටම දීලා එයා අපිටම විකුණලා අපෙන්ම සල්ලි හම්බ කර ගෙන එයා profit එකක් earn කරපු එකක් තමයි කළේ. ඇත්තටම එහෙම නොකළා නම් ඒක directly secondary market එකේ අපි අරගෙන විකුණුවා නම් Ernst and Young ආයතනයේ report එකේ බොහොම පැහැදිලිවම කියනවා මේ දවස් ගණනට රුපියල් මිලියන 136.14ක ආදායමක් අපට ලබන්න තිබුණා. එය අපට ඇත්තටම නැති වුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එදා ආපු chief dealer තවම සේවයේ යෙදෙමින් එම කටයුතු කරමින් සිටිනවාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: නැහැ. ඔහුව මාරු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. Inquiry එක යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මෙම primary dealer ට මේක ඔය ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් ගන්නත් පුළුවන්, නොගෙන ඉන්නත් පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා ද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඔව්. නොගෙන ඉන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට නොගෙන හිටියොත් නඩු දාන්න පුළුවන් ද මෙම primary dealer ට විරුද්ධව

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: බැහැ. එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට වාසි නම් ගන්නවා, අවාසිනම් අතහැර දමනවා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඒක business decision එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක එයාගේ decision එක නේ.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මම මේ අහන්නේ, එයා ඒ ආකාරයෙන් place කරනවා. Place කරලා වාසි සහගත නම් ගන්නවා, අවාසි සහගත නම් අතහැර දමනවා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: ඔව්. එහෙම ඉන්න පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අවසානයේදී primary dealer තමයි responsible. එයා ගත්තත් නැතත් primary dealer හැටියට අපි bid කරපු නිසා අපේ account එකෙන් තමයි Central Bank එකේ ගණන අඩු වෙන්නේ.

The Chairman: As far as the Central Bank is concerned, the primary dealer is Bank of Ceylon, not that person.

ගරු සුජීව. සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මොකක්ද ඒ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒ ටික අරගෙන-

සභාපතිතුමා: පැහැදිලි කරලා කියන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: රුපියල් මිලියන 3,000ක් Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකෙන් අපිනේ ගත්තේ. Bank of Ceylon primary dealer විධියට ඉල්ලුවා. එතකොට primary dealer විධියට Bank of Ceylon එක ඉල්ලුවාම ඒ වෙලාවේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited ලාගේ සල්ලි තිබුණේ නැහැ. එතකොට Bank of Ceylon එකේ account එකෙන් තමයි අඩු වෙන්නේ. එතකොට ඒක ගෙවුවා. කොහොමටත් Bank of Ceylon එකේ account එකෙන් අඩු වෙනවා. මොකද අපි settlement එක කරද්දි Bank of Ceylon එකත් එක්ක තමයි අනිවාර්යෙන්ම කරන්න ඕනෑ. Bank of Ceylon එකේ නමින් තමයි පළමුව certificates issue වෙන්නේ. අපි දෙවැනි වතාවටත් එසේ විකුණනවා නම් secondary market එකට ගිහිල්ලා තමයි විකුණන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒත් අපිට විකුණන්න බැහැනේ, එයාගේ permission නැතිව?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නැහැනේ. Bank of Ceylon එකෙන්නේ ඉල්ලලා තිබෙන්නේ. අපිට තිබෙන්නේ ලියුමක් විතරයිනේ. ඒකත් අත්සන් කරපු ලියුමක් නොවෙයි, නිකමීම නිකම් ලියුමක්. ඊ-මේල් එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මෙයා ගන්නවා ද ඒ ටික?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මෙයා අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ නැවත අපි එය ඇපයකට තියලා නැවත ස්වයං agreement එකකට යනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ Forward Rate Agreement එකකට යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ එයාට භාර දෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. එයාට විකුණලා නැවත අපි භාර ගන්නවා ඒ ටික. එයා නැවත අපිටම purchase කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගණන කොහොමද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අර interest rate එකම තමයි. පොඩි difference එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඔය total ගනුදෙනුව නිසා Bank of Ceylon එකට හම්බවෙලා තිබෙන්නේ Rs.3 million. හැබැයි, secondary market එකේ ගිහිල්ලා අපි ඔය ටික විකුණුවා නම් අපිට මිලියන 136ක් earn කරන්න තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි. අපිට පාඩුවක් වෙලා නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පැහැදිලිවම පාඩු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. Bank of Ceylon එකට පාඩු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පාඩු නෙමෙයි, ලාභය නැති වුණා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ලාභය නැති වුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්න ඒ වචනය වැදගත් වෙනවා. ලාභයක් වෙනවායි, පාඩුවක් වෙනවායි කියන්නේ දෙකක් නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, අද මෙම සිද්ධියට පරිබාහිරව ගත්තාම, Bank of Ceylon එක මෙම ආයතනයට කැඳවන ආයතනයක්. එම ආයතනයේ පරිපාලනමය කටයුතු මම හිතන හැටියට විශාල වශයෙන් සම්ප්‍රදායානුකූල තත්ත්වයන්ගෙන් බැහැර වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එම නිසා ඔබතුමා සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී විධියට බලන්න මෙතුමාට පැවැරෙන කාර්ය භාර්ය මෙතුමාට ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න බැරි තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. එම නිසා අපි මෙම කාරක සභාවට කැඳවන ආයතනයක් විධියට බලන්න ඕනෑ. නැතිනම් ඉදිරියේදීයි මෙම ප්‍රශ්න මතු වෙන්නේ. ඒකට ඔබතුමන්ලා අවධානය යොමු කරන්න වෙයි. එහි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: Bank of Ceylon Audience එකේ GM ගේ කාර්ය භාර්ය සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කාර්ය භාර්ය කෙරෙන විධියක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමාට පැවැරුණු කාර්ය භාර්ය ඔබතුමා කරනවාද?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: කොටසක් තමයි මම දැනට කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතිරි කොටස කවුද කරන්නේ?

ඩී.එම්. ගුණසේකර මහතා: වෙන DGM කෙනෙකුට භාර දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම වෙනම එකක් කියලා කිව්වේ ඒක තමයි. වෙනම එකක් වුණත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

The Chairman: Time factor is very important. තව සාක්ෂිකාරයෝ ඉන්නවා. ගුණසේකර මහත්මයාට දැන් නික්ම යා හැකියි.

සාක්ෂිකරු නික්ම ගියේය.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට කරුණක් කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? මම මේ කරුණ එම අවස්ථාවේදී එතුමා ඉදිරිපිට දී කියන්න කැමැති වුණේ නැහැ. This might help, a little bit in understanding in transaction. පළමු කාරණය නම්, General Manager නොදැන ඉන්න එක පුදුමයට කාරණයක් නොවෙයි. බැංකුවක General Managersලා, CEOලා customers ලා දන්නේ නැහැ. දැන ගන්න ඕනෑත් නැහැ. මොකද මෙම businesses ඉතා විශාල ඒවා. Bank of Ceylon කිව්වාම ලංකාව එක්ක නොවෙයි, ඕනෑම රටක් එක්ක ගත්තොත් සෑහෙන විශාල business එකක්. Asset base එකෙන් ලංකාවේ සියයට 40ක් විතර මෙම බැංකුවේ තිබෙනවා. So, there is no way he will know that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They will know only when there is a problem.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Yes. Otherwise, they will not know. If the Audit Department highlights a problem and if it is important enough, then only it comes to the General Manager. අනිත් කාරණය නම්, මේකට perspective ටිකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑනේ. So, that is one thing that they want to know. ඉතින් මොකක් හරි වෙලා තිබෙනවා නම් ඔය මට්ටම්වල නොවෙයි, වෙනම තමයි සෝදිසි කරන්න වෙන්නේ. The other thing is, this is a bond transaction. It is not like a loan transaction. There is a distinction. Loan එකක් ගත්තොත්, if it is not repaid, your clean risk is on the total amount of the loan. If you take Rs. 10 million, it is Rs. 10 million risk. If you take a Treasury Bill or a Treasury Bond. ඒක බිලියනයක් කියලා කියමු. If you take a billion risk, there is

virtually no risk. මොකද එකක් ඇවිල්ලා - put the perspective - එකක් ඇවිල්ලා, this is the Government of Sri Lanka instrument which means that you can always give this instrument back or sell this instrument back. You can report the instrument and there are various things that you can do with this instrument.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Unless, the country goes bankrupt.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes. The country going bankrupt is not relevant here because it is a rupee instrument. The country will never go bankrupt. It is a rupee instrument we will print the rupees. If we take a dollar instrument, we can go bankrupt. That is the other distinction. All the borrowings are in rupees.

So, what is a risk? Let us say that Perpetual Treasuries Limited or any broker – බ්‍රෝකර් කෙනෙක් ගත්තේ නැහැ කියලා හිතමු. ඒක වෙනවා. Market එකේ ඒක වෙනවා. So, what they do is, they calculate not the clean risk, but the settlement risk and they calculate what you called "a rate risk". The rate can differ. You buy it at one rate, you may have to exchange it with another rate. There is a rate risk. That is a risk. ඒ rate risk එක calculate කළොත් - These rate risks are normally called "basis points": points, 0.01, 0.10, 0.20. Let us say, it is 1 per cent. That is hundred-basis point which is a huge amount.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can I interrupt?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: මම explain කරලා ඉවර වුණාම කියන්න. If you take one per cent on Rs. one billion, it is a ten million rupee risk. If you take Rs. 13 billion, it is 130 million rupee risk. So, the fact is that company or the individual who is trading with the bank as its customer will have a preset line. One way to understand is that it is like the bank gives you an OD line of a Rs. 1 million, or Rs. 2 million, they will have a preset line. It is a line of credit. It is not an OD. But they earmark the line against the transaction. Then, they say that your credit line is foul. So, you cannot take it or whatever.

So, there will be a line. That line can be given on two bases. They may have put actual cash against the line or it is a long term customer, like evaluating a loan, evaluating the customer, and you put the line. If you take hundred bases points you put Rs. 130 million. Then, these Treasury secondary market brokering companies are capitalized by about Rs. 300 million. In addition to that, they may have other things. එදා dealer කියපු එක ගැන අපි ටිකක් කල්පනා කරලා, dealer ගෙන් නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න ඕනෑ. එතැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ මට්ටමේ ගැටලුවක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. එයා උත්තර දෙන කොට කිව්වා නේ, "මම තීරණය ගත්තා." Dealer හැටියට එයා දන්නවා සමහර උත්තර හරි. He knows what that risk is. He knows he has a line if it is within the line.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Only problem is, why only in this instance it was given? There is no other instance which they have done that.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: An unusual circumstance එකක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, primary dealer කෙනෙක් තව primary dealer කෙනෙක් තුළින් කවදාවත් ඉල්ලන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අපි ඒකයි මේකෙදී investigate කරන්න ඕනෑ. මම කියන්නේ, ඒක ඉහළ මට්ටමේ අය දැන ගෙන ඉන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. I was given a little bit of perspective. The amount Rs. 13 billion කියලා- The risk to the bank is not that. It is very much low.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I can understand.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What you mean is, in case Perpetual Treasuries did not take it; they can sell it to-

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes. It is like this. පොඩ්ඩක් මම කියන එක හොඳට අහගෙන ඉන්න. If I was Bank of Ceylon and Perpetual Treasuries is being taking it, I will be very happy. Do you know why? Because the later bids have been bid at that higher rates. It is to my advantage. If the customer does not take it-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is only in this instance.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: The risk is there. But the risk in this situation is in your favour කියලායි කියන්නේ. මම කියපු දේ තේරුණාද? risk එක තිබෙනවා. This is a higher rate. I will be happy. මේක තව විධියකට කිව්වොත්, දැන් ඉන්නවා නේ පොඩි පොඩි-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, let us say it went downwards. Then, this Perpetual Treasuries will not buy it. The bank will incur that Rs. 130 million loss if it had gone the other way. Then, it would have been a loss to the bank.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: What the Auditor-General referred to, it has no loss at all. It is an opportunity. Opportunities හැමදාම

Uncorrected

නිබෙනවා නේ. Bids දාන කොට, broker functions of the bank and the bank functions are two separate functions. One does not have anything to do with the other. The broker functions as the broker. If the bank is making a decision to invest its own money that decision is made somewhere else and the broker is instructed. When you talk about opportunity loss, now the customers will call and give the order to the broker. The bank broker gives the order but the decision: are we going to bid thirty-year bond, at what rate are we going to bid on it, is made somewhere else. If it is not, there is a problem. අපට ඒක investigate කරන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I have another question. If the bank says that they went on these bills- Because this is only an e.mail, it is not even a signed letter. So, do they say that? On their own they went and -

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Normally, you do not need a signed letter because being in the money market, Treasury market, lines are set up. But normally in dealing rooms there has to be voice recording and the conversations must be recorded. ඒවායේ lapses ඇති. ඒවා සොයා බලන්න ඕනෑ. You should not be using your mobile phones or anything in a dealing room. It is like a betting thing. You cannot use them there. It should be a recorded statement.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නම් ඔහුගෙන් අහන්න බැරි වුණා.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When you spoke to the Chief Dealer, we always gave you the benefit of doubt in some of the things, it is okay.

(At this moment, Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte, Country Managing Partner, Ernst & Young Company, and Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe ..... were called in.)

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte, Country Managing Partner, Ernst & Young Company, and Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe ..... affirmed and examined.

The Chairman: Can you personally formulate the present Audit Report and distribute it?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: Yes. With your permission what we wonder whether we can brief this presentation.

The Chairman: Yes. This is not an examination.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: The Chairman, we were called upon by the Board of the Bank of Ceylon to carry out the assignment which covered the 01st January to 31st March 2015. We carried this out according to the relevant auditing standard and we looked at three specific aspects. Firstly, whether the procedures followed there under 1 and 2 there, by the Unit of the primary dealers' in the BOC was inline with the guidelines given by the Central Bank in terms of how primary dealers should conduct their activities. The second thing is whether it followed the procedures enunciated by the Board of the Bank. The third one is whether it was inline with the best practice. So, that was the scope that we agreed with them.

Then, moving onto the findings in summary, there were seven auctions of bids during this period for Treasury Bonds, and it is known that generally a primary dealer is expected to bid a minimum of about ten per cent of the Bond value. In whole, but one of the seven Bonds, Bank of Ceylon the band was between 10 per cent to 13.15 per cent. So, they had bid that percentage of the total Bond value which at the issues. In that particular instances of 27th February 2015, the BOC's bid which was on behalf of various parties was 1350 times, the value of the Central Bank Bond value is on an offer. So that was one of our findings.

Then that particular 27th February 2015 auction, 13. 5 billon that was bid, was not on behalf of the Bank of Ceylon, the primary dealer also bid for their own requirements, on behalf of three parties. The three customers parties were Mahabodhi Trust, Ceylinco insurance, and the Perpetual Treasuries Limited. Some of the findings was inline with

the requirements of the Central Bank guidelines is the Noyo customer is a requirement that should be maintained, we found that this is not consistently and correctly done. It was not consistently followed. That was one of the findings.

The other thing is, when banks are taking instructions from customers; there are several methods; by emails, faxes and official letter. So, they have to initially agree with the bank and the customer which forms of instructions are acceptable. So, there is no misunderstandings that the parties who are permitted to send the emails, and faxes and who should sign as to be free agreed. Now, we found that that the procedure was not consistently followed and our Report has scheduled which gives the details.

The Chairman: There was an email communication.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: Yes, there was an email communication. But the fact that what we are saying generally is, most banks agree with the customer before hand; not before a transaction when they accept them as the customer, they were asking whether they want to telephone, and email banking or how the instruction would be conveyed. That particular process was not in place.

So, one and the other aspect is even when the communication comes in, validation of the signatures were not - It was not evident that who is authorized to sign; someone must make sure that one of the cases the faxes has been sent by the two signatories. But, then the fact that it is in fact the signatories that are authorized to deal with the banks. That was another aspect.

Mr.W.P.C. Wickramaratna: Was it an email or a fax?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: This particular was an email. Another one which was referred to the period that we looked at there were several transactions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Should it be signed or?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: First, we have to check back with that with the customer that the email has come from them genuinely.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: that is right. But does that there has to be a signature there from all?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: No.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: There has to be a some method of validating that who has sent it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is right. Has that happen in transactions?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: According to our findings, there was not such thing.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who validates it in the dealing room?

The Bank has have to have validating the dealer before doing the deal, they should be satisfied that it has come from an authorized person.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, it is a short span of time somebody in the dealing room has to be there to validate it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are you satisfied that it came from that the customer? Is that enough?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes, it should be generally enough. There has to be some evidently say that he has done the validations we did not find the evidence.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There must be validation for them to accept that Bid with the customer.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes, that should be. But as I said, we did not see any evidence of the validation is being done. Normally, when the validation is done, someone is signed off saying that these are the signatories and all these things are coming from the right source. That will be evidence by some form of signatures, and approval for whatever it is. But here there was no such thing.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, the dealer acted on his own accord. He took the responsibility.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: I do not know that. All what I can say is there was no –

The Chairman: Formality or such thing.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: The question is, regarding the primary market dealers, are they in the same dealing atmosphere as the other secondary market dealers as well?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes, they are in the same dealing room.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, if they are in the same dealing room, they must say that very much act in like the former – In other words they have some set up criteria, and dealers probably deal and subsequently

confirm in writing. So, the dealing room is like that way.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: yes, it could be. We did not see anything even subsequently there was any evidence to say that it had been done.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: In the dealing room are the dealing conversation being recorded and the conversation should be there.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Our scope was not that. But I believe, it should be there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: the bank says that this was acknowledged by the bank and this request was taken by the Bank.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: Well, subsequently, they fill the internal documentation to go ahead with this Bid. So, they accepted the email communication.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, telephone conversation, as well?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: No, not to our knowledge. On our own inquiry with them it was not evidence that there was such a conversation.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Did you enquire about telephone conversation? Because when we questioned the Chief Dealer, he said that there was a telephone conversation. Did you? You cannot say "No." If you had not questioned him on that?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: We did not.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Am I correct, if I say, there was an email and the telephone conversation to clarify it.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: Normally, I deal with the share market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, it is just a telephone conversation they buy. There should be an Agreement. There must be a letter and all that. What happens is like whatever amount, it is just a call. That is it.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: According to our best practice there should be a free arrangement with the client that we will accept email communication from so and so to the email address. Then, when that it comes, as you rightly say there can be a telephone conversation usually can be minuted and recoded some form in the bank; perhaps on that same email. The hard copy which goes into a file. It is possible they had the conversation but we cannot categorically say whether they had it or not.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But it is a client does not dispute the order you still have to go by the best practice and say that it is not disputed that you have a problem?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: The only thing is when it is disputed, the situation can be quite grave. That is the thing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right, thank you.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Bank's Procedure Manual also requires them to do the validation.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is "validation" in a sense?

The Chairman: There is a need for it.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes, there is a need for it. It is not by exception but they have to do it.

The Chairman: Have you observed it even on previous occasions? There may have been transactions with the same company earlier.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: There have also been another transactions which they have not signed off.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The best practice has not been followed in so many instances.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Exactly.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Now, this is the focus point and this is-

The Chairman: Non-observance has been the practice.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes. They have followed it in the absence.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: The next point on this document is that we did not come across any limits of delegation for the Primary Dealer who carried out these functions. Usually, it is common to have- it is against the best practice- limits of delegation. The bank had limits of delegation for-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I do not understand that.

The Chairman: Delegation of powers.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: This bid was for Rs. 30 billion and there were another bids for Rs. 500 million and Rs. 8.5 million on that particular day. One person can deal with a transaction but there is usually a limit of authority. That means the dealer might have a

certain limit of authority and above that, he would have to go to a higher-level official or two parties to approve it. From our examination, it seems that for secondary market transactions- They can sell it in the secondary market. For that, they have limits specified.

The Chairman: For secondary market, there are limits.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: Yes, the bank had its limits.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What are the limits?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: We have it with us. One is, as I can remember, for Hong Kong Bank they had a limit of Rs. 10 billion. But, some of other banks are in the range of Rs. 600 million, for instance, Pan Asia Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Rs. 600 million?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not billion?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: No, it is million.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: It is just for the banks not for the individuals.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, how much for companies?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: There were hardly any companies in that approval list.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay, I got it.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: We can give a copy of that list.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, it is not necessary because it is secondary market. Then, what about the primary market?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: For primary market, there were no stipulated limits. But, we have been told by the bank that these limits were assumed to apply to those. So, there is some-

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Generally, for you to do any transaction in primary market, you have to have a delegated authority. The Board has delegated an authority. The Board has done that for the secondary market transactions. But, for the primary market, there is not a Board-delegated authority.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, how did they practice? How did they go on?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: I think they have been buying on the grounds that these are Government Securities and there are no risks attached to these.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is there anything to say when Government Securities are bought, you do not have to have that delegation?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: No. It is a matter of interpreting "risks". Here, there is a settlement risk involved. You may not suffer a loss because there is an underlined security, which you can sell it. But, There is an exposure to settlement risk. So, there should have been limits. Technically, if there are no limits, either, they should have followed the secondary market limits logically or got an approval for each of the transactions they were doing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, they cannot do that also because this is a company or an individual not a bank. Secondary market limits are normally for banks.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Some companies have been given secondary market limits.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the maximum given?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Rs. 2 billion to NSB Fund Management Company Limited.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: That is also NSB; a bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, it is also a bank.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: It has not given for an individual.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Individuals like First Capital Treasuries has had a maximum limit of Rs. 2 billion earlier. But, subsequently, it was revised to Rs. 1 billion. These are for secondary market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right, I got it. You can continue.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: On that particular day -27th of February- the Investment Committee of the bank decided, according to the documentation we have seen, that they will not bid on their account. The bank did not require to procure Treasury Bills for the bank's needs. But, there were three requests they got and there is a proper document signed by the relevant people that they will be bidding in respect of these three parties at these various yield rates.

Uncorrected

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How did the other two communicate?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: One of them communicated by fax. One was Ceylinco Insurance. There were two signatories. The other one also communicated by fax.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That they have dealt by the best practice.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: They have sent faxes. But, there is no evidence of the signatures being verified.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What about the other company?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: This particular company, Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt.) Ltd, communicated via e-mail.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What about the other company? There were three.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: The both communicated via fax.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There also, you do not have any source to say they have gone by the best practice. So, how much were the other two companies given?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: Ceylinco Insurance was given Rs. 500 million and Mahabodhi Trust was given Rs. 8.5 million.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They also got their-

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: They have got their allocation. The other thing is, in instances where the bid is successful, the cash is obtained. There are three days for settlement, which is called T+3 settlement. Before the date for settlement by the bank, the bank is required to obtain cash or a credit facility from the parties concerned. In this instance, we have given a table there. If I may draw your attention to that particular three- If you look at the times of their system, at 15:25, the bank placed Rs. 300 million to Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt.) Ltd and at 15:26, Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt.) Ltd settled Rs. 1 billion to them. That is a second before they get Rs. 300 billion. Soon after, they settle a larger sum. The second transaction was done at 15:27; of course, virtually the same time. It is 15:27:25, if I give you it to the milliseconds. It has taken place concurrently. The third transaction is, the bank has paid at 15:27 and the settlement by the other party has taken place at 15:34; a little later.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is all right. Is it?

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: The bank has paid them money before they made the settlement.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Here, I think the issue is, when you put a bid in, you have to have the money and you have to pay the bank. Here, Rs. 2.3 billion was financed by the bank. So, they have repurchased this instrument prior to them doing the settlement.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can that happen?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: It has happened. I do not know how. Generally, it should not happen because you have to pay. If I am the buyer, I must first pay the bank, acquire it and then I can repurchase it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: On whose instructions, has it happened?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: We cannot say any.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: On whose authority or instructions?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: I think it has been done in the dealing room.

The Chairman: You know that there is one single person.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is a major issue. So, there should be somebody who take the-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Has that happened before?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: We do not have-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, what about the other two companies? Has it happened that way or they have settled the money?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: They have settled the money. The money has come in.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The money is there because they are customers of the bank.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If I can explain, I think the other two and this are different. Other two are customers. It is like me or you going to the bank. These are dealers and brokers, who have license to deal. The license has been given by the Central Bank to them. Whether they should have got the license is another question. But they have a license. I think one thing that might be important for us to find out is, internationally- I do not think it is your responsibility, but I am just asking. You know you are getting a Government Security and these are simultaneous transactions.

You know the security is there. You have a relationship with the bank basically getting simulta-neously settling it. I think that is what exactly happening here. You see that it is an international practice because it is a dealer. If it is a customer it is different. But if that is the case, then I think we are back to that earlier question about the limits have to be there. Otherwise I think this is in order. I think the real issue is that not having the limits.

Mr. H.M.A Jayasinghe: One other issue that probably might come out of this is, that re-purchase will have to be on the secondary market. So then whether you should be adhering to the secondary market transaction. This is not the primary market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This has not been adhered in the secondary market as well.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes, that is something that comes out.

Then, on 6th of March, the bank sold back the bond to Perpetual Treasuries. So, on the 27th the bid was placed. At that date the bank decided that they were not going to bid anything for themselves for their account. They bid on three for three parties. Settlement date was 2nd of March. On 2nd of March this was what took place as we explained. Then on 2nd of March, what happened was the bank repurchased this. On 6th of March, the bank sold it back to Perpetual Treasuries. There, the point we have made is that, if they had sold it at the same value, whereas whether they should have taken into consideration the yield at that time when they sold it. That is the point and we have quantified it best of viability. In that statement where we see Rs. 136.14 million –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasighe: Are they not obliged to sell it if there is an order?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: They can sell it. But if it is a secondary market transaction, then you will have to sell it at the price that prevailing then.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: It is like this. If they have purchased the bond if it is then repurchase is different. Repurchasing means you are purchasing with an option to sell it back at a particular day.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasighe: I do not get it.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: There are different methods of executing this transaction. First one is you do an outright purchase and then four days later you sell the instrument.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are talking of the bank?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes, the bank. Second one is the customer might want money for maybe short period of time.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: From somebody you buy it.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: You buy from the customer, but with an agreement to give it back to him. So in that case it is the same rate that will have to be issued. This may have been a repurchase but the documentation does not necessarily indicate so. Because there is a purchase transaction and sales transaction. So what we are trying to show here is, if it is a purchase and a sale you first purchase it, then, four days later you sold it. Now there, there is no requirement for you to sell it at a pre-determined priced unless if it is a repurchase agreement.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There is no repurchase agreement and you cannot see any repurchase agreement?

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: If it is not a repurchase agreement you should basically sell it at market but here our statement says, if it was done at a Central Bank average, this is the figure that you would have probably opportunity cost if you want to call it back but actual price at with this transaction would have gone we do not know because Central Bank gives an average price. Average of all the primary dealers over people there. So this is just an indicative thing why we included in the report is to impress to the Board that you need to tightene the processors surround it. That is the intention –

Yes, it was not necessarily to highlight any loss or any thing like that.

The Chairman: Best practice must be adhered to.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Exactly.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes that is all, just to clarify this –Would you mind explaining repurchasing? If you do a repurchase the bank must do it for the purpose of making some money.

Mr. A.D.B. Talwatte: If you do a repurchase what that bank does is it treats is as a funding arrangement. I have just funded this person for this amount of time for four days. So

they will charge interest on that. Something equivalent to interest. That is a repurchase.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Only the interest component is important for the bank then.

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: So that only they will say that they have made not a profit but they have made some –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But the risk is also there. If the bidder does not buy it then –

Mr. H.M.A. Jayasinghe: Yes, the issue is, if the person does not buy it on that settlement date. Four days later, then obviously you still again come back that is why it is important to give limits to customers under which you will trade you know that customer is good for that money.

(Witnesses withdrew

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The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is your full name?

Mr.P.G. Tissera: Gamini Tissera.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකේ Treasury Department එකේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එදා අත්සන් කරපු අයගේ ප්‍රධාන කෙනා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ ඔබතුමා දැනට retired. හැබැයි, මේ කියන ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වුණු අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමා තමයි මේ Treasury operationsවල සහකාර සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී විධියට කටයුතු කළේ. Rs. 13.5 billion කියන මේ එක customer කෙනෙකුගේ bid එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් වූ මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වුණාට පසුවද මේ තොරතුර මෙතැනට ආවේ, එහෙම නැත්නම් මෙම ගනුදෙනුව සිදුවීමට කලින්ද? මේ තීරණය ගත්තේ, මේ කියන ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Board එකද, එහෙම නැත්නම් මේ තීරණය අරගෙන dealer ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණාට පසුවද මේ සම්බන්ධව Board එක දැනුවත් වුණේ?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් customersලා දමන bids ඔක්කෝම කෙළින්ම dealing room එකේ Chief dealerට තමයි එන්නේ. මට එන්නේ නැහැ. මම ඉන්නේ පිට. එතකොට ඔහු තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ මේවායෙන් දමන්නේ මොනවාද, නැත්තේ මොනවාද කියලා. ඔය කියන ඒවා එදා දවසේ 10.47ට විතර තමයි ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. 11.00 තමයි cutoff time එක. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී කෙළින්ම තීරණය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ Chief dealer. ඔහු Central Bank එකට bids ටික submit කරලා, ඊට පසුව තමයි ඔය කොළ ටික පුරවා අපට ගෙනැවිත් දුන්නේ, අත්සන් කරන්න.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මයා: 11ට ඉවර වුණාට පසුවද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා අත්සන් කළාද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: අත්සන් කළා. එසේ අත්සන් කරන්න හේතුව වුණේ - එදා තිබුණු ටෙන්ඩර් එක Rs.1 billionවලට තිබුණේ. ඒ දවස්වල thirty-year bond එකේ price එක තිබුණේ - interest rate එක තිබුණේ - නවයයි පනහට. හැම primary dealer කෙනෙකුම අවම වශයෙන් සියයට දහයක bid එකක් දමන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම හැම කෙනෙකුම සියයට දහය ගණනේ දමන කොට, Rs. 1 billionවලින් සියයට දහයක් කියන්නේ Rs. 100 million. Rs. 100 million ඒවා පහළොවක් දැම්මත් Rs. 1.5 billion වෙනවා. ඊට අමතරව අප හරහා තව insurance company එකක් bid කරලා තිබෙනවා, Rs. 500 million.

10.55 වාගේ rate එකකට තමයි ඒක දාලා තිබුණේ. Rs. 1 billion සපිරෙන්න වෙන අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. ඔවුන් තරම් ඒකෙන්ම Rs. 1 billion fill වෙන්න තිබුණා. ඒ තත්ත්වය යටතේ- අනෙක් එක rate එක 12.50ට තමයි අඩුම එක දාලා තිබුණේ. සියයට තුනක වෙනසක් තිබිලා තිබෙනවා එනැන. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කවදාවත් 9.50 එකක් 12.50ට අපේ history විධියට යන්නේ නැහැ. එවිවර ලොකු වෙනසක් වෙන්නේත් නැහැ. Rs. 1 billion එකකින් ඒ වාගේ දස ගුණයක් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කවදාවත් ගිහිල්ලාත් නැහැ. ඒ වාගේ ටෙන්ඩර් එකක් අරගෙනත් නැහැ. Rs. 1 billion bid කරන්න කියලා Rs. 10 billion අරගෙනත් නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ තත්ත්වය යටතේ එතකොට bid එක submit කරලා ඉවරයි මම ගාවට එන කොට. මිම අත්සන් කළේ අර හේතුව මත මේක කොහොමත් වෙන්න හේතුවක් නැහැ කියන එක මත තමයි අත්සන් කළේ. අනෙක් එක තමයි submit කරලා අවසානයි මම ගාවට එන කොට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කොහොමත් මේක වෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ කියන එක මම හිතන්නේ

ඒක පැහැදිලි නැහැ. මේ තිබෙන කාරණා අනුව මේ bid එක හොඳයි කියන එක තමයි ඔබතුමා සෑහීමකට පත් වුණේ?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: කියන කාරණා අනුව මේ bid එක කවදාවත් වරදින්නේ නැහැ. Central Bank එකෙන් ගන්නේ නැහැ කියන මතයේ තමයි හිටියේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Chief dealer කිව්වේ ඒ කථාවම තමයි. ඔවුනුත් හිතුවේ නැහැ ගනීවි කියලා.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: අපි පසු ගිය අවුරුදු 15ක්, 25ක් තිස්සේම -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඔය තනතුරේ කොච්චර කාලයක් සේවය කළා ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: AGM (Treasury) වශයෙන් අවුරුදු එකහමාරක් ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා විශ්‍රාම ගියේ වයස සම්පූර්ණ වෙලාද, නැත්නම් වෙනත් - හේතුවක් නිසාද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: නැහැ. කලින්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඇයි කලින් විශ්‍රාම යන්න හේතුව?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: සෞඛ්‍ය තත්ත්වය නිසා කලින් විශ්‍රාම ගියේ. බැංකුවේ කලින් විශ්‍රාම යනවා නම් මාස තුනකට කලින් දන්වන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා මාස තුනකට කලින් දන්වලා තිබුණාද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: මම ජනවාරි අන්තිම බැංකුවට දන්වලා තිබෙනවා මම මාස තුනකින් විශ්‍රාම යනවා කියලා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ජනවාරි අන්තිම කියන්නේ කවද්ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: අප්‍රේල් අවසානයේදී මම විශ්‍රාම ගියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ජනවාරි දන්වලා තිබුණා විශ්‍රාම යනවා කියලා. ඒ අනුව මාස තුන සම්පූර්ණ වුණාට පස්සේ තමයි ගියේ?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අවුරුදු කීයකට කලින්ද විශ්‍රාම යන්නේ?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: 28ක සේවා කාලයක් තිබෙනවා. අවුරුදු 57යි මාස 10න් විශ්‍රාම යනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට දැන් ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නියෝජිතයාට බලය තිබෙනවා dealing room එකට ගිහිල්ලා ඕනෑම ගණුනක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීන්දු තීරණ අරගෙන කටයුතු කරන්න?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඒකේ සාධාරණ විධියට තමයි බලය තිබෙන්නේ. එතුමා assess කරන්න ඕනේ දැනට තිබෙන market situation එක.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැනට බැංකුවේ තිබෙන manual එකට අනුව එතුමා කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්. Dealing room එකේ සම්පූර්ණ decisions කළේ, එහි බලය තිබෙන්නේ එතුමාට තමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කාගෙන්වත් අහන්න, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ committee එකෙන් විශේෂ අවසරයක් ගන්න මොකුත් අවශ්‍ය නැද්ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: විශේෂ අනුමැතියක් ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. එයාට ඕනෑ නම් කථා කරලා අහගන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැතිනම් එයා හිතනවා නම් මෙහෙම වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඉතා වගකීමකින් යුතුව කියනවා බැංකුවේ තිබෙන නීති - රීතිවලට අනුව එතුමා කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා, වරදක් වෙලා නැහැ කියලා.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්. දැනට පවතින නීති-රීති අනුව එතුමා කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා. එතුමාට තීරණයක් ගන්න පුළුවන් customer කෙනෙක් bid එකක් එව්වාම ඒක දමනවාද, නොදමනවාද කියලා? එතැනදී එතුමා මේක එන්නේ නැති මටටමට තමයි තීරණයක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ මතය මත තමයි එතුමා කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මීට කලින් මේ වාගේ වෙන්නේ නැති විධියට දමලා තිබෙනවා ද? එහෙම ඒවාත් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද ඔබතුමන්ලාට?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: වෙන්නේ නැති ඒවා එනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කොච්චරක් විතර ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද? දැන් ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ අනිවාර්යෙන්ම මේක වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා risk එකකුත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා අනුමත කළා කියන එකද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්. අනුමත කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට කලිනුත් මේ වාගේ දේවල් වෙලා තිබෙනවා ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් auction එකක bids දමන කොට දිගටම ගොඩාක් දමනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ අපි දන්නේ නැහැනේ කොතැනද cut-off time කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කලිනුත් ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙවැනි අත්දැකීම් වලට මුහුණ දීලා තිබෙනවා ද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ලොකු එකක් දාලා එන්නේ නැහැ කියලා හිතලා ඒක ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔව්වර ලොකු ඒවා ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් හිතන්නේ නැති ඒවා ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද කියලයි මෙතුමා අහන්නේ?

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: හිතන්නේ නැති ඒවා එහෙම ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාත් තීරණය ගත්තානේ, මෙච්චර ගණනකට ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා. මේ rate එකත් වැඩියි. ඒ අනුව මහ බැංකුව මේක අනුමත කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා අනුමත කළා කියලා.

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ තීන්දු තීරණය ගත්තේ කලිනුත් එහෙම දේවල් වෙන්න ඕනෑනේ. දැන් අවුරුදු එකහමාර තුළ -

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මෙහෙමයි. දැනට පවතින rate එකට වඩා .50 තමයි වෙනස් වෙන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දැනට market එකේ rate එක තිබෙන්නේ 10 නම්, 10.50 විතර වෙනකම් තමයි යන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා හිතලා අත්සන් කළේ ඇයි?

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: එතකොට ඒක already ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. මට එනකොට ඒක දාලා ඉවරයිනේ. එතකොට මම අත්සන් කළත්, නොකළත් Central Bank එකට ඒක යනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා හිතාගෙන අත්සන් කළානේ. නමුත් දැන් වුණානේ. වුණාට පස්සේ මේ ගැන ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද දකින්නේ?

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ මම chief dealer ගෙන්නලා කිව්වා Rs.3 billion එකක් ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ මම අපේ Deputy General Managerට කථා කරලා කිව්වා, මෙහෙම දෙයක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මේ ගොල්ලන් මේක එන්නේ නැහැ කියා හිතලා තමයි දාලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමාත් අත්සන් කරලා ඉවරයිනේ.

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: ඔව්. අත්සන් කරලා ඉවරයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා හිතලා දෙයක් කළා. දැන් වුණා. වුණාට පස්සේ මේ ගැන ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද දකින්නේ? ඔබතුමා ගත්ත තීන්දුව හරිද, වැරැදිද? අත්සන් කරපු එක හරිද? බැංකුවේ නීති-රීතිවලට අනුව මේක සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා ද?

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: එතැනදී බලපුවාම දැනට පවතින තත්ත්වයට වඩා ගොඩක් උඩින් තමයි rate එක ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකෙන් බැංකුවට පාඩුවක් නැහැ. බැංකුව ගත්තොත් ඒක පාඩුවක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරියට පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: ඒ customer වෙනුවෙන් නේ අපි ගත්තේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට මේක දාන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙද්දී ඇයි තව customer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් ප්‍රථම වතාවට දුන්නේ?

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ නැහැ ඔච්චර ඉහළ rates එකට යයි කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ප්‍රථම වතාවට නේ බැංකුව තවත් customer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් මෙවැනි දෙයක් වුණේ.

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: අපි ගාව තිබෙනවා දැනට-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම අහන දේට උත්තර දෙන්න. බැංකුවටත් මේ අවස්ථාව තිබියදී වෙනත් dealer කෙනෙකු වෙනුවෙන් මේ ඉදිරිපත් වුණු පළමුවැනි අවස්ථාව නේ.

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: ඔච්චර ඉහළ මිලක් ඉදිරිපත් වුණු පළමු අවස්ථාව. Rates 2 ලොකු පරාසයකින් ඉදිරිපත් වුණු පළමුවන අවස්ථාව. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ assessment එකයි, අපේ assessment එකයි වෙනස්. අපේ assessment එක අනුව මේක මෙච්චර උඩට යන්න විධියක් නැහැ, ඕනෑ තරම් සල්ලි තිබුණා, money market එකේ. Rs. 1 billion ගන්න කිසිම අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ, ගොඩක් ඉහළට යන්න. ඕනෑ තරම් සල්ලි තිබෙනවා. Rs.500 million එක Insurance companyයක් දාලා තිබෙනවා. තව Rs. 500 million තමයි දාන්න තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ තත්ත්වය මත තමයි අපි දැම්මේ නැත්තේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා හිතුවේ Rs. 1 billion ගනීවි කියලාද?

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: ඔව්. Rs. 1 billion amount ඒකනේ auction එක දාලා තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැම්මේ ඉතුරු ටික ගන්නේ නැහැ? The Central Bank decides that.

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: තිබෙනවාද දන්නේ නැහැ. Publish කරලා තිබෙන්නේ Rs. 1 billion ක්‍රියාමාර්ගය.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙවැනි දෙයක් පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම දාලා එවැනි ගණනකට ගිය එක ගැන ගැටලුවක් නැද්ද ඔබතුමන්ලාට?

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: මොකක්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එවැනි වැඩි ගණනකට ගිය එක ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලාට ගැටලුවක් නැද්ද?

පී.ජී. කිඝේරා මහතා: එකම දේ තිබෙන්නේ කවුරු හරි customer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් නේ අපි ගත්තේ. ඔහුට නොගෙන ඉන්න පුළුවන් අපෙන්. ඔහු අපෙන් ගන්නා නම් අපට සල්ලි දෙන්න එපා යැ. Worst-case scenario නොගෙවා ඉන්න

පුළුවන්. එහෙම වුණා නම් ඒ අවස්ථාවේ අපට පාඩුවක් නැහැ. අපි ගොඩක් උඩ අගයකින් අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ 12.50ට අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ, market එකේ 9.50 තිබෙද්දී. අපේ portfolio එකේ තිබෙනවා, Treasury bonds Rs. 220 billion. ඉතින් Rs. 3 billion කියන එක අපට කොහොමත් තියා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට දැන් මේක අත්සන් කරන අවස්ථාවේ ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන සිටියාද බැංකුවට ඒ ශක්තිය තිබෙනවා කියන එක?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කොහොමද දැන ගෙන හිටියේ?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: අපේ liquidity provision එක අපි ගාව තිබෙනවා. උදේ පාන්දර හැම දාම information එනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කීයක් තිබුණාද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: අපට තිබුණා එදාට අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා බිලියන 17ක් විතර.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බිලියනද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්. බිලියන. බිලියන 17ක් විතර තිබුණා. ඊට අමතරව market එකෙන් බැලුවොත් බිලියන 40ක් විතර තිබුණා money market එක excess එකක්

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: හැබැයි Bank එකේ chief dealerට ඒ තීරණය ගන්න බැහැ. ඒකු කලින් predetermined එන තීරණයක්. Chief dealerට බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් bid කරන්න බැහැ නේ?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: බැංකුවේ bid කරන්න බැහැ. බැංකුවේ portfolio එකට bid කරනවා නම් -

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Board එකේ තීරණයක් අරගෙන එන්න ඕනෑ.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: Deputy General Manager ඉන්නවා, මම ඉන්නවා. හතර පස් දෙනෙක් එක්ක තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් ගන්නවාද නැද්ද කියන එක. බැංකුවේ අවශ්‍යතාව අනුව ගන්නවාද නැද්ද කියන එක තීරණය කරන්නේ DGM, AGM සහ chief dealerයි, කට්ටිය එකතු වෙලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: දැන් තත්පර ගණනක් තුළදී එතුමාට ගන්න කියලා-

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: එකම දේ බැරි වෙලාවත් එකක් ආවාම ඒ customer ගාව සල්ලි දෙන්න විධියක් නැත්නම් සල්ලි දුන්නොත් විතරයි එයාගේ account එකට transfer වෙන්නේ. එකම වැඩේ වෙන්න පුළුවන් එයාට සල්ලි නැහැ කියන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට බැංකුවට ගන්න වෙනවා. එහෙම ගත්තත් ඒ rate එකට එදා ගත්ත නිසා තමයි වාසියක් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරිතුමනි, 12ට ගන්න එක 9යි කියන එක මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න. Rate එක සියයට 12යි. ගත්තේ සියයට 12ට.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඒක මෙහෙමයි. 9.50යි කිව්වේ, අද වුණත් බැලුවාම market එකේ තිබෙනවා අවුරුදු 30 Bond එකක් කොයි ගණනටද trade වෙන්නේ කියන එක. ඒක තමයි රුපියල් 9.50 කියන එක. එදා තිබුණේ 9.50ට. ඊට පස්සේ auction එකෙන් අර ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ 12.50ට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකෙන් ඔයගොල්ලන්ට සියයට 12ක් ලැබෙනවා නේ.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: 12.50ක් ලැබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒවා ඕනෑම වෙලාවක විකුණන්න පුළුවන්.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්. ඕනෑම වෙලාවක විකුණන්න පුළුවන්. දැන් market එකේ තිබෙන්නේ 10.50ට වගේ තමයි.

The Chairman: Coupon rate එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔයගොල්ලන්ට ලොකු විශ්වාසයක් තිබුණා මේ ගණනට ගත්ත නිසා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා දැන ගෙන සිටියාද මේක 10 billion වලට යනවා කියලා.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: අපි දන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා දැන ගෙන සිටියේ 1 billion විතරයි.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ඔව්. හැබැයි 10 billionවලට යනවා කියලා- ඔය rate එකටත් ඉහළින් යනවා කියලා කවුරු හරි දන්නවා නම් ගොඩක් බැංකු දමනවා. ගොඩක් customersලා දමනවා. 12.50 කියන එක හොඳ rate එකක්. Long-term insurance companies, pension funds එහෙම invest කර ගන්න විධියක් නැතිව ඉන්නේ. ලොකු demand එකක් තිබෙනවා. 12.50යි කියලා දන්නවා නම් 50 million වුණත් market එකේ ගන්න පුළුවන්. එදා එච්චර ලොකු excess එකක් තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එක කම්පැනියක් විතරයි මේකට ඉල්ලුම්පත්‍ර දමලා තිබෙන්නේ.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: අපි හරහා ඉල්ලුම් පත්‍ර දමලා තිබෙන්නේ එක කම්පැනියක් විතරයි. නමුත් අනෙක් බැංකු හරහා තව තවත් කම්පැනීස් ඉල්ලුම්පත්‍ර දමලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි මේ ගැන අවබෝධයක් ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසායි අහන්නේ. One billion ඉල්ලලා 10 billion ලබා ගැනීමද හොඳ? 10 billionම ඉල්ලුවා නම් මොකද වෙන්නේ?

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: 10 billion ම ඉල්ලුවා නම් ඊට වඩා අඩු ratesවලට ගොඩක් bids එනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ 10 billion දක්වා ගන්නවා කියලා දන්නවා නේ. One billion කියන නිසා තමයි ගොඩක් අය ඉල්ලුම් පත්‍ර දමන්නේ නැත්තේ. One billion කිව්වාම එක්කෙනෙක්ගෙන් ආව හැටියේ fill වෙනවා. උදේ 09.30, 10.30 වන විට දෙන්නෙකුගෙන් fill වෙලා ඉවරයි. 10 billion කියනවා නම් තව ඉඩ තිබෙනවා. එතකොට bids වැඩි වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක නිසා තමයි 9,10,12 දක්වා දැම්මේ. 12ට ලැබුණා. එක්කෙනයි නේ හිටියේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉනින් 1 billion නැතිව, 10 billion advertise කළා නම් හරි නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එතකොට විශාල ඉල්ලුමක් තිබෙනවා කියලා market එක දන්නවා. ඒක strategy එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Interest rate එක 14ට යන්නත් තිබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කරන්නේ නැහැයි කියලා, එහෙම නම් අඩුම තරමින් 3 billion වත් ගන්න තිබුණා නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එතකොට interest rate එක වැඩි වෙනවා. ආණ්ඩුවට පාඩු වෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් කලින් ඒක නොකළේ ඇයි කියලා බලන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක පාවිච්චි කරන strategy එකක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ උපක්‍රමය කලින් පාවිච්චි කළේ නැත්තේ ඇයි?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම කරලා තිබෙනවා. හැමදාම පාවිච්චි කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ 1 billion ආවා නම් 2 billion, 3 billion අර ගෙන-

සභාපතිතුමා: අනිවාර්ය business එක. ඒ ගොල්ලන් දන්නවා මොකක්ද වෙන්නේ කියලා.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: අනෙක් කාරණය Chief Dealer ට කිව්වේ කවුරු හරි customer ඇවිල්ලා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ insurance company එකකින් තමයි මේ bids originate වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක ඒගොල්ලන්ට ගන්නම ඕනෑ නිසා තමයි ගොඩක් bid කරන්නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලොත් bid කරනවා. ඒ හරහා තමයි අපිටත් ටිකක් දමලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක තමයි හේතුව. අද අපට බලන්න පුළුවන් Central Bank එක හරහා ඒ ගත්ත ඒවා තිබෙන්නේ කා ළඟද කියලා. එයා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ ඇත්ත නම් එයා අර ගෙන ඒ ටික insurance company එකට දෙන්න ඕනෑ. එයා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ එහෙම නොවේයි නම්, එයා market එකේ විකුණලා තියෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක දැන් තිබෙන්නේ කොහේද කියන එක Central Bank එක හරහා බලා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක secondary market එකේ check කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි, එයාට බොරු කියන්නත් පුළුවන් නේ. That is its strategy.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: Insurance Company එකක් නම් bid කළේ ඒ අය ඒක ගන්න ඕනෑ. එයා ළඟ තියෙන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නැතිව බොරුවක් කළා නම් වෙන කවුරු හරි ළඟ තියෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ first time නේ primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා කළා නම් එයා අහන්න ඕනෑ එයාට කරන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙද්දී නම් තවත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා මෙක කරන්නේ ඇයි කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පළමුවැනි වතාවට primary dealer කෙනෙක් එන කොට ඔබතුමාට පුදුම හිතුණේ නැද්ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: මම පුදුමයට පත්වුණා, ඇයි මෙහෙම වුණේ කියලා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඇසිය යුතු ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔයාට directly යන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙද්දී ඇයි ඔයා අපි හරහා එන්නේ කියන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙනවා. Primary dealer කෙනෙකුට auction එකකට යන්න කවුරුවත් හරහා යන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට Perpetual Treasuries Ltd එකේ කටිටිය හමු වුණේ නැද්ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: නැහැ. කිසිම කෙනෙක් හමු වෙලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊට ඉස්සරවෙලා හමු වුණේ නැද්ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Assistant Manager කෙනෙක් හැටියට?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ customer බැංකුවත් එක්ක ගනුදෙනු කරලා නැද්ද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: ගනුදෙනු කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මේ ගොල්ලන්ගේ සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ account එකට-

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Secondary market එකේදී ගොඩක් ගනුදෙනු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: සෑහෙන්න ගනුදෙනු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Secondary market එකේ customersලා කී දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවාද?

පී.ජී. තිසේරා මහතා: Secondary market එකේ ගනුදෙනු කරන customersලා නිහක් හතලිහක් ඉන්නවා. බැංකු තිබෙනවා. Companies

තිබෙනවා. Insurance companies තිබෙනවා. Pension funds තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේ සෑහෙන්න ඉන්නවා.

(සාක්ෂිකරු නික්ම ගියේය.)

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් අපි අද දිනයට කාරක සභාව අවසන් කරමු.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණ.)

Unedited

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

මහ බැංකුවේ බැදුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

2015 ජූනි මස 04 වැනි බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා

පැමිණ සිටී:

ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය
ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු එම්.ටී. හසන් අලි මහතා
ගරු ඊ. සරවනපවන් මහතා

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක සේවා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටී:

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, වැඩබලන විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඊ.ඒ.එන්.පී. එදිරිසිංහ මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඊ.එම්.කේ.එම්. පද්මලාල් මහතා, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;

[පටිගත කළ දුරකථන සංවාදයක්]

Official (1) Hello!

Official (2) Hello, Mr. Dhanapala, Good morning.

Official (1) Good Morning. I am Kasun here.

Official (2) Hello Kasun. අනේ sorry! call එක දැක්කා. මට busy .වුණා. ආපහු කථා කරන්නයි බැලුවේ.

නිලධාරි (1) මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද සර්? පොඩි දෙයක් අහගන්න. මට auction bid එකක් දා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

නිලධාරි (2) පුළුවන්, පුළුවන්, එවන්න. ඇයි ඕගොල්ලන් දාන්නේ නැත්තේ? ***

නිලධාරි (1) අපින් දානවා සර්. Settlement ලොකු ගණනක් ආවොත් එහෙම සර්ට දාලා ***

නිලධාරි (2) හරි, හරි, මම කරලා දෙන්නම්. කියන්න කෝ මට -

නිලධාරි (1) සර්ට කීයට කලින් කියන්න ඕනෑද?

නිලධාරි (2) මට.. ඔයාගේ-confirm නම්, දැනට rate එකයි, කියන්න කෝ මට bids එහෙම හදා ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ. Manually නේ හදන්නේ මේවා.

නිලධාරි (1) මම සර්ට ටක් ගාලා ඊමේල් එකක් දාන්නද?

නිලධාරි (2) හරි, හරි. ඊමේල් එකක් හරි ෆැ..., ඊමේල් එකක් එවන්න කෝ ටක් ගාලා.

නිලධාරි (1) සර් ත් ලොකු ගාණක් දානවා ඇති නේ ඕකට නේද?

(ඉතා සෙමින්කථා කරයි. කටහඬ අපැහැදිලියි.)

නිලධාරි (2) නෑ බං direction යන්නේ නැතිව කොහේ යන්නද?

නිලධාරි (1) "නෑ බං" කියන්නේ, මම හිතුවා සර් ඔක්කොම ටික ගන්නවා ඇති ඕක කියලා.

නිලධාරි (2) මම නොවෙයි නේ EPF(??? not clear) ඉන්නවා නේ ඒකට. ඕක 9.35 දුන්නා කියලා තමයි කියන්නේ placement basis මීට ඉස්සර වෙලා.

නිලධාරි (1) Man කථා කළානේ ඊයේ. ඊයේ කථා කළා. කථා කරලා කිව්වා, -අවුරුදු දෙකකට පස්සේ පළමුවැනි පාරට Public Debt එක්ක කථා කරලා ගන්න කියලා කිව්වේ. Bond එක ගන්න 9.35 වගේ දෙනවා කියලා කිව්වා.

නිලධාරි (2) ආ....

නිලධාරි (1) හෙට auction එකට යනවා නම් (not clear) ... කළේ 2012න් පස්සේ පළවැනි පාරට.

නිලධාරි (2) ඒ කියන්නේ placements offer කරපු එකද?

නිලධාරි (1) නැහැ, මම කියන්නේ කථා කරලා මේ bond එක ගන්න auction එකට දාන්න කියලා කිව්වේ.

නිලධාරි (2) හ්ම්.... අර යකා වේ... පිස්සු පොරක් නේ හිටියේ ඔතැන. ඔවා ඔක්කොටම වැඩියේ හොඳයි මචං .... - මුන්ට කථා කරන්නවත් බැහැ නේ. ධම්මික කියලා කියන්නේ මට අවුරුද්දක් junior නේ, campus එකේ ඌ. ඒ දවස්වල මගේ හොඳම හිතවත්ම කෙනා. මම අඩු ගණනේ එහෙම හිතවත්කමක්වත් නියාගෙන වැඩ කළේ නැහැ. සම්භරවිට මිනිස්සු හිතාගෙන

Unedited

ඉන්නවා ඇති ඒවායින් අපි වාසි ගන්න එනවා කියලා.

නිලධාරී (1) මිනිහා හැබැයි හිටියා නේ ඔතැන. කාලයක් ඉඳන් හිටියා.

නිලධාරී (2) ඔව්, ඔව්. කාලයක් ඉඳන් හිටියා. ඔයා එහෙනම් මට විස්තර එවනවාද ටක් ගාලා.

නිලධාරී (1) මම සර්ට ඊමේල් එකක් දාන්නම්.

Official (2) Right, right, right! Okay, Okay.

ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ සභාපති අස්වින්ද සිල්වා මහතා; ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී/ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරී එස්.ඩී.එන්. පෙරේරා මහතා, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී/ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරී, පී.ඒ. ලයනල් මහතා, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර ප්‍රධානී; ඩී.එල්.පී. අබෙසිංහ මහතා, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ ගනුදෙනුකරු; බී.පී. ගුණසේකර මහත්මිය, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ නියෝජ්‍ය සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී / ප්‍රධාන විධායක අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ෆන්ඩ මැනේජ්මන්ට් සමාගම. පැමිණ සිටි.

ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ සභාපති අස්වින්ද සිල්වා මහතා මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදි.

සභාපතිතුමා: NSB Bond කටයුතු භාරව ඉන්නේ කවුද?

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: භාරව ඉන්නේ, Head of Treasury. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට Committee එකක් තිබෙනවා, මේ සියලුම Investments Approve කරන. Committee එක Head කරන්නේ GMCO. Head of Treasury සහ DGM Finance කොමිටියේ අනෙකුත් Membersලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Fund Management Company එක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක separate company එකක් නේද?

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක Subsidiary එක.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: It is a separate company.

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකට තමයි primary dealer ට license ship එක තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේ සභාවට මේ Chairman ව අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ කාරණ ය hand කරපු අය තමයි අවශ්‍ය. Information එක හරියට convey වෙලා නැහැ. Management එක භාරව ඉන්නේ කවුද?

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: CEO ඉන්නවා. Fund Management CEO ත් ඉන්නවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, පසුගිය 27 වෙනි දා සිදු වුණ bond issue එක bid කරපු එක ගැන?

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: කියන්න පුළුවන් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. අපි බැංකුවක් වශයෙන් NSB එකේ Act එක අනුව මම background එක කියන්නම්. එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලාට තේරේවි. අපේ Deposit Portfolio එකෙන් සියයට 60ක් Government of Sri Lanka Bonds සහ Treasury Bills තුළ invest කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක Act එක අනුව කළ යුතුව තිබෙනවා. අපේ active player කෙනෙක්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක Compulsory ද?

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, compulsory.- ඉතින් අපි Bond Market එකේයි, Treasury Bill Market එකේයි ගොඩක් active, weekly. මේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන bond issuance එකේ අපේ 3 million අපි bid කළා. 3 million ම අපට හම්බ වුණා. Weighted average rate 300 millio වල අපේ rate එක 10.9. අපි bid කරන කොට ඒ rate එක determined කරන්නේ අපේ market forces වල ඒ දවස්වලට තිබෙන rate එක මොකක්ද තිබෙන්නේ කියලා බලලා. ඊට කලින් අපට revaluation rate එක තිබුණා, 10.16 per cent. ඉතින් අපට පොඩ්ඩක් profit එක තියන්න අපි 10.9 වලට weighted average rate එක අනුව අපි bid කළා. හැබැයි, අපි three bids තිබ්බා, Hundred billion each. 10.75 11.00 per cent, 11.05 විධියට. ඒකේ average එක තමයි, 10.9. ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කරන bid එකක්.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It is a normal bid.

Mr. Aswin de Silva: There is nothing unusual about it.

The Chairman: For bidding also anything higher than that?

Mr. Aswin de Silva: Not really because what we do is we look at our cash flow position, we look at what our market rates are and maturities also we need to take into consideration. That is determined by the ALCO, Asset-Liability Committee.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is not because of the bid was Rs. one billion. If you had known that it will go up to Rs. 10 million

Mr. Aswin de Silva: You would have gone up to little bit more, but not significantly more.

Yes, that was our cash flow requirements. Generally, Central Bank regulation is minimum ten per cent. The bid has to be ten per cent of the total bid. So if it is Rs. 1 billion, Rs. 100 million. So it will take Rs. 300 million. Because our average rate was lower than the actual rate that they are accepted. We got the entire Rs. 300 million.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: NSB එකේ bid කළේ NSB එකේම customer කෙනෙක්ද?

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. අපේ customersලා bid කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා Central Bank එකේ registered?

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. Fund Management Company එක තමයි, primary dealer.

It is fully on subsidiary.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා Act එකෙන්ම ඊට අයිතිද, නැත්නම් application එකක් දාලා ඒ කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑද?

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: Application දාලා, Central Bank එකට.

ගරු ලසන්ත ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ Procedure එක පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න?

එස්.ඩී.එන්. පෙරේරා මහතා: Central Bank requirements අනුව අපි 2000 license අරන් තිබෙනවා, Fund Management Company එකේ register කරලා. Authorized primary dealer කෙනෙක් විධියට අපට ලයිසන් එක තිබෙනවා. NSB එකේ fully owned subsidiary එක යටතේ Treasury bonds deal කරන්න, market එකේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක Annually register කරන්න ඕනෑද?

එස්.ඩී.එන්. පෙරේරා මහතා: Annually renewal fee එකක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් අපට ලයිසන් එක තිබෙනවා, 2000 වසරේ පෙබරවාරි 25 සිට.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අවුරුදු කීයකටද?

එස්.ඩී.එන්. පෙරේරා: ඒක දිගටම තිබෙන ලයිසන් එකක්. Fund Management Company පවත්නාතුරු තිබෙන ලයිසන් එකක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහි යම් කිසි requirement එකක් තිබෙනවාද, මේ ලයිසන් එක අරගෙන, active ලෙස ඒ ගනුදෙනුවල නියැලෙන්නේ නැත්නම් auto cancel වෙන?

ජී.ඒ. ලසනල් මහතා: Act එකට අනුව අපි participate වෙන්න ඕනෑ, හැම ටෙන්ඩර් එකේදීම. එහෙම participate වුණේ නැත්නම් Central Bank එක අහනවා, ඇයි participate වෙන්නේ නැත්තේ කියලා. නමුත් අපි දිගටම Actively participate වෙනවා. මොකද, Huge portfolio එකක් අපි ළඟ තිබෙන නිසා. Rs. 370 Billion විතර portfolio එකක් අපි ළඟ තිබෙනවා. හැම week එකේම participate වෙනවා.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: ඒ Act එකේ තිබෙනවා නම්, අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම participate වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි අහන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ගැන නොවෙයි. Dealer කෙනෙකුගේ තත්ත්වය ගැන අපිට අවබෝධයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ නිසා අහන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Participate වෙන්න ඕනෑ, නැත්නම් Central Bank එක ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි යන්නේ වෙන තැනකට. ඒ යන ගමනේදී තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලා හමු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ සිද්ධියට අදාළව 27 වෙනි දා auction එකේ bid කළ නිලධාරීන් කවුද? Central Bank එකත් එක්ක deal කළ නිලධාරියා කවුද?

බී.පී.ජේ. ගුණසේකර මහත්මිය: ALCO එකෙන් දුන්න එම තීරණය NSB Fund Management Company එක හරහා අපි මහ බැංකුව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Chairman අහන්නේ වග කියන නිලධාරියා කවුද කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එදා උදේ Central Bank එකෙන් telephone කරලා ඔබතුමියට bid කරන්න කියා ඉල්ලුවාද?

බී.පී.ජේ. ගුණසේකර මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How did you place the bid?

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: After discussing with –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know. What was the mechanism used? Was it a call or a fax or an e-mail?

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: Electronic bidding.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is that the usual process?

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: Yes, the usual process.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: They are the primary dealer.

Mr. Aswin De Silva: We are the primary dealer. So, we can electronically bid.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි අපි අහන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් හැමදාම bills වලටයි, bonds වලටයි විශේෂයෙන්ම ආණ්ඩුවේ ආයතනවලට Central Bank එකෙන් කියනවා, bid කරන්න කියලා.

පී.ඒ. ලයනල් මහතා: System එකක් provide කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒකෙන් අපි ගිහින් bids ටික දමනවා, 11 o' clock වෙන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කාර්යය කරන නිලධාරියා කවුද?

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Is there a designated Chief Dealer?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Yes, there is. There is a CEO. That is, Mrs. Gunasekara.

සභාපතිතුමා: එදා ඔබතුමියද ඒ කාර්යය කළේ?

බී.ජී.ජේ. ගුණසේකර මහත්මිය: අපි ගත් තීරණය නිලධාරියා ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: තීරණය කරන්නේ නැහැ. Deal කළ එක් කෙනා කවුද? CEO කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවාද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who does that electronic bidding?

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: There is an officer. After receiving the bids, we have to allocate a password. So, using that password, we submit those bids electronically to the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, that officer is doing that. Is it?

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: Yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Is there a separate dealing room like in the BOC?

Mr. S.D.N. Perera: There is no Chief Dealer in the NSB like the BOC. Normally, this Committee-

The Chairman: What is the name of that officer?

Mr. S.D.N. Perera: He is one Mr. Rohana.

Mr. P.A. Lionel: He only executes what we decide.

The Chairman: Who maintains the fund management? There is a separate Company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mrs. Gunasekara, you are the CEO. Is it?

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: I am the CEO of the Company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you all take the decision. Is it? There must be a Board.

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: Assets and Liability Committee of the NSB. They had given their decision to the NSB Fund Management Company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is you. Is it?

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: Yes and one of our officers, normally he is the person who is entering the bids. He entered those three bids.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the thing. The Chairman is asking as to who that officer is.

Mrs. B.P.J. Gunasekara: Mr. Rohana Weerakoon.

Mr. Aswin De Silva: He just executes what we decide.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We know. But, we need to know as to who did that execution? That particular dealer is Mr. Rohana Weerakoon.

The Chairman: This is an investigation and not a normal COPE meeting.

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Yes, I understand that.

The Chairman: Really, we would not have invited the Chairman of the Board to come. We want the officers because we want to get various information.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: NSB එක මේ වාගේ දේවල් investment කරන කොට ඔබතුමන්ලා Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද, Credit Committee එකෙන් approval එකක් ගන්නවාද? ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන manual එක අනුව මොකක්ද කරන්නේ?

එස්.ඩී.එන්. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපේ manual එක අනුව TNIC කියා අලුත් Investment Committee එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ Committee එකේ Chairman වශයෙන් ඉන්නේ මම GM විධියට. ඒ Committee එකේ DGM-Finance ඉන්නවා, Head of Treasury ඉන්නවා. Collective decision එකක් අරගෙන ඊට පස්සේ මේ තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ investment එක කරන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා Committee එක රැස්වුණේ කවදාද? එදා උදේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Committee එක රැස් වුණා නේ.

එස්.ඩී.එන්. පෙරේරා මහතා: එදා උදේ රැස්වෙලා තීරණයක් අරගෙන පොතේ record කරලා bid එක දෙනවා. ඒ bid එක Fund Management Company එක execute කරලා රෝහණ කියන එක් කෙනාට දීලා Central Bank එකට deal එක pass කරනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It was a good bid. Was it not?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: That was a good bid. In fact, it was an opportunity loss for us because the actual rate was higher than that. We got only 10.9. As you know, we look at the market rates. The market rate at that time was

about 10.2. That was the revaluation rate. There is a two-way bid. Rates that are being published by the Central Bank-.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you explain that a little bit?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Yes. From time to time, there are two-way rates that are published by the Central Bank which are called the revaluation rates. So, this was a 30-year bond and the going rate was 10.2; 10.16 to be precise.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How would you know about the going rate?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: That is published by the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. So, the going rate was 10.2. Is it?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Yes, 10.2.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Mr. Silva, can I have a copy of that document? Can you table that?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, what was your bid?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: That was 10.9. Our average was 10.9.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know. I am asking about the three bids. What were the amounts?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: One was 10.75; the other one was 11 and the other one was 11.05. So, the average of all three was 10.9.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You said that there was an opportunity loss.

Mr. Aswin De Silva: That is because the total bid, the weighted average rate which the Central Bank accepted was 11.73. We could have gone up to 11.73. But, we got only 10.9 because that was our bid.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You could have had the fourth bid reaching up to 11.7.

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Yes, that is correct.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Even much more. Is it?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Even much more and we could have still got all four if our average would have come down. Because these three, Rs. 100 million each was much lower than 11.73. So, technically, there was an opportunity loss on that particular bid. But, we do not know.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the risk you all take. Is it?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Exactly.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: My question is, you knew that the total bond issue at that time was Rs. 1 billion. Is it? So, did you not know about the Rs. 10 billion bond issue when you took the decision?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: No.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Suppose, if you knew that there was a bond issue of Rs. 10 billion, what would have been your decision?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: That all depends on our cash flow situation at that time. Based on our maturities; we have Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds maturities. So, depending on the cash flow, we decide. Maybe, we would have taken it up a little bit more but not significantly more.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Within your limits?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: That is right.

Mr. S.D.N. Perera: We bid for only Rs. 300 million because our rates were much lower than the actual rate, the weighted average, the Central Bank rate. We got the entire Rs. 300 million.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, you cannot go for excessive amounts. Such as Rs. 2 -3 million you cannot go?

Mr. Aswin De Silva: We go. Sometimes, we bid for Rs. 2 – 3 billion. It depends on our cash flow situation at that time. So, unfortunately or fortunately I do not know, we did not have the necessary cash flow.

The Chairman: If the need arises, we will call Mr. Rohana Weerakoon.

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Okay, no problem. He is only entering the Committee approval. He is not the decision-maker.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: May I seek a clarification? The Chairman written on the 1st of June that one Mr. D.M.T. Abeysinghe is a dealer. That is number one. Then, we have Mr. Rohana Weerakoon. Is he a dealer? What are their designations and the list of duties?

පී.ඒ. ලයනල් මහතා: අබේසිංහ කියන එක් කෙනා NSB Government Securities Dealer. Company එක හරහා තමයි අපි bid එක යවන්නේ. අපට direct bid කරන්න බැහැ, Central Bank එකට. Company එකේ deal එක enter කරන එක් කෙනා තමයි රෝහණ වීරකෝන්. ඔහු dealer

නොවෙයි. ඔහු dealer හැටියට Government Securities deal කරන්නේ

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මහතා: Investment Committee එකෙන් decide කරපු එකක් ඔහු execute කරනවා. ඔහු මොනවත් decide කරන්නේ නැහැ.

The Chairman: Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Aswin De Silva: Thank you.

(Witnesses withdrew.)

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී සෙලාන් බැංකුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ සහ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරී ජනාධිපති නීතිඥ නිහාල් ජයමාන්න මහතා සහ සෙලාන් බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගනුදෙනුකරු සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා කැඳවන ලදී.)

Mr. Nihal Jayamanne, PC, Director, Chief Executive Officer of the Seylan Bank sworn and examined. සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා, ප්‍රධාන ගනුදෙනුකරු, සෙලාන් බැංකුව; ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව විමසන ලදී.

The Chairman: Good morning, Mr. Jayamanne!

Mr. Nihal Jayamanne: Good morning, Sir.

The Chairman: Sorry that we had to summon you. We did not know that we wanted to summon you.

Mr. Nihal Jayamanne: Yes, I was wondering why I was called. Sir, may I have your permission to bring Mr. Palihawadana, who is the Head of Treasury. He is the one who knows all these facts.

The Chairman: He is the one we want, not the Chairman or any other members.

Mr. Nihal Jayamanne: If you have any questions from him, - I do not think you have questions - he will answer.

The Chairman: We want to gather some information.

Mr. Nihal Jayamanne: Yes, he will be the person who will help you.

The Chairman: Sorry to have disturbed you. I would not have invited you here.

Mr. Nihal Jayamanne: No, I must come. It is a pleasure being with you all.

The Chairman: You have been coming here in some other capacities. Have you not?

Mr. Nihal Jayamanne: Yes, I have been.

සභාපතිතුමා: පලිහවඩන මහත්මයා, අපට මෙන්න මේ මේ කාරණා පැහැදිලි කරන්න. ඔබතුමාට සිංහල හෝ ඉංග්‍රීසි භාෂාවෙන් කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් අපට කරපු නියෝගයක් අනුව, inquiry එකක් මෙතැන කරන්නේ, Central Bank එකේ, ඒ ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් හොයා බලන්න. 27වැනි දා නිබුණු bond transaction එක ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නා යමක් තිබෙනවාද? 27වැනි දා වුණු ඒ සිද්ධිය පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලාට යමක් කියන්න තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පලිහවඩන මහත්මයා, Seylan Bank එකේ dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට ඔබතුමාගේ සේවා කාලය කොපමණද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අවුරුදු 16ක් වෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඊට කලින් ඔබතුමා වැඩ කළේ කොහේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුවේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුවේ කොපමණ කාලයක් වැඩ කළාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අවුරුදු 25ක් වැඩ කළා. Dealer වශයෙන් ඒකේ අවුරුදු 20ක් වැඩ කළා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට ඔබතුමාට අවුරුදු 40ක පළපුරුද්දක් තිබෙනවා. පසු ගිය පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 27වැනි දා Rs. 10 billionවලින් අවසන් වුණු මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි මේ කමිටුව මහින් පරීක්ෂණ කරන්නේ. අපට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ මේ කාරණයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාත් primary dealersලා නේ. මෙහිදී අපට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ කරන්නේ, primary dealersලා හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ activity එක කොහොමද කියලා. එකක්, මේ අවස්ථාව. එහෙම නැත්නම් ඔබතුමාට පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bond issue එකකදී ඔබතුමන්ලා primary dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට කටයුතු කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා. අන්න එතැනින් පටන් ගත්තා නම් ලෙහෙසියි. එතකොට generally බලා ගන්න පුළුවන්, කොයි විධියටද මේක වෙන්නේ කියලා.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Primary dealer කෙනෙක් විධියට හූහක් වෙලාවට අප market එකේ බලනවා, සියයට 10ක් හැම වෙලාවෙම අපේ

bids අප අරින්න ඕනෑ. අපි හිතමු නියම කරන, issue කරන ගණන Rs. 1 billion කියලා, එහෙම නම් අපි Rs. 100 million තමයි අරින්න ඕනෑ, නීත්‍යානුකූල වශයෙන්. නැත්නම් අපට Central Bank එකට කරුණු කියන්න වෙනවා, as to why we have not submitted the bid කියන එක. අවුරුදු තිහේ බැඳුම්කර ඇවිත් තිබෙන්නේ දෙකක් - මා හිතන්නේ ලංකාවේ මෙතෙක් කල් auctions පහ හයකට වඩා තිබ්බලා නැහැ. අන්තිමට තිබුණේ 2014දී ජූනි මාසයේ වාගේ. ඒ වෙලාවේ තිබුණා Rs. 2 billion bond auction එකක්. ඒකට මා හිතන්නේ Rs. 5 billion වාගේ ඇවිත් ඒ වෙලාවේ එතැන Rs. 2 billionම ගත්තා. මේක තමයි අප ගත්ත පළමුවෙනි අවස්ථාව. ඊට පස්සේ secondary market එකේ, නැත්නම් Central Bank එක private placements සඳහා විකුණනවා. Private placements කියන්නේ, ඒ අය අපට කියනවා මේ මේ ratesවලට offers තිබෙනවා කියලා. හුහක් වෙලාවට ඒ rate එක decide කරන්නේ අර පරණ තිබුණු auction එකේ rate එකෙන්. ඒ rate එකෙන් decide කරලා කියනවා, "මේ ගණන්වලට තිබෙනවා, ගන්න පුළුවන්" කියලා. Primary dealersලාට කථා කරලා ඇහුවොත් ඒ අය කියනවා, මේ amounts තිබෙනවා කියලා. නමුත්, ඒ amount එක කියන්නේ නැහැ. What the amount we are expected to invest there, we can go and invest directly with them. That is the earlier practice because they only have a small amount දමලා ඉවර වෙලා, market rate එකක් determine කරලා දෙනවා. නමුත්, මේ සැරේ වුණේ, අප දන්නේ නැහැ, අප හිතුවා Rs. 1 billion තමයි ගන්නේ කියලා. Rs. 1 billion ගන්නවා කියලා auction එක තීරණය කරලා අපට notice එක ආවා. අපත් ඒ අනුව bids ඇරියා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කොපමණ ඇරියාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: මම Rs. 1.25 billion යැව්වා. මොකද, මගේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක්. Rs. 1.25 ඇරියා. එතැනදී Rs. 1.25 අප ඇරියා. 11.75ට තමයි අපි යැව්වේ.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: The rate is 11.75.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: මොකද, අපේ investment අනුව 30-year bond එකක් අරගෙන invest කරන්න බැහැ. අප speculating purpose ගත්තේ ඇත්තෙන්ම, trading purpose to make some money. So, we put the highest bid because we need not to get the lower rate and get caught on that. Fully එකම accept කර තිබුණා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Rs. 1.25 billionවලින්?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකුගෙන් තමයි Rs. 1 billion බැංකුවට ගත්තේ 2.50.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ Rs. 1. billion කාගේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Sakya Capital කියලා වෙනත් කොම්පැනියකින් අප ගත්තේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You can bid on behalf of others also.

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Bids can be taken on behalf of others also

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මොකක්ද ඒ කොම්පැනි එක?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Sakya Capital කියලා කොම්පැනියක්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Sakya Capital. මීට පෙරත් ඒ අය වෙනුවෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා bid කරනවාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. Bid කරනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Sakya Capital - Rs. 1 billion. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ bank එකට Rs. 0.25 billion. ඒ දෙකටම rate එකට ගත්තේ Rs. 1.25 billion. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉල්ලපු ඔක්කොම ටික හම්බ වුණා. මොකද, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ rate එක වැඩි නිසා.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. Rate එක අප දැම්මේ හම්බ වෙනවා නම් - උඩින් හම්බ වෙන්න. නැත්නම්,

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the cut-off mark?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: It was 12.5

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: ඒ අය 12.5 වලින් 11.75 වලට ගියා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: 11.73 වලට.

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: 11.73 is the weighted average. Our rate was 11.75.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මොන විධියකින් හෝ දැනගෙන හිටියාද, Rs. 1 billion වුණාට මේක Rs. 10 billionවලට යයි කියලා?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: නැහැ, දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මීට කලින් එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔය විධියේ long-term bondsවල වෙලා නැහැ. හැබැයි, සමහර වෙලාවට short-term bonds like a six-month Treasury Billවල වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වෙලා තිබෙන්නෙත් හුහක් වෙලාවට rate එක පහළ යන, වැඩි වුණු වෙලාවට වැඩිපුර අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. Market එක බලාපොරොත්තුවෙන් rate එක පල්ලහොට යවන කොට හුහක් වෙලාවට ඒ අයට වැඩිපුර ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වෙලාවට අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. Rates උඩ යන වෙලාවට අරගෙන

නැහැ. ඇත්තටම ඔය bond එක ඉස්සර වෙලා about 9.67 වාගේ level එකක තමයි trade වුණේ, 30-year bond එක.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: 9.67

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: 9.67 වාගේ තමයි trade වුණේ. Central Bank එකේ කට්ටිය කථා කර කියා තිබුණේ අපට bid කරන්න කියලා. හුඟක් primary dealersලා කථා කර කියා තිබුණා, ඒ අය බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ 9.35 වාගේ rate එකක් කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුද එහෙම කථා කර කියන්නේ?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Central Bank එකේ Public Debt Department එකෙන් කථා කර කියා තිබුණේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it the practice?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Normally ඒ අය indication එකක් දෙනවා. හරියටම නැහැ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් market එක ගැන indication එකක් දෙනවා. හැම දාම කරන්නේ නැහැ, ඒ අය කියනවා ඒ අය බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ මේ වාගේ level එකක් කියලා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 9.67 වාගේ නම් trading වුණේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා ,-

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඇත්තටම අපට මේ වාගේ bond එකක් අරගෙන trade කරන්න බැහැ. A 30-year bond එක ගැන ලොකු risk එකක් තිබෙන නිසා අපට ඕනෑ නැහැ, ඒ වාගේ පහළ rate එකක ගන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you just took a risk and put-

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අප උඩින් rate එකක් දැම්මා ආවොත් පල්ලෙහා විකුණන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ සියයට දහය කථාව මොකක්ද? ඒකත් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Central Bank එක auction තියන කොට primary dealersලා 16ක් ඉන්නවා. හැම primary dealer කෙනෙක්ම සියයට 10ක් ඒකෙන් bid එකක් දමන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කියන්නේ, Rs. 1 billion auction තිබෙනවා නම් හැම කෙනෙක්ම Rs. 100 million දමන්න ඕනෑ, අනිවාර්ය bids වශයෙන් මොකක් හරි rate එකකට. Rate එක ඒ අය කියන්නේ නැහැ. අපට කැමැති Rs. 100 million එකකට අපට දමන්න පුළුවන් bid හෝ,-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ minimum ද, maximum ද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: A minimum of Rs. 100 million.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ 250ක් දැම්මා නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Short-term ඒවා ගත්තොත්, මේක නොවෙයි, බලන්න කොහොමද මේක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වැඩි වන්නේ කියලා. Treasury Bills ගත්තාම, indicative rate එකක් announce කරනවා, amount එකක් announce කරනවා නේ. පස්සේ bids ටික දමනවා.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Treasury Bills වාගේ ඒවාට indicative rate එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ නැහැ, හුඟක් වෙලාවට.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ හැම සතියේම වාගේ කෙරෙන නිසා නේ. මේ private placementsවලිනුත් ගන්නවා නේ. ඒ process එක පොඩ්ඩක් අපට explain කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: private placement කළේ මෙහෙමයි. ඇත්තටම මහ බැංකුව පසු ගිය අවුරුදු කීපය පුරා -ඉස්සර ඉඳලාම- මේ විධියට ආවා. ඒ අය auction එකක් තියනවා. අපි හිතමු ඒ අයට ගන්න ඕනෑ නම් 30-year bonds, ඒ අය කරන්නේ Rs. 1 billion හෝ Rs. 2 billion හෝ auction එකක් තියලා, එතැනින් rate එකක් determine කරනවා, market rate එක. මේකේ Rs. 1 billion ගත්තා නම් about 10.3 වාගේ rate එකක් එන්නේ. ඊට පස්සේ ඒ amount එක අනුව ඒ අය කියනවා. අපි හිතමු, ඒකේ average rate එක 10.7ට ආවා කියලා. ඒ අය Rs. 1 billion accept කළා. ඊට පසුව ඒ අය කියනවා 10.7වලට ඕනෑ නම් 10.7වලට දෙනවා, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඊට පල්ලෙහා, හුඟක් වෙලාවට 10.6 වාගේ ඒවාට අප market එකට offer කරනවා, කියලා. එතකොට market එක ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය අනුව ඒ අය decide කරනවා තව පල්ලෙහාට ගේනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා. ඒ අය secondary market rates check කරලා බලලා තමයි ඒක decide කරන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Rate එකක් establish වනවා auction එකෙන්. ඊට පසුව ඒ අයට අවශ්‍යතාව තිබෙනවා වැඩියෙන් ගන්න. එතකොට ඒ dealer-

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ Public Debt Department එක තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතැන ඉන්න dealer ඊට පසුව auction එකෙන් පිට telephone එකෙන් කථා කරනවා ඇති, primary dealerට නේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Primary dealerට උදේම inform කරනවා, "අද අප මේවා issue කරනවා" කියලා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම තේරුම් ගන්න හදන්නේ මේ කාරණාව ගැනයි. Auction එක ගැන අපට පැහැදිලියි. ඒක rate එක determine වෙනවා. Private placement එක ගන්න දැන් dealersලා කී දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: 16ක් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 16ක් ඉන්නවා නේ. ඒ Central Bank dealer call කරලා කියනවා, "මම තව ගන්නවා, මේක rate එක" කියලා නේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් කියනවා, rate එක මේකයි කියලා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අර auction rate එක කියන්නේ. එහෙම නේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. ඊට පහළ අගයක් වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හරි. දැන් මා අහන ප්‍රශ්න මේකයි. දැන් 16 දෙනකු ඉන්නවානේ?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කාටද ඒ telephone call එක දෙන්නේ කියලා කොහොමද තෝරා ගන්නේ?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: මෙහෙමයි. ඒ ගොල්ලන් උදේ announce කළාම- It is not a small amount. It is a large amount. ඉස්සෙල්ලාම කථා කරන කෙනාට තමයි අවස්ථාව ලැබෙන්නේ. Primary dealersලා, අපි ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට call කරනවා. Telephone කරලා උදේම අහනවා "What is the rate?" කියලා. සමහර වෙලාවට අසාධාරණකම් වෙන වෙලාවල් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, ඉස්සෙල්ලා ගත්ත කෙනා සම්පූර්ණ available amount එක ගත්තොත්, then, අනෙක් අයට ගන්න බැරි වෙන අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Rate එක ඒ අය දන්නවානේ?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. හැබැයි, හුහක් වෙලාවට අපි one billion auction තිබ්බා නම්, ඒ ගොල්ලන් 10 billion වාගේ දෙනවා private placements.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මා මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන හේතුව මේකයි. මා establish කරන්න හදන්නේ මේකයි. එදා වුණ සිද්ධිය වුණා. නමුත් මෙතැන culture එකක්, practice එකක් තිබෙනවාද කියන එක ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් establish කරන්න. දැන් private placement කරන කොට beyond the auction because the auction has set that rate. Then, the discretion has moved to the dealer. Now, the dealer has discretion. Then, he has to choose out of 16 people. මා තේරුම් ගන්න හදන්නේ how does he do it because at that point, it is not an auction. I have no problem with the price also because the price will be probably even better, but somebody is getting the deal. How is that determined?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: හැබැයි, ඒක හුහක් අවස්ථාවල හැමෝටම වාගේ ගන්න පුළුවන්කම් තිබුණා. සමහර අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා ගන්න බැරි. ඒ කියන්නේ issue කරන amount එක පොඩි වුණොත් එහෙම, සම්පූර්ණ quantity එක එක් කෙනකු ගත්තොත් දෙවනුවට call කරන කෙනාට හම්බ වෙන්නේ නැති අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා. නැත්තේ නැහැ. හුහක් වෙලාවට හුහ දෙනකුට ගන්න අවස්ථාව තිබුණා. ඒ ගොල්ලන් offer කරන කොට quantities, සමහර වෙලාවට large quantities offer කරනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මා මේක අහන්න තව හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා. දැන් bank එක ඇතුළේ, your internal audit process would normally once a year - දැන් money market එක ගත්තොත්, නැත්නම් EFEC market එක ගත්තොත් brokersලා ඉන්නවානේ. Once a year, you will review the brokerage paid. At least once a year. එහෙම නේද?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: We do it monthly.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay. Monthly you are reviewing the brokerage paid. So, then from that you might determine that there is a certain pattern. Brokersලා 10ක් ඉන්නවා නම් තුන් දෙනකුට එහෙම නැත්නම් දෙදෙනකුට තමයි business එකෙන් සියයට 90ක්ම යන්නේ. At a higher level, you will review that and then you will think that we better look at that. මෙකට හේතුවක් තිබෙනවාද? ඇයි, මේක මීට වඩා distribute වෙන්නේ නැත්තේ? That is a normal practice. දැන් මා අහන්නේ -මේකෙදී ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පැත්තෙන් නොවෙයි, අපි මෙක තේරුම් ගන්න හදන්නේ Central Bank එක පැත්තෙනුයි.- එහෙම එකක් වෙනවාද කියන එකයි. or does it go to a few favoured primary dealers. We are trying to establish that. I am not naming anybody, but we want to find out whether that possibility does exist because we are also inquiring about certain primary dealers without naming anyone. I know in other instances you review it. The banks will review it once a month. අපි බලන්න ඕනෑ, Central Bank එකෙත් - දැන් මේක ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න තිබෙන නිසා- එහෙම එකක් වෙනවාද කියලා because there is room that it can happen because there is discretion to the dealer.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඒක ගැන මට හරියටම කියන්න බැහැ. මොකද, Central Bank එකේ තමයි data තිබෙන්නේ. හැබැයි, හුහක් අවස්ථාවල අපටත් අවස්ථාව හම්බ වුණා. පසු ගිය අවුරුදු කිහිපයේම වාගේ අපි ඉල්ලන විට මහ බැංකුවෙන් දුන්නා. ඕනෑ නම් සමහර අවස්ථා දෙක තුනක් වාගේ අපට මහ හැරෙන්න ඇති. වැඩි අවස්ථා ගණනකදී අපටත් ඒ අවස්ථාව හම්බ වුණා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You have been in this industry for 40 years. So, were you 100 per cent happy with the transparency of private placement? Are you 100 per cent happy that

the system is working or did you also have doubts that this is not-

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: No, I cannot say that I am 100 per cent happy. I can say about 75 per cent I am happy. That 25 per cent-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I wanted to know.

සභාපතිතුමා: Private placementsවලට ඉතිහාසයේ අත්දැකීම් තිබෙනවාද? Seylan Bank එක ගිහින් තිබෙනවාද එහෙම-

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ගිහින් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා Central Bank එක contact කරනවාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Contact කරලා තිබෙනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට ඒ ගොල්ලන් සල්ලි -

සභාපතිතුමා: රජයේ ආයතන විතරද ඒ ගොල්ලන් contact කරන්නේ? අපට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ ඒක. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. මධ්‍යම බැංකුව-

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: නැහැ. අපටත් කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඒවා හම්බ වුණේ නැති අවස්ථා තිබෙනවාද? History එකෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන්ද හම්බ වුණේ නැති අවස්ථාවන් ගැන.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are there instances that you wanted to get it, but you did not it?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: සමහර අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා. මට ඒක ගැන ලොකු විස්තරයක් කියන්න අමාරුයි. ඒ කියන්නේ, සමහර වෙලාවට අපි අරගෙන තිබුණ එකක් දෙකක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විශේෂත්වයක් දැක්වූ dealersලා ගිටියාය කියලා ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුව ගිතෙන අවස්ථා තිබෙනවාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: මට හරියටම ඒක කියන්න බැහැ. මගේ දැනුම අනුව market එකේ එහෙම වුණාය කියලා හිතන්න අමාරුයි. අපට ඒක කියන්න බැහැ. ඒ ගැන මහ බැංකුවෙන් තමයි තීරණය කර ගන්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකයි , private placement එකේ පුළුවන්නේ, තමන්ට ඕනෑ කෙනාට දෙන්න .

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Private placement එකේ සමහර වෙලාවට ඕනෑ තරම් amounts issue කළා. ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඒ දවස්වල පොඩි amounts තමයි bond auctionsවලට දැම්මේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ knowledge එක අනුව විනිවිදභාවය තිබෙන්නේ මොන ක්‍රමය තුළද? Auction එක තුළද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Auction ක්‍රමයේ විනිවිද භාවය වැඩියි. නමුත් අපේ market එක develop නැති නිසා එච්චර දුරට යාමේදී ටිකක් අමාරුකම් දැනෙනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට rate උඩ යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ rates හේත්තු වෙනවා auction වලදී. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයයි තිබෙන්නේ. Market එකේ hedging instruments ඒවා මේවා මොනවත් දැනට නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Private placementsවලදී සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මේ ගොල්ලන් තීරණය කරන අගයට වඩා අඩු එකක් නේද -

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අඩුවෙනුත් දීලා තිබෙනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට fundamentals change වෙලා නම් උඩිනුත් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. එක පාරක් මට මතකයි, rate එක අඩුවෙන් දීලා පසුව 40 basic points වාගේ උඩින් issue කරන්න පටන් ගත්තා. මොකද, ඒ ගොල්ලන් බලනවා, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ ඒවා issue වෙන්නේ නැති වුණාම secondary market එකේ higher trade වෙනවා නම් they cannot issue at the lower rate. Then, they will come to the market and issue at a higher rate. Then the market will go up again to that level. That happens normally.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් primary dealersලාට minimum ගණනක් 10 per cent තිබෙනවානේ? Maximum ගණනක් නැද්ද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: නැහැ, maximum ගණනක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඕනෑ ප්‍රමාණයකට යන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට මෙනැන one billion නේ, දැන් advertise කළේ. -මේක ඔබතුමන්ලාට අදාළ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි.- නමුත් ඔවැනි ලොකු ගණනකට යන්න හේතුව වෙන්න ඇත්තේ මොකක්ද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Ten billionවලට ගිය එකද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්. දැන් ඉතිහාසයේ එවැනි දෙයක් වෙලා නැහැ නේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් long-term වෙලා නැහැ. But, short-term-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ short-term වුණත් 1 billion-

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: දස ගුණයකින් වැඩි වෙලා නැහැ. සාමාන්‍ය වැඩි වීමක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතිහාසයේ ප්‍රථම වතාවට තමයි -

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: මේ වාගේ 30-year bond එකක් issue කරලා තිබෙන්නේ බොහොම ටිකයි. ඔක්කෝම ගත්තොත් 30-year bonds issue කරලා තිබෙන්නේ බිලියන සියයකටත් වඩා අඩුවෙනුයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මෙහෙම දෙයක් වෙන්න ඇත්තේ ඇයි, ඔබතුමාට අවුරුදු 40ක් තුළ තිබෙන අත්දැකීම අනුව. අපි දන්නේ නැති නිසයි අහන්නේ.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අපිත් මහ බැංකුවෙනුත් මේ ගැන ඇහුවා. මේ සිදු වීම වුණු ගමන්ම ඇහුවා. ඒ ගොල්ලන් කිව්වේ, ඒක Tender Board එක ගත්ත decision එකක් කියලයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Tender Board එක කියන්නේ?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Central Bank එකේ Tender Board එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: Scylan Bank එකේ capital එක කොච්චරද? දන්නවාද?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: The capital is about Rs. 20 billion.

The Chairman: දැන් Rs. 300 million company එකක් ගන්නවා මුළු bidsවලින් සියයට 50ක්, 75ක් ඔබතුමාට ඒක කොහොමද දැනෙන්නේ?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඒක ලොකු risk එකක්. ඇත්තටම එහෙම යන්න අමාරුයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට විශාල capital එකක් තිබෙනවා. පුංචි කොම්පැනියක් ඇවිල්ලා ගන්නවා, මුළු bidsවලින්ම භාගයක්. Banking business එක විධියට how do you react? ඒක තමයි අපි හොයන්නේ. මේ system එකේ වරදක් තිබෙනවාද කියන එකයි අපි හොයන්නේ, Correct කරන්න. We want to help you all.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා කියන එකම මා තව විධියකට කිව්වොත්, ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නවා නේද, මොනවා හෝ limits තිබෙන්න ඕනෑය කියන එක. එහෙම නේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. Bid කරන්න limits තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් අපේ bid කරන්න limits තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Primary dealer කෙනකු bid කරන කොට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ capital එක අනුව මොනවා හෝ limits තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bond එකක් ගන්නත් market එකට ගිහිල්ලා අපට borrow කරන්න පුළුවන් up to 90 per cent. Thirty-year bond එකක 90 per cent borrow කරන්න බැහැ. About 75 per cent වාගේ තමයි maximum borrow කරන්න පුළුවන්. Then, you have to have- one billion borrow කරන්න ගන්නවා නම් 250 million capital තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. If you are buying at 1 billion, at least you need about 250 million funds. The other thing is. you can borrow from the repo market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You have to have at least 25 per cent.

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Yes, you have to have at least 25 per cent for a 30-year bond.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් tender board එකක -මේක ඔබතුමන්ලාට අයිති දෙයක් නොවෙයි.- දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට Rs. 20 billion තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මේ Rs. 10 billion ගත්ත එකට තිබෙන capital එක කීයද?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Rs. 300 million.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මහ බැංකුව මේ අය ඉල්ලීම් කළත් මේ අයගේ තිබෙන මූල්‍ය ශක්තිය පිළිබඳව බලන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැද්ද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අවශ්‍යයි. හැබැයි, ඒ ගොල්ලන් මහ බැංකුවට monthly submit කරන්න ඕනෑ, returns. ඒ returnsවලදී ඒ ගොල්ලන් capital adequacy එක බලනවා. ඒ adequacy reach කරලාද කියලා. ඒ වෙලාවට මහ බැංකුව මේවා primary dealerටම add කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි වෙන ආයතනයක් මගින් bid කළා නම් ඒක අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අන්තිමට එයාගේ නමට එනවා නේ. ඒක එයාගේ නමට ආවා නම්, අර ගෙන විකුණුවා නම්, ඒක අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කොහොමත් Bank of Ceylon එක -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Palihawadana, I would like to ask just a question. Would you have bid for another private dealer?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Normally, we do not accept bids from the primary dealers. But we accept bids from non-primary dealers.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what I want to know. You are a primary dealer.

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Would you bid on behalf of another primary dealer?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: No. We do not bid.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it a standard that is set by the Bank?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Normally, the primary dealer will not submit bids through us.

The Chairman: Is it a fair or a sound practice? What do you think?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Because in this instance -

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Sometimes there might be a case, where the primary dealer is a non-bank primary dealer, their capital is low. So, they will ask some other banks to bid through a request, because the settlement day morning, itself they have to have funds in the account.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, if the primary dealer was a customer of yours, dealing with the bank and if that primary dealer had requested you to make a bid, would you have done that? If the primary dealer is a very good customer of yours, would you do it?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Up to now we have not done that. But, within the approved limits, we can do that actually, because we have the trading limit for each primary dealer. So, within that limit we can do that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, there are no hard and fast rules saying that you cannot bid for another primary dealer. Okay.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you not do that?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: At the moment, as a practice, we do not do that actually.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Have there been any request from another primary dealer?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Not recently.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් මෙච්චර පළපුරුදු deader කෙනෙක් හැටියට දන්නවා නේ මේ issue එක මොකක්ද කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා Bond issue එකේදී primary dealer කෙනෙක් තවත් primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා - මේ අනාවරණ වන කරුණු අනුව - රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් raise කළා, රුපියල් බිලියන 5ක් ගත්තා. රුපියල් බිලියන 2ක්, එයාගේම කලින් නිබුණු ඒවා ඉදිරි විකුණුම් කරලා සොයා ගත්තා. තවත් රුපියල් බිලියන 3ක් ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා ගත්තා. ඒකනේ මෙතැන වුණේ. එහෙම කරන්න ඇත්තේ ඔබ කලින් කියපු හැටියට - ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා Rs. 3 billion ගන්න ඇත්තේ - බැංකුවක් නොවන නිසා ඒ සමාගමට ඒ තරම් ලොකු capital එකක් නැති නිසා වෙන්න ඇති.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: එයාලට ඒ තරම් capital එකකුත් නැහැ. Settlement එක දවසේ උදේටම account එකේ Rs. 5 billion තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඉතින්, Rs. 5 billion සොයා ගන්න බැරිකම නිසා වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Settle වෙනකොටම තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. හැබැයි ඒ වුණාට මේ transaction එක ඉවර වෙන කොට ඒ ගොල්ලන් Bank එකට ඒ Rs. 3 billion හොයලා දෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒක දෙන්න කොච්චර කාලයක් ලැබෙනවාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඒක actually depends on the Bank. Bank එකේ limit එකක් තිබෙනවා. They can do buy and sell swap එකක් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: "Swap" කියන එක පොඩ්ඩක් explain කරන්න.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: "Swap" කියන්නේ, එයා buy කරනවා එයාගේ නමටම. Bank of Ceylon එක තමයි example එක. Bank of Ceylon එක buy කරනවා, අද එයාගේ නමට. එයා ඒක sell කරනවා forward date එකකට, not today. දවස් හතරක් විතර forward date එකකට එයාට ඒක විකුණන්න පුළුවන්, ඒ ගත්ත rate එකටම.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහතා: එතකොට Bank එක හිතන්නේ, Bank of Ceylon එක තමයි මේක ගත්තේ කියලා.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. The Central Bank එකත් එක්ක නොවෙයි, ඒ ගත්ත අනෙක් party එක කියනවා, "මට දැන් සල්ලි නැහැ, දවස් තුනකින් තමයි සල්ලි හම්බ වෙන්නේ," කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ එයාට පුළුවන් සල්ලි හම්බ වෙනකල් buy and sell කරන්න. එයා buy කරනවා අද date එකට. එතකොට, ownership එක එයාගේ නමට තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එයත් deal එකක් නේ කරන්නේ.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: එයා අනෙක් පැත්තට sell කරනවා. එතකොට, the Bank of Ceylon is making a high yield over this. මොකද, local market එකේ මේ දවස්වල call money යන්නේ 6 per cent වාගේ percentage එකකට තමයි. It is getting about 12 per cent return on those four days. But there is the settlement risk.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ settle නොකළොත් -

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Settle නොකළොත් එයාට price risk එක තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට එච්චර capital එකක් නැති primary dealer ගෙන් Bank

of Ceylon එක අහන්නේ නැද්ද, එයා මේ සල්ලි settle කරන්නේ කොහෙන්ද කියලා? කොහොමද ඒක කරන්නේ කියලා අදහසක් ගන්නේ නැද්ද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අදහසක් ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා එහෙම කළා නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලා එහෙම අහනවාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්. අපි බලනවා, ගන්න කෙනාට ගෙවන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මම ඇහුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලා එහෙම කරනවා නම්, එහෙම අහනවාද කියලායි.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අපේ එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. අපේ customersලාට ගන්නවා නම්, customersලාගේ approved limit එකක් තිබෙන අය හෝ money market overdraft facility එකක් හෝ තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එක අවදානමක් අර ගෙන තිබෙනවා පෙනෙනවා නේ. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා බැංකුවක් විධියට ඒ වාගේ අවධානමක් ගන්නවාද? Bank of Ceylon එක customer වෙනුවෙන් යම් අවධානමක් ගත්තා කියලා අපට හැඟෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා බැංකුවක් විධියට ඒ වාගේ අවස්ථාවක් ආවොත් ඒ වාගේ අවධානමක් ගන්නවාද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Thirty-year වාගේ bond එකක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවධානමක් ගන්න අමාරුයි. Customerගේ හැටියට තමයි. It depends on the customer's credibility. Customerගේ credibility එක බලලා තමයි අපි අවධානමක් ගන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් නම් ඒ වගේ risk එකක් ගන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඒ risk එක ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා සමහ බැලුවාම මේක ලොකු ගණනක්. එහෙම නැත්නම්, for Rs. 200 million, Rs. 100 million or Rs. 50 million, you all would take that risk.

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Actually it depends on the credibility of the customer.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Customerගේ ස්වභාවය අනුව තමයි risk එක ගන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මට නව ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න පුලුවන්ද, dealing room practice එක ගැන? Primary dealer ඉන්නවා, dealer ඉන්නවා. එතකොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් calls එන්නේ dealerට නේ. Chief Dealerටවත්, AGMලාටවත් කාටවත් එන්නේ නැහැ නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එදිනෙදා සිදු වන වැඩක් නේ මේක.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: Dealer කිව්වාට සමහර වෙලාවට Chief Dealersලාත් - ඔය වගේ දේවල්වලදී නම්, හුහාක් වෙලාවට මමත් involve වෙනවා, dealingවලට. ඔය වගේ large quantityවලට අපි involve වෙනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් මම බලන්නේ, customer සහ තමුන් අතර තිබෙන relationship එක, placement of the order, confirmation of the order, execution, subsequent confirmation වාගේ දේවල් කරන කොට ඒක කොහොමද වෙන්නේ කියන එක. Instructions කොහොමද එන්නේ, instruction එක කොහොමද verify කරන්නේ කියලා අපට පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අපි හුහක් වෙලාවට customersලාව nominate කරලා තිබෙනවා, who is going to deal with us කියලා. මොකද, ඒ ගොල්ලන් over the phone තමයි හුහාක් වෙලාවට මේවා inform කරන්නේ. Then, after that confirmation will come through an email or something. Then, if it is accepted, then, we are asking bids from them. We are submitting bids. After that we will inform them that these bids are accepted at these rates. Then, they will again confirm the deal, the settlement procedure and everything.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපි අද රුපියල් බිලියන 500ක් දමනවා හරි, මොකක් හරි - දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන විධියට preset limit එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මම නම් customer, මම ඔබතුමාට ඉස්සර වෙලාම ලියමනක් එවන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මම ඉස්සර වෙලාම ඔබතුමාට call කරලා කියනවා. මොකද, ඒ තීරණය මම ගන්නේත් අන්තිම මොහොතට නේ, market එක බලලා. එතකොට ඔබතුමා දන්නවා, මම කථා කරනවා කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමා ඒක execute කරනවා, electronic system එක හරහා. ඊට පස්සේ මම subsequently email එකකින් හරි, fax එකකින් හරි, letter එකකින් හරි confirm කරනවා. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමය, නේද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හරි. එතකොට මම මූලිකව order එක place කරන්නේ හුහාක් වෙලාවට phone එකෙන් නේ. එතකොට dealing roomsවල dispute එකක් ඇති වුණොත් -

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අපේ recordings තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Dealing room එකේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ recording එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට ඒක record කරනවා. Dealersලාට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ private mobile phones dealing room එකට ගෙනෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: ගෙනෙන්න පුළුවන්. But, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඒ phones dealingsවලට involve කරගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Dealingsවලට private mobile phones පාවිච්චි කරන්න බැහැ.

So, it is on the bank system and it is bank recorded.

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Thank you.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it illegal to use phones within dealing rooms?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: There is a guideline issued by the Central Bank saying that it is prohibited. You can use phones for private purposes but not for the deal. But, they cannot even take their mobile phones inside the dealing room.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ bid price එක අඩු වෙලා 100න් පහළට යනවා - ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ bid price එක තිබෙන්නේ 95. Bank of Ceylon එක උදාහරණයක් විධියට ගත්තොත් 119යි. ඒ ගොල්ලන් රුපියල් බිලියන 8ක් - Seylan Bank එක එක අවස්ථාවයි. Bank of Ceylon එක අවස්ථා දෙක, තුනක් තිබෙනවා.

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මහතා: අපි ගන්න අපේ yield එක අනුව තමයි price එක determine වෙන්නේ. මොකද, අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ, සියයට 11.75ක yield එකක්. අපේ price එක ඊට වඩා අඩුයි. සියයට 12.5 ගන්න එක් කෙනාගේ price එක ඊටත් වඩා අඩුයි. සියයට 12.5ට ගියොත් price එක ඇත්තටම සියයට සියයක් වෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How did you all place the bid?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: At 11.75 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the mechanism?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Electronic system.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can I ask you a general knowledge question since you have been in the trade for 40 years? What are the other methods of placing bids? Can you place a bid through an email?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: The Central Bank does not allow all bids to be electronic.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I mean, if he is one of your clients, can they?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: No. They cannot actually. Only the primary dealer has access to that system.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know. What I am asking you is, can your client place a bid through an email?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: A client can send us an email.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is that enough for you?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Yes, that is enough. The client can confirm it to us through an email.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying. Actually, we are trying to get something else.

The Chairman: Right.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If a client sends you an e mail - Anyone can send an e-mail under the name of the client. You with a call will reconfirm? You would call from the local lines?

Mr. Somadasa Palihawadana: Yes, from our lines we will call.

සාක්ෂිකරුවෝ නික්ම ගියහ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි දැන් මෙතුමාගෙන් ගොඩක් ප්‍රශ්න ඇහුවා, මේ private placements වුණු ඒවා සහ කොහොමද වුණේ කියලා? Can we have a record from the Central Bank since 2013 until now on the private placements that have taken place.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And who got it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And who got it because we want to know whether consistently one particular party was getting it. We were asking these four people but they would not know the dealings of the Central Bank. May be we should have a record to see whether there is pattern where certain people - මේ ගොල්ලෝ එක්ක කථා කරලා වැඩක් නැහැ. ඒ ප්‍රශ්න අහලා වැඩක් නැහැ. ඒක Central Bank එකෙන් ගනිමු; දිගින් දිගටම කවුද private placements හරි even the auctions -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, අනික් කාරණය තමයි මේ Perpetual Treasuries කලින් ගනුදෙනු කළ ආකාරය බලන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක බලන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කලින් ගනුදෙනු කළ ආකාරය බලන්න පුළුවන්. අපේ ළඟ Secondary Market එකේ information තිබෙනවා. Primary Market එකේ first time ඇවිල්ලා

තිබෙන්නේ ගිය අවුරුද්දේ, ඒ කියන්නේ 2014 ජූලි මාසයේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 2013 නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2014 ජූලි වල.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: 2013ත් එකක් තිබුණා නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අලුත් company එකක් 2013 primary dealer විධියට නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නැහැ. Primary dealer විධියට thirty year -

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Primary market එකේ ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ විස්තර ටික අපි ළඟ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Thirty year මේකෙත් ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා - They have bid Rs.57 million. ඒ වාගේ ගණන් තිබෙනවා. ඒවා ගොඩක් වැදගත් වෙනවා. මේ dealerට favours තිබිලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Deal කරලා තිබෙන්නේ personal capacity එකෙන්ද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Secondary market එකේ.

Mr. W. P. C. Wickramaratne: Secondary market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the company?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Perpetual Treasuries. Since last year they have been dealing as a primary dealer.

Private placements ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කොපමණ දාලා තිබෙනවාද? Central Bank එක -

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට ප්‍රශ්න කිහිපයක් තමයි අහන්න තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Mr. Chairman, this is important for us to know.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේ record එකක් තිබුණා. ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුවත් හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක අහ ගත්තා නම් හරි. It is absolutely important for us to know exactly who did the Central Bank deal with as far as private placements were concerned. We can then gauge the pattern. ඒ ගොල්ලන් favour කරලා තිබෙනවාද කාට හරි? ඒක ඉල්ලන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We can then in the future advise whether it should go by auction or by private placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They say that the present Central Bank Governor has taken a stance that he will be more transparent and go through auctions. They have suspended private placements. That is what they said yesterday. They all say the best system is auction.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී මහජන බැංකුවේ සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී එන්. වසන්ත කුමාර් මහතා සහ මහජන බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධානී (භාණ්ඩාගාර) ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා කැඳවයි.)

මහජන බැංකුවේ සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී එන්. වසන්ත කුමාර් මහතා සහතික කරන ලද්දුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී. මහජන බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධානී (භාණ්ඩාගාර) ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා දිවුරුම් දෙන ලද්දුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවා නේ Rs.13 billion bond issue එක පිළිබඳව. අපි මේ පිළිබඳ කරුණු ටිකක් සොයා ගැනීම සඳහා තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලාව මෙතැනට කැඳවුයේ. ඒ පිළිබඳ පිළිතුරු දෙන්නේ කවුද? Head of the Division ද, CEO ද subject එක දන්නේ? මේකට Chairman අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: Chairmanට සනීප නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ප්‍රශ්න අහයි. මේ පිළිබඳ විස්තර ටිකක් දෙන්න. 27 වෙනිදා තිබුණ ප්‍රශ්න ගැන ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ. ඒ ගැන කියන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලාත් bid කරලා තිබෙනවා නේ?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: Yes. The Central Bank announced this auction. There was a paper advertisement. People's Bank is a primary dealer. As a primary dealer we are required to bid for ten per cent of the auction. Basically what we did was, bid for ten percent of ten billion which is Rs. one billion. At that time the market was in the range of 9.5 per cent. Deposits that we have are generally on short term and since this was for thirty years we did not want to have this bond in our port folio, so we bid at 11 per cent. From the auction, we got Rs.100 million. That is all.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: It was only for the People's Bank and not for any other dealer?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: No. We bid Rs. 100 million only for People's Bank. That is a statutory requirement.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: You fulfilled that basic requirement.

Mr. Clive Fonseka: Basic requirement.

The Chairman: On your behalf?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: On our behalf. It was not on behalf of any customer? We checked with some Insurance Companies and they were not interested in this.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you bid for other companies also?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: Some banks and insurance companies. Even Treasury bills they bid through us.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can a primary dealer bid through you?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: We do not do any bidding for primary dealers because there is nothing in it for us. They can do it on their own.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And you have to take the risk?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: Yes. That is a policy of the People's Bank.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Bank එකෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට policy එකක් තිබෙනවාද?

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: මෙහෙමයි. අපේ treasury policy එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතැන කියලා තිබෙනවා දැන් investments එහෙම කරන ඒවා ටික Treasury එකේ Investment Committee එකෙන් තමයි decide කරන්නේ. හැබැයි, අපේ understanding එකක් තිබෙනවා primary dealersලාට අපි කරන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට Central Bank එකට කෙළින්ම යන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Policy එක දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: Policy එක in writing නැහැ. අපි ඒක practice.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට මේ decisions ගන්නකොට, invest කරන්න කලින් decision එක මේ Committee එකෙන් අර ගන්නවා.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක Investment Committee වෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Dealerට ඊට අමතරව, එයාට දීලා නැහැ decide කරන්න.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: නැහැ. නැහැ. Investment Committee එකේ Membersලා තුන්දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ තුන්දෙනා discussion එකක් කරලා, ඒක document කරලා ඊට පස්සේ තමයි Central Bank එකට ගිහිල්ලා computer එකට bid එක දාන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි, decision එකක් ගන්න දේකුත් නැහැ නේ.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: එකේ දමන rate එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: rate එකද?

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 27 වෙනිදා උදේ තමයි ඔයාලාගේ meeting එක.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක informal meeting එකක්. ඒක document කරලා, අපි තුන්දෙනා කොලයක අත්සන් කරනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you happy with the bid?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: Eleven per cent is basically –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Fonseka, you are the Chief Dealer?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: I am the Head of Treasury, Ma'am.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: For example, auctions take place within a short span of time. If one your customers, a very long standing customer, asks you to make a bid you do not have to go and get permission from your Three Member Board but you have the capacity or the power through discretion to bid on behalf of them?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: As a policy, Madam, we just ask them, "How the funds are". Basically, we tell them, "Okay", because most of the customers have the Treasury Bills and Bonds maturities. Then, there is no problem because the maturity will come to People's Bank itself.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. My question is whether you have the power to take a decision on the spot in the dealing room, in case if you get an email from one of your long-standing customers to bid.

Mr. Clive Fonseka: No. Ultimately, even that also goes through the Investment Committee.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, how long does it take-

Mr. Clive Fonseka: The Investment Committee is there in the dealing room itself.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. So, you have your line of people there, in case to take a decision?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How long will it take?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: It will take five minutes only if we just satisfy ourselves over the funding.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How much do you require from the private bidder in percentage wise?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: Sir, the minimum bid is Rs. 5 million.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know that, but how much do you deposit? What is the percentage? Whether it is 25 per cent or 100 per cent?

Mr. Clive Fonseka: No, we generally ask for the full amount.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You have to have security collateral for the full amount.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Bank එකේ Credit Committee එක Rs. 5 million වාගේ ගණනකට යනවා කියලා හිතමු, එහෙම ගණනක් තිබෙනවාද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: බැංකුවට Treasury Billsවලටයි, Treasury Bondsවටලයි limits තිබෙනවා. ඒ overall limit එක ඇතුළේදී Investment Committee එකට decisions ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: බැංකුවට limits තිබෙන්නේ practice එකක් විධියටද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: Board එක approve කරපු limits තිබෙනවා. ඒක එක එක tenure එකට තිබෙනවා. Treasury Billsවලට limits තිබෙනවා, up to one year, one to five-year and five to ten-year කියලා. Tenure එක වැඩි වෙන කොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් limit එක අඩු වෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Dealer කෙනෙක් තනියම තීරණ ගන්නේ නැද්ද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: මෙහෙමයි. Trading transactions – buying and selling - වලදී dealer තීරණ ගන්නවා. අපේ interbank market එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. හැම dealer කෙනෙකුටම "stop-loss limit" එකක් කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ සීමාවට යටත්ව ඔහුට decisions ගන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැතුව ඒක කරන්නත් බැහැ. මොකද market එකේ quotes ඉක්මනට වෙනස් වෙනවා. Investment decisions හැම එකක්ම Investment Committee එක හරහා තමයි යන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් එන procedures නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ ගැන මෙතුමන්ලා ගියාම හරි අපි කථා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා තමයි නවවැනි bid එක දෙන්නේ.

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: අපි ඒ ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ. අපි Rs. 100 millionවලට bid කළා. Central Bank තමයි numbers පිළිවෙළට එන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Speculate කළාම වැඩි වෙයි කියලා-

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: ඇත්තටම අපට වුවමනාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මම දැන ගැනීම සඳහායි ඇහුවේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා minimum ගණන අනුවද තීරණය කළේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: Interest rate එක තමයි. ඒක නේ මම ඇහුවේ, Speculate කරන්න පුළුවන්, වැඩි වේවිද කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා 10 per cent ගන්න නේ හැදුවේ.

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: ඔව්. Rupees one billionවලින් ten per cent තමයි 100 million.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඇයි ඊට වඩා ගියේ නැත්තේ?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: මේක 30-year එකක් නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් බැංකුවේ deposits තිබෙන්නේ short-term ඒවා. ඒකේ Risk එක වැඩියි නේ. මොකද basis point එකක් ගියත් profits loss වෙන එක වැඩි වෙනවා. අපට deposits එක්ක justify කරන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒක හින්දා අපි සියයට 99ක් government's securities portfolio එක තිබෙන්නේ "less than ten-year" කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මීට කලින් 30-year වාගේ long-term bonds අරගෙන තිබෙනවාද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: 30-year bonds අරගෙන නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ පළමුවැනි වතාව?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: ඔව්. මේ පළමුවැනි වතාව.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Thirty-year bond එකක් ගන්න එක අවදානමද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: අවදානමක් නැහැ. ඒක බැංකුවේ decisions එක අනුව. බැංකුව හිතනවා නම් interest rates අඩු වෙනවා කියලා එහෙම නම් ගන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බැංකුවේ deposits long-term තිබෙනවා නම් ගන්නවා. එහෙමද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: 4වන නිලධාරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක ආන්දෝලනයකට තුඩු දුන් කාරණාවක් නේ. Market එකට බිලියන 10ක් ආවාම ඔබතුමන්ලාට මොකක්ද හිතුණේ? ඒක රටේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් මත නිකුත් කරපු එකක්ද, නැත්නම් වෙනත් මොකකට හරි නිකුත් කළාද කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට හිතුණාද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: එදා නම් අපි දැන ගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ. එදා නම් වුණේ rates පොඩ්ඩක් ඉහළට ගියා. Secondary Market එකේ rates පොඩ්ඩක් ඉහළට ගියා. ඊට පස්සේ තමයි stabilize වෙන්න පටන් ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බිලියනයක් දාලා බිලියන 10ක් නිකුත් කරපු සාමාන්‍ය කාරණයක්ද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: මීට ඉස්සෙල්ලා එවැනි නිකුත් කිරීම් සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. දහ ගුණයක් ආපු එකක් ගැන නම් මට හරියට මතක නැහැ. දෙතුන් ගුණයක් වාගේ නම් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒක සිදු වෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දහ ගුණයක් වෙලා නැහැ?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: මීට කලින් දහ ගුණයක් වැඩියෙන් නිකුත් වුණාද කියන්න මතකයක් නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම වැඩි වෙනවාද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වැඩි වෙනවා.

ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කොච්චර කාලයක සිට සේවය කරනවාද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: මම මහජන බැංකුවේ Treasury Division එකේ ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා, 2002 ඉඳලා අවුරුදු 13ක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Market rate එක දැන ගනීවි කියලද සාමාන්‍යයෙන් බැංකුව පොඩි ගණනකට දාන්නේ?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: ලොකු ගණනක් තිබුණා නම්, අපි වැඩි rate එකකට bid කරනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා direct placements වලටද වැඩි පුර යන්නේ?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: අපි direct placements මීට ඉස්සෙල්ලා කරලා තිබෙනවා. Customer කෙනෙක් අපට කිව්වාම five-year bond එකක් ඕනෑ කියලා customerගේ requirement එක බිලියන 500ක් නම් අපි Central Bank එකෙන් අහනවා, කීයටද දෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒකට transaction එකක් කරන්න පුළුවන් නම් බැංකුවට profitably අපි ඒක කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Direct placementsවල විනිවිදභාවය අඩුයි කියලා මතයක් තිබුණා නේද? ඒ අවශ්‍ය dealerට discretion එක අනුව දෙන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: අපි Central Bank එකට කථා කළාම Central Bank එක අපට rate එක කියනවා. මිලියන සියයකට එක rate එකක් නම්, අපි කිව්වොත් බිලියනයක් ගන්නවා කියලා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඊට වඩා හොඳ rate එකක් හම්බ වෙනවා. හැබැයි අපි වෙන කාට හරි දෙන rate එක ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ආයතනයක් නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට privately profit එකක් ලබන්න බැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ආයතනයක් වශයෙන් නේ මේකට invest කරන්නේ.

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: ඔව්. අපට personally benefit එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වෙනත් primary dealersලා එක්ක ගනුදෙනු වෙන කොට ඊට වඩා වෙනස් තත්ත්වයක් නේ තිබෙන්නේ. බැංකුවක් එක්ක වාගේ නොවෙයි නේද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Direct placementsවල විනිවිදභාවය අඩු බවක් සහ ඒකේ යම් කිසි වංචාකාරී තත්ත්වයකට ඉඩ දෙන්න පුළුවන් තත්ත්වයක් ඔබතුමන්ලා දකින්නේ නැද්ද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපි දන්නේ නැහැ, වෙච්ච සිදු වීම. වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මට හරියට එහෙම කියන්න අමාරුයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම අහන්නේ. අපි අහන්නේ තත්ත්වයට අපට දැන ගන්නයි.

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: ඇත්තටම වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Auction එකේද විනිවිදභාවය වැඩි?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: Auction එකේ. හැමෝම දන්නවා නේ. Press notice එකක් එනවා, Offer කළේ මෙච්චරයි; Accepted amount එක මෙච්චරයි; Weighted average yield එක මෙච්චරයි කියලා. එතකොට අපි දන්නවා. අපට calculate කරලා බලන්න පුළුවන් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් cut-off එක කොතැනද කියලා. අනන ඒ වාගේ එකක් නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ අත්දැකීම් අනුව direct placementsවලදී එහෙම ඉල්ලලා හම්බ වුණු නැති අවස්ථා තිබෙනවාද?

ක්ලයිව් පොන්සේකා මහතා: අපේ requirement එක Central Bank එකට කිව්වාම ඒ ගොල්ලන් දෙන rate එකට අපට transaction එකක් කර ගන්න බැහැ. එහෙම වුණාම අපි ඒකට මොකුත් කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් rate එකක් කියනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Auction එකේ කරපු rate එකේ -

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: Auction එකේ rate එකමයි. Market එකේ පොඩි differences සමහර වෙලාවට ඒවා refer කරනවා. ඒක formula එකක්. මම ඒ ගැන හරියට දන්නේ නැහැ. Central Bank එක අපට කියන්නේ, Treasury Bond එක five-year නම් මේ rate එකට දෙනවා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: People's Bank එකේ Treasury Bonds, Bills වලින් percentage wise direct placements මෙච්චරයි, auctions මෙච්චරයි කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට final figures අපට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: Private placements කොච්චර ගත්තාද කියලා කල් දැන්නොත් මට ඒ විස්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට general idea එකක් ගන්නයි අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කොච්චරක් ඉල්ලුවාද, කොච්චරක් හම්බ වුණාද කියලා අපට කියන්න.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඉල්ලන ගණන ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඉල්ලන ගණන හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: ඉල්ලන ගණන ගන්න පුළුවන්. එකම ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ rate එක තමයි. අපි expect කරන rate එක හම්බ වුණේ නැත්නම් අපි transaction එක කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙතැනදී මහජන බැංකුව යම් කිසි ක්‍රමවේදයකට කටයුතු කරන නිසා හොඳයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අභ්‍යන්තර පාලනය හොඳයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි ඒ ගැන වාර්තාවක් ගෙන්වා ගනිමු. Board decision එකක් තිබෙනවා, මෙච්චරයි යන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. මෙතුමන්ලාගේ Investment Committee එකක් තිබෙනවා. මෙතුමන්-ලාගේ procedure එකක් තිබෙනවා. practice එකක් තිබෙනවා. මේ පරිපාලනමය රටාව තිබෙන නිසා බැංකුවට අවදානමක් එන්නේ නැහැ. මෙවැනි ආයෝජන වැඩ පිළිවෙළකදී මහජන බැංකුව විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මොනවාද නීති රීති, මොනවාද circulars, manual එක කොහොමද ආදී විස්තර දෙන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපට manual එක දැන්නා නම් හරි. Board approval manual එක table කළා නම් හරි.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: මම දෙන්නම්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක in writing ගෙන්වා ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැත්නම් අපට එවන්න.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: Manual එකේ second paragraph of page 9වල තිබෙනවා, investments කරන කොට කොහොමද කරන්නේ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ කොහේවත් තිබෙනවාද, deposit එක collateral තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. හැබැයි ඒක අපේ practice එක අනුව බැංකුවට තිබෙන අවදානම අඩු කරන්න ගත්තු decision එකක්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම අවුරුදු 25කට ඉස්සර වෙලා බැංකුවක Treasury Division එකේ Head වෙලා ඉන්න කොට මෙතැන ඉන්න ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරිතුමා, Treasury Division එකක Head වෙලා හිටියා. මේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරිතුමාටත් ලොකු දැනුමක් තිබෙනවා. Treasurer විතරක් නොවෙයි, ඕනෑ නම් එතුමාගෙන් වුණත් ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: වෙන මොනවත් කාරණා අහන්න තිබෙනවාද? එහෙම නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලා දෙපළට බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

සාක්ෂිකරුවෝ නික්ම ගියහ.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ අධිකාරි ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා, අතිරේක අධිකාරි ඒ.එස්.කේ. ධර්මවර්ධන මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිකාරි ජේ.ඩී.එස්.ජේ. නානායක්කාර මහතා සහ සහකාර අධිකාරි එස්. පදුමනාපන් මහතා, කාරක සභාව හමුවට කැඳවන ලදී.)

සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ අධිකාරි ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඔබතුමන්ලා කැඳෙව්වේ මේකයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවානේ, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ඉල්ලීම අනුව Rs. 13 billion, bond issue එක ගැන පොඩි පරීක්ෂණයක් සහ විමර්ශනයක් කරන බව. ඔබතුමන්ලාත් bid කරලා තිබෙන නිසා ඒ පිළිබඳව දන්නා තොරතුරක් තිබෙනවා නම් විස්තර කරන්න, Auditor-General අහන ප්‍රශ්නවලට.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්- ලා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එහෙම bid එකක් දානවා. ඇත්තටම bond එකක් කියලා කියන්නේ දීර්ඝ කාලීන instrument එකක්නේ. බොහෝ විට ඒවාට යන්නේ funds. මම හිතන්නේ ලංකාවේ over Rs. 1 trillion වාගේ තිබෙන fund එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා තමයි ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම මේකට යන්න තිබෙන ප්‍රධානම පාර්ශ්වය. එහෙම deal එකක් යනවා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කාගේ හරහාද යන්නේ? Primary dealer කෙනෙකු හරහානේ යන්න ඕනෑ.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී.වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන් ලාක් primary dearer කෙනෙක්.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: Primary dealer's status එක දීලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන තීරණය කිරීමට committee එකක් හෝ මොකක් හෝ තිබෙනවාද? Structure එක ගැන තීරණය කරන නිලධාරියා කවුද? ඒ ගැන තීරණය කරන්නේ CEOද?

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: Superintendent තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ මේක කරනවා කියලා. ඊට අමතරව ඒකේ dealersලා ඉන්නවා. Middle office එක කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. Middle office එකෙන් තමයි මේ primary auction කියන ඒවාට යන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ නිලධාරියාට කියන්න, කරුණු පැහැදිලි කරන්න කියලා. Bid එකක් කරන කොට මොකක්ද කරන්නේ කියලා අපි අහමු.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Actually, there is a team of analyst and they are doing the analysis of each and every investment of the EPF. I am one of them. So, that team will meat everyday in the morning and consider the market situation and the prevailing economic situation, especially, the micro and macro situations and the government's funding requirement. Based on that, we will bid each and every auction. Then, we will give our recommendation in that meeting. There is a hierarchy. So, we will give that recommendation to the Deputy Superintendent, the Additional Superintendent and the S/EPF. Especially the Government securities are considered as risky instruments. Due to that, we make these decisions at department level. Thereafter, we ratify it in the investment committee then at the Monetary Board at the end of the month. We are doing in the other way with regard to the other investments. That is, we get the approval for them in advance. Because the Government securities are risky, we ratify at the level of IC and at Monetary Board. So, considering the Government funding requirement, the other factors and especially, the rate of the secondary market, we bid for this bond.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the bid?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Actually, there were three bids.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, all three bids were successful. Were they not?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: All the three were successful. One Rs. 500 million was at 10.75 per cent; the other Rs. 1 billion was at 11 per cent and Rs. 500 million was at 11.25 per cent.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: It is altogether Rs. 2 billion.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Yes, it is altogether Rs. 2 billion.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: But, the bids were called for only Rs. 1 billion.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Yes. If you see the history, we noticed that the most the time, the Public Debt Department accepted even higher than what they offered, for example, the Treasury Bills. Further, these are 30-year bonds. If you see the EPF, we are a longer-term fund. Our liabilities are more than 20 to 30 years. So, these are ideal opportunities. Even though they offered Rs. 1 billion, as a good investment analyst, we always try to get the best. So, we know that there are 16 primary dealers, plus our selves. So, there are 17 to 18 people competing for a small amount. So, when that type of opportunity arises, we always try to bid a higher amount. If we get a chance, we may go even more than that. But, we do not want to go that much more and that is why we stopped at Rs. 2 billion.

The Chairman: You should have a cash flow.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: We had money at that time. These are ideal opportunities. The reason I say like that is because it is very difficult to give a two-digit return. If you see the other bonds, they are always less than two digits. They may give one-digit return. So, when the opportunities like two-digit return arise, we try to get the maximum out of that. That is the reason we went more than that even though the offer was Rs. 1 billion. Another thing is we noticed historically also where they called for Rs. 20 billion and accepted at Rs. 26 billion with regard to the Treasury Bills. So, in line with the practice, we considered the opportunity.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you surprised when it came to Rs. 10 billion?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: It is not exactly like that. Even I think the most of the people are aware of this industry.

In the first three months of the year, the interest rate is high and the requirement is also high. Why it is so is because normally at the end of the year the Government will fully utilize the allocated funds or whatever approved. In November and December, they do not borrow. The accumulated borrowings come in January, February and March. We have been there for more than five years and our team noticed that always in the first quarter the rates are high. You can check 2014 also. You will see the yield curve of the secondary market is higher than whatever offered.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Because they are desperate to get that money.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Yes. That is what we have noticed.

The Chairman: The first quarter of the year.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the ideal time for you all to invest?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Yes.

The Chairman: Long-term is ideal for you.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: We always prefer long-term.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Is there any reason for bidding only Rs. 2 billion? Why did you not consider bidding more?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: We consider. As I said, this is a collective decision. None of these people nor I, make an individual decision. There is a team. People have different views.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How many?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: There are ten people in our team including the higher officers like the S/EPF and Additional S/EPF.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did anybody suggest bidding for more?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: A few of us had an idea to go for more. For example; for Rs. 2 billion, Rs. 3 billion, or Rs. 4 billion, although the offer was for Rs. 1 billion. That is why restricted to Rs. 2 billion. But different people have different views.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So you come into a collective decision?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Yes, a collective decision. Everyone will tell the advantages and disadvantages. Based on that, we went for double the amount.

The Chairman: That is the understanding.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Pathumanapan, did you ever at any point know the Government's requirement?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: No. Even though the Central Bank Public Debt and EPF are within the Central Bank there is a Chinese wall or even there is a barrier when it comes to information. They do not tell what they are doing. They have an objective of getting it at a lower rate. We want it at a higher rate. Always we have a fight.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think, a major very important point which did not come out earlier is the profitability route. You also said yesterday that the interest pattern is higher in the first time of the year and that cycle if you study over a period of time in the Budget cycle and the payment cycle of the Government, you will see that always. Then when you look at the average rate which is what the Tender Board made the decision on. They look only at the average. They do not look at the deals. They do not see the deals at the Board level. The 11.73 came like that. I think, independently that point was –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is a good point for us. May be you can tell how these rates are determined.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can I ask quite a different question? The reason is, as you said, for you all it is risk free, for you all it is perfect. You are the largest fund in the country. There is ALCO to manage the assets and liabilities; this is a golden opportunity because you do not really have a problem. If you can get all of it even it is worthwhile. What I am trying to find out is, from the Central Bank's side when they do Treasury Bills and go for private placements. We are looking beyond this transaction to understand how they actually operate. When they do private placements do you get the first phone call or do you get a call after other primary dealers get?

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Actually, they are not directly communicating with the Analysts. They will communicate with the top management of the EPF regarding that. Our part is, once we get the information – We do not talk regarding the rates especially.

Unedited

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I am not asking you personally. I am talking of the EPF. Now say, there is an auction. The price is set. The Central Bank tells us. Then they go for private placements. They go for private placements for a good reason they say. Sometimes they get the same rates or they can even borrow cheaper. I am just trying to find out when they are doing that, do they give the first phone call to your dealers or do they go to other dealers?

Mr. R.A.A. Jayalath: Frankly, I cannot say whether it is the first call, the in-between or the last. But they call us to assess what the requirement is like and the desired price guidance if there is any.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I want to ask it differently. You will not know whether it is the first call or not but do you always get a call?

Mr. R.A.A. Jayalath: My experience is very limited because I came here last February. February 08th was my first date in the Fund. Before that, I think, you can -

Mr. J.D.S.J. Nanayakkara: The Public Debt Department maintains the records of all the Government Securities. So, they know the maturity proceed or the coupon amount. Therefore, they know we have money coming up. Accordingly, they offer whatever available security to our Superintendent or the Deputy Superintendent. Accordingly we start the evaluating process. We also know that cash is coming. We also want to invest. Basically, in Sri Lanka the large investment is Government Securities. It is the main investment avenue. So we also -

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම මේක තව විධියකට ඇහුවොත්, ඔබතුමන්ලාට නේ මුදල් තිබෙන්නේ. ඔක්කොමලා ඒක දන්නවා නේ. Private placement එකෙන් ගන්නකොට Central Bank එක හැම තිස්සේම ඔබතුමන්ලාට call එකක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝහි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: පළමුවැනි call එක දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පළමුවැනි එක හරි, දෙවැනි එක හරි දෙන්නම ඕනෑ. ඒක එනවාද නැද්ද කියන එකයි අපි establish කරන්න හදන්නේ. මොකද ඒ dealersලා අතරේ නේ discussion එක තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ call එක වෙන තැනකට යනවාද කියන එක සොයා බලන්නයි, අපිත් ඒක තේරුම් කර ගන්නයි වැයම් කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි බලන්නේ මේකෙදි transparency එකයි. අපට තේරුම් ගිය විධියට auction ක්‍රමයේදී transparency එක වැඩියි කියලා නේ තිබෙන්නේ. අනික් ක්‍රමයේදී transparency එක නැතිව තමන්ට ඕනෑ කට්ටියට rates පාවිච්චි කරලා ඒක manipulate කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එකයි අපි මේ assess කරන්නේ. මොකද, ඉදිරියේදී අපි මේ system එක හරියට හදා ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකෙදි ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ knowledge එකයි අපි බලන්නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.එස්.ජේ. නානායක්කාර මහතා: Public Debt Department එක අපේ investment purposes වලට ඕනෑ කරන government securities, mainly private placement පහුගිය කාලයේදී අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණයට ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක primary dealer කෙනෙකුට ගියාද නැද්ද කියන එක අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. අපේ අවශ්‍යතාවයට, අප invest කරන ප්‍රමාණයට -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා invest කරන්නේ 90 per cent විතර government නේ.

ජේ.ඩී.එස්.ජේ. නානායක්කාර මහතා: ඔව්. අපට ඒ ගැන invest කරන්න අවස්ථාව නැති වෙලා නැහැ. ඒ අදාළ දවස්වලට අපි invest කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Direct placements වලදී, එහෙම request කරලා හම්බ වෙච්ච නැති අවස්ථා තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.ඩී.එස්.ජේ. නානායක්කාර මහතා: අපේ Analystsලා suggest කරන maturities තිබෙනවා. අපට ඕනෑ 20 years ද, -අවුරුදු 20 ද, 30 ද - ආදී වශයෙන් ඒ securities නොලැබුණු අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට දෙන්න පුළුවන් offer එක තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන් අපට දෙන්නේ. ඊටපසුව අපි ඒ ඔස්සේ අපේ investment analyze කරනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Auction එකකදී සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහ බැංකුවට වාසි private placement ද?

The Chairman: Opinions differ.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Auction is preferred because at an auction we can determine the rates. That is, we can bid at a rate we feel comfortable. So we prefer auction to private placements because that is more beneficial to the member. From the EPF point of view auction is more beneficial to the member. And you can trade also in the secondary market. This is my personal view.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And there is more transparency. It is in the open market.

Mr. S. Pathumanapan: Yes.

Mr. R.A.A. Jayalath: In an auction, the market forces decide. They know what to do. Otherwise, the authorities decide. We do not know what to do.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. According to the country's economy and according to the supply and demand, the rates are decided. Otherwise, in private placements they can decide whom to give and whom not to give.

Mr. R.A.A. Jayalath: That is right. It is not the price we want.

The Chairman: Okay. Thank you very much.

Witnesses withdrew.

සභාපතිතුමා: අර recording එක play කරන්න.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී දුරකථන සංවාදයකට අයත් හඬ පටයක් ගරු සභාව හමුවේ වාදනය කරන ලදි.)

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ සංවාදය ඒ තරම් වැදගත් නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එහි කාටද කථා කරන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එය ඒ මනුස්සයාගේ පෞද්ගලික දෙයක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එය වැඩක් නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ සංවාදය තුළින් අපට මොකක්ද වැටහුණේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙකෙන් තේරුණේ Normal conversation එකක්. අරගොල්ලෝ කියන විධියට, bank එකෙන් කථා කරලා කියනවා. කලින් අපට පොඩි සැකයක් තිබුණා, මේ 9.35 දැනගත්තේ කොහොමද කියා. හැබැයි එතුමා දැන් interview කළාට පසුව අපට තහවුරු වූ දෙය මේකයි. කලින් කිව්වේ, Bank එකෙන් කථා කරලා කියනවා, මේක තමයි එහි rate එක, දාන්න කියලා-

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රරත්න මහතා: ඔහු dealer ගෙන් අහනවා, "Give me some directions" කියලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: "ඇයි ඔයා direct දමන්නේ නැත්තේ?" කියා අහනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: This is Bank of Ceylon dealer නේද?

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔහුගෙන් අහනවා - කසුන් අහනවා, ඇයි ඔයගොල්ලන් දමන්නේ නැත්තේ කියලා.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He is asking Kasun, "Why are you not bidding directly?"

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: No, no. "ලොකු හින්දා අපට බැහැ....." කියලා කියනවා. එවිට කසුන් dealerගෙන් අහනවා, ඇයි ඔගොල්ලන් දාන්නේ නැත්තේ කියලා. එතකොට අහනවා, directions නැතිව කොහොමද අපි දමන්නේ කියලා. Direction එකක් එන්න ඕනෑ නේ-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Central Bank එකෙන් කියා තිබෙනවා නේ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කියනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Central Bank එක කියා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Idea එකක් දෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙය ලොකු හින්දා Central Bank එක-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔහු කියනවා නේ, අපට දමන්න කියා කිව්වා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Central Bank එක ඔක්කෝටම telephone කරනවා. ඒක සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහෙම එකක් එනවා, 9.35 වාගේ තමයි Average එක එන්නේ ආදී වශයෙන් ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විග්‍රහයක් කරනවා. Rs.10 billion කියන එක එන්නේ නැහැ. Rs. 1 billion එනවා, එහි ගණන 9.35-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහි එක තැනක කියනවා, "අපට කිව්වා, දාන්න කියලා" කියා. "බඩු ෂුවර්" වාගේ දෙයක් කිව්වේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සියලු ආයතනවලට කථා කරලා කියනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සියලු ආයතනවලට කථා කරලා කියනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Central Bank එක සියලු අයට කියනවා-

සභාපතිතුමා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් හැමෝටම කියනවා.

මෙහි එකම දෙයයි කියන්නේ. ඒ තමයි, "ඇයි ඔහේලා bid කරන්නේ නැත්තේ?" කියලා අහන එක. Bank of Ceylon එක bid නොකරන්නේ මොකද කියලා අහනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: There is another one. He says, "2012න් පසුව තමයි අපට කථා කරලා කියන්නේ." කියලා. ලොකු ගණනක් එනවා කියා ඒ අයට සිතාගන්න පුළුවන්. Central Bank interest එක motivate-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ, auction එක නිසා වෙන්න ඇති.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Auction එක නිසාත් වෙන්න ඇති. හැබැයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ අයට සැකයක් තිබුණා, ඇයි මෙහෙම කථා කරලා කියන්නේ කියලා. It is a big amount

කියන එකත් what I gathered from the Bank of Ceylon- 2012න් පසුව first time තමයි මෙහෙම කථා කරලා කියන්නේ කියා කියනවා.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: There is a 30-year bond.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2013 දැම්මා. 2014 දෙකක් දැම්මා. 2015 එකක් දැම්මා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් EPF එකටත් ඔය පණිවුඩය දෙන්න ඇති නේ. මේ අයම නේ කියන්නේ, EPF-

සභාපතිතුමා: අනෙක් නිලධාරීන් දෙදෙනාත් කැඳවන්න.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී, පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගමේ (Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt) Limited.) ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරී කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා සහ පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගමේ ලෙවි කළමනාකරු හරින් නිශාන්ත මහතා කැඳවයි.)

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා, ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරී, පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම, ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව විමසන ලදී. හරින් නිශාන්ත මහතා, අළෙවි කළමනාකරු, පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම, ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් විමසන්න ප්‍රශ්න කීපයක් තිබෙනවාලු.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සමාගම 2012 වර්ෂයේ නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ පිහිටුවපු ආයතනයක්. එය පළමුවෙන්ම public company එකක් විධියටයි register වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මා නිවැරැදි නම්, ඊට පසුව 2014 වර්ෂයේ-

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: 2013 වර්ෂයේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2013 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ පමණ එය public company එකක් විධියට incorporate කරලා register කර තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්- ලාගේ මේ ආයතනය සමාගම් පනත යටතේ ලියා පදිංචි කරපු ආයතනයක්. Article එකේ හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ප්‍රධානම කාර්යය, bond market එකට යන එකයි.

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවකු වශයෙන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්- ලාගේ ආයතනය මුලින් primary dealer කෙනකු විධියට සිටියේ නැහැ. Public company එකක් විධියට form කරලා ඒ requirement එක fulfill කරන්නේ, 2014 අවුරුද්දේයි.

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: 2013 ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Primary dealer කෙනකුගේ status ගන්න නම්, Central Bank එකේ අවශ්‍යතාවන් කීපයක් fulfill කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාව තිබුණා. ඒවා fulfill කළේ, 2014 වර්ෂයේයි.

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: 2013 වර්ෂයේයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2013 වර්ෂයේද?

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට නිවැරැදිවම කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, ඒ primary dealer status එක ගත්තේ කවදාද කියා?

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt) Limited කියන ආයතනය විධියට register කර තිබෙන්නේ, 2013 ජනවාරි 15වන දායි. 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් 15වන දා තමයි Perpetual Treasuries Limited ආයතනය සමාගම් Registrar යටතේ register කර තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Primary dealer වුණේ කවදාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Primary dealer වුණේ කවදාද කියන එකයි අප අහන්නේ.

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: Primary dealer වුණේ, 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් 17වන දායි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Primary dealer වුණේ එදා ද?

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් 17 වැනි දා. එතකොට මොකක්ද අර කියපු company-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Primary dealer වුණේ individual කෙනෙක් විධියටද, නැත්නම් company එකක් විධියටද?

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: Company එකක් විධියට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නම මොකක්ද?

කසුන් පලිහේන මහතා: පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ්. Private Limited Company became a public company.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මට තවම මෙය පැහැදිලි වුණේ නැහැ. Sequence එකෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, මුලින් register වුණේ කොහොමද, පසුව

convert වුණු දිනය සහ primary dealer licence ලැබුණු දිනය මොකක්ද කියලා.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: පුළුවන්, නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. පර්පචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ප්‍රයිවට් ලිමිටඩ් ආයතනය -

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Earliest date එකේ ඉඳලා කියන්න.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් 15 වැනි දා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රයිවට් ලිමිටඩ් නේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හොඳයි. 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් 15 වැනි දා. Public-quoted වුණේ කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2013 ජනවාරි 15 වැනි දා. ඒ කියන්නේ, public-quoted company became a public company. ඊට පසුව අපට licence එක හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් 17 වැනි දා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දවස් තුනෙන් ලයිෂන් එක හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හැබැයි, ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට public company එකක් විධියට 2013දී form කළා නම්, 2012දී ඔබතුමන්ලාට primary dealing status හම්බ වෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ නේද? Central Bank එකේ requirements fulfill කරන්න ඕනෑ. මේකේ එක requirement එකක් තමයි, capital එක වැඩි කරන්න ඕනෑ. .

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Rs. 300 million.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, Rs. 300 million. ඒක වැඩි කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක වැඩි කරලා share issue කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කොම්පැනියේ රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර්ට යවා තිබෙන්නේ, 28.02.2014. එතකොට primary dealer status දෙනවා නම් හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ, 2014.02.28ට පසුවයි.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මගේ ළඟ තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව 2013 ඔක්තෝබර් පළමුවැනි දා ලිපියක් එවා තිබෙනවා, "Appointment of primary dealer" - apply කරලා තිබෙන්නේ 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් 17 වැනි දා, Accept වෙලා ලිපිය ලැබී තිබෙන්නේ 2013 ඔක්තෝබර් පළමුවැනි දා. මම කිව්වේ apply කරපු දවස. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඔගෙන් ඇහුවේ apply කරපු දවස ගැනයි. ඒක apply කරලා තිබෙන්නේ 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් 17 වැනි දා. Accept වෙලා කියලා හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවා, 2013 ඔක්තෝබර් පළමුවැනි දා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අවුරුද්දකට පසුව.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ primary deal කළේ එදායින් පසුවද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2013 ඔක්තෝබර් පළමු වැනිදායින් පසුව තමයි primary dealer status හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි ඇසුවේ. හරි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ primary dealer status එන්න කලින් secondary market එකේදී මේ dealings ගියා?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ. Secondary market එකේ primary dealer අවස්ථාව හම්බ වෙන්න කලින් අපි trade කරලා නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Secondary market එකේ ගිහිල්ලා නැද්ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: පර්පචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් නමින් trade කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පටන් ගන්නා කොට මේකේ directorsලා විධියට සිටියේ කවුද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: පටන් ගන්නා කොට Chairman විධියට සිටියේ ජෙෆ්රි ඇලෝෂියස්. Director Board එකේ සිටියා ගොඩ්ගි ඇලෝෂියස්, අර්ජුන් ඇලෝෂියස්, මුතුරාජ සුරේන්ද්‍රන්, පුශ්‍ය ගුණවර්ධන සහ රන්ජන් හුළුගල්ල.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අය ඔක්කෝම තවම ඉන්නවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ. ගොඩ්ගි ඇලෝෂියස්, අර්ජුන් ඇලෝෂියස් සහ පුශ්‍ය ගුණවර්ධන දැනට අධ්‍යක්ෂ තනතුරුවල නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවදා සිටද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: අර්ජුන් ඇලෝෂියස් මේ අවුරුද්දේ ජනවාරි 16 වැනි දා සිට අයින් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ගොඩ්ගි ඇලෝෂියස් 2015 පෙබරවාරි පළමුවැනි දා අයින් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අර්ජුන් ඇලෝෂියස් අයින් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ 2015 අවුරුද්දේ කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ජනවාරි 16 වැනි දා. පුශ්‍ය ගුණවර්ධන 2015 මාර්තු 09 වැනි දා අයින් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේ අවුරුද්දේ නේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ජෙෆ්රි ඇලෝෂියස් අයින් වුණේ කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ජෙෆ්රි ඇලෝෂියස් අයින් වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔහු තවම ඉන්නවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්. ඔහු තවම ඉන්නවා.

Unedited

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇලෝෂියස් තවම ඉන්නවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: එතුමා අයින් වුණා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2015 පෙබරවාරි පළමුවැනි දා.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: එතකොට දැන් කවුද ඉතුරු වෙලා ඉන්නේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: දැන් ඉතුරු වෙලා ඉන්නේ ජෙෆ්රි ඇලෝෂියස්, මුතුරාජ සුරේන්ද්‍රන්, රන්ජන් හුළුගල්ල සහ අජාන් පුංචිහේවා.

ගරු සුජීව ශ්‍රේනසිංහ මහතා: අජාන් පුංචිහේවා පැමිණියේ අලුතින්ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2015 පෙබරවාරි 18 වැනි දා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙම ආයතනයේ ඔබතුමාගේ තනතුර මොකක්ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරි. CEO.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා 2012 සිටම ඉන්නවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ. මම 2013 නොවැම්බර් 15 වැනි දා සිට එකතු වුණේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: පටන් ගත්තේ මොන තනතුරෙන්ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: පටන් ගත්තේ chief dealer තනතුරෙන්.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: මුලින් කියපු නිලධාරින් අයින් වෙන්න හේතු දන්වා තිබෙනවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ අර්ජුන් ඇලෝෂියස් අයින් වුණේ, -conflict of interest- Central Bank එකේ අධිපතිතුමා එතුමාගේ father-in-law නිසායි. අනිත් අය නම් ඒ අයගේ පෞද්ගලික හේතු නිසායි අයින් වුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ජෙෆ්රිගේ, ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රිගේ සහ අර්ජුන්ගේ ඥාති සම්බන්ධකම් මොනවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ජෙෆ්රි ඇලෝෂියස් අර්ජුන්ගේ නාන්නා. ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇලෝෂියස් අර්ජුන්ගේ නාන්නාගේ මල්ලි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාව නිසා අයින් වුණු දිනය කවදාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ජනවාරි 16 වැනි දා.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: අර්ජුන් අයින් වුණේ ජනවාරි 16 වැනි දා.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That was before the Governor was appointed.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Governor වෙන්න කලින්ද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Governor appoint වුණේ කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Governor appoint වුණේ 2015 ජනවාරි මාසයේ. මට හරියටම දිනය මතක නැහැ, නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. කොහොමත් ඒ 16 වැනිදායින් පසුව.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට මේ primary market එකේ කටයුතු ඔබතුමන්ලා පටන් ගත්තේ කවදා ඉඳලාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: පෙබරවාරි පස්වැනි දා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Bidding process එක පටන් ගත්තේ -

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මැතිතුමනි, මට හරියටම දිනය මතක නැහැ. මට මතක හැටියට පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ මුල් සුමානයේ බදාදා දිනය.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට status හම්බ වුණා, 2013 ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ. හැබැයි, dealings පටන් ගත්තේ -

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2014 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ. මම ඒකට හේතුවත් කියන්නද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කියන්න.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ලයිෂන් එක හම්බ වුණේ ඔක්තෝබර් පළමු වැනි දා වුණාට SWIFT connection කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ settlement එකක් කිරීමේදී මගේ Central Bank එකෙන් වෙනත් account එකකට යවන්න අපි SWIFT කියලා connection එකක් පාවිච්චි කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉලෙක්ට්‍රොනික් නේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්. Real time settlement system එක. අපට ඒ SWIFT එක ස්විට්සර්ලන්තයෙන් ලැබෙන්න පරක්කු වුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලැබුණේ කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ජනවාරි මාසයේ අන්තිම සුමානයේ ලැබුණේ. ඒ කියන්නේ එක මාසයක් apply කළොත් ඊට පසු මාසයේ තමයි හම්බ වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ජනවාරි අන්තිම වාගේද හම්බ වුණේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබි තිබෙන්නේ ගිය අවුරුද්දේ දෙසැම්බර් මාසයේද?

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Primary dealer licence එක හම්බ වෙනකම් SWIFT එකට ගන්න බැහැ, නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 2013දී හම්බ වුණා නේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2013 ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ හම්බ වුණාට - පෙබරවාරි මාසය වන තෙක් අපට හම්බ වෙන්න පරක්කු වුණා. මොකද, ඒක apply කරලා මාසයක්, දෙකක් ඉන්න ඕනෑ, connection එක හම්බ වෙනකම්. ඒ කියන්නේ ලෝකයේ හැම කෙනා එක්කම connect වෙන්න ඕනෑ නිසා ඒ ගොල්ලන් හැමෝගේම interactions අවශ්‍යයි, establish කර ගැනීමට.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Connection එක හම්බ වුණේ 2015 පෙබරවාරි නේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2014 වර්ෂයේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට 2014 ජනවාරි ඉඳලා ඔබතුමන්ලා primary dealer විධියට කටයුතු කරනවා නේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඊට අමතරව secondary market එකේත් කටයුතු කරනවා නේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Secondary market එකේ aggressive විධියට කටයුතු කරනවා. වෙනත් බැංකු, primary dealersලා සහ තවත් මූල්‍ය සමාගම් සමඟ secondary market එකේත් trade කරනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පරණ අත්දැකීම මත ඔබතුමා දන්නවා ඇති මේ එක සිද්ධියක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් කථා කරන්නේ. එතකොට මේ dealing එකට අමතරව මීට කලින්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දිනය කියන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 කියන මේ dealing එකට කලින් ඔය විධියටම ඔබතුමාට මේ වාගේ bid කරන්න interest rate එක decide කරන විට information එන ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවා ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: අපි primary market එකට මේ තරම් ලොකුවට ගිය පළමු වතාව. මීට කලින් secondary market එකට තමයි අපි ලොකුවටම ගියේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියක් ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: එක අවස්ථාවක බිලියන 11.7 ක portfolio එකක් තිබුණා අපට.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Primary placements වලට?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ secondary market එකෙන් ගත්තේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Primary market ගියේ first time ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මෙච්චර ලොකුවට ගිය පළමුවැනි වතාව.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මීට කලින් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන primary market එකේ පළමුවැනි ප්‍රමාණය කීයද? ඒ කුමන දිනයේ ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මම Bond auction එක කියන්න ද, නැත්නම් Bill auction එක්ක කියන්න ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Bonds ගැන කියන්න.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Only about Bonds for the moment.

සභාපතිතුමා: වේලාව යනවා නම් පසුව කියන්න.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ, ඒක තිබෙනවා. පෙබරවාරි 26 වැනිදා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මොන අවුරුද්දේ ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2014 පෙබරවාරි 26 වැනිදා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කීයක් bid කළා ද? කීයක් successful වුණා ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මිලියන 125ක් bid කළා. කිසිම දෙයක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ ලැබුණු දෙයක් තිබෙනවා ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ bid කළා. ලැබිච්ච අවස්ථාවන් තිබෙනවා ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් 29 වැනිදා මිලියන 35ක් හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කීයද bid කළේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Rate එකනම් මම ළඟ නැහැ. මම මිලියන 35ක් bid කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Bid කළා, ඒක හම්බ වුණාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මිලියන 35ක් හම්බ වුණා. මිලියන 150ක් bid කළා. ඒකෙන් මිලියන 35ක් හම්බ වුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට පසුව ඒකෙන් ලැයිස්තුවක් එවන්න පුළුවන් ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: Bonds විතරයි. Bills වැඩක් නැහැ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: එවන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Private placements ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් අපිට කියන්න.

Uncorrected

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Private placements වලින් අපි අරගෙන තිබෙනවා- මම ඒ විස්තර සියල්ලම කියන්නද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: 2013 ඉඳලා කියන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මිලියන 125ක් දැම්මා කිව්වානේ. එහෙම දමන්න කීයක් ඉල්ලුම් කරලා තිබුණා ද? කීයක් advertise කරලා තිබුණා ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මිලියන 1,000ක්.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් 29 වැනිදා announce කරලා තිබෙනවා බිලියන එකක්. Bids received - බිලියන 5.1ක්. Accepted බිලියන 1.95ක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා දැම්මේ මිලියන 150යි.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: අපි bid කළේ මිලියන 150යි. හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවා 39.91ක්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ වනාවේ ඉල්ලලා තිබුණේ බිලියන එකයි.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්, බිලියන එකයි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Bids ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා බිලියන 5.1ක්.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Accepted බිලියන 1.95යි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඇයි ඉස්සෙල්ලා බිලියන 10 දක්වා යන්න උත්සාහ කළේ නැත්තේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ අපිට ගන්න පුළුවන්කමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ වේලාවේ අපේ capital adequacy උපරිම තත්ත්වයේ තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Capital adequacy. ඒ කියන්නේ Central Bank එකේ regulation එක අනුව අපගේ capital එක අවම වශයෙන් සියයට 8ක් වත් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. හදිසියේම කවුරු හරි සල්ලි withdraw කරන්න පටන් ගත්තොත් එහෙම අඩුව ගණනේ සියයට 8ක් වත් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. මේ කියන අවස්ථාවේදී අපිට එච්චර අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. අවශ්‍යයි නම් ඒකත් මම කියන්නම් සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයට.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ, අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: සියයට නවයයි ගණනක් තිබ්ලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: තිබ්ලා නැති නිසායි bid කළේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: තිබුණේ නැති නිසා තමයි bid කළේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ සමාගමට මේ තත්ත්වය ලැබුණේ කොයි කාල සීමාවේ ඉඳලා ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මොන තත්ත්වය ද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: දැන් ඔබ කලින් bid කරන්න බැරි වුණානේ. Bid කරන්න පුළුවන් තත්ත්වය ලැබුණේ කුමන කාල සීමාවේදී ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ සිටයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මොන අවුරුද්දේ ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2014 නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ සිට. ඔක්තෝම්බර් මාසයේ සිට පෙබරවාරි මස වනතුරුම our minimum capital adequacy is 8 per cent. We were running at 75 per cent to 76 per cent. It is all recorded in the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: For how much?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Is it ok if I convert to English?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: There was a political uncertainty close by. It was in November. So, we thought if a change going to be there towards December, January - we should not take a risk and we could go back afterwards and sold out the completed portfolio. From Rs. 11 billion we came down to Rs. 2 billion. So, that is the total requirement that we had. So, at that time we could have bought.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, you were at Rs. 7 billion?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No, we came down to Rs. 2 billion. As per the Central Bank regulation the total capital at that time was Rs. 1, 065, 000,000. It was very close to R. 1.1 billion. So, we had a capacity of going up to fifteen times of the total capital.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is Rs. 15 billion.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: On the date of the special auction that we are talking about we could have bought Rs. 15 billion. That was why we went for Rs. 15 billion. That is the maximum amount we held in our books.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, was it a risk or what?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: All through out, we have been playing in longer tenures - as you would see - because longer the tenure, the return on the single basis point is higher. Aas

you say, higher the risk, higher the reward. So, for example if it is at 2015, 2016, 2017 bonds, the return on one basis points is about Rs. 17,000 or Rs. 20,000. But if you go further, 45 or 35, one basis point will give you about Rs. 83,000 or Rs. 90,000. So, as it is on one basis point movement naturally- since we are profit-driven - we went all out for this auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why did you do it through Bank of Ceylon without doing it by yourself?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I will explain it. On our part we went for about Rs. 2 billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is right.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: If you want to go and settle in the Central Bank, you need to have a chunk of money in one go.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you have to settle on the first day itself?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: On that day itself.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: One the 27th itself?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. The reason why we went along with the Bank of Ceylon is this. Let us say for example, if a person who sells rice, is willing to sell his rice only for Rs.5000 notes. But I cannot give him five Rs.5000 notes and buy rice. So, I did not have the capacity to give him one Rs. 5000 note immediately. That is why we used Bank of Ceylon. So, it went ahead and settled on behalf of myself and I settled it with the Bank of Ceylon afterwards. The Bank kept a half a basis point margin on the transaction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The question that everybody is asking is, "Why did the Bank of Ceylon not go on its own and bid for a big amount and get that profit for themselves?" What is your explanation to that?

The Chairman: How can he?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I do not know how they –

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකේ ගනුදෙනු කරන්න පටන් ගත්තේ කවදා සිටද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එක සමඟ පළමුවැනි දවසේ සිටම transact කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ දවස වනවිට බිලියන 211ක් transact කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බිලියන ද? මිලියන ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: බිලියන 211ක්. මිලියනවලින් කිව්වොත් මිලියන 211,000ක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ secondary market එකේ ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්. Secondary market, එකේ repo and outward transactions ඔක්කොම ටික.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා:ඒ කියන්නේ 2012 වර්ෂයේ ඉඳලාම ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2014 පෙරබවාරි මාසය වෙනකම්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, can I ask a question? What made you to go for 13 billion, when the issue was for 01 billion? Our question is, why only did you go for this 15 billion, when others think to go for it?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I am not so sure about the others. I know how their cash flows and buying and what they were borrowing at that time. Our buying was maximum. No. 2, from 2014 December, to date - on 27th February 2015 there was a Treasury Bonds auction. 14th December to 15 February 2015. This is the first auction. We knew that the Central Bank repaid the amount of Rs.300 billion upto that date. That was all public explanation which was published on the daily basis. For example, I know that in other thirty –year, 45, the requirement of the Central Bank was Rs. 10 billion. Likewise, we kept the record of it. Whenever the Central Bank issue the Treasury Bonds, we keep a record of it. According to that on the day of the auction, the total requirement for the Government was Rs. 300 million, plus all debt maturities, plus coupon payments plus sovereign bonds and plus IMF Drollery payments. So, If I had not 15 or 300 billion - So, I knew their requirement.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Official requirement එක?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: එහෙමයි. Central Bank website එකේ තිබෙනවා. Daily outstanding problems-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ Treasury requirement එක ඔබතුමන්ලාට එවා තිබෙනවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Treasury requirement එක Central Bank website

එකේ තිබෙනවා. මම කියන්නේ Treasury Bonds mature වෙන ඒවා. ඔබතුමා one-year Bond එකක් ගත්තොත් තව අවුරුද්දකින් mature වෙනවා කියා-

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී.වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Repayment එක.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Repayment එක.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: So, I saw someone who was really desperate from money, went and offered him money. At the rate that I felt comfortable which was given an ill-curve analysis out of that. Even the last auction was at 11.75 per cent. All those factors were came into the play as for us to materialize the Bids.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you the person who took the decision?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: We have an internal Committee in which consisted of the Chief Dealer, myself and a Research Officer who is dealing that subject.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who was the main person who studied and analyzed it? Was that you?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. It will be me.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වෙනත් විධියකින් කියනවා නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙපමණ ප්‍රමාණයකට යන්න ප්‍රධානතම හේතුව රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය දැන ගැනීම. ඒක එක හේතුවක්. මීට පෙර ඔබතුමා මේ auction එකට ගිය අවස්ථාවන්වලදීත් ඔබතුමන්ට වගකීමකින් යුතුව කියන්න පුළුවන්ද මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව මීට වඩා අඩුවෙන් තිබුණේ කියලා. අපි හිතමු මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය Rs.1 billion ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියලා 2014 නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ. ඔබ කියන තර්කය අනුව 2014 නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව මෙපමණ නොතිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක වගකීමකින් යුතුව කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මගේ නිගමනයට පැමිණියේ මම උපකල්පනය කළා ඒ අය දෙසැම්බර් මාසයේ ඉඳලා පෙබරවාරි මාසය අවසානය දක්වා Bond එකක් issue කළේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හොඳයි. අපි හිතමු නොවැම්බර් මාසය දක්වා කියලා. මම කියන අවස්ථාවේදීත් ඊට මාස දෙකකට කලින් Bonds issue කරලා නැති වෙන්න තිබුණා. අපි සංසන්දනාත්මකව බැලුවොත් විශ්‍රහයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව ගැන. 2014 නොවැම්බර් වන විට Rs.1 billion තිබුණා නම් ඔබතුමා කියන තරම් අවශ්‍යතාවක් භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මට explanation එකක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පුළුවන්.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2014 නොවැම්බර් මාසය කියලා. මම උදාහරණයට ඒ දවසම ගන්නද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හොඳයි.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: 2014 නොවැම්බර් මාසයට කලින් එක දිගටම සෑම මාසයටම auctions දෙක තුනක් තිබුණා. 2014 නොවැම්බර් මාසයට එක දිගටම private placements දුන්නා. Private placements වලින් - tab basis - ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමා දන්නවා ඇති auction එකක් නැතිව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි ඒක දන්නවා.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: එහෙම ලබා දුන්නා. මේ අවස්ථාවේදී එහෙම මම නම් දුටුවේ නැහැ. Auction එකක් තිබුණෙත් නැහැ. මම දැක්කා මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ආණ්ඩුව ගොඩක්ම desperate මුදල්වලට. ඒ කියන්නේ desperate අවස්ථාවේදී මම මට පුළුවන් උපරිමයට offer කරලා බැලුවා. මට පහසු මම හොඳයි කියලා හිතන yield එකට.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබ එහෙම දැක්කේ කුමන කරුණු පදනම් කර ගෙනද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ආණ්ඩුවේ අවශ්‍යතාව.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අවශ්‍යතාව තමයි. අවශ්‍යතාව දැක්කේ මොනවායින්ද?**කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා:** සංඛ්‍යා ලේඛන සියල්ලම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ කියන්නේ සෑම මාසයේම - The debt repayment was furnished by - private placements වලින් මාසයකට Bonds දෙක තුනක් normal practice එක. නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ ඉඳලා පෙබරවාරි මාසය වෙන කල් - There was a lull period. So, you knew they had to find that money.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You thought, at that time, the requirement of the Government was bigger to find the money.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, exactly because if the debtory payment ණය ගෙවීමේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කරවලින් පමණක් රුපියල් බිලියන 300ක් අවශ්‍ය නම්, ඇත්තටම තව රුපියල් ණය සහ ඩොලර් ණය තිබෙනවා. ඒ සියල්ලම එකතු වුණාම ප්‍රමාණය ඊට වඩා ගුහක් වැඩි වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කෙළින්ම ගන්නේ නැතිව ඇයි Bank of Ceylon වලින් ගන්නේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Bank of Ceylon settlement එක අමාරු නිසා අපෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 2ක්-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා හිතුවේ නැතිද Bank of Ceylon එක දැම්මා නම්, ඒ අයට ඒක නැතිව යනවා නේ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඒක එතුමාගේ decision එක. ඒකට comment කරන්න මට ටිකක් අමාරුයි. හැබැයි, මගේ Bid එක දැකලා එතුමාට

ඒ Bid එක වෙනස් කරන්න තිබුණා. ඒ අවස්ථාව එතුමාට තිබුණා. ඒකට මොකද වුණේ කියලා comment කරන්න මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී.වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්-ලාට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එදාට තිබුණු rate එක තමයි 9.5 .

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ, mark-to-market rate එක 10.17. මාර්තු මාසයේ market rate කියන්නේ Central Bank එකෙන් දිනපතා තමාට තිබෙන - If you have a portfolio - ඔබට portfolio එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ portfolio එක දිනපතා price කරන්න ඕනෑ Central Bank Rate එකට.

Industry is highly regulated. So, you cannot do anything that you want. You have to oblige to all the rules and regulations of the Central Bank. The mark-to-market rate is 10.16.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That was the market rate at the moment.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: The Mark-to- market rate was 10.16.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What does it mean?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: That means, if you have a portfolio – Let us say, about bought Rs. 11 billion, both securities and you country holding in, you will have to value portfolio to the Central Bank rate; not the rate that you want. It is uniformed and the rate is applicable for everyone. So, if the Mark-to- market is 10.16. there is no point of going me bidding lower than that rate. So, that is why my benchmark was there - The Central Bank Mark-to- market - Then, I did small deal analysis and came back and to 11.5 onwards. My first Bid was 11.5 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The lowest was 11.5. What about the highest one?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: It is 13 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you not get that one?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No, Sir. I only got 11.5, 11.75, 12 per cent, 12.25 per cent and 12.5 per cent.; 12.5 per cent is through the Bank of Ceylon.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: So, the maximum rate 12.5 per cent: beyond that they cannot go.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Is the rate of 10.16 published rate by the Bank of Ceylon?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: They publish it Mark-to-market once a month or daily?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Daily.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: They publish the mark-tomark on the bonds and as well as the Bills.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: You do not know what the method the Central Bank already uses to arrive at that time.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I know. Shall I explain it?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: We all are primary dealers. What we do is, we all send our two way cords for the maturity. So, let us say – if it is a 2045 Bonds. So, they will collate everything and come up with the waited average Bid and waited average offer. So that is what they give us to mark-to market real.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, now the Bonds do not come everyday. Bonds are infrequent; that is two-year Bonds – yes; ten-year Bonds – fine; thirty-year Bonds – are infrequent. So, what they do? Do they use the previous thing?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No, Sir, they have excel files daily which we have to update them on a daily basis and we have to send them before 10.30 to 11.00 o'clock. Normally, 10.30. What we do is – we enter the rate and -

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, if you have a thirty-year Bond, you enter a rate at which, you bid yourself on the 30th?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, correct.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, it is a standard thing. So, can they hit you on your bid or yourself?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No. Sir it is an indicative rate to value your portfolio.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, they get it from all the primary dealers and they use that as a valuation.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: All are the primary dealers.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: On every bond maturity. they do that.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Do they do that on the Bill maturity as well?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: It is an approximation.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, it is a small approximation

Mr. Kasun Palisena: That is as a good practice for you to value portfolio, if you are carrying a really low value yield.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Do all primary dealers value their portfolio on mark-to-market?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, it is a must.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, monthly profitability is waste on that.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. That is on your whole import portfolio. Others are realized. If you are dealt on that much maturity, it is a realized profit.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Otherwise your profit is based on the mark- to- market, monthly.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, your taxation is worked out based on that.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Government Securities are tax free. Whenever you are purchasing it, you pay the withholding tax and afterwards, there is no tax imposed.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, for Bills also, only withholding tax is charged.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. For both, at the purchase.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is it.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, in a way, your profit is a notional profit.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Correct.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: It is not a cash profit.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: In mark-to-market, it is not.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How did you get the information from the Central Bank regarding this bid? It was advertised and after that, did you have a dialogue with the Central Bank or get an indication on the amount and the rate?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I got a call from the Central Bank a day before this auction. They gave an indicative rate, which was around- They asked whether we were interested in buying at 9.35 per cent to 9.5 per cent levels.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They asked that.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, they asked.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: To which phone did you get the call?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: To my office phone.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It was from the Central Bank.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you know the person who called?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I cannot recall the name. But, I got a call from the Central Bank. They did not tell me to go and bid at this rate but they asked whether I am interested in. Obviously, the Central Bank will try to raise it at the lowest possible rate.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Is it a normal practice? Have you got certain calls before also?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Not always. But, if you are in doubt, you can call them and ask. Sometime, they say and sometime, they do not. To my knowledge, they never give an indicative rate saying, "You go and bid at this rate" or "You cannot go and bid at this rate." They never do that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you surprised when you got that call from the Central Bank?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I was not surprised but actually, a bit worried, if I tell you the truth. Because, I thought they were really again-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Desperate for-

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. So, them calling and canvassing the maturity-

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Is it an unusual thing or does it normally happen?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I would not say "unusual" but I have seldom seen something like that happening.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඇයි එහෙම කථා කළේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: කලින් කථා කළා. අපි ගොඩක් වෙලාවට කථා බහ කරමින් ඉන්නවා. Central Bank එකත් එක්ක ගොඩක් කුළුපග වෙලා ඉන්නවා. හිතන්නකෝ, සමහර වෙලාවට 2015 දී Bond එකක් එනවා කියලා. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් නිකම් අහන්න පුළුවන් rate එක කොයි හරියේද

කියලා. ඒ ගොල්ලන් මේ rate එක කියලා කියන්නේ නැහැ. මේ rate එකට bid කරන්න කියලා කවදාවත් කිව්වේ නැහැ. කියන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: First time තමයි මේ සියයට 9.35ට එහෙම කියලා කිව්වේ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මට 9.35 per centවලට bid කරන්න කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ. එයා කිව්වේ ඔයා කැමැතිද මේ හරියේ Bond එකකට යන්න කියලායි. මට 9.35 per centවලට bid කරන්න කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: "මේ හරියේ" කියන්නේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා:: ඒ කියන්නේ 9.35 per cent හරියේ Bond එකක් ගන්න කැමැතිද කියලයි ඇහුවේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒකෙන් indication එකක් වෙනවාද direct placement එකක් කියන එක.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඒක ඒ වෙලාවේ direct placement එකක් වෙන්න තිබුණා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක හරියට කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ, කීයද කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි, Central Bank එක market එක analyze කරනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතුමා කියන්නේ එතුමාට ඒක නිශ්චිතව කිව්වේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුරුවත් හරියට කියන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, ඒ ආව People's Bank එක, Bank of Ceylon සහ EPF එක යන ඔක්කොම කිව්වේ අවම මේ rate එක කියලා ඒගොල්ලන්ව **නිරන්තරයෙන්ම** දැනුවත් කරන බව. මෙතුමා කියන්නේ මෙතුමාව එහෙම දැනුවත් කිරීමක් වුණේ නැහැයි කියන එකයි. එහෙම වුණේ නැහැ. එතුමන්ලා පූදුම වුණා කිව්වා.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මට call එක ආවා. Rate එක 9.35 per cent -9.5 per cent කියලා මට call කළා. නමුත් මට ඒ rate එකට bid කරන්න කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: call එක ආවේ කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Auction එකට කලින් දවසේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Auction එක තිබුණේ කවදාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Auction එක තිබුණේ 27 වැනිදා. 26වැනිදා තමයි කෝල් කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කීයට විතරද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මට වෙලාව හරියට මතක නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ දවල් 12.00ට කලින්.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: එතකොට Central Bank එකෙන් trace කළොත් ඒ කෝල් එක තියෙන්න ඕනෑ නේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: තියෙන්න ඕනෑ. මට rate එකක් කිව්වා 9.35 per cent කියලා. ඒ rate එකට ගන්න කැමැතිද කියලා ඇහුවා. නමුත් "මේ rate එකට ගන්න" කියලා මට කිව්වේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඉතින් overnight rate එක නේ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ. Overnight rate එක පහයි දශම ගණන්වලට ඒ දවස්වල ගියේ. ඊට පස්සේ දවසේ පොඩ්ඩක් උඩට ගියා. හයයි ගණන්වලට උඩට ගියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ අය amount එකක් කිව්වාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: එමවුන්ට මොකුත් කිව්වේ නැහැ. Amount එක publish කරලානේ.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: එතකොට ඒ rate එකේ සම්ප්‍රදායක් වුණේ ඔබතුමා දැන්. කිව්ව කාරණය. ඒක මම offer කරනවා කියලා කියන එක **සම්ප්‍රදායක්.** අහවල් ගණනට ගන්න කියලා කියන්නේ නැහැ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ. Private placement එකක් දෙනවා නම් කියනවා. මම ඒකත් explain කරන්නද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සම්ප්‍රදායක් වුණාට සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ගොඩක්ම සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Direct placement එකක් කියලා හිතුවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ මම හිතුවේ direct placement එකකටයි කථා කරන්නේ කියලා. මම හිතුවේ 9.35 per centවලට direct placement එකකට අයදුම් කරනවා කියලායි. හැබැයි, එයා මට කිව්වේ නැහැ auction එකට මේ rate එකට යන්න කියලා. මොකද, නිතරම direct placements දුන්නා නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ අවස්ථාවේ 9.35 per cent කියන්නේ ගොඩක්ම පහළ rate එකක්. Mark-to-market rate එක 10.16 per cent තියෙද්දී ඒ rate එකට කවුරුත්ම යන එකක් නැහැ කියලා තමයි මම නම් හිතුවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුව නීන්දු කරන්න පටන් ගත්තේ මොකක්ද? ඒ call එකෙන් පස්සේ ඔබතුමා මේ placement එකට යන්න නීන්දු කළේ කොහොමටද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ආණ්ඩුව desperate කියන මගේ අදහස තවත් වැඩි වුණා.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: So, you wanted to capitalize on that. Is it?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Obviously.

The Chairman: It is natural.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන් කිව්වා "මේක ගන්න කැමැතිද කියලා ඇහුවා, හැබැයි මේක ගන්න කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ"යි කියලා.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ගන්න කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මීට කලින් කියලා තිබෙනවාද ගන්න කියලා.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Private Placementsවලදී කියලා තිබෙනවා, මේ rate එකට දෙනවා කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඊට කලින් Private Placements වලට කියලා තිබෙන්නේ ගන්න කියලායි.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ, මේ rate එකට දෙනවා කිව්වා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Rate එක offer කරලා කියනවා ඒ rate එකට ගන්න කියලා.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ මම call කළොත් කියනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට කියනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට කියන්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ කෝල් කළොත් ද කියන්නේ. නැත්නම් normally කියනවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ. අපි call කරලා ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒගොල්ලන් කථා කරලා කියන්නේ නැහැ. උදාහරණයක් හැටියට මෙහෙමයි. මම කලින් කථා කරලා ඇහුවොත් දෙනවාද කියලා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කථා කරන්නම ඕනෑ, කෝල් එකක් එන්න. They do not call and tell you.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Normally, they do not.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is very unusual.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Quite unusual. I would not say "unusual" but I have not seen this happening; them indicating that they are desperate.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, you felt that that was an indication of desperation.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Of course, yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, just to make it clear, has the Central Bank ever called and said "There is a bid, this is the price and if you want, bid"?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: There are instances where they have called and told us about private placements and the rates.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is, when you call them, they call you back. On their own, have they called and said there was a private placement for this amount?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: It is like if I call them today, they might call me back tomorrow.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is return call. That is not what I am asking. Have they on their own called you and said that there is a private placement for this amount? Have they ever called you and told that?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I would say, "Yes, they have."

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They have done that and that is not an unusual thing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, it is very remote.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, it is very remote. It is not a usual practice.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමා Bank of Ceylon එකත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ වුණේ කොයි වෙලාවේද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ මම Bank of Ceylon එකේ Chief -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bank එකෙන් මේ වාගේ facility එකක් ගන්න කොට අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: අපි facility එකක් ගත්තේ නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ secondary market outright transaction- ඒකට DVP/RVP කියලයි කියන්නේ. එයා මට Security එක ලබා දෙන්නේ ම ගිහිල්ලා සල්ලි දුන්නාට පස්සේයි. ඒකට system එකෙන් lock එකක් තිබෙනවා. මම සල්ලි දුන්නේ නැත්නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට Security එක transfer කරන්න බැහැ. මේ අවස්ථාවේදීත් වුණේ Bank of Ceylon ගිහිල්ලා - ඒ අවස්ථාවේ මගේ එතැන Chief Dealer මහත්මයාට කථා කරලා කිව්වා මට bid එකක් දමන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: ධර්මපාල මහතාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ධර්මපාල මහතා .

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How did you speak to him?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Via my mobile, first and then, I sent him an e-mail.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Mobile එකෙන් කථා කරලා එතුමාට මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මම කිව්වා මට auction එකට bid එකක් දමන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. මුල්ම අවස්ථාවේ මම amount එක කිව්වේ නැහැ. දෙවැනි call එකේදී තමයි amount එක කිව්වේ. ටිකක් ලොකු amount එකක් කියලා මම එයාට කිව්වා. එයා කිව්වා දමන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට කලින් තිබුණ practice එකත් ඒ විධියටමයි.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ. මම පළමුවැනි වතාවට තවත් primary dealer කෙනෙකුගෙන් bid කළේ. අනෙක් කට්ටිය ගැන නම් මම කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට Bank of Ceylon එක කැමැති වුණාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: කැමැති වුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඒ ධර්මපාල කියන අය කලින් දන්නවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මම දන්නවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කලින් ගනුදෙනු කරලා නැත්නම්?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මම ගනුදෙනු කරලා තිබෙනවා. රුපියල් බිලියන 211ක්-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: රුපියල් බිලියන 211ක්.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 211ක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඒ bid කරන වෙලාවේදී තව secondary market එකේ විකුණන්න වෙනත් කාගෙන් හරි offer එකක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ. ඒ වෙලාවේ මගේ ගාව bid එකක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ තිබුණේ නැහැ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: එක bid එකක්වත් dummy bid විධියට නෙවෙයි දැම්මේ. මට ගන්නම ඕනෑ විධියට තමයි දැම්මේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ මුළු මුදල කොහොමද settle කළේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: මම ගාව තිබුණා නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ බිලියන 15ක් වෙනකම් මට ගැනීමේ හැකියාව තිබුණා. මම ඒ මුදල ගෙවා පියෙව්වා. මේ auction එකෙන් විතරක් නොවෙයි. මට මේ auction එකෙන් ලැබුණේ බිලියන 5යි. ඊට පසු auction එකෙන් මම බිලියන 7ක් ගත්තා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කෙහෙන්ද? ඒකෙන්මද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: නැහැ, ඊට පසුව auction එකක් තිබුණා. ඊට පසුව Rs. 30 billion offer එකක් දුන්නා. Rs. 30 billion auction, I bought Rs. 7 billion out of that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When was that?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Subsequent auction, Sir

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the date?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: 10th of March. Rs. 7.6 billion I bought from that auction. Then after that –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the primary bid?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: But this time we did not go Rs. 3 billion or Rs. 5 billion in last chance, we broke it down to small pieces and there was a huge issue about it. If not we would have use someone else but since there was an issue we broke it down to small, small pieces.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the issue?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: There was a major row about going through Bank of Ceylon at that time - 10th of March.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was that original bid?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Sir, we bought Rs. 7.6 billion out of that auction. Offer amount was 30 billion. That is Rs. 10 billion, 7 years – Rs. 10 billion, 10 years and Rs. 10 billion 20 years.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That was the auction?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. Out of that they expected Rs. 51 billion. Out of that Rs. 51 billion we bought Rs. 7 billion.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Have you all got Rs. 7 billion?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: We got Rs. 7 billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How much have you all bid for?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: We bid for Rs. 7 billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You got all what you bid?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then what is the average?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yield for the 7 years 9.17, then 10 years 10.09 and 20 years, 11.20. That is the weighted average not the rate that we got. That is the weighted average for the auction.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ කියක්ද advertise කළේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Rs. 30 billion තුනක් දැම්මේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Rs. 30 billion තුනයි.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Rs. 30 billion තුනක් දමලා Rs. 51 billon ගත්තා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අර කරුණ පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කර දෙන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ transaction එක කෙහොමද, ඔබතුමන්ලා bid කළා; Bank of Ceylon එකට inform කළා; Bank of Ceylon transfer කරන්න ඕනෑ කිව්වා නේ. ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකට මම ඒ වේලාවේ - අපේ ඔක්කොම transaction තිබුණේ telephone එකෙන්. ඒ කියන්නේ අපේ - Sir, would you agree with me? So all the transactions done through telephone calls. It is a normal telephone call and a dealer's word takes as a bond. So what we do is, if we say the deal is done; it is done. So what we do is, ඒක කළාට පසුව settlement එක වෙන්නේ දවස් දෙකකට පසුවයි. එතකොට අපි confirmation එකක් යවනවා back office එකෙන් deal එක කළාට පසුව. ඊට පසුව අපේ capital එක තිබෙනවා නේ. Capital එක වාගේ දස ගුණයක් හරි, පහළොස් ගුණයක් හරි වෙනකම් අපිට වැඩිපුර leverage කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපේ total portfolio බිලියන දෙකයි තිබුණේ. අපිට ඒ අවස්ථාවේ බිලියන පහක් ගන්න එක බොහොම සුළු දෙයක්. අපි ඒක leverage කරලා බිලියන පහක් settle කර ගත්තා Bank of Ceylon එකෙන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කොහොමද බිලියන දෙක සොයා ගන්නේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Leverage කරලා. අපිට capital එක තිබෙනවා නේ... ක්. ඒ වේලාවේ capital එක බිලියන 1.1ක් තිබුණා. ඒකෙන් අපිට ඇත්තටම බිලියන 15 වෙනකම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර මිලදී ගන්න තිබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ company එකේ capital එක Rs. 1.5 billion තිබුණා.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Rs. 1.1 billion ඒ වේලාවේ තිබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ Rs. 1.1 billion කවදා සිටද තිබුණේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: Rs. 1.1 billion තිබුණේ 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ සිට.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ සිට තමයි Rs. 1.1 billion ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ capacity එක තිබුණේ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ඔව්. Capital එක.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට කලින් කීයද තිබුණේ?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: පටන් ගත්තේ බිලියන 300කින්.

ගරු රෝහි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක තමයි තිබිය යුතු average එක.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Sir, minimum requirement is Rs. 300 million. It is 15 times of my capital. So then after trading - If I explain ourselves Sir, we are really, really aggressive and we mostly go on to longer term maturities as I explained earlier - because of the return. So we were successful in becoming number two in six months after trading. We made about Rs. 814 million profits up to September. 2014.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it through private placements?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No Sir, mainly secondary market trading. There were private placements but mainly secondary market trading.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you get private placements?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Private placements we had something -

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Percentage if you get, secondary market -

Mr. Kasun Palisena: There was one instance Sir, in 2014 -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Out of what you made, you came to the second position. Is it not? Private placements from the whole transactions.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Majority should be secondary market, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you give us a full report on that?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. Private placements?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Private and secondary markets, how the whole –

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I can do that, Sir.

The Chairman: Have you all finalize the accounts for 2014?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Not yet Sir. We have time till September. We are on the process of doing it.

The Chairman: Then what about 2013?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: For the year 2013, yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: Have you send a copy to the Company Registrar?

The Chairman: Yes, we have.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you send us a copy?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Can do that Sir.

The Chairman: What about audited accounts?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: It will take some more time Sir. Is it okay? I have records up to September 2014, audited accounts.

The Chairman: You can give that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: To reserve Rs. 3 billion

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No, Sir, I went and asked him to buy Rs. 13 billion.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But you were given only 50 per cent. Is it not? Then you had Rs. 2 billion. So then you asked the Bank of Ceylon to provide another Rs. 3 billion? Then you will make Rs. 5 billion.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No. They did not provide us anything. It was just a secondary market transaction.

The Hon. Susil Premajayanatha: Yes, that is okay. So then how did you settle that Rs. 3 billion?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: So, we have Rs. 1.1 billion capital. We can leverage that up to 15 times. So that is almost 16 billion rupees. Shall I explain how we do it Sir? What we do is, we have let us say, "x" amount of securities. If we go and give that to Commercial Bank, the Commercial Bank will lend us money, we will have that money and that is how we leverage Sir. We can go for 15 times like that. So the total amount that we raised –

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: The Commercial Bank, they are purchasing forward?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Sir, it is a repurchase agreement, yes what we do is Sir, - it can be overnight; it can be one week it can be two weeks - but what we do is we give the security to them and borrow rupees against that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: When you do that, you have to wait because it depends on, because you are buying and selling it.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, Sir. As I told you subsequently in the next auction we will bid for Rs. 7 billion. The latest auction it was 2013 year. we bought Rs. 2 billion out of it as well.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Which one is that?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: The latest auction. So as I told you, Rs. 10 billion, I will be very bold if I say this but Rs. 10 billion is not a big amount for us, since we are being trading. Only with Bank of Ceylon we have been trading Rs. 211 billion. This market is such, even a smaller size of deal is Rs. 50 million.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are waiting for the latest big one?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Of course yes. According to my ability I will sure we will trade aggressively.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So if you look at your business model, your business model is basically based on trading.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Correct Sir.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Approximately how many outside customers do you have?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Everything together about 40 customers.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: About 40 outside customers. What percentage of your total trades will be for those customers as a percentage roughly?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Very minute, Sir. I will use them to fund my book. It is for Repo only for trading it is very minute.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Trading in your own name. That is the business model.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, Sir. We do not believe in a good year. If I call it a "good year" we do not believe in interest income mainly capital gains.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay, So you just take the trading income, when you talk about September, 2014, Rs. 800 million profits, those were really booked profits.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Out of that there was "x" amount which was market to market unrealized profits, but total was 814. If I tell you how aggressive we are, I think in October, sorry Sir. I cannot recall the exact month. We took Rs. 120 million loss. Because we are so aggressive in longer tenants. So we are willing to take that risk as long as we strict to our business model as you said. Sir.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So trading profits are really booked profits.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Notional profits. Some "yes" and some "no" because there is a proportion of realized profits.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Would I be wrong if I say that 80 per cent, 90 per cent is notional profits?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No, Sir. It should be very close of 450 50 or 55 or 45, it is not that high sir.

I do not know how the other companies calculate it but we believe in realized profits. If there is an upward movement in rates, you sell now and go back in. So, we realize it. We mostly believe in realized profits.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Who is your auditor?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Kreston MNS & Company.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Is it a Central Bank approved audit firm?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, it is. We can only audit through the Central Bank approved auditors.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Our question is, was that not a risk for the Bank of Ceylon? If you not had bought it, was that not a big risk for the State Bank?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Can I explain that? Government Securities are considered risk free. Let us say, if I do not settle the Bank of Ceylon Rs. 3 billion today, number one, they will earn an interest income out of it. Number two, they will have a half a percent capital gain out of that deal. So, everything was done at a profit for Bank of Ceylon and if they held on to that maturity and if we did not settle, they would have made a profit out of it as well. So, there was no risk at all.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. Was there a risk factor that the profitability would go down by any chance?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: If I had not settled the Bank of Ceylon Rs. 3 billion – Is that what you are asking me?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is right. But, it was upward. Everybody made a profit out of this. It was a good stock. The interest rates went up. Is it?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, by any chance, if the interest rates had gone down, then, what would have happened?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: In our business, if the interest rates are going down and if you are holding at a higher yield, that is how you make money. It is like me lending to Gunapala and Gunapala is being funded by someone else at a lower rate. That is how Gunapala makes money or I lend to him at 12 per cent and I borrow from Sirisena at 10 per cent. So, that 1 per cent, if I tell you roughly, is my capital gain. It is like that. So, in this case, the interest rates went down from a high yield of 12.5 per cent and 12.5 per cent - Although the bond is a 30-year bond, the duration for the bond was eight years. Duration means, the time that will take for you to recover your money that you have invested. In this case, although it is a 30-year bond at 11.5, it is slightly higher than eight years but at 12.5, it is eight years. So, the risk factor, I think, is for eight years.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They have to hold it for eight years and then-

Mr. Kasun Palisena: But, again if you call a Government Security a risk, it is contradictory to the explanation that is given to the Government Security. It is called a risk-free instrument.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Has the Bank of Ceylon done similar transactions before and how did you get the confidence that the Bank of Ceylon would accept this bid through you all?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Number one, it was a risk free investment for anyone. Number two is, it was not only the Bank of Ceylon that I had reached out. Before that I went to another place and I asked them whether they could. But, their CEO was not available at that time.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was that place?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: That was Acuity Securities Limited. That is the place I worked earlier.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are they also a primary dealer?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: They are a primary dealer and they have a settlement agreement with HNB for billion rupees. I know this because I worked there. That is called intraday settlement. So, they have billion rupees available at any time for them to settle a bond which we did not have at that time. That is why Acuity Securities Limited came to my mind firstly and then the Bank of Ceylon.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You went and spoke to whom?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I spoke to a dealer there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the dealer's name?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Gajan.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How did you speak to him? Was it over the phone? Do you have his phone number?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I called him on the land line and I have his phone number.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you call from your cell phone or from your land line?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: That I cannot recall from which number I called.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Before you called the Bank of Ceylon, you called him. Is it?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Was not there any response?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Actually, I tried Acuity Securities Limited because the dealer of the Bank of Ceylon was not contactable at that time.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When was that?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: This was around 10.10. - 10.15 because the auction was from 10.00 to 11.00.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Was this on the same day?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, the same day; 27th.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Did Gajan respond to your call?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: He was there. He answered the phone but his CEO was not available for him to get the approval.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, the records are there. Is it? I mean, the telephone conversations and all that.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: For sure, there should be. I called him and he should be having –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is very important for us to establish.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was that conversation about with Gajan?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I asked whether I could bid for the auction through him.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: For how much?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: It would have been the same amount. It would have been Rs.2 billion – Rs. 3 billion; a larger amount which I could not settle at one go.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: But, they have only Rs. 1 billion.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No, they have their own facility as well as what they have with the HNB. So, altogether, they have the capacity to settle.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We will call the Gajan also.

The Chairman: Fundamentally, you were aware that the Government was hard up with money. So, there was a risk.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Sir, I would not say, "no risk." but -

The Chairman: You were confident of your investment. Were you not?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I would not say that but my risk factor was – My yield to maturity compensated on the risk that I took, if I may justify my decision -

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: When you called the Bank of Ceylon and you had that conversation with him, did he, at any time, ask you, "Why are you putting it thought me?"

Mr. Kasun Palisena: He did ask me as to why there were high rates. So, I just told him I was giving it a try.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Did he ask you, "Why are you putting it through me without bidding for it directly?" Did he not ask that?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: No, he did not ask like that.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: He assumed that you had the settlement issue. Is it?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: As a dealer, he would be knowing because a small primary dealer like us – It is difficult for us to settle everything in one chunk.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But, he did not ask you, is it?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. Sir. We call ourselves a very small primary dealer.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Did he not ask you any question?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: He asked me, "Why are you going at a very high rate?" and I told him, we were giving it a try. Then he said, as it is read in the Report, "හම්බ්වුණා නම් ඇතා තමයි". So, that was the end of the conversation. Then he took everything and I sent him an e-mail at 10.40 confirming the bids. That is the normal

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practice for clients. If a client is coming through us, we normally put an e-mail to confirm.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But, this was the first time that a primary dealer was bidding through a primary dealer. So, he did not ask you anything. He just agreed Is that not so?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: He did not ask me anything.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I am not sure about his internal constraints but he did not tell me anything. He did not ask me anything.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If you were not dealing with the Chief Dealer there, who else would you be dealing with?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: There is another dealer there. So, I would have called him.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: What is his name?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: He is called Lalana or Hasitha.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Palisena, what is Gajan's institution called?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Acuity Securities Limited

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Have you been dealing with them before?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes, there are market counter parties. All the primary dealers, banks and a few financial institutions are considered as counter parties.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, it is not an unusual thing for a primary dealer to bid on behalf of another primary dealer?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: It is not restricted. There are no regulations to say that you cannot.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Was it happened in the past?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: I have no idea whether it was happened.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Why would you go to a primary dealer if you were not sure?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: That was because of the settlement issue. We went for the Bank of Ceylon because of the settlement issue. because of the large chunk that we had to settle.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You explained that you have a very healthy, sufficient capital. So, why did you ask the Bank of Ceylon to act on behalf of you?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Sir, we do have a very healthy capital and we can buy up to Rs. 15 billion. You are correct. But, the settlement is something else. If I explain it to you, Bank of Ceylon is the biggest bank in the country and they have a huge cash flow which they have the capacity to settle in one go. I am sure that they can settle more than Rs. 50 billion in one go. We do not have that same capacity. That is why we need someone like that. I would not say, "zero", but the settlement issues are very minimal when you go for the central settlement system. Till then, I think, there will be a small lag. In this case, we paid them an interest rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the gain that they make. Is it?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: In this case, they too gained capital gains as well although we bought through them at 12.50, we bought back from them at 12.4950. They kept a half a basis point margin on that transaction as well.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, how much did they make out of that?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Altogether it is about Rs. 4.67 million.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Out of the settlement interest rate, are they making some money as well?

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Altogether it is Rs. 4.6 million.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Does the Central Bank know about your reservation with the Bank of Ceylon? Normally, if you look at the stream, you see that the Bank of Ceylon bid for Rs. 13 billion.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But, then, the Central Bank does not have any idea that they are bidding on behalf of you.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: They would not know. Let us say, if it is a huge corporate which is going through the Bank of Ceylon, it will be the same. They would not know the end-buyer, they only see the primary dealer's name.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: They see only the primary dealer through-

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Yes. That is why it is restricted only to the primary dealers.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ වෙලාවට Central Bank එකේ Dealing Room එකට යනවාද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි, අපට නම් එතැනට යන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ. එතැන ටිකක් restricted තැනක්. Forex එක ළඟට මම එකවරක් ගිහින් එතැන සිටින මගේ යහළුවෙක් සමඟ කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නැතිව අපට එතැනට යන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Primary dealersලා වශයෙන් EPF එක, ලංකා බැංකුව, People's Bank මෙහි තිබෙන අවදානම් පැහි ගැන කල්පනා කරලා තිබෙනවා. මාර්තු 10, පෙබරවාරි 27 යන දින දෙකෙහිම 30-year bond එකට bid කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබ එහෙම අවදානමක් ගැන කල්පනා කරන්නේ නැතිව ලොකු විශ්වාසයකින්ද මේ සඳහා මැදිහත් වුණේ.

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම ගන්න අවදානම .මගේ interest rate එකෙන් පෙන්නුම් කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙහි පදනම මොකක්ද?

කසුන් පලිසේන මහතා: උදාහරණයක් විධියට සෝමාලියාවට රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දෙන්න කිව්වොත් මම සෝමාලියාවට රුපියල් බිලියනය සඳහා දෙන rate එකයි ඇමෙරිකාවට රුපියල් බිලියනය සඳහා දෙන rate එකයි දෙකක්. එහි වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ repayment capacity එක, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ requirement එක, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ market එකේ තිබෙන macroeconomic factors ආදී සියලු දේ ගණනය කරලා නමයි අපි ඒ decision එක ගත්තේ.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. If the need arises, we will call you again.

Mr. Kasun Palisena: Thank you very much, Sir.

Witnesses withdrew

The Committee Adjourned.

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(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

මහ බැංකුවේ බැදුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

2015 ජූනි මස 05 වැනි සිකුරාදා

පැමිණ සිටි:

ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය
ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු එම්.ටී. හසන් අලි මහතා
ගරු ඊ. සරවනපවන් මහතා
ගරු ටී.බී. ඒකනායක මහතා (නිරීක්ෂක)

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක සේවා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, වැඩබලන විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඊ.ඒ.එන්.පී. එදිරිසිංහ මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඊ.එම්.කේ.එම්. පද්මලාල් මහතා, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;

(මේ අවස්ථාවේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා කාරක සභාවට කැඳවන ලදී)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමයන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි, මේ පරීක්ෂණය ගැන ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගෙන් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ප්‍රශ්න ඇසීමට ඉස්සරවෙලා වාර්තාගත වීම සඳහා කියන්න, ඔබතුමා Deputy Governor විධියට මේ තනතුරේ වැඩ භාර ගත්තේ කවදාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Tender Board එකේ නම් මම Chairman හැටියට හිටියේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කවදා ඉඳලාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: 2012 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ 14වැනිදා ඉඳලා. එදා සිට 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 08වැනිදා දක්වා මා සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට සිටියා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඊට පසුව සභාපතිවරයා වුණේ කවුද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ සිල්වා මහතා: ඊට පසුව සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට කටයුතු කරන්නේ, ඒ කියන්නේ 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 09වැනිදා සිට අද වනතුරු සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට කටයුතු කරන්නේ, අපේ නව නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති වරයෙක් සිටිනවා, එයාගේ නම පී සමරසිරි. එයා තමයි දැනට Tender Board එකේ සභාපතිවරයා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි, වෙනසක් සිදු වුණේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ සිල්වා මහතා: ඇත්තටම කලින් කලට වැඩ මාරු කරනවා. පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 08වැනිදා Governor නිරණය කළා, අපේ වැඩ මාරු කරන්න ඕනෑයි කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා භාරව සිටින්නේ මොන Department එකද? එහෙම විශේෂ අංශයක් තිබෙනවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ සිල්වා මහතා: අද වනකොටද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්, දැනට.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ සිල්වා මහතා: දැන් වනකොට අපේ තිබෙනවා, ප්‍රාදේශීය කාර්යාලයක්. ඒ වාගේම අපේ Regional Development Department එකක් තිබෙනවා, දැන් අලුතෙන් policy බෙදලා තිබෙනවා. Policy වැඩ කටයුතු කරන්න Dr. Weerasinghe පත් කර තිබෙනවා. Supervision and regulation පැත්ත Mr. Samarasiriට භාර දීලා තිබෙනවා. මට භාර දීලා තිබෙන්නේ - අපේ තිබෙනවා capacity development කියලා අංශයක්. ඒ කියන්නේ මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළත මූල්‍ය අංශය පුළුල් කිරීමේ කටයුතු භාර දීලා තිබෙන්නේ මටයි.

Unedited

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There are three Deputy Governors.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes, there are three Deputy Governors.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who is the senior Deputy Governor?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: I was promoted in November, 2007; Dr. Weerasinghe was promoted in September, 2011 and Mr. Samarasiri was promoted last year. .

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Technically you and Dr. Weerasinghe are the senior officers.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes. But, in the bank of course, when the Governor is away - because there is no a post of acting Governor in the Act - what we do is basically among three of us the Board normally nominates somebody as the senior Deputy General.

The Chairman: So, three of you rotate.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes, in rotation.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, when the Governor was on leave who was in charge?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Mr. Samarasiri was in charge when the Governor was on leave this time.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Are you the most experienced person in the Tender Board?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes. I have been working as the Chairman for about three years.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: As the Chairman, on previous occasions when these Bonds were issued the practice seems to have been to take a weighted average. Is that correct?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Now we do auctions as well as private placements. Private placement is a misnomer. Basically, we call it private and direct placement. I would call it direct placement since it is the better term because sometimes, people get confused when you say private placement because in the Stock Market-

The Chairman: Which is the correct term? Is it direct placement?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: I think direct placement is better. Sir, there is another one-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think we have understood that. What I am really asking now - forgive me if we get it wrong we might ask you- I think we understood the difference and the practice in the past was to go for direct placement at which point you offered these bonds at a stated interest rate. (04.50)

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: What we do basically is, we have different maturities and when we issue bonds people might ask different maturities depending on their liquidity requirement. Since our Budget deficit is huge and we have a huge debt stock we have all over this debt on a daily basis and every week we issue Treasury Bills and at the same time when there is a Government's need for cash we issue Treasury Bonds as well. We do auctions as well as private placements. Now, there is so much confusion over direct placement. What we have done in the past has been depending on the market requirement, market liquidity, and market appetite. We do private placements as well as auctions. During the month we looked at the requirement.. We prepare our monthly programme as to how much we should borrow from the market depending on the cash flow we get from the Treasury.

Now, if the market- I mean we look at the liquidity in the market and also we look at our direction in the monetary policy, because the interest rate of course affects many people. I mean, not only the Government. When you set the Treasury Billinterest rate, it affects the market as well because the thing is all the interest rates generally adjust with Treasury Bill and Government Security rates. So, we look at that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is that the mechanism to adjust the interest rates in the country?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Not really. Now, here the interest rate adjustment mechanism is set through monetary policy. We set the monetary policy and that sets the interest rates. But, in the market of course what really happen in practice is-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Practically, when the Treasury Bills go up, everything goes up.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the thing. The interest rate is more or less control-

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Theoretically it is the monetary policy.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But practically this.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Basically when you set the monetary policy, Treasury Bill rate also get adjusted. In the market, when the Treasury Bill rate or Government Security rate go up, it affects the other interest rates like the deficit rate and all that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When did you reduce the rates? Was it two months ago?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes. According to our monetary policy, those rates were reduced 50 basis points about a month ago.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, in February, the rate had been fixed technically as such and such. When you get the auction or when you call for bids, if you had gone on the old policy, you would have fixed the particular rate based on the bids.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: That depends again on the amount we required.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I understand that. What I am really saying is, I have checked something written by the previous Governor. He says, yes he did go for direct placements very often, but the rate of interest was generally lower than if you had gone for auction. Would you agree with that?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: That depends on the market conditions. If you look at historically-

The Chairman: Variable factors are there.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes. If you look at historically, we cannot guarantee that always interest rates should be at a lower level. I can show you a graph. In the past also, the interest rates- We all know that interest rates have gone up and come down. If we look at this graph, in 2012 the rates were 14 per cent. The rates came down in 2014 and when this particular bond was issued, the rate was about 9 - 10 per cent.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, would you agree that in this particular instance, there was a change of policy and you all decided not to go for direct placements, but to go for auction.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Has there not been other auctions before this auction?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: There would have been. Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, you cannot say that the policy was changed on this occasion.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Well, this time, we thought- a lot of concerns expressed about direct placements.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, you cannot say that policy was changed only this time. There are two systems. One is the auction and the other one is-

වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පොලී අනුපාත ඉහළ යාම පැහි ගණනාවකට බලපානවා නේද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. රජයේ සුරකුම්පත් වශයෙන් අපි භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්හෝ bonds issue කරලා මේ ගන්නේ ආණ්ඩුවට securities නේ. පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩි වුණොත් ඒක directly බලපාන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ එක්කම පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් වීම බලපානවා, market එකේ කට්ටියටත්. මොකද, අපි හිතමු, අපේ Treasury Bill rates හෝ,Government Security rates හෝ වැඩි වෙනවානම් primary lending rates වැඩි වෙනවා. Primary lending rates වැඩි වෙනවාකියන්නේmarket එකේ ඉන්න කට්ටියත් borrow කරන්නේ ටිකක් වැඩි rate එකකට.

වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ට කොහොමද වැඩි වෙන්නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඇත්තෙන්ම ඒක පොඩි tricky ප්‍රශ්නයක්. Treasury Bills and Bonds වල,invest කරලා තිබෙනවා, foreignersලා. මොකද, open out කරලා තිබෙනවා, අපේ Bills and Bonds stock එකේ 12.5 foreignersලාට. එතකොට මේ foreignersලාට ගන්න පුළුවන්, 12.5 වෙන තෙක්. හැබැයි ඒගොල්ලෝ කැමැතියි, මේ rate එක ටිකක් වැඩි වෙලා තිබෙනවා නම්. ඇත්තෙන්ම මේ වෙලාවේ-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒගොල්ලෝ long-term ඒවාටද කැමැති, short-term ඒවාටද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: එතැනදී වෙන්නේ මේ ගොල්ලෝ-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ short-term ඒවාට නේ වැඩිපුර කැමැති?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මෙහෙමයි වෙන්නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට direction එකක් තිබෙනවා නම්, අපේ exchange rate එක stable and interest rates are stable කියලා, then, they might go for long-term.

The Chairman: If there are constant changes-

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: That is what has happened in past few months actually. Because of the expectation that the US rates also may go up and here also we have an uncertain situation. what we have seen in the market right now is that some of the foreigners have sold their Bills and Bonds. That has

happened. But, generally of course when we have stability in the market- that is what we were trying to maintain- If you have stability, then they go for loans. There are two reasons. One is that our rates came down in end of 2014. Even now they are at a lower level. Because of that, they might think that-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Further go down?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Not further go down.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Unstable.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes. Unstable and also the US rates tend to go up. If the rupee depreciates, they get back here and invest because the thing is they invest in rupees. When you invest in rupees and convert it into dollars, they get less dollars. Because of that they are exiting. They have exited, but not all of them. Some have exited and some have not.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I go back to my next question. I was going through the Report of the Committee. The Committee says with regard to private placements that the officials of the PDD were of the opinion that private placement is a healthy mechanism. If the interest rates are lower, it seems to be healthy. The primary dealers interviewed did not like private placements. When was the last occasion on which instead of private placements, you actually went for this auction system? It happened in February.

The Chairman: He is not involved in the present issue. He was there only up to 08th February. It is a general question.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, he was in the Committee. He is not the Chairman. Are you still on the Tender Board?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: No, I am not.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Fine. Actually that helps. Since you were a Chairman of the Tender Board, what is the last occasion on which they went for auction rather than direct placements?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: After this particular auction which was held on 27th February, we did not have any direct placements.

The Chairman: No, before that. During your period.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Before 27th February, what is the last occasion you had an auction?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Before 27th February?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When you were the Chairman, according to this, there were a lot of direct placements. Were there any instances where no direct placements-

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes, we had both.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When was the last auction?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva:I can get those details. I cannot tell that off hand.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did that happen in 2014?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes. Actually I have a list here. We have prepared a list. During 2014, we have raised Rs. 832 Billion in direct placements.

Out of this, 73 per cent has been issued to Government entities like EPF and -

The Chairman: Is it 73 per cent?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Seventy three per cent and the balance 27 per cent has been given to banks and private dealers.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is all direct placements.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: That is all direct placements.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then, on auction, how much was it? You said, Rs. 830 billion was on private placements.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Altogether we have raised, I think, Rs. 1,195 billion. That means, Rs. 1.1 trillion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, it is about Rs. 200 billion on auction.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes. Rs. 300 billion විතර.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, that is about 25 per cent. What is the substantial difference in the interest rates?

The Chairman: In terms of interest rates, there are variations.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You cannot say that, because there are different interest rates.

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: The average.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You can say the average. The point is, in a particular period, if there are substantially more interest rates on auctions or -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It depends on the time.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If you take it on an average, Rs. 830 billion on direct placement, Rs. 200 to Rs. 300 billion on auction. Are there substantial differences in the interest rates?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: No. This is how it happens. When we do auction, that sets the interest rates. Then, private placement thereafter would be done on that rate.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is preciously my point. So, what you are really saying is that there was an auction, as there happened this time and the Government went for 'x' number on the basis of the auction. Then, on the strength of that interest rate, they calculated a weighted average and did private placements. So, in such a situation -

The Chairman: It is really prevailing market.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes. In such a situation, the private placement interest rates are roughly the same as the auction interest rates. That was I think the point made. So, in this instance, if I am not mistaken, after you did the auction you then decided to go for more also on the basis of auction and therefore the interest rates went up substantially.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: That is the decision that we have taken.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What was the reason for taking that decision?

The Chairman: You can address that question later.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: The thing is, for couple of reasons, there are advantages as well as disadvantages in doing a direct placement. On the advantages, I would say that we get flexibility in managing the borrowing programme. That is an advantage.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You can choose different -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, also, what you just said, during your period as the Chairman, after the original auction which led to 'x' or 'y', any further bonds that you took up were based on private placements.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, you did not have a situation in the last year where after you had done the auction, you then went further on the auction basis.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: And also this is how it worked. Lets say, during that particular week, if there is a need, we go for private placements.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Exactly.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Then, next week, if we want, we would have again gone for an auction.

The Chairman: If the condition changes, then you should shift.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I will clarify that, because there is actually kind of small grey area. What the Hon. Member is saying is, when you went for the last auction, you had the auction and later on, on hindsight decided to get the other also on the auction. I do not think that was the case. You planned that you buy everything through the auction, but you only gave Rs. 1 billion amount, because the interest rates - otherwise, if they get to know that you want so much, they will place their interest rates very high. So, it is not an afterthought, not that you went for Rs. 1 billion first and then you decided, "Okay, then we can go by the auction." It was not that. Your idea was to go on the auction to get this Rs. 13 billion.

The Chairman: He was not involved in that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, the question was that.

The Chairman: That is why is said you address that question to the next governor.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What I am saying is from what I read from this Report, it is a common practice. You only advertised for 'x' knowing full well you will go to '2x' or '3x' or '4x.' But in all previous instances while you were there, after you had taken 'x' on the auction basis, you need '2x' or '3x' or '4x' on the direct placement method and your argument for doing that - I mean, why did you do that policy rather than -

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Well, that is what -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Because the argument of the previous governor is that by using that policy the interest rates were kept lower.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: My point is, we cannot always keep the interest rates low, because when the Government needs more and more money and if we do not have resources in the market, the rates automatically go up. The thing is, though we do private placement, each week we have a Treasury Bill auction. It is an auction. We raise money through auctions as

well as placements. Then, at that point, if there is a pressure in the market, rates push up.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, you have to buy at that rate.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Then we have to get - because the thing is, we look at our rate as well as the secondary market rate. If the secondary market rate goes up, then, we cannot do private placements. We will have to do again auctions.

The Chairman: That means, a number of determining factors are there.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If you have adopted the principle you had previously adopted which is to go for private placement on the basis, would the rates have been lower and we ultimately have ended up a bid.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: This is a counterfactual question decision, because - I am sorry, we really cannot say that we will definitely keep the interest rate at that level, because if you want to raise more money, you need to pay a higher price. I mean, that is a simple, fundamental thing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The more you need money, the rate goes up.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: But in that point there were other issues as well. When we intervene in this market and when we manage the rate, we are looking at the foreign exchange market also, because sometimes if we have a pressure in the forex market, when you raise the interest rate, the pressure goes down a little bit, because in this year, originally we were thinking to raise US Dollars 1.5 billion in the international market through sovereign bonds. If that money had come in January - because earlier we were planning to raise this money on 08th January - if we had done that at that time, the condition in the money market and the forex market would have been different. Then we would have added so much liquidity and there would not have been pressure in the market. That happened in 2014. Early January in 2014, we went to market and we raised about US Dollars 1 billion and that added so much liquidity to the market and there was no pressure in the forex market as well as in the domestic rupee market. So, we were able to bring down the interest rate. But in 2015, though we were thinking to raise the Dollars, we could not do it. Because of that, when you want to raise more and more money from the market, rates tend to go up. That was also a consideration - I mean, we have to say that this particular decision was also affected not by domestic money market considerations.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You were not involved in this decision?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: No.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He is saying it with his general knowledge.

සභාපතිතුමා: මා හිතන හැටියට මෙතුමා-ගෙන් අහලා වැඩක් නැහැ. මෙතුමා මෙයට සම්බන්ධ වෙලා නැහැ. I will have to manage time. We have to address two other governors.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Does the Tender Board decide on all private placements as well as auctions?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: You mean in general?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, in general, not this one.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: In general, the domestic money requirement we get from the -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not that. When placing private placements or bonds, in private placements, you say that you select a person and the private placement is given.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: We select, in the sense, we tell all the people. Whoever, who has money can come in.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You do not put a gazette notification or a paper advertisement?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: No.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If you talk of transparency, what is the more transparent way? Auction or the -

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: That is the trade-off. Auction is more transparent but price-wise, they have to pay a little more. There are advantages and disadvantages.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: On a private placement, does the Tender Board always decide? Without the Tender Board can an individual decide?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: This is how it happens. After the auction, basically the Department looks at the different maturities.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is right. I am asking, who takes the decision?

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: Is it the Department or Tender Board?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: They get my approval. I am the Chairman.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: As the Chairman of the Tender Board?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Your approval is needed to make a private placement?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: They do the private placement. What we do is, we decide the rates. We give the rate structure. We have a Front Office, Middle Office and a Back Office. To the Front Office, we give the rates for the different maturities.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But should there be a tender board approval for that?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: No.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who calculates the rates? Who decides the rates?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: The Depart-ment prepares the rate structure and they get my approval before doing the private placement.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Only your approval and not the tender Board? The Tender Board does not approve it?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Tender Board does not meet for private placements.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is there a scientific way of calculating the rate?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You have been there, since when?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: From 2012.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Has there been any placement without your approval?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: No. In a sense, they do the placement based on those rates and they get my approval.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Every time there had been a placement your approval is there?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You said that you inform everybody, does it mean that everyone who has made a bid is told that these are the rates or you just call people up on the basis of who you think might bid?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: What we basically do is, the Front Office officials call whoever who has money. It also depends on the need of the Government as well as the availability of money in the market.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So you lay down what you need and what the interest rates are going to be based on the earlier auction figure?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා මහ බැංකුවේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයෙක් නේද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ දිනයේදී ඔබ අධිපතිතුමා සමඟ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගියාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මොකටද ගියේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මමයි, අපේ අනික් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමායි දෙන්නාම ගියා. අප දෙන්නාම ගියේ Governorත් එක්කයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අප හදනවා list එකක්, එක එක rates වලට දමපු කට්ටිය කවුද කියලා. ඇත්තටම ඒ වෙලාවේ කථාවක් තිබුණා, private placements නවත්වන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නවත්වන්න ඕනෑ කියලා නේද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අධිපතිවරයා ගියේ ඒකටද? අධිපතිවරයෙක් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එහෙම යනවාද, දෙපාර්ත- මේන්තුවට? ඉතිහාසයේ එහෙම ගිහින් තිබෙනවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ මේ අධිපතිවරයා යන්න ඇත්තේ, එතුමා අලුත් නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම ෙනවෙයි ඇහුවේ. අධිපතිවරයා අලුත් වුණාට ඔබතුමන්ලා -නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරු- පරණයි නේ. ඉතිහාසයේ ඔය වාගේ අවස්ථාවක අධිපතිවරයෙක් එහෙම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහින් ඔහොම කටයුතු කර තිබෙනවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: සාමාන්‍ය-යෙන් යන්නේ නැහැ. ගිහින් නැතිව ඇති.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැතිව ඇති කියලා නොවෙයි මම අහන්නේ. ගිහින් තිබෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියන එකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමාට උත්තර දෙන්න අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මේ අධිපතිවරයා මේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගියා. ඊට කලින් දිනයේ එතුමා අපේ තිබෙන තව department, Currency Department, IT Department වලටත් ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වෙලාවේ අපේ ඇතුළේ meeting එකක් තිබුණා, අනික් කට්ටියත් එක්ක.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ මොන වෙලාවේද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: උදේ 11.00ට විතර මා හිතන්නේ.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: At what time did the bids close?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: උදේ 11.00ට close කරන කොට, -

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: 11.000ට පස්සේ අප ගියා.

ගරු මහාචාර්ය රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Bids close කළාට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලා ගියා?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: Bids කළාට ඉස්සර වෙලා කාටවත් bids බලන්න බැහැ. Bids electronically??? හම්බ වුණාම bids බලන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ ඒ cut-off time එකෙන් පසුව විතරයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Cut-off එක උදේ 11.00ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: අප ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ 11න් පසුවයි. නැත්නම් sheet එක අරගෙන එන්න බැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Sheet එක අරගෙන ගිහින් එතුමාට පෙන්නුවා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මමයි, අනික් Deputy Governor නිකම් කථා කළා. Department එකේ කට්ටියත් කිව්වා, එකක් ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා කියලා. ආණ්ඩුවේ requirement එකත් 13ක් තිබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ආණ්ඩුවේ requirement එක 13ක් තිබුණා කියලා කොහොමද දන්නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක requirement වෙන mature bond එකේදී 13.5 ගෙවන්න දුන්නා. 3.5ක් මේ අය direct placementවලින් අරගෙන තිබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේ ආණ්ඩුවේ requirement එක 13ක් තිබුණා කියලා? ඒක කොහොමද ඒක දන්නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට අප කථා කළා නේ. ඔය auction එක තියන්නේ maturity එකක් pay කරන්න නම් ඒ maturity එකේ amount එක අප දන්නවා. Mature වුණාම 13.5

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් කියලා බැහැ. මොනවාටද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ වෙලාවේ මගේ ප්‍රශ්න ටික අහන්න දුන්නා නම් වැදගත්. ඒක හරි වැදගත් මේ සාකච්ඡාවට.

අධිපතිවරයෙක් ඉතිහාසයේ කවදාවත් මෙහෙම අවස්ථාවකට ගිහින් තිබෙනවාද? මෙවැනි අවස්ථාවකට යාම ගැන සදාචාරාත්මකද? මොකද අධිපතිතුමාට සම්බන්ධ සමාගමකුත් මේකට සම්බන්ධයි කියලා ප්‍රශ්නයකුත් මතු වෙලා තිබෙනවානේ. මේකත් එක්ක නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයෙක් වගයෙන් ඔබගේ අදහස කියන්න. ඔබතුමා අත්දැකීම් තිබෙන කෙනෙක් නේ. මා හිතන්නේ අධිපතිතුමාටත් ඉතිහාසයේ මේ ගැන අත්දැකීමක් තිබෙනවා. එතුමා ඒ ගැන ප්‍රකාශ කර තිබුණා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: අධිපතිතුමායි, මමයි එකට තමයි මේ බැංකුවට බැඳුණෙත්. අධිපතිතුමා මේ බැංකුවට තවම අලුත් නිසා මම හිතන්නේ,-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක අලුත් පරණ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. එතුමාට තිබෙන වගකීම සහ වගවීම? අලුත් පරණ බව කියන්න පොඩි ළමයි නොවෙයි නේ. එතුමා අධ්‍යයනය කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබගේ අදහස මොකක්ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: මගේ අදහස වුණේ නම් අධිපතිතුමා අලුත් නිසා, -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමාගේ අදහස කියන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම නේ මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නේ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ නම් අධිපතිතුමා අලුත් නිසා හිතන්න ඇති, කොහොමද මේ වැඩේ කෙරෙන්නේ කියලා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහින් බලන්න.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා කලින් කිව්වා වාගේ එතුමා අනික් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලටත් කලින් දවස්වල ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගියාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. අධිපතිතුමා ආවාට පසුව, Currency Department එක අපේ ලොකු Department එකක්. ඒ වාගේම අපේ තොරතුරු නාක්ෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තිබෙනවා. ඒ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලටත් රිට කලින් දවසේ එතුමා ගිහින් ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක තීරණාත්මකයි. ඒකයි මම අහන්නේ. වටේ යන්නේ නැතිව කිව්වොත් හොඳයි. එහෙම නම් රිට පහුවෙනි දා යන්න පුළුවන් නේ. නැත්නම් දවසක් පහු වෙලා යන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: මම නම් හිතන්නේ මේක ඇත්තටම පොඩි unfortunate event එකක්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජේ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, bill, bond auction කියන එක ඇත්තටම සුමානයකට පාරක් හැම දාම bill auction එකක් තියනවා. Bond auction තියනවා. ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය ඔය තරම් ඇදුණේ නැත්නම් මේක සාමාන්‍ය සිද්ධියක්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අසාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා මාධ්‍යයට ප්‍රකාශයක් කර තිබෙනවා මෙහෙම. මම එය කියවන්නම්.

"මම පල්ලෙහාට - ඒ කියන්නේ, ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට - ගියේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරු දෙදෙනෙක් සමහයි. මට අවශ්‍ය වුණේ බිලියන දහයක...

ඔය ඔබ කියන තරම් සරල නැහැ.

බිලියන දහයක මුදල ලබා ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා ප්‍රශ්නය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් විමසන්න පමණයි...

මේකෙන් නිශ්චිතව කියනවා නේ.

ඒකයි මගේ අවධානය යොමු වූ ප්‍රධාන කරුණ. ඒකයි මම පල්ලෙහාට ගියේ. ඒක හදිසි අවශ්‍යතාවක්. අපට ඒ මුදල් සොයාගත නොහැකි නම් රජයට මුදල් නැති වෙනවා. මතක තියාගන්න. රාජ්‍ය සේවකයන්ගේ වැටුප් සියයට 40කින් රජය වැඩි කර තිබුණා. එම වැටුප් ගෙවන්න මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයට මුදල් අවශ්‍ය වී තිබුණා. මේකයි නිබුණු හදිසි අවශ්‍යතාව. පල්ලෙහාට ගිහින් මම විමසුවේ මේ බිලියන දහයක මුදල රැස් කර ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලායි."

එතුමා බොහොම පැහැදිලිව කියනවා, මේ ගියේ මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණයට කියලා. එතුමාත් එක්ක ගිය ඔබතුමා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයෙක් විධියට මේක ගැන දන්නේ නැද්ද? දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ එතුමා අලුත් නිසා යන්න ඇති,-

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ මම ඒක දන්නේ නැතිව නොවෙයි. ක්‍රම දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ ඕක approve කරන්නේ කොහොමත් Governor. දැන් ඕකේ auction එක අරගෙන ආවා නම් ඕක approve කරන්න කොහොමත් Governor ට යනවා. මෙතැන වුණේ, එතකම ඉන්නේ නැතිව Governor ඉස්සරවෙලා පහළට ගිහින් තිබෙන එකයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම අහන්නේ. මේ සාකච්ඡාව හරි වැදගත්.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මම දන්නේ නැහැ, Governor කථා කරලා අප දෙන්නාත් එක්ක පහළට ගියා.

Governor අපි දෙන්නා එක්ක කථා කරලා පහළට ගියා. අපි දන්නේ නැහැ, ඇත්තටම Governorගේ අදහස මොකක්ද කියන එක. මට හිතෙන විධිය මා කියන්නම්. එකක් තමයි Governor අලුත්. Governor හිතන්න ඇති, ඔතැන සඳහන් වන විධියටම හෙට 13.5ක් දෙන්නත් ඕනෑ. -ඔය කියන දවස බදාදා දවසක්. ඊට පසු දවස නිවාඩු දවසක්. 02වැනිදා තමයි සල්ලි ගෙවන්න තිබුණේ. එතකොට තව auction එකක් කරන්න වෙලාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ- මේ ගැන මා ටීට වැඩිය හොයන්න ඕනෑයි කියලා. මොකද, මා යම් තැනකට අලුත් නම් මා බලනවානේ, මේක හරියට කෙරෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයකු විධියට ඔබතුමාට ලොකු වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි අධිපතිතුමාට සම්බන්ධ ඥාතීත්වයක් තිබෙන සමාගමකට ප්‍රශ්න එන්නේ. අපි පොඩි ළමයින් නොවෙයිනේ. එතකොට අධිපතිතුමා විශේෂයෙන් මේක ගැන හොයන්න ඕනෑය කියලා මේ වෙලාවේම මේකට යනවා. ඉතිහාසයේ හිටපු අධිපතිවරු මා දන්නා පමණින්, මා අසා තිබෙන පමණින් එහෙම මැදිහත් වීමක් කර නැහැ. අනික, මේක ලොකු ගනු දෙනුවක්. එතකොට මේකේ මේ ඔක්කෝම පෙළ ගැස්වීමක් තිබෙනවා. මේ කරුණු කාරණාත් එක්ක ගත්තාම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අධිපතිවරයකු මේ තැනට ගිහිල්ලා සෘජුව මැදිහත් වීමක් කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයකු විධියට ඒ ගැන දන්නවා. මීට කලින් පැවැති Committee එකේ ප්‍රකාශවලත් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත් වීම කියලා තිබුණාට, මහ බැංකුවේ පොතක් ගැන කථා කර තිබෙනවා මිස මෙවැනි කරුණක් ගැන කිසිම සඳහනක් නැහැ. මා මේ කථා කරන්නේ එතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශයත් එක්කයි. දිවයින පත්තරයට එතුමා interview එකක් දීලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ, 2015 ජූනි මස 04 වැනිදා බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා දිවයින පුවත් පත. මේක තමයි මේකේ තිබෙන ඇත්ත ගැටලුව. මා උපකල්පනය කරනවා, මේක සෘජුවම එතුමා මැදිහත් වෙලා කියලා. අනික, ඒ ගොල්ලන් තමයි මේකේ විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් ගන්නේ; bid එක. ඒ නිසා මේකේ වෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා කියන එක මට උපකල්පනය කරන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මගේ ප්‍රශ්නයත් මෙතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළවයි. එතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්නය ගොඩක් වැදගත්. Mr. Silva අපට හරියටම පහදා දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද, බැංකුව ඇතුළේ මේ කටයුතු සිදු වන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා. මොකද, මෙතුමා තුළ තිබෙන ඒ වැරදි උපකල්පනය මටත් එන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, පළමුවන දවසේ හිටපු Deputy Governor පහදා දීපු නිසා මට මේ ගැන යම් කිසි දැනුමක්, අදහසක් තිබෙනවා. දැන් මෙතුමා කියන විධියට මේ bids සිදු වන වෙලාවේ Central Bank එකේ අධිපතිතුමාට ගිහිල්ලා ඇඟිලි ගහන්න කිසිම සම්බන්ධයක් නැහැ. මොකද, මේක පිටින් එන එකක්. ඉවර වුණාම electronic විධියට මේක එනවා. ඉතින් අධිපතිතුමා Tender Board එක වෙලාවේ ගිහිල්ලා මැදිහත් වුණාද? මොකද, Tender Board එකට බිලියන 20ක් ආවා කිව්වානේ. ඒ 20න්නේ 10 තෝරා ගත්තේ. එතැනයි අපට වැදගත් වන්නේ. මේ 20න් 10 දෙන්නේ කාටද කියන එක Tender Board එක තීරණය කරන කොට අධිපතිතුමා එතැන හිටියාද? නැත්නම් නිකම් Floor එකේ ඇවිද්දා ද? මොකද, මෙතුමා ඒක අහන එක සාධාරණයි. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය පහදන්න. Dealing rooms කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ. dealing roomsවලින් එන-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පහළට ගිහිල්ලා අධිපතිතුමාට බලපෑමක් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද ඒ සම්බන්ධව. පුළුවන් නම් කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා Tender Board එකේ Member කෙනකු නොවෙයි නේද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They are asking a general question from him.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** නැහැ. මම Tender Board එකේ member කෙනෙක් නොවෙයි. හැබැයි, මම Governor එක්ක ඔය වෙලාවේ-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමා ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ හිටපු සභාපතිතුමා නේද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා සභාපති ධුරයෙන් අයින් වුණේ කවදා ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 08 වැනිදා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අවුරුදු කීයක් සභාපතිවරයා විධියට හිටියා ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** අවුරුදු තුනක් හිටියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට කවුද සභාපති පත් කරන්නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** ඒකට work allocation එකක් තිබෙනවානේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපති පත් කරන්නේ කවුද?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Governor.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමාව ඉවත් කළාද, නැත්නම් ඔබතුමා අයින් වුණාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** ඉවත් කිරීමක් නොවෙයි, වෙන්නේ. අපේ වැඩ reallocate කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මා අහන ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තර දෙන්නකෝ. ඔබතුමා ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපතිවරයා විධියට අවුරුදු තුනක් හිටියානේ. එතකොට ඔබතුමාව ඉවත් කළාද, ඔබතුමා අයින් වුණාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: Tender Board එක වෙනස් වෙනවානේ. Post එකට නොවෙයිනේ Tender Board එක යන්නේ. Rotate වෙනවානේ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** දැන් මම Public Debt Department එක භාරව ඉන්නවා නම් මම තමයි Chairman. එහෙමයි වෙන්නේ. එහෙම නැතිව මට Tender Board එකේ ඉන්න බැහැ, Public Debt Department එක බලන්නේ නැතිව.

සභාපතිතුමා: අලුත් administration එකක් ආවාම changes ඇති වනවා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** මා යටතේ Public Debt Department එක තිබෙනවා නම් ඒකෙන්මා මා අර තනතුරට පත් වනවා. එහෙමයි වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හොඳයි.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** එතකොට Public Debt Department එක භාරව ඉන්න DG තමයි Tender Board එකෙත් Chairman වන්නේ.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක ex-officio පත්වීමක්.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** එතකොට පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ අපේ වැඩ reallocate කරද්දී Public Debt Department එකෙන් මාව අයින් කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට Public Debt Department එකෙන් automatically අයින් වෙනවා-

සභාපතිතුමා: Tender Board එක හැදෙන්නේ Departments වලින් represen-tatives වන විධියටයි. මෙතුමා අර post එකට යන කොට ඉබේම ඒක ඇති වෙනවා. ඊළඟට අනෙක් කෙනා එනවා. ඒකයි. අස් වුණාය කියන එක වැරදියි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි. එතකොට ඒ post එකෙන් ඔබතුමා වෙනත් තැනකට යොමු කළා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ post එකෙන් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් annually අවුරුදු තුනකට වතාවක් මාරු කරනවාද? කොහොමද ඒක වෙන්නේ?

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: උසස් වීමක් ලැබෙනවා ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** නැහැ. උසස් වීමක් නොවෙයි. මේ අයිපතිතුමා ආවායින් පස්සේ වැඩ reallocate කළා. එහෙම කළේ අංශ තුනක් බලලයි. එක අංශයක් වුණේ policy කියන එකයි. Policy කියන එක එක් කෙනකුට දුන්නා. ඒක දුන්නේ Dr. Weerasingheට. තව තිබෙනවා, regulation and supervision කියලා. දැන් bank supervision -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, අභ්‍යන්තර වෙනස්කම් රාශියක් සිද්ධ කළා?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි. එතකොට ඔබතුමාගේ අවුරුදු තුනක කාලය තුළ ඔබතුමා ඔය අවස්ථාවට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** Tender Board එකේ Chairman වශයෙන් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මා යන්නේ නැහැ. මා ළඟට කොළ ටික අරගෙන එනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ගිහිල්ලා නැද්ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා **මහතා:** මා ඉනින් Public Debt Department එකට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා මේ කාලය තුළ වෙන වෙන අවස්ථාවලදී. නමුත් auction එකේ කොළ ටික සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමයට-

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපති හැටියට ඒ අවුරුදු තුන තුළ ඔබතුමා එතැනට ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Auction එක කරන්න යන්නේ නැහැ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වෙන්නේ මේකයි. දැන් auction එකේ results sheet එකක් තිබෙනවානේ. ඒ auction results sheet එක summarize කරලා හදනවා පොඩි table එකක්. එතකොට ඒ table එකේ තිබෙන්නේ කරුණු දෙකයි. ඒ දෙක තමයි - ඇත්තටම ඒකයි Perpetual Treasuries Limited අය බැලුවෙවත් නැත්තේ. මොකද, කවුරු සල්ලි දැම්මත් ඒක අපට වැඩක් නැහැ. අපට ඕනේ -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නේ නැහැනේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. අපි දන්නෙත් නැහැ; බැලුවෙත් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නේ Bank of Ceylon නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් auction එකේදී අපි බලන්නේ කරුණු දෙකයි. ඒ දෙක තමයි quantity එක මොකක්ද, at what raise we can raise the money. එච්චරයි අපි බලන්නේ. ඇත්තටම ඔය දමන අය කවුද කියලා අපි කවදාවත් දන්නේ නැහැ. මා නම් දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි. එතකොට නව බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ආවාට පස්සේ සිදු වුණු පළමුවැනි auction එකද මේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මා හිතන විධියට නැහැ. මොකද, ජනවාරි මාසයේනේ Governor ආවේ. ජනවාරි 27නේ වැඩ භාර ගත්තේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට auctions කියක් කලින් සිදු වුණාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි, dates වුණත් දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කීයක් විතර සිද්ධ වුණාද?

ගරු රෝහි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: යතියකට කොච්චර තිබුණාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Auctions දෙක තුනක් තිබෙන්න ඇති.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ දෙක තුනටත් අධිපතිතුමා බලන්න ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ, ගිය පළමුවැනි-

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මේක නම් වෙන්න ඇති. මේකෙදී තව කාරණයක් වුණා. ඒකෙදින් මා හිටියා. ඒ නමයි, ගරු කබීර් හාෂිම් ඇමතිතුමායි, RDA එකේ නිලධාරී මහත්වරුනුයි ආවා මහ බැංකුවට. ඇත්තටම ගරු රවි කරුණානායක ඇමතිතුමාත් ආවා.

ගරු විරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කවදා දආවේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඊට දවස් දෙක තුනකට විතර ඉස්සෙල්ලා.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: කරුණාකර, ආපු තැනැත්තන්ගේ නම් පැහැදිලිව කියන්න.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: කබීර් හාෂිම් ඇමතිතුමා ආවා. රවි කරුණානායක ඇමතිතුමාත් ආවා. Road Development Authority එකේ officialsලා වගයක් ආවා.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: නම් දන්නේ නැද්ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඕනෑ නම් හොයලා කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු රෝහි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ අය කවදා ද ආවේ Mr. Silva?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔය Auction එකට දවස් දෙකකට වාගේ උඩදී. 24, 25 වාගේ දවසක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් විස්තරය කියන්න.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ කාලය තුළ මලික් සමරවික්‍රම මහතාත් ආවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. එතුමාත් ආවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතුමාත් මේ කටිටිය එක්ක ආවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා ආවේ මොන හේතුව මතද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: එතුමා ආවේත් ඒ සාකච්ඡාවටම තමයි.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: මොකක්ද තිබුණු සාකච්ඡාව?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඇත්තටම ඒ සාකච්ඡාව තිබුණේ Road Development වැඩවලට සල්ලි ඕනෑය කියන එක සම්බන්ධයෙනුයි. මට මතක හැටියට Road Development වැඩවලට බිලියන 14ක් හෝ 15ක් immediately ගෙවන්න තිබෙනවා කියලා කිව්වා. මට හිතෙනවා, ඒකත් අධිපතිතුමාගේ ඔඑවේ තිබෙන්න ඇති කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් නොවෙයිද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව කියන්න ඕනෑ. RDA එකට පුළුවන්ද මහ බැංකුවට ඇවිල්ලා එහෙම මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව කියන්න.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මා හිතන්නේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය represent කරන්න තමයි ගරු රවි කරුණානායක ඇමතිතුමා එන්න ඇත්තේ.

මේක ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මා හිතන්නේ හරියටම, නීත්‍යානුකූලවම සල්ලි ඉල්ලීමක් නොවෙයි.

11.20/ උදාරා/ මේක මා හිතන්නේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් රටේ තිබෙන අවශ්‍යතාවක් ගැන කථා

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා සම්බන්ධිතයි:

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒක මම හිතන විධියට අපේ රටේ තිබෙන අවශ්‍යතාව ගැන කථා කිරීමක්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නා පරිදි මලික් සමරවික්‍රම මහතා අමාත්‍යාංශයක හෝ වෙනත් ආයතනයක හෝ යම් තනතුරක් දරනවාද? ඒ සාකච්ඡාවට එතුමාගේ මැදිහත්වීමක් සිදු වුණේ ඇයි?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මම හිතන විධියට මලික් සමරවික්‍රම මැතිතුමා advisor කෙනෙක්. මොකද, එතුමා අපේ අනෙක් සාකච්ඡාවලටත් සහභාගී වෙනවා මම දැකලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අගමැති උපදේශක -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අගමැති උපදේශක වශයෙන් නේද? එතුමා අගමැති උපදේශක වශයෙන් සහභාගී වෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දන්නේ නැහැ. වෙන්න ඇති.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක අපි දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා නොවෙයි නේ. මෙතුමා ඇහුවේ ඊට කලින් දවසක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම අහන්නේ මේකයි. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා ඔය auction එක සිදු කළ තැනට ආවා කියලා. මම අහන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා වැඩ භාර ගත්තාට පස්සේ auctions කීයක් තිබුණාද? ඒවාටත් මේ වාගේ ගියාද කියන එකයි.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මම හිතන විධියට මේක තමයි පළමු වැනි අවස්ථාව.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම දන්නා තරමින් මේක තමයි අධිපතිවරයෙක් ගිය පළමු වැනි අවස්ථාව.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මෙහෙමයි. දැන් මම -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ අවුරුදු තුනක කාල සීමාව තුළ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මේ තමයි පළමු වැනි අවස්ථාව.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා පෞද්ගලිකව හිතනවාද, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහ බැංකුවේ IT Department එකට ගිහිල්ලා බලන එකයි, මේකයි අතර ගැටලුවක් නැහැ කියලා? විශේෂත්වයක් නැහැ කියලා හිතනවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ගැටලුවකට වඩා මම හිතන්නේ මේකයි. දැන් මේ මූදල් අවශ්‍යතාව පිළිබඳව - ඒක නිසා නොවෙයි. ඒක නිසා තමයි අධිපතිතුමා යන්න ඇත්තේ. අධිපතිතුමා හිතන්න ඇති, ගිහින් බලන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. කොහොමත් auction එක ඉවර වුණා නම්, අනුමැතිය සඳහා ඒ ලියවිලි ටික අන්තිමට එන්නේ Governor ගාවට. ඒ තාක්කල් ඉන්නේ නැතුව, ඊට ඉස්සර වෙලා පහළට ගියා. ඒක තමයි වුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Mr. Silva, අධිපතිතුමාට පුළුවන්ද, එතැනට ඇවිල්ලා auction එකට බලපෑම් කරන්න? ඒ වෙලාවේ පහළට ගිහිල්ලා auction එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් මොනවා හරි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: බලපෑමක් කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. අපි කථා කරලා - bids 20ක් වාගේ ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබුණා නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Auction එක ඉවර වුණාම නේ දන්නේ bids 20ක් තිබුණා කියලා. මෙතුමා අහන්නේ auction එක වෙලාවේදි එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Auction එක වෙලාවේ නොවෙයි, auction එකට ඉස්සර bids ආවාට පස්සේ - අපට total bids එනවා. ආවාට පස්සේ list එක බිලියන 20ක් තිබුණා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක 11.00ත් පස්සේ නේ දන්නේ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. 11.00ත් පස්සේ දන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Auction එක යන වෙලාවේ නොවෙයි නේ. දැන් ඔබතුමා මෙතැන වැරදි අර්ථකථනයක් දෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ මේ auction එකේ bids යන වෙලාවේ අධිපතිතුමා ආවා කියලා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. Auction එක යන වෙලාවේ නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා නේ ගියා කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා අපට පැහැදිලිව උත්තර දෙන්න. අපට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාවන්නේ පොඩි දෙයක්. ඔබතුමා අපට මේ ගැන පැහැදිලිව කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: එක මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න. සියලු දෙනාම අහනකොට පැහැදිලි නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ආවා කියනවා නේ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අධිපතිවරයෙක් එන්නේ නැහැ. එන්නේ නැත්තේ හේතු කිහිපයක් නිසා. එතකොට එතුමා ආවාට පස්සේ එතුමාට පුළුවන්ද, ඒ bid එකට මොනවා හරි බලපෑම් ඇති කරන්න? ඒ ආපු සැණින් ඒ ලැබෙන ප්‍රමාණය සම්බන්ධයෙන්, ලැබෙන පුද්ගලයා සම්බන්ධයෙන්, කාටද ලැබෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් බලපෑම් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මෙන්න මෙහෙම දෙයක් එනැන වෙන්නේ. දැන් එක එක් කෙනා bid කරන bids එනවා. ඒවා එන්නේ electronic. එතකොට අපි ඔය යන වෙලාව වෙන කොට - bids open කරලා ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ තමයි අපි ගියේ. මොකද, එතකොට තමයි අපට table එක හදන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ table එක හදන කොට - ඊට පස්සේ තමයි අපි ගියේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ මොනවා හරි බලපෑමක් ඇති කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලායි අහන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔව් ද, නැද්ද කියලා කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "මෙහෙමයි" කියලා ඔබතුමා එක එක දේවල් කියනවා. නමුත් උත්තරය ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔව් ද, නැද්ද කියලා කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Bids ටික ආවාට පස්සේ අධිපතිතුමාට මොනවා හරි බලපෑමක් ඇති කරන්න පුළුවන්ද, bids සම්බන්ධයෙන්?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Bids සම්බන්ධයෙන් බලපෑමක් ඇති කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අන්න ඒකයි අපට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ වුණේ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නමුත් ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්. බලපෑමක් කරන්න බැහැ. මොකද, ඒ වන විට bid එක ඇවිල්ලා ඉවරයි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය කොහොමත් report එකේ තිබෙනවා නේ.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am clarifying this. The Governor himself has made it very clear that he affected the decisions in two ways. I am not saying "බලපෑම්". One is the amounts to be raised. The second is the method of raising. It is very clear from the report published by these lawyers. From the sequence of events they make it very clear that it is largely because of the Governor's intervention that the decision was made to go for an auction and to go for Rs. 10 billion. Is that correct?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is very clear.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is very clear that the two decisions that the tender board made are on the advice of the Governor. Let us put it as simple as possible. It is here in this report that it is to go for the system of auction which was a change. On the basis of the information there, if you look at this, you would realize that, if you went for Rs. 10 billion, the Bank of Ceylon has bid for Rs. 5 billion. It is very clear.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Let me just clarify the methodology. I think in order to separate the two issues of rate and cost and the issue of corruption, the decision to go for an auction is definitely a better system because it is a more transparent system.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, but, the way it is describe here-

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: You will understand it, if I explain this. So, let me finish the explanation. It is definitely more transparent to take that decision at the policy level to go for an auction. I am not talking about the amount taken on the day. I am not referring to that at all. But, it is bit clear on the method. The auction is always better as it is electronic; nobody can interfere in it and all the bids are coming. How much you take from it is a different issue. The problem with the direct placement is this. Actually, the direct placement can be cheaper because the auction sets a price, then, you call the brokers and the primary dealers and say "Give it to us at that price" or you might even say, "Give it to us at a low price." So, actually, it can be cheaper. That point is established. This is where the problem is. The reason why I say the system of auction is better is that there is discretion after the direct placement. You basically call the dealers and tell them "I want certain funds and we are willing to take. Can you give it to us at the same auction rate or even at a lower rate?" So, there is a benefit. But, the discretion is the difference of the rates, whatever the basis points are. I do not suggest that something has happened here. But, when there is discretion, that is the premium for corruption. There is no transparency. That is the premium for corruption in any system, not only in this system. Even with regard to a single source, you may argue that you can get a deal done cheaper through India or China through the single source. I was having this argument

yesterday as well. But, it creates discretion. The moment it creates discretion, that issue is there. So, in terms of the system, this is definitely a better system as a whole where it disagrees with one of the statements made by the Deputy Governor is that, if the system works like this competitively, the auction is always going to be cheaper. Otherwise the economic theory has to be always false. The reason why it may not be cheaper in Sri Lanka is because we have certain funds that are called captive funds. So, the dealers can go to the captive funds and say "You put this money in beyond the auction, we need another Rs. 2 billion or Rs. 3 billion and you put it in." The fact of the matter is, for example, the EPF does not work on a completely competitive basis. It does not work for that because there is an inbuilt conflict in the Central Bank as the primary agent for borrowing for the Government of Sri Lanka and the conflict of giving the best return to the members of the Employees Provident Fund. That is an inbuilt conflict. If you look at it like that, what the Deputy Governor says is correct. It is the correct thing that you can do. But, theoretically, an auction should always give you the best price. There is no question of that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Hon. Rajiva Wijesinha, you were not here when the Monetary Board was summoned here. There, it was categorically stated that the Governor of the Central Bank took a decision to suspend direct placements and to go for more auctions because it is a far more transparent system. That is what is being established and the decision has been taken to suspend the direct placements for the time being and to raise funds through auctions. So, this is nothing irregular that has been done then and there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When did the Governor take that decision?

Rather the Governor cannot take that decision. But, it is very clear from this report that the decision was taken on the basis of the advice or the recommendation of the Governor. My question is when that decision was taken. My belief from what you have just told us is that decision was taken on this date on the recommendation of the Governor by the tender board that met after the Governor had seen the final bid at 11 a.m. Am I correct?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: I mean, in this particular instance –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: My simple question is -

The Chairman: How can he answer that?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How can he answer that? How does he know?

The Chairman: He is not a Member of the Monetary Board.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He is not the Governor. You ask the Governor.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He has already told us -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He cannot answer that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am sorry. Can I explain? I understood everything that the Hon. Eran Wickramaratne said. Actually the date that was here was mentioned. I do not agree that discretion is always corrupt.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He is not in the Tender Board. He is not the Governor.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Not always.

The Chairman: Those things, you can argue later. You ask the questions.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am asking the witness this question. He already confirmed that the Governor made an unusual, he used the word "unfortunate", visit. The result of that was two instructions, advise, or whatever. One was, the amount to be raised was Rs. 10 billion. The second was, the system that he thought was best to adopt, the reasons he has explained, was the auction system. Those decisions were taken on that day.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The auction was called the day before.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not on that day.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It cannot be that day. If you advertise for auctions the day before -

The Chairman: On the 23rd the Monetary Board took the decision.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We interviewed the Monetary Board. They took the decision to go for an auction.

The Chairman: Are you a Member of the Monetary Board?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: I am not a Member of the Monetary Board.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Exactly. What are you asking him?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: But I attend Monetary Board meetings.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Ask the Monetary Board Members that question.

The Chairman: You are trying to test his theoretical knowledge. No! We want evidence.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He had the evidence

The Chairman: You address that question to the Governor who was involved in this?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We interviewed so many people and got the background of it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are asking what the Governor has thought and what the Tender Board has done. He cannot answer.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am asking him about information he gave us.

The Chairman: Who? :

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Silva. He gave us information on the basis of the question put that the Governor made an unusual visit.

The Chairman: That is right. That has been recorded.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: And the substance of that conversation was advise that led to the decision. Correct. Thank you. That is all I wanted to establish.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the conversation?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I did not hear that part. What was the conversation that the Governor had?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Conversation in the sense, we went to the Public Debt Department on that day.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do not say, "conversation in the sense". Just say, what was the conversation.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the conversation?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Conversation in the sense, we discussed the amount required. That particular sheet was shown to us and at that point we decided to take ten.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. Where did the sheet go after that, if you did not check it there?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what we want to know. We want to know what happens on the floor.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Where did that sheet go after that?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: The sheet was taken back to the Public Debt Department. It was in the Public Debt Department.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There, do you not take the same decision?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: They will have to take the decision there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They will have to go through and take a decision?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who takes that decision?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: That decision has to be taken by the Tender Board.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Does the Governor have a say in the Tender Board or is his advise adopted by the Tender Board, or what?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: I am not -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Normally.

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Normally what happens is, the Tender Board decides and takes it to the Governor for his authorization.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Authorization?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So his advice and his authorization is needed for that?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Needed.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Silva, did the Governor go to the Tender Board?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා වැරැදි අර්ථ කථන දෙන්න එපා. ඔබතුමා නැහැ කියනවා. මෙතුමා ඉඳගෙන ගියා කියනවා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. නැහැ. මෙතැන දෙකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වැඩිය කලබල නැතුව අහන්න. කලබල වෙන්න එපා.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Protest too much.

Edited

The Chairman: I am just asking, in a court of law do all lawyers ask questions at the same time?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I have to say, "Yes". You have to come to court and see, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They all shout.

The Chairman: One Member should address the question. Do not confuse the witness.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙතුමා දැන් පැහැදිලි කරලා කිව්වා Governor conversation එකක් කළා කියලා. ඔබතුමියට කියන්න පුළුවන්කමක් නැහැ, ඒක කියන්න එපා කියලා කියන්න.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මම අදහස් කළේ conversation එක Tender Board ඇතුළේ. Tender Board එක ඇතුළේ නේ decide කරන්නේ.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He never said about the Tender Board. What he had said Hon. Member was -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha, I want him to tell where this conversation was and with whom. Let him say with whom he had the conversation.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He has just said this. The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe is confusing two things. One is the approval of the Governor which is normally given by the Governor after the recommendation of the Tender Board. The second is, what is unprecedented, the Governor coming before and making certain suggestions and advise –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: To whom? Was he at the Tender Board?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He is not there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, no.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You are confusing him.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේක කිව්වේ ඔබතුමාට විතරක් නොවෙයි.

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මෙහෙමයි, මෙතැන දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි in general –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I want an -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Hon. Wijesinghe, you have a preconceived mind.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You have a preconceived mind and you are trying to say that he said it.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමා එක්ක එකට ඉඳපු කාරණය ගැන විතරක් ඔබතුමා කියන්න.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා කියපු කාරණය මම දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් මේකට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න. පහළට ඇවිත් Governor කාත් සමඟ කථා කළේ?

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: පහළට මමයි, Dr.Weerasingheයි, Governorයි ගියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: තුන්දෙනෙක් ගියා.

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. අපි තුන්දෙනෙක් ගියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුද ගියේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගිය කට්ටියගේ නම් කියන්න?

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මමයි, Governorයි, අනිත් Deputy Governor, Dr. Weerasingheයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි. ඒ අයගෙන් කවුද Tender Board එකේ ඉන්නේ?

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: කවුරුවත් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුරුවත් නැහැ Tender Board එකේ.

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එපමණයි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක ඔයගොල්ලන් අතරේ තමයි කථා වුණේ.

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ අපි තුන්දෙනා පහළට ගිහිල්ලා කථා කළේ Public Dept Department එකේ officersලාත් එක්ක.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒවා ටික කියන්නකෝ. ඔබතුමා හාගෙට කියලා නවත්වන්නේ නැතුව හරියට කථාව කියන්න.

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මමයි, Governorයි, අනිත් Deputy Governorයි පහළට ගියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි. තුන්දෙනාම Tender Board එකේ නැහැ.

ඩී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: අපි තුන්දෙනා Tender Board එකේ නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ අපි කථා කළේ- Public Debt Department එකේ Dr. Azim කියලා කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ වෙලාවේ ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ අනිත් Director, Mrs. Seneviratne කියන කෙනා හිටියා. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දෙන්නා තමයි අපි ගියාම අපේ ඉස්සරහට අර කොළය අරගෙන ආවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මොනවද කථා කළේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අර කොළය කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: කොළය කියන්නේ අපේ bids එන කොළය. එතකොට මෙහෙම අපිට මුදල් ඕනෑ කියලා කථා කරලා- Tender Board එකේ අය නැහැ. දැන් අපි තුන්දෙනා නේ මේ කථා කළේ. අපි තීරණය කළා 10 ක් පමණක් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කොළය යන්න ඕනෑ Tender Board එකට නොවෙයිද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකයි මම කිව්වේ. මෙතැන දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. සාමාන්‍ය යෙන් වෙන සිරිතයි, මේක ඇවිල්ලා specific මේ වෙලාවේ වුණ විධිය.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වෙන විධිය මට කියන්න?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වෙන විධිය තමයි දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඒ recommendation එක අරගෙන Tender Board එකට එනවා. Tender Board එකේ proposal එක දෙනවා Governorට approve කරන්න. Final decision anyway comes from the Governor.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි. එතකොට Public Debt Department එකට ගිහිල්ලා එතනින් recommend කරලා තමයි Tender Board එකට එන්නේ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Tender Board එකට ඇවිල්ලා තමයි Governor ළඟට එන්නේ. දැන් මේක සිද්ධ වුණේ ඔබතුමන්ලා දෙදෙනාත් සමඟ පහළට ගියා, ඒ යනකොට කවුද කොළය අරගෙන ආවේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ ආවේ Dr. Azim සහ තව හිටියා Director.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Dr. Azim කියන්නේ කවුද? මොකක්ද ඔහුගේ තනතුර?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Dr. Azim කියන්නේ Additional Director, Public Debt Department.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි. එතකොට ඒ කොළය අරගෙන ආපු වෙලාවේ Governor කිව්වේ මොකක්ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: අපි කථා කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කථා කළේ මොකක්ද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Governorගේ අදහස වුණේ 10ක් ගනිමු කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට Tender Board එකට යන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලාද ඒක Governor ළඟට ආවේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව් එතකොට Tender Board එක හමුවෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කොළය Public Debt Department එකටයි, Tender Board එකටයි යන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා තමයි Governorට දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Public Debt Department එකෙන් නේ හදන්නේ. Tender Board එකට යන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා තමයි අපි ගියේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: යන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලාද? යන ගමන්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කොළය Tender Board යන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා Governor ළඟට ආවා. ඊට පස්සේ Governor මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: අපි කථා කළා. කථා කරලා තීරණය කළා 10ක් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ තීරණය කාටද දුන්නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. ඒ තීරණයක්ම දුන්නේ නැහැ. අපි ඒ කථාව කිව්වා Public Debt Department එකේ officersලානේ එතැන හිටියේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ තමයි Tender Board එකට යන්නේ. එතැන හිටපු දෙන්නෙක් යනවා. Tender Board එකේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඉන්නේ Tender Board Chairman සහ කවුරු හරි officer කෙනෙක් Economic Research Department එකේ. අපේ Domestic Operation Department එකෙන්. Public Debt Department එකේ කථිටිය තමයි යන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලෝ එතැන හිටියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Public Debt Department එකේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට Governor මේ report එකේ එකින් එකට කියවලා බැලුවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: කොයි report එකද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Bids තිබෙන report එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් ඔය bids තිබෙන කොළය අරන් ආවා නේද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට Governor එකින් එක කියවලා බැලුවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: සාමාන්‍ය-යෙන් අපි මේ කොළය බැලුවාම, මම දන්නේ නැහැ

Governor නේ බැලුවේ. එතකොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපි කරන වැඩක් තිබෙන්නේ bids දාපු කට්ටිය - මම දන්නේ නැහැ Governor බැලුවාද කියලා. මම කියන්නේ මම නම්, අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් බලන්නේ දෙකයි. ඒ දෙක තිබෙන්නේ quantity එකයි rate එකයි විතරයි. අපි බලන්නේ ඒ අපිට ඕනෑ quantity එක මොන rate එකටද ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. එතකොට ඒක තමයි අපි බලන්නේ. මේ සල්ලි දැම්මේ කවුද කියන එක ඇත්තෙන්ම අපි සාමාන්‍ය වෙලාවේදී බලන්නේ නැහැ. ඉතින් මම දන්නේ නැහැ Governorත් බැලුවාද නැද්ද කියන එක.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි. Governor කොපමණ වේලා බලාගෙන හිටියාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Governor ගේ idea එක වුණේ මම හිතන විධියට නම්-මිනිත්තුවක් දෙකක් බලන්න ඇති.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා එතැන හිටියා නේද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හිටියා නම් ඔබතුමා දකින්න ඇති නේද කොපමණ වේලා බැලුවාද කියලා?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මෙහෙමයි. මේ කොළය ගත්තාම අපි ඒ අතර කථාත් කරනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් අපි establish කරන්න ඕනෑ- මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා සාධාරණව අහන්නේ. මේ කොළය බලලා- ඔබතුමාට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. මෙක තේරුම් ගන්න.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මට තේරෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තේරුණාට උත්තර එන්නේ නැහැ. මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන්නේ මේ කොළය බලලා, දැන් මේ කොළයේ ඔක්කෝම නම් ටික තිබෙනවා කවුද දැම්මේ කියලා. ඒ ටික හොඳට බල බලා ඒ ටිකත් අහුවෙන්න මෙන්න මේ ගණනට ගනිමු කියලා තීන්දු කරලා, ඒ තීන්දුවේ යම්කිසි අදහසක් අර Public Debt Department එකට දුන්නා, මේ ටික තිබෙන නිසා මෙන්න මේ ටික ගනිමු කියලා. ඒක තමයි මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාලාගේ සැකය තිබෙන්නේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ එහෙමම එකක් වුණේ නැහැ කියලා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම එකක් වුණේ නැහැ කියලායි මට නම් හිතන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙනම් කොහොමද වෙන්න පුළුවන්?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ස්ථිරවම ඒ ගැන කියන්න. Mr. Silva, මම මේ කාරණයත් ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්න කැමැතියි. එතැනදී Governor කිව්වාද, මේ බිලියන10 මේ මේ කට්ටියට දෙන්න කියලා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැනේ. බිලියන 20න් කාටද දෙන්නේ කියන එක තීරණය කරන්නේ Tender Board එකද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මට එච්චරයි දැනගන්න ඕනෑ. අපිට තිබෙන සැකය ඒකනේ. Governor තීරණය කළාද, මේ මේ අයට දෙන්න කියලා?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම එකක් නොවෙයි වෙන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නිකම් එතුමා බලලා කිව්වා, අපිට මෙච්චර මුදලක් ගන්න ඕනෑය කියලා.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: හරියට කියන්න. මොකද, අපිටත් මේ ගැන සැකයක් තිබෙනවානේ. අපිත් මේ සැකය දුරු කර ගන්නනේ මේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Mr. Silva කියපු විධියටයි, ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා කිව්ව විධියටයි ඒක වෙන්න බැහැනේ. Auction එක අනුව කාටවත් discretion නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Discretion එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Governor exercise කරපු discretion එක තමයි, quantity එක සහ ක්‍රමය.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ දෙක එතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත Tender Board එක, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ බිලියන 10ක් ගත්ත එක වැරැදිද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක ඇවිල්ලා subjective කථාවක්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Subjective වුණාට ඔබතුමාත් එතැන හිටියානේ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කියන්න බැහැනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම කියන්න බැරි ඇයි?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: බිලියන 10ක් ගත්ත එක හරිද, වැරැදිද කියන එක මගේ තීරණයක් නොවෙයිනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම ගැනනේ අපි අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ තීරණය නොවෙයි අපි අහන්නේ. අවශ්‍යතාව අනුව ඒ

සල්ලි අවශ්‍යද, නැත්නම් බිලියනයක් අරගෙන පස්සේ වෙන ක්‍රමයකින්, -

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකත් auction එකක්. ක්‍රම දෙකක් තිබෙනවානේ. එක ක්‍රමයක් තමයි, මේකෙන් බිලියන දෙකක් විතර ගන්න පුළුවන්. තව බිලියන අටක් ඕනෑ නම් direct placements කරලා ගන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Direct placements suspend කරනවා කියලා හිතමු.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙනම් බිලියන දහයයි ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මම මේ කාරණය පමණයි ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා Deputy Governor හැටියට හරියට මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තර දෙන්න. මගේ දැනුම අනුව නම් මෙච්චර කල් Central Bank එකේ cross-questions කරපු අය Treasury එක දැනුවත් කළා. Central Bank එකත් ඒක දන්නවා. එදා අවශ්‍යතාව වුණේ Rs. 13 billion raise කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි. ඒ Rs. 13 billionවලින් රජයේ ආයතනවලින් බිලියන තුනක් raise කරලා තිබුණේ. බිලියන දහයක අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණා. එකක් දැම්මා, market එකට auction එකට. ඒ auction එකට දාපු වෙලාවේ 20ක් ආවා. ඒ 20 එන කොට කිව්වා, අපි එහෙනම් අනික් 10ත් පුරවා ගනිමු කියලා. මේක නොවෙයිද, සිදු වුණේ? මගේ අදහස ඒකයි. ඔබතුමා වටේ යන්නේ නැතිව මේ කාරණයට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එහෙනම් දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ ඇයි?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: **ඒක හරි. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා** මගෙන් ඇහුවේ මේ බිලියන 10 ගත්ත එක හරිද, වැරැදිද කියලානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා දුන්නු උත්තර අනුවයි අපි ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවේ. මොකද, ඔබතුමා දුන්නු උත්තරය පැහැදිලි වුණේ නැහැ.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි. ඒක තමයි වුණේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එහෙම දෙයක් වුණා නම් එහෙම වුණා කියලා කියන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැවත වතාවක් මේ කාරණය කියන්න. මේ Department එකට Governor සහ ඔබතුමන්ලා ආවා. Tender Board එක හරහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට පැමිණීම තමයි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඉතිහාසය තුළ සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් ඒ ක්‍රමයට පරිබාහිරව සම්ප්‍රදාය විරෝධී ආකාරයට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට මේ කොළය ඍජුවම ආවා කියන එක හරිද, වැරැදිද කියලා කියන්න.

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකත් හමු වුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක හරිද, වැරැදිද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමය ඒක නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍ය නොවන ක්‍රමයකට මේක සිද්ධ වුණා?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: May I ask you a question, please?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: Yes.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Now, I have before me Dr. M.Z.M. Azim, Additional Superintendent of Public Debt. Now, that one is a most senior position in the Central Bank. He is a man with a lot of high responsibilities. When the Governor comes he brings a paper, gives it to him at a very critical time in the Bank? Do you think it is a right thing to do for Dr. Azim? I am not embarrassing you. In your own assessment, do you think when this auction and everything is going on, as to why Dr. Azim should give this particular paper to the Governor?

Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva: When the Governor is the topmost position in the Bank and he goes down-

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Sorry! Under process was going on.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There was no decision at the point he has given.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let him answer that question.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: ඒ කොළේ ගෙනැල්ලා දුන්නේ ඇයි?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: කොළේ බලන්නනේ Governor ආවේ. Governor ආවාම එතුමා Governorට පෙන්වන්න කොළේ අරගෙන ආවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Governor ඒ කොළේ බලන්න ආවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Governor ආවේ ඒ ගැන කථා කරන්න. කථා කරන්න ආපු නිසා එතුමා Governorට පෙන්වන්න කොළේ අරගෙන ආවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම මේ කමිටු වාර්තාවේ සාරාංශය ඔබතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. මේ කාරණය දිගු වුණත් කියන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට තමයි ඔබතුමාට මේ කාරණය තේරෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමාටවත්, Governorටවත් එතැනට යන්න කිසිදු අනුමැතියක් නැහැ කියලා තමයි මට හිතෙන්නේ. 2015 මාර්තු 2වැනිදා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත් වීම පිළිබඳව මේ කමිටු වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම 2015 මාර්තු 2වැනිදා වන විට රජයේ මුදල්

අවශ්‍යතාව පිළිබඳව මෙහි සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මේ කමිටු වාර්තාව ඔබතුමා ළඟ තිබෙනවා. එම කමිටු වාර්තාවේ මෙසේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වය අත්පොතට අනුව මෙම තීරණය ගැනීමේ බලය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අයත් වේ. අදාළ ඉනිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය ලබා ගැනීමේ නිත්‍යුව ගෙන ඇත්තේ සාමාජිකයින් අට දෙනෙකුගෙන් සැදුම්ලත් ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුව මගිනි. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා මෙම ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයෙකු නොවන්නේය. (ඒ අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුවේ කටයුතුවලට සෘජු ලෙස සහභාගී වූ බවට කිසිදු සාක්ෂියක් නැත. මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වය අත්පොතට අදාළව ගන්නා තීරණ පිළිබඳව යම් යම් මෙහෙයවීම් පමණක් කළ බව, - ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවටත් බොරු කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

මේ කමිටු වාර්තාවේ 19වැනි පරිච්ඡේදයේ තිබෙනවා, Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ලන්සු තැබීමේ ක්‍රමය හා පිළිගත් ඉල්ලුම්වලින් 50%ක් ලබා ගැනීම අසාමාන්‍ය බව කමිටුව විසින් මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී, කමිටුවට ලබා දී ඇති සීමිත බලතල නිසා මෙම කමිටුවට ඉහත සඳහන් ක්‍රියාදාමය ගැන නිගමනයකට පැමිණිය නොහැක කියලා. මේක හරි පැහැදිලියි. ඔබතුමා එතැනට ගිය එකත් වැරැදියි. ඔබතුමා ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල සාමාජිකයෙකු නොවේ නම්, මෙය අත්පොතට අනුව සිදු වේ නම් ඔබතුමා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිය එකත් වැරැදියි. අධිපතිතුමා එතැනට ගිය එක ඊටත් වඩා වැරැදියි.

මට ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න දෙකක් අහන්න තිබෙනවා. මගේ පළමුවැනි ප්‍රශ්නය මෙයයි. නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන්ට, අධිපතිතුමාට මේ සඳහා මැදිහත් වෙන්න අවශ්‍ය නම් මෙතැනට නොගිහින් මේ ගැන සොයා බැලීමට මහ බැංකුව තුළ පහසුකම් නැද්ද? කිසියම් කරුණක් දැනගන්න අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒ සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැද්ද? දැන් නාක්ෂණය දියුණුයි. පණිවුඩයක් හෝ විස්තරයක් දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒ සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැද්ද? මෙතැනට යන්නේ ඇයි? මෙතැනට යාමෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ මොකක්ද? අපිට දැන් වුණත් මෙතැන ඉඳලා ලෝකයේ ඕනෑම තැනකට කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඇයි, මෙතැනට යන්නේ? මේ වාර්තාවට අනුව විශාල බලපෑමක් තිබෙනවා. මේ කමිටුවත් තීරණය කරලා තිබෙනවා, මෙතැනින් එහාට ඒගොල්ලන්ට යන්න බැහැ කියලා. නමුත් සියයට 50කින් මේක වැඩි වීම් පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

මගේ ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය මෙයයි. රට් කරුණානායක මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා, ඊට පෙර දිනයේ පැමිණියාය කිව්ව මලික් සමරවික්‍රම මැතිතුමා වාගේම කබීර් හාෂීම් මැතිතුමා මේ නිල සාකච්ඡාවට පැමිණියා කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වා. ඒ නිල සාකච්ඡාවට ඔබතුමාත් සහභාගී වුණාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාත් සහභාගී වුණා?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: මමත් එතැන හිටියා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාත් සහභාගී වුණානේ. හරියට කියන්න. නැත්නම් එතුමන්ලාටත් අසාධාරණයක් වෙනවා. එතකොට අපිට වෙන වෙන අදහස් මතු වෙනවා. ඔබතුමා ඒ සාකච්ඡාවට සහභාගී වුණානේ. ඔබතුමාත් සහභාගී වුණු ඒ සාකච්ඡාවේදී සාකච්ඡා කළේ මොනවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: එතැනදී ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම සාකච්ඡා වුණේ මේකයි. සමහර contractsවලට සල්ලි ගෙවන්න තිබෙනවා. ඒ සඳහා රජයට මුදල්, -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ සාකච්ඡාවේ minutes තිබෙනවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ Ministry එකට මුදල් ඕනෑ කියලා තමයි සාකච්ඡා වුණේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ සාකච්ඡාවේ minutes තිබෙනවාද?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා: Minutes නම් මම හිතන්නේ ලිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නිල ආයතනයක් නම් මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයා ආපු නිල සාකච්ඡාවේ සටහන් තිබෙන්න එපායැ. මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයා මෙතැනට එන්නේ විශේෂ වැඩ කටයුත්තකටනේ. ඒ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලාට වගකීමක් තිබෙනවානේ. Minutes නැතිව සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: වැඩිය වැදගත් discussions නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා මහ බැංකුවට එන්නේ ඉතාම වැදගත්, අත්‍යවශ්‍ය රාජකාරි කටයුත්තකට නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතුමාද කැඳවුයේ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙතුමා කියනවා, Minutes නැහැ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Minutes නැහැ කියන්නේ, මෙතුමාද ඇමතිවරයා කැඳවුයේ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. සාකච්ඡාවට මෙතුමා ඉදලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතුමාගෙන් අහන්න බැහැ, Minutes ගැන. තේරුමක් නැති ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නේ නැතිව අදාළ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න. ඒක අදාළ නිලධාරියාගෙන් අහන්න එපායැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට ඒ රැස්වීමට එන්නය කියලා කවුද කිව්වේ?

බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ සිල්වා මහතා: Governor කිව්වේ එන්නය කියලා.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කවදාද කිව්වේ ඒ රැස්වීමට එන්නය කියලා?

කේ.කේ.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ සිල්වා මහතා: ඊට ඉස්සෙල්ලා දවසේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: We will stop this, now. මම මූලදීම කිව්වා අදාළ නැති witness කෙනෙකුට - You got some information but not evidence.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I have one more question. Rs. 16 billion වැඩිපුර ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඉල්ලුවා නේ. ඉස්සෙල්ලා Treasury එක කිව්වා නේ requirement එක Rs. 13 billion කියලා. මේ Rs. 16 billion ගත්තේ දහතුනටත් වැඩිපුරද?

කේ.කේ.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැනදී ඒ අයගේ ඉල්ලීමය කියන්නේ -

The Chairman: Okay. Thank you very much. We will summon the other relevant witness.

(සාක්ෂිකරු නික්ම යයි.)

(මේ අවස්ථාවේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පත්තිනිගේ සමරසිරි මහතා කැඳවන ලදී)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පත්තිනිගේ සමරසිරි මහතා, ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව විමසන ලදි.

සභාපතිතුමා: සමරසිරි මහතා, ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑ භාෂාවකින් සාක්ෂි දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමා නේද tender board එකේ Chairman?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, Sir.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකේ අනික් සාමාජිකයන් කවුද කියා කියන්න පුළුඵන්ද? මොකද මේක record එකට යන්න අවශ්‍යයි.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The Members are; Director (Economic Research), Director (Domestic Operations Department), Superintendent of Public Debt, Additional Superintendent of Public Debt, Assistant Governor, in charge of the Public Debt Department, and the Assistant Governor supervising the monetary policy economic research area. Those are the members stated in the public debt manual.

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රධාන කාරණයට එන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා, අපට පොඩි අදහසක් දෙන්න. අපට මේ තරම් funds requirement එකක් ඕනෑය කියලා, මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියා එව්වායින් පසුව ඉස්සෙල්ලාම ඒක මොන දෙපාර්තමේන්තු-වටද යන්නේ? ඒකේ process එක කියන්න. අවබෝධයක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා, එතැන ඉඳලා tender board එකට ගිහින් bids අවසාන වනකම් stages ටික අපට කියන්න.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: This is a statutory function carried out by the Central Bank in terms of the Monetary Law Act and other relevant legislations. According to the Monetary Law Act, the Central Bank is the Fiscal Agent of the Government. Also, issuing of all government securities should be done by the Central Bank. That is the basic procedure. For that, the Central Bank from the inception. has established the Public Debt Department. So, for all the funding requirements, the transaction communications are done between the Public Debt Department and the General Treasury. All these are mentioned in the manual. So, although this tender board is known as a tender board, it is not really a tender board. As you know, in respect of any procurement of goods and services, there is a tender procedure to be followed. The tender documents are prepared and approved by the tender board. There is also a Technical Evaluation Committee. The final authority is approving the tender board. But, this is really not a tender board in that sense and it is a recommendation committee.

The Chairman: Its caller also called as "tender committee", I have observed that.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. I will change that wording in the manual because that gives a wrong impression to the public that everything has been done by the tender board. Generally, tender boards in Sri Lanka do not have a good reputation. I have been in many tender boards. I was also a member even in the fertilizer procurement government tender boards. In that sense. this is different. This tender board is really making monetary policy related economic decisions with regard to each tender. So, how it starts is. the Public Debt Department announces all auctions and-

The Chairman: Before that, explain how the treasury communications are made.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Treasury communications are made with the Public Debt Department. It

does not come to the tender board or any senior level of the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It goes to the Public Debt Department, then they decide that.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. There is a Domestic Debt Management Committee. The officials of the Central Bank and the Treasury are there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How many members are from each institution?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: I think, one from the Treasury. That is, Director-General (Treasury Operations). All others are the Heads of Departments of the Central Bank. So, they decide the instruments, amounts and how much is to be raised in each week. Then, all the amounts are on weekly basis. Accordingly, they decide that how much Treasury bills and Treasury bonds we issue and how much to be raised in each week to the Sri Lanka Development Boards. Those are the three instruments that we are using to raise funds. Once the auction is announced, bids are received by the Public Debt Department. The summary of the bids is sent to the Tender Board. So, in this Tender Board, the report we got - probably you may already have seen the nature of the report- is a statistical report that has different scenarios. Say that, if this amount is accepted, what will be the interest rate for that particular auction? These amounts will be different depending on their preference. Finally, they give a recommended auction.

So they looked at the government funding requirements, because the officers there are very knowledgeable in economics and markets. So they do not want to attack the interest rates in the country because this public debt placing has been given to the government by the John Exter in 1950 with special objective because these are interest rates. It has to be within the monetary policy. So, these officers are knowledgeable. So, looking at their market developments and the knowledge they make a recommendation. So, then that comes to the Tender Board. Then in our Tender Board we have Director Economic Research – he knows the monetary policy and all economic developments. Then, DirectorDomestic Corporation, he knows the interbank liquidity market conditions, interest rates and so on. Then, we have the two assistant governors who have better views on the markets and the economy. So, as per the public debt manual, the terms of a reference of the Tender Board is to decide the optimal amount, interest rate and the amount. If you decide the amount of course the interest rate is already decided at that point. Taking into consideration the market developments, government funding requirements, current prevailing monetary policy. So, we would not go against the monetary policy and raise the funds for the government at whatever the interest rate. Of course if the Public Debt Office had been outside the Central Bank they would have done it. Because they do not know the monetary policy, then there will be a different interest rate and then you cannot manage the economy. So we look at those- so that is the TOR of the tender board.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Market development and what is the second one?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Market develop-ment, government funding requirements-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And the monetary policy?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, prevailing monetary policy. So, then when we say market developments, we look at the interbank market, liquidity positions, whether funds are available and now what it is and the foreign exchange markets, exchange rates because nowadays we always look at and see there is a foreign investment in government securities we have to see that those funds are not going out if that goes, lot of issues are created. So wewill have to see that when we are deciding the interest rate those aspects also are secured. So, these are basically and also we see the recent interest rates on government securities. If it is a Treasury bill auction, we see the recent interest rates from the Treasury bill auctions and the secondary markets. If I show you just a chart, what we see in the Tender Board, now these are the interest rates structures. All government securities are here maturity, then this is the yield curve.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What do you mean by the "yield curve"?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yield curve means the yield rates, interest rates on all government securities, treasury bills, treasury bonds by maturity. So you connect the yield points. So this is the yield curve. So this shift up and down depending on the market condition.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then you get the proper interest rate at the moment.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No. This one yield curve is one day. Because each day the yields are

changing, it depends on the market condition. So we look at you know - yield curves of different periods. Then we know, for example, now last auction we had on 03.06.2015- there was a Treasury bill auction. So at that auction, that day yield curve was this. It indicate as red one.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So where do you prefer to give the yield curve? Up or down?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Now, last one month after removing that 5 per cent interest rate then we made the policy cut on 15th April, so with that the interest rates should go down. So yield curve should go down. So we see in this whether the market yield rates are going down. For example, Treasury bill rates went down by like 50 – 60 basis points. We cut the policy rate only by 50 basispoint. But the interest rates on Treasury bills went down more than that within the two months time. This is very fast.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it bad for you all when the Treasury rates are going down?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: This is good for the economy. Because now, what we want is, the interest rates going down. I think that was one concern, our monetary policy but because of this senior citizen interest rate scheme, we are now free to manage the interest rates. So that has been one hurdle. So, we look at how interest rates structure, government securities market moving. So at the Tender Board we get the bids and then we see whether on all bids the weighted average yield rate. Whether it is consistent with this or going down or going up and probably we might see -we will decide the bids to see that the interest rates going down also. It is depending on the time.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You all control it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. It is our view. So we look at one major chart, here is the market liquidity and the call money rate. That is the interbank interest rate. When banks themselves borrow, there is an interest rate.

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe: I now.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: So that is the market interest rate we use to bench mark.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I want to know. What is that amount at the moment in the country?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It is about 6.1 - it is going down little bit. But it stabilized as 6.1 So, our Treasury Bill rates are also now around that point. So, at the Tender Board we look at this is the market interest rate, all market interest rate chart. This is the Central Bank policy rates. So normally market interest rates should be within.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the peak there?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: This peak came because we removed the 5 per cent interest rate.

The Chairman: Penal interest rate.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes penal interest rate. So soon after we removed it went up. When we put the 5 per cent, rates came down.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔය පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යාම විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ට බලපාන්නේ කොහොමද?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: If interest rates are rising yield rates the foreign investments come in. Now a days we have cut the policy rates and theinterest rates are going down when the interest rates going down, the Treasury Bill bond prices go up. So, when the prices go up, they make a profit because they have bought at a low price now price is higher some of them, speculative investors, they sell, book the profit and go and come back at another time.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: At a lower rate.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, at a lower rate at another time. Now it is happening.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔය පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ දැම්මේ විදේශ ආයෝජකයින් ගෙන්වා ගැනීමේ බලාපොරොත්තුවෙන්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ.අපි පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ දැම්මේදී ඒ පැත්ත බලන්නේ නැහැ.පොලී අනුපාතය කියන්නේ රට තුළ ආර්ථිකයේ හැම අංශයක්ම මෙහෙයවන යාන්ත්‍රණයක්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ දැමීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්ති කමිටුවට කිව්වේ, විදේශ ආයෝජන ගෙන්වා ගැනීමේ අරමුණින් තමයි මේක කළේ කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔබතුමා කථා කරන්නේ මොන පොලී අනුපාතය ගැනද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, හරියට කියන්න ඕනෑ මොන පොලී අනුපාතයද කියලා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා:මේ ගනුදෙනුවත් සමඟ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:නැහැ, නැහැ.මේ කියන කාරණය ඒ ගනුදෙනුවට අදාළ නැහැ. වෙනත් කාරණයක් ගැන මේ කථා කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැනට ආවේ නැහැ තවම. එතුමා මේ කියන්නේ වෙනත් කාරණයක්. Please do not disturb him.

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ ඔය ප්‍රශ්නයට මම උත්තර දෙන්නම්.මොකද, ඔය කරුණ-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: So, we look at the market interest rates. So there is a chart – At the Tender Board, presentation is made. This is the policy rate cart. Fifty basis point on 15th April. So, as a result interest rate by that amount went down, accordingly the market interest rates which were higher started falling.

Now, the market interest rate has reached to a minimum level –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is stable. Is it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, in consistent with the policy rates. So, the Treasury Bill rates are now close to 6.1 to 6.2. For example, on Wednesday, at the. Treasury Bill Auction, there was an argument that the Treasury Bill rates are going down and down and it is good for the Government but the foreign investors are trying to go out by booking the price margin. The Treasury Bill rates have declined by 50-60 basis points after 15th of April. So, we thought that this reduction is now enough because if you are trying to reduce it further that will disturb the market. These are our views. The Members, Director – Economic Research, Director – International Operation, we have views. So, we thought at the last Tender Board Meeting that we should not let the rates go down further.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: These views are based on your past experience. Is it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Experience and the knowledge. I am in the Central Bank for 33 years at various grades. So, I know the theory, the practice and what the market does as well.

The Chairman: So, you are trying to sustain at least the prevailing rate. Is it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: We thought that even letting the yield rate to go up a little bit, it would not be a problem because as long as these are within the margin, we do not have any concern.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the margin?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: We have a 2 per cent spread on the Central Bank policy rates. So, if the rates move within that, we do not have any concern. But, you do not have to keep those rates always at the bottom. So, depending on the market commission, we must change it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you have that leverage to go up and down. Is it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. So, we will have to decide as to why we are doing it and what factors are contributed to that. So, at present, the foreign investments in the Treasury Bills and Bonds have gone down a little bit. So, we thought of attacking that. Already, about US Dollars 70 million has gone. But, there is no any impact on the market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why has it gone?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Basically, this is because of the price increase.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They have sold and gone. Is it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Some speculative investors –

The Chairman: Mr. Samarasiri, shall we now come to the specific bond issue?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, so likewise, in terms of our ToR, we look at all those and then we look at the recommendation of the Public Debt Department.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was their recommendation on this?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: That day the recommendation was, all details, Rs. 10 billion at the weighted average yield rate of 11.73 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the weighted average? What does that mean? Is that the benchmark?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No. Weighted average means, for all bids there is an average –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The average rate. So, if you get Rs. 10 billion, the average would be set up at that level. Is it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: This is not the simple average. This is the weighted average. Say, somebody has given a yield rate at 5 per cent and his bid is, if the volume says 50 per cent of the total bids, then his 5 per cent gets the 50 per

cent weight. So, the rest gets the other 50 per cent weight and then the interest rate is merged.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can I just have a clarification on what you said earlier so that it will clean our heads. The electronic results come and then the dealers prepare a sheet of paper. Then, the Tender Board or the Tender Committee, whatever you call it, makes the recommendation. Is that what you call the Bid Summary Report?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay. Then, can you tell us, what the exact information is on the Bid Summary Report? If I am to put it another way, does the Bid Summary Report list all the companies or institutions also?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: It does not?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No information is passed through this.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: It is only to do with volumes and prices. Is it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It is only about aggregates.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I just ask whether we could have a copy of that?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Okay, I will give.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Because the problem is, this Lawyers' Report says that the Public Debt Department forwarded a document to the Tender Board which is annexed to this Report. But, there is no such document. All what they have given us is your document. I think, that is a big mistake.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Chairman, are we bound to go by this Report?

The Chairman: No, not to go by this Report but they say, "We were unable to pursue-"

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We are not bound by this Report. Are we not?

The Chairman: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Samarasiri, I think, what should be in the public domain is the recommendation of the PDD. Apparently, the PDD forwarded a document to the Tender Board

Mr. P. Samarasiri: That is not there. They have quoted different –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, if you have that, can we have a copy, please?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Because actually, that is a big lapse in this Report. Three distinguished lawyers –

The Chairman: Mr. Samarasiri, you carry on. Hon. Eran Wickramaratne, are you satisfied with the answer?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Mr. Chairman, can I ask a question?

The Chairman: Yes.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයෙක්. එතකොට තව කවුද නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරු විධියට ඉන්නේ?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe and Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතුමන්ලා දෙදෙනාගේ මහ බැංකුවේ සේවයට කොච්චර කාලයක් වෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Doctor Nandalal Weerasinghe මට වැඩිය ගොඩක් junior. Mr. Silva මා සමඟ බැංකුවේ සේවයට එකට බැඳුණේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මෙම පරීක්ෂණයට අදාළ bond issue එක වෙන අවස්ථාව වෙන කොට Deputy Governor හැටියට ඔබතුමාගේ කාර්ය භාර්ය මොකක්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අපූත් අධිපතිතුමා ආවාට පස්සු ආයතනයේ කළමනාකාරී-ත්වයේ සැහෙන්න ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙනස්කම් සිදුකළා. නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන්ගේ කාර්ය භාරය වෙනස් කළා. ඒ කාර්යභාරයේ නිල නාමයත් වෙනස් කළා. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන් කියනවා නම්, පළමුව එක Deputy Governor කෙනෙකුට තිබුණේ "මූල ස්ථායීතා අංශය" කියලා. ඊට පසුව "Economic Policy Advice" කියලා ඒකේ නම වෙනස් කළා. මට භාර දීලා තිබෙන කාර්යාංශය තිබුණේ "මූල්‍ය පද්ධති ස්ථායීතා අංශය" - Financial System Stability Cluster - කියලා. ඒ යටතට departments කිහිපයක්ම අයිති වෙනවා. පසුව එම නම වෙනස් කරලා "මූල්‍ය නියාමන සහ අධීක්ෂණ අංශය" - Financial Regulation and Supervision - කියලා. ඊට පසුව එම අංශය මට දුන්නා. මොකද, එම අංශයේ ගොඩක්ම experience තිබෙන, හිටපු බැංකු අධීක්ෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂ වුණේ මම. 2001 වර්ෂයේ ඉඳලා අධීක්ෂණ අංශයේ නමයි මම ඉඳලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Bank Supervision අංශයේ ද?.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, Bank Supervision.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. Director - Bank Supervision වශයෙන් මම සේවය කළා. එතකොට, අලුත් දේවල් සෑහෙන්න ප්‍රමාණයක් මම කරලා තිබෙනවා. මෙතුමා ඒ ගැන දන්නවා. අපි ඒ කාලයේ එකට වැඩ කළා. ඒ ආකාරයට මට ඒ කාර්යාංශය හාර දුන්නා. Mr. Silvaට ETF වාගේ operations තිබෙන අංශය හාර දුන්නා. මීට ඉස්සර වෙලාත් Mr. Silva තමයි ඒක කළේ. Public Debt Department එක මගේ යටතේ නිබුණා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔය සිදුවීම වන අවස්ථාව වන විට Public Debt Department එකත් ඔබතුමා යටතේ නේද තිබුණේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, එය මා යටතේයි තිබුණේ. පෙබරවාරි 10වන දා ඉඳලා තමයි එය වලංගු කළේ. ඒ අතර, ආයතන ප්‍රධානීන් ද, අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන් ද සෑහෙන සංඛ්‍යාවක් වෙනත් වෙනත් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලට මාරු කරලා අලුතින් ප්‍රතිව්‍යුහගතකරණයක් කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Public Debt Department එක ඔබතුමා යටතේද තිබෙන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 10වන දා ඉඳලා මා යටතේයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Tender Committee එකේ සභාපතිතුමා ඔබතුමාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Public Debt Department එක අධීක්ෂණය කරන නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, නිල බලයෙන්ම එහි Chairman වෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන විධියට, Tender Board - Chairman ඔබතුමාම නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, නිල බලයෙන්ම Chairman වෙනවා.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If I can get back to your Report, - I just saw that and I think they are coping that - on the strength of that document, the Tender Board met.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. That is the only information that I made available to Tender Board.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Only information?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, for discussion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Your recommendation says, "Approval for accepting Rs. 10 billion, at the net of tax, weighted average 11.73 per cent." Weighted average or by auction? Is there any difference?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Weighted average on the bids.

Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That was what he explained.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I got that but what we have been told earlier - forgive me if I did not understand - is that the weighted average means you fix the interest rate at 11.73 per cent.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: From the bids. We go along the bids; if you look at the bid sheet -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes, from the lowest to the highest.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: We go and set the limit. Depending on the funding requirement on Friday we wanted to raise Rs. 10 billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, what was the date?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Friday, 27th, February.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did you make any decision at that stage to go by the auctioning as opposed to direct placement?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Those decisions are not taken by the Tender Board.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who makes that decision?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Public Debt Department.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When did they make that decision?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: That of course, Public Debt Department did not do. As per my understanding- because I am a part of the senior management- that was taken – from that date to an interim - within a week or so.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When was that?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: 27th February. When that recommendation was made, the Public Debt Department knew that the money should be raised through the auction and not through private placement for this because we have to give the money by the following Monday.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When was that decision taken?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: On the 27th.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: At what time?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: What I am saying is when that information was presented to the Tender Board, the Public Debt Department mentioned at the Tender Board that we made the recommendation to raise the funds only through the auction and not through private

placements because we had to give funds by the following Monday.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, that was the rationale according to the Public Debt Department which they told you on 27th of February?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, at the opening.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Mr. Samarasiri, how was that message conveyed to you by the Public Debt Department?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Normally what happens is when they circulate that paper, they explain their rationale. "We make this recommendation and so on." It is verbal.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Dr. Azim is an Additional Superintendent of the Public Debt Department. Is that right?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. He is knowledgeable and -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How do you circulate it? Do you send it to the Department or you gather round the place and circulate it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No, this does not go out. It is done within the Board. No prior circulations.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, they came to the Tender Board and made this recommendation.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Public Debt Department is part of the Board.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, are you bound to follow that recommendation?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No, we are not bound. We are not bound to discuss issues.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Around what time did you meet?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: After 12.30.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්-ලාගේ manual එකේ තිබෙනවාද, ඔය document එක auction එකෙන් කෙලින්ම එන්න ඕනෑ ඔබතුමන්ලාටයි කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම නම්, ඔය document එක වෙනත් කුමන ආකාරයකින් හෝ වෙනත් කා වෙත හෝ යන්න විධියක් නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: යන්න විධියක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම නම්, මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට ඔය document එක යා යුත්තේ කුමන වේලාවේදි ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේ Manual එක අනුව නම්, මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට එය යන්නේ අපි - Tender Board එක- decision එකක් ගත්තාම ඒ decision එකත් එක්ක තමයි එය අනුමැතියට යන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Recommendation එකත් එක්ක.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Recommendation එකත් සමඟයි මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට යන්න ඕනෑ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අනුමැතියට යනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ ආකාරයට නැතිව, ඔය document එක මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට ගිය අවස්ථා ඉතිහාසයේ තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එච්චර නම් කියන්න මා දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඒ ගැන දන්නේ නැත්නම්, "දන්නේ නැහැ" කියලා කියන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එච්චර කියන්න මා දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම ගියොත්, මොකක්ද ඇති වන තත්ත්වය? ඔබතුමන්ලාට එන්න කලින් ඔය document එක මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට ගියොත් මොකක්ද ඇති වන තත්ත්වය?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම, බැංකු අධීක්ෂණය-compliance ගැන හොඳින් දන්නා කෙනෙක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මා අහන ප්‍රශ්නයට, පිළිතුර දෙන්න. Tender Board එකේ Chairman විධියට ඔබතුමාට වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ manual එක අනුව ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයට පරිබාහිරව, එනම් ඔය document එක ඔබතුමන්ලාට එන්න කලින් මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට ගියොත්, වෙන්න පුළුවන් දේවල් මොනවාද? එය ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කටයුතුවලට බාධාවක්ද; තීන්දු තීරණවලට බාධාවක්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මෙකයි. Internal controls කැඩීමක් තමයි එහිදී වෙන්නේ. Procedure එකේ එක් එක් මට්ටමේ නිලධාරින්ට කරන්න තිබෙන වැඩ හරියට නොකිරීම නිසා ඒ control එක කැඩෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එසේ වුණා නම්, එය සම්ප්‍රදායානුකූල නොවනවා වාගේම ඔය manual එකටත් පටහැනියි නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එසේ වුණා නම්, එය compliance එක කැඩීමක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ කියන අදාළ ගනුදෙනුවේදී එවැනි දෙයක් සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවාය කියා ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මා එය දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය document එක මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා වෙත කලින් ගියා කියන එක ඔබතුමා දන්නේ නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. මෙහෙමයි. ඒ recommendation එක කරන වෙලාවේ උදේ අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. එය කවුරුත් දන්නා කාරණයක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කුමන වෙලාවේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: වෙලාව නම් මා හරියටම දන්නේ නැහැ. කෙසේ නමුත්, උදය වරුවේ. මා හිතන්නේ ඒ ප්‍රකාශනවල කළා- උදය වරුවේ අධිපතිතුමා- සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒ දවස්වල අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලට යනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නා විධියට, කවදායින් විතර පසුව ද එතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලට යන්න පටන්ගත්තේ? වැඩ භාර ගෙන දැනට සැලකිය යුතු කාලයක් නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මා හිතන්නේ, ඇවිල්ලා පළමුවැනි සතියේම ගියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: "මා හිතන්නේ" කියා කියන්න එපා. හරියටම උත්තර දෙන්න ඕනෑ. "මා හිතන්නේ" කියා කියන්න බැහැ නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මට දින කියන්න අමාරුයි. මට මතකයි, එක දවසක් සවස 5.00ට මා සමඟ ගියා Currency Department එක බලන්න. හැබැයි, මට ඒ දිනය මතක නැහැ. මොකද, ඒවා ලියා කරන ඒවා නොවෙයි නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේද, ඔය කියන දිනයේදී එතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවකට ගියා කියා? කුමන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවටද ගියේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. Public Debt Department එකට ගියා. හැබැයි මම දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ එහේ යන බව.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමාට විශ්වාසයෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා ඔය කියන දිනයේදී Public Debt Department එකට ගියා කියා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ සාක්ෂියේදී ඔබතුමා දැන් කිව්වා නේද, Public Debt Department එකත් ඔබතුමාගේ supervision එක යටතේයි තිබෙන්නේ කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ වාගේම, ඔබතුමා Tender Board එකේත් Chairman නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Public Debt Department එකෙන් තමයි දැනුම් දෙන්නේ, ණය මුදල් ඒක රාශි කරන්න කොයි තරම් ප්‍රමාණයක් රජයට අවශ්‍යද කියන එක. Treasury එකෙන් මෙතැනට දැනුම් දුන්නා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කොපමණද මුදල?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Rs. 13.5 billion.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Rs. 13.5 billion තමයි, 2nd of March වන කොට ආණ්ඩුවේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව? ඔබතුමන්ලාට තමයි Treasury එකෙන් ඒ communication එක එන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, Treasury එකෙන් එය එන්නේ අපට නොවෙයි. එය එන්නේ, Public Debt Department එකටයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හරි ඉතින්, Public Debt Department එක ඔබතුමා යටතේ නේ තිබෙන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එය මා යටතේ තිබුණාට, මගේ අධීක්ෂණය කෙරුණාට ඒ ඒ අය කළ යුතු වැඩ manual එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහි ප්‍රධානියා ඔබතුමා නේද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Public Debt Department එක භාරව සිටින නියෝජ්‍ය බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමා නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමා කියනවාද, Rs. 13.5 billion raise කරන්න කියා Treasury එකෙන් Public Debt Department එකට දැනුම් දුන් බව ඔබතුමා දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Rs. 13.5 billion කියන එක දන්නවා. එය Tender Board එකේදියි කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි නේ. එය දන්නේ-

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Tender Board එකේදියි කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එය දන්නේ-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: First let me finish my questions. Thereafter you can ask yours.

The Chairman: Let him continue. Disturb කරන්න එපා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I am trying to help him.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන සිටියා, ඒ communication එක. එය දැනගෙන තමයි ඔබතුමා ගිහින් වාඩි වුණේ, Tender Board එකේ Chairman හැටියට?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එය Tender Board එකේදියි කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: තමුන්නාන්සේ දැනුවත්ව සිටියා-

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: දැනුවත්ව සිටියා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Tender Board එකේ වාඩි වන විට ඔබතුමා දැනුවත්ව සිටියා තමුන්නාන්සේලාට raise කරන්න තිබෙන funds Rs. 13.5 billion කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Auction එකේ නොවෙයි. Department එකට. That is the requirement.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: That is the requirement. කවුද තීන්දු කළේ, Rs. 1 billion raise කරන්න? රුපියල් බිලියන 13.5ක් ඕනෑ වෙලාවේදී Rs.1 billion raise කරන්න decide කළේ කවුද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එය තීරණය කරන්නේ Public Debt Department එකයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Public Debt Department එක ඔබතුමා යටතේ නේ තිබෙන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මට ඒ වාර්තාව එන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ manual එක අනුව එසේ වාර්තා කරන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හොඳයි, අපි එහෙම කියමු කෝ. හැබැයි, ඔබතුමාට දැනුමක් තිබුණා නේද, Rs. 13.5 billion තමයි රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාව කියා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා Tender Board එකේ වාඩි වුණාට පසුව ඔබතුමාට raise කරන්න අවශ්‍ය වුණේ Rs. 1 billion?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මට එහෙම අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: කවුද decide කළේ, Rs. 1billion raise කරන්න?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක advertise කරන කොට Public Debt Department එක තමයි decide කළේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට කවුරුත් දන්නවා නේ. ඔබතුමා විතරක් නොවෙයි. Advertise කළාම Rs. 1 billion තමයි raise කරන්නේ කියලා primary dealersලා පවා දන්නවා. හැබැයි, ඔබතුමන්ලාට Rs. 13.5 billion ඕනෑ වෙලා තිබුණාය කියලා ඒ primary dealersලා දැන ගෙන සිටියාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක නම් මම කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එය දැන ගන්න ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ market playersලා නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ එක එක තොරතුරු හොයනවා ඇති.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ තිබෙන දක්ෂතාව අනුව ඒවා හොයා ගන්නවා ඇති. එහෙම නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා දන්නා දෙයක් කියන්න.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, Rs. 13.5 billion raise කරන්න ඕනෑකම තිබුණාය කියන එක Treasury එකයි, Public Debt Department එකයි, ඔබතුමන්ලායි හැර මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා දැන ගෙන ඉන්නවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා දැන ගෙන හිටියා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ ඇති. මට එච්චරයි දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට Treasury එක දන්නවා; Public Debt Department එක දන්නවා; අධිපතිතුමා දන්නවා; ඔබතුමා දන්නවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Treasury එකත් දන්නවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙතුමා දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා නේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන ගෙන හිටියා. Rs. 13.5 billion තමයි requirement එක කියලා දැන ගෙන හිටියා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම ඒක දන්නවා. මම ඒක දැන ගෙන හිටියා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. රජයට Rs. 13.5 billion raise කරන්න ඕනෑය කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා හැර වෙන කෙනෙකුට දැන ගන්න ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මට ඒකට නම් උත්තරයක් දෙන්න අමාරුයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ අවුරුදු 33ක පළපුරුද්ද සහ ඔබතුමා කරපු bank supervision එකයි, මේ Public Debt Department එකේ overall supervision එකයි තිබෙන කෙනා හැටියට- Rs. 13.5 billion raise කරන එක ඔබතුමාට රහසක් නොවෙයි නේද? ඒක ඉස්සෙල්ලා කියන්න. යම් පිරිසකට සීමා වුණු, පොදුවේ ජනතාවට access එකක් නැති දෙයක් ද, නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක පොතේ හැටියට රහසක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Mr. Samarasiri, මම ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශයට කරුණක් add කරන්නද?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes, you can.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මේක අපි question කරන කොට transpire වුණු එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමා අවසන් කළාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමා cross-examine කරන්න. You finish it.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I have just one thing to add to that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: With my permission, let her continue. Let her assist me.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Hon. Chairman, your term is wrong. There are no two sides. We are all in one side.

The Chairman: She has right to do that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, she is not cross-examining.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is just to assist you.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It is okay.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We all are questioning.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Mr. Samarasiri, පොඩ්ඩක් assist කරන්න, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට මේ කරුණත් add කරන්න. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් market එක ගැන හොඳට තේරුම් ගත්ත, මේ දවස්වල ලංකාව මෙච්චර debts ගෙවන්න ඕනෑය කියලා observe කර ගෙන ඉන්න තියුණු බුද්ධියක් සහිත market embedded වෙලා ඉන්න කෙනෙකුට තේරෙනවාද ආණ්ඩුවට මේ කාලය වන කොට මෙච්චර සල්ලි ඕනෑය කියලා. ඒක හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: පුළුවන්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Central Bank එකේ Reports අනුව?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Market dealersලා කියන්නේ නිකම් ඇවිල්ලා deal දාන අය නොවෙයි. They study it.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Exactly, ගණන ගන්න පුළුවන්ද? Rs. 13.5 billion කියලා හරියටම හිතා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක නම් මට හරියටම කියන්න බැහැ. ඔහුට information -

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නිට්ටාවටම දැන ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියාගෙන ගිය ටික හරියට කියන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ market research එක කරලා-

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් කියන්න ගිය information- ඒ ටික කියන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: කාගෙන් හෝ information pass වුණා නම් පුළුවන්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නිට්ටාවටම මෙච්චර ගණනක් ආණ්ඩුවට ඕනෑ වෙයි කියන හැඟීමක් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක තිබෙනවා. මොකද, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් government borrowing programmesවල pressure එක එන මාසය දන්නවා. මාර්තු මාසය හුඟක්ම ඕනෑ මාසයක්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මාර්තු මාසයේ අවශ්‍යතාව මේකයි කියලා Central Bank එකේ Reports කියෙව්වාම පිට කෙනෙකුට තේරෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. Central Bank එකේ Reports හා වෙන Market එකක් කියන්නේ, එකම තැනකින් යන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: කෙනෙකු ඒ ගැන හොඳට අධ්‍යයනය කළොත් ආණ්ඩුව මෙච්චර ණය වෙලා තිබෙනවා, මෙච්චර ගෙවන්න තිබෙනවා, ආණ්ඩුවේ අවශ්‍යතාව මේක, සමහර විට මෙපමණ raise කරන්න දැන් කටයුතු කරයි කියලා dealersලාට දැන ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Dealersලා කොහොමත් හොයා ගන්නවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒකයි මට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ වුණේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැත්නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට deal කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය නේ රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලාව දැනුවත් කරන්නේ. මීට දින කිහිපයකට පෙර මහ බැංකුවට මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා ඇතුළු තවත් ඇමතිවරු කීප දෙනෙක් පැමිණියා. පැමිණිලා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් සාකච්ඡාවක් පැවැත්වූවා. ඒ සාකච්ඡාවට ඔබතුමාත් සහභාගි වුණාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම එතැන හිටියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒකේ දී සාකච්ඡා වුණේ මොනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: RDA එකේ ලොකු payments ගෙවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි සාකච්ඡා වුණේ. සෑහෙන ප්‍රශ්න තිබුණා. සමහර ගණන්-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Manual එක අනුව රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව පිළිබඳ දැනුවත් කිරීම එන්න ඕනෑ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය හරහා නොවෙයිද? පිට අමාත්‍යාංශවලට ඇවිල්ලා පුළුවන්ද මහ බැංකුවට කියන්න, අපට මෙච්චර සල්ලි ඕනෑය කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මුදල් ඇමතිතුමාත් එක්ක ඒ ආවේ රජයේ කණ්ඩායමක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කවුරු කවුරුද ඒකට හිටියේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒකේ හිටියා, ආයෝජන භාර ඇමතිතුමා-

ගරු මහාචාර්ය රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා හිටියේ නැද්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා එදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ නේ හිටියේ. ඔබතුමා කියන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ආයෝජන භාර ඇමතිතුමා හිටියා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම හිටියේත් නැහැ. දැන ගෙන හිටියේත් නැහැ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: RDA එකේ ඒ සම්බන්ධ ඉහළ නිලධාරීන් කීප දෙනෙක් හිටියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා අවංකව උත්තර දෙන්න. දැන් දිවුරුම් දුන්නා නේ. ඔබතුමා දන්නා වෙන කවුද හිටියේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම ඒ වෙලාවේ තනතුරු අනුව බැලුවේ නැහැ; දැන ගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒක හදිසි meeting එකක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මලික් සමරවික්‍රම මහතා හිටියාද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මලික් සමරවික්‍රම මහත්තයාව හඳුනනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මලික් සමරවික්‍රම මහතා හිටියා වාගේ මට මතකයි.

ගරු මහාචාර්ය රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා කථා කළාද? එතුමා අදහස් මොකුත් ඉදිරිපත් කළාද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පාස්කරලිංගම් මහතා හිටියාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. එතුමා හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේ, RDA එකට මුදල් ගෙවීම පිළිබඳව එදා යාකච්ඡා වුණාය කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව ගැන තමයි එදා කථා කළේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හැබැයි, Rs. 13.5 billion raise කරන්න ඕනෑය කියලා Public Debt Department එකෙන් Treasury එකට දැනුම් දීලා ආපහු communicate වුණේ RDA එකට ගෙවන්නද, නැත්නම් වෙන ණයක් ගෙවන්නද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක නම් මම කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අපට ලැබුණු තොරතුරු අනුව මම කිව්වොත්, Rs. 13.5 billion raise කළේ, 02nd of March වන කොට foreign debts ගෙවන්න කියලා. ඔබතුමා ඒක පිළිගන්නවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒක මොකක් සඳහා පාවිච්චි කරනවාද කියලා මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Public Debt Department එකේ overall supervision තිබෙන එකේ Rs.13.5 billion raise කරන්නේ RDA එකට ගෙවන්නද. නැත්නම් public debt ගෙවන්නද කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නේ නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එහෙම තොරතුරු ඒකේ එන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Foreign debt ගෙවන්න කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එක එක ජාතියේ-

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒකේ තොරතුරු එන එක නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට දැනීමක් තිබෙනවාද, නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මට දැනීමක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දන්නේ නැහැ. හරි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අවසාන වශයෙන් මේ කථා කරන සිද්ධිය පිළිබඳව Tender Board Committee එක දීපු recommendation එක මොකක්ද? Recommendation දීලා යොමු කළේ කොහාටද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Recommendation එක දීලා අපි අධිපතිතුමාට තමයි-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දීපු recommendation එක මොකක්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අපි මේ කාරණා ඔක්කෝම කථා කරලා බැලුවා; පළමුවැනි එක තමයි, රජයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව. ඒ කාරණය ගැන කථා කළා. රජයට සල්ලි අවශ්‍යයි කියලා ඒකේ පැහැදිලිවම තිබුණා. දෙවැනි එක තමයි, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන ද්‍රවශීලතාව -liquidity- පිළිබඳව අපි බැලුවා. ඒ සම්බන්ධව තොරතුරු, සංඛ්‍යා ලේඛන ඔක්කෝම එනවා. ඒ අනුව වෙළෙඳ පොළේ මුදල් ඕනෑ තරම් තිබෙන බව අපි දැක්කා. සෑහෙන තරම් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මේ auction එකෙන් මේක ගන්න පුළුවන්. තුන්වැනි කාරණය තමයි, පොලී අනුපාත අපි බැලුවා. මෙතැන තිබෙන technical කාරණය තමයි, පොලී අනුපාතය. ඵලදායීතා අනුපාතය. එතකොට අපි බැලුවා, මේ Bond එකේ බිලියන 10 ගැනීමේ දී සමස්ත ඵලදායීතා අනුපාතය 11.73 per cent.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 11.73 per cent අවේ bid කළායින් පස්සේ නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, bid කළායින් පස්සේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අපි පිළිවෙළට කියමු. මුලින්ම ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දු කළේ Rs. 1 billion bonds issue කරන්න. හරිද? Auction එක කීයද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Auction එක තමයි Rs. 1 billion.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ yield එක decide කළේ කීයද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ yield නොවෙයි. Coupon rate එක.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Coupon rate එක.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක 12.5යි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 12.5 per cent decide කරන්න කලින් coupon rate එක තිබුණේ කීයද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ ඒ bond එකට coupon rate එක වෙනස්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එකින් එකට වෙනස් එක ඇත්ත. ඕකට coupon rate එක 12.5 per cent කියලා තීරණය කරන වෙලාවේ ඊට පෙරාතුව තිබුණු rate එක කීයද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, පෙරාතුව කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. එක එක කාලෙට එක එක bonds නිකුත් කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ සිද්ධියට අදාළව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රමාණය පැයෙන් පැයට වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: පැයෙන් පැයට වෙනස් වෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා අහන්නේ ඊට කලින් තිබුණු-

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 12.5 per cent decide කරන්න කලින් තිබුණු rate එක කීයද කියලායි අහන්නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔය කියන්නේ secondary market එකේ rates ගැනයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, secondary market rate. That is right.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Secondary market එකේ rates.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්. කීයද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම ඒ ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, secondary market එකේ thirty-year Bond එකක් ඒ වෙලාවේ change වුණා නම් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒක තමයි. අපිට ඒක හරියටම කියන්න බැහැ. It all depends on demands and the market and other factors. There are so many factors.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, එය year එකත් එක්ක ගොඩක් වෙනස් වෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්, 9.5වල rate එකක් තිබුණේ කොහොමද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම 9.5 rate එකක් ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඊට කලින් අන්තිම එකේ තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. මම දන්නේ නැහැ. අපිට ඒවා වාර්තා වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, rates - එක එක්කෙනා එක එක දේවල් කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට Rs.1 billion වලට තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලා auction කළේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Public Debt Management Department එක.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හැබැයි, මේකේ Bids ආවා, 20.58 per centවලට offers ආවා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දු කළා, 1 billion එක raise up to 1 - 10 billion හරිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ 10 billionවලදී තමයි ඔය ආපු weighted average rate එක ආවේ 11.73 කියලා

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, weighted average rate, 11.73.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්. 20.58 Bidsවලින් Bids කොයි විධියටද spread වුණේ biddersලාගෙන්? අපි 'A' Company - එක මෙපමණයි; 'B' Company - එක මෙපමණයි කියලා ගත්තොත්, මට specifically කියන්න, Perpetual Treasuries -

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මෙහෙමයි. මම දැන් තමයි මේ හේතුව නිසා ඔය Bids ගැන විස්තර දන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් දන්නා දේ තමයි අහන්නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අපි ඒ Form එක දීලා ඇති. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා ඇති.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් සරල ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම්. ඔබතුමාට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, 20.58 ආපු offersවලින් Perpetual Treasuries කොපමණද කියලා?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් දමපු Bid එක කීයද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ total rate එක කීයද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එක එක ratesවලට දමපු මුළු Bid එක.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එදා Bids 36ක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ 36න් Perpetual Treasuries පළමු වැනි Bid එක තිබෙනවා, 16.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගණන කීයද?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Bid number - sixteen.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 250. ඊළඟට, ආපසු 17ත් තිබෙනවා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: තව එකක් තිබෙනවා, 250.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Millionද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. ඊට පසුව 20, 21 Rs. 500 billion.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට ඒ ටික එකතු වෙන කොට එතැන 2 billion වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඊළඟට මට කියන්න Bank of Ceylon කීයක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකේ පළමුවැනි Bid එක තිබෙනවා, 8 million. හතරවැනි Bid එක තිබෙනවා, 500 million. 26වැනි Bid එක තිබෙනවා, 3 billion. ඊළඟට, 28 සහ 29 Bids තිබෙනවා, 5 billion each- 5 billion and 5 billion ඔක්කෝම ten billion.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ විස්තර අප ළඟ නැහැනේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කීයද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Bids 28 සහ 29.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: 28 කාගේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Bank of Ceylon.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ගණන කීයද?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Five billion.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ rate එක කීයද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒකේ rate එක 12.75.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දෙකම ඒ ගණනද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඊළඟ 5 billion එක 12.9959

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන් මට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, ඔය දෙකේ Bid price එක කීයද කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අන්තිම දෙකද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අන්තිම දෙකේ 28 වැනි Bid එකේ Bid price එක 88.4.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අනිත් එක?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඊළඟ එක 86.76.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අපි ගත්තොත් Bank of Ceylon 26, 28 සහ 29 කියන මේ තුනෙහි එකතුව 13 billion වෙනවා. හරිද? Perpetual Treasuries හැටියට 16, 17, 20 සහ 21 කියන හතර එකතු වුණාම 2 billion වෙනවා. එතකොට Perpetual Treasuries, bid කර තිබෙන සියල්ලගේම එකතුව 2 billion වෙනවා. Bank of Ceylonවල 26, 28 සහ 29 කියන තුන එකතු වුණාම 13 billion වෙනවා. හරිද? දැන් ඔබතුමාට මෙතැනදී ගණන් හදා ගන්න වේලාවක් නැහැ, calculator එකක් නැති නිසා. නමුත් බැලු බැල්මට ආපු මුළු offersවලින් ඒ කියන්නේ 20.58වලින් කොයි තරම් ප්‍රතිශතයක්ද, Perpetual Treasuries සහ Bank of Ceylon 26, 28 සහ 29 කියන bids තුනෙහි ප්‍රමාණය? මම කිව්වොත් 75 per cent කියලා, ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Calculation එකෙන් එනවානේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: බැලු බැල්මට කියන්න පුළුවන්. 20 billionවලින් මේ තුන එකතු වෙන කොට, මෙතැන 13යි. අතන දෙකයි. ඔක්කෝම 15යි. එතකොට බැලු බැල්මට average ගණනක් හැදුවත් විස්සෙන් පහළොවක් Perpetual Treasuries සහ Bank of Ceylon. ඔය සිදුවීමෙන් පසුව නීතිඥ මහත්වරුන් තුන්දෙනෙකු පරීක්ෂණ පැවැත්වුවා; කථා බහට ලක් වුණා. ඒ අනුව ඔබතුමාට අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවාද, මේ Bank of Ceylon bid කරපු 26,28 සහ 29 කියන 13 billion bid කරලා තිබෙන්නේ on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. මම ඒවා දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: දැන්වත් දන්නේ නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔය කියන ඒවා ඇහෙනවා. නමුත් මම ඒ ගැන පරීක්ෂණයක් කරලා නැහැනේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙලාවේ දැන ගෙන සිටියාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. මේ තොරතුරු අපට ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැනේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන් දන්නේත් නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: දැන් දන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. එක එක්කෙනා කියන තොරතුරු දන්නවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එක එක්කෙනා කියන කථා බැහැනේ. ඔබතුමා Deputy Governor.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම එහෙම Deputy Governor කියලා -

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: නීතීඥ මහත්වරුන් තුන් දෙනා සකස් කළ වාර්තාව ඔබතුමා කියෙව්වාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එම වාර්තාවේ එහෙම තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: නීතීඥ මහත්වරුන් තුන් දෙනාට තමන්ගේ අනින් නිර්මාණයන් කරන්න බැහැනේ. ඒ නීතීඥ මහත්වරුන් තුන්දෙනා සකස් කළ එම වාර්තාව හැදුවේ තමුන්නාන්සේලා ඇතුළු මහ බැංකුවේ අදාළ නිලධාරීන් සහ අනිත් අදාළ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ප්‍රකාශන අරගෙන සහ ලංකා බැංකුව ආදී ස්ථානවලින් තොරතුරු ලබා ගෙනයි. එතකොට එම වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව මේ 13 billion කියන එක Bank of Ceylon bid කළේ 'on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries' කියන එක පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වාර්තාව අනුවද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්, වාර්තාව අනුව.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, වාර්තාව අනුව පිළිගන්නවා. මට එකේ records බලන්නේ නැතුව -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මැතිතුමා අහන්නේ වාර්තාව අනුව පිළිගන්නවාද කියලායි.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන බව පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: That is all. එම නිසා තමයි මම ඔබතුමාට කිව්වේ. එම වාර්තාව අනුව බැලුවාමත්, මේ අපට ලබා දී තිබෙන Sheet එක අනුව බැලුවාමත් Perpetual Treasuries 20.58 කියන total Bidsවලින් 15 billion එදා bid කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේකේ 20.58 offer එක ආවාට, ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දු කළා Tender Board එකෙන් 10 billionවලට යනවාය කියලා. මොකද, ඒ වෙනකොට ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන සිටියා, 13.5 billion රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණාය කියලා. හරිද? එතකොට මට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, ඒ 10 billionවලින් Perpetual Treasuries Company එකට කොපමණ ගිහින් තිබෙනවාද කියලා? Ten billionනේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දු කළේ. ඒකෙන් කොපමණක් Perpetual Treasuries Company ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේ Report එකේ තිබෙනවා. නමුත් අපි ඒ ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමා Report එක බලා කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Report එක නොවෙයි, ඔබතුමා Bid Sheet එක බලා කියන්න.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට ලෙහෙසියිනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ document එකෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන්නේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒකෙන් බලා කියන්න, Perpetual Treasuriesවලට කීයක් ගිහින් තිබෙනවාද කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries - මුලින් 250 ඒවා දෙකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 500යි.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඊට පසුව තව දෙකක් තිබෙනවා, 500යි - 1 billion.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි. බිලියන දෙකයි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ හතරේ එකතුව කීයද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බිලියන දෙකයි.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Bank of Ceylon කීයක් ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද? Offer කළාට කීයක් දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකේ පළමුවැනි එක විධියට 8 million තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔව්, ඒ පොඩි ගණන්.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඊළඟට 500 million තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ හැර?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ හැර අන්තිමට 3 billion තිබෙනවා, last Bid එක.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එපමණයි නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: උඩින්ම පොඩි ගණන් දෙකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ පොඩි දෙකත් දාන්න. පොඩි දෙකත් දාන්න එපායැ. Bank of Ceylonනේ. පොඩි කියලා දන්නේ අපිනේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මේ අයට ආපු ඒවා නෙමෙයි ඒ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know. He does not know that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: He does not know. It is okay. Specifically, apart from Rs. 800 million and Rs. 500 million, the Bank of Ceylon was given Rs. 3 billion. Now, the total amount given – or done in your language- to the Perpetual Treasuries is Rs. 2 billion. The Bank of Ceylon was given Rs. 3 billion. According to the report prepared by the panel on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries, the Bank of Ceylon has done Rs.3 billion. Then, altogether what is the total amount of bonds issued to the Perpetual Treasuries? You add Rs. 2 billion plus Rs. 3 billion. The total is Rs. 5 billion. So, Rs. 5 billion has been given to the Perpetual Treasuries. Directly Rs. 2 billion has been given and through the Bank of Ceylon Rs. 3 billion has been given. So, what is the percentage of Treasury Bonds given to the Perpetual Treasuries?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It is 50 per cent. හැබැයි ඒ තොරතුරු සේරම මේ වාර්තාවේ ඇතුළත් වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔය කොළවල තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව තමයි ඔබතුමා සාක්ෂි දෙන්නේ. ඔය කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමාට පෞද්ගලික දැනුමක් නැහැනේ. Mr. P. Samarasiri, can I ask in English?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are in charge of the Public Debt Department – PDD- as well.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: "In charge" does not mean that I should be over there to find out everything.

ඒක තමයි මම අහන්නේ. In charge කිව්වාම, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ඔබතුමාගේ කාර්ය භාරය මොකක්ද?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: For certain approvals they come to me.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හොඳයි, ඒ ගන්න සෑම සාමාන්‍ය තීන්දුවකටම ඔබතුමා සම්බන්ධ වෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. මේ manual එකේ ඒ රාජ්‍ය කාර්ය භාරය ඔක්කෝම කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමාට මේ bid එක සම්බන්ධයෙන්,- රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තීන්දුවක් ගත්තානේ "අපට මේ මෙන්න මේ මුදල අවශ්‍යයි" කියලා. මම කියන එක හරිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කීයක් අවශ්‍යයි කියලාද රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් තීන්දුව ගත්තේ?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Financial requirement is Rs. 13.5 billion.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ තීන්දුව ගත්තේ කවුද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක Treasury එකෙන් ආපු information එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Treasury එකෙන් information එක ආවාම, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ක්‍රමවේදය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළා. එහෙමද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය ගන්න කොට ඒකට ඔබතුමාට සම්බන්ධ වුණාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, ඒකට මම සම්බන්ධ වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා සම්බන්ධ නැහැ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය හොඳයි කියලා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් තීන්දු කරලා, මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රමාණය මෙන්න මේ ක්‍රමයට ගමු කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට දැනුම් දුන්නා. එහෙමද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. Rs. 10 billion recommend කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට Rs.1 billion දාමු කියන decision එක ගත්තේ කවුද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Public Debt Department එකෙන් තමයි ඒක කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ තීන්දුවලට ඔබතුමා සම්බන්ධද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, ඒවාට මම සම්බන්ධ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට ඒ Rs. 1 billion දාන්න ගත් තීන්දුව bid එකට ඉදිරිපත් වුණා. එහෙමද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉදිරිපත් වුණාට පස්සේ bids ආවා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Bids ආවට පස්සේ ඒ bid ආපු ලියවිල්ල රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඒක හරිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ අර sheet එක විතරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වෙනකොටත් bid එකට දාලා නිබුණේ Rs. 1 billion නේ. බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න තීන්දු කළේ මොන අවස්ථාවේදිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එතැනදී Public Debt Department එකේ recommendation එක එනවා. ඊට පස්සේ ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කියන කථා ඔක්කෝම සාකච්ඡා කරලා අපි Tender Board එකෙන් ඒ recommendation එක accept කරනවා. ඊට පස්සේ අනුමැතිය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ළඟට යනවා. එතැනින් ඒක ඉවරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට කලින් සාක්ෂි ලබා දුන් ද සිල්වා මහත්මයා කිව්වා, ද සිල්වා මහත්මයායි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමායි, වීරසිංහ මහත්මයායි ඒක බලන්න දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට යන කොට Public Debt Department එකෙන් කවුරු හෝ ඇවිල්ලා මේ ලැබුණු bid එක සම්බන්ධ ලියවිලි එතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කළා කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අධිපතිතුමාටද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. එහෙම එකක් වුණා කියලා ඔබතුමා දැනුවත් වුණාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, මටත් ආරංචිය ලැබුණා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ගැන දැන් ඔබතුමා අපට කිව්වාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මෙතැනදී එක එක views ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි ඔබතුමා අපට කිව්වේ නැහැනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කිව්වා නම් record වෙලා ඇතිනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Let me finish. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, ඒ ලියවිල්ල මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට යැවිවොත් ඒ කාර්ය පටිපාටියේ යම් කිසි කැඩීමක් සිදු වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. නමුත් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට ඒ තොරතුරු ඉල්ලන්න බලයක් නැහැ කියලා කොහේවත් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හොඳයි, හොඳයි. අධිපතිතුමා ඒ තොරතුරු දැන ගැනීම නීති විරෝධී කාර්යයක්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, කිසිදු නීති විරෝධී භාවයක් නැහැ. මොකද, මේ Public Debt Manual එක- This is not a legal document. This is the documents prepared by the officials of the Public Debt Department for their operation. This has not been approved by the Board; this has not been approved by any Governor. So, if you want we will see that it is fairer we can go into this and change and give our support.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Has not this approved by the Monetary Board?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: So, it means there is no guideline for the Public Debt Department to follow.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The Public Debt Department itself has prepared this.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: This is not approved by the Monetary Board.

Mr. Samarasiri: No. Department manuals are there.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Last update කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කවදාද?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Latest updated as at 31.07. 2013.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What is it called?

Mr. Samarasiri: This is titled "Public Debt Department: Operational Manual"

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් කිව්වානේ මොකක්ද කොළයක් දුන්නා කියලා. ඒක Bid Summary Report එකද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ Bid Summary Report එකේ තිබෙන්නේ volume and yield aggregates විතරයි. එහෙමද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. Different options.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Bid Summary Report එක ඔබතුමා ළඟ තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කියවන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Copy එකක් දෙන්නකෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Bid Summary Report එකේ copy එකක් අපට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Copies දීලා ඇති.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේකේ තමයි කියන්නේ options 7ක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. මේක Options 7ක් තිබෙන එක නේද මේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේක නේද Options 7ක් තිබෙන එක?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ Bid Summary Report එකේ මොනවාද අඩංගු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Last 30-year bond එකේ summary එක මේකේ තිබෙනවා. -ඒකේ yield rate එක කීයද, amount එක කීයද කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕකේ සඳහන් වෙනවාද මේ bid එක කොයි ආයතනය,-

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, ඒවා මොකුත් නැහැ. Different scenarios Rs. 5 billionක් ගත්තොත් මොකක්ද, 10ක් ගත්තොත් මොකක්ද කියන එක තමයි මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries එක මේවිවර ඉල්ලලා තිබෙනවා කියලා ඕකේ සඳහන් වෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, ඒවා මොකුත් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕකේ සඳහන් වෙනවාද ලංකා බැංකුව මේවිවර ඉල්ලලා තිබෙනවා කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕකෙන් තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කුමන ආයතනය කියක් ඉල්ලලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: බැහැ. අපි ඒවා තේරුම් ගන්න යනවා නම් වැරදියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි. ඒක ඕකේ සඳහන් වෙනවාද? සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැත්නම් තේරුම් ගන්න බැහැනේ. තිබෙනවා නම් තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඕක විනාඩියෙන්, දෙකෙන් තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් report එකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔය report එකේ පිටු කීයක් තිබෙනවාද?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: This is one page.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේක options 7 තිබෙන එක නේද?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Options 7ක් සඳහන් වෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, options 7යි, ඊට පස්සේ recommendation එකයි.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා recommendation එක?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕකේ තිබෙන recommendation එක මොකක්ද?

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ recommendation එකේ Rs. 10 billion කියලා නැහැනේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේකේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. මේකේ යටින්ම සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, "Eligible amount Rs.10.058 billion ඊට පස්සේ cut-off yield, weighted average yield-,"

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ මේකයි.. 10.058 කියන්නේ Rs. 10.058 billion.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Options 7 අතරේ ඒක නැහැ නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, ඒක අතරේ නැහැ. Options ටිකක් දීලා අන්තිමට recommendation කියලා different option එකක් දෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය recommendation එක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ කවුද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ Public Debt Department එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මම අවසන් කරනකල් ඉන්න. එතකොට කුමන හෝ ආයතනයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළ interest rate එකවත්, ඒ අයතනය ඉල්ලලා තිබෙන්නේ කීයටද කියලාවත් ඔකෙන් තේරුම් ගන්න බැහැ නේද? එතකොට ඕක තමයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කළා යැයි කියන ලියවිල්ල? ඒක ඔබතුමා දන්නේ නැහැ, ඉදිරිපත් කළා යැයි කියන ලියවිල්ල.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, එතකොට ඔය ලියකියවිල්ල ද ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Tender Board එකට ආවේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔය ලියකියවිල්ල අනුව ද ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දු කළේ බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක තීරණය කරන්නේ අපි අර කියපු විධියේ සාකච්ඡාවක් තියලා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට Governor මේකට recommendation එකක් දුන්නේ නැද්ද? Governor කිව්වා ද මේක ගන්න කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, අපේ Tender Board එකට කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඇයි මේ copy එකේ දාලා තිබෙන්නේ "Governor instructs to take Rs. 10 billion" කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම අහපු තොරතුරු අනුව -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ Tender Board එකේ Chairman නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මට කිව්වා "Governor මුකුත් කිව්වේ නැහැ" කියලා. මම ඔබතුමාට දැන් කිව්වා මේ document එකේ දාලා තිබෙනවා "Governor instructs to take Rs. 10 billion" කියලා. Advise විතරක් නොවෙයි, ඒ කියන්නේ, the Governor instructed the Tender Board to take Rs. 10 billion.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, Tender Board නොවෙයි. Tender Board එකට කිව්වේ නැහැ. ඔය කියලා තිබෙන්නේ Public Debt Department එකේ recommendation එකට දමන්න කියලා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, ඒකේ පැහැදිලි ලෙස කියලා තිබෙනවා. බලන්න ඔබතුමාගේ ළඟ copy එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. කියවන්න ඒකේ තිබෙන එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට copy එකක් දෙන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මගේ ළඟ copy එක තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ පැහැදිලි ලෙස තිබෙනවා "Governor instructs" කියලා. You can read Mr. Samarasiri. ඒක කියවන්න.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Raise funds up to Rs. 10 billion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Right. The Governor instructs, හරි ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, he has instructed the Tender Board to take the particular decision.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: හරි, ඒක public domain එකේ තිබෙනවානේ. Reports වලත් ඒක තිබෙනවානේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, එහෙම දාලා නැහැ. So far- I will just read to you what this report says.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Report එකේ ඒක තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Report එකේ English වලින් කියලා තිබෙනවා, "There is no direct involvement of the Governor."

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි. Thank you. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු report එකේ බොරුවක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දන්නේ නැහැ. He does not know that.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, ඒ කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි-

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේකේ බොරුවක් තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He cannot say that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He knows it because he has read the report.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He cannot say that. The report is done by somebody else.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He has to read the report.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But he cannot say what is in the report.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He can say what is in the report is false-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not his view. That is all.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, because he has instructed and it is clearly minuted. His own Governor instructs-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We can ask the Governor, not him.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He is the Deputy Governor in charge of Public Debt. He has a responsibility-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He can answer only for himself, not for anyone else.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේක තනි කෙනෙකුගේ තීරණයක් අනුව නොවෙයි ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ. මේකේ නිලධාරීන් පිරිසක් Public Debt Department එකේ ඉඳලා අන්තිම approval එක Governor. ඒ දක්වා process එකක approval එකක් වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, හරි.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන approved by the Governor and recommended කියලා තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let me finish. දැන් මේක මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට පැහැදිලි නැහැනේ. සමරසිරි මහත්මයා අපිට පැහැදිලි වෙන්න කියන්න, PDD එකෙන් ගන්නවානේ decision එක. PDD එකෙන් තමයි බිලියන 10ක් ගමු කියලා අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට මෙතැන "Governor instructed to raise funds up to 10 billion of additional funds" කියලා සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මේ report එකේ ඒ විධියටයි සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේ instruction එක කොයි වෙලාවේද යන්න ඇත්තේ PDD එකට?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Public Debt Department එක මේ tender documents හදන වේලාවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට ඒකට Governor ගේ උපදෙස් ලැබීම සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම දකින විධියට එහෙම උපදෙස් ලැබීම කිසිම වරදක් නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: වරදක් නොවෙයි, සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් ද, නැද්ද කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Let me ask this question. You can ask later. Let me follow my questions. ඒක සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේ කාර්ය භාරය මම මීට කලින් අධීක්ෂණය කරලා නැති නිසා මම දන්නේ නැහැ අතීතයේදී කොහොමද වුණේ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Governor ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් උපදෙස් දුන්නා නම් ඒක නීතිවිරෝධී දෙයක් ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. නීතිවිරෝධී දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා, ඒ වාගේම ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපතිතුමා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මේ වාගේ ගනුදෙනුවක් වෙන අවස්ථාවේදී අධිපතිතුමා එම ස්ථානයට ඒම හරිද, වැරැදිද? මීට කලින් අධිපතිවරු එහෙම ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක හරිද, වැරදිද කියන්න බැහැ. අධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ ආයතන ප්‍රධානියා. මුදල් නීති පනත ගත්තාම එහි විශාල වගකීමක් තිබෙන්නේ අධිපතිතුමාට. එතකොට එතුමාගේ දැනීම අනුව අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න ඕනෑම ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයක් ගන්න එතුමාට බලතල තිබෙනවා. කොතැනකදීවත් ඒක නීතියෙන් තහනම් කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු මේ සාරාංශ ගත කමිටු වාර්තාව මම ඔබතුමාට කියවන්නම්. "මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය 4/2015 දාතමින් යුත් සටහන් මඟින් නිස් අවුරුදු භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුතුව ගැන විශේෂයෙන් සඳහන් කර තිබුණත්, එම නිකුතුව ඇතුළත් විය යුතු වටිනාකම් පිළිබඳව මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය කිසිදු නිරණයක් ගෙන නැත."

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සම්බන්ධයක් නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: හරි, මම එතැනට තමයි මේ එන්නේ. මෙහි සඳහන් වෙනවා "රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරීත්ව අත්පොතට අනුව මෙම තීරණ ගැනීමේ බලය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අයත් වේ. අදාළ ඉතිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය ලබා ගැනීමේ තීන්දුව ගෙන ඇත්තේ සාමාජිකයන් 8 දෙනෙකුගෙන් සැදුම් ලත් ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුව මහිනි. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා එම ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයකු නොවන්නේය. (ඒ අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුවේ කටයුතුවලට සෘජු ලෙස සහභාගී වූ බවට සාක්ෂියක් නැත.)" කියලා. ඔබතුමා කියනවා අධිපතිතුමා ආවා, මෙහෙම කළා කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: කවුරුත් දන්නවානේ අධිපතිතුමා ගියා කියන එක.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙතැනට එන්න පෙර ඔබතුමන්ලා හදාපු වාර්තාව මම මේ කියවන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඔය කී වෙනි පිටුව ද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කමිටු වාර්තාවට මෙතුමන්ලා සම්බන්ධ වෙනවානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා දන්නේ නැහැ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඔය කී වෙනි පිටුව ද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සිංහලෙන් පළමුවැනි පිටුව.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නේ, එක එක දේවල් කියන්නේ මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළේ ඉහළ කළමනාකාරීත්වය වැඩ කරන පරිසරය ගැන නොදන්නා පිට කට්ටිය නේ. ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ මේ තීරණය -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පිට කට්ටිය කියලා කියන්නේ කවුද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: පිට කට්ටිය කියන්නේ මහජනයා සහ අනෙක් අය.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපිනේ මේක ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ. අපි පිට කට්ටිය නොවෙයිනේ. අපි Committee සාමාජිකයන්.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම පැහැදිලි කරන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා. මුලින්ම අපි දෙගොල්ලන්ම මෙතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා. අපිට මේ තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා අද ඉඳන් මේ ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කරන්න යනවා. මේවා නිවැරැදි කරන්න යනවා. කරුණාකරලා එහෙම කරන්න එපා. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාම පැහැදිලි කරලා කිව්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන්. අපි දන්නෙත් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, මම කිව්වේ මේ වාර්තාව ගැනයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ නිසා අද මේ දක්වා ආපු ක්‍රමය වෙනස් වුණා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමා: අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ප්‍රශ්න අහලා අවසන් වනතුරු අහගෙන ඉන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න එපා. අපිට අපේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. අපි සුහදව යමු. වැරැදි මතයක් ගොඩ නගන්න එපා. අපි මුලින්ම ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තියට එන්න ඕනෑ. ඕනෑම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුට තම තමන්ගේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. ඒවා නිලධාරීන්ට කියලා නිවැරැදි කරන්න යන්න එපා. ඒ වාගේම සාකච්ඡාවේ සටහන්වලට අනවශ්‍ය කරුණු ඇතුළත් කරන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නත් එපා. දැන් ඔබතුමා කියපු දේවල්වලට මටත් කරුණු ටිකක් තිබෙනවා කියන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට මේකේ අත්පොතට අනුවම තිබෙනවා එහෙම එකක්. ඔබතුමා ආපහු කිව්වා ඔබතුමා ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපති කියලා. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට මැදිහත් වෙන්න පුළුවන් මේකට. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට අපි ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුව ඇතුළේ නැහැනේ. ඉතිහාසයේ අපි දන්න කරුණුවලට අනුව, අපි අහලා තිබෙන කරුණුවලට අනුව සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අධිපතිවරයෙක් මෙවැනි එකකට ගිය පළමුවැනි වතාව. ඊට පස්සේ කිව්වා අධිපතිතුමා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මේ වටේ යනවා කියලා. මේ වේලාව ගත්තාට පස්සේ නිශ්චිතයි. ඒ වේලාවේ අධිපතිතුමාට තිබෙන්නේ වෙනම කාර්යයක්. අධිපතිතුමා නිකම් වටේ ගිය ගමනක් නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා හරි වැරැදියි, ඔබතුමා ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපති විධියට මේ කමිටුවට එක්තරා ප්‍රමාණයක වැරදි අර්ථකථනයක් දෙන්න උත්සාහ කරනවා කියලා මට පෙනෙනවා.

ඒ අර්ථකථනය දුන්නොත් ඔබතුමාටත් හොඳ නැහැ, ඔබතුමාගේ තනතුරටත් හොඳ නැහැ, අධිපතිතුමාටත් හොඳ නැහැ. වරදක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒක වෙනම කථාවක්.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබ කිව්වා "අධිපතිතුමා සමහරවිට නිකම් යන්න ඇති," කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, මම එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබ කලින් කිව්වා. මේ Minutesවල ඇති. වාර්තාව ආවාම අපට බලන්න පුළුවන්. "අධිපතිතුමා සාමාන්‍යයෙන්

අනෙක් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලට යනවා. ඒ ගියාම ඒ වෙලාවේ මෙතැනට මේ නිසා එන්න ඇති," කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහලා උත්තරයක් ගන්න. අනෙක් ඒවා අපි කථා කරමු.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න තමයි සූදානම් වෙන්නේ. මොකද, වාර්තාව පිට වෙන විට මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මේ Committee

එක, අපි සෑම කෙනෙක්ම නිවැරැදි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, මේ වාර්තාව එළියට ගියාම මේකේ වරදක් තිබිලා ඒක අපට හරියට සොයා ගන්න බැරි වුණොත් COPE එක වෙන පැත්තකින් - මොකද, මෙය රට අවධානයකින් ඉන්න ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඒ වාගේම, අධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙම කියනවා. නිකම් රවුමක් ගියා කියලා නොවෙයි අධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ. අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, "මම පල්ලෙහාට, එනම්, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගියා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරු දෙදෙනෙක් සමඟ". ඔබ ඒ එක්කෙනෙක්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: "මට අවශ්‍යතාව වුණේ රුපියල් මිලියන 10ක මුදලක් ලබා ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් විමසන්න." එතුමා කියනවා නිශ්චිතවම කාරණය. මම මෙතැනට ගියේ මේකටමයි කියලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක තිබෙන්නේ මේ වාර්තාවේද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පුවත් පතට එතුමා දුන් ප්‍රකාශය.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: පුවත් පතට මෙහෙම කියා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මේවා interviews. මෙය ප්‍රසිද්ධ පුවත් පතකට එතුමා ලබා දුන් interview එකක්. පත්‍ර වාර්තාකරුවෙක් ලියූ එකක් නොවෙයි. එතුමාගේ interview එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා කියපු එකක් නම් එතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. එතුමා ඒකට පිළිතුරක් දෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්. මෙය මාගේ අවධානය යොමු වූ ප්‍රධාන කරුණයි. "මම පල්ලෙහාට ගියේ ඒක හදිසි අවශ්‍යතාවක්. අපට ඒ මුදල් සොයා ගත නොහැකි වුණා නම් ...." එතුමා දිගට පැහැදිලි කරනවා, රජයට මේ මේ පාඩු සිදු වුණා කියලා. ඔබ කලින් කළ ප්‍රකාශයේදී කිව්වා - අධිපතිතුමා පහළට ඇවිල්ලා ඔබතුමන්ව හම්බ වුණාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, මාව හම්බ වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා මේ පත්‍රයේ මෙන්න මෙහෙම ප්‍රකාශ කරනවා. "මේකයි තිබුණු හදිසි අවශ්‍යතාව. පල්ලෙහාට ගිහින් මා විමසුවේ මිලියන 10ක මුදලක් රැස් කර ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා." ඒ කාගෙන්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ පල්ලෙහා කියන්නේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා මුණ ගැසුනේ, කථා කළේ නැහැ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා නේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපති. "මේ මුදල් උපයා ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය ලෙස වාඩි වී සාකච්ඡා කරන ලෙසයි මම කිව්වේ." කාටද එතකොට කියන්නේ සභාපතිතුමාටද, නැත්නම් වෙන කාට හරිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, මට කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා ප්‍රසිද්ධ ජනමාධ්‍යයට මෙහෙම කියලා තිබෙනවා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: "මෙය මා දුටු පරිදි නම්, එම රුපියල් මිලියන 10ක මුදල එම වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණා. ඒ සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත් තරම් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් වී - නිබීම එයට හේතුවයි." එතුමා කියනවා මේ ඔක්කොම මම දැක්කා, මම මේක කළා. ඒ නිසා මම ගිහින් උපදෙස් දුන්නා ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයට තීරණයක් ගන්න. ඔබතුමා කියනවා නැහැ කියලා. ප්‍රසිද්ධියේ මේ ප්‍රකාශය එතුමා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ රටේ ජනමාධ්‍යයකට; ප්‍රසිද්ධ ජනමාධ්‍යයකට; පිළි ගත් ජනමාධ්‍යයකට. මේක එතුමා දුන් interview එකක්. මාධ්‍යවේදියෙක් ලියූ එකක් නොවෙයි. ඒක නිසා දැන් අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා දැන් කියනවා ඔබතුමාට අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, මෙහිදී ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය කියන්නේ Public Debt Department එකට ගිහින් උපදෙස් ලබා දුන් එක.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබ කියන දේ අපට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් අපට පැහැදිලි වෙන්නේ මේ වේලාවේ අධිපතිතුමා එතැනට ගියා කියන එකයි. ඔබතුමා ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ ඉන්නවා නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම එතැන හිටියේ නැහැ. ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය රැස් වෙන්නේ වෙනත් තැනක.

The Chairman: It is right. But it has not been contradicted. Therefore, we can question him. when he comes. Anyway, he is the governor in charge of the subject.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අපි ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය රැස් වෙන්නේ 15වෙනි තට්ටුවේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එතකොට මේ Public Debt Department එක තිබෙන්නේ කොහේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේ කියන Public Debt Department එක තිබෙන්නේ මට මතක හැටියට, 8 නැතිනම් 10වැනි තට්ටුවේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: තට්ටු ගණනාවක් තිබෙනවා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය රැස් වුණේ 27වැනිදාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: 27වැනිදා, 15වැනි තට්ටුවේ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: There are two different floors.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හැම දාම ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය රැස් වුණේ දොළහමාරට?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ bids ටික ආපු වෙලාවේ නිශ්චිත වෙලාවේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්න කියලා ද උපදෙස් දෙන්නේ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ අවබෝධය මොකක්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Public Debt Department එකට අධිපතිතුමා ගිහින් තමයි ඒ උපදෙස දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ උපදේශය -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා එතැන හිටියේ නැහැ නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. ඒ උපදේශය ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයට ඇවිල්ලා 15වැනි තට්ටුවේ ටෙන්ඩර් කථා කරන වෙලාවේ Public Debt Department එක කිව්වා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා මුලින් කිව්වා එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැ කියලා?

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන් පිළි ගන්නවා මුලින් කිව්ව එක නොවෙයි, මේ තීරණය ගත්තේ අධිපතිතුමාගේ බලපෑම නොවෙයි, ඔහුගේ instructions මත කියා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබ දන්නවා, අධිපතිතුමාගේ ඥානිත්වයක් තිබෙන සමාගමකටයි මෙයින් විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් යන්නේ කියා. මේ ගැන සමාජයේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ කියන අවස්ථාවේ අධිපතිතුමා මෙතැනට සෘජු මැදිහත්වීමක් කරනවා. එය රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාව මත සිදු වුණා කියා අධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙනවා. නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයෙක් වශයෙන් ඔබගේ අවබෝධය අනුව , සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අධිපතිතුමාට එතැනට නොගිහින් මෙකට මැදිහත් නොවී සිටීමට ආයතනයේ වෙන ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැතිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක මෙහෙමයි වන්නේ. එය අධිපතිවරයා එහෙම තීරණය කරන විධිය නේ. මේක හොඳ වෙන්න පුළුවන්, මේක හොඳ නැති වෙන්නත් පුළුවන් කියා මට කියන්න අමාරුයි

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක විනිවිදභාවය සම්බන්ධයෙන් තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසායි මම අහන්නේ. විනිවිදභාවය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක අධිපතිවරයා ඒ වෙලාවට හොඳයි කියලා හිතලා තීරණය කළ එකක්. එයාට ඒ වෙලාවේ බලතල තිබෙනවා ඒකට.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයාගේ තීරණය ඔය manual

එකේ ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න තිබෙන ක්‍රියා පටිපාටියට අනුව හරිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Manual එකේ කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Manual එකේ කියලා තිබෙනවාද මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාට එහෙම ඇවිල්ලා කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Manual එකේ කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම අහන්නේ ඒකයි. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයාගේ පැමිණීම් දැනට තිබෙන manual එකට අනුව හරිද වැරදිද කියන්න?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Manual එකට අනුව හරි නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වැරැදියි?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කලින් සඳහන් කළා මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට ලබා දුන් document එකේ මේ ඉල්ලුම් කරන ලද සමාගම්වල නම් සහ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයන් සඳහන් වෙලා නැහැ කියා. ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට ඒ වෙලාවේ දුන් document එක මොකක්ද කියලා. මෙතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නවලට ඔබතුමා උත්තර දුන්නා නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට දුන්නු document එක මෙක -

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒකයි, අර Minute එකයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට දුන් document එක මෙක කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන් උත්තර දුන්නා නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක Public Debt Department එකෙන් ලබා දුන් එකක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ඉස්සරලා මෙතුමා දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න කළා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා එතැනට ආවා. ආවාට පසුව document එක දුන්නා. හරියට කරනවා නම් ඒ document එක එයාට නොවෙයි දෙන්න ඕනෑ. Public Debt Department එකට ගිහිල්ලා, Committee එකට ඇවිල්ලා, ඔබතුමා approve කළාට පසුව Chairmanට යන්න ඕනෑ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් මේ Report එක ගැන දිගින් දිගටම මෙතුමා කරුණු ඇහුවා. ඒ අහපු සෑම කරුණකටම ඔබතුමා උත්තර දුන්නා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා හරියටම දන්නවාද මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට ලබා දුන් document එක මේකමද කියලා?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔය Public Debt Department එකේ දීපු ඒවා -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ-

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දන්නේ නැතිනම් ඔබතුමා කොහොමද කියන්නේ. මේ document එක ගැන නේ ඔබතුමා උත්තර දෙන්නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Tender Board එකෙන් දෙන කොට-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ document එක තුනයි ගණනට issue කළ එකක්. මේ සිද්ධිය වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ දොළහයි පනහට. මෙන්න මේ document එක ගැන ඔය කියන්නේ. මේ document එකේ තිබෙනවා සියලුම සමාගම්වල නම් සහ ඒ rates සේරම. .

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. ඒ document එක ටෙන්ඩර් එකෙන් පසුව අත්සන් කරන එකක්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද, මේ document එක?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔය ගොල්ලන්ට හම්බ වුණේ නැහැ. අපට කිව්වා Governor ට දුන්නා කියලා?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුද කිව්වේ?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: කවුද කිව්වේ?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මේක දුන්නේ.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: We were asking whether he could judge and he said, -

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva කිව්වා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: වෙන්න ඇති. මම කිව්වේ නැහැ, මම කිව්වේ නැහැ දුන්නා කියලා. ඒක දුන්නාද කියලා Public Debt Department එකෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We have to summon the Public Dept Department first.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමා ඉස්සරලා උත්තර දුන්නා නේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම කිව්වේ මේක දෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට දුන්නු document

එක මොකක්ද කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දන්නේ නැතිනම් ඇයි උත්තර දෙන්නේ?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එයා ඒක නොවෙයි ඇහුවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේඛනය දුන්නා නම්, කියලා මම ඇහුවේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Tender Board එක තීරණය කළාට පස්සේ-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අපි අහන්නේ Tender Board එකෙන් දුන්නා නම් කියන එක නොවෙයි, Tender Board එකෙන් මේ Report එක ගියාට පස්සේ, ඒක වෙනම කථාවක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ දුන්නු document එක දන්නවාද කියලා අහන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් එච්චරයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙහි වාර්තා වෙන්නත් ඕනෑ නිසායි මම කියන්නේ. මේකේ බොහොම පැහැදිලිව මෙතුමා සඳහන් කළා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට ලැබුණු වාර්තාව මෙය නොවෙයි කියා. මේ වාර්තාවේ මොකක් හෝ code එකක් දමා ගන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, ඒ වාර්තාව යන්න විධියක් නැහැ. ඒක මම අත්සන් කර තිබෙන්නේ ටෙන්ඩර් එකෙන් පසුව.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි වැරැද්ද.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ, ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමය.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: තව එකක් තිබෙනවා. මේක තමයි අන්තිමට ගත්ත එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: කරුණාකර එක්කෙනෙක් ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න. නැත්නම් අපිටත් confuse වෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේක Governorට යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක Governorට දුන්නා.

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක Public Debt Department එකෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා පිළි ගන්නවාද මෙය හැදුවේ මොන වේලාවේද කියලා?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක Public Debt Department එකෙන් උදේ හැදුවේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හදලා ඔබලාට දුන්නේ මොන වේලාවේද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: දොළහමාරෙන් පසුව, Tender Board එකේදී.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙයත් ඊට පසුවයි ඔබ හැදුවේ?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මෙය Tender Board decision එක අර ගෙන Governor approve කළාට පස්සේ මට ආවාම අත්සන් කරනවා. ඕක Governorට යන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි, හරි, හරි.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: What are the two documents?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: One document is the entire list of all the bids which is the one from which we quoted 28, 29, 30. That was the document that was prepared by the Public Debt Department. Did you see this at all?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is the one with the 30 something –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Exactly.

This document is the final decision after they had recommended the Rs.10 billion on the strength of this. This was finalized.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can I geta copy of that? I do not have a copy of that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I have about five very important questions to ask. The first is, the instruction given for the Governor was addressed to Head FO. Who is Head FO?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: FO. that is Front Office.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is part of the Public Debt Department?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Public Debt Department.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who signed the instructions? Who has signed that? It is in your document -

Mr. P. Samarasiri: ThePublic Debt Superintendent.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The Public Debt Superintendent.Who is that?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Mrs. Seneviratne.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So sheaddressed this to Head of FO. Who is Head FO?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Front Office.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When was this document signed by Mrs. Seneviratne?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The same day, on the 27th.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It was signed by her and sent to Head FO. Is Head FO a part of your Tender Board?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Front Office Head comes to the Tender Board to give information, to explain.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did the Front Office person convey the Governor's instructions to you?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, it was informed to the Tender Board.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then on the strength of these instructions, you took the decision to go for Rs.10 billion?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Recommendation. Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The Recommendation which was sent to the Governor?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Basically, you send to the Governor what the Governor has recommended to you? Correct?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. That has come in the process.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is a complete subvention of the process. You used a very good term Mr. Samarasiri, "break the controls". So here is a clear example of what you described as, breaking controls.

My next question, your recommendation does not say anything about the method to be adopted, whether it be direct placements or auction. Who took that decision?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: You mean suspension of the private placement? It is like this.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who took that decision?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: That is the Governor. We also supported. I also supported.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When did he take that decision?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: I think, it was taken during that week. I cannot say that there is any written document on that.

The Chairman: Could it be at the Monetary Board Meeting?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No. The Monetary Board was informed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Informed by the Governor?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When did he discuss this with you?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Actually, this was discussed for three weeks. After the Governor came, I was appointed as the Supervising Officer. Then, when information comes to me I also question about the private placements because -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Because they send me a list of yield rates for the private placements for signature.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who sends it to you?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The Public Debt Department.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When was this?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Weekly, they send.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: This was in February after you took over?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. In practice, private placements were done depending on the secondary market and the latest weighted average yield. If there is a recent treasury bond or auction there is a weighted average. If there are no bonds or auctions, secondary market rate. So those rates are forwarded to the Deputy Governor for approval.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: And those are given to you?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. for approval.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: As Deputy Governor did you approve these?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: I will explain. As a procedure, it comes. Private placement is open every day for different bonds. So the first day, I approved. Routine papers come to us so we approve. This is weekly. In the meantime, I asked, "How do you undertake these private placements?" Because I come from the supervision field, I always look for procedures. Then they say, "Dealers talk to our officers and tell the amounts and theyield rates are approved by the Deputy Governor. Depending on the size they givea few basis points – better or worse - and the funds are raised by certain officers." Then I asked, "Do you have documents on what they are talking and how the rate is decided?" No! No documents. Then I said, "If somebody is asking, say a Rs.20 billion investment in a certain treasury bond that request has to go to somebody for approval." One junior officer cannot talk over the phone and say, "I will give you this rate. Give me the money." That is how it happened.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It must be recorded.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No records. I asked, "Do you record?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What sort of interest rate was being paid for this? Did you feel the interest rate that was given to these people were disproportionate or a loss to the country?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Those were arbitrary rates.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They could not be arbitrary. I am sure your people had some sort of calculation.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No calculation.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They just made it up.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: A few basis points here and there, sometimes above the weighted average of the latest bill or below, or sometimes the secondary market rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Discretion of the officer?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The officer decides.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It comes to you for support?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No. Normally, they submit to me a table of the yield rates of different, different bonds for approval. Some say, weighted average of the latest bond. In respect of some bonds where there has not been an auction they say, secondary market. Then say, depending on the amounts they are willing to accept they will give certain basis points.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You make it your responsibility to study that and work out, are these interest rates in accordance with the points you made earlier?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Not only the interest rates.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The procedure.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am talking of the fact that there has been a procedure which has -

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It is non-compliance because the manual says -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is a different question. You told us now that the manual is not an official document.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The manual was prepared by people who then proceeded to breach that manual.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The Department also breached.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Exactly. I do not know whether you ever read what they said about AR and FR. AR and FR are there as guidelines. They are not rules. There is a difference between a manual which is adopted by Government and has to be followed rigidly and guidelines. What we gathered so far is that the guidelines you say there, you told us rules, were breached.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is obviously the responsibility of the officers concerned to ensure that the country does not lose out. Hon. Eran Wickremaratne made out the point, when there is discretion it can lead to corruption. But to me you all are the check on that. You have to make sure that the rates are reasonable and the country is getting a good deal.

My next question is, based on an instruction for which we have absolutely no evidence; there were discussions, people raised the question, people said go for private dealings, go for auction et cetera, a decision was taken. When that decision was taken we still do not know.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It is not a written one.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Not written anywhere. To me that is an appalling breach of procedure. When you are taking a significant decision, you as the person in charge should make sure it is on record and the rationale in it.

Now, my next question is this. You all made a recommendation to Rs. 10 billion, someone took a decision to go by the auction. That decision was taken on that very day because you just told us that this was issued in that very afternoon. Now, you were asked by these people, "What is the loss made to the country?" and you said that it cannot be calculated. It does seem to me that a very simple exercise you could have done was calculated the procedure that had taken place in the last five years which was to go for the weighted average. Had you gone for the weighted average what would the interest rate have been?

This is not a difficult question, Mr. Samarasiri.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It depends on the different people's view. I know the inside of the Central Bank then and now. My subject is on economics and I have also practised supervision.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, do you feel that you are not the right person for this job.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No, I can answer that question according to the way I look at it. Somebody might think, "If Rs. 1 billion is accepted, yield rate will be this. So, we could have gone on private placements and place this much and accordingly the cost is this" It is a scenario-based question. But, after taking over the supervisory responsibilities by me, my view is I was against private placements because those are individual transactions; no procedures or records and no approvals for the amounts. One tender on Treasury Bonds accepted Rs. 2 billion and the next day there was one private placement which was around Rs. 70 billion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Samarasiri, I can understand your position saying the procedure is inadequate. There are two ways of dealing with this. One is to set in place control, if that system is more beneficiary to the country. You used that very good word and I am very proud of you saying that, when there is a breach of control, you must protest. So, I think perhaps what I would have done in your position if first calculated the cost to the country because if I am going to go for a process at a tremendous cost to the country,

then I am afraid that I would not be doing my duty by the country.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No, my first view-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, the first thing I would have done - I think it is your responsibility – is to ask the calculator the difference in what the interest rate would have been adopting your procedure which is better on process or the other. So, I am asking a very simple question. Did it never occur to anybody in the Bank to look at what the cost to the country would have been if they have taken the weighted average and the current cost to the country? No one has done that.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: I think, if anybody is doing that it is an own, personal research estimate. But, according to my view, the yield rates in the market itself have been inflated by the private placement because people know the private placement is open at the yield rate on the auction. Then, they themselves know it. They are looking for high yields at the private placement. Then, they put inflated bids in the auction so that they will secure high weighted average and get placement at high weighted average. This was not seen in the market because it has been there for many years.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Samarasiri, from what you just told us, the strategy used by the Bank in February this year under your supervision, knowing that there is a demand of Rs. 13 billion, is to only put an auction for Rs. 1 billion. The argument you all used to do that is that if we say Rs. 13 billion, inflated rates bids will be put. However, we have just heard this morning – everyone knows it was Rs. 13 billion – inflated bids are put. The consequence of what has happened today is that given the practice that existed before – what you just said that all these people have probably put inflated bids – you have given them even greater benefit by not taking the weighted average but by going for them so that you now end up, pending what seems - a massive amount.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No. It is this. There was no market mechanism in the Treasury Bond Market. If there has been a market mechanism in the Treasury Bond Markets, rates should be lower. Now, we see market mechanism. Earlier there was no secondary market; no trading. Now, there is a secondary market trading. Now, Treasury bond rates are going down to market mechanism because everybody is bidding. There is no other way and they have to come to the auction and get. So, they make their best and get it.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, do you contest the point made by the former Governor? Did you point out to the former Governor when he was Governor that what he was doing was wrong? According to your point of view, the private placement policy was wrong, was it not?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: For me, it was wrong.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did you point it out to the former Governor? You were Deputy Governor at that time.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: At that time, I did not handling these and actually I did not know the private placements because I did not supervise the Department.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. By the argument he made in that by virtue of what he did, every time there was a bond issue but, more bonds were taken the interest that was paid was lower than what was done for the stated amount. Here we find that for the one billion for which interest was called, there is a very low interest rate. Am I correct when saying that it is about ten? For the other Rs. nine billion we are leaping up to 12 and 13. So, quite honestly it seems to me, as a layman, clear that following the other procedure would have saved the country a lot of money. Do you disagree with that?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: That is because we are inclined to what is existing. I mean, everybody wants to keep the same. But, we have to look at the

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: More corruption as well, it looks.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No, even corruption people will keep it because it is favouring some people. But, what I think is the market mechanism.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I understand what you see. I can see your theoretical argument.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It is not a theory. This is a practice.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am putting it practically that, the loss to the country by this sudden change, "A" has been big and "B" has gone to benefit a relation of the Government.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If I can interrupt the Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha, for a moment?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: First thing is, I think, when we use the word, 'loss' that might be misleading because as you see the complexity of deciding that. I want to mention a little bit on this perspective. I would say, if there was no conflict of interest, as you said, between the Governor and the interest the son-in-law has in a primary dealing company, this investigation may have not even begun because if you are the Head of the Bank, one of our primary responsibilities is liquidity and then, the assets and liabilities match. You know that the Government of Sri Lanka is going to issue you basically instruments. Then, your responsibility is actually to fund the instruments. So, if you kept the conflict of interest on a side – this would be a perspective - it would be perfectly normal for the Governor to be concerned that the money is being raised, how that is conveyed et cetera. So, I just want to make that point because otherwise, we are going to lose the perspective of it and we are losing it clearly because there is a reason. The reason there is a conflict which you are trying to probe.

The other thing which is misleading in the debate all alone has been the issue about loss and gain. That is highly hypothetical and some perspective that the Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha did not probably benefit from us yesterday is that there is a borrowing pattern. The borrowing pattern is higher interest rates of the beginning of the year and the lower interest later in the year. Normally in the last four years – if you examine what the Central Bank has done - it has borrowed foreign currencies to mitigate it. After January 08th, there has been no foreign currency borrowing. So, it has been funding the Government continuously through rupees. When you do that, the interest rates keep going up. So, I think that considering the profit loss issue – that is why I said that I have been maintaining it right from the beginning - I would suggest that we look more for the circumstantial evidence.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you, the Hon. Eran Wickramaratne. I just need to answer that because there are some important points that you raised. There are two things, I think, of great concern here. One is, based on the very point you raised, is there any attempt to go back to foreign bond issue? Has that failed or succeeded?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It has already been done.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is already done and has been successful.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is about five days ago.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I saw it in the papers. What I am going to say is that the Government has realized, perhaps, of not issuing some foreign bonds. The previous officer told us that they decided to not to issue foreign bonds in January and February. They have now changed their mind.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: That is because of the current circumstances.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is up to you to work out. I think the second point you made is that while I grant there is legitimate concern for the Governor about the raising of funds, two things worry me. One is it seems to have been an attempt to hide all these because this document produced, I would not say it is entirely in the interest of the judges, concedes all these. If we had been told all these before or if he said that he had nothing to do with it, I think the matter would not have looked so bad. Secondly, I think if we had had more transparency about these decisions, especially given the fact that might or might not be a conflict of interest, I think we would not have been in this mess. I think Mr. Samarasiri has given a very coherent argument for not going for private placements. I personally see that there are problems with it, but that is a sort of matter which needs a paper and needs discussion and you may end up agreeing. In an ad hoc decision on a matter like this from which it so happens to one of the beneficiaries, it is no good for what we all campaign for any solution.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I would like to slightly clarify just one matter. It is like this. When you go from a bad practice to a good practice, it does not have to be a policy decision. I will give you an example. If you go from single sourcing to a tender and I do not think it needs a policy decision because you are going in the right direction: the Chief Executive Officer and others would move it in that direction. If you are actually going from the best practice to another practice, then, it needs it. That is the clarification I would make.

But, I would again say that you legitimate the raising of questions because of the conflict of interest. Otherwise I think you would be even raising these questions.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I will agree that is why the whole matter began.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I will get back to the question. Mr. Samarasiri, in your view, do you think that the private placement can lead to corruption?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Private placement itself is not transparent. I personally do not agree and I would not permit that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I am asking you a direct question. Can that lead to corruption?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Of course, it can. I know the dealers in the financial markets work on certain rates. Sometimes certain rates are given as commissions and so on. These are practices in the market. Nobody knows that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The dealers can make money by favouring one party or by giving a cut out of it and making a profit out of it.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: That is a very famous thing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am asking. That is my point. You said there was Rs. 2 billion and then, it went for Rs. 70 billion. Can you explain that to me? Are all the private placements done on the approval of the tender board?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No. Just the junior officer decides that. There is no approval; there is no written request or no records. Generally, the standard practice in dealing rooms is that if you talk to investors, those should be recorded.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. Do you have all the recordings in the Central Bank? Do you have the recordings of all the dealings and all the telephone conversations?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The Public Debt Department has no recording. Nothing is there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you explain the scenario of Rs. 2 billion and Rs. 70 billion?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: The tender is Rs. 2 billion on 1st of April, 2014.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the auction.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Auction has been there before also.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. It has been there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, that is the thing. It is not a new policy decision.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. The difference is between what you advertise and what you advertise goes according to the action. The question is on what you put top of what you advertise. You know it was Rs. 2 billion in 2014 and it is Rs. 1 billion now. According to what we know so far, it was generally done on private placements, but with a fixed interest rate.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It is not a fixed interest rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes. That is wrong.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: They announced Rs. 2 billion on 1st April, 2014 and the bid received was Rs. 5 billion. So, they took Rs. 2 billion; the weighted average was 11.32 per cent. So, after that, it is open for the private placements and it was a 20-year bond. It is open for private placement throughout. Then, there was private placement of Rs. 8 billion at the rate of 11.33 per cent on the same day. The weighted average was 11.32 per cent and the rate given to that placement was 11.33 per cent. So, there are several private placements like that. So, the private placement finally ended up at Rs. 70.4 billion.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: What was the rate?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Altogether the rates given were, 11.33, 11.32, 11.27, 11.25, 11.18, 11.06 and 10.99 as a percentage. So, we do not know it.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: But, only one rate is exceeding the rate of weighted average.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who took out all those bonds? Was it one or two people or was it spread over a range of people?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: I think it was one or two people in the front office.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, those are the people who gave the bond.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who was the receiver? Is it one company or one person?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: They are primary dealers.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Hon. Eran Wickramaratne said that most of them were gone to the EPF.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Hon. Member is asking whether several bought it or one or two people bought it.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: I want to see the details for that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What I would say is that it is a serious statement-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let me finish my question. You may ask your question later, Hon. Member. There was confusion on this document. It was told that the Governor went down and was shown a document. But, do you know what document was shown to him?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No. I do not know.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, this document has the names of the bidders. Are you aware of this document? This document has the names of the successful bidders.

Mr. P. Samarasiri: But, I did not see that document at any point.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, can you tell us as to when this was made, if at all this document was made?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: It is after the closure of the auction to prepare the summary sheet.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Was this document available, when the tender board made the decision?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: No. But, the Public Debt Department has it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. But, the tender board was not aware of it.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There are some persons of the Public Debt Department who are in the tender board. Are they aware of it?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes. They are aware of it. They know it. If you want to change the amounts and the rates, they have to give the feedback.

The Chairman: Okay. Thank you very much.

Witnesses withdrew.

Committee adjourned.

Unedited

මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

2015 ජූනි මස 09 වැනි අඟහරුවාදා

පැමිණ සිටි:

ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය
ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා
ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු එම්.ටී. හසන් අලි මහතා

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක සේවා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, වැඩබලන විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඊ.ඒ.එන්.පී. එදිරිසිංහ මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කැඳවන ලදී.)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ **අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.**කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මුලින්ම ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා තමන්ගේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ සම්පූර්ණ තනතුර කියන්න?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අධිකාරි, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමිය ඔය තනතුරට පත් වුණේ කවදා ඉඳලාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 2015 පෙබරවාරි 6වැනි දා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඊට ඉස්සෙල්ලා මේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ වැඩ කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: වැඩ කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ තනතුර සම්බන්ධයෙන් පළපුරුද්දක් තිබුණාද? ඔබතුමියට මේ පත්වීම ලැබුණාම පුදුම වුණාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: පළපුරුද්දක් කියන එක මට කියන්න බැහැ. මම ඉගෙන ගෙන නිබෙනවා. මම master degree එක economics වලින් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කලින් කොහේද වැඩ කළේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉස්සෙල්ලා විගණකාධිපති-තුමාට අහන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. කලින් minutes බලද්දී පෙනුණා, අහපු සමහර ප්‍රශ්නවලට උත්තර පවා ලැබිලා නැති බව.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් ඉන්න තනතුරට එන්න කලින් ඔබතුමිය හිටියේ මහ බැංකුවේමයි. ඒ වෙන අංශයක. ඒ කොහේද හිටියේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ව්‍යාහාර දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ- Currency Department එකේ - Superintendent හැටියට කටයුතු කළා. එතැන අවුරුද්දක විතර කාලයක් හිටියා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ සේවා කාලය කොච්චරද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අවුරුදු 29ක් විතර.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය කියන අංශයේ කොච්චර කාලයක් සේවය කරලා තිබෙනවාද? මේ පළමු අවස්ථාවද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: පළමුවැනි අවස්ථාව.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමියට මෙම තනතුර ලැබුණු හේතුව මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මුලින්ම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

Unedited

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපට පැහැදිලිව මේ කාරණය ගැන දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඔබතුමියන්ලාගේ ළඟ මේ කියන schedule එක තිබෙනවා. මේ particular issue එක- bid award කිරීම- සම්බන්ධව අපි කථා කරනවා. ඒ ගැන අපට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඔය schedule එකේ තිබෙනවා, bid prices ගැන. ඒකේ අපේ value එක වන්නේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සියය. මෙහි අංක 13ට වාගේ යන කොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සියයට වඩා වැඩියෙන් යනවා. ඊට පස්සේ යන්නේ සියයට අඩුවෙන්. අපේ face value එක සියයයි. අනෙක් ඒවා ඔක්කෝම යන්නේ discounted විධියටයි. මේ bid එක නොවෙයි, මීට කලින් bidsවල සියයට වඩා අඩුවෙන් ගිය අවස්ථාවන් තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමිය දන්න දේ කියන්න.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වාගේ අවස්ථා තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගැන බලන්නේ නැතුව මට කියන්න අමාරුයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමිය අධ්‍යයනය කරනවා නේ. මේ පළමුවැනි අවස්ථාවද, නැත්නම් ඊට කලිනුත් එහෙම සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මීට කලින් එහෙම සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඇයි, එහෙම කරන්න හේතුව? අපේ face value එක සියය නම් අපි ඇයි ඒ වාගේ අඩු අවස්ථාවකට යන්නේ? Award කරන කොටම discount එකක් දීලා award කරන්නේ ඇයි?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: දෙපැත්තක් තිබෙනවා. Discount කරලා ඉල්ලන්නත් පුළුවන්. Premium එකක් තියෙන්නත් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට bid කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හේතුව?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Bid කරන කෙනාගේ decision එකක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මීට කලින් සියයට වඩා අඩුවෙන් bid කරන අයට award කරන කොටම discount එකක් දීලා award කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කොයි අවස්ථාවේද, ඒ තොරතුරු අපට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ තොරතුරු දැන් ඔබතුමිය ළඟ තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: දැන් නම් නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ වාගේ Treasury Bondsවල මේක පළමුවැනි අවස්ථාව නොවෙයි කියලා තහවුරු කරන්න පුළුවන් තොරතුරු අපට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද? 2014 ආසන්න අවුරුද්ද තුළ කමක් නැහැ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මේ අවස්ථාවේ මා ගාව ඒ තොරතුරු නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කරුණාකරලා ඒ තොරතුරු ටික අපට ලැබෙන්න සලස්සන්න. Award කරපු එක ගත්තාම ලොකු discount එකක් දෙනවා. අපි line up කළාට පස්සේ bid 14 ඉඳලා bid 26 වෙනකල්ම අපි දෙන්නේ discount එකකට. ඒ කියන්නේ face value එකටත් අඩුවෙන්. එහෙම award කිරීම තුළ Central Bank එකට opportunity cost එකක් තිබෙනවා නේද? Award කිරීම තුළ එහෙම financial assessment එකක් ඔබතුමිය කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම කරලා නැහැ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අවම වශයෙන් මේ issue එක ආවාට පස්සේවත් ඒ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡාවක්වත් කරලා නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමියත් ඒ Tender Board එකේ ඉන්නවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ Tender Board එකේදීවත් මේ discussionsවලදී මේ පිළිබඳව කථා කරලා නැද්ද? සියයට වඩා අඩුවෙන් මේක award කරන කොට අපට opportunity cost එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතැනදී decision එකක් ගත්තා නේ, "placementsවලට යන්නේ නැහැ. Auction එකකට යනවා" කියලා. Auction එකට යනවා කියන කොටම ඒක හොඳයි; transparent. මේ තිබෙන තත්ත්වයත් එක්ක බැලුවාම financial analysis එකක් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා ඔබතුමිය පිළිගන්නවාද? මේ schedule එක බැලුවාම පැහැදිලිවම පෙනෙනවා, 15 ඉඳලා 36 වෙන කල්ම තිබෙන්නේ සියයට වඩා අඩුවෙන්. Immediately අපට opportunity cost එකක් තිබෙනවා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Opportunity cost එකක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් අපි එදා දවසේ මේ ගැන කථා කළොත් ඒ වෙලාවේ අපට calculation එකක් කරන්න වෙලාව මදි වෙනවා. මොකද auction එක 12 වෙන කොට අවසන් කරන්න ඕනෑ නිසා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: පෙ.ව.11.00– 12.00 අතර calculation එකක් කරන්න වෙලාව තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: පෙ.ව.11.00ට ඉවර වෙලා 12.00 වෙන කොට අපි Tender Board එකට යන්න ඕනෑ. Tender Board

එකේ decision එක 12.00 වෙනකොට දෙන්නත් ඕනෑ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් පැයකින් ඒක calculate කරන්න බැරිද? මම හිතන හැටියට මේක බොහොම පැහැදිලියි නේ. මේ දිහා බලන කොට විනාඩි පහකින් පැහැදිලි ලෙස පෙනෙනවා - සංසන්දනය කරන කොට පෙනෙනවා - විශාල interest එකක් ගෙවන්න වෙයි කියලා. ඒක අධ්‍යයනය කරන්න පැයක් යන්නේ නැහැ නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඊට පස්සේන් අපි comparison එකක් කරනවා නම්, - ඒ කියන්නේ auction එකෙන් නොගෙන private placement යනවා නම් - ඒකත් hypothetical. ඒ වෙන කොට අපි දන්නේ නැහැ, අපට placement කරන්න වෙන්නේ මොන ratesවලටද කියලා. මේකේ තිබෙන ratesවලටම placement කරනවා නම්, අපට series එකක් තිබෙනවා. නැත්නම් අපට maturities ගොඩාක් තිබෙනවා. ඒකේ තිබෙන එක එක ratesවලට තමයි අපට placement කරන්නේ, primary dealer කැමැති වෙන ආකාරය අනුව.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Auction කරන කොටම අපි කියනවා නේ, 30 year bond එකක් කියලා. එතකොට අපි තීරණය කරනවා, අපි Rs. 1000 million auction එකට යනවා කියලා. මූලින්ම කියන්නේ අපේ requirement එක up to Rs. 13 billion තිබෙනවා කියලා. එතකොට අපි ඉස්සර වෙලාම මූලිකව අපි තීරණය කරනවා, අපි 30 year bond එකකට යනවා කියලා. ඒ ගිහිල්ලා නේ අපි auction එක - අපි Rs. 13 billionම award කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමියන්ලා කියන විධියට Rs. 13 billionම එක පාරට auction එකට දමන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, biddersලාට rate එක වැඩි කරන්න පුළුවන් නිසා. ඒක limit කරන්න ඕනෑ නිසාත්, ඒක regulate කරන්න ඕනෑ නිසාත් තමයි ඉස්සර වෙලාම Rs. 1000 millionවලට යන්නේ. එතකොට මීට කලින් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ අපි Rs. 1000 millionවලට ගිහිල්ලා - ඒ වාගේ auction එකකට ගිහිල්ලා - ඊට වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයකට අපි placements කිරීම. හැබැයි අර auction එකේ ආපු yield එකේ weighted average එක අර ගෙන තමයි අපි decide කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒකම මේකට apply කළොත් ඒ rate එක calculate කරන්න අපට බැරි කමක් නැහැ නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක තමයි මම කිව්වේ. Thirty-year bond එකේ decide කරපු weighted average එකටම අපි placement කරනවා නම්, අපට පුළුවන් calculation එකක් කරන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම් ඔක්කොම scenarios ගන්න වෙනවා. Maturities එක එක තිබෙනවා. අවුරුද්දේ ඉඳලා අවුරුදු 30ට යනකල් එක එක series තිබෙනවා. ඉතින් ඒ හැම එකකටම අපට බලන්න වෙනවා, කොහොමද ඒ වෙන කොට තිබෙන rate එක කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ 30 year bond එක නොවෙයි, ඊට පස්සේ වෙන maturitiesවලට යනවා කියන එකද ඔබතුමිය කියන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Placementsවලදී අපි එහෙමයි කරන්නේ. Thirty-year bond එකෙන් අපි Rs. 1 billion ගත්තා නම්, balance එක raise කරන්න අපි placementsවලට යනවා නම්, මේ bond එකේම ඒවාට යනවා නොවෙයි, මේ maturities එකේම ඒවාට යනවා නොවෙයි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපේ ළඟ තවත් series එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ කැමැති එකක් -

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක තීරණය කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක තීරණය කරන්නේ bond එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් තිබෙන weighted average එක අනුව. ඒකට two basis pointවත් below තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ වැඩි පොලියක් හොයන්නේ නැහැ. අඩුවෙන් තමයි පොලියක් හොයලා placement එකක් කරන්නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මීට ඉස්සර වෙලා මේ වාගේ කරලා තිබුණා නේ. Bond එකක් - යම් කිසි ගණනක් - auction එකෙන් අර ගෙන කරලා තිබුණා. Dr. Samarasiri අපට උදාහරණයක් දුන්නා. අපට දුන් උදාහරණයේදී හැම එකේම average එකේ interest එක අඩුයි. එකක් 11.32 per cent එක 11.33 per cent වුණා. අනෙක් හැම එකක්ම අඩු වුණා. ඉතින් ඔබතුමිය ඉන්නා තනතුරේ වගකීමක් නැද්ද, ලංකාවේ ජනතාව වෙනුවෙන් ගෙවන පොලිය අඩුම ප්‍රමාණයක තබා ගන්න?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් ඔබතුමිය හිතනවාද, ඒ වගකීම මෙකෙන් ඉෂ්ට වුණා කියලා? දැන් අර ගෙන තිබෙන ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයෙන් ජනතාව වෙනුවෙන් ඔබතුමියට තිබෙන වගකීම ඉෂ්ට වුණාද කියලා අවංක ලෙස කියන්න. Yes or No? Do you feel that your responsibility as Superintendent of the Public Debt Department is to make sure that the people of Sri Lanka do not pay excessive interest rates? Do you fulfill that responsibility?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපි වැරැද්දක් කළා කියලා මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Mr. Senevirathna, මා දන්නා විධියට

ඔබතුමිය ඉතාමත් අවංක කෙනෙක්. හැමෝම ඒ බව කියනවා. ඉතින් මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ,

ඔබතුමිය හිතලා වැරැද්දක් කරාවි කියලා. එහෙත් මේ වාගේ තීරණයක් ගන්න කොට ටිකක් හිතන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමිය ඉතාමත් වැදගත් තනතුරකට පත් වුණා. හේතුව තවම දන්නේ නැහැ. එතකොට ඊටත් වැඩියෙන් තමන්ගේ නමත් රැක ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසා මේවා ගැන හිතන්න යුතුකමක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙය ඔබතුමියගේ වැරැද්දක් කියලා මම කිසි දවසක කියන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙත් මට පෙනෙන විධියට එම තීරණයෙන් ලංකාවේ ජනතාවට විශාල පාඩුවක් සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක තමයි මම ඉස්සර වෙලාත් කිව්වේ ඒක වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. කොච්චර පාඩුවක් වුණාද කියන එක වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. වැඩි ලාභයක් සිදු වුණා වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒක calculation කරන ආකාරය අනුව වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඔබතුමියගේ boss, Dr. Samarasiri මහ ලොකුවට කිව්වා, මේක transparent කියලා. එහෙත් එතුමා අලුත් ක්‍රමයට යන්න උදාහරණයක් හැටියට කිව්වා, Rs. 2 million bond එකක් issue කරලා Rs. 70 billion private placementsවලින් දැම්මා කියලා. ඒත් අපි ප්‍රශ්න කරන කොට එතුමා අපට පැහැදිලි ලෙස කිව්වා, ඒ හැම එකේම ලංකාවේ ජනතාවට ගෙවන්න තිබෙන interest අඩු වුණා කියලා. ඉතින් ඔබතුමිය ඔය තනතුරේ ඉඳගෙන මේ ගැන අධ්‍යයනය කරන කොට පැහැදිලි ලෙස කියන්න පුළුවන් නේ, private placementsවලින් interest අඩු වෙනවා කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Private placements අඩු වුණා කියලාද කිව්වේ?

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා අපට කිව්වා, Rs. 70 billion එකේ bond එක දුන්නේ, 11.32 per cent, on an auction කියලා. ඊට පසුවදා 11.33 per centවලින් දුන්නා කිව්වා. ඒක වැඩියි. ඊට පස්සේ හැම එකක්ම - එතුමා අපට මුළු ලැයිස්තුවම කියවලා දුන්නා - 11.03 per centවලින් අඩු වුණා, 11.02 per centවලින් අඩු වුණා, 11.01 per centවලින් අඩු වුණා, 10.00 per centවලට ගියා. ඒ කියන්නේ ලංකාවේ ජනතාවට සැහෙන මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් රැක ගන්න පුළුවන්කමක් තිබුණා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ දිගටම auctionවලට ගියා නම් -

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Auctionවලට ගියා නම් - Rs. 1 billion දුන්නේ 11.32 per centවලට නේ. ඉතින් auction එකෙන් වැඩියෙන් ගත්තොත් ඒක වැඩි වෙනවා නේ. අපි අඩුම ඒවා නේ auction එකෙන් ගන්නේ. ඉතින් ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ ක්‍රමයට යන්නේ නැතුව private placementsවලට ගිහිල්ලා හැම එකක්ම අඩු වුණා. ඉතින් මම ඔබතුමියට කියනවා, ඔබතුමියගේ job එක කළා නම් පැහැදිලි ලෙස පෙනෙනවා, rate එක calculate කරන කොට - percentage points අඩුවෙන් නේ ඉස්සර වෙලා place කරන්න බලන්නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඇත්තටම අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණා, private placementsවලට යන්න.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඇයි ගියේ නැත්තේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපට senior management එකෙන් instruction එකක් හම්බ වුණා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: කවුද instruction එක දුන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Senior management එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Senior management කියන්නේ කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඇත්තටම මම මේ තනතුරට පත් වුණාට පස්සේ මේක තමයි පළමු වැනි bond auction එක. එදා තමයි Deputy Governor සහ Governor ඒක දුන්නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මොන Deputy Governorද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Mr. Samarasiri. එයා තමයි අපේ overseer.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මොන වෙලාවේද මේ instruction එක දුන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: උදේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: උදේ කීයටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 10.30ට විතර.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේ bids එන ගමන්. Bids එන ගමන් Governor මේ ලැයිස්තුව දැක්කාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Auction එක close කළාම තමයි දකින්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ. එතකල් කාටවත් දකින්න බැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Auction එක close කරන්නේ කීයටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: පෙ.ව.11.00ට.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: අපට කිව්වා, auction එක පරක්කු කරන්න තීරණයක් ගත්තා කියලා.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: පෙ.ව.11.04ට.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: කවුද ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මම.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි ඒ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක online system එකක්. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපේ ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවා, මොනවා හරි technical error එකක් ආවොත් අපේ primary dealer inform අපට කරනවා, technical error එකක් නිසා enter වෙන්න බැරි වුණා කියලා. ඒ වෙලාවට අපි පොඩි වෙලාවක් -

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ විස්තර අපට Dr. Wijewardenaගෙන් හම්බ වුණා. ඒක කෙරෙන්නේ යම් කිසි technical error එකක් වුණා නම්. හැබැයි අපට සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා, මේක පරක්කු කරන්න කියලා Bank of Ceylon එක ඉල්ලීමක් කළා කියලා. ඒ ඉල්ලීම ඔබතුමියට ලැබුණේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් නොවෙයි. වෙනත් කාගෙන්වත් ඉල්ලීමක් ලැබුණේ නැද්ද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Technical error එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා කියපු primary dealer කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: HSBC එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Auction එක පරක්කු වෙනවා කියලා මේ ඉල්ලීම කළේ කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Treasury office එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: කවුද Treasury officer?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මම නම් දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Treasury officer කෙනෙක් ඔබතුමියගෙන් ඉල්ලුවා-

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මගෙන් නොවෙයි. Front Office එකෙන් කළේ. Front office එක මට දැනුම් දෙනවා මෙහෙම එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි, ඔබතුමිය දන්නවා නේ වෙන කිසිම දවසක මේ වාගේ auction එකක් ඒ වාගේ deliberately delay වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සමහර වෙලාවට වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. නැහැ. ඒක technical error එකක් නිසා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. එහෙම නැතුව නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නැතුව කිසි දවසක කවුරු හරි අහලා මේක delay කරන්න දීලා නැහැ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: දැන් අපිට සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා Bank of Ceylon එකෙන්, ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කිව්වේ නැහැ Perpetual Treasuries වෙනුවෙන් bid කරනවා කියලා. හැබැයි, ඒ ගොල්ලන් විශාල bids දෙන නිසා ඒ ගොල්ලන් විශේෂ ඉල්ලීමක් කළා, කාගෙන්ද කියලා අපි note කරලා නැහැ නේද? ඒක තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ මේක පරක්කු කරන්න කියලා ඉල්ලීමක් කළා. ඉතින් මම ඔබතුමියට කියනවා Treasury එකේ ඉල්ලීමක් මත මේක පරක්කු කරන එක වැරැද්දක්?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. Treasury එක තමයි system එකට enter වෙන්නේ. Treasury කියන්නේ primary dealerගේ Treasury office එක.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔය කියන්නේ dealer.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Dealerගේ Treasury office එක.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ dealer කවුද කියලා ඔබතුමිය දන්නේ නැහැ. පුද්ගලික dealer කෙනෙක් ඉල්ලීමක් කළා, වෙනත් කිසිම දවසක වෙලා නැති දෙයක්; මේක delay කරන්න කියලා? ඒ ඉල්ලීමට ඔබතුමිය එකඟ වුණා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: කිසිම දවසක වෙලා නැති දෙයක් නොවෙයි. වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Dealer කෙනෙක් කිසිම දවසක ඉල්ලා නැහැ. Dealers දන්නවා auction එකක් කියන්නේ auction එකක්. විනිවිදභාවය රැකගන්න auction එක වහන වෙලාවට වහන්න ඕනෑ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Technical error එකක් තිබුණොත්-

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Technical error එකක් තිබුණත්, ඒවා මත delay වුණ bid එක වෙලාසනින් place කරපු bid එක පරක්කු වෙලා එනවා නම් technical error එකක් නිසා ඒක භාරගන්න එක වෙනම එකක්.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. අපිට එනැන technical error එකක් දැනෙනවා නම් අපි ඒ වෙලාවට access දෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි, කිසිම දවසක අපි දන්නා විධියට professional සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා මේක පිහිටවපු පුද්ගලයාගෙන්. කිසිම දවසක dealer කෙනෙක් ඉල්ලා නැහැ. කිසිම දවසක අනුමැතිය දීලා නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Technical error එකකට මීට ප්‍රථමව delay කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා අහන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. නැහැ. ඒක නොවෙයි, මම අහන්නේ අපි දන්නවා technical errors නිසා technical error එකක් නිබුණාම වෙලාසනින් bid කරපු එකක් පරක්කු වෙලා එන නිසා ඒක ගන්න ඉඩ තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, ඉල්ලීමක් මත closing time එක වෙනස් කරන එක කිසිම දවසක වෙලා නැහැ. ඒක හරි නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: කවුරු හරි ඉල්ලීමක් කරලා වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. අපිට එවනවා ෆැක්ස් එකක්. එතකොට අපි කියනවා ඔයා ෆැක්ස් එක දැන්මම එවන්න කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ එතකොට 11.00ට කලින් ෆැක්ස් එකක් ආවාම අපිට telephone එකෙන් කථා කරලා කියනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ වෙලාවේ ෆැක්ස් එක ආවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මේ වෙලාවේ ෆැක්ස් එක ආවේ නැහැ. කථා කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කාටද කථා කළේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Front Office එකට.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේකේ අවසාන තීන්දුව, මේ වෙලාව දික් කරන්න කියලා අවසාන තීන්දුව දුන්නේ ඔබතුමිය නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමියට තිබෙන ඒ procedures අනුව එවැනි දෙයක් කල්දැමීම් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සියලුම ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ඔබතුමිය අනුගමනය කළාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මොනවාද තිබෙන ක්‍රියාමාර්ග? එවැනි ඉල්ලීමක් ආවාම මොකක්ද කරන්න ඕනෑ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අවසරය දෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් තිබෙන procedure එක මොකක්ද? මෙවැනි දෙයක් කල් දැමීම සඳහා තිබෙන, මෙහෙම දෙයක් වුණොත් මේ ආකාරයෙන් කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා ඇති නේ. මොකක්ද තිබෙන procedure එක?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ෆැක්ස් එකක් එවනවා. ඒක අපි අනුමැතිය-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමියලාගේ තිබෙන procedure එක මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක තමයි procedure එක. අපි එයාට කියනවා අපිට හේතුව ලියලා ෆැක්ස් එකක් එවන්න කියලා. එතකොට අපේ technical error එකක් අපට මේ පැත්තේ දැනෙනවා නම්-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපිට කියන්නේ කාටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Department එකට.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමියට තනි බලයක් තිබෙනවාද, නැත්නම් කමිටුවක් තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ කමිටුව කියන්නේ Front Office එකට. එතැන ඉන්නවා Divisional Head කෙනෙක්. ඊට පස්සේ Additional Superintendent ඉන්නවා, in charge.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට කාටද මේ ඉල්ලීම ඉස්සෙල්ලා ආවේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Front Office එකට.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ෆැක්ස් එකකින් නොවෙයි?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. කථා කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමිය අවසර දුන්නේ ඇයි?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ ඇත්තටම අධිපතිතුමා office එකේ හිටියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කොයි office එකේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මගේ office එකේ visit එකකට ඇවිත් තිබුණා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ වෙලාව කියද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 10.45ට විතර ආවේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඔය auction එක වෙමින් පවතින අවස්ථාව?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමිය මේ අවසරය දුන්නේ කොහොමද? මේකේ ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමිය කිව්වා ඒ ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කළා කියලා. එතකොට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියගේ කාමරයේ සිටි නිසාද අවසරය දුන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. ඒක නිසා මම කිව්වා කමක් නැහැ 11.05 ඒක ගන්නයි කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කළාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. නැහැ. අධිපතිතුමා මේ කාරණය දැනගෙන හිටියේම නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙනම්?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක අධිපතිතුමා ඒ වෙලාවේ ඉන්න නිසා ඇවිල්ලා එතැන -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා office එකේ හිටියාට මොකක්ද නීත්‍යානුකූල තත්ත්වය?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මේක අධිපතිතුමා හිටපු එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. මම දැන් අහන්නේ ඔබතුමිය කිව්වා ෆැක්ස් එකෙන් එන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ෆැක්ස් එක ආවාට පස්සේ තමයි මේකට අනුමැතිය දෙන්නේ කියලා. දැන් මෙතැන ෆැක්ස් එකක් නැහැ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට Front Office එකෙන් ඔබතුමියට කථා කරලා කිව්වා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඇයි ෆැක්ස් එකකින් දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තිබෙනවා නම්, ෆැක්ස් එකක් නැතුව ඔබතුමිය අනුමැතිය දීමට හේතුව මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ෆැක්ස් එක එනතුරුත් පමා වෙන නිසා මම කිව්වා කමක් නැහැ එතෙක් යන්න කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒක වරදක් නොවෙයිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ powers අපට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක එහෙමනම් කියන්න. දැන් මම ඒකයි මූලින්ම procedure එක ඇහුවේ? එතකොට ඔබතුමිය කිව්වා ෆැක්ස් එකක් එවන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. නමුත් ඔබතුමියට ෆැක්ස් එකකින් තොරව හෝ මේ තීන්දු තීරණ ගැනීමට බලයක් තිබෙනවා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. සමාවෙන්න ඒ අවස්ථාව වෙනකොට 11.00 හෝ 11.04 වෙනකම් හරි 11.30 වෙනකම් open නම් ඔක්කෝම primary dealersලාට එකවිධියට මේකට access තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් මේක ඔබතුමියගේ පළමුවෙනි auction එකද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: හතර වෙනි එක.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පහුවෙලා මේක ගැන ෆැක්ස් එකක් ආවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ආවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ ඉල්ලීම කරලා ෆැක්ස් එක පසුව ආවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ආවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒකේ මොකක්ද ඉල්ලුවේ? ඒ ෆැක්ස් එක දැන් තිබෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ ෆැක්ස් එක table කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ? ගෙනැල්ලා නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ෆැක්ස් එක එවිවේ කවුද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමිය වාචිකව දුන්නා නම් ඇයි ෆැක්ස් එකක් එවිවේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කියනවා ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ලිඛිතවත් එවන්න කියලා. Recordsවලට අපි තියාගන්නවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතින් ඔබතුමියට note එක දාන්න තිබුණා නේ. "මේකට ෆැක්ස් එකක් අනවශ්‍යයි. ඔබතුමියට බලය තිබෙනවා තීන්දුව ගත්තා"කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. එහෙම දමන්න පුළුවනි. Formality හැටියට අපි ඒක කරනවා. අපිට ඒ අවශ්‍යතාවය නිසා අපි ඒක අරගෙන තියාගන්නවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ෆැක්ස් එක එවිවේ කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නමුත් සමහර වෙලාවට එහෙම නොකරන අවස්ථාවල් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ මේ අවස්ථා හතරේ එහෙම දෙයක් සිද්ධ වුණාද? ඔබතුමියගේ හතර වෙනි අවස්ථාව කිව්වා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඊට පස්සෙත් වුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ අවස්ථා හතර තුළ එවැනි දෙයක් සිද්ධ වුණාද?

Unedited

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මම හිතන්නේ වුණා. සෑම දවසකම ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙනවා. පොඩ්ඩක් හරි තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ technical error නිසා කල් දෙනවා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අනිවාර්යයෙන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට කලින් මට කියන්න මේ department එකේ වගකීම මොකක්ද? මේ Public Debt Department එකට පැවරෙන කාරයභාරය, වගකීම මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Public Debt Department එක තමයි රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍ය නියෝජිතයා ලෙස ඉන්නේ. රජයට අවශ්‍ය මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවයන් ප්‍රතිසම්පාදනය කිරීමේ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්. එතකොට ඔබතුමියට නිලධාරිනියක් විධියට මේ තනතුරට පැවරෙන වගකීම මොකක්ද? දැන් ඒ department එකේ වගකීම නේ කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ වෙනුවෙන් මේ තනතුරට පැවරෙන වගකීම මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ඒ අවශ්‍ය ණය ක්‍රම අපි සකස් කරන්න ඕනෑ. මාසිකව requirement එක, මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවයන් අපට Treasury එකෙන් දැනුම් දෙනවා. ඒක දුන්නාම අපි ඒ අනුව සකස් කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ අවශ්‍යතාවය Treasury එකෙන් ඔබතුමියට කවදාද දැනුම් දුන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපිට මේක ලැබෙන්නේ මාසයේ මුල. මේ මාසයේ එක ගිය මාසයේ අන්තිම සතියේ වාගේ ලැබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සිද්ධියට අදාළ එක ලිඛිතව ලැබිලා තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉල්ලීම කියක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මේක 27 වෙනිදා auction එක. 29 වෙනිදා තමයි settlement එක තිබෙන්නේ. මාර්තු 02 වෙනිදා අවශ්‍යතාවයට තමයි. Rs. 13.5 billion.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක ලිඛිතවම ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක දැන් තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. ඒක අපි submit කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපිට ඒක අවශ්‍යයි. එතකොට මේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකුවේ, මීට පෙර සාකච්ඡාවක් තිබුණා නේද? මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා එහෙම ඇවිල්ලා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. මේ bond එක ගැනද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් නේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකුවට කියන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට අමතරව මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා මහ බැංකුවට ඇවිල්ලා සාකච්ඡාවක් තිබුණේ නැද්ද? ඒ ගැන ඔබතුමිය දන්නේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මේ 30-year bond එකට ඉස්සර වෙලා සාකච්ඡාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම අහන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපිත් එක්ක තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමිය ඒ සාකච්ඡාවට සහභාගි වුණේ නැහැ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් තිබුණ සාකච්ඡාව?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. අපිට කැඳවීමක් කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔය ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමිය දන්නේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය ආපු ඉල්ලීම විතරයි?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒකට අනුව තමයි කටයුතු කළේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මට යමක් කියන්න තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අවසන් වෙනකන් අහන්න.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: දැන් මෙම අවශ්‍යතාව-

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ සටහන් බලා ගෙන යනකොට තේරෙනවා සමහර ප්‍රශ්නවලට උත්තර ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ, තවත් මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා. කරුණාකරලා එක මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් ප්‍රශ්න කරලා අවසන් වෙනකන් ඉන්න. හැමෝටම ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න වෙලාව ලබා දෙනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අවශ්‍යතාව Rs. 13 billion නේද?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Rs. 13.5 billion.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් එහි තීරණයක් Monetary Board එකෙන් ගත්තා, auction එකට යන ප්‍රමාණය කිව්වේ නැහැ. One billion වලට යනවා කියලා තීරණය ගත්තේ ඔබතුමියගේ Department එකද? One billion වලට bids කැඳවන්න තීරණය ගත්තේ කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක ගන්නේ Public Debt Department එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගන්න තීරණයක්. ඔබතුමීගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් එයට යන්නේ නැහැ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මේ ආකාරයෙන් කැඳවන කොට අපට Deputy Governor ත් කිව්වා, ආණ්ඩුවේ කථිකයක් ඇවිල්ලා තවත් සල්ලි අවශ්‍ය බව පැහැදිලි කරලා දුන්නා කියලා. ඔබතුමිය හිටියේ නැහැ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මොන අවස්ථාවේදී ද Rs. 10 billion ගන්න ඔබතුමියට Governor instruct ඉදිරිපත් කළේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Auction එක දවසේ auction එක close කරලා අවසන් වුණාට පසුව.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මොන වෙලාවේදීද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 12.30ට විතර. මොකද? අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් 12.00ට යනවා Tender Board Meeting එකට. Tender Board එකේ Chairman ලෙස ඉන්නේ Deputy Governor.තවත් Assistant Governors ලා කිහිප දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ ඔක්කොම අය Corporate Management Meeting එකේ Governor එක්ක හිටියේ. එම නිසා පොඩ්ඩක් වෙලාවෙන් පසුවත් ඉන්න සිදු වුණා. ඊට පසු ඒ meeting අවසන් වෙලා Governor තමයි කථා කළේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වන විට Governor මේක දැකලා තිබුණාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වන විට දැකලා නැහැ. 12.30ට ආවාට පසුව තමයි දැක්කේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතකොටයි ඒක දැක්කේ? එතුමා මේ instruction දෙන්න කලින් මෙම list එක දැක්කා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා instruct කලා ද Rs. 10 billion ගන්න, එතුමා යෝජනා කළා ද Rs. 20 billion මුදලක් ගන්න?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඉස්සර වෙලාම Rs. 20 billion ගන්න බලාපොරොත්තුව තිබුණා. අපි හිතුවේ නැහැ ඒ මුදල එයි කියලා. මෙච්චර කාලයකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණේ five times වාගේ තමයි අපි offer කරන එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් එතුමා මෙම Rs. 20 billion දැකලා කිව්වා Rs. 20 billion මුදලම ගන්න කියලා.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Rs. 20 billion ඇවිල්ල තිබෙනවා නම්- why do you not-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He told you to take Rs. 20 billion.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: First he said, Rs. 20 billion. We explained him-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, having seen this and realized that there are 20 billion bids, he instructed or suggested that we should take 20 billion.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: I would say, suggested-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Why did you reject that suggestion?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: That was too high.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Why was it too high? He has told us and Mr. Samarasiri seems to agree with him that since auctions are transparent, you should always take everything by auction. So, why did you refuse? I am very glad that you refused it. I am delighted that you had the courage to say, "No". But, why did you refuse?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: One reason is that sometimes these bids maybe dummy bids. සමහර වෙලාවට ඒ අයට 10 per cent requirement.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක පැහැදිලියි. මට පෙනෙන විධියට-

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමිය මේවාට dummy bids කියලා කියනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සමහර වෙලාවට dummy bids වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, කොහොමද dummy bids වෙන්නේ? සල්ලි නැතිව bid කරනවාද?එතකොට අපි භාර ගන්නේ නැතිව ඉන්නවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ කවදාවත්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒකට dummy කියන්න බැහැනේ. Intentionally මේ දෙන්නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. ඒක too high. ඉතින් අපිට ඒ rate එකට දමන්න අමාරුයි.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is too high. Okay. So, as a responsible officer, you said that these bids are too high and they should be rejected. That is why the country was safe from taking a 20 billion bond. Thank you, Mrs. Senevirathna. Why did you now exercise the same intelligent discretion and tell the Governor this 10 billion is too much?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Especially Dr. Azim, our Additional Superintendent explained him more than four times.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: More than four times that this was too much.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But the Governor insisted?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: We did not have any other option.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You are an officer of the Central Bank. If I might-

සභාපතිතුමා: සිංහලෙන් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හොඳයි. ඔබතුමිය මේ තනතුරට පත් කළෙත් ඔබතුමියගේ අවංකකම නිසා කියලා සමහර අය කියනවා. මමත් ටිකක් සැකයෙන් හිටියා, Mr. Azim පැහැදිලි ලෙස පෙන්වා දුන්නා Governor ට මේක පොඩි වැරැද්දක් කියලා. එහෙත් Governor insist කළා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Insist කළා. මොකද, requirement is high. අපට Rs. 13.5 billion තිබෙනවා. ඒකෙන් 3 billion-

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හරි. අපිට විකල්ප තිබෙනවානේ. Private placement විකල්ප තිබෙනවා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙන කොට කිව්වා ඕගොල්ලොන්ට private placement කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: කවුද කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Governor කිව්වා. The Governor said that.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Governor තීරණයක් ගන්නවා private placements නොකරන්න. කිසිම අවසරයක් Monetary Board එකෙන් ගත්තේ නැහැ. Monetary Board එකෙන් කිව්වා interest rate එක වැඩි කරන්න එපා කියලා. එතකොට එතුමා ඇවිල්ලා කියනවා 20 billion ගන්න කියලා. ඒ sequence එක හරි. එතකොට ජනතාව වේනුවෙන් කටයුතු කරපු Mrs. Senevirathna යි Mr. Azim යි පෙන්වලා දුන්නා මේක බැහැ කියලා. මේ 20 billion කථාව ටිකක් මර්ධනය වීමක් වුණා. ඊට පසුව 10 billion ගැනත් Dr. Azim පෙන්වලා දුන්නා. නේද? ඒත් Governor insist කලා. This was at 12.30.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: I will say, "Instructed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Not instructed. Your minute is very clear. Thank you, Mrs. Senevirathna.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Instructed or insisted? Just tell the truth because instructed and insisted has-

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Instructed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But he instructed-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: "Instructed" කියලා තිබෙනවා කොලේ. "Insisted" කියලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමියගේ අවස්ථාව ආවාට පසුව ඒක කියන්න? ඔබතුමියට අවස්ථාවක් මම පසුව දෙන්නම්.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think I should explain to the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake that responsible officers of the responsible officers of the Bank, Mrs. Senevirathna, who has no experience in this area, and Dr. Azim who has a lot of experience indicated to the Governor why it was not a suitable action.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Nevertheless, he instructed- I think I am entitled to use the word "insisted". If you give an instruction and when the professional advise against it, but you say "No, no", that is what in English we call "insisted". But, Mrs. Senevirathna, being a mild lady දාලා තිබෙනවා "Governor instructed". So, what is very clear is that following the discussion with the officials of the Bank, the officials of the Bank who did their best to give professional advice, the Governor continued to instruct and it was subject to that instruction that the Tender Board made its decision. Is that correct?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you. මේ note එකක් තිබෙනවා. What time did you write this note?

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමියගේ අත් අකුරු ද කියලා අහන්න?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can you confirm at what time you wrote this note?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes, at about 12.30.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Was it after the meeting with the Governor?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, before the Tender Board had met?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Before the Tender Board had met, you conveyed to the Front Office the instructions of the Governor even though the Tender Board had not ratified because the procedure is that the Public Debt Department makes the recommendation. I am very proud that you and Dr. Azim made the right recommendation. The Tender Board and on your recommendation makes a further recommendation and the Governor approves. What we ask is this. If the Governor comes and instructs a particular recommendation, then it comes to you from a group.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is that correct?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mrs. Senevirathna, can you recall the conversation you had with the Governor and how did the Governor instruct and what words did he use because people can put words into your mouth and get you to say, "Yes"? Then, you are saying "Yes" to everything. If you can recall the conversation, can you just explain that? So that it would be clear. I want to know from her. I have the right to ask.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: First he asked, "How much they have offered?"

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: In Sinhala or in English?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: In English.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Then, we said, "20 billion. We did not expect this much". After that he said, "Why do you not get everything because we have a high requirement in addition to this 13.5-"

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You had a requirement to fulfill the very next day, on the 3rd?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes, 13.5 billion. He further said, "In addition, we have another government requirement, so why do you not get everything?"

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, those were the words.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What was the Government requirement?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Let me finish first, please! Okay. So, because you had the requirement, he told you. I would like if you can use the words as to how he said it because I want to know whether he insisted and put pressure on you all and you all determined or how it had been happened so that I can be happy and comfortable when determining my argument on this.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes. Then, we said that this rate was too high. So, we cannot go for that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Go for what? When you say, "that" what does it mean?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: We cannot accept Rs. 20 billion.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Did he say, "20" or did he say, "Government requirement"?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes. He mentioned the Government requirement as well.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, what was the Government requirement?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: It was Rs. 15 billion or something.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Rs. 15 billion -Government plus you had another Rs. 10 billion.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Rs. 13 billion

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: From Rs. 13 billion, you had already taken Rs. 3.5 billion from the-

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Public fundings.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. So, you had a 10 requirement plus you had another 15 requirement from the Government.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Governor just mentioned. but, we did not take that into consideration.

Unedited

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That 15? Okay. So, for the 10, you advised the Governor "Do not go for the 20, but, go for the 10 which was the requirement."

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: We did not propose 10.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You just tell me the conversation, because I was not there. So, I need-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You need to put words into someone's mouth.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, I am asking about the conversation. Mrs. Senevirathna, you tell me the conversation.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: He said 20 and the two Deputy Governors were there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who said, "10"? Do not make allegations against me.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: She said, "10"

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They never said "10". She said very clearly that the Governor said to take 10 and Mr. Azim advised against it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. Was there a requirement for 10?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: First, he said, "20" and then we said, "We cannot get that"

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. Thank you.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: After that, even the two Deputy Governors were there. Then, he said, "Why do you not go for 10?" Still, we said that that is too much.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You said even that 10 is too much.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes. Then we -especially Dr. Azim, not me- explained that several times.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, if you knew that 10 is too much, what made you take the 10? Is it because the Governor said to take 10? That is what I want to know.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: We thought that -10.73- is too high.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: No, you did not answer the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake's question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, I am asking you a question. You knew that you had a requirement of Rs. 13.5 billion. You said that you told him actually earlier that Rs. 3.5 billion was collected by the public money; EPF or whatever and then you had a requirement of 10. So, you had 20. The Governor told you to take all 20. You said, "No". So, what made you go for the 10?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: The Governor said, "10"

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. So, you basically went for 10 just because the Governor said, but not because you wanted to take 10. Say, for example, if you have the power, would you not have gone for 10.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: We do not have the power. What do you mean?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. In the event if you have the power and the Governor was not there, would you not have gone for 10?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: No.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How would you have raised the rest then?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: We thought that we would raise 2.6 from this auction and the balance would be raised from the private placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When the Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha was asking you a question about the other ways that were there, you said that you all have decided not to go for private placements.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. She said that the Governor has said, "No private placements."

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, because that was told by the Monetary Board. There is a paper that they gave and in that they have explained saying that they had taken a decision.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They had not. That is on the 6th March.

The Chairman: We can discuss that later.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay, fine. So, forget about that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Do not try to put words into her mouth.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I am not putting words into her mouth. I am just asking – I want to know exactly what the conversation is.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You are twisting what she said.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I am not twisting what she said.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: She never said, "Private placements are -

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can we let her speak?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Because she insulted me and I do not take insults lightly.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay, go ahead.

The Chairman: Hon. Rajiva Wijesinha, you do the same thing. Allow her to examine.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: The entire Tender Board has taken a decision to stop private placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. Mrs. Senevirathna, I have just one more question to ask from you, who determines or who gives the authority to either go for auctions or private placements? Is it by your Department?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes. In our manual, we have to go as much as possible-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Right. In the past, have they gone for private placements or auctions without your approval? Has it been done before?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: I cannot say anything for that because I was not there.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is very clear. So, thank you very much.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මෙතැන පැහැදිලි කළ දේවල් ගැන මම නැවත ඔබතුමියගෙන් අහන්නේ නැහැ. මම අහන්න හිටපු සමහර කාරණා ඔබතුමිය දැන් කළ පැහැදිලි කිරීම නිසා මට වැටහුණා. මට එක දෙයක් ගැන පමණයි දැන් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමිය මේ note එකේ සටහනක් දමලා තිබෙනවා නේ "Governor instructed to raise funds up to Rs. 10 billion." කියලා. ඔබතුමිය ඒක මෙතැන සටහන් කරන්නේ මෙතැන options හයක් තිබියදී. මේ කොළේම ලියන්න සිද්ධ වුණේත් ඒක නිසා නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: එහෙම නැත්නම් ඔබතුමිය ලියන්නේ කාබන් කොළයක හරි වෙනත් කොළයක හරි නේ. මේ bid එකට අදාළව- ඔබතුමියගේ Department එකේ මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනුවක් සිද්ධ වෙන කොට options හයක් තිබෙනවා මට මෙහි පෙනෙන විධියට.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: අපි ඉගෙනගත් විධියට ඒක cost analysis එකක්. ඒ කියන්නේ විකල්ප අවස්ථා හයක් තමයි හඳුනා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. මේ විකල්ප හය තිබියදී තමයි Governor දැනුවත් කරපු හරි, පැහැදිලි කරපු හරි, කියාපු හරි තීරණය ගන්නේ. ඒ තීරණය ගන්නාම ඒකෙන් අර options හයට බලපෑමක් සිදු වෙනවා කියලා ඔබතුමිය පිළිගන්නවාද? ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ options හය පැත්තකින් තියන්න වෙනවා කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ options හය ඒ විධියටම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒ options හය තිබෙනවා. නමුත් ඒ options හයට පිටින් නේ මේ තීරණය ගන්න වෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා නේ ඔබතුමිය මෙතැන සටහනක් යොදන්නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව options හයක් තෝරා ගෙන තිබියදී මම ඇවිත් හත්වන විකල්පයක් ගැන කියන කොට - උදාහරණයක් විධියට මම Governor කියලා හිතන්නකෝ -

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අර options එකක්වත් අපි පිළිගන්නේ-

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: මම ඇවිල්ලා එකක් කියන කොට ඔබතුමියට එකක් තෝර ගන්න වෙනවා නම්, ඔබතුමියම කියන විධියට ඒක තෝරා ගන්න වෙන්නේ Governor නිසා. නැත්නම් එතැන ඉන්න peon කෙනෙක් හරි වෙන සාමාන්‍ය පුද්ගලයෙක් හරි කිව්වා නම් ඔබතුමිය ඔය තීරණය පිළිගන්නවාද? නැහැ නේ. ඒ පිළිගැනීම තමයි ඔබතුමිය මෙතැන සටහන් කරන්නේ. ඒක විසින් ඔබතුමියගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිබුණ options හයට නොයන්න, ඒ options හයෙන් එකක් තෝරා නොගන්න බලපෑමක් වුණාද කියලායි මම අහන්නේ, ඔබතුමියට හිතෙන විධියට.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: හරි. මට තිබුණ ප්‍රධාන ප්‍රශ්නය ඒක. එතකොට මේ process එකේදී තනි තීරණයක් ගන්නවාට වඩා එවැනි options කිහිපයක් ගැන සලකලා තීරණයක් ගන්නවා නම් පහසුයි නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. පහසුයි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: හරි, එපමණයි.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I just ask one question arises from what the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake said.

සභාපතිතුමා: අහපු ප්‍රශ්න නැවතත් අහන්න එපා. අලුත් ප්‍රශ්න පමණක් අහන්න.

Uncorrected

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: ඔබතුමිය කිව්වා නේ "Governor කිව්වා Rs. 10 billionවලට අමතරව තව Rs. 15 billion requirement එකක් තිබුණා" කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගැන ඔයගොල්ලන් මීට ඉස්සරවෙලා අහලා තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා ඒක දැන ගත්තේ කොහෙන්ද කියලා කිව්වේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඊට ඉස්සර වෙලා දිනයේ road development එක ගැන meeting එකේදී කථා කළා කියලා කිව්වා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කිව්වා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි Dr. Samarasiri අපට කිව්වේ. නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා එතැන සිටියේ නැහැ.. හැබැයි ඇමතිතුමා, UNP එකේ ලේකම්තුමා සහ UNP එකේ Chairman එතැන සිටියා. ඔබතුමිය ඒ ගැන දන්නේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කලින් ප්‍රකාශ කළා මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමිය සිටින ස්ථානයට 10.45ට පමණ පැමිණියා කියලා. ඒක හරිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණියේ කා සමඟද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙලාවේ security staff එක සමඟ තනියම ආවේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරු කවුරුවත් ආවේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙලාවේ ආවේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඇවිල්ලා මොනවද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඇවිල්ලා කථා කරන වෙලාවේ අපි කිව්වා මේ අපේ auction එක යන වෙලාව කියලා. මොකද, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කොහොමටත් දන්නවා එදාට auction එකක් තියෙනවා, ඒ auction එක close කරලා නැහැ කියලා. අධිපතිතුමා අපත් සමඟ නිකන් කථා කරලා meeting එකට යනවා කියලා ගියා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Private placements කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කිව්වේ කොයි වෙලාවේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඊට පසුව පැමිණි අවස්ථාවේ කිව්වේ. 12.30ට.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: 12.30ටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. ඊට කලින් දවසේ discussionsවලදී Deputy Governor නිකන් කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා මේ private placements නවත්වන්න කියලා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙම කියලා තිබෙනවා "මම පහළට, - ඒ කියන්නේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට - ගියේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනෙක් සමඟයි."

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කලින් කිව්වේ නැහැ කියලායි.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ 12.30ට.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මුදල් තත්ත්වය බලන්න එතුමාට අවශ්‍ය වුණා. ඒ නිසා ගියා කියලා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙතැනට ඇවිල්ලා නිකන් බලලා ගියාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 12.30ට පැමිණි අවස්ථාවේද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, ඊට කලින් 10.45ට පැමිණි අවස්ථාවේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙලාවේ අපත් සමඟ නිකන් කථා කරලා ගියා.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Hon. Weerakumara, can I just ask a question?

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කාලයේ තමයි call එකක් ආවේ bids පරක්කු වෙලා ගන්න කියලා. ඒක හරිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා ඉන්න වේලාවේදී call එක ආවේ. ඒ වේලාවේ දැනගෙන හිටියා bids පරක්කු වෙලා එන්නේ කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා ඒ වේලාවේදී කිව්ව ද ටිකක් පරක්කු වෙලා ගන්න කියලා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ, auction එක ගැන කථා කළේම නැහැ. "මේ වේලාවේ auction එක අවසාන ද" කියලා ඇහුවා.

"නැහැ, තවම auction එක close කරලා නැහැ" කියලා අපි කිව්වා. එච්චරයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමිය දන්නා තරමින් හෝ අහලා තිබෙන තරමින් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහ බැංකු ඉතිහාසයේ මේ වාගේ auction සිදු වෙද්දී අධිපතිවරයෙක් මීට කලින් මේ විධියට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඇත්තටම වේලාවකට දැනුම් දීලා එනවා. අධිපතිතුමා ආපු වේලාවේ මම හිටියේ Currency Department එකේ. ඒ Department එකටම ආවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි අහන්නේ. Auction එකක් වේලාවේ-

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මට ඒක කියන්න බැහැ. මොකද, මම හිටියේ නැති නිසා. මම අහලා නැහැ. මම ළඟදී ආවේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමිය එතැනට ළඟදී ආවේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි මහ බැංකුවේ වැඩ කරන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් අපි දන්නා තරමින්, අපි අහලා තිබෙන තරමින් වැඩ කරන අය කියන පමණින් කවදාවත් එහෙම සිදුවීමක් ඉතිහාසයේ සිදු වෙලා නැහැ කියලා කියනවා. එතැන කැරකිලා යන්න එන්නේ නැතිව අධිපතිතුමාට ඔබතුමියව විමසන්න වෙනත් ක්‍රමයක් නැද්ද? මහ බැංකුව කියන්නේ රස්තියාදු ගහන කැනක් නොවෙයිනේ. මට බැහැනේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ නිකම් අතනට මෙතැනට යන්න. අධිපතිතුමාට අවශ්‍යයි නම් ඔබතුමියට කථා කරන්න දුරකථන පහසුකමක්වත් එතැන නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වේලාවේ මට එක පාරටම call එකක් ආවා අධිපතිතුමා එන්න කිව්වා කියලා. මම යන්න පොතත් අරගෙන ලැහැස්ති වෙනකොටම අධිපතිතුමා අපේ office එකට ආවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Call එක එන කොටම අධිපතිතුමා එතැන ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කවුද call එක දුන්නේ?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ අධිපතිතුමාට ඒ තරම් ඕනෑකමක් තිබුණා ද ඔබතුමිය සිටි ස්ථානයට එන්න?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. ඇවිල්ලා බලලා යන්න එන්න ඇති.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමිය සිටින ස්ථානයට අධිපතිතුමාට ඒමේ වුවමනාව, දුරකථන ඇමතුම් ලබා දීමේ වුවමනාව මොකක්ද? ඒ auction එක යන වේලාවේ එතැන බලධාරියා ඔබතුමිය. Call කරලා එන්න කිව්වා නම්, එතැන බරපතළ අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙන්න බැරිද අපිට හිතෙන විධියට?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මට දැනුවත් වෙන්න කිසිම ඉඟියක් දීමක්වත් ඒ වේලාවේ එතුමා කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කවදාද මේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සේවයට ආවේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 6 වැනිදා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමිය දන්නා තරමින් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පී. සමරසිරි මහත්මයාට තමයි ඔබතුමිය සේවය කරන overall supervision එක අයිති. එතුමා කවද්ද ඔය අංශය බාරව ආවේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 2015 ජනවාරි 28 වැනිදා වාගේ තමයි වෙනස් වුණේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඉතාම ආසන්න කාලසීමාවක් තුළදී තමයි ඔබතුමියත්, ඔබතුමියගේ අංශය බාරව සිටින පී. සමරසිරි නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමාත් ඔය අංශය බාරව ආවේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්, අධිපතිතුමා වැඩ බාර ගත්තාට පස්සේ responsibilities reshuffle එකක් කළා. Deputy Governorsලාගේ කළා. ඊට පස්සේ Assistant Governorsලාගේ කළා. ඊට පස්සේ මම එක්කම transfers තව Directorsලා අට දෙනෙකුගේ හරි, දස දෙනෙකුගේ හරි transfers එක පාරට කළා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අපි කෙටියෙන් කිව්වොත් වර්තමාන අධිපතිතුමා වැඩ බාර ගත්තාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමියත්, ඔබතුමියගේ අංශය බාරව සිටින නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමාත් ඇතුළු තවත් නිලධාරීන් ගණනාවකගේ සේවාවන් වෙනස් කරලා ඔබතුමිය දැන් සිටින ස්ථානයට පත් වුණා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කලින් කිව්වා Public Debt Department එක තමයි රජයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව සඳහා පෙනී ඉඳලා ඒ සියල්ල කරන්නේ කියලා. එතකොට ඔබතුමියගේ Public Debt Department එකට භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් ලිඛිතව උපදෙස් ලැබුණා Rs.13.5 billion අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා කියලා by 2nd of March.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමිය දන්නවා ද මොකටද Rs.13.5 billion අවශ්‍ය වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා Treasury එකට?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ, අපිට එහෙම සම්පූර්ණ විස්තර ඇතිව දෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මම කිව්වොත් එහෙම Rs.13.5 billion අවශ්‍ය වෙලා තිබුණේ foreign debts settle කරන්න කියලා?

Unedited

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අතරට foreign debts තිබෙනවා. Local debts තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Particular Rs.13.5 billion ඕනෑ කරලා තිබුණේ foreign debts settle කරන්නයි කියලා කිව්වොත් හරි ද? නැත්නම් ඒකත් කොටසක් විතරක් වෙන්න පුළුවන් ද?

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක මම හරියටම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවRs.13.5 billion තිබෙද්දී රජය වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීම කරන්නේ ඔබතුමියගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙනකොට ඇයි Rs. 1 billion bonds වලට යන්න තීන්දු කළේ?

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ දවස වෙනකම්ම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් auction එකක අපේ අවශ්‍යතාව Rs.13 billion කිව්වා නම්, අපිට rates වැඩි ප්‍රමාණවලට තමයි එන්නේ. ඒ ආකාරයේ එකක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, primary dealersලා දන්නවා අපේ අවශ්‍යතාව වැඩියි. රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාව වැඩියි කියන එක. ඒ නිසා තමයි අර විධියේ දෙආකාරයකින් internationally අපි මේ විධිය තමයි කරන්නේ. Auctionනුයි, placement systemකයි දෙකම.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට Rs.1 billion වලට raise කරන්න තිබුණු එක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔබතුමිය දන්නා පරිදි මේක විතරක් නොවෙයිනේ, මීට පස්සේත් කළා, මීට කලිනුත් කළා.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කරන කොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් Rs.1 billion requirement එක ඔබතුමියලාගේ අවශ්‍යතාව වෙනකොට auction එකට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඕක එන්නේ දෙගුණයක්, වැඩිම වුණොත් තුන් ගුණයක්.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්, වැඩිම පස් ගුණයක් කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Rs.1 billion or Rs.5 billion. දැන් මේ කියන අවස්ථාවේදී Rs.1 billion auction එකට ගියාම Rs.20.58 billion offers ආවා. ඔබතුමිය දන්නවා ද Rs.20.58 billion වලින් වැඩිම offers ප්‍රමාණයක් ආවේ කුමන primary dealerගෙන් ද කියලා?

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මම හිතන්නේ Bank of Ceylon කියලා. මොකද, ඇත්තටම auction එක ආවාම අපිට වැඩක් නැහැ කවුද primary dealer කාගෙන්ද වැඩියෙන් ආවේ කියන එක.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Rs.20.58 billion ප්‍රමාණය ආවා කියන එක දන්නවා.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කලින් දුන්නු පිළිතුර අනුවම ඔබතුමියගේ සාමාන්‍ය කාර්ය පටිපාටිය සහ ඔබතුමියගේ තිබෙන වෘත්තීය දැනුම අනුව Rs.10 billionවලට යන්න කිසිසේත්ම බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ නැහැ.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Rs.10 billion වලට යන්නත් ඔබතුමියලාට බලාපොරොත්තුවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: නමුත් ඔබතුමියලාට Governor කිව්වා Rs.20 billion වලට යන්න කියලා. මොකද, Rs.20 billion ඇවිල්ලා තිබ්බ නිසා.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: නමුත් ඔබතුමියලාගේ තිබෙන වෘත්තීය දැනුම අනුව ඔබතුමියලා කිව්වා සාමාන්‍ය පටිපාටිය අනුව Rs.20 billion වලට යන එක සුදුසු නැහැ කියලා.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: හරි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඊළඟට Rs.10 billion වලට යන්න කිව්වාම ඒකත් සුදුසු නැහැ කියන එක තමයි ඔබතුමියලාගේ මතය වුණේ.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හැබැයි, ඔබතුමියලාට Rs.10 billion වලට යන්න වුණා, මොකද අධිපතිතුමා දුන්නු උපදෙස් අනුව.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: උපදෙස් අනුව. මොකද, අපි කොහොම හරි ඒ බිලියන 10 සොයන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හරි. ඒක නොවෙයි, මම කිව්වේ ඔබතුමිය කියපු පිළිතුරමයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ සටහන දැම්මේ. ඇයි මේ සටහන දැම්මේ?

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඕක අරගෙන අපිට ඉතිරි ටික සොයා ගන්න විධියක් නැති නිසා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, මේ සටහන දැම්මේ ඇයි මේකේ options තිබෙද්දී මේ සටහන් මෙහෙම දමන්න හේතු වුණේ ඇයි?

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: එතැනදී ගත්තේ Rs.2.6 billionනේ. එතකොට අපිට ඉතිරි ටික ගන්න ක්‍රමයක් නැති නිසා.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමියගේ සාක්ෂි අනුවම අධිපතිතුමා මේ auction එක යන වේලාවේ 10.45 වලට ඔබතුමියලා ගිටපු ස්ථානයට ආවා.

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ මොන floor එකටද?

ජී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 10වැනි තට්ටුවට.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා ඉන්නේ කුමන තට්ටුවේ ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 16වැනි තට්ටුවේ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ අධිපතිතුමා 16වැනි තට්ටුවේ ඉඳලා 10වැනි තට්ටුවට ආවා මේ උපදෙස දෙන්න?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඊළඟට අධිපතිතුමා නැවත වතාවක් දහවල් 12.30 ආවා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ පැමිණීමේ තවත් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරු දෙදෙනෙකුත් සමගයි?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: හරි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඒ නිසා තමයි ඔබතුමියලා මේ තීන්දු සියල්ල ගත්තේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: හරි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ දැනුමට අනුව අපි කොටස් වෙළඳපොළ manipulate කිරීමක් ගැන දන්නවා නේ. ජෝස්සිරෝස්ලා ගැන, ලෝකයේ අත්දැකීම් දන්නවා. මෙවැනි ක්‍රියාවලියක් ඇතුළේ process එකකදී bond market එක බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය කාට හරි manipulate කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා ඔබතුමිය හිතනවා ද? මේ සිද්ධියට අදාළව නොවෙයි, මම අහන්නේ. මේ auction එක manipulate කරලා ඔබතුමිය කිව්වානේ bid කරනවා කියලා ඒ වාගේ. මොකක්ද dummy bid කථාවක්?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: දැන් අපිට පෙනෙන විධියට මේක dummy එකක් නොවෙයි නේ. වුණාට පස්සේ තමයි අපි මේක දකින්නේ. ඒක හරි. මේ සිද්ධිය වුණාට පස්සේ අපි දකින දේවල් වැඩියි.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: නමුත් එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්කමක් තිබෙනවා නේද මේක ඇතුළේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Primary dealersලාට minimum requirement එකක් තිබෙනවා 10 per cent ඊට එහා ඇති ප්‍රමාණයක් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට auction එකට එන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ඒක හරි. මොකද සාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් යටතේ auction එක යන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි විශේෂ තත්ත්වයක් හැදුනොත් ඒ විශේෂ තත්ත්වය ඇතුළේ manipulate කරන්න පුළුවන් ද කියලා මම අහන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: විශේෂ තත්ත්වයක් කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: විශේෂ තත්ත්වයක් කියන්නේ මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන කාට හරි information ආපු නිසා, එහෙම නැත්නම් කාගේ හෝ බලපෑමක් නිසා- ඔබතුමිය හරි පිළිතුර කිව්වා. ඔබතුමිය කිව්වා මෙය Rs. 1 billion කළේ මෙහි ratio එක ඉහළ දැමීම පාලනය කරන්න කියා. හැබැයි, ඔබතුමියන්ට අවසානයේ පාලනය කරන්න බැරි වුණේම මෙකයි. ඔබතුමියන්ට ඒක නේ කර ගන්න බැරි වෙන්නේම. ඒක වෙන්නේ Rs. 10 billion decision එක නිසා. ඒකයි මම අහන්නේ, ඒ Rs. 10 billion decision එක නිසා තමයි ඔබතුමියන්ගේ තිබුණු options පැත්තකින් තියලා ඒ option එකට යන්න වෙන්නේ. Fulfill කරන්න ඕනෑ බව ඇත්ත. Requirement එක හරි. මට තිබෙන argument එක ඒ requirement එකට තිබෙන process එකේ දුර්වලතා තිබෙනවා. ඒ දුර්වලතා අපි හදා ගන්න ඕනෑ මේ ගනු දෙනුවට විතරක් නොවෙයි. ඊට පසුව හෝ කවදාටත් රටේ අදාළ වරදක් ඇත්තටම නිවැරදි කරන්න නේ ඕනෑ. මේ සඳහා වගකිව යුතු කවුරු හෝ සිටිනවා නම් ඒ වාගේම මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය නිවැරදි විය යුතුයි.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: අපි දකින්නේ ඒ පැත්තෙන්. මම ඒකයි අහන්නේ එහෙම manipulate කිරීමේ ඉඩක් ඔබතුමියගේ දැනුමට අනුව දකිනවාද කියලා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: දකින්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය, අවසන් වශයෙන් මම අහන්නේ, ඔබතුමියගේ අත්දැකීම් අනුව auction එකද, private placementද වඩාත් විනිවිද- භාවයකින් යන්නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඇත්තටම auction කියන එක තමයි market rates -

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මම අහන එකට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: විනිවිදභාවය පෙනෙන එකක් තමයි auction එක කියන එක.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Auction එක තමයි වඩාත්ම සුදුසු ක්‍රමවේදය.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. නමුත් අපේ තිබෙන requirement එක ගත්තාම ගොඩක් විශාලයි. ඒකත් එක්ක ඒ ඒ ප්‍රමාණයටම auction එක යනවා කියන්නේ අපට පාලනය කර ගන්න බැරි interest rate එකකට යනවා. ඒ නිසා-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Auction එක විනිවිදභාවයකින් යුක්තව යනවා නම්, ඒක නේ හොඳ, ඒ requirement එක, මේ requirement එක කියා වෙනසක් නැහැ නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපට සමබර විධියට යන්න හදා ගන්න වෙනවා. ඒක තමයි Public Debt Management කියන්නේ. ඒ strategy එක ගන්න අපට වෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මොකක්ද strategy එක?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Strategy එක ගන්න වෙන්නේ interest rate එකත් යම් කිසි මට්ටමකට පවත්වා ගෙන, අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කිරීම.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Auction එකක් කරා යන එක තමයි වඩාත්ම සුදුසු.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මට ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: මට පොඩි කාරණයක් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. Rupees 1 billionනේ raise කරන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: Rupees 1 billion වලින් එහා ගිය ප්‍රමාණය Rs. 10 billion දක්වා auction එකේ නිබුණාට, ඒක සලකන්නේ private placement එකක් විධියටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. ඒ කොටස auction එක තමයි. දැන් ගිය auction එකම තමයි.

The Chairman: Hon. Eran Wickramaratne, you may speak now.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම මට තේරෙන විධියට යම් කිසි දේවල් කියන්න යනවා. මම කියන ඒවා එක්ක එකඟද නැතිද කියන්න පුළුවන්. නැතිනම් වැරදි වැටහීමක් සමහරවිට ඇති වෙලා තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. එකක් තමයි, dealing room එක ඇතුළත තිබෙන වාතාවරණය ගැනයි, Public Debt Department එකේ තිබෙන වාතාවරණය ගැනයි තේරුම් ගැනීමට අපි දැන් වෑයම් කරන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කාගෙන් හෝ phone call එකක් ආවොත් technical error එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා, -සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔය වගේ දේවල් වෙනවා dealing rooms ඇතුළේ- ඒක හාරව සිටින කෙනා ක්ෂණිකව තීරණයක් ගන්නවා. ඔය තැන්වල හුහක් වේලාවට fax එකෙන් නැතිනම් e-mail එකෙන් එහෙම වෙන්නේ පසුව confirm කිරීමක්. ඒක හරිද, වැරදිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක හරි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ වාගේම, ඔබතුමියට Superintendent of Public Debt වශයෙන් බලතල තිබෙනවා ඒ තීරණ ගන්න. හරිද, වැරදිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: හරි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම මේක පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නයි හදන්නේ. තව කරුණක් කථා කළා. මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා අලුතින් නේ ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ තිබෙන වාතාවරණය හරියට තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම අලුතින් මෙතුමා ඇවිල්ලා reshuffle එකක් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ departmental headsලාගේ. ඔය බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට යන එකේ කිසි වරදක් නැහැ. වරදක් තිබෙනවාද, නැතිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: වරදක් නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මොකද, it is management by walking around. ඒ වේලාවේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණීම ගැන ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්න සාධාරණයි.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නමුත්, මම කියන්නේ මේ වාතාවරණය තුළ එතුමා තැනින් තැනට යන එකේ කිසිම වරදක් නැහැ කියන එකයි.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සමාවන්න. ඊට සතියකට කලින් අපේ office එකට ආවා. ඇවිල්ලා කථා කළා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ හේතු දෙකම අනුව, එකක් reshuffle එක. ඒ කියන්නේ එතුමා අලුත් කෙනෙක්. එතුමා කාර්යාලය වටේට යැම. තුන්වැනි එක, බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට තිබෙන වගකීම්වලින් ප්‍රධානතම වගකීමක් තමයි බැංකුවේ ද්‍රවශීලතාව - liquidity එක. එය තමයි වැදගත්ම. එය සොයා බලන්න තමයි dealersලා ඉන්නේ, ALCO වාගේ එක එක committees තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් එහි මූලික වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ එතුමාට. එතුමාට ඒ වගකීම තිබෙන නිසා එතුමා නිතරම සොයා බලන්න ඕනෑ. විශේෂයෙන්ම මහ බැංකුව ඒ අයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් අවුරුද්ද මුලදී ලබා ගන්නා විට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළයි. ඒ නිසා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් විදේශීය බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කරනවා. එසේ නිකුත් කර තමයි පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු කර ගන්නේ. අවුරුද්ද අවසානය වන විට ඒක ටිකක් වෙනස් වනවා. ඒ පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු වනවා. ජනවාරි 8වැනිදා අලුත් ජනාධිපතිතුමා පත්වීමෙන් පසුව එම විදේශීය බැදුම්කරවලට ගියේ නැහැ. එතැනදී ගත්තේ රුපියල් බැදුම්කර පමණයි. එවිට ඉබේටම පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යනවා. මම මේ කියන ලද scenario එක හරිද, වැරදිද, නැතිනම් වෙනත් අදහසක් තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක හරි. අපට නිබුණු එකම අපහසුතාව තමයි අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වී සිටි විදේශ බැදුම්කරවලට යන්න බැරි වීම. Requirement එක අපි දැන ගෙන හිටියා. ඒ requirement එකට අනුව තමයි ජනවාරි මාසයේ මුල් සතියේ විදේශීය බැදුම්කරයට යන්න

හිටියේ. එයට යන්න බැරි වුණාම දේශීය බැදුම්කරවලින් තමයි යන්න වුණේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම ඒක කියන්න හේතුව, ලොකු වාද විවාදයක් යනවා මෙයින් ලාභයක් වුණාද, අලාභයක් වුණාද කියලා. ඔබතුමිය පිළිතුරක් දුන්නා ලාභ වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්, අලාභ වෙන්නත් පුළුවන් කියලා. ඔබතුමිය මුලින් ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර අනුව ඒක හරිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක hypothetically. ඒක වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම ඒක කියන්නේ මම එක දෙයක් සමඟ එකඟ වුණේ නැහැ. ඒ තමයි මේක අපි ලංසු ක්‍රමයෙන් - auction ක්‍රමයෙන් - ගන්නවාද, නැතිනම් පෞද්ගලික ගිණුම්වලින් - private placements - ගන්නවාද කියන නිසා. මොකද, private placement ක්‍රමයෙන් සෑම වේලාවේම අඩුවෙන් ලැබෙන්න යනවා කියන සංකල්පය මම කිසි දිනක හරි කියලා පිළි ගන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, එහෙම නම් economic theory එක වැරැදි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, competitiveness එකෙන් පමණයි the most efficient price you will get. අපට මෙතැන පැටලෙන්නේ අපට මෙතැන captive funds තිබෙනවා නේ ලංකාවේ system එකේ. ඒ captive funds manage කරන්නේ Central Bank එක. මොකද, basic conflict එක තිබෙනවා. ඒ ක්‍රමය දැන් අවුරුදු 30ක සිට ගොඩ නැඟිලා තිබෙන ක්‍රමයක්. අපි Central Bank එකෙන් එළියට ඒක ගත්තොත්, ඉබේටම bid කරන්න වෙනවා එතැනට කිසිම දැනුමක් නැතිව. මම මෙහෙම කියන්න හේතුව, මේ discussion එක දිගින් දිගටම මෙහෙම යනවා; මෙහෙම අදහසක් ගොඩ නැඟිලා තිබෙනවා. මම ඒකයි එය ප්‍රකාශ කළේ. මම කියන එක වැරැදි නම් කරුණාකර, you can contradict me. මම ඒක නැවතත් කියනවා, එදා දවසේත් මම කිව්වා. අනිත් එක ඒක ගන්න කොට average cost එකයි, duration එකයි දෙකම බලනවා. දැන් 30-year bond එක දෙන්න මූලික හේතුව මෙතැන 30-year bonds 13 දුන්නා, 14 දුන්නා, 15 දුන්නා. දෙන්න ඇවිල්ලා duration එක පසුවට දමනවා. මොකද, debt crisis එකක් ආවොත් අපට liquidity එක manage කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙනවා. අධිපතිතුමා ඒ තීරණය දෙන කොට එතුමා ඒ තීරණය දෙන්නේ duration එක පසුවට දමන්න. ඒක හරිද, වැරැදිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක හරි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මට එක ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. මෙතැන මේ sheet එක බැලුවොත් එහි සඳහන් වෙනවා 2014 මැයි මාසේ 27 වැනිදා. ඒකෙන් ගත්ත bond එකේ yield to maturity එක 11.75. රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකයි අර ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපි පෙබරවාරි 27වැනිදා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගත්තා. ඒකේ yield to maturity එක 11.73. මම ඒක කිව්වේ prices පිළිබඳ කථා කරන නිසා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒ තීරණය ගන්න කොට බලන්නේ debt requirement එක, supply එක, price එක volume එකට ගැලපෙනවාද කියලා. ඒ අනුවයි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් තීරණය ගන්න කොට ගන්නේ. ඒක හරිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: හරි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට එක ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. මම දැන ගන්න කැමැතියි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ තීරණය දෙන කොට, ඒ තීරණය දුන්නේ volumes ටිකයි, volume එකයි, average rates දැකලාද? නැත්නම් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ තීරණය දුන්නේ ඔක්කෝම bids දැකලාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Bids බැලුවේ නැහැ. මේ කොළේ තිබුණා. නමුත් අධිපතිතුමා glance කරපු ගමන් ඇහුවේ volume කියක්ද weighted average එක කියලායි?

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම ඒක අහන්න හේතුව මේකයි. මොකද, සාමාන්‍ය තීරණය ගන්න කොට volume එකෙන් නේ ගන්නේ. ඉතින් ඒකයි මම ඇහුවේ. ඔබතුමිය දන්න තරමින් ඒක ගත්තේ requirement clear Rs. 13.5 billion. ඉතින් 10 ගන්නවා, 11.72 average එකක් තිබෙනවා, liquidity point of view එකෙන් හොඳයි. Foreign bond එකකුත් නැහැ, fund කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. Requirements ටික දන්නවා, මහා මාර්ග ආදී වෙන වෙන requirements තිබෙනවා ගෙවන්න. Overall macro decision එකක්. එතැන macro level decision එකක් ද ගත්තේ? නැත්නම් bids ඔක්කොම analyze කරලා ද ඒ decision එක ගත්තේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ, volume එක බලලා macro decision එකක් එතැන ගත්තේ.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Thank you.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කොළේ ගත්තා කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ළඟද ඒ කොළේ තිබුණේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ කොළේ අපි ළඟ තිබුණේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාත් ඒ කොළේ බැලුවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක බලලා තමයි Rs. 20 million ගත්තේ. Bids තිබුණා නේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: අපේ ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මැතිතුමා කියන කාරණය ගත්තොත් එහෙම, දැන් අධිපතිතුමාට එතැනට එන්නත් අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා, ඇවිදින්නත් අයිතියක්

තිබෙනවා කියන කාරණා පිළිගන්නවා වාගේම, මේ පැවැත්වෙන COPE එකට අගමැතිතුමාට එන්න බැහැ නේ? අගමැතිතුමාට එන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ අගමැතිතුමා COPE Committee Member කෙනෙක් නම් විතරයි. නැත්නම් අගමැති වුණත් එන්න බැහැ. අතිගරු ජනාධිපතිතුමාට එන්නත් බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු කථානායකතුමාට එන්නත් බැහැ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා: ගරු කථානායකතුමාට එන්නත් බැහැ. ඒ වාගේම අතන තිබෙන auction එක special දෙයක් නම්, ඒ විශේෂ කාරණාවට මහ බැංකු අධිපති වුණාය කියලා මැදිහත් වෙන්න බැහැ. ඊළඟට මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය වෙන්නෙත්, මෙතැනදී අපි මතු කරන්නෙත්, අධිපතිතුමාගේ ඥාතීත්වයක් තිබෙන සමාගමක්, ආයතනයක්, කැරැව්කාර ආයතනයක් මේකට bid කරලා තිබෙන නිසායි. එතැනත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. එතකොට එවැනි දෙයකට අධිපතිතුමා මැදිහත් වීම සාධාරණම නැහැ. මම ඒක සඳහන් කරලා තියන්න ඕනේ, නැත්නම් මේක සාමාන්‍යකරණය වෙන නිසා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කියන්නේ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔය කොළේ බැලුවේ ඔබතුමියගේ කාමරයේදී කියලාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙලාවේ මගේ කාමරයෙන් එළියේදීයි බැලුවේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් manual එක තිබෙනවා නේ. Manual එක අනුව තිබෙන්නේ auction එකෙන් ඔබතුමිට paper එක එන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමියලාගෙන් Tender Board එකට යන්න ඕනෑ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Tender Board එකට මේක යන්නේ නැහැ. Recommendation එක විතරයි යන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඕක යන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කියන්න කෝ. එතකොට ඔබතුමිය ළඟ ඔය document එක නවතිනවා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමියලා බැඳිලා නැහැ අධිපතිතුමාට ඔය document එක යවන්න.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපි බැඳිලා නැහැ. අපි ඒ document එක යවන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් යවනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් යවන්නේ නැහැ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අධිපතිතුමාට යවන්නේම නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: යවන්න බැඳිලාත් නැහැ. ඒ document එක ආව නිසා තමයි ඒක දැක්කේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය document එක ආව නිසා දැක්කා. ඔබතුමිය දන්නවාද, ඔබතුමියටත් ඉස්සෙල්ලා ඔය document එක මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට ගියා කියලා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මම දන්නේ නැහැ. ඉස්සර වෙලා ගියාද කියන එක නම් මට විශ්වාස කරන්න අමාරුයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගියා නම් හරිද? වැරදිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඉස්සර වෙලා යන්න විධියක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉස්සර වෙලා ගියා නම් හරිද? වැරදිද?.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: වැරදියි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමියලාගේ manual එකට අනුව ඔය documents එක ඔබතුමියගෙන් හෝ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා බැලුව එක වැරදියි. Manual එක අනුවත් වැරදියි, එසේ බලන්නත් බැහැ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Manual එකේ, අධිපතිතුමාට එහෙම බලන්න බැහැ කියන එක දක්වලා නැහැ. කාටවත් බලන්න බැහැ කියලා මේකේ කොහේවත් දක්වලා නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නමුත් procedure එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. Auction එකෙන් යන්නේ ඔබතුමියට. ඔබතුමියගෙන් Tender Board එකට. Tender Board එකෙන් තමයි අන්තිමට recommendation එක Governorට යන්නේ. එතකොට තමයි Governor අත්සන් කරන්නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම manual එකක් තිබියදී, procedure එකක් තිබියදී, ඒක මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා බැලුව එක හරිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ අපේ part of the management. අපි අතරට ඇවිල්ලා කථා කිරීම සම්බන්ධව- මට ඒ අත්දැකීම නැහැ. නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේදි අපිට අධිපතිතුමාට එළියට යන්න කියන්න පුළුවන්කමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. නමුත් ඉදිරියේදී නම් අධිපතිතුමාට office එකට එන්න එපා කියලා කියයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඇයි එහෙම කියන්නේ?

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: හැබැයි, ඒ වෙලාවේ නම් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපිට ඒ වෙලාවේ එහෙම කියන්න පුළුවන්කමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කිව්වේ ඉස්සරහට නම් අධිපතිතුමාට කියයි එන්න එපා කියලා. හැබැයි ඒ වෙලාවේ කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට වෙනත් විධියකින් කියන්නේ manual එක අනුව ඔබතුමියගේ කාමරය තුළ document එක බැලීමත්- යම් හෙයකින් auction එකේදී ඔබතුමිය එන්න කලින් ඔය document එක මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා බැලුවා නම් manual එකට අනුව හරිද? වැරදිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: වැරදියි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වැරදියි.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක මට විශ්වාස කරන්න අමාරුයි. එහෙම යනවා කියන එක. එහෙම යන්න නම් අපේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව ඇතුළෙන් යන්න ඕනෑ. එසේ නොමැතිව කෙසේවත් auction එකට close කරපුවාම report එක generate කරන්නේ department එකෙන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට පරිබාහිර ප්‍රශ්නයක් මම අහන්නේ, සමහර විට ඔබතුමියට පිළිතුරු දෙන්නත් බැරි වෙයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මහ බැංකුවේ අභ්‍යන්තර උසස්වීම්, මාරුවීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තියක්, දින වකවානු එහෙම නැතිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Directorsලාට Grade 4 officersලාට below staff අවුරුදු පහෙන් පහට transfer කරන policy එකක් තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නැතිව directorsලාට අවුරුදු පහක් කියන policy එකක් නැහැ, ඕනෑම වෙලාවක transfer කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට පුළුවන් ඕනෑම වෙලාවක, ඕනෑම කෙනෙක්ව, ඕනෑම තැනකට මාරු කරන්න.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්, ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම ඉතිහාසයේ සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මහ බැංකුව තුළ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට ඕනෑම වෙලාවක නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන්, අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන්, ඕනෑම තැනකින්, ඕනෑම තැනකට මාරු කරන්න බලයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම මීට කලිනුත් මේ වාගේ දේවල් සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: පොඩි ප්‍රශ්න දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. මේ fax එක කරුණාකරලා අපිට එවන්න. ඒකේ දාලා තිබුණද, මේක දිගු කරන්න හේතුව technical error එකක් කියලා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්, මට ඒ fax එක හරියටම බලන්න ඕනෑ. Fax එක ආවාද කියන එක.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මම අහන්නේ, අපේ සාක්ෂි අනුව මේක එවපු කෙනා - Bank of Ceylon dealer - අපිට කිව්වේ, එයා ඉල්ලීම කළේ බොහොම ලොකු වැදගත් bids ටිකක් තිබෙන නිසා පරක්කු කරන්න කියලායි. එයා කිසිම දවසක අපිට කිව්වේ නැහැ technical error එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. අනෙක් එක එයාගේ bids ටික වෙලාවට ආවා. ඉතින් ඒක ඇහුවේ කවුද කියලා ඔබතුමියට මතක නැහැ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මට Bank of Ceylonවලින් කථා කළා කියලා කිසිම කෙනෙක් වාර්තා කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමියට මේක delay කරන්න,

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: HSBC

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අය ද මේක delay කරන්න ඉල්ලුවේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. Bank of Ceylon -

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක technical error තිබෙනවා නම් මටත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ bid එක නිකම් dummy bid එකක්. හැබැයි ඒක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ලැබුණා. Rs. 100 million - ten percent නේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: අනෙක් එක අපි ඇත්තටම මේක වගකීමක් ඇතිව හොයන්න ඕනෑ. Bank of Ceylon අපිට කිව්වා ඒ ගොල්ලෝ call කරලා මේක delay කරන්න කිව්වා කියලා. කාටද call කළේ කියලා මට බලන්න ඕනෑ. My second question is – you may not want to answer this – But, අපට පෙනෙන විධියට ඔබතුමිය මෙතැනට අලුත්. මට පෙනෙන විධියට ඔබතුමිය කිව්වා වාගේ ඔබතුමියගේ staff එක හොඳයි. ඒ නිසා අමාරුකමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. එහෙත් අපට Mr. Samarasiri පැහැදිලි ලෙස කිව්වේ එයාට මේවා හරියට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ වාගේ. අපි ප්‍රශ්න අහන කොට මම මේක බැලුවේ නැහැ, පාඩුව බැලුවේ නැහැ. අන්තිමට කිව්වා, Mr. Samarasiri said that you are unsuitable for this job. මගේ අදහස තමයි මීට කලින් මේ වාගේ අලුත් දෙන්නෙක් එක වෙලාවට දාලා තිබෙනවාද? ඒක ඉතාමත්-

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මීට ඉස්සර?

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමියත් Superintendant.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: I can see reasons for putting you there. මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. හැබැයි ඒ වෙලාවේම Mr. Samarasiri දාන කොට ඔයාට guidance එක ඇති තරම් ලැබුණාද? සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කවුරු හෝ මේ වාගේ වගකීමෙන් position එකට දාන කොට guidance එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ ඉහළින්. ඒක ඇති තරම් ඔබතුමියට ලැබුණාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ අවස්ථාව වෙන කොට ලැබිලා තිබුණා මදි. මොකද සති දෙකක වාගේ කාලයක් නිසා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ වාගේ වැදගත් තැනකට පළපුරුද්ද නැති අලුත් දෙන්නෙක් ඒ විධියට දාන එක වැරැදියි. ඇත්තටම ඔබතුමිය දාපු එක ගැන නම් කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කියපු කාරණයක පරස්පරතාවක් තිබෙනවා. 10.45ට අධිපතිතුමා ආවා කියලා ඔබතුමිය කලින් ප්‍රකාශ කළා. ඊට පස්සේ technical error එකක් කියලා call එකක් එන වෙලාවේත් අධිපතිතුමා ඇතුළේ හිටියා කියලා ඔබතුමිය ප්‍රකාශ කළා. මේ list එක අධිපතිතුමා එළියේදී තමයි බැලුවේ කියලා ඔබතුමිය කිව්වා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ බැලුවේ 12.30ට. ඒ වෙලාවේ auction එක close කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඇවිල්ලා බලලා ගියා විතරයිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙලාවේ කථා කරලා ගියා විතරයි. ඒ වෙලාවේ ඒක බලන්න report එකක් නැහැ.

The Chairman: Okay, Mrs. Senevirathna, thank you very much.

Witness withdrew.

(At this time, Dr. M. Z. M. Azim, Additional Superintendent, Public Debt Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka was called in).

Dr. M. Z. M. Azim, Additional Superintendent, Public Debt Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka affirmed and examined.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Azim, I must apologize as I was not here when you came here last time. But, I read you evidence carefully and by all accounts you are one of the professionals in this area. Can you tell me your views first on whether it was made in good sense to take Rs. 10 billion on this auction given the range of bids that we had.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact I already mentioned that the at the time of announcement of the auction, we announced Rs. 1 billion with the expectation that we will be using not only the auction channel to finance the Government's cash flow requirement, but also we will be using the direct issuance methodology channel to finance the Government's cash flow requirement. It is only on that basis, we made the announcement for auction. From another perspective, when we received the bids at the auction on 27th of March, the Central Bank at that time was in fact looking the possibility that we are gradually moving away from the direct issuances channel and also highlighted the fact that from 2013 onwards how we were moving away from the direct issuances of different instruments like Treasury Bills in the first place. In 2014, we have accessed the international capital markets and raised about Rs. 1.5 billion and also Sri Lanka Development Bonds US Dollar denominated-instruments issued in Sri Lankan market. So, we were gradually moving in that direction. On that particular day, it was a policy decision that informed us that we will be moving away from the direct issuance channels and on that basis, the requirement for 22nd of March - the auction was held on Friday, 27th March, 2015 - was Rs. 13.5 billion and we have funded Rs. 3.5 billion of that at that time and we should be raising the balance of Rs. 10 plus billion from the auction itself. So, on that basis, I see that it is a decision taken on the basis of the developments at that particular moment and accordingly the decision was taken to the tender board; the tender board ratified it and subsequently the Governor has given the clearance for us to bid for it.

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Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did you put any role in that decision? You said that you are gradually moving from the direct placement. But, we are now told that there was a policy decision conveyed to you without previous approval from the Monetary Board to immediately move away from the direct issuance. That seems to me slightly different from what you said - which obviously you would not mind – a gradual movement away from the direct placement. Am I correct?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We were gradually moving away from this arrangement.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That has happened earlier.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The decision to completely suspend at that particular moment was not a decision that I made. It was a decision vested in the higher-ups of the Central Bank.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who are the higher-ups? Who made that decision?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact the Governor informed it to us at the day of the auction. Subsequently the decision was ratified by the Monetary Board at the meeting held on 6th.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I saw that later. But, you said that the Governor made a policy decision. Was it after consultation?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not know.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He announced it to you.

The Chairman: Were you not consulted?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact I do not know whether the Governor took our observation into consideration. It is a matter that you should take up with the Governor. In fact, we were highlighting the fact that we are in the direction and we were slowly moved away from the direct issuances for Treasury Bills. We were accommodating direct issuances only for the Central Bank at that time and for a very few State-related parties like ETF or sometimes Bank of Ceylon and the Peoples Bank for different purposes. So, we were moving in that direction. There were discussions within the Central Bank that we should be moving away from the direct placements arrangement.

The Chairman: At what level was it?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It was at Deputy Governor's level and also at the level of the decision makers of the Public Debt Department where I am involved. As the Additional Superintendent, I am involved there with the Superintendent and we were discussing that.

This is the time to stop it. There was nothing to do with me or the Public Debt Department. It is something comes from higher-ups for us to-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. While everyone keeps saying from certain perspective that auction is much better. Obviously auction is much better if you tell the truth. We want to auction Rs. 20 billion and will go for Rs. 20 billion. But of course that is a mistake sometimes because rates go up. But, if you say you are going to auction Rs. 1 billion in the belief which the Public Department had that you would then find the rest through private placements a sudden change actually leads to distortions. Would you agree with that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I cannot agree, fully, because I always put the point here that a mixture of auctions and a placements arrangement or any other funding arrangement. That is what even US does. They have tap issuances.

The Chairman: That had been the policy in practice.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: This is how we should be going ahead because for a country like Sri Lanka, you had to factor in many things.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I would agree with that the mixture is good and from what you say the bank had begun to move towards a greater degree of non-direct placements, already. That is fair enough. What you are telling us is that that so-called policy decision on the basis for which you are not aware was announced to you at the time a decision had to be made with regard to your recommendation to the Tender board.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Now, the Governor conveyed that so-called policy decision and wanted you-

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: You have to factor in "Governor in the presence of two Deputy Governors".

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes. And, how did he convey that? **Dr. M.Z.M. Azim:** He basically mentioned- I mean we were discussing even prior to the auction outcome being known in the sense number of bids

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received, the volumes, size and things were known that we were gradually moving away from this.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When you were discussing the size of the bids and all?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Before we were come to know about the details because the auction had to close in the first place.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When were you discussing this and at what time?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the Governor made a visit to Public Debt Department preferably around 10.45 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. At that time he was basically highlighting that gradually, we should be moving away from this and also I am not necessarily in favour of direct issuances arrangement that we were having and he was highlighting those things. We also highlighted the fact that the volumes of funds that we have to raise and we should be taking a path that we should first see this, time being passed and then we probably looking at kind of a complete auction arrangement where we do not have a big quantum to raise. And also we were highlighting the fact that in a time like when you issue an international sovereign bonds and the proceeds are available for us then we should be going for that because then a fall back also available. That type of details we were discussing.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It was at 10.45 a.m.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It was at 10.45 a.m., 11.00 a.m., and 11.05 a.m.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, he was there up to the time the auction was closed.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. He was there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He was there when a request was made to delay closing of the auction.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not know whether he was there. It was not necessarily a delay. It was 11.05 a.m., I believe Superintendent of Public Debt had come.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: All the formal agreements were made.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I was aware that, the Front Office Manager had informed that to Superintendent of Public Debt and given the clearance because these are-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Whom did that request come from?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Usually, the Primary Dealers have a technical difficulty on submission of bids, probably, they request. If it is fair enough and if it is on a reasonable time, like the operational arrangements, in Public Debt Department the Superintendent of Public Debt Department or the Additional Superintendents can give the consent.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you. We have been told that there were two requests: one is because there was a technical delay, the second was from the Bank of Ceylon to say that they had some very big bids coming in and could that be delayed. You know nothing about the second request?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No. I was not aware of that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. My next question is now you were discussing all these at 10.45 a.m. to 11.00 a.m. The Governor went away, then. Did he come back again?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When he came the first time was he with two Deputy Governors or alone?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No. He came alone.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: This so-called decision, not a decision, but the Governor's view that we should stop private stop placements now was-

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: He did not ask us to stop private placements at that time but, he was highlighting the fact that he was not full in agreement with the arrangements that we were having.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, only he was there.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: He was there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Later he came down after you all had got all the bids-

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: And you had prepared this.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did he look at this form?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Which form are you referring to?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The form that itemized.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is the auction sheet, if I am not mistaken.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is not the Auction sheet. It is the form that summarizes the bids. That is the Auction sheet.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I will tell you the kind of proceedings as to how it happens. Then, you can clearly see the links or anything that you wanted to raise over it. Even the public debt officials come to know about the details of bids once you close the auction. This probably happen around 11.00 a.m. - 11.15 a.m.. And then, we download the details. Usually, we download the details in the aggregate form, not necessarily by knowing which parties bid and things like that. This is usually comes up subsequently, when we are processing other kind of information where we normally send up for approvals and things like that. So, when we had the details of aggregate - of course there is a one sheet comes with the bidders also. So, that bidders' details and the aggregate information that the Public Debt Department is interested in, and we got those copies from the Front Office Manager and usually the Superintendent of Public Debt Department, Additional Superintendents and the Front Office Manager sit down and base on the cash flow requirement, we prepare a different options that we could take it to the Tender Board. On that basis we looked at and the auction was over subscribed by more than 20 times, Rs. 1 billion, bids were some Rs. 20,700 million, if I am not mistaken. These bids were spreading from 9.35 to some 18 plus yield rate sum. This is the kind of pattern we see. There were different options. If we go by the last auction, last auction for 30 year conducted by the Public Debt Department which was on 27th of May 2014, the value date was 2nd of June, 2014, the weighted average was 11.75. How much can you accept if we go by that? If we go by the cutoff of that particular bid auction how much we can accept? Then, if we accept only the offered amount, how much we can accept. If increase by five base points. There were different options. On that basis, based on the arrangements that we had in our mind, the Department had a kind of a decision that we probably be looking at two to three times acceptance. I mean, this is what the Department prepared. That was the kind of a term sheet and we were again about to move the 10th floor where the Tender Board meetings are usually held. Then, the Governor visited the Department with two Deputy Governors. He inquired how much-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who were the two Deputy Governors?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: They are Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe and Mr. B.D.W. Ananda Silva. He inquired how much bids that we have received and we mentioned it was 20 times more than offered amount. So, he was informing "this is a ideal time we should be considering that we should be going for the auction-based arrangement". We should be accepting more than what the Department was of the view.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What was the amount that he suggested to accept?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: He did not initially mention. He even said, "why not we accept all".

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is Rs. 20 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. We know sometimes certain Primary Dealers come and bid for the fact that the bidding 10 per cent requirement. Sometimes, even though they do not want to buy in the auction they probably send the bids.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, presumably, you had this in front of you and you realized that you actually had closed to Rs. 20 billion without those false bids because that was Rs. 100 million.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Not necessarily. I mean you can figure it out. I mean, you can see the kind of dispersion of interest rates they quoted.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. What I am just trying to say is that, for instance, you took Rs. 10 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, Rs. 10 billion. Finally, that is the decision we took.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You look at the next sheet you actually can go down to Rs. 20 billion before you come to the so-called bids because these are two very serious bids of the Bank of Ceylon, Rs. 5 billion each. So, what you are saying is that the Governor perhaps suggested going for this and did you argue against that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No. I do not think so. I believe, his view at that time was even without seeing this. He was basically highlighting the fact that "Okay, if it is 20 times over subscribed we should be considering as this is ideal time you should be moving to the market based arrangement."

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The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But two people have already told us that he had seen this, just glanced at it.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Not at that time.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He never saw that.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I believe, after mentioning that we should not be 20 times oversubscribed - no, not at that time. When we were discussing this, I was, in fact, inquiring from the Deputy Governors also asking as to what their view was, if you are accepting 10 billion, because we were having 2.7 billion 2.8 billion, the Department's recommen-dation. Then, we, the Deputy Governors and me- the Additional Superintendent - all were having the document with us.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, at that time he looked at it. So, he saw it then.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: He saw it.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, the idea of accepting the whole 20 billion was there before he saw it.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then, did you all tell him that that made no sense because of -

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I said that. I said that there may be some of these bids probably, we call it dummy.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He accepted that.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: He also, said, "Okay, then, how much of that like in the bids pattern." Then, I said, "You have to define from what rates onwards that you probably call, dummy." So, then, we basically see the dispersion of bidding. I mean, you can take out all these outliers. So, when you take out the outliers, you can probably take 3 billion to 5 billion away from it. So, it is like this, I mean, you wanted to make the previous weighted average and 50 basis points either side, you can call an arrangement or you can take last weighted average and 100 basis points.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then, you all took a decision obviously to move from this idea of 20 billion, but how did you end up at 10 billion when your initial recommendation was 2.7 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: At that time itself, the senior management in the Public Debt Department was inquiring, "Okay, what was the last weighted average at the auction that we had on the 02nd of June?" In fact, the settlement date of the 27th auction was on the 02nd of June. So, on that basis, this is the pre-September structure. The Governor was highlighting the fact that we should be looking at before introducing the 5 per cent overnight interest rate flow by the Central Bank in September. So, the interest rate structure on that basis was - if we go on that basis, the 11.75 was the weighted average on the 2nd of June auction that we mentioned. Correspondingly that it comes to about 10 times. So, that is the kind of a message and he indicated that he would be happy that we are taking this to the Tender Board.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But were you all happy with that? Did anyone suggest that was too much?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Of course, when we do not have the direct placements channels also been available for us - because that was the initial plan and -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What you are saying is, if there was no option, you had to take it.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, would you have preferred to take that option?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is what I am saying. I mean, 1 billion offer was in an environment where we had options of auction as well as the direct issuances and the decision that the direct issuances cancelled or post, I mean, temporarily suspended came on this particular moment.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, you were given a decision by the Governor, which you have actually made it impossible to do anything except taking 10 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I cannot call it in that way. Because it is a way that one could interpret it. But, that is not way that I will put it.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. What I am saying is, if there were not an alternative, would you have preferred an alternative, bearing in mind -

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I mean, I am always preferred to have alternative options and the -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Shall I finish first? Bearing in mind that perhaps, one of your responsibilities is to make sure that the

Sri Lankan people do not pay interest which they could avoid paying, therefore, this idea of even going to the 11.75 per cent in a context in which rates were otherwise lower for whatever reason, is not something that I would have expected you to recommend, if there were an option.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I believe this cost argument is, I already clarified. This is a hypothetical argument. You are arguing the fact that pre-27th interest rate environment prevailed after 27th and continued. I do not think anywhere in the world in economics this can be justified.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I fully agree with that. But what I am saying is, you also had a decision of the Monetary Board on the 23rd not to change exchange rates.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is, I believe the Monetary Board clarified with this august Committee as to why they have made the decision and as to why subsequently they decided to take out the 5 per cent flow. It has nothing to do with us. I mean, it is a decision -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But the decision of the Monetary Board on the 23rd February was based on an assumption that - in fact, I think, the recommendation was the lower interest rates, but they decided that it should not be raised. Did you read the decision of the Monetary Board?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, yes, but they also highlighted in that same press release, if I am not mistaken, the private sector credit was picking up. That was there in the press release on the 23rd and the decision to introduce 5 per cent in September was partly to let private sector credit come out in the country and the cost of finance to be got down.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Absolutely and it seems within that framework to succeed, but the Governor just felt that that should be changed.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is not necessarily the Governor, it is the Monetary Board. I do not know what exactly the Monetary Board discussed. We do not have access to that decision of the Monetary Board.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then the suggestion was to go for 10 billion in bonds, contrary to what you all have been finalizing in the recommendation, did anyone in your Department suggest that perhaps this should not be done or did you accept the decision that with direct placement gone? Was there no advice preferred to the Governor?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, we were mentioning - we had this arrangement with the placement in mind, so, we should be having the mix of both and then gradually moving out.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It was mentioned to him?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We mentioned.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: By whom? You?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I mentioned that and he said, "I understand. But, of course, this is the ideal time. If I were you, I would be accepting more than this."

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But it is not you. I mean, you are a professional expert and you given him your advice but -

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not know. It is something, I mean, the Deputy Governors were also there. They are very much aware of the practice and how we were doing those and all kind of things.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They did not say anything?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: They were quiet. They did not mention anything.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: After you made your position, the decision was made.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I just asked from them also as to what their observation was. Then, the Governor mentioned to the Superintendent of the Public Debt Department, to me and also to the others, "We should be accepting from the auction itself the fund requirement of the Treasury and I would be happy that you all are taking this to the Tender Board."

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: We saw the recommendation and the instructions. The Governor has instructed this.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We informed that to the Tender Board also and requested the Chairman and the other members of the Tender Board to cross check that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Do you think it is correct that in a context in which that the procedure should be, you make a recommendation, the Tender Board takes up that recommendation, the final approval comes from the Governor, what in effect happened is that the Governor came and suggested or instructed - "instructed is the word you used; I

used the word, "insisted," but I was told that it was too strong - that a particular recommendation go; therefore, that is obvious the need for his approval at the end. Did you hear of the man who bought a second copy of the morning paper to prove that what the first said was true.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I did not follow you.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There is a famous philosophical line about a man who bought a second copy of the morning paper to check that what the first said was true. So, here you have a situation where a recommendation comes on the basis of advice instructions from the Governor, then, finally it has to be approved by the Governor.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We have a fact that in a Central Bank environment when a Governor says something, that carries a huge weight and it is simple as that when a Governor comes and mentions something to the Executives, that carries a huge weight.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I fully accept that.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: And this message was conveyed to the Tender Board and the Tender Board then subsequently -

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But you could have agreed to differ, if you felt strongly about it.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, I would differ, if I had the alternative option of financing. But at that time, when the Governor mentioned that this is the ideal time we should be and if there is no other option to finance, it was Friday, the fund requirement was Monday, so, I had no any other business day to even plan another funding arrangement with market participants.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If I would put it in a very straight forward way, here the Debt Department that takes a certain course of action in a certain belief. On the day that that course of actions has to be finalized, you are told that the belief you had was no longer valid. So, you really had no option which is why having made your point, you had to accept and make the recommendation accordingly.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It should not be right to call that it is not valid the belief that we had.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. The belief was valid. But you are told that you can no longer have private placements.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think your belief was very valid and very good belief, if I may say so.

Now I have just a couple of minor things to suggest. When you have the bids before you, you were of the view that perhaps rather large proportion of the bids came from the Bank of Ceylon. What were your feelings when you found that those bids have been on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries Limited?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: If it is Bank of Ceylon, People's Bank, NSB and EPF, I believe this is very usual for me because they are coming in very much big volume sizes for auctions. If you see the auction details or what we have submitted, you probably see that there are number of times where we have offered more than what they have bid at the auctions and I do not see any problem with the Bank of Ceylon's bidding like that because the Bank of Ceylon is one of the major investors in Treasury Bonds. In this particular instance, this Bank of Ceylon's bid is on behalf of somebody else is completely a subsequent information for us, not at the time of auction or not at the time of the decision that we were making in the Tender Board. All this came up subsequently and for us, we also crosscheck with the regulations. I mean, there is no restriction in regard to somebody, some other primary dealer is bidding through another primary dealer. I mean, international market is not at all a problem because that encourages the secondary market activities.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Dr. Azim, my question which you missed is – You said exactly what I assumed. I assumed from what I know that of course, you all had total good faith that this came from the Bank of Ceylon when you look at the bid. I believe that. I just asked you as to what your feelings were. When you found that this came from Perpetual Treasuries Limited, you checked the books and found it was perfectly legal, but I am just asking you a question as a citizen of Sri Lanka as to what your feelings were.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the possibility that the supervision will follow up. That was my first initial feeling because the supervision will have their on-site, off-site discussions and they will follow up as to why they want to come because we have so-called effective participation by primary dealers in auctions. So, they will be taking up this with individual primary dealers.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did this supervision look into this question when it occurred?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I believe, yes. They called for a meeting and the Assistant Governor overseeing the public debt also chaired that discussion and they discussed with both the Bank of Ceylon and also the party which requested the Bank of Ceylon to send their bids. This was, I believe, they discussed and I am not necessarily involved in supervision-related activities. But, I know.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Have you read the Report of the Three-man Committee? There was a Report by the Three-man Committee that was asked to look into this?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Would you agree with their statement which states that there is no evidence that the Governor was not involved in the decision? They say, "There is no evidence to the effect that the Government had direct participation in regard to the activities of the PDD." Would you agree with that statement? Yes or No?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not want to say, "yes" or "no" for this type of questions because it is not right for me to give a "yes" or "no" type of answer for this. Not a direct participation -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No direct participation?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: You can define the word "direct" and see what is outside the parameters of "direct" there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Would you say that he had participation?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is not right to say, "participation" because –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Would you say that he had influence over the decision?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not say, "influence" also.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. Would you say that his policy decision conveyed to you on the 27th made a fundamental change to what would have been the initial recommendation of the Board?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes, it changed the fundamental way in which that we were funding the Government's cash-flow requirements.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But you do not think that that is the participation in the decision of the Board? Is it?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is a policy decision. I mean, the higher-ups take and they communicate. If I am in the policy-making level, I probably have my say on that also.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The policy decision contained in the last Minute which changed the fundamental belief of this whole exercise –

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha, just to clarify, I view it like this, I mean, in good faith till we are proven otherwise. You have, as I said earlier, a procurement system which can be single sourcing. Then, you decide to go for the tender. Right? This is quite similar. You have actually gone to a better system. If you did not have the issue of the conflict of interest, I do not think that you have been arguing this because if we have the conflict of interest only we are arguing this. It is a better system. If you have gone into a better system or a more comparative system, then I would ask you the reverse. I would want to know as to who took the decision to go for direct placements; when was the decision taken and I wanted the documentary evidence of that. Let me record this. Who took the decision to go for direct placements? When was the decision taken and by whom? Provide documentary evidence to COPE and Mr. Chairman, please ask for it because that was the wrong decision. If that decision was not there we will not be arguing this case at all. I am not talking about the issue of conflict of interest and probing it. I said, we should but, this, we need to know.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. Hon. Eran Wickramaratne, I fully agree with you but, I think, the one flaw in this erudite defence of what occurred is very simply this. I think, it is quite clear that when you have an auction, the auction must be based on level playing fields. I think, we saw it from all the evidence given to us by all the other direct dealers. They said very clearly that it was impossible that the Bank would go for any bid above a certain amount. This was what seems to have been the sincerely held belief of the entire market, from what we hear, apart from one person. So, even if we do not believe, or if we say that we do not believe that there is information, if you read the telephone transcript, there is information. The simple fact

is that here is an exercise in which the expectations of the market, the expectations of the decision makers were all suddenly changed. The change maybe for the better. Dr. Azim himself has said that he agreed with the principle that we should move away from these. We also had evidence and I do not know whether you read through that that the direct placements had started long before the bête noire of the present regime, Mr. Cabraal. Anyway, where it stared, how it started, we have asked for absolute details and we have not got them from the Bank, as to who had got the direct placements and how they were offered. The Seylan Bank's evidence makes it very clear that they had no great objection to that system although they were not a captive market. But, it is fair enough if you feel very strongly that you must change and you have been saying this for some time. I have no quarrel but I put it to you that I think, this whole argument about transparency is completely initiated by the fact that the auction was for Rs. 1 billion. So, everybody bid in the belief that the usual practice would continue and they had every right to believe that but people who were adopting the results made a recommendation on the belief of all the evidence they had and you know perfectly well that if the market suddenly changes, that is a distortion beyond belief.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: There is a slight difference in this auction. You cannot compare this like you have a car, you auction it, you take the best price and you give it. You look at any financial closure. For example, take the stock market. In the stock market you might say, "I am raising 'x' amount." Then, people bid far in excess of 'x' amount and then what does the people who floated the transaction do? They would say, "We closed it. We took more than we had initially indicated." So, financial auctions are different. You can take 'x' amounts in excess. That is my point. You say so but I am saying it is not. What we are arguing is, because we do not have a long history of 30-year bonds, we are saying ten times is a lot. But, if you look at the Treasury Bills, it has happened frequently. They have been taking a lot on Treasury Bills many times over. This is unusual because it is a 30-year bond. While it could have been funded using direct placements, you cannot fund it on direct placements on 30-year basis. That is the difference. You would have gone for shorter tenures. You would have gone for two years or five years or whatever. But, if you want duration, you have to resort to this.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Dr. Azim, You knew that. Is it? If you had to go for direct placements –

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the arrangement for direct placements is that, we offer 30-year also. It is the decision of the investor as to whether he will invest in that or in some other maturity. It is a matter for the investor to make the decision.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is not an impossible thing to do. Is it?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: They invest. In fact, there are investors and they invest.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: The thing is, you got Rs. 20 billion in. Normally, direct placement is, you have an auction, you absorb the auction and then you say, "Okay, I am willing to take more money at this rate." That is what it is. If you have an auction, and if you renegotiate based on the auction, then you are really in conflict. You cannot renegotiate based on the auction. If you have an auction, you cannot renegotiate the prices again. That is not possible.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Hon. Eran Wickramaratne, you cannot renegotiate if your auction was for Rs. 5 billion or for Rs. 30 billion but if your auction was for Rs. 1 billion you are honour-bound to take -

The Chairman: What matters is the end result.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Exactly. If your auction is for Rs. 1 billion, then you are honour-bound to take Rs. 1 billion. Then you are perfectly entitled to -

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: No. If you have an auction system, you must stick to the auction system. Otherwise you are undermining the auction system.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. Auction system is what you are offering.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If you are having an auction system and you are throwing your bids in, you can decide not to take it. You can say, instead of taking Rs. 10 billion, I am taking Rs. 2 billion or Rs. 1 billion. But you must take it from the system. Otherwise you cannot build the auction system.

The Chairman: That is correct.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I just ask this form Dr. Azim? What you all have done about an auction system is to advertise, "X" – to take two X or three X on the auction, but then take things in different ways. Is that unique to Sri Lanka? I mean, the fact that you have an auction but then you realize that you need more than you have auctioned. It is like, you have auctioned Rs. 1 billion and then you may decide that you need Rs. 10 billion. Is it absolutely not done in any other country? Having fulfilled your auction promise, you then think of other ways to raise the rest of the money.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not know what details that you all wanted to. Basically we offer the amounts and on that basis we see the market response. If the market is really aggressive and bidding with substantial volumes, there is no restriction that we will be accepting more than that we have offered. Usually, we probably see four or five times in bonds that we have issued recently and as rightly pointed out by the Hon. Eran Wickramaratne, in Bills that we have many times; even eleven times at certain auctions. So, we accept that. It all depends on the market response to that particular offer.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: One of your responsibilities is to check if the amount of money – if you went by an auction - would end up paying well over yours and then you need to stop at something.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is the decision – I mean, when you have the quantum in front of you to raise and the quantum is now Rs. 13. 5 billion - of that we have funded and the balance, we have to fund through the auction. So, we basically go for the balance. This is what you will see. Also that balance falls in line with the pre-September environment in which the management was highlighting. I believe that was minuted in the minutes sheets of the Tender Board discussion also. So, we basically went with that and still the cost of borrowing to the Government is two basis points below; what we paid in June.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: My last question is -you said there was a much bigger need of money. The Governor said Rs. 20 billion. Though you had been told Rs. 13 billion, there was a need for more money. What was that extra money needed for?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact whatever money – the management could inform us verbally. That is a different story. But the arrangements we do at the Public Debt Department is on the basis of the request come from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. That is the cash flow. On the cash flow for the month of March, the requirement was Rs. 172 billion, in addition to the rollover requirement of Rs. 94 plus billion Treasury Bills and on 2nd of March it was Rs. 13. 5 billion. So, for that 2nd of March funding only that we were doing this particular auction.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I fully got that point but you have told as one of the reasons why the Governor wanted to take more is this. As he said, he had been informed that there was another massive debt. Do you know anything about that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the Governor referred to a discussion on 26th in his first visit to the Department and the requirement of the Government for additional funding. The amounts were somewhere around Rs. 15 billion, he was highlighting for us.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What did he say that the funds needed for?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: He was mentioning about various Government related projects. That was what he mentioned.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He did not tell you who had come and -

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We did not get into that details because it was almost like the auction closing time. So, even if the Government requests something like that – additional financing – they send us in writing. So, once that we received on-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is the proper procedure?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, if the Governor thought that a decision should be based on that requirement, you will not have thought that -

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We will not because we are funding in on the basis of Government's cash flow.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Dr. Azim, is it your Department that determines how the money is raised – whether it is raised through an auction or private placements or whatever way? Is it your Department that determines it?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. It is a decision taken by a Committee called "Domestic Debt Management Committee." So, this Domestic Debt Management Committee is comprised of

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a Director –General for Treasury Operations Department from the Ministry of Finance– that is where we receive the cash flow. And we have the Director – Economic Research, Director –Statistics, Director-Domestic Operations –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I do not need to know the details of the Committee. So, you belong to that Department which comes under you.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is a group of Departments. Public Debt Department is also included in it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, have there been instances, without the consultation of this particular Department, where somebody – either the Governor or the Deputy Governors or whoever – has gone directly and done direct placements or auctions for raising funds?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, it always goes through you.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You also stated that to move away from direct placements is a thought that has been there. That means you have been discussing about it. When did this discussion come in?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: If I am not mistaken, even before I came to Public Debt Deparmtent, I was-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When would that be?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I was posted to Public Debt Department – in the most recent cycle – somewhere in August 2013.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That means you have been thinking about it for sometime.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is right.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I am quite happy with the questions and the answers. But I would like to have a few clarifications. You said you had no option but to take the Rs. 10 billion. Was it because - The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha also asked about it from you- you believed that you could have done it in two ways; with the direct placements because that was squashed by the Governor or because you had a deadline to meet? What did you mean by you had no option but to take Rs. 10 billion at this auction? Clarify that because that is very important?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: As I mentioned, the 27th was a Friday. There was no business day in between. Second thing is the fund requirement - that is Rs. 13.5 billion. So, from the arrangements that we had, if we did not have the placements option available to Public Debt Deparmtent, whatever funds that we had to raise at that particular moment was on the basis of the auction that we conducted on that day.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Let me rephrase the question again. If you had the option of going for private placements, did you have the time to do it before Monday? I want you to be very clear in telling me, when you said, "We had no option but we had to take Rs. 10 billion" was it because of the time factor? Because you are contradicting yourself –

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Not necessarily the time factor because what we have to recognize here is that even within half a day or on the business day itself, you can raise that much of money.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: On that particular day, if you did not get so many bids, if the volume was not Rs. 20 billion – suppose it was five times over – would you have - in that afternoon - gone for private placements because you have to meet the requirement by Monday?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: If the Central Bank or the management has not mentioned that the private placements channel is suspended, we will definitely go for the placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. Are you telling me the private placements channel was suspended before? Because you told us once, at 10.45 the Governor came and said, "This is the best option and this is the way to go." Did he insist and say that this channel is suspended and therefore you make sure that you take the other? That is what I want you to clarify.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: On the second visit -after the first visit that I was mentioning- he recognized the fact that auction was twenty times over – subscribed.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it when he recognized that there were volumes and you went for that because I want you to be clear?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I believe so.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I want you to be clear Dr. Azim because you were

responsible to raise these finances. It was of Rs. 13.5 billion by Monday, and we are talking about the Friday. You would have had an option of going for the auction with Rs. 1 billion that you have asked for and then you would have had a backup scenario as well for instance, "In case we need to raise so much, what are we going to do?" So, it is your Department's responsibility. Did you have that? Are you telling me in that last hour or in that 13th hour just because the Governor made this statement – because you said you had no option but to take Rs. 10 billion from the Rs. 20 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: To meet the financing requirement, we had to

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, it is to meet the financial requirement for the Monday.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: To meet the financing requirement we had to accept we had to accept it from the auction. If we had not accepted that at that particular moment, we had to use the channels like inflationary Treasury Bills issuance to the Central Bank.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Would it be done on private placements?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is in fact even if you are issuing Central Bank Treasury Bills it is also private placement arrangement.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senananayake: Would it have had an affect on the economy of the country because there are two theories here. First one is the long-term 30- year bonds and also it would have an affect where the Government incurs losses.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I have of course already highlighted-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it true? I am a lay person. I absolutely have no knowledge in this. I am only learning from what you are saying and what everyone else is saying. I am also gathering information and trying to understand this whole scenario to determine where I should put my thoughts. No. 1 is to find out. You tell me, did the Government incur any losses as a result of this thirty-year bond at a weighted average of 11.73 per cent?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: My answer to that question is, all this loss calculations are hypothetically based. So, on that basis, comparing pre interest rate structure to a pro interest rate structure –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You explained that very clearly earlier. So I do not want to go back into that.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I am not in favour of this argument.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That was very clearly explained and my understanding is now fine with regards to that. Perpetual Treasuries is the whole reason why we are wasting so much time in going through this whole thing. This is because of this so-called rather direct dealer called, "Perpetual Treasuries." How long have they been in the business? Are they a leading primary dealer as far as the dealers are concerned and where do they stand in the market?

This is not somebody that came in because the Governor came into the business. They have been in business. They have been bidding billions before. There was Rs.59 billion last year; Rs.56 billion in private placements. So, we would like to see that scenario as well. These are not newcomers. These are big players from what I understood through this whole investigation.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. In fact, I am not much into supervision and into individual primary dealers.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is not an individual. This is a primary dealer dealing with you all. Exactly. We need to go into that.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, what I mentioned by individual is, individual primary dealer because to me always the aggregate matters. I am looking at the total quantum the Government wants and overall costs and how we will manage the debt structure, how we are looking at the debt strategy that we have already.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Dr. Azim, let us not ignore the fact that you are here and we are here because of this one particular primary dealer and he bidding through the Bank of Ceylon and whether the Governor had some connections to this primary dealer and whether there were undue influences? So let us not beat around the bush. Let us be very clear. Tell me whether this primary dealer has been in the market before?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is he a top-player in the market? Has he been bidding with you all over and over again in private

placements and to what extent? You know, he maybe a normal player who bidded this time as well. It would have been a normal scenario? But, unfortunately, there was a connection to the Governor so therefore, we all here sitting and investigating this.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: My answer to the question is, I know Perpetual Treasuries was in existence. I was not aware of their connections to the Governor until all this came up. I was not interested to know who that party was or anything else apart from my Supervision Division work. If there is anything they highlight. Of course, then we go into that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is this group a big player in the market? You know who has been bidding with you all.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: When it comes to the Treasury Bonds Market, the biggest players were the institutional investors.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. Yes, that is understood. We are talking about the primary dealers.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: They are one of the primary dealers who actively participate in the auctions.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: After this particular auction on the 27th of February, did they play again in the auctions in the market?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And how much did they bid? You mean to say, after the 27th of February also they have been bidding? To what extent and how much are they?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not have the exact details with me right now. I can send it you from the Supervision Department.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are they bigger amounts or -

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Reasonable amounts, I could say.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, they are in the business and they are in the market. Thank you very much. That is all I wanted to know from you.

The Chairman: All records are here. Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy, you can get it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay, thank you.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: If you need, all the records are here.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: According to the bidding records, until December 2014, the most they had ever bid was a Rs. 150 million. After 27th February, they have bid Rs. 2 billion, Rs.1 billion, Rs.3 billion and Rs.3 billion. Their bidding has risen astronomically after 27th February. I think that answers Mrs. Rosy Senanayake's question that they were not a major player, until 27th February. Of course, having succeeded so brilliantly, I do not think that there is any reason that they should not be a major player any more. This is the answer to your question. Have a look at this.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We will submit that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They bidded in March also for Rs.7 billion. This is only Rs. 5 billion here.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I said, after February.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Also, they have put private placements for Rs. 39 billion before. The 39 billion is bigger than this.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Sorry, what –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Last year, it was Rs. 39 billion. Then, you have not got the record.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: They have made the Bid but the only accepted one is Rs. 27.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Bid කරලා තිබෙනවා 230ක්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: ඔව්, 230ක් bid කරලා තිබෙනවා. They have bidded. 27 අරන් තිබෙනවා in May, last year. I saw the records actually.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We will send the details.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Send the details of Perpetual Treasuries because it is important.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: And also the interest rates.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Exactly, that is important as well.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Hon. Chairman, we will send those details.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: In the past with regard to private placements, because private placements have not come into being after the new Governor came into place, who decides?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Have they stopped private placements after the new Governor came?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what he is saying. They have taken a -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, I do not think that is correct. You were given a decision on 27th February. But has there been private placements afterwards?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Not necessarily after the 27th of February. The placements that we have done after 27th is, whatever Treasury Bills that we have issued to the Central Bank, that is not necessary to fall into this direct issuances discussion that we are discussing. It is a totally different arrangement. At times the Treasury requests us to issue so-called restructuring Bonds. That is approved in the Budget itself - Appropriation Act - that this much of bonds are earmarked for restructuring purposes of National Water Supply and Drainage Board and things like that. Those were done, but not to the primary dealers or the participants who can access the public auction after 27th February.

The Chairman: That is short-term requirements?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Not the Bonds?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Not the long term private placements?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Even long term. There is nothing we separate out. When placements are available, we open it out to the all participants who can access the public auction.

The Chairman: Then it is not correct to say that you have suspended it. It is in operation.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Not to primary dealers. That is what he is saying. Am I correct in saying that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: EPF has been stopped from taking private placements?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes. -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I want to ask you, in the past who calls for, who is the one who determines primary placements? That is important.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Even the Public Debt Manual specifies the procedure on how we make private placements. When we have auctions, we do not make private placements. But after the auctions, we offer the securities that the Government would like to offer, on the basis of our Debt Management Strategy Concerns - like maturities we pick up and also we pick up securities which are not necessarily bunched at that particular time. By "Bunched" I mean, a huge volume already built up. So, we do not want to load into the securities which have already been built up because then on maturities we have to raise a huge amount of money. So, we select those securities from the outstanding list and then look at the weighted average if we have done auctions for a corresponding maturity and use a weighted average and often the placements were done on one basis points or two basis points below the weighted average. For other maturities where we have not done an auction what we are using is the prevailing secondary market yield rates. Those yield rates, all being kind of tabulated and with the offering securities, we send up for our higher-up's approval. This is through the Assistant Governor overseeing the Public Debt Management Department and finally the Deputy Governor overseeing the Public Debt Department. He naturally is the Chairman of the Tender Boards of Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who takes the decision at the end of the day to call for the private placements?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I mean, it is a decision that comes from the cash flow itself where DDMC makes the call. At the DMCC say the Treasury is asking Rs. 100 billion, we propose, "Okay, through auction we will raise a certain amount and the balance will be raised through direct issuances arrangements." This information goes to the approval of the Governor. Once the approval of the Governor is also given to us, we make the arrangements on the basis of a specific cash flow requirement dates.

On that basis, we get the clearance for specific prices from the Deputy Governor who oversees the public debt. On that basis, we quote the prices across the board to all the participants.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: According to your knowledge, has there been any instance at any time, where without this channel that you are talking about the Governor has determined and gone for private placements?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No. I do not think so.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Thank you.

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ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අසීම් මහත්මයා, ඔබතුමා දැන් සඳහන් කළා, private placementsවලින් ක්‍රමානුකූලව ඉවත් වෙන්න තීරණය කළා කියලා. ඒකට විකල්පයක් විධියට තමයි වෙන්දේසිය ඔබතුමා සතුව තිබෙන්නේ. මම මේ සිද්ධිය නිසාම 2014 මහ බැංකු වාර්තාව අරගෙන බැලුවා. එතකොට private placementsවලින් තමයි යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක මේවා කරලා තිබුණේ. නමුත් මුදලේ අගය සහ යම් කළමනාකරණයක් සහිතව තියා ගන්න පුළුවන් සාර්ථක මට්ටමක් ඒකේ පෙන්වනවා. ඒකේ ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට විශේෂ ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා අපි මුදල් ඉපැයීමක් කරනවා වෙන්දේසියෙනුත්, private placementsවලිනුත් මේ ක්‍රම දෙකම භාවිතා කරනවා කියලා. මමත් හිතන්නේ මම පසුගිය කාලයේ මේ ගැන අධ්‍යයනය කරපු පමණින් EPF එක, ලංකා බැංකුව වාගේ තැන්වලින් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ නම් අවුරුදු 30ට නොවෙයි, lifetime වුනත් Bond එක ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා රජයේ ආයතන නිසා. නේද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: අපි වසර 30කට වඩා කල් පිරෙන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර කොයිම වෙලාවකවත් නිකුත් කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නිකුත් කරලා නැහැ තමයි. ඕනෑ නම් EPF එකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා වසර 30කට.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: එහිදී යම් කිසි කාලසීමාවකට ආයෝජනය කරපු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරයක් කල්පිරීමේදී නැවත ආයෝජනය කිරීමක් තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන් කරන්නේ. මේ හරහා ඕනෑම අවස්ථාවක යම් කිසි ආයෝජකයෙක් තමන්ගේ මුදල් මේ වාගේ රජයේ ආයතන කිහිපයකට බාර දුන්නොත් ඒ මුදල් දිගටම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරවල ආයෝජනය කරමින් පවතිනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: හදිසි මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවකදී ඕනෑ නම් පියවා ගන්න ලංකා බැංකුව, EPF එක වාගේ තැන්වලිනුත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්කමක් තිබෙනවා ද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: ඔව්, තිබෙනවා. ඊට හේතුව භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරවලට ඉතා ක්‍රියාත්මක වන ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළක් පවතිනවා. අවශ්‍ය ඕනෑම වෙලාවක මේක විට්ටම් කර ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පුළුවන්කම් තිබෙනවා ද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: Yes. නමුත් පවතින වෙළඳපොළේ පොලී අනුපාතය මත තමයි ලාභයක් ද, පාඩුවක් ද කියන එක තීරණය වෙන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙතැනදී අපිට ඇත්තටම අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ එකක් තමයි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා, ඊට පස්සේ perpetual Treasuries (Pvt.) Limited එක, ඊට පස්සේ ලංකා බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියා කලාපය. ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරද්දී යම් ගැටලුකාරී තැනකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. එතැනදී අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැමිණීම ඔබතුමාත් සඳහන් කළා. අනෙකුත් නිලධාරිනුත් සඳහන් කළා. එකක් තමයි මේ ආයතනයේ bidsවලට අධිපතිතුමාගේ සම්බන්ධයකුත් අපිට වාර්තා වෙනවා. ඔබතුමා නිලධාරියෙක් නිසා අහන්නේ, ඒක අපිට වාර්තා වෙනවා. ඒකත් එක්ක අධිපතිතුමා මෙම ස්ථානයට ඇවිල්ලා ඉතිහාසයේ නොවුණු සිදුවීමක් සිද්ධ වෙනවා. ලංකා බැංකුවත් මේකට සම්බන්ධ වෙනවා. ඔබතුමා මෙතැන හිටපු නිලධාරියෙක් හැටියට අපි හිතනවා- මේකේ ඉලක්කම්වල සංඛ්‍යාත්මක අගයන් මොනවා වුණත්, අපිට බාහිරින් බැලුවාම පෙනෙනවා මෙතැන

යමක් සිද්ධවෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒ ගැන රටේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය නිසා තමයි ඔබතුමා මෙතැනට එන්නෙත්, අපි මෙතැනට එන්නෙක්. ඔබතුමා මේ රටට වගකියන නිලධාරියෙක්. රටේ මූල්‍ය හැසිරවීමේදී සහ කළමනාකරණයේදී විශාල වගකීමක් තිබෙන කෙනෙක් තමයි ඔබතුමා. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි දැන් මෙතැන තිබෙන ඇත්ත ප්‍රශ්නය. ඔබතුමා කලින් ඇහුවානේ "ඔබතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්නය මොකක්ද? ඔබතුමා හිතන දේ තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ" කියලා. ඒ ප්‍රකාශ කරද්දී තේරෙනවා. අපි විශ්වාස කරනවා අධිපතිතුමා එම ස්ථානයට නොපැමිණියා නම් හොඳයි කියලා. ඔබතුමා නිලධාරියෙක් වශයෙන් මම මේ දැන් කියන සිදුවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස මොකක්ද? අපට එක එක්කෙනා තොරතුරු ලබාදී තිබෙනවා. අධිපතිතුමාගේ මාධ්‍ය ප්‍රකාශයත් තිබෙනවා එම ස්ථානයට ආපු එක ගැන. ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ මොකක්ද මේ ප්‍රශ්නය කියන එක? පොදුවේ රටේ ඇති වුණු ආන්දෝලනාත්මක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ. මෙතැන හිටපු නිලධාරියෙක් වශයෙන් ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 27වැනිදා මේ නිස් අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කරන කොට අධිපතිතුමා මහ බැංකුවට පත් වෙලා වැඩි කාලයක් ගිහිල්ලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. මේ කාලසීමාව තුළ අපිටත් බොහෝ වීට දැන ගන්නට ලැබුණා අනෙක් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලටත් අධිපතිතුමා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගිහිල්ලා තිබුණා කියන එක. මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියා කලාපය අනුව අධිපතිවරයෙකුට ඕනෑම වේලාවක, ඕනෑම ස්ථානයකට යන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම restriction එකක් නැහැ. එදා දවසේ අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණීමත් අපේ කෝණයකින් බැලුවොත් අපිට එහෙමයි දැනුණේ. ඊට වඩා වැඩි දෙයක් ගැන අපි කල්පනා කරන්න ගියේ නැහැ. නමුත් කෙනෙකුට මේ බැඳුම්කරය සමඟ සම්බන්ධ කරලා ඒ ගැන කථා කරනවා නම් හොඳම දේ අධිපතිතුමාගෙන්ම ඒ විස්තරය දැන ගන්න එක තමයි. මොකද, මම දැනුවත්ව නම් අධිපතිතුමා

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් field visits/department visits අනෙක් departments වලටත් කරලා තිබුණා. ඒකේම කොටසක් විධියට තමයි අපේ

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැමිණීම මම දැක්කේ. අනෙක් හේතුව අධිපතිතුමා අපිව යම් අවස්ථාවලදී මීට කලිනුත් හමුවෙලා තිබුණා. එම දවසට කලින් නොයෙකුත් සාකච්ඡාවලදී.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමාගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවටත් අධිපති-තුමා මීට කලින් ඇවිත් තිබුණා ද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: If I am not mistaken, he visited once before.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Because, Mrs. Seneviratne said he visited.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes, he visited once before.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මීට කලින් හිටපු අධිපතිතුමන්ලා මේ වාගේ වෙන්දේසිවලට ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා ද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: මම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සේවය කරන කාලසීමාවේදී වෙන්දේසි තිබෙන දවසක නම් මම අධිපති කෙනෙක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණ එක නම් මම දැකලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. මම වැඩ කරන දවස්වල.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අහලා තිබෙනවා ද එහෙම අධිපති කෙනෙක් ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා කියලා?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: අතීතයේදි නම් මට හිතුණේ නැහැ එහෙම separation of boundaries තිබුණා කියලා. මොකද, අතීතයේ අධිපතිවරුන් එහෙම ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා කියලා කියා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් එතකොට මේ විධියට public auctions or primary dealer systems තිබුණේ නැහැ. නමුත් මම වැඩ කරන කාලසීමාව තුළ නම් auction එකක් තිබෙන දවසකට -

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එක් නිලධාරියෙක් කිව්වා කිසිම දවසක ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ කියලා?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is probably right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I quote you the Minutes, Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake? I think it is important because I think we are going with this myth that the Monetary Board took a decision to stop direct placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, it is not the Monetary Board. It was read out and they gave us a copy where the Governor at some point had a meeting with them-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, they never even endorsed it, I will tell you exactly what the Minutes read.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The Minutes say, "The Chairman informed the Board that the Central Bank temporarily suspended the method of direct placements of Treasury Bills."

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is not the -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am reading from the Minutes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: මේ Minutesවල නොවෙයි. She gave a copy of the letter.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It was not in the Minutes of the Tender Board Meeting. It was in the Minutes of the Monetary Board Meeting.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, to me the sequence is there was a decision which the Governor had tried to make, given to you on the 27th -

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It was subsequently ratified.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It was not even ratified. The Board took a note of that fact that he had told that he had done this. Accordingly, the Central Bank decided to accept Rs. 10 billion. So, what the Monetary Board really does is they do not endorse it. They say, "We are aware that the Central Bank took a decision to accept this full amount based on the Chairman informing the Board - as he informed your Department - that the Central Bank temporarily suspended method of direct placement. What is meant by the Central Bank temporarily suspending is, obviously the Governor took a decision to instruct - I think that is the word Mrs. Seneviratne used- to stop. So, I think that needs to be very clear. There is no endorsement.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Dr. Aazim, there is one more question from me.

The Chairman: It will be the final question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, the final question. It was said that - you also said that- you all discussed with the Governor and the Governor asked why do you not take the whole amount: you said that it was not possible and so on.

When did it happen? Did it happen on the floor or on the corridors or did he come to you

all and ask, "How much have you all got." or "Can I see this?" There are contradictive statements made by various people. I want get it very clear because it was said by one of the Deputy Governors that you are the one who showed this sheet of paper. When they were going around the Department did you meet him half way through or where did it happen?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, this discussion took place in front of the Superintendent of Public Debt Department and Additional–

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: While standing-

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes, we were standing

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Not that you went to the office, sat down and determined.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what I want to know. It is like they met you coming with this. Is that how it happened?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, the Governor walked into the Department - he usually walks into the office of the SPDD –Superintendent of the Public Debt Department- which is adjoining the entrance. He was there and we were basically walking towards that side because I went to the front office and I was basically seeing that all the documents were ready that we wanted to go to the Tender Board.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: While you were going to the Tender Boar you met the Governor.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The Governor came to the Department and we met there and the Governor inquired the details. I do not know whether it is right to say I have given the sheet to the Governor. This is the bid received or whether when I was discussing that with the Deputy Governors and the Governor also wanted to see it and he took it from me.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, you were discussing with the Deputy Governors.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We were discussing. It is not fair to say that I have given it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That was my understanding from-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අසීම් මහත්මයා, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ manual එක තිබෙනවා. මේකේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් manual එකට අනුව තිබෙන්නේ auction report එක යන්න ඕනෑ, Public Debt Department එකට. ඊට පසුව එතැනින් Tender Board එකට ගිහින් තමයි Governorට approvalඑකට යන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඔය විධියට Governor ඔය report එක බැලීම manual එකට අනුව හරිද, වැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාන්මක වන ක්‍රමවේදයන්වලට අනුව අධිපතිවරයෙකුට ඕනෑම අවස්ථාවක ඕනෑම ලිපි ලේඛනයක් පරිශීලනය කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එසේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කොහේද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ Monetary Law Act එකේම තිබෙනවා. MLA එකේම තිබෙනවා, අධිපතිවරයාට අවශ්‍ය නම් ඕනෑම තොරතුරක් -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඕනෑම වේලාවකද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: ඔව්. ඕනෑම වේලාවක ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියන එක එහි සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් ඔබතුමා කියපු පරිදි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අධිපතිතුමාට Tender Board meeting එකෙන් පසුව Tender Board decision එක inform කරලා එහි approval එක ගත්තායින් පසුව තමයි, අපි announce කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කරන්නේ එහෙමද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක තමයි සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමවේදය. දැන් මෙතැනදීත් ඒ දෙය සිදු වුණා. Tender Board එකේ decision එක අධිපතිතුමාට යොමු කළාම එතුමා approve කළා. නමුත් ඊට කලින්ම අධිපතිතුමා Tender Board එකට "My observation in terms of accepting from this auction" කියන එක highlight කළා. එසේ highlight කළ එක අපි factor කර ගෙන තමයි, Tender Board එකට අපේ auction sheets අරගෙන ගියේ. On that basis, Tender Board එකේදී අපි - Even we requested the other members and informed the other members that the senior management is of the view that we should be accepting this much from the auction and also they informed that we should be suspending direct placement arrangements that we will be having as usual. At that point of time we requested the Tender Board Chairman and the other members, "Please clarify this point." and he then inquired from the Governor and after inquiring only the Tender Board Chairman had given us the approval. In fact, we usually send these sheets and the Governor signs and sends but because we cannot be waiting too long till the Governor physically presents in the Central Bank-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම නිවැරදියි. නමුත් මම අසන ප්‍රශ්නය

මේකයි. දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට ඕනෑම වේලාවකදී ඕනෑම තැනකට යන්න පුළුවන්; ඕනෑම ලියකියවිල්ලක් බලන්න පුළුවන් කියලා නීතිමය තත්ත්වයේ තිබෙනවා කියලා.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: මගේ දැනුමේ හැටියට එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක හරියට කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: MLA එකේ එය හරියට Section එකේ එහෙම නැහැ. නමුත් මගේ දැනුමේ හැටියට, මා මහ බැංකුවේ සේවය කළ කාලසීමාව තුළ මම මගේ seniorsලාගෙන් දැන ගත් දෙය අනුව එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නමුත් manual එකේ මෙය යා යුතු procedure එකකුත් තිබෙනවා.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට එම procedure එකේ නැහැ, මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා එතැනට ගිහිල්ලා මෙම report එක බලා කටයුතු කරනවාය කියලා?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: Procedure එකේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔය procedure එක අනුව මේක හරිද, වැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා මේක බලන්නද ආවේ, එහෙම නැත්නම් මෙම තීරණය අපට දැනුම් දෙන්නද ආවේ කියන එක ඇයිය යුත්තේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන්මයි. මම දන්නේ නැහැ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නමුත් දැන් ඒක වෙලා ඉවරයිනේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මේක බලා මේ උපදෙසත් දුන්නා. දැන් ඒක වෙලා ඉවරයිනේ. එතකොට එතුමා ආවේ ඒකටද, නැද්ද කියන එක අපි නැවරදි කරන්න යන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. ඒක වුණානේ. එම කාර්යය වෙලා අවසානයි. මම අහන්නේ manual එකට අනුව ඒක හරිද, වැරදිද කියන එකයි.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා මහ බැංකුවේ ඕනෑම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවකට ගිහිල්ලා එතුමාට තිබෙන උපදෙසක් එම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවක නිලධාරීන්ට ලබා දීම වැරදියි කියලා නම් මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ. එය භාර ගැනීම සහ ඒ අනුව ක්‍රියාත්මක වීම -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔය manual එක අනුව හරිද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: Manual එකේ එහෙම බැහැ කියලා නැහැ. Usual procedure එක මේකේ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Usual procedure එකේ එය තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: Usual procedure එකේ තිබෙන්නේ Tender Board එක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ decision එක Governorට inform කරනවා කියලායි. නමුත් Tender Board එකේ කියලා නැහැ, Tender Board එකට කලින් Governor Department එකට ඇවිල්ලා එතුමාගේ උපදෙසක් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි. මම සරල විධියට අහන්නේ ඔය manual එකේ තිබෙන එකට අනුව මේ සිදු වුණු සිදුවීම හරිද, වැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: Manual එක එහෙම process එකක් ගැන silent. නිශ්ශබ්දයි.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The next point from what you have told us, if the Governor had not come down at that point your recommendation would have been to take 3.7 or whatever from the auction. That should be recorded that here was the decision of the-

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No, that is a decision we are taking to the Tender Board. We do not know what the Tender Board will take at that time.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The simple fact of this, you and Mrs. Senewiratne had taken a decision to make a recommendation to take 3.7.

The Chairman: Are you are member of the Tender Board.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: However, normally the Tender Board accepts your recommendation because you have all the information at your finger tips

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Not necessarily.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But the recommendation before them would have been "x". By virtue of the Governor coming to your office your recommendation was a different recommendation.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We would have taken the lower amount that we have had in our mind to the Tender Board. We do not know the Tender Board's decision. That is different.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Let me again put it to you. While I think what you said, "The Governor is ultimately responsible for his making the decisions" is perfectly justified. The Tender Board would have followed your recommendation or whatever and then it was up to the Governor because he has to endorse the recommendation to say, "Sorry, I have a different view."

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Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is possible. That happens.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is that the impression created at least initially- I think it is now being exploded. Here is the recommendation of the Tender Board based on your report with which the Governor had nothing to do. That is the impression created which the Prime Minister tried to create on the strength of report. You read the Pitipana Report.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I read the report and some of the observations are not necessarily in line with what we are rationalizing. .

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It almost suggests that you all were not doing your job.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is something that everybody else can sit down anywhere - I remember even on 17th of March when the Hon. Prime Minister was making a statement in Parliament he was mentioning that the Governor instructed the Tender Board to accept it in terms of the. That was in the Hansard and we went through that also.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, the Pitipana Report, obviously does not prove that position. I think by then the Hon. Prime Minister realized the cover-up had failed.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact I read through, but I am again mentioning that it was not in line with the rationality that we have as professionals.

The Chairman: Do not ask his comments on the Prime Minister's speech.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Azim, let me just say that you have done your best. But I think from what we have heard already you actually put a better case even though it ultimate was not taken up. So, I think we need to thank you up to a point. I wish you. You have stuck to your guns throughout.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Thank you.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: And my last comment is this. Your answer to a question put to you with regard to your impressions of the Governor, you said "Best that the question be put to him so that he will give the pertinent answer." I think you should get A+ for that answer for the way you articulated it.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Thank you.

The Chairman: Dr. Azim, I also have a question for you. This is the first question I am asking. As Chairman, I was quiet during the whole session. I allowed all of you to ask questions. I will not ask any irrelevant questions.

As an upcoming Economist, I admire you very much. You have bright prospects in the Central Bank as an Economist. You were quite aware of the economic environment, the financial situation and the financial market at the time this bond issue took place.

When the market responded with an astronomical amount like Rs.20 billion, was it a shock to you?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: You mean the bids received?

The Chairman: Yes, the bids received for Rs.20 billion.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Not really because when we auction, Rs. 20 billion is twenty times when it comes to Rs.1 billion. Usually, on a weekly cycle if you look at Treasury Bills, we offer something like Rs.20 billion and we receive bids up to Rs.30 to 40 billion.

Today also we had three; five year, seven year and ten year bond auctions. We offered Rs.9 billion for each and we received bids up to about Rs.80 billion. That is available in the press now. Just before coming here –

The Chairman: But, this is a thirty-year bond.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly.

The Chairman: This is a long-term bond, an unprecedented bond. That is why I put that question to you because of your experience as an Economist. It is not related to the issue at all.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Hon. Chairman, with regard to the thirty-year bond issue, the thirty-year bond issue was planned for the month of March and the market was aware of that for quite some time, since December 2014, if I am not –

The Chairman: The market was aware?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The market was aware because it is available in the Central Bank website itself. It is known as, "Tentative Treasury Bond Issuance Calendar". This was in existence from December 2014. Also, we prepare the Tentative Treasury Bond Issuance Calendar after consulting institutional investors, leading private sector firms and also the major banks, including the foreign banks. We highlight to them the preference of maturities that we are offering. At the same time, we were aware to some extent that some

insurance funds were expecting long-term instruments to match their liabilities. That was there.

Rs.20 billion is not necessarily something that surprised us. But, one thing which I looked at after the auction subsequently was, Rs.13 plus billion bid by one dealer. And that was the Bank of Ceylon but because it was Bank of Ceylon I felt it was reasonably normal as the Bank of Ceylon is a big player.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The fact that Rs.13 billion came from one bidder –

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That is subsequent information.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That surprised you?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Then, I had to see on what basis that had come. It is not necessary that all bids that are sent get accepted. Even if it gets accepted, in Government's securities per se, we always have a settlement assurance because this is highly tradable. You do not need to pay the entire chunk in one go. You can break it up. You can pay Rs.100 million first. It is over a period of time.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is a win-win situation for everybody except for the people of Sri Lanka.

The Chairman: Perpetual Treasuries Limited offered a bid of Rs.1 billion. Knowing very well that you all wanted only Rs.1 billion, they send their bid. What made them to offer another bid of Rs. 5 billion?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That again is something we should be asking from Perpetual Treasuries Limited.

The Chairman: As an Economist you know the financial market. That is why I am asking you. I am asking this for my knowledge.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, one possibility is the usual acceptance parcels. Most of these bond issuances are for; Rs.5 billion, Rs.7 billion. It is something around three to five, three to seven. This is the range that we have seen in 2014. So they probably expected –

The Chairman: Your advertisements clearly say - the advertisement is here - Rs.1 billion. Then they send an offer. Now. Perpetual Treasuries Limited was not aware that it was going up to Rs. 10 billion. Why did they come again with another Rs.5 billion?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: They sent Rs.2 billion from their own account. Similarly, EPF also sent about Rs.2 billion from their own account.

The Chairman: They would not have been aware that EPF had offered. I am speaking about the Perpetual Treasuries Limited. Unless they had got the information that you all will be going up to Rs.10 billion, they would not have sent the second bid.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not know. It should be cross-checked or scrutinized by a different source. In my opinion, I do not know whether they had any information about the amount we will be accepting. I do not know. It does not come within the purview of what we are doing.

The Chairman: That is why I told you that I am addressing the question to you as an Economist and not quite related to the issue.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Basically according to the information we had very good people were put in charge of this Department. Both the Deputy Governor and the Director seemed uncertain of their positions. I have to say that I was very impressed by Mrs. Senevirathna. I had been told that she has a reputation for integrity. I think, she is someone who is anxious to learn. I may be wrong. She herself said that you are one of the experts. You working in a more junior position, do you feel that there was sufficient guidance from the Deputy Governor, who seemed to me not to be on top of his brief, to this department at a time of such change? Could you tell me, what you feel about that? Had there been sufficient guidance?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, it is not right to say that someone is not on top of his mark when it comes to assigning responsibilities in the Central Bank because when you are recruited to the open cadre of the Central Bank, you can get posted anywhere at any time. Tomorrow, I might be transferred somewhere else. Today I might be here and tomorrow I might be at ER. Before coming to this Department I was in the Economic Research on International Finance.

The other thing is, the systems and procedures in place in the Central Bank is a continuing process. It has been tried, tested and very much practiced. Just because the person changes, most of the things that we practice will not change. Of course, the direction in which that person is taking us might change on the basis of policies he is focusing his objectives. This is the kind of change but

unfortunately that change and this particular incident happened more or less simultaneously. That probably one could-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: All are capable people. They should be able to learn very quickly. To me the problem is twofold. One is, two changes at very crucial levels happening at the same time. And in one case the feeling that it does not matter that I do not know because that is their job. If they are going to supervise you all properly, they need to be on top of this whole position. I thought, the change was perhaps too sudden, especially when given an absolute fiat about a new decision without consultation is what we can see. Do you think that perhaps a little bit more consultation, training might have helped?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Not necessarily. One can argue, in that case the Governor who came to the Central Bank is relatively new.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You should keep sitting officers at least for three months in their position.

The Chairman: Dr. Azim, thank you very much. We had to summon you for re-examination in the context of being transpired.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I appreciate Hon. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Witnesses withdrew.

Committee adjourned.

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

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පැමිණ සිටී:

ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය
ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා
ගරු ඒ.ඩී. සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු එම්.ටී. හසන් අලි මහතා
ඊ. සරවනපවන් මහතා

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක සේවා

සභායට පැමිණ සිටී:

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, වැඩබලන විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඊ.ඒ.එන්.පී. එදිරිසිංහ මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;

Mr. D.L.P. Abeysinghe, Executive Officer, Government Securities Dealings. National Savings Bank affirmed and examined.

Edited

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ නම, තනතුර මොකක්ද කියලා කියන්න.

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: මම ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ. Executive Officer, Government Securities Dealing. National Savings Bank.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා Chief Dealerද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, Chief Dealer කියලා position එකක් bank එකේ නැහැ. ඒකේ තිබෙන්නේ, Executive Officer, Government Securities Dealing කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Chief Dealer කියලා එක් කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවාද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: බැංකුවේ Chief Dealer කියලා position එකක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ සිද්ධිය වන අවස්ථාවේදී ප්‍රධාන නිලධාරියා හැටියට කටයුතු කළේ කවුද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: එහි decision එක ගන්නේ Tender Investment Committee එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: Investments අපට වැඩක් නැහැ. ඒක අපි තීරණය කරන්නම්. ඒක භාරව සිටි ප්‍රධාන නිලධාරියා කවුද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔහු තමයි Head of the Division.

සභාපතිතුමා: නම මොකක්ද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: Mrs. B.P J. Gnasekara, DGM/CEO Fund Management Company.

සභාපතිතුමා: Mr. Dahanayake කියලා කෙනෙක් හිටියා නේද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔහු Fund Management Company එකේ CEO.

සභාපතිතුමා: Fund Management Company එකයි අපට ඕනෑ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔහු ඉන්නවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔහු ඇවිල්ලා නැද්ද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔහු දැන් ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ. ඒකේ එක් කෙනෙක් ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නවා. ඒකේ dealings කරන කෙනා ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Fund Manager ඉන්නවාද? ඒ ගොල්ලන්නේ Bids handle කරන්නේ. බැංකුවෙන් නොවෙයි නේ ඒක කරන්නේ. අබේසිංහ කියන කෙනා තමයි අපට ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඕනෑ, ඔබතුමා නොවෙයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ සම්බන්ධයක් නැද්ද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඇත්තටම bid කළේ බැංකුවයි. අපි තමයි මිලියන 300 දැම්මේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ සිද්ධිය ගැන ඔබතුමා දන්නා දේ කියන්න.

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් auction එකක් තිබෙන කොට අපේ Tender and Investment Committee එකේ meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒකට මමත් සහභාගී වෙනවා. ඒකේ Head විධියට ඉන්නේ Bank එකේ GM; DGM, Finance and Planning; Head of the Treasury; AGM, Asset Management. ඔහු තමයි Secretary විධියට ඉන්නේ. මගේ part එක තමයි auction එකේ තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද. maturity එක

මොක්කද, අපේ cash flow එක මොකක්ද, market situation එක මොකක්ද කියන එක ගැන explain කරන එක. Committee එකෙන් තමයි decision එක ගන්නේ, අපි දමන්නේ මොකක්ද, දමන rate එක මොකක්ද කියලා. ඒ Committee එකෙන් ගන්න decision එක තමයි NSB, Fund Management එකට submit කරන්නේ. ඒකට අනුව තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන් bid කරන්නේ. අපට Central Bank එකට direct bid කරන්න බැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ interest එකට මෙච්චර bid කරනවා කියලා decision එක ගන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එදා මේ කටයුත්තේදී auctionවලට ගියා නේ.

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. Rs. 100 million ඒවා තුනක් දැම්මා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා දැනගෙන සිටියා, මිලියන දහදාහක auction එකකට යනවා කියලා. ඔබතුමාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට එහි පොඩි හෝ වෙනස්කමක් වෙනවාද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ, එච්චර ලොකු වෙනසක් වෙයි කියලා. ඔය auction එක regular auction එකක් නොවෙයි. අපේ cash flow එක අනුව අපට දාන්න පුළුවන් ප්‍රමාණය ඕනෑ නම් තව මිලියන 100ක් වැඩි වෙයි. ඊට වඩා ඉහළ අගයකට යන එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Bidding level එක බලන කොට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ interest එක අඩු වුණා. මේ වාගේ bid කරන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද? අනෙක් කට්ටිය 90 ගණන් වලට නේ යන්නේ. 101, 102, 103 ගියා. අන්තිම result එක බලන කොට පොඩි පාඩුවක් ලැබුවා.

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: අපි bid කරද්දී ඔය average එක ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මට පෙනෙන විධියට නම් සාමාන්‍ය rate එකට bid කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. අනෙක් කට්ටිය bid කළේ 90 වාගේ ගණනකට නේද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ වාගේ හිතුවේ නැද්ද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: කොමිටි එක ඒ rate එක reasonable කියලා තමයි decide කළේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: NSB එක, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් profit එක maximize කරන්න බලනවාද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒක එහෙම වුණේ නැහැ නේද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ තිබෙන situation එකේදී reasonable rate එකනේ Committee එක decide කළේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Reasonable rate එකක්?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: අනෙක් ආයතන හුඟක් අඩුවෙන් bid කරන එක reasonable නැද්ද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: අනෙක් කට්ටිය decide කරන එක ගැන අපි දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් හිතන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. කොමිටි එක තමයි decision එක ගන්නේ. මිලියන 100ක් මේ rate එකට දාමු කියලා තීරණය කරන්නේ කොමිටි එක. අපේ තිබෙන scenario එක අනුව අපි හිතනවා, ඔක තමයි හොඳම rate එක කියලා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හුඟක් අය ඔය විධියට හිතලා තිබුණා. එක් කෙනෙක්, දෙන්නෙක් විතරයි හුඟක් අඩු ගණනකට ඉල්ලුවේ. මොන වෙලාවටද ඔබතුමන්ලා bids ටික දැම්මේ?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: 10.75ට එකක් දැම්මා. අනෙක් එක 11ට දැම්මා. අනෙක් එක 11.05ට දැම්මා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මම ළඟ rates තිබෙනවා. මොන වෙලාවටද bids ටික දැම්මේ?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: අපි එදා දවසේ 10ට Fund Management Company එකට දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: 11ට නේද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: 11ට කලින් bid කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒ නිසා අපි 10 වෙන කොට Fund Management Company එකට submit කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Fund Management Company එකට දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කොමිටිය තීරණ ගන්න කොට ඒ වෙනුවෙන් වෙන් කළ මුදල කීයද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: මිලියන 300යි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තුන් වනාවකදී තමයි දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ offer කරන්නේත් Management එකෙන් නේද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි ඔබතුමන්ලා bids ටික දැම්මේ 10.40 a.m.වලට නේද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක Fund Management Company එක enter කරන වෙලාව නේ. Before 11.00 a.m. ඒ ගොල්ලන් enter කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා 10ට දුන්නු එක බලලා 10.45ට දුන්නා?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ අත්දැකීමේ හැටියට මේ ගැන කියන්න. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් 11.00ට නේ close කරන්නේ. Technical effect එකක් හරි මොකක් හරි හේතුවක් නිසා තව වැඩි කාලයක් ඉල්ලුවොත් දෙනවාද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: අනෙක් අයගෙන් තමයි ඒ ගැන අහන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ ගැන හරියට කියන්න ඔබතුමා දන්නේ නැද්ද?

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

ඩී.එල්.පී. අබේසිංහ මහතා: බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

සාක්ෂිකරු නික්ම ගියේය.

(Mr. W.M.R.B. Weerakoon, Senior Manager (Dealings), National Savings Bank, Fund Management Company Limited was called in.)

Mr. W.M.R.B. Weerakoon, Senior Manager (Dealings), National Savings Bank, Fund Management Company Limited, affirmed and examined.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ගේ නම සහ තනතුර කියන්න?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: මම රෝහණ බණ්ඩාර වීරකෝන්. NSB එකේ Fund Management සමාගමේ -Primary Dealer Company එකේ- Senior Manager, Dealer විධියට වැඩ කරනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ගේ ඔය තනතුරට අදාළ කටයුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොඩි හැඳින්වීමක් කරන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: අපි NSB එකේ Primary Dealer Company එක. අපි තමයි Central Bank එකේ auction එකකට direct participate වෙන්න පුළුවන් party එක වෙන්නේ. අපි තමයි NSB එකේ primary dealer arm එක. අපට ඕනෑ නම් market එකෙන් bids අරගෙන customersලා වෙනුවෙන් portfolio එකක් තියා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ඒ වාගේම ඉනිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව auctions දවස්වලදී ඒ අය තීරණය කරලා අපට දෙන bids අපි ඒ අය වෙනුවෙන් place කිරීම තමයි මූලික වශයෙන් කරන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට NSB එකෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන bids සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම ඒක change කරන්න ඔබතුමාට discretionary power එකක් නැහැ. Interest එකක් හරි, මොකක් හරි decide කරපු එකම තමයි ඔබතුමාට place කරන්න වෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: NSB එකට අමතරව මේ කියන 27 වැනි දින ලැබුණ bid එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම වෙන private partiesවලින් requirements හෝ requests ඇවිත් නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ආවොත් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒකත් place කරනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: Place කරනවා. ඇත්තටම අපට ගොඩක් වෙලාවට customersලාගෙන් තමයි එහෙම requirements එන්නේ. එතකොට අපි ඒක බලලා assessment එකක් කරනවා - confidence party එකක නම් විතරයි කරන්නේ. Confidence party එකක් නොවෙයි නම් settlements values, ඒ කියන්නේ අපට Rs. 100 million දමන්න කිව්වොත් අපි ඒකේ approximately, settlement value එකට සමාන මුදලක් ඊට කලින් place කරන්න කියනවා. එහෙම කියන්නේ බැරිවෙලාවත් default වුණොත් අපට ඒ risk එක ගන්න බැරි නිසායි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපට limits තිබෙනවා. Approve කරපු papers තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේ party එකකින් අපට bid එකක් ආවොත්, අර වාගේ requirement එකක් නැති වුණාත් අපි place කරනවා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට මොකක් හරි බැංකුවක් කිව්වොත්, අපි නිතර deal කරන එකක් නම් අපි place කරනවා. ඊට අමතරව Insurance Corporations වාගේ corporate customersලා ඉන්නවා. ඒ අය පිළිබඳ

ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැති නිසා අපි ඒ අය වෙනුවෙන් bids place කරනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ assurance එක ගන්නේ කොහොමද? අපි සිතමු private party එකක් හරි, bank එකක් හරි කියලා. ඒ අය ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ account එකක් maintain කරනවාද? එහෙම නැත්නම් මුදල් අරගෙන -

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් settlement date එක තිබෙන දවසට කලින් approximate amount එකක් අපේ account එකට දමන්න කියනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Settlement එකට කලින් දවසේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: Settlement එකට කලින්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Bid කරන දවස වෙනකොට එහෙම assurance එකක් නැහැ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: සමහර customersලා ඉන්නවා, දිගටම අපි ගාව roll over යන අය. එහෙම කෙනෙක් කිව්වොත් placement එකක් කරන්න කියලා අපි ළඟ cash තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ maturity වෙන එකේ. ඒ අය වෙනුවෙන් අපි අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම bid කරනවා.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මීට කලින් කරපු නැති කෙනෙක් මේ වාගේ ආවොත් bid කරන්න කලින් margin එක ඉල්ලනවාද, risk එකක් ගන්නවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එහෙම කෙනෙක් නම් අපි කලින්-participantsලාට වෙනම counterparty limits සකස් කරලා තිබෙනවා. Within limits ආවොත් අපි දමනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ කලින් Board එකෙන් approve කරපු ඒවා. Fund Management එකට වෙනම Board එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ Board එකෙන් ගත්ත limits තිබෙනවා. Within limits ආවොත් දමනවා. ඒ අය අපි යම් කිසි criteria අනුව decide කරපු අය. ඊට අමතරව කෙනෙක් ආවොත් එහෙම අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම Board එකට හරි, නැත්නම් ඒ වේලාවේ හැටියට CEOට හරි reference දමලා අරගෙන තමයි මම අවසාන වශයෙන් bid එක place කරන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bid එකක් එන්නේ අන්තිම අවස්ථාවේ කියලා සිතුවොත්, අපි සිතමු 10.50ට bid එකක් ආවා කියලා. මම කියන්නේ regular customer කෙනෙක් ගැන නොවෙයි. විශේෂිත පුද්ගලයෙක් ආවොත් මොකද කරන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: Suspicious customer කෙනෙක් ආවොත් දමන්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Risk එකක් ගන්නේ නැහැ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: Risk එක ගන්නේ නැහැ. Default වුණොත් ඒ risk එක අපි Central Bank එකට settle කරන්න ඕනෑ. Central Bank එකට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ අපි කවුරු වෙනුවෙන් bid කළාද කියන එක. අපට ඒ risk එක ගන්න සිදු වෙන නිසා අපි ඒක ගන්නේ නැහැ. අවසාන මොහොතේ දන්න party එකක් වුණත් within 15 minutes වාගේ in-writing ආවේ නැත්නම් අපි කෙහොමත් bid එකක් place කරන්නේ නැහැ. In-writing අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් ඔය කියන පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින bid එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාද ඒක offer කළේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: මම තමයි ඒක place කරන්නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ මට තමයි ඒක NSB එකෙන් එන්නේ. ආවාට පසුව අපි තමයි ඒක Electronic Bidding System එකෙන් primary dealer arm එකට දමන්නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Mr. Abeysinghe ද ඒ තීරණය convey කරන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒ තීරණය අපට දෙන්නේ ඒ පැත්තේ dealer තමයි. TNIC එකෙන් decide වුණාට පසුව ඒ අය තමයි අපට deliver කරන්නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: In-writing ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: In-writing තමයි.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He placed three bids of Rs. 3 billion at the following rates. ඒ අය rates තීරණය කරන්නේ?

Mr. W.M.R.B. Weerakoon: Yes.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ rates දකින කොට සිතුවාද මේවා ටිකක් අඩුවෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: මට සිතුණේ rate එක market rate එකට වඩා ටිකක් වැඩි ඇතියි කියලායි. නමුත් කියන්න බැහැ market එකේ සමහර වේලාවට liquidity වාගේ, ඒ කියන්නේ TNIC එකේ අය decide කරන්නේ මොකක් හරි පදනමක් මත. මට පෙනුන හැටියට ඒ අය පොඩි amount එකක් දැම්මේ liquidity ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසා වෙන්න ඇති, ඒ අයට maturities නැති නිසා. සමහර විට long-term maturity එකක් නිසා වෙන්න ඇති. ඒ වාගේ මොකක් හරි හේතුවක් නිසා තමයි. නමුත් rates, within the range වාගේ කියලා තමයි මට සිතුණේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින්, ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. Central Bank එක යම් කිසි හේතුවකට ඕළුමිනින්ම auctionsවලට යනවා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට අදහසක් තිබුණා නම්, වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් දැම්මොත් වැඩිය productive වෙනවාද? සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට වැඩි පළපුරුද්දක් තිබෙන්නේ bank එක Rs. 1 billion

කිව්වා නම් bank එකේ Rs. 1 billion, Rs. 2 billion අරගෙනයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ නිසා වැඩියෙන් auctionsවලට දමන්න හේතුවක් නැහැ නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: යම් කිසි විධියකට bank එක මුළු අවශ්‍යතාව auctionsවලින් පුරවනවා නම් ඒ වාගේ අදහසක් ආවොත්, ආරංචියක් ආවොත් තව ටිකක් bid කළොත් හොඳයි කියලා හිතෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bank එක තමයි ඒ decision එක ගන්නේ. මම primary dealer arm එක මේවා කරන්නේ. අපි හැම තිස්සේම buying and selling කරන්නේ. අපි, primary dealer unit එක කරන්නේ trading තමයි. ඒ නිසා අපි ගොඩක් වේලාවට market එක place වෙන හැටි බලලා market එකෙන් ගොඩක් වේලාවට ගන්නවා. Primary auctionsවලිනුත් ගන්නවා. ලොකු amount එකක් නොවෙයි. මොකද, market එකේ යන trend එක බලලා තමයි අපි tradingවලට ගන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Market එකෙන් තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලා ගන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Bond dealing කරන අය, insurance companies එහෙම ඒවා ගන්නේ long-term investments හැටියට නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ගන්නේ deal කරන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙන් market එක බල බලා යම් කිසි විධියක අදහසක් තිබුණොත්, then, the Central Bank is going to go for full-scale auction. Is it not a good idea if we buy? You gave a thought of that.

Mr. W.M.R.B. Weerakoon: We did not get that kind of an indication.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You did not get such an indication?

Mr. W.M.R.B. Weerakoon: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Do you think that anyone got such an indication?

Mr. W.M.R.B. Weerakoon: I do not know about that.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට කොමිටියෙන් Rs. 300 million වෙන් කළා?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේක්ෂා කළේ නැද්ද interest rate එක 12ට යනවාය කියලා?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒ committee එක අපට-

සභාපතිතුමා: Market conditions අනුව පටන් ගන්න කොට, මේක දමන කොට ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබිලා තිබෙන්නේ අඩු පොළියක්. Private sector එකට 11, 12 ගිහින් තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඊට week එකකට විතර කලින් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් තිබුණු rate එකට වඩා market rate එකේ upward trend එකක් තිබුණා. අපි ගොඩක් වේලාවට previous auction එකක, නැත්නම් ඒ ළඟ යන එකේ bonds අපි සැලකිල්ලට ගන්නවා. එයා යන trend එක අනුව, මට bids ලැබුණාම මට හිතුණා මේ level එක සමහර වේලාවට place වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඊට කලින් ඔක 35-year. 30-year bond එක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් 55 විතර market එකේ තව ටිකක් උඩට ආවා. මම සිතන විධියට අපි minimum bid එක දමලා තිබෙන්නේ 11.75ට. ඒ හරිය සමහර වේලාවට accept වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: 30-year bond එකක් ඔබතුමන්ලා අපේක්ෂා කරන්නේ නැහැ සියයට දොළහක් යයි කියලා, එහෙමද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: එච්චර නම් අපේක්ෂා කළේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා තව මිනිත්තු 10ක් ප්‍රමාද වෙලා දැම්මා නම් සියයට 11ක් ලැබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: Market conditions බලන්නේ නැද්ද, සම්බන්ධයක් නැද්ද? National Savings Bank එකෙන් ඉවත් කරලා fund management කියලා වෙනම කොම්පැනියක් හදලා භාර දීලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒ වාගේ business කරන්න නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: Primary dealer - ඇත්තටම අපි වෙනම unit එකක් විධියට යන්නේ. NSB එකේ සම්පූර්ණ portfolio එක, ඒ අයගේ cash flows ඔක්කොම decide කරන්නේ එතැනින්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒ අය තමයි අපට decide කරලා දෙන්නේ. ඒ අය market conditions ඔක්කොම -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා නේ Central Bank එකත් සමඟ bids deal කරන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: අපි place කරන එක කරන්නේ. අපි secondary market එකේ තමයි deal කරන්නේ

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ප්‍රමාණය ගැන මෙතුමාට තීරණයක් ගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමාට තීරණයක් ගන්න බැහැ. බැහැයි සිතන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: තුන් පාරකට offer කරලා තිබෙනවා. මිලියන තුන් සියයම එක පාරට offer

කරන්න තිබුණා නේ. ඇයි සියය, සියය decide කළේ. ඒ තීරණය ගන්නේ ඔබතුමා නේ. කොමිටිය නොවෙයි නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: නැහැ. කොමිටියෙන් කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකත් කොමිටියෙන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒක කොමිටියෙන් කරන්නේ. අපට NSB එක වෙනුවෙන් decisions ගන්න බැහැ. ඒ අයගේ Tender and New Investment Committee-TNIC- කියල වෙනම එකක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් මොකටද fund management කියලා වෙනම එකක් දමලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒක Central Bank requirement එකක්. මොකද, NSB එක primary dealer කෙනෙක් නොවෙයි. NSB එකට direct participate කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක නිසා තමයි අපිව form කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: NSB එකට ඒක කරන්න බැරි කමක් නැහැ නේ. NSB එකටත් primary dealer status ගන්න පුළුවන්; බැරි නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: 2000 වර්ෂයට කලින් තිබුණා. 2000 වසරෙන් පසුව ඒක නැති කරලා තමයි primary dealer status company එකට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: NSB එකට ඒක කරන්න බැහැ කියලා මොකක් හරි restriction එකක් තිබෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මොකක්ද ඒ restriction එක?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒකට හේතුව මේකයි. Central Bank එකේ current account එකක් තබා ගෙන යන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ commercial bank එකකට හරි, primary dealer කෙනෙකුට හරි තමයි. NSB එක කියන්නේ commercial bank එකක් නොවෙයි. 2000 වර්ෂයෙන් පස්සේ primary dealership එක banks වලින් seize කළා. Banksවලින් අයින් කරලා ඔක්කෝම dedicated primary dealer companies හදන්න කිව්වා. එතකොට Central Bank current account එක company එකට තමයි දුන්නේ. ඒ කාලයේදී Bank of Ceylon, Sampath Bank වාගේ banks ඔක්කෝම companies හැදුවා. 2004 වසර විතර වෙනකොට - අපි උදාහරණයක් හැටියට ගත්තොත් Bank of Ceylon එකට primary dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට account එකකුත් තිබෙනවා. Bank එකටත් Central Bank එකේ account එකක් තිබෙනවා. පසුව ඒ ගොල්ලන් decide කළා, එකම unit එකකට dual account එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලා. එහෙම කියලා unit එක bank එකටම absorb කර ගන්න option එකක් දුන්නා. නමුත් අපට එය කර ගන්න බැරි වුණා. මොකද, NSB එක commercial bank එකක් නොවන නිසා අපට absorb කර ගන්න බැරි වුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ facility එක නැහැ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒ facility එක නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ නිසා company එකක් form කරන්න වුණා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ නිසා දැනට settlement account එක තිබෙන්නේ අපට. ඔක්කෝම settlements; bid place කරන ඒවා ඇතුළු හැම දෙයක්ම අපේ through තමයි කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකේ CEO වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරන්නේ කවුද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: එන්.කේ. දහනායක මහත්මයා ලබන මාසයේ දෙවැනිදා retire වෙනවා. එතුමා prior to retirement ඉන්නේ. ඒ වැඩ දැනට භාර අර ගෙන තිබෙනවා-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අවස්ථාවන වන විට එතුමා හිටියාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාව වන විට- පෙබරවාරි මාසය වන විට- එතුමා හිටියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් එතුමා retire වෙලාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: දැන් එතුමා leave prior to retirement.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා එතුමාගේ address එක දන්නවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්. දන්නවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට address එක හරි telephone number එක හරි දීලා යන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ වැඩ කරපු එක් කෙනා එතුමා නේ. එතුමාගේ නමයි address එකයි අපට දීලා යන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට තනියෙන් තීරණ ගන්න ඔබතුමාට කිසිම හැකියාවක් නැහැ. NSB එකෙන් තමයි කියන්නේ. NSB එක කියන ප්‍රමාණයට ඒ bidsවලට තමයි කටයුතු කරන්න වෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට secondary market එකේ තීරණ ගැනීමේ අයිතිය තිබෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒ අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. අපි වෙනම portfolio එකක් maintain කරනවා. අපි වෙනම unit එකක් විධියට කටයුතු කරනවා. ඒකෙදී අපි තමයි decisions ගන්නේ. CEO, මම ඇතුළුව අපේ වෙනම TNIC එකක් තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒ අනුව අපේ portfolio එක

tradingවලට හරි, ඒ අදාළ දේවල් අපි තීරණය කරනවා. අපි සම්පූර්ණ වෙනම unit එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. පළමු වැනි bid එක දැම්මා ඔබතුමන්ලා Rs. 100 million.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක දමන කොට company එකෙන් කියනවාද දමන්න කියලා?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: NSB එක කියනවා. අපට in writing paper එකක් එනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන් එතැනින් operate කරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා නිකම් අතරමැදියන් වාගේ. එහෙමද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ NSB එකද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඇත්තටම NSB එක වෙනුවෙන් තමයි අපි primary dealer විධියට ඉන්නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඇත්තටම එතැනදී වෙනම decide කරලා අපට ආවාට පස්සේ තමයි අපි ඒක place කරන්නේ. අපට ඒක manipulate කරන්න හරි, ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න හරි, මොනවත් add කරන්න හෝ මොනවත් කරන්න බැහැ. ඒකම තමයි අපි place කරන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් ඔය ගත්ත bids ටික secondary market එකේදී ගනු දෙනු කරනවා නම්, එතකොට තීරණ ගන්න ඔබතුමාට අයිතිය තිබෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ කියන්නේ secondary market එකෙන් ගන්නවා නම්, කීයටද ගන්නේ කියලා අපට තීරණය කරලා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ issue එකෙන් පස්සේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited වලින් bonds මොනවත් ගත්තේ නැද්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.බී. වීරකෝන් මහතා: නැහැ. මොකුත් ගත්තේ නැහැ.

සාක්ෂිකරු නික්ම ගියේය.

(At this moment, Mr. Kavinda Mewan Gunawardena, Senior Trader (Rates), HSBC Bank was called in.)

Mr. Kavinda Mewan Gunawardena, Senior Trader (Rates), HSBC Bank, affirmed and examined.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You are Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You are the Senior Trader (Rates)?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Correct.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Was it you who place the bid for this?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Yes. After consulting the superiors, I placed the bid.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You have to consult the superiors through direct discussion. Have you not?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: We usually discuss. It is a 30-year bond and especially this bond we do not have a risk appetite to buy a 30-year bond. So, we just bid for 10 per cent which is our statutory requirement. So, it was a Rs. one-billion bond option and we bid for Rs. 100 million which was our requirement.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: As some people describe, this was really a "dummy bid". So, you have to bid. Did you expect to get it?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: No.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Are you delighted that you got it?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: No. Actually I sold that bond the same day. I did not want to have that on my books.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: How much did you sell it for?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: The same rate.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is very kind of you.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Actually I thought at the time that I was lucky to get rid of it at the same rate. Just after the auction, the market is all over the place. The first bid I got was 13 per cent which means I would have set it, but I did not sell it at 13 per cent as I was tempted and then, a little while later there was a bid at 12.5 per cent –

Unedited

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Now that the rates have gone up. So, do you not feel regret? Okay. I have one question to ask. You have to make a bid on this.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, why did you not make your bid before 11.00 a.m.?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: I bid.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: No, as per the time log you have made the bid at 11.04.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: By 11 o'clock the system is closed down. I do not know where this time of 11.04 came from. As far as I am concerned, I bid before 11 o'clock.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What time did you bid? Can you tell us?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: I cannot tell it exactly. Usually, an auction closes at 11 o'clock. So, we bid before. I bid between 10.50 and 10.55. I thought this particular auction – already we have decided that we would bid at 12 ½. We did not want it. I thought I would bid at around 10.35. I am surprised to see this 11.04.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can you find out the accurate records of the minutes? Did you place the bid on your system?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: We placed it on the Central Bank system. What we do have is we have records of- Usually for every auction we participate we keep a track of how much we bid and what rate we bid. I have that information but unfortunately we do not get a time stamp for that.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, was there anyone in your office who contacted the Central Bank and asked them to delay closing the auction?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Sometimes, it happens if we cannot make our bids in time. But, in this case, no.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Are you absolutely sure?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: I am a hundred per cent sure.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: You are confirming now that you have not made any request for a time extension.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: No.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Even a telephone call, no?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: No.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: By fax, no?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: No.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: As there was no question obviously. Something has gone wrong with the system therefore, you wanted a delay of five minutes or ten minutes. I am sorry to put this to you because obviously you are astonished.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Honestly, Sir, I cannot remember if there was a problem like this. I really feel sorry. This is the first time I am hearing this. So, I do not know. Sometimes, the Central Bank system does have issues. Sometimes, maybe we cannot log into the system and then we ask some extensions. But in this instance, I cannot remember asking for an extension.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You are the person who had deals with this particular case.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Yes, I am the one who placed that bid.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Okay.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: I am hundred per cent sure but I cannot remember at what time I placed the bid and I also cannot remember if I asked for an extension, that would have been because there was a problem in the system. But, I cannot remember if there was an issue like that on this date.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, would you be surprised if you are told that your bid came in last of all?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Yes, I am surprised.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The last and the only bid that came in late was yours. I am telling what we have been told.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Yes, I am surprised.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Someone in your office had telephoned and asked that the auction be delayed to make your bid and that fax was subsequently sent in your name.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: In my name?

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes, in the name of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. I think we need to check this absolutely, immediately. Mr. Wickramaratne, we were told -you remember by whom-

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Sir, I am sorry. I really cannot remember this.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes. I believe. This astonishes because here is a very suspicious action from the part of the Central Bank.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: I mean we just placed a bid for hundred million.

I am sure you have no doubts that I bid just a 10 per cent and in fact, I have an e-mail correspondence while my immediate boss was out of the country at that time before the auction, on the 26th there was an article on "Ceylon Today" saying – it very inaccurate; details in that article are inaccurate. The article said, "This is the first time the Central Bank is offering a 30-year bond." and it is stated, "This is after 10 years." That was wrong. And they said the market was expecting rates to come around 12 ½. One of my colleagues who is out of the country saw this article and forwarded it to me asking what was going on. Then I replied to him copying my boss saying, "Look. Most of these are inaccurate and until then the Central Bank was offering the 30th. It was 2044 bond around 9.35 and 9.30 and in that e-mail I told them that, "Look, it has come around at 9.30 and this is a very small auction. Usual practice is the EPF or someone else would buy the one million and that is the end of the story. So, I thought there was nothing to worry. By 12.30 I wanted to get an end to this story.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You all will be sacked for not being as clever as Perpetual Treasuries Limited.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Obviously, no.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Give a copy of that e-mail because this is of your view. You are deadly considered reasonable operators in the market. So, this was your view.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Yes, this was our view.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Obviously about this idea, I think we must check with "Ceylon Today". We have developed an absolute assurance-

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Sorry. Sir. Do not call it "an absolute assurance" because honestly I cannot put down on the line and say there was no problem. There could have been a problem with the system or something to that effect which unfortunately I cannot remember.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who placed the bid? Was it yourself?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: I placed a bid myself. There are two auctions every week. There is a problem. After that we were all talking about this 30-year bond auction.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, were you surprised?

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Yes. Everybody was like that. I nearly sold at 13 per cent. I was honestly delighted to get rid of that bond at 12.30 that day.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Though I bought the bond, I had no intention in keeping the bond. That is why I sold it at 12 ½ .

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: All the suspicions were cast on the fact that you all bid at a ridiculous rate. The fact is that you only bid 100 million.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: It is 100 million.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: We have 10 bids which are of very much statutory requirement. You are the only one at a very what is seen as an unreasonable rate

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: I agree that that reason is suspicious.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: This is basically a view of the "market". You are representing the market. But, we need to establish the truth of that fact. You promised that you will send a copy of the fax today. Let me have a copy of the fax.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Which fax are you referring to?

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yesterday, we were told that closing of the auction was delayed because of a request made by HSBC.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: A technical factor.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But the HSBC says that they have not made such a request.

Mr. Kavinda Gunawardena: Sorry, Sir. I cannot remember.

The Chairman: He cannot remember.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If I recollect what somebody said that these technical things do happen and that generally what happens is dealer tells a dealer first and they followed it up with some fax or e-mails which is the usual practice.

Uncorrected

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What we were told is that fax comes from HSBC. But we have a separate evidence that another dealer, which is unprecedented, had asked the auction to be delayed on the grounds that they were submitting a bid.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is not technical.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes, not technical.

Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is in fact an irregular request.

(Witness withdrew.)

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී සමාගම් ලියාපදිංචි කිරීමේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර් ජනරාල් ඩී.එන්.ආර්.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා කැඳවන ලදී.)

සමාගම් ලියාපදිංචි කිරීමේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර් ජනරාල් ඩී.එන්.ආර්.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සමාගම් තුනක් පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා නේද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න. Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගම ලියාපදිංචි කළේ කවදාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සමාගම පටන් ගැන්මේ ඉඳලාම කියන්න. පෞද්ගලික කාර්ය මණ්ඩලය කවුද? ඒ directorsලා කවුද කියලා පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited නමින් සමාගමක් ලියාපදිංචි කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ සමාගමේ අංකය පීවී 88 /550. එම සමාගම ලියාපදිංචි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ 2012 ඔක්තෝබර් මස 01 වැනි දින.. සමාගම ලියාපදිංචි කරන අවස්ථාවේදී ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබන අයදුම් පත්‍රය, ඒ කියන්නේ Form I ලේඛනය අනුව අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු දෙදෙනෙක් සිටිනවා. ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියෙස්. ඔහුගේ ලිපිනය අංක 07, ක්වීන්ස් ඇවිනිව්, කොළඹ 03. අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් අලෝසියෙස්. ඔහුගේ ලිපිනය අංක 07, ක්වීන්ස් ඇවිනිව්, කොළඹ 03.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දෙදෙනාගේම ලිපිනවල අංකය 07 ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්, ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි. එම ලේඛනයේ සඳහන් වෙනවා කොටස් හිමිකාරත්වය සම්බන්ධයෙන්. එහිදී සමාගමේ කොටස් හිමි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited සමාගමට. එම සමාගමේ ලියාපදිංචි අංකය පීවී 68/584.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ සමාගමේ අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන්ගේ නම් මොනවාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක වෙනම ලිපිගොනුවක තිබෙන්නේ. මට ඒ ලිපිගොනුව බලලා තමයි කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ ලිපිගොනුව තිබුණා නම් ලෙහෙසියි. එතකොට ඒ කටයුත්ත අවසන් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ සමාගමේ නමද Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited කියන්නේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, Shareholder.

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: Shareholder.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Shareholder are Jeffrey Joseph Aloysius -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, ඒ directorsලා.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Shareholder කවුද?

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට මොන company එක පිළිබඳව ද අපි මේ කථා කරන්නේ?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: No. What is the exact company in which these directors are working?

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay. Thank you.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited සමාගමේ ලියාපදිංචි අංකය පීවී 68/584. ලියාපදිංචි කරලා තිබෙන දිනය 2009 ජූනි 27 වැනිදා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ අය කවුද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ලියාපදිංචි කරන අවස්ථාවේ ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද Form I ලේඛනය අනුව, එම සමාගමෙත් අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු දෙදෙනෙක් සිටිනවා. ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්. ඔහුගේ ලිපිනය අංක 07, ක්වීන්ස් ඇවිනිව්, කොළඹ 03. ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇන්ටන් අලෝසියස්. ඔහුගේ ලිපිනය අංක 02, 6 වැනි පටුමග, කොළඹ 03.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒකේ directorsලා ඊට පස්සේ මාරු කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Directorsලා එකතු වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එක්කෙනෙක් ඉවත් වෙලා, තවත් කෙනෙක් දමන්නත් පුළුවන් නේ?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: එක් අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයෙක් ඉවත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. තවත් අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයෙක් පත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඉවත් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇන්ටන් අලෝසියස්. ඉවත් වෙලා තිබෙන දිනය 2012 ජූලි මාසයේ පළමු වැනිදා. පත් වෙලා තිබෙන අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයා අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් අලෝසියස්. ඔහුගේ පත්වීම් දිනය 2012 ජූලි පළමුවැනිදා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ වකවානුවෙම?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමියනි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, තේරුම් ගන්න, two brothers were the two original directors. ඊට පස්සේ සහෝදරයා ඉවත් වෙලා පුතාව දාලා තිබෙනවා. නාත්තායි, පුතයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අද වන කොටත් මේ Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited සමාගමේ මේ අය ඉන්නවාද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: දැන් ඉන්නේ කවුද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මේ Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited කියන සමාගම තවත් සමාගමක් එක්ක ඒකාබද්ධ වෙලා, මේ සමාගමේ නම මේ අවස්ථාව වෙන කොට කපා හැර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ සමාගම මොකක්ද? ඒකේ අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු කවුද?

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දෙකක් merge කරලා?

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: Amalgamation එකක් කරලා.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Amalgamation එකක් කරලා.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: එම සමාගම Perpetual Capital Private Limited.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒකේ දිනය කවදාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ ඒකාබද්ධ වීම සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ 2014 අගෝස්තු මස 08 වැනිදා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒකේ කවුද ඉන්නේ?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: අලුතෙන්ම ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙන Form 20 ලේඛනයට අනුව අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු දෙදෙනෙක් සිටිනවා. ඒ ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්, අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්. එම ලේඛනය අත්සන් කළ දිනය 2015.03.12 වැනිදා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ Perpetual Capital Private Limited.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Perpetual Treasuriesවල අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය 2012න් පස්සේ වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද? ඒ කියන්නේ CEOsලා, අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන් අලුතෙන් ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද, ඉවත් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගමේ වර්තමාන අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මුලින් private limited සමාගම. ඉන් පසුව තමයි limited company-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: කොයි කාලයේද ඒක වුණේ?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Private limited සමාගම limited සමාගමක් බවට පත් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ 2013 ජනවාරි මස 15 වැනිදා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ කියන්නේ අවුරුද්දකට පස්සේ?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒකේ කවුද ඉන්නේ?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: එහි වර්තමාන අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය විධියට ඉන්නේ-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ආරම්භයේදී හිටපු අයමද වර්තමානයේත් ඉන්නේ?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ. හිටපු අය අස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. අලුතෙන් අය එකතු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. වර්තමානයේ සිටින්නේ ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්, විතා රන්ජන් හුඑගල්ලේ, මුතුරාජන් සුරේන්ද්‍රන්, අජාන් ගාර්දිය පුංචිහේවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අජාන් මහතා ඇතුළත් වුණ දිනය කවදාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: 2015.02.18 වැනිදා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ වර්තමාන දිනය නේ. කලිනුත් ඒගොල්ලන් ඇවිත් කිව්වා වෙනස් වුණ දින සහ අජාන් මහතා පැමිණියේ 2015 කියලා. දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේ මේ සමාගම private limited වුණේ 2013 කියලා?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: 2013 වසරේ සිට 2015 අලුත් වෙනස්වීම් වනතුරු හිටපු අයගේ, ඇවිත් ගිය අයගේ නම් ටික කිව්වොත් හොඳයි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2013 ජනවාරි 15, Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට 2012 නම මොකක්ද?

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට 2013 නම මොකක්ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries Limited. ඒක public company එකක් -පොදු සමාගමක් - බවට පත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Does the name change?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. The name is same. It is not a private limited. It is a limited company.

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: Status change.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට 2013 නම මොකක්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි, මම හිතන විධියට මේ සමාගම 2009 ජූලි 28 මුලින්ම පටන් ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ Perpetual Asset Management නමින්. ඒක නේ ඇත්ත කථාව.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Correct.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ 2012.10.01 Perpetual Treasuries පටන් ගත්තා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහි සම්පූර්ණ නම මොකක්ද?

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මුලින්ම මේ සමාගම් ලියාපදිංචි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited යන නමින්. වෙනත් සමාගමක් තිබෙනවා-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මුලින්ම Perpetual Asset Management යන නමින් තමයි 2009 මේ සමාගම පටන් ගන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හරි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මේ සමාගම යටතේ තමයි අනෙක් සමාගම තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක වෙනත් සමාගමක්. Perpetual Asset Management කියන්නේ පී.පී.68584 යටතේ ලියාපදිංචි වුණ සමාගමක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් අපි කථා කරන්නේ මේ පී.පී.88550 යටතේ ලියාපදිංචි වුණ Perpetual Treasuries ගැන නේ?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ ගැන කථා කළාට මේ සමාගමේ shareholdersලා වෙන්නේ Perpetual Capital Private Limited නේද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මේකේ shareholder Perpetual Asset Management.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට පසුව ඒක merge කළා නේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට දැන් ඒ merge කළ සමාගම නේ shareholder වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපි මේ ගැන පිළිවෙළට කථා කර ගෙන ගියොත් Perpetual Asset Management එක තමයි first company එක. අපි ඒ ගැන agreed නේ. ඒකේ shareholdersලා කවුද?

The Hon. E. Saravanapavan: I think they have gone into private limited to public company. You have to mention that to them.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Perpetual Asset Management එකේ shareholdersලා කවුද? ඒ මේ පුද්ගලයන් දෙදෙනාමද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්, මේ දෙදෙනාම තමයි.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Shareholders ලා confirm කරන්න.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They are Directors. There can be shareholders.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is why I am asking. Who are the shareholders?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හැබැයි මට ලැබිලා තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව නම් Perpetual Treasuries එකේ shareholder තමයි Perpetual Asset Management.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක හරි. මම අහන්නේ Perpetual Asset Management එකේ shareholdersලා කවුද කියලායි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒත් මේ දෙදෙනාම තමයි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම ඒක ඇහුවේ confirm කර ගන්න.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Shareholdersලා දෙදෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්, ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇන්ටන් ඇලෝසියස්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ අය shareholders and directors. එතකොට Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited කියලා 2012 වසරේ company එකක් ආරම්භ කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහි අයිතිකරු Perpetual Asset Management. ඒකත් හරි නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2013 නම මාරු වුණේ නැද්ද? මේ සමාගම් දෙකම private limitedද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මුලින්ම පටන් ගත්තේ private limited යන නමින්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට අලුත් නම මොකක්ද? ඒ ගැනයි මම නැවත නැවතත් ඇහුවේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: 2013දී වුණේ private limited සමාගම public සමාගමක් බවට පත් වුණ එකයි. It is a status change.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: It is a status change, but can the word "private" be kept in the name?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, it is not in the name.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, the name is Perpetual Treasuries Limited. එතකොට Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ shareholdersලා කවුද? අර පුද්ගලයන්ම නේද? Status විතරයි නේද මාරු වුණේ? Perpetual Asset Managementම තමයි නේද ඒකෙන් අයිතිකරු? හරි නේද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: හරි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ 2014 අගෝස්තු 08 Perpetual Capital Private කියලා තවත් company එකක් හැදුවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒකෙත් අර පුද්ගලයන් දෙදෙනාම ඉන්නවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම හිතන විධියට මේ සම්බන්ධව chart එකක් හදලා දුන්නා නම් හොඳයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අවසාන විශයෙන් අපි සාකච්ඡාවට බඳුන් කර තිබෙන සමාගම් වන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited. මෙහි අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය අවසාන වතාවට සංශෝධනය වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කවදාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: 2015.03.10 තමයි ලේඛනය දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 2015 ඒ ලේඛනයේ තිබෙන්නේ කාගේ නම්ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන් හතර දෙනෙකුගේ නම් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ හතර දෙනාගේ නම් මොනවාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්, විතා රන්ජන් හුළඟල්ලේ, මුතුරාජන් සුරේන්ද්‍රන්, අජාන් ගාර්දිය පුංචිහේවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අර්ජුන ඇලෝසියස් දැන් එහි නැද්ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම පෞද්ගලිකව දකින විධියට, Perpetual Treasuries එකෙන් 2015 මාර්තු මාසයේ අර්ජුන ඇලෝසියස් අයින් වුණා කියලා මේගොල්ලන් කියනවා. එහෙම අයින් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරි නේ?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මාර්තු නොවෙයි ජනවාරි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Board එකෙන් අයින් වුණාත් මෙහි shareholder වන company එකේ ඔහු ඉන්නවා. එහෙම නේද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පැහැදිලියි නේද?

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මොකද, shareholder is Perpetual Asset Management.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේකෙන් අයින් වුණාට එතුමාට තිබෙන අයිතිය සහ සම්බන්ධතාව කැඩිලා නැහැ. ඒක හරිද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක confirm කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: Chart එකක් හදන්නේ නැතිව හරියන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔව්. Chart එකක් නැති වුණාම අපිත් confuse වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා chart එකක් හදලා එවන්න.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට 2014 ආරම්භ වුණ Perpetual Capital Private Limited කියන company එකක් ගැනත් දැන් කිව්වා නේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ Company එකේ Directorsලා වන්නේ ජෙෆ්රි ජෝෂප් ඇලෝසියස්, අර්ජුන් ජෝෂප් ඇලෝසියස්. ඒ Directorsලා දෙන්නා විතරයි ද ඉන්නේ ඒ Company එකේ? මේ තමයි, Perpetual Capital Private Limited එක.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒකේ shareholder කවුද? ඒකේ Directors ලා කවුද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Directors ලා දෙන්නෙක් ඉන්නවා. ජෙෆ්රි ජෝෂප් ඇලෝසියස් සහ අර්ජුන් ජෝෂප් ඇලෝසියස්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒකේ shareholders ලා කවුද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒ දෙන්නාම තමයි shareholders ලා වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ දෙන්නා තමයි shareholders ලා වෙන්නේ. It is okay, fine. එතකොට අපි පසුවට ගිහිල්ලා බැලුවොත්, Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited එකේ 2009 මුල්ම Company එකට ගිහිල්ලා බැලුවොත්, මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇහුවා වාගේ මේ Directors ලා දෙන්නා හිටියා, Geoffrey and Godfrey. ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි අයින් වෙලා අර්ජුන් ආවා. ඊට පසුව මෙම Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited එකේ Director Board එකේ වෙනස්වීම් සිදු වුණා ද?

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: මම නම් කියන්නේ අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වන schedule එක ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම වෙනස්වීම් ගැන. එම වෙනස්වීම්වලට තුඩු දුන් හේතුන් legend එකක් හැටියට අපිට අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා, whether one has resigned or dismissed or expired. ඒක බොහොම critically කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙමනම්, මෙහෙම යෝජනා කරමුද? අපි යෝජනා කරමු, Registrar-General of Company ට මෙම කරුණු COPE එකට දෙන්න කියලා. අපිට එතකොට හදන්න පුළුවන්. එම කරුණුවල අපිට හරියට නම් ඕනෑ වෙනවා, registration date එක ඕනෑ වෙනවා, මූල් directors ලාගේ නම් ඕනෑ වෙනවා, subsequent directorsලාගේ හැම change එකක්ම ඕනෑ වෙනවා - subsequent directorship එකේ හැම change එකක්ම - resignations, new appointments by date. එතකොට shareholders ලා ඕනෑ වෙනවා. ඊට පසුව එම shareholding එකේ වෙනස්වීමක් ඇති වුණා නම් එහි වෙනස්වීම් පවා අපට ඕනෑ වෙනවා. වෙන මොනවාවත් තිබෙනවාද?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are there any other companies that were affiliated with the companies.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. Any other affiliated companies. ඒකත් අපිට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ වෙනවා.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Linked companies. That is important.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මෙම companies සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමාට - public company එකක් වුණාම audited financial statements එන්න ඕනෑනේ. මේ දේවල් ලැබිලා තිබෙනවාද? අවසානයේ දී ලැබිලා තිබෙන්නේ මොන අවුරුද්දේදී?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. We have to know that. Pattern එක බලන්න ඕනේ.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Because there is no other way.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. 2009 වසරේ විතර.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If I ask a very quick question, දැන් මෙම family එකේ අයනේ ඉන්නේ shareholding එකේ. That is not unusual. තේරෙනවා නේද? ඊට පසුව, when it goes as a public company, they bring in new shareholders. එතකොට තයමී අර චිත්තා, මුතුරාජායි, අජානුයි ඔක්කොම ඇවිල්ලා ඇති.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Ajan came in 2015. I do not know whether there were people in between.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ. This is complete. මෙම Directors ලා අපිට දුන්නානේ, Perpetual Treasuries Private Limited became a public company on the 15th of January, 2013. When it became a public company on day one were all these Directors - Geoffrey, Chitta, Muthuraja and Ajan?

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: There were four Directors.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Did they come on different dates or were they all together?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They came I think in 2015. That is what the Perpetual Treasuries Limited mentioned when we interviewed them.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: වෙනස් වෙනස් දින වල තමයි පත්වීම් ලබා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙමනම් අපිට ඒ ඔක්කොම නම් ටික වෙන වෙනම ඕනෑ කරනවා. When did this Perpetual Treasuries Limited get their primary dealer licence? මට ඒ ගැන මතක නැහැ. එම දිනය මතකද?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: In 2013.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, when they became a public company only they got it.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Then only they can get it.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, we need to know all the director holding of that public company and the private company previous to it with any shareholder interest - we know one shareholder interest, that is, Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited - who the directors were and who resigned and when?

The Hon. E. Saravanapavan: Any other Perpetual companies liquidated within the last five years?

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ Perpetual Asset Management කියන සමාගම amalgamate වුණාට පස්සේ නම strike off කරලා තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: With whom the Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited is amalgamated?

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: Perpetual Capital Private Limited.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියනෙක් Perpetual Capital Private Limited. කියලා company එකක් හැදුවා.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක හදලා අවසන් වෙලා Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited was liquidated. How did the amalgamation happen?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Amalgamation proposal එකක් හදලා එම companies දෙක amalgamate කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම අහන්නේ Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited is a separate legal entity. Perpetual Capital Private Limited is another legal entity. Were they formed separately and amalgamated or how did it happen?

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: They formed separately and shareholders were same. Perpetual Capital Private Limited එකේ කොටස් හිමියන් වෙන්නේ ගොෆ්රි ජෝෂප් ඇලෝසියස්, අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්. Perpetual Asset Management සමාගමේ shareholders ලා විධියට සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒත් මුල් අවස්ථාවේදී ගොෆ්රි ජෝෂප් ඇලෝසියස්, ගොෆ්රි ඇන්ඩන් ඇලෝසියස්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And Geoffrey Joseph Aloysius.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But, by now it was same, because Godfrey has resigned and Arjun has come in.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, then, Arjun has resigned from all responsibilities. There is no Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited any more.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Before we get into that, when Geoffrey and Godfrey were there, who were the shareholders? If it was the two of them, did they have - what was the share proportion? Then, when Godfrey resigned as the director, did he sell his shares to the nephew? We need to basically understand that as well.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Now, what we are trying to establish is, - right at this point what the Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna wanted to establish is -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔක කියන්න අමාරුයි. හදන්න ඕනේ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I just asked that –

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Let him go back and put the chart. We are having the discussion now. So, it will help him to do that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What the Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna was trying to establish here is that even though Arjun had resigned from the Perpetual Capital Private Limited on the 15th of January, 2015 whether he was still a shareholder of the main company - there was no main company, because they have been amalgamated and it is just a one now. So, that means, he has resigned from all responsibilities of the Perpetual Treasuries, Perpetual Asset, whatever it is. Am I correct? That is what we wanted to establish. That we must know exactly who the other shareholders are

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: And the Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited, when they say -

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Even though they have amalgamated, the two companies are there.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is what we wanted to know. I want to know whether the Perpetual Asset Management Private Limited exists or not.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He said, it is stricken off.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, if that that company has closed, that company has assets -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Whether that company is stricken off.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක clear නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Chart එක හදලා බලමු, නැතුව කරන්න බැහැ.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: And also we need the capital of this company and the financial report of it. You have not answered that question yet.

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: 2014.03.31 දිනට මූල්‍ය වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපිට ඒවා ටික officially submit කරන්න ඕනේ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We really do not know the Board of shareholders of the affiliated organizations.

The Hon. E. Saravanapavan: Are the resigned shareholders having any other companies now?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Anyone who had resigned.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: සමාගම්වලට අදාළ ලිපි ගොනු පරීක්ෂා කර බලන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. E. Saravanapavan: Get the names from the computer.

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: No, not yet. Project එක ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ. තවම අවසන් වුණේ නැහැ.

The Hon. M.T. Hasen Ali: You have to computerize.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සිරිවර්ධන මහත්මයා, දැනට තිබෙන record අනුව ලංකාවේ private companies සහ public companies කොපමණ තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඔබතුමාට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට තිබෙන කාර්ය භාරය ගැන දැන් තමයි අපට තේරෙන්නේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Public quoted companies තුන්සිය ගණනක් තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ quoted companies නේද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. අලුත් companies Act එක යටතේ register වුණු public companies එක්දහස් ගණනක් විතර තිබෙනවා. Private companies 60,000ක් විතර තිබෙනවා.

The Chairman: Mr. Siriwardena, thank you very much. ඔය වාර්තාව හදලා අපට ඉක්මනින්ම ලබා දෙන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කවදා වනවිට ඔය වාර්තාව ලබා දෙන්න ඔබතුමාට පුළුවන්ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මම සිකුරාදා වන විට මෙය සම්පූර්ණ කරලා දෙන්නම්.

සාක්ෂිකරු නික්ම ගියේය.

කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

SPECIAL SUB COMMITTEE OF COPE TO LOOK INTO THE BOND ISSUES OF THE CENTRAL BANK

Thursday, 11th June, 2015

PRESENT:

The Hon. DEW Gunasekara (Chairman)
The Hon. Arjuna Ranatunga
The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake
The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha
The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne
The Hon. A.D. Susil Premajayantha
The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna
The Hon. Weerakumara Dissanayake
The Hon. M.T. Hassan Ali
The Hon. E. Saravanapavan

Mr. W.M.N.P. Iddawala, Deputy Secretary-General of Parliament, and Secretary to the Committee;
Mr. J.R. Gajaweera Arachchige, Director (Legislative Services)
Mr. Lionel Fernando, Advisor to the Chairman

In Attendance:

Mr. W.P.C. Wicramaratne, Acting Auditor-General
Ms. L.S.I. Jayaratna, Superintendent of Audit
Ms. E.A.N.P. Edirisinghe, Superintendent of Audit
Mr. E.M.K.M. Padmalal, Superintendent of Audit

Unedited

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal, former Governor of Central Bank was called in. Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal, former Governor of Central Bank, affirmed and examined.

The Chairman: Mr. Cabraal, I am sorry to disturb you.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I am not doing much, Mr. Chairman, So, it is okay.

The Chairman: We have summoned you in order to get some information from you, particularly, with regard to the direct placements and the auction. You have been there as Governor of Central Bank for nearly, I think, nine to ten years. There is a controversy going on as to which system is better than the other. We would like to know in your own experience as a Governor of the Central Bank what made you to shift more emphasis on the direct placements than on auctions and whatever you want to say. We would like to have general view of you.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Thank you, Sir. The context of the auctions must be understood in the sense of the public debts duty of being able to borrow for the Government at the lowest possible price. That is the most important factor. I think, we all would like to see the Government's finances being raised at the lowest possible cost. In fact, if you look at the-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is it an obligation?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, it is.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If you do not mind can you cite that part?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: If I may cite that the Section 113 of the Monetary Law Act says that "The Central Bank of Sri Lanka shall be the agency that is responsible for the management of the public debt as the Agent of the Government." So, there is an onus put on the Central Bank to raise finances as the Agent of the Government.

Then, the website of the Central Bank and the Public Debt Department will tell you, Sir,

that the objective of debt management is to ensure that the government's financing needs are met at the lowest possible cost consistent with a prudent degree of risk, and developing and strengthening the government securities market, while enhancing efficiency and maintaining stability."

It goes on to say. "Although the strategic objective to be pursued in government debt management has not been made explicit by any law in Sri Lanka. The Central Bank has agreed

that the debt management should be carried out in such a way as to:"

There are six points.

First point is: "Minimize the direct and indirect cost of public debt on a long-term perspective." Second is, "Avoid volatility in debt service cost and guarantee a balanced distribution." Third, "Prevent an excessive concentration on redemption payments." That is, in the event that you have two many amounts being maturing at the same time, then, you have a bit of a problem. Therefore, you will balance it in such a way that you will be able to not have what we call a rollover risk so that it is easier for the Central Bank to manage the finance because it is large sums of money. You have to be able to phase it out in such a way that there will not be a huge risk.

Fourth one is, "Minimize any type of rollover risk" That is what I am saying now. "and the refinancing risk." Fifth, "Promote the efficient functioning of the government securities"; and sixth is, "Service government debt on time with 100 per cent accuracy."

On that basis, Mr. Chairman, we have to ensure that it is at the lowest cost that we do not have a rollover risk and that we will have the ability of maintaining stability. If you have huge changes in the interest rates that puts a lot of uncertainty into the market. That is why you got to be able to see that there is only a gradual shift at all in the interest rates. So, what is meant by direct placements I believe has not been very well explained in the three member report which the Prime Minister had also, subsequently picked up and then this controversy erupted with regard to direct placements being called "private placements". Direct Placements are actually placements that are made to all the primary dealers after the rate has been established. And the rate is established at the auction for the bills or the bond.

The Chairman: What is the auction?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Say for example, if you wish to raise Rs. 5 billion, the Central Bank will hold an auction and at the auction – let us say without allowing the interest rate to rise too much you can only take Rs. 2 billion. You will take the Rs. 2 billion and then, establish a weighted average rate on that basis based upon the monies that you have then taken. Thereafter, since you need to have another Rs. 3 billion you will announce to the market, "we will use this weighted average rate and thereafter you can bid any amount of money to come up to the level that we require, but without any increase in the rate."

The Chairman: Is there generally a difference between the prevailing market price and the weighted average? Will it there be?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There can be, but not very much. It is very little because Guidance at the Central Bank gives to the debt market is based upon the prevailing rates. So, at different times depending on the market conditions, the rates can defer. So, the guidance at the Central Bank gives is an important part of the whole exercise of debt management and once the guidance is given they will not depart from it too much. It can be a slight departure, but never a large departure. As a result of that you find it much easier to obtain finances, it is also not volatile, and also you are able to borrow money at the least possible cost. If you take the example, that I just cited if the Central Bank wishes to take up to the Rs. 5 billion itself from the auction you might suddenly find that after four billion, the last billion that is there in the market is at, say 5 per cent more in the auction. Are you to take at 5 per cent more? No. You will not take at 5 per cent more. It is being prudent you will only take what is required at that rate that you believe is the reasonable rate and thereafter you might say at that weighted average rate we will take more but without upsetting the entire market.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can you give one second to clarify something. One of the things you have told about is that there is a minimum bid. Some people really do not want anything bid that on really wondering large rates. If it comes as it were, then, they will get a massive income. So, obviously, the Central Bank is aware that some of the bids that are coming would really be what they called dummy bids which you would be paying massive interest. Therefore, would it be at all prudent that any point to say, "let us take every bid that is coming."

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Certainly not. You do not take like that because we do recognize that there are some bids which are very high, particularly because those people who are making those bids do not want to have that. So, if you were to accommodate those bids you can have a serious problem where your debt management can be very difficult to manage

because your interest rate that you are paying can be extremely high. That is why we have this mechanism. This is not only practiced in Sri Lanka and, also, Mr. Chairman, not only a practice during my term even well before. If you speak to some of the public debt Superintendents they will tell you that this has been a practice. That has been a time tested practice. It is being followed in many other countries as well. I was told at that time there were 16 countries that follow this. You can see that it is a time tested procedure as well.

The Chairman: I observe that most of the bidders are from the public sector, say Government institutions. As far as placements are concerned, is it correct?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, that is also correct because most of the-

The Chairman: Why is that? Will it not be unfair by the private sector?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. They also have the same opportunity. There is no opportunity that is not given to them. All the banks and all the primary dealers have the same opportunity that the Government sector banks and the Government sector large institutions like the EPF has.

So, there is no person or institution that is deprived, but it so happens that the large amounts of funds that are available, are with these captive institutions.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I want to raise one supplementary question to the point which I earlier raised.

We have been faced here not by anyone, except one person in the Central Bank. But I think, in economics it depends very much on the market since market forces are sacrosanct. It was described in Britain, as "Voodoo economics." Now, to me, from what you are really saying, to equate pure auction with the market mechanism is really a complete fallacy given the fact that we know that there are distorted bids in any case. Leave aside any question on Perpetual Treasuries bids because they are going to be excessive bids. Indeed, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank which got a bid at an exorbitant rate told us that they got rid of it immediately because they never expected to get it. So, do you think it makes sense for people in the Central Bank, knowing this practice, to advocate full auction-based acceptances? We might argue on behalf of your successor that because he did not know the system; he was laying himself open to such distortion, but does it make sense for anyone in the Central Bank who knew the system to have said for instance, "Let us take all the Rs. 20 billion."

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think, it is very unusual for someone to do that mainly because to my mind, it seems rather reckless to make interest rates go up like that. And, I do not think that we would have ever wanted to see it that way. At the same time, this entire system is one system. It is not that you have to break it up by saying that this portion is the portion for auction.

The Chairman: It is a consolidated system.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is a consolidated system, Mr. Chairman. So, when you announce to the market, every player in the market knows that the Central Bank has a right to stop it at any point that they require. And beyond that, if there are any monies that the Central Bank requires, they will take the weighted average rate and they will get money at the weighted average rate. So, there is no uncertainty about it. It is a very clear system. And, that system has prevailed for the last so many years. So, you cannot break down this system and say this part is auctioned and this part is not auctioned. The second part is also a kind of extension of the auction where the auction has established a price and based on that price, you seek additional funds from the primary dealers. So, there is no uncertainty about it.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can you explain this? You have the auction and you establish some rate, subsequently only you go to get it directly. How does that announcement happen?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It will be in the manual. I do not know exactly how it is done. It is most probably electronically mentioned to all the primary dealers and that will be communicated. All will be communicated that there will be additional placements that will be available at such and such a rate.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay. The answer to that question is very critical. If it is in the manual, we should look at the manual.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Manual gives all those particulars and they will follow the manual, because if there is any instance where they have not followed, then we have to ask the Central Bank staff. But, I am pretty certain that

it must be in the manual and you can perhaps read that up.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, we will need to establish that because it will turn on that, if we are establishing a rate. The earlier situation is, everybody bids at the same time electronically, the rate is being established, subsequently once you have decided what your cut-off point is and what the rate is; everybody has equal access and information at the same time. I think, that is very critical for us to know.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The Auditor-General must have checked that out also because these procedures are laid down.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If you can clarify that, clarify that now.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: No, we have to refer to that guideline.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I would also like to ask a very relevant question, because there are all sorts of allegations. We have really asked for a full list of all the placements done by direct placements, and we have not got it for two weeks. Is there any reason why there should be such a delay?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I do not think so, because for every auction, there will be a file. I am sure there must be a list of who would have received placements.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There should be a schedule. The relevant things for us are: who got the amounts and what the rates are. For instance, the Deputy Governor concerned too was particularly upset that Rs. 70 billion had been given. Give us the rates. The rates seem to satisfy what you have said but he did not have with him the people who had obtained this. So, my real question is why there is a delay in getting this information?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I do not really know, but I am sure that the information will be available.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Would it be readily available?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, of course.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can I just check whether the understanding is correct that you have a Domestic Debt Management Committee and the Committee first ascertains what the debt requirement is? We were trying to understand the mechanism and how it works. So. there is a Domestic Debt Management Committee and it ascertains the requirement. Then, the Public Debt Department which is independent from that, calls for the auction. So, somebody or a group ascertains the financial requirement and the Public Debt Department calls for the auction. Then, there is a separate group called the "Tender Board Committee" and it also has members of the Public Debt Department. They are the ones who actually look at the auctions that have come and the Tender Board Committee makes a proposal based on aggregates, that is volume and price, what to take. Then, we were also told that there are some options that are given. Option 1, option 2, option 3 and so forth. I just want to know who actually draws up that option. Is it the Tender Board Committee that draws that option? Then, after that option is there, probably do they make a recommendation which ultimately goes to the Governor of the Central Bank? Who basically either approves it or whether he actually ratifies a decision that has already been taken? We were just trying to understand that whole process.

The Chairman: In your own experience.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I will not be able to tell you the exact details as to who will be in the tender committees and all those things. But, during my period of time, I remember it used to be a Deputy Governor who will come and explain the results of the auction. They will say, "We had an auction of this nature and we had recommended such and such acceptance." That is what normally happens.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Comes and tells the Governor?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes. If you look at the way the Central Bank works, Mr. Chairman, there are various responsibilities cast upon each person. Finally, it comes to the Governor. The Governor does not get involved in looking at each and every transaction as to who bids or anything like that.

The Deputy Governor comes and briefs him and says, "Okay. These are the types of options that we have received. We believe that this is the option that we should go along with and are you okay with this?" That is the way it normally happens. There are a very few instances where the Governor might say, "Why do you not consider a different option from the one that you have recommended?" The Governor also has to look at, as you would see in the debt management process. not only the

monetary policy, the fiscal policy, all that have to be revolved around in his mind. He has to see what the new fund requirements that will also take shape are and things like that also. But on very rare occasions, he might say, "Look at the other options as well". Then he normally goes back to the Tender Committee and then he may come back with another thought or he may even say, "Our belief is that we should proceed on the same basis." That is what the way it normally happens.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I am trying to find out whether the Governor actually ratifies or whether the Governor actually approves?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The word is "approve".

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: The Governor approves. So, the Governor can change the option.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The Governor can change.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There are instances where the Governor has changed it, but does he change it after discussion or does he just say, "I am sorry, I would prefer to this." You said, the Governor would say, "Why do you not do this instead"

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes. Let us say, one or two instances that I can remember where the rates have gone up too much, he might say, "A Treasury Bill auction, do not take any money. We will not accept any bids because, it is too costly."

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, whatever the reasons the Governor might not agree, then a final decision made by the Governor with the Deputy in attendance or does it go back to the Tender Board.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It will go back and then they will bring back document. But it is invariably where you believed that it is too much and then he will say, "I do not think we should go ahead with this"

The Chairman: Were there occasions where the Governors has cancelled the whole process?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes. He can cancel.

The Chairman: He has power. Has he not?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The Governor has the discretion and power to do that. Sometimes if the rates that have been bid are too much, the Governor might say, "Look! We do not want to take this at these rates because it is going to upset the market too much. So, let us not take anything." and there are instances where we have seen that.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, the Governor ultimately has responsibility for the liquidity and the rate.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Absolutely.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Cabral, just to ask you this question whether the Public Debt Department's manual specifies on the ratio that it should be taking with regard to private placements or auctions.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Actually, that is a very good question. In central banking, there are a lot of things that you do in order to establish the principles of banking. It is not only by law. If you read the renowned economist, Mr. John Exter, he has said very clearly, "Good central banking is less good law than good practice." If you follow the law and then you have inflation going at high rates, or only that, it is not a good policy. So, the Central Banking has an aspect of some flexibility which is to ensure that the stability is maintained. So, in the sense, if we follow a particular position where he says, "Let us have 50 per cent from the auction and 50 per cent from direct placements and that interest rate shoot up, then that will not be a proper practice to follow." That is why you have to understand the central banking with the context where your job is to ensure stability. So, when it is to establish stability, there will be certain flexibility and certain discretion that you use in order to ensure that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But my question was, does the Public Debt Department's manual specifies a ratio or is it the Governor's discretion that would determine which is-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes. If you look at the website of the Public Debt Department, it gives principles based on which the public debt has to be carried out. It says, "minimize the direct and indirect cost of public debt on a long-term perspective; avoid volatility in debt service cost and guarantee a balanced distribution; prevent an excessive concentration on redemption payments; – that is, you have to ensure that there are too many amounts coming out at the same time for maturity-minimize any type of rollover risk or refinancing risk; promote an efficient

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functioning of the government securities market and service government debt on time with 100% accuracy.

So, these are all features that the Public Debt Department has to consider simultaneously.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, still you have not answered my question. I am asking you whether the manual specifies the ratio whether private placements get an "x" amount or auctions can get an "x" amount or whether it is entirely up to the Governor at the end of the day depending on the market.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You have summoned me to give you the insight situation and I am trying to do that. I cannot tell you exactly what is there in the manual. So, I would suggest that you read the manual and see. But the principle behind it is that you got to ensure that there is a certain flexibility to ensure that all these are managed at the same time.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. I quite understand that. But what I want to know is, because from the pattern that I have observed and whilst talking to and investigating the ex-officials and the present of the Central Bank what I understood was, I would say, more than 80 per cent of the debt has been serviced by private placements-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. That is a wrong statement. There is nothing called "private placements"

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. This is my understanding. You can correct me.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There is no private placement. These are direct placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Sorry! - direct placements- Okay.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think before you came in, I explained how these direct placements are done that you first establish the rate by virtue of an auction and thereafter it is opened out to all the primary dealers, not to any private parties. Sometimes, it was the impression given in the statements that were made and also in that report that was written. But, that is not correct. These are not given to private parties. These are given to the same primary dealers who bid at the auction.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who determines who the primary dealers are?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There are 16 primary dealers and they will be requested to bid further at the price that has already been established.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. But, it is the Central Bank who would inform them.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Of course.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, if the Central Bank decides to inform a particular group of 16, can that happen as well?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: They cannot do that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it public knowledge?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Not public. They will be informing all 16.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, they individually call them.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You can find out exactly from the current officials of the Central Bank as to how they communicate. But, the communication has to be to all 16.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, if it does not happen and if it is being said that only a few people-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You can check that out.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Because, somebody might say, "This particular auction, I did not receive any notification".

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. That is being said and that is why I am asking you whether it is in the manual or whether there is a breach of conduct as far as the manual is concern. For this reason, I want to check that with you.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You can have a look at that, but, my own view is, during the nine years that I was there I did not hear a single complaint of any primary dealer saying that he has not been notified.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How they are complaining now that you are not there? That is always the case.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. That cannot be.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I have one more question, Mr. Cabral. During your time, was it being said -

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Not only during my time, these placements were there for many

decades before. So, if there were no complaints at that time also you will have to think about it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, I know. I understand that, Mr. Cabral. But, what I am asking is, during your time, was it primarily through private placements or direct placements that you raised the public debt or is it through auctions because from what I gather, it is less than 20 per cent and more than 80 per cent has been through direct placements.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. I need to explain this system to you. You cannot break up an entirety of a system into different different components. You have a system which is notify by the Public Debt Department to all the primary dealers. They know this is the system that they follow where they will be invited to come in for the auction and if there are any monies that are not taken in the auction, the Central Bank has another window that is open after establishing the rate. Because the Central Bank's job is to see that you raise monies at the lowest possible cost and that is specified in the Section 113 of the Monetary Law Act as well. So, in order to give effect to that, the Central Bank has the system where it is notified after the auction to the same primary dealers to come in and take it at the established price. So, this is not a question of one half being one system and the other half being another system. It is all one composite system as I explained and I think the Chairman understood it very well. It is a composites system where you have both these arms functioning together.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. Mr. Cabral, if I may ask you this, from what I understood, -I am a layperson; I am not a banker and I am not a financial person – whether the auction system is far more transparent than the private placements.

Would you agree with that? That is what has been mentioned-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. I will not agree with that at all because those people who are suggesting that do not care about the price that you bid. Would you like to have a system through which you call for Rs. 5 billion, you have different people bidding and then the rates going up by 3 per cent to 4 per cent? What would it do to the fiscal policy of the country?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Could that not happen with private placements as well?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, that will not happen because the guidance has been given by the Central Bank and they will lock a price after a certain limit. They will not want to go beyond that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it not the same with the auction as well? There was a price which you could not go beyond - 12.5 per cent or whatever?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I will give you an example.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is that correct?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. The ceiling was 12.5 per cent.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There was a coupon rate which amounts to 12.5 per cent. So, is it absolutely forbidden to accept bids beyond that coupon rate?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The coupon rate will only be the rate that you are given. If you get some of the experts who have come in, they will explain to you.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I understood that. I do not think what the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake is suggesting is the case, but it confirms that if you have a coupon rate of 12.5 per cent and if there are bids far beyond that - going up to 15 per cent even - there will be nothing against you to take in except prudence.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The coupon rate of 12.5 per cent is only a mechanism that you use to have a coupon for the amount that is being put in. Therefore, that is not a guidance as far as the actual rate being by the Government is concerned.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The point that the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake is making - think, we need to make it very clear – is that if you have an auction, if there is a coupon rate of 12.5 per cent and if people bid even up to 20 per cent there will be no legal barrier to your taking that.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. it is like this.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You just answer my question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Then, why would you have a ceiling – a coupon rate, if you can go beyond that? That is what I wanted to ask him to explain

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think laymen generally have that difficulty. I understand what she means.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is not a ceiling. It is just the rate that you pay - .

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: What happens is, the coupon rate is mentioned in every instrument because that would be the convenient method by which the payments could be made by the Central Bank when the interest rates are being paid. But, look at the way it is bid for an interest of 12.5 per cent – let us say, for 100 rupees that will be 12.50 rupees. But there may be a person who might bid at 90 rupees. There you are getting a different interest rate actually: for 90 rupees, they will get 12.50 rupees. Or he might bid at 110 rupees. That is how this auction systems work because you keep the interest rate constant so that for the instrument the rate that is paid is set out. But the amount at which the contribution is made, is changing. That is how this auction works.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Tell me the difference of the interest rates between the private placements, then.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If you look at what actually happens, in actual fact that the final bid taken, the interest rate is higher than 12.5 per cent.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, it is 11.73 per cent.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That is the average.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If you look at this, it is very clear - if your argument was correct that there is a ceiling-.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, it is not an argument. I am trying to clarify this. My question was which system is more transparent and more advantageous; whether it is auction or the private placements? You are telling me private placements are better than auctions. I am trying to ask you, "Why?" and then, you are trying to explain. So, how does the interest rate walks with the private placements because I am quite clear with the auctions?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: First of all, I am saying, once again, that there are no private placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Direct placements. I am sorry, pardon me for my ignorance.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: To continue by using that term, which I think, is entirely wrong.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We are being given all the documents mentioning the same. They kept on saying, 'private placements'.

The Hon. M.T. Hasen Ali: Even the previous people who were summoned used the term, 'private placements'.

The Hon. E. Saravanapavan: Even the Deputy Governor from the Bank and all the others. In fact one of the officials told us 'private placements' was the wrong word. What is the word used in the manual?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is direct placements. So, somebody is trying to shift this focus by calling it, 'private placements.' I do not know who, I have an idea myself. But, what I am saying is this word, 'private placement' is not in the manual. Have a look at it. These are direct placements that are being made. So, direct placements are made after establishing the rate. I have been explaining that and once the rate is established once again the same primary dealers are entitled to make direct placements at the interest rate which has been established through the auction. I think that that is a very transparent system and taken as a composite, I believe that system has saved an enormous amount of money to this country and if somebody suggests that they should have an auction only, you will be paying some serious amounts and very soon you will probably have to revert back and if you want to go that way, you will get stuck reverted back. I really think it is going to be extremely unwise to do so.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think that is a partial explanation because an auction, by its very nature, gives you a comparative price. That is why you are having it to start with. Otherwise you could be doing private placements without an auction or you could do direct placements without an auction. So, the auction in theory itself establishes the market price. Then, once you have decided based on the auction that you are taking at a particular price, you are inviting others on a very transparent basis at the same moment to openly take it. That is why we have to go to the manual to determine, as you said, and I am not very sure, and then that is less problematic because if it is actually happening, everybody will have

information at the same time and they were re-bidding basically.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: They are re-bidding. The bid price has been established.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But, they are putting another bid and saying, "I will take Rs. 5 million more or Rs. 10 billion more or whatever the number is because it is not in the first round electronically. You cut off at a certain point. We say, "This is the price. We are willing to take more." Then, they have to go back into the system and probably say, "Okay, I will take 'x' or 'y'. " or whatever. If everybody has information at the same time, there is some equality. But, in the auction system why I said that you cannot dismiss the auction system is you take what you want from the auction system and if the price is too high you do not take it at the higher prices and you cut it off. That is over there. You can have another auction subsequently. The auction systems by nature have to be competitive. Otherwise, you do not need to have the auction system.

So, the question here which we have not got an answer - you said that we really need to look at the manual and we will look at it - is whether this information has consistently gone out electronically or otherwise to everybody in the system at the same time. Then, they have decided whether to give it or not. We will have to establish that. The other thing that, I think, we need to remember is the Central Bank obviously wants to take the money at the lowest possible cost which is, I think, correct. Why should the Government pay at a much higher cost but also the lowest possible cost is not just in isolation because costs, rates and interest rates have to be looked in different tenures. So, the one consideration will be because I think, the wording you read also said from a long-term perspective – you read something a little while ago. So, I think it is the balance between the cost and the tenure, has to be taken into account because you advertise a 30-year bond and then you say, "Okay, we have a gap and we can get it for lower and we take a two-year bond or a five-year bond, it is not the same thing as taken in a 30-year bond. So, costs and tenures are related to each other. It is not just cost in isolation and, I think, you have to look at the whole thing. So, who is making that decision – I do not know whether it is the Tender Board Committee or whatever because there is one thing. Mr. Chairman, which we have not got clarification, we will have to again call for and ask officials, it is the process. It is still not clear and I went over that now and we will have to get clarification again because we want to check more than one source: whether this process is being followed, whether there is a domestic debt management committee, who ascertains the domestic debt requirement, whether there is Public Debt Department who calls for the auction. We need to know, I am not talking of individuals, I am talking of ex-officio, whether members are sharing with each other and whether there is a Tender Board committee, which we know there is and it has been mentioned.

But, what is the role of the Tender Board Committee? We need to know whether they are the ones who do the auctions, whether they see the original bids or not. One clarification we did get from the former Governor is that of course the Governor approves. That is very clear. The Governor approves the process; we have to really establish that because for the question that is swelling in our mind without knowing the processed details, what the former Governor says is very helpful in terms of the policy; in terms of knowing the bigger answers to the questions swelling in our mind, we will have to follow up with it.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I may just add something to that. Mr. Chairman, where we seem to be missing the point is, this tenure. Once you have said that you want to take Rs. 1 billion, there is no necessity for you, even if you have a request for an additional amount, to take from the same tenure. We have had instances like this in the past as well. If there is somebody or the Treasury who comes and says that they want another-

The Chairman: We are going through that.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Okay. You want me to answer it now or later?

The Chairman: No. It is okay.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There can be so many different ways in which funds can be raised, not only from a 30-year bond. If there is a request from the General Treasury, first of all we might say "if you want some immediate money, go to Bank of Ceylon and take overdraft or you can have short-term Treasury Bills. If there are not takers, you can give it to the Central Bank without disturbing the rates." So, I think what the Hon. Member needs to

grasp is that one of the most important criteria of the debt management is the price. You cannot ignore that. You cannot say we have to get money only at 30 years or only at 20 years. You have got to be conscious. Otherwise you will have a situation where you are only looking at certain tenures and the debt management of this country will be so out of control that you will not be able to balance the balance of it. That is very critical. So, I think you need to be very cautious when you take these decisions because if you do not have it in the right form and then you have a system which you blindly follow only without taking the entirety of the system into consideration, you will have a very difficult situation.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: The difference seems to be is, I am not questioning the issue of taking it at a lower rate as you need to take it at a lower rate, when you are managing debt, you are not only managing rate, you are managing the duration of the debt. Therefore, the decision to take 30-year bond is because you have to take the duration back.. That will not only be about this transaction, but you are looking at the whole debt profile also. Otherwise you are going to be having more and more debt amounting up of earlier payments and cash flow problems. So, the dealers would have done duration analysis saying, "Let us push it back" and so forth. The duration and the rates are clearly related. There is no question about it. When that decision is made, somebody is making a judgmental decision because those two are connected. That is the point I am making. If it is purely taken at a lower rate, generally, you may get the short-term bonds at a lower rate and you can manage the cash flow. But, I think we have to keep that in mind. So, I think it is just the difference. It is obviously the way you see it.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Actually, I am glad that you mentioned the point about the duration so that we can have it on record as well. I remember that the average time to maturity at the time I took office in 2006 was only one year and nine months. When I left the office, it was over six years. So, we have done that right. We have been able to shift the duration as high as possible. It could have bee more, but, there has been a very clear shift of the duration. If you like, I can send you a note after the Committee where the duration of the debt portfolio has improved. That is exactly what the Hon. Member is mentioning where we have improved. So, we have to take action, not only with the total amount of the maturity, but also the price in order to improve it. If you look at the average rate of the total debt portfolio, that has also decreased quite substantially. I will give you a clue as to how the debt management has been done with regard to both two figures. Both those are extremely vital. Both the price of debt and the duration of debt have been managed and I was not a loss on us as well. At that time we gave an enormous amount of attention.

The Chairman: Were there 30-year bonds during your period?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: We are the ones who started it. Earlier, there were no takers. I remember when I first went to the Central Bank, we could not issue even a five-year bond. Do you know why? That is because the people did not take as they did not have confidence in the economy even to put money for more than five-year bond.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You started to issue 30-year bonds.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I started it because the conditions of the country got changed. We were then able to have long-term confidence in the economy. That is a very important question. We started it because the time was right.

The Chairman: Can you remember which year?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think it was in 2014.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, I think in 2013/2014. We have that here.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The Auditor-General might be able to see it. We have gradually increased it. Today, you would find that many auctions are of short-term amounts. That is not a very good thing. You have got to have a mixed of these auctions so that your money does not bunch; that is called bunching up.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Hon. Minister, Eran Wickramaratne's explanation is correct in that case.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is partially correct. The objective should not be not only the lengthening of the tenure of the debt portfolio, but also the cost because the cost is a very important factor in this whole exercise.

We have to look at both together in order to get a right decision.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There are some questions that I would like to raise. The first, actually relates to a point that was made. There have been several questions about this direct placement. I think there were attempts to suggest that there is something wrong. So, I would like to just site the evidence produced when I was not here and maybe my Friends were also not here. The Bank of Ceylon gave very clear evidence as to how these direct placements were made. I just want to site because the people seem to have forgotten this.

"හැබැයි ඒක හුහක් අවස්ථාවල හැමෝටම වාගේ ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබුණා. සමහර අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා ගන්න බැරි. ඒ කියන්නේ issue කරන amount එක පොඩි වුණා නම්, සම්පූර්ණ bond එක එක් කෙනෙක් ගත්තොත් දෙවනුවට call කරන කෙනාට හම්බ වෙන්නේ නැහැ."

This seems to me to indicate that there was certainly equality and transparency about offering, but I think it is well worth asking whether there have been any instances where people wanted this and felt that they have not been informed. You said that you have not heard. Mrs. Senanayake told that perhaps they tell it now. But, we would like to have concrete instances where people felt that they have been deliberately deprived of the information. Bank of Ceylon gives a very clear systems of how it works and also says that the people have the right to call in and ask. So, former Governor, is that the case? Have the people never felt that they were deprived of the information in this regard?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Let me put it this way. I had not heard anyone making that complaint. That suggests to me that they were satisfied and that they were notified because it is not for me to go and ask everyone whether they had been notified. If they were not notified like what happened in this particular instance of 27th of February, they make a fuss. There are the checks and balances that are obviously there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: As far as I know we have never heard of a fuss before of this magnitude with regard to bond dealings in the last ten years.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, never.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: My second question is because I need to clarify that Mrs. Senanayake made an alternative when asked whether it is in the manual. I think the answer was, "No, it is not in the manual." Obviously, they need it all the time.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I want to get it clarified. If you do not know, we have to get the manual.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I have the manual with me and you can see it.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The second point is whether it is said at the auction sheet or it is solely at the discretion of the Governor. What I understand from everything is that the Governor had never had any discretion. Although you have brought it for the approval, the direct placements are made by the dealer. The Governor has to approve the results of the auction.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, absolutely.

The Chairman: The recommendation comes to you. Then only you can approve it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He has to approve it. There have been instances where the Governor has not approved. He said that he did not approve.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, is it correct to say that-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Subsequently I would approve that no money should be taken. There is always an approval. Then, the decision would be that the rates are too high and therefore we will not take anything. There is always a decision.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Technically, you could also ask to take more.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, that also can happen.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But my point is this. Once the auction is done by the procedure is clear, when the direct placements follow, is that subject to your discretion?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, not at all. It only comes to the Monetary Board subsequently when the entire month report is submitted.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, the procedure is, once the auction has fixed a price, it is open to the dealers from your Department, to communicate with the primary dealers with a fixed interest rate.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Absolutely!

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: And then whatever bids come in are accepted at that

fixed interest rate and you have nothing to do with it, except when the schedule comes to the Monetary Board for not even ratification because the decision has already been made. It is just for information.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That is correct. I also want to mention, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for giving that lead. I think what was stated in one of the speeches were that the Governor is used to sit down and then allocate it to his friends - what was said was to his cronies. Certainly that was not the case. I, as the Governor, I think, even my predecessors never took part in those in any way, in any one of those transactions.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The evidence we have had so far, not that we have consulted all 16 primary dealers. But no one has made any such suggestion and Bank of Ceylon is very clear about their satisfaction with the procedure.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: But then the suggestion made was that the Governor has been sitting down and -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is something -

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Now I think I want to make that - you have invited me and I want to mention that certainly that is completely wrong.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think it needs to be established because otherwise there was a leading question giving you two alternatives which I believe neither of which is correct. The auctions decision has to be approved by the Governor. Subsequently, he has no discretion at all.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Absolutely.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can you clarify that. The auction is announced and then the rates are there. They decided particular rate to take, 'x' amount. Then they say once the rate is fixed, "Really, we want another 'y'." Is it correct? So, when that comes to the Governor, - if I am incorrect, correct me please- the Governor can say, "Okay 'x' is at this amount, but we need to take 'y.'" Sometimes he says, "Do not take anything because the rates are too high," or he says, " You can go ahead and take 'y.' The Governor never gets involved in from where they take it or whom they take it from. But he can give an instruction because he is finally responsible for liquidity. That is because he may be considering so many different variables. So, in that sense, he is saying, take 'y.'

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is, for the auction.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: No, beyond the auction.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think that is a good point.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: No, I am talking of beyond the auction.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Once the auction has been decided on the recommendation of the Tender Board which you can or cannot accept, then the fixing of the exchange rates subsequently for direct placements comes to you for ratification or not?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. Once the auction is over and the Governor signs off from that, that is the end of the Governor's role.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. That is for the auction. But, subsequently, what you said is, if they need more money -

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: If the need more money, they will take that rate that has only been established at the auction and if there is a shortfall of say, Rs. 2 billion, or Rs. 3 billion or whatever, they will invite all the other primary dealers to place monies at that rate.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: At that rate?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Absolutely.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Not more or less?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes. When the Hon. Eran Wickremaratne mentioned 'x' and 'y' I did not understand it very well, certainly not an interest rate which is higher.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So therefore, that is correct. Your approval has to happen at the auction time, subsequently, the way they take more money does not come to you for any decision at all. It is based on that exchange rate.

The Chairman: Exchange rate?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Not exchange rate, it is the interest rate. What they do is, it is either the auction rate or the secondary market rate, if it is lower.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So. they make that decision.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That is made by them and the secondary market rate is -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What I really want to make clear from what you tell us was that, you have no discretion at all with regard to direct placements.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If I can just follow up on that, when they take it, the auction is there, the rate is there, then, really the dealers have a liquidity position that they are trying to fulfill. So, what the former Governor seems to be saying is, the dealers do that, the Governor has nothing to do with that. They will fill their liquidity position at that rate or lower.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Lower means the secondary market rate that is really - because otherwise, it will not be fair.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But, will it be for the same tenor that it was offered at that particular option or can the tenor vary?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You can have all those details, but I am not very familiar with all. But I know once the governor signs off and the rate is established, that is established.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, the rate is established, I agree.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: And then thereafter, the Public Debt Department has their own procedures in order to raise the balanced funds but they have to fulfill the conditions that have been set out in their own manual and the Auditor-General will check that, I am sure.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think the Hon. Eran Wickremaratne made a good point because for instance if there is a fixed rate but they offer it at -

The Chairman: Are you asking a question or are you making an explanation?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am asking it now. Tell me if I am incorrect. Do they have the right to offer at the same rate for much lower tenor?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That particular auction and that particular instrument are for a particular tenor. So after that you cannot change the tenor.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is what I wanted to know. So that is transparent to me and the next question is, we were told by the Deputy Governor that there was once an auction at which Rs. 2 billion was taken. Subsequently, Rs. 70 billion was raised by direct placements, but what you are telling us is that, all that Rs. 70 billion would have been for the same tenor.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Same principles would have been followed. I do not know exactly, but the same principles would have been followed. Like what I mentioned, it would have either the auction rate or the secondary market rate whichever is lower.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, they would not have the discretion to change the tenor following that auction.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, if they would have done anything wrong they would have been -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Exactly! Mr. Cabraal, this is a question, you said, unless they follow the manual you will not approve. Have you found an instance when they have not followed the manual and gone through the proper procedure?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I do not understand.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who does take the final decision with regards to the bonds or the direct placements? Is it the Tender Board?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: At the Central Bank we have, what is known as the Internal Audit. The Internal Audit is supposed to check these procedures to see whether these are being followed. Then, we also have a compliance officer. The compliance officer also has a responsibility to see that all the rules and regulations are complied with. Then, we have the External Auditor, who has to see whether the external audit- they check whether the procedures have been followed. We have an auditor from IFRS audit, that is Ernest and Young, they also check it. Then, we have also got a safeguard assessment team that comes from the IMF at different times. So, each and every transaction has some cover over the other to be assessed. That is why I am saying, when there is a manual and if the manual will be also looked at to see whether they have followed it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But have we found an instance when there was a breach of -

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Not to my knowledge because if there was a breach -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If I would say this from the report that we got; the Committee that was appointed by the Government, the Prime Minister to look into. It states that on the 27th of May, 2014, the page X :5 :2 clearly states that the Tender Board Committee has not been party to this decision - the Superintendent of the Public Debt Department signature and your signature are the only signatures there and the others are just ratified it. So, that means they did not go through the proper procedure. So there is a breach of conduct there.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: May I know that you mentioned about this report, I also have a lot of -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Not the report, I am talking about something you have signed -

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Is this in the report. Is it not?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, it is in the final page of the report.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: If you look at that you will find that there are two signatures at the top of the page as well. This Committee has even missed that. This Committee of three lawyers has even missed that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I do not know whether they have missed that. But they clearly said that it has not gone through the Tender Board

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: They have clearly said that but it is completely wrong. Because if you look at that, note that they themselves have attached where they say only the Superintend of Public Debt and the Governor signed -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They have also said –

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You are trying to justify that, I know.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I am just asking you whether this has gone trough the Tender Board.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I am saying that this Committee that has written this report is entirely wrong and there are lots of other things that are wrong in this report. I am glad that you mentioned it. May I take up some of those matters. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Chairman, if you look at the top of the final page you can see that when a note comes to the Governor, it has to follow a certain process. This process is by the SPD and he signs off and when he signs off, he has to ensure that his procedures are followed. SPD is the Superintendent of Public Debt. Then, you see a note on top before "G." "G" is the Governor, "DGS" is the Deputy Governor, "/AGM" is the Assistant Governor. This Committee has missed that also. This Committee, which had three lawyers, has even missed that and they are writing to say that it only has the signature of the SPD when these two signatures are on top. This is what the Hon. Minister just mentioned. It is completely a wrong statement. I am really shocked.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I just want to clarify this. Did this go through the Tender Board?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I do not know.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I am asking you former Governor because the Tender Board is the one that brings it to you.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The Deputy Governor brings it to me. So, it is up to them to see that all these things are followed.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, is it the Tender Board's recommendation that comes to you through the Deputy Governor?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, this is the document that comes to the Governor -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, where does this document come from? Does it say that it is from the Tender Board?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Can I explain that, please?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, please. Go ahead.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: When the Governor gets a document, it is submitted by the Deputy Governor and it is not by the SPD only. So, the Deputy Governor will come and say that all the people have signed. Then only the Governor puts his signature saying "approved."

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. So, the Deputy Governor brings the final report that is submitted by the Tender Board? Is it?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, the Deputy Governor brings the document. That is what happens. The Governor does not see the Tender Board's papers.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So. this document can come from anywhere. The

Deputy Governor can bring this document from anywhere.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, the Deputy Governor is the Deputy Governor because of that reason. He is not – May I explain it to you?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: According to this Report, the Head of the Public Debt Department has signed this and sent it to you for your ratification and you have signed and subsequently the officers of the Tender Board have put their signatures. I am trying to ask you the question. Tell me.

The Chairman: So, allow him to explain.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You must try to understand as to how the Central Bank works. Central Bank's Governor's job is not to see whether the Tender Board meets at this time. His job is not to go and sit with the Tender Board. His job is to be guided by the Deputy Governor.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Anything that the Deputy Governor brings to you, you will sign. Is it?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: May I finish Hon. Minister because it is important for you to understand this?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You explain it to me. I am asking and I understand. You are saying that the Deputy Governor brings it and you sign. Is it?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is necessary for you to understand the procedures.

The Chairman: You are a layman. So, let him explain. After that, you can ask your question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Sir, he explains.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You must also appreciate a certain way in which the institution like the Central Bank works. There is a certain way it works. The Governor of the Central Bank has so many duties. The job of the Governor of the Central Bank is not to go and see as to how many people are sitting at the Tender Board; who is making the bids and what is happening there. That is not his business.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I understand. That is very clear.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: So, his business is to see as to what is being brought to him by the Deputy Governor who also has to see whether the Assistant Governor has done his work. The Assistant Governor's job is to see whether the other persons beneath him have done their work. Then, they have systems. So, the Governor gets a document which the Superintendent of the Public Debt has signed and it has been countersigned by the Assistant Governor. So, that Committee has missed it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The Committee Report states that when they questioned, the Tender Board has clearly said that this has been signed subsequently after your approval.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You have got the version from the Committee. I am giving you the version. So, I think, it is up to the Committee here to accept it or not. That is okay as far as I am concerned.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: My only question is, do you sign anything that the Deputy Governor – It is clear to me that what the Deputy Governor brings and gives you, you will ratify, approve and sign. But, what I am asking you is, do you sign anything that the Deputy Governor brings in?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That suggests to me –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, I am asking - Clarify this. That is all.

The Chairman: That is unfair.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That is an unfair question also but I will answer that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Please, answer that if you can.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think, it belittles the position of Governor. Governor's job is, not just because somebody brings it to him, to sign it. I am a former Governor. So, it does not matter to me. But, if you ask the Governor, "Look, anything that comes to you, would you sign?" I think, is not a nice question to ask. Anyway, I will answer that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is up to you to clear it.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: As you can see, the Governor has final responsibility. So, it is the Governor's business to see whether these things are in order. So, the Governor has to rely on certain people as well. So, the Governor will have say, two or three Deputy Governors whom he has to trust and whom he has to accept as the right people. That is why they have been appointed. They will also take those decisions properly. So, what I am trying

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to say here is, now that you raised this issue with regard to this Three-Member Committee, they have missed the most important point when they say that the Governor and the Superintendent of Public Debt have signed off a document without the others' knowing. Governor has relied upon the other signatures as well of a Deputy Governor and of an Assistant Governor.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I just make a simple point? The Tender Committee Chairman is the Deputy Governor and the Assistant Governor is the Member of that Committee as well. Is it?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, this document that was brought to you was signed by the two senior Members of the Tender Committee.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: And the next person is the Superintendent of the Public Debt. It is up to them to see that those procedures are followed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I have to say that – I now see that the paragraph is somewhere else. It seems to me that - I want this on record. – there is an attempt by Mr. Samarasiri to bring in a red herring and actually, tells an untruth about this because for him to have failed to have noted this, is shocking.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, it is very strange. Shocking!

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Shocking! I think, the Three-Man Committee should not have reproduced this if they could not see the signatures. But, it does seem to me to be an absolute breach of the right of Parliament to be informed correctly–

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Completely misled.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: and the fact that you have this statement when very clearly the Chairman of the Tender Board, the Deputy Chairman– I assume that the Assistant Governor acts in the absence of the Governor - and the Superintendent of the Public Debt have signed the document saying that the Tender Board decided to accept it- I mean, it seems to me that this is an effort to throw dust in our eyes. So, I think, this Committee should very strongly say that this is unacceptable and after the behaviour of Mr. Samarasiri here, I think, we should recommend that someone of that sort is unfit to have a position of this importance. I want that on record. Mr. Chairman, I am shocked.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Which document are you referring to?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am referring to what the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake brought up She has obviously read this extremely carefully; made a claim not having looked at the back, repeating the sentiments on – I am shocked.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: What is the page?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Paragraph 32 on page 16.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Mr. Chairman, now that -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I want it get this clarified. You have your time to clarify.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Thank you. May I just take a few minutes of your time to make some points?

The Hon. E. Saravanapavan: Excuse me. I will ask you just one question. Is there a ratio between direct placements and auctions?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There is no ratio mentioned.

The Hon. E. Saravanapavan: Is it not in the manual either?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There is a discretion that is permitted to the Public Debt Department.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I also make a point? Maybe this gentleman does not study this as thoroughly as I do. Mr. Samarasiri told us, when we pointed out breaches, that the manual is not abide by. It is a guideline and it has not been ratified by the Monetary Board; it has not been adopted by the Bank and it is a very good guideline. But, it just seemed to me that if we are going to rely on what appears to be a breach of the manual in order to draw red herrings about this incident that has occurred, we are falling into a trap that was set for us in order to hold us finding out the truth about this appalling incident. Mr. Samarasiri himself pointed out that the manual is not accepted by anybody; it is a good guideline and they should certainly follow it where possible. But, when you have a Deputy Governor who makes a falsehood like this, I think, we really need to be more serious about the financial probity.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: May I take a few minutes, Mr. Chairman, to give you a few points about my observations about this Report, which I think, are useful to you

The Chairman: Yes, please. That is very good.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think, on page three, it is mentioned that direct placement is commonly known as private placement. I think, that is where the word "red herring" which you mentioned comes in because I believe this new word, terminology has been introduced –

The Chairman: Okay, you carry on.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: So, some or the other, some new term has been used here and now it is there. Second point is, 3.3 states, - it is very significant - that the primary dealers interviewed by the Committee were of the opinion that the private placement lacks transparency.

There are to key components in public debts. One is the issuer. The issuer is the Government and the Central Bank issues public debt-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can I interrupt you, Mr. Cabraal because it is not just this Report. Most people who came and sat here made it very clear and evident to us that auctions are far more transparent than direct placements. So, that is the understanding. It has been established. When we go through our records, we see it.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. I contest that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. You were not here when most of them came and -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I was here. I went through everything and I studied it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But that is the understanding we have and it is not just this Report. That is being said.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Let me be very clear. The word, "Transparency" was used – but I think it would apply-

The Chairman: You can argue it later. Let Mr. Cabraal finish.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. I am sorry. The record must be correct.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: I am asking questions from him. Let me finish.

The Chairman: Another red herring. Okay. you carry on. Mr. Cabraal.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I, of course think there is no terminology called "private placements" I think it has been introduced by this Report. After this Report introduced that word and the Prime Minister mentioned that in Parliament, many people started talking about "private placements". That is what happened. But there is no such thing called "private placements" in the dictionary or the lexicon of the Central Bank. It is always known as "direct placements." That is how it has been. If you ask all the public debt managers and the Governors before me, they will probably tell you the same thing. Somebody has brought in this new terminology and people are getting carried away with it. I do not think it is necessary to get carried away.

Now the item 3.3 of this Reports states, "Even though the officials of the PDD were of the opinion that the private placement is a healthy mechanism, the primary dealers interviewed by the Committee were of the opinion that the private placement lacks transparency." Mr. Chairman, there are. two key components of public debts. One is the issuer, which is the Government and the Central Bank issues public debt on behalf of the Government. You all are representing the Government. You must be consciously worried as to whether the best price is taken or not and the Central Bank is fulfilling that role for you because when the Central Bank does all these things, it is trying to raise money at the lowest possible cost and I think you all are keen to see that that is happening. But what is the intention of the primary dealers and a normal investor? If you have millions of rupees Hon. Member, would you not like to get the best possible rate for that? You would. So, there is a conflict that is there. The primary dealers who represent the investors, will naturally want the best possible price and there is nothing wrong in that also. If you ask the primary dealers and any investors, "Would you like to have an auction or would you like to have some system where you can get a better price?" They will definitely say that. So, this Report written by the three-member Committee – I am shocked – has said that they asked it from these primary dealers who represent the investors and also they have said that they are of the opinion that private placements lack transparency and they buy that! That is what is so sad. They buy that and it comes to Parliament. Sometimes you may also buy it. That is what is sad. I do not want you to buy that. I am telling you as the former

Governor, please do not buy that story because that is not a good story.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think that the answer to that question will turn on the issue which I asked originally and we need to check it. If all the primary dealers are getting information at the same time, I think your argument is valid.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Mr. Chairman, I think this statement is shocking, to my mind.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I do not want to comment on the statement.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: As the former Governor, I hope I can take a few liberties to comment on it, if you do not mind. If you tell me not to -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I have a few other questions.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I will come to that. But I think these are important. I think that this three-member Committee observes that there is no proper mechanism.

The Chairman: Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha, if you have any question, you can ask.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Cabraal can come up with the analysis.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: And it states, Mr. Chairman, "The Committee observes that there is no proper mechanism with regard to private placement." I do not think it is proper to say because as I mentioned, all these agencies have gone through the mechanism of the private placements. This particular three-member Committee Report call it "private placement" but it is a direct placement. The Auditor-General, the IFRS auditors and IMF – all of them have gone through it and they all have said that it was in order. I do not know after a few days whether this Committee can say that there is no proper system.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: Just to interrupt- but can there be favouritism as well, as far as when you are determined and deciding on whom to give the direct placements to? Can that happen?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: If there was, it should have come out by now.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. But it can happen.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes. The only time that there was favouritism-

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: So, for that reason some who does not get it can complain.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Absolutely.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: About this statement – they have also taken what the primary dealers have said and it is not that they are making up a story. Maybe, primary dealers would also complain. So, you cannot say-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think that was what happened with regard to the bonds on 27th February. There were set of people who said, "We knew nothing about it."

The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, what you are really saying is that there can be favouritism in auctions as well and if the auction is distorted by virtue of offering "x" and taking arbitrary decisions to take ten "x" –

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think that is what –

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: I disagree with that.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I do not agree with that because the fact that whether information went out, the Hon. (Prof.) Wijesinha,- it went out improperly. In other words some people had information which others did not have- is what we need to establish as a Committee. That I agree with.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. I made a further point. The further point I made which you failed to understand Hon. Eran, is that you keep saying –

The Chairman: We can discuss those matters later.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: No, just to clear it, what I am just saying is this. We are trying to establish whether information went out and whom really got it from. That is what we are trying to establish. That is the problem. But the danger of the rubbishing the auction system – that is what I am concerned about –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Rubbishing the auction system?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: No, I am not saying you are but I am saying that the way the discussion is going on. we may come to that conclusion because it is electronically happening and people are putting bid electronically. Whether they had insider information is another matter. That is a different issue.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The point I am trying to make –

The Chairman: We can do that later. We must finish the clarification of the former Governor.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: These are taken from the evidence given by the Governor. It is there under item 4 in page 4 of this Report and it states, "He further pointed out that the previous Governor borrowed from the EPF and invested in commercial banks and instructed commercial banks to borrow from overseas." I would like you to check to see whether there had been anything like that done.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: We will do it.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Please check that up because I want to tell you that 95 per cent of the EPF funds are invested with the Government -in Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds. So, there is a certain methodology by which the EPF also invest and that is transparent. You can have a look at that, Mr. Chairman.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did you invest them in commercial banks?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: EPF has invested a very minute portion to buy shares in the commercial banks.

The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. I asked whether you invested it in commercial banks.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The investments of the EPF has made in commercial banks as well as other –

The Chairman: It is not his money, Hon. (Prof.) Wijesinha.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I wish I had that kind of money.

The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, the tenor of this sentence is that the Governor borrowed from EPF and invested in commercial banks. What this suggests is that the Governor of the Central Bank borrowed money from the EPF – which you say is the case – and invested that money in commercial banks.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That is completely wrong. That is a silly statement. That is not a correct statement. Then this Report further states, "Central Bank did not have enough foreign currency to meet such payment." On the 23rd of January there was a repayment of US Dollars 500 million. So, this states, "The Central Bank did not have enough foreign currency to meet such payment and that itself created some volatility in the market." That is not a correct statement. We had US Dollars 8.2 billion in the reserves. At the time the Government changed, there was US Dollars 8.2 billion and to make US Dollars 500 million was possible but there was also a plan to go to market and borrow US Dollars 1.5 billion. That was available which meant that this money could have been paid off without any fuss at all.

The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is it US Dollars 1.5 million or US Dollars 1.5 billion?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: US Dollars 1.5 billion. US Dollars 8.2 billion was the reserves of the Central Bank – reserves of the country. If you look at the figures as at 31st of December, 2014, you will see it.

The Chairman: I have identified that.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Very good. Then item 6 of this three-member Committee Report states, "However the market was unclear at that time because the CBSL had not been clear in declaring its monetary policy." Every month, immediately after the monetary policy decision, a statement is issued by the Central Bank.

For the last nine years, you can see that. So, if the market was unclear I do not know how this Committee could have said that the market was unclear. Maybe, it was unclear to the Committee because they did not understand it. But, every month it was given and every month there was to be an interview on Bloomberg which set out what the monetary policy was. Then, "When questioned about the success of the new monetary policy, he said that there is an effective participation in the market and the CBSL raising records of money in the market. CBSL has always been able to raise monies in the market at any given time." Even at the height of the humanitarian operation we raised monies.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Last bond issue-

The Chairman: You do not allow him to finish.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am just asking a question relevant to that. The CBSL always been able to raise money. But, I believe the last bond issue was a failure and the Hon. Wickramaratne said in Parliament yesterday

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that this was all your fault. Can you explain that?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I thought I was only responsible for what happened in the past.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am talking about what was said yesterday.

The Chairman: Do not comment on what transpired in the House.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think this is important because if the Central Bank is raising a record amount of money, but they have failed because it is your fault. I think you owe a country an explanation.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Of course, I did see that the number of investors had reduced dramatically from about 450 investors who came for the 2012 international bond, it has reduced to about 160. I did not hear this comment, but somebody mentioned it to me. If I could have persuaded about 300 investors worldwide from my home in Borella not to invest I must be really up to something good. That is something that you all have to ask them.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Mr. Chairman, I have to answer this because now we are introducing what was said in the House.

The Chairman: This is not the House. This is where some serious investigation takes place. You are making another-

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Sir, what I said in the House is important. It is in Hansard.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Then, may I also take another minute of your time. On page 5 it says, "Therefore, given the fact that the funding requirement of the Government as at 2nd March, 2015 was Rs. 13.5 billion. The PDD has decided to announce the said 30-year bond up to an amount of Rs. 1 billion even though the minutes of the Monetary Board No. 4/4/2015 specifies the issue as a 30-year bond." Mr. Chairman, there are many options that are available to the Central Bank to raise funds. As I mentioned earlier also, if there is a sudden request comes from the Government many occasions there can be-

The Chairman: Who decides about the auctions?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The Central Bank will decide.

The Chairman: Is it the Monetary Board or is it the Public Debt Department?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is the Public Debt Department. It is always based upon the six criteria that I have mentioned initially. You look at those criteria. Just because the Government says, "Can I have another Rs. 10 billion more?" the Central Bank should not go and say, "I will take on the bond that has already been announced." That is why the Central Bank will say, "Let us look at the shorter options first. Deal with the funds that the Government wants and then raise the monies later on." I think that is the way we have followed it in the past. That is what I want to just mention because that is very important to establish.

The Chairman: Is there any other references to you on that report? If there is any reference you have to answer it.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There is one point there. Some members of the Central Bank have said that there was no loss. See the way the interest rates work.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Is it in the report?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, it is in the report. I saw that. "Though not directly within the mandate of the TOR the Committee questioned Mrs. Deepa Senewiratne, the Superintendent of the Public Dept Department, Dr.Azim, the Assistant SPDs'..."

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: What is the para?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Para no. 21"... and Mr. Samarasiri, the Acting Governor whether the bond issue has caused any loss to the Government." In my view, yes it has caused a very serious loss because all the interest rates went up in sympathy. One end of the interest rate structure - the yield curve - was disturbed and you increased that interest rate by almost 3 per cent it has an impact right across on all the other interest rates as well and that had happened.

The Chairman: It is all integrated.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is all integrated. Sir, you are quite right. The conservative assessment that has been made so far- Someone has sent me a basis. It has come about at 51.9 billion so far. If you like I can send you that particular paper that I received of the workings of that 51.9 billion. I think you should take cognizance of that Mr. Chairman, because that shows when a sudden decision

like this is taken what a huge impact it can have on the finances of the country.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we get down that paper and we will look at it because these are extremely hypothetical and I completely contest this view. I have always contested this view about arriving at losses and gains based on decisions that were made on economic basis and it should-

The Chairman: There is a lot of controversy.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes, there is a lot of controversy. I think we should get the paper anyway to educate ourselves over the assumptions.

The Chairman: I agree with you.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, you have a look at that.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Mr. Wijewardanaක් දුන්නා මේ වාගේම proposal එකක්.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ එකත් දෙන්න අපට.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: මෙතැනදී මම මෙහෙම කියන්න හේතුව සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ report එකේ දීලා තිබෙනවා එහෙම කිසිම loss එකක් නැහැ කියා. මම කියන්නේ මෙහෙම loss එකක් තිබෙනවා. මෙහෙම loss එකක් නැහැයි කියලා මේ report එකේ ලියනවා නම්-

The Chairman: You are the former Governor.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: මම හිටිය කාලයේ මෙහෙම දෙයක් වුණා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා මගෙන් ඇහුවා නම් මට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද මෙහෙම loss එකක් නැහැ කියලා. මම හිතන්නේ සමහරවිට මෙතුමිය අහයි ඇයි එහෙම loss එකක් තිබුණේ කියලා. අදත් එහෙම අහන්න ඕනෑ. මම කියන්නේ එහෙම loss එකක් තිබෙන විට අහන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම loss එකක් ඇයි ඇති වුණේ කියලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Mr. Cabral, මෙහෙම වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ අපි කලින් මේවා බැලුවෙත් නැහැ, බලන්න තරම් ආන්දෝලනාත්මක තත්ත්වයකට පත් වුණෙත් නැහැ, එහෙම පත් වෙන්නට ප්‍රධානතම හේතුව තමයි, මෙතැන bid කරපු එක primary dealer කෙනෙක්ගේ ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාවක් ගැන. ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාව ආවේ නැති නම් මෙය යනවා. මම දන්නේ නැහැ ඔබතුමාගේ කාලයේදී losses තිබුණාද නැතිද කියන කාරණය. ඒක සොයා බලන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාවම- මම පොඩ්ඩක් ඔය කාරණයෙන් බැහැර වෙන්නද ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න. ඔබතුමාටත් මේ dealer එක්කම තිබුණා කියලා කිව්වොත්, මම ඒක ප්‍රශ්න කළාට කමක් නැතිද? ඔබතුමාගේ සොහොයුරියක් වන ශිරෝමි චිත්‍රමසිංහ Perpetual Capital (Private) Limited එකේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ ධුරයක් දැරුවා නේද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: මගේ ඥාතීන් බැංකු රාශියකම ඉන්නවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: විශේෂයෙන්ම මේ primary dealer එක්ක.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඔබතුමිය බොහොම හොඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇහුවේ. මම කියන්නම් මගේ ඥාතීන් සිටින ස්ථාන. මට හිතුනා ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය මගෙන් අහයි කියා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අහන්න වෙනවා. We do not have to beat around the bush because on this whole issue we are wasting our time. You all are here. All this is because of a relationship.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: What is important is for us to recognize whether anything wrong has happened not because my relation was there.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: At the DFCC Bank, my brother-in-law -Mr. Ravi Thambaiah was a Director and now my niece is a Director, At the NDB, my brother-in-law was a Chairman, Mr. Sunil Wijesinghe. At the Sampath Bank my sister-in-law, Ms. Dara Wijethilake was a Director.

The Chairman: It is a banking family

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: At the HDFC Bank my sister was a Chairman.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And also at the DFCC or HDFC Bank Arjuna Aloysius was also a Director.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Very Correct.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, there was a close link between Arjuna Aloysius and your sister.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: These all are close links

The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha: What is purpose of this?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Hon. Rajiva Wijesinha, it is important because the whole discussion now is because-

The Chairman: So, how can he answer to that?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: May I answer that? I think it is a valid question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Let him answer. Hon. Rajiva Wijesinha, why are you getting excited about that?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: At the Hatton National Bank, my first cousin, Mr. Amal Cabral-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Hon. Wickramaratne, do you want to add something?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Sir, let me finish.

The Chairman: Hon. Rosy Senanayake, let him answer.

The Hon. M.T. Hasen Ali: The present Governor's relationship - Mr. Arjun Mahendran's brother or son-in-law something like that - also has come out for discussion. So, that is the reason why she is raising this question, but not for anything else.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Perfectly fine.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I want to say who my relations are. At the DFCC Bank, the CEO, Mr. Nihal Fonseka is also my first cousin. At the HNB, Mr. Amal Cabral is my first cousin. At the DFCC Vardhana Bank, my niece was a Director, Ms. Shivani Thambaiah. Currently, at the Bank of Ceylon, again my brother-in-law, Mr. Ranil Wijesinghe is a Director, the current Administration-

Has there been any one instance, unlike in the present instance, where there has been insider information being traded or whatever allegation that has been made? Has anyone made any allegation that anyone of them had done anything wrong?

The Chairman: Why do you not say you are remotely related to the Hon Prime Minister?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, of course. I am remotely related to the Hon. Prime Minister also.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Ex-Governor, Mr. Cabral, my question was not that. My question was whether your sister, Shiromi Wickramasinghe was a Board Member of Perpetual Capital Holdings and Perpetual Capital Holdings has been a very strong primary dealer during your time?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. It was not a primary dealer. That is where you are missing a point.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Clear this. I am only asking the question.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Anyway, if you have any evidence that she had done anything wrong, please take action. I am not saying, "No".

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: All I am asking is, I want to -

The Chairman: Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake, the charge is against the present Governor and not the former Governor.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, I am not charging. I am asking whether she was -

The Chairman: Allow him to speak.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Sir he is speaking.

The Chairman: Do not jump all the time.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Perpetual Treasuries bids were rejected before two thousand -

The Chairman: Mr. Cabral, you carry on.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There you are.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Sir, I only wanted him to answer my question.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Hon. Member, you know this.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I did not know about that.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපට කථා කරන්න දුන්නේම නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් අනිත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු කථා කරන්න බලාගෙන ඉන්නවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා මට හිතෙන්නේ පසු ගිය ආණ්ඩුව කාලයේ හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා නරකයි හෝ හොඳයි හෝ දැන් ඉන්න අධිපතිවරයා නරකයි හෝ හොඳයි කියන කාරණය නොවෙයි අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ. මේ නිශ්චිත සිදුවීම පිළිබඳ දැන ගන්නයි අපට අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එපමණයි අපට ඕනෑ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මොකක්ද වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා අපට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේ අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඉගෙන ගන්න ඕනෑ මේකේ මොකක්ද මේ තිබෙන දේ කියලා. එහෙම නැති වුණොත් මේක අපට විසඳන්න බැරි වෙනවා. අපි එතකොට වෙන පැත්තකටයි යන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අනික සභාපතිතුමා, දැන් මේ සිද්ධියේදී මෙතුමිය කිව්ව මේ ඥානි සම්බන්ධතාවය පමණක් නොවෙයි මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. ඥානි සම්බන්ධතාවය එකක්. ඥානි සම්බන්ධතාවය අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් වියයට පත් වුණේ මහ බැංකුව පටන් ගත් දවසේ සිට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා, ඒ අධිපතිවරයාට පැවරුණු කාර්යභාරය ඉතාමත් අන්තනෝමතික

විධියට, ඒක පාවා දෙමින් මහ බැංකුව තුළ කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ක්‍රියාකලාපය එහෙම වුණේ මේ ඥාති සම්බන්ධය නිසාද්ෝ කියන සැකය විතරයි අපට තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ ඥාතිකම පමණක් නොවෙයි මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ප්‍රධාන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඥාතිකම ප්‍රධාන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා මෙවැනි ආකාරයෙන් කටයුතු කිරීම පිළිබඳ දැන් සාධාරණ සැකයක් තිබෙනවා ඥාතිත්වය මේකට හේතුවක් වුණාද කියලා? අපට කරුණු කිහිපයක් දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී අපට ඉදිරිපත් වුණ කරුණු අනුව අපගේ දැන ගැනීම සඳහායි අහන්නේ. මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට පැවැරෙන කාර්ය භාරය පිළිබඳ කොහේද හරියට සටහන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ? නීතිමය තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද?

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මුදල් පනතේ තිබෙනවා. Monetary Act එකේ Governorගේ role එක, Governor කළ යුත්තේ මොනවාද, හැසිරිය යුත්තේ කොහොමද කියලා ඒ සියලුම දේවල් තිබෙනවා. මම ඒක ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් කියන්නද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: මම ඒක අරගෙන ආවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඒක දෙන්නම්. එතුමාගෙන් අහන්න වැඩක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට ඒක ගන්න බැරි වුණා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: / සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඔබතුමාට මේහෙන් ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි ගත්තේ නැහැ. ඒ ගැන අපි දැන් දිගින් දිගටම ඇහුවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Library එකෙන් නිබෙනවා. ගන්න පුළුවන්. කාලය ගත කරන්න එපා.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: Monetary Law Act එකේ තිබෙනවා. සභාපතිතුමා කියන එක හරි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: හරි. ඒක හරි. ඊළඟට ඔබතුමා ටිකක් සඳහන් කළා දැන් මේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සහ මෙවැනි මුදල් සොයා ගැනීම පිළිබඳව manual එක තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ manual එක Public Debt Department එකෙන් හදපු manual එක.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක කවුද හදලා තිබෙන්නේ? ඒක Monetary Board එක approve කරලා තිබෙනවාද? කොහොමද ඒක?

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: මට හරියටම කියන්න බැහැ පෙර කාලවලදී ඒක හරියටම approve කරලාද නැද්ද කියලා. මොකද, අපි හැමෝම ඒක තමයි පිළිගන්නේ සහ පිළිපදින්නේ. මොකද, ඒක අපේ website එකෙත් දාලා තිබෙනවා. Website එකෙත් ඒකේ යම්කිසි කොටස් දාලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ manual එකේ තිබෙනවාද මේ auctions සම්බන්ධව?

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: ඔව්. එහෙම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා වෙලා ඉන්නකොට අවස්ථා කීයක මේ auction තිබෙන ස්ථානයට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: එක දවසක්වත් මම ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ. කිසි දවසක මම ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊළඟට අපට දැන් දිගින් දිගටම කරුණු පැහැදිලි කළා, දැන් ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කළා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති කෙනෙක් තමයි ඔබතුමා ළඟට මේක ගෙනාවේ කියලා. නමුත් අපට පැහැදිලි කළේ ඉස්සෙල්ලාම auction එක තිබෙනවා; auction report එක Public Debt Department එකට යනවා; එතැනින් Tender Board එකට ගිහිල්ලා, Tender Board එකේ recommendation එක තමයි ඔබතුමා ළඟට එන්නේ කියන එක. එතකොට ඒක හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: හරි Tender Board එකේ document එකක් මට එන්නේ නැහැ කවුද bid කෙරුවේ කියලා එහෙම details නැහැ. ඒ වුණාට Deputy Governor කෙනෙක් ඒක ගෙනැල්ලා කියනවා අහවල් මුදලක් අපි ගන්නට බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා. තිබුණ විකල්ප මෙන්න මෙවා කියලා කියනවා. ඊට පස්සේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයා Governor ගෙන් ඒවාට අනුමැතිය ලබා ගන්නවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයා Governorගෙන් approval එකක් ගන්නවා. එතකොට manual එකේ තියෙන්නේ අර system එක නොවෙයිද? Auction එකෙන් Public Debt Department එකට ගිහිල්ලා එතැනින් Tender Board එකට ගිහිල්ලා - Tender Board Chairman සාමාන්‍යයෙන් Public Debt Department එකේ ඉන්න නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයා මම හිතන්නේ පනත අනුව තිබුණේ එහෙමයි.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක හරි ඇති. මට හරියටම කියන්න බැහැ ඒකේ අර sequence එක හරියටම මට කියන්න අමාරුයි. මම ඒක හරියටම study කරලා නැහැ. මට දැන් ඒක මතකත් නැහැ. ඒ වුණාට ඒක බැලුවොතින් මට කියන්න පුළුවන් කොහොමද ලියලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ වුණාට මම හිතන විධියට මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. ඒ ඔක්කෝම ඒ අයගේ system අනුව ඒ අය කරනවා.

මොකද ඒ අය system එක follow කළේ නැත්නම් ඒ අයටම ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. මොකද, මහ බැංකුවේ Public Debt Department එකේ කොටස් තුනක් තිබෙනවා. Front Office කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. Middle Office කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. Back Office කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. මේකේ අනන්‍යතාවය සහ මේකේ විශ්වාසනීයභාවය රැක ගැනීම සඳහා ඒ තුන්ගොල්ලන්ට වෙන වෙනම රාජකාරි භාරදීලා තිබෙනවා. මොකද එක්කෙනෙකුට අනිත් පැත්තට ගිහිල්ලා වැඩක් කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක තමයි segregation of powers කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ අය වෙන වෙනම කටයුතු කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඉතින් ඒ ඔක්කෝම කරනවාද නැද්ද කියලා බලන එකට විවිධ අය ඉන්නවා. එතකොට ඒවා ඔක්කෝම කෙරුණා කියලා තමයි Governor හිතන්නේ. මොකද, Governor ගිහිල්ලා එතැන වාඩි වෙලා ඉන්නේ නැහැ. ඉතින් Deputy Governor කෙනෙක් ඇවිල්ලා කියනවා දැන් අපේ auctions අනුව මේ තමයි තත්ත්වය කියලා. එතකොට Governor ඒකට අනුමැතිය දෙනවා. මේ systems හරියට ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවාද නැද්ද කියලා බලන එක ඒ විවිධ අයගේ වගකීමක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔව්. දැන් අපි මේ සාකච්ඡාවට භාජනය කරලා තිබෙන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පළමු වන දිනයේම Mr. Wijewardena ඇවිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන ගණනක පාඩුවක් මේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව නිසා වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා ලිඛිතව වාර්තාවක් ලබා දුන්නා. ඔබතුමාත් දැන් කිව්වා රුපියල් බිලියන 51කට ආසන්න මූල්‍යමය තක්සේරුවක් ඒ පිළිබඳ දැනට කරලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. එතකොට ඒ පිළිබඳව අපට ලිඛිතව ඒ වාර්තාව ලබා දෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: මම බාරදෙන්නම්. මම ගෙනාවේ නැහැ. ඒ වුණාට ඒක හෙට වෙනකොට සභාපතිතුමාට එවන්න මම ලෑස්ති කරන්නම්. ඒ ගණනය කරලා තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය මම හිතන විධියට නිවැරදියි. එතකොට වෙන විකල්ප තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ වෙන වෙන අය වෙන වෙන විධියට ඒවා බලන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ වුණාට අනිවාර්යයෙන් පිළිගත යුතු දෙයක් තමයි අවාසියක් සහ අලාභයක් සිදුවෙලා තිබෙනවාමයි. ඒ වුණාට මම මෙතැනදී මේ කාරණය මතු කෙරුවේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේ වාර්තාවේ මේ අය ලියන්න හදනවා එහෙම අවාසියක්, අලාභයක් වුණේ නැහැ කියලා. ඒක වැරැදියි. ඒක වැරැදියි කියලා මට කෙලින්ම කියන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකේ ප්‍රමාණය සමහරක් වෙලාවට යම් තුඩු දෙන මත තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: අනිත් පැත්තෙන් කියනවා අපට investigations කරන්න බලයක් නැහැ. මේක ආණ්ඩුවෙන් කළ යුතුයි කියලා අවසානයේ කියනවා.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට investigation කරන්න බලයක් නැහැ. මේක ආණ්ඩුවෙන් investigate කරපු එක කියලා අවසානයේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: අන්තිමට අවුරුදු 3ක් තිස්සේ issue කරපු ඒවා ගැන ආන්දෝලනයක් මතු කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ පටන් ගත්ත වැඩය කරලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඒවා බලනවා.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඒවා බලනවා නම් හොඳයි. Report එකේ කියපු දේ නොවෙයි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු කරලා තිබෙනවා 2012 ඉඳලා 2014 වෙනතුරු. ඒ වුණාට වුණ දේ ගැන වැඩි යමක් නැහැ. එතැනදී Bank of Ceylon එක ගැනත් සභාපතිතුමා මට කියන්න පුළුවන් නම් හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: කියන්න. කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: මෙතැනදී ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වෙනවා රුපියල් බිලියන 13 ක ප්‍රමාණයක්, මම හිතනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාත් ඒ ගැන සමහර විට බලන්න ඇති කියලා. රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් කියන්නේ පොඩි ගණනක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Bank of Ceylon දීලා තිබෙන්නේ Rs. 10 billion.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: Rs. 13 billion.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ හරහා bid කරන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් bid කරනවා. ගත්තේ 05යි.

ගරු අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක්, අනිත් ඒවා ලැබිලා නැහැ. ඒ වුණාට රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් Bank of Ceylon වාගේ ආයතනයක් තව ආයතනයක් වෙනුවෙන් facility එකක් දෙනවා කියලා කියන්නේ මහා විශාල facility එකක්. That is really US Dollars 100 million.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It has not happened before or during your time?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I do not know. Maybe the Auditor-General will be able to tell you.

The Chairman: Never in the history.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: This is the first time.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I do not think so, because-

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Not even the private sector.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: This is a small time primary dealer. I mean, you get the big primary dealers also. There are really big primary dealers. If you take, කොමර්ෂල්

බැංකුවෙන් bid එකක් දානවා නම් Bank of Ceylon එක කොටසක් දාන එක ගැන හිතන්න පුළුවන්.

The Chairman: It happened without the knowledge of a single top officer.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: ඒක තමයි. Single tope officer කෙනෙක් දන්නේ නැතුව ඒ ගොල්ලන් කරයි කියලා මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝහිණි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් දන්නේ නැහැ.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: My view is slightly different because I do not think an officer at the rank of a dealer will take a call on 13 billion unless there was some other person or some other influence that would have encouraged them to make a call on.

The Chairman: The HSBC has and said-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The dealer has the discretion to bid within quick seconds. We actually listened to the transcript and the telephone conversations as well. So, that is up to us to determine whether we want to accept it or not.

The Chairman: The HSBC said, "Within five minutes I sold entire thing and I made a big profit".

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It can happen. The Bank of Ceylon has also made a profit of Rs. 4 billion or something.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think what happen with the HSBC- I may be wrong, but I am privy to some information. I suppose people tell me these things because I am a former Governor. The HSBC has actually put this bid not to get it because their own internal procedure is such that they are precluded from bidding for anything over two years. So, when they see a bond for 30 years, they would have said, "Okay. Bid at 12 per cent or 14 per cent" or something like that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what the Bank of Ceylon dealer also said. "හම්බ වුණොත් ඇතා තමයි" කියලා කිව්වා. They have put that thinking it will not come. He said it.

සභාපතිතුමා: වෙනත් ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා නම් අහන්න.

ගරු රෝහිණි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මට අහන්න ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I have two more questions. Can I go ahead?

The Hon.E. Saravanapavan: I also have a question. I want to ask whether the PDD room was under any kind of monitoring or surveillance system.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I do not know. You can check that up with the current people.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is there no proper monitoring system and why is that? That is what one of your officers mentioned, when she was here. Her name was Deepa Senevirathna. They said, from your time onwards, there was no-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I do not know. I think that question did not arise at that time. Now I suppose we hear these things happening and therefore it may be necessary to have some monitoring also because these things are happening now.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Governor, when was the Legal Department shut in the Central Bank and why was it shut?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The Legal Department is still there.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: There is a Secretariat Department.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The Legal Department is shut.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The legal people were attached to different departments, so that they can give their advice directly to that department without having to go in a queue at the Legal Department.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I want to ask a couple of slightly different questions. One is, there was a decision of the Monetary Board on the 23rd that interest rate should not be changed. Now, from what you have said and from what Dr. Wijewardhana told us, as a consequence of the decision taken on the 27th, interest rates rose. Is that correct?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Rose astronomically.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Would anyone making a decision to go for the 10 billion on the auction as revealed in the bids, would they have been able to understand that because of such a decision. the interest rates would rise?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: They should have.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. I am just referring to an ordinary person with a basic

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knowledge of economics or someone able to fulfill an office in the Central Bank. Is it surprising if they did not realize they would rise astronomically?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Very surprising.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Therefore, anyone taking such a decision would have known that this was a violation of the directive of the Monetary Board made on the 23rd of February.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Because it is completely against the grain of the movement. If you look at the numbers, Sri Lanka had a 3 per cent-

The Hon.E. Saravanapavan: I think, opinion is now allowed.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: You have invited me, Mr. Chairman-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha:I am sorry, I have asked a question. The Chairman can rule it out of order, but it is a very relevant question because it relates to a decision of the Monetary Board on 23rd February.

The Chairman: As a former Governor, he may accept or not.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, you can accept it or not. What I am just telling you-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Why are you trying to stop this question?

The Hon.E. Saravanapavan: No, I am not-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: If you look at the conditions and if you look at the environment, Sri Lanka had 4 per cent inflation in 2014. The inflation in January was about 3.5 per cent. Then, in January- ජනවාරි මාසයේprices අඩු කෙරුවා. තෙල් මිල අඩු කෙරුවා. ගෑස් මිල අඩු කෙරුවා. ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් දන්නවා, පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ උද්ධමනය අඩු වෙනවා කියලා. It went down to about 4 per cent. ඒක අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම වෙනවාය කියලා හැමෝම දන්නවා. ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් හිතන්නේ එතැනින් එහාට පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු වෙනවාය කියලා. පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩි වෙන ස්වභාවයක් නැහැ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් පොලී අනුපාතය සහ උද්ධමනය ඉතා කිට්ටු සම්බන්ධයකින් යන්නේ. උද්ධමනය අඩුවෙන කොට පොලී අනුපාතිකය අඩු වෙනවා. අවුරුදු හයක් තිස්සේ උද්ධමනය අඩු වෙලා පොලී අනුපාතයත් තනි ඉලක්කමක තිබෙනවා.

The Chairman: Monetary Board එකේ minutes වල තිබෙනවා.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Minutes වල තිබෙනවා. මේක එක පාරටම වැඩි වුණාය කියලා කියන්නේ ඒක ඉතාමත්ම unusual situation එකක්.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Any anyone who understands economics would have understood that by such a sudden decision, it was very likely that interest rates would go up.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Of course, which did.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Has that affected inflation in the last couple of months or not?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It has not affected inflation, but it is a very unusual situation that we are in today where the interest rates are high whereas the inflation is low.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. I have one more question. The usual practice for the Government to indicate its payment requirements is what? How does Government tell the Central Bank about the amount of money that is needed to public debt?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: They send it in writing.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Has it ever happened that a particular Ministry has come to the Central Bank to declare an urgent need for money?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Never happened before?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. Ministries have no business at the Central Bank. It is only the Finance Ministry.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, do you think, because the Governor had in wanting to take the large debt, which is the 20 billion which he had first suggested, he had mentioned that there was a need for even more than the 13.5 billion mentioned in this document and he claimed that this had been conveyed to him by Mr. Malik Samarawickrema. Hon. Kabir Hashim and the Minister of Finance the day before.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: By the way, the Hon. Kabir Hashim is the Minister in charge of highways. Yesterday also you referred to him as the General Secretary of the United National Party without referring to him as the relevant Minister.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. But the Deputy Minister who understands I think

more about investment and finance was not informed of this meeting and he did not attend. Okay. So, the Minister of Highways and Investment Promotion, the Minister of Finance and Mr. Malik Samarawickrema, who is present we have to find out, who also happens- I do not know whether he is involved to the Ministry of Highways, but I do know he is the Chairman of the United National Party. So, the link between him and the Hon. Kabir Hashim is a political link. These three apparently came and advised the Governor of a need for a massive amount of money and this was a relevant factor according to the officials of the Central Bank in his advice to take 20 billion. Do you think that this has ever happened before?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. Never. Our only dealings were with the Ministry of Finance. During my tenure, I can very categorically state-

The Chairman: Do Ministers come for conferences there?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. They used to come for other type things, not to come and ask for money.

The Chairman: What about seminars?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: For seminars and all they used to come.

The Chairman: I also have come there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Has the Minister of Finance ever come and convey the borrowing requirement on his own and not through the official channels?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Never. It was only the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance who will send us a letter, but the Minister of Finance has only come on about seven or eight occasions to receive the Annual Report.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who was the Minister of Finance, Mr. Cabraal, during your time?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Thank you.

The Chairman: Do you have any other questions?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes. I have a few questions to ask. First is on the comments on the interest rates. I am commenting to put some perspective about the high interest rates. At the beginning of the year, if you look at over a period of time, the interest rates have always been higher and at the end of the year, the interest rates have been lower. If you go and look at the Central Bank over a period of time, you will see that and then interest rates become lower. The other thing is, the new the new Government was borrowing only in rupees and had not borrowed internationally to bring the interest rates down up to that pointing time and now it is subsequently borrowing.

So, I think there is a perspective in which we will look at interest rates. So, whether it is reasonable or not is a different question. සභාපතිතුමා ඔතැන ඉඳලා කියපු comment එකකට මම එකඟ නැහැ. මම ඒක සභාපතිතුමාට කියන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මොකක්ද?

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා කිව්වා- මම වැරදි නම් නිවැරදි කරන්න- ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාව ගැන අහනවා කියලා, the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake. මේක ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාව ගැන -

The Chairman: I allow that question.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම ඒක කියන්න හේතුව මේකයි, සභාපතිතුමනි. මම නම් ඇත්තටම මේක දිහා මූලිකව බලන්නේ ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාව නිසායි. මම නම් ඒක කියනවා. මොකද, ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාව නිසා සැකයක් තිබෙනවා මෙතැන දූෂණයක් වුණාද නැද්ද කියලා. නැත්නම් අපි මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ හොඳ කළමනාකාරී තීරණයක් වුණාද නැද්ද කියන එක ගැනයි. Are we looking at it from a view that some corrupt practice happened here or are we trying to judge a decision taken by Bank officials in terms of the management of the Central Bank. That, I think, we can debate a lot whether that decision was right, wrong, profitable, unprofitable, et cetera. But, I am primarily looking at it from that point of view.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Also we should see whether there was violation of procedure or not- violation of procedure is an obvious question- and violation of good governance.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කිව්වේ මෙතුමාගේ නෑ සම්බන්ධතාව අහනකොටයි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, එතැනදී රිට විඩා ගැඹුරට බලන්නත් පුළුවන්: අහන්නත් පුළුවන්. එතුමිය ඇත්තටම ඇසුවේ ශිරෝමි වික්‍රමසිංහ මහත්මිය - company එක මොකක්ද කියලා මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Perpetual Holdings එකේ company එකක්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔය Perpetual group එකේ හුහක් companies තිබුණා නේ. ඒවායින් කොයි එකේද අධ්‍යක්ෂ -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය පහුවෙලා ඇසුවේ. කලින් ඇසුවේ අනෙක් දේවල්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හරි. කොයි එකේද කියලා පොඩ්ඩක් කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: මම දන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට, ඔබතුමියන්ලාට ඒ ඔක්කොම සොයලා බලන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පුළුවන්.

අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: සොයලා බලන්න. මම ඒකයි කිව්වේ, මම දන්නවා මගේ ඥාතීන් හොඳ රැකියා කරන අය කියලා. හුහක් දෙනෙක් ඉගෙන ගෙන තිබෙන අය. ඒ අයට හොඳ qualifications තිබෙනවා. ඒ අය මේ රටේ හොඳ තැන්වල ඉන්නවා.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මයා: වරදවා තේරුම් ගන්න එපා, Dr. Cabraal. අපි අහන්නේ මෙතුමිය ගැන විතරයි. අනෙක් අය ගැන අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: මෙතුමියත් ඒ වාගේ. මෙතුමියත් lawyer කෙනෙක්. මෙතුමිය ගැන කථා කරද්දි මම පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න ඕනෑ මෙතුමිය මොන වාගේ පුද්ගලයෙක්ද කියලා. නැත්නම් සමහර විට අනෙක් අය සිතන්න පුළුවන් මෙතුමිය මගේ ඥාති සම්බන්ධය නිසා පමණක් මෙතැනට ආවාය කියලා. ඒ නිසා මම මේක කියන්න ඕනෑ. මම මගේ ඥාතියා ගැනත් කියන්න එපායැ, ඔබතුමිය ඒක අහනවා වාගේම. මම කියන්න ඕනෑ සභාපතිතුමා, මෙතුමිය නීතිඥවරියක්. එතුමිය Hatton National Bank එකෙන් retire වුණේ Deputy General Manager කෙනෙක් හැටියට. කොම්පැණි කිහිපයකම අධ්‍යක්ෂවරියක් හැටියට සිටියා. ඊට පසුව එතුමිය HDFC බැංකුවේ සභාපති හැටියට සිටියා. HDFC බැංකුවේ සභාපති හැටියට සිටින විට තමයි මම සිතන විධියට එතුමියට ඇලෝසියස්ලාව හමුවෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට තමයි එතුමියගේ දක්ෂතාව ගැන සිතලා එතුමියට ආරාධනා කරන්න ඇත්තේ, මම සිතන හැටියට. මම දන්නේ නැහැ මොන company එකේද සිටියේ කියලා. මොකද, මගේ ඥාති ගොඩක් දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි එතුමිය හරි, ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් වැරැද්දක් කරලා තිබෙනවා නම් මම කිසි විටෙක කියලා නැහැ මේවා බලන්න එපා කියලා. මෙතැන එක වැරැද්දක් සිදු වුණාම ඒ වැරැද්ද සිදු වෙන කොට ඒ කොම්පැණියේ තවත් කෙනෙක් සිටියාය කියන එක සාධාරණ නැහැ. ඒකයි මම මේ කියන්න බලන්නේ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම කිව්වේ, සභාපතිතුමනි. මම කියන දේ අහගෙන සිටියොත් මම කියන්නේ අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයේ වරදක් මට පෙනුණේ නැහැ කියලායි. මම මොහොතකටවත් කියන්නේ නැහැ කථා කරපු ඥාතීන්ගේ වරදක් තිබෙනවා කියලා.

අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම හුහක් අයව හඳුනනවා. පෞද්ගලිකවත් හඳුනනවා. මම කිව්වේ ප්‍රශ්නය අසාධාරණ නැහැ කියලායි. මොකද, දැන් අපි තේරුම් ගන්න හදන්නේ Perpetual company ජාලයේ එක එක companies තිබෙනවා. සමහර ඒවා holding companies වුණා. ඊට පසුව ඒවා private companies, public companies කළා. එය ජාලයක් වාගේ තිබුණා. අපි ඒක දැන් විභාග කරගෙන යනවා. ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න තමයි එම ප්‍රශ්නය ඇසුවේ. මොකද, ඔබතුමාම කිව්වා වාගේ, මේක එක විධියකට කියන්න පුළුවන් කුඩා primary dealer කෙනෙක් කියලා. අපි මේ ගැන සොයා බලා තව ගැඹුරට යන්න ඕනෑ. මම අහන්න කැමති ප්‍රශ්න හුහක් තිබෙනවා. එයින් එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් තමයි primary dealership එකක් දෙන කොට ඒ primary dealership එක ලබා දීමේ පදනම මොකක්ද? මොකද, මේක අලුතෙන් දුන්න එකක් නේ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: Primary dealership එකක් හරි, බැංකුවක් හරි, ඕනෑම ආයතනයකට අලුතෙන් licence එකක් දෙනවා නම් මහ බැංකුවේ ඒකට ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. Money changer කෙනෙක් පත් කරද්දිත් ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ සියලුම ක්‍රමවේදයන් හරියාකාරව සිදු කරලා තමයි මහ බැංකුවෙන් යම් කිසි කෙනෙකුට ඒ වාගේ අවසරයක් ලැබෙන්නේ. මම දන්න විධියට ඒ සියලුම කටයුතු සිදු වෙලා ඇති. ඒ අය හරියාකාරව අවශ්‍ය නීති රීති අනුව සියලුම කටයුතු කර තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ අයට එහෙම අවසරයක් දීලා ඇති. මේ අයටත් ඒ විධියටම දීලා ඇති.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක සම්මත කරන්නේ Monetary Board එකෙන්ද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: අන්තිමේදී සම්මත කරන්නේ Monetary Board එකෙන්. ඒවාට එක එක departments තිබෙනවා. ඒවා සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම හරියට කෙරිලාද නැද්ද කියලා බලන්න ඒ අයට අවකාශයක් තිබෙනවා. Monetary Board එකේ තීරණවලට එන්නේ අන්තිමට.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට ඒවා සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම ඒක ඇසුවේ, අපට හුහක් දේවල් සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් අපි අවස්ථාව පාවිච්චි කරනවා අධිපතිතුමා සිටින විට අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඒ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න. සමහර ප්‍රශ්නවලට සැහීමට පත්වීමට නොහැකි පිළිතුරු ලැබෙනවා නම් අපි මහ බැංකුවේ අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන් මෙතැනට ගෙනැත් - හිටපු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඔක්කොම අහන්න අවශ්‍යත් නැහැ. එයා ඔක්කොම දන්නේත් නැතිව ඇති. ඒකත් සාධාරණයි. හැබැයි අපි අනෙක් අයව ගෙනැත් මේවා ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන එකයි මම මෙතැන කියන්නේ. මොකද, ඇත්තටම මේ primary dealerගේ හැසිරීම බැලුවොත් අපට දැන ගන්න ලැබුණු දේවල්වලින් මූලික ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න

වෙනවා. මෙයාට මෙහෙම dealing licence එකක් දුන්නේ ඇයි කියලාත් අහන්න වෙනවා. මේ ඔක්කොම සම්බන්ධයි. අපට මේවා වෙන වෙනම ගන්න බැහැ. ඥාති සම්බන්ධතාව නිසා තමයි මම නම් බලන්නේ. මම මෙපමණ ගැඹුරට ගිහින් බලන්නේ ඇයි මේ අයට දුන්නේ කියන එකයි. එතකොට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයත් එනවා. මම මේ පසුබිම කිව්වේ ඒකයි. අනෙක් අයව ගෙනැත් අපි මේවා පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්න කරමු.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, මහ බැංකුවේ හැම දෙයකටම ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක කියන්න තමයි මම නැවත් වරක් උත්සාහ කරන්නේ. එම ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව තමයි හැම එකක්ම සිදු වෙන්නේ. මොකද, එම ක්‍රමවේදය යම් කිසි පුද්ගලයෙක් හෝ ආයතනයක් follow කරලා තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ අයට right එකක් තිබෙනවා ඒක ලබා ගන්න. යම් කිසි කෙනෙක් බැංකුවක licence එකක් ගන්න කොට එහෙමයි කෙරෙන්නේ. Primary dealer කෙනෙක් විධියට licence එක ගන්න කොටත් එහෙමයි, money changing licence එක ගන්න කොටත් එහෙමයි. ඉතින් ඒ හැම දෙයකටම ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය follow කරන්නේ නැතිව කාට හරි දුන්නොත් තමයි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙන්නේ. හැම තිස්සේම ඔය ප්‍රශ්න මතු වෙන්නේ ක්‍රමවේදය හරියට follow කරන්නේ නැති නිසායි.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව කැඳවලා බලන්න වෙයි. බලලා ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න වෙයි.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Cabraal, I want to ask a lot. But we do not have enough time. May I table this document where you have responded to certain allegations and submit it to the Committee without wasting time? I table this document to be included in the Minutes. Mr. Cabraal, this is the list of your responses to some of the queries. You have answered some of them already.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I accept that. Thank you very much.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නිටපු අධිපතිතුමා, අපට ඇත්තටම වුවමනාව තිබෙන්නේ - මම සිතන විධියට මෙම කමිටුවේ සියයට සියයක් මහ බැංකුවේ සම්පූර්ණ ක්‍රියාදාමය පිළිබඳව චැටහීමක් තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණය අඩුයි. මට වැටහෙන විධියට කලින් පැමිණි නිලධාරීන් කරපු ඇතැම් පැහැදිලි කිරීම් තුළ ගොඩක් වේලාවට නිවුණේ මේ සිද්ධි දාමය ආරක්ෂා කරන්න කරපු පැහැදිලි කිරීම්. ඔවුන් සමහර සිද්ධි සම්බන්ධයෙන් සම්පූර්ණ වගකීමක් අරගෙනත් නැහැ. සමහර මුදල් ගනුදෙනු සිදු වෙන ආකාරය අනුව සමහර වේලාවට ඒවාට ඒ ඒ අවස්ථාවේ තමයි සමහර ක්‍රමවේද, අපි කිව්වොත් ටෙන්ඩර් එකක් නම් එම අවස්ථාවේ තමයි ඒක තීරණය වෙන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ අවස්ථාව කිව්වාම ඒක අතීතයටත් සොයන්න බැහැ; වර්තමානයේ හරියට සොයන්නත් බැහැ; අනාගතයේදී සොයන්නත් බැහැ. ඒ ප්‍රකාශ ඇතුළේ වගකීමක් දැනුණේ නැහැ. මම සිතන විධියට ඔබතුමා කටයුතු කරන කාලයේ මේ වාගේ ප්‍රශ්න ඔබතුමාට ඇවිත් නැහැ. මේ වාගේ Committee ඇවිත් නැහැ. ඔබතුමාගේ ඥාති සිටියා කියලා මීට කලින් ඒ වාගේ ප්‍රශ්න මතු වෙලාත් නැහැ.

අපි දන්නා තරමින් එහෙම ආන්දෝලනාත්මක සිද්ධි දාමයක් සිදු වුණේ නැහැ. දැන් අපට බැලූ බැල්මට පෙනෙනවා, මේ Perpetual Treasuries ආයතනයට වර්තමාන මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ තිබෙන ඥාතිත්වය පිළිබඳව. ඒ කාරණය ප්‍රසිද්ධ එකක්. මේක තමයි ප්‍රධාන සැකය. ඒ ඥාතිත්වය තිබෙන ආයතනයටම මෙපමණ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් - අපි ගොඩක් වෙලාවට සාධාරණීකරණය කරන්න උත්සාහ කළේ, private placement හරිද, වෙන්දේසිය හරිද කියන එකයි. මේක මට වැඩක් නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව මුදල් සෙවීමේදී රටට වැඩදායක පොලී අනුපාතයක් පවත්වා ගනිමින් private placementවලින්ද මුදල් ගන්නේ, වෙන්දේසියෙන්ද කියලායි මම නම් කල්පනා කරන්නේ. වෙන්දේසියද හරි, private placement ද හරි කියන එක වැඩක් නැහැ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, direct placement. Private placement කියන වචනය අලුතෙන් හදපු වචනයක්. You have got so used to it.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Direct placement - මම හිතන විධියට මේක හරි පැහැදිලි නාටකයක්. මෙතැනට ආපු අය ඔක්කෝම - ඔබතුමා හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා නිසා තමයි අපි බොහොම විවෘතව ඔබතුමාගෙන් මේ ගැන අහන්නේ. මෙතැනදී අපට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ කරන සිද්ධිය වන්නේ ලංකා බැංකුවයි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට ඥාතිත්වය තිබෙන සමාගමයි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමායි සම්බන්ධ වෙලා වංචාවක් කළාද කියන එකයි. ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත කථාව. සරළව කියනවා නම් අපට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ ඒකයි. ඒකට තමයි අපි වටේම තිබෙන ඔක්කෝම දේවල් අහන්නේ. ඔය documentsවලින් - මම පරණ බැංකු වාර්තාත් අර ගෙන බැලුවා. ඒවා මොකකින්වත් අපට මේ ගැන සොයා ගන්න බැහැ. ඇත්ත කථාව ඒකයි. 2014 මහ බැංකු වාර්තා අර ගෙන බැලුවා. මේ දිපු reports බැලුවා. කරපු ප්‍රකාශ බැලුවා. වංචාවක් සිදු වුණාද කියලා ඒවායින් සොයන්න බැහැ. මොකද, එක එක නිලධාරීන් ඇවිල්ලා කරපු ප්‍රකාශ සහ මේවා අතර - ඇත්තටම මෙය අපරාධ විද්‍යාවෙන් හැරුණු විට අංක ගණිතයෙන් සොයන්න පුළුවන් දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත කථාව. මේකේ පූර්ව සැලැස්ම අනුව බැලූ බැල්මට මට පින්තූරයක් පෙනෙනවා. අධිපතිතුමා වන විට එතුමා ඒකෙන් අයින් වෙනවා. ඥාතිත්වය අයින් වෙනවා, ඊට පස්සේ තමයි එතුමා අධිපති වෙන්නේ. එතුමා අධිපති වුණාට පස්සේ මේ

සමාගම සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේදී primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරි. මම බැලුවා, මහ බැංකු වාර්තාවලත් ඒ ගැන තිබෙනවා. Primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඉතාම පහළ හිටපු සමාගමක් ඉතාම කෙටි කාලයක් ඇතුළත ඉතාම වේගයෙන් රටේ තිබෙන අනෙක් බැංකු, මූල්‍ය සමාගම් ඔක්කොම පරයා උඩට එනවා. ඒක නේ මේකෙන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේ වෙන්දේසියෙන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒකයි. සියල්ල පරයා උඩට එනවා. ඒ උඩට එන සිද්ධි දාමය ඇතුළේ ඒ වෙලාවේ අධිපතිවරයාගේ හැසිරීම බැලුවොත්, මෙතෙක් ඉතිහාසයේ කිසිම අධිපතිවරයෙක් හැසිරුණේ නැති ආකාරයට හැසිරිලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා දැන් ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න. ඔබතුමා දේශනයක් කරන්න එපා. Background එක -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔය ප්‍රශ්න එකකින්වත් මෙකට උත්තරයක් ලබා ගන්න බැහැ. අපි අහපු ප්‍රශ්න ඔක්කෝම කොළ කැබලි විතරයි. මම මේ වාර්තා බැලුවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපට කියන්න. ඒක එතුමාට කියලා වැඩක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මට දැන් මෙතුමාගෙන් ලබා ගන්න ඕනෑ උත්තරය තමයි ලබා ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි මේ රටේ මිනිසුන්ට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් අපි මේ කමිටුවේ ඉඳලා වැඩක් නැහැ. මොකද, මේ කමිටුවට තමයි විවේචන එන්නේ. මේ කමිටුව ඉවර වෙන කොට -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අප සමඟ කථා කරන්න. ඒක අප සමඟ කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපේ කාලය ඉක්මවා ගිහින් තිබෙන නිසායි උණුසුම් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක කාලය පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. එහෙම නැත්නම් අපි මේ කමිටුවේ ඉඳලා වැඩක් නැහැ.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් අපි ආයෙත් හමු වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාට ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න කියලායි. ඔබතුමා කියන ඔය කාරණා අපි අතර කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ දේවල්. ඒවා පස්සේ කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, එහෙම නම් අපි මේ කමිටුවේ ඉඳලා වැඩක් නැහැ. නැත්නම් අවසානයේදී වගකීමක් අර ගෙන නැගිටින්න බැහැ. ඔන්න ඔයගොල්ලන්ගේ කමිටුවේ හිටපු අය තමයි මේක කරන්නේ කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්.

මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ මේකයි. අංක ගණිතය අනුව ඇත්තටම මට මෙය තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. බැංකුවේ අය ඇවිල්ලා එක එක ගණන් කිව්වා. අපි ඒවාත් අහ ගෙන හිටියා. අපට ඒ ඔක්කෝම තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. හිටපු අධිපතිතුමා විධියට ඔබතුමාටත් අත්දැකීමක් තිබෙනවා නේ. බැලූ බැල්මට එහෙම එකක් පෙනෙනවා. මේ රටේ ජනතාව අහන්නේත් ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා හෙට අනිද්දාට රටේ මුදල් අර්බුදයක් දැනෙන එකකුත් නැහැ කියලා. එවැනි දෙයක් දැනුණොත් රටේ ජනතාව ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අහවි. එහෙම වෙන්නේත් නැහැ. එතකොට පැහැදිලිවම මේ ක්‍රියාදාමයට අදාළව ඉදුණු පුහුලම කඩා ගන්න, එහෙම නැත්නම් මිදි වැලට ළං වුණු ස්වභාවයක් තිබෙනවා. එම නිසා අපි ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ මේ සිද්ධි දාමය ඇතුළේ - ප්‍රශ්න අංක එක මේකයි. මම අධ්‍යයනය කරපු විධියට ඉතිහාසය බැලුවාම අධිපතිවරයෙක් මෙලෙස හැසිරිලා නැහැ. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශයේ තිබුණා, ඔබතුමා අධිපති කාලයේත් එහෙම වුණේ නැහැ කියලා. එතකොට මේක ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයේ එක ගැටලුවක් විධියට තිබෙනවා. අනෙක් ගැටලුව තමයි මේක මේ රටේ ජනතාවට -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා තවම ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි අහන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ නේ. තරහා වෙන්න එපා. ඔබතුමා කරුණාකරලා ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න, දේශනයක් කරන්නේ නැතුව.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ සිද්ධි දාමය තුළ වංචාවක් තිබෙනවා වාගේ අපට පෙනෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ අප අතර කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ දේවල්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ අත්දැකීම අනුව මේ සිද්ධි දාමය ගැන අපට පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට හිතෙන විධියට ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන්නේ මේ ගැන මගේ අදහසක්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: මම අදහසක් ලබා දෙන්නම්. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මට පෙනෙන විධියට මෙතැනදී අපි තේරුම් ගත යුතු සිද්ධි කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ සිද්ධි සියල්ලම සිදු වුණේ නැත්නම් මේ වංචාව සිදු වන්නේ නැහැ. මේ සිද්ධි විවිධ ස්ථානවල සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. සමහර තැන්වල සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන ඒවාට වෙනත් තැනක ඉන්නා කෙනෙකුට බලපෑමක් කරන්න බැහැ. මම උදාහරණයක් දෙන්නම්. රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක bid එකක් එනවා, Bank of Ceylon එකෙන්. එතකොට Bank of Ceylon එක එහෙම bid එකක් දමන්නේ ඇයි? මහ බැංකුවෙන් සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ඒක reject කරාවි කියලා හිතෙනවා නම් එහෙට bid එකක් දමන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ අය ළඟ මොකක් හරි දැනුමක් තිබුණා, මේ bid එක දැම්මොත් ඒක සැලකෙයි කියලා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එහෙම කරන එක unusual දෙයක් නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙය ඉතා විශ්වාසයෙන් දමපු bid එකක්.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඉතා විශ්වාසයෙන් දමලා තිබෙනවා. රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක bid එකක් ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් දමලා තිබෙනවා, Central Bank එකට. මම හිතන විධියට Central Bank එකත් දැන ගෙන ඉන්න ඇති, - මොකද, රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් අවශ්‍යයි නේ. Perpetual Treasuries වාගේ කොම්පැණියකින් ඒ වාගේ bid එකක් දමන්න බැහැ කියලා හිතන්න පුළුවන් නේ. රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක bid එකක් Perpetual Treasuriesවලට තනිවම දමන්න බැහැ කියලා ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට හිතන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නම් ඒ bid එක ආවේ වෙන තැනකින්. ඒක පැහිදිලියි නේ. ඉතින් ඒවායින් මට නිගමනය කරන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ මේකේ වෙනත් අංශයක් තිබෙනවා, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ ගැන හොයලා බලන එක හොඳයි කියන එකයි. ඒක තමයි මාගේ අදහස. මොකද, මතුපිට තිබෙන කොටස පමණක් නොවෙයි මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ. මතුපිට තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවෙන් bid එකක් සලකා බලා ගත්තා කියන එක. ඒක එක පැත්තක්. ඒ පැත්ත වාගේම අනෙක් පැත්ත බැලුවොත්, ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 1ක් ඉල්ලන තැනට රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් commit කරනවා. ඒකත් අසාමාන්‍ය දෙයක්. සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම අසාමාන්‍ය දෙයක්. Rs.1 billion ඉල්ලද්දී Rs.13 billion bid එකක් දමන්නේ කවුද? ඒක ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඉතිහාසයේ කවදාවත් එහෙම වෙලා නැද්ද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ. එහෙම වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එහෙම කරන එක නහනම්ද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: නහනම් නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නහනම්ද, නැද්ද කියලා මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා මෙය පැහැදිලි කරන්න. මම Bank of Ceylon එක කියලා හිතමු. මට මාගේ customersලා 10 දෙනෙක් කියනවා, ඔය Rs.1 billionවලට bid කරන්න කියලා. මම එහෙම bids 10ක් දමනවා. කවුරු ගනීවිද කියන එක Central Bank එක තමයි determine කරන්නේ. ඉතින් මම රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් හෝ 13ක් දැමීමේ වරදක් නැහැ නේ. ඒක ගන්නවාද, නැද්ද කියන එක Central Bank එකට අයිති දෙයක්.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: මම කියන්නේ ඒක හරි අසාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් කියලායි. ඒක හරිම අසාමාන්‍ය දෙයක්. මොකද, bid එකක් Rs. 1 billion තිබෙද්දී සාමාන්‍යයෙන් Thirty Year Bondsවලට සාමාන්‍ය customersලා bid කරන්නේ නැහැ. Three monthsවලට bid කරනවා. Six monthsවලට කරනවා. මම මේ අත්දැකීමෙන් කියන්නේ. Thirty yearsවලට තිබෙන ඉල්ලුම එච්චරම නැහැ. ඒකට ඉල්ලුම තිබෙන්නේ EPF එකෙන්, NSB එකෙන්, එහෙම නැත්නම් Insurance Company එකකින්. ඒ වාගේ සීමිත කොටස්වලින් තමයි 30 yearsවලට එන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අන්තිමට Thirty Year Bid එකකට ගියේ කවදාද? Direct placementsවලට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි මේක කියවලා බලන කොට පෙනෙනවා, auctionsවලට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ ඉතාම සුළු ප්‍රමාණයක් බව. 30 yearsවලට ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඔව්. ඒකට හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක හොඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඉතින් ඒක නිසා අසාමාන්‍ය දේවල් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, අසාමාන්‍ය අවස්ථාවලදී.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: Central Bank එකේ අය දන්නවා, එහෙම අසාමාන්‍ය දේවල් වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Central Bank එක ගැන නොවෙයි නේ, bid කරන කෙනා ගැන නේ අපි මෙතැනදී කථා කරන්නේ. Bank of Ceylon එක මෙච්චර bid කළේ ඇයි කියලා නේ අපි බලන්නේ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඔව්. එතැනදී තවත් අසාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් සිදු වුණා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සාමාන්‍ය rate එක දුන්නේ - Central Bank එක guidance එකක් දෙනවා. Guidance එක දුන්නේ 9 ½ per cent කියලා. සියයට් නවයහමාරයි. Central Bank එක සියයට නවයහමාරක guidance එකක් දුන්නාම අවශ්‍ය නැති කෙනෙක් තමයි සියයට දොළහමාරට දමන්නේ. මෙතුමිය කිව්වා වාගේ මුදල් ලබා ගන්න කැමැති කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා නම්, වැඩිම වුණොත් මම හිතන විධියට සියයට දහයහමාරට දමාවි.

සභාපතිතුමා: HSBC එක කිව්වා dummy bid එකක් දමන්නේ කියලා.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරියටම හරි. Dummy bid එකක් තමයි දමන්නේ. ඒ වුණාට dummy bids Rs.13 billionවලට දමන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට දමන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට දමන්න තිබුණේ 1.6යි නේ. Only 10 per cent of the bid.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ආවොත් අලියෙක් කියලා දමලා තිබෙන්නේ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ආවොත් ඇනා තමයි. ඉතින් ඒක හරි. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට මම නැවත වරක් සාරාංශ කළ පිළිතුරක් දෙන්නම්. ඒක ඉතාම වැදගත් ප්‍රශ්නයක්. මොකද, මේකේ කොටස් කිහිපයක් එක සැරේටම සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කොටස් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සිදු වන දේවල් නොවෙයි. අසාමාන්‍යයෙන් සිදු වන දේවල්

රාශියක් එක සැරේට සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලා බලන එක -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට නිලධාරීන් කිහිප දෙනෙක් මේකට වගකියන්න ඕනෑ. එක්කෙනෙක් නොවෙයි. තම තමන්ගේ කොටස හරියට කරලා නැහැ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‌රාල් මහතා: ඔබතුමා තවත් බලන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක් තමයි නිලධාරීන්ට මේක හැසිරවුයේ කවුද කියලා?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක තමයි. හසුරවන්න තිබුණු බලපෑමක් මේක ඇතුලේ තිබෙනවා. මට නම් බැලූ බැල්මට එහෙම එකක් පෙනුණා.

The Chairman: Mr. Cabraal, Mr. Lionel Fernando, the Legal Advisor to this has a question.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes. Mr. Lionel.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: කබ්‌රාල් මහත්මයාණෙනි, මගේ මෙම ප්‍රශ්නය බොහොම පරණ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. අපි දන්නවානේ මොකක්ද මේ සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. දැන් මේ තුළින් රජයට වුණු පාඩුව මොකක්ද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‌රාල් මහතා: මගේ අදහසේ හැටියට, රජයට ප්‍රථමයෙන්ම සිදු වන පාඩුව තමයි වැඩි පුර පොලියක් ගෙවන්නට සිදු වීම. ඒ වැඩි පුර පොලියක් ගෙවන්න සිදු වෙන්නේ මෙම බැදුම්කරයට පමණක් නොවෙයි. මොකද සියලුම පොලී අනුපාතයන් මෙම බැදුම්කරය නිකුත් කිරීම හරහා වැඩි වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මොකද මෙම සියලුම පොලී අනුපාත පිහිටුවන්නේ yield curve එකක. ඒක ඔබතුමා දන්නවා. එක කොණක තිබෙනවා මාස තුනේ බැදුම්කර සහ බිල්පත්. අනෙක් කොණේ තිබෙනවා අවුරුදු 30 බැදුම්කර. ඉතින් ඉතාමත්ම ඉහළ පොලියක් ගෙව්ව ගමන් එක පැත්තකින් මෙම සියලුම බිල්පත් සහ බැදුම්කරවලට යම් බලපෑමක් ඇතිවෙනවා. ඒක මේ ඔක්කෝටම බලපානවා. ඒක පෙනුණා පෙබරවාරි මාසේ 24 වෙනිදායින් පසුව නිකුත් කරපු සියලුම බැදුම්කරවලට සහ බිල්පත්වලට රජයෙන් ගෙවපු පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩි වුණා. සෑහෙන්න ප්‍රමාණයක් වැඩි වුණා. එය දැන් ටිකෙන් ටික අඩු වී ගෙන එනවා. ඒ වුණාට ලොකු බලපෑමක් සිදු වුණා. ඒක තමයි මූලිකම පාඩුව. දෙවැනි පාඩුව තමයි සියලුම business කරන අය සහ රටේ කටයුතු කරන සියලුම දෙනා ඒ අයගේ පොලී අනුපාත සාපේක්ෂ කර ගන්නේ රජයේ බැදුම්කර සහ බිල්පත්වලට තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය බලලා. මේක ඉතාමත්ම වැදගත් දෙයක් මේ ගැන බොහෝ දෙනෙක් කල්පනා කරන්නේ නැති දෙයක්. You add a risk premium to the Treasury Bill rate or to the Treasury Bond rate. එතකොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කියනවානම්, කොමර්ෂල් බැංකුවෙන් කවුරු හරි lease එකක් දෙනවා නම්, එම lease එකටත් බලපානවා මෙම වෙච්ච සිද්ධිය. ලයනල් මහත්මයාණෙනි, මොකද මෙතැනින් පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ ගිය ගමන් අනිත් පැත්තෙනුත් මෙය වැඩි වෙනවා. එතකොට ඒ ආකාරයට මුළු ණය පද්ධතියේම ලොකු වෙනසක් සිදු වුණා. එය දැන් ටිකෙන් ටික අඩු වී ගෙන එනවා. එය අනෙක් පාඩුව. තුන්වැනි එක තමයි ඕනෑම රටක පොලී අනුපාතය බලපාන මූලික සාධකයක් තමයි උද්ධමනය. අපි අවුරුදු 6ක් තිස්සේ බොහෝම වෙහෙස වෙලා උද්ධමනය අඩු කරන්න කටයුතු කෙරුවේ,- ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි බොහෝ දෙනෙක් අපිට ඇවිල්ලා කිව්වේ මේ රටේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය නිසා business කරන්න බැහැයි කියලා. අපි කොහොමද සියයට 20ක් ණයට අරන් business කරන්නේ; අපි කොහොමද සියයට 15ට ණය ගන්නවා නම් ගෙයක් හදන්නේ? ඉතින් ඒක තමයි මේ රටේ තිබුණු ලොකුම ආන්දෝලනය. එම ආන්දෝලනය නැති කිරීමට නම් මූලික කටයුත්ත තමයි අර පැත්තෙන් උද්ධමනය අඩු කර ගැනීම. උද්ධමනය අඩු කරන්න අවුරුදු 6ක් තිස්සේ වෙහෙසිලා එය යම් කිසි මට්ටමකට ගෙනාවා. එතකොට ඒකේ මූලික ප්‍රතිඵලය තමයි ඒ හරහා පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු වීම. ඒ ආකාරයට පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු වුණා. අපි track කෙරුවොනිත් පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු වුණේ කොහොමද කියලා, සෑහෙන්න මට්ටමක පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු වුණා. ජනවාරි මාසේ වන විට මේ රටේ සියලුම පොලී අනුපාතය තනි ඉලක්කමේ පිහිටෙවුවේ. අවුරුදු 30 බැදුම්කර වෙලත් පොලී අනුපාතය තිබෙනවා 8.85කට. අවුරුදු 30ට තමයි වැඩියෙන්ම පොලී අනුපාතය තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. පොලී අනුපාතය 8.85 කියලා කියන්නේ බැංකුවක් borrow කරන ගාන, ඒ මට්ටම අනුව ඒ ගණනට අඩු වෙලා ගිහිල්ලා තිබුණා. එතකොට ඒ හරහා සියලුම පොලී අනුපාත අඩු වීම නිසා රටේ තිබෙන අවදානම, risk premium එක අඩු වුණා. ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් ගෙයක් හදන කොට, එහෙම නැත්නම් business එකක් කරද්දි තමන්ගේ මුදල් යොදන්න තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණය සහ අවදානම අඩු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක නැති වෙලා ගියා. ඒක යම් කිසි ආකාරයකින් පළුදු වුණා. එය ඉතාමත්ම විශාල ප්‍රශ්නයක්. එම නිසා තමයි business sentiment කියන එක business confidence කියන එක විශ්වාසනීයභාවය. ඒ කියන්නේ business carrier කරන්න තිබෙන ප්‍රවණතාවය ඒක අඩාළ වුණා. ඒක මට හරියටම ගණනය කරලා මෙපමණයි කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. එතකොට ඒක සිදු වුණා. එහෙම වුණාම තව කාලයක් යනවා නැවත වරක් එය ගොඩනගා ගන්න. යම් ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් අනුව ඒක නැවත ගොඩ නැගෙයි. මම දන්නේ නැහැ ඒ ගැන. එතකොට ඒ කාලය -මාස 6ක හෝ අවුරුද්දක හෝ කාලයක්- අපට අහිමි වෙනවා. අපට අහිමි වෙන්න නොනිබ්බිව අහිමි වීමක් සිදු වුණා. ඔබතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය මම හිතන්නේ ඉතාමත්ම වැදගත් ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහතා: මම කැමැතියි ඔබතුමාගෙන්ම දැන ගන්න දෙවැනි කාරණය

ගැන. මෙය ඉංග්‍රීසි භාෂාවෙන් කියනවා නම් - උපකල්පනයක් කියලා සිංහලෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන් - මෙය hypothetical calculation එකක හරි situation එකක් නොවෙයිද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: නොවෙයි. අපි දන්නවා හැම පොලී අනුපාතයක්ම තිබුණු ගණන. මොකද, secondary market එකක් මේ රටේ තිබෙනවා. එම secondary market එක ඉතාමත්ම active market එකක්. අපි දන්නවා කොයි පොලී අනුපාතයකට ද හැමදාම එක එක instruments trade වෙන්නේ කියලා. ඉතින් පෙබරවාරි මාසේ 27වෙනිදා trade වුණු ගණන් හිලව් අපි දන්නවා. මහ බැංකුව ඇති. මගේ ළඟ පුද්ගලිකව එම තොරතුරු නැති වුණාට Central Bank website එකේ ඒ ගැන අධ්‍යයනය කරන අයට එම තොරතුරු ඉතාමත්ම පහසුවෙන් හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්. ලයනල් මහත්මයාණෙනි, මේ bonds අපි කීයට ද issue කළේ කියලා එයට සාපේක්ෂව අපි බැලුවොතින් අපිට බලා ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙනවා වැඩි පුර ගෙවපු මුදල කීය ද කියලා. එය ලොකු rocket science එකක් නොවෙයි. යම් කිසි කෙනෙක් කියන්න පුළුවන් නැහැ ඒක නොවෙයි ඊට වඩා අඩු වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. එතකොට ඒක discuss කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක instruments අනුව වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා. මම එය පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත්, සමස්තයක් හැටියට මොනවා හරි yardstick එකක් අපි ගන්න එපායැ. එම yardstick එක ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා එදා පැවතුණු interest rates ඒ interest rates ඔක්කොම instruments වලට තිබෙනවා.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Thank you very much.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අධිපතිතුමනි, අපිට පැමිණි නිලධාරීන් ප්‍රකාශ කළා ඔවුන් මේම තීරණයට ආවේ මේ පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යාම විදේශ ආයෝජකයන් දිරි ගන්වන්න විශාල පිටුවහලක් වෙනවා කියලා. මෙහි තිබෙන සත්‍යතාවය කුමක්ද? විදේශ ආයෝජනයි මෙම පොලී අනුපාතයයි අතර සහ ඔවුන්ගේ සැලැස්ම තුළ තිබෙන දෙය.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, විදේශ පමණක් නොවෙයි ඕනෑම ආයෝජකයෙක් කැමැතියි ඉහළ පොලියක් ලැබෙනවාට. ඒක අපි තේරුම් ගැනීමට අවශ්‍යයි. අද අපි කිව්වොතින් පොලී අනුපාතය තවත් සියයට දෙකකින් වැඩි කරනවාය කියලා බොහෝ දෙනෙක් කැමැති වෙයි. රජය අකමැති වෙයි, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ ගැන කළකිරෙයි. ඒ වුණාට ආයෝජකයෝ කැමැතියි. විදේශිකයොයි, දේශීය ආයෝජකයන් කැමැතියි වැඩි පොලී අනුපාතයක් රජයක් ගෙවනවා නම්. මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි ඒ හරහා වැඩි පුර ආයෝජනක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද කියන එක. ඒ පළමු කාරණයයි. දෙවැනි කාරණය නම්, එම නිසා අපේ රටේ මූල්‍ය පද්ධතියට යම් කිසි බාධාවක් සිදු වුණා ද කියලා බලන එක. මොකද, කෙටි කාලීනව යම් කිසි විදේශ ආයෝජකයෙක් ආවාට සමහර විට දිගු කාලීනව එම ආයෝජකයෝ අකමැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, ආයෝජකයෝ වුණත් කැමැති නැහැ එක පාරටම interest rates වැඩි වෙනවාට. මොකද ආයෝජකයන්ට වුණත් තිබෙනවා positions. They hold positions in any currency, in any instrument. So, if they find that it is fluctuating- හුහාක් උච්චාවචනය වෙනවා නම් ඒ අයටත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වෙනවා ඒ අයගේ businesses වලට. එම නිසා එයින් සමහර විට එතරම් ලොකු ප්‍රතිඵලයක් ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ. දිගු කාලීනව එය සමහර විට අවාසියක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, එම විශාල පරතරයක් හදිසියේ සිදු වුණා නම්.

ගරු රෝහිත බෝගොල්ලාගම මහතා: ඒ එක්කම ආපු නිලධාරීන් පැවසුවා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අවුරුද්දේ පළමු වෙනි කාර්තුවේ පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩියෙන් යන්නේ කියලා. දැන් ඔබ ඔය කියන දෙයින් නිගමනයට එන්න ඉක්මන් වැඩියි නේද? මෙයින් වාසියක් වුණාද විදේශ ආයෝජකයින් එන එකත්, උද්ධමනය ගැනත් අපට තර්ක විතර්ක කරන්න කාලය මදි කියලත්. පළමුවෙනි කාර්තුවේ උද්ධමනය - interest rate එකක් තියලා ඊට පසුව- මෙය තමයි නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් අපි දැනුවත් වන දේවල්.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: ඔව්. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමයනි, එය ඉතාමත්ම හොඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඇත්තටම මෙය බැලිය යුතු කාරණාවක් වෙනවා. මොකද, සමහර අවස්ථාවන්වල තිබෙනවා පසු ගිය අවුරුදුවල අපි දැක්ක එක දෙයක් තමයි අවුරුද්ද මුල කොටසේදී interest rate එක වැඩි වෙනවා. ඒකට හේතුවක් තිබුණා. ඒ හේතුව බලලා තමයි අපි යම් කිසි ආකාරයකින් වෙනසක් ගිය අවුරුද්දේ ඉඳලා සිදු කළේ. ඒ තමයි Government එකේ debt එකේ වැඩි කොටසක් renew වුණා ඒ කාලයේ දී. වැඩි කොටසක් ඒ කාලයේ දී - It was getting rollover. ඉතින් අපි එය අවුරුදු ගණනක් නිස්සේ සිට ටිකෙන් ටික වෙනස් කෙරුවා. දැන් වෙනකොට ඒ තත්ත්වය එහෙමම නැහැ. මොකද, එක කාලයක් තිබුණා අවුරුද්ද මුලදී ගොඩක් payments කරලා. එතකොට එම payments කිරීම නිසා rollover factor එක වැඩි වෙලා තිබුණා. ඒ වුණාට ගිය අවුරුද්දේ ඉඳලා ඒක අඩු වුණා.

ගරු රෝහිත බෝගොල්ලාගම මහතා: නමුත් අපිව දැනුවත් කළේ නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ ඉඳලා, they have not repaid our debt payments till that time. There was a lapse of three months because of electrical -

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහතා: Debt repayments එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I think if we go back to the report which was conveyed to us – this lapse seems after November or October - was this the first one that happened?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That was 30 years.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: For direct placements, there were no auctions, but there was a need to take this money.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That was 30-years.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමිය, ඒ කිව්වේ අවුරුද්දේ මුල money market එකේ සල්ලි තිබෙනවා, අවුරුද්ද අන්තිම වන විට සල්ලි නැහැ. ඒ කාරණාවත් කිව්වා.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමන්ලාට බලන්න පුළුවන් liquidity කොපමණ තිබුණාද කියලා. මම හිතන විධියට ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා ඒ ගැන හොඳටම දන්නවා. Liquidity position කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. Central Bank එක හැමදාම ඒක ගණනය කරනවා. මේ දවස්වල බිලියන සියයට වඩා වැඩියි. ඒ නිසා එහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. දැන් වුණත් නොවැම්බර්, දෙසැම්බර්, ජනවාරි, පෙබරවාරි මාස අරන් බැලුවොත් අපේ රටේ liquidity position එක high. ඒ නිසා එහෙම බලපෑමක් සිදු වන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, අපි ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය meet කරන්න ඕනෑකමින්ම තමයි ඒ දේ කරලා තිබුණේ. එසේ නොවුණා නම් ඒ කාලවලදී interest rate එකේ විශාල උච්චාවචනයක් සිදු වෙනවා. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමිය, අපි පසුගිය අවුරුදුවල ඔය වගේ දේවල් කිහිපයක්ම කළා තිබුණ risks අඩු කර ගැනීමට. මෙකත් එයින් එක ප්‍රශ්නයක්. දැන් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය එතරම් උග්‍ර විධියට නැහැ. යම්කිසි කොටසකට තිබෙනවා. නමුත් ඒ තිබුණ ආකාරයට නැහැ.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: අපට කිව්වේ, They did not actually inform us that they had prepared a recommendation to take much lower amounts because they were of the view that, that could be bid by direct placements.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Of course. That is very possible.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Do you think that they were not wrong in saying that there was enough available in the market to do direct placements?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The way I would look at it is that if there was a need for additional sum of money, there would not be a necessity to issue a 30-year bond. Therefore, I think there is no question about that. There will be needs even in the future. ඒ නිසා ඒක අවුරුදු තිහක බැඳුම්කරයකින් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. ඒ වගේ බොහෝ අවස්ථාවලදී කරන්න ඇත්තේ, එහෙම කරන බව මම දන්නවා, මම සිටි අවස්ථාවලත් එසේ කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපි ඉස්සර කියනවා "ඔක ගිහින් ගන්නකෝ Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් overdraft එක වැඩි කරලා" කියලා. මම හිතන විධියට ලයනල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහත්මයාත් People's Bank එකේ සභාපති විධියට හිටියා. එතුමාටත් ඒවා මතක ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: Mr. Cabral, මට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ direct placementsවලට වැඩිපුර එන්නේ public sector එකේ අපේ government institutions funds, pensionsවලින්. ඒ නිසා අපි හිතුවොත්, අධිපතිතුමා කල්පනා කරන්න ඇති කියලා මේ සඳහා private sector එකේ එකතු වෙලා තිබෙන funds ගන්න, මේ policy එක auctionsවලට shift කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: එහෙම කියන්න අමාරුයි. මොකද, private sector එකේ ඒ තරම් free float funds base එකක් නැහැ. හැම මාසයකම EPF එකෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන හයක්, හතක් එකතු වෙනවා. ජෝන් කීල්ස් එකේ profit එකත් අවුරුද්දටම රුපියල් බිලියන හයයි නේ. ඒ නිසා private sector එකට එතරම් ලොකු funds base එකක් නැහැ. Main savings of this country come from few institutions. එකක් EPF එක, අනෙක් එක ETF, අනෙක NSB එක, අනෙක් එක Bank of Ceylon, අනෙක් එක People's Bank, අනෙක් එක Insurance Corporations. ඒ ආයතනවල තමයි වැඩිම liquidity එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ ඔක්කොම instrumentsවලට එන්නේ ඒ ආයතනවලින්. සමහර තවත් පොඩි පොඩි amountsනුත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වුණාට මේවා තමයි මූලික ආයතන. Private sector එක open out කරලා private sector එකට යම්කිසි මුදලක් දෙනවාය කියලා අනෙක් ඒවායේ interest rate එක වැඩි කරන එක නම් මම හිතන්නේ බොහොම dangerous වැඩක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට තව ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙන්වා. Bids දැම්මනේ. අපි advertisement එකේ දමන්නේ Rs. 1 billion කියලා. ඒක ආවා. ඒ එනකොට unexpectedly, Rs. 20 billion ආවා. ඒ වෙලාවේ Board එක හරි, Governor හරි, management එක හරි ඒ ගැන කල්පනා කරනවා නේ. Chart එකේ හැටියට මේකේ interest එක යනවා 18 per cent විතර. ඒ නිසා cost එක අඩු කරන්න ඕනෑ නම්, ඒක නම් policy එක, අපි තරමක් අර ගෙන නතර කරලා auction එක නැවත වෙනත් දවසකට දමනවා. සල්ලි තිබෙන බව දන්නවා. මේ ආපු bidsවලින් ඒ බව පෙනෙනවා. Dummy bids එහෙම තිබෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. එතකොට දවස් තුනකින් ඒක ගන්නවා. එහෙම කළා නම් අඩු cost එකට ගන්න තිබුණා නේද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඔව්. ඔබතුමා ඒක ඉතාමත් හොඳට තේරුම් අර ගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඉතාමත්ම සාධාරණ assumption එකක්. අපට ඒක හෙට ගන්න පුළුවන්. නැත්නම් අනිද්දා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන අලගියවන්න මහතා: අද දැම්මොත් ආයෙ හෙටත් දමනවා නේ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ නිසා කිසිම ගැටලුවක් නැහැ එහෙම දමන එක ගැන. Central Bank එකට ලියවිල්ලක් අරින විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒත් ඒක advertise කරන්න ඕනෑ නේද? Advertise කරපුවාම minimum days කීයක් දෙන්න ඕනෑද?

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඒ සියල්ලම කරන්න අපි හිතමුකෝ දවස් දහයක් යනවා කියලා. ඒ දවස් දහයට අපි කියනවා Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් overdraft එකක් ගන්න කියලා. එවිවරයි නේ කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. නැත්නම් Treasury Secretaryට තිබෙන්නේ Governorට ලියුමක් එවන්න Treasury Bill එකක් issue කරන්න කියලා. ඒක Central Bank එක කරනවා.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you for clarifying that because we were told by the Public Debt Department that they had been following the previous practice and made recommendations. I think they said to take about Rs. 2 billion and they were planning to go for direct placements after that. Also, they told us that they had plenty of time to do that Friday afternoon. That is the possible position. The Governor had told them, "You cannot go for direct placements because there is a decision which he had made - not after the consultation - not to go for direct placements." But, let us accept that the Governor can make such a decision because he has inappropriately given the cost which is a separate issue. So, what you are telling us now is that there is a third possibility. You do not go for the full auction. You do not have to go for direct placements because you can get an overdraft from the Bank of Ceylon which you have already told that they have Rs. 13 million.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Absolutely.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, in fact, as the position remembered by the Governor, there is a third possibility.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Actually, there is also a fourth possibility which is the Treasury Secretary could have requested the Governor to issue a short-term Treasury bill for two weeks - we have done that on several occasions - and to collect the money, have the auction, then collect the other monies and retire the bill.

සභාපතිතුමා: Treasury Secretary අපට කිව්වේ repayments of foreign debts ඒ immediate requirement. එක එක්කෙනා එක එක දේවල් කියනවා. ගිය සතියේ ST ඇවිල්ලා සාක්ෂි දෙන විට එතුමා ඒක තමයි කිව්වේ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: එහෙම වුණත් කමක් නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියන්නේ එතැනදී funds raise කරන එකට විකල්ප කිහිපයක් තිබුණා. ඒ එක විකල්පයක් තමයි Bank of Ceylon එක. තවත් පහසු එකක් තිබුණා. Interest rates වැඩි වෙන්නේ නැතිව මම මේ කියන්නේ. Interest rate එක වැඩි නොකර ගෙන කරගන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණා නම්- අනෙක් එක Treasury Secretaryට ලියුමක් එවලා කියන්න තිබුණා "අපට හදිසි මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා, ඒ නිසා කරුණාකරලා රුපියල් බිලියන දහයක Treasury bill එකක් නිකුත් කරන්න" කියලා. එතකොට ඒ bill එක අපි market එකට issue නොකර මහ බැංකුවට දෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: බිලියන දහයක් නැතිව ඇති.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: නැහැ, තිබෙනවා. ඒ කාලයේත් Rs. 40 billion විතර තිබුණා.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is that option always available?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That option is available.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක available නමුත් හැමතිස්සේම Central Ban එක Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් ගන්නේ නැහැ නේ. එසේ ගන්න අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒගොල්ලන් පුළුවන් තරම් market එකෙන් ගන්නේ. Bank of Ceylon එකට, Commercial Bank එකට හැමතිස්සේම යන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්රාල් මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන දේ හරි. එතැන තිබෙන මූලිකම දේ තමයි එහෙම කරද්දි interest rate එක සියයට දෙකකින්, තුනකින් වැඩි වෙනවා නම් කිසි විටෙක යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක මට කියන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, එහෙම වැඩි නොකර යන්න තිබුණා නම් යන්න පුළුවන්. ඇත්තටම එතුමා කියන එක හරි. මොකද, එහෙම සිදු වුණා නම් interest rate එක වැඩි නොකර අපට පුළුවන් වුණා නම් තවත් බිලියන දහයක් ගන්න එහෙම නම් Treasury bill නොගන්න එක වැරදි නැහැ. ඒ වුණත් මෙතැනදි interest rate එකත් ඉතාමත් අවශ්‍ය කරුණක්. ඒක වැඩි කර ගෙන අරක කරන එක එතරම් නුවණට හුරු වැඩක් කියලා මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙහි තිබෙන යෝජනාවක් තමයි මේ වාගේ Governor කිව්ව ඒවාවලින් PDD එක තමන්ගේ තීරණය වෙනස් කළා. හැබැයි මට පැහැදිලි වුණේ කථා කරන කොට, මේ පාලනය කරන අය බොහොම ළඟදී මේක වෙනස් කරලා තිබෙනවා. අලුත් තත්ත්වයට ආපු දෙදෙනාම අපට කිව්වේ මෙහි experience නැහැ, අධ්‍යයනය කරන්න පුළුවන්, මෙහි මාරු කරන එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. The two leading people in this department – the Deputy Governor and the Superintendent- being changed simultaneously, does that strike as a wise decision?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, not at all.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The new Governor has the prerogative on that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Prerogative has to be exercised as we have always said, people have discretion and discretion must be exercised sensibly. Certainly in all your management and management institutions, you do not change two important positions until people learn. Now I am happy to say that in our discussions with Mrs. Seneviratne, it was apparent that she has relied a lot on Dr. Azim who seems to be quite able and from what they told us they have made us seems that it was a sensible decision.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is like this, Hon. Member.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I finish my question. Then you can answer at length. But, it strucks me that Dr. Samarasiri seems to have very dogmatic approach that was not very practical. However, you are the person who promoted Dr. Samarasiri. So, what are the strengths he has that perhaps made you impose such confidence in him and to make him a Deputy Governor and do you think that he is in the right position to exercise those strengths.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I had a strong feeling that sometime or other this will come back to me because I have promoted him that this has happened.

Okay, nevertheless let me explain. I will come to the first part of your question first, Hon. Member. If you really look at the Public Debt Department, one of the most important departments of the Central Bank, it manages a portfolio of about seven trillion. It has about eight hundred foreign loans. It has auctions at least twice a week ranging from three months to thirty years. It has renewals of so many debts that have to take place on a weekly basis. So, it is one of the most complex and complicated departments in the Central Bank. Every time the person who has headed the Public Debt Department has been an outstanding Member of the staff. I am, of course, saying that Mrs. Deepa Seneviratne is an outstanding person. But she has no experience in public debt management neither is she a person with numbers background. So, I do not know whether that was a right choice at that particular moment. Particularly, at the same time, they are changing another person at the top. Now, the people who were involved in the Public Debt Department were all outstanding people.

If you take Mr. Wijewardena, who has come here before you was the Superintendent of the Public Debt Department at one time. If you take Mr. Siriwardene, who is presently the Assistant Governor was a Superintendent of the Public Debt Department. Mrs. Premaratne was a Deputy Governor was a Superintendent of Public Debt Department. Mr. Dhammika Nanayakkara, a chartered accountant, was also a Superintendent of Public Debt Department is an outstanding official. I am not saying somebody else cannot do the job. Yes, he can. But it takes a lot of doing because it is a very highly complex work. So, I think changing two, three people at the same time is not a very good thing to do and perhaps it should have been thought through little more carefully. Even the Assistant Governor was changed like this. So, all three -the Deputy Governor, Assistant Governor and the Superintendent- were changed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who is the Assistant Governor?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The Assistant Governor at that time was – I have forgot that- You can see that if you check the names, all three key slots to do with the public debt were changed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There is only one Assistant Governor in the Public Debt Department.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes. So, there is a Superintendent, one Assistant Governor and a Deputy Governor – all three were changed. It is not a very easy thing to do.

The second part is about Mr. Samarasiri himself. I would think that Mr. Samarasiri has certain strengths.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What are they?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: He has certain strengths like compliance.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Compliance with whom?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: He used to have a lot of good knowledge with regard to the law.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Sorry! I thought you meant that he complied with-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No. But, he was not the person who was in-charge of the department which dealt with monetary policy

or of that kind of nature but he has been changed maybe because the present Governor would have seen some strengths in him that I have not seen. But he is the person whom I no doubt with the rest of the Monetary Board promoted, but I would thought that he should have been budded a little slowly because he was the most junior out of the Deputy Governors and we have two other Deputy Governors. They are Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe, who is the outstanding person. I do not know whether he is coming to give evidence before you. I think you should because he is a very knowledgeable person.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: He is abroad.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Is he abroad? He is extremely knowledgeable and he is very very savvy with all the central banking nuances. Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe in fact went to the IMF also. He was alternate director of the IMF.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Do you say that the Tender Committee has two Assistant Governors: Mr. S. Rathnayake and Mr. C.P.A. Karunathilake.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Two Assistant Governors now?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes, that is what we got from the Report.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Very unlikely. It must be one person.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, who is the new comer?

The Chairman: Hon. Wijesinha, you ask those questions from the new Governor.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think, it is Mr. Rathnayake.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Cabral, you mentioned about Mr. Dhammika Nanayakkara now. He was the head of the Public Debt Department. He is a very efficient officer. Why did you transfer him to handle the advertising campaign or the international campaign?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That is a good question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And also is it true that he has spent Rs. 1.5 billion on a campaign for the Government in the US?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Do you know how much is the campaign for Ceylon Tourist Board?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No. I do not know. I am not aware.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The tourism promotion campaign is Rs. 3.5 billion.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What was the Rs. 1.6 billion?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes, I will come to that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is it last year or this year?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is in this year. A sum of Rs. 3.5 billion was spent. When you are handling a public debt which has about Rs. 6 billion of foreign money you have to ensure - this is what I am saying. These are the stories that would have warranted his change. I am glad that you mention that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Did you change him during your time?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, I did not change him. Under public debt we carried out that campaign because it is essential that you keep a very close relationship with all the investors and have good publicity out there in the US because that is extremely important.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But he was constantly traveling. He has been more out of the country.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Constantly traveling. Yes. I also used to travel very often. If you take the current Governor, he also will be traveling.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: A sum of Rs. 1.6 billion is justifiable

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think you are suggesting that -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: 1.6 billion. Is it in Rupees or Dollars?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: 1.6 billion rupees.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: If you take the current bond that was issued by the Government, -this is a very essential, very relevant question. So, pardon me for taking a little time for this. I do not have time to calculate. but, I will give you figures- it was US Dollars 650 million and they paid 6.125 per cent for a 10-year bond. The previous bond, four year ago. was raised at 5.875 per cent. So, 2.5 per cent per annum was the increase in the rate of that bond: 0.25 into ten years is 2.5. So, 2.5 per cent of US Dollars 650 million, -if you

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work it out if somebody has a calculator and if you take it in rupees- it is about Rupees four billion. So, you can see how much of an impact it has if you do not have a sufficient number of investors coming into the bonds that the country is placing. So, keeping the confidence levels of all these investors is essential and if the confidence levels being coming down as a result of a human rights violations being spoken of or –

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do you have a Communication Department there?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, why did you not use it-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: If you want me to explain all that, I will do that. I can take a lot of time and explain to you why it is necessary. People must understand what they are communicating.

The Public Debt Department has skillful people and he was able to manage that communication programme extremely well keeping all the tabs. Do you know that we keep a tab on all these investors?

The Chairman: I will have to stop now. I must send the staff. I cannot provide transport to them.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I know that. I can give a very comprehensive answer to that because I think it is a very important question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Where was Mrs. Muthugala during your time?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: She was also in the Public Debt Department.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: She could not answer the questions.

The Chairman: We can ask him to come once again.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That is why I was the Governor. I can answer those questions.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Exactly. But, Mrs. Muthugala could not answer the questions relating to her own department.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That you will have to ask her. But, I have studied the subject in every aspect. I want to tell you that. I am glad that you ask me those questions because I have come prepared and I know what has happened at the Central Bank during my tenure. I can explain to you all in detail.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I must say this to defend Mrs. Muthugala.

The Chairman: No more questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Cabral.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Thank you.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: Would you agree with that? That is what has been mentioned-

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, I will not agree with that at all because those people who are suggesting that do not care about the price that you bid. Would you like to have a system through which you call for Rs. 5 billion, you have different people bidding and then the rates going up by 3 per cent to 4 per cent? What would it do to the fiscal policy of the country?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Could that not happen with private placements as well?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, that will not happen because the guidance has been given by the Central Bank and they will lock a price after a certain limit. They will not want to go beyond that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it not the same with the auction as well? There was a price which you could not go beyond - 12.5 per cent or whatever?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I will give you an example.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is that correct?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. The ceiling was 12.5 per cent.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There was a coupon rate which amounts to 12.5 per cent. So, is it absolutely forbidden to accept bids beyond that coupon rate?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The coupon rate will only be the rate that you are given. If you get some of the experts who have come in, they will explain to you.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I understood that. I do not think what the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake is suggesting is the case, but it confirms that if you have a coupon rate of 12.5 per cent and if there are bids far beyond that - going up to 15 per cent even - there will be nothing against you to take in except prudence.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The coupon rate of 12.5 per cent is only a mechanism that you use to have a coupon for the amount that is being

put in. Therefore, that is not a guidance as far as the actual rate being by the Government is concerned.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The point that the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake is making - think, we need to make it very clear – is that if you have an auction, if there is a coupon rate of 12.5 per cent and if people bid even up to 20 per cent there will be no legal barrier to your taking that.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: No, it is like this.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You just answer my question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Then, why would you have a ceiling – a coupon rate, if you can go beyond that? That is what I wanted to ask him to explain

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: I think laymen generally have that difficulty. I understand what she means.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is not a ceiling. It is just the rate that you pay - .

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: What happens is, the coupon rate is mentioned in every instrument because that would be the convenient method by which the payments could be made by the Central Bank when the interest rates are being paid. But, look at the way it is bid for an interest of 12.5 per cent – let us say, for 100 rupees that will be 12.50 rupees. But there may be a person who might bid at 90 rupees. There you are getting a different interest rate actually: for 90 rupees, they will get 12.50 rupees. Or he might bid at 110 rupees. That is how this auction systems work because you keep the interest rate constant so that for the instrument the rate that is paid is set out. But the amount at which the contribution is made, is changing. That is how this auction works.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Tell me the difference of the interest rates between the private placements, then.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If you look at what actually happens, in actual fact that the final bid taken, the interest rate is higher than 12.5 per cent.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, it is 11.73 per cent.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: That is the average.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If you look at this, it is very clear - if your argument was correct that there is a ceiling-.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, it is not an argument. I am trying to clarify this. My question was which system is more transparent and more advantageous; whether it is auction or the private placements? You are telling me private placements are better than auctions. I am trying to ask you, "Why?" and then, you are trying to explain. So, how does the interest rate walks with the private placements because I am quite clear with the auctions?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: First of all, I am saying, once again, that there are no private placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Direct placements. I am sorry, pardon me for my ignorance.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: To continue by using that term, which I think, is entirely wrong.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We are being given all the documents mentioning the same. They kept on saying, 'private placements'.

The Hon. M.T. Hasen Ali: Even the previous people who were summoned used the term, 'private placements'.

The Hon. E. Saravanapavan: Even the Deputy Governor from the Bank and all the others. In fact one of the officials told us 'private placements' was the wrong word. What is the word used in the manual?

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: It is direct placements. So, somebody is trying to shift this focus by calling it, 'private placements.' I do not know who, I have an idea myself. But, what I am saying is this word, 'private placement' is not in the manual. Have a look at it. These are direct placements that are being made. So, direct placements are made after establishing the rate. I have been explaining that and once the rate is established once again the same primary dealers are entitled to make direct placements at the interest rate which has been established through the auction. I think that that is a very transparent system and taken as a composite. I believe that system has saved an enormous amount of money to this country and if somebody suggests that they should have an auction only, you will be paying some serious amounts and very soon you will probably have to revert back and if you want to

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go that way, you will get stuck reverted back. I really think it is going to be extremely unwise to do so.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think that is a partial explanation because an auction, by its very nature, gives you a comparative price. That is why you are having it to start with. Otherwise you could be doing private placements without an auction or you could do direct placements without an auction. So, the auction in theory itself establishes the market price. Then, once you have decided based on the auction that you are taking at a particular price, you are inviting others on a very transparent basis at the same moment to openly take it. That is why we have to go to the manual to determine, as you said, and I am not very sure, and then that is less problematic because if it is actually happening, everybody will have information at the same time and they were re-bidding basically.

Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal: They are re-bidding. The bid price has been established.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: But, they are putting another bid and saying, "I will take Rs. 5 million more or Rs. 10 billion more or whatever the number is because it is not in the first round electronically. You cut off at a certain point. We say, "This is the price. We are willing to take more." Then, they have to go back into the system and probably say, "Okay, I will take 'x' or 'y'. " or whatever. If everybody has information at the same time, there is some equality. But, in the auction system why I said that you cannot dismiss the auction system is you take what you want from the auction system and if the price is too high you do not take it at the higher prices and you cut it off. That is over there. You can have another auction subsequently. The auction systems by nature have to be competitive. Otherwise, you do not need to have the auction system.

So, the question here which we have not got an answer - you said that we really need to look at the manual and we will look at it - is whether this information has consistently gone out electronically or otherwise to everybody in the system at the same time. Then, they have decided whether to give it or not. We will have to establish that. The other thing that. I think, we need to remember is the Central Bank obviously wants to take the money at the lowest possible cost which is, I think. correct. Why should the Government pay at a much higher cost but also the lowest possible cost is not just in isolation because costs, rates and interest rates have to be looked in different tenures. So, the one consideration will be because I think, the wording you read also said from a long-term perspective – you read something a little while ago. So, I think it is the balance between the cost and the tenure, has to be taken into account because you advertise a 30-year bond and then you say, "Okay, we have a gap and we can get it for lower and we take a two-year bond or a five-year bond, it is not the same thing as taken in a 30-year bond. So, costs and tenures are related to each other. It is not just cost in isolation and, I think, you have to look at the whole thing. So, who is making that decision – I do not know whether it is the Tender Board Committee or whatever because there is one thing, Mr. Chairman, which we have not got clarification, we will have to again call for and ask officials, it is the process. It is still not clear and I went over that now and we will have to get clarification again because we want to check more than one source: whether this process is being followed, whether there is a domestic debt management committee, who ascertains the domestic debt requirement, whether there is Public Debt Department who calls for the auction. We need to know, I am not talking of individuals, I am talking of ex-officio, whether members are sharing with each other and whether there is a Tender Board committee, which we know there is and it has been mentioned.

The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha: While I am very happy that you raised this debate, and you must do it, maybe within the United National Party or maybe in Parliament, but this is not the place to do it.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think we are talking of two different things here. One is, I accept what you are saying that there should be a change in policy on EPF and if it does not happen, it is a larger question and it is outside the forum of COPE. But, the relevance of the other part of it in going for the auction is very much a part of COPE. That is going to be a better, competitive practice. That happening is perfectly normal.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is not for the COPE to decide. That is to be decided by the relevant authorities and not by one person acting in a way that seems to be contrary.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: No. The overall point that I am making is that this question has to be asked from the others as well. So, my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is if we do not get these basic things answered and if we were to just go to a finality without getting these basic things answered, our questioning will not really produce the result that we actually want. This whole thing is about the electronic manual. The former Governor did not know the details. My preliminary questions were not answered today. What I am saying is that we need to get answers for those questions before we go to the finality. Otherwise what is going to happen is, we are going to be running here and there. As you said we should call him again or one of the Assistant Governors or Deputy Governors. We should get that cleared and then, we should plan what we are actually going to do in terms of the present Governor, in bringing back the Bank of Ceylon and the Perpetual Treasuries Limited. My suggestion is that we come to some common understanding first as we are all in the same page in actually how these things have operated. If we do not have that, this confusion will go through all the other rounds as well including when we bring in the Governor and question him. It will just go here and there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Talking about procedure, I would like to make one point. It may not be relevant to both of you. But, there is a move by the Hon. Prime Minister to delay the Report of this as much as possible. This may be untrue. Maybe these are not instructions given to you. But, in a situation where this incident happened on 27th of February, 2015, a Committee of experts was appointed. I just read the Hon. Prime Minister's speech in the Hansard. He has almost said to ignore this. This was followed by delaying producing the Report to Parliament.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Shall we determine as to whom we should bring in tomorrow to answer these questions. ඒ කියන්නේ පරණ කෙනෙකුව ගෙන්වමු. මොකද, දැන් මෙතැන දෙපැත්තේම සිටින්නේ conflict of interest තිබෙන පිරිසක්නේ. එම නිසා I am talking of someone who can thoroughly answer the questions.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Shall we bring in the Governor tomorrow?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන තමයි මේ කථා කරන්නේ.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Shall we discuss ourselves tomorrow and decide?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is better.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think we should have a meeting among ourselves. We are bringing in only the evidence and we have got so much of paper to read. We can come up with a framework first and then, see what we have agreed and what we have disagreed and get that clarified. Then, we can get the next round going on. I think even if you just get the Governor to come, we will be going in circles again.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think it is vital to get him.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Obviously, we must get him.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, but before that we must get the questions so that we can fire questions at him.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can we have a session just among ourselves and read the whole thing up as the Auditor-General suggested?

The Chairman: We are free next week as it is a non-Sitting week.

Witness withdrew

Committee adjourned.

Unedited

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

2015 ජුනි මස 17 වැනි බදාදා (උදයවරුව)

පැමිණ සිටි:

ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය
ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු එම්.ටී. හසන් අලි මහතා
ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක සේවා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, වැඩබලන විගණකාධිපති.
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඊ.ඒ.එන්.පී. එදිරිසිංහ මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඊ.එම්.කේ.එම්. පද්මලාල් මහතා, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;

ලංකා බැංකුවේ හිටපු ප්‍රධාන ගනුදෙනුකරු ජේ.කේ.ඩී.ධර්මපාල මහතා කැඳවන ලදී. ලංකා බැංකුවේ හිටපු ප්‍රධාන ගනුදෙනුකරු ජේ.කේ.ඩී.ධර්මපාල මහතා ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: The Auditor-General, එතුමාගෙන් කරුණු අහන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හොඳයි. අපි ප්‍රථමයෙන්ම පසු ගිය 27 වැනිදා ඔබතුමා සහ Central Bank එකේ යම් නිලධාරියකු අතර සිදු වුණු දුරකථන සංවාදයක හඬ පටය අහන්න යලස්වනවා. ඒක ඔබතුමා කථා කළ හඬ පටය බව කරුණාකර සහතික කරන්න. ඔබතුමා කථා කරන්නේ, Central Bank එකේ, Front Office එකේ, නිලධාරිනියක් එක්ක. අපට තහවුරු කරන්න ඒ කථා කරන අනෙක් පුද්ගලයා කවුද කියන එක.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: හොඳයි.

[පටිගත කළ දුරකථන සංවාදයක්]

(Lady): Hello, Mr. Dharmapala

(Lasantha): Lasantha, Madam.

(Lady): Lasantha

(Lasantha): ඔව්, Madam.

(Lady): Mr. Dharmapalaට වුට්ටක් හදිසියෙන් කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ. Busy ද?

(Lasantha): හරි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

(Lady): නැත්නම් කියන්න කෝ ලසන්ත... ලසන්ත - පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

(Gentleman): Hello!

(Lady): Mr. Dharmapala,

(Gentleman): වහ කුප්පියකුත් එවන්න, අපට.

(Lady): ආ..?

(Gentleman): වහ කුප්පියකුත් එවන්න, අපට.

(Lady): Mr. Dharmapala, ඒකයි මම කිව්වේ. අපි rate indication දෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේකට ඔනෑ ගාණක Bid කරන්න ...

(Gentleman): From our point of view that is not that much – what you call not ethical නේද? බලන්න කෝ දැන් 9.35 නේ ඉස්සෙල්ලා ඕගොල්ලන්ට -

(Lady): Mr. Dharmapala, you won't believe, it is between you and me. හරිද? Governor walked into the Department and told, "take this bid, take at this level,"

(Gentleman): ඔයා කියන්නේ මට කථා කරන්න බැරිව ඉන්නේ. ඔයා විශ්වාස කරනවාද?

(Lady): අපි දන්නවා, Mr. Dharmapala.

(Gentleman): ඉන්න කෝ. 9.35 lowest bid එක. පවු අර පොඩි customer කෙනෙකුගේ.

(Lady): 8 million නේ?

(Gentleman): ඊට පස්සේ අපේ twelve and a half එකත් ඒක නේ. more than 315 basis point range එකක one billion ඕගොල්ලන් දාපු offer එකට ten billion මොකක්ද දැන්, බලන්න අපි ඔක්කොම අනිවාර්යෙන්ම lending rates එහෙම වැඩි කරනවා.

(Lady): ඔව්, මේක මාර shock එකක් market-

(Gentleman): ඇයි, එහෙම කරන්නෝ ඉනින්?

(Lady): Mr. Dharmapala අපි කොච්චර කිව්වත් decision එක ගන්නේ එයා නේ.

(Gentleman): හරි, අපිට නේරෙනවා. What is the purpose behind?

(Lady): එයාගෙන්මයි අහන්න වෙන්නේ, Mr. Dharmapala. we rationalize Bids. එහෙම බැහැ කියලා ඉතින් man එච්චර ඇහුම්කන් දුන්නේ නැහැ. Mr. Dhamapala, I saw this eight million and I was like wondering-

(Gentleman): ඒක නම් Miss, මෙහෙමයි. අපි ඇවිල්ලා customers ලාට කියන්නේ ඕගොල්ලො කියන එක - ඒ කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි, ඕගොල්ලන්ගේ view එක නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. අපි ඇවිල්ලා State Bank එකක් නේ.

(Lady): ඔව්, ඔව්.

(Gentleman): State Bank එකක - we have a duty to protect the people, people's money.

(Lady): Very true. Very true.

(Gentleman): We have to give the aggregate picture. ඒ picture එක ඒගොල්ලන්ට අපි කියන්නට ඕනෑ. Central Bank එක ගිය සැරේ මේ විධියට ගත්තේ. ඕනෑ නම් පොඩ්ඩක්- වැඩි වෙයි. එච්චර වැඩි වෙන්න - අපි එච්චර - පුළුවන්තරම් අපි - ඕගොල්ලන් කියන දේ තමයි මිනිසුන්ට අපි කියන්නේ. නැහැ, නැහැ, Central Bank rate උඩ දමයි, එහෙම කවදාවත් අපි කියන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, That is not a duty. ඉතින් 315 -

(Lady): නැහැ, නැහැ, අපිත් හිතුවේ නැහැ, Mr. Dharmapala. you believe it or not අපිවත් හිතුවේ නැහැ, මෙච්චර යයි කියලා. අපි මේකට වඩා අඩුවෙන් තමයි set කරලා තිබුණේ. හරිද? Man walked into the Department and said, "No. What rubbish are you'll doing? Increase it. Give it at this level." You won't believe he wanted us to take all the bids.

(Gentleman): Eh, eh

(Lady): කිව්වා, Sir ඔහොම කරන්න එපා, එනකොට ඔක්කොම යයි. අපිට මෙතැන වැඩ කරන්නම බැරි වෙයි කියලා.

(Gentleman): නැහැ, නැහැ, අපි ඊළඟට Treasury Bills ගදනවා. අපි Treasury Bills quote කරන්නේ 10 per cent වලට

(Lady): මම දන්නවා Mr. Dharmapala, ඔක වෙයි කියලා. කොච්චර කිව්වාද? නෑ Sir, this market is not that advanced. මේක තමයි උපරිම කියලා මේගොල්ලන් ගන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මේක දුන්නාට පස්සෙත් two basis points කට උඩ යයි, කට උඩ යයි, එහෙම නේ Mr. Dharmapala, කිව්වට ඉතින් what can we do?

(Gentleman): අපේ මුළු බැංකුවම really shock; market shock.

(Lady): හ්ම්., ශබ්දයක්වත් නැහැ.

(Gentleman): ශබ්ද නැහැ කියන්නේ, පවු ඉතින්.

(Lady): පවු වැඩේ, Mr. Dharmapala.

(Gentleman): පවු වැඩේ. ඔයා කියන්නේ අපිට නම් මේ State bank - we can afford that shock

(Lady): Afford it.

(Gentleman): But මට rumour එකක් මෙහෙම ආවා. ඊයේ Central Bank එකේ එක්කෙනෙක් ආවා, මෙතැනට. එයා ඇවිල්ලා එයාගේ - that he wanted to invest Rs.750,000.00. He wanted to buy that bond.

(Lady): Thirty-year

(Gentleman): 750,000 අපි දෙන්නේ නැහැ. minimum 5 million වෙන්න ඕනෑ. Sir මෙහෙමයි, අපි bid එකක් දමන්නම්. one million වාගේ ඔයාට අරන් දෙන්න පුළුවන් නම්. එයා කිව්වා, නැහැ නැහැ coupon rate එකට twelve and half නේ. coupon rate එකට උඩින් ඔය bond එක දෙනවා හෙට Central Bank එකෙන්.

(Lady): නැහැ.

(Gentleman): එයා එහෙම කිව්වා නේ අපට. මම කිව්වා මේ පිරිසෙක් වෙන්ඩ ඇති. යන්න කියන්න ඔය application එක තියලා, ආවොත් අපි අරන් දෙන්නම් කියලා. ඒ මිනිහා හරි ඇති. That is true නේද?

(Lady): කවුද දන්නේ නැහැ නේද? කියන්න බැහැ නේ නේද?

(Gentleman): කියන්න බැහැ. මා ළඟ application එකක් තියෙනවා. අනේ මං දන්නේ නැහැ මට මේ - ඇත්තටම මේ job එක දාලා යන්න හිතිලා තිබෙන්නේ.

(Lady): මටත් එහෙමයි, Mr. Dharmapala. කොහොමද market එකට ආපහු යන්නේ මේ rate එක දුන්නාට පස්සේ. මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ -

(Gentleman): මෙහෙමයි, දැන්. අපි immediately meeting එකක් තියන්න යන්නේ. Lending rates ඔක්කොම උඩ දානවා අපි.

(Lady): දෙයියනේ!

(Gentleman): ඔයා කියන්නේ අපේ maximum lending rate එක, ඒ කියන්නේ අපි nine and half rates අඩු කරලා තියෙන්නේ. Liquidity එකේ තියෙනවා. බලන්න කෝ, LKR position එක BOC ම තියෙනවා 33 billion -- excess. market liquidity ම හිතන්නේ 15 billion කියන්නේ ඕගොල්ලන් ගාව short-term standard market දාලා ඇති about 250 billion එච්චරම තිබුණත් මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ, මොකක්ද මේ වුණේ කියන එක.

(Lady): මටත් තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ Mr. Dharmapala, අපිත් මොනවා කරන්නද කියන එක.

(Gentleman): දැන් ඊට හපන්. ඔයා දන්නවාද, 11.73 නේ weighted average rate වුණේ.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

(Lady): ඔව්.

(Gentleman): ඒකට ගන්තු කට්ටියන් දැන් happy නැහැ. ඔයයි.

(Lady): ඔයයි?

(Gentleman): Two and a half වැට්ලා නේ.

(Lady): ඔයා දන්නවාද Mr. Dharmapala, කොච්චර convince කරන්න හැදුවාද? මේක බැහැ, අරක බැහැ, Sir, this is - එයාට between even you and me Mr. Dharmapala. කාටවත් කියන්න එපා. එයා ඉන්නේ අර international market idea එකේ නේ Mr. Dharmapala. He doesn't have an understanding of our market. අපි දන්නවා නේ මෙහෙම දුන්නාම මොනවාද වෙන්නේ කියලා.

(Gentleman): නැහැ, ඉතින් මෙහෙමයි. සමහර විට Foreignersලා එයි. Foreignersලා එන - එහෙම එකක් වෙන්න ඇති බලාගෙන ඉන්නේ. ඒක හොඳයි. ඒ වුණාට Foreignersලා වුණත් එච්චරම -

(Lady): කොච්චරද ගන්න පුළුවන් foreignersලා -

(Gentleman): Five year bond එකට, seven quarter කියන එකට ඒගොල්ලන් happy නැහැ. ඒගොල්ලන් කියන්නේ at least eight per cent වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක තමයි ඒගොල්ලන් කියන්නේ. නමුත් eight per cent නෙමෙයි, මේක -

(Lady): Ten per centවත් දෙන්න වෙයි වාගේ.

(Gentleman): නැහැ, ලබන සැරේ අපි One year bill quote කරන්නේ 10 per cent

(Lady): ඇත්තද? කොහේ නතර වෙයිද දන්නේ නැහැ.

(Gentleman): Okay. එහෙනම් -

(Lady): Mr. Dharmapala, මම වෙන එකකට call කරා කළේ. අපේ අර SLBT එකට payment agent agreement එක මම අද එවන්නද, Mr. Dharmapalaට?

(Gentleman): එවන්න, එවන්න.

(Lady): අද නැත්නම් Monday morning දාන්නම්.

(Gentleman): Right, Okay.

(Lady): Okay, thank you."

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා තහවුරු කරනවාද මේක ඔබතුමා සහ Central Bank එකේ Front Office එකේ තවත් පුද්ගලයකු අතර සිදු වුණු සංවාදයක් බව.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Central Bank එකේ Front Office එකෙන් කථා කරන මේ අනෙක් පුද්ගලයා කවුද කියලා අපට හඳුනා ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඒ නිසා අපට කරුණාකර පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඒ පුද්ගලයා ඔබතුමා දන්නා පුද්ගලයකුද කියා. කවුද මේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා දන්නා පුද්ගලයෙක්. අපි Central Bank එකත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ වෙන කොට උදාහරණයක් විධියට රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරියේ වාගේ ඉහළ නිලධාරීන් එක්ක නොවෙයි සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ. ඔය වාගේ ඊට ටිකක් පහළ මට්ටමේ නිලධාරීන් එක්කයි. ඒ අය තමයි Front Office එකේ වැඩ කරන්නේ.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කරන්නේ ඔය වාගේ auction එකක් තිබෙන අවස්ථාවක අපේ තිබෙන customer base එකට හෝ ඒ අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු දෙන්න ඒගොල්ලන් එක්ක කථා කරනවා. Market එක, direction එක, interest rate එක වැඩි වෙයිද, අඩු වෙයිද කියන ඒවා සම්බන්ධයෙන් දැනගන්න තමයි අපි ඒගොල්ලන්ට කථා කරන්නේ. මා සමග සංවාදයේ යෙදී සිටියේ ස්ටෙෆි කියන නිලධාරිනියයි. එතුමියත් එක්ක තමයි අපි කථා කරන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතුමිය වැඩ කරන්නේ මොන branch එකේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සම්පූර්ණ නම මොකක්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ස්ටෙෆි කියලා තමයි අපි එතුමියට කථා කරන්නේ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සම්පූර්ණ නම දන්නේ නැහැ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: සම්පූර්ණ නම මම හරියට දන්නේ නැහැ. මගේ නම ධර්මපාල වාගේ මම එතුමියට ස්ටෙෆි කියලා තමයි කථා කරන්නේ. එතුමිය දීපු call එකට තමයි මම මේ answer එක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතුමිය front office එකේද, middle office එකේද, back office එකේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Front office එකේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමිය හමු වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එතුමිය මම හමු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ සංවාදය තුළ කියැවෙනවා, Central Bank එකේම තවත් පුද්ගලයෙක් 750,000ක bond එකක් offer කරන්න, bid එකක් දාන්න ආවාය කියලා. ඔබතුමා ඔහුට මේ සංවාදය තුළ කියනවා, මිලියන පහක minimum තමයි දාන්න පුළුවන්, ඒ නිසා මේක දාන්න බැහැ කියලා. ඊට අමතරව කියැවෙනවා, මේක සියයට 12.5ක coupon rate එකටත් වඩා වැඩියෙන් යනවාය කියා එතුමා තහවුරු කරනවාය

කියලා. මේ සංවාදය තුළ ඒක කියැවෙනවා. මහ බැංකුවේ එහෙම කියන පුද්ගලයා කවුද කියන එකත් අපට හඳුනා ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එතුමා වැඩ කරන්නේ, -

සභාපතිතුමා: Customer කෙනෙක් වෙන්න ඇති නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ. මහ බැංකුවේ වැඩ කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැත්නම් ඔහු කොහොමද, Bank of Ceylon එකේ bidsවල, -

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔහු private bid එකක් දාන්න ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි. Private bids ඔක්කෝටම, -

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතැන තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට මොහොතක් කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න. තනිකරම අපේ retail transactions handle කරන්නේ Primary Dealer Unit කියන එක. ඒක back office එක විධියටත් වැඩ කරනවා. ඒ වාගේම දැනට අපේ ලංකා බැංකුවේ ගිණුම් හරහා කෙරෙන retail customer base එක handle කරන්නේත් ඒගොල්ලන්. ඒ, front office functions විධියටයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකෙන්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකෙන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ කී දෙනෙකු ඉන්නවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතැන staff එකේ අට දෙනෙක් විතර ඉන්නවා. එතැන Senior Manger කෙනෙකු තමයි ඉන්නේ. පොඩි පොඩි customersලා එනැනට ඇවිල්ලා කථා කරලා තමයි retail ratesවලට retail amounts ඒ විධියට ගන්නේ. එතැනදී තමයි මේ සුලෝචන කියන නිලධාරි මහත්මයා ආවේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සුලෝචන කියන පුද්ගලයා Central Bank එකේ වැඩ කරනවා කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. මම දන්නවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: වැඩ කරන branch එක, division එක මොකක්ද කියලාත් ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: IT Division එකේ තමයි වැඩ කරන්නේ. එතුමා මා ළඟට නොවෙයි ආවේ. Back office එකට තමයි ආවේ. එතැන නිලධාරිනියක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ නිලධාරිනිය application form එකක් අරගෙන මම ළඟට ආවා. ඇවිල්ලා කිව්වා, "සර්, 750,000කට මේ වාගේ bid එකක් දාන්න Central Bank එකේ මහත්තයෙක් ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නවා. හැබැයි, ඔහු 30-year bond එකක් තමයි ඉල්ලන්නේ. සර්, අපි ළඟ bonds නැහැ නේද?" කියලා. මම මගේ portfolio එක බැලුවා. නමුත් එහෙම 30-year bond එකක් අපි ළඟ නැහැ. අපි ළඟ එතකොට තිබුණේ Ceylon Petroleum Corporation එකට ආණ්ඩුවෙන් දුන්නු අවුරුදු 20 bond එකක් විතරයි. ඒකත් ඇත්තටම අපිට දෙන්න ක්‍රමයක් නැහැ. මොකද, ඒක අපි දාලා තිබෙන්නේ investment portfolio එකේ. ඊට පස්සේ මම කිව්වා, "මේක දෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ. 750,000ක් අපිට bid කරන්න බැහැ. At least, Rs. 5 million තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ bid කරන්න. බැරි වෙලාවත් පොඩි පොඩි customersලා කීප දෙනෙකු හෝ ආවොත් Rs. 5 million හදලා මම ඒක දාලා දෙන්නම්. ඒ නිසා ඔය application form එක නියා ගන්න" කියලා. ඔහු කථා කරපු විධියට මට තේරුණේ මේකයි. Coupon rate එක සියයට 12.50 කියලා ඇත්තටම publish කරන්නේ - That is not the market rate. Market rate is different from the coupon rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it lower or higher?

Mr. J.K.D. Dharmapala: It may be lower or higher according to the market rate scenario. That means, if the market rate is starting to go up-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Market rate was about 9.35 per cent at that time. Is it?

Mr. J.K.D. Dharmapala: Yes. It was 9.35 per cent. If the coupon rate is 12.5 per cent, that means- The coupon is paid on the face value. එහෙම වුණාම coupon rate එකේ තිබෙන reinvestment risk එක තමයි තිබෙන්නේ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. ඒ කියන්නේ, interest rate ඉහළ යන වෙලාවකදී coupon එක හොඳයි. පහළ යන කොට reinvestment risk එක වැඩියි. මේ පුද්ගලයා කථා කරපු විධියට මට හිතුණා, ඇත්තටම ඔහු මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් වැඩි දැනුමක් තිබෙන පුද්ගලයෙකු නොවෙයි කියලා. ඒක තමයි මගේ idea එක තිබුණේ. මම ඔහුට කිව්වා, "කමක් නැහැ. ඔය application form එක නියලා යන්න" කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ application form එක නියා ගත්තා. Bidding date එක ආවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Coupon rate එක ගැන කලින් දැනුවත් කරනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Coupon rate එක publish කරනවානේ. Coupon rate එක 12.5 per cent කියලා amount එක and the duration, as well ඒගොල්ලන් publish කරනවා. ඔහු මේ application form එක නියලා ගියා. මේ application form එක නියලා ගියාට පස්සේ ඔය issue එක ආවා. Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ කතන්දරය ඇවිල්ලා අපි bid කළානේ. විශේෂයෙන්ම මොහු Central Bank එකේ

පුද්ගලයෙක්. Central Bank එකේ පුද්ගලයෙකු ආවාම අපි ඔවුන්ට විශේෂ සැලකිල්ලක් නොවෙයි, කොහොමත් පොඩි concern එකක් තිබෙනවා. අපේ regulator ළඟ වැඩ කරන කෙනෙක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොඩි concern එකක් තිබෙනවා, ඔහුට මේක අරගෙන දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒ නිසාම තමයි මම මේ application form එක තියා ගන්න කියලාත් කිව්වේ. අපට ගන්න බැහැ කියලා මම ඔහු යැව්වා නම් සමහර විට ඒක, -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is detrimental to you all.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒක එච්චර හොඳ මදි. Central Bank එකට වුණත් ගිහිල්ලා ඔහු කියන්න පුළුවන්නේ, ලංකා බැංකුවට මම ගියා, මගේ application form එක ගත්තේත් නැහැ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නැති වුණත් Customer කෙනෙකු ආවාම help කරන්න එපායැ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. ඔහු මේ application form එක තියලා ගියා. Bidding දවසේ bidding එක ඉවර වෙලා Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ කසුන් මාත් එක්ක කථා කළා. Dealing room එක කියන්නේ විශාල pressure එකකින් වැඩ කරන තැනක්. දවසකට calls 3,000ක් විතර අපේ Treasury Division එකට එනවා. ඒවාට දෙන පිළිතුරු සමහර වෙලාවට සම්පූර්ණ පිළිතුරු නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. සමහර විට කථා කරන දේවල් smooth නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. සමහර වෙලාවට ඒවාට ඇහුම් කන් දෙන අයට හිතෙන්න පුළුවන් මේ මොනවාද කථා කරන්නේ කියලා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Up and down ad hoc ගොඩාක් යනවා.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Ad hoc කියන්නේ, ඉතා ඉක්මනින් කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ, ඊළඟ call එක line up වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වෙලාවේ මට සුලෝචනගේ application form එක ගැන පොඩි අදහසක් ආවා. කසුන්ට මම කිව්වා, "කසුන්, ඔයාට හමු වුණොත් මටත් ටිකක් දෙන්න" කියලා. කීයක් විතර දෙනවාද කියලාත් මම ඇහුවා. මට හිතුණා, සමහර විට මොහුගෙන් Rs. 1 million or Rs. 2 millionවත් අරගෙන මොහුට මේ deal එක match කර ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි කියලා. නමුත් auction එකත් ඉවර වුණා. Auction එක ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ සුලෝචන අපිට කථා කරලා තිබුණා. මට නොවෙයි, back office එකට කථා කරලා තිබුණා. ඔහු කියලා තිබුණා, "සර්, මෙහෙමයි. අපිට bonds හමු වුණේ නැහැ. දෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ. මොකද කරන්නේ?"කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ මම ආපසු back office එකට ගිහිල්ලා එතැනින් call එකක් අර ගත්තා. ඔහුගේ mobile phone එකට කථා කළ බව මට මතකයි. "සර්, මෙහෙමයි bonds හමු වුණේ නැහැ. සර් දන්නවා නේ අපිට වෙලා තිබෙන වැඩේ. සියයට 9.50ට විතර වාගේ Kalutara Bodhi Trust එක වැදිලා තිබුණේ. ඒකේ පොඩි කැල්ලක් ඉතුරු වෙලා තිබුණා. මහ බැංකු නිලධාරියෙකු විධියට සර්ට මට ඒක දෙන්න බැහැ." කියලා කිව්වා. ඔහු ඒක වුණත් ගන්න ඇත්තටම ඒ වෙලාවේ කැමැති වුණා. මම කිව්වා, "නැහැ සර්, මම එහෙම නම් දෙන්න කැමැති නැහැ. සියයට 12ට විතර දැන් rate එක ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. මම ඒක සර්ට දෙන එක විශාල වැරැද්දක්. සර්ට market එකෙන් මීට වැඩිය ගන්න පුළුවන්. වෙන primary dealer කෙනෙකුගෙන් ගන්න" කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ ඔහු application form එකත් අරගෙන ආපසු ගියා. ඒක තමයි ඒ සුලෝචන කියන නිලධාරියාගේ කතන්දරය.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කලින් අපි වාදනය කරපු සංවාදය තුළ මෙන්න මෙහෙම කථාවක් කියැවෙනවා.

"750,000 අපි දෙන්නේ නැහැ. Minimum, 5 million වෙන්න ඕනෑ. Sir මෙහෙමයි. අපි bid එකක් දමන්නම්, one million වාගේ ඔයාට අරන් දෙන්න පුළුවන් නම්. එයා කිව්වා, නැහැ නැහැ. Coupon rate එක 12.5 නේ. Coupon rate එකට උඩින් ඔය bond එක දෙනවා හෙට Central Bank එකෙන්." ඔබතුමා ඒ කියන්නේ එතුමා කියපු දේ. නිශ්චිතවම ඔහු දන්නවා, 12.5ට වඩා වැඩියෙන් මේක යනවාය කියන එක.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, උදාහරණයක් විධියට ගත්තොත් අපේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඊයේ පෙරේදා පත්තරේ තිබුණු සාකච්ඡාවකදී කියලා තිබුණා, සියයට 12.5ට මේ bond එක දෙනවා කියා publish කළා කියලා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒකෙන් සාමාන්‍ය කෙනෙකුට හැඟී යන්නේ සියයට 12.5ට මේ bond එක දෙනවාය කියලායි. ඇත්ත වශයෙන් මේක coupon rate එක. Treasury Bonds සම්බන්ධයෙන් දන්නේ නැති කෙනෙකු හිතන්නේ මහ බැංකුව සියයට 12.5ට දෙනවාය කියන කතන්දරයයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Advertisement එකේ දාන්නේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Advertisement එකේ දාන නිසා.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. Advertisement එකේ දමන නිසා. සමහර විට එහෙම හිතලා මගේ conversation එකේදී "පිස්සෙක් වෙන්න ඇති" කියන කථාව කියන්නේ ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒ පුද්ගලයාට කිසිම දැනුමක් නැහැ කියන හැඟීම තමයි මගේ හිතේ තිබුණේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හැබැයි ඒක එහෙම කථාවක් නොවෙයි. මෙනැනින් අදහස් වෙන්නේ ඔබතුමා කියනවා, මෙතැන rumor එකක් තිබුණාය කියා මීට කලින් කියපු එකක් ගැන සංවාදයේ මෙහෙම කියවෙනවා. (සංවාදයේ 4 වන පිටුව)

"But, මට rumor එකක් මෙහෙම ආවා. ඊයේ Central Bank එකේ එක්කෙනෙක් ආවා, මෙතැනට. එයා ඇවිල්ලා එයාගේ he wanted to

invest Rs. 750 million, he wanted to buy that bond. – "

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Rs. 750 million නොවෙයි Rs. 750,000.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Sorry, Rs. 750,000. ඊට පසු තමයි මේ සංවාදය ඇති වෙන්නේ. මේ coupon rate එක උඩින් දෙනවාය කියන එක ඒකෙදි කියවෙනවා. ඒක එයා නිශ්චිතවම කියනවා. ඔබතුමා මේ කියන සංවාදය තුළින් අදහස් වෙන්නේ සියයට 12.5 ට වඩා මේක යනවාය කියන එක ගැන. එයාට නිශ්චිතවම information එකක් නිබෙනවාය කියන එකයි. (සංවාදයේ 4 වන පිටුවේ අන්තිමට ඒක සඳහන් වෙනවා.)

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "Rs. 750,000 අපි දෙන්නේ නැහැ. Minimum Rs. 5 million වෙන්න ඕනෑ.සර් මෙහෙමයි. අපි bid එකක් දමන්නම්. Rs. 1 million වාගේ ඔයාට අරන් දෙන්න පුළුවන් නම්. එයා කිව්වා, නැහැ, නැහැ coupon rate එකට 12.5 නේ. Coupon rate එකට උඩින් ඔය bond එක දෙනවා හෙට Central Bank එකෙන්. "

"එයා එහෙම කිව්වා නේ අපට. මම කිව්වා, මේ පිස්සෙක් වෙන්න ඇති. යන්න කියන්න,

ඔය application එක තියලා, ආවොත් අපි අරන් දෙන්නම් කියලා. ඒ මිනිහා හරි ඇති.

That is true නේද? "

කවුද දන්නේ නැහැ නේද? කියන්න බැහැ නේද? He is also guessing. Is it not?

ඔබතුමා කියන එකේ ඒ තේරුමත් නිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව කියනවා, ඒ මිනිහා හරි ඇති. That is true නේද? " කියා අහනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Central Bank එක නිසා වෙන්න ඇති.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: That is why. ඔය කියපු හැම එකක්ම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ගන්න නොවෙයි අපි බලන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට සාධාරණ ලෙස ඕනෑ දෙයක් කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාගේ දැනීම, ඔබතුමාගේ මානසිකත්වය, මේ පුද්ගලයාගේ දැනුම මොකක්ද කියන එක තමයි අපි test කරන්නේ? මේ වචන ඔස්සේ නොවෙයි අපි දුවන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට බය නැතිව පැහැදිලි කරලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, මේකෙන් ඔබතුමා අදහස් කරන්නේ මොකක්ද කියන එක? Central Bank එකේ පුද්ගලයෙක් ආවාම විශේෂ අවධානයක් යොමු කරනවාය කියන එකත් අපි දන්නවා. අපට ඒක අමුතුවෙන් පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මේ රටේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන ඒ දෙය සභාපතිතුමාටත්, අපටත්, කාටත් තේරෙනවා. හැබැයි, මේ information එක ඔබතුමාට තිබුණාද, ඒ පුද්ගලයාට තිබුණාද කියන එකයි අපට දැනගන්න ඕනෑ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Auction එකට කලින් වෙහෙම වෙයි කියන එක ගැන මට කිසිම - ගරු

සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අපට තේරෙනවා. ඔබතුමාට එහෙම knowledge එකක් නැහැ කියන එක conversationවලින් අපට තේරෙනවා. එවැනි දෙයක් මෙයාට තිබුණාද කියන එක තමයි අපට ඔබතුමාගෙන් තහවුරු කර ගන්නයි අපි බලන්නේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම එයා ලොකු rate එකක් ඉල්ලුවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. Central Bank එකේ වැඩ කරන කට්ටියට bidsවලට මෙවා කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම restriction එකක් නැහැ. Public Debt Department එකේ අයට බැහැ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මෙයාට මොකක් හරි දැනුමක් තිබුණාද කියන එක මේ සිද්ධිය වුණායින් පසුව මට තේරුණා. ඒ ගැටලුව තමයි තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි, sure නැහැ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට ඒක sure නැහැ. මට sure නැහැ කියන්නේ, මේ පුද්ගලයාට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර සම්බන්ධ දැනුමක් තිබෙනවාද, එහෙම නැත්නම් එතුමාට වෙන -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාට සැකයි?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එහෙම වුණාදෝ කියන- ඒක තමයි මම ස්ටෙෆිටත් කියන්නේ, මෙහෙම එකක් ආවාය කියා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට bid කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව් සර්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පොඩි අය bid කරනවා නම්, bid කරන හැම කෙනෙකුටම CDS Account එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට මේ පුද්ගලයාට CDS Account එකක් තිබුණාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්න, CDS Account එකක් නැතිව ඔය පොඩි bids ආවාම එකතු කරලා, එකකට දමලා දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද? Legally ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? Rs. 1 million, Rs. 1 million එකතු කරලා, Rs. 5 million හදා ඒක බෙදා දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට නම තිබෙන්නේ කොහොමිද?

Mr. J.K.D. Dharmapala: Sir, if there are five customers, say, Rs. 1 million each they got and I can bid that amount as Rs. 5 million to Central Bank, once I get the bid, I can divide those bids and -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is that legal?

Mr. J.K.D. Dharmapala: Yes, that is legal.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: So you have to sell that again to that particular person then it goes to the secondary market.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Yes.ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට වෙන වෙනම CDS Accounts තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට මේක පොඩ්ඩක් විස්තර කරන්න. දැන් කාටද මේක ගන්නේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එකට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, අර primary dealerගේ bid එක වාගේ Bank of Ceylon එක ගන්නවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා අරගෙන ඒක ඒ කට්ටියට බෙදා දෙනවා. ඒ බෙදා දෙන්නේ කොහොමද? Certificatesවලින් බෙදා දෙනවාද? එහෙම නැත්නම් secondary market එකේ විකුණනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Certificates නැහැ නේ. මේක ඔක්කොම electronic basis නේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, electronic basis ඔබතුමන්ලාට නේ එන්නේ? Bank of Ceylon එකට නේ එන්නේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ජී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නමයි වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. පුද්ගලයාගේ අයිතිය නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකට නේ එන්නේ? කොහොමද ඒ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල් පත් පුද්ගලයන්ට, පෞද්ගලිකව දෙන්නේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට individual securities accounts වෙන වෙනම තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ජී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: CDS accountsතිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: CDS accounts තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම තිබුණේ නැත්නම් බැහැ නේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: තිබුණේ නැත්නම් බැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ජී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ පුද්ගලයාට CDS account එකක් තිබුණාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ පුද්ගලයාට අපිත් එක්ක CDS account එකක් තිබුණා.

But it is inoperative after 2011 or somewhere –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But he can operate it at any time if he wants.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පුළුවන්, පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැනදී අපට ප්‍රධාන ප්‍රශ්නය වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා හරහා දමපු bid එක සම්බන්ධයෙනුයි. ඔබතුමාගේ වැටහීම අනුව මේ bid එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒ පුද්ගලයාට මොන වාගේ දැනුමක් තිබුණාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, ඒ කොම්පැනියේ මට bid එක යෝජනා කරපු පුද්ගලයා සම්බන්ධයෙන්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. කසුන් ඔබතුමාට කථා කරනකොට ඔබතුමාට මොන වාගේ හැඟීමක්ද තිබුණේ, මේක විශාල bid එකක්, මේක unusual ද, එහෙම නැත්නම් සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම Rs. 10 billion, Rs. 15 billion කියන එක ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම අපට ලොකු ගණනක් නොවෙයි. මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න, මම තව පැහැදිලි කිරීම් කිහිපයකුත් කරනවා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට අපේ නියෝජ්‍ය භාණ්ඩාගාර-DST ගේ account එක අපි ළඟ තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක හැම වෙලාවේම Rs. 90 billion වාගේ overdraw වෙන account එකක්. ඒ Funding part එක වුණත්, market එකෙන් සල්ලි අරගෙන අපි තමයි කරන්නේ. ඒ Rs. 10 billion, Rs. 15 billion කියන එක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔය ව්‍යාපාරයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා මාසයකට කොච්චර හම්බ කරනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගිය අවුරුද්දේ - 2014දී- විතරක් මම තනිකරම Rs. 1.3 billion capital gain එකක් උපයා දීලා තිබෙනවා, මගේ බැංකුවට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඒක වැදගත් කාරණයක්. කරුණාකරලා ආයෙත් කියන්න ඒක.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගිය අවුරුද්දේ විතරක් Government Securities Trading වලින් almost 1.3 billion මගේ බැංකුවට මම උපයා දී තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Net profit.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒක net profit එක. That is not related to interest income. නිකම් buying and selling එකෙන් හම්බ කරපු එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Interest incomeවෙනම යනවා?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒවා වෙනම යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Interest income කියක් විතර ඇද්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Interest income එක Rs. 17 billion වාගේ ඇති. මට ඒක හරියට මතක නැහැ. ඒ වාගේ ගණනක් සොයා තිබෙනවා. Interest income කියන එක ගැන කථා කරන්න කැමැති නැහැ. මොකද, ට්‍රෙෂරියේ පාවිච්චි

කරන්නේ අපේ branchesවලින් mobilize කරන සල්ලි නේ. ඒ සල්ලි mobilize කරන්න අපි ලොකු effort එකක් කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඒක අපි ඒ excess money ටික වෙන කොහාට හරි debt කරලා earn කරන interest එක. ඒක මගේ උත්සාහයෙන් කළාය කියා කියන්න මම කැමැති නැහැ. මගේ උත්සාහයෙන් මම risk එක අරගෙන කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඔය capital gain වාගේ ඒවා තමයි. Government securities සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම ඔය කටයුතු කළාට, ඒක මගේ job එකේ එක කොටසක් විතරයි.

තනිකරම overall Treasury එකේ Front Office dealings හැම දෙයක්ම බලන්න ඕනෑ මමයි. මම foreign exchange dealing, අනෙකුත් හැම එකක්මත්, fund management ඒ හැම දෙයක්ම බලන්න ඕනෑ මමයි. එතකොට මගේ profit එක, මම හිතන්නේ more than Rs. 4 billion. ඒ කියන්නේ බැංකුවේ මුදල් පාවිච්චි කිරීමෙන් නොරව ලබන ලාභය- ඒ කියන්නේ fee-based income කියන එක. අපේ බැංකුවේ බිලියන 20ක් තමයි profit එක කියලා කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා පත්තරවලින් එහෙම දැකලා ඇති, ඒ බිලියන 20න් සියයට 23.5ක් මගේ contribution එකෙන් තමයි මම සොයලා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාටවත් තරඟ කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එක මම දන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ වාගේ ලොකු profit එකක් මම බැංකුවට සොයනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: So, you know the market; you know the risk. ඔබතුමා දන්නවා, මෙහි තිබෙන අවදානම. ඔබතුමා දන්නවා, මෙහි තිබෙන ධනාත්මක පැත්ත ගැනත්. ඔබතුමාට මේ පිළිබඳව හොඳ අවධානයක් තිබෙනවා?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: හොඳ අවධානයක් තිබෙනවා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited වලට bid කරන එකේ මොනවාගේ අවදානමක් තිබුණාද? නැත්නම් මේවා කලින් කරලා තිබෙනවාද? අපට මෙහි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, පළමුවැනි වතාවට නේ මේ primary dealer කෙනෙක් ඕගොල්ලන් හරහා bid කළේ? ඔබතුමන්ලාට තේරුණේ නැද්ද, මේකෙ මොකක් හරි information ලැබිලාද, ඇයි මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited මෙහෙම පන්නන්නේ කියලා. ඔබතුමාගේ දැනීම අනුව මොකක්ද තේරුණේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Treasury Division එකේ අවුරුදු 18ක මගේ පළපුරුද්දක් තිබෙනවා. සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම බැංකුවේ මගේ පළපුරුද්ද අවුරුදු 24යි. අවුරුදු 06ක් මා ත්‍රිකුණාමලය වැනි පිට පළාත්වල බැංකු ශාඛාවල සේවය කර තිබෙනවා. මා 1998 දී තමයි Treasury එකට trainee dealer කෙනෙක් විධියට ආවේ. මගේ පළපුරුද්දේ හැටියට මට මේ ප්‍රමාණය ගැන කිසිම සැකයක් ඇති වුණේ නැහැ. මොකද, නේතුව දැන් බලන්න 10.30න්, 11.00න් අතර තමයි මට මේ decision එක ගන්න ඕනෑ වෙන්නේ. මොකද, 11.00 වෙනකොට Central Bank එක cut-off time එකට මේ system එක වසා දමනවා. එතකොට මේ කාල සීමාව ඇතුළත මට මේ decision එක ගන්න සිදු වෙනවා. මීට කලින් primary dealer නොවන HSBC, එතැනින් ගියාම Deutsche Bankඑක, Citibankඑක, අන්න ඒ වාගේ බැංකුත් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා, මේ Rs. 10 billion, Rs. 15 billion - බිලියන 40ටත් වැඩි ගණනක්. මේ call එක එන අවස්ථාවේ මගේ මනස තිබුණේ, "මීට කලින් මම මීට වඩා ලොකු ගණන් bid කළා නේද? එතකොට මට කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් වුණේ නැහැ නේද? " කියන එක ගැනයි. ඒ වාගේම"මෙයා primary dealer කෙනෙක් නේද?" කියන එක ගැනයි. Primary dealer කෙනෙක් කියලා කියන්නේ, Central Bankඑක appoint කරන, Central Bank එකට හොඳ චරිත සහතිකයක් දෙන්න පුළුවන් කෙනෙක්. ඒගොල්ලන් on-site, off-site යන දෙකම හරියට supervise කරනවා. පොඩ්ඩක්වත් වරදින්න බැහැ, ඇයි මේක කළේ කියලා ඇවිල්ලා අහනවා. On-site, off-site හැම වෙලාවකම daily report යවන්න ඕනෑ; weekly report යවන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ හැම දෙයක්ම Central Bank එකට යවන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒගොල්ලන්ට හොරයක් කරලා Code of Ethics එක violate කරලා ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට survive වෙන්න බැහැ. එතකොට මේ වාගේ කෙනෙක් Rs. 10 billion, Rs. 13 billion දානවා කියන එක ගැන මට කිසිම සැකයක් ඇති වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට වෙනත් බැංකුවකට තිබෙන personality එකම ඔය company එකට තිබෙනවාද? ප්‍රායෝගික වශයෙන් අපි අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට Code of Ethics ඔක්කොම දීලා තමයි - අන්න ඒ වාගේද ඔය market එකේ primary dealer කෙනෙක් කියලා කියන්නේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Primary dealer කෙනෙක් කියලා කියන්නේ, අනිවාර්යෙන්ම මා අර කිව්වා වාගේ, විශේෂයෙන්ම Central Bank එකේ බලන කෙනෙක්. Central Bank එක කියලා කියන්නේ- They always say, "Primary dealers are our extended families." ඒ කියන්නේ අපි වෙනුවෙන් ඕගොල්ලන් තමයි මේ dealing එක කරන්න ඕනෑ. Market එක develop කරන්න ඕනෑත් ඕගොල්ලන්. එතකොට බැරි වෙලාවත් - දැන් උදාහරණයක් විධියට standalone primary dealer කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා නම්, එයාට handle කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ පොඩි ගණනක් නම්, capital එක හරි, මොනවා හරි equity එක හරි leverage කරන්න පුළුවන් යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම යම් corporate customer කෙනෙක් - අපි හිතමු කෝ බිලියන 25ක විතර customer කෙනෙක් එයාට ඉන්නවා කියලා. ඒ වාගේ customer කෙනෙක් ආවොත් එහෙම එයාට ඒ customer වෙන කාටවත් බෙදලා දෙන්න බැහැ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. එහෙම නම් මේක bid කරන්න

ඕනෑ, වෙනත් primary dealer කෙනෙකුගෙන්. එහෙම හරි ඒ අය සහයෝගය ගන්න ඕනෑ. මගේ මනසට ඔය විනාඩි 15 ඇතුළත ඒ සියල්ල කැටි කරගෙන තමයි මම මේ bids ටික ගත්තේ. අනෙක් කාරණය තමයි, මේ bids ටික අනිවාර්යෙන් වදින්නේ නැහැ කියන එක මා දන්නවා. මොකද, මගේ experience එකේ හැටියට 9.30ට තිබෙන rate එක දොළහමාරකට කවදාවත් යන්නේ නැහැ. අනෙක් කාරණය, Rs. 1 billion තිබෙන එක Rs. 13 billion වලට මොන හේතුවක් නිසා වත් එන්න විධියක් නැහැ. නමුත් business relationship එකත් එතැනදී වැදගත් වෙනවා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. අදාල කොම්පැනියකට ගිය අවුරුද්දේ - 2014 - විතරක් අපි ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් බිලියන 108ක Repo -Repurchase Agreement - lend කරලා තිබෙනවා. Repurchase Agreement.කියලා කියන්නේ, if a person has a Treasury Bill or a Treasury Bond, he can keep that as a collateral with the Bank of Ceylon with a haircut to prevent the market risk and all and get the money. ඒ වාගේ බිලියන 108කට අපි මේ වාගේ Repo -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඉතින් ඔය කියන විධියට ඒකත් risk එකක් වෙන්නට ඕනෑ.

ජී.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්, ඒකත් risk එකක් වෙන්නට ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම අපේ Audit Superintendentට මා reports දීලා තිබෙනවා. බිලියන 49ක interest income එකක් අපට ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කීයක්ද?

ජී.කේ.ඩී ධර්මපාල මහතා: බිලියන 49ක හෝ 48ක් වාගේ ගණනක interest එකක් ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මොනා primary dealer කෙනෙක් වුණත් අපේ Repo customer කෙනෙක්. මට මේ මනුෂ්‍යයා ඇවිල්ලා කියනකොට, අනේ! සර් මට මේ ටික දාලා දෙන්න කියලා කියනකොට මම bids ටික යැව්වාට, ඒ පිළිබඳ තීරණය ගන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවයි. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව තමයි ඒගොල්ලන්ට මේ interest rate එක ගැළපෙනවාද, ආර්ථිකය යන විධියට fundamentals වලට හරි යන විධියට මේ interest rate එක හරි යනවද කියන එක තීරණය කරන්නේ ඒගොල්ලන් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ, ඒගොල්ලන් ගන්නේ නැන්නම් ඔබතුමා දරන අවදානම මොකක්ද කියන එක විතරයි. ඒක දෙන එකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි අපට තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ Perpetual Treasuries Limited ගන්නේ නැත්නම් - එහෙම ගන්නේ නැතිව ඉන්න පුළුවන්ද? දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්ව විධියට එහෙම නොවෙයි කියලා commitment එකක්, අපට අදහසක් එනවා. Bank එකක් නම් ගන්නේ නැතිව ඉන්නේ නැහැ නේ. HSBC නම්, Deutsche Bank නම්, you are certain that they will buy. අපි මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට primary dealer කෙනෙක් වෙන්න නම් ඒ වාගේ හොඳ character එකක් තිබෙන්නට ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා market එක දන්නවා, ඔබතුමාට sureද මේ කට්ටිය මේක ගන්නවා කියලා. ගත්තේ නැත්නම් තිබෙන අවදානම මොකක්ද කියන එක තමයි අපට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය.

ජී.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Number one, ගත්තේ නැත්නම් ඇති විය හැකි තත්ත්වය මෙන්න මේකයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. ගත්තේ නැත්නම් අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ඒගොල්ලන් blacklist වෙනවා. Market එකෙන් ඒගොල්ලන්ට - There is no way. ඒ කියන්නේ, Central Bank එකෙන් අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ඒගොල්ලන් - අපි complain කරනවා නේ. මේගොල්ලන් bid එකක් දැම්මා ගත්තේ නැහැ කියලා. අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ඒගොල්ලන්ට market එකෙන් ඉවත් වෙන්න හරි, ban කරන්න හරි සිද්ධ වෙනවා. Adverse විධියට ඒගොල්ලන්ට ඒකට මුහුණ දෙන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා. බැරි වෙලාවත් ගත්තේ නැත්නම් - මගේ total portfolio එකේ weighted average එක සියයට 10.81යි. මා ළඟ තිබෙනවා, Rs. 207 billion bonds. එතකොට මේ bond එක - Rupees 207 billion portfolio එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒකෙ weighted average එක සියයට 10.81යි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක ඊටත් වඩා උඩින්?

ජී.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේක ඊටත් වඩා උඩින්. බැරි වෙලාවත් Perpetual Treasuries Limited මේක ගත්තෙ නැත්නම්, මේ default කළා නම්, මේ bond එක එන්නේ මට. මා ළඟ ඒ වෙලාව වනකොට liquidity එක බිලියන 20කට වැඩියෙන් තිබුණා නම්, මට immediately මේක settle කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම කළා නම් මේ asset එක මටයි එන්නේ. ඔබතුමා හිතන්න, එතකොට බැරිවෙලාවත් මේක settle කර ගන්න මා ළඟ සල්ලි නැහැ කියලා මට හිතුණා නම්, මට market එක බිලියන 57ක් excess. ඒ market එකෙන් මට මේ bond එක නොවෙයි, - මා ඔබතුමාට කියනවා - මා ළඟ බිලියන 207ක් තිබෙනවා, මට ඒවා තියලා Repo කරලා 6.50ට market එකෙන් borrow කරන්න පුළුවන්. 6.50ට borrow කරලා මට හම්බවෙන්නේ 12.50ට ලොකු instrument එකක්. එතකොට මේ වනකොට market එකේ interest rate පහළට, පහළට ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණා. අපට housing loan සියයට 9.50ට දිගන්න බැහැ. සියයට 11යි, 12යි. අද අපි සියයට 10ට interest rate අඩු කළොත්, some other commercial banks, they reduce - මම නම් කියන්න කැමැති නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකෙ මේ interest rate එක සියයට 8ක තිබ්බලා නේද ඔය පොඩ්ඩ පොඩ්ඩ ඉහළ ගියේ? සියයට 8ක තිබ්බලා නේද ඔය සියයට නවයයි ගණනකට නැග්ගේ?

ජී.කේ.ඩී.ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ සර්, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 9.35 වලට වාගේ market rate එක ඉහළ ගියා නේ?

ජී.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒත් ඔය යට ඉඳලා නේද නැග්ගේ? සල්ලි ගන්නකොට, ගන්නකොට නේද ඒක ඉහළ ගියේ?

ජී.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. Thirty-year bond එක ටිකක් වෙනස්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Normal ඒවා ගැනයි මා කියන්නේ. Normal bonds වල 9.35 average එකක් තිබුණා නේ?

ජී.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ටිකක් තිබුණා. ටිකක් තිබිලා පොඩ්ඩක් උඩට ගියා. නමුත් ඔය වනකොට market එක ටිකක් stabilize වෙලායි තිබුණේ. මේක ආවාට පසුව තමයි මේ හැම දෙයක්ම ඇවිස්සුණේ. අපිට housing loan දීගන්න බැරි වුණා, මිනිසුන්ට සියයට 9.50ට. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතකොට හිතන්න, අවුරුදු 30ක bond එකක් මට ආවා නම් 12.50ට ඒක අපට කොච්චර ලාභයක්ද කියලා හිතා ගන්න. එතැන මට කිසිම risk එකක් නැහැ. මොකද, මට liquidity risk එකක් නැහැ.එතකොට මේක interest rate risk එකක් නොවෙයි. මොකද සියයට 9.50කට තිබුණු bond එකක් සියයට 12.50කට දැම්මාට පසුව basis points 300කට වැඩියේ උඩින් මට තිබෙනවා. ඒත් පහුවදාම -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Couponrateඑක ගැන ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ?

ජී.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Secondary market rate එක ගැන කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ මේ දැන් තිබෙන scenario එක නේ.

ජී.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බැරිවෙලාවත් ඔය rate එක පහළට ආවා නම්, interest rate එක අඩු ගණනකට හම්බ වුණා නම්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ ගැන තමයි මම කියන්න යන්නේ. මම කිව්ව අන්දමට ඒ වෙලාව වන කොට market rate එක 9.50 නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: 9.50ට ඉල්ලුවා නම් මම කොහොමටත් ඒක කරන්නේ නැහැ. මම ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට කියනවා, "මෙතැන ලොකු risk එකක් තිබෙනවා, මට කරන්න බැහැ" කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් දැම්ම interest rates තිබුණේ උඩින්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඉල්ලුවේ rate එක 12.50ට; 12.75ට; 13.00ට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කොහොමටත් ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට හම්බ වුණත් ඔබතුමන්ලා through, හම්බ වුණේ නැතත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට මේක හම්බ වුණත් එකයි, හම්බ වුණේ නැතත් එකයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හම්බවෙලා නේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 12 නේ ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දාලා තිබෙන්නේ. Anyway ආවොත් it is a plus. ගත්තේ නැත්නම් anyway, it is a bigger plus.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 12.50ක පොලියකට මට මේක හම්බ වුණා නම් මේක Bank of Ceylon එකේ asset එකක්. මොකද, එතුමාට bond එක pass කරන්නේ නැහැ. Because it happens electronically, simultaneously. ඒ කියන්නේ once they take -

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඇයි ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ opportunity එක ගත්තේ නැත්තේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා:මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ risk එක ගන්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතැන risk එකක් නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ හම්බ වුණේ නැත්නම් නැහැ. සත පහක්වත් වියදම් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඇයි අපි අනෙක් පුද්ගලයෙක් වෙනුවෙන් ඒක bid කරන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ risk එකක් අරන් bid එකෙන් නේ ගන්නේ. You cannot. හරි ගියොත් තියා ගන්නයි, වැරදුණොත් pass කරන්නයි බැහැ නේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔබතුමා මට විනාඩියක් ලබා දෙන්න. මම ඒක පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රටේ තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, "ඇයි ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුවත් වෙනුවෙන් මෙච්චර වටිනා bond එකක් ගත්තේ, ඇයි ඔබතුමන්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් විතර දාලා ගත්තේ නැත්තේ?" කියන එක.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔය ප්‍රශ්නයම කලිනුත් ආවා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මම විහිළු කරන පුද්ගලයෙක්. කථාවකුත් තිබෙනවා නේ "ආවොත් ඇතා නේද?" කියලා. මම ඒ කථාව කියලා පත්තරවල ඒක ලොකුවට ගියා. ආවොත් ඇතා කියලා කියන්නේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ bond එක ලැබුණොත් ලොකු ලාභයක් නේද කියන එක. ඇයි ඒ ඇතා මම පැත්තට ගත්තේ නැත්තේ කියලා ප්‍රශ්න කෙරුණා. නමුත් මම දන්නේ නැහැ වෙහෙම ඇතෙක් ඉන්නවා කියලා. මොකද, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 9.50ක පොලියකට දෙන්න තිබෙන bond එක 12.50ට දෙයි කියලා මම විතරක් නොවේයි, අනෙක් බොහෝ අය හිතුවේත් නැහැ. මොකද, ලෝකයේ කිසිම රටක, මොනම Central

Bank එකක්වත් මේ වාගේ දෙයක් වෙලා නැහැ. මම අවුරුදු තුනක් UK වල ලන්ඩන් branch එකේ වැඩ කළා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, basis points 5ක් ඉහළ යනවා කියන්නේ සමහර වෙලාවට market එක collapse වීමක්. අන්න ඒ වාගේ තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ මුදල් ටික ඕනෑ, ආණ්ඩුව desperate කියන එක ගැන ඔබතුමාට knowledge එකක් තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ, මැතිතුමනි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ documentation, Central Bank එක කලින් ගත්ත තීන්දු ගැන එහෙම study කළේ නැද්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම වැඩියෙන්ම පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ මගේ history එක. ඒ මාගේ අවුරුදු දහ අටක පළපුරුද්ද.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ අවශ්‍යතාව, ඒ knowledge එක ඔබතුමන්ලාට දෙන්නේ නැහැ නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒවා දෙන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් අපි උපරිම උත්සාහ කරනවා. Central Bank එකේ නිලධාරීන් සමඟ කථා කරලා අපි උත්සාහ කරනවා, මොකක්ද මේ ගොල්ලන්ගේ අදහස කියන එක ගන්න. නමුත් ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කියන්නේ නැහැ, ගන්නවා එහෙම කියලා. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කරන්නෙත් job එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Business එකක්.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ටත් responsibility එකක් තිබෙන නිසා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දැන් මගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇහුවා, "12.50ක rate එකකට ඇයි ඔබ bid නොකළේ?" කියලා. මැතිතුමනි, මම අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම දන්නවා, 12.50ක bid එක වදින්නේ නැහැ කියන එක. රජයේ බැංකුවක් විධියට මම 9.50ට තිබෙන rate එක 12.50ට bid කළා නම් අපි රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුව මහා භාණ්ඩාකාරයට සහ මහ බැංකුවට අපි සහයෝගය දැක්විය යුතුයි. අපි අනෙකුත් කොමර්ෂල් බැංකු වාගේ ලාභය පදනම් කර ගෙන වැඩ කරන ආයතනයක් නොවෙයි. අපට ඒ වැඩය කියටවත් කරන්න බැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හැබැයි ඔබතුමා ඒක කළා නේ, වෙනත් පුද්ගලයෙක් වෙනුවෙන්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: වෙනත් පුද්ගලයෙක් අපට ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලීමක් කරන විට -

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට කරන්න බැරි දේ හරි. ඔබතුමා වෙනත් පුද්ගලයෙක් නමින් කළා?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේත් ඔබතුමා හිතන්න ඕනෑ, ඔය interest rate එක රටේ stabilize කරන්න ඕනෑ නම්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන එක මම පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, 9.50 තිබෙන rate එක 12.50ට යයි කියලා මම කොහොමවත් හිතුවේ නැහැ. කීයටවත් මම එය විශ්වාස කළේ නැහැ. නැත්නම්,-

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්ව එකත් මම පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, රටේ මූල්‍ය interest rate එක ඒ විධියට අසාමාන්‍ය විධියට වැඩි කරන්න බැහැයි කියන අදහස ඔතුමාට තිබෙනවා නම්, හැබැයි ඔබතුමා ඉල්ලන්නෙත් වෙනත් පුද්ගලයෙක් වෙනුවෙන් නම්, bid කරන අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමා ඒක ගැනත් එහෙම නම් හිතන්න ඕනෑ. වෙනත් පුද්ගලයෙක් වෙනුවෙන් ඒ කියන්නේ private පුද්ගලයෙක් වෙනුවෙන් ඉල්ලන කොටත් ඒ interest rate එක වැඩියි, අසාමාන්‍යයයි කියන එක හිතන්න තිබුණා.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නමුත් මම එහෙම හිතුවේ නැහැ. මොකද, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ ආයතනයක් වශයෙන් ඔබතුමා ඒ risk එක ගන්නේ නැහැ; වෙනත් කෙනෙක් ඒ risk එක ගන්නට ඔබතුමාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ කියන එක නේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු මැතිතුමනි, මෙතැන risk එකක් කොහෙත්ම-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Risk එක නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ මූල්‍යකරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනත් පෞද්ගලික පුද්ගලයෙක් වෙනුවෙන් ඔබතුමා bid කරන එක වෙනස්, ආයතනයක් වශයෙන් ඔබතුමා bid කරන එක වෙනස් කියන එක නේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම. මම මගේ ආයතනයේ පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ මාගේ view එක. මම දන්නවා, මේක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි. ඒක හරි. මට තේරෙනවා.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇහුවා, ඇයි ඔබ bid නොකළේ කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපේ තිබෙන portfolio එකේ ලොකුම-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ බැංකුව කවදාවත් bid කරලා තිබෙනවාද, රුපියල් බිලියන 5ක් 10ක් වාගේ මුදලක්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අනිවර්යයෙන්ම bid කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ විස්තර මා ළඟ තිබෙනවා. ඒවා දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අහන්නේ ඇයි මෙතැනදී ඔබතුමා bid කළේ නැත්තේ කියලා, පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක්. එය ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. මේක ඔබට උත්තර දෙන්න අමාරු ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට මොහොතක් දෙන්න ගරු මැතිතුමනි. මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන්

ගොඩක් තොරතුරු මට හිතන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, හේතුව: මම ඔබතුමාට කිව්වා, Rs. 207 billion මගේ investment portfolio එකේ ඒ වන කොට තිබුණා කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, commercial bank එකක් විධියට අපට Central Bank එකෙන් දීලා තිබෙනවා, "ඔබලාගේ liquid asset ratio එක 20%කින් maintain කරන්න ඕනෑ" කියලා. නමුත් ඔය වෙන කොට සියයට 27ක් අපේ තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, මම ඔබතුමාට බාධා කරලා තවත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: හොඳමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා ලංකා බැංකුවේ නොවෙයි නම්, ඔබතුමා Chief Dealer කෙනෙක් නම් එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමා හිතනවාද, රටේ තිබෙන තත්ත්වය අනුව ලොකු bid එකක් දමන්න ඕනෑ කියල? ඔය Perpetual Treasuries Ltd එක වෙනුවෙන් ආපු ඒ ඥානය ඔබතුමාටත් එන්න පුළුවන්ද, බැරිද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැ. මම රජයේ බැංකුවක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රජයේ බැංකුවක නොවෙයි නම් කියලා තමයි මම අහන්නේ. මම අහන්නේ hypothetical question එකක්. මොකද, රජයේ බැංකුවක නිසා නේ ඔබතුමා bid එකට ගියේ නැත්තේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම එහෙම දමන්නේ නැහැ. මම වෙන dealer කෙනෙක් වුණත් මේ වාගේ unusual rate එකකට මම දමන්න කැමැති නැහැ. මොකද, උදාහරණයක් විධියට කියනවා නම්, ඒක දැන ගත්තාම සෙන්ට්‍රල් බැංකුව වුණත් අපට කියයි, "පිස්සුද, මේ ගණනට දමන්න?" කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ මේ Perpetual Treasuries Ltd එකට inside information එකක් ලැබුණාද, නැත්නම් කනා ඟොට එකක් ගැහුවා කියලාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට පෙනෙන විධියට inside information එකක් ගැන මේ ගොල්ලන්ට මොකක් හෝ දැනුමක් තිබෙන්න ඇති.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ උපරිම දැනුම පාවිච්චි කරලා අපට කියන්න Perpetual Treasuries Ltd එකට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම්කිසි දැනුමක් තිබුණාද, නැද්ද කියලා. ඔබතුමාට හැඟෙන පරිදි කියන්න.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට මේ bid එක දමන්න කලින් එහෙම කිසිම -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ මට හිතුණා, මොකක් හෝ දෙයක් මෙතැන සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියන එක. ඒක මට හැඟුණා. ඒක තමයි මම ඔබතුමාට මාගේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී කිව්වේ, "I am really shocked. Market is really shocked." කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට කථා කර ගන්න බැරි මට්ටමේ තමයි මම හිටියේ. මම කොහොමද, 9.50 rate එකකට bid කරපු මිනිසුන්ට ආපහු කථා කරන්නේ, ලංකා බැංකුවේ Chief Dealer විධියට, 12.50ට මේවා වැදිලා තියෙද්දී.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are responsible for those.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්, මම responsible.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා Bank of Ceylon එක වෙනුවෙන් ගත්තේ නැහැ නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අපි ගත්තේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: වෙනුවෙන් ගත්තේ නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආපහු හැරිලා බලන කොට ඔබතුමා දුක් වෙන්නේ නැද්ද, සල්ලි ටිකක් තමන්ගේ බැංකුවට හම්බ වෙන්න තිබුණ වෙලාවක් miss වුණායි කියලා?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ. මම ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා විතරක් නොවෙයි සියලුම දෙනා දුක් වෙනවා. ඒක නේ කිව්වේ, "ආවොත් ඇතා, ගියොත් නැතා" කියලා. කවුරුත් දුක් වෙනවා, අපි දන්නේ නැත්තේ ඇයි කියලා.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: සමා වෙන්න ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා වාගේ බැරි වෙලාවත් මම ඉහළ rate එකකට - 12.50කට- වැදෙනවා කියලා මම දන්නවා නම් අනෙක් අයට ගන්න මම දෙන්නේ නැහැ. 12.49ට ගහලා මම මේක මගේ බැංකුවට ගන්නවා. එහෙම ගත්තා නම් අද මට දොස් කියන අය මට ප්‍රශංසා කරයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: True.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: හැබැයි එතකොට තව දෙයක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මයා: නමුත් ඔබතුමාට ගන්න ඒ වෙලාවේ තීරණය කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: පුළුවන්.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: On behalf of the Bank?

The Chairman: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But last time he said that the Central Bank has to give. He said, "No."

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: It is unclear. Mr. Dharmaratne, you have to clearly say

whether you directly deal on behalf of the Bank of Ceylon.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You have to get the approval. That was what you mentioned last time.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Mr. Dharmapala, you have to clearly say whether you have the authority to do that or you have to get approval from the higher.

Mr. J.K.D. Dharmapala: If I send a bid to Central Bank on behalf of the Bank of Ceylon, for investment purpose or if it is a big amount for trading purpose, I will discuss it with the Assistant General Manager and send the bid.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Because you have to go through the process. Could you have done it during that span of time?

Mr. J.K.D. Dharmapala: This time?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ පොඩි කාල පරාසය තුළ බැංකුවේ Board එකෙන් approval එන්න ඕනෑද,-

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. Board එක නොවෙයි, මැනිනියනි. අපේ Treasury Division එක manned by one Assistant General Manager. එතකොට-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ approval එක ගත්තාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Customer කෙනෙකුට bid එකක් දමන්න ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපට අනුමැතිය ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, එවැරයි අවශ්‍ය. එහෙම ඔබතුමා බැංකුවට රුපියල් බිලියන 5ක් ගන්නවා නම් ඔබතුමා ඒ approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ approval එක මම ගන්නවා. මම කථා කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කලින් මෙවැනි හැම අවස්ථාවකදීම ඒ approval එක අරන් තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක කොහෙද කියවෙන්නේ? මොකක් හරි guideline එකක් තිබෙනවා ද? Manual එකේ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Manual එකේ තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Manual එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එකේ තිබෙනවා, directly Bank of Ceylon එක වෙනුවෙන් ගන්නවා නම් ඔබතුමා අනුමැතිය ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. එතකොට ඒකේ level එක threshold එක මොකක්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒකේ limit එකක් දාලා නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කීය වුණත් Bank of Ceylon එක වෙනුවෙන් ගන්නවා නම් ඔබතුමා ඒ අනුමැතිය ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ රුපියල් මිලියන 5ක් වුණත්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ වාගේ මුදලක් නොවෙයි ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් තිබෙනවා නේ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. Manual එකේ කොහෙද තිබෙන්නේ? විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අහන්නේ -

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Manual එකේ කොතැනකවත් amount එකක් කියලා නැහැ ගරු මැතිතුමනි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕනෑම amount එකකට approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑද කියලායි අහන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Manual එකේ තිබෙන්නේ, approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක විතරද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑ කියා විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන විටියට, මිලියන 5කට වුණත් approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑ නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මිලියන 5කට වුණත්, කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. Treasury manual එකේ Primary bidding ගැන, Customers ලාගෙන් ගන්නා bids ගැන කොතැනකවත් සඳහන් වෙලා නැහැ, ගන්න ඕනෑ මෙන්න මේ මේ අයගෙන්ය, ගන්න ඕනෑ මේ මේ limit එකටය ආදි වශයෙන්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Nothing has been stated.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එවැනි කිසිම දෙයක් mention කරලා නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම නම්, කොහොමද ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, මෙය authority එකකට යන්න ඕනෑ කියා? වෙනත් පුද්ගලයකු වෙනුවෙන් ගන්නවා නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැති බවත්, එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑම වටිනාකමකට යන්න පුළුවන් බවත්, බැංකුව වෙනුවෙන් යනවා නම් authority එක ගන්න ඕනෑ බවත් ඔබතුමා කියනවා. නමුත් එහි level එකක් ගැන කියන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්,

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ බව Manual එකේ කොතැනකද සඳහන් වන්නේ? මා ළඟ manual එක තිබෙනවා. කරුණාකර අපට පෙන්වන්න, එය මෙහි කොතැනකද තිබෙන්නේ කියා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එය සඳහන් වන්නේ කොතැනද කියා කිව්වා නම්, ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න අපට ආයෙත් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වතුර ගලන්නේ පහළම තැනින් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ධර්මපාල මහත්මයා, ඔබතුමාට එය දැන් සොයාගන්න බැරි නම්, පසුව බලා අපට දන්වන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් ඒ වෙනුවෙන් කාලය ගත කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. පසුව බලා අපට දැනුම් දෙන්න.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එය තිබෙනවා ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මා හිතන විධියට, මා ළඟ දැන් තිබෙන්නේ 2010 manual එකයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැනට ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ 2010 manual එකද? අද වන විට ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ කුමන manual එකද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අපි මෙය 2013 දී revise කළා ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. Revise කරපු එකෙහි ඒ අදාළ තැන සොයාගන්න මට අමාරුයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඒ ගැන දැන් කියන්න එපා. අපි එය හරියටම දැනගන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන බලා පසුව අපට දන්වන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ කියන particular bid එක සිදු වන වෙලාවේ operate වූ manual එකේ section එක හරියටම කොතැනද කියා අපට කියන්න. BOC එක වෙනුවෙන් ඔබතුමා invest කරනවා නම්, කාගෙන්ද approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑ, ඒ කොතරම් ප්‍රමාණයක්ද, එසේ ප්‍රමාණයක් ගැන කියා නැත්නම් එසේ කියා නැති බව, වෙනත් කවුරුන් හෝ වෙනුවෙන් bid එකක් දමනවා නම් එවැනි approval එකක් ඕනෑ නැද්ද, ඕනෑ නැත්නම් ඕනෑම value එකකට ඔබතුමාට තනිවම තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්ද, ඒ බව මේ manual එකේ සඳහන්ව තිබෙන්නේ කොතැනකද යනාදිය ගැන කරුණාකර මේ ගරු සභාවට -අපට- දැනුම් දෙන්න.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, customer කෙනකුගේ bid එකක් ගන්න කොට limit එකක් දාලා නැහැ කියන එකෙන් කියන්නේ, ඕනෑම ප්‍රමාණයකට යන්න පුළුවන් කියන එක නොවෙයි. එමඟින් mean වෙන්නේ නැහැ, බැංකුවේ Chief Dealerට ඕනෑම ගණනකට යන්න පුළුවන් කියන එක. සාමාන්‍යයෙන්, බැංකුවේ Chief Dealer කියලා කියන්නේ, potential විධියට වැඩ කරන්න ඕනෑ කෙනෙක් නේ. ඔහු තමන්ට තිබෙන risk එක ගැන බලා තමයි සෑම දෙයක්ම කරන්නේ. අපි උදාහරණයක් ගනිමු. මේ Perpetual Treasuriesවලින් අපි දාපු Rs. 13 billion, rate එක 12.50ට තිබෙන නිසා දැම්මා විනා market එකේ 9.50ට දමන්න කියා මට කිව්වා නම්, මම කියනවා, 'පුතා මෙය දමන්න විධියක් නැහැ.' කියලා. මොකද, අනිවාර්යයෙන් ලොකු market risk එකක් එහි තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා අපි එහෙම දමන්නේ යන්නේ නැහැ. අපි ඒ විධියට Potentially සිතනවා. නමුත් ගත යුතු තීරණය මෙන්න මේ parametersවල තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක මේ procedureවල කොතැනකවත් නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට, එවැන්නක් procedure එකක නැත්නම්, එසේ නැහැ කියන එක අපට පැහැදිලිවම confirm කරන්න. ඔබතුමා ඔය කියන විධියට, ඔබතුමාට decide කරන්න වෙනවා, එය උඩට යනවාද නැද්ද කියන එක. ඒ decision එක ගන්නේ ඔබතුමායි. එහෙම නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කුමන value එකකටද යන්නේ, එය දමන්න තමන් approval එක ගන්නවාද; එහෙම නැත්නම් approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑ නැද්ද ආදී කාරණා ගැන කොහේවත් කියන්නේ 'නැහැ, අදාළ තීරණය ගන්නේ ඔබතුමායි. එහෙම නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. සියයට 20 liquid asset ratio එකක් ගැන මා කථා කරගෙන එන කොට ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඇහුවා, ඔබ සියයට 12.50ට bid නොකළේ ඇයි කියා සහ අනෙක් අයට bid කරලා දුන්නේ මොකද කියා. මා කලිනුත් කිව්වා වාගේ, මගේ විශ්වාසය වෙලා තිබුණේ මේ rates උඩ යන්නේ නැහැ කියන එකයි. මේ වන කොට සියයට 27ක liquid asset ratio එකක් අප ළඟ තිබෙනවා. Prescribed rate එකට වඩා තවත් 7 දශම ගණනක් තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නම් අපට invest කරන්න වෙන්නේ, තවදුරටත් ඒවායේ හිර කරන්න වෙන්නේ අපේ මිනිසුන්ට lend කරන්න තිබෙන, ඒ කියන්නේ, core banking activities දමන්න තිබෙන ඉල්ලීයි. මා කලින් කිව්වා වාගේ, investment portfolio එකේ විතරක් රජය අපට බලෙන් දුන් මෙතරම් bonds ගොඩක් තියෙද්දී තවත් අවුරුදු 30ක bond එකක් 9.50ට දමාගන්න අපට වුවමනාවක් නැහැ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. ඒක තමයි මගේ පිළිතුර.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ කාර්ය භාරය, bid කරලා ආයතනයට ලාභ සොයන එකම නොවෙයි නේද? ඔබතුමාගේ කාර්ය භාරය එයම විතරක් නොවෙයි නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, Central Bank එක, රාජ්‍ය බැංකුවක් විධියට, primary dealer කෙනකු විධියට අපෙන් නිතරම බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා, රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍යකරණයට අවශ්‍ය සහයෝගය. Market එකේ යම් bid එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ bid එක ඒ අයට ඉදිරිපත් කරන

එක අපේ යුතුකමක්. අපි උදාහරණයක් ගනිමු. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වටිනා කාලයෙන් මට ටිකක් දෙන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි මෙහෙම හිතමු. මම මේ bids තුන ගත්තේ නැත්නම්, ඒවා ගන්න බැහැ කියලා මම කිව්වා නම් මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, එතුමන්ලාට මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවක් නිබුණාය, අපි මේ දක්වා ගත්තාය කියා. මම මේ bids ගත්තේ නැත්නම්, එතුමා ඊළඟට අත තබන්නේ කුමන rate එකටද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is right.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එහෙම නම්, සියයට 14 හෝ 15 ratesවලටයි යන්නේ. එහෙම වුණා නම් මා වාගේ මාසික පඩියක් ගන්නා අහිංසක- I am sorry. "අහිංසක" කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරන්න මම කැමැති නැහැ. මම එය ඉල්ලා අස් කරගන්නවා. මා වාගේ මිනිහෙකුට ඊළඟට එන්න තිබෙන චෝදනාව තමයි, -primary dealer කෙනකු විසියට- 'මේ වාගේ අඩු ratesවලට bids තිබුණා. නමුත් අපට යන්න සිදු වුණා උඩ ratesවලට. ඔබ මෙය ගත්තේ නැති නිසා රජයට මෙතරම් පාඩු වුණා.' කියන එක.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the thing.

ගරු රෝයි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔව්, ඒ චෝදනාවත් එන්න ඉඩ තිබුණා.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ චෝදනාව අනිවාර්යයෙන් මට එනවා. එහෙනම් අහන්නේ නැහැ, ඇයි primary dealer කෙනකුගෙන් පළමුවැනි විකාවට ඔයා ගත්තේ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: That is important. රජයට ඔය මුදල් ටික සොයාගන්න බැරි වුණොත්, bids ආවේ නැත්නම්, ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුව රජයේ ඊළඟ පියවර මොකක්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ තත්ත්වය නොවෙයි. මීට පසුව නේ auction එකට ගියේ? මීට කලින් වෙලා තිබුණේ, private placementsවලට direct placementsනේ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුර දෙන්න කෝ, මෙහිදී Rs. 1 billion නේ දැම්මේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රජයට ඕනෑ Rs. 20 billion. රජය එය කියන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රජයට අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණය සොයගන්න බැරි නම්, bids ඇවිත් තිබුණේ බිලියන 2කට විතරක් නම්, රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව අනුව ඊළඟට රටේ ඇති වන තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද? රජයට අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණය ආවේ නැත්නම් ඊට පසුව රජයට කරන්න සිදු වන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: රජයට කරන්න වෙන්නේ මුදල් අවවු ගැසීමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි, පිටරටවලින් ඩොලර්වලින් ණය ගැනීම?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඩොලර්වලින් ණය ගන්නා එක ලංකාවේ market එකෙන් ණය ගන්නවා වාගේ එක පාරටම කළ හැකි වැඩක් හෝ ලෙහෙසි වැඩක් හෝ නොවෙයි නේ ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම ගන්න පුළුවන් නම්, ඒකත් කරන්න වෙනවා නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන් එයත් කරන්න වෙනවා. එවිට Dollar interest rate එකත් -දැනට 6.1 ගණනක තිබෙන එක- අනිවාර්යයෙන් ඉහළ යන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: රජයට අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණය සොයාගන්න බැරි නම් ඊළඟට කරන්න වෙන්නේ මුදල් අවවු ගැසීමයි කියන එක ඔබතුමා වගකීමෙන්ද කියන්නේ? මොකද, ඊට වඩා තවත් instruments තිබෙනවා. මීට කලින් apply කරපු ක්‍රම තිබුණා නේ. EPF එක ගත්තොත්, over Rs. 1.3 trilion විතර fund එකක් තිබෙනවා. ETF එකත් තිබෙනවා. ඊට අමතරව, NSB එකෙනුත් ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ සියලුදෙනා ඉල්ලුම් නොකළා නම් කුමක්ද කරන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මීට කලින් එසේ සිද්ධ වෙලා නැහැ නේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ.

මට මොහොතක් දෙන්න ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මගේ explanation එකට මොහොතක් දෙන්න. ඔය කියන bond issue එකට කලින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කළේ, Rs. 1 billion වාගේ issue කළත් Rs. 3 billion වාගේ maximum එකකට යන එකයි. මම එය දන්නවා. ඒ නිසාම තමයි Rs. 13 billion දක්වා යාවී කියා මා කිසිසේත් නොසිතුවේ. ඉස්සර තිබුණා ඒ අයගේ strategy එකක්. පොඩි ගණනක් issue කරලා අර වාගේ captive source එකකට කියලා ඉස්සර වෙලා ගන්න කියනවා. අපත් රජයේ නේ. ලංකා බැංකුවත් රජයේයි, EPF එකත් රජයේයි. මොනවා හරි, whatever other banks- රජයේ ආයතනවලට කියනවා, ඔයගොල්ලන් ටිකක් ගන්න කියලා. එවිට එයට subscribed වෙනවා. එහිදී කියනවා, "මෙන්න weighted average එක, ඒ තමයි 9.35, කැමැති අය ඇවිත් ගන්න." කියා. එවිට පෝලිමේ ඇවිත් ගන්නවා. මා හිතන විධියට එය තමයි, Private placementsවල-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Private placements වල වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. කැමැති අයට ගන්න කියලා open දමන්නේ නැහැ. එක් එක් අයට කථා කරලා තමයි, ගන්න කියලා කියන්නේ.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අපි උදාහරණයක් ගනිමු. අපේ excess liquidity එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් අපි වුණත් Central Bank එකෙන් අහනවා, අපට bond එකක් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා.

Unedited

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. අපට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය එය නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා කියපු විධියට, කැමැති අය ඇවිල්ලා අරගෙන යන්න කියලා විවෘතව කිව්වා නම් හොඳයි. අපි ඒ ක්‍රමයට කැමැතියි. නමුත් අප කියන්නේ, private placement එකේ එක් එක්කෙනාට කථා කරලා කියනවා- Perpetual Treasuries එක ගැන තමයි දැන් ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නේ. Auction එකෙන් නේ හම්බ වුණේ? Auction එකේදී bid කරන්න ඕනෑම කෙනකුට අයිතිවාසිකම් තිබෙනවා. එහි සැකයේ වාසිය තිබුණාද, ඇතා වුණාද කියන එක බලන්නේ පසුව නේ. හැබැයි සියලුදෙනාට නිදහස තිබෙනවා එයට bid කරන්න. ඔබතුමාටත් bid කරන්න පුළුවන්. HSBC එකටත් bid කරන්න පුළුවන්. Primary dealersලා සියලුදෙනාට bid කරන්න පුළුවන්. Primary issues issue කරන කොට Central Bank එක කථා කරලා තමන්ට ඕනෑ කෙනාට issue කරනවා. අපට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය එයයි. අපි දුටුවා Perpetual Treasuries එකට ඒ වාගේ issue කර තිබෙනවා. එවැනි ක්‍රමයක් හොඳයි කියා ඔබතුමන්ලා කියනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ කියන අවස්ථාව වෙනතුරු මගේ අදහස වුණේ මෙයයි. ඒ වාගේ private placement එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් Central Bank එක අපට කථා කරනවා, එහෙම නැත්නම් People's Bank එකට කථා කරනවා. රජයේ බැංකුවලටයි කථා කරන්නේ. මොකද, අපට තමයි අර වාගේ ලොකු ගණුනක් ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ, private placementsවල ඉඳලා. අපිට සල්ලි නැති වුණත් අපි දන්නවා අපේ අයිතිකාරයා කවුද කියලා. අපේ අයිතිකාරයා රජය. මම කලින් කිව්වා වාගේ රජය මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේදී-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නැතිව වෙනත් primary dealersලාට දෙනවා නම්?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: රජයට හැර primary dealersලාට දීලා තිබෙන අවස්ථාවල් ඔබ මීට පෙර දැකලා තිබෙනවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම ඒක ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Perpetual Treasuries history එක දිහා බලන විට අපට පේනවා එහෙම දීලා තිබෙන බව.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ විධියට දීලා තිබෙන අවස්ථා තිබෙන්නේ බොහොම සුළු සංඛ්‍යාවක්. අපි analyze කරලා බැලුවා. බහුතරයක් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ NSB, ETF, EPF, Bank of Ceylon වාගේ ඒවාට. 90 per cent වාගේම ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ ඒ වාගේ ආයතනවලටයි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Private placementsවලදී Bank of Ceylon එකෙන්ද bid එක දාන්නේ, එහෙම නැත්නම් තමන්ගේ customersලා වෙනුවෙන් දාන්නත් පුළුවන්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: අපි වෙනුවෙන් දාන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Private placements වෙනුවෙන්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමියනි, private placement කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් Central Bank එක අපට කථා කරලා කියනවා, අපිට මෙහෙම සල්ලි වුවමනාවක් තිබෙනවා, ඔබලාට bonds ටිකක් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා. අපි අහනවා rate එක කීයද කියලා. හොර rate එකක් නොවෙයි ඒ අය කියන්නේ. පසු ගිය auction එකක තිබුණු weighted average එක base කරලා තමයි ඒ අය දෙන්නේ. ඒ අනුව අපි ගන්න bond එක එක්කෝ අපට investment එකේ දා ගන්නට පුළුවන්, එහෙම නැත්නම් අපට-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ market එකේ ගොඩක් අය ඉන්නවානේ. Perpetual Treasuries එක ගැන ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම මොකක්ද? ඔබතුමා Perpetual Treasuries එක ගැන හොඳට අහලා තිබෙනවාද? කවුද මේකේ ඉන්නේ, අයිතිකාරයෝ කවුද, directorsලා කවුද කියලා ඔබතුමාගේ යම් කිසි වැටහීමක් තිබුණාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: යම් කිසි වැටහීමක් තිබෙනවා. අර්ජුන ඇලෝසියස් මේකේ අයිතිකාරයා කියලා මම දන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිව සිටි අජිත් නිවාඩ කබ්‍රාල් මහත්මයාගේ නංගි මේකේ director කෙනෙක් වෙලා සිටී බව ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒක මම දැන ගත්තේ පසු කාලීනවයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොන කාලයේද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේ අලුත් රජය බලයට පත් වුණාට පසුව තමයි මම ඒ බව දැන ගත්තේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ වනතුරු දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ ඇය ඒකේ ඉන්නවා කියලා?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද Perpetual Treasuries එකට කලිනුත් මේ වාගේ 30-year bonds අරන් තිබෙනවා කියලා, auction එකෙන්?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාට Perpetual Treasuries එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් මොනවා හෝ අදහසක් තිබුණාද? මේ කට්ටියගෙන් වැඩියෙන් information ගන්න පුළුවන් වාගේ. මේ අය market එකේ player

කෙනෙක් කියන එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් කිසි වැටහීමක් තිබුණාද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Information සම්බන්ධයෙන් මට එහෙම දැනුමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. නමුත් මේ අය dealsවලට හරිම aggressive. ඒ කියන්නේ tradingවලට highly active කියන කාරණය මම දන්නවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Market එකේ primary dealersලා 16යිනේ ඉන්නේ. රජය හැර අනෙක් අය අතරේ මේ අය කොතැනද ඉන්නේ? Player කෙනෙක් හැටියට පළමුවෙනි, දෙවෙනි වශයෙන් ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුව කොතැනද ඒ අය ඉන්නේ? ඔබතුමා විශ්වාසයකින් යුතුව අර වාගේ ප්‍රමාණයක් ඒ අය වෙනුවෙන් bid කරන්න නම්, ඒ අය ගැන පැහැදීමක් තිබෙන්න ඇති කියලා මම විශ්වාස කරනවා. ඒකට හේතුව මොකක්ද? ඒ අය ඒ market එකේ කොතැනද ඉන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රජයේ ආයතන හැර private dealersලා අතරේ ඒ අය කොතැනද ඉන්නේ?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමියනි, මම කලින් කිව්වානේ ඒ අය අපේ Repo borrow කරනවා කියලා. අවුරුද්දකට Rs. 108 billion අපෙන් Repo borrow කරනවා කියන්නේ, මට ඒ අයගේ trading volume එක ගැන හිතා ගන්නට පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අයද borrow කරන්නේ, Perpetual Treasuries?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඔව්. 2014දී අපෙන් Repo borrow කරලා තිබෙනවා. Rs. 108 billion. අපි 48-49 million, interest income එකක් earn කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාට කිසිම සැකයක් ආවේ නැහැ මේ අයට information leak වෙනවා, ඒ අයගේ aggressiveness එක මේ information සමඟයි යන්නේ කියන එක ගැන?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: නැහැ. මට එවැනි හැඟීමක් ආවේ නැහැ නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. මොකද, ඒක 10.30ත් 11.00ත් අතර ගන්නට ඕනෑ decision එකක්. ඒ වන විට ඒවා ගොඩාක් analyze කරලා. ඒ දාන bid එක දා ගන්නවා හැරුණු කොට, මේක වදින්නේ නැහැ කියලා මගේ හිතේ විශ්වාසයක් තිබෙනවා නම් සහ මට මේ reject කරන්නට හැකියාවකුත් නැත්නම්, "නැහැ. නැහැ ඕක අපට දාන්න බැහැ" කියලා කියනවාට වඩා, මට ඒ සම්බන්ධව legal barrier එකකුත් නැත්නම්, අනෙක් පැත්තනේ ආණ්ඩුව කියනවා නම් මේක ගන්න කියලා, -ආණ්ඩුව කියන්නේ මේක නොවෙයි, ආණ්ඩුව කියන්නේ පුළුවන් තරම් bids ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අයනේ තීන්දු කරන්නේ ඉන් පසුව, තීරණය.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: තීරණය ගැනීම සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන්නේ පුළුවන් තරම් bids එකතු කරලා දෙන එක.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම අතරමැදියෙක් පමණයි. මම මාසිකව පඩි ගන්නා රජයේ සේවකයෙක් විතරයි. මම ඒක නොකළා නම් මම කලින් කිව්වා වාගේ සමහර විට මේ වන විට මගේ job එක නැති වන්නට පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කළේ යුතුකමක්?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නැහැ, රාජකාරිය.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මගේ job එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊට වඩා දෙයක් මෙතුමාගෙන් දැන ගන්නට නැහැ. Thank you very much.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කර ගන්නට තිබෙනවා. සමහර විට මේ ඉල්ලීම කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඔබතුමා නොවෙයි වෙන්න ඇති. අපට තහවුරු කර ගන්නට ඕනෑ කාරණය මෙයයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bid එක 11.00 වන විට වහනවානේ. එහෙම තමයි Central Bank එකේ manual එකේ තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් මේක 11.00ට වඩා විනාඩි 10ක් open කරලා තිබිලා තිබෙනවා. BOC එක ඒ විනාඩි 10 ඉල්ලුවේ ඔබතුමා දැනුවත්වද, එහෙම නැත්නම් BOC එකේ වෙනින් කවුරුන් හෝ නිලධාරියෙක්ද?

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මම දැනුවත්ව. මගේ සහායක අනෙක් dealerට මමයි කිව්වේ. ගරු විගණනාධිපතිතුමනි, bid එකක් කියන්නේ රුපියල් 12.50ට, 12.75ට, 13.00ට rate එක දුන්නාට අපි අතින් price එක manually හදන්නට ඕනෑ. We are bidding not at the rate, but at the price. Customer ඒක අපෙන් ඉල්ලන්නේ net of the rate. We have to gross up that rate and calculate the price. Then, only we have to send. It will take sometime. So, once this bid came after 10.30 a.m., they are asking us to submit the bid. During the time when the system was closed, we are liable.

අනිවාර්යනේම අපි මීට ඉස්සෙල්ලාත් මේ වාගේ දේවල් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේ වාගේ, technically විනාඩි 10ක් අවශ්‍ය නම් අපි ඒක ඉල්ලනවා.

The Chairman: Okay. Thank you very much.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Mr. Chairman, I also want to make a small comment. ඔබතුමන්ලා කරන මේ රාජකාරිය ඔබතුමන්ලා කරගෙන යන්න. අපි මේ කරන්නේ කරුණු සොයා බැලීමක් පමණයි. මේ කාරණය විශාල වශයෙන් රටේ ආන්දෝලනයට තුඩු දුන් නිසා, මේ සාක්ෂි බලනවා. ඔබතුමාගේ telephone conversations

සේරම බලනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා හොඳ කාර්ය භාරයක් කරන බව අපට තේරෙනවා. ඒ කාර්ය ඉදිරියටත් කරගෙන යන්න, අපේ සහයෝගය උපරිම වශයෙන් අපි ලබා දෙනවා.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක කාලයක් දෙන්න. මේ වන විට අවුරුදු 24ක මාගේ සේවා කාලය තුළ මට නොයෙකුත් ආයතනවලින් offers ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. කවදාවත් මම රජයේ සේවය දාලා ගියේ නැහැ. මම මගේ රාජකාරිය උපරිම අන්දමින් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේ වන විට මාව රැකියාවෙන් interdict කරලා ගෙදර යවනවා කියලා නොයෙකුත් තර්ජන තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැන මට කියන්න කෙනෙක් නැති නිසායි මේ ගරු කාරක සභාවට කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව ජේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගරු සභාපතිතුමාගේ අවධානය අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම යොමු කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් පරීක්ෂා කර බැලීම සඳහා පමණයි ඔබතුමාව ගෙන්වූවේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Chairman, what he says is, as a result of this, he is having a lot of problems at the moment.

සභාපතිතුමා මේ පරීක්ෂණය අවසානයේදී ඒ සියලු දේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් කිසි recommendation එකක් ඇතුළත් කරනවා. ඒ recommendation අනුව තමයි ඔබතුමාගේ රාජකාරිය වාගේම අනෙක් අය රාජකාරි මට්ටමෙන් ගන්නා ලද තීන්දු තීරණ සම්බන්ධව තීරණය වෙන්නේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමා පැකිලීමට පත් වන්නට එපා. ඔබතුමා රාජකාරී කටයුතු කරගෙන යන්න.

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මට ළමයින් දෙදෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. එක ළමයෙක් Medical College එකේ. ඒ ළමයා campus යන්න බැහැයි කියනවා, "තාත්තා හොරෙක්" කියනවාය කියලා. ඒ වාගේ අදහස් තිබෙනවා. මා රාජකාරී කරන තැනින් අයින් කරලායි තිබෙන්නේ. මට විශාල pressure එකක් තිබෙනවා. දැනට මා නීල් ප්‍රනාන්දු මහත්මයාගෙන් බෙහෙත් බොනවා, මගේ stress එකට. මට එපමණයි කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ.

ලංකා බැංකුවට රුපියල් මිලියන 4.1ක profit එකක් එන විධියට මා මේ transaction එක ඉතාම සද්භාවයෙන් handle කරලා තිබෙනවා. මගේ අවුරුදු 24ක කාල සීමාව තුළ කිසිම වෙලාවක කිසිම ගනුදෙනුකරුවකුගෙන් ප්‍රයෝජනයක් ගන්නේ නැතුව මාසික පඩිය විතරක් ගන්න මනුෂ්‍යයෙක්, මම. එවැරයි මේ කාරක සභාවට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ. බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We understand that. ඔබතුමාගේ රාජකාරිය ඔබතුමා කර ගෙන යන්න. මෙය ඔබතුමාගේ මනසට වද දෙන කාරණයක් බවට පත් කර ගන්න එපා. මෙම කාරක සභාවේ සභාපති වශයෙන් ඉන්නේ, හොඳට දැනුම තිබෙන, කරුණු කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවබෝධයක් තිබෙන සභාපතිවරයෙක්. එතුමාගේ Report එක අනුව තමයි ඉදිරි කාරණා තීරණය වන්නේ. ඔබතුමා දුන්නු උත්තරවලින් අපට සෑහීමකට පත් වන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉදිරියේදී අපි ඔබතුමාව දැනුවත් කරන්නම්.

Mr. J.K.D. Dharmapala: Thank you very much, Sir.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Witness withdrew.

(මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීමේ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරී එන්.කේ. දහනායක මහතා සාක්ෂි දීම සඳහා කැඳවයි.)

ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීමේ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරී එන්.කේ. දහනායක මහතා, ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව, සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: දහනායක මහත්මයා ඔබතුමාට කැමැති භාෂාවකින් කථා කරන්න. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ තිබෙන bond issue එක පිළිබඳව NSB එකත් bid කරපු primary dealer කෙනෙක්. මීට පෙර පැමිණි නිලධාරීන් අපට කිව්වා, ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී එය handle කළ ප්‍රධාන නිලධාරියා විධියට ඔබතුමායි හාරව සිටියේ, ඒ නිලධාරීන් නොවෙයි කියලා. එම නිසා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කරුණු ටිකක් දැන ගන්නයි ඔබතුමාව කැඳවා තිබෙන්නේ. එදා ඔබතුමා දැරූ තනතුරත්, 27වන දා සිද්ධිය පිළිබඳව දන්නා තොරතුරුත් කියන්න. ඒ පිළිබඳව අපේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ටී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැනට දරන තනතුර, විශ්‍රාමික නම් එවකට දැරූ තනතුර සහ මෙම ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන්, ඒ කියන්නේ පෙබරවාරි 27වන දා මේ bond issue එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ ඔබතුමා දමා තිබෙන bid එක සම්බන්ධයෙනුත්, ඊට අමතරව මේකට සම්බන්ධ අනිකුත් තොරතුරු, එනම් bid එක දැමීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ website එක හෝ වෙන තැනකින් ඔබතුමා ගත්ත තොරතුරු සම්බන්ධයෙනුත්, මේ bid එක දැමීමේ ඇයි යන කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙනුත් background එක පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ කටයුතු සඳහා වෙනම ආයතනයක් පිහිටුවා තිබෙනවා. එය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ instructions මත තමයි පිහිටෙව්වේ. එහි ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරි හැටියට තමයි මා වැඩ කරන්නේ. NSB Fund Management Company Limited එකෙන් තමයි NSB එකේ primary dealer activities handle කරන්නේ. ජූලි මාසයේ 02වන දා මා retire වනවා. ඊට පෙර මා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සේවය කළා. මේ ආයතනයේ සේවයට ඇවිල්ලා දැනට අවුරුදු 9ක් වනවා. Retirement එක 2nd of July තිබෙන්නේ. මේ දවස්වල විශ්‍රාම පූර්ව නිවාඩු මතයි ඉන්නේ.

මෙම බැදුම්කර නිකුතුව ගැන ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පුවත් පත් මාර්ගයෙන් සහ අපට වෙනම දැනුම් දීම් කරනවා. එහිදී අවුරුදු 30කින් mature වන රුපියල් මිලියන 1,000ක bond නිකුතුවක් නිකුත් කරනවාය කියලා දැනුම් දීලා තිබුණා. එතකොට primary dealer ආයතනයක් හැටියට අපි අවම වශයෙන් සියයට 10ක ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කියන්නේ, රුපියල් මිලියන 1,000ක් නිසා රුපියල් මිලියන 100ක ලංසු අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. එය සාර්ථක වන්න ඕනෑද, නැද්ද කියන එකේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. රුපියල් මිලියන 100ක් තමයි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එම තීරණය ඔබතුමාගේ තීරණයක්ද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නියමයක්ද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නියමයක්. Primary dealersලා appoint කරන කොටම අපි හැම auction එකකින්ම සියයට 10කට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is a statutory requirement for the primary dealers to make their bid at least of 10 per cent of the total amount.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම සාර්ථක වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. චිත්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Fund Management Company එකද, එහෙම නැත්නම් NSB එක තීරණය කරලා ඔබතුමාට දැනුම් දුන්නාද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: මෙය අවුරුදු 30ක දිගු කාලීන බැදුම්කරයක් නිසා අපේ Fund Management Company එකටත් Treasury Bills සහ Treasury bond portfolio එකක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් අපි ළඟ සල්ලි නැහැ. Primary dealer company එකක් හැටියට අපි ළඟ තිබෙන portfolio එක ගැම තිස්සේම market එකෙන් borrow කරලා තමයි run කරන්නේ, leverage කරලා තමයි run කරන්නේ. එහෙම leveraging company එකක් සතුව සාමාන්‍යයෙන් බොහෝ දීර්ඝ කාලීන bonds තබා ගන්න බැහැ. මෙය high-risk bond එකක් නිසා අපට රුපියල් මිලියන 100ක්වත් ලබා ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ, අපේ cash flowsවල හැටියට. Market එකෙන් borrow කරලා ඒ වාගේ දීර්ඝ කාලීන bond එකක් අපි ළඟ තබා ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. ඒ වාගේ අවස්ථාවකදී බොහෝ විට අපේ යුතුකම හැටියට customersලාගෙන් bids අරගෙන තමයි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. මෙතැනදී ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව, ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවක් නිසා හැම තිස්සේම ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට capacity තිබුණා, රුපියල් මිලියන 100කට වඩා bid කරන්න. ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ ALCO වාගේ ආයතන තීරණය කරලා තිබුණා, රුපියල් මිලියන 300ක bids ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. එතකොට අපේ රුපියල් මිලියන 100 requirement එක, ඒක යටතේ cover වන නිසා අපි ඒ ගැන -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා වෙනම දමන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you must have a minimum of Rs. 100 million and over and above that, you can bid through other companies.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඒ රුපියල් මිලියන 300 සම්බන්ධයෙන් rates මොනවාද කියලා NSB එක තමයි තීරණය කළේ. ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය committees තිබෙනවා. ඒ committeesවල සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවන් සහ දීර්ඝ කාලීන bond එකක අවශ්‍යතාවන් උඩ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ රුපියල් මිලියන 300ම ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ලැබුණාද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ලැබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලැබුණු rates කීයද කියා දන්නවාද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දමලා තිබුණේ සියයට 10.5, සියයට 10.95, සියයට 11.05. ඒ ගැන මට හරියටම මතක නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම ගැන ඔබතුමා අහලා තිබෙනවාද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොනවාද අහලා තිබෙන්නේ?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: මා හිතන හැටියට Primary dealer ආයතනයක් හැටියට ඒ ගොල්ලෝ අවුරුදු 2ක් වාගේ කාලයක් කටයුතු කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු අධිපතිතුමාත් සමඟ ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ සම්බන්ධයක් තිබෙන බවට ඔබතුමාට දැනුමක් තිබෙනවාද?

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: එහෙම දැනුමක් නැහැ. ප්‍රවෘත්ති වාර්තා හැරෙන්න පෞද්ගලික වශයෙන් මා දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රවෘත්ති වාර්තාවලින්?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම ගැන නොවෙයි, holding company එකේ යම්කිසි -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන සිටි සම්බන්ධය මොකක්ද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු අධිපතිතුමාගේ සහෝදරියක් ඒ Board එකේ ඉන්නවාය කියලා දැන ගෙන සිටියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් දැනුමක් තිබුණා?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඇත්තටම පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 27වනදා bond issue එකේ සිද්ධියෙන් පස්සේ තමයි මා දැන ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊට කලින් Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිම සැකයක් ඇති වුණේ නැද්ද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: අපි ඒ සමාගමත් එක්ක අන්තර් primary dealer transactions කරනවා හැරෙන්න වෙනත් විශේෂ ගනුදෙනුවක් කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විශාල bid එකක් දැමීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම්කිසි හැඟීමක් ඇති වුණාද, කොහොමද මෙවැනි විශාල bid එකක් දැමීමේ කියලා? එහෙම නැත්නම් එය සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක්ද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: එය සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක් කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. එහිදී අපට තීරණයක් ගන්න වෙනවා, ඒ වාගේ විශාල bid එකක් ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දරා ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා. මා ඉස්සෙල්ලා කිව්වා වාගේ අපි market එකෙන් මුදල් ණයට අරගෙන තමයි, ඒ වාගේ position එකක් maintain කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ඊළඟට අප හැම තිස්සේම ඒවා market එකේ value එකට value කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ විධියට value කරන අතරේ, යම්කිසි විධියකින් අප ගන්න value එකට වඩා market value එක අඩු වුණොත්, loss එකක් හැටියට අපේ P&L account එකේ ඒවා සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. කාලය වැඩි වෙන්න, වැඩි වෙන්න ඒ කියන්නේ, අවුරුදු දෙකක bond එකකට වඩා අවුරුදු තුනක bond එකක risk එක වැඩියි. අවුරුදු දෙකක bond එකක rate එක සියයට දශම 10කින් ඉහළ ගියොත් වෙන loss එකට වඩා අවුරුදු තුනක bond එකක loss එක වැඩියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අප ඉහළ rate එකක් දැමීමොත් ඒකේ අවාසියක් වන්නේ නැහැ නේද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා Rate එක ඉහළින් අරගෙන market rate එක ඊට වඩා පහළ තිබෙනවා නම් ඒකේ ලොකු වාසියක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. ඊට ඉහළ rate එකක් දමන එක අවාසියක් නොවෙයි නේද? හම්බ වුණා නම් හම්බ වුණා. හම්බ වුණේ නැත්නම් කිසි පාඩුවක් නැහැ.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ වුණාට, ඒ ඉහළ rate එක කියන එක මොකක්ද කියලා තීරණයක් තියෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. Market rate එක ඊට වඩා පසු වෙලාවකදී ඉහළට ගියොත් මොකද වන්නේ? ඒකයි අප තීරණය කළේ, ඒ bond එකෙන් අපට මිලියන 100ක් වුණත් ගන්න තත්ත්වයක් නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා 13.5ක විතර rate එකක් දමලා ඒක හම්බ වුණොත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට වාසියක් නේද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් primary dealer company එකක් හැටියට අප ඒ වාගේ way-out rates දමන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, දමන්නේ නැහැ. දමලා හම්බ වුණොත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලොකු වාසියක් නේ වෙන්නේ. ඒ වාගේ rate එකක් දමන එකෙන් පාඩුවක් වන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවට වාසියි. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඒ වෙලාවේ තිබෙන market එකේ තත්ත්වය අනුව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. ඒ market එකට නේ දමන්නේ. වෙන market එකකට නොවෙයි නේ දමන්නේ.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, නමුත් වෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. මගේ අත්දැකීමෙන් මේ කියන්නේ. අප 13.5ට දමලා ඒ rate එකට accept කළොත් තර්ජනයක් තිබෙනවා, immediately after that, market rate එකත් එතැනට යයි කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඒක අපට අතට හම්බ වෙන කොටම market rate එක සමහර විට 14 වෙන්න ඉඩ තිබෙනවා. අන්න ඒ වාගේ දෙයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩි risk එකක් තිබෙනවා.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඒක ගන්න සුදුසු නැති risk එකක්. එහෙම දෙයක් සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ මොකක් හරි වෙන හේතු නිසා නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, market rate එක එක පාරටම සියයට 3කින් විතර ඉහළට යනවා නම් පසුබිමේ යම්කිසි දේවල් සිද්ධ වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 13කට කාට හරි හම්බ වුණාය කියලා උපකල්පනය කරන්නකෝ. ඒත් risk එක තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ 13ට ගන්න අයට risk එක තිබෙනවා නේ, market rate එක ඊට ඉහළින් යයි කියලා.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඔව්, risk එකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Inside information එකක් හම්බ වෙලා ඕක ගත්තත්, risk එක තිබෙනවා නේ. ඊට පස්සේ market එක manipulate කරන්නේ කවුරුවත් නොවෙයි නේ. Automatic market manipulation එකක් වෙනවා නේ. එහෙම වෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට ඒ risk එක තිබෙනවා. ඒකට ඉහළින් යන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගන්න පුද්ගලයාගෙන් risk එක ලබා ගන්න ඕනෑ.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ලොකු bid එකක් දමන එක ගැනයි මම මේ කිව්වේ. Market එක way-out rate එකක් දමලා bids ගන්නවා කියන එක සමහර වෙලාවට අනික් පැත්තට වැඩ කරන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම වැඩ කරපු අවස්ථා තිබෙනවාද? ඔබතුමාගේ අත්දැකීම් අනුව කියන්න බලන්න, market එකේ එහෙම හැසිරුණු අවස්ථා සහ විශාල පාඩුවක් වුණු අවස්ථා ගැන.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට එහෙම පාඩුවක් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: අපට එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ. මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අපට එහෙම පාඩුවක් වුණා. ඒ කියන්නේ, market rates ඉහළ ගිය නිසා අප ළඟ තිබුණු portfolio එකට අපට එක **පාරටම** මිලියන 150ක විතර revaluation loss එකක් ලබා ගන්න සිදු වුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: **විගණකාධිපතිතුමා** ඇහුවේ way-off limit එකක් ඉහළින් දමලා, දමලා හම්බ වෙලා, market rate එක ඊටත් ඉහළට ගිය අවස්ථා තිබෙනවාද කියලායි.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: එහෙම අවස්ථා ගැන මගේ අත්දැකීමක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ bond එක නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ loss එකක් ආවා කියලාද කියන්නේ?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: Revaluation loss කියලා, -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, they are also losing the insurance they had.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ අප ළඟ තිබුණු portfolio එක market rate එකට value කරන්න ඕනෑ. Market rates ඉහළ ගිය නිසා අපේ අනික් bondsවල market rate එකත් ඉහළ ගියා. ඒ නිසා අපේ portfolio එකට මිලියන 160 ගණනක් විතර, -

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ මොන මාසයටද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේම වාගේ- immediately.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක monthly financial statement එකේ reflect වෙනවා ඇති නේද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකේ පිටපතක් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: පුළුවන්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මෙහාට ගෙන්වා ගන්න, NSB, Fund Management Company Limited එකේ, monthly financial statement එක.

ඩබ්ලිව් පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඊට අමතරව ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් 9.5ට වාගේ ආසන්නයෙක් නේ, -

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: 9.35ට වාගේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ කියන 27වැනි දා වෙන කොට bid එකට කලින්, 30-year bondsවල 9.35ට වාගේ ආසන්නයේත් නේ, market rate එක තිබුණේ. එතකොට එක පාරම මේ transaction එක නිසා, යම් හේතුවක් හෝ market එක හැසිරුණු විධිය අනුව අප ගියා 11.75ක weighted average yield rate එකට. එතකොට මේක ඔබතුමා predict කළාද? සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මීට පෙර අවස්ථාවලදී මේ වාගේ විශාල points ගණනකින් වැඩි වෙලා තිබෙනවාද? ඒ අත්දැකීම් අනුව ඔබතුමා කියන්න බලන්න.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මේක predict කරන්නත් බැරි වුණා. මොකද, මිලියන 1,000යි - බිලියන එකයි- announce කළේ. එතකොට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒ වාගේ amount එකක් අවුරුදු 30ක bond එකක් නිසා ඒකත් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ලොකු bond එකක්. ඒ වුණාට අප බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ, -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක දැන ගෙන හිටියේ නැද්ද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: නැහැ. ඒ bond එක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒ rate එක establish කරන්න මහ බැංකුවෙන් කරපු නිකුතුවක් කියන එක තමයි අපට අදහස් වෙලා තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකුවට සල්ලි ඕනෑ වෙලා තිබුණා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට ආරංචියක් තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: නැහැ. අපට එහෙම ආරංචියක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් අවස්ථාවලදී rate එක ඒ වාගේ එහාට මෙහාට වෙන කොට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ portfolio එකට පාඩු සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: අපට එහෙම පාඩු වෙලා තිබෙනවා, rate movements නිසා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක්.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඔව්. කාලයකදී එහෙම reevaluation loss එක එනවා. කාලයකදී අනික් පැත්තට ගියාම revaluation gains එනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලාභ එනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ ප්‍රමාණයකින් මේ වාගේ volume එකක- දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, මිලියන 150ක විතර වාගේ ලොකු loss එකක් ගැන. මීට පෙර අවස්ථාවලදී එහෙම ලොකු ප්‍රමාණයකින් වුණු අවස්ථා තිබෙනවාද?

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඒක සාමාන්‍ය දෙයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට මතකද, 2014ත් මේ වාගේ 30-year bond එකක් තිබුණු බව.

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: NSB එකද ඒකටත් bid කළේ? මට මතක හැටියට,-

අනුර කුමාර දහනායක මහතා: 2014 මැයි මාසයේ bond එකක් තිබුණා. NSB එක bid කළාද කියලා මට මතක නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකත් long-term bond එකක්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They are not interested in those. They go for short-term bonds. Only certain companies go for long-term bonds.

The Chairman: Okay, then. Thank you very much.

(Witness withdrew.)

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ Minutesවල අඩුවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක පිළිබඳව complain කරන්න ඕනෑ. මෙතැනදී එදා, I wanted a question clarified, Sir. I asked Mr. Cabraal whether Mrs. Shiromi Wickramasinghe was his sister. He did not come to the point and went around explaining – I am reading this now – that his whole family is in Boards and directors in all the banks and most of the banks are coming under the Central Bank anyway. He did not answer. I was trying to get to that and everybody was getting agitated to get to that. He never answered, but finally he agreed and answered. He said, "Yes. My sister was the Chairman and Aloysius' were close friends of the Bank and good customers and because of that friendship, they have invited her to sit on that post." That is not in these records. ඒක miss out කර තිබෙන්නේ කවුද? ඒ ටික ගලවලා. මේ වාර්තාවල කොහේවත් ඒ ගැන සඳහන් වෙලා නැහැ. That is a serious error. That is a serious error because we all were here. I think you, Hon. Chairman, and the Hon. Eran Wickramaratne were here. He said that. කෝ, මේ recordsවල නැහැ නේ, ඒවා.

Mr. Jagath Gajaweera Arachchige: We will ask the Editor of Hansard to go through the Verbatim Report again.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නැහැ, fundamental point එකක්. When I finally pushed for that, you, Sir, shouted at me and then I said, "මම අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තරයක් දුන්නේ නැහැ. එටෙ ගියා රාජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේ බැංකුවේ ඉන්නවා, මගේ නැයෝ මෙතැන ඉන්නවා. "I have a very eminent and learned family." කිව්වා. He did not come to the point. I was pushing for the point. All I am asking to say, "yes" or "no." He finally admitted and these were the words he said. "Yes, she is the Chairman and the Aloysius' are very good customers of the HDFC." He said so. ඒ ගැන මෙතැන කොතැනවත් නැහැ. Finally because they trusted that she is such an eminent person, they invited her to this post. ඒ කාරණය මෙතැන නැත්තේ ඇයි? කවුද මේවා distort කරන්නේ? ඒක තමයි මට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහෙම වෙනවා නම් කරන්න බැහැ. The most important evidence given that day was, Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකට primary dealership එක දුන්නේ කවුද?

Central Bank එක ඇතුළෙන් ඒ information දෙනවා ඇති Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකට. මොකද, තවම එතැන ඉන්නේ නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල්ගේ කට්ටිය. මහ බැංකුවට අලුතින් ආපු අධිපතිට දාලා ඒක හංගන්න හැදුවාට ඒකේ විශාල ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. කොහොමද ඒ අය dealersලා වුණේ, මොනවාද කරපු business. හිටපු අධිපතිගේ sister ඒකේ ඉන්නවා නම්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි ගෙන්වා ගන්නා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒවා ජනතාවට වසන් කරන්න බැහැ. මම දැන් වාර්තාව කියෙව්වා. ඒක ගලවලා නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is there a recording of what we talked?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what was said. We were all here when he admitted it finally. ඒක නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා නම් මට පෙන්වන්න කෝ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is a very serious issue. එහෙම නැත්නම්, there is a serious problem with these records.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මොකක් හෝ මෙතැන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හැම එකක්ම වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් වනවා නම්, ඒක නැති වෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: වැරදි. මිනිහෙක්ට ඇහිල්ල දික් කරන්න දෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වාර්තාවේ නැද්ද කියලා මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒක මේ වාර්තාවේ නැහැ. මම ඒක හොයනවා. ඒක තමයි, Mr. Cabraal ගෙන්වපු එකේ වැදගත්ම කොටස. ඒ primary dealer කොහොමද primary dealership එකක් ගත්තේ, කලින් ගත්ත ඒවා, ඥාති සම්බන්ධය මොකක්ද ඒවා ඔක්කෝම කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අනුව record ගෙන්වා ගන්නා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I have gone through this a little bit. I also have some doubts. Even the Hon Member, (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha is giving a platform to him. There is a relationship between him and earlier-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is the earlier Governor.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There is a conflict of interest.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: He is whitewashing. මේවා කියෙව්වාම පැහැදිලි වනවා. ඒක ගැලෙව්වේ කවුද කියලා මට-

සභාපතිතුමා: එදායින් පස්සේ නැහැ. He has gone abroad.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Most crucial evidenceවල ගිටියා නේ. We want to be fair and find out exactly whose false this is. This comes to the people in notion that this is how this hearing should go. අපි මෙහෙමයි වරද පටවන්න ඕනෑ කියලා, ඇවිල්ලා ඒකට අවශ්‍ය කරන ප්‍රශ්න ටික අහලා යනවා. අපි මොකක් හෝ වැදගත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇහුවාම ඒක recordsවලත් නැහැ.

The Hon. M.T. Hassan Ali: They do not erase the recordings.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, that is not here. I am asking this because there is no point of us sitting here if the most important pieces of evidence are not here.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is very dangerous.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is very dangerous. මම කියෙව්වා. ඒ කියපුවා මේ වාර්තාවේ නැහැ. තව මොනවා නැද්ද දන්නේ නැහැ.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: We will compare it with the voice recording.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That also can be destroyed. That also can be erased. But, we all heard him saying this. ඒක ඇයි මෙතැන නැත්තේ? That is the most important thing that he finally admitted it. He said that I am going through this to see because this is a very crucial matter.

The Chairman: Yes, I can remember that question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He finally admitted because he never came to say that she was his sister.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is more important is the information.

The Chairman: He admitted it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He said that they were good customers. He was a friend of his sister and the sister was invited by them because the sister was a confident person. ඔක්කෝම කෑ ගැහිලි අස්සේ, I wanted him to admit that because he did not want to mention about his sister. He read out all the other names. ඒක දැන් මේ වාර්තාවේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන බලන්න.

Mr. J.R. Gajaweera Arachchige: The Editor of Hansard will go through it.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නැති වෙන්න බැහැ. තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. But, we have to call him again.

Mr. J.R. Gajaweera Arachchige: Definitely, it should be there.

The Chairman: We all were there.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We are witnesses. But, how comes it is not in the records.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It maybe there. But, let them go through it.

Unedited

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: By then, you have to summon him again on a few matters. I think the Hon. Eran Wickramaratne waned to call him back.ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ primary dealerම තමයි EPF එක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම පසු ගිය දවස් ටිකේ මේක පොඩ්ඩක් study කළා. The manual is very important. There are judgments from the Supreme Court that a manual is mandatory. You cannot just say it is simply a manual. එකේ විධියට තමයි මේවා තීන්දු වෙන්නේ. Manual විධියට කරන්නේ නැත්නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් රාජකාරී මට්ටමෙන් නිවැරදි ක්‍රමවේදයක් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්න බැහැ.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: No one from the Central Bank has confirmed that this has been approved by the Monetary Board. We have to get it confirmed.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි කිව්වා certify කරලා එවන්න කියලා.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: What happened to the Greece bond also was the same. They said that it was an amended thing.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, Greece bond නඩුව දැම්මේ මම නේ. I do not want to go through it because there was a case.

The decision of the manual is very clear. It states that the member of the Tender Board discussed on existing liquidity position of the market, current market, rates of the market perception, current monetary policy stance and expected reserved money target and cash flow requirements of the Government in deciding the optimal option of that particular tender.

The Monetary Policy is also very valuable when you take that decision. Then, it states that the decision of the Tender Board is submitted for the information and approval of the Governor. The decision of the Tender Board should come in a format. It is not just by a DG. The former Governor has no approval of the Tender Board. DG කියලා පුංචි signature එකක් උඩින් දාලායි තිබෙන්නේ. Tender Board approval කියන්නේ එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මම එදා මේ ගැනත් question කළා. එතකොට කිව්වා, "නැහැ එහෙම්-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The Governor by SPD with a brief note giving existing market development and respective auction outcome-

There are case laws of about eight in AG's Department saying that these manuals are mandatory. So, I got the case laws also. Auditor-General, මම ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරවනවා මේ කාරණය.

There is a part about the private direct placement. It states that the FO has to make arrangements to meet financing need as much as possible through auctions.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, there is private and direct placement. But, they said that there was no word called "private" anywhere.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Yes, I also have that issue. The word they have used is the "private placement".

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If you cannot go for an auction, for the balance fund requirements of the Government indicated in the approved borrowing programme maybe arranged through private placements with TBs. ඒ කියන්නේ, හදිසි අවශ්‍යතාවක් ආවොත් auction කිය කියා ඉන්න බැහැ නේ. .Then, it is on small petty cash. ඔය පොඩි පොඩි දේවල් ගන්න ඕල්ලර කඩ තිබෙන්නේ. අන්න ඒ වාගේ තමයි මේ කරන්නේ. So, this manual is very important. Mr. Chairman, you could see that the Governor has got away with this manual by a board paper.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Which Governor?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is Mr. Ajith Nivard.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: විපක්ෂය දැන් කටයුතු කරන හැටි තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය. ඒ කාලයේ raise කරපු ඒවායේ විනිවිදභාවයක් නිබුණේ නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The proposed yield structure for Treasury Bonds to be mobilized through direct placement in 2008. He has changed that manual, Sir. I want to question him on that. It was approved before that-

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Can I get a copy of that? මේක ආවේ 1997. ඔක්කෝම තිබෙනවා. That is the issue of Treasury Bonds. There are recommendations to the Government. This is the norm. This is according to the mandatory. You must go by this. You cannot deviate from this. This is the approval in 1997 and 1998 and it has continued up to 2008. Mr. Cabraal has changed it in 2008 on his own and then, there is no approval of Tender Board. There is no Tender Board approval for separate. single

auction and no trace as to how you have private placement after that. It is already made and his signature has been given.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That has happened. මේ report එක කියෙව්වාම පැහැදිලියි. He has trashed this report into pieces. Maybe we need to summon the members to ask as to where they got this information.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: We want to know as to when this was approved by the Monetary Board.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, exactly. That is what I also want to know.

මේ තිබෙන්නේ, 2013 අලුත් edition එක.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: මේ බලන්න මේකේ තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is the updated version of 31.07.2013. This is the Operational Manual of the Public Debt Department. මේකේ තිබෙනවා. මේකේ original එක කවදාද ආවේ? They are going by this.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට ආපු එක බලන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේක මම මෙහෙන් ගත්ත එක ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, it is a comprehensive one.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: I need a copy of that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is an updated version of 31.07.2013.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මේ වාර්තාවේ 8වැනි පිටුවේ තමයි තිබෙනවා, "FO has to make arrangements to meet financial needs as much as much as possible through auctions." කියලා.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Yes, it is there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: "Fundamental auctions are the most vibrant and transparent system-" How did Mr. Cabral change this? ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කබරාල් මහත්මයා Operation Manual එකත් වෙනස් කරලානේ. I was very sad that I was not there when Mr. Cabral came.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Chairman, එතුමා අනුමත කරපු එක, ඒ කියන්නේ "sister මෙහෙමයි, sister මෙහෙමයි. යාළුකමක් තිබුණා" කියලා තිබෙන කොටස මට අවශ්‍යමයි. නැත්නම් මෙතැන ඉඳගෙන ඉඳලා වැඩක් නැහැ.

Mr. Jagath Gajaweera Arachchige: Sir, what is the page number?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Pages eight and nine. At the bottom of page eight, "(b) Private direct placements." Private direct placement කියලා වෙනම එකක් ආවේ- In urgent matters only you can go for private placements. That is why it is separately it says,-

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Was it not there in the previous version? Was the private dealer placement not there in the previous version?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is not there, but they explained why private and direct placements must be there. They say it must be by auction all the time, but in emergency because- ආණ්ඩුවට සල්ලි අවශ්‍ය වෙන කොට නැවත auction තිය තියා ඉන්න බැහැනේ. Then you can go for a private placement. Transparency එක minimize කරන්න,- හදිසි අවස්ථාවක, you can go for private placements. But, Mr. Cabral made the private placements as a norm which is totally against the Operation Manual. I am going to court against on this also.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: I need a copy of that, the document that they have changed. Not this one.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 1997 දී තමයි මේක approve කරලා ආවේ. ඊට පස්සේ by auctions. 2008 දී කබරාල් මහත්මයා එතුමාගේ හිතුමතේට private placementsවලට වෙනස් කළා, which is totally illegal.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: We have to fix that summoning all these Board Members.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: That is right. ඒක තමයි මම study කළේ. ඒ සියලුම දේවල් ඊයේ මට එවලා තිබුණා. We need summon Mr. Cabral again.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Primary dealer එක්ක තිබෙන සම්බන්ධතාව,- මොකද, මගේනේ්ද්රන් හිටියත් නැතත් ඒ ගොල්ලෝ මෙහෙම තමයි කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කරන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. Primary dealer දෙනවා EPF සහ ETF money. Then they give the information to the secondary market that the EPF is investing this much. Sir, what they do ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, EPFවලට සහ ETFවලට primary issue එක දෙනවා. දෙනකොට they give the secondary market that we are giving the primary issue to these people. එතකොට ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, EPF එකේ සහ ETF එකේ fluctuation එක single digit එහාට මෙහාට ගියාම profit is about 400 million to 800 million වෙනවා. That is how Mr. Cabral and these people have manipulated the market. That is why they got their relations in all the banks.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: All the relations-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This person, Aloysius knew it and got the sister as a- That is how they grew to 11 billion. That is how they grew. EPF හා ETF එකට දෙන කොට "අපි EPF හා ETF එකටමෙන්න මේ ගණන primary dealerගෙන් ගන්නවා" කිව්ව ගමන් ඒ ගොල්ලෝ අර rate එකට EPF හා ETF තිබෙන bonds ටික එහාට මෙහාට කරනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, they can buy from- අද කිව්වාම, අද ගන්න පුළුවන් ඒ market එකෙන්. EPF, ETF එක හෙට primary එකෙන් 2 billion, 3 billion ගන්නවා. එතකොට ඉබේම market එක fluctuate වෙනවා.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara, Director of Financial Sector Research of Central Bank of Sri Lanka was called in.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara, Director of Financial Sector Research of Central Bank of Sri Lanka, affirmed and examined.

The Chairman: Mr. Nanayakkara, were you the former Superintendent of Public Debt Department of the Central Bank?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Hon. Chairman, I functioned as the Superintended of the Public Dept Department from January 1st 2012 to 9th of February 2015.

The Chairman: Now, what Department are you attached to?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Sir, now, I am heading the Financial Sector Research Department

The Chairman: When did you leave the Public Debt Department?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry. Sir, I did not hear you.

The Chairman: When did you leave the Public Debt Department or were you transferred or was there a reshuffle in the staff?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Actually, with the appointment of the new Governor, there were several changes within the Central Bank. So, I was one of the Heads of Departments who have been transferred out and now I am heading the Financial Sector Research Department.

The Chairman: Can we know your experience as the Superintended of Public Debt Department with regard to issue of bonds in general in a brief way.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Well, Hon. Chairman, I am a Chartered Accountant by profession and I have a Master's Degree in Financial Derivatives from the American University of Washington DC. With my knowledge and also with the experience before, I was appointed as the Superintendent of Public Debt, I was the Additional Director of Bank Supervision. So, my duty was to examine banks especially the dealing room activities. So, with the appointment of Superintendent of Public Debt Department with effect from 1st January 2012, I had been one of the members of the entire team to implement the Government borrowing programme effectively and efficiently. Hon. Chairman, "effectively and efficiently" means the cost of borrowing is a matter for the Government and also the underlined risk of the public debt portfolio. So, our team including the Chairman of the Tender Board Committee and also the Domestic Debt Management Committee has been looking at the ways and means as to how we can borrow at least possible cost while improving the risk profile, that means reducing the debt profile to the Public Debt Portfolio. During my tenure as the Superintendent of Public Debt, I think we have been able to deliver or rather add some values to the entire public debt management functions. We have been able to bring down the cost of refinancing substantially. At the time of appointing me as the Superintendent of Public Debt we had an average time to maturity of the entire domestic debt portfolio of less than three years. Then. we had been able to improve it more than six years in three years. So, our debt management strategies- We have implemented a medium-term debt management strategy duly approved by our seniors. With that we had been able to improve the risk profile while bringing down the cost of the debt portfolio. About the specific attention to the bonds. Sir, actually in

our market there is a little reluctance for everyone to invest in bonds because bond is a long-term instrument and everyone was uncertain as to what would happen because with the new accounting practices, especially the international accounting, IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards - the portfolio new to mark-to-market and, then, if somebody invest in bonds at a particular rate and if the market yield rate goes up then they are going to incur a mark-to-market loss. The longer the tenure or the duration the loss is going to be much bigger. So, everyone was tending to or rather tempted to invest in short-term.

The Chairman: In Treasury Bills.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Treasury Bill, Sir. But we had a mixture of strategies. That is the competitive auctioning system where we auction a portion of the bills and bonds and then establish a market rate and then allow the market players, primary dealers come directly to the Public Debt Department and then invest as they wish.

This strategy helped us immensely to encourage people to invest in long-term bonds. So, that was my experience and then, I was very happy that we had been able to save a lot of money to the Government and also by increasing the average time to maturity, Hon. Chairman, you can imagine the debt portfolio is about Rs. 7 trillion now. And if the ATM is three years mean that entire debt stock is going to be repriced within three years. Then in a market like ours, not entire Rs. 7 trillion is local rupee-denominated bonds, but say about more than half about 56 per cent of it in rupee-denominated instruments and if that stock comes to the market it is going to create havoc and then rates are going to be much much higher and that would affect not only the borrowing cost. Hon. Chairman, the Government bills and bond rates are the benchmarked risk-free rates. Other instruments are going to be priced based on the Government securities market. It may be a housing loan, motor vehicle loan or whatever but the lending institutions first will look at where the benchmarked rest-free rate is. Then, we had a duty to maintain low and stable interest rates in the market in order to encourage the private sector to augment their investments because if you may permit I really want to state this, as well. In order to achieve about 7.5 per cent growth, Sri Lanka needs about 30 per cent of GDP being investments every year. Now from that only 6 per cent come from the Government's budget, balanced 24 per cent should come from the private sector. In order for the private sector to take long-term projects we need to maintain low and stable rates and during the period 2013 specially and first half of 2014, you may witness that the corporate debt market was so active and then longer end of the yield curve was so active and then we saw lot of capital creation and corporate debts, listed debts, transactions were very high and we saw that our efforts paid dividends, Sir.

The Chairman: Now coming to the question at issue regarding the bonds, what is really the difference between this direct placement and auction? Is it an integrated system? In your experience how were you dealing with these managing debt?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Sir, actually as I mentioned earlier, before we conduct an auction my Front Office – if I may tell you a little bit about arrangement within the Public Debt Department, we have five divisions namely, the Front Office, Back Office, Middle Office, Security Settlements Division and then Primary Dealer Supervision Unit. Then the Front Office where the dealers are located, they normally speak to the market and then see the market appetite and then decide because before we put up an auction or make public announcement about an auction we want to make sure that whatever the amount. This is Government securities. We did not want to offer or make an announcement to the market and then subsequently withdraw simply because there were no adequate demand or the asking yield is much higher. So, we really did not want to pay that. So, basically, the Front Office was functioned under the supervision of my Additional Superintendent, Dr. Azim and basically we offer certain quantum to the market and there again the market also consist many different people. Primary dealers, have only Rs. 300 million capitals with each of them. That is the strategic requirement and also we have huge funds like EPF. If you look at the demands for bonds nearly 30 - 40 per cent come from the EPF and another 30 - 40 per cent from the banking system. Then, the primary dealers' interest was very limited. Yet, we wanted to offer a sizable amount to the market in order to let the market to decide the rates. What did I mean by the market rates? Sir,

actually the market making function is done by the primary dealers. EPF buy and hold because they have a different purpose. If we announce to the market, say Rs. 10 billion, there is a regulatory requirement that each primary dealer should bid minimum 10 per cent at each auction. And if we announce for example Rs. 10 billion to the market then minimum requirement is going to be Rs. 1 billion. Primary dealers' capital alone is Rs. 300 million. Then what we saw in practice was that the primary dealers tend to send fake bids for high yields. Asking yield is much higher. Eventually, that tends to increase the weighted-average yield.

The Chairman: That was called "dummy".

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: "Dummy deal" Sir. You are perfectly correct, Hon. Chairman.

The Chairman: I came to know it being here during the proceedings.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: And then, we offer a minimum sizable quantity depending on the market requirement or market appetite and at the weighted-average we allowed even EPF to come and take whatever the amount because we really did not want. That was the policy at that time. I am saying this as if like we have implemented the Central Bank policy, Sir. My personal view was that at that time the Central Bank did not want, for example, EPF to come and disturb the market functioning because EPF is anyway guaranteed at weighted-average yield and that helped us to maintain lowest possible cost to the Government and then when people wanted to come and take subsequently. There is another reason for that. When we go to the market sometimes the investors do not have money especially the foreigners. Foreign investors, really do not want to go through the banking system and then send their bids through the primary dealers because they have to pay commissions also to the primary dealers because they are doing a free-based business. And then we had been able to accommodate those kinds of requests also yet again at the weighted-average yield or yields below the market rates at the time of making the direct placements. Hon. Chairman, I also want to make a little clarification here. There is a misunderstanding here about the concept or rather word we normally call it as "direct placements" not the "private placements". Of course, in the public debt manual, private placement/direct placement. Hon. Chairman, private placements, in my view, the way I understood, was for rupee borrowings, tap basis. Now we go to the investors like Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation, for example, and then, tell them that we would offer you this much, would you like to lend your money to us. But in direct placements the investor can directly come to the Public Debt Department and then take at weighted-average yield rate or the lower of the market or weighted-average yield rate. That always helped us to push the investors demand towards longer end of the yield curve. That helped us enhancing or increasing the average time to maturity over the period.

The Chairman: So that is why a sort of an integrated system the direct and private both terms?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, Sir. It gave us lots of required flexibility. Now, if we offer to the market or rather if we implement a policy, for example, on competitive public auctions, then, there is little flexibility for the Debt Manager to manage the debt stocks because the market knows at whatever rates it will have to take at the auction. But here, if the asking yield is much bigger or much higher, then we always had the flexibility to say that "No, we will not take that in". But investors also want to invest in Government security so that we can force them to invest because eventually the whole idea is to bring down the cost and also increase or rather reduce the underlined risk profile of the public debt stock.

The Chairman: Does the Tender Board also come under you?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry Sir. I am a member of the Tender Board. Deputy Governor in charge of the Public Debt Department is the Chairman of the Tender Board. Then, Superintendent of Public Debt Department did not have any authority to decide on any rates or even for direct placements the Tender Committee discusses at the time of deciding the quantity and the price whether the Public Debt Department be able to meet the Government's borrowing requirement on a particular date.

With that assurance only the Committee take that decision whether this price and quantity can be accepted. Otherwise, if the Public Debt Department says, "No. There is hardly any possibility that we can find any new investors", then the Tender Committee decides, "Okay, we will go for a higher price, eventually for a

higher quantity". So, that is how the system works.

The Chairman: You were handling this 30-year bond in 2014.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That is exactly right, Sir.

The Chairman: That was the first 30-year bond.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Sir, if I may tell you about the history, 2013 was the year we saw that, partly because of our debt management strategies and also because of the benign economic conditions in the country, the low inflation and then higher investor preference, the market yield also coming down. Then, we thought that this is the right time for us to extend the Government debts. That chunk of Government debts would not bother us for the next 30 years and it is being silenced and that gave us a lot of space in order to handle the maturing debts without bothering about re-pricing or re-issuing those stocks for a long period of time. The other thing is, that gave market the required benchmark rate for them to price other financial instruments, especially the corporate debts and debentures for a longer period.

The Chairman: Although you are not the in charge, would you like to express your views on what has gone wrong in this recent bond issue, as an experienced Superintendent?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry. I have not taken any part in this bond issue and I must tell you that public debt management is only one of the functions of the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Has anything gone wrong in this bond issue?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry, Sir.

The Chairman: You may not give an opinion. I just asked a question.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Has anything gone wrong with the bond issue?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry. I will not be able to comment about that because I was not a party to that. What I wanted to tell you is this. The Central Bank not only looks at the Government borrowing cost, because in the Tender Committee of the Treasury Bonds or Treasury Bills, we have the Director of Economic Research and we have the Director of the Statistics Department. Basically those two officials tell us. The Director, Economic Researches will tell us what the economy is going to be look like.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The monetary policy and the necessity as well.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, Sir, the borrowing in line with monetary policy because we really did not want to disturb the smooth functioning because the Government is only a tiny player of this big market, as I said earlier. The Government's entire investment is only 6 per cent and 24 per cent from the private sector. So, we really did not want to disturb the private sector simply because- If the Government jump into the market and then disturb this and borrow it, then, one thing is, it will disturb the smooth functioning of the debt market. The second thing is- Sir, actually we need to go to the market every week. It is not that we go and take it out because we can forget about anybody else, yet the Government has to be in the market and our debt management function will be smoothen and then will be easy only if we see a stable market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If you all get a requirement for about Rs. 15 billion, by the Treasury, how do you all manage the funding? What is your first and foremost step? Can you tell us what would you go through and what would you do?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: We get the Treasury requirements through the Treasury cash flow statements. It is only an estimate that is subject to changes. But, to give you a precise answer, we first see whether there are any potential investors in the market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is primary-

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: We do a search even before we make an announcement because we really do not want to or rather the Central Bank basically does not want to go to the market and then simply take it out because this is Government debt. So, we first do a research and then we also see whether we can attract some foreigners for this because the whole idea is, we want to fulfill the Government's requirement at the lowest possible cost.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And not upset the market also.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes. That is one of the primary objectives and then-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇඟට දැනෙන්නේ නැතුව ගන්න එක තමයි හොඳම ක්‍රමය.

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර මහතා: ඇත්තටම ඒ බිලියන 15 ගන්න ගිහිල්ලා market එකට disturb කළොත් -Now, there are certain investors who have invested at, say, 8 per cent and the if the market rate all of a sudden goes to 10 per cent, then that entire investors are like left out and they are going to incur a huge loss. That would put them into difficulty and in the next time, not a single investor will come to the bond auction. They will say, "Look! We have invested in your 30-year bond. We invested at 9 per cent. Now, it is going at 10 per cent. How can we go to the senior management and get an approval for this one?"

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We understand that. So, how do you get the money?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Then we conduct the auction and then we try to get as much as possible through the auction and then we would not stop at that point. Then, we speak to the markets and also we know there are certain foreign banks who brings in the foreigners because the Government-

The Chairman: Is it what is call making an assessment?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, Sir. After the auction-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is if you cannot get whatever you need from the auction.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It you can get it from the auction, you would rather get it from-

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Provided that, the rates stay within the range that the Tender Committee envisaged. That includes the Director of Economic Researches and also the Director of Statistics and then the Deputy Governor in charge of Public Debt and all that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The Tender Board decides that?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, the Tender Board decides that rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not the Governor decides?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No. Actually, the Tender Board recommends. Eventually the Governor is the final authority to take it or not.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Does the not Governor not speak to the Tender Board about the economic policy and what we have to do? Is it like the Governor totally separated from this function and only he has to ratify it or else is the Governor is also a part of it like the whole body, the Public Debt Department, the Governor? Do you not all discuss that this is our way forward?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Sir, we as the Head of Departments basically do not discuss these things with the Governor on ad hoc basis. But, the basically Director, Economic Researches is the authority to take on that and then make proper recommendations and also elaborations at the Tender Committee and then the Tender Committee decisions or the recommendations go as one recommendation to the Governor. That is the recommendation of the Tender Committee for the Governor to consider.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, the Governor does not participate in any ideas or is the Governor totally a separate person and only approval is given by him or else he is also a part of it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do you all have discussions?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry. As I said earlier, the Governor has the discretion to accept it or reject.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is not what I am asking. Is it only his function? Is he only a person there to accept or reject?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No, the Governor can. I mean, the Governor basically-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it like a manager in a bank. The manager approves in the end.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you have discussions and say, "Okay, this is our policy. This is the guideline. Okay, go like this". There is an understanding among the Public Debt Department, Tender Board and the Governor.

The Chairman: Are there any guidelines to the Tender Board?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: From the Governor?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, are there any operational manuals or something?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: There are no guidelines to the Tender Committee as such.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, not the committee. Do you have guidelines on the operations of the private placements, tenders are auctions? Is there a manual?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes. The Public Debt Manual is there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you all go by that manual?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes. Basically the Public Debt Department's function is duly explained in the manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, that manual is mandatory.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Not by law, but that has been the practice we have been following.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There is a manual for a reason.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If it is not mandatory or if you do not adopt it, you do not need a manual.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you go by that for public placement or private placement or direct placement or auctions. So, that manual is very important.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The manual gives clear guidance. This has been reviewed by our Internal Auditor and then annually the Internal Auditor also comes and looks at the fund raising activities. So, basically that subject to the surveillance of even the External Auditors, the Auditor-General as well.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Getting back to the Rs.15 billion that the Government needs by Monday. From this Monday to next Monday, you need Rs.15 billion. How do you all fulfill that money requirement within that week?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: As I said –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Go for an auction?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You take from the auction whatever you need, and then?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Now say, the requirement is Rs.15 billion. From the auction, we manage to get only Rs.1 billion. Still, we have five working days till next Monday. So, we try to get as much as possible from the market. Say, we collected only Rs.4 billion. Altogether, we have Rs.5 billion. We had the auction. The Treasury wanted money. We can allocate Rs.10 billion to the Central Bank in the form of T-Bills. Then again we get a time space, we go to the market and issue T-Bonds as much as possible, get the money and then retire the Central Bank holdings.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is if you have the time frame?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No, Madam even after the auction because it is next Monday -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Monday is the requirement?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Friday is the auction?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Wednesday is the auction, settlement is on Friday and on the value date, next Monday we have only Rs.5 billion in hand. Then there is a Rs.10 billion short. There is a possibility that-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Possibility?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: There is a way that we have been following. We can issue the balance in T-Bills to the Central Bank. We did it so many times because we did not want to compromise the cost factor and the risk factor. We allocated the balance Rs.10 billion to the Central Bank and then got the money, Rs.15 billion on Monday. The Rs.10 billion that we allocated to the Central Bank- Even after the auction, we can make direct placements.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you must go on bills? You must make that money through direct placement because you cannot go for another auction?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you go for another auction?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Not an auction. Direct placement through the Central Bank at the latest weighted average yield rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The primary dealers must be able to take the direct placements.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Here there are two things. The first thing is, the Government

needs Rs.15 billion by next Monday. We really did not want to upset the market by increasing the rates. What we can do is, we can go to the market, take whatever possible and then from the auction date to the value date we can do direct placements and then still source money from the market and the balance we allocate to the Central Bank and then on post facto basis we can again raise from the market and retire the Central Bank holdings.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Nanayakkara, I want to ask you this because you have been the Head of the Debt Department.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If you have a need to furnish on Monday would you go for an auction, not knowing that you did not have a penny as reserves, on Friday? In the conversation just now, you were talking about Monday, you would have the auction on Wednesday so that you have enough time to find the balance through private placements or direct placements or whatever. Would you call for an auction just the day before you have to meet with your need?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Madam, if I may explain to you. That is why we get the Treasury Cash Flow Requirement well in advance.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How advance?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: They send us the cash flow statement before the beginning of the month, at least a week before the beginning of the month.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So you have three weeks?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So roughly you havethree tofour weeks?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Say for the first week -We have roughly about two weeks and that is more than enough for us to arrange an auction. We need to give the public sufficient notice, place the advertisements in the newspapers and then conduct the auction, not necessarily on Wednesday, Wednesday by default is for T-Bills only. T-Bond auction can take place any day.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: My question was would you wait for that last hour, that last minute to do this or would you as you know -

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No, we do not. The thing is, by practice we will have to give the market sufficient time for settlement. Basically, at least two value days prior to the settlement date. That is why -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You do not wait for the last date, last hour?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: We do not wait till the last date. Even for T-Bills, the auction is on Wednesday and then it is on spot basis. That means, two value days for the market to settle their obligations. That is on Friday.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: At the same time, do you all try to find the money not only from auctionbutdo you all not try to get the money from private placements also? If it is under the rate, do you all not try to collect some money that way also because Rs.15 billion is not easy to make? And you know, when you make Rs.15 billion the market will move.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You know that. When you need Rs.15 billion -

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: If we try to make the entire Rs.15 billion there is a possibility that the market rates might jack up at the auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying. You use that method. You do not tell them that you have this requirement. You keep it under the blanket and then you just put forward, this is what we need. At the auction you will not put the whole amount. What you do is, you put a small amount.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Small quantity.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Small quantity so that it will not upset the market. So at the same time by not upsetting the market do you not try to get some more money from the private placements before that? Collect?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Not that particular issue but may be some other issue. There are investors because we have the weighted average yield rate and we can accommodate that request as well.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: For instance, if you can get about Rs.5 billion from direct placements and private placements, then you need Rs.10 billion from the auction?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That is quite a possibility

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Without upsetting the market.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, Sir. We tried a mixture of that strategy.

The Chairman: Anyway, you operate within the framework of that integrated system.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, Sir.

The Chairman: Placements and auctions framework.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That framework is clearly articulated in the Manual.

The Chairman: The determining factors are the risk and the cost.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: More than anything Sir, the cost to the Government need to be kept at the lowest possible level.

The Chairman: And without upsetting the Government.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Market.

The Chairman: Those are the deciding factors.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: From our understanding this Public Debt Department Operation Manual is very important. You all must go by this Manual?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Page 8 of the Manual says, "Private and Direct Placements". They talk about what this means.

Mr. W. P. C. Wickramaratne: Hon. Minister first we have to establish whether this is the Manual they use.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They said that this is the Manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is the Public Debt Department Operation Manual Version II, I have the updated one, as of 31.07.2013. You do not have that?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: But Sir, you can ask the question.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are aware of this also?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I can remember. Since I was the Superintendent. I can remember many of the things.

Mr. W. P. C. Wickramaratne: We need to know because this is the latest Manual that we are having.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is during your time.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: 2013.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: At that time, I was there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can we show it to you to see whether this is the one?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Sir, you said page 8?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I want you to see if this is the Manual. Do you accept that this is the Manual?

Mr. W. P. C. Wickramaratne: At present, is this the Manual that the Public Debt Department is applying?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: This is the Manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: According to page 8 in the Manual, "Private and Direct Placements". FO, what is FO?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Front Office.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Front Office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That you agree?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, the means of making this requirement is by way of auctions?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: As much as possible.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is there a ratio?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No ratio, as much as possible.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: As much as possible?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: As much as possible, through auctions?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Balance requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved borrowing programmes may be arranged through private placements with PDs.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So what I understand is, during your tenure in office as

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much as possible, it must be done through auctions?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, can you tell us, within your time, how much was made through auctions and how much was made on private placements? Mr. Chairman, we can also get a report on that.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Sir, actually, all the direct placements and auction amounts have been published. So, this is the Public Debt Bulletin. We have been publishing this since 2006.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. With your knowledge, can you say it in percentage wise?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: If I may say, in 2013, we managed to raise nearly 20 per cent of the requirement through auctions and balance 80 per cent rather direct placements and -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, is not that incorrect from the manual guidelines? The guideline says,

The Chairman: "As much as"

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The guideline says, "As much as." As I understand, what that means is the majority that you must go by auctions. "As much as" there means is that.

The Chairman: Why did you depart from that?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why did you depart from that?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Actually, that was the demand in the market and as I said earlier, we conducted a survey and then said how much the market was wanted.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But why did you move away from the manual? You cannot decide on what you want.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry; we need to look at the funding methodology as well as the underlying cost. So, basically, it is not my personal decision but the Tender Committee, at the time of the deciding the price and the quantity, decided, "No, we cannot afford this much of cost to the Government; we take only this much, balance through direct placements."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what we are asking. Why did you move away from the manual? As officials, you can decide on so many things. But, it must be on the manual. The manual sets up the guidelines. You cannot go on just for a point difference or something. You cannot take your own decisions on that. In regulations, there are manuals and manuals to be adopted and it is mandatory. That is for transparency and this has been adjusted for that. So, the manual says, "As much as possible..." you must go by that.

I would like to draw your attention to this document, which says, "ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය" - Monetary Board - 14.02.1997. මෙයින් තමයි auctions originate වුණේ, issue of Treasury Bonds. That had remained continuously with the manual. That has been the practice. You went by auctions and that is the most transparent way, because, by way of auctions, sometimes you lose a bid, but the transparent mechanism must be adopted. You know that the market must move on its own. So, the most transparent and - that is why probably the manual was directed. Otherwise, the manual could have said, "As much as possible through private placements." because the people who made the manual also must have known about the financial requirements in the country.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The manual is prepared by the Public Debt Department people.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. So, for them to prepare it - they have gone by the best practices. Is it not?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They go by the best practices. You all are not private dealers to understand that one point you can make from this deal and one point you can make from this deal. You cannot do that. So, you have to go with a mechanism. So, that mechanism says clearly and that was actually originated and I got the documentation as to how you started the auctions. There is the document. I can give it to you also. We see that in 2008, totally against the manual -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you say, 2008?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: 26.01.2008 - proposed yield structure for Treasury Bonds to be mobilized through direct placements in 2008.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry, I was not there in 2008.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. I am sorry. That is the thing. So, this is how private placements were introduced. It says, "මූදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත." මාතෘකාව - subject: proposed yield structure - the propose of this Board Paper is to - Board Paper එකකින් මේ manual එක වෙනස් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The Monetary Board has the responsibility of managing the public debt. Basically, the Central Bank means the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board takes the ultimate responsibility of performing that agency functioned.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct. But they must go by the manual. The manual is the guideline, the manual is mandatory and within that you can and the Monetary Board take decisions. The Monetary Board cannot change the Manual. Is it not?

The Chairman: The manual is also approved by the Monetary Board.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, how can the Monetary Board come with the same manual after changing it also -

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: They have to amend it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. In 2003 - you cannot take a Board decision and then say, "The manual must be changed. For these reasons, we have amended the manual." According to the decision taken by the Board you cannot say that. The manual had not been amended, because this is simply a Board decision.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: As far as I know, the manual does not go to the Monetary Board, because this is clearly a documentation of the process in the department to make sure that there is a consistency, uniformity in the activities that we perform in the Department. Then, basically, as far as I know, the manual goes only up to the Deputy Governor's level and it does not go to the Monetary Board, because it keeps on changing if necessary. That is why it needs to be revived annually also. So, basically, if you compare the manual and the Board decision, the Board decision is the ultimate authority.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. The Board decision is the ultimate authority. But you must be guided by the manual. Otherwise, there is no purpose of having a manual. You do not need a manual if the Monetary Board is the ultimate decisive body.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No. The manual serves the purpose of directing the people in the department as to how they should perform the activities.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is exactly the point.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is exactly what we are saying. So, the manual is very important. As the Auditor-General directed, if there is a change of policy, the manual must also be changed. So, we only see - from where did you divert from manual? The manual says, "FO has to make arrangements to meet functions, financing needs as much as possible though auctions." You must show us from where did you take that decision when you came into office; where did you sway from this principle and how did you sway from this principle? You said, 20 per cent was only raised through auctions.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That was the total that we managed to raise. When I took office as the Superintendent of the Public Debt, basically, I have been following the practice that had been following previously. As you said, it was changed in 2008.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When did you come?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I came in 01st of January, 2012.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you do not know what happened in 2008?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No. Basically, my first duty in the Department as the Superintendent was to send the implementation of the Government borrowing programme to the Governor for information that included direct placements as well done by the previous Superintendent of the Public Dept.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You just actually continued the prevailing system.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I continue the prevailing system.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: You can confirm that this manual - the guidelines - does not want to go to the Monetary Board for the approval.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That is what I said. The Internal Audit Department basically keeps an eye on the operational manuals of the bank. Then, basically they need us to go to the Deputy Governors' approval and

then send it to them. Now we have been reviewing currently the operational manual. So, I have been rather reviewing the Financial Research Department manual. The approval they wanted us is the Deputy Governor's approval.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not the Monetary Board?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Not the Monetary Board.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: But, I can remember, with regard to the Greek Bond case, that manual was - I cannot remember exactly the?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That is a different thing. I acted as the Chief Dealer of the Central Bank in 2004 and that is the Foreign Reserve Management Guidelines. So, that needed the Monetary Board approval.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Nanayakkara, what are the functions of the Legal Department of the Central Bank?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: To my understanding, basically, the Legal Department is to help the officers in various departments of the bank to perform their duties and functions within the existing statutes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, would they be also watching closely whether the manual is being taken into consideration?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: During my time they did not do that.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The reason as to why I am asking this is, during your time, should the Legal Department be vigilant, watching and giving you directions?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I cannot remember that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If I say that you could not remember that there was no Legal Department and the Legal Department of the Central Bank was shut down.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That is right.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Why? I mean that this is to my amazement, the Legal Department of the Central Bank has been shut down, and it is very questionable.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Madam, if I may explain to you, I also noticed that. What happened was- Earlier, the legal function was centralized. Then, we had a Director (Legal) and then about five legal officers were attached to that Department. Then, later on, it was decentralized. For example, I said I was the Additional Director of Bank Supervision till 31st December 2011. We had three Legal Officers attached to the Bank Supervision Department to deal with matters pertaining to the Bank Supervision Department for example. Likewise, there were Legal Officers and even in the Public Debt Management Department; we had one legal officer all the time. That has to be looked at.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If one would basically caste allegations saying that this is to channel high fees to private lawyers who were partial towards the irregular deals of the Central Bank? When was the Legal Department of the Central Bank shut down? There was an existing Legal Department in the Central Bank. Were you aware that the Legal Department was shut down?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I was aware.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When was it shut down?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I served in the Central Bank till August 2004, and then left for Central Bank of Oman on deputization; by the time I left in August 2004, the Legal Department was there. Then I returned from the Central Bank of Oman on 01st January 2008, at that time, it was not there. I do not know exactly, when the Department was closed.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay, also to ask you a question about – you mentioned about 13th June, where the thirty-year Bond - Was it through private placements?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No. We had an auction.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What was the weighted average or the interest rate there?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry. I cannot remember that. I need to look at the records.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Then, 17th June again, a thirty-year Bond; because they all stated that when we did the investigations what we discovered was 12. 5 per cent.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: 12.5 per cent was the coupon rate.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, that was the rate that was taken at the Bids. On the 03rd June 2013 – thirty-year bond. On 17th June, 2013 - thirty-year bond. So. I mean, this

is a high interest rate. This is one of the things that have been questioned right now as well. We would like to know who has got it? I think that you have mentioned that Perpetual Treasuries got part of it as well when you were speaking on this. That was why I wanted to re-question you on this. It was at a very high interest rate, 12. 5 per cent.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: You said that it was in 2001 the first bond issue.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: On the 03rd June 2013 – thirty years. On 17th June, 2013 - thirty-year bond at 12.5 per cent.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I think I need to look at the numbers. I cannot remember that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Then, in 2014 again – 11.75 per cent.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Madam, I think, you maybe referring to the Coupon rate.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, this is the rate that they had taken. This is not the coupon rate. We know in this deal the coupon rate was 12.5. Then they took the Rs. 10 billion of the – They have gone to the maximum here. This was happened during your time.

The Chairman: Anyway, it cannot go over the rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the maximum rate. After the high coupon rate, that is a high amount.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Yes, that is the maximum amount that they can. Sometimes, that also may cheap.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is during your time.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: We need to look at the yield rate also. For example, if an institution like EPF, I think, again we need to cross-check with the Front Office as to who did it and who has taken that amount. Even an investor, needs a stream of income for thirty-years. But, it does not mean that we have been paying for 12.5 per cent for 100. No. If taking the yield is much lower - that means, in order for them to get in 12.5 per cent cash stream over the years, maybe they want to pay- 115 sometimes. Above far, at a premium the Bond is sold. So, now the coupon is decided to attract the Bond in the market. But when the investors come into the auction, sometime they get much yield much lower than that rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, what is the purpose of coupon rate?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: This was given idea. This is the amount that the market rate to have a benchmark.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: It does not mean that the borrowing rate would go up to that level. That was totally a misconception.

The Chairman: Not necessarily.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Not necessarily, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. When there is an auction, once that approves, you have the Bids and so on, what is the process after that?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: If I may explain you, at the Front Office receives the Bids. Then, the Public Debt Management Department, We, as the Superintendant of the Department of Public Debt Management, there are two Additional Superintendants; then the Deputy Director Superintendant supervises the Front Office. There is the Head of the Front Office –He is the Chief Dealer of the Front Office. We get together and prepare schedules forthe Tender Committee. Then, we go to the Tender Committee, with certain options. We did not have.

In fact, the Public Debt Department does not have the authority to decide the rate and the quantity. Then the Tender Board looks at only the price and the quantity. Then, they do not look at even who the bidders were. Then, looking at the price and the quantity, and also taking into account, the Monetary Policy Consideration as well, the deliberation at the auction and also the inflation; because that is why we have the Director (Domestic Operations), who is doing market liquidity and all these things into consideration. Then, the Committee decides – "this is the rate, at which we are going to take in this much." Then, we make. It has a recommendation to the Governor for approval.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, that the Tender Board must recommend it.

Mr. N.W,G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In the Page five of the Manual it says, "the decision of the Tender Board is submitted for the information and approval of the Governor. "

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, that is correct because the Tender Boards recommends only once we decide it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How many members did you have in the Tender Board during your time?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: If I may tell you, it consists of the Deputy Governor in-charge of it – Same structure.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Tell me the amount. Five, six or seven members?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Sir, I am sorry. Actually I need to look at the names.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let us say, maybe five.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: If I may tell you by names – the Deputy Governor –in-charge of the Public Debt Management Department, Assistant Governor, in-charge of the Public Debt management Department, Assistant Governor, in-charge of the Economic Research Department, then, the Director, Department of Economic Research, Superintendant of the Department of Public Debt Management, the Director, Domestic Operations and also the Additional Superintendant of Public Debt Management also comes there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is he a member or -?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Is he a member or comes as an observer?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: He is a member.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Altogether, seven members are there.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you need to get the approval from that Board for the Governor to approve that requirement.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The approval in the sense sometimes if there are going to be some absentees as well.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. But, there must be a quorum. You cannot have one person for approving that.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No, always by majority.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: At least there must be four members.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, then you need to know you are the people who approve that. Then the Board you have to have the names. Then getting the signatures in front of them and approving it. That is the normal method. So, was it practiced right through out?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Now, I bring to your attention regarding the document which this question was asked by the earlier Governor Mr. Nivard Cabraal. Five year – one month; Fourteen Years – 7 months and thirty year Treasury Bonds auction held by 27th February 2014. Are you aware of that auction?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, because I signed the document.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you show me the approval for the Tender Board?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Actually, I knew that you are going to ask me about that question.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How do you know?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: When you mentioned about the five-year one month, then it came to my mind - I saw the Report of the Committee looked into the Bond issue of the Central Bank for 2015. Of course there is a totally misleading –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do not preconceive or imagine the questions.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry about that.

The Chairman: We are not investigating in relation to that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I even did not read that. I just went through the documentation and I got some information that certain auctions have not been approved by the Tender Board. You said that there can be absentees. At that time, majority must approve it. We need to know who are the people who approved that tender at that auction? Then, you need to have the name and the signature.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes. I have a document for that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is all I am asking.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: It is here. May I table it?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes. But, the former Governor said that there is no approval

like that and the signatures of the DG and the AG are enough.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Actually, if I may mention about the process-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, I am not asking about the process. The former Governor was not aware of having Tender Board's approval on this.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The Tender Board's "approval" means, the Tender Board meets, attendance is properly recorded and then in the body of the Tender Board's decision-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the date of that signature?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can I see that document?

These are just signatures. This can be typed and signed anytime. But, where is the recommendation?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The recommendation is on the overleaf where the Superintendent of Public Debt signs, the Chairman of the Tender Committee, Mr. Ananda Silva counter signs and also the Assistant Governor incharge of Public Debt signs and then submit it to the Governor. Again, this has been the practice that had been followed when I-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Did you just scribble all over, on the top and the bottom, and say this is the Tender Board's recommendation?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No. It is-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: There is no Tender Board's recommendation here. The paper that we are questioning-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is just an attendance sheet. The recommendation is not here. You need the Board to recommend certain thing.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Then, they put their signatures under the recommendation.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: These signatures are for their attendance.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: If I may read out that document-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Nothing says that the Tender Board has approved this.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The Tender Board has decided to. It clearly states there. And the Chairman of the Tender Board signs it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: No, it does not say. That is a different page. Here, previously they did it and they all have signed on the back of the same paper.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: It is better to show it to him.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Because, the Tender Board must need a document on top of it to sign.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is the page and on the back, they have all singed, ratified and sent it to the- ඕකේ recommendations දාලා, ඒ පිටුවේ අනෙක් පස ඔක්කෝම අය අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: This was on 27th of February, 2015.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, we are questioning something else.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We are questioning the practice.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The practice is that.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: This is the practice, the new Chairman wanted to adopt. The new Chairman is Mr. Samarasiri. Earlier, the Chairman was Mr. Ananda Silva and that was the then practice.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Practice is to give the attendance list and the recommendations are not ratified by them. Is it?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: See, the Chairman sings the recommendations of the Tender Committee.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But the Tender Board also must sign. For instance, in this Committee, the Chairman's decision must be signed by us.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: If you look at the transactions up to this date, all the Tender Board Meetings, Minutes and attendance sheets, you will see a document similar to what I showed you.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are you trying to say that the Tender Board- We can argue or we can cast out saying that there was no Tender Board Meeting; somebody else like the Head of the Tender Board took the decision: took it straight to the Governor and you just marked an attendance sheet. That is

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all. If that was the practice, did Mr. Samarasiri basically, adopt a more transparent and proper practice? That is how this came into being.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: With due regards to the new process, actually, that was the practice that we had been following and I also used to follow. That had been the practice for all the decades.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The former Governor says that approval is not necessary from the members of the Tender Board, separately. You have not been able to go through his answer. But, his answer is that the DG and AG signing the document is enough for the Tender Board's approval. Because, even this document does not show that- The Tender Board does not even talk about this thing. If the Chairman has a report, we have to sign below on the report. We cannot annex our attendance sheet and say this has been approved by us. It is a total separate thing. There is nothing in this report of the Public Dept Department Treasury Bond Tender Committee Meeting. They have just attended to the meeting.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The decision they took is not there.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That is how the attendance was taken.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct. That is specifically what we are saying. That is how the attendance was taken.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, not the approval.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: The Superintendent signed the document and then on top of it, Mr. Ananda Silva, the Chairman of the Tender Committee has signed.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the thing.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Another member is the-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, the signature is not on behalf of the Tender Committee. There is nothing like that. The DG signs it and then the AG signs it. Those are separate functions.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I am sorry. I really do not know how to answer this question. Because, this is the practice we have been following. And in the body of the recommendation-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, I am putting it to you that it is a wrong practice you have been adopting-

The Chairman: Is that the format you use?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: That is the format we have been following and this was subject to the audit and external audit. Nobody was questioned about it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying. Nobody has questioned. Just because somebody does not question, that does not become right. What I am saying is, there is no mention of the Tender Board approving on the signatures. On this document, there must be a line to say, "The Tender Board makes this recommendation" It is just a minute on top. That is all. Then the Board signs. You answered correctly. This is Public Dept Department Treasury Bond Tender Committee Meeting in the morning. These are signatures taken in the morning. That is it. The signatures of the members of the Tender Board are there. For instance, we are in this Committee. That does not mean that we agree with the Chairman on every decision he takes. It is attendance that we mark. He and all of us as Members mark our attendance. That does not mean that we have approved what the Chairman says. When he makes a recommendation, we must sign stating, "The Chairman made a recommendation and the Board/ the Committee/ the Commission approved it". We also sign below it. Here, as you say, are the signatures of Public Debt Department Treasury Bond Tender Committee Meeting's attendance list.

The Chairman: If you disagree, then you mention it and sign.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. This is an attendance list. You sign this when you come in the morning not once you take the decision. The very adamant former Governor says that you do not need the Tender Board to sign and the signatures of the DG and AG are enough. It is contradictory to- Do you agree that members must sign the Tender Board decision if they decide-

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Members have signed and then-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, they have not signed. Do not contradict it now. Earlier, you said they have signed the attendance.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: It is the attendance of the members of the Tender Committee. We have mentioned that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct. That is attendance.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is only the attendance not the approval. Attendance and approval are two different things. When you walk in, you sign attendance sheet.

The Chairman: It should be "the recommendation" not "the approval".

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, it should be recommendation.

The Chairman: Approval is given by the Governor.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes. A recommendation must be stated like we recommend this, this and so forth and the explanation must be given. Then, they must sign below. Do you know why it is contradictory? Because, the former Governor says this is not necessary just because that is not there.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I cannot explain as to what the former Governor meant was. But, I can tell you what the practice was. If I may have that document back, I can tell you as to what we have stated there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you have the original document of this?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I do not have that because I am not in the Public Debt Department now.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You were there when this was-

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes, the original document must be there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Hon. Chairman, can you submit us how to get the original of this? Because, we do not have certain signatures.

Mr. J.R. Gajaweera Arachchige: They can send it through somebody to the Committee tomorrow.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you send the original document to the Committee?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: He is not more there. So we have to make an arrangement.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I would request. But if the Committee makes that request, that would be better because we are in two different lines.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We will do that.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Hon. Chairman, will you permit me to read out what we have stated in this document?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Here, we say, "Considering the above situation in the market, the Treasury Bond Tender Board decided to accept Rs. Rs. 1,755 million from the 10.60% 2019'A' bond series, Rs. 2,200 million from the 13.00% 2028'A' bond series and Rs. 1,000 million from the 13.50% 2044'B' bond series from the market. The press release with details is annexed. Submitted for your approval and information pls." Superintendent of Public Debt, the Chairman of the Tender Committee and another member of the Tender Committee sign.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Now you see, the Press release with details is annexed.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That they say. Is there any wording to say that the signatures of the approval of the Tender Board is annexed in this document to show that –

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No, in this document there is no mentioning.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There is no mention of the next document.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Actually, I may not be the appropriate person to question about this thing. I would request you to question the Chairman of the Tender Board. He is the person who is responsible for delivering the terms of reference. This has been the practice they have been following for decades.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You cannot practice a wrong –

The Chairman: He is only one Member.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes. His answer is correct. But he is answering. He is answering that this is the practice which they have been adopting. So I am saying, if you continue a wrong practice that does not make it right.

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: I do agree, Sir. Sir. basically this is a learning process.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know you are not responsible and you cannot answer that.

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You are only the Department Head of the Public Debt Department. So this is not your document. This is actually the Tender Board –

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Basically this is a Tender Board document.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Chairman is responsible for this?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Now, we wanted to clarify certain things because we were not sure of certain issues. One more question to you. You were in charge of the Public Debt Department?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you given responsibilities of marketing also?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: No, Sir. Basically I was the Head of the Department. So my responsibility was to make sure that the Department's activities goes through smoothly. As I mentioned earlier, we had five different divisions in the Department. The fund raising activities were looked after or carried out by the Front Office with the supervision of an additional superintendent and the Head of Front Office as well. Whatever activities conducted by the Front Office were processed by the Back Office. All the activities were subjected to the scrutiny of the middle office. Middle Office is a risk management function. So we had adequate, what you call the division of work, and internal control. I as the Superintendent of Public Debt did not get involved in any of these transactions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What transactions?

Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara: Direct placements, for example. They call the dealers, they know the rates they need to be dealt at and then transactions were concluded. At the end of the day, Front Office comes up with a report of all the transactions they have conducted during the day and then submit through the Additional Governor in charge of Public Debt to the Tender Committee Chairman for his information and signature. Individual transactions were placed before the Domestic Debt Management Committee. About a week later of the month we send up a report again for the information of the Governor as to what the direct placements and all the other activities conducted during the previous month. That is how it works.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Witness withdrew

Ms. L.S. Fernando, Manager, Public Debt Department, Sri Lanka Central Bank was called in.

Ms. L.S. Fernando, Manager, Public Debt Department, Sri Lanka Central Bank affirmed and examined.

The Chairman: Please introduce yourself for recording purpose.

Ms. L.S. Fernando: I am the manager at the Public Debt Department working for the Middle Office at the moment. I have been with the Bank for the last five years. I have been working at the Public Debt Department right throughout.

The Chairman: You continued to work there or what?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: I started at the Public Debt Department and I am still at the Public Debt Department.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: You were in the front office?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: I was at the Front Office but now I am working in Middle Office.

At this stage a recording was played.

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සභාපතිතුමා: කාගේද?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes, that was me.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහා පැත්තෙන් කථා කළේ කවුද?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Mr. Dharmapala

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ධර්මපාල මහතා කියලා කියන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එකේ Chief Dealer?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කථා කළේ වෙනත් දෙයකට නේද?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes, regarding the SLDB Paying Agent Agreement.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, he started talking about this. Is it?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, from what I understand, you were just accommodating his conversation and then just trying to –

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes, I did not particularly call for this because there was an SLDB issue and I was talking about the Paying Agent Agreement.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It was you called him and not that he called you. Is it?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes, not that he called; I called him for something else.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, to my understanding - I help you to start - it was just like you were doing a PR thing, just agreed with him and talking to him. What exactly did you do? Did you participate in this conversation or was it just like damage control එකක් ද කළේ? මොකක්ද කළේ?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: No, it was like a complete shock to the market. So, I was just trying to justify, as you know, actually what happened rather than making him believe that it was an irrational decision. So, when he started talking, I just gave him the real picture of it. It was not really trying to do damage in that sense. I was trying to convince him as to what happened because he was really worried because his bid was the least bid in the auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, how could you all have made this money if not through the auction? What is the other way? How much did you all make by that time?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Three point five, we had already raised.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, how many days did it take for you all to make that 3.5?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: That was on Thursday, if I am not wrong. The auction was on Friday. Three point five was raised on Thursday. So, as a practice, usually we go for direct placements once the auction is over. So, that was the plan actually. Once the auction is over, if there is a shortfall for us to go for direct placements -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, if you had no time for direct placements -

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Not really. We had Friday. After the auction we had time and on Monday also because the settlement did not go early in the morning per se. So, we had time till 12.00 – 12.30 maybe. So, we could have gone for it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You all are governed by the manual. Is it?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, the manual states – we asked this question earlier also – "FO has to make arrangements to meet financial needs as much as possible through auctions." So, that is the mechanism. You all are used to that private placement method –

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Direct placements.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: - direct placement method but the normal norm must be through auctions. Is it?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes, Sir, but if the rates are not conducive and if it is –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This does not talk about rates. You all are governed by the manual. So, you all are not there to decide the way you want. You all are not experts in - This manual has also been made by you all. Is it?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes.

The Chairman: She is not a senior officer.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, we need not ask any question from her about this conversation. But, she gives the opinion of the Department. So, I am trying to ask her as to how could they make this money. She is giving the opinion on this.

Ms. L.S. Fernando: The thing is, I do not sit at the decision-making process.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you not?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: No, I do not sit at the decision-making process.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You just gave your opinion on this conversation. Is it?

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes, I was just giving my opinion. I do not sit at the decision-making process. Sir, whatever is asked from me, I do it. If they want me to raise it from direct placements, I raise it from direct placements. If they want to do an auction – I do not even sit to make the initial departmental recommendation. I just implement whatever the decision given to me. On that day also they asked me to prepare the report for 2.7. I prepared the report for 2.7. I do not even sit at the department-level decision-making.

Edited

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, if the method is the auction which is being stipulated by the Public Debt Department Operation Manual and since there is a policy decision by the Government to go for auctions, you have to do that.

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Yes.

The Chairman: Okay, thank you.

Ms. L.S. Fernando: Thank you.

(The witness withdrew)

(The Committee was suspended for lunch.)

Unedited

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ පරීක්ෂා කිරීම සඳහා වන විශේෂ අනුකාරක සභාව

2015 ජුනි මස 17 වැනි බදාදා (සවස්වරුව)

පැමිණ සිටි :

ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය
ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු එම්.ටී. හසන් අලී මහතා

ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක සේවා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි :

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, වැඩ බලන විගණකාධිපති.
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව.
ඊ.ඒ.එන්.ජී. එදිරිසිංහ මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව.
ඊ.එම්.කේ.එම්. පද්මලාල් මහතා, විගණන අධිකාරි, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;

මේ අවස්ථාවේදී සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර් ජනරාල් ඩී.එන්.ආර්.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා සාක්ෂි දීම සඳහා කැඳවන ලදී.

සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර් ජනරාල් ඩී.එන්.ආර්.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා; ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කරුණාකරලා මුලින්ම හැඳින්වීමක් කරන්න ඔබතුමාගේ තනතුර සහ නම මොකක්ද කියලා?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මම ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන. සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර් ජනරාල් වශයෙන් රාජකාරිය ඉටු කරනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා අපි ඉල්ලපු තොරතුරු ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවා. කිහිප සැරයක් තොරතුරු දීම නිසා මේකේ අපිට පොඩි ගැටලුකාරී තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා අද කැඳවුවේ මේ පිළිබඳව හරියටම විස්තර කර ගෙන මේ තොරතුරු තහවුරු කර ගන්නයි. කරුණාකරලා ඔබතුමාගේ ළඟ තිබෙන ඒවා table කරන්න. ඔබතුමා මෙන්න මේ තහවුරුව අපිට දෙන්න ඕනෑ. Perpetual Treasuries Private Ltd කියන company එක පටන් ගන්න කොට Director Board එකේ ඉන්නවා, ඒ කියන්නේ incorporate කරන කොට 2012.09.20 ඉඳලා ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්, අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස් කියන දෙදෙනා තමයි Director Board එකේ හිටියේ. ඒ company එකේ shareholding company එක තමයි Perpetual Asset Management Private Ltd කියලා කියන්නේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ Director Board එකේ හිටියා ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස්, ජෙෆ්රි ඇන්ටන් ඇලෝසියස් කියන දෙදෙනා. මම මේ කියන්නේ holding company එක ගැන. ඊට පස්සේ මේක යම් යම් වෙනස්කම්වලට භාජනය වෙලා Director Board එක වෙනස් වුණා. අලුත් අය පැමිණියා. සමහර අය ඉවත් වුණා. Company එක merge වුණා. ඊට පස්සේ නැවත නම් වෙනස් වුණා. එතකොට අවසානයට මේ holding company එකේ අද තිබෙන නම තමයි Perpetual Capital Private Ltd.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: .නැහැ ඒක Perpetual Capital Holdings Private Ltd.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ Perpetual Capital Private Ltd කියන එක නැති වුණාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒකේ name එක change වුණා. නම වෙනස් වුණා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා දීලා තිබෙන එකේ Perpetual Capital Private Ltd කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ අවසානයේදී Perpetual Capital Private Ltd. නමයි තිබෙන්නේ. දැන් ඔබතුමා මේ දීලා තිබෙන එකට අනුව Perpetual Capital Private Ltd from 06.02.2015 ඉඳලා to 16.02.2015 හරිද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Perpetual Capital Private Ltd කියලා අලුත්ම company එකක් incorporate කරලා තිබෙනවා -

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: New company was incorporated on 8.02.2015.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: 18.02.2015 එතකොට අර share holding company එකත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධයක් නැහැ. මේක අලුතින්ම register කරපු company එකක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. එතකොට ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට මේ කියන Perpetual Treasuries Private Ltd කියන company එකේ shareholder කලින් හිටුණේ Perpetual Asset Management Private Ltd කියන එක. එතකොට

Uncorrected

ඒක continue වෙලා අද තිබෙන තත්ත්වය කියන්න?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Perpetual Asset Management Private Ltd කියන එක amalgamate වුණා. Perpetual Capital Private Ltd එකත් එක්ක.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හරි.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: එතකොට Perpetual Capital Private Ltd කියන එකේ name change එකක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා 2014.12.31 වැනිදා Perpetual Capital Holdings Private Ltd කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, දැන් ඔබතුමා කියනවා මෙතැන Perpetual Asset Management Private Ltd එක merge වුණා Perpetual Capital Private Ltd කියන එකත් එක්ක කියලා. ඒ වුණේ 2014.08.08 වැනිදා.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. 2014.08.08 දින.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට මේකෙන් Perpetual Asset Management Private Ltd කියන එක strike off කළා. එතකොට ඒක 2014.09.13 වැනිදා වුණේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ ඉතිරි වුණේ Perpetual Capital Private Ltd කියන එක.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට දැන් දිගටම යන්නේ ඒකද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් එතකොට මේකද change වුණේ?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Perpetual Capital Private Ltd කියන එකේ නම වෙනස් කළා. ඒකට "Holding" කියන කොටස ඇතුළත් කරලා Perpetual Capital Holdings Private Ltd නම වෙනස් කළා. ඒක සිද්ධ වුණේ 2014.12.31 වැනිදා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා අපිට දීලා තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව මේ company එක තමයි දැනට ඉතිරි වෙලා තිබෙන හැටියට තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මම එවපු වාර්තාවේ පිටු 4ක් තිබෙනවා. ඒකේ මුල් ලේඛනයත් ඊයේ මම බාර දුන්නා. එතකොට මේකේ නම වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා Perpetual Capital Holdings Private Ltd කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Perpetual Holdings Ltd කියන නම නොවෙයි ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: Perpetual Holdings Private Ltd.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Perpetual Holdings Private Ltd කියන එකක් අපිට දීලා නැහැ.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මේ අන්තිමට තිබෙනවා ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක තමයි අන්තිමට තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් මේක වැරදියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකේ අන්තිම date එක කවදා ද තිබෙන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපිට තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව එතුමා දීලා තිබෙන විධියට new company incorporated නේ. එතකොට ඒ අලුත් company එක මේකට සම්බන්ධයක් නැහැ නේද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, ඒ අන්තිම කොළයේ තමයි ඒක තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා කියලා තිබෙන විධියට දැන් මේ දෙක merge කරලා Perpetual Capital Private Ltd එක register වෙලා තිබෙනවා 10.06.2010 වැනිදා.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. 2010.06.10 වැනිදා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2010.06.10 ඉඳලා දිගටම තිබෙන්නේ ඒ company එකද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒකේ නම වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක Perpetual Capital Private Ltd කියන එක තමයි merge වුණේ Perpetual Asset Management Private Ltd කියන එකත් එක්ක. ඊට පස්සේ ඒක තමයි shareholder විදිහට දිගටම ආවේ. ඒ company එකේ directors ලා ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස් සහ අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝසියස් කියලා. එතකොට ඒකේ shareholders ලා දෙදෙනෙක් ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා. One-one shares අර ගෙන shareholders දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. ඊට අර ගෙන පස්සේ ඒකේ directors ලා change වෙලා තිබෙනවා 2014.01.09 ශිරෝමී නොයෙල් වික්‍රමසිංහ ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

එතකොට Board of Directorsලා විධියට Director Board එකේ තුන්දෙනෙකු ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ තමයි, ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස් සහ ශිරෝමී නොයෙල් වික්‍රමසිංහ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ නම කලින් කිව්වේ නැහැ. එදා ඔය නම සඳහන් වුණේ නැහැ. ශිරෝමී වික්‍රමසිංහ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ශිරෝමී නොයෙල් වික්‍රමසිංහ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Okay. ඒ තුන්දෙනා විතරයි ඉන්නේ නේද? ඇලෝෂියස්ලා දෙදෙනායි; වික්‍රමසිංහයි.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. ඊට පසුව වික්‍රමසිංහ කියන කෙනාත් අයින් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: අයින් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කවදාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: අයින් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව මේ Perpetual Capital (Pvt) Limited කියන එකේ නමත් Perpetual Capital Holdings (Pvt) Limited කියලා වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කවදාද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, 2014.12.31 වැනි දා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: 2014.12.31. ඒ කියන්නේ ගිය අවුරුද්දේ දෙසැම්බර් 31 වැනි දා.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එතකොට ශිරෝමී වික්‍රමසිංහ අයින් වුණා?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඊට පසුව 2015.03.12 වැනි දා ශිරෝමී නොයෙල් වික්‍රමසිංහ අයින් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේ incident එකට පසුව.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. 2015.03.12 නමයි form එක එවා තිබෙන්නේ. එයාගේ resignation එක තිබෙන්නේ -

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමා එදා ඔය නම කිව්වේ නැහැ. මම ගන්නම් බැලුවා, ඔය නම. ඔබතුමා ඔය නම කියන්නේ නැතුව අර දෙදෙනාගේ නම් දෙක විතරයි කිව්වේ, ඔය විස්තර කියා ගෙන යනකොට.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඒක නවත්වා වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න කියලා මට කියපු නිසා -

සභාපතිතුමා: පැහැදිලි නැති හින්දා නේ ඊට පසුව කිව්වේ, වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න කියලා.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ශිරෝමී නොයෙල් වික්‍රමසිංහගේ resignation එක තිබෙන්නේ, 2015.03.09 වැනි දා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අද වන කොට ඉන්නා Director Board එක කියන්න.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අදට?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: අදට ඉන්නේ ඒ දෙදෙනා නමයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට මේක නමයි, Perpetual Treasuries කියන company එකේ shareholding company එක.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට Perpetual Holdings Limited කියන්නේ වෙන company එකක්ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක වෙනම company එකක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එම කොම්පැනිය මේකට සම්බන්ධයක් නැහැ නේද? එය වෙනම incorporate කරපු company එකක්ද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා තහවුරු කරනවා, Perpetual Treasuries Limited කියන Company එකේ shareholding company එක ඔය අන්තිමට කිව්ව Perpetual Capital (Pvt) Limited -

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: නැහැ. Perpetual Capital Holdings (Pvt) Limited.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Perpetual Capital Holdings (Pvt) Limited. ඒකේ අවසාන -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක සඳහන් කර ගන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ, සභාපතිතුමනි. අපිට වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද?

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: Perpetual Capital Holdings (Pvt) Limited.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතකොට 2015.02.27 වැනි දා වෙන කොට Directorලා තුන්දෙනෙකු සිටියා.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්, තුන්දෙනෙකු ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ තුන්දෙනාගේ නම් කියන්න.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස් සහ ශිරෝමී නොයෙල් වික්‍රමසිංහ. ශිරෝමී නොයෙල් වික්‍රමසිංහ අයින් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, 2015.03.09 වැනි දා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හරි. එතකොට අද වෙන කොට දෙදෙනෙකු සිටිනවා නේද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ ඉතුරු වෙලා ඉන්නේ කවුද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස් සහ අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ ඉන්නේ මේ කියන Perpetual Treasuries කියන company එකේද?

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: නැහැ. Perpetual Capital Holdings (Pvt) Limited.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Okay. But, that is the shareholding company. Perpetual Treasuries is the private holding company.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: එතකොට Perpetual Treasuries එකේ Directorලා එදා කිව්වේ - පස්දෙනෙකු ඉන්නවා නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පස්දෙනෙකු ඉඳලා, Arjun Joseph Aloysius has resigned.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: මුලින්ම පටන් ගන්නා අවස්ථාවේදී දෙදෙනෙකු සිටියා. ඒ, ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස් සහ අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්. ඊට පසුව අලුතින් Directorsලා හතරදෙනෙකු appoint වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එම form එක එවා තිබෙන්නේ, 2013.04.08 වැනි දා. කාටර් ඇලෝෂියස්, ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇන්ටන් ඇලෝෂියස්, විතා රන්ජන් හුළුගල්ලේ, පුශ්‍යා මිත්‍ර ගුණවර්ධන. ඒ විධියට අලුතින් හතරදෙනෙකු appoint වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට කලින් හිටපු දෙදෙනාත් එක්ක Director Board එක හයදෙනෙකුගෙන් සමන්විත වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ඊට පසුව form 20 එකෙන් 2013.09.27 වැනි දා අපට දැනුම් දීලා තිබෙනවා, කාටර් ඇලෝෂියස් died on 2013 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ පස්වැනි දා කියලා. එදිනම මුතුරාජා සුරේන්ද්‍රන් කියලා අලුත් අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයෙකු පත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට ඒ අවස්ථාව වෙන කොට Director Board එකේ හය දෙනෙකු සිටිනවා. ඒ තමයි, ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇන්ටන් ඇලෝෂියස්, විතා රන්ජන් හුළුගල්ලේ, පුශ්‍යා මිත්‍ර ගුණවර්ධන සහ මුතුරාජා සුරේන්ද්‍රන්. ඊට පසුව නැවතත් අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන්ගේ වෙනස්වීමක් සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. අර්ජුන් ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස් 2015.01.16 වැනි දා අයින් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව Director Board එකේ පස්දෙනෙකු සිටිනවා. ඒ තමයි, ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, විතා රන්ජන් හුළුගල්ලේ, පුශ්‍යා මිත්‍ර ගුණවර්ධන, මුතුරාජා සුරේන්ද්‍රන් සහ ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇන්ටන් ඇලෝෂියස්. ආයෙත් වෙනස්වීමක් දැනුම් දීලා තිබෙනවා. ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇන්ටන් ඇලෝෂියස් 2015.02.01 වැනි දා resign වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට Director Board එකට ඉතුරු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ හතරදෙනායි. ඒ තමයි, ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, විතා රන්ජන් හුළුගල්ලේ, පුශ්‍යා මිත්‍ර ගුණවර්ධන සහ මුතුරාජා සුරේන්ද්‍රන්. නැවතත් Directorsලාගේ වෙනස්වීමක් 2015.02.20 වැනි දින දැනුම් දීලා තිබෙනවා. එහිදී අජාන් ගාර්දියෙ පුංචිහේවා 2015.02.18 වැනි දින පත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට සිටි Director Board එකේ Directorsලා පස්දෙනෙකු සිටිනවා. ඒ තමයි, ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, විතා රන්ජන් හුළුගල්ලේ, පුශ්‍යා මිත්‍ර ගුණවර්ධන, මුතුරාජා සුරේන්ද්‍රන් සහ අජාන් ගාර්දියෙ පුංචිහේවා. 2015.03.10 වැනි දින form 20 එකෙන් නැවත වෙනස්වීමක් දැනුම් දීලා තිබෙනවා. පුශ්‍යා මිත්‍ර ගුණවර්ධන 2015.03.09 වැනි දා resign වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: ඒ, ශිරෝමි වික්‍රමසිංහ resign වුණු දවසේමද? ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ, ශිරෝමි resign වුණේත් 2015.03.09 වැනි දා කියලායි.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: 2015.03.09 වැනි දින resign වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: දෙදෙනාම එක දවසේ resign වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. එක දවසේ resign වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: Mr. Gunawardhana ගේ full name එක මොකක්ද?

Mr. D.N.R. Siriwardena: Pushya Mitra Gunawardhana.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: අන්තිමට තිබෙන ලේඛන අනුව Directorsලා හතරදෙනෙකු ඉන්නවා. ඒ තමයි, ජෙෆ්රි ජෝශප් ඇලෝෂියස්, විතා රන්ජන් හුළුගල්ලේ, මුතුරාජා සුරේන්ද්‍රන් සහ අජාන් ගාර්දියෙ පුංචිහේවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද, Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt) Limited කියන එක public company එකක් වශයෙන් වෙනස් වුණා.

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ බව මෙම වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ කොහැනද?

ඩී.එන්.ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: පළමුවැනි පිටුවේ මුල් අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන්ගේ නම් සඳහන් වුණාට පසුව "The company status changed from (private) to public, Perpetual Treasuries (Pvt) Limited to Perpetual Treasuries Limited on 15th January, 2013" යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: "The Company status changed.." කියන වාක්‍ය.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරිද?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Okay.

The Chairman: Thank you.

(Witness withdrew.)

(At this stage Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank was called in.)

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank affirmed and examined.

The Chairman: Dr. Weerasinghe, can you make a brief introduction about your present position and your responsibilities for recording purpose?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I am a Deputy Governor, in charge of Economic and Price Stability which means setting interest rates, exchange rates, managing reserves and also economic research and statistics. I have been in the Central Bank for over 24 years. I joined the Central Bank in 1991 as a Staff Officer. Then, I did my Master's Degree and the PhD in the Australian National University in 2000 and came back to the Economic Research Department as an Economist. From that point, I became the Director of Economic Research, the first Chief Economist, and the Assistant Governor. Also, I represented Sri Lanka at the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund in Washington DC as an Alternate Executive Director. In the mean time, I was promoted as a Deputy Governor in 2011. From 2011 up to now, I have been serving as a Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in charge of Economic and Price Stability.

The Chairman: Are you also the in charge of the Fund Department?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: There are key departments coming under my supervision such as Economic Research Department, Statistics, International Operations Department, and Domestic Operations Department. In addition, I am also the in charge of the Human Resources Department, Communication Department and also the Facilities Management Department which is an internal department. Those are my current responsibilities. Earlier, I was also the in charge of the Department of EPF and the Department of IT before this Governor was appointed.

The Chairman: Before the reshuffle, where were you in charge of?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Before the reshuffle, I had all the departments, but my responsibilities were supervising of EPF and IT. But, IT was taken away and it was given to other two Deputy Governors.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do you have a training department in the Central Bank?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Yes. We have a Human Resources Department under which there is a separate training department.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Was there any separate training department before which was merged into the Human Resource Department?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Yes. In fact, when I joined the Central Bank, we had a separate training department. I think in 2007 or 2008, both departments were merged. The training department was also merged under the HR and now, we have one Human Resources Department. But, there is a plan again to have a separate department. The new Governor has proposed to have a separate training department.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, why did they do so? Did they think that the training department was not important? In any bank, they have a training department, especially, the Central Bank should also be having a training department, because when we were doing investigations, we found that people were unable to answer. They did not have a proper training. They did not know about the manuals and they were like that.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I think the reason was, there was a lot of restructuring in the department at that time and the departments those were having similar responsibilities, were put together. Still the staff and the resources allocated to the training department have been kept because every year the Monetary Law provides any amount or resources that have been allocated for the training for the staff. But, in my view, we have been utilizing that and we have been able to train professionals. They join as economists, engineers etc. We recruit people from Mathematics, Engineering, Economics and several other streams. Once they are recruited, they are trained on their own professions like economists, accountants and managers etc.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are you telling us that they are trained on the job?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: They are trained on the job as well as on postgraduate studies and short-term training programmes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who took the decision to merge the training department with the Human Resources?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I think when Mr. Cabral was the Governor, this idea was initiated. Specially, when we take this kind of decisions, we have a Strategic Planning Session to discuss Annual Retreats. Every year, we discuss all the restructuring of the departments at the Retreats. Then, we take the feedback of all the heads of departments and senior management and on those discussions, we debate and decide what to the best form of going forward. As a result, there are some departments that were added and merged. It was a kind of dynamic process. For example, the present Governor is proposing and he has already established a new Legal and Compliance Department and a Risk Management Department. So, depending on the requirements and from time to time, we changed the structure of the overall management structure and the department structure. So, that is how it happens. It is a consultative process; it is not a decision of a single person.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it not better to have a separate department and have separate responsibilities? Then, there will be transparency and efficiency.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: In terms of efficiency, I think human resources training is also a part of human resources. That is why at that time, those two were merged to have one head of department instead of two heads and two additional heads. At the time we did not have number of Grade IV Senior Officers, we had to merge those two and it was placed under one Head of department. Still, all the staffs were in the same department. Basically, I think there are pros and cons also. If we have a separate training department, then it would still be a small department. Even now, if we did not have a separate department, the staff would be around 10 maximum. So, for a ten staff, we need to have a separate head of department, additional or a deputy and then have a separate structure. That is one of the reasons why they thought to have separate departments for HR function management. recruitment and training.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You can have one person for all the departments to get away from that.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: No. My argument is, basically they are not carrying similar functions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know that, but to get away from the Heads of the Departments, Deputy Heads of Departments, you can have everybody under one person.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: No, there is a capacity because there are large departments. For example, the Department of EPF has about more than 200 staffs and Economic Research Department has about 56 – 76 staffs, but that is one focused department.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do you not believe Dr. Weerasinghe that training is an utmost important element in any establishment? If we have to see more competent people- I mean why we are asking this question is when we were investigating, we had to investigate people from the Central Bank. It was pretty evident that even the acting head of the Public Debt Department, Mrs. Muthugala was unable to answer the questions put across by the COPE. They were not competent enough. So, this is the reason why we are asking. I mean if some other heads of departments in the Central Bank cannot answer and if they are not competent enough, there is something radically wrong with their training. Merging the training department with human resources and saying that, "It is the same function and we can run", is some thing that we saw. There were a lot of people. But, we had to question from one officer that was Dr. Azim, because all the others were looking at him to answer, and none of them could. I felt that the competence was the question.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you in favour of the decision from the beginning?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Looking at the people who were basically going to be heading the department, I did not see a problem with the Head of the Human Resources Department and its staff. Basically, instead of having two heads, we are going to have one head, but all the staff including the technical staffs are there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is our problem as to why both the Departments; Human Resources and Training are running under one head when both the Departments are important.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Yes. Both are important.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So then initially also they would have had one department under Human Resources. Would they not have? Even the regulations say that you have to have separate departments even for funding.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Earlier, what we had was called, "Establishment Department". The name was different. Only recruitment and promotion part was handled by that Establishment Department. Training is done separately. When we had human resources, the name was changed and then we had one head who was handling, training, recruitment and promotion all together.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, both happened together; the name change of the Human Resources Department and one head was handling the subjects of training and human resources.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Yes. That is right.

The Chairman: You are a Member of the Tender Board also. Are you not?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I am not a Member of the Tender Board. But, earlier, I had been served as a Member of the Tender Board when I was the Director, Economic Research.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When was that you were serving as a Member of the Tender Board?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: It was from 2007 to 2009. That is 2007, 2008 and part of 2009.

The Chairman: Were you a Member of the Debt Management Committee?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: No. I was not a Member of the Debt Management Committee. As I said, I was a Member of that Tender Board when I was the Director, Economic Research. Sometimes, I used to act as the Head of that Committee also when one of the Deputy Governors was on leave.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I have one question to ask from what I have gathered when we were investigating various department heads or whoever. There was only one official who was constantly answering. So, it looks as if one person is running the whole Bank. It looks funny for us to know that the Central Bank was so ineffective when the officials could not give answers without looking at the other official's face and they are asking us to enquire from one official who was the only one who was competent enough to answer. So, it looks as if the Bank was run by two or three officials.

The Chairman: Even the Head of Department could not answer-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, the Head of Department could not answer anything.

The Chairman: -and he looked for the assistance form his Assistant.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If you are the Head of Human Resources Department-

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: As what I see, what would happen here was basically, rotating officials especially the heads of departments like for example, Public Debt Department. After the present Governor was appointed, he transferred the earlier experienced Official who was heading the Public Debt Department and placed a new official as the Head of that department. She did not have any experience in that area. She was from the EPF. Once, a new official is appointed as head of departments certainly it takes some time to familiar and learn the technicality of the subjects. It does not mean that she is an expert of what she has been doing. She may have basic overall knowledge in economics and finance. But for certain technical matters, it takes some time for them to learn and come up to that level whereas some officials, experts, those who have been there for a long period of time and those who have been working in that particular department in junior level, they basically know from the bottom about all the technicalities because they are familiar with them.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I am not talking about the new Heads. I am talking about the officials who have been there for long period because they have said that they are there for five years, ten years, twenty years or whatever. But, they were not competent enough in answering the questions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Weerasinghe, after one week, by just sitting here, actually we can answer most of your questions about all the departments. So, we expect certain amount of knowledge and competence. It is not that you are appointed from a different department because if you are in the system for about a long period like twenty years, you should definitely know about the subject. You are not appointing a person

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who is sleeping in the streets to this position. Are you not? So, we expect them more awareness and competence because the Chairman and all the Members of the Committee know most of the technicalities of the Bank after about one week. So, we did not see that and that is our problem.

The Chairman: The Director, Economic Research is, of course, very smart. Particularly, we observed that in the management.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, in future, the subjects of training and human resources perhaps too -

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Hon. Member, your point is taken. So, basically, one of the suggestions that new Governor has also proposed-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Something has radically gone wrong. When these officials go abroad for a conference or whatever, they must be able to express themselves freely and effectively.

Okay. Moving from that, are you aware of the Operation Manual of the Public Debt Department?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I have not gone through because I have never been supervised this Department or I have never been in the Department. I am not a Member of the Public Debt Committee too. Because of this issue, I have got a copy of that. I have gone through and understood how it works. But I am not familiar with all the rules and regulations.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you have been a Member of the Tender Board. Have you not?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I was a Member of the Tender Board sometime back, in 2007 to 2009, when I was the Director, Economic Research. During that period, I was also representing the monetary policy in that Committee.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Now according to this Public Debt Department's Operation Manual, "The decision of the Tender Board regarding auctions: The decision of the Tender Board is submitted for the information and approval of the Governor - by STB" It is there in the brief note giving existing market developments.

Even the earlier officials always said that the Tender Board approval is a must. So, the Tender Board approval must come. clearly defining that approval had been given -if the seven Members or out of the seven Members, will say five. It should be a majority. So, it is a majority- Then, they should say who the Members who were present and that paper must be annexed to the decision and send it to the Governor. The Board approval must be there.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Yes, the Tender Board recommendation.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: "The decision of the Tender Board is submitted for the information and approval of the Governor." So, that is the procedure according to the Manual. So, were you aware of that practice when you were the Member?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: When I was a Member of the Tender Board, the practice was that we represent our different clusters, have- this meeting and discuss each other and make a recommendation on the amount that it is going to be taken. Once we make that decision, we sign the attendance sheet and then that Chairman of the Tender Board submits that recommendation to the Governor. Then, the Governor finally approves. That was the practice.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. So, how it works according to the Manual? I draw your attention to the page Number 8: Private and Direct Placements. There it is defining what the private and direct placements are. In that, they say, "FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." So, this recommends that auctions are the way forward and as much as possible it must be way through auction and in 2007, you must be aware of that because it must have been-.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Yes. At that time, you see, subject to that that the overall objective of the Public Debt Department is to raise financing for the Government at least possible cost.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: At the same time, you cannot do what you want to do. You cannot adhere to any method that you can because there are guidelines. These are mandatory guidelines by the Public Debt Department's Operational Manual. According to that you can.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Yes. These are guidelines, but. not necessarily the rules.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes. But, there are court cases which say that guidelines are mandatory.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I have no idea. That is about a legal question.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes. It has been changed in 2008 by the then Governor? Are you aware of that?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: No. The Public Debt Department may know whether that was changed at that time. I did not know that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are not aware.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I am not aware.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: After this particular bond issue, have you made any assessment on this since you are in-charge of Research Division? Have you predicted any market movements?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: As the Deputy Governor in-charge of the economic and price stability, we have mainly been maintaining interest rates and exchange rates. We have been monitoring the movements of market interest rates to see whether that is in line with our policy objectives. I have been monitoring that but not the cost of this thing. It does not come under my purview.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, are you involving in the decision-making process as to how these monies should be made when there is a requirement by the Treasury.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: No. I am not involving in that process.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you are not involving in the bonds-

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: No, I am not. My role is basically involved with the area of economic policy, monetary policy and the exchange rate. The overall objective of the Central Bank is to maintain the economic and price stability, for which there are two key instruments; the interest rates and the exchange rates. So, we will have to make sure that all interest rates, market rates are in line with our overall monetary policy objective. That is why the Director, Economic Research is sitting on that Tender Committee to make sure that his view is also taken into consideration when they make a decision on interest rates.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are you now focusing on local manufacturing for the future direct economic policy?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Basically from the Central Bank's point of view what we are trying to manage by using interest rates is to meet the aggregate demand of the economy which is divided into two: domestic demand and external demand. So, considering domestic demand it involves in domestic manufacturing, services and agriculture. That is also one of our responsibilities to-

The Hon. Sujeeewa Senasinghe: We see a stagnant economy and a stagnant financial situation actually. Land prices are not moving, considering interest rates and I do not how it works. So, what is your idea of the future?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: What I see right now, in my opinion, is there is certain uncertainty. Because of some investors, people are not taking new decisions on investments. They are waiting until elections are over and until the adoption of new investment policies. That is why there is some slowdown in the economy this year. But, I think, it is temporary and once it is established people will start moving back to normal business.

The Chairman: Okay, then. Thank you very much.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Thank you.

(Witness withdrew.)

At this state, Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius of Free Lanka Trading Company Private Limited, was called in.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius of Free Lanka Trading Company Private Limited, sworn and examined.

The Chairman: Mr. Aloysius, I would like you to tell us about the companies that you all own and the general idea of those.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: We have a group of companies which expands from the plantation industry to the granite industry including financial services comprising of treasuries, equities and certain other investments around the financial services foray. We are also into the liquor business, we own a company called, W M Mendis & company and we have duty-free businesses around the airports and in the Colombo Port. Those are the main businesses, Sir.

The Chairman: What company is dealing with bonds and bills?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: It is a subsidiary of the holding company which goes by the Perpetual Treasuries Limited.

The Chairman: Were you one of the directors?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: He worked as a Director for the Perpetual Treasuries Limited.

The Chairman: What is your present position in the company?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Officially, I have no present position in Perpetual Treasuries Limited. I resigned from the Board of that on the 16th of January, 2015 and ever since I resigned, I have had no official role in the activities of Perpetual Treasuries Limited.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Why did you resign from that, Mr. Aloysius?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Madam, I resigned from the company with the intention of good governance because the story was outing about that my father-in-law was to take up the position of the Governor of the Central Bank. Had he taken that position, I think, it was in good faith and that I should not operationally be involved in a company of that nature and if not, it is clearly a conflict of interest. So, on that note, I resigned.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When did your father-in-law become the Governor of the Central Bank?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: If I am not mistaken, I think it was at the end of January.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you not advise other Directors also that they must be careful with the conflict of interest when they invest on bonds or with whatever other activities in which the Central Bank is involved.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Sir, my parting words at the farewell when I am going to resign were, "What I have been always stressing upon from the inception is that they basically invest within the guidelines of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and that is what should be followed with all intentions and purposes." That was always a practice of Perpetual Treasuries from the time that we began operations.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, if you had been there with those partying words, it would have been ideal. If you had practised that in your stay, you need not have to be resigned.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes, but I thought it would be best if I resign because of the conflict of interest and that it was the right thing to do at that time because had I been involved, I would have been definitely involved in operational activities. When I was the CEO formally, I got involved in quite a bit of operational activities. So, I thought it would be best, since people who have linked our relationship, and it was a tough decision to get resigned, but that is why I took that decision.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you not able to convince them overall not to get involved in the issue of the Central Bank although the rest of is actually the family members or whoever?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Sir, the activities of Perpetual Treasuries is mandatory to invest in auctions and if the Perpetual Treasuries did not invest in auction then, they would have lost their licence. That is something, Perpetual Treasuries, being part of the core activities of that particular organization, needed to participate in the auctions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, they could have actually held on to that 10 per cent?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Perpetual Treasuries had almost given a bid for Rs. 13 billion. The problem is that the bulk has gone to the Perpetual Treasuries and that is the whole problem here – the conflict of interest. Even though you were not there your name has been linked.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Actually. Just to ask a question, prior to my resignation, I actually held the post as the Chief Executive Officer for Perpetual Treasuries for little over a year and we were very aggressive in the market from the time that we got our licence. It so happened that our six-month results was in terms of profitability we were the No. 2 and that was a great achievement for a company that was started and this was well before my father-in-law took the position as Governor.

Before the last Presidential Election, we decided to divest our entire portfolio and the reason for doing that was because we wanted to exit the portfolio. We thought that there would be uncertainties, and in the bond industry uncertainties have a big role to play with fluctuations. So, we exited the portfolio and I would say almost 100 per cent is in big opportunities and we were in cash. So, after my resignation, the new CEO who took over he was the second in command when I was the Chief Executive Officer.

The Hon. Sujeewas Senasinghe: What is his name?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Mr. Kasun Palihena. He was also a very aggressive individual. Being in cash, we knew very well that there would be an upward movement. Why I say this is because at that time, the corresponding period of the last year - from January to March, there was usually a substantial amount of borrowings which the Government participates in.

So, at this particular period, there is a movement every year. There is a chart here which basically states that on 16th of January 2014, the five year maturity was trading at 9.25 per cent and the seven year maturity was trading at 9.75 per cent. Within a period of almost four or six months, that number at five year maturity numbered to right down to 7.75 per cent with a seven year maturity being about 7.90 per cent. So, there was a very clear indication and this has been the past practice and the rates do come down after the first quarter.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, what did your study show you? What was the trend during January and February 2015?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: When I probed into this matter in 2015 also and the reason I had to ask information of this because I was made a respondent at the hearing of the Supreme Court. So, it was only prudent that being a respondent at the Supreme Court hearing, I had to go through the subject thoroughly. When we requested why they bid such a large position, one was an obvious factor that since it was a corresponding a period of year 2015 rates would spiral. The second reason that they gave me, which I think is a very valid point, is that the borrowings that the Sri Lankan Government undertook during that particular period, if you take the repayments, we had 212 billion of repayment which was only in rupee bonds. We have close to a 500 million dollar sovereign bond repayment. Usually, what happens is if you take the previous year at the time I was the CEO of the company, there was almost a million dollar bond issue that was raised if I am not mistaken.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is one billion.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes. That was in 2014. That bond issue was raised to further repay the previous bonds. Here, there was no indication.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That was a dollar bond. That is not a rupee bond.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That was in 2014. It is a dollar bond, a sovereign bond. In 2015, there was no clear indication that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka was going for any bond and there was no announcement. So, if that was not in place, if that bond was not raised, then this 500 billion dollar which is equivalent to 69 billion in Sri Lankan Rupees would have had to be paid by local borrowings and with 212 billion plus 69 billion which is close to about the Rs. 300 billion, with no indication of a sovereign bond, that is probably the only rationale for my team to have invested such a large amount.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I think that was quite clearly explained by Mr. Kasun Palisena when he was here. You were talking about ethics as to why you stepped down because you heard that the father-in-law was going to be the Governor of the Central Bank. In your Perpetual Capital Holdings Limited.

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there were only two directors, Mr. Geoffrey Joseph Aloysisus, yourself and Mrs. Shiromi Wickramasinghe who was the sister of the then Governor of the Central Bank, Mr. Ajith Nivard Cabraal. Did you not think that was very unethical since you are talking of values, ethics or whatever? Was that not an unethical situation? Did you not advise her, maybe you should not in this position and under what condition, did she get into your Board?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Hon. Member, that was a very good question that you posed. At the age of 26, I was appointed to the Board of the Housing Development Finance Corporation.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who was the Chairman?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: The Chairperson was Mrs. Shiromi Wickramasinghe. I think I was the youngest Board Member to be a representative at that time to be representative of a bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How did she appoint you?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: In which year?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That was in 2011/2012. What happened was I bought fifteen percent of HDFC.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you friends?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely, not. I bought 15 percent of the Housing Development Finance Corporation because at that time, we were in the equities market and I believed that HDFC had a very good standing in terms of its Price-To-Book value and its Price- Earnings Ratio which are the two calculators of buying into a stock. I also believed that the HDFC was a brilliant bank because it was partly owned by the Government of Sri Lanka and with Sri Lanka's intention of moving to one million houses bracket, that this bank will partake in housing facilities because it is was a specialized bank that only dealt in housing-related loans, whether it be roofing or whatever it maybe. It is a specialized bank in that. So, on that 15 percent, I requested for a board-ship and I was duly granted that board-ship by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka on fit and proper. During the relationship with the HDFC, I felt that she was a good Chairperson and that she is specialized in HR-related matters. So, I invited her. Since Perpetual Capital Holdings Limited was a relatively new company, I wanted to form up to the board. I basically requested that she comes on to the Board of Perpetual Capital Holdings Limited. That was not because she was the then Governor's sister or not because of anything else but because I thought while she was the Chairperson and I was one of many other directors that there was a certain level I could relate to her.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, did you not think that was conflict of interest because you were dealing, obviously, when you were an aggressive dealer as far as the bonds and bonds market is concerned, to have on the Board? I mean there are so many capable, qualified people to be on your Board, not Mrs. Shiromi Wickramasinghe. This baffles me a little bit.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: As a person who relies on ethics and-

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Had I invited her to Board of the Perpetual Treasuries Limited, that would have been a conflict of interest. But, since I invited her to the Board of the Perpetual Capital Holdings Limited-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, that was the main Board.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: The Board of the Perpetual Capital Holdings Limited is the board of many other organizations which involved in food beverage, travel retail, financial services and management of plantations and certain other businesses. That is the reason I wanted her to go for the main Board; that is just to help me and to basically add a level of character in terms of recruitments and so on and so forth. But, had she been on the Board of the Perpetual Treasuries Limited, yes I would agree with you, Hon. Member that it is conflict of interest.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay, tell me then, if that was the reason or let us say that it was normal because she was on the main Board, why did she resign on 09th of March, 2015 after this very controversial bond issue.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: You know that surprised me as well. But, she did mention to me that she was going to resign. I think that is because of two reasons. One is that she was talking about resignation for some time and the second is when this bond issue did blow up since she was the sister of the former Governor. that she did it. I mean this is the only reason I

would have thought and I do not want to go into a greater deal because individuals' preferences as to whether they want to be part of a Board or whether they want to step down on that particular moment.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: But, when I questioned the former Governor, Mr. Cabraal, he said that you were a good client of HDFC or whatever the Housing Bank and that you had a good relationship with Mrs. Wickramasinghe. That is probably the reason you invited her to be on the Board. So, vice versa she invited you to be on her Board and you invited her to be on your Board. This scenario looks and sounds a bit strange because you were specifically dealing with the Central Bank. I would say that your main business is Perpetual Treasuries Limited.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. I would not agree.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you state the income statements of-

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely, I think if you take the main revenue generator of the group, it comes from the W.M. Mendis and Company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How much is that? What was the revenue or the profit?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: It was about Rs. 7 billion in last year. This year we forecast of going maybe doing about Rs. 18 to Rs. 20 billion. That is definitely the co-business. Very honestly, Sir, we went into the Perpetual Treasuries Limited for two reasons. One is we believed that the bond market in Sri Lanka will progress and it will mature. If Sri Lanka wanted to get into the position that Sri Lanka requires to get into, only the government bank borrowings would not suffice and we will probably have to go in for more corporate borrowings and corporate bonds. That is a broad basis, Sir. That was one reason. The second reason is to more efficiently manage high cash-flow generating businesses because when you have a treasury organization what does is, apart from trading profits, it also gives you a certain level of discipline in terms of cash flow management and in terms of treasury management. That is the reason.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: At any time, did Perpetual Treasuries Limited got involved in EPF and ETF managed by the Central Bank?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Well. I cannot comment on that because the Perpetual Treasuries Limited traded with many funds. It would not only be with EPF, ETF, but, there would be many funds which could be Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation; it could have been Ceylinco Insurance Company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, EPF and ETF are two of the main funds in the market. You know that.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They have a huge influence on the market. Was that also involved in EPF and ETF?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I can answer it at the time I was the Chief Executive Officer. At the time I was the Chief Executive Officer, yes, the PPF and EPF were major players. Because if you take the bond market in Sri Lanka, we are talking about, maybe over four or four and half-trillion market of which if you take the Employees' Provident Fund's portfolio, it is close to 1.2 to 1.3 trillion or maybe little more than that.

And 90 per cent of that is Government Securities. On a note of your being the largest fund, they are very much involved in Government securities. It is not only the EPF. There are other -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is where the question arises, your appointing Mrs. Wickremasinghe as one of your directors.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And Mr. Cabral being the Governor.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I can remember there was a lot of speculation. I heard your name also with this EPF, ETF, Mr. Cabral and his sister. Did you not think that you should not appoint since you said that you thought about ethics? You thought it is a conflict of interest. Did you not have an idea that you are making a mistake when it comes to conflict of interest appointing the then Governor's sister to your Board when you deal so much with the EPF, ETF bonds? Did you realize that it is a total conflict of interest?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I will come back to that question. Just to answer the question Mr. Nivard Cabral stated that I was a good customer of HDFC. I was not a customer of HDFC. We were a shareholder of HDFC.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He said they were good friends with Aloysius.

That is how the appointment may have been done.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. Absolutely not. It was done purely through professionalism. My appointment to the HDFC Board was purely because we were a significant shareholder with 15 per cent shares.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You mean to say in this country, out of 22 million people you found only Mrs. Wickremasinghe to be appointed as the Director when Mr. Cabral was the Governor of the Central Bank?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: It sounds a little vague. But the honesty is that when I was on the Board I did develop a relationship with her.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So you did develop a relationship?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Professional relationship, after I was appointed to the Board of Housing Development Financial Corporation.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Aloysius, did you know Mr. Cabral?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No, I did not know. I know of Mr. Nivard Cabral.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Have you been to his house at any point?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Have you met him socially?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I have met him socially at cocktail functions. I have met him.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Did he know that his sister is in your company and that she was a director, the only director apart from your father and you?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I would not know whether he knew.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did he know you?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So then, how do you meet him at functions?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. I know of Mr. Nivard Cabral because he was the then Governor of the Central Bank and when we were at functions I would have -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Did he attend your wedding?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes, he did.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: On whose invitation?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Madam, I cannot tell you because I do not know on whose invitation because there were many people who attended my wedding.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is your wedding.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: But, the Sri Lankan culture is that parents and in-laws do the invitation. They are supposed to -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can I say that your father invited him because your father is also a member of the Board?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I cannot say whether my father invited him or not, but, yes he was at my wedding and I honestly do not know who invited him. But he was at the wedding and he was one of many invitees at the wedding.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We are just basically investigating these just in case -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did he say, "I have seen you in cocktail parties" at the wedding?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I do not think he would see me because I was-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You mean to say that he did not know who you are at all.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Well-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is not what we have heard. That is what I want to clear. Feel free to say. There is no crime in that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is a very small society

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is difficult for us to understand that you did not know him because his sister sat on the Board and your relationship with Ms. Wickremasinghe, the sister for such a long time and you being such a vibrant businessmen.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And the Governor not knowing you is bit of a-

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: With all humility, Sir, on that note, yes, I was say, "vibrant"., I was a vibrant businessman and I did appear in many of the media articles. He obviously, probably knew of me on that note. But I cannot tell you-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are you telling me that you were not even acquainted with Mr. Cabral?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. Absolutely not. I have no relationship with Mr. Nivard Cabral at all. Again, I have met him a few times in cocktail parties. I have not been to his house.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Have you met him at Ms. Shiromi Wickramasinghe's house?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. I do not know where Ms. Shiromi Wickramasinghe even lives. So, that is not true at all.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How come you do not know where she lives if she has been a close friend of yours and she has been on the Board? Do you not even send a letter?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: We have met each other at Board meetings many times. She has come to-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Was she on the Board for convenience?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: She was on the Board to -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Because she was Mr. Nivard Cabral's sister?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I would not say that because she did not get involved in any of the Treasury related matters. She was actually on the Board and to add to that last year and half ago I firmed up my HR Division and my Audit Division. She was at the interview process. She was one of the people who helped me choose my head of Audit Division and my head of HR. Just to add to that she also recommended a strategic planner who did the HDFC strategic plan as well, Anuji Consultants. He was very professional.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How long was she on the Board?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I would say probably about a year.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: From 2013 to 2015. You have been a primary dealer for that long. From the records here, she was on your board from 2013 to 2015.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You associated her closely during this period?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Professionally. But that does not mean that I know where she lives.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is why I am baffled that you do not know where your Board Director lives.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is questionable.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Okay.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Aloysius, when did you get married to the Governor's daughter?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: On 28th of October, 2012.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is the time when you actually getting your primary dealer status. On October, 2012 Mr. Nivard Cabral was at your wedding.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Right.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, he knew whose wedding he was coming to and you knew who you were inviting for the wedding.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Okay.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You have been in the bond market. When we look at the charts we can see how much you gained or whatever between 2013 and 2014 actually.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay, you had good acquaintance. I do not know what you may call it and I do not know how to word it. You knew Mr. Cabral and Mr. Cabral knew you and he attended your wedding. So, you cannot say that you did not know him and he is just an acquaintance and he accidentally came to your wedding.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Madam, with all due respect, as I mentioned earlier I know of Mr. Cabral, but I do not know him to the level that people are-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Now you do not want to know him or what?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I did not know him. Also when you said profitability, one amongst the many primary dealers who had windfall profits that calendar year.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We do not have a problem you making profits. Actually, we compliment you making profits. But the only problem was that Mr. Cabral- This country has actually forgotten conflict of interest, the value of conflict of interest. When the Governor is there, the Governor's sister is in your company and then there are - There are

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so many issues at the moment that we have to clarify. So, as you say if you had stayed in the Board you might come and say now, "I have the right to stay in the Board and my father-in-law can do what he wants to do." You could have said that.

We appreciate that you have resigned.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, we really appreciate that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the thing you should do. We would have appreciated you more if you had told your Aloysius's, your uncles or whoever, not to get involved in the Central Bank businesses. That would have been ideal when it comes to conflict of interest because there is an issue. As you are a person who believes in ethics, we only want to know, did you not ever feel that having Mr. Cabral's sister in your Board is a conflict of interest?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And that it is unethical.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: To answer that, HDFC never partook in any of the fixed income trading. They did not do any fixed income trading. So, coming back to that point, Mrs. Wickremasinghe did not have any idea about financial-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: She need not have any ideas. You only have to have some President's brother sitting there. He does not need to have-

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I agree, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In this part of the world, you just need to have them seated there. They have to warm the chair. That is all. The rest will happen.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I agree with you.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In this part of the world, that is how things happen.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And one phone call, things move.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You just sell the brand. Nepotism happens like that. They do not do much. They actually have no intelligence to go through the businesses. What they do is they appoint the person there and the rest flows. So, did you not ever think that, as you said to us, that you thought that it is unethical, it is not the right thing for you to sit on the Board which is the right thing you did. Otherwise, you would have had so many problems being in the Board. So, did you not think that the Governor - There were a lot of issues about the then Governor also. You know that. The Greece Bond issue, EPF, ETF issue.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, with all that did you not think that it is fit for her not to be in the Board and did you not even make a recommendation, a letter saying that, " I suggest that you would resign from this position because of this reason".

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Sir, at the time, it was I who invited her to come on to the Board and as I mentioned the reason she came to the Board was because I was on the HDFC Board. I was on the HDFC Board because we acquired 15 per cent of the company, and on that note I was duly elected.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Was that not enough for you to be on that Board and continue your businesses rather than inviting the Governor's sister to-

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: It did not strike me -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: One would say that because it is profitable to have on your Board since the Central Bank Governor is the brother of the lady whom we are talking about. It is profitable. How many other Boards are you on Mr. Aloysius? Can you tell us? Are you on any other bank Boards?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Only on HDFC. That also I resigned last year.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why did you resign?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Because of other responsibilities as I am on many of our group company Boards. I did not have time to actually go for the Board meetings. So, I did resign and we nominated one of our other group directors to the Board of the HDFC.

When it comes to Mrs. Wickremasinghe, she is also on the Board of many other companies including HNB Assurance.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is a separate part. That is a separate part that we have to deal with Mrs. Wickremasinghe. We are only asking your involvement with Mrs. Wickremasinghe. She being a director elsewhere is her problem and it is up to us to ask how she had been a member and the Governor. We are only asking you, you spoke about ethics and you spoke about values, why did you get the Central Bank Governor's sister

to your Board? You say that you are very aggressive and you grew from zero to Rs. 11 billion. Is that right? When you liquidated it was about Rs. 11 billion.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. At the time of liquidation we were close to a billion

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Kasun Palisena said it is Rs. 11 billion

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is the total value of the portfolio. Rs. 11 billion with leverage. But our net equity we are close to about a billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You brought it down to Rs. 1 billion.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then you became the second?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is our problem. Our issue is that. You have been in that with the Governor's sister being in your Board.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: On the main Board. But I can vouch, I am under oath that she had absolutely nothing to do with any information -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We are not interested whether she had any information or whatever. I just want to know what is a criterion for one to become a primary dealer.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: You need to have a stated capital of Rs. 300 million.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who approves the status of primary dealer?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If one would say that you got the Governor's sister on the Board because you wanted to get this status in 2013 because she is sitting I think from 2013 onwards and of course you had the money like you said you have a portfolio of the company that you mentioned and may be this is one of the objectives of getting Mrs. Wickremasinghe on the Board?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. That was not the case at all. That was certainly not the case. As I mentioned, we got into the primary dealer business because we wanted to effectively run our Treasury management because we were in cash flow generating businesses. That is the reason. Actually since you asked I can also show the level of documentation that had to go to and fro of the Public Debt Department of the Central Bank. I have all those documentation in office. It was not a favour that was granted to us. We followed the due process.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: To put it slight differently, when did she come on the Board and when did you get the licence?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Sir, I think, I want to check the records.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You can check.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I am pretty sure she came on the Board after I got the licence. It was not before -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: In 2013.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: It was 2013, after I got the licence.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: On the 23rd December, 2013.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In 2013, you got the licence. You were submitted before. When did she become a director?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I want check that with the company register. I did not come prepared for that.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: On the 23rd December, 2013.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: She became a director?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Yes.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: So, it was after that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When were you a director of the Housing Development Finance Corporation Bank?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: It was in 2011/2012.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You have been in contact with her and you have been on her Board since 2011?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You became a dealer in 2012?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: In 2013.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In 2012. Mr. Kasun Palisena said you became a dealer in 2012.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Okay.

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The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You became a primary dealer in 2013.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And then Mrs. Wickremasinghe came on Board in 2013.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right. Again, I want to check that with the company register. But I am pretty sure that she came on the Board after we got our licence.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We are not concerned about after or whether it happened at the same time.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You knew her very well because you were on her Board since 2011?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right. Professionally.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: She did not have to be a Board Member to make a conflict of interest claim here because you were on her Board and you knew her. That is established. When did you get to know about this bond issue?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: After the bond issue was done, there was wide publicity given in all the media.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They never informed you earlier that there was a bond issue like that?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You do not talk after you resigned? You totally, -

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No, Sir. We have been in conversation but the decisions to execute and the decisions to progress with the nature of business were completely under the guidance of the Chief Executive at that time and that is Mr. Kasun Palisena.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Have you got shares in that company? Have you got any interest in that company?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I have got shares in the holding company but not in Perpetual Treasuries Limited. One of the many. There are other shareholders as well. On that, yes, I have shares.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How much shares have you got?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: 50 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If Perpetual Treasuries Limited make a profit, do you also make a profit. Am I correct?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can I slightly just check something? Perpetual Capital is the holding company. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: And Perpetual Treasuries Limited is the trading company.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Perpetual Treasuries Limited is the company that engages in fixed income and Government securities.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, it basically was doing the trading on the bond issue?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: And what is the ownership of Perpetual Treasuries Limited and Perpetual Capital Holdings?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Perpetual Capital Holdings owns Perpetual Asset Management (Private) Limited and Perpetual Asset Management (Private) Limited owns 100 per cent of Perpetual Treasuries.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Perpetual Capital Holdings holds how much of Perpetual Asset Management?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: 100 per cent.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I am just trying to establish something. That it is basically a 100 per cent to 100 per cent. So, you have basically a sub and a sub?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: In terms of Perpetual Capital Holdings, what do they report into the holding company? Or what is the holding company's involvement in its subsidiaries?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: The holding company involvement with its subsidiaries is only to- Let me rephrase that. Subsidy companies report on the profit and loss and that is as far as it goes. There is no direct excursion of any power or anything of that nature.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Does it give some strategic direction or what does it do? What does a holding company do apart from

the profits being fed up? What does it actually do?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: The Board of Directors for the holding company is not formed up yet. So, I would not say that it gives strategic direction. But, with regards to dividends, I would also say that there are no dividends in the subsidiary companies that have to be gone to the holding company. So, I would say that the holding company is just a holding company. It is an organization that holds shares in the subsidiaries.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: What is the responsibility of the directors in the holding company?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: The directors are shareholders. When the holding company was started, as per the Companies Act, you need two directors. That is why when we started, my father and I were appointed.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: You all invited outsiders to take shareholdings, Board seats. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: What you were expecting outsiders to take Board seats on like the holding company and what would their responsibilities be?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Sir, the Perpetual Capital is relatively a young company that has been in operation for not more than four or five years. It is basically an organization. When we started the Perpetual Capital, I had a little bit of seed money that came from my grandfather. So, initial activity of Perpetual Capital was equity trading, share trading and with the profits that were generated through Perpetual Capital, which was the tender holding company - it was a discipline entity that went into share market transactions. We then went into other strategic investments such as W.M. Mendis and Company and a few others. The last year was the year that we made a decision to firm up the Board and two exert professionalism through the holding company. So, that is why in four years, I did not do that because it was in the growth stage. As you very rightly pointed out what would be the direction of the holding company, I would say that the holding company is still not firmed up as yet.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Because it is understandable that family members hold shares and then take the profits. That is understandable. But, when new people are brought in, it does not make sense unless there is a very clear definition of what their roles are. That does not come through. That is why I was asking.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: The reason why the outsiders were invited to the Board was to bring in a fresh perspective.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who are the outsiders?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: It was only Mrs. Wickremasinghe at that time. But, with the intention of firming up the Board even further and that could have been done. When choosing directors of an organization, you need to do it very carefully because it is a family owned business. So, line of direction and other things should be, to some extent, in the same line.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the share portfolio she had?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: She had no shares.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it just because she was the Governor's sister? Was it just to upgrade the stock or the image?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. It was a private company which I extended that invitation purely because I wanted to add professionalism to the organization and she was on the Board of HNB Assurance which is also a financial institute. So, on that basis, that also could have been a conflict of interest. She was on the Board of Agstar. She was also on the Board of a few other companies. So, because of that and as this was first public company that I was on theBoard, I thought I will extend that invitation and after her bringing more professionals to the Board. That was the sole intention. What we would like to do is, we would like to take Perpetual Capital Public in the near future and further enhance.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You would have had no problem to bring professionals into it if that person was not connected to the Governor.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You said that you resigned because- you were also must have been a capable person, but 26 you have this portfolio and appointed to the Board. You decided that with your all credential that you should resign because of the conflict of interest.

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Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: On Perpetual Treasuries. Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You were the son-in-law, not even the son.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Here you appointed the Governor's sister to your Board knowing that the conflict of interest will also take place in that instance also.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why did you take such a decision?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: She was not on the Board of any of our financial services related business. She came on to the main board. That was because due to my youth, I am not exposed to many other directors. I wanted whoever the directors who were outsiders and who came over to the main board. What our intention was to have some sort of a credible résumé where they can add some value and she was the only one I was exposed to because I was on the Board of HDFC at a very young age. So, it is not as if I could have gone to any other public company director and invited him or her and said, "Can you please come on to the Board of Perpetual Capital". But, this is the reason.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But did it not occur to you that she is the sister of the Governor?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: You know, it really did not occur to me at that time because she was on the board of many other companies. It did not really occur to me.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you deal with the Central Bank.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Not the holding company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: But the subsidiary deals with the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You need the main person there. Then the other companies will also benefit. Can you tell me when did you get married?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: On the 28th of October in 2012.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: 28th of October?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When you were appointed to the Board of Bank?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: HDFC in 2011, one year before I got married.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, Mrs. Wickremasinghe also came for your wedding.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Cabraal also came for your wedding.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And you tell us that you did not know Mr. Cabraal after that.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I know Mr. Cabraal. I have met him in social functions. But I do not know Mr. Cabraal to the level that- You know the question that is posed to me-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Does your father know Mr. Cabraal?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are you always aloof with people like that or just made sure that the Governor you must keep away?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No, not only the Governor. I do not know people. I do not really-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you are on the sister's Board and her brother is the Governor of the country.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Sister is on your Board.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Not the sister's Board. That is a Government Board. Sister was only the Chairman at that moment and now the Chairman has changed.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I want to ask a few questions on the dealership licence itself. If you look at the primary dealers apart from the 300 million capital, which is like the minimum capital, but the Central Bank goes through a very rigorous bidding process to do this. It appears from the information we have. So far we have not seen all the information of Perpetual Treasuries. It appears that the Central Bank in a sense gave a licence to a unit which had no previous experience of primary market dealing.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: It appears like that. Can you comment on that?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes. This is not the first time that the Central Bank has given a licence to units that have not had prior

experience. Even if you take companies like Capital Alliance, companies like Entrust, none of them had prior experience. As and when you fit the criteria, you are entitled on your fit and proper and the other assessmentsqualifying to get a primary dealer licence.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you explain what fit and proper is?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Fit and proper is the director board.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But Entrust is also owned by Ratwattes.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes, I am aware of that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you know that they were close to the President also?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes. Entrust was formerly a Ceylinco company. It was called Ceylinco Shriram. That was bought by Ratwattes. I am not quite sure about this thing. One of the Ratwattes was on the Board. We are aware of who the other directors and primary dealer companies are. That is correct.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, we see a pattern. As you said, others were also issued the primary. There are all connections. That is the problem we had. During the past regime we see connections and nepotism. That is why we asked this question. Were you not aware of this? When you appointed the sister, did you think that you will also get the same sort of approach as you said that conflict of interest is clearly there?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I did not see it at that time. At that time I genuinely wanted-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why did you not stay on the Board if you did not see that? Why did you not stay because you are the son-in-law?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: This is different, Sir. There is a direct connection-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the direct connection?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: There is also a direct connection.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: More direct connection is there. She is the sister.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: But there is no family relationship between me and Mr. Nivard Cabraal.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not you. But like the sister, the person you appointed.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: To be very frank, we saw it with the intention of professionals in the Board and she was one of the only few people I was exposed to. After she came on the Board, the intention was to firm up the Board little further. There was no ulterior motive as to why-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who is the Chairman of your main board?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: My father and now I am the Chairman.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, your father could have known and he is exposed to quite a number of eminent people in the industry, in the field.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: My father does not get involved in the Board positions because there is a clear succession line that has been created. He wants me to be comfortable with the Board members who are present. So, he has not recommended or nominated anybody.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is you who decides.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: On the main Board, yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Aloysius, did you have a conversation with your father-in-law with regard to the 27th February, 2015 bond issue?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I can say with certainty that we had no conversation at all.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do you at any point talk about the- because this is your profession. Let us not beat around the bush. Let us talk very frankly. I mean this is your profession because you have been dealing with the Central Bank. At any point, did you have a conversation or did he indicate to you that this is the debt requirement and this might be the interest rate that we might be going for?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: The debt requirement is public information.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, but not the whole requirement.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Well. No, most of the requirement is public information.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You can do your own little assessment and work out and know exactly how much the Government will be needing.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

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The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is something that if you are very clever and smart. Kasun explained that like you explained earlier. You would know the pattern and you know what they might be requiring. So that, you could take chance and bid for whatever. What I am asking is, did you at any point have a conversation with your father-in-law? Did your father-in-law mentioned to you or did you overhear a conversation or whatever? Did you have any information?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. Absolutely no. My father-in-law and I have actually spoken about bonds once and that was prior to me getting married to his daughter. That was the only time. That was prior to getting married to his daughter.

In a conversation he asked me the lines of businesses-that I am in and I told him that I intend -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, this whole problem is, for some reason, you all and your company are always connected with the Central Bank Governor. So, what is your explanation on this allegation which is on your father-in-law that he passed down the information to your subsidiary company?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No, Sir. That is not true at all. He maintains utmost professionalism and even when he was at the NBD Investment Bank in Dubai, there were times that I would try to breach the subject of equities and he would not participate in the discussions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What I am just trying to ask you is that this is not rocket science; this investment is not rocket science. But the only thing is that your involvement comes here and that is the problem. We understand this and we have gone through that and there was a requirement of 20 billion and it was 13 billion. Rs. 3 billion was found. Then there was the necessity and they have decided to go on auctions; all that is clear. So, our problem is, only your subsidiary company earlier, the predecessor, and a few other companies have bid for this amount. So, give us an explanation. if you did not have a connection, as to how this company would have reacted to this.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Thank you for that question. I think the only thing that I can plead you all to do is to assess and analyze my previous performance prior to my father-in-law becoming the Governor of the Central Bank. We were outperformers. With all humility, we performed very well last year and that performance was far superior to this quarter that Perpetual Treasuries Limited existed.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I do not try to say that you are like a strong player - where do your ratings stand in the bond market?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He said he was the second.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: In terms of profit last year, we were number two. But in terms of-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Which is the first?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: First is the Capital. If you take private primary dealers, first was the Capital. But I am not comparing us to the banks. If you take the banks out, if you take the private primary dealers, the first - the Capital is number one and we are number two. Yes, we were very strong players and there were times that we have carried 17 billion portfolios, 11 billion portfolios.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are you trying to tell me, even if your father-in-law was not the Governor and there were somebody else, you would have been bidding this.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely, I think my results -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not you, but your company.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I am sorry. I did not understand the question.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake said, you would bid. But you cannot bid, you are not in that company - but the Perpetual Treasuries would have bid.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: If my father-in-law was not or was -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Whether he was there or not -

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes, absolutely, I would have bid anyway.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why do you say that?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Because one is that we are required to bid, it is mandatory to bid, and number two, with the aggression of the team -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is why we say this. What is mandatory is 100 million. Is it not? What we are asking is, why did you bid for 10 billion?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: We were always very aggressive. At the time when I was the CEO, a 30-year bond came out and let me just share an insight of the long tenors.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Tell us a history.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I will tell you a small history about long tenors. Long tenors are something that we have always been very bullish on. When you believe in the Sri Lankan story and of course when you bid in longer tenor bonds, your returns are also superior.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What are the longer tenor bonds that you have bid?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Thirty-year.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When was that?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Before my father-in-law became the Governor of the Central Bank, we bid 500 million on a private placement of a 30-year bond, because at that particular time, it was a private placement that prevailed. The culture then changed after the new Governor came into play where he converted everything to transparent public auctions. At that time there was no auctions, auctions were very limited. So, mostly businesses were done off the track and on private placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Off the track means, there is a good point that you are getting at. So, how were the private placements done? Did the Central Bank call and tell you?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes, they called.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, can we say that because Mrs. Shiromi Wickramasinghe was a Board Member on your main Board that you were a preferred person?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely not.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How can you say that?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I was one of the many other primary dealers where the Public Debt Department of the Central Bank would call and offer bonds to on direct placements. So, this has nothing to do with Mrs. Shiromi Wickramasinghe. This is to do with the fact that - it was not only us, it was everybody including the State banks and commercial banks.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes. They can inform everybody. But when they take direct placements, for you to become number two in the market, did you have any favours?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. Because if you take our past assessment of building up the portfolio, we would have built up our portfolio give or take and that also, I can support it with this documentary evidence, probably 20 per cent on primary placements and 80 per cent on secondary market. We were very big in the secondary market. But coming back to the 30-year bond, what took place was, there was very bullish on the 30-year bond, because I felt that with Sri Lanka's growth story, the more of the longer tenors that you invest, bigger returns that you can get and this is not only in Sri Lanka, when you take India, there are 50-year bonds.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How much did you bid?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I bid 500 million at that time and at that time it was 33 per cent of the entire float. So, 33 per cent of the entire float is at 500 million, if you actually compare that to what my successor did by bidding 5 billion or 15 billion, our net capital, after I resigned, was much larger than the net capital when I was running it. Then we went up to 400, 500, 600 onwards. So, taking a 500 million placement on a 30-year bond was a very big risk at that time. But we paid off. So, that is a reason that my successor and the team realized that that potential is there in longer-term tenors and they bid much more.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When was this 30-year bond took place? Was it June, 2014?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: It was last year. I cannot quite remember. May be June or July, somewhere like that. It was on 27th June, 2014.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: I think, when we asked the CEO we saw the profitability numbers. The company has done exceptionally well. Then, there are conclusions that we can come to. One is that even an exceptional team they would just have outperformed everybody else. That is one conclusion. In this inquiry, one of the things that is concerning and which is being probed is whether they had any inside

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information. Obviously it is our concern and it is being probed, because if there was inside information, then, clearly we cannot judge it by its performance.

Now, the circumstances are unusual. In that, you have a 1 billion advertised amount that is to be taken and you end up taking 10 billion and one company has bid 15 billion out of 20 billion. So, circumstances are clearly unusual or can say, exceptional, so to use another word. You need to explain this a little bit more clearly. When you said that everybody knew this was a requirement that it was a borrowing requirement, the 13.5 billion or whatever, everybody also knows that you do not necessarily take it, you do not fund it necessarily through your advertized bond, because the Central Bank has several other instruments to fund itself. So, it will go through the auctions, it will decide on an amount at a particular rate cost and then to solve its liquidity, it could either go for shorter tenors and fund itself or it could even resort to an overdraft with a commercial bank and then fund itself; it could go for another auction subsequently. So, that would be the normal pattern and everybody knows that. So, when you say everybody had the information, maybe, you should explain yourself a little bit more, what do you mean by that?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Madam asked me, how did I know that the requirement of the Sri Lankan Government was "x" amount. What I meant was, the 212 billion ispublic information. The 500 million Dollar sovereign bond repayment is also public information. That was what I was referring to. I was referring to the 300 billion made public to the entire nation in terms of what Sri Lanka's borrowing repayment is. That is what I meant by, "public information".

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Annually?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. For this particular period we had a 300 billion requirement that had to be paid.

Coming back to the point as to why we bidded more. I could safely say that at the time of resignation, probably we were the only company that liquidated the entire portfolio. So our asset to liability ratio was very strong. The reason we did that was because of the Presidential Election and we believed that with a forthcoming election that there will be a lot of swings in the market.

Last week, there was a 100 basis point incrementin the German Bond Market. It was not 50 or 60 basis points but almost 100 basis points. There are a lot of swings that take place. Especially, in a country like Sri Lanka we have seen four cycles on average per year. We have seen600 basis points movements in 2011/2012. That was seen in 2011/2012. That volatility prevails in the Sri Lankan market. So when we were in cash, not only we anybody who has any sort of macro-economic insight, will realize that the requirement is so large they have to increase rates. And there was no intention, or rather there was no public announcement of any sovereign. Every time anybody made an assessment there was no relevance with regards to a sovereign. The only way they could have raised that sort of money is by increasing the rates. That is probably the reason. I asked him many a times after this situation erupted. That is probably the reason why he bidded much more than what the requirement was. We were not the only one. There were others who bidded more and that has been a practice.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: But would you not agree that the increase in the rates was unusually large, because if we look at how the secondary market has now settled, it has settled at a much lower point on the yield curve?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: You know at the same time last year the thirty year bond was at 11.73. We are only talking about twelve months. As I pointed out a little earlier if you take the graph there was a sudden dip from January 2014 for three months and at that time the rates were somewhat similar to what the rates are now. So that has prevailed. That has been a thing of the past. There have been sudden drops because when requirements are large the bunching effect is such there is an upward pressure in terms of movements. So this is the reason. We were cashed up. I would say probably 100 per cent in cash. We had the ability of levering ten times over so we went for something much larger. Subsequently, at the next bond auction which nobody is talking about we biddedRs.7 billion. At the first bond auction we bidded 15. We could not get the entire 15. We got five. At the second auction- This is what the team did. I had absolutely no influence.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How much did they get from the Rs. 7 billion?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: If I am not mistaken it was Rs.40 billion that was - I had no influence in their decision making. The decision making was purely by them. They are a group of professionals who go into these decisions but I asked them what took place. Ever since -

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: What was the date of that Rs.7 billion?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Soon after.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: The reason I asked for the date is -

Mr. W. P. C. Wickramaratne: 10th March.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: Was there a rate cut along that?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Well after.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: Well after, meaning?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: May be a month later or something like that.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: There was nothing that preceded it?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: "No", for sure?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I cannot tell because I am notinvolved in operations.If I am not mistaken they made a big hue and cry about the rate cut. Most probably it was a month after. Two days before the thirty year bond auction the OMO, Open Market Operations Department of the Central Bank officially made a statement in line with the CBSL short term borrowing rates indicating their stance to increase the rates. That was, short term borrowing. They very categorically indicated two days before the bond auction that on short term tenors they are increasing the rates and that was made public. So my CEO -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When was that? On the 25th?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: May be or a few days before. I cannot tell you exactly which day it was but that was public information. Prior to the 27th bond auction. the OMO decided to increase the short term rates. So, my successor Kasun. he was under me when I was there, made a very calculated decision and that was the right decision.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: That was two days before?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: So then his reaction would havebeen immediately to dump the bonds he had, go liquid in the anticipation that he will pick up subsequently?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Yes, with the littlebonds he had. He did not have many bonds. But the little short tenor bonds- It is only obvious that he would have done that. When I asked about this, there were a lot of things that came around that he dumped his short term tenors and went into this thing. I did not even need an explanation from him because this clearly states that this is the direction that one needs to move towards.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You spoke about the earlier bond in 2014. You said that that also went for eleven point something.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Last year it was 11.73. It was 11.75. This year the Central Bank offered at 11.73 which actually is a better rate than last year.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am asking. The last time what was the amount that they were seeking to make?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Last time, they never practiced auctions. So as and when they decided they would offer Rs.500 million, Rs. one billion, Rs.one and half billion, Rs. two billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That was for how much? For 11.75 or what?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I cannot remember at what rate because sometimes they offer at 11.73. 11.20, 11.10 at the whims and fancies of the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How many billions were made out of that? How much money was made out of that percentage? At 11.75, how much money was made by the Central Bank in that that primary offer?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is information privy only to the Public Debt Department. From the private participants, we got 33 per cent. You can multiply that from three. So, may be one and half to two billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Two billion?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: May be about two billion. But I am sure it was more than that because at that time there was you know -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The point that I want to make is. there was actually a doubt

why all of a sudden this had gone from 9.35 to 11.75? ForRs.3 billion also that had gone up to 11.75?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: 11.73, this was better than -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is at ten billion. That is what I am saying. This is a much better rate when you compare to the rate earlier.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Earlier, it was Rs. three billion. If they had gone for twenty billion that would have been -

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right. I cannot quite confirm whether it was three but from private participants it would have been three.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It would have been two?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: 33 per cent you got Rs.500 million, half a billion?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, it would have been about one and a half billion.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: 1.6, 1.7 that sort of range. The other thing that I would like to state is that long term borrowing is definitely the way to go as opposed to short term borrowing. It was not too long ago -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: With regard to you?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Well with regard to -

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Primary dealers?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: With regard toGovernment per se. It was not too long ago that the rates were at 20 per cent. Those were one, two year rates. 18 per cent, 19 per cent was not too long ago. Thirty year bonds coming at 11.75, in the defence of my team, I think it was fair for them to bid at those rates. Single year, two year bonds were trading at 18 per cent not so long ago, just after the war, an year, year and a half after.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you tell us exactly when was the 18 per cent and the 20 per cent you were referring to?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: I would say may be three years ago. I cannot tell you exactly. But borrowing rates at one time was 18 +. So if you take the eighteen plus into consideration a thirty year bond should be trading at 40 per cent. The thirty year bond should be trading at 40 per cent if a year, two year -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: One more question. Hon. Eran asked you a question regarding inside information. Is there any possibility that your team, not from you, got some inside information from somebody?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No. They are highly professional.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How can you give a guarantee about them? You cannot give a guarantee on anybody?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely. I cannot give a – I cannot say for

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is why we are in a bit doubtful way what you say. How can you give a guarantee on your predecessors? Another person? You can give a guarantee on yourself? You are under oath for yourself but for not anyone else.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: But knowing the caliber of my team, they would not state to –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You mean to say that if they got the inside information, they would cut the communication of phones and then say," we are highly professionals and we do not want it.'

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: No, I would not say that. I have three CFA graduates within our team. They operate through macro-economic analysis.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right, we want to establish it. If they get information, they will take it.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: If they get the information, they probably would not acknowledge it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why is that?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Let me rephrase it. If they are –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are they so ethical? I have not seen persons like that way. Actually, we would like to see that people.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Have you had any information in the past when you were the CEO in the Perpetual Treasuries?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: As you know, the one thing that when we started the Perpetual Treasuries operations, we hired very sound

analysis. So, they came in on macro-economic analysis and that is what the success of the Perpetual Treasuries. That was what it stem-out of it. Over and above that, it was a very aggressive unit so that coupled with very strong research department gave us a profit that we did last year.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think the risk in this is how people are compensated. So, if people are compensated on fixed income; and they are compensated on bonuses; sometimes they can get push to act, beyond a certain framework. So, that risk always exists. Would I be right in presuming that in a very aggressive business model like yours, the people are compensated both on fixed incomes and on bonuses?

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Absolutely. That is not only for us but also it is a practice. That is in around the market. So, there are a percentage of profits that is given out of the team.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: Thank you, Mr. Aloysius.

Mr. Arjun Joseph Aloysius: Thank you very much Madam.

The Chairman: Thank you very much for all of you.

[Witness withdrew.]

[The Committee adjourned.]

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SPECIAL SUB COMMITTEE OF COPE TO LOOK INTO THE BOND ISSUES OF THE SRI LANKA CENTRAL BANK

Thursday, 18th June 2015.

PRESENT:

The Hon. DEW Gunasekara (Chairman)
The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake
The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne
The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe
The Hon. Susil Premajayantha
The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna
The Hon. M.T. Hasen Ali

Mr. J.R. Gajaweera Arachchige, Director (Legislative Services)
Mr. M.E. Lionel Fernando, Advisor to the Chairman

In attendance:

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne, Acting Auditor-General
Ms. L.S.I. Jayaratna, Superintendent of Audit
Ms. E.A.N.P. Edirisinghe, Superintendent of Audit
Mr. E.M.K.M. Padmalal, Superintendent of Audit

Dr, Arjuna Mahendran, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, was called in.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, affirmed and examined.

The Chairman: Good morning, Mr Mahendran.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Good morning, Hon. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much for responding to our call. First, can you introduce yourself with your professional and academic qualifications for the purpose of record, please?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. I am, basically, an economist and I was graduated in 1981 from the University of Oxford. Before that, I had my primary education in Sri Lanka at Royal College, Colombo and I passed out with my Advanced Level in 1977. In 1983, I joined the Central Bank of Sri Lanka as a Staff Officer. I was sent on a Postgraduate residential scholarship in 1985 by the President's Office and I then obtained the master's degree in Economics in 1986 from the University of Oxford. Thereafter, I worked at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka till 1993; for 10 years. In 1994, I joined the private sector and I set up a stock broking company, which I ran till 2001. That company had activities in Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and Singapore. In December 2001, I was invited by the then Government to become the Chairman and the DG of the Board of Investment. I worked there till May, 2004 and resigned consequent to the change of Government that year. In 2004, I went to Singapore, obtained employment in a Swiss bank based in Singapore and worked there till 2008. In 2008, I went to Hong Kong and joined a Hong Kong based bank. Finally, in 2013, I moved to Dubai in the UAE where I worked with the major bank in Dubai. In Janurary, 2015, I was asked by the Hon. Prime Minister to come back to Sri Lanka and I became the Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, which is my current position. I was handed over my letter of appointment in 23rd January, 2015 by His Excellency Maithripala Sirisena, the President of Sri Lanka.

The Chairman: When did you assume duties as the Governor?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: On 23rd of January, 2015.

The Chairman: Mr. Mahendran, as far as this inquiry is concerned, I have to raise one core question leaving out the subsidiary, supplementary or mutual concentrates. That is, after you assumed duties as the Governor, you have taken two policy decisions from your records.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Chairman: The first one is complete departure from direct placements to auctions. Then the removal of the special SDF rate of 5

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per cent. While going through, I need to discuss with you what made you to take such a policy decision. When we see from outside, I find that it resulted in heavy costs to the Government, then it raised the interest rate and also involved some risk to the Government. But, you are the person who took the decision and you are in a better position than us. So, explain us what made you to do that policy changes. My main question is that.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: First of all, on the issue of moving to the auction system from the private placement system which was there earlier, this was something that was discussed by the Minister in charge of the Central Bank. That is the Hon. Prime Minister. He told me in early February, that he had many complaints from the primary dealers - these are the companies that deal in this market - that this system was very opaque and as a result, they were unable to understand how certain primary dealers were getting allocations to certain deals and they were kept out. There were certain alleged malpractices in the market. So, I examined the market and found that- I have worked abroad in major markets like Hong Kong, Singapore and Dubai and I have observed in those markets that there is a standard manner in which these issuance of Government Bonds is conducted. The normal practice in all the major markets in the world like UK, the USA, India and China is that the bulk of the issuance is done through auctions. That is for a specific purpose. One is the transparency. The whole market can see how these bonds are issued to different bidders and the price is also determined by the market not by any individual or done secretly. That is the main reason. So, the normal practice anywhere in the world is that, at least, 80 to 90 per cent of the issuance is done through the auction and the balance is given through a tap issuance or private placements where the balance bonds can be issued at the rate that the auction established. So, when I examined this, I found it was the opposite that was happening here. Here, there was a lot of issuance going on through these direct or private placements and the auctions, in fact, had not occurred since September 2014. So, I advised the Hon. Prime Minister and he instructed me to immediately move to the auction system. So, in that backdrop, I informed the Monetary Board on the 23rd of February- we have the Minutes there- that we will restart the auctions and we suggested starting with a 30-year bond. Because, that is the longest maturity bond issued in Sri Lanka by the Government of Sri Lanka. We decided that it would be held in the same week, on the 27th of February.

The second issue you raised is why the special SDF rate of 5 per cent was removed. That, again, was a very peculiar practice. In September 2014, the repurchase rate -this is the rate, at which the Central Bank borrows money from commercial banks- was 6.5 per cent. Then, sometime in September 2014, the Central Bank issued a Circular to the banks saying that their rate of 6.5 per cent can only be obtained on any three days of the month. On all other days, the banks who lend money to the Central Bank only get 5 per cent. This is a very peculiar practice. I have never seen this anywhere in the world. In fact, it was criticized by very learned people. Dr. W.A. Wijewardane, who was my superior in the Central Bank many years ago, criticized this practice very vehemently in the press. Because, when Sri Lanka does something like that, all investors who look at our market wonder what is going on. This is a very peculiar practice that you have one rate published as your repurchase rate but you say that it is only applicable for three days of the month and all other days, you only get 5 per cent.

This has never happened, as far as I am aware, anywhere in the world. So, my first priority was to correct this and also to restart Bond auctions. I hope that answers your two questions, Sir.

Now, I will come to the next issue which you have raised. That is, the allegation that we have raised interest rates. That 5 per cent clearly was an artificial rate because the advertised rate was 6.5 per cent. We had to clean that up. On the 27th of February, the Monetary Operations Committee which is headed by Dr. P. Nandalal Weerasinghe made a recommendation to remove the 5 per cent and go back to the 6.5 percent. So, we have a clean system where all the banks know exactly what the rate is. The reason they recommended that was that the Monetary Board at its previous meeting on the 23rd had been advised to do this, raise interest rates; because the Sri Lanka Rupee was under pressure. It was falling. It had devalued by about one per cent in the month of January and unless you raised the interest rates, there was a danger that the Sri Lanka Rupee would really start going to a free fall, because there were some uncertainties

about the new Government policies and after the mini Budget that was announced on 29th of January 2015 where wages were increased substantially for public servants. There were some concerns that the fiscal deficit would get out of control et cetera. All these made market expectations, expected devaluation of the rupee and also an increase in interest rates. So, the market was behaving that way. So, the Monetary Operations Committee requested the Governor to approve for them to remove that 5 per cent rate because that rate was considered to be too low, and we needed to support the rupee.

Then, Sir, on the issue of losing money. Now, in a situation where the Central Bank is facing pressure on the currency; and secondly and the most important thing is we were unable to raise sufficient funds in the market to fund the Treasury. The Treasury, as you know, sends us a cash flow at the beginning of each month and tells us to raise certain amounts throughout that month. We were unable to raise those monies. We were falling short for about three successive weeks in late January and early February because interest rates were being suppressed by the private placement system. So, I said, let us test what the market feels is the acceptable rate, what is the realistic rate for these issuances. For instance, on the Thirty-Year Bond, there is an allegation that I could have raised this money at 9.35 per cent. That 9.35 per cent is, I place it to you, is a totally fictitious rate. It is not a market determined rate and we would not have raised one cent at that rate if we advertised the thirty-year bond. There were three transactions where it was given at 9.45 per cent and that was all to the EPF. So, what has happened in the past is, there has been an artificial reduction of interest rates by selling through these private placements to captive sources. That is to the Government related sources like EPF, and NSB. That has nothing to do with the market.

In fact, I have evidence that when the primary dealers are asked by the Central Bank what is the realistic rate for a thirty-year bond, they all came back and said 11.75 per cent; which is the rate that prevailed at the last auction held in last May, 2014. So, this 9.35 per cent was a purely artificial rate created by the Central Bank forcing EPF to invest at that level and pretend that interest rates have come down. That is one. So, there was no way that I could raise that money. As you know, when you artificially suppress prices, even in the vegetable market or any market, production reduces. There will not be enough quantity being supplied. This is the same in the Treasury Bond Market. We found that the volume of money that we were raising was totally insufficient to meet what the Treasury required. That is why we moved to the auction system. So, to say that we could have raised this money at 9.35 per cent, I beg to disagree, Sir. It would have been impossible. The net result would have been the Treasury would have been severely short of funds.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: At what interest rate was the Rs. 3 billion raised?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Basically, the Rs. 3 billion was raised at varying interest rates depending on the maturity of the bonds that were issued. In that week we had to raise Rs. 13. 5 billion and up to Friday, only 3.5 had been raised.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: For how many days?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Monday to Thursday. That is over four days, they had only been able to raise Rs. 3.5 billion out of the Rs.13.5 billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That was through whom?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was through the private placements. Again, from Bank of Ceylon and some other participants in the market, through private placements. So, the private placements system was not working. It was not generating the amount of money that we needed.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you all made Rs.3 billion.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: We only raised Rs. 3. 5 billion as of the Friday afternoon. My quandary was how to raise the balance 10.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If you all had tried more, could you have not made it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Over four days if we had only 3.5, It is very unlikely on Friday afternoon in two hours, we could have got 10. That was what I discussed with the Public Debt Department officials.

The Chairman: There were a number of bidders, if you take the bidding list. while you intervene at the stage of the thirteenth bidder - and give a direction to stop it to get the Rs. 10 billion. If you have a number of options before

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you, say by way of direct placements, through Treasury Bills and various other ways of collecting money; if you had stopped by - Out of Rs. 10 billion, say you collect about Rs. 7 billion, and try on another day to collect from the market, then that would have minimized the cost of the Government. How do you explain that? These are the questions that are being raised.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: There are two or three ways that we could raise money. The other as you mentioned is, Treasury Bills. In Treasury Bills, there is an issue. You know the Bill that came before Parliament, I think in March or April, to raise the Treasury Bill limit was defeated. Now, that was very critical. There is a limit of Rs.850 billion that the Central Bank can invest in Treasury Bills. That had almost been reached. We only had about not even Rs. 10 billion left in that limit. So, Treasury Bills as an option was not available. Secondly, we could have maybe, gone for an overdraft from the Bank of Ceylon or People's Bank. But, there again, Sir, between the two of them from Bank of Ceylon we had already borrowed Rs. 45 billion and from the People's Bank about Rs. 58 billion. The rule is basically that anything over Rs. 15 billion, the Government should start resisting from borrowing from those banks as otherwise private borrowers from those banks will suffer because there will be less availability of funds. So, we had already exceeded Rs. 100 billion from the two banks. So, that also was not an advisable option. That would have created a shortage of funds in the private sector. So, it was really the Bond that was available or the private placements which had not worked.

To answer to your question, the list was given by the public debt department officials which said that we had offers up to 12.5 percent which was the rate we advertised the previous day. In the advertisement, the coupon rate was 12. 5 per cent. So, I said, Okay, if you borrow up to the coupon rate, which means you are selling the bond at par, how much can you raise? They said, "we can raise Rs. 10 billion." So, I said, "it is a marvelous coincidence that we are able to collect the exact amount of money that we need by paying up to the coupon rate." So, that was the basis on which we decided that that would be the best way. As I said Sir, the other options were not really feasible. There was no space for an overdraft or Treasury Bills.

The Chairman: Your position is that they were not available or not feasible?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Exactly, and the time constraint was very binding because Monday morning we had to give the money to the Treasury.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: As he said if you had raised Rs. 7 billion, talking about the cost, and the balance Rs. 3 billion if you had gone for private placements, what would have happened? How do you do private placements for the balance Rs. 3 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Typically, what happens is, you go and take the money from the EPF or the NSB, and here again, I feel that we are doing a disservice. I have been accused of losing money for the Government. But, think of the depositors Sir, in the EPF and in the NSB. They are losing money. We are finding it difficult this year to give the 10.5 percent interest that we pay to EPF holders. Because firstly the interest rate structure has come down and secondly HE the President and the former President gave that facility for 30 per cent loans to be given for housing purposes from EPF funds, we are now finding it difficult to generate that same rate of return which the investors in the EPF have enjoyed over the last few years.

So it is wrong in principle. We are actually robbing the people who are investing in the EPF, the NSB and other Government institutions by artificially depressing these interest rates and preventing them from getting a reasonable return on their money. People are not looking at that.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Mr. Chairman is not listening to that point. Mr. Chairman has been making in Parliament for the last five years what he just made.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He made the point about the EPF.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, I was just saying we are struggling this year to reach the 10.5 per cent to pay that interest to the EPF holders. Because, as you know, the 30 per cent can now be withdrawn from the EPF balances for housing loans. This has immediately diminished the availability of funds in the EPF on the one hand and secondly, if we are unable to invest those funds in high interest type of instruments to generate that return. So, this is another thing that we are looking at to see how we can protect the EPF and the NSB money

from those interest rates being artificially suppressed.

The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Governor, when did you know that you needed Rs. 13.5 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Generally, they send it about 20 days before the beginning of the following month. So, around the 10th of February, the Ministry of Finance sends us a request for the following month, in this case, the month of March, 2015.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, why did you wait till the last hour, because you needed to furnish this on Monday and you have the auction on Friday? Who determines when to have the auctions and why would you wait till then? But, if you did not get the 10 ten billion, if there were no 20 billion pledges and there was only like 5 per cent, what would you have done?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is a very good question, Madam. Again, having worked abroad - the general trend in other countries is, you have a time table of auctions so that the whole market can anticipate when auctions will happen. So, in the first week, you will have an auction for five years, in the second week for ten years, in the third week for 15 and in the fourth week for 20 years and something like that so that every week you have specific auctions in a calendar month which are predictable by the market. Now, in Sri Lanka we have this private placement system whereby there is really no timing. People just arbitrarily go to the Central Bank and ask for bonds. Then the bonds are basically issued to them privately. That means that there is no programming of how these funds are going to be raised, to answer your question. So this was a big problem for me and that is one of the reasons why - this is the first thing that I wanted to address of timetabling the auctions making sure that they are predictable and we know how much money we have to raise from each of them and you can match that with the cash flow requirements of the Treasury.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Who determines to have the auction on that particular day? I mean, could you not have done that timing when you knew on the 10th of February that you had a requirement for the 29th of or whatever.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Officials of the Public Debt Department told me that they have been successful in the past in raising these funds through the private placements. When I looked at the numbers, I questioned that, because in the month of February the amounts you were raising from private placements were steadily declining. In fact, there were three weeks when we failed to meet the Treasury requirements by about Rs. 2 billion to Rs. 3 billion each. So, I was getting worried that that system was not working.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Mr. Governor, for the domestic borrowing programme for the month of March, 2015, the programme was submitted to you for your approval and it clearly says that at that the particular date, 1000 should be gone for primary auction and 12,554 for the direct placements. So, for the other days also it was included.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: And you have made a Minute on that one approving this and stating that - four paragraphs are there, but I will read only the relevant paragraph. It states, "EPF, NSB, SLIC to be obtained to stabilize the rates." So, after that you have totally deviated from that one and the whole thing has gone for auction. So, is that correct?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Chairman: You changed your original decision?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right, because as I said, Sir, we were moving towards the auction system. What had prevailed in the past was the ETF, the NSB, et cetera were being used. Then, we discussed collectively with the Public Debt officials and the Deputy Governors whether it is desirable to use these other institutions to artificially maintain these lower rates and we all agreed unanimously that this is not a good practice that we should see that the market really participates in these auctions and more money should come in. So, that was one of the discussions I had at that time with the officials in the Central Bank.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: When that was decided?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was decided, Sir, over the period of that week. So, on the 23rd of February, there was a discussion at the Monetary Board where we discussed the merits of moving towards the more transparent auction base system and that is where the decision was made to do the 30-year bond in the first instance as an auction. So, there itself

it was discussed and as I mentioned earlier, Hon. Prime Minister had told me in early February that he is getting lots of complaints from these primary dealers that there are also artificial deals going on in this market and I should immediately move towards auction. That is why we initiated that and I, myself was convinced that we had to move towards more internationally recognizable type of bond issuance system using auctions so that whole process took a few weeks to implement and we finally implemented it on the 27th where we did not have to call up the EPF, the NSB or anybody to come and especially invest that artificial lower rates.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Have you got the Minutes of that 23rd Meeting?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. The Monetary Board Minutes are there.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Did you state at that point that you wanted to go for private placements and go for a more transparent thing and suspend the private placements?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right. At that Monetary Board Meeting, we did not specifically say, we spend private placements. But, we definitely said that we want to have the 30-year auction and move towards the better market base formation call, "The yield curve," which is the formation of interest rates across the bond market. That was minuted on the 23rd Meeting. Then, subsequently, I think, on the 06th of March, at the next Board Meeting, I specifically said that the 27th February auction had been a great success, it was totally over subscribed, and I gave them the details of the -

The Chairman: At that meeting that decision was taken.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In which Meeting?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The decision to completely suspend the private placements was taken on the 06th of March and to move towards auction was decided on the 23rd of February.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is there any Minute on that?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. We have Minutes of the Monetary Board.

The Chairman: There is no minute to suspend?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Not to suspend, Sir, to move towards the auction based system. That is how we said.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: That was on the 27th?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Mr. Governor, this Minute was on the 02nd of March after this one.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can I have a copy of this?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: This is the monthly programme.

The Chairman: Mr. Mahendran, please, read the Minute.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Does it say that on the 23rd you are moving in to auctions in anywhere?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I will get to the Minutes of the Monetary Board. That is where the reference to the auction is. This is an internal minute.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But what we are asking is, you said it was on the 23rd - our problem is on the 27th. So, we want to see whether you all have spoken about this auction system because we have got this idea that all of a sudden you decided that it should be auctioned on the 27th.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No. That was decided by the Monetary Board. I have that Minute.

The Chairman: It is really a 30-year long term auction.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, that is right.

The Chairman: The wording is that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We have the 23rd minute here.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Madam. Can I read it out? This is dated 23rd February, 2015. This is an extract true copy from Mr. H. A. Karunaratne, the Monetary Board Secretary, regarding review of the Monetary Policy Stance - February, 2015. It states, "The Board was of the view that issuing 30-year Treasury bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and re-profile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors. Accordingly, the Board instructed the Superintendent of Public Debt to

conduct a 30-year Treasury bond auction during the week and arrange to list sovereign bonds in Euro Clear Exchange in future."

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That was on the 23rd? Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was on the 23rd.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. That is what I want to establish. That is in paragraph 2.3. Is that right?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: But, there is no mention here about the total deviation from private placement. You do not have to have a deviation

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, that is correct. In fact-

The Chairman: It can be decided subsequently.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Decide on the auctions.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Decide on the auctions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, Governor, how can you - I think, one of them also corrected. – suspend the private placements? I do not think that you can suspend private placements totally because your Manual also talks about the private placements.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, I do not think that you all can suspend private placements. I do not know. You explain that to me. Page eight of the Manual states about the private and direct placements. So, the Manual talks about the private and direct placements.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, it does. Well, the reason we thought –

The Chairman: It is really a sort of an integrated system where you shift more and – Is that correct. I do not know.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir. I would put it this way.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can I draw your attention? Explain this to me. This is what I understand from the English that I read. It states, "FO has to make arrangements to meet financial needs as much as possible through auctions."

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, "as much as through auctions" means majority should be through auctions.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Majority should be through auctions. Sir, the practice abroad is normally 90 per cent is through auctions, maybe 85 per cent to 90 per cent and the balance is what they call a "tap".

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: "And the balance fund requirements", that means, when you have a shortfall, to go for private placements. So, you cannot do away with private placements according to the Manual.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is correct.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: For that you have to take a decision and then you have to amend this Manual.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Mr. Chairman, can I make a clarification here which we need to have. Now, private placements - It depends on what we mean by private placements and Governor, you can correct me if I am wrong. Historically, they have been there for a long time and you basically go to your captive sources, largely the EPF and then some of the other Government institutions and once you have finished the auction, you have a rate that is set and then, at that rate or below you go and raise money and you raise that money because they are captive sources. Now, the Governor has made the point that that yield curve that is being talked about is an artificially yield curve because you are getting it from private sources. So, he is setting about to create a market yield curve by moving into an auction system. That is one fundamental shift that is happening here and that is why I have argued right along and I have debated the issue of what is actually the loss. But, I think, the most important point which has not come out Governor and which we would like to know is, - I think, private placements traditionally have been through captive sources. - .has there been a move to get money from private sources, not from captive sources, using the private placement methodology and if the practice has been there, when did that practice commence? Who authorized that practice? I am I clear on my question?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir. In the way that private placements have been done in the past. there was no discrimination between captive sources and private sources. Basically,

the windows are open for anybody to come and negotiate with the Central Bank dealers and buy these bonds privately. That was the basic methodology which had started in 2008 when a Board Paper was sent to the Monetary Board suggesting that these captive sources in particular - We used to control interest rates which at that time, in 2008, were shooting up. It was the end of the war and as you know, there were some difficulties in controlling the monetary policy. So, ever since that practice has prevailed there, the bulk of issuances has been done through private placements. But, there was no discrimination against private operators coming into the market. They were also coming in and buying from these dealers in the Central Bank at these suppressed interest rates.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, from the knowledge you have, you are saying that the private placements were always allowed through private sources other than captive sources all along. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: All along.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Okay. Mr. Chairman, I would like that to be verified independently also to go back to history and see where that practice actually started. Because the knowledge I have and the information I have is different. So, we can independently check that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Mr. Mahendran, you said that you joined the Central Bank in 1983 after graduating from the Oxford University in the field of economy.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then, you served there till 1993. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: In the meantime, in 1985 you were given a scholarship and then you did your Master's in Economics in the Oxford University. Then, you left the Bank in 1993. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Until 1993, you served there as a staff officer. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then, you joined a private sector stock brokering company. Is it?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, other than that, you did not engage in any Bank or any other position after leaving the Central Bank in 1993.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then, you left for Singapore in the year 2004. Before that, you were positioned as the Chairman or the DG of the BOI in the year 2001 till May, 2004. Then, you resigned from the BOI after the change in government and you left for Singapore.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, is that the first time that you left the country for Singapore in 2004? Earlier, did you go to Singapore and come back in 2001?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir. In 1999, I started covering the Singapore market. So, I was travelling there regularly but I was still based in Sri Lanka. I was employed by a firm in Sri Lanka but I was travelling there regularly.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, after you resigned from the BOI, you left for Singapore and you joined the Swiss Bank. So, you served in various banks and then went to Hong Kong, UAE et cetera. Then, were you a citizen of Singapore?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir. I became a citizen of Singapore around 2006.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Still you are a citizen of Singapore. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: According to the internal law of Singapore, can a Singaporean citizen get dual citizenship in some other countries?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, then you left the country in the year 2004 for your future prospects. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, did you not have any threat or any kind of harassment in the year 2004?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: As I was Chairman of the BOI, it was very difficult for me to get a job in Sri Lanka because as you know, that was a political type of job and I found it very difficult to find employment.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, in searching for an employment you left for Singapore. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Was it not for any other reason?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well, I mean, there were also some comments made against me in Parliament

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: After a change in government, that is natural.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, to assume duties as the Governor of the Central Bank, as requested by the Prime Minister after 10th of January in forming the Government, you came back from Singapore. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: From Dubai where I was working at that time.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: At that time, you were in Dubai. So, then, you assumed duties at the Central Bank as the Governor. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: As the Governor.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: When was that?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: On 23rd of January, I got my letter.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, did you make any arrangements to change the top-level officials and rotate them?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, that is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: When?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: This would have been around the 2nd week of February. I do not know the exact date. But, basically the first thing that I noticed when I came was that a lot of Heads of Departments had been in their positions for more than three years and from my experience, you should not keep Heads of Departments in the same position for more than – Roughly/ three years is considered appropriate because then, as you know, bad habits come in and there is room for poor management practices to set in.

So, I spoke to the Head of Human Resources and looked at the list. On that basis, we moved the people who had typically been more than five years service in the same position.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Was there anybody who served more than three years?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. All of them - in fact the majority of them had been there for more than three years.

The Hon. A. D. Susil Premajayantha: So, in that way, you made Mr. Samarasiri as the Head of the Public Debt Department.

Mr. Arjuna Mahedran: Yes. The three Deputy Governors overlooked all the Heads of Departments. So, I reshuffled their portfolios also. The Public Debt Department was handled by Mr. Ananda Silva for little over three years. So, I decided that that Department should go to Mr. Samarasiri. The EPF Department and the Public Debt Department are the two most important Departments in the Central Bank from a agency perspective because they manage huge amounts of money. That is really where the biggest risk of mismanagement and allegations of corruption can come in. My focus really was to try and see that the rotation of management of these two departments should happen.

The Hon. A. D. Susil Premajayantha: Actually the Public Debt Department is responsible for supplying funds for the Government.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: And managing the Government's debts and even purchasing Government's debts. So, it is the key –

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: The key area of the subject.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, the key area. That is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Now this particular Committee decided to raise Rs. 1 billion by issuing 30- year bonds. Then they fixed a coupon rate at 12.5 per cent and they published it.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The advertisement, yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then on the 27th, the auction took place. Normally, the auction is closed at 11 o'clock.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But according to Minutes and the statements made by the responsible of the Central Bank, it was revealed that that auction went on a little longer – even after 11 o'clock.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: For about five minutes or so.

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The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, on this particular day, did you go to the Public Debt Department?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir. I went twice.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: At what time?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: I would have gone around 10.45 a.m. At that point, I wanted to convey to the Department officials – because the Monetary Board met on the 23rd, as I told you, and we had decided to go for an auction and that was the auction that was happening that day - the view that we should accept as much as possible from the auctions because the private placement method was not working. We had not been able to raise enough money. For this Rs. 13.5 billion we only raised 3.5 so far for the first four days of the week. Secondly, that this private placement method is not something that is desirable. The Hon. Prime Minister had already pointed this out to me. He was getting complaints from the public and I myself said, "This is not really a desirable way," because it is not transparent and secondly it is not working. We are not getting enough money for the Government.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Mr. Mahendran, you knew very well before you published the auction advertisement that the Government needed Rs. 13.5 billion by the first week of March.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Exactly.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Knowing that you decided to issue Rs. 1 billion bonds.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was not my decision. That was a decision of the Public Debt Department.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Okay. After that decision was taken by the Public Debt Department, were you informed of it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Of the Rs. 1 billion?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, when I saw the advertisement only I realized that that had been published.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You saw the advertisement?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I saw the advertisement.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But you knew and you had knowledge though the Government needed Rs. 13.5 billion by the first week of March, the Public Debt Department had decided to issue Rs. 1 billion bonds.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, I knew that. The Debt Department told me, they could raise the balance through private placements. So, I agreed.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You agreed. Okay. Then, the auction took place on the 27th of February. You went to the Public Debt Department somewhere around 10.45 a.m. By any chance, did you come to know about the offers of Rs. 20.58 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, not until I was informed by the Public Debt Department officers when I went the second time to the Department that afternoon at about 12.30 p.m.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, why did you go to the Public Debt Department around 10.45 a.m.?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: To communicate to the Public Debt officials because the way it works is this. When the Monetary Board makes a decision, the Minutes are ratified by the next Monetary Board meeting. So, until they are ratified, the decisions are not conveyed to the relevant Departments. So, I just wanted to inform the Public Debt Department officials that there was a change in the thinking of the management which had been discussed at that Monetary Board. Also, I was new to the Bank. So, I was walking around everyday to different Departments. That day, I happened to go to the Public Debt Department. The previous day, I went to the Currency Department – the vaults and the place where the gold is stored and also to the IT Department. So, I was doing my rounds. That is my style of management. I walk around and see what people are doing.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, how did you come to know that there were offers about Rs. 20.58 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was told to me, when I went the second time with the two Deputy Governors.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: At what time?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was around 12.15 p.m. to 12.30 p.m.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: By that time the auction was closed.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, it was then that you came to know about Rs. 20.58 billion offers.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You published the advertisement for issuing bonds worth of Rs. 1 billion and at 12.30 p.m. you came to know that you had Rs. 20.58 billion offers.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, by any chance, did you tell the Superintendent of the Public Debt Department, Mrs. Senevirathne, that you would like to raise Rs. 20 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well, when they said, Rs. 20 billion had been offered, I asked whether it was possible for them to raise Rs. 20 billion this way because the Government has a lot of need for money. For March, we had to raise about Rs. 127 billion. Now this auction was only raising Rs. 1 billion. So, I was looking for the whole month of March and saying, "Shall we raise a larger amount through the auction?" That was why I asked, "Is it possible to raise Rs. 20 billion in our auction?"

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That was because you knew that you needed funds for the Government for the month of March.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: For the whole month of March. That is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: However, you definitely knew that by 2nd of March the Treasury needed Rs. 13.5 billion. Keeping that in mind, you asked the Superintendent of the Public Debt Department, whether it is possible to raise Rs. 20 billion.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then what was the response?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The response was that Rs. 20 billion includes what are called dummy bids – bids that are ridiculous. For instance, they are somewhere at 18 per cent - that it would be advisable to include those dummy bids because those were clearly interest rates that were not realistic and had been put just because there is an obligation for the primary dealers to put a 10 per cent of the total auction value. So, some of them put these dummy bids so that in the knowledge they will not be accepted but they have fulfilled their responsibility to put that 10 per cent.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: By that time, at 12.30 p.m. – the auction was closed at 11.04 a.m. – you were getting all the details about the parties who bid for the auction for Rs. 20. 58 billion. You had knowledge about the parties who bid for Rs.1 billion by that time.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did not know the names of the parties but I knew that

Rs. 20 billion had been offered.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is the bulk.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Bulk.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then what was your response to Mrs. Senevirathne's comment?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: We have advertised 12.5 per cent as the par value of the bond; of the coupon rate. So, I said, "How much can you get within that 12.5 per cent?" Because that was what we advertised. So, she said, "We can get about Rs. 10 billion." Then I said, "That is fair, because we have offered it at 12.5 per cent." I asked, "What is the weighted average of all the bids that will come up to 12.5 per cent?" Then she said, "11.73 per cent," after consulting her officials. So, I said, "What was the rate of the last auction which was held in May, 2014?" They said, "11.75 per cent." So, I said, "We are very lucky actually because we have to raise the balance Rs. 10 billion and Rs. 3.5 has already been funded. So, then we will have Rs. 13.5."

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: By any chance, did the Superintendent of the Public Debt Department, Mrs. Senevirathne, resist to raise Rs. 20 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, I could see that they were not used to raising that amount. There was one comment from Dr. Azim, who works with her and who has knowledge in this area, perhaps to go for a lower amount.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Then, what was the response when you ask them to raise-the rate is good if that is the rate, a better rate compared to previous auctions – and then to go for Rs. 10 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I asked them, "Is this the average rate of interest? Is there anything that is acceptable? Compared to the previous auction how does it appear?" They said, "It is just likely, lower than the previous auction". Then, I said, "Is there any issue in raising this large amount? There was no answer. I said

then, "Why do we not do this? I said, "You all are now going to meet in the Tender Board Committee, the Government needs this money, if I were you I would take this".

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, if not for your intervention at that time they would not have raised Rs. 10 billion.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: They knew that they had to raise that Rs. 10 billion. I think I cannot speculate how they would have responded to that. But, I know that the two Deputy Governors were with me. I deliberately wanted them to be there because we wanted the whole Senior Managers –

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Who were the two Deputy Governors?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Mr. Nandalal Weerasinghe and Mr. Ananda Silva.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Now it means that to your knowledge, it is true that as a responsible officer and the Governor of the Central Bank you have to raise on behalf of the Government Rs. 13.5 billion. So, naturally as the CEO of Central Bank you are compelled to go for a higher amount. It means that to raise if possible entire amount. But, the Debt Department officers were not ready to raise Rs. 10 billion if not for your intervention.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I cannot say that, Sir. Because I would have then questioned them if I had not intervened at that point. If they had sent me a recommendation later saying that they are only raising Rupees three or four billion I would have said, "where is the balance going to come from?".

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Do you have any experience or do you have any knowledge about previous auctions when they published or when they called auctions for Rs. 1 billion, they raised for five times or ten times like that?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, in the Treasury Bill market there had been cases like that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: What were the Treasury Bills, bond market?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Not in the bond market, Sir. Because bond market is relatively new. 30-year bonds have only been issued for one year. There is no case of that type in the bond market.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Do you not have any knowledge about raising three times, four times or five times or even ten times at previous occasions?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: There had been cases where about two to three times have been raised in the bond auction. It is higher.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: When?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I do not have the exact details.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Has it happened recently or-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. I think, it is in November, last year.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: How many times?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I would say about four or five times per year.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But, this is the first time to your knowledge that you are raising ten times of bonds after publishing the auction.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is correct.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Surely, you have to intervene. If not for your intervention they would not have raised Rs. 10 billion.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is speculative because the point is they had to raise that money. Such a big gap of Rs. 10 billion is not raised only to the Treasury.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It is okay. But the thing is, knowing very well the Government requirement is Rs. 13.5 billion why did they go for raising Rs. 1 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is the question that still mystified me to this day. I do not know whether it was an attempt to sabotage the Government. It is serious. I mean this is a very important issue. The Treasury needed this money on Monday. That is an order from the Government. It had never happened before.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, you knew very well as you said earlier, the Government requirement is Rs. 13.5 billion. So, this particular Board decided to go for Rs. 1 billion.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, by 27th of February, the day of auction, you knew very well as the CEO of Central Bank or the Governor, the Government requirement is Rs. 13.5 billion. You went through the newspaper and you came to know about the auction, the Rs. 1 billion. Then, did you not think about intervene to this and then ask, "why did you go for Rs. 1 billion and then why do you not raise full amount, Rs. 13.5 billion?"

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The point is, Sir, they had time till Thursday, the previous day to raise that money through private placements. They promised me that they would, but they did not.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But earlier you said that you deviated from the earlier practice, that is the private placement and after you were given instructions by the Hon. Prime Minister you decided to go for public auction.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right. But, that was not communicated to the public Debt Department.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But, now you say that you were expecting to raise the balance through private placements.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Public Debt Department officials were expecting that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It is of course not your policy. Your policy was - after assuming duties you are getting instructions from the Hon. Prime Minister - to deviate as much as possible from private placements and go for public auction.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That has to be done in a systematic way where the Board makes that policy decision, conveys that decision to the Public Debt Department, and then implement it. That took about two weeks to happen. In the mean time, what I was telling them I pre informed them that this policy has been made by the Board. So, please get yourselves ready to implement it and move away from the private placements method.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Pre informed them on that day at 10.45, not before?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Because that was the first auction.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You thought that they would raise the rest-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Through private placements.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I understood.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, Governor, we are not clear. Hon. Member asked a question, "why this Rs. 1 billion, but all the other officials' answers we got was that you do not show that Rs. 10 billion. You just go for Rs. 1 billion because otherwise the rates will get crumbled. I do not know whether you know this. Other officials' answer was that. If you show Rs. 10 billion the interest rates would go for 18 per cent. 19 per cent. That is what even the Perpetual Treasuries said. So, they read. From the information I got, the primary dealer get to know how much you are desperate for. They said they speculated that you all want this money and that is why they went for a big amount. What the officials said was if they want Rs. 10 billion they will not put Rs. 10 billion. They put Rs. 1 billion and they keep that as a secret. That was the explanation we got.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was a open secret because from the time of the Budget in November that was made by the previous HE the President and the mini Budget on 29th of January it was very clear that Government's spending was going to explode. It was a 40 per cent-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That was explained to us by the dealer-

The Chairman: Nothing is strange to the business-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can they then go for Rs. 10 billion. I have the rationale. I think when they explained I understood it can be an open secret but still you tried to suppress the interest rate as much as possible through Rs. 1 billion. You were desperate. If you say this "Now we need Rs. 300 million they will be waiting to shot it at 14 per cent, 15 per cent and 16 per cent. Because others did not know that. Only one company knew that.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I disagree. On Thursday, what I heard from the primary dealers and this is something I have to investigate once this committee has made it findings that somebody in the Central Bank has been calling the primary dealers and asking them how much they can bid.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is that the practice?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is not a good practice. That is very bad because that shows that the Central Bank was getting desperate. They had not raised enough through the private placements and then they started calling everybody asking, "How much can you bid?. And then, they were telling bid that at 9.73.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If they got that 9.73 when they did that. If the primary dealers said, "Okay we are buying Rs. 10 billion on 9.35." Is it not a great thing?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Nobody would bid at 9.35, Sir. I can show you the market expectation. We have a secondary market survey in every month. That was showing 11.75 as the market expectation of the rate in the secondary market. So, this 9.75 is a purely artificial thing only to EPF.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you furnish that that is 9.75 from the primary dealers-

The Chairman: In the advertisement you have put Rs. 1 billion. But the whole country knew that the Government is trying to get Rs. 13 billion. It would lead to speculations.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Others did not know that. That is the problem, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: One particular company knew.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Not Rs. 1 billion, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It was Rs. 15 billion. Out of Rs. 20.58 billion as you said the bulk-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: The total bids. One particular company bid for 75 per cent of the total offer. Is that correct? Out of 20.58 a particular company-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. I think there are two companies. One is the Bank of Ceylon.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It was Rs. 15 billion. It was revealed that the Bank of Ceylon as one primary dealer bid Rs. 13 billion on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries. It means that one particular company ultimately, they themselves bid for Rs. 2 billion and through Bank of Ceylon, they bid for Rs. 13 billion. The total amount will be Rs. 15 billion out of Rs. 20.58 billion on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Earlier, it was your son-in-law's company.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: He was involved earlier, but he resigned when I became the Governor.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It was one of the companies of that total holding company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, no. He was in that company also.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It is okay. That is one particular company. So, after closing the auction, this particular company, through Bank of Ceylon and on their own, got 50 per cent of the Rs. 10 billion, that is almost a half.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Now, you said earlier that you deviated from private placements as much as possible and normally the international practice is 90 per cent of auction and somewhere around 10 per cent of private placements, you made arrangements to go for a public auction following that fundamental. So, if the Central Bank- not any other organization - goes for public auction, you just now said that, "It is a open secret going for Rs. 10 billion," but, you called for Rs. 1 billion. You said, "It is a open secret" that normally the primary dealers knew that you were going for a higher fund.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The borrowing was going to increase, not that it was Rs. 10 billion. What I said "open secret" is, the Government is going to borrow much more than they had borrowed in the past.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It is okay. Then, why this one particular company bid at 75 per cent out of the Rs. 20.58 billion?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That happens in any auction. Even last year, there was an auction where the Bank of Ceylon bid on behalf of another company. In that case, I think it was Commercial Bank where they took the bulk of the auction.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is Commercial Bank, not one of the banks.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: But, they are all primary dealers.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Governor, do you rule away that they got some insider information? Can you rule away?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: It did not come from me, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, I am asking. It is obvious that you will not give it directly, but from the Bank. Is there a possibility?

The Chairman: It did not come to your knowledge that the country was aware.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: What I became to my knowledge is from talking to some of the primary dealers, that they had got calls from somebody in the Public Debt Department in the Central Bank saying that, "How much will you give at 9.73?" So, that was the indication to the

market that the Central Bank was getting desperate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not only that, can somebody say that they are looking for Rs. 10 billion mentioning that, "This is the bench mark "

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is possible.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, can you not find out that their conversations are recorded in their phones.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Actually that is the problem. Our phones are not recorded in that department. We have to fix -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Governor, we have a problem with this company. They started this company about two years ago without anything and they went up to Rs. 200 billion worth of business. Also, your son-in-law was very close to the ex-Governor. He said he is not. Can you say the relationship that he had with the ex-Governor?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well. This gentleman married my daughter about three years ago. At that time also, there were issues that had been mentioned. I know for a fact that the ex-Governor's sister was sitting on the Board of this company. He had obtained the licence from the ex-Governor to become the primary dealer.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: His sister was a Board Member other than the father and the son.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right. And, there were obviously some relationships between the ex-Governor and this company. Anyway, I asked him, "I would look at what is going on", because, he was married to my daughter. That is what any father will do. And, he explained it in a way saying that, "This is the normal practice and there is nothing wrong here." So, when my daughter said she wants to marry him, I said, "Okay."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did the ex-Governor come to the wedding?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: He came, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did the ex-Governor's sister come to the wedding?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I cannot remember that but I would expect that she was invited.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who invited the ex-Governor for the wedding?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: There were over thousand guests.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How many guests?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Over 1,000 guests.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who invited for the ex-Governor for the wedding according to your knowledge?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was not I, Sir. I think it must have been from the groom's side.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, your son-in-law said that it could be you.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No. I did not invite the ex-Governor. I do not know the ex-Governor that well.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did he have a personal connection to the ex-Governor? Did he know them personally?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well, to the extent. He got the primary dealer licence, which a lot of people will not that he got that from the ex-Governor, means he must have met him and there must be some sort of connections.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, he said that he does not know him personally.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That, I am not sure. I think the fact that if he invited for the wedding, he must know him.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He said that he has only met him at cocktail party or somewhere else but he has never met. Has he gone to his house or have they visited his house? Do you have any knowledge that they had a connection?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I do not ask those questions because I do not get involved in their business activities.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Now, the problem is that they have arisen within two years to Rs. 200 billion and become the second company in the country.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The broad thing I want to state is, this whole process of appointing primary dealers is very arbitrary. There is no system and that applies to a lot of things in the Public Debt Department. This is one thing we want to fix. There are no unsolicited proposals anymore. Primary dealer applications have to be submitted through a process. We will advertise asking the people to apply.

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The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are you telling us that the ex-Governor just gave the licence to anybody that he thought he was fit enough to him?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: It appears to be the case, Madam.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, it was his discretion to give them the licence because from what we gathered when we basically interviewed Mr. Aloysius, he is sitting on the board where the ex-Governor's sister is the Chairperson. And, the ex-Governor's sister is sitting on his board where only the father and the son are sitting. There, the third member is the ex-Governor's sister. So, this tells us a story. This is why we want to know whether there could be information being leaked for this company from masses like what the Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe says to have arisen to where they are today. We want to know whether their information is going out of the Central Bank.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is possible, Madam. I cannot rule that out and we have to have an inquiry on this. Once this inquiry is finished, we will definitely commence that, but the ex-Governor had several relations in several banks, so I do not want to comment on those issues.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who are the other private primary dealers?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well, all the commercial banks have –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, no. I mean private primary dealers.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: There are about 4 or 5 private primary dealers.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you name them?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: One is Capital Alliance.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who is the head of that?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Mr. Ajith Fernando is the head of that company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, entrust securities?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think Mr. Chanuka Rathwatta is the main person in that. So, there are various individuals who have got these primary dealer licences outside the Commercial Bank, and those were awarded on a non-transparent basis.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, can you cancel these, if there is not any transparency? Is there a proper process to cancel these licences of private primary dealers?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have sought legal advice on whether these can be remedied by cancellation etc. We do not want to get into litigation, now, that this has been given. We do not want to bring the Central Bank disrepute. So, I am very cautious about just canceling them arbitrarily. But, definitely, we will have to have a due process of finding out whether they are fit and proper persons who are sitting in those companies. Secondly, if we are empanelling more primary dealers, we will have to have a transparent process of advertising for applications and then having a proper screening process.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If you find something suspicious with the Perpetual Treasuries Limited-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: We will cancel their licence. That process is going on.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Mr. Mahendran, you said that you have been serving in the Central Bank from 1983 to 1993 – ten years.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Now, we are in 2015. So, do you find that your colleagues are still serving there in the Central Bank?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. Mr. Ananda Silva and Mr. Samarasiri, both the Deputy Governors were in my batch.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Both Mr. Ananda Silva, Deputy Governor and Mr. Samarasiri, Deputy Governors were your batch mates. Is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, my batch mates.

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: Can you use the simultaneous interpretation facility?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, I think he can understand Sinhala.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I can understand, but, I prefer to be absolutely certain about what is being asked.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you study in Sinhala or in English?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I studied in English.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I have been asked a question and I clarified it before. Shall I clarify the question?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I made a disclosure to Parliament when I opened the Debate on the bond issue saying that Mr. Arjuna Mahendran was in the prefects' room when I was the head prefect of Royal College. I said this in Parliament before I started the Debate and then of course, he went to Oxford and I went to London.

The Chairman: There is no conflict of interest in that.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes. Then, our path ways went in different directions.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී මුලින්ම සඳහන් කළා, අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ ආරාධනයක් පරිදියි ආවේ, තනතුර භාරගත්තේ කියලා.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 'Direct placement ක්‍රමයේ dealersලාගේ ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා, ඒ නිසා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට යා යුතුයි' කියලා, මේ තනතුර භාරගත්තාට පසුව අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා ඔබතුමාට පැවසූ බව ඔබතුමා කිව්වා. ඒ අනුව ඔබතුමා විදේශ රටවල තිබෙන අද්දැකීම් ද සහිතව මෙය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළා. මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයා විධියට මේ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණය මොකක්ද? මේ දුරකථන ඇමතිතුම ආවේ නැත්නම් ඔබතුමා මේ system එක වෙනස් කරනවාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir, I would have changed it because as I said, the way that bond markets operate is that there has to be maximum transparency so that the confidence of the investors also grows. What I observed was, we were obtaining very low amounts of money in our local auctions in Sri Lanka for the bond auctions and that is one of the reasons I think the previous Governor had to go abroad to raise what I called, "International Sovereign Bonds" in the foreign markets. My objective by going to the auction system even if the Hon. Prime Minister did not tell me was to grow our local market so that we can raise as much money in Sri Lanka. I will tell you why, Sir. When you borrow aboard in Dollars, you are borrowing at say, 5 or 6 per cent in Dollars, but. because the Sri Lanka Rupee is depreciating every year, say, by about 5 per cent, you have to add that. The cost of that borrowing is very high. So, over 5, 10 years you are sometimes paying over 100 per cent effective interest rates whereas if you borrow in Rupees, the cost is much low. That is why I believe we should go for auctions.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Monetary Board එකේ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: At the moment Sir, it is the Secretary to the Treasury, the official Member. Then, there is Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan, who was in the Legal Draftsman's Department. She used to be on the Board under the previous Governor. She is the sole remaining Member of that Board. Then, there is Mr. R.A. Jayatissa, who was a former colleague of mine in the Central Bank who served for many years. He is now retired. There is one more Member who is about to be appointed, Mr. Krishantha Perera whose appointment has still not been made.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මා ඇහුවේ, පුද්ගලයන්ගේ නම් නොවෙයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන්, නීතිය අනුව Monetary Board එකේ සම්පූර්ණ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද කියලායි.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The position Sir, -we have an official Member from the Treasury- the Secretary to the Treasury and myself are the official Members and three independent people with knowledge of the economy and private sector.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ වසරේ පෙබරවාරි 23වන දා වන විට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සියලු සාමාජිකයන් පත් කරලාද තිබුණේ?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No. There were two vacancies that had not been filled.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සමස්ත සාමාජිකයන් 5දෙනායි. ඒ අතරින් දෙදෙනකු පත් කරලා නැහැ. එහෙම නේද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් සිටින තුන් දෙනා -මේ වෙලාවේ සිටින තුන්දෙනා- පත් කළේ කවදා ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, I was appointed on the 23rd of January. The Secretary to the Treasury was appointed around 10th of January this year and Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan was appointed many years ago. I am not sure of the exact date.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මේ auction එකට යෑම සහ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව පිළිබඳ තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා කියා කිව්වා. එය සාකච්ඡාවකදී ආ තීන්දුවක්ද? එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් Board Paper එකක් දැම්මාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Both, Sir. So, we discussed the proposal to have a 30-year bond auction and –

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මා ඇහුවේ එය නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා minute එකක් දුන්නා Board එක approve කළා කියලා.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම නම්, ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට Board Paper එකක් දැම්මාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I am not sure, Sir. It may have been a discussion or it may have been a Board Paper. I will have to check that. I cannot remember.

The Chairman: In that case, who should have initiated the Board Paper? In which Department?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: In that case, Sir, it should have been initiated by the relevant Department; the Public Debt Department but since this was a change in the system, it may not have come from that Department.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා Monetary Board එකේ එවේලේ සිටියා නේද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ Board එකට මේ යෝජනාව ආවේ කොහොමද? එය පුද්ගලයකු විසින් ගෙන ආවාද; එහෙම නැත්නම් Board Paper එකක් ඉදිරිපත් වුණාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I will have to check that and come back to you, Sir. I do not have the details with me right now.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, we are asking that from your basic knowledge. How did it come?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Okay. From my knowledge either a proposal would have come from me or I would have explained the reason why we need to move towards the auction-based system and then the other-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම හරි. නමුත්, මා අහන්නේ මේකයි. දැන් ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කළා, Monetary Board එක තමයි මෙය approve කළේ කියා.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Monetary Board එක approve කරන්න නම් එක්කෝ එය සාකච්ඡාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ; එහෙම නැත්නම් Board Paper එකක් දමන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: සාකච්ඡාවට ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙනවා.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is possible, Sir. But, I will have to verify this that I initiated it without a paper. I just discussed it with the Monetary Board Members under "Other Business". Normally, in other business, we do not have a Monetary Board Paper being placed. So, under "Other Business", I would have told the Committee that we should go for auctions.

The Chairman: It is your initiative. Is it not?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Board Paper එකක් දැම්මාද, නැද්ද කියා ඔබතුමාට මතකයක් නැද්ද? නමුත්, මේ යෝජනාව ඉදිරිපත් කළේ ඔබතුමා නේද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු යෝජනාව Monetary Board එක approve කළාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: "නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ කමිටුව" කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම මොකක්ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: He is one of the Deputy Governors of the Central Bank.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කමිටුව මොකක්ද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No. He is asking about the Committee.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, සියයට 5 පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ නැංවීම සඳහා-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. That is the Monetary Operations Committee.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ Committee එක appoint කරන්නේ කවුද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is appointed by the Monetary Board and it has designated Members who meet everyday to decide on the Monetary Policy and how it should be implemented.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ කමිටුවේ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The purpose of that Committee is to see that the Monetary Policy, interest rates and all the different policies are implemented smoothly and report to the Monetary Board.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Committee එකේ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද? එහි සිටින අය කවුරුන්ද? කමිටුවක් කිව්වාම, පුද්ගලයන් බොහෝ දෙනෙක් ඉන්න එපායැ.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right. You have the Director of Economic Research; you have I think the Director of International Operations; you have the Director of Domestic Operations. There are about six or seven Members - all Heads of Department of the Central Bank

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ කමිටුවේ සභාපති කවුද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ කමිටුව පත් කළේ කවදාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: This has been in existence for over ten years, may be even twenty years.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe, පත් කළේ කවදාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I will have to find that out. But he must have been there at least for about five to ten years.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා අවුරුදු 10ක් දිගටම ඒ තනතුරේද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: He has headed that Committee.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා සඳහන් කළා, primary dealersලාට මේ පත් වුණු අය පිළිබඳ පැහැදිලිකාවක් නැහැ කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව කියන්නේ, මහ බැංකුව තුළ මේ අයට licence දීම සඳහා වූ ක්‍රමවේදයක්, රෙගුලාසි, applications දැමීමක් වැනි දෙයක් නීත්‍යනුකූලව නැහැ කියලා ද?

අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා: එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතාමත් වගකීමකින් යුතුවද කියන්නේ? මහ බැංකුව තුළ මේ අයට සාමාජිකත්වය දීමේදී, ඒ කියන්නේ, licence දීමේදී ක්‍රමවේදයක්, නීතියක් නැතිව ද දීලා තිබෙන්නේ? ඒ කියන්නේ දැන් ඉන්න සියලුම අයට.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, what I am saying is that it is done through an unsolicited basis. Random applications are coming to the Central Bank and then, certain criteria are adopted.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Everybody is not given an opportunity.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. It is not publicly announced. It is through unsolicited proposals that they come in. Then, there are certain steps adopted to see that these companies can fulfil what is required of them. They have to have certain staff, minimum capital requirements et cetera. So, there are some procedures that are followed.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who decides that?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Eventually the Governor and the Monetary Board.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මා පැහැදිලිව අහන්නේ මේ අයට dealership එක දීමේදී unsolicited basis එක යටතේ හෝ මහ බැංකුව තුළ දැනට නීතියක් නැද්ද කියලයි.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, we have published guidelines on how primary dealers should behave, what is expected of them and what their responsibilities are.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ guidelinesවලට පරිභාහිරව ද මේ ඉන්න dealersලා 19 දෙනා ඉන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. අපි කථා කරන්නේ private dealersලා ගැන.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is being monitored. We have compliance officers who monitor their performance.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, දැනට මහ බැංකුවේ guideline එකක් හෝ නිසි ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැතිව -ඒ කියන්නේ, සුදුසුකම් නැති අයත් මේක තුළ ඉන්නවා කියලා. එතකොට ඒක හරිද?

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Unqualified people.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: All I said, Sir, was that the selection of these primary dealers was not done on a systematic basis, but that does not mean they are not qualified. They have to fulfil certain requirements to be qualified. The thing is that the method of choosing them was not transparent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Would you say that it is an arbitrary chosen?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. මා දිගින් දිගටම අහන්නේ මහ බැංකුව තුළ ඒ සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැද්ද කියලයි.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: There was no methodology for advertising and choosing primary dealers transparently.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Have there been instances when people have applied and then, they have been rejected?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think there are a lot of pending applications. But I am not sure about whether those have been rejected or not, but I know there are pending applications.

Unedited

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Pending for how long?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: For several years.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They had the qualifications, but they did not get.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Possibly, yes. But, I have not gone into those details, but I would imagine they-

The Hon. (Mr.) Rosy Senanayake: That is the question we need to look at.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, will you go into the details?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: If you can submit those pending applications which run back to ten years?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is important to know exactly who is being favoured here.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Probably within two months you cannot put all that right, Mr. Mahendran. We accept that within a matter of two months, you cannot put all these right by yourself. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to the Committee. Would you be able to send us that list which is pending for the past ten years or any less period?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Okay, I will do that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Not only pending applications, but also the applications turned down or whatever.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අධිපතිතුමනි, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව ඉල්ලීම පිළිබඳව තිබෙන ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, we have monthly meetings which are called, the "DDC" where basically the officials of the Ministry of Finance meet with the officials of the Central Bank and present a cash flow for the coming month. Say, if we are looking at the month of July, by the 10th of June there is a meeting held where the Finance Ministry officials convey their cash flow requirements to the officials of the Public Debt Department of the Central Bank.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට දැනට තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදයට පරිභාහිරව රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකුවේ වෙනමම මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා ඇවිල්ලා සාකච්ඡාවක් පැවැත්වූවාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Not to my knowledge, Sir. I mean, we have ad hoc meetings sometimes to look at specific projects which the Government wants to undertake and then, the Central Bank can participate in discussing how those projects can be funded.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මා අහන්නේ එවැනි සාකච්ඡාවක් තිබුණා ද, නැද්ද කියලයි.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I had several discussions like that.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ආවාට පස්සේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඇමතිවරු ඇවිල්ලා අවස්ථා කීයකදී සාකච්ඡා පැවැත්වූවාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Every week we have the Cabinet Subcommittee on Economic Affairs where this type of issues is discussed. That happens every week.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Cabinet Subcommittee එක කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Those are held in the Hon. Prime Minister's Office – the Temple Trees, Sir.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මහ බැංකුව තුළ සාකච්ඡාවක් තිබුණා ද? මහ බැංකුවට මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා ඇතුළු තවත් ඇමතිවරු සහභාගී වෙලා රැස්වීමක් පැවැත්වූවාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. I think it was about three or four times.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, මේ auction එකට කලින් තිබුණා ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. The day prior to this auction, there was a meeting about highways.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ highways පිළිබඳ meeting එකට කවුද සහභාගී වුණේ?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: There was the Hon. Minister of Finance, Secretary to the Treasury, the Hon. Minister of Highways and Investment Promotion, his Secretary, officials of the Road Development Authority and there was an advisor to the Hon. Prime Minister.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කවුද එයා?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Mr. Malik Samarawickrama.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Malik Samarawickrama is the adviser to the Hon. Prime Minister.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right, Madam. I think he is the senior adviser to the Hon. Prime Minister.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ සාකච්ඡාවේදී, රටේ මාර්ග සංවර්ධනය සඳහා අවශ්ය කරන මුදල් අවශ්යයි කියන එක ඔබතුමාට කිව්වා ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: What happened was that week, Sir, at the Cabinet Subcommittee on Economic Affairs, the issue of funding the highway came up and the Hon. Prime Minister requested these officials and myself to prepare a credible estimate of how much money is needed by the Ministry of Highways and Investment Promotion for the ongoing projects to be completed. He asked the Central Bank to prepare that estimate. So, we prepared that estimate and then we were instructed to meet on Thursday morning to show our estimates to the Hon. Minister of Finance, the Hon. Minister of Highways and Investment Promotion and the Senior Adviser to the Prime Minister.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට Monetary Board එකට මුදල් අමාත්යාංශයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කළ අවශ්යතාව ද Public Debt Department එක සලකා බලා තිබෙන්නේ? එහෙම නැත්නම් මේ සාකච්ඡාවෙන් පසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ අවශ්යතාව සඳහා ද මේ මුදල් හොයන්නේ?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, Sir. Raising public debt and all that is conducted separately of these discussions. Here we were only discussing the issue of whether those highway projects are required money and how much money is needed. So, this is a very separate meeting and it has nothing to do with the normal work of the Monetary Board.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් මේ සාකච්ඡාවට භාජනය වුණු auction එක පැවැති දවසේ ඔබතුමා නියෝජ්ය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරු දෙදෙනකු එක්ක ගියේ auction එක තිබෙන නැනටද, Public Debt Department එකටද? ඔබතුමා ගියේ කොතැනටද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: There is the Public Debt Department, I think, on the 10th floor and there is no specific auction room or anything. I just walked into the office of the Superintendent of Public Debt.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මෙවැනි auction එකක් පැවැත්වීමේදී manual එක අනුව මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ක්රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. Sir.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ manual එක මොකක්ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The manual sets out the procedure on how those bids should be accepted, how they should be prepared in a list and then, that list should be give to the Tender Board to make recommendations to the Governor on how to accept those bids.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා එතැනට ගියාම අසීමී මහත්මයා auction එකේ report එකක් ඔබතුමාගේ අතට දුන්නේ නැද්ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir. When I was talking to the Superintendent of the Public Debt Department, Mrs. Seneviratne, Dr. Aazim came there and he showed me this piece of paper.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මොකක්ද ඒ paper එක?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: So, there was a list of bids on that paper given in descending order of interest rates that had been bid by all the dealers.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Dealers ලාගේ නම් list එක ඔබතුමාට දුන්නා?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right, Sir.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Manual එක අනුව සාමාන්යයෙන් තිබෙන්නේ, මේ auction report එක Public Debt Department එකට ගිහිල්ලා, එතැනින් Tender Board එකට ගිහිල්ලා ඒ recommendation එක ඔබතුමාගේ කාමරයට එන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමා එතැනට ඇවිල්ලා ඒ report එක ගැනීම හරිද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, first of all, the reason I went to the Public Debt Department was to talk to the Superintendent, not to look at this report. The reason why I met her was to ask whether this Rs. 10 billion had been raised. In the process, she then called Dr. Aazim who brought this piece of paper to show that actually we could raise that Rs. 10 billion or in fact more. They were saying it can be Rs. 20 billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You did not ask for a paper. Did you not?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did not ask for a paper.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That was voluntarily.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: He showed it to me voluntarily.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Voluntarily එක ගෙනැත් දුන්නාම ඔබතුමා භාර ගත්තා?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You never asked for it.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I never asked for it. I asked how much was raised.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: I may refresh my mind. On that particular day, when Dr. Aazim mentioned these, he said he had this paper in his hand and gave that to the Governor.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is right. You met him on the corridors. Was it on the corridors that you met him, not inside the office?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, madam. Actually it was on the corridors just entering the Superintendent's office. But, we stopped on the corridor.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He was going to the Tender Board with the paper.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: He did not ask for it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The Governor has not asked for it.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are you sure?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Yes, he said that. He said that he was on his way.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I just to went to meet the Superintendent to ask how much have been raised.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He said that he was on his way.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Voluntarily එක ගෙනැත් දුන්නාම ඔබතුමා භාර ගත්තා? ඒක බැලුවාද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, I looked at it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: For how long did you look at it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did not look at it for even one minute. I just saw how much is the total and they said that it is 20 billion and then, I asked as to how much you can realistically raise if you give 12.5 per cent which is what we advertised. Then, he showed me that if you cut off here, you can raise 10 billion. That is all and then, we ended the conversation.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: In that list of bidders.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You categorically say that you did not ask that piece of paper.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did not ask for anything.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you ask for any information as to what are the bidders?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, I did not look for the names of the bidders or anything like that. All I wanted to see was that we raise that Rs. 10 billion. So, I asked if you raise this Rs. 10 billion, how much do you have to pay, what is the interest rate and is it justifiable? Then, they said there are dummy bids. I said to take those dummy bids out and tell me how much you can raise at a realistic basis given that we have advertised at 12.5 per cent. They said that we can raise Rs. 10 billion. That is all and I said that it is fine and I would recommend you that you go ahead with that, discuss it with the Tender Board Committee and come back to me.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It was also mentioned that you had said to go by the previous interest rates which was 11.75 per cent and to go below that.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, that is right. I was mentioning that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the previous interest rate?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is 11.75 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: For how many billions is it?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That could have been from two billion for my memory.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I have been in this inquiry and to my knowledge, raising 10 billion at that rate is much greater than raising 2 billion at 10.75.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I agree.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it profitable for the Government because in our mind, we feel that-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is compared to the first bid on 14th November.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you explain that because the mindset that I have on this whole matter is, was there a loss to the Government? We have to look at the past patterns.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We were made to understand that this is the first time that it has gone up to 11.73 per cent and it could have easily been done at 9.35 per cent. That is the knowledge we got from Parliament and elsewhere.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Hon. Members, that is complete nonsense. In the auctions in the past, it was 11.75 that was given to the EPF. Then, they have sold some of those bonds artificially privately again to the EPF.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is also to the EPF.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is also the EPF at 9.73 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It has been 11.75 per cent by pushing also.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was down to around 9.73 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, 10.75?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: There was a transaction in between. Over two or three months, they have gradually brought it down by one per cent every time.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: To whom was it given at 11.75 per cent?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was also given to the EPF at the auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You pushed it and gave it to the EPF at 11.75 per cent.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right. Then, they have asked the EPF to bid at a lower rate of interest subsequently through the private placement channels to show that these rates have come down.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The EPF is also from the same bank, the Central Bank.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Exactly, Sir. That is why I say that the EPF is also loosing as a result of this.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, you are telling the same Central Bank to bid at a lower rate and you are manipulating the market.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right, Sir. In fact, there should be a Chinese wall. In my opinion, the EPF should not be allowed into these auctions. If you look at the stock market, the EPF cannot directly go to the stock market. They have to go through brokers. But, we are allowing them to bid directly at the bond market.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We hear of malpractices because when you do that; you give inside information that the EPF is going to buy the stock and we know couple of top players in the past and they have been making so much of money. The stock market was coming from a high point of 100 to two.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: The name of the Perpetual Treasuries Limited has been linked to these playing in the past.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are you aware that the Perpetual Treasuries Limited was involved in EPF rackets before?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have heard that rumour and have seen it being published everywhere. But, this is something that is being investigated by the SEC at the moment and we are cooperating as much as possible with them to establish whether that is correct or not.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What had been the advice of your daughter after all these?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is an unfair question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I have a question, Hon. Governor.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Can I just make a quick comment?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Please, give me just one minute. Since you brought the daughter up, do your daughter and your son-in-law live with you?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, madam.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: We wanted to know it because if you live in the same house, you might be talking.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, I do not discuss these with either my daughter or my son.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do they live with you? That is all I want to know.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay. They do not live with you.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I would bring this to your notice. It is the Domestic Borrowing Programme for March, 2015. Do you have this document?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think I know what you are talking about, Sir.

Unedited

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: That is the Public Debt Programme for the month of March. That is what I have.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is being scribbled down here and by whom? That is on page no. 11.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think those are my comments, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What are the comments? Can you explain them one by one?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I also need a copy of that document.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The officials of the General Treasury and the officials of the Central Bank meet every month.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the date? Is it 2nd of March?

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: You can find the date at the bottom of the minute.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is the 2nd of March. But, I think it was written before that and it could have been around 27th of February.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it after the auction?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, I think it was on 27th of February. It may have been in that morning of the auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What has been there?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Basically, it states that at this meeting held on 27th February, decided to make the following recommendations regarding the Government borrowing. They basically tell you how much is to be raised through the issue of Treasury Bills and treasury bonds. They decide on the amount based on the Treasury's calculations on the cash flow.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Does it say for it to be raised through EPF, ETF and NSB-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is my comment, Sir. What I have said there is first of all to raise 40 billion through the issue of treasury bonds advertising 10 billion each. That is the first point. Earlier, they were advertising one billion each. I asked to raise it to ten billion each for each auction so that we get more.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are talking about auctions.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is not the private placement.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Not private placement.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: That was not mentioned here. It says, "Raise Rs. 40 billion through issue of 20, 30, 50 years of Treasury Bonds 10 billion each."

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right. That is assumed. Sir, it is an auction. Then amount is announced. That is why I said that.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Yes. But, here is the programme. The programme itself says, "2nd March 2015: It should be primary auction on 27.02.2015 for 1,000 million and direct placement institutional market sources 10,550."

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right. So, I was contradicting that because as you can see the direct placements are twelve times the size of the auction amount. So, I said, "Raise 40 billion through issue of 20, 30 10 billion each. When they read it they will know that the 10 billion should be the amount for the auction.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Sir, is it correct because I can see the issue here is of a transition and if you are going for the private placement, you always will advertise a lower amount because you get the best interest rate and then you go for the private placement to captive sources largely at that rate or a lower rate. But, if you are going for the auction system, you should actually put the whole amount for auctioning. That will be the fair system; the whole amount.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Exactly.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, what has happened in this transitional auction is the Public Debt Department has advertised based on the old philosophy on a lower amount even though you want to raise a higher amount because they are not fully conversant with the decision of the Board that you are actually going to insist on taking through the auction. Therefore, you go there because you said the minutes are not ratified and not circulated actually to convey to the Public Dept Department. Actually, you are going to do in this particular way. Is my understanding correct?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Absolutely. Sir. Since the Board's minutes were going to be sent to the Department around 4th or 5th of

March, I said for that week where they were trying to raise 41,570 million, "Raise 40 billion through the issue of 20, 30, 50 year Bonds of 10 billion each at each auction." That was what I intended and they would have understood that from this minutes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Sir, in the second minute, it says. "EPF/NSB/SLIC to be"

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: "asked to stabilize rate."

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Yes, "asked to stabilize rate."

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right, Sir.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: You should stabilize the rate by issuing Bonds especially to EPF, NSB and SLIC. So, that means that this should be a direct placement.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right and as you saw, 40 billion through the auction and there is a balance 1.5 billion which we could have done through direct placement to ask them to stabilize. That is the normal conduct. That is how this happen.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: My misunderstanding is that to stabilize 40 billion market with EPF, NSB and SLIC.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is not correct, Sir. We will not intervene in the auction. Auction is a public bidding process. We should not interfere with that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is what we want to get cleared.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what we want to get clarified.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේ දී කිව්වා, "මහ බැංකුව තුළ -කුමන මට්ටමේ හෝ- සමහරවිට වැරදි වැඩ කරන අයත් ඉන්නවා" කියලා.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ අනුව ඔබතුමා හිතනවා ද Perpetual Treasuries කියන dealer සියයට 75ක් පමණ auction එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ එවැනි නිලධාරියකු මේ අයට කොරතුරු දීම නිසා කියලා.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is possible, Sir. We have to prove that, and that is why I want to start recording the telephone conversations in the Central Bank. At the moment, we do not do that. We do not look at the hand phone calls.

The Chairman: We want to recommend it.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකුව මට්ටමෙන් පරීක්ෂණයක් පවත්වන්න ඔබතුමා තීරණය කරලා නැද්ද?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: We want to do that, but we are waiting for this Committee to come out with its findings and we will then-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ Committee එක ඔබතුමාගේ අභ්‍යන්තර පරීක්ෂණවලට බාධාවක් නැහැ. ඇයි ඔබතුමා මේකට පරීක්ෂණයක්-

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Those are also ongoing, Sir. They are going in parallel and of course, when your findings come then we also see that. You guide us how we should proceed further.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පරීක්ෂණ කමිටුව පත් කළේ කවුද? පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වෙනවා නම් කවුද කමිටුවේ ඉන්නේ?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, we already have a Legal and Compliance Department. This is another thing that I would like to clarify.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I want to question you on that as well. Who abolished the Legal Department?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඉවර නැහැ.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, we do not have to form a committee for this purpose. In a normal bank, there is legal and compliance department.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නමුත් ඔබතුමාගේ අර සාකච්ඡාවේ දී කිව්වා, training, Legal Department එක මේකේ නැහැ කියලා.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට කොහොමද මේ ගැන පරීක්ෂණ කරන්නේ?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have formed the Legal Department.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ සම්බන්ධව පරීක්ෂා කරන්න තවම කමිටුවක් පත් කරලා නැහැ?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, Sir. We are waiting for the Legal Department to be set up to do that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Mr. Chairman, one last question with your permission.

Now do you have any idea, after you assumed duties as you said in 23rd of January, up to date how much funds you raised by way

of issuing Treasury Bonds, Sovereign Bonds and the Development Bonds altogether.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, I have those figures with me.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Can you give us some breakdown of that?

The Chairman: Mr. Mahendran, have you finished?

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: This is the last question for which he is answering.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: This is as of the end of March 2015. By the end of March 2015, we have raised the total through the auctions- that is auction methodology- for both Treasury Bills and Bonds Rs. 144 billion and through private placement- I am sorry. I have to add these up. Anyway, I can give the figures.

Sir, till the end of March 2015, we have raised Rs. 256 billion through auctions and Rs. 236 billion through private placements.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Rs. 256 billion through auctions

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: And Rs. 236 billion through private placements, the bulk of which was done in January.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, the total amount is about Rs. 492 billion. This is only from January to the end of March. Is it from the first of January or after assuming duties as the Governor?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, after 23rd of January

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: From 23rd of January to end March 2015 you have raised Rs. 256 billion through auctions, Treasury Bonds and private placements Rs, 236 billion. The total is Rs. 492 billion. So, apart from Treasury Bonds, is there any other way of raising more funds?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: The other way is to go for International Sovereign Bonds which are raised overseas.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Can you tell us how much you have raised?

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: In this period we did not raise any. I purposely wanted to minimize those Bonds because as I explained to you when you borrow in dollars you are paying too much.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But my question is when you come next day, can you bring us up to date how much you have raised from 23rd of January up to date the Treasury Bonds, Sovereign Bonds and if there is any Treasury Bills and Development Bonds. The total funds you raised from 23rd January up to date.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Okay.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Mahendran, thank you very much. Today, we want to adjourn now. My officials will communicate with you to fix the time and a date. Thank you very much for your response.

Dr. Arjuna Mahendran: Thank you, Sir.

(Witness withdrew.)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ කළමනාකාරිනී එම්. එස්. එම්. පී. ප්‍රනාන්දු මහත්මිය කැඳවන ලදී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ කළමනාකාරිනී එම්. එස්. එම්. පී. ප්‍රනාන්දු මහත්මිය ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි document එකක් ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමිය ඒ original document එක ගෙනාවාද? ඔබතුමිය ගෙනැවිත් තිබෙන ලියවිල්ල මොකක්ද? දිනය සහ එම ලියවිල්ලේ අඩංගු දේ?

එම්.එස්.එම්.පී. ප්‍රනාන්දු මහත්මිය: මට රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිය විසින් කිව්වා 2014 සහ 2015 අපි Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබන වාර්තාවල originals ගේන්න කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමිය දැන් ඒ වාර්තා ඔක්කොම හාර දෙනවා නේද?

එම්.එස්.එම්.පී. ප්‍රනාන්දු මහත්මිය: Originals බලලා ආපසු ලබා දෙයි කියලා හිතනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Originals බලලා, ඒවායේ පිටපත් ගන්න.

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, original document එක බලලා true copy කියලා ගත්තාම හරි.

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සභාපතිතුමා: හොඳයි, බොහොම ස්තූතියි.

සාක්ෂිකාරිය නික්ම ගියාය.

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SPECIAL SUB COMMITTEE OF COPE TO LOOK INTO THE BOND ISSUES OF THE SRI LANKA CENTRAL BANK

Tuesday, 23rd June, 2015

PRESENT:

The Hon. DEW Gunasekara (Chairman)
The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake
The Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha
The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne
The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe
The Hon. A.D. Susil Premajayantha
The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna

Mr. J.R. Gajaweera Arachchige, Director (Legislative Services)

Mr. M.E. Lionel Fernando, Advisor to the Chairman

In attendance:

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne, Acting Auditor-General
Ms. L.S.I. Jayaratna, Superintendent of Audit
Ms. E.A.N.P. Edirisinghe, Superintendent of Audit
Mr. E.M.K.M. Padmalal, Superintendent of Audit

(Mr. Arjuna Mahendran, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, was called in.)

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *affirmed and examined.*

The Chairman: Good morning, Mr. Mahendran.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Good morning, Sir.

The Chairman: Shall we start?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you. I must apologize that I was not here, last week. I got here only last night. I went through the transcript. It was fascinating. Tell me, Mr. Governor from what you say the decision to go for what is termed "auction" was being suggested very strongly by the Prime Minister. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, indeed, Sir. This is the policy decision that was taken by the Hon. Prime Minister.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is the Prime Minister allowed to take such policy decisions?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was in the interest of the transparency of the system.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, my question is that when you take decisions affecting the economy they are generally done by an official body. They are not done by an individual politician. The body may be appointed by the politician. Would you agree that that is the correct way? The Prime Minister has no expertise in Economics.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: There were discussions at the Cabinet Subcommittee on Economic Affairs on this subject for several weeks prior to the Monetary Board -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When did it start?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It started around the middle of February.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, that is two weeks, not several weeks?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, two or three weeks.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Be precise, Mr. Mahendran.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Okay. The Cabinet Subcommittee meets on Tuesdays in the afternoons. I would say that from the second week of February, in the afternoon of Tuesdays, this matter was brought up.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That was on the 09th of February.

Mr. **Arjuna Mahendran:** Yes. that is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You agreed with this decision?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

Unedited

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He based his argument on the claims that several private dealers were complaining?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who were these private dealers who were complaining about this?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Their names were not mentioned.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The names were not mentioned and you did not think to ask.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did my own sounding-out of some of the primary dealers and I found that what he had said was accurate.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who were these primary dealers you sounded out?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I spoke to some of the banks; the People's Bank, the Commercial Bank and the Hatton National Bank and some private dealers. Acquity Securities was one of those that I consulted. I found that there was a concern that large state owned institutions particularly the EPF were being brought into these private placements, even into the auctions and as a consequence they were crowding out Bids that were coming from some of the primary dealers at these auctions and even in the private placements.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But in your evidence, you gave the impression that there was no way in which these non-state institutions felt deprived; because we asked you and you answered that there were no complaints that they did not have access to this market.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did not make that statement, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Well, I will find it for you. But, I have another question. Was there an objection to being crowded out or to having to work on lower interest rates?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well, the objection was that they felt that the market mechanism was not working. It was a system that was dominated by private placements and auctions had not been held since September last year, and as a consequence, the feeling was that interest rates that prevailed in the secondary markets did not reflect accurately the expectations of market participants on a variety of factors that affect interest rates.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Let us put it bluntly. Did not reflect expectations means, they **thought it was** too low? I am asking you a very simple question.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, I think, there was a perception that interest rates were lower than they should be.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What was the decision of the Monetary Board on the 23rd of February?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: On the 23rd of February, the Monetary Board decided that we should move towards an auction-based system and start with an auction of thirty year bonds.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I mean, you had always had auction-based systems. As far as I can see looking at the records, there were always auctions and the decision to a so-called, move to an auction based system is not reflected in the Minutes. The Minute simply says that they decided to go for an auction.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is not a question of moving. The so-called policy change that you tell us the Prime Minister had from the 09th of February was not brought to the attention of the Monetary Board on the 23rd.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The context of the discussion which may not be reflected in the Minutes was that about 80 per cent of issuances of Treasury Bonds were through private placements and only 20 per cent was going through auctions which is in complete contrast to accepted practices in all developed countries throughout the world.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Sorry. That is your view. Accepted practice all over the world is not perhaps what we should follow in the Sri Lankan context. We have had several experts here telling us why the mixed system in operation – they used the words "direct placements" was perhaps in the interest of the country. That is a separate issue. The fact that you decided on the advice of the Prime Minister to go for a different system is not reflected at all in the Minutes of the decision made by the Monetary Board. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was because I believed in that decision. I was part of making that decision. It was not just the Prime Minister's decision.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am sure you were a part of that decision. You

implemented it. My next question is this. Are you aware that as a result of the procedure adopted, interest rates would go up?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: There was that expectation in the market, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There was that expectation in the market?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, you knew when you took the decision on the 27th of February, to go for auctions for the entire amount you needed that interest rates would go up?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is a reasonable conclusion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Answer is,"Yes."

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But the Monetary Board decision on 23rd February was not to raise interest rates. Am I correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was a separate decision, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is not a separate decision, Mr. Mahendran. If the Monetary Board reaches a clear decision which is that interest rates should not be raised and the Governor then takes action in a way that inevitably reached to the raising of interest rates, the Governor is flouting a decision of the Monetary Board.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I disagree, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You disagree. Tell me why knowing that interest rates would go up, knowing that the Monetary Board had said, "do not raise interest rates", you went ahead with instructions to take the entire amount needed on auction. Can you explain why knowing that interest rates would go up, you did this?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The Government needed the money, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: We know the Government needed the money. There are other ways of getting the money without flouting the instructions of the Monetary Board.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I made a statement at the last session when I was here, Sir. The other measures were not available to us. The Treasury Bill limit was almost reached for Central Bank purchases of Treasury Bills.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Almost reached?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was Rs. 850 billion and we were close to Rs. 845 or thereabouts so that avenue was effectively closed. It would have sent very wrong signals to the market which would have actually exacerbated upward movements in interest rates.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. What we heard from experts is that while auctions are very good, it is necessary to discipline the natural interest of dealers to raise interest rates. You may disagree with that philosophy.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You disagree with that philosophy?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I do.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You do. So you feel that, the mechanisms in place in the Central Bank to use direct placements as a method of not allowing free flow to market forces was wrong?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did you raise this issue in any policy discussions at the Monetary Board?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes indeed!

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What was the decision?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The decision was to go for auction system.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is not reflected in the Minutes. The Minutes must say that there is a change to go 100 per cent for auctions. Now when this happened, given your keenness, did you not check as to what was offered in the auction by the PDD?.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The advice I got from the Public Debt Department was that auctions would not be a success and we would not be able to raise adequate funds through the auction methodology. So I differed to their advice and we conducted the auction to test the water so to speak.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Right! I will stop for now because my colleagues say they have to go.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Mr. Mahendran, at the last session you said that you were called to accept this position by the Prime Minister.

Unedited

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So before you came here what were you doing there?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I was in Dubai, Sir. I was working as the Chief Investment Officer in the largest Bank in the U.A.E. called the Emirates NBD.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: And last time you said that you are still a citizen of Singapore?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: According to the law of Singapore, you are not allowed to get dual citizenship in any other country.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You are a Singaporean citizen. Normally, the Governor of the Central Bank takes an oath when he or she assumes duties?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, Sir, I do not think there is a requirement for that.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Is that so?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. I received a letter from His Excellency the President appointing me. But I was not administered an oath.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But what I have collected is that that is the tradition where the Governor of the Central Bank to take oaths before/when he or she assumes duties as the Governor.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have not come across that requirement, Sir. But I stand to be corrected.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: You were not told that by your other officials?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No. I was not informed by anybody.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: It means that you did not take oaths as the Governor of the Central Bank?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Now, referring to the questions posed to you by The Hon. (Prof.) RajivaWijesinha and even I posed some questions to you on the last occasion. You said by end of March you have issued bonds worth Rs. 492 billion.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir. I have to check the numbers but that sounds accurate, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: I told you to bring all the reports or any records. Up to date, how many bonds have been issued from 23rd of January?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have that data with me.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: With the breakup and all?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: What is the total amount?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The total amount is, for Treasury Bills it is Rs. 589.9 billion, and for Treasury Bonds it is Rs. 358.8 billion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: How much?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Rs. 358.8 billion.

The Hon.(Prof.) RajivaWijesinha: That is on bonds?.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is on bonds. For Treasury Bills, it is 589.9

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is over the limit, you just mentioned to me.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, Sir. The limit is Rs. 850 billion. Just to clarify that limit only applies to how much the Central Bank can purchase of the total amount of Treasury Bills in circulation. This amount is to the whole market.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did you mention about 450 and 430? You said that you had almost reached the limits.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was 850.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: And you were at?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: On that day we were close to 850. In addition to that Sir, we have raised in SLDBs, Sri Lanka Development Bonds, US dollars 890.8 million. And the International Sovereign Bond we have raised Rs. 650 million Dollars.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: So, if you convert these US Dollars 890.8 million and 650 then what is the total amount you have raised up to date in rupee terms?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have to calculate that, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Yes, Rs. 948.7 billion Treasury Bills and Bonds and 1.5 billion US Dollars- 1540.8.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Close to Rs.1.2 trillion approximately.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think it is more than that. 890 plus 650 is 1.5 something. The 1.5 something into 1.3 has to be 195 something.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: The total amount of US Dollars 1540.8 million. If you multiply by whatever the rates 133 or 132 then you get the rupee equivalent.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, you are right. I took it as 125. Actually, at 130 it is close to 1.5 trillion, say.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: 1540 into 130.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Let us see again just to make sure, 1540 means 1.5 billion Dollars into 130. So it is nearly 2 trillion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is only foreign?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: This is the total, Sir.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But you have to add 940 Treasury bills and Treasury bonds.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You have to add the rupee amounts to that.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: To the Dollar amount?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Dollars, I am getting a different number, Sir,

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Altogether how many Dollars?Is it 1.5 billion?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: About 1.5 billion Dollars.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe:1.5 into 130. That comes to about 200.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Okay, we will calculate and see. It will take some time for the calculation. It is okay, Mr. Mahendran. We can calculate and see. There is no problem. On the last occasion you said that you deviated from direct placements to auctions. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Okay. You raised Rs. 948.7 billion through Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds. So, direct placement-wise and auction-wise can you give us a breakup of that?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Treasury Bills, you get on auctions?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: They are all done on auctions. The Treasury Bill is entirely done on auctions. It is only the bonds -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Leave that apart. We have to take the bonds

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: We have to take only the bonds.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly, take the bonds and say the breakup from when?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I would say that the whole of January and February it was done on the methodology of private placements. So, there, the total comes to 36.7 billion and thereafter in March onwards we have been entirely focusing on auctions. There have been no private placements.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Since February 27th ?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, February 27th. If I remove that 10 billion from the private placements, then we would have got 26 through private placements for this year. We have done about 322 billion through auctions this year and 26.7 billion through private placements in the first two months of the year.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: From auctions?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: From auctions, it is 322.5 billion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: 87 million–

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Billion?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, SLRs billion

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: - on March 16th was by private placements. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That would all have been by auctions. We have not done any private placement since the 27th of February.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Even small amounts?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, small amounts. We completely stopped it.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Earlier, with the practice of as you know, going for more on private placements, the average interest rate is somewhere around 9.35 per cent.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well, on my calculations-this maybe of interest to you– the average borrowing cost in 2015. up to the end of May is 8.9 per cent.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Is that the average?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Average for all types of borrowings.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: From which date?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: From January 1st to 31st May.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it this year?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: This year. Sir, last year, for the corresponding period, it was 9.21 per cent. So, our average borrowing cost has fallen this year.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Even with the auctions. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Even with the auctions.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What about the cost of the auctions? That is, including the interest rate also for the international bids. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, our question was not this general figure. It was the cost of interest for the bonds.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Is it specifically for the 30-year bond?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, no.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Is it for everything?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: From March onwards, what has been the average interest rate?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, .I do not have that figure but –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, you should.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have it from the 1st of January. I will have to calculate it from March onwards.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. From what you have been told so far and from your evidence as well, the interest rate between January and February was quite low. I mean, less than 10 per cent.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, that is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, the interest rate of 22 per cent or whatever was at about 10 per cent or less. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, but also the magnitudes that were raised in January and February were much smaller than what we raised subsequently.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I know. But, the interest rate on bonds subsequent to that is well over 10 per cent. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Not necessarily. It has come down in the last two months.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When was the decision taken by the Monetary Board to reduce interest?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The decision to reduce interest rate was taken somewhere in the middle of March. That was actually a reduction in the short-term rates which do not necessarily translate into the long-term rates because the long-term is determined by the auctions and the short-term –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, as you know, the Monetary Board took a decision which in practice ended up being flouted on 23rd February not to raise rates. Is it correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, this was taken subsequently in March.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, no. He said, in March, they took the decision and the 27th was prior to that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, no. What I have just pointed out is, on the 23rd there was a decision not to raise rates.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Was there a decision?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, Sir, there was no such decision.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: By the Monetary Board? We have just seen the Minutes.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: There was a recommendation for this dual-tier interest rate structure, what is called the repurchase market which is effectively the Monetary policy rate to be amalgamated into one rate. So, we had a very curious structure of short-term interest rate.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, I am –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let him finish.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am sorry. You ask those questions later.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let him finish because I need to know the answer.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You ask those questions later because I want to finish my -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let him finish the answer. We need to know the answer.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I asked one question earlier to which– I am sorry. I asked this very simple question to which your answer was, "yes"-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let him answer. I will get the answer for you. How can you obstruct when the answer is given?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Your answer a few minutes ago was that the Monetary Board, on the 23rd of February, took a decision that the interest rate should be kept at the same level as before.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is on record and you granted that. Then, as a result of the action you took, interest rates went up. Was this formerly approved by the Monetary Board or did they simply take notice of the action taken on the 27th of February?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, first of all, it is not entirely accurate to say that the interest rates went up. We had a two-tier system; 5 per cent and 6.5 per cent. That was unified at 6.5 per cent on the 27th of February by the Monetary Operations Committee.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: We saw that.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Thereafter, it was ratified by the Monetary Board at its next meeting.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The decision was taken on the 23rd and ratified at the March meeting. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: On the 23rd the decision was to keep it as it is, that is let the two-tier rate continue but on the 27th, there was a lot of pressure on the foreign currency and the Monetary Operations Committee recommended to me that we should amalgamate the two at 6.5 per cent.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Right. That decision was formerly taken on the 2nd of March. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: On the 27th of February and it was ratified by the Monetary Board at its subsequent meeting.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. but because of the action to accept 10 billion on auction entirely, the interest rates for bonds went up on that date? Is it

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. The Minutes of the Monetary Board with reference to this transaction simply record the decision taken to take the. 10 billion on bonds. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They did not in anyway engage in any discussion on the consequences of this raising interest rates. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: There was a discussion on the consequences but it was explained that this rate that was proposed unofficially by some officials of the Public Debt Department of 9.35 per cent was an artificial rate and there was no acceptance for that in the market.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, this was explained on this day. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There were just three Members on the Monetary Board on that day. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Right. Then, subsequent to that, was there a decision formerly taken by the Monetary Board to work towards reducing interest rates?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: 6.5 per cent short-term rate which I mentioned earlier was reduced by 50 basis points somewhere in the third week of March, I believe. Then, I was on leave.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That was when you were on leave?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: When I was on leave.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Right. Who made that recommendation?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The recommendation came from the Senior Deputy Governor who was Acting Governor at that point.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who was that?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Mr. Samarasiri.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: In April, was there a decision taken by the Monetary Board on reducing rates given that inflation was dropping?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was the main decision. After that, there has not been any decision to cut rates.

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The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: April 15th, there was no such decision. You cannot recall any such decision. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I cannot recall any such decision. It may have been in April. I mean, my dates may be wrong. I can get you the exact date.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You were not on leave in April. Is it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I was on leave for most of April.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: April as well?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. Where were you living when The Hon. Prime Minister first raised this question on the 09th February?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I was living in my parents' house.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You were not in the Governor's bungalow?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Governor's bungalow was in a considerable state of disrepair. I could not really move in there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who else lives in your parents' house?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: My parents and I.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Is that all?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. At any stage did you live with your daughter and son-in-law during this two months period?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, never.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: As you have motioned, your son-in-law was one of the primary dealers –

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: He used to be until he resigned.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Did you ever discuss with him, at any stage, the desirability of moving to a full auction system?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Not at all.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Never?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Never.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Absolutely never?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Absolutely not.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Could he have discussed with other people because he clearly has other contacts?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Possibly. He had very intimate contacts with the Central Bank before I became the Governor and he had sister of the former Governor on his Board et cetera. So, I would imagine he had those sorts of discussions probably continued to do so-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Because the Bank itself, until February 27th was of the view that they would continue with the previous practice.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The impression was that they would continue. But I had had very significant discussion with the senior officials of the Public Debt Department and the Deputy Governors on the need to move away from the private placement system.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But the Public Debt Department had made a recommendation that they just accept Rs. 1 billion, Rs. 2 billion or Rs. 3 bilion – I think they told us Rs. 3 billion – on the auction.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That was their decision until you suggested making a change.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I would not say that they were fixed in that view. We were suggesting, when I had a conversation with them that we go for 2.6 or -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But that was their recommendation which they said was formalized by them because their internal meeting had finished. Correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No. They had not had that meeting. The Tender Board had not met at that point.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Not the Tender Board, the PDD. The PDD told us–it is open for you to say that it may be incorrect– that they gave a recommendation to the Tender Board. Their original recommendation was Rs. 2.6 billion to be taken on the auction.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I do not believe that was casting stones at that point-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It was not casting stones because obviously you uncast it.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: And they had not even come up with that number as well–

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They told us that they had come up with that number at which point you actually having looked at this suggested taking Rs.20 billion. Correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I asked them what would be the consequences of accepting the whole Rs. 20 billion that was on offer.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But that was how they put it. But you suggested taking all Rs. 20 billion and they pointed out that there were adverse consequences.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Correct.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, your initial suggestion of Rs. 20 billion - because once you looked at this sheet, you could see the way that the interest rate was rising even more but despite your seeing from this that taking Rs. 20 billion would lead to much greater rise in interest rate, you suggested that.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No. At that point I had not seen the sheet. So, I asked them what would be the consequences and they said that there were a lot of dummy bids there. So, we should ignore those and go for a more reasonable amount.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawana wants five minutes. I will come back.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා පෙර දිනයේ පැමිණි දවසේ සඳහන් කළා, Monetary Board එකට Board Paper එකක් දැම්මාද, නැත්නම් වාචිකව කිව්වාද කියලා ඔබතුමාට මතක නැහැ කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව බලලා කියන්නම් කියලා කිව්වා. ඔබතුමා ඒ පිළිබඳව බැලුවාද? ඒ කියන්නේ මේ auction එකට යෑම පිළිබඳව ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුව ගත්තේ Monetary Board එකෙන්. ඔබතුමා අපට එදා Board Paper එක දුන්නා.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙතුමත් ඒ Board Paper එකේ decision එක පිළිබඳව අද විමසීමක් කළා. එතකොට එදා මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් විමසීමක් කළා මේකට Board Paper එකක් දැම්මාද, නැතිනම් ඔබතුමා යෝජනාවක් කළාද කියලා. එදා කිව්වා "මේ පිළිබඳව හරි මතකයක් නැහැ, ඒ පිළිබඳව බලන්නම්" කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව බැලුවාද?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, I have checked that.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මොකක්ද එහි තත්ත්වය?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I made that suggestion verbally. So, there was no Board Paper.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When was it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was on the 23rd of February.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට අමතරව අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් dealers ලාගේ තිබෙන complaints සම්බන්ධව වාචිකව ඔබතුමාට කවදාද කිව්වේ?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: As I told you, Sir, that was discussed at the Cabinet Sub Committee on Economic Affairs - starting around 9th of February.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහි ප්‍රතිඵලයක් විධියට ඔබතුමා dealersලාට දුරකථනයෙන් ද කථා කළේ? People's Bank ඇතුළු- කාටද ගත්තේ? කොහොමද ඒ තොරතුරු ගත්තේ?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I contacted some dealers. In most case not directly but through officials of the Central Bank to ask them whether this was the case and what was their view.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මොන මොන ආයතනවල කාටද කතා කළේ? මොනවාද ඒ අය කළ චෝදනාවන්?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: As I said earlier, Sir, I think the People's Bank was contacted, the Commercial Bank, the Hatton National Bank and also Acuity Securities Ltd. In three of those cases, I did not call them directly but I got officials of the Bank to call them separately and find out.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Who are the officials?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I asked the former Head of the Public Debt Department, Mr. Dhammika Nanayakkara and also I think the Head of the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Department Mrs. Daulagala.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එම අය ඔබතුමාට දැනුම් දුන්නාද, ඒ අදාළ මහජන බැංකුව මේ පිළිබඳ මොනවා හරි ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා කියලා කිව්වා කියලා.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: What they told me was that they felt that there had not been an auction for a long time and therefore the interest rates in the market were probably not accurate.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. නැහැ. මම දැන් විමසුවේ, primary dealers ලාගේ complaints තිබෙනවා කියලා Prime Minister ඔබතුමාට කිව්වා නේද කියලා?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ අනුව ඔබතුමා මෙම primary dealers ලා සම්බන්ධව මෙය සත්‍යයක් ද කියලා සොයලා බැලුවා. මෙය සාධාරණයි.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා කියනවා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් මෙහින් තමයි මෙය සොයා බැලුවේ කියලා.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ කුමන නිලධාරීන් ද මේ පිළිබඳව සොයා බැලුවේ? ඒ සොයා බැලූ නිලධාරීන් මොන බැංකුවේ කුමන නිලධාරීන්ද? එම නිලධාරීන් කියපු අඩුපාඩුකම් මොනවාද? ඒ පිළිබඳවයි මම විමසන්නේ?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I will have to get the data on who they contacted because I do not have the names and the designations right now. But I have sufficient confidence that what was conveyed to me by the Central Bank officials was accurate.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Private placements වල තිබුන අඩුපාඩුකම් මොනවාද?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The basic comment was that the way interest rates were being set was not market friendly and there was excessive reliance on private deals between Central Bank officials in the Public Debt Department and the primary dealers who were buying these bonds from them. Therefore, there was lack of transparency.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Hon. Lasantha Alagiiyawanna, can I clarify one matter?

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: Okay.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You also told us that their position was that there had not been an auction for a long time.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is slightly different from the suggestion that direct placements should be stopped. Obviously what they wanted was an auction which would have allowed more understanding on market bids. So, the conclusion you drew was that they agreed with the Prime Minister that the system of direct placement was wrong ; it does not seem accurate and it is not reflected by what they all told us.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The impression I got was that that was precisely what they meant.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is the impression you got but that was not the impression given to us by them.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What does the manual say? It is not about whoever or whatever thinks. Can I draw your attention to the manual? Page 8 of the manual says under title "Private/ Direct Placements," "The FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." So, they are talking about private placements and express the view, "The FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirement of the Government has indicated in the approved borrowing programme maybe arranged through private placements with PDs." And that system was changed against the manual, I believe in 2008 by the then Governor.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Arbitrarily?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The Monetary Board, yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The manual has not been amended even though it has been-

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, it has been amended even in 2013, when this current position was published.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think we understood that.

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna : Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha, I have five minutes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Sorry.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Auction එකේදී අදාළ අවසාන වේලාව දීර්ඝ කිරීම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සිදු කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? ඒකේ මොකක්ද procedure එක.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is possible. If there is a technical glitch, there is a grace period of about five minutes that is allowed after the closing time. That is mentioned in the manual.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Was there an electronic glitch?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක කල් ඉල්ලන ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think they telephone the Central Bank dealers and ask for extra time because their bids perhaps have not been registered in the system.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කාගෙන් ද ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I do not know the exact name of the person, but I am sure it is somebody in the Front Office of the Public Debt Department.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉදිරි පෙළ Front Office එකෙන් මෙම ඉල්ලීම කරපු අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ ඉල්ලීමට අනුමැතිය දෙන්න වගකීමක් තිබෙන නිලධාරිතුමා හෝ නිලධාරිතුමිය මේ සාකච්ඡාවට ඇවිල්ලා කිව්වා ඒ වෙලාවේ ඔබතුමාත් ඒ නිලධාරිතුමිය ළඟ හිටියා කියලා.

Mr. **Arjuna Mahendran:** I was not with that officer. I was with the Superintendent of Public Debt, just in the corridor talking to her. I was not in the Department.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you at any stage told them to extend the-

Mr. **Arjuna Mahendran:** No. Not at all. I had nothing to do with them.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did anybody request you to extend-

Mr. **Arjuna Mahendran:** No. Nobody requested from me.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Were you aware that it was extended by-

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I was not aware.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී මේ අදාළ සාකච්ඡාවට භාජනය කරනු ලබන auction එකේදී තීරණය වූ පොලිය සහ ඊටපසු සියලුම auctions වල තීරණය වූ පොලිය අතර විශාල වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා ඒ පිළිබඳව මොකක්ද දකින්නේ? වෙනත් විධියකින් කියනවා නම්, මේ සිද්ධියේදී අදාළ පොලියට වඩා ඊටපසු auctions වල පොලිය අඩුයි. එතකොට එසේ වෙන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Basically the market has a certain expectation about interest rates and at any auction they will convey that expectation through what they bid. So, at this particular auction- I suppose since auctions had been held for a considerable period of time- they bid higher and then in subsequent auctions once they realize that there was a lot of liquidity in the market that was coming in and that was by the way our intention in moving to the auction system to encourage more bidding and more liquidity because we were falling short of what the Government needed. Then the market subsided its expectations of interest rates. A primary driver of interest rates is perceptions of how much liquidity is available to fund the Government and at that point, there was complete opacity. Nobody knew what sort of liquidity was out there available to fund the Government. The general expectation after the mini-Budget and even the main Budget in the previous year was that the Government spending was going to go through the roof and the Government needed to borrow a lot of money. That is why we were falling short of raising money for the Government in such-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you see a pattern of the interest rates coming down now?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Of course because we have been incredibly successful I might say andI congratulate the officials of the Public Debt Department for mobilizing so much liquidity at short notice.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Even though there is actually a suspicion, is the Public Debt Department convinced that this is the system to go forward now.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I hope so and I think so because they are working very actively to bring lots of funds into the auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: With the discussion that you had with them, can you see that they also have a kind of accustomed to this system?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is a cultural shift. It is a big mental and cultural shift for those officials.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you see it from them that there is a change?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, I see the change.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Before I continue the question, I just want to make a couple of points. We have had this manual cited. But the manual also makes it clear that mixed systems are permitted and I also go further. There is a line in the manual that says, "The Tender Committee which is appointed to take decisions and the amount to be accepted that gives the lowest and optimal cost and risk combination" So, there is a very clear directive even in the manual that there is an obligation on the Tender Board and the people preparing it. It goes further to cite this and I think you have to read this as a whole that there is an obligation to go for the lowest cost. Would you agree?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The lowest cost depending on what methodology?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The optimal cost and certainly every single official who came here with one exception was of the view that the mixed system was a better system and their full expectation on February 27th was to go with that system and they had not doubt whatsoever that they could get the Rs. 13 billion needed. This is what they told us.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I do not-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is on record. You read through the record carefully. So, I am just putting this to you. As you have granted, they had made an assessment which you thought should be changed and first having suggested Rs. 20 billion, you then went ahead to suggest that they take Rs. 10 billion. Did they give you any idea of the consequences of taking Rs. 10 billion in terms of the impact on interest rates?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: They thought it was fair because the cutoff rate was 12.5 per cent which is what we had advertised the previous day.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But that is not what they told us. They said that they suggested to you that this would be in paying higher rates of interest. But that you said a decision had been taken by higher management to go completely for auction.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That was my impression, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is on record. May be they misunderstood. Sometimes a very powerful personality can give an impression.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It has done before.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It has always been done in this country, but it has not led to such a big loss.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It does not make sense because we had raised this Rs. 10 billion at 11.73 per cent and average weighted rate whereas in the previous auctions they had raised only Rs. 2 billion at 11.75 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, how many-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The previous auction was in May.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, in May, last year.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Exactly. The previous auction was in May after which for variety of reasons-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the interest rate on that?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was 11.75 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the amount?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Two billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: For two billion, it was at 11.75 per cent.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Just for two billion?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, for two billion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Subsequent to that, as you know, there was a concerted effort to bring down the interest rates with all these measures that you have described which you have described in your interviews as being an artificial depression of the market.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, what you are really telling us is that having paid 11.5 per cent in an auction in May, the Bank decided wrongly in your view that interest rate should be brought down. There was a lot of work done in various areas. Senior citizens suffered. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, they did not suffer.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The interest rates came down for senior citizens.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The interest rates came down, but that was adjusted in the Budget.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I know. But they suffered at the time the interest rates came down. I am talking of my father who was of your father's age.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, there were a lot of efforts taken to reduce interest rates. Whether it is right or wrong, it is a separate question.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: As a result, the interest rates in the period preceding February 27th would lower. They were not at

11.75 per cent. They were in fact, I think below 10 per cent at that time. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think from the secondary market data that I have, they have risen back to 11.75 as of the December, 2014.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is secondary market.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You may describe this as captive funds. Certainly the explanation we got from a technical expert was that interest rates in February which the Government could have expected to pay for this sort of bonds were lower.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I disagree with that. That was an artificial rate given to the EPF. So, it is not an interest rate in my view. It is a bilateral-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is a separate issue with regard to the policy which was wrong and in all fairness to **The Hon.** Wickramaratne- he has been pressing this point for the last few years.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I am still waiting to press it again.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I know.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think the line of argument is still wrong and I want to go into detail, Mr. Chairman. I need to go into detail. I will wait till you finish. About what time will you finish?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Within about half an hour.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne:Okay. I hope Mr. Chairman I will get a chance to go into detail.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think all that is essential. I think, we can all understand the coherence of a certain view point. What we cannot understand is the sudden imposition of that view point contrary to a decision of the Monetary Board by fiat of the Governor on the 27th contrary to the recommendation initially drafted by the PDD.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It did not contradict the Monetary Board. I beg to disagree.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. You beg to disagree, but you told me earlier and it is on record that they took a certain decision and you knew that by the action you were taking interest rates would go up and that led to a result that was not in accordance with the decision of the Monetary Board on the 23rd to keep rates at the same level.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I disagree, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: We will go back through the record. Now, to go a bit further, once this particular decision had been made, there are arguments to say that interest rates have gone up. Mr. Chairman, Prof. Samarasinghe of University of Peradeniya called to me and wanted a paper he had done table to this effect. I hope that can be tabled and made available the Members.

This is done by the Prof. Samarasinghe of the Peradeniya University, who is an economist. We have also had various speculations -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Regarding what?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: On the results of the interest rates -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know that. But, Sir, these are opinions from -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am just saying that it could be given to **The Hon.** Members to look at; it is not official.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I mean, it is an opinion by another person.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: To come back to the basic issue, on this particular day the decision was taken, we have got a lot of evidence to say that it was not a general decision - you say, you took the Deputy Governs with you - but there is no record of any consultation with them. Certainly, the impression created by both of them, who appeared before me, was that, one: your actions were unfortunate and that they affected the controls, they breached the controls normally in effect in the Banks. This is on record.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I completely disagree with you.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am sure you disagree with it. I am just telling you -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, I have to object this line of questions. A lot of suggestions were given by **The Hon.** (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha saying, this witness said this and that witness said this. Can we have it - when, that is placed, you need to read that. Otherwise, what happens is - you said, it is on record and if it is only on record, how can he answer those questions?

Uncorrected

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. I will extract those.

The Chairman: We will draw our own conclusions.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: These are the statements of law colleagues, which are on record.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Because you have to support from evidence. You cannot give your own ideas about it.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe, I do not give my own ideas.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do not talk to me. You talk to the Chairman.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that I am quoting from the record which I have -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, give us those quotations.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. I will certainly do that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, give us those quotations.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I have no time to do it now.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, if you have no time - I object. It is very unfair of line of questioning. How can you say that? If it is there, you must quote from there and say he has said this.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I will quote it after I finish this, because I do not want to waste your time going through my papers. I will find it out and put on record.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If you quote it, we will save time.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: But I would be very surprised, if a Deputy Governor of the Central Bank made a statement that I have flouted the control procedure. I will be very surprised about it.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He did not.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He did not. That is very unfair, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I will put on record later. I do not want to waste your time, but I will through the papers. There are a lot of papers.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This line of questions is totally unfair.

The Chairman: Do not ask for his comments on other people's evidence.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, you feel that after this decision was made - you now say that the market has equilibrium. Did you at any point express any regret that perhaps other dealers should have been kept informed that there was a plan to go for larger auction, because almost all have told us that they never thought it possible that the Bank would take so much.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have heard the exact diametric opposite of that from dealers.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What have you heard?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can I clarify that because the question is important? Other dealers being informed; was this dealer informed by you?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I have not informed any dealer about the decision to raise the amount. But what had transpired was that the Central Bank dealers had been calling up primary dealers a prior day asking them whether they could raise amounts at 9.35 per cent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is that correct?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is that the normal practice?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is not the normal practice. It is very unfortunate that took place. But, the fact of the matter is that word had got out amongst all the primary dealers that the Central Bank was getting desperate.

The Chairman: You have mentioned that earlier also.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, Mr. Governor, you tell me is it illegal or is it the practice of the Central Bank?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is not illegal. But it is not a satisfactory practice, because, first of all, you do not give us the price out ahead of an auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you are testing the market -

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: You could test the market, but again it is not a very good practice, because the whole point is price discovery.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Is it a moral issue?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it a moral issue?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Morally there is nothing to -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why do you say it is a wrong practice?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It basically gives the market - it is sort of bullying the market in trying to accept the predetermined price - which is what we are trying to move away from.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, have you had an inquiry on that?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: We have started an inquiry.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The practice, of course, is not entirely different from the fact that the Bank had followed previously, which is, you set the price by auction, if it had not been for the 5 billion that the Perpetual Treasuries bid, the price would have been closer to 9.75. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No. If you had taken 1 billion, then, you would have already been about 10.3 per cent and as you went up, it escalated up to 12.5 per cent so that the average was around 11.73 per cent.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. We looked at it and the point you remember that we discussed that the PDD had suggested a certain figure, 2.6 or something. That figure was actually under 11, if we have taken that. So, after that, presumably, if the direct placement system had been observed, the Bank would have offered bonds at that figure.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: And they could not raise the money.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Well, that is the view that was held. Their view was certainly different. They have all argued that their view was different at the time. Anyway, you took a decision.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Where did they say that?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Dr. Azim said that he wants -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Show it to us.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe, I will take all those -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, this line of questioning is very unfair. How can you say - he gives totally a negative picture saying Dr. Azim said this, that one said this. It is totally unfair.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. It is on record. I will find those. Can I also say that I find it outrageous that in my absence you had said that I was related to the former governor and therefore following a line of thinking?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No. From the questioning that you have made with the former governor, you are helping him. Every time I read the questionings, you were just helping him and saying -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: And are you not doing the same with the present Governor?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are totally different and you are going on a totally different way.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. Can we stop arguing? Mr. Chairman, will ask my questions. The Chairman will rule me out of order if necessary.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We are here, Sir, without any partiality, to ask questions and you have given a picture to the - in this inquiry, if you take the questionings, the Central Bank Governor said this, other officials of the Central Bank said that you are flouting and you have taken a wrong decision, which is totally unfair.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: As a legal officer or the legal adviser to the Chairman of the COPE, I would like to intervene at this stage. If you do quote ,x, then you must quote him within inverted comas and you must submit evidence documentarily.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. It is on record. From the beginning - I am not anything against you, Hon. (Prof.) Rajiva Wijesinha. I am a lawyer and I know that you cannot quote any inquiry; you cannot quote without quoting and showing that was quoted by so and so.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I fully agree with that. So, I will now take the time off, continue with your questioning and will find it out. Absolutely, I do not want to waste time.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Think of the witness's mental states, when you say that. It is like putting on to me, the Chairman of this Committee says that you are an immoral person and he had said this. Without your

presence he is putting that. So, every official has spoken against me and what is my position? He is not going to answer he is going to be under a lot of pressure.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. I can do one of two things. I can either find these things and cite them but that will take time.

The Chairman: We are here to form our own conclusion. You try to get -

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. What I am getting is to challenge some of the assumptions that are being made and I think I am entitled to cite things. But I take the point that I must give them in writing and I will find those. The only question is, should I do it immediately or should I wait? Mr. Lionel Fernando, can you tell me?

Mr. Lionel Fernando: May I say this? You were quoting Dr. Azim in two instances. One is, when the governor went to the Department or to that floor, there is a statement to say that Dr. Azim gave the paper -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Voluntary.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: There is another instance that he took it from him.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is why when there is a discrepancy, I do not cite.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You choose to say, you took it from him.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I never said. When did I say that?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You said, everybody had been discrediting him and disagreeing with him.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I cite there are three people I talked about.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You quote one thing.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The words, breach of control; the word, unfortunate.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: That is one instance. But also there is another instance. What I am trying to say is that if you go on repeating, as he said, it becomes a problem. Psychologically he would be very down.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Thinking that everybody has spoken against him.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It is pretty evident.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, all what we have to find out is, how this decision has taken and whether this was leaked out by him. We did that. We wanted the sequence of dates and how this decision was taken and whether this is an arbitrary decision by him or did he go and find that paper and took that decision. Those are things that are important.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay. What I will do is, I will stop my questioning, allow you all to continue and I will find these, because I think I am owing to everybody's chapter and worse. I could beg an opportunity to come back.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I would ask this from Mr. Governor. This is very simple. What was the average interest amount on the 23rd in the market?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: For 30-year bonds?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, the normal average. We would like to know, because you had these auctions, the interest rates have gone up tremendously uncontrollably. That is the question that they wanted to ask. With your decision how much money you wanted by Monday?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Rs.13.5 billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If you do not find that money, what happens?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The economy will face some difficulties because the Government spending will be affected.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Like what? What are the repercussions?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Whether it is Samurdhi payments, or salary payments or payments to tea small holders; a variety of spending would not have taken place as a consequence of a shortfall in raising this money for the Government.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In two weeks time, you will need more money?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right. March was going to be a very heavy month for Government borrowing because there is a lot of repayment of previous debts coming up.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So when did this necessity of Rs.13.5 billionarise?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was told to us around the 10th of February.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So from the 10th of February until whichdate did you have time to find this money?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Until the 26th, the day before the auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Until the 26th. You had to deliver by when?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: By the 2nd of March, the following month.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: When did you start? When did you have this requirement?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: 10th of February.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So from the 10th of February to 23rd, how much money had the PDD made with their expert comments, with their expert knowledge andwith their expert knowledge against your knowledge? How much money did they find by the 23rd?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: As of the 23rd they had not raised anything which really worried me.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But what **The Hon.** RajivaWijesinha says is that the private placement system was working fine in this country and why did they not find any money by the 23rd if that is working right?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was not working fine. That is my main concern.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But we say it was working fine. Can you tell us why they did not make any money by the 23rd? They did not try or they have not gone to the market? Why? Are the Central Bank officers not doing their duty or they are just not coming to work?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: There are allegations which we are investigating saying that Central Bank officials had an interest in sustaining the private placement system because of kick-backs and other types of inducements from primary dealers. I have not got evidence as yet but we are investigating this and we will let you know in due course.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you have an investigation on the primary dealers, especially the private primary dealers.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We have found certain names connected to the then Government and certain powerful people as well. So we want all the private primary dealers and the pattern of business they have done for the past few years and how they have come up with their business.

The next question is. on the 23rd how much money had you found? Nothing?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: From what they told me they had not raised anything of the 13.5.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: By the 26th?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: They said that they have raised 3.5.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: For how many days had they raised 3.5?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think, they had raised it over about two or three days.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: From the 10th the requirement was there?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: From the 10th to the 26th, the answer must be that. If it differs tell me why it differs. I am asking you to make that Rs.3.5 billion, how many days did it take?

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: And how did they raise the 3.5 billion?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: They had adequate notice of this for at least two weeks. They had not raised anything by the 23rd when we had the Monetary Board meeting.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Did you not question the PDD, how are you going to raise this money

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Of course, I did. I did several times. I had several lengthy discussions and I was telling them that as far as I could see this private placement system was not working.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Do you have any Minutes on that?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I do not have any Minutes except for what was said at the Monetary Board on the 23rd where I said we should immediately recommence auctions and it is best that we start with the thirty year bond. There again, I must point out that it was a curious piece of advice that I got that I should on go for Rs. one billion in advertising this Thirty Year Bond. When I look back at what had happened in 2014 in March and in May they had advertised for Rs. two billion. In 2013, there was an instance where they had advertised ten billion worth of thirty year bonds to be auctioned.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Ten billion?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. So I cannot understand why I was told only one billion could be raised and this makes me suspect that there was an ulterior motive in trying not to make this auction a success.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But Mr. Governor the answer to that from the department sources, the officials was that they did not want to show that Rs.10 billion because the mistake they can make by telephoning the dealers was that you kind of gave away the impression that you are desperate for money. So they did not want to show that desperation and that is why they went for Rs. One billion

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: They said that that was a tactic they were using.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: A tactic. That is a tactic and I thought that was, I do not know, a fair tactic because if you had given ten billion, people would have known and they would have then bidded for a higher interest rate.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is a fair comment but in the event it backfired. They got desperate on Thursday and -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In subsequent auctions did you place the whole amount?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, we asked for ten billion thereafter.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: From my knowledge it could work both ways because if you give ten billion there would be other people who would be bidding and the interest rates may come down.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: When they find that there is a lot of money coming into the market. Exactly.

Mr. **Lionel Fernando:** Chairman Sir, after he finishes I would like to quote an important document.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I need about three minutes. Sir.

The Chairman: Right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The Chairman and all of us need to understand this. Mr. Governor, tell us when you have an artificial interest rate in a country what does that do to the economy? I am a person who believes that there must be a supply and demand interest rate in a country. Countries like Greece and Spain have fallen by having artificial interest rates. Those countries havehad a credit crisis and are on the brink of disaster at the moment. India, America and countries which are developing. what is the mode of interest rate that they have? They have artificial interest rates controlled by the Government or have a market interest rate on supply and demand?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: They all have market interest rates. China moved towards that 20 years ago after having a very rigid system and even Cuba and North Korea are now moving in that direction towards market based interest rates for the simple reason, when you suppress prices in any market, whether it is vegetables or money, the supply gets affected. People do not supply the market. That is precisely what has been happening. We were unable to raise money through private placements because the interest rates were artificially depressed.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Governor, the Auditor General had a good question. What he was asking was, you need a little bit of control by the Government also, a little bit on the interest rate. You cannot just leave it open for it to find its own level. So what do you have to say about that?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, to the extent that speculators can perhaps push prices in unusual directions you want to control that. The way you do that is to have large Government funds assisting you to see that rates are reasonable.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Auditor General actually pointed out that you have made a Minute also saying that NSB and EPF have been made to stabilize. What you meant was, the major portion of the interest rate you leave it to the market and when it is like manipulated by some dealers you can use this and level it to the level that you want to have it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Exactly.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The next question is, so on the 26th you had Rs.3.5 billion.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So on the 27th you had an auction.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And on the auction, what the officials said was, they were not used to auctions of this magnitude so they wanted to take Rs. One billion and they wanted to make the rest by private placements.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How would you have done that? Just explain to us, how would the Central Bank on the 27thhavean auction for Rs. One billion and they have one billion out of that and then by Monday how

would they by private placement make that Rs. Nine billion balance?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: This is a mystery to me. I asked them that very question. You mentioned Dr. Azim Prof. Wijesinha. I asked him that very question when we met in the corridor. You are suggesting you raise Rs.6.2 billion. But my question is, how are you going to raise the balance Rs. 7.4 and he did not have an answer. My judgment was that –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He did not answer or –

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: He did not answer. He just remained blank. I quoted to him the track record that they had only been able to raise Rs. 3.5 billion in a whole week. So where was the possibility of raising more than that in the few hours left on Friday or on Monday morning? It seemed incredible to me that they would even -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You have a list of amounts which they have bid. So, you take Rs. 2.5 billion out of the auction. For the balance Rs. 7.5 billion can you not call these people, give private placements, and manipulate the interest rate and bring it down?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is very unlikely because those people would be looking into the general expectation in the market and to face it since the Budget of November, 2014 was for massive Government borrowing ahead. That expectation was what was driving interest rate. When you look at the secondary market the yields on this thirty-year bond already shot back up to 11.75 at the end of December. And therefore, I doubt very much that anyone would have come for private placements at artificially depressed interest rate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: My next question is, if you had taken Rs. 1 billion, Rs. 2.5 billion from the auction, if you had gone for private placements would it had not been Perpetual Treasuries that you would give the first call for that private placement also on the papers given to you, if at all, it had been in that system.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It would have been the Bank of Ceylon because on the paper I believe Bank of Ceylon was the biggest bidder at the auction.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Could Bank of Ceylon bought it on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries as it has revealed that they have done. now.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. They have done that in the past.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They can do that.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, the question would have been if they had gone for private placements it had been Perpetual Treasuries that would have got that as well. It is for sake of possibility.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, it is possible.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why could you not have a better system to go for a lesser interest rate? Is there any mechanism to find that balance Rs. 9 billion with a lesser interest rate below 10 or below 11.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: As I said earlier the expectation was that you would have a short-term spike in rates but eventually market would settle down at a equilibrium. It should be lower than the initial spike. That is what happen in practice.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You had to correct the system that you believe when the Government believes. You have to take that drastic decision that you have to somewhere go for an auction.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Exactly.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Down the line.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what you did.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: People are talking that the interest rates going up. In 2014, we find that another auction had happened with an interest was 11.75. On that auction the interest was went up to 11.75. The same sequence had taken place. Did anybody raise a doubt that the interest rates have gone up through auction and the system is wrong?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: At that time nobody had raised any issues. This is what puzzles me. Why this created such a curio because the rate was actually lower. Government is paying less because what we did in 2014 until it was artificially depressed at the latter part of the year.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Actually, the auction was for the full amount.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Our question is, the PDD went for the full amount and they gave explanation saying that you give a lesser amount so that the interest rates would be low because they would not have a clue that you wanted more money. But, from what the Perpetual Treasuries' CEO came and said was that they studied. Do you think that one institution can study the market and they were the only people who study the market according to them? Do you think this is credible? It is a bit of a superficial question? Or else, is there any that possibility that they had any information that the Bank might take this Rs. 9 billion.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: People who analyze the market know that the Government has to borrow a lot of money, particularly, in March. For March we had a lot of rollover because Rs. 100 billion had to be rolled over and the danger in rolling over is if those people who hold those securities do not re-subscribe the Government and the Central Bank would have been in deep trouble. So, we have to build a buffer to see that we could get new money in case same people do not re-subscribe those Treasuries that were maturing. That was the situation facing at the market at the end of February. The reasonable expectation of any primary dealer would have been that there going to be a big spike in Government borrowing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let us say Mr. Governor that PDD decided on a Rs. 1 billion and they came for approval. Was it happened on 23rd Friday?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: On 27th Friday.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What was the time when they came for approval?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was around 1.00 O'clock in the afternoon.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They brought a paper saying that Rs. 1 billion or Rs. 2.5 billion will be taken from the auction.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What would be your response to them and how would you follow from there as a Governor making the rest of the money?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I will immediately send back the recommendation without approving it and point out to the cash flow projections on the Treasury and ask them the question how is it going to raise the funds for the Treasury which it was demanding on Monday the 2nd of March.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, is there a possibility that with your recommendation they can go back and take a decision that they must take Rs. 10 billion from that auction?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is imminently possible.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is that allowed once the recommendation was made?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Because at that point until the Governor approves it as the finality it is not published to the market in terms of what has been accepted and what has not been accepted. The Tender Board makes its recommendation, the Governor approves and only then it is made for public knowledge.

The Chairman: Governor can totally reject it.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: We can totally reject it if they have done.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is a hypothetical question. You can do so many things but the question is why you had done certain things. You have the power to do so many things as a Governor but the question is why certain decisions had been made by you? We also want to find out. So, Rs. 2.5 billion has been taken from the auction what is your chain of action for Monday.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: If Rs. 2.5 billion was only accepted, first of all, I will find out whether the Central Bank can buy any of those Bills or Treasury Bills from the existing stock to try and meet that balance of Rs. 7.5 billion. But I already knew that we have reached the limit of how much the Central Bank can buy. That option was out. Or you look for bank overdraft from Bank of Ceylon and People's Bank which again it will be over Rs. 115 billion which was not desirable.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How much from the People's Bank and how much from the NSB?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think, from my memory Rs. 58 billion from People's Bank and from Bank of Ceylon it was about Rs. 45 billion. So, in total you have exceeded Rs. 100 billion.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are you planning to bring those amounts down for the bank?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: We are planning to, Sir. I am happy to state as of the middle that is

end of last week we have only borrowed about 35 per cent of the total annual borrowing limit given to us by the Parliament. So, that means we are managing our debt very prudently.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, what is your goal in one year's time for the Peoples' Bank and the NSB, the States Banks.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: You have to bring it down.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is the amount? What is the target that you are planning?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Ideally, it would be about Rs. 15 billion. That is what I mean by the end of the year.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: From all the state banks.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: From all the State Banks.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: All together.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Chairman: Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe, how long would you take?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Sir, I will question later.

Mr. Lionel Fernando: Chairman Sir, only as your legal adviser I am posing this. We have been talking about this generally, but not specifically. Nuances are so importance that we have missed them. Para 3.3 of the minute paper signed as true copy by H.A. Karunaratne, Secretary Monetary Board. The Governor of the Central Bank is the Chairman of the Monetary Board. Board Paper No. MB/ER/53/2015 dated 6th March 2015. " The Chairman informed the Board that the Central Bank temporarily suspended the method of direct placements of Treasury bills and Treasury bonds used to raise funds for the Government with a view to move towards a greater market mechanism based on standard auction system followed alternatively at present. Accordingly, the Central Bank at the 30 year Treasury bond auction held on 27th February, 2015 decided to accept Rs. 10 billion out of Rs. 20 billion worth bonds received for Rs. 1 billion announced to the market for bids in order to meet the Government's funding requirements only from the open market bids."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: On this manual, Mr. Governor, what is the effect of these manuals? Are they mandatory, you must go by these manuals or can you just forget these manuals and go as you want? Why are these manuals being actually prepared?

The Chairman: It was the same question you raised last time.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Because, I want to clarify it, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think you got an answer from Mr. Samarasiri.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, no. I want to clarify it from him.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Under Section 1.1.3 of the Monetary Law Act, there is an underlined comment to the effect that the Central Bank shall manage the raising of public debt for the Government. There are no stipulations in terms of how that debt should be raised etc. That is where the existence of a manual becomes very critical, because we have to have transparent procedures where everybody is aligned both in the department and in the Government Treasury to see that there is a process. These things are not done in a haphazard manner. That is why a manual is published and continually updated to keep in touch with foreign practices in developed markets and at the same time to see that everybody within Sri Lanka the primary dealers that included, are aware of how that process works. So, manual is very important.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Are you expecting to follow it as a mandatory piece of directions? Do you say that it is mandatory? How do you explain that?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is accepted in any rule-based system. You have to have a code of procedures. So, to that extent, it is mandatory. In the sense that everybody accepts it, but of course, it is done on a mutually accepted basis. So, we are not imposing this on anybody, because everybody accepts that this is the way it should be done.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What does the Sri Lankan court system say about these manuals? What is their approach?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I am afraid, I have not read the legal opinions. I have not been long enough in the-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, in this manual, I pointed out to you earlier about the private and direct placements. It says, "F4 has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." Last

time, you said that 80 per cent, 90 per cent must be done through auctions.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In other countries, what is the mechanism they are using? Is it private placement or auction?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is auction, Sir. As I said, the typical rule –

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I mean in developed countries, not in Banana Republics?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I would include India and China for that matter. All have up to 90 per cent through auctions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, in a developing country like ours where corruption is rampant, I feel that even giving this private placement to certain primary dealers is an arbitrary decision made by the Governor or certain individuals.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is extremely arbitrary.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I would like to make one point. The 90 per cent and so on, is it traditional to have an auction for "x" and then take 10x? In countries like India which you mentioned earlier- we will say they go for auction –is it the norm to accept what you have auctioned?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. So, you accept "x" then you issue ".1x", that is 10 per cent subsequently through a tap until the next auction, if there is somebody who needs those securities in between.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: What I just want to check is the auctions you talked about in other countries, the norm is to advertise a certain amount and then accept bids up to that amount.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is not necessary. They can overshoot or undershoot depending on the auction or cancel the whole auction that is there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You said that the Governor has the power to reject the recommendations. Do you have instances where it overshoots by 100 per cent?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I am sure, I can find that evidence because there must be-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am just asking. because in other countries what surprises us here is the concatenation of circumstances. Here is the Governor who believes the auctions are good. Here is an announcement of an auction for Rs. 1 billion. Now, the Governor and many people say, "Go for auction." In many other countries as you said, they take 90 per cent of the action and tap.

The Chairman: You get the opinion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No, no. My question is a fact that these countries you talked about, is it the case that in such countries you have an auction for "x" and the amount taken on that auction is 10 x?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well. What was unusual about this situation was we have not had an auction for a long time, so that, there was a pent-up-demand which expressed itself at this auction. So, it is very unusual.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Pent-up-demand by one country.

The Chairman: Hon. Member, do not involve into a debate.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: My simple question is, can you give us in detail? You cited all these other countries that go for auction internationally, 90 per cent of auction and 10 per cent on tap or whatever, are there instances where they have advertised an auction but gone for 10 times the amount that they have said they were going to take?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I do not have the direct knowledge on that but I am sure, I can find it for you. But, in a normal functioning auction system where auctions are held regularly, the need does not arise.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes, exactly.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, it is a very important point that **The Hon.** Member made. As he says, this one company got the bulk of this auction that is about 50 per cent, I believe. I want to know little bit about the history of the Perpetual Treasuries. Could they have found some information from the Central Bank or somewhere else? Did you give any information to Perpetual Treasuries on this?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did not.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: On any account on this auction?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did nothing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, would they have found some evidence from the Central Bank. Is there any possibility of leaking out information?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is possible. I hear that one of the Central Bank dealers had called around on Thursday. I suspect that Perpetual Treasuries may have been one of those companies called.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Do you have all recordings on those calls?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Actually not, Sir. We do not have any recording system in our Public Debt Department as of now.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How long have the Perpetual Treasuries been in the market?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I understand that they have been a little beyond here.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I believe, your son-in-law had been the CEO of that company until January 16. So, was there the ex-Governor's sister as a director in that Board?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I believe she was not on the Board of the Perpetual Treasuries, but on the Board of the Holding Company.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: She was on the Board of the Holding Company. Then, Mr. Cabral was the Governor while she was being a Director of the Board in that company.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They were dealing with the Central Bank and even with their subsidiary company for a long period of time while the sister being a director in that company, the brother was the Governor of the Central Bank.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, with your knowledge, do you think that it is conflict of interest where a sister being a director of the Board of a company which is actually being dealing with the Central Bank?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well, it just gives rights to concerns that there could be some sort of undue advantage given to such companies because of the relationship.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It was the Holding company.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, it was the Holding Company that owns this company.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Your son-in-law continued on the Holding company as well after January 16.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The same situation.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Chairman: Now, we will allow The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne to ask questions. He is waiting for more than two hours.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: Mr. Chairman, you said, "Do not give opinions, but ask questions", but I have two areas of questions.

The Chairman: If it is relevant, you are permissible to ask.

The Hon. Eran Wickremaratne: Okay. I need to give some opinions because I think I have to balance other opinions with some opinions to give perspective.

The second reason is, Mr. Chairman, maybe next to you. I probably sat the longest number of hours in the room and spoke the least. So, I think I have a special right to make my opinion own.

What I would like to first say is that I disagreed with some of the things that Prof. Wijesinghe made at the beginning which was relating to the cost to the country and so forth where he also said that, "We brought many experts here and many said that it was not in the interest of the country." Now, the first thing I would say is these opinions are highly debatable. I think one of the things that we are missing throughout the discussion is the fact that the only responsibility of the Central Bank is not to get the Government to get the lowest possible interest rate. The Central Bank by definition has a contradiction and conflict of interest in that it is getting most of those funds from captive sources and largely from the Employees' Provident Fund. So, there is this constant issue about: are these interest rates actually market interest rates; are these interest rates actually artificial interest rates; and whose interests are they actually defending. When they said that they are defending the interest of the country, whose interest are they actually defending? So, this contradiction is going throughout and I think the fact that the Central Bank at some point in the recent past, has decided to actually let the market manifest itself more freely so that we could actually establish more market driven interest rates. In that sense, I would say loadable. But, we cannot get away from the fact that there is a conflict of the interest that the Central Bank is trying to defend. When we are looking at the

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recommendations for the report, I think one thing we will have to clearly debate in our recommendation is whether the Central Bank should be managing the funds of the EPF at all, - I think this discussion has happened on the floors over the last five years in Parliament -or whether there should be an independent management authority for the Employees' Provident Fund. I think that is something that we will have to actually make a decision.

The Chairman: I have made note of it.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Thank you. Then, The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe also mentioned and read out extracts from the Operation Manual of the Central Bank where it stated that it is preferred that the funds are raised through auction but direct placements are permissible and obviously in that Manual, it must say that it should be at the lowest possible cost because that particular Manual refers to-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Hon. Wickramaratne, it is not "Preferred" and the wording given in that is, "..has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." It is mandatory. That is there as a direction.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Thank you for re-reading that. So, it has to do that. Actually I have argued that it is not a question of going back even to the Manual. It is just going back to fundamentals that a competitive system is always more preferable to a non-competitive system even if it did not say in the Manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If you are moving to something better, it is not even a policy change, it is just going in the right direction and that should be happening all the time. I think we are confusing it often by saying that these are policy changes. These actually are the things that should have been happening right along. These are issues of implementation which have not actually been followed. So, again, you may be down to the fundamentals of the Central Bank for having conflicting interest.

Mr. Mahendran, while we moved in the right direction in terms of seeing how interest rates move, this certainly looks like upset the market. So, will you comment on that as to whether it did upset the market, who did it upset and also in hindsight now, one of the Central Bank's goals is market stability? What are your responses?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Thank you, Sir. First of all, I do not have any evidence that this upset the market. There has been a lot of comment in the press and elsewhere. But, so far, no primary dealer has written to me objecting to what happened. I have not been sued by any primary dealer for breach of whatever rights they had in the way the market was conducted. So, I am not aware that this has caused any major dislocation in the market. At least I have not been told this so far by anyone except for commentary in the media. So, I would reject the suggestion that this has created any sort of dislocation. If the market has responded admirably by raising the volumes of money going through the primary auctions for Treasury Bonds I think the very week following this 27th of February Auction, we have three auctions where we raised a record of Rs. 100 billion in just one week which was a record of sorts and that showed how the policy had worked.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Mr. Chairman, there was another line of argument that came up and that was just to put this discussion into some perspective on the citizenship of the Governor and that was constantly being asked here. Personally, I did not really see the relevance to the issue at hand but, of course, others may have different opinions on that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Unless if there is a prohibition.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes. Whether it is a legal issue or not I think the legal experts could look at but I do not think it really bias on the arguments or the investigation that we are presently making.

It might be just instructive to mention that the Governor of the Central Bank of England is a Canadian citizen and there have been Governors of the other Central Banks around the world who have been citizens of other countries and the logic behind that has normally being the fact that the Central Bank of the country normally functions independently of the government of that country because its objectives sometimes are in conflict with the government of the country which has responsibility for fiscal policy and the Central Bank has responsibility for monetary policy and that is the reason why in other countries even expatriates have come and

served in those positions. So, I just want to put some perspective since this argument is coming over and over again. Of course, Sri Lanka can make its own decision as to what position Sri Lanka would like its citizens to occupy. That is a different argument. But, I do not think it really alters the discussion that we are having here and I would like to just point that out. We also might be pointed out that we have had maybe not citizens of other countries but certainly dual citizens of other countries functioning as Ministers in this country, Secretaries in very high positions in the public service and so forth. But I think that this argument on citizenship is not very central to the arguments that are being made.

The Chairman: Even if he is a citizen still the inquiry would have gone.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes, even if he is a citizen.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You have done a great job by abolishing the non-argument. That is my viewpoint.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Thank you. I am glad that at least we have agreed on one point.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I am just worried that you all have not implemented what you think.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Maybe ten years from now, this will not be an arguments -whether people are citizens or not. We will see that it will not be but I guess every country in a particular stage in the historical development, sometimes these things do come up.

Mr. Mahendran, I am referring to the sheet of Treasury Bond issue in March 2015 or whatever that was given and there were two sheets; one with 26 parties on it and the other one with the full number of parties on it. Now, I am referring to the sheet which has 26 parties on it and I just want to get confirmation.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: As you move down, you look at collecting the first billion which is the amount you did advertise -the first billion. So it was 8 million, 50 million, 100 million, 500 million from the Bank of Ceylon .Then, 50, 100 and you have to get to number 7, which is Employees' Provident Fund's 500 million before you actually cross the first billion. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Cumulatively, "Yes". You have to cross the 7 to get the 1.8 billion.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is right. That is to get the first billion.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Now, when you cross the seven to get the first billon which was the amount advertised for this particular auction, the weighted average cost is going to be 10.465. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes. That is 10.465. Then, Mr. Mahendran, subsequently, the decision was taken to raise 10 billion and then you basically had to go all the way down to the application number 26 and the weighted average cost was 11.727. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, correct.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: So, am I correct in concluding then that to raise the additional Rs. 9 billion, the weighted average cost was a little under 1.3 per cent

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Absolutely right.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Correct. So, to raise the cost by additional Rs. 9 billion, the weighted average cost was just under 1.3 per cent. Now, if you do - I do not know whether you can confirm this or not because the numbers may or may have not been worked.- a present valuation at those rates of raising the additional money, it would come to approximately about Rs. 1 billion. That is, roughly, 1 per cent comes to about Rs. 84 million; 1.3 per cent will come to, may be, a little more than 100 and on all of the balance, which is 9, that you are raising is probably approximately a Rs.1 billion. If you have done that number, I do not know you have any comments on that.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. The assumption is that your interest rates will persist at the same level for go into the future. If you make that assumption, "Yes"- the 1 billion number is correct. But if you assume that rates are going to fall which they already have in the last three months, then, it is a substantially lower number.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: The reason I am going through this is, because this is actually the market rate and if you look at up to number 7, you are raising money at 10.46 and

it does not have Perpetual Treasuries Limited at all.

Then, The Former Governor of the Central Bank, may be, - I am only saying, "may be"- in an attempt to influence the workings of COPE has published an article clearly in the "Financial Times" yesterday, which does not give a source for the numbers. If you look at that article carefully, there is no source in that Financial Times' article. I believe that there must be some help coming from interested parties. He says in that that the secondary yield in that particular -

The Chairman: We are not guide by those things. We are only guide only by what is transpired here.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Right. I agree with the Chairman that we will be guided only by what is said here.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I agree with you, but, what I am saying is, the principle that he was referring to is that the secondary market was at 9.48. He came here and he made the same statement that that is about 9.48. I am saying that that comparison is either the secondary market rate of 9.48 or the rates a year ago. That was also made by the Party to which I belong in Parliament. I am saying that both arguments are not relevant because when you are doing profitability calculations, it all depends on assumptions and these are very hypothetical.

The Chairman: We can discuss conclusions later.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Sir, the reason why I am raising this is this document provides details about the actual market.

The Chairman: Whatever you want to address can be discussed later.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I am only getting confirmation from his point of view as well. This document is about the actual market and this is actually, without having Perpetual Treasuries, reading into it. So, obviously I am questioning some of the evidence given by the former governor at the stage he actually gave that evidence.

Considering my second line of questioning. Governor. you may or may not be able to answer this straightaway, but this is a kind of information that we would like to have. I think it would be reasonable for us to assume that Members of this Committee actually want to know whether information leaked out from the Central Bank to primary dealers and whether that influenced the behaviour of primary dealers because if that was the case and if there was inside information, then certainly that would be a breach and there has to be consequences that will have to flow. I do not know whether we already have this information. The Auditor-General might know about that and we know that this document is leaked from the Central Bank to start with because that is how the document went to public. We never had documents like this previously. It is leaked from the Central Bank. If there is a leak from the Central Bank, it would be possible this information would have leaked from the Central Bank. I mean those tables we have-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Leaked or what happened was-

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: No, this is just to ask. It was previously given to us and it was in the market. It is on the internet and all over the places.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When did it come?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I do not know the date.

Mr. **W.P.C. Wickramaratne:** We can ask the Governor and he knows about it.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Please ask the question.

Mr. **W.P.C. Wickramaratne:** Do you know about this, Mr. Mahendran? Now there is an allegation that this document has been leaked and it was appeared in the website. Do you know about this situation?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was pointed out to me that this document was published on a website. I have absolutely no clue how that got there.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That would have been published after 22nd of February.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, of course.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinha: Is it a secret document?

Mr. **W.P.C. Wickramaratne:** Definitely it should be.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Well, there was a press release which contained the amounts that have been accepted at the auction.

Mr. **W.P.C. Wickramaratne:** But the document cannot be appeared. That particular document should not go out.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Ideally it should not go out. But the point is that it is public knowledge because all the brokers know who has received the bids.

Mr. **W.P.C. Wickramaratne:** Right, but that is not the question. The question is this. Is it proper to leak a document like this?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is not proper.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, will you have an investigation on that?

Mr. **W.P.C. Wickramaratne:** Definitely it has to be investigated.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: We are having investigations.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: If I can just finish my line of questioning. It is actually about the information that went out at various stages. The question is to whom did the information go out from? One of the things that we are concerned-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Also there is a question on that information. To whose benefit it has been leaked?

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Fine. One of the issues that I do have is, to understand the behaviour of the dealing company- Perpetual Treasuries- in this particular situation and in previous situations. It is not only in this particular situation.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: History is important.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: Yes. One of the things we may want to know is, considering Perpetual Treasuries, they got a licence somewhere in 2013, I think, and they have been in operation for two years plus. If we can understand when there were rate cuts or rate rises and what was basically the behaviour in terms of either purchasing bonds or dumping bonds both prior to rate cuts or rate increases and immediately after those rate cuts and rate increases - I will leave it to the Acting Auditor-General to decide how many days before and how many days after - that will help us to determine the behaviour of that particular primary dealer and that is important. It is not just on this day because it is a company which has done extraordinarily well and we just need to make sure whether it is bond fide, whether it has extraordinarily done well or whether there is a particular behaviour. Then, it will help us a little bit more to come to the conclusions we want to come: whether information has actually been going out or not and to whom that information has been going out. You can extend that investigation to other dealers, I am just focusing only on Perpetual Treasuries, just to establish the fact.

Thank you.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can I now resume, Sir, with a couple of things because I was interrupted and I was told to find this?

The Chairman: Please ask.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Firstly I want you to refer to page 81of the verbatim report where Mr. P. Samarasiri gave evidence.

"එතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. Internal controls කැඩීමක් තමයි එහිදී වෙන්නේ."

I just want to put that on record because I think I was rightly reprimanded for not doing it.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Sir, could you explain the context in which it was mentioned?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes. The question was – this was not asked by me – "එය ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කටයුතුවලට බාධාවක්ද? තීන්දු තීරණවලට බාධාවක්ද? "You have seen those documents and you have been there.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Can I respond to that?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. I am just saying this now because I just want to get over this.

"එතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්න්යත් මේකයි, internal controls කැඩීමක් තමයි එහිදී වෙන්නේ."

Secondly in page 24, this is what is stated:

"මම නම් හිතන්නේ මේක ඇත්තටම පොඩි unfortunate event එකක්.

Meaning of that is your going to the Department on that day.

Then, I would also refer you to Mr. Azim's evidence passim where he says he wanted to go for direct placements but. you said that the Bank has decided not to go for direct placements. It was a fiat and he had no alternative.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Where is that?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is in Mr. Azim's evidence.

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Did anyone suggest that it was too much – taking Rs. 10 billion? Of course when we do not have the direct placements, channels also have been available because that was the initial plan. What you are saying is that there is no option, you have to take it exactly. But would you prefer to take that option? That is what I am asking. I mean, Rs. 1 billion offer in an environment was going to be options of auctions as well as the direct instances and the decision that the direct issuances cancelled, I mean temporarily suspended, came at this particular moment. Either Governor told them-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He does not say that Governor told them.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He does. It is all there and I am not going to quote.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Read and say where did the Governor say.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It states:

"I would always prefer to have alternative options"

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He does not say Governor said that. There he says,

"-because the decision was taken to temporarily suspend-"

But, he does not say that Governor said.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: This is the day Dr. Azim gave evidence which is at pages 76 and 80.

"Then the Governor mentioned to the Superintendent, "We should be accepting from the auction itself and the final requirement of the Treasury-"

In page 80, it states:

"-and I would be happy that you all taking this to the Tender Board."

We have this arrangement with this placement in wide. So, we should be having amidst of both." It was mentioned to him, by whom? You have said, "I understand, but, of course this is the ideal time if I were you, I would be accepting more than this." It is all there. You could read it again.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: He says, "if I were you.....". So, the choice was his.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Of course.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Not that he said, "take it". He said, "If I were you..."

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: No. He has also said that the direct placements are out.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: When you questioned the other day also, you said that there was pressure. If he says, "If I were you..." it is not a pressure, Hon. Member.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He has said that the direct placement option was out and the Governor has-

Mr. Chairman: He can-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, you told that you are the one who conveyed decision that you did not want direct placements.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I expressed what the Monetary Board had discussed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, the minute of the Monetary Board says something different. But, you conveyed your impression of the Monetary Board's decision which was no more direct placements. The minutes of the Monetary Board in the subsequent week reported a very different story because, as what Mr. Fernando read out, the Monetary Board was told that the Central Bank has decided. Can you read that again, Mr. Fernando?

Mr. Lionel Fernando: No, I do not

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It does not matter. It was read before and it is on record now. Anyway, I just said these because I was challenged. But, I would like to return to my questioning and I have four areas of question which I would like to go on very quickly.

It was said that some of the problems of liquidity arose because the Central Bank took a decision to not to go for an international bond as it had been decided in January. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is correct.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, when you mentioned on television that the previous Government had no plans to pay its debts, you knew that there were plans to issue an international bond in January.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is correct.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, the previous Government had plans, for good reasons or for bad reasons, I am not going to the quality of the decision, you decided to not to go for the international bond.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is not my decision, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Then?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The Front Managers who subscribed to these issues will not take kindly to an issue coming out so soon after the new Government is installed in office.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is for good reason. I am not challenging your reasons. But, what you said on television that the previous Government had no plans, was not correct because it had plans, but you just thought those plans were inappropriate.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: What I said on television was that I wished that the previous Governor had done this issue before the election was held.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It does not matter. But, the point is that they had a plan whether it is a good plan or not, it is a different point, in fact the evidence you just gave suggest that it was not that the plan was bad, but, it was because there was a new Government and it would have been inappropriate.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The misleading suggestion that you made on television that they had no plan in that television interview was misleading because they had a plan.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It has no relevance to this inquiry.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is important because of the evidence given. I am not going to quote it now. The Government has reported to us that they had a plan and because this decision was taken, whether good decision or not, there might have been a problem about liquidity. In fact, the Governor said more liquidity would have been released at that bond gone in.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I would just clarify, Sir. The previous Governor had not anticipated that there would be a difficult election. That is what I meant by there being no plan.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, you could have followed their plan, but you decided not to.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I could not have done it because it is impossible.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Anyway. there was this crisis. My next question is that you also mentioned somewhere and tell me if you never mentioned so because I do not have it with me here. I am asking you one of the reasons why so much of money had to be raised was the requirement put to you by the Ministry of Road Development. Was that also relevant?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was certainly in my mind because it had been factored into the Treasury's cash flows that we had obtained.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: How was it brought to your notice?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was brought up at the Cabinet Subcommittee on Economic Affairs on the preceding Tuesday of that week where it was discussed that there were several road projects that had stalled as a consequence of inadequate funding and the Committee decided that a special meeting should be held with **The Hon.** Minister of Finance and **The Hon.** Minister of Highways and the Secretary to the General Treasury, the officials of the Central Bank were then assigned to make an estimate of what type of funding was required for these highways to be recommenced.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: When did you all meet?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The research team of the Central Bank immediately went out on the following Wednesday and Thursday and came up with the estimates and then, the meeting was held on Thursday morning in the Central Bank

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Whatever that requirement was, by when did you need that?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Almost immediately, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Almost immediately means, was there an absolute deadline?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. The projects had stalled and as you know, the construction companies are mobilized and on the ground, they needed that cash immediately to continue with their work.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: By when did you get that money for that purpose?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It was in the subsequent week. I would say that by the third week of March we collected sufficient excess funds to meet these requirements which were over and above the cash flows that had been requested.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That would have been in the third week of March.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, that was really not relevant to the decision taken on the 27th.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: We have to set in motion a sort of train of events which would culminate that money being raised. I would say so. The 27th of February was critical to kick-start that process.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: How do you say that it was kick-started? Is it by having raised its interest rates?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is by 1.3 per cent. It would have occurred, if we had not gone over Rs. 1 billion that was advertised.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, you could have also had another auction later in which you advertise the full amount or whatever.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: We did that.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Of course. In actual fact, what you did on 27th of February was to take the amount that the General Treasury asked you for.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: There are two issues here that should not be confused. The whole issue of highways was a separate issue which was not the decision to raise it from one to ten. That was driven purely by the Treasury's cash flow requirement.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That is what I would have thought. It is just as this has recurred constantly in discussion on the subject including by you. There are two issues here. One is, you just said that it is not relevant to the decision on the 27th of February. The second is perhaps a political point.

The Chairman: That is not related to here.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Yes, exactly. My question is this. Normally a requirement for money for the Government comes through the General Treasury. Is it not?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is even occasionally done through Cabinet Ministers' advisors.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The General Treasury represents them. **The Hon.** Minister of Finance and the Secretary to the General Treasury were present at the meeting.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The State Minister was not present and did not know about this meeting.

Mr. Chairman: That is not related to this, Hon. Member.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is very relevant because the question I would like to ask is whether Mr. Malik Samarawickrama was also present.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: He came as the adviser to **The Hon.** Prime Minister.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He came there as the adviser to **The Hon.** Prime Minister, not in his capacity as the Chairman of the Party.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: No, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Are you a member of the United National Party?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: My affiliation with the Party is well known.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: That is an unfair question.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I am the State Minister of Children's Affairs and I am a member of the United National Party.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You are a politician and he is the Governor of the Central Bank. I am sorry. I asked him a question and he has answered.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: I think it is a very unfair question anyway.

The Chairman: Please, do not mislead the Committee. Do not bring in these.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: These are relevant. The three-man Committee that investigated has made two points that are relevant. Do you feel that they discussed this matter with you sufficiently?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Sir.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: They say that you have no direct involvement in the decision to take Rs. 10 billion. Is that correct?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: In deed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, you also told that you went down on that occasion and set down guidelines which made it necessary to go take the whole amount by auction.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I did not set down any guideline. It is my normal walkabout. My style of management is that I walked about the bank every morning and this is one such occasion.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You made it very clear that the direct placements were not

on and you just told us that you thought to convey the decision of the Monetary Board.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, in fact we find it from the minutes, the Monetary Board claims that the decision was yours or that of the Central Bank. That is what I wanted to ask him. Can you read that minute again, Mr. Fernando?

Mr. Lionel Fernando: The 3.3 of the Minute of the Monetary Board states, "The Chairman informed the Board that the Central Bank temporarily suspended the method of direct placements of Treasury bills and Treasury bonds used to raise funds for the Government with a view to move towards a greater market mechanism based on standard auction system followed alternatively at present."

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you. That is enough. Basically, the Monetary Board says that the Chairman informed them of a decision where as you told us a bit earlier that in fact what you conveyed to the Public Debt Department was what you thought had been a decision of the Monetary Board.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, we had already decided at a prior meeting

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Obviously, the Monetary Board may know such decision.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Where is that minute? Can we have that minute of the prior meeting?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: When the Monetary Board does not object, then it is the policy of the Monetary Board.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There is a big difference between the Monetary Board ratifying a decision which you may have taken in good faith and you are telling us that this decision was based on a decision of the Monetary Board which is what you said.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is correct.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But, clearly, there is a big difference between a recommendation that is ratified and a decision.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Hon. Member, I will guide on that. There is a minute on the 23rd which states that the Board was of the view that issuing 30-year treasury bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and reprofile debt service as there is a good interest shown by the foreign investors. Accordingly, the Board instructed the Superintendent of the Public Debt Department to conduct a 30-year treasury bond auction during the week and arrange to list sovereign bonds in euroclear exchange in the future.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: That has been already cleared. The point I am trying to make is that the decision-

The Chairman: How many times this has been discussed.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: May I ask a question?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Let me finish, Hon. Member. It is not incompatible with the previous system. Now, we are told that a full decision to change the previous system hundred per cent was taken and it is not recorded in the Monetary Board's minute.

But, it was conveyed to the PDD and then the Monetary Board was told the following week - that minute is very clear. - the bank took this decision. Now, my final question is, you mentioned several times in your evidence last week - and I will not cite it, but you were there - that the Prime Minister kept telling you to move to the direct system.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: He mentioned it once or twice.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Your minutes it is said about three times. Now, I have a very simple question. As firm in your decision, had it not been from the suggestion of the Prime Minister?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Of course.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: If the Prime Minister has said, "Do not go for auction", would you still have go on completely for auction?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I would have tried to canvass him to change that view.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Sorry.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I was trying to convince the Prime Minister to-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Okay, fine. Therefore, what you are saying two factors dwell together leading to this decision. Okay.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Sir, can I ask a question. Mr. Governor, last time, I wanted to ask this question, but I was told that I would ask this today. Therefore, I am going to ask you. You said about these captive sources. When it comes to private placements, when you said typically you go to the EPF or

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the NSB and you also said about you were feeling sorry for the depositors because the Government is finding it difficult to give – it is struggling- this year to reach the 10.5 per cent interest rate to the EPF holders.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I want to ask you, was the EPF, the ETF used manipulate the market?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Madam.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what I want to know and if you can elaborate a little bit on that because it is very important. The EPF, ETF scam was much talked about and also was the Perpetual Treasuries closely linked to the EPF and ETF funds management. Can you elaborate on this because this is something that was talked about in the past? You are talking about Perpetual Treasuries on this bond issue which was a transparent issue, but I really like to know because you specifically mentioned that. For our knowledge, please explain because there have been frauds and scams which we never spoke about but this is a good platform for us to actually know the truth.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Okay, Madam. I will give you some data to start with to prove that the EPF was used to artificially depress the interest rates on this 30-year bond. These are the dates of transactions. "On the sixth of February 2015, Rs. 1.4 billion was invested by the EPF at a weighted average yield net of tax of 9.45 per cent." That was the 6th of February.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Which year?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is 6th February, 2015.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This year.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, this year. Then, "On the 2nd of February, the EPF again invested Rs. 4.9 billion at a weighted average of 9.45 per cent." This is the only transaction in February for that 30-year bond. Then, we go back to the 17th of October last year when the EPF invested Rs. 1.35 billion at a weighted average of 8.85 per cent yield on the 30-year bond. In between there were no other transactions by private parties. "On the 1st of August, 2015, the EPF invested Rs. 1.1 billion at a weighted average of 10 per cent." Then, going back to the 15th of July, the NSB invested at a yield of 11.4 per cent. So, you can see that gradually the interest rates have been brought down very dramatically just using captive sources - the EPF and the NSB - from the previous auction rate of 11.75. So, that is what I established in terms of captive sources distorting the price in the market. So, any talk of this 9.35 or 9.45 per cent has been the market rate is completely rubbish. It is not a market rate. It is purely manipulated by captive sources in collusion with the Central Bank to create artificially low interest rates and the result was that we could not raise the funds for the Government in the volumes that they required. '

The Chairman: Could it be a regular repetition.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: If you go back to the history, Sir, it is a regular occurrence.

The Chairman: As an instrument.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: As an instrument of control of the market.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: My second question about the Perpetual Treasuries closely linked the-

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, Madam, now, again, this is all hearsay, but, clearly the fact that-

The Chairman: What is the purpose of hearsay?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The point is we are investigating in trying to find the linkages.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Are you investigating into this?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes, we are investigating into this. I have just set up the Legal and Compliance Department which was non-existent for about 10 years.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: What are you investigating?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why not the Legal and the Compliance Department - The Legal and the Compliance Department is very important for the Central Bank. Am I right?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It is very suspicious, Sir. I know-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: It was suspended by the previous Governor. There was no Legal Department. That is what-

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: When I came in there was no Legal Department which I found rather shocking. We have made measures now to bring all the lawyers in the bank together again

to reform that Department to undertake this inquiry.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is there any mention of the Legal Department in the manual?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Not in the manual, but, Sir, I would be surprised if the Monetary Law Act has a reference to it. But I will have to check that. The standard practice in any major banking institute anywhere in the world, whether it is Central Bank or a commercial bank you have a Legal and Compliance Department. That is the standard practice; good practice; good governance. It was rather shocking that this did not exist. Now that has been done. They are undertaking this inquiry. All I can say is that the Perpetual Treasuries has been mentioned in regard to certain transactions that occurred with EPF funds in the past and this will be investigated by the Central Bank and the SEC collaborating together and they also have had access to information from the EPF when it was investing into the bond market et cetera and we will be investigating into-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is the thing.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: And we will investigate all that.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That is what we want to know.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: And of course the fact that the-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Where did the information come from?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: The fact the close relative of the former Governor was on their Board leads to some suspicion of that having been the case. I will not discount the fact that individual officials of the Public Debt Department and the EPF Department given that the Governor's sister was sitting on the Board of such a company would feel that there is some linkage where there perhaps giving that information to this company. These are the ruses that companies use all over the world to try and gain privileged access to privileged information. So, I would not discount that and we are going to investigate into that and find the results.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you also just say what impact did it have on the economy, the country and the Central Bank?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: I think it is well documented that the so-called pump and dump events in the stock market were deliberately injurious to the health of that market. In the sense that after about two years of very exalted activity and the fund flow the market collapsed and to this date we really see very lackluster performance of our market and our market is trading at prices that multiples- which are way below the markets around the world as a consequence of that perception that insiders had taken control of this market and in fact shockingly some very senior corporate leaders in this country went on record in the press saying that they condone insider trading which shocks the whole world or really brought our markers into disrepute.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: The stock market, not about the Central Bank.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Those two are connected because coming to the bond market, the perception was that again through private placements as I have just illustrated to you rates were manipulated to levels which were artificial and could not be justifiable in terms of market expectations-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: And huge monies are made-

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: And huge monies are made

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is 1 per cent manipulation can make huge income for a private company?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Absolutely.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Mr. Governor, regarding the stock market – actually we were very concerned about the stock market. Sir, I will take just one minute. This is very important because that says the Central Bank-

The Chairman: Let him investigate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I want to mention this. If at all you are investing EPF, ETF money it should be on blue-chip companies and that direction had been given by two previous Attorney-Generals and that view had been given. But I see a lot of other companies which are not blue-chip companies had been invested by the earlier Governor.

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

So, will you have an inquiry on how those investments were made and whether there was a pattern on how those investments were made? In the share market I have seen, certain

shares going up from Rs.7 to Rs. 85 in just one day and then coming down again to Rs. 15 or something like that. Are you all having inquiry on this as well?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: We are doing an inquiry.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I would actually guide you to have it because all these are linked. I see a pattern because a lot of relations of the former Governor are sitting on several Boards in several banks and the primary dealers are also connected to the hierarchy of the last Government. It is a Minister or some connection to the President or something like that. I want you to investigate that also. What the primary dealers have been given and –

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Totally different from the present situation.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Very different from the present situation because nepotism was the norm of the day during that time. Especially, I would love people like you raising that. Actually I do not see that happening from you.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Mr. Governor, one last question. After speaking to the CEO and also the former CEO of the Perpetual Treasuries what I learnt was they rose from ashes to glory. Today they are a Rs. 500 billion – I cannot remember the exact statistics.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is Rs. 200.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Within a short span of time, one and a half years. Is it because of this manipulation and because they were favoured? How did they rise from – They are the number two player according to their own verdict. Could it be because they were favoured and they knew the information or the right people in dealing with these things?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: In a market which is dominated by private placements that possibility is eminently possible.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: One more question, Sir. Last time, we asked from you and you said that there are other applications by people who wanted to be primary dealers. Do you have any evidence of that?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: We sent the list to the Secretary, Sir.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: How many applications?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: There are four applications that are pending which have not been awarded.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I did not get it.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: There are four. One is in 2004 and the other three are last year. I just got that piece of paper. It is here.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: I need that. I did not get it. It is in.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Those are the people who have applied and not got it?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: That is right.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is there any reason why they have not got it? They have not complied with requirements or what is the reason?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: It has not been made clear why they did not receive it, Sir. I am investigating that but we do not have any valid reason as to why they were not awarded these licences.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You have a file on this with their applications?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Yes. We have a file.

The Chairman: Right. No more questions.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Okay, thank you.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියූ දේවල් මේ වාර්තාවල වෙන කාගේද නමින් ලියවී තිබෙනවා. මගේ නම ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න. ඒක ලියවිලා තිබෙනවා. සමහර තැන්වල "එරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න" කියලා ඒ වාර්තාවේම නිබෙනවා. ඒක මගේ නම්, "ඉ" යන්නෙන්ම ඒක ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න කියා දමන ලෙස කරුණාකර ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ tone එක අනුව - It depends on his tone.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන සමාව ඉල්ලනවා.

ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඉදිරියෙන් ඉන්නේ-

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි අපිත් ඉල්ලන්නේ.

The Chairman: Thank you, Governor.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Thank you very much.

Committee Adjourned

Investment In Treasury Bonds - 2016 Purchases

Purchase Date	ISIN Number	Coupon %	Yield %	Face Value	Purchase cost	Counter party
11.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.45	1,000,000,000	968,329,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
11.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.50	4,000,000,000	3,859,748,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
11.01.2016	LKB01025H016	11.00	11.10	1,000,000,000	994,048,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
11.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	3,000,000,000	2,999,730,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
11.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.05	3,000,000,000	2,987,952,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
11.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.10	4,000,000,000	3,968,336,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
13.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	11.30	100,000,000	101,519,100	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
20.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.94	150,000,000	130,447,950	Seylan Bank Ltd / / Colombo 3
20.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.95	100,000,000	86,904,500	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
20.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.90	100,000,000	87,209,000	Seylan Bank Ltd / / Colombo 3
20.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.90	250,000,000	218,022,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
20.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.85	100,000,000	87,514,900	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
20.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.90	50,000,000	43,604,500	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
20.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.85	50,000,000	43,757,450	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
20.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	11.00	250,000,000	284,052,500	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
20.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.91	100,000,000	114,299,200	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
20.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.90	500,000,000	523,756,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
20.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	500,000,000	527,924,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
20.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	250,000,000	263,962,250	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
20.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.90	100,000,000	104,751,200	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
20.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	250,000,000	263,962,250	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
20.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	100,000,000	105,584,900	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
20.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	400,000,000	441,163,600	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
20.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	1,000,000,000	1,102,909,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
20.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.85	100,000,000	109,824,900	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
21.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.81	650,000,000	570,450,400	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
21.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.80	300,000,000	263,469,600	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.80	250,000,000	219,558,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB01528E016	9.00	10.80	250,000,000	219,713,750	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	500,000,000	575,670,000	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
21.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	500,000,000	575,670,000	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
21.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	500,000,000	575,670,000	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
21.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	150,000,000	158,377,350	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	1,000,000,000	1,055,849,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	200,000,000	211,169,800	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.81	250,000,000	253,336,750	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.80	1,000,000,000	1,014,075,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	300,000,000	330,870,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	1,500,000,000	1,654,350,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.

21.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	1,500,000,000	1,654,350,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
22.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.80	100,000,000	87,824,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.01.2016	LKB01628G019	9.00	10.80	50,000,000	43,912,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	50,000,000	57,565,850	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	500,000,000	575,658,500	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
22.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	250,000,000	287,829,250	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
22.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	500,000,000	575,658,500	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
22.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	100,000,000	105,585,000	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
22.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	250,000,000	263,962,500	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
22.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.80	850,000,000	861,961,200	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
22.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.80	50,000,000	50,703,600	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	50,000,000	55,144,550	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
22.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	1,000,000,000	1,102,891,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
22.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	1,000,000,000	1,102,891,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
22.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.80	250,000,000	275,722,750	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
25.01.2016	LKB01025H016	9.00	10.00	500,000,000	479,771,000	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
25.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	250,000,000	287,812,750	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
25.01.2016	LKB01529A012	13.00	10.80	500,000,000	575,625,500	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
25.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	600,000,000	633,512,400	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
25.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.80	250,000,000	253,515,500	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
25.01.2016	LKB01025H016	11.00	10.50	750,000,000	772,192,500	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
25.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.75	650,000,000	719,912,050	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
25.01.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	10.75	400,000,000	443,022,800	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
26.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	150,000,000	158,378,250	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
26.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.80	200,000,000	202,811,800	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
27.01.2016	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.70	100,000,000	106,429,700	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
27.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.70	1,100,000,000	1,123,515,800	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
28.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.70	3,150,000,000	3,217,331,250	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
28.01.2016	LKB01025H016	11.00	10.70	750,000,000	763,202,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
28.01.2016	LKB01025H016	11.00	10.70	600,000,000	610,561,800	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
29.01.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.80	1,150,000,000	1,166,158,650	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
03.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.10	750,000,000	744,414,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
03.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.10	750,000,000	744,414,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
03.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.10	750,000,000	744,414,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
03.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.10	750,000,000	744,414,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
03.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.10	650,000,000	645,158,800	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
03.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.10	750,000,000	744,414,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
03.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.10	750,000,000	744,414,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
10.02.2016	LKB01226F014	11.00	11.08	100,000,000	99,480,500	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
12.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.65	1,000,000,000	954,923,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
12.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.70	1,000,000,000	951,609,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
12.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.55	150,000,000	155,442,150	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
12.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.54	750,000,000	777,840,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3

12.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.54	750,000,000	777,840,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
12.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.54	750,000,000	777,840,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
12.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.54	750,000,000	777,840,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
12.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.54	250,000,000	259,280,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
12.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.54	50,000,000	51,856,000	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
12.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.55	800,000,000	829,024,800	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
15.02.2016	LKB00922G017	11.20	10.72	250,000,000	255,374,500	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
15.02.2016	LKB01226F014	11.00	11.03	50,000,000	49,891,150	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
15.02.2016	LKB01226F014	11.00	11.03	50,000,000	49,891,150	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
15.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.35	50,000,000	48,759,050	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
15.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.35	250,000,000	243,795,250	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
15.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.35	200,000,000	195,036,200	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
15.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.35	100,000,000	97,518,100	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
15.02.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	11.35	100,000,000	97,518,100	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
15.02.2016	LKB00922J011	10.00	10.74	500,000,000	482,651,000	HSBC / Sir Baron Jayathilake Mawatha / Colombo 1.
15.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.55	750,000,000	777,198,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
15.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.55	500,000,000	518,132,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
15.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.55	500,000,000	518,132,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
15.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	11.55	500,000,000	518,132,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
16.02.2016	LKB00922G017	11.20	10.72	500,000,000	510,743,500	Commercial Bank / / Colombo 01.
16.02.2016	LKB00922G017	11.20	10.72	500,000,000	510,743,500	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
16.02.2016	LKB01023I019	11.20	10.80	500,000,000	510,086,000	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
16.02.2016	LKB01023I019	11.20	10.80	500,000,000	510,086,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	50,000,000	49,981,650	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	250,000,000	249,908,250	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	300,000,000	299,889,900	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	150,000,000	149,944,950	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	100,000,000	99,963,300	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	500,000,000	499,816,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	250,000,000	249,908,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	250,000,000	249,908,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.02.2016	LKB02541A016	12.00	12.00	200,000,000	199,926,600	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
01.03.2016	LKB01023I019	11.20	11.70	1,000,000,000	975,480,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.03.2016	LKB01023I019	11.20	11.80	3,000,000,000	2,912,016,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.03.2016	LKB01023I019	11.20	11.85	1,000,000,000	968,280,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.03.2016	LKB00821H019	11.00	11.40	1,000,000,000	983,948,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.03.2016	LKB00821H019	11.00	11.45	2,000,000,000	1,963,976,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.03.2016	LKB00821H019	11.00	11.50	1,000,000,000	980,034,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
09.03.2016	LKB01023I019	11.20	11.90	700,000,000	676,123,700	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
18.03.2016	LKB01024A014	11.40	12.10	500,000,000	482,455,500	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
18.03.2016	LKB01024A014	11.40	12.15	1,000,000,000	962,495,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
18.03.2016	LKB01024A014	11.40	12.20	1,500,000,000	1,440,129,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
18.03.2016	LKB01024A014	11.40	12.30	1,000,000,000	955,294,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.

01.04.2016	LKB01226F014	11.00	13.45	500,000,000	432,970,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.04.2016	LKB01025C157	10.25	13.35	1,000,000,000	840,656,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	13.65	500,000,000	417,805,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	13.70	500,000,000	416,451,500	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
11.04.2016	LKB01528I017	11.50	12.40	500,000,000	471,736,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
11.04.2016	LKB01528I017	11.50	12.40	500,000,000	471,736,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
12.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,176,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
12.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.42	50,000,000	45,317,600	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
18.04.2016	LKB01226F014	11.00	12.20	100,000,000	93,101,100	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
18.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.45	500,000,000	452,301,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
20.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
20.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
20.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
20.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
20.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.50	1,000,000,000	901,596,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
20.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.45	500,000,000	452,314,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
20.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.45	500,000,000	452,314,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.50	250,000,000	225,416,750	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.50	750,000,000	676,250,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.04.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.50	1,000,000,000	901,667,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
03.05.2016	LKB00718K151	8.00	11.45	500,000,000	462,942,500	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
03.05.2016	LKB00718K151	8.00	11.50	500,000,000	462,431,500	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
03.05.2016	LKB00718K151	8.00	11.55	500,000,000	461,921,500	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
03.05.2016	LKB00520E014	9.25	11.75	2,000,000,000	1,844,124,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
03.05.2016	LKB00520E014	9.25	11.80	2,000,000,000	1,841,164,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
03.05.2016	LKB00520E014	9.25	11.85	2,000,000,000	1,838,210,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
03.05.2016	LKB00922J011	10.00	12.05	2,000,000,000	1,820,000,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
05.05.2016	LKB01528I017	11.50	12.15	1,000,000,000	958,620,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
05.05.2016	LKB00922J011	11.50	12.15	1,000,000,000	958,620,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
11.05.2016	LKB01528I017	11.50	12.10	2,000,000,000	1,923,388,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
12.05.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.20	250,000,000	230,083,750	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
12.05.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.20	250,000,000	230,083,750	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
12.05.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.16	2,250,000,000	2,076,374,250	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
12.05.2016	LKB01528I017	11.50	12.10	500,000,000	480,848,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
12.05.2016	LKB01528I017	11.50	12.10	500,000,000	480,848,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
13.05.2016	LKB01530E152	11.00	12.25	800,000,000	733,794,400	National Savings Bank / / Colombo 3.
13.05.2016	LKB01528I017	11.50	12.10	500,000,000	480,848,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
13.05.2016	LKB01528I017	11.50	12.10	500,000,000	480,848,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
16.05.2016	LKB00718K151	8.00	11.55	500,000,000	462,417,500	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.05.2016	LKB01024A014	11.40	12.10	1,000,000,000	965,447,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.05.2016	LKB00520E014	9.25	11.80	500,000,000	460,526,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.05.2016	LKB00922J011	10.00	12.00	1,000,000,000	912,332,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
Total				**111,150,000,000**	**109,564,347,500**	

Investment In Treasury Bonds - 2016 Sales

Sale Date	ISIN Number	Coupon %	Yield %	Face Value	Purchase cost	Counter party
13.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.65	250,000,000	245,603,000	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
13.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.65	500,000,000	491,206,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
14.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.65	750,000,000	736,845,750	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
14.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.65	750,000,000	736,845,750	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
14.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.65	100,000,000	98,246,100	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
20.01.2016	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.50	500,000,000	501,405,500	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
21.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.75	1,000,000,000	981,853,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
21.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.75	150,000,000	147,277,950	Nations Trust Bank / 242, Union Place / Colombo 02
22.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.65	500,000,000	496,814,000	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
22.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.65	500,000,000	496,814,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
22.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.65	100,000,000	99,362,800	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.75	1,000,000,000	998,731,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
22.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.78	1,000,000,000	998,683,000	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
22.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.75	250,000,000	249,682,750	Nations Trust Bank / 242, Union Place / Colombo 02
22.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.75	250,000,000	249,682,750	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
22.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.75	1,000,000,000	998,731,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
22.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.75	1,000,000,000	998,731,000	Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd. / / Colombo 1.
22.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.75	500,000,000	499,365,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.75	500,000,000	499,365,500	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
22.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.75	850,000,000	834,614,150	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
22.01.2016	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.75	500,000,000	490,949,500	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
22.01.2016	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.75	250,000,000	250,538,250	Nations Trust Bank / 242, Union Place / Colombo 02
22.01.2016	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.75	500,000,000	500,663,500	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
22.01.2016	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.70	500,000,000	500,809,500	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
22.01.2016	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.74	1,050,000,000	1,051,454,250	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
22.01.2016	LKB00516F019	8.00	7.10	750,000,000	752,145,000	HSBC / Sir Baron Jayathilake Mawatha / Colombo 1.
27.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	250,000,000	248,266,750	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
27.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	500,000,000	496,533,500	Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd. / / Colombo 1.
27.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	500,000,000	496,533,500	Hatton National bank / Level 17, HNB Tower, 479 / TB Jayah MW, Colombo10
27.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.85	250,000,000	248,205,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
27.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.85	250,000,000	248,205,500	Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd. / / Colombo 1.
27.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.85	1,000,000,000	992,822,000	Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd. / / Colombo 1.
27.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.40	500,000,000	499,717,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
27.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.50	1,000,000,000	999,255,000	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
28.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.45	250,000,000	249,838,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	250,000,000	248,276,500	Nations Trust Bank / 242, Union Place / Colombo 02
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	250,000,000	248,276,500	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	250,000,000	248,276,500	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	250,000,000	248,276,500	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	250,000,000	248,276,500	Nations Trust Bank / 242, Union Place / Colombo 02

28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	500,000,000	496,553,000	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	500,000,000	496,553,000	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	1,000,000,000	993,106,000	Commercial Bank / / Colombo 01.
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	250,000,000	248,276,500	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	750,000,000	744,829,500	Hatton National bank / Level 17, HNB Tower, 479 / TB Jayah MW, Colombo10
28.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.85	250,000,000	248,215,500	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
28.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.40	500,000,000	499,720,000	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
28.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.40	500,000,000	499,720,000	Sampath Bank / / Colombo 2
28.01.2016	LKB00616D012	7.25	7.50	750,000,000	749,447,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
29.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.85	500,000,000	496,451,000	Sampath Bank / / Colombo 2
29.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.85	1,000,000,000	992,902,000	HSBC / Sir Baron Jayathilake Mawatha / Colombo 1.
29.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.82	5,000,000,000	4,965,240,000	Commercial Bank / / Colombo 01.
29.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	750,000,000	744,858,750	Sampath Bank PLC / 110, Sir James Peiris Mawatha / COLOMBO 02
29.01.2016	LKB00616H013	6.40	7.80	500,000,000	496,572,500	Sampath Bank PLC / 110, Sir James Peiris Mawatha / COLOMBO 02
04.04.2016	LKB01518B013	8.50	11.75	100,000,000	94,765,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
08.04.2016	LKB00819K017	8.00	11.10	700,000,000	637,455,000	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
11.04.2016	LKB00819K017	8.00	11.10	300,000,000	273,249,900	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
11.04.2016	LKB00819K017	8.00	11.10	250,000,000	227,708,250	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
11.04.2016	LKB00819K017	8.00	11.10	250,000,000	227,708,250	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
11.04.2016	LKB00819K017	8.00	11.10	250,000,000	227,708,250	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
11.04.2016	LKB00819K017	8.00	11.10	250,000,000	227,708,250	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
12.04.2016	LKB01518B013	8.50	10.75	500,000,000	481,846,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
12.04.2016	LKB01518B013	8.50	10.75	250,000,000	240,923,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
12.04.2016	LKB01518B013	8.50	10.75	1,250,000,000	1,204,615,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
12.04.2016	LKB00819K017	8.00	11.10	100,000,000	91,089,400	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
12.04.2016	LKB00819K017	8.00	11.10	500,000,000	455,447,000	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
15.04.2016	LKB00616J019	6.40	9.70	500,000,000	492,655,500	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
15.04.2016	LKB00616J019	6.40	9.70	500,000,000	492,655,500	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
15.04.2016	LKB00517A018	8.00	10.05	500,000,000	493,007,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
18.04.2016	LKB01518B013	8.50	10.75	100,000,000	96,398,400	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
18.04.2016	LKB01518B013	8.50	10.75	500,000,000	481,992,000	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
18.04.2016	LKB00616J019	6.40	9.70	250,000,000	246,384,500	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
18.04.2016	LKB00616J019	6.40	9.70	200,000,000	197,107,600	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
18.04.2016	LKB00616J019	6.40	9.70	300,000,000	295,661,400	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
18.04.2016	LKB00517A018	8.00	10.08	400,000,000	394,389,200	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
18.04.2016	LKB00517A018	8.00	10.08	200,000,000	197,194,600	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
18.04.2016	LKB00517A018	8.00	10.05	250,000,000	246,542,500	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
18.04.2016	LKB00517A018	8.00	10.05	250,000,000	246,542,500	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
20.04.2016	LKB00517F157	8.00	10.35	1,000,000,000	974,846,000	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
20.04.2016	LKB00517F157	8.00	10.35	250,000,000	243,711,500	Nations Trust Bank PLC / 242 Union Place / COLOMBO 02
20.04.2016	LKB00517F157	8.00	10.35	250,000,000	243,711,500	Nations Trust Bank / 242, Union Place / Colombo 02
11.05.2016	LKB00616J019	6.40	9.95	1,000,000,000	986,387,000	Sampath Bank PLC / 110, Sir James Peiris Mawatha / COLOMBO 02
11.05.2016	LKB00616J019	6.40	9.95	1,000,000,000	986,387,000	Commercial Bank / / Colombo 01.
12.05.2016	LKB00517A018	8.00	10.15	250,000,000	246,712,000	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
12.05.2016	LKB00517A018	8.00	10.17	2,000,000,000	1,973,458,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
12.05.2016	LKB00517F157	8.00	10.65	500,000,000	486,583,000	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
Total				**48,400,000,000**	**47,712,174,750**	

Investment In Treasury Bonds - 2015 Purchases

Purchase Date	ISIN Number	Coupon %	Yield %	Face Value	Purchase cost	Counter party
01.01.2015	LKB01225E019	9.00	7.88	1,500,000,000	1,516,967,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.01.2015	LKB01529E014	13.00	8.60	1,283,770,000	1,743,692,156	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.01.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	8.37	8,000,000,000	9,526,568,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.01.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	8.37	7,414,230,000	8,829,020,783	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
12.01.2015	LKB00417E153	8.75	6.90	3,797,920,000	3,946,756,687	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.01.2015	LKB01529E014	13.00	8.62	3,977,000,000	5,391,455,843	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.02.2015	LKB03044F019	13.50	9.45	4,919,160,000	6,885,072,779	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
06.02.2015	LKB03044F019	13.50	9.45	1,404,050,000	1,965,115,400	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.03.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	11.25	500,000,000	553,467,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.03.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	10.75	500,000,000	577,871,500	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.03.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	11.00	1,000,000,000	1,130,863,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.03.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.75	2,000,000,000	2,062,954,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.03.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	10.00	3,000,000,000	3,046,707,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.03.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	11.00	2,000,000,000	2,080,212,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.03.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	11.25	3,000,000,000	3,059,172,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.03.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	11.30	5,000,000,000	5,078,630,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.04.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.70	5,000,000,000	5,423,860,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.04.2015	LKB00820F015	8.00	9.00	2,000,000,000	1,918,422,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.04.2015	LKB00820F015	8.00	9.05	1,000,000,000	957,234,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.04.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.90	2,000,000,000	2,043,458,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.04.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.95	3,000,000,000	3,055,710,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.04.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	10.00	5,000,000,000	5,077,115,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.04.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	10.00	5,000,000,000	5,077,115,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.04.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	10.15	2,000,000,000	2,012,126,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
09.04.2015	LKB00821H019	11.00	9.25	500,000,000	541,009,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
09.04.2015	LKB00821H019	11.00	9.30	1,000,000,000	1,079,546,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
09.04.2015	LKB00821H019	11.00	9.35	1,500,000,000	1,615,623,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
08.05.2015	LKB00520E014	9.25	8.40	2,000,000,000	2,067,982,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
08.05.2015	LKB00520E014	9.25	8.50	3,000,000,000	3,089,742,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
21.05.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.09	73,000,000	81,727,150	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
21.05.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.08	50,000,000	56,024,150	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
22.05.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.00	1,000,000,000	1,080,093,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
25.05.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	11.00	400,000,000	452,128,400	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
25.05.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	11.00	100,000,000	113,032,100	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
01.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	8.75	1,000,000,000	1,141,561,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	8.80	2,000,000,000	2,276,812,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.06.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.60	2,000,000,000	2,219,684,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.06.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.70	5,000,000,000	5,507,010,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
04.06.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	10.85	100,000,000	114,509,600	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
04.06.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.80	100,000,000	114,698,800	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
05.06.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	10.80	40,000,000	46,004,120	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.

08.06.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	10.75	30,000,000	34,654,380	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
11.06.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	10.50	2,000,000,000	2,361,970,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
11.06.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	10.50	50,000,000	59,049,250	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
11.06.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.55	50,000,000	58,576,900	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
12.06.2015	LKB01529E014	13.00	9.30	100,000,000	128,499,400	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
12.06.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.30	1,500,000,000	1,703,340,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.80	2,000,000,000	2,186,678,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.85	2,000,000,000	2,179,834,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
15.06.2015	LKB00922J011	10.00	8.50	1,000,000,000	1,080,071,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
15.06.2015	LKB00922J011	10.00	8.55	1,000,000,000	1,077,261,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
15.06.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	8.85	50,000,000	57,527,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
15.06.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	8.85	50,000,000	57,527,500	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
15.06.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	8.85	50,000,000	57,527,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
15.06.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	8.85	50,000,000	57,527,500	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
15.06.2015	LKB00922G017	11.20	8.56	250,000,000	284,357,500	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
15.06.2015	LKB01529E014	13.00	9.30	93,000,000	119,495,421	Entrust Securities Ltd. / 281, R A DE MEL MAWATHA / COLOMBO 03
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.90	100,000,000	108,650,900	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.90	50,000,000	54,325,450	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.91	50,000,000	54,291,450	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.91	250,000,000	271,457,250	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.85	50,000,000	54,495,850	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.85	50,000,000	54,495,850	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.85	100,000,000	108,991,700	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.90	500,000,000	543,254,500	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.88	500,000,000	543,935,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.86	500,000,000	544,617,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
15.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	8.85	50,000,000	54,495,850	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
16.06.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.30	100,000,000	113,549,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
16.06.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.30	500,000,000	567,747,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
23.06.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.50	100,000,000	111,805,300	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
24.06.2015	LKB00821H019	11.00	9.25	100,000,000	108,005,200	HSBC / Sir Baron Jayathilake Mawatha / Colombo 1.
25.06.2015	LKB00922G017	11.20	9.15	50,000,000	55,220,600	Entrust Securities Ltd. / 281, R A DE MEL MAWATHA / COLOMBO 03
25.06.2015	LKB00922G017	11.20	9.15	250,000,000	276,103,000	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
25.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.25	50,000,000	53,147,200	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
25.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.25	100,000,000	106,294,400	DFCC Vardhana Bank / 73, WA De RAMANAYAKE MAWATHA / COLOMBO 02
25.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.25	100,000,000	106,294,400	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.25	100,000,000	106,294,400	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.25	50,000,000	53,147,200	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
25.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.25	50,000,000	53,147,200	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
25.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.25	100,000,000	106,294,400	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
25.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.34	400,000,000	441,803,200	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
25.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.19	50,000,000	55,679,500	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd / 134 Galle Road /
26.06.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	100,000,000	116,148,700	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
29.06.2015	LKB00921E014	9.00	8.95	500,000,000	501,011,000	Commercial Bank / / Colombo 01.
29.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.19	50,000,000	53,343,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
29.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.19	50,000,000	53,343,250	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08

29.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.17	50,000,000	53,409,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
29.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.10	50,000,000	53,642,300	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
29.06.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.50	650,000,000	764,668,450	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
29.06.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.50	600,000,000	705,847,800	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
29.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	50,000,000	56,010,600	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
29.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.05	100,000,000	112,205,300	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
29.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	50,000,000	56,010,600	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
29.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.05	200,000,000	224,410,600	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
29.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	50,000,000	56,010,600	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
29.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.05	50,000,000	56,102,650	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd / 134 Galle Road /
29.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.07	50,000,000	56,041,250	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd / 134 Galle Road /
29.06.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.33	150,000,000	169,900,350	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
29.06.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.33	150,000,000	169,900,350	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
30.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.00	100,000,000	112,510,400	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
30.06.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.00	100,000,000	112,510,400	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
30.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.10	500,000,000	536,417,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
30.06.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.00	2,000,000,000	2,159,064,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
02.07.2015	LKB01022A018	8.00	8.70	5,000,000,000	4,829,015,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.07.2015	LKB01022A018	8.00	8.70	5,000,000,000	4,829,015,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.07.2015	LKB01123I017	9.00	8.80	5,000,000,000	5,056,310,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.07.2015	LKB01123I017	9.00	8.85	7,000,000,000	7,058,632,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	100,000,000	112,013,700	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
03.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.05	50,000,000	53,806,950	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
03.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.05	100,000,000	107,613,900	Sampath Bank PLC / 110, Sir James Peiris Mawatha / COLOMBO 02
03.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.07	400,000,000	429,920,400	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
03.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.05	50,000,000	53,806,950	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
03.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.05	50,000,000	56,097,550	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
03.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.05	200,000,000	224,390,200	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
03.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.02	50,000,000	56,189,700	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
03.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.01	50,000,000	56,220,450	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
03.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.10	500,000,000	536,399,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
03.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.10	500,000,000	536,399,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
06.07.2015	LKB00922G017	11.20	9.00	300,000,000	333,678,300	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
07.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	300,000,000	336,003,600	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
07.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.15	200,000,000	213,885,800	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
08.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	250,000,000	279,997,000	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
08.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	100,000,000	111,998,800	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
08.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	50,000,000	55,999,400	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd / 134 Galle Road /
08.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.08	50,000,000	55,999,400	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd / 134 Galle Road /
09.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.10	500,000,000	536,365,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
09.07.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.10	500,000,000	536,365,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
15.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.45	2,000,000,000	2,195,046,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
15.07.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.55	3,000,000,000	3,274,797,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
15.07.2015	LKB00922J011	10.00	9.05	4,000,000,000	4,197,056,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
07.08.2015	LKB00821H019	11.00	9.10	1,000,000,000	1,086,163,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
07.08.2015	LKB00821H019	11.00	9.05	3,000,000,000	3,265,674,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.

07.08.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.50	2,000,000,000	2,190,692,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
07.08.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.60	4,000,000,000	4,354,424,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
07.08.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.70	5,000,000,000	5,409,615,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
07.08.2015	LKB00821H019	11.00	9.10	1,000,000,000	1,086,163,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
18.08.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.65	500,000,000	542,518,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
18.08.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.70	2,500,000,000	2,704,270,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	10.10	2,000,000,000	2,115,740,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	10.25	8,000,000,000	8,382,720,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	10.40	6,000,000,000	6,227,652,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.70	2,000,000,000	2,164,316,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.80	3,000,000,000	3,229,221,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.90	3,000,000,000	3,204,909,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	10.00	5,000,000,000	5,309,065,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	10.00	5,000,000,000	5,309,065,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.09.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	10.10	2,000,000,000	2,110,754,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
11.09.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.95	1,000,000,000	1,003,275,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
11.09.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.99	2,000,000,000	2,000,768,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
21.09.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.85	1,000,000,000	1,044,503,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
21.09.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.90	1,000,000,000	1,040,965,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
21.09.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.95	1,000,000,000	1,037,444,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
01.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	11.10	1,000,000,000	1,026,897,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
14.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.60	50,000,000	51,593,850	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
14.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.60	300,000,000	309,563,100	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
14.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.60	50,000,000	51,593,850	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
14.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.60	50,000,000	51,593,850	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
14.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.60	100,000,000	103,187,700	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
14.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.60	250,000,000	257,969,250	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
16.10.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.05	100,000,000	107,171,700	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
16.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.45	50,000,000	53,657,000	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
16.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.33	50,000,000	54,101,550	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
16.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.00	400,000,000	442,816,800	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
19.10.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.05	300,000,000	321,514,200	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
19.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.00	300,000,000	332,098,800	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
19.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.00	200,000,000	221,399,200	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
19.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.18	250,000,000	273,314,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
19.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.18	50,000,000	54,662,800	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
19.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.12	250,000,000	274,452,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
19.10.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.12	100,000,000	109,780,800	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
22.10.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	9.70	200,000,000	216,947,200	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.10.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.20	150,000,000	158,978,850	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.21	200,000,000	208,897,000	National Savings Bank / / Colombo 3.
02.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	11.00	600,000,000	623,666,400	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
02.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.30	1,000,000,000	1,052,085,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
02.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.30	1,000,000,000	1,052,085,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
02.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.30	1,000,000,000	1,052,085,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
02.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.30	550,000,000	578,646,750	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.

02.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	11.10	2,000,000,000	2,062,578,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	11.15	3,000,000,000	3,081,750,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	11.20	5,000,000,000	5,116,190,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	10.50	2,000,000,000	2,138,574,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
05.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.80	1,000,000,000	1,145,978,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
05.11.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.00	450,000,000	484,980,300	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
05.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.35	250,000,000	289,598,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
05.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	200,000,000	232,501,800	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
05.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	500,000,000	581,254,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
06.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.95	100,000,000	113,171,700	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
06.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.94	200,000,000	226,531,600	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
06.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	50,000,000	56,351,400	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
06.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	300,000,000	338,108,400	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
06.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	500,000,000	563,514,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
06.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.50	750,000,000	837,617,250	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
06.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.25	1,000,000,000	1,138,256,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
06.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.25	500,000,000	569,128,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
06.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.25	1,000,000,000	1,138,256,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
06.11.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.00	50,000,000	56,380,700	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
06.11.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	9.00	100,000,000	113,629,600	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
06.11.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	9.00	100,000,000	113,629,600	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
06.11.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	9.00	100,000,000	113,629,600	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
06.11.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.00	100,000,000	107,771,700	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
06.11.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	8.85	100,000,000	113,033,800	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
09.11.2015	LKB01528E016	9.00	9.25	1,000,000,000	981,676,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
09.11.2015	LKB01528E016	9.00	9.25	1,000,000,000	981,676,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
09.11.2015	LKB03045C013	12.50	10.50	50,000,000	59,030,650	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
09.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	50,000,000	56,350,050	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
09.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.80	500,000,000	572,968,500	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
09.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	150,000,000	170,460,900	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
09.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.85	100,000,000	114,115,600	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
09.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.85	100,000,000	114,115,600	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
09.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.75	250,000,000	287,687,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
09.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.25	350,000,000	398,382,950	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
11.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.40	250,000,000	281,325,000	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
11.11.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	9.02	500,000,000	566,443,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
11.11.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	9.01	1,000,000,000	1,133,619,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
11.11.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	9.01	500,000,000	566,809,500	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
11.11.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	9.02	500,000,000	566,443,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
12.11.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.00	100,000,000	107,761,400	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
12.11.2015	LKB01025C157	10.25	9.00	200,000,000	215,522,800	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
13.11.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.00	700,000,000	789,222,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
13.11.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.00	700,000,000	789,222,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
16.11.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	9.35	745,000,000	830,418,720	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
16.11.2015	LKB00922G017	11.20	8.90	700,000,000	779,321,900	Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd. / / Colombo 1.
17.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	250,000,000	284,083,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.

17.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.35	100,000,000	112,952,800	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
17.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.45	50,000,000	56,049,450	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
17.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	50,000,000	58,113,400	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
17.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.40	150,000,000	173,110,800	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
17.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.45	250,000,000	287,501,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
17.11.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	9.01	1,000,000,000	1,133,525,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
17.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.80	200,000,000	229,171,600	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
17.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	500,000,000	580,193,500	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
17.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.33	100,000,000	113,124,700	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
17.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.35	50,000,000	56,476,400	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
17.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.33	1,500,000,000	1,696,870,500	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
17.11.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.00	750,000,000	845,530,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
17.11.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.00	750,000,000	845,530,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
17.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	50,000,000	58,113,400	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
17.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	1,000,000,000	1,162,268,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
18.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	300,000,000	348,113,100	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
18.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	200,000,000	232,075,400	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
18.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	200,000,000	232,075,400	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
18.11.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.00	750,000,000	845,514,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
18.11.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.00	500,000,000	563,676,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
18.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	200,000,000	232,449,600	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
18.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	50,000,000	58,112,400	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
19.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	1,000,000,000	1,160,367,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
19.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.33	1,000,000,000	1,131,210,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
19.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.33	1,000,000,000	1,131,210,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
20.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	100,000,000	116,035,600	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
20.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.35	100,000,000	112,947,300	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
20.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.25	1,000,000,000	1,166,337,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
20.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.25	1,000,000,000	1,166,337,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
20.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	200,000,000	232,441,800	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
23.11.2015	LKB01024A014	11.40	9.00	350,000,000	397,537,700	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
23.11.2015	LKB00922G017	11.20	9.00	1,400,000,000	1,550,620,400	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
23.11.2015	LKB01226F014	11.00	9.10	500,000,000	563,440,500	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
23.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	400,000,000	464,130,400	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
23.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.65	1,000,000,000	1,160,326,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
23.11.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	9.08	50,000,000	56,086,450	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
23.11.2015	LKB01528I017	11.50	9.30	850,000,000	987,829,200	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
24.11.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.03	750,000,000	839,256,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
24.11.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.03	750,000,000	839,256,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
24.11.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.03	750,000,000	839,256,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
24.11.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	9.03	550,000,000	615,454,400	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
27.11.2015	LKB00922J011	10.00	9.10	750,000,000	783,656,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
27.11.2015	LKB00922J011	10.00	9.10	750,000,000	783,656,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
27.11.2015	LKB00922J011	10.00	9.10	750,000,000	783,656,250	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
27.11.2015	LKB00922J011	10.00	9.10	250,000,000	261,218,750	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.40	2,000,000,000	2,180,868,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.

04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.45	2,000,000,000	2,172,040,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.50	3,000,000,000	3,244,905,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.10	300,000,000	335,258,100	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.10	300,000,000	335,258,100	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.10	1,000,000,000	1,117,527,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.10	1,000,000,000	1,117,527,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.10	200,000,000	223,505,400	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	1,000,000,000	1,136,191,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	900,000,000	1,022,571,900	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	350,000,000	394,379,300	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.95	50,000,000	56,573,950	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.95	50,000,000	56,573,950	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.95	50,000,000	56,573,950	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	300,000,000	340,857,300	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	1,050,000,000	1,193,000,550	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	50,000,000	56,339,900	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	50,000,000	56,339,900	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	50,000,000	56,339,900	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	100,000,000	113,619,100	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	50,000,000	56,809,550	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	100,000,000	113,619,100	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.95	100,000,000	113,147,900	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.00	200,000,000	225,359,600	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.86	50,000,000	56,999,150	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	9.90	100,000,000	113,619,100	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
04.12.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.30	100,000,000	113,352,200	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
04.12.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.30	250,000,000	283,380,500	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
18.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.75	1,000,000,000	1,060,088,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
18.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.80	1,000,000,000	1,055,873,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
18.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.85	2,000,000,000	2,103,370,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
18.12.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.95	1,000,000,000	1,043,388,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
30.12.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	10.90	500,000,000	507,497,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
30.12.2015	LKB01023I019	11.20	10.95	500,000,000	506,208,000	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
30.12.2015	LKB01025H016	11.00	11.05	83,333,000	83,072,084	Public Debt Department / 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha / Colombo 1.
Total				**293,010,463,000**	**318,174,313,924**	

Investment In Treasury Bonds - 2015 Sales

Sale Date	ISIN Number	Coupon %	Yield %	Face Value	Purchase cost	Counter party
01.01.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.10	250,000,000	253,115,000	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
09.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.20	150,000,000	151,373,100	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
10.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.20	50,000,000	50,457,550	Entrust Securities Ltd. / 281, R A DE MEL MAWATHA / COLOMBO 03
10.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.20	50,000,000	50,457,550	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
10.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.20	250,000,000	252,287,750	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
24.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.40	50,000,000	50,149,200	Seylan Bank Ltd / / Colombo 3
24.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.40	50,000,000	50,149,200	Entrust Securities Ltd. / 281, R A DE MEL MAWATHA / COLOMBO 03
24.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.40	50,000,000	50,149,200	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
24.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.40	50,000,000	50,149,200	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
24.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.40	100,000,000	100,298,400	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
24.02.2015	LKB01518H150	7.50	7.40	100,000,000	100,298,400	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
24.02.2015	LKB00615C156	11.75	6.00	500,000,000	501,421,500	Standard Chartered Bank plc. / / Colombo 1.
24.02.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.13	500,000,000	507,346,500	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
10.04.2015	LKB00618F013	8.50	8.80	500,000,000	495,864,500	Seylan Bank Ltd / / Colombo 3
21.04.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	6.20	350,000,000	350,156,450	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
28.05.2015	LKB00415F154	6.20	5.92	500,000,000	500,028,500	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd / 134 Galle Road /
12.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.95	2,000,000,000	2,000,710,000	Seylan Bank Ltd / / Colombo 3
15.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.92	500,000,000	500,173,000	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
15.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.92	300,000,000	300,103,800	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
15.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.95	1,000,000,000	1,000,321,000	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
16.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.92	650,000,000	650,217,100	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
17.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.94	500,000,000	500,153,000	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
24.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	6.00	2,000,000,000	2,000,378,000	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
26.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.95	2,000,000,000	2,000,394,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
29.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.95	600,000,000	600,099,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
29.06.2015	LKB00515G159	6.50	5.95	650,000,000	650,107,250	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
30.06.2015	LKB00615H015	11.00	5.95	500,000,000	502,102,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
30.06.2015	LKB00615H015	11.00	5.95	500,000,000	502,102,000	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
03.07.2015	LKB00615H015	11.00	5.90	500,000,000	501,924,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
03.07.2015	LKB00615H015	11.00	5.90	500,000,000	501,924,500	Perpetual Treasuries Limited / No.10 Alfred House Gardens / 00300 Colombo 03.
22.07.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	6.51	750,000,000	761,713,500	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
21.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	100,000,000	104,484,600	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
21.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	150,000,000	156,726,900	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
22.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	50,000,000	52,240,800	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
22.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	50,000,000	52,240,800	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
22.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	50,000,000	52,240,800	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
22.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	150,000,000	156,722,400	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
22.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	200,000,000	208,963,200	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
22.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	50,000,000	52,240,800	Wealth Trust Securities Limited / 32 Castle Street / COLOMBO 08
22.10.2015	LKB00619I155	10.60	9.20	200,000,000	208,963,200	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
04.11.2015	LKB00617G153	5.80	7.40	350,000,000	341,183,500	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
04.11.2015	LKB00617G153	5.80	7.50	150,000,000	145,990,350	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.

04.11.2015	LKB00617G153	5.80	7.50	750,000,000	729,951,750	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
04.11.2015	LKB00618F013	8.50	8.20	100,000,000	100,672,800	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
04.11.2015	LKB00618F013	8.50	8.20	100,000,000	100,672,800	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
04.11.2015	LKB00618F013	8.50	8.18	100,000,000	100,718,600	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
05.11.2015	LKB02035C155	11.50	10.98	600,000,000	624,642,600	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
05.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.28	1,000,000,000	1,053,641,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
05.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.28	1,000,000,000	1,053,641,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
05.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.28	1,000,000,000	1,053,641,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
05.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	10.28	550,000,000	579,502,550	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
05.11.2015	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.20	750,000,000	738,108,000	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
05.11.2015	LKB00617G153	5.80	7.50	100,000,000	97,331,000	Entrust Securities Ltd. / 281, R A DE MEL MAWATHA / COLOMBO 03
05.11.2015	LKB00618F013	8.50	8.05	200,000,000	202,032,600	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
05.11.2015	LKB00821H019	11.00	8.83	600,000,000	657,472,200	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
06.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.20	500,000,000	504,273,000	National Savings Bank / / Colombo 3.
06.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.22	750,000,000	756,245,250	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
06.11.2015	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.25	3,000,000,000	2,950,872,000	Sampath Bank PLC / 110, Sir James Peiris Mawatha / COLOMBO 02
09.11.2015	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.22	100,000,000	98,406,400	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
09.11.2015	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.22	250,000,000	246,016,000	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
09.11.2015	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.22	400,000,000	393,625,600	Seylan Bank PLC / / Colombo 3.
09.11.2015	LKB00617A156	5.80	7.20	500,000,000	492,142,000	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
11.11.2015	LKB01530E152	11.00	9.33	50,000,000	56,565,250	National Savings Bank / / Colombo 3.
12.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.24	250,000,000	252,001,250	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
12.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.24	250,000,000	252,001,250	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
12.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.24	200,000,000	201,601,000	Capital Alliance Ltd. / / Colombo 2.
13.11.2015	LKB00616J019	6.40	7.12	500,000,000	496,922,500	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
13.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.25	1,000,000,000	1,007,881,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
16.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.50	5,000,000,000	5,012,620,000	HSBC / Sir Baron Jayathilake Mawatha / Colombo 1.
16.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.50	500,000,000	501,262,000	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
16.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.15	200,000,000	201,780,400	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
16.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.15	500,000,000	504,451,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
16.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.25	1,000,000,000	1,007,831,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
16.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	6.95	250,000,000	251,946,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
16.11.2015	LKB00516F019	8.00	6.75	175,000,000	176,134,350	Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd. / / Colombo 1.
17.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	600,000,000	604,425,600	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
18.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	750,000,000	755,511,750	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
18.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	500,000,000	503,674,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
18.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	500,000,000	503,674,500	National Savings Bank / / Colombo 3.
18.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	500,000,000	503,674,500	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
18.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	250,000,000	251,837,250	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
18.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	1,000,000,000	1,007,349,000	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
19.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.50	750,000,000	751,842,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
19.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	500,000,000	503,661,500	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
19.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	250,000,000	251,830,750	First Capital Treasuries Ltd. / / Colombo 3.
19.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	150,000,000	151,098,450	NatWealth Securities Ltd. / 46/58, Navam Mawatha, / Colombo 2.
19.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	250,000,000	251,830,750	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
19.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	250,000,000	251,830,750	Acuity Securities Limited / Acuity House,53, Dharmapala MW / COLOMBO 03
20.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.50	500,000,000	501,217,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.

20.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.50	250,000,000	250,608,500	NDB Bank / / Colombo 3.
20.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.50	750,000,000	751,825,500	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
20.11.2015	LKB00517A018	8.00	7.20	500,000,000	504,147,500	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
20.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	7.00	500,000,000	503,648,500	National Savings Bank / / Colombo 3.
20.11.2015	LKB00516F019	8.00	6.50	1,500,000,000	1,511,485,500	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
23.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.40	1,000,000,000	1,002,719,000	Sampath Bank / / Colombo 2
23.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.40	1,000,000,000	1,002,719,000	Sampath Bank / / Colombo 2
23.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.40	1,000,000,000	1,002,719,000	Sampath Bank / / Colombo 2
23.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.40	1,000,000,000	1,002,719,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
23.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.40	1,000,000,000	1,002,719,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
23.11.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	6.90	1,000,000,000	1,007,966,000	Pan Asia Banking Corporation Ltd / / Colombo 3.
23.11.2015	LKB00516F019	8.00	6.45	500,000,000	503,902,000	Sampath Bank / / Colombo 2
24.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.45	1,500,000,000	1,503,778,500	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
30.11.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.30	1,000,000,000	1,002,880,000	DFCC Bank / / Colombo 3
01.12.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.25	500,000,000	501,509,500	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
01.12.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.30	500,000,000	501,426,500	National Savings Bank / / Colombo 3.
01.12.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	6.65	500,000,000	504,778,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
02.12.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.30	2,000,000,000	2,005,652,000	People's Bank / / Colombo 2.
02.12.2015	LKB00616D012	7.25	6.30	1,000,000,000	1,002,826,000	HSBC / Sir Baron Jayathilake Mawatha / Colombo 1.
02.12.2015	LKB00516I013	8.00	6.65	200,000,000	201,904,400	Union bank of Colombo Limited / No.15A, Alfred Place / COLOMBO 03
Total				**64,125,000,000**	**64,540,118,850**	

Investment in Treasury Bonds - 2014 Purchases

Purchase Date	ISIN Number	Yield	Coupon	Nominal Value	Purchase Cost	Counter Party
01.01.2014	LKB02033G011	11.00	13.25	5,088,210,000.00	6,000,001,967.37	PDD
01.01.2014	LKB02034A012	11.08	13.25	5,116,810,000.00	6,002,990,323.90	PDD
06.01.2014	LKB01529A012	10.70	13.00	2,133,800,000.00	2,496,189,655.40	PDD
13.01.2014	LKB01020H017	9.80	6.20	26,000,000.00	21,550,152.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
16.01.2014	LKB01529A012	10.61	13.00	3,000,000,000.00	3,531,453,000.00	PDD
16.01.2014	LKB01529A012	10.61	13.00	1,268,460,000.00	1,493,168,957.46	PDD
16.01.2014	LKB00619G019	8.65	10.60	1,000,000,000.00	1,083,355,000.00	PDD
20.01.2014	LKB01528E016	10.65	9.00	200,000,000.00	175,998,800.00	Entrust Securitie
20.01.2014	LKB01020H017	9.42	6.20	50,000,000.00	42,274,050.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
24.01.2014	LKB01022A018	10.10	8.00	50,000,000.00	44,354,600.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
24.01.2014	LKB01022A018	10.10	8.00	100,000,000.00	88,709,200.00	HSBC
24.01.2014	LKB01529A012	10.76	13.00	1,300,000,000.00	1,513,825,300.00	PDD
03.02.2014	LKB01022A018	10.22	8.00	50,000,000.00	44,069,150.00	HSBC
03.02.2014	LKB01123I017	10.30	9.00	50,000,000.00	46,095,400.00	HSBC
03.02.2014	LKB01529A012	10.76	13.00	4,251,200,000.00	4,949,633,899.20	PDD
03.02.2014	LKB01529A012	10.76	13.00	2,705,230,000.00	3,149,674,941.93	PDD
03.02.2014	LKB01529A012	10.76	13.00	8,000,000,000.00	9,314,328,000.00	PDD
03.02.2014	LKB01529A012	10.76	13.00	8,000,000,000.00	9,314,328,000.00	PDD
05.02.2014	LKB01123I017	10.20	9.00	200,000,000.00	185,529,000.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
05.02.2014	LKB01123I017	10.20	9.00	200,000,000.00	185,529,000.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
05.02.2014	LKB01123I017	10.20	9.00	200,000,000.00	185,529,000.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
07.02.2014	LKB00921E014	10.15	9.00	900,000,000.00	847,625,400.00	HSBC
07.02.2014	LKB00921E014	10.10	9.00	500,000,000.00	472,117,500.00	Citi Bank
13.02.2014	LKB02033G011	10.90	13.25	415,470,000.00	493,461,197.46	PDD
17.02.2014	LKB01024A014	10.30	11.40	500,000,000.00	533,445,500.00	People's Bank
18.02.2014	LKB01024A014	10.30	11.40	500,000,000.00	533,438,500.00	People's Bank
03.03.2014	LKB01529A012	10.76	13.00	8,000,000,000.00	9,310,464,000.00	PDD
03.03.2014	LKB01529A012	10.76	13.00	8,000,000,000.00	9,310,464,000.00	PDD
03.03.2014	LKB01529A012	10.76	13.00	2,500,000,000.00	2,909,520,000.00	PDD
06.03.2014	LKB00921E014	10.10	9.00	500,000,000.00	472,333,500.00	HSBC
14.03.2014	LKB02033G011	11.29	13.25	1,700,000,000.00	1,958,957,600.00	PDD
18.03.2014	LKB00921E014	9.98	9.00	300,000,000.00	285,203,700.00	Citi Bank
18.03.2014	LKB00618D018	9.00	8.50	400,000,000.00	393,324,400.00	Commercial Bank
19.03.2014	LKB00921E014	10.10	9.00	500,000,000.00	472,447,000.00	HSBC
19.03.2014	LKB00921E014	9.98	9.00	400,000,000.00	380,278,000.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
20.03.2014	LKB00619G019	9.50	10.60	500,000,000.00	522,293,000.00	People's Bank

01.04.2014	LKB02033G011	11.30	13.25	4,666,140,000.00	5,372,210,972.52	PDD
01.04.2014	LKB02033G011	11.30	13.25	8,000,000,000.00	9,210,544,000.00	PDD
01.04.2014	LKB02034A012	11.33	13.25	8,125,000,000.00	9,342,019,375.00	PDD
01.04.2014	LKB02034A012	11.32	13.25	2,000,000,000.00	2,301,334,000.00	PDD
01.04.2014	LKB01529A012	10.91	13.00	3,100,000,000.00	3,568,602,200.00	PDD
01.04.2014	LKB03044A010	11.76	13.50	2,240,000,000.00	2,559,285,120.00	PDD
01.04.2014	LKB03044A010	11.75	13.50	2,000,000,000.00	2,286,938,000.00	PDD
02.04.2014	LKB00615C156	7.20	11.75	1,900,000,000.00	1,977,945,600.00	PDD
11.04.2014	LKB02034A012	11.33	13.25	850,000,000.00	977,273,050.00	PDD
02.05.2014	LKB02034A012	11.33	13.25	8,000,000,000.00	9,197,240,000.00	PDD
02.05.2014	LKB02034A012	11.33	13.25	2,200,000,000.00	2,529,241,000.00	PDD
05.05.2014	LKB02034A012	11.33	13.25	1,416,570,000.00	1,628,556,867.36	PDD
09.05.2014	LKB02034A012	11.33	13.25	3,400,000,000.00	3,908,776,000.00	PDD
19.05.2014	LKB01529A012	10.91	13.00	1,016,500,000.00	1,169,698,748.00	PDD
19.05.2014	LKB00922G017	10.00	11.20	631,710,000.00	673,031,414.52	PDD
02.06.2014	LKB01529A012	10.91	13.00	2,000,000,000.00	2,301,252,000.00	PDD
02.06.2014	LKB03044F019	11.80	13.50	8,000,000,000.00	9,115,472,000.00	PDD
02.06.2014	LKB03044F019	11.80	13.50	8,000,000,000.00	9,115,472,000.00	PDD
02.06.2014	LKB03044F019	11.80	13.50	8,000,000,000.00	9,115,472,000.00	PDD
02.06.2014	LKB03044F019	11.80	13.50	8,000,000,000.00	9,115,472,000.00	PDD
02.06.2014	LKB03044F019	11.80	13.50	4,500,000,000.00	5,127,453,000.00	PDD
02.06.2014	LKB03044F019	11.80	13.50	1,850,000,000.00	2,107,952,900.00	PDD
02.06.2014	LKB03044F019	11.75	13.50	2,000,000,000.00	2,288,156,000.00	PDD
06.06.2014	LKB02034A012	11.27	13.25	1,000,000,000.00	1,154,914,000.00	PDD
06.06.2014	LKB02034A012	11.27	13.25	7,700,000,000.00	8,892,837,800.00	PDD
13.06.2014	LKB02034A012	11.25	13.25	2,096,430,000.00	2,424,923,809.56	PDD
17.06.2014	LKB01326B011	10.40	9.00	203,818,200.00	184,780,561.03	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
20.06.2014	LKB02034A012	11.25	13.25	1,700,000,000.00	1,966,401,900.00	PDD
30.06.2014	LKB01529A012	10.83	13.00	737,000,000.00	852,675,835.00	PDD
01.07.2014	LKB02034A012	11.18	13.25	3,353,520,000.00	3,900,002,912.16	PDD
01.07.2014	LKB02034A012	11.25	13.25	7,500,000,000.00	8,675,557,500.00	PDD
01.07.2014	LKB01529A012	10.83	13.00	7,000,000,000.00	8,098,664,000.00	PDD
01.07.2014	LKB01529A012	10.83	13.00	1,010,000,000.00	1,168,521,520.00	PDD
03.07.2014	LKB02034A012	11.06	13.25	4,250,000,000.00	4,988,267,500.00	PDD
04.07.2014	LKB02034A012	11.06	13.25	1,750,000,000.00	2,053,964,500.00	PDD
04.07.2014	LKB00922G017	9.27	11.20	500,000,000.00	553,630,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
08.07.2014	LKB02034A012	10.99	13.25	2,000,000,000.00	2,359,988,000.00	PDD
15.07.2014	LKB03044F019	11.42	13.50	7,550,000,000.00	8,872,767,550.00	PDD

15.07.2014	LKB03044F019	11.42	13.50	8,000,000,000.00	9,401,608,000.00	PDD
22.07.2014	LKB00922G017	8.30	11.20	750,000,000.00	874,605,750.00	Pan Asia
22.07.2014	LKB00922G017	8.30	11.20	150,000,000.00	174,921,150.00	Pan Asia
22.07.2014	LKB00922G017	8.30	11.20	100,000,000.00	116,614,100.00	Pan Asia
28.07.2014	LKB03044F019	10.85	13.50	500,000,000.00	616,713,500.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
28.07.2014	LKB01529E014	9.67	13.00	500,000,000.00	629,273,000.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
30.07.2014	LKB03044F019	10.05	13.50	50,000,000.00	66,225,850.00	Pan Asia
31.07.2014	LKB03044F019	10.05	13.50	100,000,000.00	132,450,900.00	Pan Asia
31.07.2014	LKB00922G017	8.12	11.20	2,000,000,000.00	2,354,392,000.00	Commercial Bank
01.08.2014	LKB02034A012	9.70	13.25	1,500,000,000.00	1,961,376,000.00	PDD
01.08.2014	LKB03044F019	10.00	13.50	1,100,000,000.00	1,463,649,000.00	PDD
01.08.2014	LKB01529E014	9.45	13.00	3,000,000,000.00	3,837,168,000.00	PDD
01.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.40	13.00	550,000,000.00	704,490,600.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
04.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.45	13.00	200,000,000.00	255,223,200.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
04.08.2014	LKB01529E014	9.45	13.00	250,000,000.00	319,746,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
07.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.30	13.00	750,000,000.00	967,614,000.00	Seylan Bank
07.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.32	13.00	500,000,000.00	644,128,000.00	Seylan Bank
07.08.2014	LKB00922G017	8.02	11.20	50,000,000.00	59,164,050.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
08.08.2014	LKB02034A012	9.25	13.25	200,000,000.00	271,467,600.00	Pan Asia
08.08.2014	LKB03044F019	9.45	13.50	100,000,000.00	140,089,000.00	Pan Asia
11.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.10	13.00	500,000,000.00	654,851,000.00	Pan Asia
11.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.09	13.00	250,000,000.00	327,546,750.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
11.08.2014	LKB01529E014	9.10	13.00	500,000,000.00	656,299,500.00	Pan Asia
11.08.2014	LKB01529E014	9.10	13.00	450,000,000.00	590,669,550.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
12.08.2014	LKB01326B011	8.60	9.00	200,000,000.00	205,750,600.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
12.08.2014	LKB03044F019	9.50	13.50	50,000,000.00	69,709,650.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
14.08.2014	LKB00921E014	7.57	9.00	250,000,000.00	268,499,750.00	Citi Bank
14.08.2014	LKB00921E014	7.60	9.00	200,000,000.00	214,474,200.00	NatWealth Securities
14.08.2014	LKB00921E014	7.60	9.00	200,000,000.00	214,474,200.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
15.08.2014	LKB01022A018	8.03	8.00	25,000,000.00	24,955,225.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
15.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.13	13.00	100,000,000.00	130,618,100.00	Seylan Bank
15.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.13	13.00	100,000,000.00	130,618,100.00	Seylan Bank
15.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.13	13.00	50,000,000.00	65,309,050.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
15.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.15	13.00	250,000,000.00	326,062,500.00	Seylan Bank
15.08.2014	LKB01529E014	9.13	13.00	100,000,000.00	130,954,500.00	Seylan Bank
15.08.2014	LKB01529E014	9.15	13.00	250,000,000.00	326,896,750.00	Seylan Bank
21.08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.15	13.00	250,000,000.00	326,014,500.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
21.08.2014	LKB01529E014	9.15	13.00	250,000,000.00	326,857,750.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
29.08.2014	LKB00921E014	8.40	9.00	1,000,000,000.00	1,029,973,000.00	Commercial Bank

01.09.2014	LKB01529A012	9.35	13.00	50,000,000.00	64,233,600.00	Acuity Securities Ltd
01.09.2014	LKB01529E014	9.35	13.00	50,000,000.00	64,392,150.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
01.09.2014	LKB01529E014	9.30	13.00	50,000,000.00	64,631,550.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
01.09.2014	LKB01529E014	9.31	13.00	700,000,000.00	904,169,700.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
02.09.2014	LKB02034A012	9.35	13.25	150,000,000.00	201,818,850.00	Pan Asia
02.09.2014	LKB03044F019	9.45	13.50	250,000,000.00	350,172,750.00	Pan Asia
03.09.2014	LKB00417E153	7.36	8.75	500,000,000.00	516,637,500.00	Acuity Securities Ltd
11.09.2014	LKB01529A012	9.15	13.00	50,000,000.00	65,170,300.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
16.09.2014	LKB01528E016	8.55	9.00	26,000,000.00	26,926,484.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
16.09.2014	LKB01529A012	9.10	13.00	850,000,000.00	1,111,862,050.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
16.09.2014	LKB01529A012	9.10	13.00	200,000,000.00	261,614,600.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
16.09.2014	LKB01529E014	9.10	13.00	150,000,000.00	196,750,950.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
23.09.2014	LKB02034A012	9.18	13.25	3,600,000,000.00	4,911,721,200.00	PDD
01.10.2014	LKB02034A012	8.78	13.25	5,000,000,000.00	7,056,905,000.00	PDD
01.10.2014	LKB02034A012	8.78	13.25	2,000,000,000.00	2,822,762,000.00	PDD
07.10.2014	LKB01024A014	7.70	11.40	250,000,000.00	310,267,750.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
07.10.2014	LKB01024A014	7.70	11.40	150,000,000.00	186,160,650.00	Taprobane Holdings Limited
07.10.2014	LKB00922G017	7.50	11.20	200,000,000.00	242,784,200.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
07.10.2014	LKB00922G017	7.50	11.20	50,000,000.00	60,696,050.00	Entrust Securities
10.10.2014	LKB01024A014	7.72	11.40	150,000,000.00	185,913,000.00	Taprobane Holdings Limited
16.10.2014	LKB01024A014	7.80	11.40	500,000,000.00	616,573,500.00	Pan Asia
17.10.2014	LKB03044F019	8.85	13.50	1,350,000,000.00	2,004,409,800.00	PDD
17.10.2014	LKB01024A014	7.79	11.40	500,000,000.00	616,923,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
20.10.2014	LKB00921E014	8.00	9.00	50,000,000.00	52,503,300.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
20.10.2014	LKB01024A014	8.25	11.40	400,000,000.00	480,012,800.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
20.10.2014	LKB00922G017	8.13	11.20	250,000,000.00	293,221,250.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
20.10.2014	LKB00922G017	8.15	11.20	200,000,000.00	234,326,600.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
21.10.2014	LKB01123I017	8.55	9.00	200,000,000.00	205,476,200.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
21.10.2014	LKB01024A014	8.25	11.40	400,000,000.00	479,997,200.00	Seylan Bank
21.10.2014	LKB00922G017	8.15	11.20	250,000,000.00	292,897,750.00	Seylan Bank
21.10.2014	LKB00417E153	7.10	8.75	500,000,000.00	519,015,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
24.10.2014	LKB02032A016	9.00	8.00	100,000,000.00	91,315,200.00	NSB Fund Management Ltd
28.10.2014	LKB02032A016	9.05	8.00	50,000,000.00	45,457,100.00	NSB Fund Management Ltd
28.10.2014	LKB01024A014	8.05	11.40	500,000,000.00	607,093,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
28.10.2014	LKB01024A014	8.05	11.40	500,000,000.00	607,093,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
30.10.2014	LKB02034A012	9.06	13.25	250,000,000.00	344,386,750.00	Pan Asia
31.10.2014	LKB01024A014	8.15	11.40	350,000,000.00	422,382,800.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
31.10.2014	LKB03044F019	9.20	13.50	100,000,000.00	143,451,800.00	Pan Asia
03.11.2014	LKB01529A012	8.70	13.00	500,000,000.00	672,980,500.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd

03.11.2014	LKB01529A012	8.70	13.00	250,000,000.00	336,490,250.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	8.10	11.40	250,000,000.00	302,576,750.00	Seylan Bank
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	8.20	11.40	250,000,000.00	300,771,500.00	Seylan Bank
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	8.10	11.40	50,000,000.00	60,515,350.00	NatWealth Securities
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	8.10	11.40	50,000,000.00	60,515,350.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	8.12	11.40	50,000,000.00	60,442,900.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.80	11.40	500,000,000.00	616,159,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.80	11.40	500,000,000.00	616,159,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.80	11.40	350,000,000.00	431,311,650.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
03.11.2014	LKB01024A014	8.12	11.40	150,000,000.00	181,328,700.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
03.11.2014	LKB00922G017	7.65	11.20	250,000,000.00	300,680,250.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
03.11.2014	LKB00922G017	7.65	11.20	500,000,000.00	601,360,500.00	Pan Asia
03.11.2014	LKB00922G017	7.65	11.20	500,000,000.00	601,360,500.00	Pan Asia
03.11.2014	LKB00922G017	7.70	11.20	500,000,000.00	599,751,500.00	Pan Asia
03.11.2014	LKB00417E153	6.85	8.75	250,000,000.00	260,863,250.00	Seylan Bank
04.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.80	11.40	500,000,000.00	616,137,000.00	Seylan Bank
04.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.87	11.40	50,000,000.00	61,354,550.00	Entrust Securities
04.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.95	11.40	50,000,000.00	61,060,200.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
04.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.82	11.40	50,000,000.00	61,539,500.00	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
04.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.80	11.40	50,000,000.00	61,613,700.00	NatWealth Securities
04.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.80	11.40	1,000,000,000.00	1,232,274,000.00	Pan Asia
04.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.86	11.40	50,000,000.00	61,391,500.00	NatWealth Securities
04.11.2014	LKB00922G017	7.65	11.20	1,750,000,000.00	2,104,670,750.00	Seylan Bank
05.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.85	11.40	50,000,000.00	61,426,200.00	Entrust Securities
05.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.85	11.40	50,000,000.00	61,426,200.00	Seylan Bank
07.11.2014	LKB01024A014	7.85	11.40	500,000,000.00	614,218,000.00	Pan Asia
10.11.2014	LKB01529A012	8.66	13.00	200,000,000.00	269,951,600.00	Pan Asia
10.11.2014	LKB01529A012	8.73	13.00	50,000,000.00	67,137,050.00	NSB Fund Management Ltd
10.11.2014	LKB01529A012	8.63	13.00	500,000,000.00	676,391,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
10.11.2014	LKB01529A012	8.63	13.00	200,000,000.00	270,556,400.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
10.11.2014	LKB01529E014	8.70	13.00	27,273,000.00	36,821,631.85	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
10.11.2014	LKB01529E014	8.65	13.00	500,000,000.00	677,606,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
10.11.2014	LKB01529E014	8.65	13.00	150,000,000.00	203,281,950.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
18.11.2014	LKB00921E014	7.60	9.00	25,000,000.00	26,757,650.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
27.11.2014	LKB00922G017	8.07	11.20	50,000,000.00	58,750,650.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
02.12.2014	LKB00517A018	6.90	8.00	200,000,000.00	204,180,200.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
18.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.05	7.50	500,000,000.00	507,078,000.00	Commercial Bank
26.12.2014	LKB01529A012	8.55	13.00	200,000,000.00	271,890,200.00	Pan Asia
26.12.2014	LKB01024A014	7.75	11.40	50,000,000.00	61,682,850.00	Entrust Securities

26.12.2014	LKB01024A014	7.70	11.40	900,000,000.00	1,113,609,600.00	Pan Asia
26.12.2014	LKB01024A014	7.75	11.40	500,000,000.00	616,828,500.00	Pan Asia
26.12.2014	LKB03044A010	8.85	13.50	150,000,000.00	222,419,100.00	Pan Asia
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.75	11.20	50,000,000.00	59,687,900.00	NatWealth Securities
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.75	11.20	50,000,000.00	59,687,900.00	NatWealth Securities
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.70	11.20	250,000,000.00	299,228,250.00	Commercial Bank
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.75	11.20	50,000,000.00	59,687,900.00	Entrust Securities
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.60	11.20	500,000,000.00	601,627,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.60	11.20	500,000,000.00	601,627,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.65	11.20	500,000,000.00	600,039,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.75	11.20	100,000,000.00	119,375,800.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.65	11.20	400,000,000.00	480,031,200.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.70	11.20	100,000,000.00	119,691,300.00	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.73	11.20	50,000,000.00	59,750,900.00	Acuity Securities Ltd
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.72	11.20	50,000,000.00	59,782,450.00	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
26.12.2014	LKB00922G017	7.75	11.20	50,000,000.00	59,687,900.00	Capital Alliance Ltd.
26.12.2014	LKB03044F019	8.85	13.50	50,000,000.00	74,208,600.00	Pan Asia
26.12.2014	LKB01529E014	8.55	13.00	550,000,000.00	749,989,350.00	Pan Asia

Investment in Treasury Bonds - 2014 Sales

Purchase Date	ISIN Number	Yield	Coupon	Nominal Value	Purchase Cost	Counter Party
06.02.2014	LKB00614D017	6.85	11.75	500,000,000.00	503,390,000.00	Citibank N A / / Colombo 7.
06.02.2014	LKB00614D017	6.85	11.75	500,000,000.00	503,390,000.00	Commercial Bank
07.02.2014	LKB00921E014	10.00	9.00	500,000,000.00	474,558,500.00	Commercial Bank
11.02.2014	LKB00921E014	10.00	9.00	500,000,000.00	474,586,000.00	Commercial Bank
18.02.2014	LKB00616D012	7.60	7.25	500,000,000.00	496,578,500.00	People's Bank
20.02.2014	LKB00616D012	7.44	7.25	50,000,000.00	49,811,900.00	People's Bank
21.02.2014	LKB00415F154	7.10	6.20	500,000,000.00	494,388,000.00	HSBC
11.03.2014	LKB00517A018	8.02	8.00	100,000,000.00	99,932,100.00	NatWealth Securities Ltd.
11.03.2014	LKB00517A018	8.02	8.00	400,000,000.00	399,728,400.00	NatWealth Securities Ltd.
18.03.2014	LKB00618D018	8.02	8.50	100,000,000.00	98,594,800.00	BOC
19.03.2014	LKB00618D018	8.02	8.50	100,000,000.00	98,594,800.00	Wealth Trust Securities
19.03.2014	LKB00618D018	8.02	8.50	200,000,000.00	197,123,600.00	Wealth Trust Securities
20.03.2014	LKB00618D018	8.02	8.50	400,000,000.00	394,776,000.00	Wealth Trust Securities
21.03.2014	LKB00618D018	9.06	8.50	300,000,000.00	294,410,700.00	BOC
21.03.2014	LKB00619G019	9.47	10.60	50,000,000.00	52,291,350.00	People's Bank
21.03.2014	LKB00619G019	9.48	10.60	150,000,000.00	156,811,050.00	People's Bank
21.03.2014	LKB00619G019	9.47	10.60	250,000,000.00	261,456,750.00	HSBC
21.03.2014	LKB00619G019	9.48	10.60	50,000,000.00	52,270,350.00	NatWealth Securities Ltd.
09.05.2014	LKB00618D018	8.02	8.50	100,000,000.00	99,595,200.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
20.05.2014	LKB00618D018	8.53	8.50	150,000,000.00	149,828,400.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
20.05.2014	LKB00618D018	8.53	8.50	250,000,000.00	249,714,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
20.05.2014	LKB00618D018	8.53	8.50	250,000,000.00	249,714,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
23.05.2014	LKB00618D018	8.58	8.50	500,000,000.00	498,619,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
23.05.2014	LKB00618D018	8.58	8.50	500,000,000.00	498,619,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
27.05.2014	LKB00819K017	9.00	8.00	50,000,000.00	47,883,800.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
28.05.2014	LKB01518H150	8.55	7.50	500,000,000.00	481,633,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
30.05.2014	LKB00819K017	9.00	8.00	200,000,000.00	191,543,200.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
30.05.2014	LKB00517F157	8.01	8.00	250,000,000.00	249,917,750.00	HNB
02.06.2014	LKB00516I013	7.55	8.00	550,000,000.00	554,927,450.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
02.06.2014	LKB00516I013	7.55	8.00	250,000,000.00	252,239,750.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
02.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.55	7.50	250,000,000.00	240,842,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
03.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.55	7.50	700,000,000.00	674,373,700.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
03.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.55	7.50	300,000,000.00	289,017,300.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited

04.06.2014	LKB00819A158	8.85	5.65	500,000,000.00	440,404,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
04.06.2014	LKB00819K017	8.96	8.00	500,000,000.00	479,712,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
04.06.2014	LKB00921E014	9.58	9.00	500,000,000.00	485,510,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
04.06.2014	LKB00921E014	9.60	9.00	500,000,000.00	485,022,500.00	Wealth Trust Securities
05.06.2014	LKB00616D012	7.30	7.25	250,000,000.00	249,753,000.00	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd
05.06.2014	LKB00819A158	8.78	5.65	350,000,000.00	309,149,400.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
05.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.45	7.50	50,000,000.00	48,341,450.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
05.06.2014	LKB00921E014	9.56	9.00	500,000,000.00	486,000,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
06.06.2014	LKB00616D012	7.30	7.25	500,000,000.00	499,506,500.00	People's Bank
06.06.2014	LKB00616D012	7.30	7.25	250,000,000.00	249,753,250.00	Commercial Bank
06.06.2014	LKB00819A158	8.76	5.65	350,000,000.00	309,412,250.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
06.06.2014	LKB00819A158	8.76	5.65	250,000,000.00	221,008,750.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
06.06.2014	LKB00819A158	8.76	5.65	400,000,000.00	353,614,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
09.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.42	7.50	450,000,000.00	435,566,250.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
09.06.2014	LKB00921E014	9.46	9.00	500,000,000.00	488,456,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
10.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.35	7.50	350,000,000.00	339,356,750.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
11.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.38	7.50	400,000,000.00	387,722,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
13.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.34	7.50	500,000,000.00	485,360,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
13.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.34	7.50	500,000,000.00	485,360,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
13.06.2014	LKB00415K014	7.20	8.50	500,000,000.00	508,347,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
16.06.2014	LKB00515G159	7.03	6.50	500,000,000.00	496,996,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
16.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.34	7.50	200,000,000.00	194,154,600.00	Pan Asia
16.06.2014	LKB00516F019	7.22	8.00	500,000,000.00	506,226,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
23.06.2014	LKB00415K014	7.10	8.50	250,000,000.00	254,412,000.00	People's Bank
24.06.2014	LKB00515G159	7.08	6.50	500,000,000.00	497,064,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
25.06.2014	LKB00516F019	7.25	8.00	250,000,000.00	253,313,250.00	People's Bank
25.06.2014	LKB00515G159	7.05	6.50	500,000,000.00	497,222,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
26.06.2014	LKB00515G159	7.00	6.50	500,000,000.00	497,479,000.00	HNB
27.06.2014	LKB00616D012	7.23	7.25	500,000,000.00	500,082,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
27.06.2014	LKB00516F019	7.26	8.00	500,000,000.00	506,506,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
27.06.2014	LKB00515G159	7.00	6.50	250,000,000.00	248,743,250.00	HNB
30.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.31	7.50	500,000,000.00	486,018,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
30.06.2014	LKB01518H150	8.31	7.50	500,000,000.00	486,018,000.00	Pan Asia
30.06.2014	LKB00515G159	6.99	6.50	500,000,000.00	497,558,500.00	Seylan Bank
01.07.2014	LKB00617G153	7.60	5.80	500,000,000.00	475,964,000.00	Commercial Bank
01.07.2014	LKB00819A158	8.59	5.65	500,000,000.00	445,675,500.00	Pan Asia

01.07.2014	LKB00921E014	9.18	9.00	500,000,000.00	495,393,500.00	Pan Asia
01.07.2014	LKB00921E014	9.18	9.00	500,000,000.00	495,393,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
03.07.2014	LKB01518H150	8.03	7.50	500,000,000.00	490,793,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
03.07.2014	LKB00616D012	7.11	7.25	500,000,000.00	501,051,500.00	People's Bank
03.07.2014	LKB00616D012	7.11	7.25	250,000,000.00	250,525,750.00	People's Bank
03.07.2014	LKB00819A158	8.40	5.65	500,000,000.00	449,019,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
03.07.2014	LKB00921E014	9.14	9.00	500,000,000.00	496,388,500.00	Pan Asia
03.07.2014	LKB00921E014	8.98	9.00	500,000,000.00	500,391,500.00	Pan Asia
[illegible].07.2014	LKB01518H150	7.98	7.50	500,000,000.00	491,676,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
08.07.2014	LKB00921E014	8.88	9.00	500,000,000.00	502,905,500.00	Pan Asia
[illegible].07.2014	LKB00922G017	9.22	11.20	500,000,000.00	555,055,000.00	Pan Asia
10.07.2014	LKB00515G159	6.97	6.50	1,000,000,000.00	995,940,000.00	HNB
10.07.2014	LKB00619G019	8.20	10.60	500,000,000.00	548,207,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
[illegible].07.2014	LKB00515G159	6.85	6.50	500,000,000.00	498,312,500.00	HNB
[illegible].07.2014	LKB00616D012	7.50	7.25	500,000,000.00	501,909,000.00	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd
[illegible].07.2014	LKB00515G159	6.75	6.50	500,000,000.00	498,810,500.00	HNB
[illegible].07.2014	LKB00515G159	6.89	6.50	500,000,000.00	498,575,500.00	HNB
17.07.2014	LKB01518H150	7.94	7.50	500,000,000.00	492,409,500.00	Pan Asia
[illegible].07.2014	LKB00921E014	8.80	9.00	750,000,000.00	757,371,000.00	Pan Asia
[illegible].07.2014	LKB00921E014	8.65	9.00	500,000,000.00	508,720,000.00	Pan Asia
22.07.2014	LKB01518H150	7.66	7.50	500,000,000.00	498,238,500.00	Pan Asia
[illegible].07.2014	LKB00616D012	7.65	7.25	500,000,000.00	501,494,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
[illegible].07.2014	LKB01518H150	7.28	7.50	2,000,000,000.00	2,015,066,000.00	Commercial Bank
01.08.2014	LKB01518H150	7.27	7.50	500,000,000.00	503,939,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
01.08.2014	LKB01518H150	7.27	7.50	500,000,000.00	503,939,000.00	Pan Asia
[illegible].08.2014	LKB01529A012	9.35	13.00	500,000,000.00	642,755,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
04.08.2014	LKB01529E014	9.35	13.00	250,000,000.00	322,127,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
05.08.2014	LKB00616D012	6.52	7.25	250,000,000.00	252,789,750.00	National Savings Bank
07.08.2014	LKB00922G017	7.97	11.20	25,000,000.00	29,662,675.00	Capital Alliance Ltd
11.08.2014	LKB01518H150	6.98	7.50	1,000,000,000.00	1,017,909,000.00	Pan Asia
11.08.2014	LKB00619G019	7.00	10.60	500,000,000.00	573,368,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
13.08.2014	LKB00921E014	7.55	9.00	650,000,000.00	698,820,200.00	Pan Asia
18.08.2014	LKB01518H150	7.10	7.50	250,000,000.00	253,421,250.00	Ceylinco Insurance Ltd
18.08.2014	LKB01518H150	7.08	7.50	100,000,000.00	101,437,500.00	Seylan Bank
29.08.2014	LKB01518H150	7.60	7.50	1,000,000,000.00	996,584,000.00	Commercial Bank
03.09.2014	LKB00616D012	7.01	7.25	500,000,000.00	501,721,500.00	Acuity Securities Limited

15.09.2014	LKB00617G153	7.10	5.80	700,000,000.00	676,945,500.00	Commercial Bank
15.09.2014	LKB00617G153	7.10	5.80	300,000,000.00	290,119,500.00	Commercial Bank
16.09.2014	LKB01528E016	8.50	9.00	200,000,000.00	207,945,000.00	Wealth Trust Securities
25.09.2014	LKB00921E014	7.25	9.00	650,000,000.00	708,758,700.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
29.09.2014	LKB01529A012	8.90	13.00	250,000,000.00	331,796,000.00	Pan Asia
29.09.2014	LKB00922G017	7.40	11.20	500,000,000.00	610,486,000.00	Pan Asia
29.09.2014	LKB00922G017	7.24	11.20	250,000,000.00	307,909,500.00	NatWealth Securities Ltd
30.09.2014	LKB00922G017	7.25	11.20	1,000,000,000.00	1,230,907,000.00	Seylan Bank
07.10.2014	LKB01024A014	7.68	11.40	400,000,000.00	497,031,600.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
07.10.2014	LKB00922G017	7.48	11.20	250,000,000.00	303,808,750.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
21.10.2014	LKB00615I012	6.20	11.00	250,000,000.00	259,880,250.00	Commercial Bank
21.10.2014	LKB00615I013	6.20	11.00	1,000,000,000.00	1,039,521,000.00	Commercial Bank
28.10.2014	LKB00415K014	6.05	8.50	500,000,000.00	511,832,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
28.10.2014	LKB00415K014	6.05	8.50	500,000,000.00	511,832,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
04.11.2014	LKB00417E153	6.70	8.75	250,000,000.00	261,736,750.00	Commercial Bank
07.11.2014	LKB01518H150	7.21	7.50	500,000,000.00	507,244,500.00	Pan Asia
10.11.2014	LKB00415K014	6.00	8.50	150,000,000.00	153,415,950.00	Nations Trust Bank
12.11.2014	LKB00415K014	6.00	8.50	100,000,000.00	102,277,300.00	NDB Bank
18.11.2014	LKB01518H150	7.12	7.50	200,000,000.00	202,424,200.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
20.11.2014	LKB01518H150	7.12	7.50	200,000,000.00	202,422,600.00	National Savings Bank
26.11.2014	LKB01518H150	7.28	7.50	350,000,000.00	352,412,550.00	Pan Asia
27.11.2014	LKB01518H150	7.30	7.50	100,000,000.00	100,624,500.00	Wealth Trust Securities
01.12.2014	LKB00616D012	6.58	7.25	200,000,000.00	202,159,400.00	Capital Alliance Ltd
10.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.01	7.50	500,000,000.00	507,720,000.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
12.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.15	7.50	250,000,000.00	252,733,000.00	Seylan Bank
22.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.15	7.50	600,000,000.00	606,559,200.00	Wealth Trust Securities
22.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.15	7.50	1,000,000,000.00	1,010,932,000.00	Commercial Bank
23.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.20	7.50	500,000,000.00	504,668,000.00	BOC
23.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.21	7.50	1,000,000,000.00	1,009,018,000.00	BOC
23.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.21	7.50	1,000,000,000.00	1,009,018,000.00	Commercial Bank
24.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.20	7.50	500,000,000.00	504,665,500.00	Wealth Trust Securities
24.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.20	7.50	750,000,000.00	756,998,250.00	Wealth Trust Securities
24.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.20	7.50	750,000,000.00	756,998,250.00	Wealth Trust Securities
30.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.24	7.50	500,000,000.00	504,019,500.00	Perpetual Treasuries Limited
31.12.2014	LKB01518H150	7.16	7.50	500,000,000.00	505,282,500.00	Commercial Bank

Treasury bond Issues Through Placements – 2014

(Issued Amount – Rs. Million)

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
01-01-2014	01-01-2014	ETF	01-11-2019	167.44	9.67
01-01-2014	01-01-2014	EPF	07-07-2033	5,088.21	11.00
01-01-2014	01-01-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	5,116.81	11.08
02-01-2014	03-01-2014	FCTL	01-07-2019	500.00	9.35
03-01-2014	03-01-2014	FCTL	01-07-2019	250.00	9.35
03-01-2014	06-01-2014	FCTL	01-07-2019	250.00	9.35
03-01-2014	06-01-2014	FCTL	01-07-2019	250.00	9.35
06-01-2014	06-01-2014	WTSL	01-07-2019	500.00	9.35
03-01-2014	06-01-2014	WTSL	01-07-2019	65.00	9.35
03-01-2014	06-01-2014	SEYLAN	01-07-2019	1,000.00	9.35
06-01-2014	06-01-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	2,133.80	10.70
06-01-2014	07-01-2014	BOC	01-07-2019	2,000.00	9.35
08-01-2014	09-01-2014	NSB	01-07-2019	1,410.19	9.15
09-01-2014	09-01-2014	BOC	01-07-2019	1,300.00	8.65
09-01-2014	09-01-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	2,000.00	9.72
13-01-2014	16-01-2014	ETF	01-07-2019	1,774.04	8.65
16-01-2014	16-01-2014	PB	01-01-2029	1,000.00	10.61
13-01-2014	16-01-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	1,268.46	10.61
20-01-2014	20-01-2014	CAL	01-07-2022	21.00	9.72
23-01-2014	23-01-2014	CAL	01-01-2029	4.00	10.76
23-01-2014	23-01-2014	PB	01-07-2019	1,000.00	8.83
24-01-2014	24-01-2014	ACUITY	01-01-2024	40.00	10.00
24-01-2014	24-01-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2033	40.00	10.80
23-01-2014	24-01-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	1,300.00	10.76
24-01-2014	27-01-2014	HSBC	01-07-2019	400.00	8.83
24-01-2014	27-01-2014	HSBC	01-07-2022	3,500.00	9.90
29-01-2014	31-01-2014	BOC	01-07-2019	338.79	9.08
03-02-2014	03-02-2014	NSB	15-06-2017	500.00	7.98
03-02-2014	03-02-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	4,251.20	10.76
30-01-2014	03-02-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	8,000.00	10.76
30-01-2014	03-02-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	8,000.00	10.76
30-01-2014	03-02-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	2,705.23	10.76
30-01-2014	03-02-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	9,200.00	9.90
30-01-2014	03-02-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	8,204.00	9.90
30-01-2014	03-02-2014	ETF	01-07-2022	6,659.88	9.90
06-02-2014	06-02-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	25.00	9.90
05-02-2014	06-02-2014	PB	01-07-2022	413.22	9.90
07-02-2014	10-02-2014	CAL	01-07-2014	18.00	9.90
07-02-2014	10-02-2014	BOC	01-01-2024	4,500.00	10.00
07-02-2014	10-02-2014	BOC	01-01-2024	5,000.00	10.00
07-02-2014	10-02-2014	BOC	01-01-2024	4,325.83	10.00
07-02-2014	10-02-2014	BOC	01-01-2024	5,000.00	10.00
07-02-2014	10-02-2014	PB	01-01-2024	5,000.00	10.00

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
07-02-2014	10-02-2014	PB	01-01-2024	4,099.00	10.00
12-02-2014	13-02-2014	EPF	01-07-2033	415.47	10.90
18-02-2014	18-02-2014	PB	01-01-2044	3,000.00	11.50
18-02-2014	18-02-2014	CAL	01-01-2044	200.00	11.50
20-02-2014	21-02-2014	FCTL	01-01-2034	100.00	11.07
20-02-2014	21-02-2014	WTSL	01-01-2034	150.00	11.07
24-02-2014	24-02-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	271.60	9.90
26-02-2014	28-02-2014	BOC	01-07-2022	50.00	9.90
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	8,000.00	10.76
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	8,000.00	10.76
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	2,500.00	10.76
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	NSB	01-01-2029	686.75	10.76
26-02-2014	03-03-2014	PB	01-07-2022	1,539.62	9.90
28-02-2014	03-03-2014	BOC	01-07-2019	6,999.38	8.83
28-02-2014	03-03-2014	NSB	01-07-2019	4,500.00	8.83
28-02-2014	03-03-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	809.53	10.00
28-02-2014	03-03-2014	NSB	15-06-2017	5,000.00	7.98
28-02-2014	03-03-2014	CAL	01-01-2044	50.00	11.50
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	BOC	01-03-2017	3,591.05	8.10
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	PB	01-03-2017	6,295.53	8.10
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	BOC	01-03-2017	9,000.00	8.10
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	BOC	01-03-2017	9,000.00	8.10
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	PB	01-03-2017	9,000.00	8.10
03-03-2014	03-03-2014	BOC	01-03-2017	9,000.00	8.10
28-03-2014	04-03-2014	PB	01-07-2022	458.10	9.90
04-03-2014	04-03-2014	CAL	01-01-2044	50.00	11.50
06-03-2014	07-03-2014	PB	01-01-2029	300.00	10.76
07-03-2014	07-03-2014	FCTL	01-07-2033	100.00	11.04
07-03-2014	07-03-2014	BOC	01-07-2019	8,500.00	8.83
07-03-2014	07-03-2014	BOC	01-07-2019	8,500.00	8.83
07-03-2014	07-03-2014	BOC	01-07-2019	924.09	8.83
07-03-2014	07-03-2014	BOC	01-07-2019	5,974.69	8.83
07-03-2014	10-03-2014	FCTL	01-07-2033	100.00	11.04
13-03-2014	14-03-2014	EPF	01-07-2033	1,700.00	11.29
13-03-2014	17-03-2014	NSB	01-03-2017	500.00	8.10
17-03-2014	17-03-2014	NSB	01-03-2017	500.00	8.10
17-03-2014	17-03-2014	PB	01-01-2029	17.57	10.91
20-03-2014	20-03-2014	BOC	01-03-2017	3,053.06	9.10
20-03-2014	21-03-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	20.00	10.15
20-03-2014	21-03-2014	WTSL	01-01-2029	100.00	10.91
20-03-2014	24-03-2014	HSBC	01-11-2015	2,630.00	7.60
20-03-2014	24-03-2014	HSBC	01-11-2015	370.00	7.60
24-03-2014	25-03-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	500.00	7.60
24-03-2014	25-03-2014	PB	01-07-2022	228.98	10.00
24-03-2014	28-03-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.60
25-03-2014	28-03-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	3,000.00	7.60
25-03-2014	28-03-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	1,860.00	7.60
27-03-2014	28-03-2014	WTSL	01-11-2015	750.00	7.60
28-03-2014	28-03-2014	BOC	01/0/2024	1,030.79	10.15

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
28-03-2014	28-03-2014	PB	01/0/2024	1,030.79	10.15
28-03-2014	28-03-2014	BOC	01/0/2024	2,946.86	10.15
01-04-2014	01-04-2014	COM BANK	01-10-2014	6,000.00	7.01
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	PB	01-07-2022	1,188.45	10.00
31-03-2014	01-04-2014	EPF	01-01-2044	2,240.00	11.76
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	COM BANK	01-03-2017	400.00	8.10
31-03-2014	01-04-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	8,125.00	11.33
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	NSB	01-07-2019	2,962.45	9.00
31-03-2014	01-04-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2019	1,500.00	9.00
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	EPF	01-07-2033	4,666.14	11.30
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	EPF	01-07-2033	8,000.00	11.30
31-03-2014	01-04-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	3,100.00	10.91
31-03-2014	01-04-2014	FCTL	01-01-2029	200.00	10.91
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	PB	01-11-2015	5,000.00	7.65
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	2,000.00	7.65
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	NSB	01-11-2015	3,000.00	7.65
31-03-2014	01-04-2014	NSB	01-11-2015	500.00	7.65
01-04-2014	01-04-2014	COM BANK	01-11-2015	2,000.00	7.65
01-04-2014	01-04-2014	PB	01-11-2015	1,500.00	7.65
01-04-2014	01-04-2014	WTSL	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.65
01-04-2014	01-04-2014	WTSL	01-11-2015	500.00	7.65
01-04-2014	01-04-2014	COM BANK	01-11-2015	2,000.00	7.65
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	NSB	01-03-2017	3,000.00	8.15
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	BOC	01-03-2017	5,000.00	8.15
31-03-2014	01-04-2014	COM BANK	01-03-2017	1,500.00	8.15
01-04-2014	01-04-2014	NSB	01-03-2017	1,500.00	8.15
25-03-2014	01-04-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.60
27-03-2014	01-04-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.60
27-03-2014	01-04-2014	WTSL	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.60
27-03-2014	01-04-2014	WTSL	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.60
27-03-2014	01-04-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	7,000.00	7.60
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	1,400.00	7.60
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	HSBC	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.60
28-03-2014	01-04-2014	SEYLAN	01-11-2015	1,500.00	7.60
31-03-2014	01-04-2014	HSBC	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.60
01-04-2014	01-04-2014	PERPETUAL	01-11-2015	100.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	PB	01-11-2015	1,300.00	7.65
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	NSB	01-11-2015	300.00	7.65
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	FCTL	01-11-2015	200.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	FCTL	01-11-2015	200.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	FCTL	01-11-2015	200.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	FCTL	01-11-2015	200.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	FCTL	01-11-2015	200.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	FCTL	01-11-2015	200.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	FCTL	01-11-2015	200.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	FCTL	01-11-2015	200.00	7.60
02-04-2014	02-04-2014	SEYLAN	01-11-2015	500.00	7.60

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
01-04-2014	02-04-2014	COM BANK	01-03-2017	1,500.00	8.15
01-04-2014	02-04-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2019	3,500.00	9.00
01-04-2014	02-04-2014	EPF	01-07-2019	1,900.00	7.20
03-04-2014	04-04-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	500.00	8.15
04-04-2014	04-04-2014	SEYLAN	01-09-2016	500.00	7.75
03-04-2014	04-04-2014	NSB	01-11-2015	500.00	7.65
03-04-2014	04-04-2014	SEYLAN	01-11-2015	1,000.00	7.60
03-04-2014	04-04-2014	WTSL	01-11-2015	500.00	7.60
03-04-2014	04-04-2014	WTSL	01-11-2015	500.00	7.60
07-04-2014	08-04-2014	PB	01-07-2022	228.12	10.00
10-04-2014	10-04-2014	ACUITY	15-05-2017	500.00	8.15
10-04-2014	10-04-2014	ACUITY	15-05-2017	500.00	8.15
11-04-2014	11-04-2014	FCTL	01-01-2044	200.00	11.75
11-04-2014	11-04-2014	FCTL	01-01-2044	200.00	11.75
11-04-2014	11-04-2014	FCTL	01-01-2044	200.00	11.75
11-04-2014	11-04-2014	FCTL	01-01-2044	200.00	11.75
11-04-2014	11-04-2014	FCTL	01-01-2044	200.00	11.75
11-04-2014	11-04-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	850.00	11.33
10-04-2014	11-04-2014	SEYLAN	01-06-2016	1,000.00	7.65
10-04-2014	11-04-2014	FCTL	01-07-2022	250.00	10.00
10-04-2014	11-04-2014	FCTL	01-07-2022	250.00	10.00
11-04-2014	11-04-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	15.00	10.00
10-04-2014	11-04-2014	FCTL	01-07-2022	250.00	10.00
16-04-2014	16-04-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2019	3,000.00	9.00
16-04-2014	16-04-2014	COM BANK	01-03-2017	1,000.00	8.15
16-04-2014	17-04-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	6.00	10.00
16-04-2014	17-04-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2022	50.00	10.00
17-04-2014	17-04-2014	NSB	01-09-2016	1,922.45	7.80
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	500.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	500.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	500.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	500.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	500.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	500.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	500.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	500.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	WTSL	01-01-2019	200.00	10.93
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	500.00	8.10
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	HSBC	15-05-2017	140.00	8.10
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	HSBC	15-05-2017	375.00	8.10
17-04-2014	22-04-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	1,000.00	10.05
22-04-2014	23-04-2014	PB	01-07-2022	454.40	10.00
24-04-2014	25-04-2014	FCTL	01-01-2044	200.00	11.75
24-04-2014	25-04-2014	NSB	01-09-2016	1,000.00	7.80
25-04-2014	25-04-2014	ACUTY	01-09-2016	500.00	7.75
25-04-2014	25-04-2014	ACUTY	01-09-2016	500.00	7.75
25-04-2014	25-04-2014	FCTL	01-09-2016	200.00	7.75
25-04-2014	25-04-2014	FCTL	01-09-2016	200.00	7.75
25-04-2014	25-04-2014	FCTL	01-09-2016	200.00	7.75

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
01-08-2014	05-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	250.00	8.20
01-08-2014	05-08-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	7,000.00	7.25
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	250.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	400.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	400.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB Fund	01-01-2024	250.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	COM BANK	01-01-2024	1,000.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	SEYLAN	01-01-2024	3,000.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-05-2029	750.00	9.00
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-07-2033	500.00	9.15
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2044	200.00	9.38
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2034	200.00	9.20
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-09-2023	1,500.00	8.00
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	1,000.00	8.05
18-08-2014	19-08-2014	WTSL	01-06-2044	100.00	9.38
01-09-2014	01-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	936.18	7.00
01-09-2014	03-09-2014	WTSL	15-05-2017	1,150.00	7.00
01-09-2014	03-09-2014	WTSL	15-05-2017	1,000.00	7.00
01-09-2014	03-09-2014	WTSL	01-01-2017	1,000.00	6.90
01-09-2014	03-09-2014	WTSL	01-01-2017	1,150.00	6.90
10-09-2014	11-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	9,000.00	7.00
10-09-2014	11-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	9,000.00	7.00
10-09-2014	11-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	9,000.00	7.00
11-09-2014	11-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	3,331.72	7.00
10-09-2014	11-09-2014	BOC	15-05-2017	1,000.00	7.00
15-09-2014	16-09-2014	PB	01-11-2019	8,000.00	7.01
15-09-2014	16-09-2014	PB	01-11-2019	8,000.00	7.01
15-09-2014	16-09-2014	PB	01-11-2019	4,000.00	7.01
19-09-2014	22-09-2014	NSB	01-05-2021	1,783.60	7.33
22-09-2014	23-09-2014	COM BANK	01-10-2022	8,000.00	7.85
22-09-2014	23-09-2014	EPF	01-01-2015	3,600.00	9.18
26-09-2014	26-09-2014	NSB	01-01-2017	2,506.37	6.15
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	ETF	01-10-2022	3,267.11	7.15
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	5,000.00	8.78
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	2,000.00	8.78
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	100.00	7.48
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	Acuity	01-05-2029	100.00	8.61
01-10-2014	01-10-2014	PERPETUAL	01-05-2029	200.00	8.60
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	FCTL	01-05-2029	200.00	8.60
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	NSB	01-06-2018	1,000.00	6.25
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	Acuity	01-01-2024	200.00	7.48
01-10-2014	01-10-2014	COM BANK	01-09-2023	1,000.00	7.40
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	1,500.00	6.20
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	NSB	01-11-2019	3,500.00	6.50
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	400.00	7.60
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	Acuity	01-01-2024	100.00	7.60
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	500.00	7.60
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	BOC	01-01-2024	1,000.00	7.60
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	SEYLAN	01-01-2024	500.00	7.60

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	WTSL	16-05-2017	80.00	7.75
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	PB	16-05-2017	451.59	10.00
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	CAL	16-05-2017	20.74	10.00
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	WTSL	16-05-2017	250.00	10.00
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	COM BANK	16-05-2017	500.00	8.10
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	PB	16-05-2017	750.00	8.10
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	BOC	16-05-2017	1,000.00	8.10
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	COM BANK	16-05-2017	1,400.00	7.70
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	PERPETUAL	16-05-2017	175.00	11.32
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	PERPETUAL	16-05-2017	175.00	11.32
13-05-2014	16-05-2014	PERPETUAL	16-05-2017	150.00	11.32
16-05-2014	16-05-2014	WTSL	16-05-2017	500.00	8.94
16-05-2014	16-05-2014	WTSL	16-05-2017	500.00	8.94
16-05-2014	19-05-2014	WTSL	16-05-2017	500.00	8.10
16-05-2014	19-05-2014	WTSL	16-05-2017	500.00	8.10
16-05-2014	19-05-2014	WTSL	16-05-2017	500.00	8.10
16-05-2014	19-05-2014	WTSL	16-05-2017	250.00	8.10
19-05-2014	19-05-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	1,016.50	10.91
19-05-2014	19-05-2014	EPF	01-07-2022	631.71	10.00
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	PB	15-05-2017	300.00	8.05
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	WTSL	15-05-2017	250.00	8.05
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	FCTL	15-05-2017	250.00	8.05
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	FCTL	15-05-2017	250.00	8.05
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	SEYLAN	15-05-2017	500.00	8.05
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	COM BANK	15-05-2017	500.00	8.05
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	COM BANK	15-05-2017	500.00	8.05
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	ACUITY	15-05-2017	50.00	8.05
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	ACUITY	15-05-2017	50.00	8.05
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2022	100.00	10.00
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	SEYLAN	01-07-2022	100.00	10.00
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	100.00	10.00
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	500.00	10.00
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	500.00	10.00
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	500.00	10.00
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	500.00	10.00
20-05-2014	23-05-2014	BOC	01-07-2022	9.84	10.00
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	1,000.00	10.00
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	CAL	01-07-2022	4.50	10.00
22-05-2014	23-05-2014	WTSL	01-01-2029	61.00	10.91
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	BOC	15-05-2017	2,000.00	8.10
21-05-2014	23-05-2014	PB	15-05-2017	2,000.00	8.10
29-05-2014	30-05-2014	SEYLAN	15-05-2017	500.00	8.00
29-05-2014	30-05-2014	ACUITY	15-05-2017	4,000.00	8.00
29-05-2014	30-05-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	500.00	10.10
29-05-2014	30-05-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	500.00	10.10
29-05-2014	30-05-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	100.00	9.95
29-05-2014	30-05-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	6,000.00	9.95
29-05-2014	30-05-2014	PB	01-07-2022	224.37	9.95
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	4,500.00	11.80

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	8,000.00	11.80
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	8,000.00	11.80
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	8,000.00	11.80
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	8,000.00	11.80
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	8,000.00	11.80
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	1,850.00	11.80
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	WTSL	15-05-2017	700.00	8.00
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	FCTL	15-05-2017	250.00	8.00
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	FCTL	15-05-2017	250.00	8.00
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	COM BANK	15-05-2017	500.00	8.00
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	NATWEALTH	15-05-2017	500.00	8.00
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	4,884.83	8.00
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	250.00	9.95
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	FCTL	01-07-2022	75.00	9.95
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	PB	01-07-2022	6,034.17	9.95
29-05-2014	02-06-2014	PERPETUAL	01-07-2022	150.00	9.95
02-06-2014	02-06-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	1,000.00	9.90
02-06-2014	02-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	150.00	9.90
02-06-2014	02-06-2014	COM BANK	15-05-2017	400.00	7.95
30-05-2014	02-06-2014	NSB	01-07-2019	1,799.57	8.93
30-05-2014	02-06-2014	NSB	01-07-2033	1,242.09	11.29
30-05-2014	02-06-2014	NSB	01-06-2034	1,243.63	11.32
30-05-2014	02-06-2014	NSB	01-06-2034	1,747.57	11.75
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	SEYLAN	15-05-2017	500.00	7.95
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	BOC	15-05-2017	1,000.00	7.95
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	ACUITY	15-05-2017	100.00	7.95
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	WTSL	15-05-2017	500.00	7.95
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	WTSL	15-05-2017	250.00	7.95
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	SEYLAN	01-07-2019	500.00	8.88
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	FCTL	01-07-2019	250.00	8.88
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	FCTL	01-07-2019	250.00	8.88
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	PB	01-07-2022	251.02	9.95
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	PB	01-01-2029	500.00	10.83
03-06-2014	03-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	150.00	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2022	100.00	9.90
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	CAL	01-07-2022	100.00	9.90
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	ENTRUST	01-07-2022	100.00	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	CAL	01-07-2022	150.00	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2022	200.00	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	CAL	01-07-2022	250.00	9.90
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2022	300.00	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	500.00	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	500.00	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	500.00	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	NATWEALTH	01-07-2022	550.00	9.90
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	PB	01-07-2022	580.77	9.90
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	600.00	9.90
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	FCTL	01-06-2044	250.00	11.70
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	FCTL	01-06-2044	250.00	11.70

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	FCTL	01-06-2044	250.00	11.70
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	FCTL	01-06-2044	250.00	11.70
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	1,000.00	8.85
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	FCTL	15-09-2019	250.00	8.85
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	500.00	10.05
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	PERPETUAL	01-01-2024	250.00	10.05
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	SEYLAN	01-07-2019	1,000.00	8.80
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2019	2,000.00	8.80
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	SEYLAN	01-07-2019	500.00	8.80
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	CAL	01-07-2019	500.00	8.80
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2019	500.00	8.80
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2019	500.00	8.80
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	NSB	15-09-2019	500.00	8.82
06-06-2014	06-06-2014	ACUITY	15-09-2019	4,000.00	8.82
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	1,000.00	11.27
05-06-2014	06-06-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	7,700.00	11.27
11-06-2014	13-06-2014	FCTL	01-07-2022	250.00	9.78
11-06-2014	13-06-2014	FCTL	01-07-2022	250.00	9.78
11-06-2014	13-06-2014	FCTL	01-07-2022	250.00	9.78
11-06-2014	13-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	500.00	9.78
11-06-2014	13-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	500.00	9.78
11-06-2014	13-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	20.00	9.78
13-06-2014	13-06-2014	SEYLAN	01-07-2022	500.00	9.78
13-06-2014	13-06-2014	ACUITY	01-01-2024	1,175.00	10.00
13-06-2014	13-06-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	250.00	10.00
11-06-2014	13-06-2014	ENTRUST	01-06-2044	50.00	11.67
11-06-2014	13-06-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	2,096.43	11.25
13-06-2014	16-06-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	265.70	9.78
16-06-2014	16-06-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2022	300.00	9.78
13-06-2014	16-06-2014	CAPITAL	01-07-2022	350.00	9.78
11-06-2014	16-06-2014	PB	01-07-2022	885.68	9.78
13-06-2014	16-06-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	263.86	10.00
13-06-2014	16-06-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	266.61	9.35
13-06-2014	16-06-2014	NSB	15-09-2019	361.64	8.68
20-06-2014	20-06-2014	NSB	15-06-2044	431.99	11.68
20-06-2014	20-06-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	1,700.00	11.25
20-06-2014	20-06-2014	NSB	15-06-2044	411.02	11.65
20-06-2014	20-06-2014	NSB	01-07-2033	819.42	11.22
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	883.12	9.78
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2022	500.00	9.78
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	SEYLAN	01-07-2022	1,100.00	9.78
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	2,000.00	9.78
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	300.00	9.78
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	150.00	9.78
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	450.00	10.00
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	COM BANK	01-01-2024	2,000.00	10.00
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	163.73	11.25
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	1,919.82	7.18
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	PERPETUAL	01-01-2044	500.00	11.68

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	1,000.00	8.68
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	200.00	8.68
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	ACUITY	17-05-2017	1,000.00	7.52
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	ACUITY	17-05-2017	1,000.00	7.52
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	ACUITY	17-05-2017	1,000.00	7.52
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	ACUITY	17-05-2017	1,000.00	7.52
26-06-2014	27-06-2014	COM BANK	01-08-2021	1,000.00	9.35
30-06-2014	30-06-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	737.00	10.83
30-06-2014	01-07-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	1,010.00	10.83
27-06-2014	01-07-2014	EPF	01-01-2029	7,000.00	10.83
01-07-2014	01-07-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	914.26	9.50
27-06-2014	01-07-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	7,500.00	11.25
27-06-2014	01-01-2014	PB	01-07-2022	1,178.60	9.78
27-06-2014	01-07-2014	ACUITY	01-07-2022	600.00	9.78
27-06-2014	01-07-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	928.03	9.78
27-06-2014	01-07-2014	WTSL	01-07-2022	150.00	9.78
27-06-2014	01-07-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	800.00	8.68
27-06-2014	01-07-2014	NSB	15-09-2019	900.97	8.68
01-07-2014	01-07-2014	NSB	15-09-2019	894.67	8.50
01-07-2014	01-07-2014	COM BANK	01-07-2022	5.10	9.42
01-07-2014	01-07-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	3,353.52	11.18
03-07-2014	03-07-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	250.00	9.71
03-07-2014	03-07-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	250.00	9.71
03-07-2014	03-07-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	250.00	9.71
03-07-2014	03-07-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	250.00	9.71
03-07-2014	03-07-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	500.00	9.71
03-07-2014	03-07-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	1,000.00	9.25
03-07-2014	03-07-2014	NSB	15-09-2019	250.00	8.27
03-07-2014	03-07-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	4,250.00	11.06
04-07-2014	04-07-2014	BOC	15-09-2019	2,000.00	8.27
04-07-2014	04-07-2014	BOC	01-07-2022	2,000.00	9.23
04-07-2014	04-07-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	1,750.00	11.06
08-07-2014	08-07-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	2,000.00	10.99
08-07-2014	11-07-2014	SEYLAN	01-01-2029	1,750.00	10.63
08-07-2014	11-07-2014	WTSL	15-09-2019	250.00	8.10
09-07-2014	11-07-2014	FCTL	01-01-2034	100.00	10.99
09-07-2014	11-07-2014	FCTL	01-01-2015	100.00	11.41
11-07-2014	11-07-2014	SEYLAN	01-01-2029	510.00	10.53
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	15-09-2019	878.12	8.10
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	HSBC	15-09-2019	7,000.00	8.10
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	HSBC	15-09-2019	8,000.00	8.10
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	HSBC	15-09-2019	8,000.00	8.10
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-08-2021	857.45	8.75
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	COM BANK	01-08-2021	2,000.00	8.75
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	884.67	8.95
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	PB	01-07-2022	3,998.69	8.95
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-01-2029	1,686.03	10.53
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	SEYLAN	01-01-2029	2,000.00	10.53
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-05-2029	2,074.57	10.58

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	FCTL	01-05-2029	150.00	10.58
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-06-2044	1,258.99	11.42
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	8,000.00	11.42
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	7,550.00	11.42
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	438.89	9.23
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-07-2033	840.43	10.92
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-01-2034	843.29	10.98
11-07-2014	15-07-2014	NSB	01-01-2044	1,268.83	11.40
16-07-2014	16-07-2014	BOC	01-01-2019	208.22	8.10
16-07-2014	18-07-2014	COM BANK	01-08-2021	1,000.00	8.75
15-07-2014	18-07-2014	WTSL	01-07-2044	100.00	11.42
14-07-2014	18-07-2014	FCTL	01-01-2029	350.00	10.53
14-07-2014	18-07-2014	SEYLAN	01-01-2029	3,600.00	10.53
15-07-2014	18-07-2014	PERPETUAL	01-01-2029	100.00	10.53
15-07-2014	18-07-2014	WTSL	01-01-2029	300.00	10.53
15-07-2014	18-07-2014	COM BANK	01-01-2029	1,000.00	8.10
15-07-2014	18-07-2014	SEYLAN	15-09-2019	500.00	8.10
15-07-2014	18-07-2014	WTSL	01-05-2029	100.00	10.58
16-07-2014	18-07-2014	PERPETUAL	01-05-2029	250.00	10.58
16-07-2014	18-07-2014	SEYLAN	01-05-2029	500.00	10.58
16-07-2014	18-07-2014	FCTL	01-05-2029	300.00	10.58
16-07-2014	18-07-2014	WTSL	01-05-2029	250.00	10.58
16-07-2014	18-07-2014	WTSL	01-05-2029	500.00	10.58
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	1,000.00	8.48
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	CAPITAL	01-01-2024	600.00	8.48
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	1,000.00	7.60
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	1,000.00	7.60
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	BOC	15-09-2019	2,000.00	7.60
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	2,000.00	7.60
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	CAPITAL	01-05-2029	250.00	9.45
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	SEYLAN	01-05-2029	1,250.00	9.45
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	NSB	01-05-2029	500.00	9.45
28-07-2014	01-08-2014	EPF	01-05-2029	3,000.00	9.45
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	COM BANK	01-08-2021	4,000.00	7.95
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	COM BANK	01-08-2021	1,000.00	7.95
28-07-2014	01-08-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	1,500.00	9.70
28-07-2014	01-08-2014	EPF	01-06-2044	1,100.00	10.00
25-07-2014	01-08-2014	NSB	01-07-2022	500.00	8.12
01-08-2014	01-08-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	1,000.00	7.25
01-08-2014	01-08-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	1,000.00	7.25
01-08-2014	01-08-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	1,000.00	7.25
01-08-2014	01-08-2014	WTSL	15-09-2019	500.00	7.25
01-08-2014	01-08-2014	WTSL	15-09-2019	250.00	7.25
01-08-2014	04-08-2014	CAPITAL	01-01-2024	500.00	8.20
01-08-2014	04-08-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	200.00	8.20
01-08-2014	04-08-2014	NSB	15-09-2019	500.00	7.25
01-08-2014	04-08-2014	FCTL	15-09-2019	250.00	7.25
01-08-2014	04-08-2014	WTSL	01-05-2029	500.00	9.25
01-08-2014	04-08-2014	NSB	01-08-2021	1,000.00	7.65

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
01-08-2014	05-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	250.00	8.20
01-08-2014	05-08-2014	COM BANK	15-09-2019	7,000.00	7.25
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	250.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	400.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	400.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB Fund	01-01-2024	250.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	COM BANK	01-01-2024	1,000.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	SEYLAN	01-01-2024	3,000.00	8.05
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-05-2029	750.00	9.00
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-07-2033	500.00	9.15
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2044	200.00	9.38
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2034	200.00	9.20
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-09-2023	1,500.00	8.00
11-08-2014	12-08-2014	NSB	01-01-2024	1,000.00	8.05
18-08-2014	19-08-2014	WTSL	01-06-2044	100.00	9.38
01-09-2014	01-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	936.18	7.00
01-09-2014	03-09-2014	WTSL	15-05-2017	1,150.00	7.00
01-09-2014	03-09-2014	WTSL	15-05-2017	1,000.00	7.00
01-09-2014	03-09-2014	WTSL	01-01-2017	1,000.00	6.90
01-09-2014	03-09-2014	WTSL	01-01-2017	1,150.00	6.90
10-09-2014	11-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	9,000.00	7.00
10-09-2014	11-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	9,000.00	7.00
10-09-2014	11-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	9,000.00	7.00
11-09-2014	11-09-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	3,331.72	7.00
10-09-2014	11-09-2014	BOC	15-05-2017	1,000.00	7.00
15-09-2014	16-09-2014	PB	01-11-2019	8,000.00	7.01
15-09-2014	16-09-2014	PB	01-11-2019	8,000.00	7.01
15-09-2014	16-09-2014	PB	01-11-2019	4,000.00	7.01
19-09-2014	22-09-2014	NSB	01-05-2021	1,783.60	7.33
22-09-2014	23-09-2014	COM BANK	01-10-2022	8,000.00	7.85
22-09-2014	23-09-2014	EPF	01-01-2015	3,600.00	9.18
26-09-2014	26-09-2014	NSB	01-01-2017	2,506.37	6.15
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	ETF	01-10-2022	3,267.11	7.15
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	5,000.00	8.78
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	EPF	01-01-2034	2,000.00	8.78
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	100.00	7.48
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	Acuity	01-05-2029	100.00	8.61
01-10-2014	01-10-2014	PERPETUAL	01-05-2029	200.00	8.60
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	FCTL	01-05-2029	200.00	8.60
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	NSB	01-06-2018	1,000.00	6.25
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	Acuity	01-01-2024	200.00	7.48
01-10-2014	01-10-2014	COM BANK	01-09-2023	1,000.00	7.40
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	NSB	15-05-2017	1,500.00	6.20
30-09-2014	01-10-2014	NSB	01-11-2019	3,500.00	6.50
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	WTSL	01-01-2024	400.00	7.60
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	Acuity	01-01-2024	100.00	7.60
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	FCTL	01-01-2024	500.00	7.60
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	BOC	01-01-2024	1,000.00	7.60
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	SEYLAN	01-01-2024	500.00	7.60

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
02-10-2014	03-10-2014	CAPITAL	01-01-2024	300.00	7.60
03-10-2014	03-10-2014	PERPETUAL	01-05-2029	150.00	8.50
03-10-2014	03-10-2014	PB	01-05-2029	250.00	8.50
16-10-2014	17-10-2014	EPF	01-06-2014	1,350.00	8.85
31-10-2014	03-11-2014	PB	01-11-2015	3,905.29	6.00
03-11-2014	03-11-2014	BOC	01-11-2015	2,000.00	6.00
03-11-2014	03-11-2014	NSB	15-11-2017	939.15	6.56
07-11-2014	07-11-2014	NSB	01-06-2017	944.37	6.35
12-11-2014	12-11-2014	HSBC	01-09-2016	3,650.00	6.40
14-11-2014	17-11-2014	HSBC	01-09-2016	106.00	6.36
17-11-2014	17-11-2014	NSB	01-01-2017	943.05	6.45
17-11-2014	17-11-2014	PB	01-11-2015	1,300.00	6.00
27-11-2014	01-12-2014	NSB	15-06-2017	1,122.66	6.61
02-12-2014	02-12-2014	BOC	01-12-2024	548.80	7.78
02-12-2014	02-12-2014	BOC	01-12-2024	191.33	7.78
02-12-2014	02-12-2014	BOC	01-12-2024	191.33	7.78
02-12-2014	02-12-2014	BOC	01-12-2024	5,694.47	7.78
12-12-2014	12-12-2014	BOC	01-12-2024	334.30	7.78
12-12-2014	12-12-2014	BOC	01-12-2024	39.80	7.78
12-12-2014	12-12-2014	PB	01-06-2016	2,000.00	6.35
12-12-2014	15-12-2014	NSB	01-09-2016	953.67	6.40
12-12-2014	15-12-2014	PB	01-10-2022	628.59	7.43
15-12-2014	15-12-2014	BOC	01-05-2025	4,442.80	8.00
24-12-2014	26-12-2014	PB	01-06-2016	2,000.00	6.42
Total				832,944.54	

[illegible] Through Placements - 2015

(Issued Amount – Rs. Million)

Transaction Date	Settlement Date	Investor	Maturity Date	Accepted Amount	Net of Tax Yield Rates %p.a.
31-12-2014	01-01-2015	PB(ETF)	01-10-2022	1,353.66	7.45
01-01-2015	01-01-2015	EPF	01-06-2026	8,000.00	8.37
01-01-2015	01-01-2015	EPF	01-06-2026	7,414.23	8.37
01-01-2015	01-01-2015	EPF	01-05-2029	1,283.77	8.60
01-01-2015	02-01-2015	BOC	01-06-2016	1,000.00	6.30
09-01-2015	12-01-2015	EPF	15-05-2017	3,797.92	6.90
13-01-2015	16-01-2015	PB(ETF)	01-09-2023	3,348.32	7.75
13-01-2015	16-01-2015	PB(ETF)	01-09-2023	7,000.00	7.75
13-01-2015	16-01-2015	PB(ETF)	01-10-2022	4,528.05	7.65
13-01-2015	16-01-2015	PB(ETF)	01-10-2022	8,000.00	7.65
16-01-2015	16-01-2015	NSB	15-06-2017	8,000.00	7.00
16-01-2015	16-01-2015	NSB	15-06-2017	1,720.26	7.00
16-01-2015	16-01-2015	WTSL	01-06-2016	500.00	6.32
16-01-2015	16-01-2015	EPF	01-05-2029	3,977.00	8.62
22-01-2015	23-01-2015	NSB	01-06-2016	1,000.00	6.42
22-01-2015	23-01-2015	SEYLAN	01-06-2016	2,000.00	6.45
22-01-2015	23-01-2015	COMBANK	01-06-2016	5,000.00	6.45
28-01-2015	29-01-2015	WTSL	01-01-2024	500.00	8.07
28-01-2015	29-01-2015	WTSL	01-01-2024	500.00	8.07
28-01-2015	29-01-2015	WTSL	01-01-2024	500.00	8.07
28-01-2015	29-01-2015	WTSL	01-01-2024	500.00	8.07
30-01-2015	02-02-2015	EPF	01-06-2044	4,919.16	9.45
30-01-2015	02-02-2015	BOC	01-01-2024	2,000.00	8.20
30-01-2015	02-02-2015	NSB	01-01-2024	1,240.21	8.20
30-01-2015	06-02-2015	NSB	01-01-2024	413.04	8.20
30-01-2015	06-02-2015	BOC	01-01-2024	1,000.00	8.20
02-02-2015	06-02-2015	EPF	01-06-2044	1,404.05	9.45
06-02-2015	09-02-2015	WTSL	09-02-2024	750.00	8.15
06-02-2015	09-02-2015	WTSL	09-02-2024	750.00	8.15
06-02-2015	09-02-2015	WTSL	09-02-2024	750.00	8.15
06-02-2015	09-02-2015	WTSL	09-02-2024	750.00	8.15
06-02-2015	09-02-2015	WTSL	09-02-2024	598.00	8.15
13-02-2015	13-02-2015	COMBANK	15-05-2017	5,000.00	7.03
16-02-2015	16-02-2015	WTSL	01-09-2016	500.00	6.45
19-02-2015	19-02-2015	BOC	01-06-2018	50.00	7.14
24-02-2015	26-02-2015	HSBC	01-11-2019	1,700.00	7.40
24-02-2015	26-02-2015	HSBC	15-06-2017	1,700.00	7.00
31-03-2015	31-03-2015	BOC	01-06-2020	14,143.55	9.07
Total				**107,591.22**	

ඇමුණුම 01 – 1.1.2

විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
கணக்காய்வாளர் தலைமை அதிபதி திணைக்களம்
AUDITOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

මගේ අංකය / எனது இல. / My No. BAF/H/GEN/66

මෙම අංකය / உமது இல. / Your No.

දිනය / திகதி / Date 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 30 දින

සභාපති.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ සිදු කර තිබුණු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව 2016 ජූනි 29 වන දින විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් අනතුරුව 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 23 දක්වා කාලය තුළ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් සහ විගණකාධිපති විසින් අනාවරණය කරගත් තොරතුරු අනුව එම වාර්තාවට කරන ලද යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම් ඇතුලත් වාර්තාව

උක්ත විෂයයට අදාල විමර්ශන කටයුතු සඳහා 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 23 වන දින රැස්වූ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ දී, 2016 ජූනි 29 දිනෙන් අනතුරුව රැස්කරගත් තොරතුරුද සලකා බලා එම කරුණු පදනම් කරගෙන 2016 ජූනි 29 වන දින ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව යාවත්කාලීන කර පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙත ලබා දීමට මා විසින් එකඟතාව එල කරන ලදී.

02. එම වාර්තාව මේ සමඟ ඉදිරිපත් කරමි.

විගණකාධිපති.

එච්.එම්.ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ සිදු කර තිබුණු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් පිළිබඳව 2016 ජූනි 29 වන දින විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් අනතුරුව 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 23 දක්වා කාලය තුළ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් සහ විගණකාධිපති විසින් අනාවරණය කරගත් තොරතුරු අනුව එම වාර්තාවට කරන ලද යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම් ඇතුලත් වාර්තාව.

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1 උක්ත විශේෂ වාර්තාව නිකුත් කිරීමේ පසුබිම සහ වාර්තාවේ ස්වභාවය.

2016 මැයි 06 දින පැය 1430 ට පැවති පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා සාකච්ඡාවේදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදුකර තිබුණු පසුගිය හා වත්මන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් පිළිබඳව වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලෙස විගණකාධිපති වෙත දුන් උපදේශය සහ ඒ සඳහා වූ එකඟතාවය පරිදි මෙම වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබේ. මෙම විෂයයට අදාළව 2016 ජූනි 08 දින පැවති පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙත විගණකාධිපති විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ලිපියද (ඇමුණුම i) මේ සමඟ ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇත. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව වෙතින් විගණනයට ලබා ගන්නා තොරතුරුවල පැවතිය හැකි සංවේදීභාවය හේතුවෙන් ඒවායේ රහස්‍යභාවය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම පිළිබඳව නීතිපති විසින් 2004 පෙබරවාරි 12 දින ප්‍රකාශ කර තිබූ එම මතය (ඇමුණුම ii) සහ එම මතය සඳහන් කරමින් මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ලිපියක් ද (ඇමුණුම iii) දක්වා ඇත. එහෙයින් මෙම වාර්තාවේ ඇමුණුම් ලෙස ඇතුළත් කර ඇති ඇතැම් ලේඛන එලෙස රහස්‍යභාවය ආරක්ෂා විය යුතු ලේඛන යැයි හැඟී ගිය හෙයින් එම ඇමුණුම් රහිත වාර්තාවක් ඔබ කමිටුව වෙතද, එම ඇමුණුම් සහිත වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ද ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කර ඇත.

(එසේ වුවද, ගරු කතානායකතුමාගේ ලේකම්ගේ 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 09 දිනැති ලිපිය මඟින් කර තිබූ ඉල්ලීම පරිදි 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 15 දින එකී ඇමුණුම් සහිත වාර්තාවේ පිටපත් 26 ක් ගරු සභික සාමාජිකවරුන් වෙත ලබාදීම සඳහා ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ලබාදෙන ලදී.)

එම ඇමුණුම් රහිත වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසුව විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව මත පදනම්ව විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා පහත සඳහන් දිනයන් වලදී පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කමිටුව රැස් වූහ.

දිනය	සහභාගී වූ පාර්ශවයන්		
	කමිටු සමාජිකයින්	විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව	මහ බැංකුව සහ අදාල අමාත්‍යාංශ නිලධාරීන්
2016 ජූනි 29	✓	✓	x
2016 ජූලි 05	✓	✓	x
2016 ජූලි 07	✓	✓	✓
2016 අගොස්තු 12	✓	✓	✓
2016 අගොස්තු 23	✓	✓	✓
2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 08	✓	✓	මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා පමණක් කැඳවන ලදී
2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 23	✓	✓	x

ඒ අනුව 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 23 වන දින රැස්වූ කමිටුව විසින්, 2016 ජූනි 29 දිනෙන් අනතුරුව රැස්කරගත් තොරතුරු සලකා බලා එම කරුණු පදනම් කරගෙන 2016 ජූනි 29 වන දින ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව යාවත්කාලීන කර පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙත ලබා දීමට විගණකාධිපතිවරයා එකඟ වන ලදී. ඒ අනුව එම යාවත්කාලීන කරන ලද විගණන වාර්තාව පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවට මෙලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කරන ලදී. මෙම වාර්තාවට අදාලව රහස්‍යතාවය ආරක්ෂා විය යුතු යැයි හැඟී ගිය ලේඛන මේ වන විට ගරු කථානායකතුමාගේ ඉල්ලීම පරිදි සභික සාමාජිකවරුන් වෙත ලබා දී ඇති හෙයින් එම තොරතුරු මෙම වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.

2016 ජූනි 29 දිනෙන් පසුව අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු හේතුවෙන් එදින නිකුත් කළ විශේෂ වාර්තාවේ 5.1.9 සහ 5.1.11 ඡේදයන් පමණක් සංශෝධනයට ලක් කර ඇති අතර එම සංශෝධනයන් හේතුවෙන් වාර්තාවේ නිගමනයන්ට කිසිදු බලපෑමක් ඇති නොවේ.

2. මෙම විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේදී පහත දැක්වෙන ක්‍රමවේදයන් අනුගමනය කරන ලදී.

2.1 පහත සඳහන් ලේඛන පරීක්ෂා කිරීම

(2016 ජූනි 29 දක්වා)

2.1.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී අනුගමනය කරන පිළිවෙත් දැක්වෙන මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත.

2.1.2 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශණය කිරීම සඳහා වූ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනුකාරක සභාව විසින් පවත්වන ලද පරීක්ෂාවට අදාල වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්.

2.1.3 ඉහත 2.1.2 ඡේදයෙහි සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අදාළව පරීක්ෂා කර වාර්තා කිරීම සඳහා පත්කළ ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටු වාර්තාව.(2015 මැයි 19 දින මෙම වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රී ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් කිරිඇල්ල මැතිතුමා විසින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ සභාගත කර ඇත.)

2.1.4 ඉහත 2.1.2 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව විශ්‍රාමික ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණ විනිසුරුවරයකුගේ පරීක්ෂණ වාර්තාව.

2.1.5 1949 අංක 58 දරන මුදල් නීති පනත එහි සංශෝධන සමග.

2.1.6 අදාල දේශිය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටු සහ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණ.

2.1.7 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙහි වෙබ් අඩවියෙහි පළ වූ තොරතුරු හා දත්ත.

(2016 ජූනි 29 දිනෙන් පසුව)

2.1.8 2016 ජූනි 29 වන දින පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලද ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්.

2.1.9 2016 ජූලි 07, 2016 අගෝස්තු 12, 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 08 වන දින පැවැති පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවන් හි වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්.

2.1.10 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සහ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය වෙත පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කමිටුව විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ප්‍රශ්නාවලි සඳහා ලද පිළිතුරු.

2.2 වෙනත් පරීක්ෂාවන්.

2.2.1 විවිධ ආකාරයෙන් ලද තොරතුරු විශ්ලේෂණාත්මක විග්‍රහයකට ලක් කිරීම.

2.2.2 ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළට අදාළ ඇතැම් තොරතුරු පරීක්ෂාව.

2.2.3 ද්විතික වෙළෙඳපොලට අදාළ ඇතැම් තොරතුරු පරීක්ෂාව.

2.2.4 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු ඇගයීමට ලක් කිරීම.

2.2.5 අදාළ පාර්ශවයන් සමග සාකච්ඡා කිරීම.

3. විෂය පථය සීමාවීම

මෙම වාර්තාවෙන් ඉස්මතු කර ඇති නිරීක්ෂණයන් තුළින් නිගමනයන්ට එළඹීමේදී මාගේ විෂය පථය මතු දැක්වෙන සීමා කිරීම්වලට යටත්ව තිබූ බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ.

3.1 විෂයගත ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළව මහ බැංකුව යම් මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතක දැක්වෙන පිළිවෙත් අනුව කටයුතු කළ බව සඳහන් කර තිබුණද, එය එහි මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් හෝ වෙනත් අධිකාරී බලයක් සහිත ආයතනයක් විසින් අනුමත කළ සමස්ථ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතක් නොවන බව මා වෙත වාර්තා වී තිබීම. (ඇමුණුම iv සහ v)

3.2 විෂයගත ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වීමේ කාර්යය විගණකාධිපති වෙත පැවරුනු දිනය හා අදාල සිද්ධීන් සිදු වූ දිනයන් අතර සැලකිය යුතු කාල පරතරයක් තිබීම.

3.3 අදාල විෂයගත කරුණු පිළිබඳ විෂය බද්ධ පෘථුල දැනුමක් සහිත මූල්‍ය හා ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයින්ගේ සහය ලබා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් නොතිබීම හා මෙම වාර්තාවේ පළමු ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය පිළිබඳව ගැටළු සහගත තත්ත්වය නිසා එවැනි සහයක් ලබාගැනීම ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී වීම.

3.4 ඉහත 3.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් විශේෂඥයින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව සිටියද එම නිලධාරීන්ගේ සහය අපක්ෂපාති ලෙස ලබාගත හැකිද යන්න ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී වීම.

3.5 අදාල විෂයට සම්බන්ධිත ඉතා වැදගත් ද්විතික වෙළඳපල පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු එම තෙවන පාර්ශවයන් වෙතින් සෘජුව ලබාගැනීමට හෝ තහවුරු කරවා ගැනීමට අධිකාර බලයක් විගණකාධිපති වෙත නොතිබීම.

3.6 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට මෙම වාර්තාවේ (ඇමුණුම vi) හි දක්වා ඇති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත ප්‍රමාණාත්මක බලපෑමක් සිදු කිරීමේ හැකියාවක් තිබුණේ ද යන්න අනාවරණය කරගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් නොවීම.

3.7 ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතර ද, මහ බැංකු අධිපති සහ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතරද එකිනෙක පුද්ගලයන් අතර ප්‍රමාණාත්මක බලපෑමක් සිදු කිරීමේ හැකියාවක් තිබුණේද යන්න අනාවරණය කර ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් නොවීම.

3.8 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් හා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතර සිදුවන දුරකථන සංවාද පටිගත කර නොතිබීම නිසා එම තොරතුරු පරීක්ෂා කළ නොහැකි වීම.

3.9 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසිය සිදු වූ අවස්ථාවට අදාල පටිගත කළ සජීවී දර්ශණ භෞතිකව පරීක්ෂා නොකිරීම.

3.10 මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරතුරු නිවැරදිව හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර අනුව ලබා දි ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබීම හේතුවෙන් වාර්තා කිරීමට සීමා පැවතීම. (ඇමුණුම iii)

4. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය හැඳින්වීම

4.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ආර්ථික හා මිල ස්ථායිතාවය පවත්වාගෙන යාමද මූලික අරමුණු ලෙස සළකා ස්ථාපිත කර ඇති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පස් දෙනෙකුගෙන් සමන්විත මහ බැංකු මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ ප්‍රධානියා ද වන මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙහෙයවනු ලැබේ (ඇමුණුම vii). තවද මුදල් නීති පනතේ 19(1) වගන්තිය පරිදි මහ බැංකු අධිපති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියා ද වේ. (ඇමුණුම viii) මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ දැනුම්දීම මත රජයේ ඉදිරි මාසික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරාලීම සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් (Treasury Securities) එනම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් (Treasury Bills) හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර (Treasury Bonds) නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ වගකීම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් දරනු ලබයි (ඇමුණුම ix). වර්ෂයකට වඩා අඩු කාලයකින් කල් පිරෙන (Maturity) අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කරනු ලබන අතර වර්ෂයකට වැඩි දිගු කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරයි. මෙම බැඳුම්කරයක මුහුණත වටිනාකම (Face Value) රුපියල් 100 ක අගයක් ගනි. මෙහිදී මහ බැංකුව විසින් රජය වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් සපයා දීම

සිදුකරනු ලබන අතර මුදල් නීති පනතේ 106 (1) වගන්තියට (ඇමුණුම x) අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව රජයේ නියෝජිතයකු ලෙස කටයුතු කරන බව දක්වා ඇත. මෙම සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා සුදුසුකම්ලත් ආයතන 16 ක් 2015 වර්ෂය අවසාන වන විට ලියාපදිංචි කර තිබූ අතර, 2016 වර්ෂයේ දී ඉන් එක් ආයතනයක් ඉවත් වී ඇත (ඇමුණුම vi). එම ආයතන අතර රාජ්‍ය මෙන්ම පෞද්ගලික ආයතන ද වේ. මෙම ආයතන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් / වෙළඳුන් (Primary Dealers) ලෙස හඳුන්වනු ලබයි. තවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට ද ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොලෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදීගැනීමට අවසර ලබා දී තිබේ.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයන් 2 ක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි. ඉන් පළමු ක්‍රමය වූයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන දැන්වීමක් අනුව ඉහතින් සඳහන් කරන ලද ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් මිලගණන් කැඳවා ඒ අනුව බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි (auction) මඟින් අවශ්‍ය මුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමයි. දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය වූයේ සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට සුරකුම්පත් නිකුත්කිරීම හෙවත් පෞද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයයි (Direct Placement / Private Placement). මෙම දෙවන ක්‍රමයේ දී සිදුවූයේ මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන ලද බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඉපයුම්/ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් (Weighted Average yield Rate) මත ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම් සඳහා අවස්ථාව ලබාදීම වේ. මෙහිදී මෙම බරතැබූ ඉපයීම් අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීම ක්‍රම 2 ක් අනුව සිදු කරනු ලැබේ. එක් ක්‍රමයක් වන්නේ ආසන්නතම පෙර කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේ දී සමාන කල්පිරීමේ කාලයක් (Maturity Period) සහිත බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් හි බරිත සාමාන්‍ය අගය ඵලදා අනුපාතය ලෙස ගැනීම වේ. අනෙක් ක්‍රමය වන්නේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලේ (Secondary Market) පවතින සමාන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර ඵලදා අනුපාත පදනම් කරගෙන නැවත ඵලදා අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීමයි. සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වෙන්දේසි දින හැර අනෙකුත් සෑම වැඩකරන දිනයකම විවෘතව පවතින අතර බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනිමට කැමති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පෙර තීරණය කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් යටතේ, අලෙවියට ඇති බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගැනීමට අයදුම්කළ හැකිය. භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවක දී අනුගමනය කරනු ලබන ක්‍රියාවලිය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි (Public Debt Department Operation Manual) දක්වා තිබේ.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් කිසිදු විරෝධතාවයක් දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින්ද ඒ සඳහා නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් එම ඡේදය මෙම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 02 සිට 04 දක්වා)

4.2 භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර පොළී අනුපාතයකට (Coupon Rate/Interest Rate) විවිධ පරිණත කාලසීමාවන් සඳහා නිකුත් කරනු ලබයි. එලෙස නිකුත් කරනු ලබන බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකමට අනුව පොළී අනුපාතය මත අර්ධ වාර්ෂිකව රජය විසින් පොළී ගෙවනු ලබයි. (ඇමුණුම xi). බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියන්හිදී ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන පොළි අනුපාතයක් මත පදනම්ව විවිධ මිල ගණන් යටතේ ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. එම ලංසු අධිමිලකට (Premium) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වැඩි මිලකට, සමමිලට (at par) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට සමාන වූ මිලකට සහ අවමිලට (Discount) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වඩා අඩු වූ මිලකටද ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. මෙහිදි ඔවුන් විසින් අධිමිලට ඉල්ලුම්කළ හොත් බැඳුම්කරයේ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පොළි අනුපාතයට වඩා පහළ අගයක් ගන්නා අතර සම මිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන අගයක්ද, අවමිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක්ද ගනු ලබයි. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට ඉහළින් ඇති ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට වඩා අවමිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත්, පොළී අනුපාතය හා ඵලදා අනුපාතය සමාන වන විට බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට නිකුත් වන බවත්, පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා පහළින් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී මුහුණත අගයට ඉහළ වූ අධිමිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත් දැක්විය හැක. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් අධිමිලක් ලැබෙන අතර එයින් රජයට අමතර මූල්‍ය වාසියක් ලැබේ. එමෙන්ම පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතයට එනම් වට්ටම් අනුපාතයකින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් රජයට මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදු වේ. පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන ඵලදා අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළහොත් රජයට අමතර වාසියක් හෝ අවාසියක් සිදුනොවේ.

(ඉහත ඡේදය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ලබා දුන් ලිඛිත පිළිතුර හා එකඟ විය නොහැකි බව පහත සඳහන් යොමුවෙහි අන්තර්ගත කරුණු අනුව තහවුරු වන හෙයින් එම ඡේදය මෙම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 4 සිට 5 දක්වා)

4.3 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා රජයේ මූදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයෙන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් සපුරා ගත් ආකාරය පහත වගුවේ දැක්වේ.

වගු අංක 1: බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ ක්‍රමවේදය සහ වටිනාකම (2014 ජනවාරී - 2016 මැයි)

වර්ෂය හා මාසය	බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ ක්‍රමවේදය හා වටිනාකම			නිකුත් කළ වටිනාකමින් ප්‍රතිශතයක් ලෙස	
	වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය (Auction)	සෘජු ක්‍රමය (Direct Placement)	එකතුව	වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය (Auction)	සෘජු ක්‍රමය (direct Placement)
	රු.බිලියන	රු.බිලියන	රු.බිලියන	%	%
2014 ජනවාරි	5.500	32.718	38.218	14	86
2014 පෙබරවාරි	3.050	80.088	83.138	4	96
2014 මාර්තු	5.000	130.117	135.117	4	96
2014 අප්‍රේල්	-	120.373	120.373	0	100
2014 මැයි	5.950	62.745	68.695	9	91
2014 ජූනි	-	126.210	126.210	0	100
2014 ජූලි	5.300	109.483	114.783	5	95
2014 අගෝස්තු	-	44.230	44.230	0	100
2014 සැප්තැම්බර්	2.950	72.458	75.408	4	96
2014 ඔක්තෝබර්	-	22.617	22.617	0	100
2014 නොවැම්බර්	-	13.788	13.788	0	100
2014 දෙසැම්බර්	4.000	18.148	22.148	18	82
2015 ජනවාරි	-	69.923	69.923	0	100
2015 පෙබරවාරි	10.058	23.524	33.582	30	70
2015 මාර්තු	171.659	14.144	185.803	92	8
2015 අප්‍රේල්	44.306	-	44.306	100	0
2015 මැයි	35.730	-	35.730	100	0
2015 ජූනි	82.900	-	82.900	100	0

2015 ජූලි	99.575	-	99.575	100	0
2015 අගෝස්තු	100.578	-	100.578	100	0
2015 සැප්තැම්බර්	57.576	-	57.576	100	0
2015 ඔක්තෝබර්	55.811	-	55.811	100	0
2015 නොවැම්බර්	20.594	-	20.594	100	0
2015 දෙසැම්බර්	29.545	-	29.545	100	0
2016 ජනවාරි	61.119	-	61.119	100	0
2016 පෙබරවාරි	38.959	-	38.959	100	0
2016 මාර්තු	135.667	-	135.667	100	0
2016 අප්‍රේල්	30.44	-	30.440	100	0
2016 මැයි	114.335	-	114.335	100	0

(2016 ජූනි 26 දිනැති විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව යතුරුලියනය කිරීමේදී, සදොස්ව තිබූ අගයන් නිවැරදි කර ඉහත වගුව යාවත්කාලීන කරන ලදී.)

කෙසේ වෙතත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා ඉහත සඳහන් ක්‍රම දෙකම අනුගමනය කර තිබුණද, එදින සිට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් තාවකාලිකව සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි.

(ඉහත සඳහන් වටිනාකම් පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් කිසිදු විරෝධතාවයක් දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින්ද ඒ සඳහා නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් එම ඡේදය එලෙසම මෙම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 05 සිට 06 දක්වා)

4.4 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය මුළුමනින්ම ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා වූ මාස 15 ක කාලය තුළ, සෘජු ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදාගත් මාසයන්ද වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත් මාසයන් ද මෙම ක්‍රම දෙකම යොදාගත් මාසයන්ද, පැවති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. කෙසේ වුවත් එම මාස 15 ක කාලය තුළ නිකුත් කළ සමස්ථ බැඳුම්කරයන්ගෙන් සියයට 80 කට වඩා සෘජු ක්‍රමය යොදාගෙන නිකුත් කර තිබුණු බව වැඩි දුරටත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(පහත සඳහන් යොමුවෙහි දක්වා ඇති පරිදි මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඉහත ඡේදයට අදාලව ලබා දුන් ලිඛිත පිළිතුර හා පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව ලබා ගත් වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් අනුව ඉහත ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 06 සිට 22 දක්වා)

5. නිරීක්ෂණයන්

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට ඉදිරි කාලයට අදාල භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව සිදුකළ නියැදි විගණන පරීක්ෂාවේ දී අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු සහ ඒවායේ ස්වභාවය ඉස්මතු වී ඇති ආකාරය අනුව පහත පරිදි උප ශීර්ෂ තුනක් යටතේ විගණන නිරීක්ෂණ සඳහන් කරනු ලැබේ.

(අ.) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිදු කළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

(ආ) 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

(ඇ) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවට අදාල ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනසින් පසු ඇති වූ ප්‍රවණතාවයන්

5.1 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිදු කළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම

5.1.1 මහ බැංකුවේමූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/05/18/97 (ඇමුණුම xii) ට අනුව 1997 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මගින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. වෙළඳපලේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවක දී හෝ පොළි අනුපාතිකයන් අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවකදී වෙන්දේසි මගින් සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වූ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල යොදා ගත යුතු බව **ද,** එහිදී නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මේ නිසා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පොළී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලනය කිරීමේ යාන්ත්‍රණයක් ලෙස සෘජු ක්‍රමය මත අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම යොදා ගෙන තිබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 22 සිට 23 දක්වා)

5.1.2 තවද මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/1/26/2008 හි කරුණු (ඇමුණුම xiii) සැලකිල්ලට ගැනීමෙන් පසුව සහ රජයේ සුරැකුම්පත් සම්බන්ධව පොළී අනුපාත ඉහළයාම සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් 2008 වර්ෂයේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/25/20/2008 ට අනුව (ඇමුණුම xiv) මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලේ පවතින පොළී අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05 (Five Basis Points) ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාතයන් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් වෙළඳපොළ ද්‍රවශීලතාව ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති අතර පහත යොමුවෙහි දැක්වෙන වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හා අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුව ඉහත ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 23 සිට 34 දක්වා)

5.1.3 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහි අධිකාරි අමතා මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහි (Treasury Operation Department) අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල් විසින් එවන ලද අංක TO/DG/CFS/03 දරන හා 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දිනැති ලිපිය (ඇමුණුම xv) සමග 2015 මාර්තු මාසයට අදාලව ඉදිරිපත් කරන ඇති මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බිලියන 172 ක් විය. එහි 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින සඳහා පමණක් වූ රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බිලියන 13.550 ක් වන අතර මෙම අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් රු.බිලියන 1 ක් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියක් තුළින්ද ඉතිරි රු.බිලියන 12.550 සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ද සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීම මගින් රජයට අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරන කමිටුව DDMC) විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1300 පැයට (ඇමුණුම xvi) පවත්වන ලද රැස්වීමේදී නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් ද ඇතුළත් මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් 04 දෙනෙක්ගෙන් සැදුම්ලත් මෙම කමිටුවේ වගකිම වනුයේ දේශීය ණය ගැනුම් වියදම හා අවදානම අවම වන ආකාරයෙන් පවත්වා ගැනීමයි. (ඇමුණුම xvii). කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ මෙම රැස්වීම සඳහා එම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ නියෝජිතයා සහභාගී වී නොතිබුණි. එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් යටතේ එම පැමිණ නොසිටි සාමාජිකයාගේ එකඟත්වය විකල්ප ක්‍රමයකින් එනම් දුරකථනය මඟින් හෝ ලබාගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය. ඉන් පසු එනම් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින මෙම තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතිය ද (ඇමුණුම xvi) ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

(පහත සඳහන් යොමුවෙහි දක්වා ඇති පරිදි මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඉහත ඡේදයට අදාල ලබා දුන් ලිඛිත පිළිතුර, පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව ලබා ගත් වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හා අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුව ඉහත ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 34 සිට 42 දක්වා)

5.1.4 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කර සපුරා ගතයුතු රජයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වූ රු.බිලියන 261.683 ක් (මේ තුළ රු.බිලියන 89.683 ක් වූ වර්ෂය තුළ නැවත නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ද ඇතුළත් වේ.) සඳහා වූ රජයේ ණය ගැණුම් වැඩසටහන (Government Borrowing programme) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. එම වැඩසටහනට අනුව එකී සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් රු. බිලියන 89.683 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වලින්ද, රු.බිලියන 172 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මගින් ද ලබා ගැනිමටත්, එම රු.බිලියන 172 න් රු. බිලියන 1 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් ද, ඉතිරිය සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ද සපයා ගැනීමටත් තීරණය කර තිබුණි.

මෙම අනුමැතිය නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපති (SM) මගින් රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී (Superintendent of Public Debt) වෙත දැනුම් දී තිබුණද, (ඇමුණුම xvi) ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම එම කටයුතු ක්‍රියාත්මක නොවූ බව මාර්තු මාසය තුළදී සපුරා ගන්නා ලද රු. බිලියන 185.802 ක් වූ සම්පූර්ණ මුදලින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් රු. බිලියන 14.143 ක් පමණක් සපුරා ගෙන තිබීම (4.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වගුව පරිදි) හේතුවෙන් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින්ද එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 42 සිට 44 දක්වා)

5.1.5 එසේම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින නිකුත් කිරීමට සැලැසුම් කර තිබුණේ වසර 30 කින් කල්පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර වන අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කාලීන බැඳුම්කර සඳහා සාමාන්‍ය ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත් විමක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් අපේක්ෂා කර නොතිබූ බවත් පොළී ඵලදා වක්‍රය වසර 30 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම මගින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළින් විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත්වීමක්ද අපේක්ෂා කර තිබූ බව (ඇමුණුම xviii) මගින් අනාවරණය වී තිබුණි. එසේ වුවද විදේශ

ආයෝජකයන් සිය ආයෝජන නැවත ආපසු ලබාගෙන ඇති බව 2015 වර්ෂයේ වාර්ෂික වාර්තාව මගින් තහවුරු කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම අපේක්ෂා සාර්ථක වී තිබුණේද යන්න ගැටළු සහගත විය. (ඇමුණුම xix)

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති අතර පහත යොමුවෙහි දැක්වෙන වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් අනුව ඉහත ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 44 සිට 45 දක්වා)

5.1.6 මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු දිනයට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළ තුළ වසර 30 ක බැඳුම්කර සඳහා වූයේ සියයට 9.48 ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවැති අතර (ඇමුණුම xx) **<u>එම අනුපාතයන්ට ආසන්න අනුපාතයන්ගෙන් මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවද සිදුවේයැයි අපේක්ෂාවක් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සතුව පැවති බව මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශණය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාචික සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් (වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්) පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේ දී අනාවරණය විය (ඇමුණුම xxi). එසේ බලාපොරොත්තු වූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් සහිතව අධිමිලකට බැඳුම්කර විකිණීමට අමතරව</u> ඉහත 4.1 ඡේදයේ දක්වා තිබූ පරිදි රජයට වැඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාව තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දින සහ 26 දින පිළිවෙලින් අන්තර්ජාලයේ සහ පුවත්පත්වල ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලද දැන්වීම්වලට අනුව ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 16 දෙනා වෙත වසර 30 ක කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන රු.බිලියන 1 ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සියයට 12.5 ක් වන පොළී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි (ඇමුණුම xxii).

මේ පිළිබඳව වූ ලංසු ලැබීමේ තොරතුරු වාර්තාව (ඇමුණුම xxiii) පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූයේ සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සහ ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් 16 දෙනෙකු විසින් රු.බිලියන 20.708 ක එකතු වටිනාකමක් දක්වා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ බවයි. තවද එම මුදලින් සියයට 75 ක් පමණ එනම් රු.බිලියන 15.531 ක් එක් පෞද්ගලික ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු විසින් සහ ඔහු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකුවන ලංකා බැංකුව මගින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ බවද නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(කෙසේ වෙතත් ඉහත ඡේදයේ ඉරි ඇදි වගන්තියේ දක්වා ඇති කරුණු පිළිබඳව 2016 ජූනි 29 දිනෙන් පසුව නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමක් කර නොමැති අතර එහෙයින් එම කරුණු නැවත සනාථ වී නොමැත. ඒ අනුව එම වගන්තිය අවශ්‍යය වන්නේ නම් විගණන නිරීක්ෂණ ඡේදයෙන් ඉවත් කළ

හැකිය. එලෙස ඉවත් කළද ඒ හේතුවෙන් විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ නිගමනයන්ට කිසිදු බලපෑමක් ඇති නොවේ.)

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති අතර පහත යොමුවෙහි දැක්වෙන වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් අනුව ඉහත ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 45 සිට 47 දක්වා)

5.1.7 දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් නිකුත් කිරීමට නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණේ රු.බිලියන 1 බැඳුම්කර පමණි. එසේ වුවද එම ප්‍රමාණය මෙන් දසගුණයකටත් වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වන දින වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන් ද අනතුරුව පැය 1230 සිට පැය 1310 , දක්වා පැවැත්වුනු අංක 2/2015 දරන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව (Treasury Bond Tender Committee) විසින් තීරණය කර තිබුණි (ඇමුණුම xxiv). මෙහිදි නිරීක්ෂණය වූ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ ඉහත තීරණය ගෙන ඇත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන්ද අනතුරුව බවය. මෙය ඉහත 5.1.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් රු.බිලියන 12.550 ක් සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් සපුරා ගැනීමට කර තිබූ තීරණයෙන් සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම බැහැර වීමකි. එම තත්ත්වය යටතේ එදින පැවති වෙන්දේසියේදී 9.3510 සිට 11.7270 දක්වා වූ බරතැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් 14 දෙනෙකුට වසර 30 කින් කල්පිරෙන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් (ඇමුණුම xxv) රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් උපයා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළද වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට (අවම්ලට) නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රු.බිලියන 9.658 ක් පමණක් උපයා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබුණි. මෙහිදි අනාවරණය වූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ඉහත පරිදි සපයා ගත නොහැකි වූ රු.බිලියන 0.371 (රු.බිලියන10.058 - රු.බිලියන 9.687) ක මුදල වෙනත් කෙටිකාලීන ප්‍රභවයකින් සපුරා ගැනීමට සිදුව තිබුණි.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති අතර පහත යොමුවෙහි දැක්වෙන වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හා අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුව ඉහත ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 47 සිට 95 දක්වා)

5.1.8 ඉහත ඡේදයේ කරුණු අනුව නිරීක්ෂණය වන ඉතාම වැදගත් කරුණ වන්නේ 2015 මාර්තු 27 දින පැය 0830 සිට පැය 1100 දක්වා වූ වෙන්දේසිය පවත්වන අවස්ථාව වන විටත් එම වෙන්දේසිය මගින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දිනට අවශ්‍ය රු.බිලියන 13.550 ක් වූ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයද ඇතුළත් 2015 මාර්තු මස මාසික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයද ඇතුළත් දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශය මෙන්ම මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතියද, එනම් වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් වී ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය ලබා ගැනිමටත් පසුව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ ණය ගැණුම් වැඩසටහන සඳහා නිර්දේශය සහ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

(පහත යොමුවෙහි දැක්වෙන කරුණු අනුව ඡේදයේ ඉහත සඳහන් නිරීක්ෂණය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ලබා දුන් ලිඛිත පිළිතුර හා එකඟ විය නොහැකි අතර වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හා අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුව ද ඉහත නිරීක්ෂණය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 48 සිට 95 දක්වා)

ඉහත ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත දෙන ලද උපදෙස් (එකී උපදේශයේ උදෘතයක් පහත දැක්වේ) ප්‍රකාරව ගන්නා ලද්දක් බව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි විසින් ලංසු සාරාංශ වාර්තාව (Bid Summery Report) මත අත්අකුරින් (ඇමුණුම xxvi) සටහන් කර තිබුණි. **(එම සටහන තමන් විසින්ම තබන ලද සටහනක් බවට (ඇමුණුම xxvii) එම අධිකාරි විසින් වාචික සාක්ෂියක් මගින් තහවුරු කර තිබුණි)**. ඉහත සඳහන් සටහනට අමතරව එකි බැදුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය මගින්ම මෙම රු.බිලියන 10.058 ප්‍රමාණයක් සපයා ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනත් කිසිදු ලිඛිත සාක්ෂියක් විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොකෙරිණි. ඉහත ලිඛිත සටහනෙන් ප්‍රකාශිත උදෘතය සහ එහි සිංහල පරිවර්තනය පහත දැක්වේ.

“Governor instructed to raise funds up to Rs.10 Billion taking into consideration additional fund requirement of the Government” (ඇමුණුම xx vii)

"රජයේ අතිරේක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳව සැලකිල්ලට ගැනීමෙන් පසු රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක් දක්වා අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීමට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා විසින් උපදෙස් දෙන ලදී."

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිරීක්ෂණ පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති අතර පහත යොමුවෙහි දැක්වෙන 2016 ජූනි 29 දිනෙන් පසුව ලබාගත් වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හා

අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුවද, ඉහත නිරීක්ෂණය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 48 සිට 95 දක්වා)

5.1.9 තවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ මිල ගණන්, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි සඳහන් ක්‍රමවේදයට අනුව විවිධ වූ විශ්ලේෂණයන්ට ලක් කිරීමෙන් පසු සකසන ලද විවිධ විකල්ප (Option) 07 ක් අතුරින් 05 වන විකල්ප අවස්ථාව අනුගමනය කිරීම උචිත බවත්, රු.බිලියන 2.608 ක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් උපයා ගන්නා ලෙසත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් **නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි**. (ඇමුණුම xxvi)

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිරීක්ෂණය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොතිබුණි. රුපියල් බිලියන 2.608 ක් වෙන්දේසි මඟින් උපයා ගැනීමට සුදුසු බව නිර්දේශ කරමින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් වාර්තාවක් පිළියෙල කර තිබුණද එම අවස්ථාවේදී, මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රු. බිලියන 20 ක් වෙන්දේසි මඟින් ලබා ගැනීමට යොජනා කිරීම හේතුවෙන් පිළියෙළ කර තිබූ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට අවස්ථාවක් නොවූ බව වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් මඟින් (යොමුව පිටු අංක 95 සිට 98 දක්වා) අනාවරණය විය. එලෙස රු. බිලියන 20ක් ලබා ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් අකැමැත්ත ප්‍රකාශ කළ බවද, ඒ අනුව රු. බිලියන 10 ක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් කරන ලද ප්‍රකාශයට අනුව ඒ සඳහා වූ වාර්තාවක් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ front office විසින් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ බවත් එහිදී අනාවරණය විය. ඒ අනුව විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදයේ ඉරි ඇදි වගන්තිය ඉවත් කර ඒ වෙනුවට පහත වගන්තිය යාවත්කාලීන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කළ යුතුය. " නිර්දේශ කර ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා වාර්තාවක් සකසා තිබුණි")

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 95 සිට 98 දක්වා)

5.1.10 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1110 පැයට පවත්වන ලද වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ විස්තරද ඇතුළත් වූ 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන එදිනම පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ (ඇමුණුම xvi) දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. අනුපාතිකයන් ස්ථාවර කිරීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල (EPF),ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමණාකරන සමාගම **(NSB)** සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රක්ෂණ සමාගම **(SLIC)** වෙත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට විමසන ලෙස වැනි අදහසක් දැක්වෙන සටහනක් සහ වර්ෂ 20, 30 සහ 50 ලෙස එක් වර්ගයකින් රු.බිලියන 10 ක් බැගින් නිකුත් කර බැඳුම්කර රු.බිලියන 40 ක් රැස්කර ගන්නා ලෙස සටහනක් ද තබමින්

(ඇමුණුම xvi) 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන තුළ ඍජු ක්‍රමය මගින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින අනුමැතිය දී තිබුණි. එහිදී ඍජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිවක් එම අනුමැතියෙහි සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි. එම සටහන් දෙක (අ) සහ (ආ) ලෙස පහත දක්වා ඇත.

(අ) *"Raise Rs.40 bn through issue of 20,30,50 years of T-Bonds, 10 bn each"*

(ආ) *"EPF/NSB/SLIC to be asked to stabilize rates"*

(කෙසේ වෙතත් මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් වර්ෂ 50 කින් කල් පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලෙසට ඉහත (අ) ලෙස දක්වා ඇති සටහනේ තිබුණද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිහිටුවීමෙන් අනතුරුව කිසිදු අවස්ථාවක වර්ෂ 30 ඉක්මවා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර නොතිබුණු බවත් එහි දක්වා ඇති සංයුතියේ එකතුව රු. බිලියන 40 ක් නොවන බවත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.)

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් ද ඡේදයේ (අ) සහ (ආ) ලෙස දක්වා ඇති ලිඛිත සටහන් සහිත ලේඛන, සාක්ෂි ලෙස ඇති බැවින් ද, වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් සහ ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 98)

5.1.11 ඉහත ඡේද අංක 5.1.10 න් විස්තර කළ පරිදි රු.බිලියන 40 ක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා දිගුකාලීන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර ඍජු ක්‍රමයට නිකුත් කිරීමක් ද මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින අනුමත කර තිබුණද (ඇමුණුම xvi) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට මාර්තු 06 දින දක්වා කාලය තුළ සිදු වූ සිදුවීම් පෙළ එකී නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟ නොවන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. එනම් අවශ්‍ය සම්පූර්ණ මුදලම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවති වෙන්දේසියෙන් සපයා ගැනීම සිදුකර තිබූ අතර එය භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව විසින් අනුමත කර තිබුණි. එසේම 2015 මාර්තු 06 දින දක්වා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ඍජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම අනුමත කර නොතිබුණි. 2015 මාර්තු 06 දිනැති හා MB/ER/5/3/2015 අංක දරන මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවට (ඇමුණුම xxviii) අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී භාවිතා කරන ඍජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට **කළ දැනුවත් කිරීම පරිදි එය එදිනම අපරඅනුමැතියට (Ratification) ලක් කර ඇත.** තවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 23 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේ සටහන් අනුව (ඇමුණුම xviii) මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් එම සතිය තුළ වසර 30

ක පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියක් පැවැත්විය යුතු බවට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට උපදෙස් දීම හැර සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යොදා ගැනීම සඳහා කිසිදු තීරණයක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ලබා ගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොතිබුණි. කෙසේ වෙතත් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම පිළිබඳව අපරඅනුමැතියක් ඇති බව 2106 ජූනි 29 වන දින ඉදිරිපත් කළ විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ සටහන් කර තිබූ අතර එම අත්හිටුවීම සඳහා අපරඅනුමැතියක් හෝ නොමැති බව (යොමුව : පිටු අංක 100 සිට 101 හි විස්තර දැක්වෙන) වාචික සටහන් මඟින් සනාථ වී ඇත. තවද, එවැනි තීරණයක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ සාකච්ඡා වී අනුමත වියයුතු බවද එමඟින් තවදුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත. ඒ අනුව ඉහත ඡේදයේ ඉරි ඇඳි වගන්තිය ඉවත්කර ඒ වෙනුවට පහතින් දක්වා ඇති වගන්තිය යාවත්කාලීන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් විය යුතුය. **"දැනුවත් කර තිබුණද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොලී අනුපාතය වෙනස් කිරීමට ගත් තීරණයකට අපරඅනුමැතියක් ලබා ගැනීම මිස සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුවීම සඳහා අපරඅනුමැතියක් හෝ ලබා ගෙන නොතිබුණි.")**

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිරීක්ෂණ පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති අතර පහත යොමුවෙහි දැක්වෙන 2016 ජූනි 29 දිනෙන් පසුව ලබාගත් වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හා අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුවද, ඉහත නිරීක්ෂණය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 98 සිට 132 දක්වා)

5.1.12 දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් පෙර අනුමත කර තිබූ පරිදි බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කරනු ලැබුවේ නම් එම වෙන්දේසියේ දී ලැබුණු මිල ගණන් අඩුම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයේ සිට ඉහළම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය දක්වා වර්ගීකරණය කිරීමෙන් පසු පහත දැක්වෙන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් 7 දෙනෙකුගෙන් බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 10.4652 ට රු.බිලියන 01 ක මුදල සපුරාගැනීමට පමණක් නොව රජයට රු.බිලියන 1.403 ක් දක්වා මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. එසේ සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 11.7270 දක්වා වැඩි නොවනු ඇත.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 132 සිට 133 දක්වා)

5.1.13 ඉහත තත්ත්වය ලංසු කැඳවීමේ තොරතුරු පත්‍රිකාවලට (Bid acceptance Information sheet) අනුව සකසන ලද (ඇමුණුම xxv) පහත දැක්වෙන වගුවට අනුව අනාවරණය වේ. (ඉහත 01 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවය හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ගේ අනන්‍යතාවය හෙළි නොවන පරිදි එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉංග්‍රීසි අක්ෂරයකින් හඳුන්වාදී ඇත.)

වගුව අංක 2 : පළමු ලංසු හතට අදාළ දත්ත

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරු (Dealer)	බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම රු.	වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලද මුදල රු.	බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය (WAYR)
1	**B** ආයතනය	8,000,000	9,546,736	9.3510
2	**A** ආයතනය.	50,000,000	56,005,000	9.9063
3	**F** ආයතනය	100,000,000	110,954,800	10.0278
4	**B** ආයතනය	500,000,000	546,966,000	10.1970
5	**E** ආයතනය	50,000,000	52,253,650	10.2339
6	**H** ආයතනය	100,000,000	104,507,300	10.2959
7	**EPF**	500,000,000	522,536,500	10.4652
	එකතුව	**1,308,000,000**	**1,402,769,986**	

තවද ඉහත දැක්වූ පරිදි ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසිය රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් 7 දෙනා හැරුණුවිට එදිනට ලැබී තිබූ එකතුව රු.බිලියන 20.708 ක් වූ සියළුම මිල ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම්වලින් සියයට 75 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ පහත 5.1.15 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති K ආයතනය ඇතුළු වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට අවස්ථාවක් නොතිබූ බව ඉහත වගුවෙන් පැහැදිලි වේ. එදින වෙන්දේසිය මගින් නිකුත් කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු.බිලියන 1 ක මුදල රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා වැඩිකිරීමට තීරණය කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 07 දෙනා අතර ද නොසිටි K ආයතනයට එදින නිකුත් කරන ලද මුළු බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකමින් සියයට 50 ක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 5 ක් ලබා ගැනීමේ (ඇමුණුම xxv) අවස්ථාව උදාවී තිබීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලක්ෂණයක් විය. මෙහිදී

එම රු.බිලියන 5 කින් රු. බිලියන 2 ක් සෘජුවමත් රු. බිලියන 3 ක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා වක්‍රාකාරයෙනුත් ලබා ගැනීමට එම ආයතනය කටයුතු කර තිබුණි.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 133)

5.1.14 ඉහත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ දී සිදුවූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙහි අධීක්ෂණයට යටත් වන සහ ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් ඇති ආයතනයක් ලෙස සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයන් සහිත ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් සාපේක්ෂව අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගෙන (ඇමුණුම xxix b) තිබූ අතර අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයක් සහිතව පෞද්ගලික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් මිලදී ගැනීම හේතුවෙන් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ මූල්‍ය වාසිය අහිමි කර ගෙන තිබුණි.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 133 සිට 134 දක්වා)

5.1.15 ඉහත 5.1.6 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි 2015 මාර්තු 02 දිනට රාජ්‍ය ණය වාරික පියවීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයද නිශ්චිතව දක්වමින් 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව වෙත ලැබී තිබූ හෙයින් සුදුසු ක්‍රමෝපායන් භාවිතයෙන් එම මුදල ජනනය කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

ඒ අනුව අනවශ්‍ය ලෙස වට්ටම් ලබා දීමකින් තොරව සහ වෙළඳපළ පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් ඉහළ යාමට ඉඩ ප්‍රස්ථා විවර නොකරමින් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය නම් පහත දැක්වෙන විකල්ප ක්‍රමෝපායන් ද අනුගමනය කිරීමේ අවස්ථාව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(i). මහජන බැංකුවෙන් හා ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් දැනටමත් ලබා දී ඇති අයිරා පහසුකම් භාවිතා කර පසුව කෙටිකාලීන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් එම අයිරාව පියවා දැමීම.

(ii). සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ අතිරික්ත අරමුදල් තිබුණේ නම් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් එම අරමුදලෙන් මුදල් සපයා ගැනීම.

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වන විට සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් රු.බිලියන 3 කට ආසන්න මුදලක් රැස් කර තිබූ අතර 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින වන විට තිබූ ඉතිරි අවශ්‍යතාවය ද සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් රැස්කර ගත නොහැකි බවට කරුණු තහවුරු නොවූ හෙයින් එලෙස මුදල් රැස් කර ගැනීම. (1997 වර්ෂයේ සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක කර තිබූ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අසාර්ථක වී තිබූ බවට නිරීක්ෂණය නොවූ අතර තවදුරටත් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ලබා ගැනීම) .

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 134)

5.1.16 මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට අදාලව පහත කරුණු නිරීක්ෂණය වීම හේතුවෙන් එය සැක සහිත ගනුදෙනුවක් බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(i). වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් කිරීමට ඉතා ආසන්න කාලය තුළ එනම් අවසන් මිනිත්තු 08 තුළ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු.බිලියන 20.708 කින් රු.බිලියන 13.60 ක ලංසු ලැබී තිබීම.

(ii). ඉහත සඳහන් රු.බිලියන.13.60 ක වටිනාකම තුළ රු.බිලියන 13.00 ක් K ආයතනය වෙනුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

(iii). රු.බිලියන 01 ක් වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනිම.

(iv). K නමින් හඳුන්වා දී ඇති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරු වෙනුවෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව රු. බිලියන 13 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ පළමු අවස්ථාව වීම.

(v). රු. බිලියන 01 ක් සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී, K ආයතනය විසින් රු. බිලියන 2 ක් සෘජුවත් රු.බිලියන 13 ක් ලංකා බැංකුව හරහාත් වශයෙන් එකතුව රු.බිලියන 15 ක් සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ලංසු කැඳවා තිබූ වටිනාකම මෙන් 15 ගුණයක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් වීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 135)

5.1.17. 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හැකිව තිබූ විකල්ප ක්‍රම තුනක් සහ ඒවායේ ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි අවාසි වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් පහත දක්වා ඇත.

(i). 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අපේක්ෂා කළ පරිදි රු.බිලියන 01 ට සීමා කලේ නම් එම වටිනාකම ආවරණය වන පරිදි ලබා තිබූ ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය අනුව බැඳුම්කරයක ලංසු වටිනාකම රු.104.5073 ක් දක්වා පමණක් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කලේ නම් රු.මිලියන 1,403 ක් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. එලෙස එම වටිනාකමට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සීමා නොකිරීම නිසා පහත වගුවෙහි දැක්වෙන පරිදි රජයට රු.මිලියන 889 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.

වගුව අංක 3 : රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කලේනම් ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්	ලංසු මිල රු.	බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම (රජයේ වගකීම) රු.	ගෙවියයුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම රු.	අවාසිය රු.
7	**සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල**	**104.507**	**500,000,000.00**	**1,402,769,986.00**	**-**
8	E	103.116	50,000,000.00	1,454,327,886.00	695,750.00
9	J	102.207	100,000,000.00	1,556,535,086.00	2,300,100.00
10	H	102.207	100,000,000.00	1,658,742,286.00	2,300,100.00
11	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	102.207	1,000,000,000.00	2,680,814,286.00	23,001,000.00
12	G	102.207	50,000,000.00	2,731,917,786.00	1,150,150.00
13	H	101.758	100,000,000.00	2,833,675,786.00	2,749,300.00
14	G	99.999	50,000,000.00	2,883,675,286.00	2,254,150.00
15	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	99.999	500,000,000.00	3,383,670,286.00	22,541,500.00
16	K	97.878	250,000,000.00	3,628,365,286.00	16,573,250.00
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000.00	3,867,963,786.00	21,669,750.00
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000.00	5,065,556,286.00	108,748,750.00

19	P	93.879	50,000,000.00	5,112,495,786.00	5,314,150.00
20	K	93.879	500,000,000.00	5,581,890,786.00	53,141,500.00
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000.00	6,501,818,786.00	125,145,000.00
22	P	90.177	50,000,000.00	6,546,907,286.00	7,165,150.00
23	N	90.177	100,000,000.00	6,637,084,286.00	14,330,300.00
24	I	90.177	250,000,000.00	6,862,526,786.00	35,825,750.00
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000.00	6,952,703,686.00	14,330,400.00
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000.00	9,657,800,686.00	430,122,000.00
	එකතුව				**889,358,050.00**

(ii). රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේනතුව විසින් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව වෙත ලබාදුන් විකල්ප ක්‍රම දැක්වෙන පත්‍රිකාවේ (Option Sheet) නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ රු.මිලියන 2,608 ක බැඳුම්කර (බැඳුම්කරයක ලංසු වටිනාකම රු.102.20720 ක් වන පරිදි) බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ හැකියාව තිබුණි. එසේ නොකර රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රජයට පහත වගුවෙහි ගණනය කර ඇති පරිදි රු.බිලියන 0.688 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.

වගුව: අංක 4 - නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ රු.බිලියන 2.608 ක් ඉක්මවීම නිසා සිදු වූ අවාසිය

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්	ලංසු මිල රු.	බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම (රජයේ වගකීම) රු.	ගෙවියයුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම රු.	අවාසිය රු.
12	**G**	**102.21**	**50,000,000.00**	**2,731,917,786.00**	**-**
13	H	101.76	100,000,000.00	2,833,675,786.00	449,000.00
14	G	100.00	50,000,000.00	2,883,675,286.00	1,104,000.00
15	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	100.00	500,000,000.00	3,383,670,286.00	11,040,000.00
16	K	97.88	250,000,000.00	3,628,365,286.00	10,822,500.00
17	K	95.84	250,000,000.00	3,867,963,786.00	15,919,000.00
18	M	95.81	1,250,000,000.00	5,065,556,286.00	79,995,000.00
19	P	93.88	50,000,000.00	5,112,495,786.00	4,164,000.00

20	K	93.88	500,000,000.00	5,581,890,786.00	41,640,000.00
21	K	91.99	1,000,000,000.00	6,501,818,786.00	102,142,000.00
22	P	90.18	50,000,000.00	6,546,907,286.00	6,015,000.00
23	N	90.18	100,000,000.00	6,637,084,286.00	12,030,000.00
24	I	90.18	250,000,000.00	6,862,526,786.00	30,075,000.00
25	C	90.18	100,000,000.00	6,952,703,686.00	12,030,100.00
26	B	90.17	3,000,000,000.00	9,657,800,686.00	361,113,000.00
	එකතුව				**688,538,600.00**

(iii). තවද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරීම රු.බිලියන 1 ට සීමා නොකර මෙම වාර්තාවේ 5.1.18(ii) ඡේදයේ දක්වා තිබූ පරිදි මහ බැංකු අධිපති යෝජනා කළ රු.බිලියන 20 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කලේ නම් පහත වගුවෙහි ගණනය කර ඇති පරිදි රු.බිලියන 2.730 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් රජයට සිදු වීමට ඉඩ තිබුණි.

වගුව 5 - මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ යෝජනාව ක්‍රියාත්මක කලේනම් ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්	ලංසු මිල රු.	බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම (රජයේ වගකීම) රු.	ගෙවියයුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම රු.	අවාසිය රු.
7	**සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල**	**104.5073**	**500,000,000**	**1,402,769,986**	**-**
8	E	103.1158	50,000,000	1,454,327,886	695,750
9	J	102.2072	100,000,000	1,556,535,086	2,300,100
10	H	102.2072	100,000,000	1,658,742,286	2,300,100
11	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	102.2072	1,000,000,000	2,680,814,286	23,001,000
12	G	102.207	50,000,000	2,731,917,786	1,150,150
13	H	101.758	100,000,000	2,833,675,786	2,749,300
14	G	99.999	50,000,000	2,883,675,286	2,254,150
15	සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල	99.999	500,000,000	3,383,670,286	22,541,500
16	K	97.878	250,000,000	3,628,365,286	16,573,250

17	K	95.8394	250,000,000	3,867,963,786	21,669,750
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000	5,065,556,286	108,748,750
19	P	93.879	50,000,000	5,112,495,786	5,314,150
20	K	93.879	500,000,000	5,581,890,786	53,141,500
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000	6,501,818,786	125,145,000
22	P	90.177	50,000,000	6,546,907,286	7,165,150
23	N	90.177	100,000,000	6,637,084,286	14,330,300
24	I	90.177	250,000,000	6,862,526,786	35,825,750
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000	6,952,703,686	14,330,400
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000	9,657,800,686	430,122,000
27	I	88.428	150,000,000	9,790,442,686	24,118,950
28	B	88.4074	5,000,000,000	14,210,812,686	804,995,000
29	B	86.769	5,000,000,000	18,549,262,686	886,915,000
30	D	86.7428	50,000,000	18,592,634,086	8,882,250
31	I	86.7425	100,000,000	18,679,376,586	17,764,800
32	A	86.74	100,000,000	18,766,116,586	17,767,300
33	D	86.0851	50,000,000	18,809,159,136	9,211,100
34	O	76.4803	50,000,000	18,847,399,286	14,013,500
35	O	74.2125	50,000,000	18,884,505,536	15,147,400
36	L	62.6216	100,000,000	18,947,127,136	41,885,700
	එකතුව				**2,730,059,050**

(2016 ජූනි 29දින ඉදිරිපත් කළ ඉහත වගුවෙහි “ගෙවිය යුතු සම්චිචිත වටිනාකම ” තීරුවෙහි තිබූ යතුරුලියන දෝෂ නිවැරදි කර යාවත්කාලීන කරන ලදී.)

ඉහත ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය ගණනය කර ඇති ආකාරය ඇමුණුම xxx හි දැක්වේ.

තවද ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසි එම දිනට ක්ෂණිකව ඇති වූ/ඇති විය හැකි තත්ත්වය පමණක් වන අතර එමගින් දීර්ඝකාලීනව ඇතිවන බලපෑමද සළකා බැලුවහොත් එම විකල්ප අවාසි තවත් ඉහළ යාමට ඇති ඉඩකඩද බැහැර කළ නොහැක.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර විගණන ඡේදය සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරන බැවින් සහ වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හා අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුව ඉහත

ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 135 සිට 138 දක්වා)

5.1.18 2015පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවති වෙන්දේසියට අදාලව ලබා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු. බිලියන 01 ක බැදුම්කර වටිනාකමට එරෙහිව එකතුව රු. බිලියන 10.058 ක් ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට ගත් තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ක්‍රියා කලාපය ප්‍රබල ලෙස බලපා ඇති බව රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ අනු කමිටුව විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ සිදු කරන ලද විමර්ශණයේදී අදාල නිලධාරීන් විසින් ලබා දී ඇති වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්හි ඇති පහත කරුණු හේතුවෙන් තහවුරු විය.

(i). වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා අවසන් වූ ද පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් වූ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු. බිලියන 20 ක්ම නොගන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගෙන් විමසා තිබීම.

(ii). එලෙස රු. බිලියන 20 ක් දක්වා බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හොත් එය ඉතා ඉහළ පොළි අනුපාතිකයක් වන හෙයින් එය නුසුදුසු බව රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය සහ අතිරේක රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.අසීම් මහතා විසින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට අවධාරණය කර තිබීම.

(iii). ඉන්පසු මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රු.බිලියන10 කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ කර තිබීම (Why don’t you go for 10 bn) හා ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී පවා රු.බිලියන 10 කට යාම නිසා ඉහළ (that too much)පොළී අනුපාතිකයක් බව අනාවරණය කර තිබීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පිළිතුරු මඟින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති අතර 2016 ජූනි 29 දිනෙන් පසුව ලබා ගන්නා සාක්ෂි මඟින් ද ඉහත ඡේදයේ සඳහන් නිරීක්ෂණ තවදුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත. එහෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 138 සිට 152 දක්වා)

5.1.19 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් තීරණය කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 9.48 ක් විය. එලෙස තිබියදී අදාල වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා සියයට 12.5 ක ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කර තිබුණි. තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසි සඳහා ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතය ලෙස සියයට 12.5 තීරණය කළ ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවීය. එලෙසම ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් යටතේ වර්ෂ 30 ක් වැනි දිගුකාලීන අමතර පිරිවැයද රජයට සිදුවන අවාසියක් ලෙස සැලකිය යුතු බවද නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ. මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ වර්ෂ 30 ක වැනි දිගුකාලීන බැඳුම්කරයක පොළී අනුපාතිකයේ සිදුවන ඉතා කුඩා වැඩිවීමකින් වුවද, රජයට විශාල මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවිය හැකිවීමය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර විගණන ඡේදය සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරන බැවින් සහ අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුව එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 152 සිට 153 දක්වා)

5.2 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින සිදුකළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

ඉහත 5.1 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවෙන් පසු එලෙස මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකම ඉක්මවා ඉතා ඉහළ වටිනාකමකින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබූ දෙවන අවස්ථාව ලෙස 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම ඉස්මතු වී පෙනී යන හෙයින් ඒ පිළිබඳව විශේෂයෙන් පරීක්ෂා කරන ලදී.

5.2.1 2016 මාර්තු 10 දින හා මාර්තු 24 යන දිනවල බැඳුම්කර අලෙවි කිරීම සඳහා පවත්වා තිබූ වෙන්දේසි දෙකම අපේක්ෂා කල අනුපාතයන්ට වඩා වැඩි අනුපාතයන් දක්වමින් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් වීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම xxxi).

කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙම අවස්ථාවලදී සෘජු ක්‍රමයට අරමුදල් ලබා ගැනීම කෙරෙහි අවධානය යොමු කර තිබූ බව අනාවරණය නොවීය.

ඉහත ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීමට හේතු වූයේ යැයි සලකන ලද අනුපාතයන් පහත වගුවෙහි වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් දැක්වේ.

වගුව 6 - ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන ලද ලංසුවලට අදාළ බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්

වෙන්දේසි දිනය	**පරිණත කාලය**	**ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)**	**බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතය**
2016.03.10	වසර 03 මාස 08	LKB00819K017	11.4498-12.2625
	වසර 05මාස 05	LKB00821H019	11.8503-12.6855
	වසර 07මාස 10	LKB01024A014	12.2004-12.9879
2016.03.24	වසර 04 මාස 01	LKB00520E014	12.5000-14.1570
	වසර 05 මාස06	LKB00721J157	12.6999-14.4099
	වසර 06 මාස06	LKB00922J011	12.8997-14.8950
	වසර 08 මාස 11	LKB01025C157	12.9996-14.7510

අනතුරුව ඉහත (ආ) උපශීර්ෂයෙහි දැක්වෙන 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රුපියල් බිලියන 10 බැගින් වූ විවිධ පරිනත කාලයන් සහිත කල්පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර 04 ක් එනම් රුපියල් බිලියන 40 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි.

එහිදි එම නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කර 04 සඳහා මිල ගණන් ලැබීම් හා එම මිල ගණන් පිළිගැනීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

වගුව 7 - මිල ගණන් ලැබිම් සහ පිළිගැනිම්

අනු අංකය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය **(ISIN)**	මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	මිල ගණන් ලද වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	පිළිගත් බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන
01.	LKB00520E014	10	27.022	10.272
02.	LKB01025C157	10	36.915	21.475
03.	LKB01226F014	10	32.560	17.010
04.	LKB01530E152	10	45.925	28.975
	එකතුව	**40**	**142.422**	**77.732**

මෙහිදි නිරීක්ෂණය වන එක් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ රු.බිලියන.40 ක සීමාවකට කැඳවන ලද අතර එම මිල ගණන් මත තවත් අමතර රු.බිලියන 37.732 ක් (මුහුණත අගය) එනම් රු.බිලියන 77.732 ක් (මුහුණත අගය) දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබීමයි. එලෙස මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ වටිනාකම ඉක්මවා නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කර වලින් සියයට 60 ක් K ආයතනය හිමි කර ගෙන තිබුණි. එම ආයතනය විසින් විවිධ පොළී අනුපාතයන් යටතේ ඉහත සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර වර්ග 04 හිමිකරගත් අනුපාතය විග්‍රහ කිරීමේදී පහත සඳහන් වගුව අනුව අනාවරණය වන්නේ අඩුම ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේදී පළමු බැඳුම්කරයෙන් සියයට 0.5 ක් පමණක් හිමිකරගන්නා K ආයතනය ඉහළ ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේ නිකුත් කර ඇති අනෙක් බැඳුම්කර තුනෙන් සියයට 35 ක සිට සියයට 44 ක් දක්වා ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට සමත් වී ඇති බවයි. එනම් වට්ටම් ප්‍රමාණය වැඩිවන විට වැඩි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගෙන තිබීමය.

වගුව 8 - රු.බිලියන 40 ක් ඉක්මවා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම නිසා K ආයතනයට හිමි වූ ප්‍රමාණයන්

අනු අංකය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරැකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	ලබා ගත් ප්‍රතිශතය	බර තැබූ අනුපාතය
01.	LKB00520E014	0.5%	**12.6909**
02.	LKB01025C157	39.3%	**13.0689 - 13.7979**
03.	LKB01226F014	44.7%	**13.2984 - 13.9311**
04.	LKB01530E152	35.6%	**13.1823 - 14.0742**

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කළ දිනයට පෙර පැවති වෙන්දේසි දෙකම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබූ පදනම් වූ ඵලදා අනුපාත වැඩිවීම මෙම වෙන්දේසියේ දීද එලෙසම නිරීක්ෂණය වුවද, ඉහළම ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්ට එනම් සියයට 14.0742 ක් දක්වා ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබුණි. මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ඉහත අවස්ථා දෙකෙහිදීම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන ලද අනුපාත ඉක්මවා මෙවර අනුපාතය පිළිගැනීමය.

තවද, ඉහත පරිදි බැඳුම්කර 4 ක් මඟින් රු.බිලියන 77.73 ක මුහුණත අගයක් ලැබෙන පරිදි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණද, වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා පහත සඳහන් වගුවේ දැක්වෙන පරිදි රු.බිලියන 59.325 ක් පමණක් ලැබී තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව ඉතිරි රු.බිලියන 18.407 වෙනත් කෙටිකාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයකින් සපුරා ගැනීමට සිදුව තිබුණි.

වගුව 9 - වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා අපේක්ෂිත බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත් අගය නොලැබීම නිසා වෙනත් කෙටිකාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයකින් එය සපුරා ගැනීම

වෙන්දේසිය සිදු වූ දිනය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරැකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	කල්පිරෙන කාලය	වෙන්දේසි කරන ලද මුළු වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	ගෙවන ලද මුළු වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	වෙනස රු.බිලියන
2016.03.29	**LKB00520E014**	**10 Y 2 M**	**10.272**	**8.734**	**1.538**
	LKB01025C157	**8 Y 11 M**	**21.475**	**16.250**	**5.225**
	LKB01226F014	**4 Y 1 M**	**17.010**	**13.161**	**3.848**
	LKB01530E152	**14 y 1 M**	**28.975**	**21.180**	**7.794**
	එකතුව		**77.732**	**59.325**	**18.407**

තවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනැති බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ රු.බිලියන 1 ක ප්‍රමාණය ඉක්මවා රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගෙන තිබීම හා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රු.බිලියන 40 ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා රු.බිලියන 77.73 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම හැරුනු විට එවැනි විශාල ලෙස අපේක්ෂිත සීමාවන් අභිබවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සළකා බලන ලද කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදුව නොමැති බව අනාවරණය විය. ඒ අනුව එම අපේක්ෂිත සීමා ඉතා විශාල ලෙස ඉක්මවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් එම එකිනෙක සීමාව ඉක්ම වූ කොටස හිමිකර ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව බහුලව K ආයතනයට හිමිවීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලෙස වර්ධනය වී ඇති බව පහත වගුවෙන් හා ප්‍රස්ථාරයෙන් අනාවරණය වේ.

වගුව 10 – K ආයතනය ලබාගත් ප්‍රමාණය

අනු අංකය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	නිකුත් කල මුලු බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	K ආයතනය ලබා ගත් ප්‍රමාණය රු.බිලියන
01	LKB00520E014	0.272	-
02	LKB01025C157	11.475	7.950
03	LKB01226F014	7.010	6.600
04	LKB01530E152	18.975	8.075

රූපසටහන 1 - වගුව 10 – K ආයතනය ලබාගත් ප්‍රමාණය



(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර විගණන ඡේදය සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරන බැවින් සහ අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුව එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 154 සිට 157 දක්වා)

5.2.2 තවද මෙම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරු විසින් මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත්කර ඒවා අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සහ අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ ටෙන්ඩර් අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සන්සන්දනය කිරීමේදී K ආයතනයේ ලංසු ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වීම සාපේක්ෂව පහළ මට්ටමක පැවති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 157)

5.2.3 මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගත හැකි ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල විසින් 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින තුළදී නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කරයන්ගෙන් ඵලදා අනුපාතය සියයට 12.20 ක සිට සියයට 12.45 ක් දක්වා පරාසයක් තුළ රු.බිලියන 9.736 (ඇමුණුම xxxix a) ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් ලබා ගෙන තිබුණු බවයි. සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දිනට ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුනේ පහත පරිදි ඉතා අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට බව පැහැදිලි වේ . එම තත්ත්වය ඇමුණුම (xxix b) හි තොරතුරු මඟින් පැහැදිලි වේ. ඒ අනුව එම සියලු ඉල්ලීම් සාර්ථක වී තිබූ අතර ඔවුන්ට අවශ්‍ය ඉතිරි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් මිලදී ගැනීමට අයදුම්කර හෝ නොමැතිව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් මිලදි ගෙන තිබීම ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී වේ. තවද මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ භාරකාරීත්වයේ පවතින ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙලෙස කටයුතු කිරීම පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකුව විසින් අවධානය යොමු නොකිරීම ද ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී තත්ත්වයකි.

වගුව 11 - සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ සාර්ථකත්වය

අනු අංකය	මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම රු.බිලියන	පිළිගත් මිල ගණන් වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන
01.	-	-
02.	1.000	1.000
03.	0.500	0.500
04.	1.000	1.000
එකතුව	2.500	2.500

මෙම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් අපේක්ෂිත නාමික වටිනාකම වූ රු.බිලියන 40 ක් වෙනුවට රු.බිලියන 77.732 ක් දක්වා පිළිගෙන තිබුණි. එසේ නොකර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව මුහුණත වටිනාකම වූ රු.බිලියන 40 කට සීමා කලේනම් පහත වගුවේ ගණනය කර දක්වා ඇති රු.784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වාගත හැකිව තිබුණි.

වගුව 12 - සීමාව ඉක්මවා පිළිගැනීම නිසා ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය

අනු අංකය	ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්	ලංසු මිල රු.	බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම (රජයේ වගකීම) රු.	ගෙවියයුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම රු.	අවාසිය රු.
31	B	84.3512	800,000,000	**8,733,875,000**	-
	එකතුව				-
63	**J**	**75.57580**	**120,000,000**	**7,886,053,130**	-
64	G	75.4451	100,000,000	7,961,498,230	130,700
65	J	75.4451	120,000,000	8,052,032,350	156,840
66	J	75.3147	120,000,000	8,142,409,990	313,320
67	K	75.2279	50,000,000	8,180,023,940	173,950
68	J	75.2279	160,000,000	8,300,388,580	556,640
69	K	75.2279	200,000,000	8,450,844,380	695,800
70	J	75.1845	120,000,000	8,541,065,780	469,560
71	J	75.0547	120,000,000	8,631,131,420	625,320
72	J	74.9253	120,000,000	8,721,041,780	780,600
73	M	74.8393	100,000,000	8,795,881,080	736,500
74	K	74.7961	50,000,000	8,833,279,130	389,850
75	K	74.7961	100,000,000	8,908,075,230	779,700
76	P	74.7961	100,000,000	8,982,871,330	779,700
77	J	74.7961	120,000,000	9,072,626,650	935,640
78	K	74.7961	250,000,000	9,259,616,900	1,949,250
79	M	74.7959	160,000,000	9,379,290,340	1,247,840
80	C	74.7959	200,000,000	9,528,882,140	1,559,800
81	K	74.3678	50,000,000	9,566,066,040	604,000
82	J	74.3678	200,000,000	9,714,801,640	2,416,000
83	K	74.3678	250,000,000	9,900,721,140	3,020,000
84	K	73.943	50,000,000	9,937,692,640	816,400
85	K	73.943	500,000,000	10,307,407,640	8,164,000
86	B	73.9345	250,000,000	10,492,243,890	4,103,250

87	C	73.732	100,000,000	10,565,975,890	1,843,800
88	P	73.7319	100,000,000	10,639,707,790	1,843,900
89	K	73.5216	50,000,000	10,676,468,590	1,027,100
90	J	73.5216	250,000,000	10,860,272,590	5,135,500
91	K	73.5216	750,000,000	11,411,684,590	15,406,500
92	K	73.1036	50,000,000	11,448,236,390	1,236,100
93	M	73.1036	180,000,000	11,579,822,870	4,449,960
94	K	73.1036	750,000,000	12,128,099,870	18,541,500
95	M	72.6891	100,000,000	12,200,788,970	2,886,700
96	C	72.6891	100,000,000	12,273,478,070	2,886,700
97	P	72.68902	100,000,000	12,346,167,090	2,886,780
98	K	72.689	50,000,000	12,382,511,590	1,443,400
99	F	72.689	100,000,000	12,455,200,590	2,886,800
100	K	72.689	750,000,000	13,000,368,090	21,651,000
101	B	72.656	180,000,000	13,131,148,890	5,255,640
102	K	72.483	2,000,000,000	14,580,808,890	61,856,000
103	M	72.2778	100,000,000	14,653,086,690	3,298,000
104	K	72.2777	50,000,000	14,689,225,540	1,649,050
105	J	72.2777	160,000,000	14,804,869,860	5,276,960
106	K	72.2777	2,000,000,000	16,250,423,860	65,962,000
	එකතුව				**258,828,050**
70	**C**	**75.91150**	**200,000,000**	**8,012,848,545.00**	
71	J	75.821	60,000,000	8,058,341,145	54,300
72	J	75.6858	60,000,000	8,103,752,625	135,420
73	K	75.6858	500,000,000	8,482,181,625	1,128,500
74	K	75.2376	750,000,000	9,046,463,625	5,054,250
75	K	74.7933	100,000,000	9,121,256,925	1,118,200
76	C	74.7933	200,000,000	9,270,843,525	2,236,400
77	K	74.7933	750,000,000	9,831,793,275	8,386,500
78	K	74.134	500,000,000	10,202,463,275	8,887,500
79	K	74.0904	500,000,000	10,572,915,275	9,105,500

80	K	74.0468	500,000,000	10,943,149,275	9,323,500
81	K	74.0032	500,000,000	11,313,165,275	9,541,500
82	K	73.9597	500,000,000	11,682,963,775	9,759,000
83	K	73.9162	2,000,000,000	13,161,287,775	39,906,000
	එකතුව				**104,636,570**
88	**K**	**73.71470**	**1,000,000,000.00**	**8,185,426,680.00**	**-**
89	M	73.7146	50,000,000	8,222,283,980	50
90	P	73.4701	100,000,000	8,295,754,080	244,600
91	K	73.2268	25,000,000	8,314,060,780	121,975
92	P	73.2268	50,000,000	8,350,674,180	243,950
93	P	73.2268	100,000,000	8,423,900,980	487,900
94	K	73.2268	1,000,000,000	9,156,168,980	4,879,000
95	M	73.2267	20,000,000	9,170,814,320	97,600
96	C	72.9849	100,000,000	9,243,799,220	729,800
97	P	72.9848	150,000,000	9,353,276,420	1,094,850
98	P	72.9848	500,000,000	9,718,200,420	3,649,500
99	P	72.9848	600,000,000	10,156,109,220	4,379,400
100	K	72.7441	25,000,000	10,174,295,245	242,650
101	J	72.7441	40,000,000	10,203,392,885	388,240
102	P	72.7441	100,000,000	10,276,136,985	970,600
103	K	72.7441	1,000,000,000	11,003,577,985	9,706,000
104	H	72.744	10,000,000	11,010,852,385	97,070
105	H	72.2665	10,000,000	11,018,079,035	144,820
106	K	72.2665	25,000,000	11,036,145,660	362,050
107	M	72.2665	40,000,000	11,065,052,260	579,280
108	P	72.2665	100,000,000	11,137,318,760	1,448,200
109	K	72.2665	1,000,000,000	11,859,983,760	14,482,000
110	P	72.0296	250,000,000	12,040,057,760	4,212,750
111	H	71.794	10,000,000	12,047,237,160	192,070
112	J	71.794	60,000,000	12,090,313,560	1,152,420
113	M	71.794	100,000,000	12,162,107,560	1,920,700

114	C	71.794	100,000,000	12,233,901,560	1,920,700
115	P	71.794	550,000,000	12,628,768,560	10,563,850
116	P	71.794	550,000,000	13,023,635,560	10,563,850
117	M	71.3266	60,000,000	13,066,431,520	1,432,860
118	P	71.3265	100,000,000	13,137,758,020	2,388,200
119	K	71.0946	1,000,000,000	13,848,704,020	26,201,000
120	K	71.0484	1,000,000,000	14,559,188,020	26,663,000
121	K	71.0022	1,000,000,000	15,269,210,020	27,125,000
122	K	70.9561	1,000,000,000	15,978,771,020	27,586,000
123	K	70.9561	1,000,000,000	16,688,332,020	27,586,000
124	J	70.864	80,000,000	16,745,023,220	2,280,560
125	P	70.86395	100,000,000	16,815,887,170	2,850,750
126	P	70.63451	500,000,000	17,169,059,720	15,400,950
127	P	70.63451	500,000,000	17,522,232,270	15,400,950
128	C	70.6345	100,000,000	17,592,866,770	3,080,200
129	M	70.4065	15,000,000	17,603,427,745	496,230
130	M	70.4065	80,000,000	17,659,752,945	2,646,560
131	I	70.4063	5,000,000,000	21,180,067,945	165,420,000
	එකතුව				**421,434,135**
	මුළු එකතුව				**784,898,755**

(2016 ජූනි 29දින ඉදිරිපත් කළ ඉහත වගුවෙහි “ගෙවිය යුතු සම්චිචිත වටිනාකම ” තීරුවෙහි තිබූ යතුරුලියන දෝෂ නිවැරදි කර යාවත්කාලීන කරන ලදී.)

ඉහත ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය ගණනය කර ඇති ආකාරය ඇමුණුම (xxxii) හි දැක්වේ.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 157 සිට 158 දක්වා)

5.3 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින සෘජු ක්‍රමයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමෙන් පසුව එම සිදුවීමට අදාළව ඇති වූ තත්ත්වයන්

ඉහත 5.1.11 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන පරිදි 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින සිට සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව නැවැත්වූ පසුව 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ සිට මේ වන තෙක් නිකුත් කර ඇති සෑම බැඳුම්කරයක්ම ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යටතේ නිකුත් කර තිබුණු අතර ඒ පිළිබඳව පහත දැක්වෙන නිරීක්ෂණයන් කරනු ලැබේ.

5.3.1 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසු බොහෝ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබූ පළමු අවස්ථාවේ සිටම බැඳුම්කර වෙනුවෙන් වට්ටම් සහිත මිල ගණන් එනම් නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු අගයන්ට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් වී තිබුණු අතර එහි ප්‍රතිඵලය වූයේ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් ගෙන තිබීමයි. මෙමගින් රජයට අමතර පිරිවැයක් දැරීමට (ආයෝජකයන්ට වට්ටම් ලබා දීම) සිදු විය. එනම් මුහුණත අගය රු.100 ක බැඳුම්කර වට්ටම් සහිතව ඊට වඩා අඩු අගයකට අලෙවිකළද, බැඳුම්කරය කල් පිරීමේදී රුපියල් 100 බැගින් ආපසු ගෙවිය යුතු වීම හේතුවෙන් එම වට්ටම් වටිනාකම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කළ දිනයේදීම රජයේ අමතර වගකීමක් බවට පත්විම වේ. වට්ටම් කළ අගයකට බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට අලෙවි කළද ඒවායේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළ මිල ඉහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළ විකිණීම මගින් වැඩි ලාභ ආන්තිකයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් ලැබෙන අතර එම තත්ත්වයන් තුළ රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසි සහගත තත්ත්වයක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදනුකරුවන් වෙත විතැන්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම පසුබිමතුළද සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයම සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති මිල ගණන් පිළිගෙන වෙන්දේසි මඟින්ම වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබුණි.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර විගණන ඡේදය සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරන බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 158 සිට 159. දක්වා)

5.3.2 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසුව සිදු වූ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනස්කම් සමගම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වූ සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල, ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණ සමාගම, මහජන බැංකුව, ලංකා බැංකුව වැනි රාජ්‍ය ආයතන එම වෙන්දේසිවලින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ගැනීම දුර්වල වී තිබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 159)

5.3.3 ඇතැම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිවලදී ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාත සමග මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම වෙන්දේසි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළ අවස්ථා ද විය. 2015 වර්ෂයේ සිට 2016 මැයි 31 දින දක්වා පැවති වෙන්දේසිවලින් වෙන්දේසි 5 ක් ඉහත තත්ත්වය තුළ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබුණද, 2014 වර්ෂයේදී එවැනි ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම් වාර්තා වී නොතිබුණි. ඒ අනුව නිරීක්ෂණය වනුයේ 2015 වර්ෂයේ දී සිදු කළ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනසින් පසුව ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව අපේක්ෂා කරන මිල ගණන්වලට වඩා ඉතා ඉහළ මිල ගණන්වලටද, මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් ඇති වී තිබීමය. (ඇමුණුම xxxiii) එනම් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල පවතින අනුපාතයන්ට සාපේක්ෂව ඉහළ අනුපාතයන් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කිරීමය. මෙම තත්ත්වය පහත දැක්වෙන රූපසටහන 2 මඟින් පැහැදිලි වේ.

රූපසටහන 2 - වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් භාවිතා කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඵලදා අනුපාතයට වූ බලපෑම



ඉහත දක්වා ඇති ප්‍රවනතාවය විවිධ වූ සාධකයන්ගේ බලපෑම මත සිදුව ඇති බව නිරීක්ෂණය කළද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින ගත් බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවට අදාල ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයද ඉවහල් වූ බවට අනුමාන කිරීම ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී නොවන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර විගණන ඡේදය සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරන බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 159 සිට 160 දක්වා)

6. පද්ධති දුර්වලතා

6.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තවදුරටත් ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකර සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ඉදිරියට ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ දී ඉන් සිදුවන මූල්‍ය බලපෑම් පිළිබඳව ප්‍රතිඵල විශ්ලේෂණයක් සිදුකර එම අධ්‍යයනය ප්‍රතිඵල හා නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟව එම තීරණය ගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවුණි.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 160 සිට 161 දක්වා)

6.2 ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙන්දේසියේදී අවම්ලට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන එම බැඳුම්කර නැවතත් ක්ෂණිකව ඉහළ මිලට ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළ අලෙවි කිරීම තුළින් ලාභයක් ලැබීම අපේක්ෂා කරන අතර එමගින් රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසිය නොලැබුණි. මෙය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් බාහිර වූ පාර්ශවයන් විසින් වෙළඳපල පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් කෘතිමව හැසිරවීමක් ලෙසත්, මෙමගින් පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් පදනම් රහිතව උච්චාවචනයට ලක්වන බවත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම තත්ත්වය පාලනය කිරීමේ වගකීම පැවරී ඇති මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය පියවර ගෙන තිබූ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 161)

6.3 ඉහත 4.1 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව පවතින මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපළ නියාමනය කිරීමේ වගකීම මැනවින් ඉටුකරලීම සඳහා මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපළෙහි හැසිරීම් රටාවන් පිළිබඳව වැදගත් සියළු දත්ත තමන් සතුකර ගත හැකි ක්‍රමවේදයක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වාගත යුතු වුවද, පහත දැක්වෙන නිරීක්ෂණයන් හේතුවෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට එම නියාමන කාර්යය මනාව කළ හැකිද යන්න ප්‍රශ්ණ ගතව ඇත.

(පහත සඳහන් යොමුවෙහි දක්වා ඇති පරිදි මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඉහත ඡේදයට අදාල ලබා දුන් ලිඛිත පිළිතුර අනුව ඉහත ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් හා වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 161 සිට 162 දක්වා)

6.4 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිකුත් කරනු ලබන බැදුම්කර හඳුන්වාදීම සඳහා, ඒවායේ කල්පිරෙන දිනය පදනම් කර ගෙන සකස් කරන ලද ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් (International Security Identification Number) භාවිතා කරනු ලබයි. එකම දිනකදී පරිණත වන බැදුම්කර කිහිපයක් වරින්වර නිකුත් කිරීමේ දී එම බැදුම්කර සඳහා එම එකම ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් භාවිතා කිරීම නිසා ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේ දී එම බැදුම්කරය කුමන දිනකදී නිකුත් කරන ලද බැදුම්කරයක්ද යන්න වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් හඳුනාගත නොහැකි බවට විගණනයට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 162)

6.5 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේදී ලබා ගනුයේ ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරැකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකය සහ එම බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම සහ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු කළ දිනය යන තොරතුරු පමණක් බවත් එම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙහි අළෙවි වූ වටිනාකම හා ඵලදායි අනුපාත පිළිබඳ දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව නොමැති බව විගණනයට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින්ද, කාරක සභාව විසින් යොමුකළ ලිඛිත ප්‍රශ්නවලට මහ බැංකුව ලබාදුන් පිළිතුරු වලින් විගණන ඡේදයට බලපෑමක් නොමැති හෙයින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 162 සිට 163 දක්වා)

6.6 ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති පරිදි අවශ්‍ය මුළු මුදලම වෙන්දේසිය මඟින් සපුරා ගැනීමට ගෙන ඇති තීරණය ඉහත 5.1.1 ඡේදයේ ඇමුණුමේ සඳහන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු පොළී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලන වගකීම ඇතුළු කරුණු සළකා බලා ගන්නා ලද තීරණයක්ද යන්න පැහැදිලි නොවීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 163)

6.7 එලෙසම ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති තීරණය ගැනීමේදී ඉහත 5.1.2 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ඇමුණුමේ දැක්වෙන කරුණු හා තීරණය පිළිබඳ අවධානයක් යොමු කර තිබුණු බව පැහැදිලි නොවීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 163)

6.8 තවද ඉහත 5.1.11 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුවා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට තීරණයක් ගෙන තිබුණද ඉහත 01 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් මාර්ගෝපදේශය තුළ හෝ වෙන යම් ලිඛිත නීතියකගේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්,සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයක් ගැනීමේ අභිමතයක් තිබේද යන්න විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 163)

6.9 ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් තීරණය ගැනීමෙන් පසුව මේ වන විට වර්ෂයකට ද වැඩි කාලයක් ගත වී තිබුණද එකී තීරණය හේතුවෙන් සෘජුවම හෝ වක්‍රව මූල්‍ය වෙළඳ පළට සිදු වී ඇති බලපෑම පිළිබඳව අධ්‍යයනයක් කර එම තාවකාලික අත්හිටුවීම ස්ථාවර කිරීමට, ඉවත් කිරීමට, නැවත සළකා බැලීමට හෝ වෙනයම් නිශ්චිත අනුපාතයක් මත සෘජු ක්‍රමය හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය තෝරාගැනීම වැනි විකල්ප ක්‍රමයක් අනුගමනය කළ යුතුද යන්න පිළිබඳව පසුවිපරමක් හෝ විධිමත් අධ්‍යයනයක් කළ බවට තොරතුරු විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවිම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 164)

6.10 වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට අනුව වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගත් ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන් ඒවා ක්ෂණිකව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලෙහි අලෙවි කර අධික ලාභ ලබන්නේද එමගින් රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසියක් වෙනත් පාර්ශවයකට විතැන් වී තිබේද යන්න පිළිබඳ අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදුකිරීමට හෝ එවැනි අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදු කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය දත්ත තමන් සතු කර ගැනීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බවට තොරතුරුද විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 164)

6.11 රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් මෙම වෙන්දේසිවලදී ලබා ගන්නා සාර්ථකත්වය අවම වීමට හා පෞද්ගලික අංශයන්හි එම සාර්ථකත්වය ඉහළ යාමට හේතු සොයා බලා රජයට අවම පිරිවැයක් සහිතව අරමුදල් රැස්කරදීමේ වගකීමද ඉටුවන පරිදි අවශ්‍ය නියාමනයන් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කටයුතු කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 164 සිට 165 දක්වා)

6.12 තවද වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගත් පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් එම බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන ඉතා කෙටි දින ගණනකින් රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හෝ ආයතන වඩා අඩු පොළී අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන තිබේද යන්න පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂා කළ බවට හෝ එලෙස කටයුතු සිදු වී තිබේනම් එලෙස රජයට සිදුවන මූල්‍ය අවාසිය අවම කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය නියාමනය කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් ද, කාරක සභාව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කළ ලිඛිත ප්‍රශ්න වලට ලද පිළිතුරු අනුවද විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් නොමැති හෙයින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 165 සිට 166 දක්වා)

6.13 පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් තමන් වෙනුවෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් මඟින් සිදුකිරීම තුළ රාජ්‍ය අංශයට හා පෞද්ගලික අංශයට ලැබෙන වාසි අවාසි සළකා බලා රජයේ පිරිවැය අවම කිරීමට කටයුතු කළ බවට හෝ අවශ්‍ය නියාමනයන් කළ බවට කරුණු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් ලිඛිත පිළිතුර විගණන ඡේදය සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරන බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 166 සිට 167 දක්වා)

6.14 ඉහත 5.3.3 ඡේදයේ නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇති පොළී අනුපාතයන්හි ක්‍රමිකව ඉහළ යාමේ ප්‍රවණතාවය ඇති වීමට ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයෙහි සඳහන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය සෘජුව හෝ වක්‍රව හේතු වූයේද යන්න තීරණය කිරීමට තරම් ප්‍රමාණාත්මක විශ්ලේෂණයක් කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම ඡේදය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 167)

7. නිර්දේශ

7.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණවලදී මෙන්ම පවතින ක්‍රමවේදයන් වෙනස්කම්වලට භාජනය කිරීමේ දී සහ නව ක්‍රමවේදයන් හඳුන්වාදීමේ දී එමගින් රටේ ආර්ථිකයට සිදුවන ධන හෝ සෘණ බලපෑම් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අරමුණු වලට ඉන් සිදුවන බලපෑම දිගුකාලීන හා කෙටි කාලීන වශයෙන් සලකා බලා අදාල තීරණ වලට එළඹිය යුතු වන අතර එලෙස කටයුතු කල බවට පිළිගත හැකි සාක්ෂි අවශ්‍ය අවස්ථාවන් හි දී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට හැකිවන පරිදි පවත්වාගෙන යාම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 167)

7.2 ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලද නියාමනය කිරීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු නොවන තත්ත්වයක් තුල මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල හැසිරවීමේ හා නියාමනය කිරීමේ කාර්යය වඩාත් ඵලදායීව ඉටුකිරීම අඩපන වීම වලක්වනු වස් අවශ්‍ය සියලු දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව පවත්වා ගැනීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති අතර පහත යොමුවෙහි දැක්වෙන වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් අනුව ඉහත නිර්දේශය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 167 සිට 173 දක්වා)

7.3 මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිකුත් කල බැඳුම්කරයන් කල්පිරී මුදල් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා තමන් වෙත ඉදිරිපත් වන අවස්ථාව දක්වා එම බැඳුම්කරයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය හා ගණුදෙනු වන ආකාරය පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වා ගැනීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 173 සිට 174 දක්වා)

7.4 රටක මහ බැංකුව කෙරෙහි පවතින විශ්වාසය එහි නිලධාරින් විසින් ගන්නාවූ තීන්දු තීරණවල අවංකභාවය මතද රඳාපවතින හෙයින් හා එම විශ්වාසය දේශීයව මෙන්ම අන්තර්ජාතික වශයෙන්ද නොකැළැල්ව පවත්වාගත යුතු හෙයින් එම නිලධාරීන් ගන්නා වූ තීන්දු තීරණයන්ගේ අවංකභාවය කාල පමාවකින් තොරව ඒත්තු ගැන්විය හැකි පරිදි යම් යම් සීමාවන්ට යටත්ව හෝ විනිවිද භාවයකින් යුතුව කටයුතු කිරීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 174)

7.5 නෛතික තත්ත්වයන් ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේඛයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද ඒවාටම සීමා නොවී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ කළමනාකරණ තීරණයන්ට බලපෑම් කළ හැකි මට්ටමේ නිලධාරින් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට සම්බන්ධිත ආයතන අතර යම් බැඳියාවන්හි ගැටීම් පවතින්නේ නම් සද්භාවය පෙරදැරි කරගෙන සුදුසු අනාවරණයක්ද සහිතව සිය කාර්යයන් ඉටු කිරීමට මහ බැංකුවේ ඉහළ කළමණාකාරීත්වය කටයුතු කිරීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 174)

7.6 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන බොහෝ තීරණ සමස්ථ ආර්ථිකයට දිගුකාලීනව බලපෑම් ඇති කරවන අතර එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්,සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයන් ගැනීමේදී නිවැරදි පදනමකින් එම තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේද යන්න ස්වාධීන පාර්ශවයකගේ පරීක්ෂාවන්ට සහ අධීක්ෂණයකට ලක්වීම ඉතා වැදගත් වනුයේ එකී තීරණයන්ගෙන් ජනිතවන යහපත් මෙන්ම අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵලවලටද සමස්ථ ජනතාවට මුහුණ දීමට සිදුවන හෙයිනි. ඒ අනුව එවැනි සංකීර්ණ තීරණ විධිමත් ඇගයීමකින් තොරව ඉතාමත් සරලව හා ක්ෂණිකව ගෙන එමගින් යම් අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵල ඇති වී තිබේද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ඒ සඳහා බලවරමක් ඇති ආයතනයන්ට ලබා දීමට බාධා සිදුවන පරිදි මුදල් නීති පනතේ 45 වගන්තියේ සඳහන් රහස්‍යතාවය සුරැකීමේ ප්‍රතිපාදන යොදා ගත නොහැකි වන පරිදි එම වගන්තිය සුදුසු පරිදි සංශෝධනයන්ට ලක් කළ යුතුය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 175)

7.7 මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරතුරු නිවැරදිව හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර (ඇමුණුම xxxiv) එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර (ඇමුණුම iii) අනුව ලබා දී ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබේ. එහෙයින් රාජ්‍ය විගණනය විසින් එවැනි තොරතුරුවලින් හඳුනාගනු ලැබූ තොරතුරු මෙම වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුළත් නොකර එම තොරතුරු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ලබා දෙන බවත් සඳහන් කළ යුතුව ඇත.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින්ද, කාරක සභාව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත නිකුත් කළ ප්‍රශ්නවලට ලද පිළිතුරු මඟින්ද විගණන නිර්දේශයට බලපෑමක් නොමැති හෙයින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 175 සිට 176 දක්වා)

7.8 ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් අතර බැඳුම්කරවලට අදාළව සිදුවන අන්තර් ගනුදෙනු නියාමනය කිරීම සඳහා නිසි ක්‍රමවේදයක් මාර්ගෝපදේශ මගින් හඳුන්වා දිය යුතුය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින්ද, කාරක සභාව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත නිකුත් කළ ප්‍රශ්නවලට ලද පිළිතුරු මඟින්ද විගණන නිර්දේශයට බලපෑමක් නොමැති හෙයින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 176 සිට 177 දක්වා)

7.9 බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියට අදාළව ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන වෙන්දේසිවල අවසාන දිනය හා වේලාව යම් යම් අවස්ථාවලදී දීර්ඝ කිරීම් අනුමත කර තිබූ අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කිරීම් නොවැලැක්විය හැකි සහ සාධාරණීකරණය කළ හැකි කරුණුවලට සීමා කළ යුතුය.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 177)

7.10 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු නොවුවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු මෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ලබා දී ඇත. එසේ වුවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට විකල්පයන් ලෙස වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් දක්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. මේ වන විට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ පවතින අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල එම අධීක්ෂණයෙන් බැහැරව ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කළ හැකි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බවට පත් කිරීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින්ද, කාරක සභාව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත නිකුත් කළ ප්‍රශ්නවලට ලද පිළිතුරු මඟින්ද විගණන නිර්දේශයට බලපෑමක් නොමැති හෙයින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 177 සිට 178 දක්වා)

7.11 මේ වන විට ඉදිරි මාසයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය වෙතින් ලබා ගන්නා අතර අවම වශයෙන් එය ඉදිරි මාස තුනක කාලයක් දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඵලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 179)

7.12 ඉහත පරිදි මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය ලබා ගන්නා ලද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරය කල් ඇතිව තීරණය කිරීම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඵලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 179)

7.13 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම. එනම් පසුගිය කාලය තුළ එක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බුන්වත්භාවයට පත්වීම හේතුවෙන් රජයද ඇතුළුව එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු සමග ගනුදෙනු කළ ආයෝජකයන් අසීරුතාවයට පත්ව ඇත. එවැනි තත්ත්වයන් වැලකෙන පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඔවුන් මූල්‍ය ශක්තීන් ඇතුළු අදාල වර්යාවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු විම.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඵලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 179)

7.14 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විගණකාධිපති වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති තොරතුරු අතර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකිය යුතු ලේඛන හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්ගෙන් විමසන ලදී. ඒ සඳහා පිළිතුරු ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරයකු දන්වා තිබුණේ, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අදාලව මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යයන් වර්ෂයේ විසර්ජන පනතින් අනුමත සීමාවන් තුළ රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය මාසික පදනමින් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ මහ බැංකුව

වෙත දැනුම් දීමට සීමා වන බවයි. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණ කටයුතු භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යභාරය ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති සරල කාර්යයකට සීමා වන බවට විගණනයේදී එකඟ විය නොහැක.

(ඉහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විරෝධතා දක්වා නොමැති බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මඟින් එම නිර්දේශය පිළිබඳව නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් නිර්දේශය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුලත් කරන ලදී.)

(යොමුව : උපලේඛනයෙහි පිටු අංක 180)

8. නිගමන

8.1 ඉහත 5.1.17 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වාගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.889,358,050 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය සහ 5.2.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වා ගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය ලෙස 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින පැවැති භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි දෙකේදී වලක්වා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබූ එකතුව රු.1,674,256,805 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වා ගැනීමට කටයුතු නොකිරීම පිළිබඳව බලධාරීන් වගකිවයුතු බව නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ.

තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමයට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට තීරණය ගත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා සිදුකර ඇති බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම්වලට අදාලව ද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි හෝ අවාසි ගණනය කළහොත් ඉහතින් දක්වන ලද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය තවදුරටත් ඉහළයාමේ හැකියාවක් පැවැතීමද බැහැර කළ නොහැක.

8.2 මෙම වාර්තාව සැකසීමේ දී විගණකාධිපති වෙත අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු සහ ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේද වලින් අවධාරණය කර ඇති කරුණු අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ස්වකිය කාර්යය මෙහෙයවීමේ දී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයකුගෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරනු ලබන මට්ටමේ වෘත්තිමය විචක්ෂණභාවයකින් (Professional Due Care) යුතුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බව තහවුරු නොවීය.

8.3 මෙම වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේ දී විගණකාධිපති වෙත හිමි බලතල හා විෂය සීමාව තුල කටයුතු ඇති බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ. ඉන් ඔබ්බට සාපරාධි හෝ විගණකාධිපතිට නිගමනය කල නොහැකි මට්ටමේ නීති විරෝධී කටයුතු සිදු වී ඇත්දැයි යන්න මෙහිදී පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් නොවුනු හෙයින් එවන් පරික්ෂාවක් අවශ්‍යය හැඟී යන්නේ නම් ඒ සඳහා විශේෂිත වූ ආයතනයන්හි සහය ලබා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව නිගමනය කරමි.

අ/කලේ, එච්. එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ,

විගණකාධිපති,

විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේදී.

- මෙම විමර්ෂණයේදී පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ පරීක්ෂාවට ලක්වූ ක්ෂේත්‍රයන් හා අදාල යොමු පහත දක්වා ඇත.
    - ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ (යොමුව: පිටු 202 සිට 222 දක්වා)
    - මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත (යොමුව: පිටු 223 සිට 255 දක්වා)
    - වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයේ හා සෘජු ක්‍රමයේ සංයුතිය (යොමුව: පිටු 255 සිට 262 දක්වා)
    - අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා (යොමුව: පිටු 263 සිට 265 දක්වා)
    - මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ කාර්යභාරය (යොමුව: පිටු 265 සිට 268 දක්වා)
    - ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ (යොමුව: පිටු 268 සිට 274 දක්වා)
    - සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල (යොමුව: පිටු 274 සිට 281 දක්වා)
    - වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මඟින් හැකිතාක් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීම (As much as possible)

      (යොමුව: පිටු 281 සිට 288 දක්වා)

BAF/H/Gen/2016/36

2016 ජූනි 02 දින

සභාපතිතුමා,
පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමණි,

<u>ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මෑත කාලයේදී සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව වාර්තාව</u>

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් ඉල්ලා සිටි පරිදි ඉහත සඳහන් වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීම සඳහා මාගේ විධානය අනුව මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු ලබාගැනීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ විගණන කටයුතු භාර විගණන අධිකාරිවරිය විසින් කටයුතු කරන ලදි.

02. ඒ අනුව නිශ්චිත කාලසීමාවක් තුළ සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව විස්තර සපයන ලෙසට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිකාරිවරයාගෙන් 2016 මැයි 11 (අදාල ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම i ලෙස යාකර ඇත) සහ 2016 මැයි 17 (අදාල ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම ii ලෙස යාකර ඇත) දින ඉල්ලා සිටියද අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු අප වෙත ලබා නොදුන් හෙයින් එකී තොරතුරු නොපමාව ලබා නොදුනහොත් ඒ බව පාර්ලිමේන්තුව වෙත වාර්තා කිරීමට සිදුවන බව 2016 මැයි 25 දින (ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම iii ලෙස යාකර ඇත) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති වෙත දැනුම් දෙන ලදි.

03. බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීම සඳහා අප විසින් ඉල්ලා ඇති නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු ලිඛිතව ලබාදෙන මෙන් එලෙස ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද නමුදු 2016 ජූනි 02 දින (අදාල ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම iv ලෙස යාකර ඇත) රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිවරයා විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ විගණන අධිකාරිවරිය වෙත දන්වා තිබුණේ ඉල්ලා ඇති පරිදි බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව නිශ්චිත දත්තයන් සුදුසු පරිදි ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා සිය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට පහසුකම් සලසා දෙන ලෙසට ඔහුට මහබැංකු කළමනාකරණයෙන් උපදෙස් ලැබී ඇති බවත් ඒ අනුව විගණන නිලධාරීන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත එවා පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කර අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු රැස්කර ගන්නා ලෙසත්ය.

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04. අනතුරුව 2016 ජුනි 03 දිනැතිව මා අමතන ලද නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයෙකුගේ "විගණන කටයුතු සඳහා තොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීම" මැයෙන් වූ ලිපිය (ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම v ලෙස යාකර ඇත) මඟින්ද බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ලබාගැනීමට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන්ට පහසුකම් සලසා දී ඇති හෙයින් අවශ්‍ය වන නිශ්චිත දත්තයන් එකී පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමෙන් ලබාගත හැකි බව දන්වා තිබුණි.

05. තවද විගණන කාර්යයන් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය පරිදි විශේෂයෙන් සකසන ලද තොරතුරු ලබාදීම මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ට අදාල කාර්යයක් නොවන බවත් එය විගණන නිලධාරීන්ගේ වගකීමක් බවත් ඉහත ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ලිපියේ දක්වා තිබුනද ඒ පිළිබඳව මා එකඟ නොවන බවද කරුණාවෙන් දන්වනු කැමැත්තෙමි.

06. මේ අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් අප විසින් ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද තොරතුරු ලබාදීම සෘජුවම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර නොතිබුණද පහත සඳහන් හේතූන් මත උක්ත වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමට නොහැකි විය හැකි බව/ පිළියෙල කිරීම ප්‍රමාද විය හැකි බව ඔබ කමිටුව වෙත කරුණාවෙන් දන්වමි.

(අ) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉතා විශාල ගණුදෙනු සංඛ්‍යාවක් සහ දත්ත සංඛ්‍යාවක් පරිගණක ජාලය තුළ පවතින බැවින් අපගේ නිලධාරීන්ට අදාළ නිශ්චිත දත්ත ලබාගැනීම සඳහා එකී සියලුම දත්තයන් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට සිදුවන බැවින් සහ ඒ සඳහා විෂයානුබද්ධ විශේෂඥ දැනුමක් අවශ්‍ය වන බැවිනුත් ක්ෂනිකව අදාළ තොරතුරු උපුටා ගැනීම ප්‍රායෝගිකව අපහසුවීම.

(ආ) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද නිශ්චිත දත්තයන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් මීට පෙර ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද අවස්ථාවලදී එකී තොරතුරු ඉතා සුළු කාලයක් තුළ ලබාදී තිබියදී මෙවර ඔවුන්ගේ පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කර බලා තොරතුරු උපුටා ගන්නා ලෙස දැනුම් දීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වීම.

(ඇ) මහ බැංකුව විසින් මෙවර යෝජනා කර ඇති ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කර විශාල කාලයක්ද වැයකර අදාල තොරතුරු මාගේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් සොයා ගනු ලැබුවද ඒවායේ නිවැරදිභාවය පිළිබඳව නැවතත් මහ බැංකුව වෙතින් සනාථ කර ගතයුතුවීම හේතුවෙන් එකවරම මහ බැංකුව විසින් අපට අවශ්‍ය නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු සැපයීම වඩාත් කාර්යක්ෂමව හා නිවැරදිව උක්ත වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමට හේතුවන බව අවබෝධවීම.

07. තවද විගණන කටයුතු සඳහා සුදුසු පරිදි සකසන ලද මෙම නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු මාවෙත ලබානොදීම මඟින් අදාල වාර්තාව කාරක සභාව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට ඕනෑකමින්ම බාධා පැමිණවීමට මහබැංකු කළමනාකරණය විසින් කටයුතු කරන බව නිශ්චිතව සඳහන් කළ නොහැකි වුවද ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු කළමනාකරණය විසින් මාගේ ව්‍යවස්ථාපිත කටයුතු ඉටු කිරීම ප්‍රමාද වන අයුරින් වෙහෙසකර ක්‍රියාවලියකට මාගේ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලය පත් කිරීමට උත්සාහ කරමින් මාගේ විෂය පථය සීමා කිරීමට පසුබිම සැකසීම පිළිබඳ නොසතුට පල කිරීමට සිදුව ඇති බවද කරුණාවෙන් දන්වමි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ
විගණකාධිපති

Regd: Post

Annex 4 අමුණුම ii

212

මගේ අංකය
எனது இல.
My No. E 118/03/C1B5

මගේ අංකය
உமது இல.
Your No. SC/G/CB

දුරකථන අංක
தொலைபேசி இல.
Telephone Nos. : 433967, 433769, 320800, 327919

ඉලෙක්ට්‍රොනික් තැපෑල්
மின்-அஞ்சல்
E-mail attorney @ sri.lanka.net, counsel @ sri.lanka.net

ෆැක්ස
பெக்ஸ்
Fax 436421

නීතිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
சட்டமா அதிபதி திணைக்களம்
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

කූ. පෙ. අංකය
அஞ்சல் பெட்டி
P. O. Box No. 502

කොළඹ 12.
கொழும்பு 12.
Colombo 12.

February 12, 2004



1. Auditor General,
Auditor General's Department,
Independence Square,
Colombo 7.

2. Director Legal,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha,
Colombo 1.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

I refer to the letter of the Auditor General dated 11th April 2003 and the letters of the Director Legal, Central Bank dated 17th June 2003, 19th August 2003 and 23rd January 2004, on the above subject.

Further to the above letters consultations were had on the above issue with the Auditor General and Mr. Nagahawatte, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, and the following questions were raised :

By the Auditor General :

1. Whether Article 154 of the Constitution applies to the audit of the Central Bank and whether section 45 of the Monetary Law Act, applies against the right of access of information, and documents by the Auditor General in terms of Article 154(5) of the Constitution.

2. Whether the Central Bank is accountable to Parliament and subject to the examination by the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE)

3. Whether the Provisions of the Finance Act No.38 of 1971 except certain provisions exempted by the Hon. Minister of Finance are applicable to the Central Bank.

D/Legal
I enquire the Governor
above our discussion with
AG. and said that we will
be following up with a letter to AG.
DG/N 12/04/03/10

Pl. put in Audit file. Ag
2004/03/17

Pl. put in Audit file. Ag
2004/03/17

Reb the consultation we had with AG

D/Legal
Pl. file
12-03/12 3/12

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By the Central Bank :

4. Whether the Central Bank is obliged by law to divulge all information and documents of the Central Bank or available to the Central Bank to the Auditor General.

5. Whether the Central Bank is obliged by law to comply with instructions issued by Treasury and Public Administration Circulars.

Having considered previous opinions expressed on related matters, my opinion on the above questions is as follows :

1. The Auditor General is empowered by Article 154 of the Constitution and by sections 42 and 43 of the Monetary Law Act to audit the accounts of the Central Bank. As Article 154 of the Constitution applies to the audit of the Central Bank, and as there should be uniformity in the application of the Auditor General's powers to all institutions audited by him, the Auditor General would be entitled in terms of Article 154(5)(a) of the Constitution:-

   (i) to have access to all books, records, returns and other documents,

   (ii) to have access to stores and other property; and

   (iii) to be furnished with such information and explanations, as may be necessary for the performance of his duties and functions, with regard to the Central Bank.

   Part VII of the Monetary Law Act deals with the Audit of the Central Bank. The secrecy clause (section 45) appears in Part VIII of the Monetary Law Act concerning restrictions relating to the officers and servants of the Central Bank. Having considered the scheme of the Monetary Law Act and the placement of the secrecy clause outside the Part in the Monetary Law Act dealing with audit, I am of the opinion that section 45 of the Monetary Law Act does not impose any restrictions on sections 42 or 43 of the said Act which deals with the audit of the Central Bank. I am further of the opinion that an officer or servant of the Central Bank who discloses information to the Auditor General in the course of the audit, would be performing his duty in terms of the Monetary Law Act and would therefore not contravene section 45 (1) thereof.

2. In terms of section 42(2) of the Monetary Law Act, the Minister of Finance is charged with laying before Parliament the Auditor General's report on the accounts of the Central Bank. The Central Bank is therefore accountable to Parliament. In terms of the definition of a public corporation in Article 170 of the Constitution and in terms of the opinion expressed by the Attorney General to the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank by letter dated 20th April 1981 (copy annexed for easy reference) the Central Bank would be subject to the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises as it was established by funds provided by the Government.

3. As I am of the opinion that the accounts of the Central Bank are subject to Parliament and the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises, I am also of the opinion that the Finance Act No. 38 of 1971 as amended would apply to the Central Bank except certain provisions therein, exempted by the Hon. Minister of Finance.

4. In terms of Article 154(5) of the Constitution and section 43 of the Monetary Law Act, the Central Bank would be obliged to divulge all information and documents available to the Auditor General in so far as they are applicable to the audit. The Auditor General should bear in mind that certain information contained in documents of the Central Bank would be of a sensitive nature and therefore avoid disclosing such information, doing so if necessary only with the concurrence of the Central Bank. In any event, it would be prudent and appropriate for the Auditor General to communicate with the Monetary Board, the reasons for seeking sensitive information and consider the observations of the Board before proceeding.

5. For the reasons above, I am of the opinion that Treasury and Public Administration Circulars would apply to the Central Bank in so far as they apply to public corporations. It is noted however, that in terms of the Monetary Law Act the Secretary, Ministry of Finance is a member of the Monetary Board. This appointment to the Board ensures comity between the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. As Treasury circulars are generated by the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, he would be in a position in consultation with the Monetary Board, to exempt the Central Bank from certain Treasury circulars, if necessary.

Rajiv Goonetilleke
State Counsel

Sgd. K.C. Kamalasabayson P.C.
Attorney General

24th June, 2016

Mr Gamini Wijesinghe
Auditor General
Auditor General's Department
306/72, Polduwa Road
Battaramulla

My dear Auditor General,

Audit Examination on Treasury bond issuance by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Further to your letter dated 17th June 2016 reference BAF/H/GEN/2016/41 in which you have requested the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to inform you as to information of a sensitive nature contained in documents or any secret documents furnished to the Auditor General.

I draw your attention to the letter from the then Governor of Central Bank of Sri Lanka Mr. A.S. Jayawardena to the then Auditor General Mr. S.C. Mayadunne dated 10th April 2001 (copy attached) in which it was stated that the Central Bank considered as sensitive "all information relating to impending or future monetary, exchange rate, interest rate and government policy and matters relating to third parties such as banking institutions falling within the ambit of Section 45 of the Monetary Law Act". We wish to reiterate this definition of market sensitive information.

Moreover, we consider that the entirety of the documentation handed over to your officers on Monday 20th June 2016 constitutes information relating to impending and future interest rates and matters relating to third parties, in this case direct dealer participants and their clients, as recognized under section 21E of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance.

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(9411) 2477577
FAX: (9411) 2477677
E-MAIL: governor@cbsl.lk

40

Moreover, in a letter from the Attorney General dated 12th February 2004 addressed to the then Auditor General and the then Director- Legal/ Central Bank of Sri Lanka (copy attached), it is stated in the 4th paragraph of the Hon. Attorney Generals' opinion that "the Auditor General should bear in mind that certain information contained in documents of the Central Bank would be of a sensitive nature and therefore avoid disclosing such information, doing so if necessary only with the concurrence of the Central Bank. In any event, it would be prudent and appropriate for the Auditor General to communicate with the Monetary Board, the reasons for seeking sensitive information and consider the observations of the Board before proceeding."

I would therefore, be grateful if you could acknowledge that the most appropriate modality for your department officials to examine such sensitive information and documentation would be for them to peruse such documents in the premises of Central Bank of Sri Lanka, in order that we do not run the risk of such information and documentation falling into unauthorized hands.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Arjuna Mahendran
Governor
Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Copy to – Hon Attorney General

Encls.

A. S. Jayawardena
The Governor

Central Bank of Sri Lanka
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha
Colombo 1, Sri Lanka.

April 10, 2001

Strictly Confidential

Mr S C Mayadunne
Auditor General
Auditor General's Department
Colombo.

Dear Sir,

FURNISHING OF INFORMATION

I thank you for your co-operation at the discussion held on 28/03/2001 to resolve a long outstanding issue relating to the type of information that could be made available to you for the audit of the Central Bank's accounts. While you were of the view that all information should be made available, you were appreciative of the fact that section 45 of the Monetary Law Act precluded information being disclosed by the Central Bank on certain matters.

2. It was also mentioned that having considered the Monetary Law Act and the Constitution, the Attorney General has ruled that the Auditor General has the right of access to and examination of the accounts of the Central Bank and of all books and documents containing information with respect to matters connected with such accounts. Upto now, the Central Bank has been guided by this ruling.

3. However, in order to enable you to undertake a more comprehensive audit of the Central Bank accounts, we agreed to make available the following;

a) agendas of all Board Meetings,

b) all confirmed Board decisions, excluding those containing market sensitive information, those relating to impending or future monetary, exchange rate, interest rate and government policy and matters relating to third parties such as banking institutions falling within the ambit of section 45 of the Monetary Law Act

c) all other information and documents required for the purpose of the audit, other than information and documents that are sensitive or pertaining to policy matters and to third parties, as stated above.

4. I trust that the above meets with your acceptance.

Thanking you,

Yours sincerely,

P.O. BOX 590
Colombo
TEL : (941) 477477
(941) 477577
FAX : (941) 477677
E-mail : jayawar@lanka.ccom.lk
asjayaward@cbsl.lk

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் Public Debt Department

June 24, 2016

Mrs L S I Jayaratna
Superintendent of Audit
External Audit Department

Public Debt Department Manual

With regard to the queries raised in your letter dated 17th June 2016 on the above subject, our responses are as follows:

i. PDD's operational manual has not been approved.
ii. This manual is relevant to the period of February 2015.

Addl. Superintendent of Public Debt

10 වන මහල, අංක 30, ජනාධිපති මාවත, කෑ . පෙ . 590, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
94 11 2477277/574
10 ஆம் மாடி, இல. 30 சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை கொழும்பு 1 த. பெ. இல. 590, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை
94 11 2477718
Level 10, No. 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1 P . O. Box. 590, Colombo 01, Sri Lanka
pdebt@cbsl.lk
www.cbsl.gov.lk

27th June, 2016

Auditor General's Secretariat
Add.AG AAG
DAG Sec
27 JUN 2016
AG
7.10 pm.

The Auditor General
Auditor General's Department
306/72, Polduwa Road
Battaramulla

My dear Auditor General,

Operational Manual of the Public Debt Department

I refer to your letter dated 24th June, 2016 BAF/H/GEN/2016/45 signed by Mr S M D S S Rohitha, Assistant Auditor General. I write to inform you that, in terms of operational procedures followed hither to in the Central Bank, there is no specific requirement imposed by the Monetary Board to obtain approval of the Monetary Board for Operational Manuals of the Departments of the Central Bank. Therefore, the statement that the Operational Manual of the Public Debt Department has not been approved by the Monetary Board should be corrected. The Public Debt Department carries out its operations in terms of the provisions of the sections 33 and 113 of the Monetary Law Act and various provisions of the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance and Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance. I wish to mention that the Public Debt Department has been in operation in the Central Bank since 1950. Therefore, the issue of the legal validity of decisions taken in terms of the Public Debt Department Manual does not arise.

Yours sincerely,

Arjuna Mahendran
Governor
Central Bank of Sri Lanka

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Colombo
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(9411) 2477577
FAX: (9411) 2477677
E-MAIL: governor@cbsl.lk

List of Primary Dealers - 2014

1. Acuity Securities Ltd
2. Bank of Ceylon
3. Capital Alliance Ltd
4. Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC
5. Entrust Securities PLC
6. First Capital Treasuries Ltd
7. NatWealth Securities Ltd
8. NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd
9. Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC
10. People's Bank
11. Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
12. Sampath Bank PLC
13. Seylan Bank PLC
14. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd
15. WealthTrust Securities Ltd

List of Primary Dealers - 2015

1. Acuity Securities Ltd
2. Bank of Ceylon
3. Capital Alliance Ltd
4. Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC
5. Entrust Securities PLC
6. First Capital Treasuries Ltd
7. NatWealth Securities Ltd
8. NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd
9. Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC
10. People's Bank
11. Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
12. Sampath Bank PLC
13. Seylan Bank PLC
14. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd
15. Union Bank of Colombo PLC
16. WealthTrust Securities Ltd

List of Primary Dealers - 2016

1. Acuity Securities Ltd
2. Bank of Ceylon
3. Capital Alliance Ltd
4. Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC
5. Entrust Securities PLC
6. First Capital Treasuries Ltd
7. NatWealth Securities Ltd
8. NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd
9. Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC
10. People's Bank
11. Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
12. Sampath Bank PLC
13. Seylan Bank PLC
14. Union Bank of Colombo
15. WealthTrust Securities Ltd

Superintendent
Public Debt Department

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK TO ADMINISTER AND REGULATE THE MONETARY SYSTEM

PART I – THE CENTRAL BANK, ITS POWERS AND PURPOSES

Establishment and objectives of Central Bank. [§.2, 32 of 2002]

5. An institution, which shall be called and known as the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as "the Central Bank") is hereby established as the authority responsible for the administration, supervision and regulation of the monetary, financial and payments system of Sri Lanka, and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act, the Central Bank is hereby charged with the duty of securing, so far as possible by action authorised by this Act, the following objectives, namely–

(*a*) economic and price stability; and

(*b*) financial system stability,

with a view to encouraging and promoting the development of the productive resources of Sri Lanka.

Powers of the Central Bank and the Monetary Board in relation to section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act No. 4 of 1963. [§.56, 18 of 1965]

5A. (1) For the purposes of section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act, No. 4 of 1963, the Central Bank may open, maintain and manage special deposit accounts.

(2) Where an institution is approved by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance by Order made under paragraph *(b)* of subsection (2) of section 69A of the Inland Revenue Act, No. 4 of 1963, the Monetary Board may determine the terms and conditions subject to which that institution may open, maintain and manage special deposit accounts for the purposes of that section.

Capital of Central Bank. [§.2, 15 of 2014]

6. The capital of the Central Bank shall be fifteen million rupees, which sum is hereby appropriated to the bank from the surplus assets of the Board of Commissioners of Currency:

Provided however, the Monetary Board may from time to time, having regard to the viability and stability of the financial system of Sri Lanka and in the interest of the national economy, with the concurrence of the Minister to whom the subject of Finance has been assigned, increase the capital of the Central Bank to an amount not exceeding fifty billion rupees.

Place of business.

7. The Central Bank shall have its principal place of business in Colombo, and may have such branches, agencies, and correspondents in other places in Sri Lanka or abroad, as may be necessary for the proper conduct of the business of the bank.

PART II – THE MONETARY BOARD

Constitution of Monetary Board. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

8. (1) The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall, in addition to determining the policies or measures authorised to be adopted or

taken under this Act, be vested with the powers, duties and functions of the Central Bank under this Act, and be generally responsible for the management, operations and administration of the Bank:

Provided, however, where the Monetary Board considers it appropriate, it may delegate to the Governor, or to any officer of the Central Bank or to a Committee of such officers, any power, duty or function conferred or imposed on, or assigned to, the Board by Section 10(*a*), (*b*), (*bb*), (*d*) and section 27.

(1A) Where any power, duty or function is delegated by the Monetary Board under subsection (1), the person or the group of persons to whom such power, duty or function is delegated shall exercise perform or discharge such power, duty or function, in accordance with such general or special directions or guidelines as may be issued by the Monetary Board. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

(2) The Monetary Board shall consist of –

(*a*) the Governor of the Central Bank who shall be the chairman of the board;

(*b*) the person holding office for the time being as Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance; and [S3, 52 of 1985

(*c*) three members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, with the concurrence of the Constitutional Council. [§.3, 32 of 2002]

(3) In the absence of the Governor from any meeting of the Monetary Board, the Deputy Governor designated as Senior by the board shall act as his alternate and shall preside at the meeting and have the right to vote thereat.

(4) In the absence of the member of the Monetary Board mentioned in paragraph (*b*) of subsection (2) from any meeting of the board, the person holding office for the time being as Deputy Secretary to the Treasury shall act as that member's alternate at the meeting and have the right to vote thereat.

Monetary Board to be a body corporate.

9. (1) The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall in that name be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue or be sued in its corporate name.

(2) The Monetary Board shall have the power, in the name of the Central Bank, to hold property, both movable and immovable, and to sell and dispose of the same, to enter into contracts and otherwise to do and perform all such acts or things as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the principles and provisions of this Act.

(2) Meetings of the board shall be convened by the Governor.

(3) At any meeting of the board, three members shall constitute a quorum. [§.9, 32 of 2002]

(4) No decision taken at any meeting of the board shall be deemed to be a decision of the board unless it has the concurrence of at least three members, or, in any case where any other provision of this Act requires a unanimous decision, the concurrence of all five members. [§.9, 32 of 2002]

Attendance of certain officers at meetings of Monetary Board.

18. The Deputy Governor designated as senior by the Monetary Board and the Director of Economic Research may attend meetings of the Monetary Board, but shall not have the right to vote on any question.

PART III - THE GOVERNOR AND DEPUTY GOVERNORS

General functions and duties of Goveernor.

19. (1) The Governor shall be the chief executive officer of the Central Bank and shall accordingly be charged with the following powers, duties, and functions :–

(a) the execution of policies and measures approved by the Monetary Board and, subject to any such policies and measures as may be applicable, the direction, supervision, and control of the operation of the Central Bank and its internal management and administration;

(b) the preparation or the agenda for meetings or the Monetary Board and the submissions for the consideration of the board of policies and measures considered by him to be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the principles and provisions of this Act; and

(c) the exercise or performance of such other powers or duties as may be conferred of imposed upon him by the Monetary Board.

(2) Every instrument of the following description, that is to say, every contract, promissory note, security, report, balance sheet, statement, or other document and every rule, regulation, order, direction, notice, or requirement which bears the signature of the Governor or such other officer as may be authorized in that behalf by the Monetary Board, shall be deemed for all purposes to be an instrument executed, made, or issued by the Central Bank or by the Monetary Board, as the case may be.

Governor to be principal representative of Central Bank and Monetary Board.

20. The Governor of the Central Bank shall be the principal representative of the bank and of the Monetary Board and shall in that capacity, but in accordance with policies or rules approved or made by the board, have authority.-

"securities" means–

(i) treasury bills issued in accordance with the provisions of the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance whether issued in scripless form or otherwise;

(ii) registered stock or securities issued in accordance with the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance whether issued in scripless form or otherwise;

(iii) any securities of the Central bank whether issued in scripless form or otherwise.

Any body corporate to privide facilities under sections 98(1) and 112A. [§ 28, 32 of 2002]

112B. (1) Any or all of the functions referred to in subsection (1) of section 98 and section 112A may, notwithstanding the provisions of such section, be carried out by a body corporate authorised for the purpose by the Monetary Board subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Monetary Board.

(2) A body corporate referred to in subsection (1) may hold an account with the Central Bank for the purpose of carrying out such functions.

Management of the public debt.

113. The Central Bank shall, as agent of the Government, be responsible for the management of the public debt.

Advice on Government credit operations.

114. No new loan shall be raised and no new issue of stock or debentures shall be made by the Government or by any agency or institution referred to in subsection (1) of section 106, whether in pursuance of authority conferred by any written law or otherwise, unless the advice of the Monetary Board has first been obtained upon the monetary implication of the proposed loan or issue.

Recommendations as to policy, &c. of Government agencies or institutions.

115. The Monetary Board may from time to time make recommendations to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance or to any agency or institution referred to in subsection (1) of section 106, as to the measures and policies which should be adopted by such agency or institution for the purposes of co-ordinating its policy with the policies of the board; and where any such recommendations are made to the Minister, the Minister or any other authority or person may, if empowered so to do by any such other written law as may be applicable, make or issue such orders or directions or take such other action as may be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to such recommendations.

Monetary policy and fiscal policy. [§.11, 37 of 1974]

116. (1) On or before the fifteenth day of September in each year the Monetary Board shall submit to the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance for use in preparation of the budget speech a confidential report describing and analysing the monetary situation in Sri Lanka and the current monetary policy of the board, and examining the effect of the current fiscal policy of the Government upon the ability of the Central Bank to achieve the objects specified in section 5.

Conditions of eligibility of credit instruments for discount, &c., by Central Bank.

105. The Monetary Board may declare that credit instruments held by banking institutions and licensed specialized banks will not be accepted for discount or rediscount by, or advances from, the Central bank, if the interest rates charged by such institutions and banks in respect of the loans or other credit operations to which such instruments relate exceed the interest or rediscount rates of the Central Bank by more than such percentage or margin as may from time to time be prescribed by the board.

CHAPTER VA

THE CENTRAL BANK TO PURCHASE SHARES IN CERTAIN COMPANIES

Central bank to purchase share in companies. [§.2, 26 of 1995]

105A. Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act or anything in any other written law, the Central bank may acquire and hold shares in any company which in the opinion of the Monetary Board was formed for the advancement and promotion of human resources and technological development in the banking and financial sector in Sri Lanka, or to provide for all or any of the facilities referred to in subsection (1) of section 98 or 112A of this Act.

CHAPTER VI

THE CENTRAL BANK AS FISCAL AGENT, BANKER, AND FINANCIAL ADVISER OF THE GOVERNMENT

Central Bank to be fiscal agent and banker of the Government.

106. (1) The Central Bank shall act as the fiscal agent and banker of the Government and of agencies or institutions acting on behalf of the Government, whether established by any written law or otherwise.

(2) The Central Bank may, in addition to exercising the functions mentioned in subsection (1), act as agent of the Government for the purposes of any matter or transaction if it is authorised so to do by the Minister in charge of the subject of Finance after consultation with the Monetary Board.

Official depository of the Government.

107. (1) The Central bank shall be the official depository of the Government and or agencies or institutions referrred to in subsection (1) of section 106:

Provided, however, that the Monetary Board may authorise one or more commercial banks operating in Sri Lanka to accept Government deposits, subject to such rules and regulations as the board may prescribe.

(2) The monetary Board shall advise the Government regrding the distribution of official deposits between the Central Bank and commercial banks and the effects of such distribution on monetary conditions in Sri Lanka.

x. In relation to issues of T-bills, send a letter to TOD, identifying such details viz. face value, book value of the relevant issue (Appendix BO-10).

B. Rupee Securities (RSs)

BO receives summary of the investments in Rupee Securities that are on float from the FO together with the relevant cheques for full amounts.

i. Enter information on applicants/Investors i.e. name/s, amount subscribed, cheque no., date of the receipt of application in the register named 'Cheque Register- Rupee Securities' as well as in the computer programme maintained at the Back Office.

ii. Verify cheques forwarded by applicants to ascertain that they are drawn in favor of the 'Registrar Public Debt- Government Securities- PDD Current A/c 4203' and also reconcile with the amount indicated in the application.

iii. Send DOD, cheques collected together with input sheets prepared for effecting the credit to 'PDD Current Account No. 4203'. After realization of the cheques prepare another input sheet to debit PDD Current account No. 4203 and credit DST's account No. 4201 along with a duly completed paying-in-voucher No. 118 and forward to DOD in order to credit funds to DST (Appendix BO-7).

iv. Inform FO in writing confirming the receipt of subscriptions from investors enabling it to issue stock certificates to the subscribers.

2. Servicing of domestic debt

A. T-bills/ T-bonds (fund transfer from the Treasury to CBSL only)

T-bills mature on every Friday and in the event of such day falling on a holiday, payments will be effected on immediate business day prior to the maturity date. With respect to T-bonds servicing involves both payment of semi-annual interest and maturity payments and in the event the payment due date (ie. Either or both interest and maturity) falls on a holiday payments will be effected on the following business day.

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MINUTE PAPER

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CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

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MONETARY BOARD

CONFIDENTIAL

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. MB/PD/05/18/97

ගොනු අංකය :
File No. PD/U7

රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 05/97

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 18

දිනය :
Date : 14.02.1997

විෂය :
MINUTE : 18. Issue of Treasury Bonds

The Board approved of :

a) Recommending to the Government -

i) the auction of Treasury Bonds carrying a half yearly coupon rate through Primary Dealers commencing March, 1997;

ii) the issue of Treasury Bonds amounting to Rs.10,000 million from March to December, 1997; and

iii) that the coupon rate and the maturity of Bonds be determined by the Central Bank.

b) The Central Bank making administrative arrangements for the issue of Treasury Bonds from the first week of March, 1997.

c) i) appointment of Primary Dealers for Treasury Bills as Primary Dealers for Treasury Bonds; and

ii) appointment of Treasury Bill Tender Board to act as Treasury Bond Tender Board; and

d) the arrangements proposed in this Board Paper for the subscription by EPF of any shortfall in any issue of Treasury Bonds.

TRUE COPY

H M [illegible]
Secretary
Monetary Board

52 TO: S/PD / ED(D)

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Meeting No. 5/97

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Item No. 18

දිනය :
Date : 14th February 1997

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක : MB/PD/5/18/97
Board Paper No.

ලිපිගොනු අංක :
File No. PD/U7

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව :
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board.

මාතෘකාව :
SUBJECT : ISSUE OF TREASURY BONDS

The Board Paper discusses arrangements made by the Central Bank on the proposed issue of Treasury Bonds (T.Bonds) and seeks Board approval to undertake the issue, servicing and re-payment of T.Bonds.

2. T.Bonds will be issued under the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance, as amended by Registered Stock & Securities Amendment Act No.32 of 1995.

3. T.Bonds will be a new Government debt instrument with a medium and long term maturity carrying interest coupons payable half yearly at a rate specified for each issue. These bonds will be issued on auction basis through Primary Dealers and are transferable by endorsement and delivery. These instruments will be issued in addition to the presently available Treasury Bills and Rupee Loans (Registered Stocks).

4. At present, only Treasury Bill yields are market determined and the yields of Rupee Loans (RLs) are pre-determined at the time of issue by the Central Bank. The absence of a medium and long term instrument, with a market determined yield has been a hindrance to the development of a yield curve for debt securities. Yields of T.Bonds will be market determined as these bonds will be issued with coupons and will be sold in auction. The investors will be able to purchase these bonds at market determined yield rates. The addition of T.Bonds to the debt securities market inter alia, will facilitate the development of the money and capital markets by providing a benchmark for private debt securities.

5. The introduction of the new debt instrument will also strengthen the secondary market for Government Securities. The only government debt instrument that is traded in the secondary market, at present is T.Bills. RLs are not traded at all. Owing to the requirement of registration of transfers and the procedures involved, RLs are not attractive in the secondary market. On the other hand, T.Bond is an instrument with a great deal of flexibility and convenience for trading. In a situation where the government is not planning to issue new T.Bills in the near future, T.Bonds of 2-3 year maturity are likely to be accepted by the dealers.

6. At present, short term debt form a significant proportion of domestic debt. Treasury bills totalling Rs.125,000 million account for 38 per cent of domestic debt. This high proportion of short term debt is largely due to the use of Treasury bills as a funding instrument of the Budget. This has also led to an anomalous situation in the risk and return structure for Treasury bills in that, as compared to bank deposits, T.Bills carry a higher rate of interest. The introduction of T.Bonds as a funding instrument will also reduce the share of short term debt in government domestic debt.

. Public Debt Department has finalised all arrangements for the commencement of Treasury bond auctions by the first week of March. Draft regulations, necessary to be gazetted by the Hon. Minister of Finance was approved by the Board at its meeting No.1/97 held on 3rd January, 1997 and forwarded to the Legal Draftsman for final drafting. These regulations will be ready by 14th February, 1997 for gazetting by the Hon. Minister.

7. Detailed guidelines to be issued to Primary Dealers regarding auction procedure, calculation of interest, payment of interest and

maturity proceeds, pricing of bonds and also the issue of duplicates, sub-division and consolidation of bonds have been finalised after a series of discussions with all Primary Dealers. The Department proposes to issue these to all Primary Dealers by 17th February, 1997. Annex 1.

8. All documentation necessary for the issue of T.Bonds in scrip form have been prepared. These include the bond certificate which is in final form and printing will be completed by the 17th February, 1997. (Annex II). Other documents necessary for the primary issue will be printed at the Central Bank Press.

9. As T.Bond issues will be a part of the borrowing programme of the Government and as the Central Bank is not permitted to subscribe to primary issue of T.Bonds, it would be necessary to make special arrangements to ensure total subscriptions to these Bonds. The following special arrangements have been made in order to ensure total subscription.

i. A minimum level of participation has been fixed for each Primary Dealer depending on its level of performance in primary auction of Treasury bills. This level will range from 2 per cent at the minimum to 10 per cent at the maximum, varying with the performance of each Primary Dealer; and

ii. In order to ensure that the market behaves in an orderly manner the Superintendent, Employees' Provident Fund (S/EPF) will also be permitted to bid at these auctions. This will in addition help to ensure that the issue will be fully subscribed.

11. Auctions will be held twice a month. The Central Bank will determine the maturity, coupon rate and the amount to be issued at each auction. The auction procedure will be similar to that of

Treasury Bills. A new computer based system has been developed in-house in the Public Debt Department to deal with T.Bond auctions. The Public Debt Department will also make recommendations in regard to acceptance/rejection of bids to the T.Bond Tender Board, the decision of which will be final as regards the price and amount to be accepted.

12. It is planned to issue T.Bonds amounting to Rs.500 million at each auction to be held twice a month. Accordingly, issue of Rs.10,000 million of bonds is envisaged for the period from March to December 1997. This amount is about 20% of the total domestic borrowing requirement of the government for 1997.

13. The Monetary Board is invited to approve of;

a) recommending to the Government

i) the auction of T.Bonds carrying a half yearly coupon rate through Primary Dealers commencing March, 1997;

ii) the issue of T.Bonds amounting to Rs.10,000 million from March to December, 1997; and

iii) that the coupon rate and the maturity of Bonds be determined by the Central Bank.

b) The Central Bank making administrative arrangements for the issue of T.Bonds from the first week of March, 1997.

c) i) appointment of Primary Dealers for Treasury bills as Primary Dealers for T.Bonds; and

ii) appointment of Treasury bill Tender Board to act as T.Bond Tender Board; and

d) the arrangements proposed in this Board paper for the subscription by EPF of any shortfall in any issue of T.Bonds.

S M R Ellepola
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

Annex I

Treasury Bonds Guidelines 1

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
PUBLIC DEBT DEPARTMENT

PROCEDURES FOR PRIMARY ISSUE, TRANSFER AND COLLECTION OF INTEREST AND MATURITY PROCEEDS, ISSUE OF DUPLICATES , RENEWAL ,CONSOLIDATION AND SUB-DIVISION OF TREASURY BONDS

1. General

1.1. These procedures are applicable to Treasury Bonds issued in written form, with coupons attached. Treasury Bonds, issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL or Central Bank) on behalf of the Government, are transferable, medium and long term debt instruments on which periodic payments of interest at a specified rate are made. The bonds are issued in terms of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chapter 420), as amended by Act No. 51 of 1983, Act No. 3 of 1985 and Act No. 32 of 1995, and the Appropriation Act pertaining to each financial year.

1.2 As used in these Procedures, the following terms have the meanings set forth below:

"Auction date" will be the date three working days preceding the issue date, fixed for the series except where the auction date falls on a Treasury Bill auction date in which case the auction date will be the working day preceding the Treasury Bill auction date.

"Dealer" means any person who is authorized to deal in Treasury Bonds for its own account and for the account of customers, either as a Primary Dealer or as a Secondary Market Dealer.

"Issue date" means the date for settlement of payment for the Bond by the successful bidders to CBSL at a primary auction. It is also the date from which the Bonds of that series commence to accrue interest.

"Primary Dealer" means any commercial bank, company or other person appointed by the Monetary Board as a Primary Dealer for the purpose of dealing with the Central Bank as a counterparty in the primary and secondary markets for stock and securities.

"Secondary Market Dealer" means any person, other than a Primary Dealer, authorized by the Central Bank to be a Dealer in Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds.

"Value date" means the date for settlement of payment by the buyer and delivery of the Bond certificates by the seller, in the secondary market.

2. Auction Procedures

2.1 Treasury Bonds will be issued by the auctions from time to time depending on the fund requirements of the Government of Sri Lanka and on terms and conditions to be stipulated by the Government of Sri Lanka and the CBSL.

2.2. Tenders will be accepted from Primary Dealers. In addition, CBSL may authorize a few additional major institutional investors to bid directly at primary auctions (referred to in these procedures as "Designated Non-dealer Bidders"). The general public will not be permitted to bid directly or make direct subscriptions to Treasury Bonds. The general public is advised to purchase Treasury Bonds from the Primary Dealers.

2.3 Tenders must be made on forms obtainable from the Public Debt Department of CBSL.

2.4 Tenders must be in multiples of Rupees one million, with a minimum tender of Rupees five million.

2.5 A separate tender form should be forwarded in respect of each bid if a bidder wishes to make bids at more than one bid price. The bid price should be quoted in Rupees and cents for each Rs.100/- to be tendered. Bids should not be made in fractions of cents.

2.6 Treasury Bonds will carry semi-annual interest payments at a fixed rate per annum (also referred to as the coupon rate). However, tenderers will have the flexibility to bid at par, at a premium or at a discount.

2.7 Duly perfected tender forms should be enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed to the 'Registrar of Public Debt, Central Bank of Sri Lanka', and marked on top left hand corner, 'Treasury Bonds'. The sealed envelopes must be deposited in the tender boxes provided for the purpose at the premises of the Public Debt Department, CBSL, or at other pre-announced places, within the stipulated time limit. Tenders in respect of which tender forms are not duly perfected are liable to be rejected.

2.8 CBSL will reserve to itself the right of accepting any portion of a tender or the whole of it, and shall have the right of rejecting any or all tenders without assigning any reason.

2.9 Successful tenderers will be notified by telephone as early as possible upon finalisation of the tenders.

2.10 For each auction of a series of Treasury Bonds, an issue date will be specified for the series. In general the issue date for a series will be 1st of the month or 1st working day of the month or the 15th of the month or the 1st working day after the 15th of the month. CBSL presently intends to issue Treasury Bonds twice a month with interest payment dates and maturity dates falling either on the first day of the month, or on the 15th day of a month.

11 In order to ensure full subscription of primary issues, the CBSL may stipulate minimum participation levels to each Primary Dealer. The participating level expected of one Primary Dealer will not be made known to the other Primary Dealers.

12 A first press notice inviting bids for each auction will be published in national newspapers approximately two weeks before the auction date for the information of Primary Dealers, investors and the general public. The press notice will carry details pertaining to the auction, including date of auction, amount on offer, terms and conditions governing submission of bids, date the Bonds will be issued, maturity date, and interest payment dates. The notice will also state that the coupon rate for payment of interest will be specified in a subsequent press notice. A second press notice will be published in national newspapers at least three days before the auction date, specifying the coupon rate for payment of interest. Promptly after the auction, a press release will be published, announcing the results of the auction.

2.13 All payments on account of accepted tenders must be made in full on the dates specified in the press announcement. All cheques in settlement of accepted tenders must be handed over to the Public Debt Department within the time frame stipulated, unless otherwise specified.

Non-payment by a successful bidder of an accepted tender within this stipulated time frame will result in disciplinary action against the bidder pursuant to the Statement of Responsibilities and Privileges for Primary Dealers, and the Central Bank will not release the bidder from liability for payment in full of the accepted tender.

2.14 Promptly after the issue date for a series, the Registrar of Public Debt will issue the Treasury Bonds for the series in the form of printed certificates, made payable to the successful tenderers. These certificates may be obtained in one or more denominations indicated on the reverse of the tender form. The minimum value is Rs. 10,000/-. Certificate requirements should be clearly indicated, on the reverse of the tender form. If the required denominations are not specified, bond certificates will be issued in denominations as decided by the Registrar of Public Debt.

2.15 Unless specifically authorised by the customer in writing to do otherwise, the Primary Dealer should, not later than the next working day after receipt of the related certificate from CBSL, properly endorse and deliver the certificate, with all interest coupons attached, to the customer.

3. Coupon and Maturity Dates

3.1 Treasury Bonds will provide for semi-annual interest payments. For each series of Treasury Bonds, the first coupon date will be determined by CBSL and announced in a press notice preceding the auction. Once the first coupon date is fixed, the second coupon date will be the same date of the month 6 months hence; the third coupon date will be the same date of the month 6 months thereafter, and so forth. This pattern will continue throughout the life of the Bond.

eg.

If the date of a two year Treasury Bond is January 15, 1997, the interest payment dates and maturity date will be as follows.

Coupon/maturity	Date
First coupon	July 15, 1997
Second coupon	January 15, 1998
Third coupon	July 15, 1998
Fourth coupon	January 15, 1999
Maturity date	January 15, 1999

3.2 To simplify calculations, CBSL will normally set the first coupon date exactly 6 months after the issue date for the Bonds, resulting in a normal first interest period (normally containing between 181 and 184 days). Under some circumstances, however (due to weekends,

holidays or other reasons), it may be necessary to schedule the first coupon date at slightly more or slightly less than the normal six month period. When such an irregular first coupon period occurs for a bond series, an appropriate adjustment will be made in the amount of the first interest payment on that series, to reflect the irregularity. All subsequent interest payments, however, will be made in the normal amount.

3.3 In the event that any coupon date or maturity date falls on a non-working day, interest payments and maturity payments will be made by CBSL on the next working day.

3.4 To help simplify Bond calculations, record keeping, and comparisons between bond series, CBSL intends to standardize the coupon dates and maturity dates among bond series as much as practicable (that is, to choose the same day of the month as the payment date for interest and maturity proceeds), as noted in Section 2.10 above. As series of Treasury Bonds accumulate, standardized maturity dates will also allow the issue dates for settlement of new bond issues to be matched more closely with the maturity dates of old bond issues. Thus, eventually, this will aid with the re-investment of maturing bond proceeds and funding of new issues.

4. Calculation of Interest

4.1. Half yearly interest coupon carry an amount of interest exactly equivalent to one half of the interest due on the Bond, for a year at the coupon rate specified for the series (although the exact number of days falling within the specific half year period vary from 181 to 184 days) except in the case of first coupon whenever the actual number of days from the issue date to the first coupon date is less or more than the exact number of days for the relevant 6 month period.

4.2 Wherever the actual number of days within the first coupon period is less or more than the exact number of days for a period of 6 month from the issue date, interest is calculated on the following basis. Interest will be calculated to the nearest rupee.

$$C_1 = r\left[\frac{D^*}{D} - \frac{1}{2}\right]F$$

C_1 = Coupon amount for the first coupon period

r = Coupon rate as specified for the Bond series

D^* = Actual number of days from the issue date to the second coupon date

D = Actual number of days for a complete period of one year from the issue date (Which is 365 days for a normal year and 366 days, in respect of the year commencing on first March of the preceding year of a leap year and ending on 29 th February of the respective leap year.

F = Face value

Example

Calculate interest amount on 15%, 1999 Bond series with a face value of Rs.10,000 with an issue date of 17th February 1997 and first coupon date of 15th August, 1997.

$$C_1 = r\left[\frac{D^*}{D} - \frac{1}{2}\right]F$$

$$= 15\left[\frac{363}{365} - \frac{1}{2}\right] \times 10{,}000$$

$$= 15\left[\frac{726 \div 365}{730}\right] \times 10{,}000$$

$$= 15\left[\frac{361}{730}\right] \times 10{,}000$$

$C_1 \div Rs.741.78$

rounded off to Rs. 742

5. Payment of Interest

5.1 Semi-annual interest payments will be made by CBSL on the coupon payment dates specified at the time of initial issue and indicated on the face of the bond certificate and attached interest coupons. As noted in section 3.3 above, if a coupon payment date is not a working day, the interest payment will be made on the next working day.

5.2 Bonds will be issued as written certificates with interest coupons attached. Interest payments will be made by CBSL on the due date only in accordance with the procedures set forth below for the proper completion and submission of coupons.

5.3 Interest payments will not be made directly to any holder of a Treasury Bond, or any holder of a Treasury Bond interest coupon, or any agent of such holder, unless the holder is either a Primary Dealer, a Secondary Market Dealer, or a Designated Non-dealer Bidder. Any other holder must collect its interest payments through either a Primary Dealer or a Secondary Market Dealer pursuant to the requirements of these Procedures. There is no requirement that the Dealer making the collection on behalf of the customer be the same Dealer from whom the Treasury Bond was acquired by the holder.

5.4 Interest will be paid on submission of the relevant interest coupons in accordance with the following procedures and requirements:

(a) The lawful owner of the Bond must furnish the Bond certificate with the coupons intact to a dealer.

(b) To collect interest payments on behalf of a customer, the Dealer must ensure the following.

i. It must satisfy itself that the customer has proper title to the coupon and the underlying Treasury Bond.

ii. Ensure that the coupon is attached to the Treasury Bond certificate in the same manner as when originally issued. The coupon must then be detached from the certificate by the Dealer.

iii. It must enter the customer's name on the reverse side of the coupon, and must sign and seal the coupon at the appropriate place to certify that the named customer is the holder of the Treasury Bond, and that fate of proceeds is guaranteed. Completing, signing and sealing the coupon in this manner constitutes the guaranty of the Dealer that the interest proceeds of the coupon will be paid to the named customer immediately upon receipt from CBSL. The completed, signed and sealed coupon, together with any other documents that may be required by CBSL, must be submitted to CBSL.

(c) To collect interest payments on Treasury Bonds held for its own account, the Dealer must enter its own name on the reverse side of the coupon, and submit it, together with any other documents that may be required, to CBSL for collection at the appropriate time.

(d) Interest coupons may be submitted to CBSL for collection no sooner than 7 working days prior to their respective due dates. Properly submitted interest coupons will be paid to the Dealer on their due date or, if the due date is not a working day, on the next working day, provided the coupon is submitted to CBSL not less than 3 working days prior to the due date. Coupons submitted later than 3 working days prior to their due date will be paid by CBSL after processing as soon as practicable.

(e) Immediately upon receipt of an interest payment by a Dealer on behalf of a customer, the Dealer must immediately, effective as of the same working day, credit the interest to the account of the customer. To avoid practical problems that might hinder such same day crediting of interest, the Dealer is expected to make prior arrangements to solve problems of this nature, so that same day crediting for all customers can take place on the date interest is received from CBSL.

5.5 Under no circumstances will any Dealer use an interest coupon, surrendered to it by a customer for purposes of collection, for any other purpose whatsoever.

5. Payment of Maturity Proceeds

5..1 Maturity proceeds of Treasury Bonds will be paid by CBSL on the maturity date specified at the time of initial issue and indicated on the face of the bond certificate. As specified above in section 3.3, if the maturity date is not a working day, the principal amount will be paid on the next working day.

5.2 Payments of maturity proceeds will not be made directly to any holder of a Treasury Bond, or any agent of such holder, unless the holder is either a Primary Dealer, a Secondary

Market Dealer, or a Designated Non-dealer Bidder. Any other holder must collect its maturity proceeds through either a Primary Dealer or a Secondary Market Dealer pursuant to the requirements of these Procedures. There is no requirement that the Dealer making the collection on behalf of the customer be the same Dealer from whom the Treasury Bond was acquired by the holder.

6.3 Payment of maturity proceeds will be made by CBSL on the maturity of a Treasury Bond only in accordance with the following procedures and requirements:

(a) The lawful owner of the Bond must furnish the bond certificate to a dealer after duly perfecting the relevant cage.

(b) To collect maturity proceeds on behalf of a customer, the Dealer must ensure the following:

i. It must satisfy itself that the customer has proper title to the Bond.

ii. It must sign and seal the Bond certificate at the appropriate place to indicate fate of proceeds is guaranteed. This signature and seal constitutes the guaranty of the Dealer that the maturity proceeds of the Bond will be paid to the customer by the Dealer immediately upon receipt from CBSL.

iii. The bond certificate, together with attachments for endorsements and other documents that may be required by CBSL, must be submitted to CBSL.

(c) To collect maturity proceeds on maturing Treasury Bonds held for its own account, the Dealer, as holder, must sign the collection instructions printed on the reverse side of the bond certificate, and submit the bond certificate, together with any attachments for endorsements and other documents that may be required, to CBSL.

(d) Maturing Bond certificates may be submitted to CBSL for collection no sooner than 7 working days prior to their maturity date. The maturity proceeds for properly submitted bond certificates will be paid to the Dealer on maturity date of the bond or, if the maturity date is not a working day, on the next working day, provided that the certificate is submitted to CBSL not less than 3 working days prior to the maturity date. Bond certificates submitted later than 3 working days prior to their maturity date will be paid by CBSL after processing as soon as practicable.

(e) Immediately upon receipt of maturity proceeds by a Dealer on behalf of a customer, the Dealer must immediately, effective as of the same working day, credit the proceeds to the account of the customer. To avoid practical problems that might hinder such same day crediting of maturity proceeds, the Dealer is expected to make prior arrangements to solve problems of this nature, so that same day crediting for all customers can take place on the date the maturity proceeds are received from CBSL.

6.4 Under no circumstances will any Dealer use a bond certificate, surrendered to it by a customer for purposes of collection, for any other purpose whatsoever.

7. Endorsement and Transfer

7.1 Following a primary auction, the bond certificates are initially issued in the name of successful tenderers. Although CBSL keeps a record of this initial ownership of Treasury Bonds, it does not thereafter keep records to track changes in ownership after initial issuance. Treasury Bonds are transferable by endorsement, and transfers do not require registration. In order to effect a valid transfer, however, CBSL will require the endorsement and transfer to be carried out in accordance with the requirements and procedures described below.

7.2 The only party entitled to transfer a Treasury Bond by endorsement is the person duly entitled to own the bond. Each transfer of a Treasury Bond to be valid must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) The transferor must endorse the bond to the transferee by completing an endorsement in the form "pay _____ , or order" by inserting the transferee's name legibly. This endorsement must be contained on the reverse side of the Bond certificate, or on a separate attachment in the form prescribed by CBSL. If the transferee is an individual, the National Identity Card number of the transferee must also be inserted. The endorsement must then be signed by the transferor, as owner, or by his duly appointed representative.

(b) The endorsement by the transferor must be certified by a dealer. There is no requirement that the Dealer certifying the transfer be the same Dealer from whom the Treasury Bond was acquired by the transferor.

8. Issue of Duplicates

8.1 Applications for issue of duplicates will indicate the circumstances under which a bond has been lost, stolen or destroyed totally or in part. This request should be addressed to the Registrar of Public Debt and shall be accompanied by:-

(a) A statement indicating:

(i) the Bond series, Bond number and the value of the Bond,

(ii) the last occasion when interest has been collected,

(b) A letter from the Primary Dealer from whom the Bond was purchased, indicating the Bond series, Bond number and the value of the Bond and the certification that the Bond has been sold to party making the request.

(c) A letter from at the Dealer who authenticated the last transfer indicating the Bond series, Bond number and the value of the Bond and the certification that the Bond has been sold to party making the request.

(d) Post office registration receipt if the letter containing the Bond, was lost in transmission by registered post.

(e) An affidavit indicating that the party:-

(i) is the legal holder of the Bond which has been lost, stolen or destroyed,

(ii) that he is not in possession of the Bond and

(iii) has not transferred the Bond to any other person or hypothecated it as security for any purpose whatsoever.

(f) The remaining portion of a bond, if the Bond is partly damaged or if coupons are lost or damaged or destroyed.

8.2. If the registrar is satisfied, that the Bond is lost, he will instruct the applicant to publish a notice at his expense in a national newspaper giving notification of the loss, theft or destruction of the Bond in a format indicated below:-

Treasury Bond
Lost, Stolen or Destroyed

The Government of Sri Lanka ....Treasury Bond.....series bearing Bond No.....issued on.....and maturing on.....for Rs.....originally standing in the name of.....and the first endorsed to.....and last endorsed to..... by whom it was never endorsed to any other person, having been lost or stolen or destroyed, notice is hereby given that payment of the above Bond and the interest thereon has been stopped by the Registrar, and that application has been made to the Registrar for the issue of a duplicate Bond in the name of the Applicant. The public is warned against purchasing or otherwise dealing with the above mentioned Treasury Bond.

Any person entitled to make a claim pertaining to these Bonds should forwarded same to Registrar/Superintendent of Public Debt, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Level 29, World Trade Center, West Tower, Colombo 1, within 14 days from date hereof.

Name of Applicant
Address Date

The Registrar will issue a duplicate if he is satisfied with the information forwarded to him and after the lapse of 6 months from the date of the loss or after the next interest payment date which ever occurs first after obtaining an Indemnity Bond indemnifying the government of Sri Lanka, the CBSL and Registrar against any loss or damage resulting from the issue of the duplicate Bond. No duplicate interest coupon will be issued under any circumstances for existing Bonds. In the event of loss of interest coupon/coupons too, the procedure will be the same. The duplicate Bond will carry interest coupon only for the balance life time of the Bond and will be stamped 'Duplicate'.

9. Renewal, Consolidation and Sub-division

Applications for renewal, consolidation and sub-division of Treasury Bonds should be forwarded in forms designed for that purpose together with the original Bond/Bonds through Primary Dealers. The applicant should reimburse the cost of the renewal ,

consolidation and sub-division of Treasury Bonds as specified by the Registrar of Public Debt.

The Registrar shall issue the renewed, consolidated or sub-divided Bonds after stamping the Bonds "Renewal", "Consolidation" or "Sub-division" as the case may be, to the Primary Dealer and the Primary Dealer shall issue such Bonds to the holder with necessary endorsements.

The Registrar shall not receive applications for renewal, consolidation or sub-division during the period of one week immediately preceding the respective date of interest payments.

10. Stamp Duty and Taxes

10.1 Treasury Bonds are exempted from stamp duty and withholding tax. However, income tax will have to be paid in the normal manner with respect to interest or other income arising from ownership of the Bond.

11. Miscellaneous

11.1 All Primary Dealers and Secondary Market Dealers are required to furnish to the Public Debt Department the names and certified specimen signatures of officers who are authorised to sign on their behalf for any purposes under the Registered Stock & Securities Ordinance, Regulations made thereunder, or these Guidelines. These signatures will be updated and circulated among Primary Dealers.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය/இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

බැඳුම්කර අංකය/முறி எண்/Bond No. :

අනුක්‍රමික අංකය/தொடர் எண்/Serial No.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය
இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி
Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series

කල්පිරෙන දිනය / முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி / Date of Maturity

රු./ரூபா/Rs.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar :

දිනය/ திகதி/Date .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය

இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

අනුක්‍රමික අංකය/தொடர் எண்/Serial No.

බැඳුම්කර අංකය/முறி எண்/Bond No. :

මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කරනු ලබන්නේ .....අංක..... දරණ විසර්ජන පනතින් යටත් බලයෙන් හා (420 වැනි අධිකාරය වන) ලියාපදිංචි කළ ව්‍යාපාර විස්තර හා ඇපකර ආඥාපනතේ විධිවිධාන යටතේ .....මුදල් වර්ෂයේ පෝරවීන් සඳහා වැය කරනු පිණිසය/..... ඇති ද්‍රව්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සඳහා වැය කිරීමට ඇති බලය යටතේ හා ඒ ආඥාපනතේ විධිවිධාන යටතේ .....ඇති ඇණ්ඩිය ..... ඇති ද්‍රව්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සඳහා වැය කිරීමට ඇති බලය යටතේ හා ඒ ආඥාපනතේ විධිවිධාන යටතේ

This Treasury Bond is issued on the authority of the Appropriation Act No.....of.....and under the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chap. 420) to meet expenditure for the service of the financial year.....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය
இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி
Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series

කල්පිරෙන දිනය / முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி / Date of Maturity

රු./ரூபா/Rs.

ඉහත දැක්වෙන කල්පිරෙන දිනයේ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ අරමුදලින් කොළඹ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් රුපියල් .....යි හෝ වෙනත් ඇමෙරිකා .....හෝ අඩවි හෝ මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරයෙන් හිමිකම් පැවෙන්නේය/இந்தத் திறைசேரி முறியானது மேலே குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட முதிர்ச்சித் திகதியில் கொழும்பு, ...என்பவருக்கு அல்லது இலங்கை මධ්‍ය වාණිජ්‍ය බැංකුවේ ඉලංකා අරසාන්ක නිධීන්ගලිල් ඉරුන්තු තිරුප්පික් කොටුක්කප්පටුම්පොතු ..... කට්ටළෙප්පඩි රූපා .....ඉන් ගෙවීමට හිමිකම් කියනු ලැබේ./This Treasury Bond entitles..... .....or order to payment of Rupees..... out of the funds of the Government of Sri Lanka on the above maturity date at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo.

කල් දිරෙන දිනය දක්වා සෑම වර්ෂයකම ..... සහ ..... යන දිනවලදී .....දින පටන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මත කල් ඇති ඕනෑම අලෙවිකරුවකුගේ මාර්ගයෙන් කොළඹ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත මෙම බැඳුම්කරයට යා කර ඇති අදල පොළී කූපනය ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසුව ඉහත් සඳහන් දිනවල හෝ ඒ පසු දිනක පොළිය ලැබේ/ඇත්තේය. මෙම බැඳුම්කරය මත ලියාපදිංචි කර ඇති හිමිකරුගේ නම හා ලිපිනය වෙනස් කිරීම් ඇතුළත් ඉල්ලීම් ලිඛිතව ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුය. ඉහත

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය/இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

අනුක්‍රමික අංකය/தொடர் எண்/Serial No. .....

බැඳුම්කර අංකය/முறி எண்/Bond No. : .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය / இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி / Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond ..... | කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series ..... | කල්පිරෙන දිනය / முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி / Date of Maturity .....

රු/ரூபா/Rs.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar : .....

දිනය/ திகதி/Date .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය

இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

අනුක්‍රමික අංකය/தொடர் எண்/Serial No.

බැඳුම්කර අංකය/முறி எண்/Bond No. : .....

මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කරනු ලබන්නේ ..... අංක ..... දරණ විසර්ජන පනතින් හෝ බලයෙන් හා (420 වැනි අධිකාරය වන) රියාපදිංචි කළ ව්‍යාපාර වස්තු හා ඇපකර ආඥාපනතේ විධිවිධාන යටතේ ..... මුදල් වර්ෂයේ සේවාවන් සඳහා වැය කරනු පිණිසය./ இவ் திறை ஈட்டுப் பங்குகளின் பதிவு செய்தல் கட்டளைச் சட்டத்தின் (அதிகாரம் 420) ..... ஆம் ஆண்டின் ..... ஆம் நிதி ஆண்டிற்குரிய செலவுகளுக்காக ஒதுக்கீடு செய்வதற்கான ..... ஆம் ஆண்டின் ..... ஆம் இலக்க ஒதுக்கீட்டுச் சட்டத்தின் அதிகாரப்படி (420 ஆம் அத்தியாயமான) பதிவுசெய்யப்பட்ட. பங்குத்தொகுதிப் பிணைகள் கட்டளைச் சட்டத்தின் ஏற்பாடுகளின் கீழ் திரட்டப்படுகின்றது. This Treasury Bond is issued on the authority of the Appropriation Act No. ..... of ..... and under the provisions of the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (Chap. 420) to meet expenditure for the service of the financial year. .....

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය / இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி / Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond ..... | කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series ..... | කල්පිරෙන දිනය / முதிர்ச்சித் திகதி / Date of Maturity .....

රු/ரூபா/Rs.

ඉහත දැක්වෙන කල්පිරෙන දිනයේ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ අරමුදලින් කොළඹ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් රුපියල් ..... ක් හෙවිනු පැමිණිමට ..... හෝ ඒහට හෝ මෙම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරයෙන් සිහිකම් දැනෙන්නේය/இந்தத் திறைசேரி முறியானது மேலே குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட முதிர்ச்சித் திகதியில் கொழும்பு, இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியில் இலங்கை அரசாங்க நிதியங்களில் இருந்து திருப்பிக் கொடுக்கப்படும்போது ..... என்பவருக்கு அல்லது கட்டளைப்படி ரூபா ..... இனை உரித்துடையதாக்கும்./This Treasury Bond entitles ..... or order to payment of Rupees ..... out of the funds of the Government of Sri Lanka on the above maturity date at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo.

කල් පිරෙන දින දක්වා සෑම වර්ෂයකම ..... සහ ..... යන දිනවලදී ..... දින පටන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා පත් කර ඇති මූල්‍යකරුවකුගේ මාර්ගයෙන් කොළඹ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත මෙම බැඳුම්කරයට යා කර ඇති අදල පොළී කූපනය ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසුව පොළී මුදල් හෙවිනු ලැබේ/வட்டியானது இதனோடு இணைக்கப்பட்டுள்ள பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டுக்களை திறைசேரி முதி வணிகர்களின் ஊடாக கொழும்பு இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி பொதுப்படுகடன் பதிவாளருக்கு சமர்ப்பிக்கும்போது ..... தொடங்கி முதிர்ச்சியடையும் வரை ஒவ்வொரு ஆண்டு ..... நாளும் ..... நாளும் செலுத்தப்படும்./Interst is payable on the ..... and ..... of each year commencing on ..... until maturity at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, on submission of the relevant coupon attached to this Bond through any Dealer for Treasury Bonds to the Registrar of Public Debt, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුව වෙනුවට හා වෙනුවෙන්.
இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்திற்காகவும் அதன் சார்பிலும்.
for and on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar

කොළඹ/கொழும்பு/Colombo .....

D 641226 (96/08) ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජයේ මුද්‍රණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

(ඩෙබිටර්වරුවකු හැර අන් කිසිවකු විසින් වෙන් කොට ඉවත් කළ නොහැක/வணிகர் ஒருவரினால் அன்றி கிழிக்கப்படலாகாது)
Not to be Detached Except by a Dealer)

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය/இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

පොළී කූපනය – 4/பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டு – 4/Interest Coupon – 4

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය / இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி / Govt. of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond ..... | කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series ..... | බැඳුම්කර අංකය / முறி எண் / Bond No. .....

රු/ரூபா/Rs.

මෙම කූපනය කොළඹ දී රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත 19 ..... දිනයේදී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් රු. ..... ක මුදල් ඉල්ලා සිටීමට හිමිකම් ලැබේ/இந்த கூப்பனை கொழும்பில் உள்ள இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியில் பொதுக்கடன் பதிவாளருக்கு சமர்ப்பிக்கும்போது ..... ஆம் ஆண்டு ..... ஆம் நாளில் அல்லது அதற்குப் பின்னர் ரூபா ..... பெற்றுக்கொள்ளலாம்./The holder is entitled to Rupees ..... on ..... in Colombo on submission of this coupon to the Registrar of Public Debt.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar : .....

(ඩෙබිටර්වරුවකු හැර අන් කිසිවකු විසින් වෙන් කොට ඉවත් කළ නොහැක/வணிகர் ஒருவரினால் அன்றி கிழிக்கப்படலாகாது)
Not to be Detached Except by a Dealer)

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය/இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

පොළී කූපනය – 3/பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டு – 3/Interest Coupon – 3

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය / இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி / Govt. of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond ..... | කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series ..... | බැඳුම්කර අංකය / முறி எண் / Bond No. .....

රු/ரூபா/Rs.

මෙම කූපනය කොළඹ දී රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත 19 ..... දිනයේදී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් රු. ..... ක මුදල් ඉල්ලා සිටීමට හිමිකම් ලැබේ/இந்த கூப்பனை கொழும்பில் உள்ள இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியில் பொதுக்கடன் பதிவாளருக்கு சமர்ப்பிக்கும்போது ..... ஆம் நாளில் அல்லது அதற்குப் பின்னர் ரூபா ..... பெற்றுக்கொள்ளலாம்./The holder is entitled to Rupees ..... on ..... in Colombo on submission of this coupon to the Registrar of Public Debt.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar : .....

(ඩෙබිටර්වරුවකු හැර අන් කිසිවකු විසින් වෙන් කොට ඉවත් කළ නොහැක/வணிகர் ஒருவரினால் அன்றி கிழிக்கப்படலாகாது)
Not to be Detached Except by a Dealer)

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය/இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி/Government of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond

පොළී කූපනය – 2/பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டு – 4/Interest Coupon – 2

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය / இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி / Govt. of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond ..... | කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series ..... | බැඳුම්කර අංකය / முறி எண் / Bond No. .....

රු/ரூபா/Rs.

මෙම කූපනය කොළඹ දී රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත 19 ..... දිනයේදී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් රු. ..... ක මුදල් ඉල්ලා සිටීමට හිමිකම් ලැබේ/இந்த கூப்பனை கொழும்பில் உள்ள இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியில் பொதுக்கடன் பதிவாளருக்கு சமர்ப்பிக்கும்போது ..... ஆம் நாளில் அல்லது அதற்குப் பின்னர் ரூபா ..... பெற்றுக்கொள்ளலாம்./The holder is entitled to Rupees ..... on ..... in Colombo on submission of this coupon to the Registrar of Public Debt.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar : .....

(ඩෙබිටර්වරුවකු හැර අන් කිසිවකු විසින් වෙන් කොට ඉවත් කළ නොහැක/வணிகர் ஒருவரினால் அன்றி கிழிக்கப்படலாகாது)
Not to be Detached Except by a Dealer)

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පොළී කූපනය – 1/பற்றுரிமைச் சீட்டு – 4/Interest Coupon – 1

ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරය / இலங்கை அரசாங்க திறைசேரி முறி / Govt. of Sri Lanka Treasury Bond ..... | කාණ්ඩය / தொடர் / Series ..... | බැඳුම්කර අංකය / முறி எண் / Bond No. .....

රු/ரூபா/Rs.

මෙම කූපනය කොළඹ දී රාජ්‍ය ණය ලේඛකාධිකාරී වෙත 19 ..... දිනයේදී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් රු. ..... ක මුදල් ඉල්ලා සිටීමට හිමිකම් ලැබේ/இந்த கூப்பனை கொழும்பில் உள்ள இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கியில் பொதுக்கடன் பதிவாளருக்கு சமர்ப்பிக்கும்போது ..... ஆம் நாளில் அல்லது அதற்குப் பின்னர் ரூபா ..... பெற்றுக்கொள்ளலாம்./The holder is entitled to Rupees ..... on ..... in Colombo on submission of this coupon to the Registrar of Public Debt.

ලේඛකාධිකාරී/பதிவாளர்/Registrar : .....

"பதிவு நம்பிக்கையாளரினால் குறித்த திகதியன்று அல்லது அதற்கு முன்னர் திறைசேரி முறிகளின் பின்புறத்தில் அல்லது இணைப்புக்களில் செய்யப்பட்ட அனைத்து ஒப்புதல்களும் சரியானவை என்பதை வியாபாரி உறுதிப்படுத்தியுள்ளார் என்பதை ஒப்புதல் பெறுநர் உறுதிப்படுத்திக் கொள்ள வேண்டும்." / "At every point of transfer the transferee must ensure that a Dealer has duly certified the preceding endorsements."

இம்முறி சம்பந்தமாகவோ அல்லது இம்முறி இணைக்கப்பட்டுள்ள இணைப்புக்கள் சம்பந்தமாகவோ பொது முகாமையாளரினால் குறித்த நோக்கத்திற்காக வழங்கப்பட்ட விண்ணப்பங்களின் பின்புறத்தில் அல்லது இதற்கு தேவைப்படுகின்ற பதிவாளரின் தேவைக்கு இணங்க இதற்கு திகதியிடப்பட்ட முறிகள

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මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/12-6/2008

රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 1/2008

ලිපිගොනු අංකය :
File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 2.6

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව :
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

දිනය :
Date : 7.1.2008

TABLED BOARD PAPER

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

මාතෘකාව :
SUBJECT : PROPOSED YIELD STRUCTURE FOR TREASURY BONDS TO BE MOBILISED THROUGH DIRECT PLACEMENTS IN 2008

The purpose of this Board Paper is to;

(i) inform the Monetary Board of the plan of direct placements on Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans in 2008 to be arranged through the captive type investors.

(ii) seek the Monetary Board approval for the yield structure proposed for medium and long term direct placements on Treasury bonds and Rupee loans.

Introduction

According to the government cash flow for 2008, government expects to raise Rs 355 bn from domestic rupee sources by issuing Treasury bonds and Rupee loans. The main investor group operating in the long term debt market is state owned and state managed captive type sources. Major captive investors are EPF, NSB and ETF. Resource availability with these captive sources in 2008 is estimated at Rs 300 bn. (EPF -Rs 183 bn, NSB – Rs 83 bn and ETF – Rs 33 bn). The annual investment programmes of these captive sources indicated that Rs 235 bn would be invested in Treasury bonds while the balance to be invested in Treasury bills and other instruments.

Based on the above estimates, Rs 120 bn has to be collected from non captive sources mainly from Treasury bonds and Rupee loans through auction process to meet the borrowing requirement. In addition, Rs 9 bn is to be raised through new Treasury bills as indicated in the Cash Flow totaling Rs 129 bn borrowings from non captive market sources. This amount excludes the re-issue of maturing Treasury bills during the year estimated at Rs. 690 bn.

In 2008, the governments borrowings requirement from the domestic market through Treasury bonds and Rupee loans is excessive and not be able to raise through the normal auction process at a reasonable yield rates. Therefore, it would be advisable to raise funds available with captive type investors through direct placements. Further, considering the bunching problem in the domestic debt, it is suggested to issue long term securities in order to lower the refinancing risk in the future. Since, there is no active yield curve for long term maturities, this paper has proposed

suitable rate structure for long term maturities based on the medium term inflation targets given by the Economic Research Department.

Proposed Yield Rate Structure

The Medium Term Macroeconomic Framework has targeted a downward inflation path as given in Table 1 and on which the proposed rate structure is based.

Table 1
Inflation Targets as per MT Macroeconomic Framework

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
11.0%	9.0%	7.0%	5.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%

Based on these inflation targets, a proposed yield rate structure is estimated taking in to account real returns of 3% - 4% and appropriate risk premium for future market risks. The proposed yield rate structure for different maturities is given below. Details of the yield rate analysis is attached (Annex 1).

Table 2
Proposed Yield Rate Structure (After Tax)

Maturity	2 yrs	3yrs	4 yrs	5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	9 yrs	10 yrs	15 yrs.
Yield (%)at Real return of 4%	16.70%	15.85%	15.10%	14.40%	13.80%	13.46%	13.20%	13.00%	12.80%	12.60%
Yield(%) at Real return of 3%	15.80%	14.90%	14.15	13.40%	12.90%	12.45%	12.15%	11.95%	11.80%	11.55%

Possible Implications

- Shifting of a large share of fund mobilization program through direct placements would help lower the amount to be raised through the auction process thereby reducing the pressure on the market yield.
- However, this has a negative impact on the domestic debt market development.
- Initially, there would be a dual rate structure for similar maturities that would distort the market operations since current market rates are above the proposed rate structure due to high inflationary expectations.
- Possible mark to market losses for captive holders until the entire debt market stabilize around the proposed rate structure.
- Captive holderswould keep these securities in their investment portfolio in order to avoid mark to market losses.

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

- Captive holders could not trade or sale these bonds without capital losses if duel rate structure continues.
- This would have some impact on Primary Dealer operations reducing their operation in primary and secondary markets.

Considering the above issues, it is suggested to issue long term bonds with 6,8, 10 and 15 years tenure for direct placements. The proposed rates for these bonds (net of taxes) are 13.90%, 12.15%, 11.80% and 11.55% respectively.

Since the domestic debt market is volatile in the recent past, it is proposed to review this rate structure at end of April 2008, taking into consideration the development in debt market and macroeconomic environment in the economy.

The Monetary Board approval is sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placements of Treasury bonds and Rupee loans in respect of captive investors such as EPF, NSB and ETF during January-April 2008.

DG(W) SMB

AG(P) Actg. SPD

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

A Proposal for the Yield Rates (Based on Inflation expectations)

Method 1

Nominal Interest Rates Which Would Equate
Net Present Value At Given Real Rate Of Return

Maturity Years	Without Market Risk Premium at Real rate of					Market Risk Premium	With Market Risk Premium at Real rate of					Remarks
	0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	4.00%		0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	4.00%	
2	12.78%	13.66%	14.59%	15.53%	16.46%	0.25%	12.95%	13.90%	14.84%	15.78%	16.71%	After Tax Rate
3	11.53%	12.49%	13.45%	14.40%	15.34%	0.50%	12.03%	12.99%	13.95%	14.90%	15.84%	
4	10.91%	11.49%	12.46%	13.43%	14.39%	0.70%	11.21%	12.19%	13.16%	14.13%	15.09%	
5	9.56%	10.55%	11.54%	12.52%	13.50%	0.90%	10.45%	11.45%	12.44%	13.42%	14.40%	
6	8.76%	9.78%	10.78%	11.79%	12.78%	1.10%	9.86%	10.88%	11.88%	12.89%	13.88%	
7	8.19%	9.21%	10.24%	11.25%	12.26%	1.20%	9.39%	10.41%	11.44%	12.45%	13.46%	
8	7.75%	8.79%	9.82%	10.85%	11.87%	1.30%	9.05%	10.09%	11.12%	12.15%	13.17%	
9	7.41%	8.46%	9.50%	10.53%	11.56%	1.40%	8.81%	9.86%	10.90%	11.93%	12.96%	
10	7.13%	8.19%	9.24%	10.28%	11.32%	1.50%	8.63%	9.69%	10.74%	11.78%	12.82%	
15	6.30%	7.38%	8.46%	9.53%	10.59%	2.00%	8.30%	9.38%	10.46%	11.53%	12.59%	
2	14.11%	15.16%	16.21%	17.25%	18.29%		14.39%	15.44%	16.49%	17.53%	18.57%	Before Tax Rate
3	12.81%	13.88%	14.94%	16.00%	17.05%		13.37%	14.43%	15.49%	16.55%	17.60%	
4	11.65%	12.76%	13.84%	14.92%	15.99%		12.46%	13.54%	14.62%	15.70%	16.77%	
5	10.62%	11.72%	12.82%	13.92%	15.01%		11.62%	12.72%	13.82%	14.92%	16.01%	
6	9.74%	10.86%	11.98%	13.09%	14.20%		10.96%	12.08%	13.20%	14.32%	15.42%	
7	9.10%	10.24%	11.37%	12.50%	13.62%		10.43%	11.57%	12.71%	13.83%	14.96%	
8	8.61%	9.77%	10.91%	12.05%	13.19%		10.06%	11.21%	12.36%	13.50%	14.63%	
9	8.23%	9.40%	10.55%	11.70%	12.84%		9.79%	10.95%	12.11%	13.26%	14.40%	
10	7.93%	9.10%	10.26%	11.42%	12.57%		9.59%	10.76%	11.93%	13.09%	14.24%	
15	7.00%	8.20%	9.40%	10.59%	11.77%		9.22%	10.42%	11.62%	12.81%	13.99%	

Inflation Expectations (Forecasts)

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	>2017
15.00%	11.00%	9.00%	7.00%	5.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%

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H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

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MINUTE PAPER

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CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය
MONETARY BOARD

17 JAN 2008
රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

CONFIDENTIAL

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/1/26/2008

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File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

රැස්වීම් අංක :
Meeting No. : 1/2008

විෂය අංක :
Item No. : 26

දිනය :
Date : 07.01.2008

සටහන :
MINUTE : 26. Proposed Yield Structure for Treasury Bonds to be Mobilised through direct Placements in 2008

The Chairman informed the Board that the CBSL has been concerned about the unwarranted increases in the interest rates on government securities. Against this background, he informed that he had requested the Departments of Public Debt and Economic Research to come up with proposals with respect to the issue of government debt instruments and also aiming at minimizing the interest rate differentials between the primary and the secondary markets. The Board discussed the proposal in detail.

The Official Member was of the view that the investors mentioned in the paper, namely, the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF), Employees' Trust Fund (ETF) and the National Savings Bank (NSB), should not be treated alike as the cost structure in mobilizing funds by these three institutions differ. He also emphasized the need to take a realistic inflation forecast and stated that during the first half of the current year inflation is likely to remain high as several projects will continue to incur costs towards completion, whilst defence expenditure is unlikely to reduce and that certain adjustments in the administered prices will also have to be made. He further mentioned that in addition to the three institutions mentioned in the paper, the Public Debt Department should also look at several other sources such as different funds. He was also of the view that auctioning of government securities should aim at sources with more liquid funds.

(P.T.O)

The Board taking into consideration the views expressed by the members, approved :

(a) to allow the EPF to invest in longer term Government papers based on long term inflationary expectations plus 4 percent real rate of return and 2 percent risk premium to cover the errors in inflation projections;

(b) ETF also to be offered investment opportunities in Government paper on the same basis;

(c) for Superintendent of Public Debt (SPD) to negotiate with NSB for investments in Government paper, based on yield rates proposed in the paper; and

(d) For the Monetary Board to review the rates after April, 2008.

The Board requested SPD to report back to the Board with the progress on the proposal. The Board also requested CBSL to review the primary dealer system as this doesn't seem to raise funds from the market in an effective manner.

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M A R C Cooray
Secretary

TO : SPD
DER
S/EPF

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

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රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 25/2008

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 2.2

දිනය :
Date : 07.10.2008

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/25/)8/2008

ලිපිගොනු අංකය :
File No. : 08/11/003/0060/002

අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

TABLED BOARD PAPER

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board

මාතෘකාව :
SUBJECT: IMPROVEMENT OF MARKET LIQUIDITY THROUGH ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF EMPLOYEES' PROVIDENT FUND.

The purpose of this Board Paper is to seek the Monetary Board approval to;

(i) Issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at an interest rate 5 basis points above the rates prevailed in the secondary market through private placements; and

(ii) Request EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations.

2. It has been observed an emerging pressure on the government borrowing programme since mid September 2008. The main contributory factors include excessive government borrowings from domestic sources, delay in government borrowing from external foreign currency sources, newly developed turmoil in the international capital market and continuous shortfall in liquidity in the domestic market. As a result, there is a high risk of increasing the interest rates in the domestic market and the possibility of funding through the Central Bank to meet borrowing shortfalls.

3. In this context, it would be advisable to adopt a market stabilisation process by inviting the EPF to play an active role in both the primary market, preventing upward pressure in the primary market and actively trading in the secondary market thereby improving liquidity in the government securities market.

4. Accordingly, the Monetary Board is invited to approve;

(i) to issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at a interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and,

(ii) to request the EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations.

DG(W) S/MB AG(P) S/PD

M A R C Cooray
Secretary

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සටහන් පත්‍රය
MINUTE PAPER

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය
MONETARY BOARD

CONFIDENTIAL

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක : Board Paper No. : MB/PD/25/20/2008
ගොනු අංක : File No. : 08/11/003/0060/002

රැස්වීම් අංක : Meeting No. : 25/2008
විෂය අංක : Item No. : 20
දිනය : Date : 7.10.2008

සටහන : MINUTE : 20. Improvement of Market Liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund (EPF)

The Board having considered the paper approved of :

(a) Issuing Treasury Bonds to EPF and other captive sources at an interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and

(b) Requesting the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engaging in secondary market operations.

TRUE COPY

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

TO: S/PD
Thro' AG(P)

TRUE COPY

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

ඇමුණුම XV

භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
திறைசேரி செயற்பாடுகள் திணைக்களம்
Department of Treasury Operations

මුදල් හා ක්‍රමසම්පාදන අමාත්‍යාංශය,මහලේකම් කාර්යාලය,
කැ.පෙ.1559, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව.

நிதி திட்டமிடல் அமைச்சு, செயலகம்,
தபெ. 1559, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை

Ministry of Finance & Planning, The Secretariat,
P.O.Box: 1559, Colombo 01. Sri Lanka.

අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්
பணிப்பாளர் நாயகம்;
Director General
0094112484729
dgto@tod.treasury.gov.lk

ෆැක්ස්
பெக்ஸ்
Fax
0094 112 484970

පොදු
பொது
General
0094 112 484500
0094 112 484600

මගේ අංකය
எனது இல
My No. TO/DG/CFS/03

ඔබේ අංකය
உமது இல
Your No.

දිනය
திகதி
Date 20.02.2015

Superintendent of Public Debt,
Public Debt Department,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
Colombo 01.

Dear Sir,

Cash Flow & Borrowing Requirement for the month of March , 2015

I am sending herewith cash flow forecast for the month of March 2015.

I shall be thankful if you could arrange the borrowing requirement mentioned in the cash flow, March 2015. Actual cash flow position up to 19th February , 2015 also attached.

Yours sincerely,

M.S.D. Ranasiri
Director General

Additional Director General (Foreign Aid , Public Debt, Admin & Finance)
Tel : 0094 112 484738
Fax : 0094 112 320042

Additional Director General (Consolidated Fund Mgt, Revenue & Reforms.)
Tel : 0094 112 484748
Tel : 0094 112 484970

Director (Cash Management)
Tel: 0094 112484901
Tel : 0094 112 484970

Director (Consolidated Fund Mgt)
Tel: 0094 112 484994
Tel : 0094 112 484970

Director (Revenue)
Tel: 0094 112484638
Tel : 0094 112 484970

Director (Foreign Aid Mgt)
Tel: 0094 112484751
Tel : 0094 112320042

Director (Debt Mgt)
Tel: 0094 112484749
Tel : 0094 112320042

Projected Govt. Daily Cash Flow Statement for the period of 02nd March 2015 to 31st March 2015

Cash Management Division - Dept. of Treasury Operations

Rs. Million

		March	02.03.15	03.03.15	04.03.15	06.03.15	09.03.15	10.03.15	11.03.15	12.03.15	13.03.15	16.03.15	17.03.15	18.03.15	19.03.15	20.03.15	23.03.15	24.03.15	25.03.15	26.03.15	27.03.15	30.03.15	31.03.15	Total	SN
		Original Est	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	*Est*	Est	
Opening Cash Balances-Actual/Projected-Surplus/(Deficit)		(171,926)	(171,926)	(174,745)	(174,307)	(172,831)	(185,492)	(182,655)	(181,726)	(179,713)	(178,199)	(166,943)	(156,957)	(154,512)	(181,525)	(179,791)	(169,938)	(188,680)	(186,544)	(184,550)	(182,810)	(180,474)	(179,329)	(171,926)	(1)
(1) Add: Cash Inflows from Collection of Revenue																									1.1
1.1	CG Inland Revenue - Tax	5,968	163	146	128	123	260	90	562	519	512	1,782	247	139	128	77	179	218	84	175	120	92	223	5,968	
	- VAT	10,282	165	85	60	43	105	57	51	86	156	1,743	296	149	425	5,213	242	188	87	37	89	228	776	10,282	
	- NBT	1,978	19	22	17	12	13	8	16	17	37	105	56	58	142	1,162	97	100	19	34	11	15	20	1,978	
	- Withholding Tax	8,768	366	44	-	182	1,546	13	4	-	-	5,077	40	251	-	99	104	55	26	322	-	614	24	8,768	
1.2	DG Customs	38,395	1,800	1,850	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,825	1,850	1,825	1,800	1,825	1,850	1,875	1,850	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,850	1,845	1,825	1,850	1,875	38,395	1.2
1.3	DG Customs (Special Provisions)	5,454	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	5,154	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	5,454	1.3
1.4	TRC	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,500	1.4
1.5	Motor Traffic	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	200	1.5
1.6	Commissioner of Excise (Liquor)	8,300	325	62	19	41	29	48	20	41	4,350	122	132	22	87	42	27	75	92	61	43	62	2,600	8,300	1.6
1.7	DGTOD	3,975	-	-	-	652	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,332	-	-	11	-	-	-	1,980	3,975	1.7
1.8	Profit,Dividends & Sur. F./ CBSL Profit Transfer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8
1.9	Imprest Refunds,Deposits,Grants & CPF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.9
1.10	RFA Loans & Grants	115	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	-	-	-	10	-	-	115	###
1.11	Miscellaneous	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1
	Sub Total (1)	85,935	2,838	2,209	2,024	2,953	3,753	2,041	2,553	2,488	12,009	10,654	2,621	2,494	2,632	9,825	5,004	2,436	2,170	2,474	2,198	2,861	7,698	85,935	
(2) Less: Cash Out flows for Recurrent Expenditure									20,403	12,671	16,955	7,732													(2)
2.1	For Personnel Emoluments	53,406	-	-	-	1,392	320	-	-	300	-	-	-	28,310	-	-	23,084	-	-	-	-	-	-	53,406	2.1
2.2	For Pension Payments/Samurdhi	14,900	3,000	-	-	11,900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,900	2.2
2.3	For Other Recurrent Expenditure Payments	7,959	2,127	50	190	2,160	200	50	50	349	466	50	50	1,177	164	50	107	150	70	199	50	150	100	7,959	2.3
2.4	For Defence LC Payments	380	-	-	-	-	60	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	120	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	380	2.4
2.5	Fertilizer	1,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,200	-	1,200	2.5
2.6	Medical Supplies	3,332	-	1,666	-	-	-	1,000	-	-	-	666	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,332	2.6
	Sub Total	81,177	5,127	1,716	190	15,452	580	1,050	50	749	466	716	50	29,487	284	50	23,191	150	70	299	50	1,350	100	81,177	
2.7	For CBSL Interest Payments - Local	36,183	12,231	-	-	1,498	-	6	-	-	1,215	14,596	2,921	-	-	2,483	-	406	-	36	764	7	20	36,183	2.7
	- Foreign	6,162	230	-	629	1	40	-	-	15	51	636	55	17	1056	2045	495	45	-	0	541	170	134	6,162	
	- Loan Flotation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Interest Pre Received	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Sub Total (2)	123,522	17,588	1,716	819	16,951	620	1,056	50	764	1,732	15,948	3,026	29,504	1,340	4,577	23,686	601	70	335	1,355	1,528	254	123,522	
(3) Less: Cash Outflows for Capital Expenditure																									(3)
3.1	For Ministries, Departments & Statutory Board	4,002	352	-	300	200	350	-	400	150	350	-	150	-	500	-	500	150	50	350	-	100	100	4,002	3.1
3.2	Foreign Finance Associated Costs	210	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	50	-	-	-	-	50	-	40	-	-	-	30	-	-	210	3.2
3.3	RFA Loans & Grants	315	-	50	-	-	-	50	50	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	55	-	50	-	10	-	-	315	3.3
3.4	Grants, Deposits & CPF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.4
3.5	Advances to POO	473	178	5	75	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	105	-	-	-	5	50	-	50	-	473	3.5
	Sub Total (3)	5,000	530	55	375	200	350	55	490	200	350	-	150	-	705	-	595	150	105	400	40	150	100	5,000	
(4) Less: Cash Outflows for Repayment of Public Debt (Capital)																									(4)
4.1	For CBSL Payments - Local	111,844	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	111,820	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	111,844	4.1
	- Foreign	17,454	1,089	-	4	362	547	-	-	10	3,072	1,600	-	2	2,553	4,794	565	-	-	-	1,567	38	1,252	17,454	
4.2	Admin. Borrowings, Others & etc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.2
4.3	Deferred Payments -Fertilizer/Defence/PTF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.3
4.4	Treasury Bill Retirement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.4
	Sub Total (4)	129,298	1,089	-	4	362	547	-	-	10	3,072	113,420	-	2	2,553	4,794	565	-	-	-	1,567	38	1,276	129,298	
(5) Add: Borrowings - Treasury Bonds		172,000	13,550	-	650	1,900	600	-	-	-	4,400	128,700	3,000	-	3,700	9,400	1,100	450	-	-	3,100	-	1,450	172,000	(5)
	- Treasury Bills	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	- SLOB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	- Foreign Borrowings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	- Othere/Pro.Ad/obu/Rupee Loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Total Borrowings (Net)	172,000	13,550	-	650	1,900	600	-	-	-	4,400	128,700	3,000	-	3,700	9,400	1,100	450	-	-	3,100	-	1,450	172,000	
(6) CBSL TEB																									
(7) Closing Cash Balance - Surplus / (Deficit)		(171,810)	(174,745)	(174,307)	(172,831)	(185,492)	(182,655)	(181,726)	(179,713)	(178,199)	(166,943)	(156,957)	(154,512)	(181,525)	(179,791)	(169,938)	(188,680)	(186,544)	(184,550)	(182,810)	(180,474)	(179,329)	(171,810)	(171,810)	
(8) *Estimated Bank Balance at the end of the Month / day*																									
(9) Net effect of modified Treasury Single Account System																									

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H/FO

ASPD(A) 4/3 As G and DG(SM) instructed follow the future fund raising strategies under option 2 in the attached proposal 3/3

SPD

Pl. see G's instructions below and discuss. We strategically. 02/03

Governor

DG (SM) 27/02

AG (S) Participation of DG/TOD & MOF at DDMC is required. We will take necessary action in this regard. AG(S) 27/02/2015

Domestic Borrowing Programme for March 2015

The Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC) at its meeting held on 27.02.2015 decided to make the following recommendations regarding the Government borrowing programme for the month of March 2015, on the basis of the Cash flow and borrowing requirement of the General Treasury.

(1) Total Domestic Borrowings (estimates)

Table – 1

Rupee Borrowing Requirement – March 2015

Rupee Borrowings	Rs. million	Mode
T- bills (Re-issue)	Rs. 89,683 (Book Value)	Primary auctions, direct placements with institutional investors and market sources
T-bonds	Rs. 172,000 (Book Value)	

(2) The above borrowing requirement is to be raised as per the time table given in the Annexure – 1 and raise funds from investors including SLDBs, as prefunding to meet future financing requirement, as and when market conditions support.

(3) The Committee recommended to continue with the flexible arrangements to raise the funds from the market/ institutional investors depending on the availability of funds with such sources even allowing investments by foreigners in T-bills and T-bonds on conditions favourable to the economy.

Submitted for your information and approval please.

Members of the Committee:

Sr. No	Designation	Signature
1	Superintendent of Public Debt	
2	Director General/Treasury Operations, MOF	Absent
3	Director of Economic Research, CBSL	
4	Director of Statistics, CBSL	
5	Director of Domestic Operations, CBSL	

Mode of borrowing - only from primary auction.
cost ↑.

DDMS - 22/S.

Annexure –

Time Table for the Domestic Borrowing Programme
March 2015

For the week ending	Value date	Mode of borrowings and date	Re-issue of T-bills (BV) (Rs Mn)	T-bonds (BV) (Rs Mn)	Weekly total (Rs. Mn)
06.03.2015	02.03.2015	Primary auction (27.02.2015) Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		1,000 * 12,550 *	41,570
	04.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		650	
	06.03.2015	Primary auction (02.03.2015) Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources	25,470	1,900	
13.03.2015	09.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		600	26,223
	13.02.2015	Primary auction (11.03.2015) Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources	21,223	4,400	
20.03.2015	16.03.2015	Auctions ∝ Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		128,700	167,360
	17.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		3,000	
	19.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources		3,700	
	20.03.2015	Primary Auction (18.03.2015) Direct placements - Institutional /Market sources	22,560	9,400	

2

27.03.2015	23.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional / Market sources		1,100	25,080
	24.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional / Market sources		450	
	27.02.2015	Primary Auction (25.02.2015) Direct placements - Institutional / Market sources	20,430	 3,100	
04.04.2015	31.03.2015	Direct placements - Institutional / Market sources		1,450	1,450
Total for the month			**89,683**	**172,000**	**261,683**

DG(SM)

1. Raise Rs 40k. through issue of 20,30,50 years T bonds. 10 bn each.
2. CRF / NSB / SLIC to be asked to stabilize rates.
3. Revert rates to pre Sep-2014 levels.
4. Manage Rupee liquidity to stabilize USD/LKR at 132/90 Spot.

2/3

i. Preparation of the Order Papers and prospectus for T-bonds and RSs in order to obtain required authorization of the Finance Minister as stipulated in the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (RSSO).

ii. Reservation of gazette numbers in consultation with the Government Printing Department for publication of gazette notifications of T-bonds and RSs.

B. Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC)

The Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC) is the committee responsible for taking decisions on raising funds from domestic market with a view to minimizing the cost and risk of government public debt. DDMC meetings are held monthly in order to decide on the borrowing programme for the subsequent month. The Terms of Reference (TOR) of the DDMC is given in (Appendix FO-1). In this regard, FO has to attend to the followings;

i. One week prior to beginning of each month, prepare the monthly borrowing programme for the forthcoming month on the basis of the approved annual borrowing programme, the cash flow requirements of the government for the respective month obtained from Treasury and resources available in the market. The monthly borrowing programme consists of details on dates of proposed auctions, the size of auctions, maturity period, planned private placements and special arrangements if any.

ii. Make arrangement for the meetings.

iii. Submit the monthly issuance programme recommended by the DDMC for the Governor's approval.

iv. Communicate the details of the approved borrowing programme and debt service payments to be made to the PDs.

v. At the end of the each year prepare gazette notifications for all T-bonds, RSs, SLDBs and ILBs issued during the year.

vi. Make necessary arrangements with the Government Printing Department to publish relevant gazette notifications. The formats of the gazette notifications (in three languages) of RSs and T-bonds are given in the (Appendix FO-2 and FO-3).

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THE MONETARY BOARD
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

MINUTE PAPER

Board Paper No. : MB/ER/4/2/2015 File No. : 03/16/025/0002/001

Meeting No. : 4/2015 Item No. : 2 Date : 23.02.2015

2. Review of the Monetary Policy Stance - February 2015

2.1 Mrs S Gunaratne, Director of Economic Research (DER), made a presentation to the Board.

2.2 The Board having considered the paper and the presentation was of the view that the cut in policy rates as recommended by the Monetary Policy Committee for the purpose of rationalization of two tier Standing Deposit Rate is not appropriate at this stage, given the rising trend of market interest rates and rising growth of private sector credit and decided to maintain the policy interest rates at current level until the next month's monetary policy review.

2.3 The Board was of the view that issuing 30 year Treasury bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and re-profile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors. Accordingly, the Board instructed the Superintendent of Public Debt to conduct a 30 year Treasury bond auction during the week and arrange to list sovereign bonds in Euro Clear Exchange in future.

2.4 The Board raised concerns whether bank credit is sufficiently channeled to the needy sectors instead of corporate customers and instructed the DER to undertake a research to identify major borrowers and report to the Board at the next meeting.

TRUE COPY

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

06.03.2015

පොලී අනුපාතිකය හා වෙළඳපොළ ප්‍රතිමිලදී ගැනුම් පොලී අනුපාතිකය අතර සීමා පරාසය පදනම් අංක 0 ත් 131 ත් අතර දෝලනය විය.

මුදල් වෙළඳපොළ ද්‍රවශීලනාවය බොහෝ දුරට දෛනික පදනමක් මත අවශෝෂණය කර ගත්නා ලදී. පැවැති මූලය ප්‍රතිපත්ති රාමුව සහ පසුගිය වසරට සාපේක්ෂව 2015 වසරේ දී ශීඝ්‍ර ලෙස ද්‍රවශීලනාවය පිරිහීම හේතුවෙන් වසර තුළ දී විවිධ වෙළඳ කටයුතු සඳහා වන වෙන්දේසි අල්ප ප්‍රමාණයක් පමණක් පවත්වන ලදී. ප්‍රතිමිලදී ගැනුම් වෙන්දේසි ආවරණය කිරීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් රාජ්‍ය සුරුකුම්පත් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු වූ බැවින් සහ දෛනික වශයෙන් වෙන්දේසි නොපැවැත්වූ බැවින් වසර තුළ දී රාජ්‍ය සුරුකුම්පත් ණයට ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදය මත සුරුකුම්පත් ණයට ගැනීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවයන් අවම විය.

දේශීය විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළ

2015 වසර තුළ දී එක්සත් ජනපද ඩොලරයට එරෙහිව ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල සැලකිය යුතු ප්‍රමාණයකින් අවප්‍රමාණය විය. සමස්තයක් ලෙස ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල එක්සත් ජනපද ඩොලරයට එරෙහිව සියයට 9 කින් එනම් රුපියල් 131.0 සිට රුපියල් 144.1 දක්වා අවප්‍රමාණය විය. 2015 වර්ෂය තුළ දී විනිමය අනුපාතිකය මත වූ පීඩනය වැඩි වීම කෙරෙහි මූලිකවම හේතු වූයේ රජයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ බැඳුම්කර, කොළඹ කොටස් වෙළඳපොළ සහ සාතුමය ආනයන නිසා වූ විදේශ මුදල් ආපසු රටින් පිටට ගලායෑමය. එමෙන්ම 2015 සැප්තැම්බර් 04 දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විනිමය අනුපාතය තීරණය කිරීම සඳහා වෙළඳපොළට වැඩි අවස්ථාවක් ලබා දීම හේතුවෙන් ද එක්සත් ජනපද ඩොලරයට එරෙහිව ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල අවප්‍රමාණය විය. ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියලෙහි සමස්ත අවප්‍රමාණයට අනුගත වෙමින් වාණිජ බැංකුවල විදුලි පැවරුම් සඳහා වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලදී ගැනීමේ හා විකිණීමේ සාමාන්‍ය අනුපාතිකය, 2015 වසරේ දී පිළිවෙළින් රුපියල් 141.9 ක් සහ රුපියල් 146.2 ක් ලෙස වාර්තා වූ අතර, 2014 වසරේ දී එය පිළිවෙළින් රුපියල් 130.4 ක් සහ රුපියල් 133.4 ක් විය. වසර තුළ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල අනෙකුත් ප්‍රධාන මුදල් ඒකක වන ස්ටර්ලිං පවුම්, ජපන් යෙන් සහ ඉන්දියානු රුපියලට එරෙහිව පිළිවෙළින් සියයට 4.5, සියයට 8.2 සහ සියයට 4.6 කින් අවප්‍රමාණය වුවද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා රුපියල යූරෝවලට එරෙහිව සියයට 1.3 කින් අධිප්‍රමාණය විය.

2015 වසර තුළ දී දේශීය විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළේ ගනුදෙනු පරිමාව, පසුගිය වසර හා සසඳන කල සියයට 12.2 කින් පහළ ගොස් ඇත. දේශීය වෙළඳපොළේ විදේශ විනිමය ගනුදෙනු පරිමාව 2014 වසරේ දී වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 15,478 සිට 2015 වසර තුළ දී එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 13,593 ක් දක්වා පහළ ගොස් ඇත. ඊට සමගාමීව අන්තර් බැංකු විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළේ දෛනික ගනුදෙනු පරිමාවේ සාමාන්‍යය ද 2014 වසරේ දී වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 64 සිට 2015 වසරේ දී එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 57 ක් දක්වා පහළ යෑමත් වාර්තා විය.

2015 වසරේ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව දේශීය විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළේ ශුද්ධ විකුණුම්කරුවෙකු විය. මේ සඳහා හේතු වූයේ විනිමය අනුපාතිකයේ අපාමාන්‍ය උච්චාවචනයන් සමනය කිරීමේ අදහසින්, මේම වසර තුළ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළට මැදිහත් වීමයි. ඒ අනුව වසර තුළ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 179 ක් වෙළඳපොළෙන් මිලදී ගන්නා ලද අතර එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 3,429 ක් වෙළඳපොළට මුදාහරින ලදී. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව 2015 වර්ෂයේ සැප්තැම්බර් මස 4 වැනි දිනට පෙර සිට විනිමය අනුපාතය තීරණය වීමට දේශීය විදේශීය විනිමය වෙළඳපොළට වැඩි අවකාශයක් ලබා දීමට පෙර එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 2,060 ක් වෙළඳපොළට මුදාහරින ලද අතර එයින්, එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 782 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්/බැඳුම්කර ආශ්‍රිත අරමුදල් ආපසු රැගෙන යෑම සඳහා ද ඉතිරි එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 1,278 අනෙකුත් වෙළඳපොළ ගෙවීම් සඳහා ද මුදා හරින ලදී. 2015 සැප්තැම්බර් 4 දිනෙන් පසුව ද මහ බැංකුව සිය විදේශ සංචිතවලින් එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 1,369 ක් මුදා හරින ලද අතර, එයින් එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 562 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් බැඳුම්කර ආශ්‍රිත අරමුදල් ආපසු රැගෙන යෑම සඳහා ද ඉතිරි එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 807 අනෙකුත් වෙළඳපොළ ගනුදෙනු සඳහා ද විය. සමස්තයක් වශයෙන් ගත් කල 2015 වසර තුළ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් දේශීය විදේශ විනිමය වෙළඳපොළට ශුද්ධ සැපයුම එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 3,250 ක් විය.

රජයේ සුරුකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ

2015 මාර්තු 2 වන දින සිට බලපැවැත්වෙන පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිත්‍ය තැන්පතු පහසුකම් මත පනවා තිබූ සීමාවන් ඉවත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් මුල් මාස 2 තුළ ස්ථාවරව තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ඵලදා අනුපාතික මාර්තු - අප්‍රේල් කාලපරිච්ඡේදයේ දී ඉහළ යන ලදී. කෙසේ නමුත් 2015 අප්‍රේල් 15 දින ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොලී අනුපාතය පාදකාංක 50 කින් අඩු කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඵලදා අනුපාතික නැවත පහළ යෑමට පටන් ගන්නා ලදී. ණය කළමනාකරණ උපකුමයක් ලෙස පොලී අනුපාතය පහළ මට්ටමක රඳවා ගැනීම සඳහා, ආණ්ඩුකාර

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ප්‍රාග්ධන වෙළඳපොළෙන් ණය ගැනීම් දේශීය පොලී අනුපාතිකය මත වූ අනිසි පීඩනය ඉවත් කර පවත්වාගෙන යෑමට උපකාරී වී ඇත. ඒ අනුව 2015 ජූනි මස කුපන අනුපාතය සියයට 6.125 ක් වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 650 ක හා 2015 නොවැම්බර් මස කුපන අනුපාතය සියයට 6.85 ක් වූ එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 1,500 ක ජාත්‍යන්තර ස්වෛරීත්ව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලදී. කෙසේ වුවත්, ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් එක්සත් ජනපද ප්‍රතිපත්ති අනුපාතය ඉහළ යා හැකි බවට ආයෝජකයින් තුළ පැවැති සුභවාදී ආකල්ප හේතුවෙන්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර මත වූ විදේශ ආයෝජන 2015 අවසාන භාගයේ දී ශීඝ්‍රයෙන් පහළ යන ලදී. එසේ වුවත්, රජයේ ණය කළඹේ සාමාන්‍ය කල්පිරීමේ කාලය වැඩි කිරීම තුළින් ප්‍රතිආයෝජන අවදානම අවම කර ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට හැකියාව ලැබිණි. තවදුරටත් අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීමේ කටයුතු සඳහා හිතකර පරිසරයක් නිර්මාණය කිරීම සඳහා සඵලදායී නිර්නායක පිහිටුවීම් වස් 2015 වසරේ දී ද අවදානම් රහිත ඵලදා වක්‍රයේ දිගුකාලීන අන්තය අඛණ්ඩව සක්‍රීය කරන ලදී. එසේ නමුත්, විදේශ ආයෝජන පිටතට ගලා යෑම හා දෙසැම්බර් මාසයේ දී ව්‍යවස්ථාපිත සංචිත අනුපාතය පාදකාංක 150 කින් ඉහළ දැමීමට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගන්නා ලද තීරණයත් සමඟ 2014 වසරට සාපේක්ෂව 2015 වසර අග භාගයේ දී දින 364 ක කල්පිරීම් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා වන ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පාදකාංක 130 ක ඉහළ යෑමක් වාර්තා විය. 2015 අග වන විට දින 91, දින 182 හා දින 364 ක කල්පිරීම් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා පොලී අනුපාතිකය පිළිවෙළින් සියයට 6.38, සියයට 6.69 හා සියයට 7.11 ක් විය.

2015 වසරේ දී භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රධාන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වෙනස්කම් අනුව යමින්, ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ වෙන්දේසි පදනම් කරගත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පසුගිය වර්ෂය හා සසඳන කල සැලකිය යුතු ලෙස ඉහළ යන ලදී. ඒ අනුව, 2014 වසරේ ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි මගින් නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ප්‍රමාණය වන රුපියල් බිලියන 760 හා සසඳන කල 2015 වසරේ දී රුපියල් බිලියන 1,006 ක් විය. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු 8.17 සංඛ්‍යා සටහන මගින් දැක්වේ.

සුදුසු ණය නිකුත් කිරීමේ උපක්‍රමයන් අනුගමනය කර තිබියදී පවා කෙටිකාලීන පොලී අනුපාතිකයේ ඉහළ යෑම 2015 වසර අවසානයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ඵලදා අනුපාතයේ ඉහළ යෑමට හේතු වන ලදී. 2015 වසරේ දී භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සඳහා විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ගේ තිබූ රුචිකත්වය සැලකිය යුතු මට්ටමකින් පහළ ගොස් ඇත. 2015 දෙසැම්බර් අග වන විට භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරවල විදේශීය ආයෝජන රුපියල් බිලියන 303.8 ක් විය. මෑත අතීතයේ දී සිදු වූ පරිදි විදේශිකයන් විසින් සිදු කරනු ලබන හදිසි ආපසු ගැනීම් නිසා විදේශීය සංචිත මත ඇතිවන අනවශ්‍ය පීඩනය අවම කිරීමේ අරමුණින් රජය 2016 අයවැය මගින්, මුළු භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර තොගයෙන් විදේශිකයන්ට ආයෝජනය කිරීමට තිබූ අවස්ථාව සියයට 12.5 සිට සියයට 10 දක්වා සංශෝධනය කරමින් රජයේ සුරැකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ විදේශිකයන් වෙත නිරාවරණය වීම අවම කිරීමට කටයුතු කරන ලදී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කර කෙරෙහි ආයෝජකයන්ගේ කැමැත්ත ඉහළ යෑම නිසා, 2015 වසර තුළ දී කල්පිරුණු ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කර එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 835.57 ක ප්‍රමාණයට අමතරව එ.ජ.ඩොලර් මිලියන 2,491.37 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් අලුතින් රැස්කර ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට හැකියාව ලැබුණි. බාහිර සාධකයන්ගෙන් වන අවදානම අවම කර ගැනීමට 2015 වසර තුළ දී භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා විදේශ ආයෝජන උපක්‍රමික‍ව ප්‍රගස්ථ මට්ටමකට අඩු කිරීම සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ආයෝජකයන්ගේ මෙම කැමැත්ත ඉහළ යෑම සඳහා හේතු විය. තවද, රජයේ ණය ගැනීමේ වැඩසටහනට මූල්‍යනය කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය රුපියල්වලින් නාමනය වූ සුරැකුම්පත්වල අවශ්‍යතාවය ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කරවලින් වූ ගලාඒම් තුළින් පියවීම නිසා තවදුරටත් දේශීය වෙළඳපොළේ පොලී අනුපාතිකය මත ඇති විය හැකි පීඩනය අවම මට්ටමක පවත්වාගෙන යෑමට ද හැකියාව ලැබුණි.

2015 වසර තුළ දී සමස්ත දේශීය රාජ්‍ය ණය කළඹේ සාමාන්‍ය කල්පිරීම් කාලය තවදුරටත් වැඩි වූ අතර පසුගිය වසරේ වාර්තා වූ වර්ෂ 5.75 සමඟ සසඳන විට 2015 වසරේ දෙසැම්බර් අවසානයට එය වර්ෂ 6.28 ක් ලෙස වාර්තා විය. 2014 දෙසැම්බර් අවසානයේ වසර 6.98 ක් වූ නොපියවූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර කළඹේ සාමාන්‍ය කල්පිරීමේ කාලය 2015 දෙසැම්බර් අවසානය

8.17 සංඛ්‍යා සටහන **භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ බැඳුම්කරවල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ නිකුතූන් සහ බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතික**

වර්ෂය	නිකුත් කළ වටිනාකම (රු. බිලියන)		
	වෙන්දේසිගත	කෘජු නිකුතූන්	මුළු වටිනාකම
2013	201	816	1,017
2014	28	833	861
2015	712	158	870

මූලාශ්‍රය: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

8.18 සංඛ්‍යා සටහන භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්හි වාර්ෂික ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ බරිත සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතික

වාර්ෂික ප්‍රතිශතය

වර්ෂය	පරිණත කාලය			සමස්ත සාමාන්‍යය
	දින 91	දින 182	දින 364	
2011	7.28	7.21	7.41	7.31
2012	10.72	12.29	12.14	11.81
2013	7.54	7.85	8.29	8.20
2014	6.58	6.57	6.73	6.68
2015	6.32	6.5	6.6	6.46

මූලාශ්‍රය: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

වන විට වසර 7.36 ක් දක්වා ඉහළ යන ලදී. 2015 වසර තුළ දී දිගුකාලීන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සැලකිය යුතු ප්‍රමාණවලින් නිකුත් කිරීම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර කළඹෙහි මෙම සාමාන්‍ය කල්පිරීම් කාලය වැඩි වීම කෙරෙහි හේතු විය.

සාංගමික ණය සුරුකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ

ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ සාංගමික ණය සුරුකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළෙහි වැදගත් සහ අත්‍යවශ්‍ය කාර්යභාරයක් ඉටු කරන ණයකර වෙළඳපොළ 2014 වසරට වඩා 2015 වසරේ දී සාපේක්ෂව ඉහළ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වයක් පෙන්නුම් කරන ලදී. බැංකුවල සහාය ඇතිව 2015 වසර තුළ දී නිකුත් කළ වාණිජ පත්‍රවල සමස්ත වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියන 7.9 ක් වූ අතර, එය 2014 වසරේ දී නිකුත් කළ වාණිජ පත්‍රවල වටිනාකම වූ රුපියල් බිලියන 8.2 කට සාපේක්ෂව රුපියල් බිලියන 0.3 ක අඩුවීමක් වාර්තා කරන ලදී. 2015 වසර තුළ දී වාණිජ පත්‍රවලට අදාළ පොලී අනුපාතික සියයට 7.0 ත් 12.0 ත් අතර පරාසයක විචලනය වූ අතර එය 2014 වසරට සාපේක්ෂව එතරම් විචලනාවයක් පෙන්නුම් නොකරන ලදී. මාස 3 ක් හෝ ඊට අඩු කල්පිරීම් කාලයක් සහිත වාණිජ පත්‍රවල දායකත්වය සමස්ත නව නිකුතුන්වලින් සියයට 65.5 ක් වූ අතර, මාස 6 ක සහ මාස 12 ක කල්පිරීමේ කාලයක් සහිත වාණිජ පත්‍රවල ප්‍රතිශතය පිළිවෙලින් සියයට 19.4 ක් සහ සියයට 15.1 ක් විය. 2015 වසර අවසානයට නොපියවූ සමස්ත වාණිජ පත්‍රවල වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියන 4.5 ක් වූ අතර, 2014 වසර අවසානයට එම වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියන 3.5 ක් විය.

8.19 සංඛ්‍යා සටහන රජයේ සුරුකුම්පත්වල ඵලදා අනුපාතික

වාර්ෂික ප්‍රතිශතය

අයිතමය	ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ		ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ	
	2014	2015	2014	2015
භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්				
දින 91	5.74-7.42	5.74 - 7.10	5.47-7.52	5.72 – 7.00
දින 182	5.83-7.53	5.86 - 7.31	5.64-7.83	5.85 – 7.12
දින 364	5.89-7.95	6.00 - 7.37	5.82-8.27	6.03 – 7.30
භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර				
වසර 2	6.15-8.70	6.70 – 8.14	5.97-8.86	5.95 - 7.75
වසර 3	6.20-8.80	7.18 – 8.70	6.45-9.05	6.93 – 9.02
වසර 4	6.40-9.06	8.15 – 9.50	6.50-9.54	7.13 - 9.42
වසර 5	6.48-9.29	8.11 – 9.79	7.09-10.29	7.24 – 9.63
වසර 6	6.64-9.42	8.87 – 9.90	7.41-10.37	7.45 – 9.85
වසර 10	7.78-10.15	7.88 – 10.94	7.79-10.89	7.93 – 10.43
වසර 15	8.50-10.91	9.67 - 10.96	8.28-11.60	7.65 - 10.71
වසර 30	8.85-11.80	11.73	9.27 - 11.24	9.27- 11.60

මූලාශ්‍රය: ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

ලැයිස්තුගත ණය සුරුකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ 2015 වසරේ දී රුපියල් බිලියන 83.4 ක වාර්තාගත අරමුදල් රැස්කිරීමක් සිදු කළ අතර එය 2014 වසරේ දී වාර්තා කරන ලද රුපියල් බිලියන 54.2 ට වඩා සියයට 53.9 ක ඉහළ අගයකි. කොළඹ කොටස් හුවමාරුවට අනුව 2015 වසරේ දී ණයකර නිකුතුන් 25 ක් මගින් මෙම කාර්යසාධනය ළඟා කරගත් අතර එය 2014 වසරේ දී නිකුත් කළ ණයකර නිකුතුන් 20 ට සහ 2015 වසරේ දී මූල්‍ය අංශයෙන් සිදු කළ ණයකර නිකුතුන්ට සාපේක්ෂව වාර්තා කළ ඉහළම ලැයිස්තුගත සාංගමික ණයකර නිකුතුන් ප්‍රමාණය විය. ආයෝජකයන් විසින් සාංගමික ණයකර නිකුතුවෙන් ලබන පොලී ආදායම 2015 අයවැයෙන් යෝජනා කරන ලද ආකාරයට ආදායම් බදුවලින් නිදහස් කරනු ලැබූ අතර එම නිසා එකී වාසි සහගත තත්ත්වය යටතේ වැඩියෙන් ණයකර නිකුත් කිරීමට සමාගම් පෙළඹෙන ලදී. කෙසේ වුවද, මෙම ප්‍රතිලාභය 2016 අයවැය තුළින් ද තවදුරටත් දීර්ඝ කරන ලදී. 2015 වසරේ දී ලැයිස්තුගත සමාගම්වල ණයවලින් ඉහළම අගය වූ රුපියල් බිලියන 9 ක් ජාතික සංවර්ධන බැංකුවෙන් නිකුත් කළ අතර, ලංකා බැංකුව විසින් රුපියල් බිලියන 8 ක් ද, සම්පත් බැංකුව විසින් රුපියල් බිලියන 7 ක් සහ සීපල්ස් ලීසිං සමාගම රුපියල් බිලියන 6 ක් ද නිකුත් කරන ලදී.

කොළඹ කොටස් වෙළඳපොළ

මිල දර්ශකවල උච්චාවචනයන් හේතුවෙන් 2015 වසරේ දී කොළඹ කොටස් හුවමාරුවෙහි මන්දගාමී කාර්යසාධනයක් වාර්තා කරන ලදී. 2015 වසර අවසානයට සමස්ත කොටස් මිල දර්ශකය, දර්ශකාංක 6,894 දක්වා සියයට 5.5 කින් ද, එස් ඇන්ඩ් පී ශ්‍රී ලංකා 20 දර්ශකය දර්ශකාංක 3,626 දක්වා සියයට 11.3 ක් ද පහත වැටුණු අතර මෙයට සාපේක්ෂව 2014 වසර අවසානයට පිළිවෙලින් 7,299 ක් සහ 4,089 ක් විය. ප්‍රමාදීත ප්‍රතිපත්ති නිර්දේශ මෙන්ම දේශපාලනික වෙනස්වීම්, පොලී අනුපාතික ඉහළ යෑම, විනිමය අනුපාතය අවප්‍රමාණය වීම හේතුවෙන් ආයෝජකයින්ගේ අවිනිශ්චිතතාවය ඉහළ යෑම සහ නැගී එන වෙළඳපොළ ආර්ථික තුළ වූ විදේශීය

FISCAL SECTOR

3.1 Government Finance (Rs.bn)

Item	2014 * Jan-Sep	2013 Jan-Sep
Revenue and Grants	836.9	787.2
Revenue	828.2	784.2
Tax	752.2	710.7
Non tax	76.0	73.5
Grants	8.7	3.0
Expenditure & Lending Minus Repayments	1,326.7	1,279.1
Current	962.1	920.4
Capital & Lending Minus Repayments	364.6	358.7



* Provisional **Revised

3.2 Government Debt (Rs.bn)

Item	2014* End Sep	2013 End Dec
Total domestic debt	4,186.0	3,832.8
of which		
Treasury bills	620.1	700.1
Treasury bonds	2,821.0	2,452.4
Rupee loans	55.5	55.5
Total foreign debt	3,182.9	2,960.4
Total outstanding govt. debt	7,368.9	6,793.2



* Provisional

3.3 Government Securities - Primary and Secondary Market Yield Rates as for the week ending - 25th February 2015

Security	Maturity	Primary Market*		Secondary Market			
		This Week	Last Week	This Week			Last Week Average
				Buying	Selling	Average	
Treasury Bills	3 Months	5.98%	5.94%	5.97%	5.83%	5.90%	5.86%
	6 Months	6.09%	6.03%	6.08%	5.97%	6.02%	5.97%
	12 Months	6.13%	6.12%	6.21%	6.10%	6.15%	6.12%
Treasury Bonds	2 < Years	7.00%	6.98%	6.36%	6.22%	6.29%	6.29%
	5 < Years	7.39%	-	7.43%	7.30%	7.36%	7.27%
	6 < Years	-	-	7.64%	7.49%	7.56%	7.49%
	8 < Years	-	-	8.00%	7.89%	7.95%	7.84%
	10 < Years	-	-	8.13%	8.01%	8.07%	7.99%
	15 < Years	-	-	9.05%	8.77%	8.91%	8.70%
	20 < Years	-	-	9.92%	9.68%	9.80%	9.33%
	30 < Years	-	-	10.14%	9.92%	10.03%	9.48%

* Primary market transactions during the week ending 25/02/2015

The secondary market yield rates of T-bonds and T-bills yield rates elevated during the week compared against yield rates of last week.





කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

පෙරේරා මහතා: දැනගෙන
යනවා. අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය
ුත් Dealer කියනවා, Rs. 1
Central Bank එකෙන් ඉල්ලා

ියවන්න මහතා: එය publish

රේරා මහතා: Public notice

නත්ති මහතා: Rs. 13 billion
ry dealer කෙනකු ගැටියට
ආගන්තුකව එන කෙනෙක්
ට -

ශ්නය Chairmanගෙන් අහලා

යවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි.
බැංකුවේ අභ්‍යන්තර විගණන
ක් ගෙන්වා ගනිමුද?

පරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා
රන්නම්.

'remajayantha: That is good
ternal audit report.

Perera: We did not want a
ternal Audit. Since the
ed that I will get that. When
eport?

ා පතියේ ඒ වාර්තාව එවන්න.

Perera: As soon as possible

remajayantha: You can
e report.

Thank you.

(Witness withdrew.)

ත්න මහතා: දැන් audit system
තිබෙන්නේ. බොහෝ දේවල්
නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ risk
කරනවා. සමහර ඒවා, once in
months, one year, once in two
පුළුවන්.It is depending on
ent. අනික් කාරණය, විශාල
al Auditorsලා permanently
y are doing rolling audits.
nal auditors. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ
hat.

'remajayantha: That is fair

මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව

(සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් - Verbatim)

(මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ඉල්ලුම්කරු ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා සාක්ෂියට කැඳවයි.)

ජයකඩුතන්ත්‍රී දේවයලාගේ ධර්මපාල,ප්‍රධාන ඉල්ලුම්කරු, ලංකා බැංකුව ප්‍රතිඥා දෙන ලදුව, විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා:ඔබතුමා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සේවයට පැමිණියේ කොයි කාලයේදීද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා 1991 අප්‍රේල් 22වන දා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සේවයට බැඳුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා:කවුරුන් වශයෙන්ද සේවයට බැඳුණේ?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: කළමනාකරණ පුහුණුවන්නකු වශයෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාදැන් දරන Chief Dealer තනතුරට පත් වුණේ මොන අවුරුද්දේද?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මේ අවුරුද්දේ අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ 28වන දා දක්වා මා Chief Dealer තනතුරේ සිටියා. දැනට මා එතැනින් වෙනත් ස්ථානයකට ස්ථාන මාරු කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා ඇහුවේ, ඔබතුමා දැනට දරන තනතුරට පත් වුණේ කවදාද කියලායි.

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: Chief Dealer තනතුරට පත් වුණේ 2013 ජනවාරි මාසයේ 01වන දා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම පළමුවන අවස්ථාව කමිටුව දැනුවත් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ primary dealer කෙනකු වෙනුවෙන් තවත් primary dealer කෙනකු bid කරන එක සම්බන්ධයෙනුයි. ඔය bid එක ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට, ඒ request එක කරන කොට ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන සිටියාද,මේ ඉල්ලන්නේ primary dealer කෙනකුගෙන්ය කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: මා දැන ගෙන සිටියා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැයි කියලා නීතියේ නැති වුණාටprimary dealer කෙනකුගෙන් තවත් primary dealer කෙනකු ඉල්ලීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒවෙලාවේ සැකයක් මතු වුණේ නැද්ද, මේ පුද්ගලයාටඑය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හැකියාව තිබියදී, Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ඇයි කියලා?

ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මහතා: ඒ පුද්ගලයා කථා කරන අවස්ථාවේදී මා ඇහුවා, ඔබට හැකියාව තිබියදී අපේ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා මේ ලංසුව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ඇයි කියලා. එයට ඔහු දුන් පිළිතුර වුණේ, දැනටමත් ඒ අයටකෙළින්ම - සෘජුවම- ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න bids කිහිපයක් තිබෙන නිසා, ඒ පැත්තෙනුත් ටිකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑය කියන එකයි. නමුත් රාජ්‍ය බැංකුවක Chief Dealer කෙනකු විධියට විශේෂයෙන්ම මට වග කීමක් තිබෙනවා, රජයේ ණය ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සෑම සහයෝගයක්ම දෙන්න. හැම වෙලාවේම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව primary dealersලා විධියට අපෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන්නා වූ ඉල්ලීම, විශේෂයෙන්ම වෙන්දේසියක් තිබෙන අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ අයට යොමු කරන්න කියලායි. ඒ වගකීම මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා.

අනික් කාරණය, මෙම ගනුදෙනුකරු -ඔය කියන primary dealer- අපිත් සමඟ හොඳ ගනුදෙනුකාර සම්බන්ධයක් තිබෙනprimary dealer කෙනෙක්. මේ bids තුනම, සියයට 12.50ට, සියයට 12.75ට හා සියයට 13ටයි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. මේ අවස්ථාව වන කොට වෙළෙඳ පොළේ මෙවැනි, මීට සමාන අවුරුදු තිහේ බැඳුම්කරයක් වෙළෙඳාම් වුණේ සියයට 9.50ක් වැනි rate එකකටයි. එතකොට සියයට 9.50ත්, සියයට 12.50ත් අතර සියයට 3ක පමණ විශාල වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. දැනට මා භාණ්ඩාගාර අංශයේ අවුරුදු 18ක් සේවය කරලා තිබෙනවා.

මගේ අත්දැකීම අනුව මේ නවයයි පනහට තිබෙන bond එක උපරිම වශයෙන් - basis point - ඒ කියන්නේ සියයට දශම දෙකයි පහක්. දශම පහක් වාගේ තත්ත්වයකින් ඉහළ සහ පහළ යෑමේ ප්‍රවණතාවක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. මීට පෙර auctionsවලදී මම ලබා තිබෙන අත්දැකීම අනුවයි මම එහෙම කියන්නේ. එම නිසා මම කවදාවත් විශ්වාස කළේ නැහැ, නවයයි පනහට තිබෙන rate එක දොළහයි පනහට accept කරන්න. අනිත් එක. මෙතැනදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් තමයි වෙන්දේසියට ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණේ. එතකොට මගේ පූර්ව අත්දැකීම අනුව කියනවා නම්, විශේෂයෙන් මහ බැංකුව සමහර විට Rs. 1 billion භාර ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; Rs. 2 billion ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; තව ඒ වාගේ දෙගුණයක් ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; Rs. 3 billion විතර වාගේ වෙනකම් යන්නත් පුළුවන්. අන්න එහෙම ගත්තත්. කවදාවත් මොනම හේතුවකටවත් දොළහයි පනහේ rate එකට මේවා වදින්නේ නැති වෙයි කියන විශ්වාසය මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා. මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මෙක වදින්නේ නැති වෙයි කියලා. මේක මහ බැංකුව පිළිගන්නේ නැති වෙයි කියලා මට හිතුණා. ඒ වාගේම මගේ හිතේ තිබුණා. මේ bids ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් මගේ බැංකුවට කිසිම අවදානමක් නැති වෙයි කියලාත්. අනිත් එක මොහු ලිඛිතව මට මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණා, මෙය දමන්න කියලා. එම නිසා මට හිතුණා මෙය නොදා ඉන්න එක සදාචාරාත්මක නැහැ කියලා. මොකද, නීතිමය පැත්තෙන් බැලුවත් ඇත්තවශයෙන්ම primary dealer කෙනෙකුගෙන් තව primary dealer කෙනෙකු bid එකක් දමනවා කියන එක කොහේවත් එපා කියලා නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම ඒ සම්බන්ධව මොකුත් තහනමක්වත්, මොකක්වත් නැහැ. මම මුලින් කිව්වා වාගේ මගේ

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DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

ISSUE OF RS 1.0 BILLION TREASURY BOND

Rs. 1,000 million Treasury Bond under the series of 12.50% 2045 'A' is being offered on an auction basis on Friday, 27th February 2015.

Details of these Treasury Bond are as follows:

Series	12.50% 2045 'A'
ISIN	LKB03045C013
Amount offered	1,000 million
Period to maturity	30 Years
Coupon rate	12.50% per annum
Date of issue	01st March 2015
Date of maturity	01st March 2045
Dates of interest payment	01st March & 01st September
Accrued Interest Rate	Rs. 0.0340 per Rs. 100.00
Date of auction	27th February 2015
Closing date and time of tenders	Friday, 27th February 2015 at 11.00 a.m.
Date of settlement	02nd March 2015
Minimum amount of bid	Rupees five million (Rs. 5,000,000/-) and multiples of Rupees one million (Rs.1,000,000/-) there onwards.

Bids are invited from the Primary Dealers in Treasury Bonds on the basis of clean prices (exclusive of accrued interest from the date of issue of the series to the date of settlement). Bids should be made only through the electronic bidding facility provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

The general public is invited to purchase Treasury bills from the following Primary Dealers and any other Licensed Commercial Banks

Acuity Securities Ltd.	2206297	People's Bank	2458935
Bank of Ceylon	2541938	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd.	2206123
Capital Alliance Ltd.	2317777	Sampath Bank PLC.	2305842
Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC	2332319	Seylan Bank PLC.	2456340
Entrust Securities PLC	5500600	The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd.	2421697
First Capital Treasuries Ltd.	2639883	Union Bank of Colombo PLC.	2374158
NatWealth Securities Ltd.	4703000	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd	2675096
NSB Fund Management Co. Ltd.	2564601		
Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC	2565561		

C M D N K Seneviratne (Mrs)
Superintendent/Registrar of Public Debt.

Public Debt Department
Central Bank of Sri Lanka
30, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 1.
Telephone: 2477316 Fax: 2477687
Web: www.cbsl.gov.lk

Treasury Bond Issue March 2015
Amount Offered - Rs 1000 Mn

Settlement Date : 02/03/2015
Issue Date Of The Series: 01/03/2015
Maturity Date Of The Series: 01/03/2045
Coupon Rate: 12.50%

Loan Title: 12.50%2045A
Maturity Period: 30 Years and 0 Months
ISIN : LKB03045C013

Series No: 275
Auction Number: 15023
Accrued Interest Rate: 0.034

27/02/2015

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Amount Payable	Yield to Maturity	Yield Net of Tax	Cumulative Amount Tendered	Cumulative Amount Payable	Weighted Average Price	W.Ave Yield to Maturity	WAYRNT
	BANK OF CEYLON	8,000,000	119.33420	9,546,736.00	10.3900	9.3510	8,000,000.00	9,546,736.00	119.3342	10.3900	9.3510
	ACUITY SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	112.01000	56,005,000.00	11.1110	9.9999	58,000,000.00	65,551,736.00	113.0202	11.0070	9.9063
	FIRST CAPITAL TREASURIES LTD.	100,000,000	110.95480	110,954,800.00	11.2220	10.0998	158,000,000.00	176,506,536.00	111.7130	11.1420	10.0278
	BANK OF CEYLON	500,000,000	109.39320	546,966,000.00	11.3900	10.2509	658,000,000.00	723,472,536.00	109.9502	11.3300	10.1970
	ENTRUST SECURITIES PLC	50,000,000	104.50730	52,253,650.00	11.9440	10.7496	708,000,000.00	775,726,186.00	109.5658	11.3710	10.2339
	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	104.50730	104,507,300.00	11.9440	10.7496	808,000,000.00	880,233,486.00	108.9398	11.4400	10.2959
	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	500,000,000	104.50730	522,536,500.00	11.9440	10.7496	1,308,000,000.00	1,402,769,986.00	107.2454	11.6280	10.4652
	ENTRUST SECURITIES PLC	50,000,000	103.11580	51,557,900.00	12.1110	10.8999	1,358,000,000.00	1,454,327,886.00	107.0934	11.6450	10.4805
	PEOPLE'S BANK	100,000,000	102.20720	102,207,200.00	12.2220	10.9998	1,458,000,000.00	1,556,535,086.00	106.7582	11.6830	10.5147
0	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	102.20720	102,207,200.00	12.2220	10.9998	1,558,000,000.00	1,658,742,286.00	106.4661	11.7170	10.5453
1	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	1,000,000,000	102.20720	1,022,072,000.00	12.2220	10.9998	2,558,000,000.00	2,680,814,286.00	104.8012	11.9100	10.7190
2	NATWEALTH SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	102.20700	51,103,500.00	12.2220	10.9998	2,608,000,000.00	2,731,917,786.00	104.7514	11.9160	10.7244
3	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	101.75800	101,758,000.00	12.2780	11.0502	2,708,000,000.00	2,833,675,786.00	104.6409	11.9290	10.7361
4	NATWEALTH SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	99.99900	49,999,500.00	12.5000	11.2500	2,758,000,000.00	2,883,675,286.00	104.5568	11.9390	10.7451
5	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	500,000,000	99.99900	499,995,000.00	12.5000	11.2500	3,258,000,000.00	3,383,670,286.00	103.8573	12.0220	10.8198
6	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	250,000,000	97.87800	244,695,000.00	12.7780	11.5002	3,508,000,000.00	3,628,365,286.00	103.4312	12.0730	10.8657
7	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	250,000,000	95.83940	239,598,500.00	13.0559	11.7504	3,758,000,000.00	3,867,963,786.00	102.9261	12.1340	10.9206
8	SEYLAN BANK PLC	1,250,000,000	95.80740	1,197,592,500.00	13.0600	11.7540	5,008,000,000.00	5,065,556,286.00	101.1493	12.3539	11.1185
9	WEALTH TRUST SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	93.87900	46,939,500.00	13.3330	11.9997	5,058,000,000.00	5,112,495,786.00	101.0774	12.3630	11.1267
0	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	500,000,000	93.87900	469,395,000.00	13.3330	11.9997	5,558,000,000.00	5,581,890,786.00	100.4298	12.4450	11.2005
1	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	1,000,000,000	91.99280	919,928,000.00	13.6110	12.2499	6,558,000,000.00	6,501,818,786.00	99.1433	12.6110	11.3499
2	WEALTH TRUST SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	90.17700	45,088,500.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,608,000,000.00	6,546,907,286.00	99.0755	12.6200	11.3580
3	HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKIN	100,000,000	90.17700	90,177,000.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,708,000,000.00	6,637,084,286.00	98.9428	12.6370	11.3733
4	PAN ASIA BANKING COPORATION	250,000,000	90.17700	225,442,500.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,958,000,000.00	6,862,526,786.00	98.6279	12.6780	11.4107
5	CAPITAL ALLIANCE	100,000,000	90.17690	90,176,900.00	13.8890	12.5000	7,058,000,000.00	6,952,703,686.00	98.5081	12.6940	11.4246
6	BANK OF CEYLON	3,000,000,000	90.16990	2,705,097,000.00	13.8900	12.5009	10,058,000,000.00	9,657,800,686.00	96.0211	13.0300	11.7270
7	PAN ASIA BANKING COPORATION	150,000,000	88.42800	132,642,000.00	14.1670	12.7503	10,208,000,000.00	9,790,442,686.00	95.9095	13.0459	11.7417
8	BANK OF CEYLON	5,000,000,000	88.40740	4,420,370,000.00	14.1700	12.7530	15,208,000,000.00	14,210,812,686.00	93.4430	13.3970	12.0577
9	BANK OF CEYLON	5,000,000,000	86.76900	4,338,450,000.00	14.4400	12.9959	20,208,000,000.00	18,549,262,686.00	91.7917	13.6410	12.2766
0	COMMERCIAL BANK OF CEYLON LT	50,000,000	86.74280	43,371,400.00	14.4440	12.9996	20,258,000,000.00	18,592,634,086.00	91.7792	13.6430	12.2787
1	PAN ASIA BANKING COPORATION	100,000,000	86.74250	86,742,500.00	14.4440	12.9996	20,358,000,000.00	18,679,376,586.00	91.7545	13.6470	12.2827
2	ACUITY SECURITIES LTD.	100,000,000	86.74000	86,740,000.00	14.4450	13.0005	20,458,000,000.00	18,766,116,586.00	91.7300	13.6510	12.2867
3	COMMERCIAL BANK OF CEYLON LT	50,000,000	86.08510	43,042,550.00	14.5560	13.1004	20,508,000,000.00	18,809,159,136.00	91.7162	13.6530	12.2887
4	UNION BANK	50,000,000	76.48030	38,240,150.00	16.3890	14.7501	20,558,000,000.00	18,847,399,286.00	91.6791	13.6580	12.2927
5	UNION BANK	50,000,000	74.21250	37,106,250.00	16.8890	15.2001	20,608,000,000.00	18,884,505,536.00	91.6368	13.6650	12.2987
6	SAMPATH BANK PLC	100,000,000	62.62160	62,621,600.00	20.0000	18.0000	20,708,000,000.00	18,947,127,136.00	91.4967	13.6860	12.3167

TREASURY BOND TENDER COMMITTEE

CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

MINUTE PAPER

Meeting No: 2/2015 - Time: 12.30 to 13.10 hrs. Date: 27.02.2015

1. The information provided by PDD to make a rate decision for Treasury Bond auction held on 27 - 02-2015 are as follows: (See attendance of the Tender Committee Members)

Series	**12.50% 2045 'A'**
ISIN	LKB03045C013
Maturity date	01-03-2045
Settlement Date	02-03-2015
Amount Offered (Rs.mn.)	1,000.0
Bid Received (Rs.Bn.)	20,708

2. The Tender Committee having considered;
   a) tight financing requirement of the Government;
   b) prevailing high liquidity level in the market as reflected in bids; and
   c) the term structure of interest rates prevailed prior to September 2014,

   granted approval for accepting Rs. 10,058 million at the net of tax WAYR of 11.73%.

.....
Chairman
(DG overseeing the PDD)

.....
SPD

.....
Secretary to the
Tender Committee

Approval of the Governor,

.....
27.02.2015

V. Important doc. to be brought in as an annexure

Public Debt Department
Treasury bond Tender Committee Meeting
27th February 2015

	Name	Designation	Dept.	Signature
1.	Mr. P. Samarasiri	DG(SM)	-	
2.	Mr. S. S. Ratnayake	AG (S)	-	
3.	Mr. C. P. A. Karunatilake	AG (KL)	-	
4.	Mrs. C. M. D. N. K. Senevirathne	SPD	PDD	
5.	Mr. P. W. V. N. R. Rodrigo	DDO	DOD	
6.	Mrs. S. Gunaratna	DER	ERD	
7.	Mrs. U. L. Muthugala	ASPD	PDD	
8.	Dr. M. Z. M. Aazim	ASPD	PDD	

AG/ Public debt Price stability

Treasury Bond Issue March 2015
Amount Offered - Rs 1000 Mn

Settlement Date : 02/03/2015
Issue Date Of The Series: 01/03/2015
Maturity Date Of The Series:01/03/2045
Coupon Rate: 12.50%

Loan Title: 12.50%2045A
Maturity Period: 30 Years and 0 Months
ISIN : LKB03045C013

Series No: 275
Auction Number: 15023
Accrued Interest Rate: 0.034

27/02/2015

Seq No	Dealer	Amount Tendered	Bid Price	Amount Payable	Yield to Maturity	Yield Net of Tax	Cumulative Amount Tendered	Cumulative Amount Payable	Weighted Average Price	W.Ave Yield to Maturity	WAYRN
1	BANK OF CEYLON	8,000,000	119.33420	9,546,736.00	10.3900	9.3510	8,000,000.00	9,546,736.00	119.3342	10.3900	9.351
2	ACUITY SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	112.01000	56,005,000.00	11.1110	9.9999	58,000,000.00	65,551,736.00	113.0202	11.0070	9.906
3	FIRST CAPITAL TREASURIES LTD.	100,000,000	110.95480	110,954,800.00	11.2220	10.0998	158,000,000.00	176,506,536.00	111.7130	11.1420	10.027
4	BANK OF CEYLON	500,000,000	109.39320	546,966,000.00	11.3900	10.2509	658,000,000.00	723,472,536.00	109.9502	11.3300	10.197
5	ENTRUST SECURITIES PLC	50,000,000	104.50730	52,253,650.00	11.9440	10.7496	708,000,000.00	775,726,186.00	109.5658	11.3710	10.233
6	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	104.50730	104,507,300.00	11.9440	10.7496	808,000,000.00	880,233,486.00	108.9398	11.4400	10.295
7	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	500,000,000	104.50730	522,536,500.00	11.9440	10.7496	1,308,000,000.00	1,402,769,986.00	107.2454	11.6280	10.465
8	ENTRUST SECURITIES PLC	50,000,000	103.11580	51,557,900.00	12.1110	10.8999	1,358,000,000.00	1,454,327,886.00	107.0934	11.6450	10.480
9	PEOPLE'S BANK	100,000,000	102.20720	102,207,200.00	12.2220	10.9998	1,458,000,000.00	1,556,535,086.00	106.7582	11.6830	10.514
10	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	102.20720	102,207,200.00	12.2220	10.9998	1,558,000,000.00	1,658,742,286.00	106.4661	11.7170	10.545
11	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	1,000,000,000	102.20720	1,022,072,000.00	12.2220	10.9998	2,558,000,000.00	2,680,814,286.00	104.8012	11.9100	10.719
12	NATWEALTH SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	102.20700	51,103,500.00	12.2220	10.9998	2,608,000,000.00	2,731,917,786.00	104.7514	11.9160	10.724
13	NSB FUND MANAGEMENT COMPAN	100,000,000	101.75800	101,758,000.00	12.2780	11.0502	2,708,000,000.00	2,833,675,786.00	104.6409	11.9290	10.736
14	NATWEALTH SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	99.99900	49,999,500.00	12.5000	11.2500	2,758,000,000.00	2,883,675,286.00	104.5568	11.9390	10.745
15	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	500,000,000	99.99900	499,995,000.00	12.5000	11.2500	3,258,000,000.00	3,383,670,286.00	103.8573	12.0220	10.819
16	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	250,000,000	97.87800	244,695,000.00	12.7780	11.5002	3,508,000,000.00	3,628,365,286.00	103.4312	12.0730	10.865
17	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	250,000,000	95.83940	239,598,500.00	13.0559	11.7504	3,758,000,000.00	3,867,963,786.00	102.9261	12.1340	10.920
18	SEYLAN BANK PLC	1,250,000,000	95.80740	1,197,592,500.00	13.0600	11.7540	5,008,000,000.00	5,065,556,286.00	101.1493	12.3539	11.118
19	WEALTH TRUST SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	93.87900	46,939,500.00	13.3330	11.9997	5,058,000,000.00	5,112,495,786.00	101.0774	12.3630	11.126
20	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	500,000,000	93.87900	469,395,000.00	13.3330	11.9997	5,558,000,000.00	5,581,890,786.00	100.4298	12.4450	11.200
21	PERPETUAL TREASURIES	1,000,000,000	91.99280	919,928,000.00	13.6110	12.2499	6,558,000,000.00	6,501,818,786.00	99.1433	12.6110	11.349
22	WEALTH TRUST SECURITIES LTD.	50,000,000	90.17700	45,088,500.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,608,000,000.00	6,546,907,286.00	99.0755	12.6200	11.358
23	HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKIN(	100,000,000	90.17700	90,177,000.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,708,000,000.00	6,637,084,286.00	98.9428	12.6370	11.373
24	PAN ASIA BANKING COPORATION	250,000,000	90.17700	225,442,500.00	13.8890	12.5000	6,958,000,000.00	6,862,526,786.00	98.6279	12.6780	11.410
25	CAPITAL ALLIANCE	100,000,000	90.17690	90,176,900.00	13.8890	12.5000	7,058,000,000.00	6,952,703,686.00	98.5081	12.6940	11.424
26	BANK OF CEYLON	3,000,000,000	90.16990	2,705,097,000.00	13.8900	12.5009	10,058,000,000.00	9,657,800,686.00	96.0211	13.0300	11.727

Accept Bids (1) to (26) and Balance _____ to _____ at prices Shown In 'Bid Price' Column (Column 4)

Chairman
Treasury Bond Tender Committee

Prepared by:
L.S. Fernando (1888)
Manager

Verified by:
M.S.M.P Fernando (1678)
Senior Manager

Authorised by:
Assistant Director
Department of Public Debt
Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Level 10 Tower 01
Janadhipathi Mawatha
Colombo 1.
Tel: 011 2477316

97
97

(13)

THIRTY YEARS TREASURY BOND AUCTION : 27-02-2015 I
SETTLEMENT DATE : 02-03-2015
ISSUE DATE : 01-03-2015
MATURITY DATE : 01-03-2045
Series: 12.50% 2045 A

(RATES % P.A.)
(AMOUNTS IN RS. MN)

		without tax	with tax
ISIN	LKB03044F019		
PREVIOUS 30 YEARS AUCTION 13.50% 2044 B (27-05-2014)			
ACCEPTED AMOUNT			2,000
O/W AT PREMIUM			2,000
AT PAR			
AT DISCOUNT			
COUPON RATE			13.50
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY		11.7503	13.0559
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		11.7503	13.0559

		without tax	with tax
ISIN	LKB03045C013		
CURRENT 30 YEARS AUCTION - 12.50% 2045 A (27-02-2015)			
AMOUNT OFFERED			1,000
COUPON RATE			12.50
BIDS RECEIVED	AT PREMIUM		20,708
	AT PAR		
	AT DISCOUNT		

OPTION 1- PREVIOUS CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	11.7503	13.0559
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.9206	12.1340
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		3,758
OPTION 2- PREVIOUS W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	12.7503	14.1670
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	11.7413	13.0459
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		10,208
OPTION 3- ACCEPT ALL BIDS (INDICATIVE)		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	18.0000	20.0000
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	12.3174	13.6860
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		20,708
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	57	
OPTION 4- ACCEPT AMOUNT OFFERED		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	10.7496	11.9440
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.3806	11.5340
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		1,000
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	137	
OPTION 5- If Accept Rs. 1,408 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	10.9998	12.2220
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.4985	11.6650
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		1,408
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	125	
OPTION 6- If Accept Rs. 2,800 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	11.2500	12.5000
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.7523	11.9470
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		2,800
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	100	
OPTION 7- If Accept Rs. 4,150 Million		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	11.7540	13.0600
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.9944	12.2160
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		4,150
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	75	
Department Recommendation		
CUT-OFF YIELD TO MATURITY	10.9998	12.2220
W.A. YIELD TO MATURITY	10.7244	11.9160
ELIGIBLE AMOUNT (AT PREMIUM)		2,608
Change of WAYR (in basis points)	103	

Hd/FO
G instructed to raize funds upto Rs 10 bn, taking into consideration of additional fund of the Govt. pl.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Rs. 13.5 billion.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් එහි තීරණයක් Monetary Board එකෙන් ගත්තා. auction එකට යන ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කළේ නැහැ. One billion විතර යනවා කියලා තීරණය ගත්තේ ඔබතුමියගේ Department එකද? One billion විතර bids කැඳවන්න තීරණය ගත්තේ කවුද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක ගන්නේ Public Debt Department එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගන්න තීරණයක්. ඔබතුමිගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් එයට යන්නේ නැහැ?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මේ ආකාරයෙන් කැඳවන කොට අපට Deputy Governor ත් කිව්වා, ආණ්ඩුවේ කට්ටියක් ඇවිල්ලා නවත් සල්ලි අවශ්‍ය බව පැහැදිලි කරලා දුන්නා කියලා. ඔබතුමිය හිටියේ නැහැ?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී ද Rs. 10 billion ගන්න ඔබතුමියට Governor instruct කළේ?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Auction එක දවසේ auction එක close කරලා වෙසන් පුංචාට පසුව.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔතනා වෙලාවේදිද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 12.30ට විතර. ඔව්කෙදේ? අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් 12.00ට යනවා Tender Board Meeting එකට, Tender Board එකේ Chairman වලස ඉන්නේ Deputy Governor.නේන් Assistant Governors ලා තිහිප දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ නිසාම අපට අය Corporate Management Meeting එකේ Governor එක්ක හිටියේ. එම නිසා ඔෆිස්එකේ වෙලාවටත් පසුවත් ඉන්න සිදු වුණා. ඊට පසු ඒ meeting අවසන් වෙලා Governor තමයි කාට කොළේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වන විට Governor ලවින දැනලා තිබුණාද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වන විට දැනලා නැහැ. 12.30ට ලබාදෙ පසුව තමයි දැනගන්නේ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: පත්තරකාරයි එක දැක්කේ? ඔතුමා මෙම instruction දෙන්න කලින් මෙවර list එක දැක්කා.

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔතුමා instruct කලා ද Rs. 10 billion ගන්න, ඔතුමා නොවැසිකා කලා ද Rs. 20 billion බදලක් ගන්න?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඉස්සර වෙලාම Rs. 20 billion ගන්න බලාපොරොත්තුව තිබුණා. අපි හිතුවේ නැහැ ඒ මුදල එයි කියලා. මෙච්චර කාලයකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණේ live times වගේ කමයි අපි offer කරන එකෙන්.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් ඔතුමා මෙම Rs. 20 billion දැකලා තිබ්බා Rs. 20 billion මුදලම් ගන්න කියලා.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Rs. 20 billion ඇවිල්ල තිබෙනවා නම්- why do you not-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: He told you to take Rs. 20 billion.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: First he said. Rs. 20 billion. We explained him-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: So, having seen this and realized that there are 20 billion bids, he instructed or suggested that we should take 20 billion.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: I would say, suggested-

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Why did you reject that suggestion?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: That was too high.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Why was it too high? He has told us and Mr. Samarasiri seems to agree with him that since auctions are transparent, you should always take everything by auction. So, why did you refuse? I am very glad that you refused it. I am delighted that you had the courage to say, "No". But, why did you refuse?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: One reason is that sometimes these bids maybe dummy bids. සමහර වෙලාවට ඒ අයට 10 per cent requirement.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක පැහැදිලියි. ඊට පෙනෙන විධියට-

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඉ.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔතුමිය කවදාවත් dummy bids කියලා කියනවාද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සමහර වෙලාවට dummy bids වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඉ.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, කොහොමද dummy bids වෙන්නේ? සල්ලි නැතිව bid කරනවාද? පෙනෙනවා අපි හාර්ගත්තේ නැතිව ඉන්නවාද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ, සමහර වෙලාවට නැහැ කියනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ඉ.ඩී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔතුමියට එතකොට dummy කියලත් නැහැනෙ. Intentionally ඒ වගේනෙ.

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්. ඒක too high. ඉතින් අපිට ඒ rate එකට දමන්න බෑනේ.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: It is too high. Okay. So, as a responsible officer, you said that these bids are too high and they should be rejected. That is why the country was safe from taking a 20 billion bond. Thank you, Mrs. Senevirathna. Why did you now exercise the same intelligent discretion and tell the Governor this 10 billion is too much?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Especially Dr. Azim, our Additional Superintendent explained him more than four times.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: More than four times that this was too much.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But the Governor insisted?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: We did not have any other option.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: You are an officer of the Central Bank. If I might-

සභාපතිතුමා: සිංහලෙන් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හොඳයි. ගෞතුමිය මේ තනතුරට පත් කළෙත් ගෞතුමියගේ පෙංකමට නිසා කියලා සංගම් එක කියනවා. එහෙ විකක් සැකයෙන් හිටියා. Mr. Azim පැහැදිලි උලස පෙන්වා දුන්නා Governor ට මේක පොඩි වැරැද්දක් කියලා. ඒනෙත් Governor insist කළා.

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Insist නෙළා. හොඳද, requirement is high. අපට Rs. 13.5 billion තිබුනේ. ඒනෙත් 3 billion-

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: හරි, අපිට විකල්ප තිබුනා නේ. Private placement විකල්ප තිබුනා.

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වෙන කොට කිව්වා යම්කිසි ලෙසකින් private placement කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: කවදා කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ කිව්වාද?

ඩී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Governor කිව්වා. The Governor said that.

ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රාජිව විජේසිංහ මහතා: Governor කීවාය කියනවා private placements කොළඹටනේ. කිසිම දෙයක්වත් Monetary Board යවන්න එපාලු නැහැ. Monetary Board යවනවා කිව්වා interest rate එක ඉහළ නංවන්න ඕන කියලා. පොළොන්ද වලින් ඉල්ලලා කියලා 20 billion ගන්න කියලා. ඒ sequence එක නම්. පොළොන්ද වලින් ඉල්ලන්න කියපු කථාව Mrs. Senevirathna ට Mr. Azim ට පෙන්වලා දුන්නා මෙන බැහැ කියලා. මේ 20 billion කියන්නේ විකුණා ඉවරයිනෙ දැණා. රිය පසුව 10 billion ගැනීම Dr. Azim පෙන්වලා දුන්නා, නේද? එත Governor insist කළා. This was at 12.30.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: I will say, "Instructed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Not instructed. Your minute is very clear. Thank you, Mrs. Senevirathna.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Instructed or insisted? Just tell the truth because instructed and insisted has-

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Instructed.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: But he instructed-

ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය: "Instructed" කියලා තිබෙනවා කොළේ. "Insisted" කියලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගෞතුමියගේ අවසාන ප්‍රකාශය ඉදිරිපත් කියන්න? ගෞතුමියට අවසරයක් දෙන්නට.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: I think I should explain to the Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake that responsible officers of the responsible officers of the Bank, Mrs. Senevirathna, who has no experience in this area, and Dr. Azim who has a lot of experience indicated to the Governor why it was not a suitable action.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Nevertheless, he instructed- I think I am entitled to use the word "insisted". If you give an instruction and when the professional advise against it, but you say "No, no", that is what in English we call "insisted". But, Mrs. Senevirathna, being a mild lady එලා තිබෙනවා "Governor instructed". So, what is very clear is that following the discussion with the officials of the Bank, the officials of the Bank who did their best to give professional advice, the Governor continued to instruct and it was subject to that instruction that the Tender Board made its decision. Is that correct?

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathna: Yes.

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Thank you. ඒ note එකේ තිබෙනවා, What time did you write this note?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගෞතුමියගේ අවසාන ප්‍රකාශය ඉදිරිපත් කියන්න?

The Hon. (Prof) Rajiva Wijesinha: Can you confirm at what time you wrote this note?

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CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

MINUTE PAPER

Board Paper No. : MB/ER/5/3/2015 File No. : 03/16/025/0002/001

Meeting No. : 5/2015 Item No. : 3 Date : 06.03.2015

3. Ratification of the Withdrawal of the 5 per cent Special Standing Deposit Facility Rate

3.1. .....

3.2. .....

3.3. The Chairman informed the Board that the Central Bank temporarily suspended the method of direct placements of Treasury bills and Treasury bonds used to raise funds for the Government with a view to move towards a greater market mechanism based on standard auction system followed alternatively at present. Accordingly, the Central Bank at the 30 year Treasury bond auction held on 27th February 2015 decided to accept Rs. 10 billion out of Rs. 20 billion worth bonds received for Rs. 1 billion announced to the market for bids in order to meet the Government's funding requirements only from the open market bids.

TRUE COPY

H A Karunaratne
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

17.03.2015

Employee Provident Fund - Purchases from Secondary Market

Bond Issued date	ISIN No	Purchase Dat	Coupon	Yield	Face Value	Purchase Cost	Counter party
2015.02.27	LKB03045C013	25.05.2015	12.50	11.00	400,000,000	452,128,400	Seylan Bank PLC
		25.05.2015	12.50	11.00	100,000,000	113,032,100	Seylan Bank PLC
		04.06.2015	12.50	10.85	100,000,000	114,509,600	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
		05.06.2015	12.50	10.80	40,000,000	46,004,120	First Capital Treasuries Ltd
		08.06.2015	12.50	10.75	30,000,000	34,654,380	Seylan Bank PLC
		11.06.2015	12.50	10.50	2,000,000,000	2,361,970,000	Perpetual Treasuries Ltd
		11.06.2015	12.50	10.50	50,000,000	59,049,250	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd
Total Purchase cost for 2015.02.27 bond issue						**3,181,347,850**	
2016.03.29	LKB01226F014	18.04.2016	11.00	12.20	100,000,000	93,101,100	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
	LKB01530E152	12.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,176,000	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		12.04.2016	11.00	12.42	50,000,000	45,317,600	DFCC Bank
		18.04.2016	11.00	12.45	500,000,000	452,301,000	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	453,228,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.50	1,000,000,000	901,596,000	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	452,314,500	DFCC Bank
		20.04.2016	11.00	12.42	500,000,000	452,314,500	DFCC Bank
		25.04.2016	11.00	12.50	250,000,000	225,416,750	DFCC Bank
		25.04.2016	11.00	12.50	750,000,000	676,250,250	DFCC Bank
		25.04.2016	11.00	12.50	1,000,000,000	901,667,000	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		12.05.2016	11.00	12.20	250,000,000	230,083,750	First Capital Treasuries
		12.05.2016	11.00	12.20	250,000,000	230,083,750	DFCC Bank
		12.05.2016	11.00	12.16	2,250,000,000	2,076,374,250	Pan Asia Banking Coporation Ltd
		13.05.2016	11.00	12.25	800,000,000	733,794,400	National Savings Bank
Total Purchase cost for 2016.03.29 bond issue						**9,736,704,850**	

Source - Invesment in Treasury Bonds information sheets receved from EPF

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Employee Provident Fund - Purchases from Primary Market

Bond Issued date	ISIN No	Purchase Date	Bid price	Face Value	Purchase Cost	Counter party
2015.02.27	LKB03045C013	2015.02.27	104.5073	500,000,000	522,536,500	CB
			102.2072	1,000,000,000	1,022,072,000	CB
			99.9990	500,000,000	499,995,000	CB
Total Purchase cost for 2015.02.27 bond issue					**2,044,603,500**	
2016.03.29	LKB01530E152	2016.03.29	75.9765	500,000,000	379,882,500	CB
			75.7200	500,000,000	378,600,000	CB
					758,482,500	
	LKB01226F014	2016.03.29	79.6594	500,000,000	**398,297,000**	CB
	LKB01025C157	2016.03.29	77.6667	1,000,000,000	**776,667,000**	CB
	LKB00520E014	Not purchased				
Total Purchase cost for 2016.03.29 bond issue					**1,933,446,500**	

Source - Bids accepted documents of Central Bank

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Estimated Loss occurred from the Primary Auction held on 27.02.2015

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tendered Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price Rs. (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
Panel A - Estimated loss by accepting bids amount in to Rs.10.058 Bn of Face Value as opposed to accepting Rs.1.308 Bn of Face Value							
1	B	119.3342	8,000,000	8,000,000	9,546,736		-
2	A	112.0100	50,000,000	58,000,000	65,551,736		-
3	F	110.9548	100,000,000	158,000,000	176,506,536		-
4	B	109.3932	500,000,000	658,000,000	723,472,536		-
5	E	104.5073	50,000,000	708,000,000	775,726,186		-
6	H	104.5073	100,000,000	808,000,000	880,233,486		-
7	**EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND**	**104.5073**	**500,000,000**	**1,308,000,000**	**1,402,769,986**		-
8	E	103.1158	50,000,000	1,358,000,000	1,454,327,886	1.3915	695,750
9	J	102.2072	100,000,000	1,458,000,000	1,556,535,086	2.3001	2,300,100
10	H	102.2072	100,000,000	1,558,000,000	1,658,742,286	2.3001	2,300,100
11	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	102.2072	1,000,000,000	2,558,000,000	2,680,814,286	2.3001	23,001,000
12	G	102.2070	50,000,000	2,608,000,000	2,731,917,786	2.3003	1,150,150
13	H	101.7580	100,000,000	2,708,000,000	2,833,675,786	2.7493	2,749,300
14	G	99.9990	50,000,000	2,758,000,000	2,883,675,286	4.5083	2,254,150
15	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	99.9990	500,000,000	3,258,000,000	3,383,670,286	4.5083	22,541,500
16	K	97.8780	250,000,000	3,508,000,000	3,628,365,286	6.6293	16,573,250
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000	3,758,000,000	3,867,963,786	8.6679	21,669,750
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000	5,008,000,000	5,065,556,286	8.6999	108,748,750
19	P	93.8790	50,000,000	5,058,000,000	5,112,495,786	10.6283	5,314,150
20	K	93.8790	500,000,000	5,558,000,000	5,581,890,786	10.6283	53,141,500
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000	6,558,000,000	6,501,818,786	12.5145	125,145,000
22	P	90.1770	50,000,000	6,608,000,000	6,546,907,286	14.3303	7,165,150
23	N	90.1770	100,000,000	6,708,000,000	6,637,084,286	14.3303	14,330,300
24	I	90.1770	250,000,000	6,958,000,000	6,862,526,786	14.3303	35,825,750
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000	7,058,000,000	6,952,703,686	14.3304	14,330,400
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000	10,058,000,000	9,657,800,686	14.3374	430,122,000
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**889,358,050**

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tendered Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price Rs. (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
Panel B - Estimated loss by accepting bids amount in to Rs.10.058 Bn of Face Value as opposed to accepting Rs.2.608 Bn of Face Value							
1	B	119.3342	8,000,000	8,000,000	9,546,736		-
2	A	112.0100	50,000,000	58,000,000	65,551,736		-
3	F	110.9548	100,000,000	158,000,000	176,506,536		-
4	B	109.3932	500,000,000	658,000,000	723,472,536		-
5	E	104.5073	50,000,000	708,000,000	775,726,186		-
6	H	104.5073	100,000,000	808,000,000	880,233,486		-
7	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	104.5073	500,000,000	1,308,000,000	1,402,769,986		-
8	E	103.1158	50,000,000	1,358,000,000	1,454,327,886		-
9	J	102.2072	100,000,000	1,458,000,000	1,556,535,086		-
10	H	102.2072	100,000,000	1,558,000,000	1,658,742,286		-
11	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	102.2072	1,000,000,000	2,558,000,000	2,680,814,286		-
12	**G**	**102.2070**	**50,000,000**	**2,608,000,000**	**2,731,917,786**		-
13	H	101.7580	100,000,000	2,708,000,000	2,833,675,786	0.4490	449,000
14	G	99.9990	50,000,000	2,758,000,000	2,883,675,286	2.2080	1,104,000
15	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	99.9990	500,000,000	3,258,000,000	3,383,670,286	2.2080	11,040,000
16	K	97.8780	250,000,000	3,508,000,000	3,628,365,286	4.3290	10,822,500
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000	3,758,000,000	3,867,963,786	6.3676	15,919,000
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000	5,008,000,000	5,065,556,286	6.3996	79,995,000
19	P	93.8790	50,000,000	5,058,000,000	5,112,495,786	8.3280	4,164,000
20	K	93.8790	500,000,000	5,558,000,000	5,581,890,786	8.3280	41,640,000
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000	6,558,000,000	6,501,818,786	10.2142	102,142,000
22	P	90.1770	50,000,000	6,608,000,000	6,546,907,286	12.0300	6,015,000
23	N	90.1770	100,000,000	6,708,000,000	6,637,084,286	12.0300	12,030,000
24	I	90.1770	250,000,000	6,958,000,000	6,862,526,786	12.0300	30,075,000
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000	7,058,000,000	6,952,703,686	12.0301	12,030,100
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000	10,058,000,000	9,657,800,686	12.0371	361,113,000
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**688,538,600**

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tendered Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price Rs. (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
Panel C - Estimated loss if the bids amount in to 20.708 Bn in Face Value were accepted on opposed to accepting Rs.1.308 Bn in Face Value							
1	B	119.3342	8,000,000	8,000,000	9,546,736		-
2	A	112.0100	50,000,000	58,000,000	65,551,736		-
3	F	110.9548	100,000,000	158,000,000	176,506,536		-
4	B	109.3932	500,000,000	658,000,000	723,472,536		-
5	E	104.5073	50,000,000	708,000,000	775,726,186		-
6	H	104.5073	100,000,000	808,000,000	880,233,486		-
7	**EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND**	**104.5073**	**500,000,000**	**1,308,000,000**	**1,402,769,986**		-
8	E	103.1158	50,000,000	1,358,000,000	1,454,327,886	1.3915	695,750
9	J	102.2072	100,000,000	1,458,000,000	1,556,535,086	2.3001	2,300,100
10	H	102.2072	100,000,000	1,558,000,000	1,658,742,286	2.3001	2,300,100
11	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	102.2072	1,000,000,000	2,558,000,000	2,680,814,286	2.3001	23,001,000
12	G	102.2070	50,000,000	2,608,000,000	2,731,917,786	2.3003	1,150,150
13	H	101.7580	100,000,000	2,708,000,000	2,833,675,786	2.7493	2,749,300
14	G	99.9990	50,000,000	2,758,000,000	2,883,675,286	4.5083	2,254,150
15	EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND	99.9990	500,000,000	3,258,000,000	3,383,670,286	4.5083	22,541,500
16	K	97.8780	250,000,000	3,508,000,000	3,628,365,286	6.6293	16,573,250
17	K	95.8394	250,000,000	3,758,000,000	3,867,963,786	8.6679	21,669,750
18	M	95.8074	1,250,000,000	5,008,000,000	5,065,556,286	8.6999	108,748,750
19	P	93.8790	50,000,000	5,058,000,000	5,112,495,786	10.6283	5,314,150
20	K	93.8790	500,000,000	5,558,000,000	5,581,890,786	10.6283	53,141,500
21	K	91.9928	1,000,000,000	6,558,000,000	6,501,818,786	12.5145	125,145,000
22	P	90.1770	50,000,000	6,608,000,000	6,546,907,286	14.3303	7,165,150
23	N	90.1770	100,000,000	6,708,000,000	6,637,084,286	14.3303	14,330,300
24	I	90.1770	250,000,000	6,958,000,000	6,862,526,786	14.3303	35,825,750
25	C	90.1769	100,000,000	7,058,000,000	6,952,703,686	14.3304	14,330,400
26	B	90.1699	3,000,000,000	10,058,000,000	9,657,800,686	14.3374	430,122,000
27	I	88.4280	150,000,000	10,208,000,000	9,790,442,686	16.0793	24,118,950
28	B	88.4074	5,000,000,000	15,208,000,000	14,210,812,686	16.0999	804,995,000
29	B	86.7690	5,000,000,000	20,208,000,000	18,549,262,686	17.7383	886,915,000

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tendered Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price Rs. (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
30	D	86.7428	50,000,000	20,258,000,000	18,592,634,086	17.7645	8,882,250
31	I	86.7425	100,000,000	20,358,000,000	18,679,376,586	17.7648	17,764,800
32	A	86.7400	100,000,000	20,458,000,000	18,766,116,586	17.7673	17,767,300
33	D	86.0851	50,000,000	20,508,000,000	18,809,159,136	18.4222	9,211,100
34	O	76.4803	50,000,000	20,558,000,000	18,847,399,286	28.0270	14,013,500
35	O	74.2125	50,000,000	20,608,000,000	18,884,505,536	30.2948	15,147,400
36	L	62.6216	100,000,000	20,708,000,000	18,947,127,136	41.8857	41,885,700
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**2,730,059,050**

TREASURY BONDS TENDER BOARD
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
MINUTES PAPER

Meeting No: 05/2016 Time: 1230 to 1330 hrs. Date: 10.03.2016

1. Members of the Tender Board attended as detailed at Annex I.

2. The key details provided by PDD to facilitate making decisions on the Treasury bond auctions (held on 10.03.2016*) were as follows. The Technical details provided by PDD to the Tender Board members are at Annex II.

Series	**8.00% 2019'A'**	**11.00% 2021 'A'**	**11.40% 2024 'A'**
Period to Maturity	03 Year 08 Months	5 Years 05 Months	07 Years 10 Months
ISIN	LKB00819K017	LKB00821H019	LKB01024A014
Maturity Date	01-11-2019	01-08-2021	01-01-2024
Amount Offered (Rs.mn.)	2,000	2,000	2,000
Bid Received (Rs.mn.)	6,514	7,040	9,535

* Settlement Date: 11.03.2016

3. PDD made a technical presentation with the following highlights (Annex III).

   a. The previous corresponding bond auctions' information and comparison of those yields with the prevailing secondary market yield rates.

   b. Movement in secondary market yield rates and overall movements in money market liquidity, call money market and central bank policy rate corridor.

   c. The yield curve moved upwards over 50 bps in 2-years and in 3-years in addition to this yield curve moved upwards by 10 to 25 bps rest of maturity compared to the last week.

   d. The call money rate increased to 7.78% level compare to February 29, 2016 level of 7.50% and exchange rate appreciated to Rs.140.00/USD from February 29th level of Rs.144.35/USD.

   e. The money market liquidity level declined to negative Rs.5.38 billion compared to positive Rs.32.84 billion in the last week.

Superintendent
Public Debt Department

f. Year to date net foreign out flows from T- bill and T-bond amounted to USD 440.41 million.

4. The Tender Board made the following observations:

a. Today's auction was to raise funds for the coupon payment of Treasury Bonds amounting to Rs.12.77 bn.

b. As per the department recommendations only around Rs. 4.00 bn can be raised with the increases in yield rates by 54 to 264 bps across the maturities. Any other option to raise more funds would further increase the yield rates which may not be prudent.

c. The excessive speculation appears to continue as reflected in bids. The yield rates since the recent monetary policy tightening have increased by nearly 100 to 150 bps and further increase doesn't appear to be appropriate at this stage.

5. Decision

Accordingly, the Tender Board decided to decline to accept the departmental recommendation and reject consideration of all bids.

Chairman .....

SDG, DG overseeing PDD

AG(R), AG overseeing PDD .....

Actg. SPD .....

Add DER .....

A221 D/DOD .....

Superintendent
Public Debt. Department

ASPD (M), Secretary to the Tender Board

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6. Approval of the SDG

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10.03.2016

Superintendent
Public Debt Department

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TREASURY BONDS TENDER BOARD
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
MINUTES PAPER

Meeting No: 06/2016 Time: 1300 to 1330 hrs. Date: 24.03.2016

1. Members of the Tender Board attended as detailed at Annex I.

2. The key details provided by PDD to facilitate making decisions on the Treasury bond auctions (held on 24.03.2016*) were as follows. The Technical details provided by PDD to the Tender Board members are at Annex II.

Series	**9.25% 2020'A'**	**9.45% 2021 'A'**	**10.00% 2022 'A'**	**10.25%2025'A'**
Period to Maturity	04 Year 01 Months	05 Years 06 Month	06 Years 06 Months	08 Years 11 Months
ISIN	LKB00520E014	LKB00721J157	LKB00922J011	LKB01025C157
Maturity Date	10-05-2020	15-10-2021	01-10-2022	15-03-2025
Amount Offered (Rs.mn.)	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Bid Received (Rs.mn.)	13,628	17,500	13,520	33,150

* Settlement Date: 01.04.2016

3. PDD made a technical presentation with the following highlights (Annex III).

   a. The previous corresponding bond auctions' information and comparison of those yields with the prevailing secondary market yield rates.

   b. Movement in secondary market yield rates and overall movements in money market liquidity, call money market and central bank policy rate corridor.

   c. The yield curve moved upwards by 60 bps, 70 bps, 85 bps and 85 bps in 4-years, 5-years, 7-year and in 9-years compared to the last week.

   d. The call money rate as at today increased to 8.00% level compare to March 15, 2016 level of 7.83% and exchange rate remained unchanged at Rs.143.898/USD.

   e. The money market liquidity level decreased to Rs.3.33 billion compared to Rs.10.893 billion in the last week.

Superintende-i
Pubic Debt. Department

f. Year to date net foreign out flows from T- bill and T-bond amounted to USD 568.15 million.

4. The Tender Board made the following observations:

a. Today's auction was to raise part of the funding requirement on 01.04.2016 amounting to Rs.105.0 bn.

b. The bids at today's auction for all maturities have begun in the range of 12.50% to 13.00% which are very high compared to the recent auctions. Therefore the amount that can be raised from the auction as recommended by the department is very limited to Rs.10.3 bn in book value.

c. Therefore, one or more auctions has to be announced to raise the balance part of the funding requirements where such funds will have to be raised at further higher yield rates if any bids are accepted at today's auction.

d. On the other hand, sufficient liquidity will be available from maturity proceeds and coupon payments in the market for investment in bonds. However, bids placed for this auction are limited, expecting further increase in yield rates at the upcoming auctions.

e. Accordingly, the Tender Board was of the view that raising fund from this auction is not advisable and consideration of raising total funding requirements from the next auction could be more prudent

5. Decision

Accordingly, the Tender Board decided to reject the acceptance of all bids,

Chairman

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DG(SM), DG overseeing PDD

AG(R), AG overseeing PDD .....

Superintendent
Public Debt Department

Actg. SPD Absent

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Addl DER

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D/DOD

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ASPD (M), Secretary to the Tender Board

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6. Approval of the Governor

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24.03.2016

Superintendent
Public Debt. Department

Immediate Loss occurred from Primary Auction held on 29.03.2016 by accepting bids at a discounted Price

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tenderd Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
ISIN - LKB00520E014, 9.25% 2020A (4 YEARS AND I MONTHS),AMOUNT OFFERED RS.10,000 MN							
31	B	84.35120	800,000,000	10,272,000,000	8,733,875,000		-
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						-
ISIN -LKB01025C157,10.25% 2025A (8 YEARS AND 11 MONTHS),AMOUNT OFFEREDRS 10,000 MN							
63	J	75.57580	120,000,000.00	10,065,000,000.00	7,886,053,130.00		
64	G	75.44510	100,000,000.00	10,165,000,000.00	7,961,498,230.00	0.1307	130,700.00
65	J	75.44510	120,000,000.00	10,285,000,000.00	8,052,032,350.00	0.1307	156,840.00
66	J	75.31470	120,000,000.00	10,405,000,000.00	8,142,409,990.00	0.2611	313,320.00
67	K	75.22790	50,000,000.00	10,455,000,000.00	8,180,023,940.00	0.3479	173,950.00
68	J	75.22790	160,000,000.00	10,615,000,000.00	8,300,388,580.00	0.3479	556,640.00
69	K	75.22790	200,000,000.00	10,815,000,000.00	8,450,844,380.00	0.3479	695,800.00
70	J	75.18450	120,000,000.00	10,935,000,000.00	8,541,065,780.00	0.3913	469,560.00
71	J	75.05470	120,000,000.00	11,055,000,000.00	8,631,131,420.00	0.5211	625,320.00
72	J	74.92530	120,000,000.00	11,175,000,000.00	8,721,041,780.00	0.6505	780,600.00
73	M	74.83930	100,000,000.00	11,275,000,000.00	8,795,881,080.00	0.7365	736,500.00
74	K	74.79610	50,000,000.00	11,325,000,000.00	8,833,279,130.00	0.7797	389,850.00
75	K	74.79610	100,000,000.00	11,425,000,000.00	8,908,075,230.00	0.7797	779,700.00
76	P	74.79610	100,000,000.00	11,525,000,000.00	8,982,871,330.00	0.7797	779,700.00
77	J	74.79610	120,000,000.00	11,645,000,000.00	9,072,626,650.00	0.7797	935,640.00
78	K	74.79610	250,000,000.00	11,895,000,000.00	9,259,616,900.00	0.7797	1,949,250.00
79	M	74.79590	160,000,000.00	12,055,000,000.00	9,379,290,340.00	0.7799	1,247,840.00
80	C	74.79590	200,000,000.00	12,255,000,000.00	9,528,882,140.00	0.7799	1,559,800.00
81	K	74.36780	50,000,000.00	12,305,000,000.00	9,566,066,040.00	1.2080	604,000.00
82	J	74.36780	200,000,000.00	12,505,000,000.00	9,714,801,640.00	1.2080	2,416,000.00
83	K	74.36780	250,000,000.00	12,755,000,000.00	9,900,721,140.00	1.2080	3,020,000.00
84	K	73.94300	50,000,000.00	12,805,000,000.00	9,937,692,640.00	1.6328	816,400.00
85	K	73.94300	500,000,000.00	13,305,000,000.00	10,307,407,640.00	1.6328	8,164,000.00

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tenderd Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
86	B	73.93450	250,000,000.00	13,555,000,000.00	10,492,243,890.00	1.6413	4,103,250.00
87	C	73.73200	100,000,000.00	13,655,000,000.00	10,565,975,890.00	1.8438	1,843,800.00
88	P	73.73190	100,000,000.00	13,755,000,000.00	10,639,707,790.00	1.8439	1,843,900.00
89	K	73.52160	50,000,000.00	13,805,000,000.00	10,676,468,590.00	2.0542	1,027,100.00
90	J	73.52160	250,000,000.00	14,055,000,000.00	10,860,272,590.00	2.0542	5,135,500.00
91	K	73.52160	750,000,000.00	14,805,000,000.00	11,411,684,590.00	2.0542	15,406,500.00
92	K	73.10360	50,000,000.00	14,855,000,000.00	11,448,236,390.00	2.4722	1,236,100.00
93	M	73.10360	180,000,000.00	15,035,000,000.00	11,579,822,870.00	2.4722	4,449,960.00
94	K	73.10360	750,000,000.00	15,785,000,000.00	12,128,099,870.00	2.4722	18,541,500.00
95	M	72.68910	100,000,000.00	15,885,000,000.00	12,200,788,970.00	2.8867	2,886,700.00
96	C	72.68910	100,000,000.00	15,985,000,000.00	12,273,478,070.00	2.8867	2,886,700.00
97	P	72.68902	100,000,000.00	16,085,000,000.00	12,346,167,090.00	2.8868	2,886,780.00
98	K	72.68900	50,000,000.00	16,135,000,000.00	12,382,511,590.00	2.8868	1,443,400.00
99	F	72.68900	100,000,000.00	16,235,000,000.00	12,455,200,590.00	2.8868	2,886,800.00
100	K	72.68900	750,000,000.00	16,985,000,000.00	13,000,368,090.00	2.8868	21,651,000.00
101	B	72.65600	180,000,000.00	17,165,000,000.00	13,131,148,890.00	2.9198	5,255,640.00
102	K	72.48300	2,000,000,000.00	19,165,000,000.00	14,580,808,890.00	3.0928	61,856,000.00
103	M	72.27780	100,000,000.00	19,265,000,000.00	14,653,086,690.00	3.2980	3,298,000.00
104	K	72.27770	50,000,000.00	19,315,000,000.00	14,689,225,540.00	3.2981	1,649,050.00
105	J	72.27770	160,000,000.00	19,475,000,000.00	14,804,869,860.00	3.2981	5,276,960.00
106	K	72.27770	2,000,000,000.00	21,475,000,000.00	16,250,423,860.00	3.2981	65,962,000.00
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**258,828,050.00**
ISIN - LKB01226F014,11.00% 2026A (10 YEARS AND 2 MONTHS),AMOUNT OFFERED RS.10,000 MN							
70	**C**	**75.91150**	**200,000,000.00**	**10,090,000,000.00**	**8,012,848,545.00**		
71	J	75.82100	60,000,000.00	10,150,000,000.00	8,058,341,145.00	0.0905	54,300.00
72	J	75.68580	60,000,000.00	10,210,000,000.00	8,103,752,625.00	0.2257	135,420.00
73	K	75.68580	500,000,000.00	10,710,000,000.00	8,482,181,625.00	0.2257	1,128,500.00
74	K	75.23760	750,000,000.00	11,460,000,000.00	9,046,463,625.00	0.6739	5,054,250.00
75	K	74.79330	100,000,000.00	11,560,000,000.00	9,121,256,925.00	1.1182	1,118,200.00

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tenderd Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
76	C	74.79330	200,000,000.00	11,760,000,000.00	9,270,843,525.00	1.1182	2,236,400.00
77	K	74.79330	750,000,000.00	12,510,000,000.00	9,831,793,275.00	1.1182	8,386,500.00
78	K	74.13400	500,000,000.00	13,010,000,000.00	10,202,463,275.00	1.7775	8,887,500.00
79	K	74.09040	500,000,000.00	13,510,000,000.00	10,572,915,275.00	1.8211	9,105,500.00
80	K	74.04680	500,000,000.00	14,010,000,000.00	10,943,149,275.00	1.8647	9,323,500.00
81	K	74.00320	500,000,000.00	14,510,000,000.00	11,313,165,275.00	1.9083	9,541,500.00
82	K	73.95970	500,000,000.00	15,010,000,000.00	11,682,963,775.00	1.9518	9,759,000.00
83	K	73.91620	2,000,000,000.00	17,010,000,000.00	13,161,287,775.00	1.9953	39,906,000.00
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**104,636,570.00**
ISIN - LKB01530E152, 11.00% 2030A (14 YEARS AND 1 MONTHS),AMOUNT OFFERED,RS.10,000 MN							
88	**K**	**73.71470**	**1,000,000,000.00**	**10,775,000,000.00**	**8,185,426,680.00**		
89	M	73.71460	50,000,000.00	10,825,000,000.00	8,222,283,980.00	0.0001	50.00
90	P	73.47010	100,000,000.00	10,925,000,000.00	8,295,754,080.00	0.2446	244,600.00
91	K	73.22680	25,000,000.00	10,950,000,000.00	8,314,060,780.00	0.4879	121,975.00
92	P	73.22680	50,000,000.00	11,000,000,000.00	8,350,674,180.00	0.4879	243,950.00
93	P	73.22680	100,000,000.00	11,100,000,000.00	8,423,900,980.00	0.4879	487,900.00
94	K	73.22680	1,000,000,000.00	12,100,000,000.00	9,156,168,980.00	0.4879	4,879,000.00
95	M	73.22670	20,000,000.00	12,120,000,000.00	9,170,814,320.00	0.4880	97,600.00
96	C	72.98490	100,000,000.00	12,220,000,000.00	9,243,799,220.00	0.7298	729,800.00
97	P	72.98480	150,000,000.00	12,370,000,000.00	9,353,276,420.00	0.7299	1,094,850.00
98	P	72.98480	500,000,000.00	12,870,000,000.00	9,718,200,420.00	0.7299	3,649,500.00
99	P	72.98480	600,000,000.00	13,470,000,000.00	10,156,109,220.00	0.7299	4,379,400.00
100	K	72.74410	25,000,000.00	13,495,000,000.00	10,174,295,245.00	0.9706	242,650.00
101	J	72.74410	40,000,000.00	13,535,000,000.00	10,203,392,885.00	0.9706	388,240.00
102	P	72.74410	100,000,000.00	13,635,000,000.00	10,276,136,985.00	0.9706	970,600.00
103	K	72.74410	1,000,000,000.00	14,635,000,000.00	11,003,577,985.00	0.9706	9,706,000.00
104	H	72.74400	10,000,000.00	14,645,000,000.00	11,010,852,385.00	0.9707	97,070.00
105	H	72.26650	10,000,000.00	14,655,000,000.00	11,018,079,035.00	1.4482	144,820.00
106	K	72.26650	25,000,000.00	14,680,000,000.00	11,036,145,660.00	1.4482	362,050.00

Seq No.	Dealer	Bid Price Rs. (A)	Face Value of the Bond (Government Labilities) Rs. (B)	Cumulative Face Value Tenderd Rs.	Cumulative Amount Payable Rs.	Benchmark Price minus Bid Price (C)	Estimated Loss Rs. (B/100*C)
107	M	72.26650	40,000,000.00	14,720,000,000.00	11,065,052,260.00	1.4482	579,280.00
108	P	72.26650	100,000,000.00	14,820,000,000.00	11,137,318,760.00	1.4482	1,448,200.00
109	K	72.26650	1,000,000,000.00	15,820,000,000.00	11,859,983,760.00	1.4482	14,482,000.00
110	P	72.02960	250,000,000.00	16,070,000,000.00	12,040,057,760.00	1.6851	4,212,750.00
111	H	71.79400	10,000,000.00	16,080,000,000.00	12,047,237,160.00	1.9207	192,070.00
112	J	71.79400	60,000,000.00	16,140,000,000.00	12,090,313,560.00	1.9207	1,152,420.00
113	M	71.79400	100,000,000.00	16,240,000,000.00	12,162,107,560.00	1.9207	1,920,700.00
114	C	71.79400	100,000,000.00	16,340,000,000.00	12,233,901,560.00	1.9207	1,920,700.00
115	P	71.79400	550,000,000.00	16,890,000,000.00	12,628,768,560.00	1.9207	10,563,850.00
116	P	71.79400	550,000,000.00	17,440,000,000.00	13,023,635,560.00	1.9207	10,563,850.00
117	M	71.32660	60,000,000.00	17,500,000,000.00	13,066,431,520.00	2.3881	1,432,860.00
118	P	71.32650	100,000,000.00	17,600,000,000.00	13,137,758,020.00	2.3882	2,388,200.00
119	K	71.09460	1,000,000,000.00	18,600,000,000.00	13,848,704,020.00	2.6201	26,201,000.00
120	K	71.04840	1,000,000,000.00	19,600,000,000.00	14,559,188,020.00	2.6663	26,663,000.00
121	K	71.00220	1,000,000,000.00	20,600,000,000.00	15,269,210,020.00	2.7125	27,125,000.00
122	K	70.95610	1,000,000,000.00	21,600,000,000.00	15,978,771,020.00	2.7586	27,586,000.00
123	K	70.95610	1,000,000,000.00	22,600,000,000.00	16,688,332,020.00	2.7586	27,586,000.00
124	J	70.86400	80,000,000.00	22,680,000,000.00	16,745,023,220.00	2.8507	2,280,560.00
125	P	70.86395	100,000,000.00	22,780,000,000.00	16,815,887,170.00	2.8507	2,850,750.00
126	P	70.63451	500,000,000.00	23,280,000,000.00	17,169,059,720.00	3.0802	15,400,950.00
127	P	70.63451	500,000,000.00	23,780,000,000.00	17,522,232,270.00	3.0802	15,400,950.00
128	C	70.63450	100,000,000.00	23,880,000,000.00	17,592,866,770.00	3.0802	3,080,200.00
129	M	70.40650	15,000,000.00	23,895,000,000.00	17,603,427,745.00	3.3082	496,230.00
130	M	70.40650	80,000,000.00	23,975,000,000.00	17,659,752,945.00	3.3082	2,646,560.00
131	I	70.40630	5,000,000,000.00	28,975,000,000.00	21,180,067,945.00	3.3084	165,420,000.00
	ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS						**421,434,135.00**
	ESTIMATED GRAND TOTAL LOSS						**784,898,755.00**

T BOND AUCTION DETAILS SINCE 2014 TO 2016

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
1	10/1/2014	5 Years 6 Months	LKB00619G019	2,000	6,750	2,000	4,750	Q	1,000,000,000	50.0%	8.6490-8.6490
								H	1,000,000,000	50.0%	
2		14 Years 11 Months	LKB01529A012	3,000	8,100	3,500	4,600	Q	3,000,000,000	85.7%	10.6100-10.6100
								H	500,000,000	14.3%	
3	26/02/2014	8 Years 4 Months	LKB00922G017	1,000	2,575	1,050	1,525	H	1,000,000,000	95.2%	9.9000-9.9027
								M	50,000,000	4.8%	
4		9 Years 10 Months	LKB01024A014	1,000	3,825	1,000	2,825	H	1,000,000,000	100.0%	9.9999-9.9999
5		14 Years 10 Months	LKB01529A012	1,000	3,625	1,000	2,625	H	1,000,000,000	100.0%	10.7604-10.7604
6	27/03/2014	8 Years 3 Months	LKB00922G017	1,000	2,675	1,000	1,675	H	1,000,000,000	100.0%	9.9999-9.9999
7		19 Years 9 months	LKB02034A012	2,000	5,050	2,000	3,050	Q	2,000,000,000	100.0%	11.3202-11.3202
8		29 Years 9 Months	LKB03044A010	2,000	7,875	2,000	5,875	Q	2,000,000,000	100.0%	11.7504-11.7504
9	27/05/2014	5 Years 1 Months	LKB00619G019	1,000	6,750	1,750	5,000	F	200,000,000	11.4%	8.9198-8.9282
								H	1,000,000,000	57.1%	
								N	250,000,000	14.3%	
								M	300,000,000	17.1%	
10		14 Years 7 Months	LKB01529A012	2,000	5,475	2,200	3,275	Q	2,000,000,000	90.9%	10.5000-10.8760
								J	200,000,000	9.1%	
11		30 Years	LKB03044F019	2,000	5,530	2,000	3,530	Q	2,000,000,000	100.0%	11.7504-11.7504
12	10/7/2014	9 Years 6 Months	LKB01024A014	2,000	6,200	2,000	4,200	H	2,000,000,000	100.0%	9.2303-9.2303
13		14 Years 10 Months	LKB01529E014	2,000	7,025	3,300	3,725	F	1,300,000,000	39.4%	10.5498-10.5758
								H	2,000,000,000	60.6%	
14	29/09/2014	8 Years	LKB00922J011	1,000	4,050	1,000	3,050	H	1,000,000,000	100.0%	7.1400-7.1400
15		14 Years 7 Months	LKB01529E014	1,000	5,150	1,950	3,200	F	772,727,000	39.6%	8.6000-8.6340
								H	1,000,000,000	51.3%	
								E	150,000,000	7.7%	
								K	27,273,000	1.4%	
16	30/12/2014	6 Years 7 Months	LKB00821H019	1,500	5,250	2,500	2,750	H	1,000,000,000	40.0%	7.0497-7.0497
								J	1,500,000,000	60.0%	
17		10 Years 4 Months	LKB01225E019	1,500	4,800	1,500	3,300	Q	1,500,000,000	100.0%	7.8804
18	27/02/2015	30 Years	LKB03045C013	1,000	20,708	10,058	10,650	Q	2,000,000,000	19.9%	9.3510-11.7270
								A	50,000,000	0.5%	
								F	100,000,000	1.0%	
								H	300,000,000	3.0%	
								E	100,000,000	1.0%	
								C	100,000,000	1.0%	
								G	100,000,000	1.0%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	P	100,000,000	1.0%	
								K	2,000,000,000	19.9%	
								B	3,508,000,000	34.9%	
								N	100,000,000	1.0%	
								J	100,000,000	1.0%	
								M	1,250,000,000	12.4%	
								I	250,000,000	2.5%	
19	10/3/2015	7 Years 4 Months	LKB00922G017	10,000	45,895	18,240	27,655	A	850,000,000	4.7%	8.5049-9.1701
								H	5,250,000,000	28.8%	
								E	50,000,000	0.3%	
								C	100,000,000	0.5%	
								P	2,240,000,000	12.3%	
								K	1,600,000,000	8.8%	
								B	2,000,000,000	11.0%	
								D	5,200,000,000	28.5%	
								M	950,000,000	5.2%	
20		10 Years 0 Months	LKB01025C157	10,000	38,607	15,707	22,900	Q	5,000,000,000	31.8%	9.5040-10.0863
								A	750,000,000	4.8%	
								F	500,000,000	3.2%	
								H	4,100,000,000	26.1%	
								C	50,000,000	0.3%	
								G	750,000,000	4.8%	
								P	300,000,000	1.9%	
								K	3,000,000,000	19.1%	
								B	1,007,000,000	6.4%	
								M	250,000,000	1.6%	
21		20 Years	LKB02035C155	10,000	41,340	17,890	23,450	Q	10,000,000,000	55.9%	10.8990-11.2032
								F	440,000,000	2.5%	
								H	1,200,000,000	6.7%	
								P	50,000,000	0.3%	
								K	3,000,000,000	16.8%	
								D	1,000,000,000	5.6%	
								M	1,700,000,000	9.5%	
								I	500,000,000	2.8%	
22		3 Years 2 Months	LKB00618F013	10,000	34,343	22,943	11,400	A	3,000,000,000	13.1%	8.2503-8.6976
								F	1,760,000,000	7.7%	
								H	6,150,000,000	26.8%	
								E	100,000,000	0.4%	
								C	450,000,000	2.0%	
								G	350,000,000	1.5%	
								P	3,283,000,000	14.3%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
	12/3/2015							K	100,000,000	0.4%	
								D	2,400,000,000	10.5%	
								N	500,000,000	2.2%	
								M	4,650,000,000	20.3%	
								I	200,000,000	0.9%	
23		8 Years 5 Months	LKB01023I019	10,000	27,890	14,462	13,428	A	450,000,000	3.1%	9.2502-9.7910
								F	750,000,000	5.2%	
								H	4,000,000,000	27.7%	
								C	650,000,000	4.5%	
								G	600,000,000	4.1%	
								P	3,362,000,000	23.2%	
								K	100,000,000	0.7%	
								N	300,000,000	2.1%	
								M	4,050,000,000	28.0%	
								I	200,000,000	1.4%	
24	17/03/2015	4 Years 6 Months	LKB00619I155	7,000	24,763	9,846	14,917	A	4,040,000,000	41.0%	8.9001-9.1305
								F	780,000,000	7.9%	
								H	300,000,000	3.0%	
								C	355,000,000	3.6%	
								G	300,000,000	3.0%	
								P	1,121,000,000	11.4%	
								K	500,000,000	5.1%	
								D	250,000,000	2.5%	
								J	700,000,000	7.1%	
								M	1,500,000,000	15.2%	
25		6 Years 4 Months	LKB00821H019	7,000	21,206	7,858	13,348	A	3,030,000,000	38.6%	9.1998-9.5517
								F	350,000,000	4.5%	
								H	550,000,000	7.0%	
								C	50,000,000	0.6%	
								G	200,000,000	2.5%	
								P	500,000,000	6.4%	
								D	678,000,000	8.6%	
								M	2,300,000,000	29.3%	
								I	200,000,000	2.5%	
26		4 Years 6 Months	LKB00619I155	10,000	40,620	19,245	21,375	A	5,725,000,000	29.7%	8.6202-8.9208
								F	2,500,000,000	13.0%	
								H	100,000,000	0.5%	
								E	45,000,000	0.2%	
								C	1,100,000,000	5.7%	
								G	100,000,000	0.5%	
								P	1,500,000,000	7.8%	
								K	625,000,000	3.2%	
								D	2,100,000,000	10.9%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
	26/03/2015							N	1,000,000,000	5.2%	
								J	1,300,000,000	6.8%	
								L	200,000,000	1.0%	
								M	1,800,000,000	9.4%	
								I	1,150,000,000	6.0%	
27		8 Years 5 Months	LKB01023I019	20,000	74,600	20,100	54,500	Q	5,000,000,000	24.9%	9.4401-9.7344
								A	2,000,000,000	10.0%	
								F	2,050,000,000	10.2%	
								C	1,300,000,000	6.5%	
								P	2,150,000,000	10.7%	
								D	200,000,000	1.0%	
								N	2,000,000,000	10.0%	
								J	2,000,000,000	10.0%	
								L	200,000,000	1.0%	
								M	3,000,000,000	14.9%	
								O	200,000,000	1.0%	
28	30/03/2015	5 Years 2 Months	LKB00820F015	5,000	22,760	5,265	17,495	Q	3,000,000,000	57.0%	9.0000-9.0747
								F	150,000,000	2.8%	
								H	250,000,000	4.7%	
								E	15,000,000	0.3%	
								G	100,000,000	1.9%	
								P	550,000,000	10.4%	
								K	300,000,000	5.7%	
								D	500,000,000	9.5%	
								M	200,000,000	3.8%	
								I	200,000,000	3.8%	
29		10 Years	LKB01025C157	20,000	48,048	20,103	27,945	Q	17,000,000,000	84.6%	9.9000-10.0260
								F	150,000,000	0.7%	
								H	200,000,000	1.0%	
								C	303,000,000	1.5%	
								K	1,250,000,000	6.2%	
								D	150,000,000	0.7%	
								M	1,050,000,000	5.2%	
30		2 Years 2 Months	LKB00417E153	12,500	32,756	12,441	20,315	A	50,000,000	0.4%	8.0001-8.1387
								F	1,241,000,000	10.0%	
								E	300,000,000	2.4%	
								C	350,000,000	2.8%	
								G	350,000,000	2.8%	
								P	2,000,000,000	16.1%	
								K	1,650,000,000	13.3%	
								D	1,650,000,000	13.3%	
								N	3,050,000,000	24.5%	
								J	200,000,000	1.6%	
								M	1,100,000,000	8.8%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
	7/4/2015							O	500,000,000	4.0%	
31		6 Years 4 Months	LKB00821H019	7,500	27,400	7,600	19,800	Q	3,000,000,000	39.5%	9.2502-9.3960
								A	350,000,000	4.6%	
								F	100,000,000	1.3%	
								E	100,000,000	1.3%	
								C	1,000,000,000	13.2%	
								G	50,000,000	0.7%	
								P	1,450,000,000	19.1%	
								K	500,000,000	6.6%	
								D	150,000,000	2.0%	
								L	100,000,000	1.3%	
								M	800,000,000	10.5%	
32	16/04/2015	4 Years 2 Months	LKB00619G019	5,000	26,800	-	26,800	-	-	-	-
33	21/04/2015	3 Years 1 Months	LKB00618F013	3,000	21,860	4,560	17,300	A	300,000,000	6.6%	8.0982-8.1549
								F	2,000,000,000	43.9%	
								E	100,000,000	2.2%	
								C	300,000,000	6.6%	
								D	850,000,000	18.6%	
								L	100,000,000	2.2%	
								M	210,000,000	4.6%	
								O	500,000,000	11.0%	
								I	200,000,000	4.4%	
34		7 Years 2 Months	LKB00922G017	3,000	21,585	-	21,585	-	-	-	-
35	29/04/2015	3 Years 1 Months	LKB00618F013	10,000	38,755	15,205	23,550	A	950,000,000	6.2%	7.8498-7.9587
								F	1,150,000,000	7.6%	
								E	200,000,000	1.3%	
								C	400,000,000	2.6%	
								G	100,000,000	0.7%	
								P	1,200,000,000	7.9%	
								K	600,000,000	3.9%	
								D	2,100,000,000	13.8%	
								N	1,000,000,000	6.6%	
								J	2,555,000,000	16.8%	
								L	200,000,000	1.3%	
								M	1,650,000,000	10.9%	
								O	500,000,000	3.3%	
								I	2,600,000,000	17.1%	
36		9 Years 11 Months	LKB01025C157	10,000	32,369	4,500	27,869	A	250,000,000	5.6%	8.9001-8.9838
								F	100,000,000	2.2%	
								C	750,000,000	16.7%	
								P	1,200,000,000	26.7%	
								K	800,000,000	17.8%	
								M	700,000,000	15.6%	
								O	100,000,000	2.2%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								I	600,000,000	13.3%	
37	5/5/2015	2 Years 9 Months	LKB01518B013	5,000	17,300	-	17,300	-	-	-	-
38		5 Years	LKB00520E014	5,000	16,970	5,750	11,220	Q	5,000,000,000	87.0%	8.3997-8.4627
								F	250,000,000	4.3%	
								I	500,000,000	8.7%	
39	12/5/2015	4 Years 1 Months	LKB00619G019	5,000	19,600	6,500	13,100	A	50,000,000	0.8%	8.0901-8.9531
								F	100,000,000	1.5%	
								H	550,000,000	8.5%	
								C	50,000,000	0.8%	
								K	50,000,000	0.8%	
								B	250,000,000	3.8%	
								D	550,000,000	8.5%	
								J	3,550,000,000	54.6%	
								L	100,000,000	1.5%	
								M	1,250,000,000	19.2%	
40		6 Years 2 Months	LKB00821H019	5,000	19,375	-	19,375	-	-	-	-
41	19/05/2015	7 Years 4 Months	LKB00922J011	2,000	11,540	-	11,540	-	-	-	-
42		9 Years 10 Months	LKB01025C157	2,000	14,670	3,290	11,380	Q	1,000,000,000	30.4%	8.9100-9.0135
								A	100,000,000	3.0%	
								H	100,000,000	3.0%	
								C	100,000,000	3.0%	
								P	1,000,000,000	30.4%	
								K	150,000,000	4.6%	
								B	200,000,000	6.1%	
								D	540,000,000	16.4%	
								M	100,000,000	3.0%	
43	28/05/2015	4 Years 11 Months	LKB00520E014	3,000	11,210	1,910	9,300	F	450,000,000	23.6%	8.2602-8.3538
								H	400,000,000	20.9%	
								P	50,000,000	2.6%	
								J	710,000,000	37.2%	
								M	300,000,000	15.7%	
44		8 Years 3 Months	LKB01023I019	7,000	27,880	7,830	20,050	Q	3,000,000,000	38.3%	8.7102-8.7786
								F	450,000,000	5.7%	
								H	400,000,000	5.1%	
								C	250,000,000	3.2%	
								P	800,000,000	10.2%	
								K	100,000,000	1.3%	
								D	200,000,000	2.6%	
								N	500,000,000	6.4%	
								J	830,000,000	10.6%	
								M	1,300,000,000	16.6%	
								Q	7,000,000,000	67.0%	9.5499-9.6723

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
45		14 Years 11 Months	LKB01530E152	10,000	33,330	10,450	22,880	P	500,000,000	4.8%	
								K	2,000,000,000	19.1%	
								M	750,000,000	7.2%	
								I	200,000,000	1.9%	
46	9/6/2015	4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520E014	9,000	27,350	16,500	10,850	A	350,000,000	2.1%	7.9002-8.1063
								F	300,000,000	1.8%	
								H	2,300,000,000	13.9%	
								E	150,000,000	0.9%	
								G	100,000,000	0.6%	
								P	350,000,000	2.1%	
								K	1,000,000,000	6.1%	
								B	100,000,000	0.6%	
								D	600,000,000	3.6%	
								N	5,000,000,000	30.3%	
								J	4,900,000,000	29.7%	
								L	100,000,000	0.6%	
								M	350,000,000	2.1%	
								I	900,000,000	5.5%	
47		7 Years 4 Months	LKB00922J011	9,000	30,100	16,100	14,000	F	600,000,000	3.7%	8.3997-8.5617
								H	1,900,000,000	11.8%	
								P	400,000,000	2.5%	
								K	50,000,000	0.3%	
								B	100,000,000	0.6%	
								J	12,600,000,000	78.3%	
								M	350,000,000	2.2%	
								I	100,000,000	0.6%	
48		9 Years 9 Months	LKB01025C157	9,000	27,330	-	27,330	-	-	-	-
49	12/6/2015	4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520E014	2,000	8,100	-	8,100	-	-	-	-
50		7 Years 3 Months	LKB00922J011	3,000	15,700	5,350	10,350	Q	2,000,000,000	37.4%	8.4996-8.5644
								H	400,000,000	7.5%	
								J	2,900,000,000	54.2%	
								L	50,000,000	0.9%	
51		9 Years 9 Months	LKB01025C157	7,000	23,150	9,650	13,500	Q	4,000,000,000	41.5%	8.8002-8.8947
								A	150,000,000	1.6%	
								F	100,000,000	1.0%	
								H	1,000,000,000	10.4%	
								C	100,000,000	1.0%	
								P	900,000,000	9.3%	
								J	3,000,000,000	31.1%	
								M	400,000,000	4.1%	
52	23/06/2015	2 Years	LKB00517F157	1,000	6,100	1,500	4,600	H	700,000,000	46.7%	6.6996-6.7005
								B	200,000,000	13.3%	
								J	600,000,000	40.0%	
								H	500,000,000	33.3%	7.1802-7.1802

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
53		3 Years 5 Months	LKB00718K151	1,000	6,100	1,500	4,600	B	300,000,000	20.0%	
								J	700,000,000	46.7%	
54	29/06/2015	4 Years 11 Months	LKB00820F015	10,000	17,200	3,700	13,500	H	1,400,000,000	37.8%	8.1503-8.1594
								B	1,000,000,000	27.0%	
								D	300,000,000	8.1%	
								J	1,000,000,000	27.0%	
55		6 Years 6 Months	LKB01022A018	10,000	29,580	13,300	16,280	Q	10,000,000,000	75.2%	8.5698-8.6679
								H	1,300,000,000	9.8%	
								B	1,000,000,000	7.5%	
								J	1,000,000,000	7.5%	
56		8 Years 2 Months	LKB01123I017	10,000	32,370	15,300	17,070	Q	12,000,000,000	78.4%	8.8002-8.8227
								H	1,300,000,000	8.5%	
								B	1,000,000,000	6.5%	
								J	1,000,000,000	6.5%	
57	2/7/2015	4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520E014	5,000	8,700	1,000	7,700	H	500,000,000	50.0%	8.1999-8.1999
								J	500,000,000	50.0%	
58		7 Years 3 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	9,250	1,000	8,250	H	500,000,000	50.0%	8.5698-8.5698
								J	500,000,000	50.0%	
59	9/7/2015	4 Years 9 Months	LKB00520E014	15,000	28,850	11,500	17,350	F	250,000,000	2.2%	8.2701-8.3853
								H	2,500,000,000	21.7%	
								E	100,000,000	0.9%	
								G	200,000,000	1.7%	
								B	5,100,000,000	44.3%	
								D	850,000,000	7.4%	
								N	1,000,000,000	8.7%	
								J	500,000,000	4.3%	
								M	1,000,000,000	8.7%	
60		6 Years 3 Months	LKB00721J157	10,000	17,365	7,615	9,750	F	500,000,000	6.6%	8.8497-9.0792
								H	2,500,000,000	32.8%	
								G	100,000,000	1.3%	
								P	200,000,000	2.6%	
								K	100,000,000	1.3%	
								B	1,500,000,000	19.7%	
								D	1,000,000,000	13.1%	
								J	715,000,000	9.4%	
								M	1,000,000,000	13.1%	
61		7 Years 2 Months	LKB00922J011	15,000	27,800	12,100	15,700	Q	4,000,000,000	33.1%	8.9001-9.1448
								F	250,000,000	2.1%	
								H	2,500,000,000	20.7%	
								P	50,000,000	0.4%	
								B	1,750,000,000	14.5%	
								D	800,000,000	6.6%	
								J	1,250,000,000	10.3%	
								M	1,500,000,000	12.4%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
62	14/07/2015	3 Years 3 Months	LKB00418J150	10,000	21,820	4,670	17,150	F	200,000,000	4.3%	7.9002-8.1818
								H	1,500,000,000	32.1%	
								E	70,000,000	1.5%	
								B	350,000,000	7.5%	
								D	1,750,000,000	37.5%	
								J	500,000,000	10.7%	
								M	300,000,000	6.4%	
63		8 Years 1 Months	LKB01023I019	10,000	29,150	11,050	18,100	Q	5,000,000,000	45.2%	9.1998-9.5814
								A	150,000,000	1.4%	
								F	200,000,000	1.8%	
								H	1,500,000,000	13.6%	
								E	50,000,000	0.5%	
								C	200,000,000	1.8%	
								P	1,600,000,000	14.5%	
								B	350,000,000	3.2%	
								D	800,000,000	7.2%	
								J	600,000,000	5.4%	
								M	600,000,000	5.4%	
64	27/07/2015	3 Years 11 Months	LKB00619G019	12,500	49,665	27,630	22,035	F	750,000,000	2.7%	8.1503-8.1918
								H	2,000,000,000	7.2%	
								G	200,000,000	0.7%	
								P	1,180,000,000	4.3%	
								D	1,550,000,000	5.6%	
								N	20,000,000,000	72.4%	
								J	1,250,000,000	4.5%	
								L	500,000,000	1.8%	
								M	200,000,000	0.7%	
65		6 Years	LKB00821H019	12,500	47,420	23,010	24,410	F	425,000,000	1.8%	8.8002-8.8740
								H	1,000,000,000	4.3%	
								C	500,000,000	2.2%	
								G	100,000,000	0.4%	
								P	1,435,000,000	6.2%	
								B	200,000,000	0.9%	
								D	1,000,000,000	4.3%	
								N	15,000,000,000	65.2%	
								J	1,250,000,000	5.4%	
								L	300,000,000	1.3%	
								M	1,800,000,000	7.8%	
66		10 Years	LKB01025H016	15,000	59,710	-	59,710	-	-	-	-
67		3 Years 11 Months	LKB00619G019	5,000	20,400	-	20,400	-	-	-	-
								Q	5,000,000,000	43.8%	9.0000-9.0666
								A	100,000,000	0.9%	
								F	250,000,000	2.2%	
								H	250,000,000	2.2%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
68	4/8/2015	6 Years	LKB00821H019	5,000	28,835	11,405	17,430	E	100,000,000	0.9%	
								C	850,000,000	7.5%	
								G	150,000,000	1.3%	
								P	1,050,000,000	9.2%	
								B	150,000,000	1.3%	
								D	750,000,000	6.6%	
								N	400,000,000	3.5%	
								J	1,255,000,000	11.0%	
								M	1,100,000,000	9.6%	
69		10 Years	LKB01025H016	10,000	56,680	14,340	42,340	Q	11,000,000,000	76.7%	9.5004-9.6327
								F	50,000,000	0.3%	
								H	250,000,000	1.7%	
								E	100,000,000	0.7%	
								C	120,000,000	0.8%	
								G	50,000,000	0.3%	
								P	1,420,000,000	9.9%	
								K	1,000,000,000	7.0%	
								B	50,000,000	0.3%	
								J	200,000,000	1.4%	
								M	100,000,000	0.7%	
70	11/8/2015	4 Years 8 Months	LKB00520E014	3,000	22,273	6,273	16,000	F	100,000,000	1.6%	8.2998-8.3781
								H	700,000,000	11.2%	
								C	400,000,000	6.4%	
								P	700,000,000	11.2%	
								B	100,000,000	1.6%	
								D	300,000,000	4.8%	
								N	3,400,000,000	54.2%	
								J	173,000,000	2.8%	
								M	400,000,000	6.4%	
71		10 Years	LKB01025H16	5,000	32,918	6,660	26,258	Q	3,000,000,000	45.0%	9.5003-9.6687
								F	95,000,000	1.4%	
								H	700,000,000	10.5%	
								E	155,000,000	2.3%	
								C	460,000,000	6.9%	
								G	95,000,000	1.4%	
								P	705,000,000	10.6%	
								K	200,000,000	3.0%	
								B	150,000,000	2.3%	
								J	800,000,000	12.0%	
								M	300,000,000	4.5%	
72		4 Years 2 Months	LKB00819K017	5,000	12,508	-	12,508	-	-	-	-
								Q	5,000,000,000	48.6%	9.5796-9.7595
								F	47,000,000	0.5%	
								H	800,000,000	7.8%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
73	25/08/2015	8 Years	LKB01023I019	10,000	30,452	10,294	20,158	E	90,000,000	0.9%	
								C	804,000,000	7.8%	
								G	42,000,000	0.4%	
								P	695,000,000	6.8%	
								B	592,000,000	5.8%	
								D	198,000,000	1.9%	
								J	1,416,000,000	13.8%	
								L	50,000,000	0.5%	
								M	560,000,000	5.4%	
74		9 Years 11 Months	LKB01025H016	12,500	43,996	20,288	23,708	Q	15,000,000,000	73.9%	9.6660-9.9747
								F	47,000,000	0.2%	
								H	800,000,000	3.9%	
								E	140,000,000	0.7%	
								C	143,000,000	0.7%	
								G	42,000,000	0.2%	
								P	1,795,000,000	8.8%	
								B	111,000,000	0.5%	
								D	250,000,000	1.2%	
								J	1,660,000,000	8.2%	
								M	300,000,000	1.5%	
75		14 Years 8 Months	LKB01530E152	12,500	40,220	-	40,220	-	-	-	-
76	31/08/2015	4 Years 8 Months	LKB00520E014	5,000	14,268	5,500	8,768	F	483,000,000	8.8%	9.0999-9.3537
								H	1,250,000,000	22.7%	
								E	136,000,000	2.5%	
								C	146,000,000	2.7%	
								G	32,000,000	0.6%	
								P	187,000,000	3.4%	
								B	134,000,000	2.4%	
								D	1,700,000,000	30.9%	
								N	500,000,000	9.1%	
								J	632,000,000	11.5%	
								M	300,000,000	5.5%	
77		5 Years 11 Months	LKB00821H019	12,500	25,190	1,755	23,435	F	135,000,000	7.7%	9.6003-9.7073
								H	700,000,000	39.9%	
								E	40,000,000	2.3%	
								C	15,000,000	0.9%	
								G	25,000,000	1.4%	
								P	40,000,000	2.3%	
								B	40,000,000	2.3%	
								D	500,000,000	28.5%	
								J	60,000,000	3.4%	
								M	200,000,000	11.4%	
								Q	16,000,000,000	66.5%	10.0998-10.3356
								F	986,000,000	4.1%	
								H	800,000,000	3.3%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
78		10 Years 09 Months	LKB01226F014	12,500	39,937	24,063	15,874	E	16,000,000	0.1%	
								C	20,000,000	0.1%	
								G	26,000,000	0.1%	
								P	415,000,000	1.7%	
								K	2,250,000,000	9.4%	
								B	1,279,000,000	5.3%	
								J	21,000,000	0.1%	
								M	250,000,000	1.0%	
								I	2,000,000,000	8.3%	
79	8/9/2015	4 Years 8 Months	LKB00520E014	2,000	14,110	3,735	10,375	A	2,200,000,000	58.9%	9.6003-9.6498
								H	300,000,000	8.0%	
								E	50,000,000	1.3%	
								C	100,000,000	2.7%	
								G	25,000,000	0.7%	
								P	350,000,000	9.4%	
								K	500,000,000	13.4%	
								D	50,000,000	1.3%	
								M	160,000,000	4.3%	
80		8 Years	LKB01023I019	2,000	14,060	4,470	9,590	H	300,000,000	6.7%	10.0503-10.2509
								C	350,000,000	7.8%	
								P	950,000,000	21.3%	
								K	2,000,000,000	44.7%	
								D	470,000,000	10.5%	
								M	200,000,000	4.5%	
								I	200,000,000	4.5%	
81		10 Years 9 Months	LKB01226F014	3,000	14,769	-	14,769	-	-	-	-
82		14 Years 8 Months	LKB01530E152	3,000	17,401	7,427	9,974	Q	3,000,000,000	40.4%	10.7000-10.9575
								H	212,000,000	2.9%	
								C	50,000,000	0.7%	
								P	1,700,000,000	22.9%	
								K	150,000,000	2.0%	
								I	2,315,000,000	31.2%	
83		4 Years 7 Months	LKB00520E014	3,000	20,003	3,100	16,903	A	50,000,000	1.6%	9.4896-9.5768
								F	200,000,000	6.5%	
								E	50,000,000	1.6%	
								C	450,000,000	14.5%	
								P	1,000,000,000	32.3%	
								K	100,000,000	3.2%	
								D	100,000,000	3.2%	
								J	500,000,000	16.1%	
								L	50,000,000	1.6%	
								M	300,000,000	9.7%	
								I	300,000,000	9.7%	
								F	1,490,000,000	15.6%	9.0486-9.9495

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
84	15/09/2015	7 Years 0 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	19,773	9,559	10,214	H	300,000,000	3.1%	
								E	29,000,000	0.3%	
								C	32,000,000	0.3%	
								G	36,000,000	0.4%	
								P	2,331,000,000	24.4%	
								K	3,500,000,000	36.6%	
								B	48,000,000	0.5%	
								J	1,543,000,000	16.1%	
								L	50,000,000	0.5%	
								M	200,000,000	2.1%	
85		9 Years 10 Months	LKB01025H016	5,000	15,582	5,241	10,341	F	400,000,000	7.6%	10.2500-10.3815
								H	200,000,000	3.8%	
								C	150,000,000	2.9%	
								P	2,050,000,000	39.1%	
								K	1,300,000,000	24.8%	
								D	130,000,000	2.5%	
								J	1,011,000,000	19.3%	
86		12 Years 11 Months	LKB01528I017	3,000	17,779	10,884	6,895	Q	3,000,000,000	27.6%	10.5003-10.8845
								F	973,000,000	8.9%	
								H	300,000,000	2.8%	
								E	18,000,000	0.2%	
								C	100,000,000	0.9%	
								G	21,000,000	0.2%	
								P	4,274,000,000	39.3%	
								K	1,500,000,000	13.8%	
								B	28,000,000	0.3%	
								D	30,000,000	0.3%	
								J	40,000,000	0.4%	
								M	400,000,000	3.7%	
								I	200,000,000	1.8%	
87	28/09/2015	3 Years 11 Months	LKB00619I155	2,000	14,610	3,000	11,610	A	1,500,000,000	50.0%	9.4500-9.5003
								H	1,500,000,000	50.0%	
88		5 Years 10 Months	LKB00821H019	3,000	15,060	6,500	8,560	A	3,050,000,000	46.9%	9.8000-9.9018
								F	50,000,000	0.8%	
								H	1,800,000,000	27.7%	
								P	350,000,000	5.4%	
								D	120,000,000	1.8%	
								J	1,030,000,000	15.8%	
								L	50,000,000	0.8%	
								M	50,000,000	0.8%	
89		8 Years 3 Months	LKB01024A014	4,000	15,593	-	15,593	-	-	-	
90		12 Years 11 months	LKB01528I017	4,000	18,965	3,660	15,305	Q	1,000,000,000	27.3%	10.9800-11.0448
								H	600,000,000	16.4%	
								P	955,000,000	26.1%	
								K	1,000,000,000	27.3%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								J	55,000,000	1.5%	
								M	50,000,000	1.4%	
91		3 Years 10 Months	LKB00619I155	7,000	32,562	8,000	24,562	H	8,000,000,000	100.0%	9.0702-9.1377
92		6 Years 11 Months	LKB00922J011	7,000	32,611	6,222	26,389	F	700,000,000	11.3%	9.6003-9.6488
								H	1,500,000,000	24.1%	
								P	506,000,000	8.1%	
								K	300,000,000	4.8%	
								B	106,000,000	1.7%	
								D	310,000,000	5.0%	
								J	600,000,000	9.6%	
								L	2,100,000,000	33.8%	
								M	100,000,000	1.6%	
93	26/10/2015	12 Years 10 Months	LKB01528I017	6,000	27,247	8,880	18,367	Q	2,000,000,000	22.5%	10.1502-10.3913
								F	5,000,000	0.1%	
								H	3,000,000,000	33.8%	
								C	10,000,000	0.1%	
								G	5,000,000	0.1%	
								P	2,260,000,000	25.5%	
								K	900,000,000	10.1%	
								B	610,000,000	6.9%	
								D	30,000,000	0.3%	
								J	10,000,000	0.1%	
								I	50,000,000	0.6%	
94		19 Years 4 Months	LKB02035C155	10,000	37,295	22,340	14,955	Q	10,000,000,000	44.8%	10.8900-11.1321
								F	105,000,000	0.5%	
								H	500,000,000	2.2%	
								C	460,000,000	2.1%	
								G	605,000,000	2.7%	
								P	3,300,000,000	14.8%	
								K	2,250,000,000	10.1%	
								B	1,010,000,000	4.5%	
								J	10,000,000	0.0%	
								M	200,000,000	0.9%	
								I	3,900,000,000	17.5%	
95	30/10/2015	4 Years 6 Months	LKB00520E014	3,000	30,473	3,669	26,804	A	100,000,000	2.7%	8.9496-8.9946
								F	750,000,000	20.4%	
								H	500,000,000	13.6%	
								P	481,000,000	13.1%	
								N	1,000,000,000	27.3%	
								J	288,000,000	7.8%	
								M	150,000,000	4.1%	
								I	400,000,000	10.9%	
96		8 Years 2 Months	LKB01024A014	3,000	13,735	-	13,735	-	-	-	-
								A	600,000,000	9.0%	10.1070-10.3275

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
97		14 Years 06 Months	LKB01530E152	3,000	28,060	6,700	21,360	P	1,450,000,000	21.6%	
								K	1,050,000,000	15.7%	
								B	600,000,000	9.0%	
								I	3,000,000,000	44.8%	
98		4 Years 5 Months	LKB00520E014	2,000	17,877	1,244	16,633	H	1,000,000,000	80.4%	8.9001-8.9082
								J	244,000,000	19.6%	
99		10 Years 6 Months	LKB01226F014	3,000	17,567	500	17,067	H	500,000,000	100.0%	9.3500-9.3500
100	27/11/2015	19 Years 3 Months	LKB02035C155	7,000	36,400	18,850	17,550	H	1,000,000,000	5.3%	10.2500-10.4984
								Q	7,000,000,000	37.1%	
								A	550,000,000	2.9%	
								F	300,000,000	1.6%	
								C	400,000,000	2.1%	
								G	150,000,000	0.8%	
								P	400,000,000	2.1%	
								K	1,750,000,000	9.3%	
								B	700,000,000	3.7%	
								M	600,000,000	3.2%	
								I	6,000,000,000	31.8%	
101		5 Years	LKB00520L159	2,000	12,614	-	12,614	-	-	-	-
102	15/12/2015	9 Years 7 Months	LKB01025H016	3,000	12,075	3,000	9,075	A	500,000,000	16.7%	9.9503-10.3563
								F	655,357,000	21.8%	
								H	200,000,000	6.7%	
								C	550,000,000	18.3%	
								G	69,643,000	2.3%	
								P	450,000,000	15.0%	
								B	150,000,000	5.0%	
								J	225,000,000	7.5%	
								M	200,000,000	6.7%	
103		19 Years 3 Months	LKB02035C155	5,000	27,975	12,555	15,420	Q	5,000,000,000	39.8%	10.5003-10.8567
								A	950,000,000	7.6%	
								F	1,345,000,000	10.7%	
								H	80,000,000	0.6%	
								C	400,000,000	3.2%	
								G	750,000,000	6.0%	
								P	1,850,000,000	14.7%	
								K	50,000,000	0.4%	
								B	330,000,000	2.6%	
								M	1,100,000,000	8.8%	
								I	700,000,000	5.6%	
104		5 Years	LKB00520L159	3,000	10,050	1,300	8,750	H	1,100,000,000	84.6%	9.3996-9.5589
								B	200,000,000	15.4%	
105		14 Years 5 Months	LKB01530E152	3,000	10,010	2,860	7,150	A	400,000,000	14.0%	10.4796-11.0016
								H	1,100,000,000	38.5%	
								P	600,000,000	21.0%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
[illegible]	18/12/2015	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	B	150,000,000	5.2%	
								J	310,000,000	10.8%	
								M	300,000,000	10.5%	
106		19 Years 3 Months	LKB02035C155	6,000	15,430	2,930	12,500	A	550,000,000	18.8%	11.1951-11.4480
								F	200,000,000	6.8%	
								H	1,280,000,000	43.7%	
								P	450,000,000	15.4%	
								K	50,000,000	1.7%	
								B	100,000,000	3.4%	
								J	200,000,000	6.8%	
								M	100,000,000	3.4%	
107	23/12/2015	5 Years	LKB00520L159	2,000	7,650	2,150	5,500	F	350,000,000	16.3%	9.5499-9.7947
								H	1,150,000,000	53.5%	
								B	200,000,000	9.3%	
								D	250,000,000	11.6%	
								M	200,000,000	9.3%	
108		7 Years 9 Months	LKB01023I019	3,000	10,990	3,140	7,850	Q	1,000,000,000	31.8%	10.5003-10.8162
								F	207,692,000	6.6%	
								H	500,000,000	15.9%	
								C	350,000,000	11.1%	
								P	157,693,000	5.0%	
								B	300,000,000	9.6%	
								J	274,615,000	8.7%	
								M	350,000,000	11.1%	
109		9 Years 7 Months	LKB01025H016	5,000	14,215	1,610	12,605	Q	83,333,000	5.2%	10.8000-10.9395
								H	505,000,000	31.4%	
								E	5,000,000	0.3%	
								P	200,000,000	12.4%	
								B	300,000,000	18.6%	
								J	300,000,000	18.6%	
								M	216,667,000	13.5%	
110	29/12/2015	3 Years 10 Months	LKB00819K017	3,000	8,700	-	8,700	-	-	-	-
111		5 Years 10 Months	LKB00721J157	5,000	11,950	-	11,950	-	-	-	-
112		12 Years 8 Months	LKB01528I017	5,000	12,405	-	12,405	-	-	-	-
113		4 Years 11 Months	LKB00520L159	2,000	14,830	-	14,830	-	-	-	-
114		9 Years 7 Months	LKB01025H016	5,000	23,379	6,059	17,320	Q	1,000,000,000	16.5%	10.8900-11.0538
								F	950,000,000	15.7%	
								H	200,000,000	3.3%	
								C	200,000,000	3.3%	
								P	800,000,000	13.2%	
								K	1,500,000,000	24.8%	
								B	135,000,000	2.2%	
								D	464,000,000	7.7%	
								J	600,000,000	9.9%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								M	210,000,000	3.5%	
115	8/1/2016	14 Years 4 Months	LKB01530E152	5,000	24,285	13,585	10,700	Q	5,000,000,000	36.8%	11.2500-11.4552
								A	300,000,000	2.2%	
								F	1,600,000,000	11.8%	
								H	300,000,000	2.2%	
								C	100,000,000	0.7%	
								P	350,000,000	2.6%	
								K	2,000,000,000	14.7%	
								D	650,000,000	4.8%	
								J	35,000,000	0.3%	
								M	100,000,000	0.7%	
								I	3,150,000,000	23.2%	
116		25 Years	LKB02541A016	8,000	41,975	19,635	22,340	Q	10,000,000,000	50.9%	11.5595-12.0888
								A	950,000,000	4.8%	
								F	450,000,000	2.3%	
								P	1,150,000,000	5.9%	
								K	3,000,000,000	15.3%	
								D	50,000,000	0.3%	
								J	35,000,000	0.2%	
								I	4,000,000,000	20.4%	
117		4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520L159	2,000	13,275	-	-	-	-	-	-
118		10 Years 4 Months	LKB01226F014	3,000	19,030	6,190	12,840	A	250,000,000	4.0%	10.8504-11.1393
								F	415,000,000	6.7%	
								H	550,000,000	8.9%	
								P	2,187,500,000	35.3%	
								B	685,000,000	11.1%	
								D	270,000,000	4.4%	
								J	1,432,500,000	23.1%	
								M	400,000,000	6.5%	
119	28/01/2016	14 Years 3 Months	LKB01530E152	5,000	27,150	15,650	11,500	A	1,450,000,000	9.3%	11.1059-11.5344
								F	1,000,000,000	6.4%	
								H	250,000,000	1.6%	
								C	200,000,000	1.3%	
								G	100,000,000	0.6%	
								P	1,750,000,000	11.2%	
								K	4,150,000,000	26.5%	
								B	530,000,000	3.4%	
								D	360,000,000	2.3%	
								J	1,140,000,000	7.3%	
								M	4,190,000,000	26.8%	
								O	40,000,000	0.3%	
								I	490,000,000	3.1%	
120		29 Years 01 Months	LKB03045C013	5,000	44,840	-	44,840	-	-	-	-
121		4 Years 10 Months	LKB00520L159	2,000	11,972	-	-	-	-	-	-

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
122	5/2/2016	14 Years 3 Months	LKB01530E152	3,000	42,865	10,455	32,410	Q	2,000,000,000	19.1%	11.5002-11.6640
								A	650,000,000	6.2%	
								F	1,300,000,000	12.4%	
								H	230,000,000	2.2%	
								C	100,000,000	1.0%	
								P	2,250,000,000	21.5%	
								K	1,600,000,000	15.3%	
								D	25,000,000	0.2%	
								J	300,000,000	2.9%	
								M	1,200,000,000	11.5%	
								I	800,000,000	7.7%	
123		24 Years 11 Months	LKB02541A016	5,000	48,080	10,250	37,830	A	450,000,000	4.4%	11.9997-12.1527
								C	200,000,000	2.0%	
								P	550,000,000	5.4%	
								K	6,250,000,000	61.0%	
								I	2,800,000,000	27.3%	
124	29/02/2016	5 Years 5 Months	LKB00821HO19	3,000	12,277	5,312	6,965	Q	4,000,000,000	75.3%	11.0502-11.4236
								A	50,000,000	0.9%	
								F	150,000,000	2.8%	
								C	200,000,000	3.8%	
								P	100,000,000	1.9%	
								B	150,000,000	2.8%	
								D	100,000,000	1.9%	
								J	262,000,000	4.9%	
								M	300,000,000	5.6%	
125		7 Years 6 Months	LKB01023I019	3,000	18,750	7,637	11,113	Q	5,000,000,000	65.5%	11.6496-11.7836
								F	200,000,000	2.6%	
								C	250,000,000	3.3%	
								P	250,000,000	3.3%	
								B	340,000,000	4.5%	
								N	1,000,000,000	13.1%	
								J	175,000,000	2.3%	
								M	278,000,000	3.6%	
								O	126,000,000	1.6%	
								I	18,000,000	0.2%	
126		1 Years 11 Months	LKB01518B013	3,000	15,760	5,305	10,455	C	5,000,000	0.1%	9.8000-9.9962
								N	5,000,000,000	94.3%	
								J	50,000,000	0.9%	
								M	250,000,000	4.7%	
127	10/3/2016	03 Years 08 Months	LKB00819K017	2,000	6,514	-	6,514	-	-	-	-
128		05 Years 05 Months	LKB00821H019	2,000	7,040	-	7,040	-	-	-	-
129		07 Years 10 Months	LKB01024A014	2,000	9,535	-	9,535	-	-	-	-
130		4 Years 1 Months	LKB00520F014	1,000	6,805	1,305	5,500	A	455,000,000	34.9%	11.6000-11.8736
								F	100,000,000	7.7%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	H	600,000,000	46.0%	
								M	150,000,000	11.5%	
131		1 Year 3 Months	LK00517F157	1,000	8,300	-	-	-	-	-	-
132	17/03/2016	7 Years 9 Months	LKB01024A014	2,000	13,030	6,620	6,410	Q	4,000,000,000	60.4%	10.9314-12.2571
								F	550,000,000	8.3%	
								H	460,000,000	6.9%	
								G	50,000,000	0.8%	
								P	600,000,000	9.1%	
								K	20,000,000	0.3%	
								D	90,000,000	1.4%	
								N	400,000,000	6.0%	
								J	150,000,000	2.3%	
								M	300,000,000	4.5%	
133	24/03/2016	04 Years 01 Months	LKB00520E014	5,000	13,628	-	13,628	-	-	-	-
134		05 Years 06 Months	LKB00721J157	5,000	17,500	-	17,500	-	-	-	-
135		06 Years 06 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	13,520	-	13,520	-	-	-	-
136		08 Years 11 Months	LKB01025C157	5,000	33,150	-	33,150	-	-	-	-
137	29/03/2016	4 Years 1 Month	LKB00520E014	10,000	27,022	10,272	16,750	F	122,000,000	1.2%	12.5000-12.7809
								H	3,550,000,000	34.6%	
								C	400,000,000	3.9%	
								P	150,000,000	1.5%	
								K	50,000,000	0.5%	
								B	1,000,000,000	9.7%	
								J	5,000,000,000	48.7%	
138		8 Years 11 Months	LKB01025C157	10,000	36,915	21,475	15,440	Q	1,000,000,000	4.7%	12.7503-13.7979
								F	100,000,000	0.5%	
								H	4,000,000,000	18.6%	
								C	800,000,000	3.7%	
								G	100,000,000	0.5%	
								P	350,000,000	1.6%	
								K	8,450,000,000	39.3%	
								B	1,550,000,000	7.2%	
								D	15,000,000	0.1%	
								J	3,850,000,000	17.9%	
								M	1,140,000,000	5.3%	
								I	120,000,000	0.6%	
139		10 Years 2 Months	LKB01226F014	10,000	32,560	17,010	15,550	Q	500,000,000	2.9%	12.9996-13.9311
								F	250,000,000	1.5%	
								H	3,500,000,000	20.6%	
								C	900,000,000	5.3%	
								G	125,000,000	0.7%	
								K	7,600,000,000	44.7%	
								B	1,000,000,000	5.9%	
								D	35,000,000	0.2%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								J	3,000,000,000	17.6%	
								I	100,000,000	0.6%	
140		14 Years 1 Month	LKB01530E152	10,000	45,925	28,975	16,950	Q	1,000,000,000	3.5%	12.7998-14.2263
								F	400,000,000	1.4%	
								H	1,030,000,000	3.6%	
								C	1,400,000,000	4.8%	
								P	6,450,000,000	22.3%	
								K	10,310,000,000	35.6%	
								B	1,000,000,000	3.5%	
								D	35,000,000	0.1%	
								J	1,200,000,000	4.1%	
								M	750,000,000	2.6%	
								I	5,400,000,000	18.6%	
141		3 Years 5 Months	LKB00619G019	5,000	15,025	5,000	10,025	H	2,500,000,000	50.0%	11.7504-11.7504
								B	500,000,000	10.0%	
								J	2,000,000,000	40.0%	
142		5 Years 4 Months	LKB00821H019	5,000	24,175	14,350	9,825	A	7,600,000,000	53.0%	11.9897-11.9986
								F	600,000,000	4.2%	
								H	1,000,000,000	7.0%	
								G	750,000,000	5.2%	
								P	750,000,000	5.2%	
								K	625,000,000	4.4%	
								B	500,000,000	3.5%	
								N	500,000,000	3.5%	
	31/03/2016							J	1,825,000,000	12.7%	
								M	200,000,000	1.4%	
143		1 Year 10 Months	LKB01518B013	5,000	21,254	9,000	12,254	H	3,000,000,000	33.3%	11.7504-11.7513
								B	2,500,000,000	27.8%	
								J	3,500,000,000	38.9%	
144		12 Years 5 Months	LKB01528I017	10,000	52,605	21,660	30,945	A	250,000,000	1.2%	13.3299-13.7996
								H	1,000,000,000	4.6%	
								K	15,000,000,000	69.3%	
								B	4,000,000,000	18.5%	
								D	10,000,000	0.0%	
								J	1,000,000,000	4.6%	
								M	400,000,000	1.8%	
145		4 Years 8 Months	LKB00520L159	5,000	14,080	-	14,080	-	-	-	-
146	18/04/2016	6 Years 5 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	14,200	-	14,200	-	-	-	-
147		7 Years 8 Months	LKB01024A014	5,000	31,236	-	31,236	-	-	-	-
148		4 Years	LKB00520E014	8,000	33,970	9,360	24,610	Q	6,000,000,000	64.1%	11.5497-11.7774
								A	300,000,000	3.2%	
								F	350,000,000	3.7%	
								H	1,500,000,000	16.0%	
								C	160,000,000	1.7%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
148		4 Years	LKB00520E014	8,000	33,970	9,360	24,610	P	600,000,000	6.4%	
								B	100,000,000	1.1%	
								D	200,000,000	2.1%	
								M	50,000,000	0.5%	
								O	100,000,000	1.1%	
149	28/04/2016	2 Years 6 Months	LKB00718K151	8,000	28,800	15,600	13,200	Q	1,500,000,000	9.6%	11.2500-11.5334
								A	3,500,000,000	22.4%	
								F	2,400,000,000	15.4%	
								H	1,500,000,000	9.6%	
								P	2,900,000,000	18.6%	
								B	400,000,000	2.6%	
								D	1,000,000,000	6.4%	
								J	1,900,000,000	12.2%	
								M	500,000,000	3.2%	
150		6 Years 5 Months	LKB00922J011	8,000	42,230	5,480	36,750	Q	2,000,000,000	36.5%	11.6901-11.9817
								A	350,000,000	6.4%	
								F	675,000,000	12.3%	
								H	1,030,000,000	18.8%	
								C	50,000,000	0.9%	
								P	900,000,000	16.4%	
								K	5,000,000	0.1%	
								D	320,000,000	5.8%	
								M	150,000,000	2.7%	
151		4 Years	LKB00520E014	5,000	29,271	7,001	22,270	Q	500,000,000	7.1%	
								A	400,000,000	5.7%	
								F	350,000,000	5.0%	
								H	200,000,000	2.9%	
								C	1,205,000,000	17.2%	
								P	2,626,000,000	37.5%	
								D	820,000,000	11.7%	
								J	100,000,000	1.4%	
								M	500,000,000	7.1%	
								I	300,000,000	4.3%	
152		2 Years 6 Months	LKB00718K151	5,000	35,405	8,400	27,005	Q	500,000,000	6.0%	
								A	1,000,000,000	11.9%	
								F	3,800,000,000	45.2%	
								H	200,000,000	2.4%	
								C	50,000,000	0.6%	
								P	1,650,000,000	19.6%	
								B	100,000,000	1.2%	
								D	250,000,000	3.0%	
								M	700,000,000	8.3%	
								O	150,000,000	1.8%	
	12/5/2016							Q	1,000,000,000	28.2%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
153	12/5/2016	6 Years 5 Months	LKB00922J011	5,000	23,065	3,545	19,520	A	300,000,000	8.5%	
								F	250,000,000	7.1%	
								H	250,000,000	7.1%	
								C	500,000,000	14.1%	
								P	900,000,000	25.4%	
								D	45,000,000	1.3%	
								M	300,000,000	8.5%	
154		7 Years 8 Months	LKB01024A014	4,000	28,802	2,817	25,985	Q	1,000,000,000	35.5%	
								A	779,000,000	27.7%	
								F	22,000,000	0.8%	
								H	210,000,000	7.5%	
								C	231,000,000	8.2%	
								G	26,000,000	0.9%	
								P	170,000,000	6.0%	
								K	24,000,000	0.9%	
								B	14,000,000	0.5%	
								D	147,000,000	5.2%	
								J	16,000,000	0.6%	
								M	155,000,000	5.5%	
								O	5,000,000	0.2%	
								I	18,000,000	0.6%	
155	19/05/2016	2 Years 5 Months	LKB00718K151	10,000	33,070	12,845	20,225	F	3,678,975,000	28.6%	
								A	561,538,000	4.4%	
								B	300,000,000	2.3%	
								D	1,935,897,000	15.1%	
								H	1,148,718,000	8.9%	
								M	1,048,718,000	8.2%	
								J	3,371,795,000	26.2%	
								P	725,000,000	5.6%	
								O	74,359,000	0.6%	
156		3 Years 11 Months	LKB00520E014	10,000	29,545	11,970	17,575	F	721,428,000	6.0%	
								A	455,000,000	3.8%	
								B	600,000,000	5.0%	
								D	1,300,000,000	10.9%	
								H	1,700,000,000	14.2%	
								M	1,150,000,000	9.6%	
								J	3,635,000,000	30.4%	
								C	100,000,000	0.8%	
								P	1,800,000,000	15.0%	
								I	100,000,000	0.8%	
								K	54,286,000	0.5%	
								O	354,286,000	3.0%	
								F	15,000,000	0.6%	
								A	900,000,000	34.6%	
								B	300,000,000	11.5%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
157		7 Years 7 Months	LKB01024A014	12,500	31,755	2,601	29,154	D	200,000,000	7.7%	
								H	330,278,000	12.7%	
								M	367,192,000	14.1%	
								J	417,978,000	16.1%	
								K	3,360,000	0.1%	
								O	67,192,000	2.6%	
158		10 Years	LKB01226F014	12,500	45,296	17,450	27,846	F	690,000,000	4.0%	
								A	2,250,000,000	12.9%	
								B	200,000,000	1.1%	
								D	115,000,000	0.7%	
								H	1,660,000,000	9.5%	
								M	680,000,000	3.9%	
								Q	6,000,000,000	34.4%	
								G	50,000,000	0.3%	
								P	650,000,000	3.7%	
								K	5,055,000,000	29.0%	
								O	100,000,000	0.6%	
159	26/05/2016	2 Years 4 Months	LKB00418J150	10,000	38,765	13,865	24,900	F	2,100,000,000	15.1%	
								B	4,500,000,000	32.5%	
								D	2,600,000,000	18.8%	
								H	1,700,000,000	12.3%	
								M	400,000,000	2.9%	
								J	2,255,000,000	16.3%	
								C	110,000,000	0.8%	
								P	200,000,000	1.4%	
160		5 Years 4 Months	LKB00721J157	15,000	38,093	11,611	26,482	F	1,150,000,000	9.9%	
								A	450,000,000	3.9%	
								B	1,000,000,000	8.6%	
								H	3,100,000,000	26.7%	
								M	550,000,000	4.7%	
								Q	1,000,000,000	8.6%	
								J	1,511,000,000	13.0%	
								C	700,000,000	6.0%	
								P	1,750,000,000	15.1%	
								K	250,000,000	2.2%	
								O	150,000,000	1.3%	
161		7 Years 7 Months	LKB01024A014	12,000	39,360	14,130	25,230	F	300,000,000	2.1%	
								A	750,000,000	5.3%	
								B	217,000,000	1.5%	
								D	1,323,000,000	9.4%	
								H	4,073,000,000	28.8%	
								M	650,000,000	4.6%	
								Q	1,000,000,000	7.1%	
								J	1,517,000,000	10.7%	
								C	100,000,000	0.7%	

	AUCTION DATE	TENOR	ISIN	TOTAL OFFERED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS RECEIVED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FOR AUCTION (RS MN)	BIDS REJECTED (RS MN)	DEALER NAME	TOTAL BIDS ACCEPTED FROM DEALER (RS)	PECENTAGE (%)	WAYRNT
								P	1,800,000,000	12.7%	
								K	2,200,000,000	15.6%	
								O	200,000,000	1.4%	
162		10 Years	LKB01226F014	8,000	54,100	8,100	46,000	F	500,000,000	6.2%	
								A	150,000,000	1.9%	
								M	100,000,000	1.2%	
								Q	2,000,000,000	24.7%	
								P	350,000,000	4.3%	
								I	500,000,000	6.2%	
								K	4,500,000,000	55.6%	

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கணக்காய்வாளர் தலைமை அதிபதி திணைக்களம்
AUDITOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

මගේ අංකය எனது இல. My No. } BAF/H/GEN/2016/41 ඔබේ අංකය உமது இல. Your No. } දිනය திகதி Date } 17 June 2016

Governor
Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Audit Examination on the Bonds Issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Upon our request you have submitted to us information pertaining to the Bonds issued during the period of 1st January 2014 to date.

As you are aware this information was sought to prepare a report to the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) pertaining to the Bond issue on the direction of the COPE.

Please let us know whether there is any information of sensitive nature contained in the documents or any secret documents furnished to the Auditor General in order to maintain the sensitivity or confidentiality required in preparing the report to the Committee on Public Enterprises as requested by the Committee.

Your early response in this regard is very much appreciated.

o/c

S.M.D.S.S. Rohitha
Assistant Auditor General
For Auditor General

අංක 306/72, පොල්දූව පාර, බත්තරමුල්ල, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව. - இல. 306/72, பொல்துவ வீதி, பத்தரமுல்லை, இலங்கை. - No. 306/72, Polduwa Road, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka
+94-11-2887028-34 +94-11-2887223 oaggov@sltnet.lk www.auditorgeneral.gov.lk

විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
கணக்காய்வாளர் தலைமை அதிபதி திணைக்களம்
AUDITOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

මගේ අංකය எனது இல. My No. BAF/H/GEN/2016/41 ඔබේ අංකය உமது இல. Your No. දිනය திகதி Date 17 June 2016

Secretary
Ministry of Finance

Audit Examination on the Bonds Issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka

As you aware the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) is acting as the sole agent of debt management for the Government and is solely responsible for issuance of Treasury Bonds.

We were directed by the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) of Parliament to submit a special report pertaining to Treasury Bonds issued by the CBSL.

To prepare the said report, CBSL has submitted the necessary information to us upon our request.

Please inform me whether there are any matters of sensitive or confidential nature relating to the Ministry of Finance with regard to the issuance of Bonds by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Your early response in this regard is very much appreciated.

g/c

S.M.D.S.S. Rohitha
Assistant Auditor General
For Auditor General

අංක 306/72, පොල්දූව පාර, බත්තරමුල්ල, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව, . - இல. 306/72, பொல்துவ வீதி, பத்தரமுல்லை, இலங்கை. - No. 306/72, Polduwa Road, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka
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අැමුණුම 01 – 1.1.3

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ සිදු කර තිබූ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් පිළිබඳව පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කරන යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවේ ඇතුලත් එකිනෙක ඡේදයන්හි නිරවද්‍යතාවය පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේ උප ලේඛණය.

2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් සිදු කර තිබූ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති විසින් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙත 2016 ජූනි 29 දින ඉදිරිපත් කල විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ

ඡේද අංකය	විස්තරය
4.1	ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ආර්ථික හා මිල ස්ථායිතාවය පවත්වාගෙන යාමද මූලික අරමුණු ලෙස සළකා ස්ථාපිත කර ඇති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පස් දෙනෙකුගෙන් සමන්විත මහ බැංකු මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ ප්‍රධානියා ද වන මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙහෙයවනු ලැබේ. තවද මුදල් නීති පනතේ 19(1) වගන්තිය පරිදිමහ බැංකු අධිපති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියා ද වේ.මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ දැනුම්දීම මත රජයේ ඉදිරි මාසික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරාලීම සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් (Treasury Securities) එනම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් (Treasury Bills) හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර (Treasury Bonds) නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ වගකීම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් දරනු ලබයි.වර්ෂයකට වඩා අඩු කාලයකින් කල් පිරෙන (Maturity) අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කරනු ලබන අතර වර්ෂයකට වැඩි දිගු කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරයි. මෙම බැඳුම්කරයක මුහුණත වටිනාකම (Face Value) රුපියල් 100 ක අගයක් ගනී. මෙහිදී මහ බැංකුව විසින් රජය වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් සපයා දීම සිදුකරනු ලබන අතර මුදල් නීති පනතේ 106 (1) වගන්තියට අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව රජයේ නියෝජිතයකු ලෙස කටයුතු කරන බව දක්වා ඇත. මෙම සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා සුදුසුකම්ලත් ආයතන 16 ක් 2015 වර්ෂය අවසාන වන විට ලියාපදිංචි කර තිබූ අතර, 2016 වර්ෂයේ දී ඉන් එක් ආයතනයක් ඉවත් වී ඇත එම ආයතන අතර රාජ්‍ය මෙන්ම පෞද්ගලික ආයතන ද වේ. මෙම ආයතන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් / වෙළඳුන් (Primary Dealers) ලෙස හඳුන්වනු ලබයි. තවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලටද ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොලෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදීගැනීමට අවසර ලබා දී තිබේ. ශ්‍රී ලංකාමහබැංකුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයන් 2 ක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි.ඉන් පළමු ක්‍රමය වූයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන දැන්වීමක් අනුව ඉහතින් සඳහන් කරන ලද ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් මිලගණන් කැඳවා ඒ අනුව බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි (auction) මඟින් අවශ්‍ය මුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමයි. දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය වූයේ සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට සුරකුම්පත් නිකුත්කිරීම හෙවත් පෞද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයයි (Direct Placement/Private Placement). මෙම දෙවන ක්‍රමයේ දී සිදුවූයේ මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන ලද බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඉපයුම්/ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් (Weighted Average yield Rate) මත ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම් සඳහාඅවස්ථාව ලබාදීම වේ. මෙහිදී මෙම බරතැබූ ඉපයීම් අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීම ක්‍රම 2 ක් අනුව සිදු කරනු ලැබේ. එක් ක්‍රමයක් වන්නේ ආසන්නතම පෙර කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේ දී සමාන කල්පිරීමේ කාලයක් (Maturity Period) සහිත බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද

ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් හි බරිත සාමාන්‍ය අගය ඵලදා අනුපාතය ලෙස ගැනීම වේ. අනෙක් ක්‍රමය වන්නේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලේ (Secondary Market) පවතින සමාන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර ඵලදා අනුපාත පදනම් කරගෙන නැවත ඵලදා අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීමයි. සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වෙන්දේසි දින හැර අනෙකුත් සෑම වැඩකරන දිනයකම විවෘතව පවතින අතර බැඳුම්කරමිලදී ගැනීමට කැමති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පෙර තීරණය කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් යටතේ, අලෙවියට ඇති බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගැනීමට අයදුම්කළ හැකිය. භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවක දී අනුගමනය කරනු ලබන ක්‍රියාවලිය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි (Public DebtDepartment Operation Manual) දක්වා තිබේ.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ඡේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1. මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සකස් කරනු ලබන්නේ කා විසින්ද?
   රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින්
2. මෙම අත්පොත සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා දෙනු ලබන්නේ කවුරුන් විසින්ද?
   රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරීතුමා
3. එම අත්පොතෙහි සංශෝධන සිදුකරන අකාරය කුමක්ද?
   අදාළ නීති, රෙගුලාසි ,නියාමනය සහ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ වෙනස් වන විට සහ/හෝ අලුත් නීති, රෙගුලාසි, නියාමන සහ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ අදාල අධිකාරිය විසින් හඳුන්වා දීමේදී අත්පොත ඊට අනුකූලව වෙනස් කරනු ලැබේ.
4. එම සංශෝධන සඳහා පූර්ව අනුමැතියක් ලබා ගන්නේද?
   අදාළ අධිකාරිය විසින් අනුමත කර ඇති වෙනස්වීම් සහ/හෝ අලුත් ඇතුළත් කිරීම් සඳහා පමණක් සංශෝධන සිදු කරන බැවින් පූර්ව අනුමැතියක් අවශ්‍ය නොවේ.
5. අවසන් වරට මෙම අත්පොත සංශෝධනය කරන ලද්දේ කිනම් දිනකද?
   2013 ජූලි 31 , මෑත කාලයේදී සිදු කරන ලද වෙනස් කිරීම් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කරමින් සිටී.

6. මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා ගන්නේ නම් එසේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගත යුතු බව සඳහන් නීත්‍යානුකූල ලියවිල්ල කුමක්ද?

   අදාළ නොවේ.

7. මෙම අත්පොතෙහි සඳහන් ක්‍රියාමාර්ග අනුගමනය කල යුතු බවට නිලධාරීන්ට වගකීමක් පවතීද? ඔව්.

8. එසේ ක්‍රියාමාර්ග අනුගමනය නොකිරීම හේතුවෙන් නිලධාරීන්ට එරෙහිව විනය ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් පවතීද? ඔව්.

4.2 භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර පොළී අනුපාතයකට (Coupon Rate/Interest Rate) විවිධ පරිණත කාලසීමාවන් සඳහා නිකුත් කරනු ලබයි. එලෙස නිකුත් කරනු ලබන බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකමට අනුව පොළී අනුපාතය මත අර්ධ වාර්ෂිකව රජය විසින් පොළී ගෙවනු ලබයි. (ඇමුණුම xi). බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියන්හිදී ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන පොළී අනුපාතයක් මත පදනම්ව විවිධ මිල ගණන් යටතේ ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. එම ලංසු අධිමිලකට (Premium) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වැඩි මිලකට, සමමිලට (at par) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට සමාන වූ මිලකට සහ අවමිලට (Discount) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වඩා අඩු වූ මිලකටද ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. මෙහිදී ඔවුන් විසින් අධිමිලට ඉල්ලුම්කළ හොත් බැඳුම්කරයේ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා පහළ අගයක් ගන්නා අතර සම මිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන අගයක්ද, අවමිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක්ද ගනු ලබයි. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට ඉහළින් ඇති ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට වඩා අවමිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත්, පොළී අනුපාතය හා ඵලදා අනුපාතය සමාන වන විට බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට නිකුත් වන බවත්, පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා පහළින් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී මුහුණත අගයට ඉහළ වූ අධිමිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත් දැක්විය හැක. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් අධිමිලක් ලැබෙන අතර එයින් රජයට අමතර මූල්‍ය වාසියක් ලැබේ. එමෙන්ම පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතයට එනම් වට්ටම් අනුපාතයකින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් රජයට මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදු වේ. පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන ඵලදා අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළහොත් රජයට අමතර වාසියක් හෝ අවාසියක් සිදුනොවේ.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

බැඳුම්කරයක් සම මිලට, අධි මිලට හෝ අව මිලට නිකුත් කිරීම තීරණය වන්නේ සාර්ව ආර්ථික කරුණු රාශියක් මත වේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් වැඩිමනත් විස්තර 5.1.19 යටතේ දක්වා ඇත.

අව මිලට, සම මිලට හෝ අධි මිලට නිකුත් කිරීම, නිකුත් කරන්නා වෙත ලාභයක් හෝ පාඩුවක් හෝ ලෙස නිගමනය නොකළ හැකි වන අතර එහි ණය සේවාකරණ පිරිවැය තීරණය වනුයේ පරිණත ඵලදා අනුපාතය (Yield to Maturity (YTM))තුලිනි. තවද, දැනටමත් නිකුත් කර ඇති බැඳුම්කරයක් නැවත නිකුත් කිරීමේදී අදාල මිල තීරණය වනුයේ ණය කළමනාකරණයේදී සලකා බැලෙන අනෙකුත් සාධක මතයි.

කෙසේ නමුදු නව නිකුතුවකදී මිල බොහෝ විට තීරණය වනුයේ අදාළ වෙළඳපල තත්වයන් මත වන අතර එම මිල මුහුණත වටිනාකමට ආසන්න අගයක් ගනු ඇත.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.(ඇමුණුම vii)

පිළිතුර හා ඒකඟ විය නොහැක. බැඳුම්කර අවමිලට නිකුත්කරන විට රජයට මුල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවන බවත් ,අධිමිලට නිකුත් කරන විට රජයට මූල්‍ය වාසියක් ලැබෙන බවත් විගණය විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇත.ඒනම් රුපියල් 100 ක බැඳුම්කරයක් රුපියල් 90 ක අවමිලකට නිකුත්කලද රජයට වන වගකීම රු.100 ක් වන අතර එයින් රු.10 ක මුදලක් රජයට අහිමි වේ.ඒලෙස අහිමි වන මුදල හේතුවෙන් රජයට සිදුවන්නේ මූල්‍ය අවාසියකි.ඒ අනුව අධිමිලට හෝ අවමිලට නිකුත් කිරීම තුල රජයට පිළිවෙලින් මූල්‍ය වාසියක් හා මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවන බවට නිගමනය කිරීම තාර්කික නිගමනයකි.

මෙම අවාසිය පහත අවස්ථා 03 යටතේ තවදුරටත් දැක්විය හැක.

I. නාමික අගයට අඩු මිලකට නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රජයට අඩු මුදලක් ලැබීම.
II. නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු වටිනාකමක් රජය විසින් ලබා ගත්තද කල් පිරීමේදී නාමික අගයම ගෙවිය යුතු වීම.
III. නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු වටිනාකමක් ලබා ගත්තද කල් පිරීම දක්වා නාමික අගය මත පොලී ගෙවීමට සිදුවීම

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

4.3 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016මැයි මාසය දක්වා රජයේ මූදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයෙන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් සපුරා ගත් ආකාරය පහත වගුවේ දැක්වේ.(වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ) කෙසේ වෙතත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා ඉහත සඳහන් ක්‍රම දෙකම අනුගමනය කර තිබුණද, එදින සිට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් තාවකාලිකව සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

4.4 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය මුළුමනින්ම ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා වූ මාස 15 ක කාලය තුළ, සෘජු ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදාගත් මාසයන්ද වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත් මාසයන් ද මෙම ක්‍රම දෙකම යොදාගත් මාසයන්ද, පැවති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. කෙසේ වුවත් එම මාස 15 ක කාලය තුළ නිකුත් කළ සමස්ථ බැඳුම්කරයන්ගෙන් සියයට 80 කට වඩා සෘජු ක්‍රමය යොදාගෙන නිකුත් කර තිබුණු බව වැඩි දුරටත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

2015.02.27 දින දක්වා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සෘජු හා වෙන්දේසි යන දෙආකාරයටම සිදු කරන ලද අතර එතැන් පටන් නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යටතේ පමණක් සිදු කරන ලදී

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

මහ බැංකුව නිරීක්ෂණය පිළිගෙන ඇත. ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තහවුරු වී ඇත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

කලින් අනුගමනය කළ ක්‍රියාවලියේ කොටසක් auction කරනවා. ඉතුරු කොටස Privet Placement කරනවා. එතකොට කලින් ඒ auction කරලා ගන්න අගය auction කරලා මුළු අවශ්‍යතාවෙන් කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් එහෙම auction කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒකෙ ප්‍රමාණය මොකක්ද කියන එක Tender Committee එක සහ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ. බහුතරයක් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ අපි බැලුවහම දත්ත සියයට 80 ක් පමණ Direct Placement කියන ක්‍රමයෙන් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ. සියයට 20 ක් පමණ තමයි වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒක Practice එකෙන් ආව එකක්. 20 : 80 අනුපාතය Practice එකෙන් ආව එකක්

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව් ඒක කරන්න මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් තිබුණා

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

Ratio එකට අනුමැතියක් තිබුණාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

Ratio එකට අනුමැතියක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

Ratio එක කියන්නේ යම් කිසි හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් අරගෙන ඉතුරු ප්‍රමාණය ගන්න කියලා තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

2008 decision එක කිව්වේ auction වලට ගිහිල්ලා ගන්න පුළුවන් තරම් ප්‍රමාණයක් auction වලින් ගන්න , එහෙම ගන්න බැරි ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා නම් direct placement කරන්න. ඉතින් එතකොට දැන් එහෙම නම් සියයට 100ක් ගන්න පුළුවන් නම් auction වලින්. එතකොට මුල් තීරණයයි ඔය දවසේ සිදුවීමයි. මම දන්නවා ගැටලුවක් තිබෙන බව. ඒක නොදැන අහනවා නොවෙයි. එය සිද්ධාන්තය වශයෙන් ගත්තොත් ඒ මුල් තීරණයයි ඔය දවස තුළ සිදුවීමයි අතර මුල් තීරණයට පරස්පරකමක් නැහැ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුල් තීරණයට තාක්ෂණිකව පරස්පරකමක් නැහැ.

නමුත් ඊට පස්සෙ දිගටම ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තිබෙනවා අර ක්‍රමය කරන්නෙ නැහැ කියන එකත් අධිපතිතුමා තරයේ ප්‍රකාශ කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

2008 තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒ තීරණය අනුව කිව්වේ හැකි තරම්auction කරලා ගන්න බලනවා. සියයට 20 ක් නොවේ 30 ක්, 80 ක්, 90ක් දක්වා යන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට Balance එකේ ප්‍රමාණය direct placement කරනවා. දැන් ඒ අනුව මේ නිශ්චිත දවසේ- මතභේදය තුඩු දුන් දවසේ තාක්ෂණිකව නිවැරදියි. නමුත් වෙන කාරණා නිසා අපි ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා. ඒකනෙ තත්ත්වය?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒකට තව පොඩ්ඩක් කරුණු එකතු කරන්නම්. හැකි තරම් ගන්නවා කියන එක Practice වශයෙන් කරන්නේ. ඒ කාලය තුළ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළේ තිබෙන පොළී අනුපාතය සංසන්දනය කරලා, ඒ සංසන්දනය අනුව ඒ පොළී අනුපාතයේ ලොකු වෙනස්වීමක් වෙන්නේ නැතිව, ඒ ප්‍රමාණයට තමයි හැකි ප්‍රමාණය කියන එක තීරණය කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඊට වඩා හැකි නොවන ප්‍රමාණය, ඒ කියන්නේ පොළී අනුපාතය ඊට වඩා ගොඩක් වැඩි වෙනවා නම් සලකන්නේ හැකි නොවන ප්‍රමාණය කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ පොළී අනුපාතයට අනුකූල වන විධියට කියන එකනේ ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ අනුකූල වන විධියට හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ Tender Committee එක නේද? එහෙම නැත්නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

Tender Committee එක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒක යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක Tender Committee නිර්දේශ කරලා අධිපතිතුමා අනුමත කරනවා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 06/07)

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

තව ප්‍රශ්ණයක් මතු වුනා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සඳහන් කලා විස්සයි අසූව වගේ rateඑක පවත්වාගෙන යනකොට, විස්සක් auction කරලා ඒ විස්සට ලැබෙන අගය මත direct placement කරනවා කියලා. ඒක හරිද? එහෙම Practice එකක් තිබුණාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

පසුගිය කාලය තුල බැලුවොත් සාමාන්‍ය වශයෙන් එහෙම තමයි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අවසර දෙනවා නම් හේතු කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

අන්තිමට කියපු දේ මට ඇහුණේ නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එහෙම උනේ ඇයි කියන එකට අවශ්‍ය නම් කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර දිය හැකියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

පැහැදිලි කර දෙන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම හේතුව වන්නේ, අපේ රටේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙළඳපොළ ඉතාම සුළු එකක්. ඒ වෙළඳපොළේ ප්‍රධානම ගණුදෙනුකරු විධියට එන්නේ සහ විශාලම fund එක EPF එක. ඒකෙන් සියයට හැත්තෑපහක් විතර ප්‍රමාණයක් EPF එක වාගේ එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. අනෙක් අය ඉතාම පොඩි අය. ඒ වාගේ පොඩි marketඑකක සියයට සියයක් තරහකාරී ලෙස කරන්න ගියොත් ඒ වගේ market එකකදී පොළී අනුපාත උච්ඡාවචනය වීම ඉතාම විශාලයි. ඒක ආර්ථිකයට සුදුසු නැහැ. ඒක නිසා තමයි සියයට හැත්තෑපහක් විතර අය පැත්තකට තැබුවහම නියම marketvalue කියන එක තෝරා ගැනීමට පහසු ක්‍රමයට තමයි යම් කිසි marketplayersලාට ඒ අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්නේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙන්නේ පසු ගිය කාලයේ වුණෙත් එහෙමයි. සියයට සියයක් ඒ වගේ ක්‍රමවේදයන් ගන්න ගියාම, අපේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තියේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවාට වඩා පොලී අනුපාත විශාල වශයෙන් ඉහල ගියා. මගේ විශ්වාසයේ හැටියට මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය පිළිබඳ ප්‍රධාන භාරකරු විධියට මහ බැංකුවේ පොලී අනුපාත එතරම් ඉහල යෑම රජයේ ආර්ථිකයටත්, රජයේ ණය ගැනීමටත් හොඳ නැහැ.අනෙක ඒ රටේ ස්ථාවරත්වයට,පුද්ගලික අංශයේ ණය ගැනීමටත් අවාසිදායකයි. මහ බැංකුව වශයෙන් අපේ එක්තරා වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා. පොලී අනුපාත කිසි ආකාරයකට වෙළඳපොළ අනුව හැසිරීමට ඉඩ දෙන ගමන්, ක්‍රමාණුකූලව ඒක ස්ථාවර තත්ත්වයට පත් කරගෙන ඉදිරියට යන්න මේ වගේ විශාල වශයෙන් අඩු වැඩි වීම් වැලැක්වීමට. ඒක නිසා තමයි එම ක්‍රමවේදය තුළින් යම්කිසි ආකාරයක ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් පවත්වාගන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ, විස්සයි අසූව වගේ ක්‍රම වේදයකින් පසුගිය කාලයේ ගිය නිසා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

විස්ස auction කරනකොටත් වෙළඳපොළ පුංචි වීම වාගේම වෙළෙඳ පොළේ playersලා ඉන්න ප්‍රමාණය අඩු වීම නිසා, යම් ආකාරයක manipulation එකක් එතැන විය හැකියි නේද? probability එක ගැන මම අහන්නේ. Governor කියපු අපේ market එකේ තිබෙන weakness එක 20 percent සම්බන්ධව වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. මොකද market එක දන්නවා මේ 20 percent based කරගෙන තමයි ඊලඟට rates වලට Central Bank එක යන්නේ කියලා. Epolicy එක Known policy එකක් එහෙම නැත්නම් 20 percent සම්බන්ධව auction එකේදි manipulation කරනවා නම් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එතැනදී කරන්න තිබෙන ඉඩකඩ ඉතාම අඩුයි. ඊට හේතුව මෙතැන flexibility එකක් තිබෙනවා. අපට තීරණය කරන්න සියයට විස්සක් ගන්නවාද, සියයට විසිපහක් ගන්නවාද, බිංදුවක් ගන්නවාද කියලා. එතකොට අපි හිතුවොත් ද්විතිය වෙළෙඳපොළේ market එකේදි interestrates වලට වඩා විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා කියලා, අපිට ඒක reject කරලා direct placement වලට යන්න පුළුවන් option එක තිබෙනවා. එතකොට අපට ඒක ගන්නම ඕනෑ කියලා එකක් නැහැ. market එකත් ඒක දන්න නිසා ඒ වෙළඳ පොළ ආසන්නයේම තමයි ඒ අය bid කරන්නේ. ඊට වඩා වැඩිපුර හෝ ගොඩක් වැඩියෙන් කළොත් අපි ඒක reject කරන්න ඕනෑ වෙලාවක පුළුවන්. මොකද ඒ වෙනුවට අපට ඉතිරිවික replacement වලින් ගන්න පුළුවන්. මේ යන ක්‍රමය තුළ එහෙම option එකක් නැතිව market එක දන්න නිසා ඒ අයට ඕනෑම ගණනකට දාන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද දන්නවා, මේක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා, අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම අපි ඒක ගැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒගොල්ලන්ට ඒකෙන් manipulate කරන්න තිබෙන අවස්ථා වැඩි.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 10,11)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

20:80 අනුපාතය ඒ කියන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි 20 යි, private placements 80 යි කියන අනුපාතය මෙම manual එකේ යම් තැනෙක සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

මා දැනුවත්ව මේ manual එකේ කිසිදු තැනෙක 20:80 අනුපාතය කියලා සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 17)

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් කලින් අවසර ඉල්ලා සිටි පරිදි, මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙනුත් සහ මොන අධිපතිතුමා වුණත් කමක් නැහැ පිළිතුරු දුන්නාට, ratio එක අසුවයි විස්සයි කියලා. එහෙම regulation එකක් හෝ Board Paper එකක් හරි තිබෙනවා කියලාද විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව හෝ මහ බැංකුව කියන්නේ. නැත්නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා බලපු අවුරුද්දක් 2013 වර්ෂය හෝ 2014 වර්ෂයේ සිට, මේ සිද්ධිය දක්වා කාලය තුළ bonds ගත්ත විධිය තිබෙනවානේ. ඒ ගත්ත විධිය තුළ අවසානයේවෙලා තිබෙන results අනුවද ඔබතුමන්ලා අසුවයි විස්සයි හෝ හැත්තෑපහයි විස්සයි හරි කියලා කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමන්ට ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් දැනගන්න ඕනෑද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

එතුමාගෙනුත්. ඔබතුමාත් කියන්න.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා

පසු ගිය කාලයේ දිගටම අරන් තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ 4:3 එකේ analyze කරලා තිබෙනවා, ඒ ගත්ත ප්‍රමාණය. අවසාන උත්තරය එන්නේ ඒකයි. එහෙම නැතුව කොහේ හෝ තිබෙන සටහනක් විධියට නොවෙයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක පැහැදිලි කර කියලා තිබෙනවා 4:3 Item එකේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ ඒක මහ බැංකුවෙන් අරන් තිබෙන තීරණයක් නොවෙයි, ඒක practice එක ඇතුළේ වෙලා තිබෙන දෙයක්.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා

බොහෝ වෙලාවට වෙලා තිබෙන සිදුවීම කාරණා කිරිමේදී ඔය rate එකේ තමයි ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

නැතුව අසුවයි විස්සයි කියලා කොහේ හෝ Monetary Board එකේ decisionඑකක් අරගෙන නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සටහනේ තිබෙනවා "වැඩිදුර නිරීක්ෂණය වේ" කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 43)

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් කලින් ඇහුවේ 80:20 කියන අනුපාතය - bonds ගන්න කොට ඔබතුමන්ලා tools දෙකක් පාවිච්චි කරනවා නේ. 80:20 කියන අනුපාතය ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ regulation එකක් විධියට හරි, Board decision එකක් විධියට හරි තිබෙනවාද? එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒක best practices ඇතුළේ, අඩුම cost එක ඇතුළේ ගන්න ගිහින් ආපු අවසාන result එකද කියලා දැන ගන්න කැමැතියි.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

Hon Member, I must say I need to have some help from my colleague because at the moment, as you know, we are using a full auction system. So, what happened earlier, I am not aware whether there was an actual decision , Can any of my colleagues help me out of that?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

මම මේ කාරණය මීට පෙරත් පැහැදිලි කළා. අපි මේ තාක් පැහැදිලි කළා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අරගෙන තිබෙන තීරණ සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය පාලනය පිළිබඳ මුලධර්ම මත පදනම් වෙලා auction ක්‍රමයට සහ direct placement ක්‍රමයට යනවා කියලා. ඒකේ තිබෙන මුලධර්මය තමයි අඩු පිරිවැය සහ අඩු අවදානම. මේ පදනම මත යන කොට ඒ මුලධර්ම මත රජයට සහ රටට යහපත් වන විධියට රාජ්‍ය ණය රැස් කිරීමේදී අපි බොහෝ වේලාවට යොදා ගන්නේ අඩු පිරිවැය සහ වෙළඳ පොළේ පොලි අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කිරීම. අපි ඒ මතණය රැස් කිරීමේදී, ඉතිහාසය දිහා බලලා data එකතු කරලා - දත්ත එකතු කරලා - බැලුවාම ඔය සියයට 80:20 කියලා ඇති. හැබැයි අපි එහෙම නිර්නායකයක් තීරණය කරලා ඒ අනුව කටයුතු කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක පසු ගිය data බලන විට ලැබෙන outcome එකක් විතරයි.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 48)

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර මහතා

මම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සිටි කාලය තුළ, පසුගිය තොරතුරු ගවේෂණයන් කළොත්, ඒ කාලයේ තමයි වැඩිපුර සෘජු ක්‍රමයට direct placements ලබාගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.නමුත් අපි එය සිතා මතා කරන දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ වාගේම auction ක්‍රමය හරහා මෙපමණ ගන්න ඕනෑ, direct placement හරහා මෙපමණ ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් තීන්දුවක් දීලා නැහැ.Domestic Debt Management Committee එක මාසයේ මුල රැස්වී, සාකච්ඡා කර, එය ක්‍රියාවට නන්වද්දී වෙළඳ පොළේ සිදු වන උච්චාවචනයන් නිසා එය වෙනස් කරන්න වෙනවා. එහි ප්‍රතිඵලයක් හැටියට 20යි 80 හෝ වෙනත් අනුපාතයක් ලැබී තිබෙනවා. එය එම ක්‍රියාදාමයේ ප්‍රතිඵලයක් විනා ගත් තීරණයකට අනුගත වීමක් නොවෙයි කියන එකයි මට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 49)

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට ප්‍රශ්ණයක් තිබෙනවා. Manual එකේ 3 වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, ‘Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme කියලා. එහි තවදුරටත් මෙසේ සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා.

“Funds are raised through

A. Auctions
B. Private placements
C. Rupee Loans

“A” කියන්නේ Auctions. ඒකෙන්, firstly auctions වලට යන්න ඕනෑ indicate වෙනවාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

No.Then, Rupee Loans come under C. We are not issuing rupee loans. For instance, may be after 2009, we have not issued rupee loans, if I am not mistaken.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

A - Auctions, B- Private Placements කියලා ඒ විධියට දැම්මාට auctions firstly යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා එකක් නැද්ද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

There is no order as far as "A" and "B" concerned.

සභාපතිතුමා

තවත් ප්‍රශ්ණ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර එතරම් පැහැදිලි නැහැ. පසුගිය කාරක සභාවේදී මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ විමසීමකදී, "manual එකේ වගන්තියෙන් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් සියයට 80 ක්, සියයට 85 ක් පමණ - ගණනක් හරියට කිව්වේ නැහැ. -මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් සපුරාගෙන ඉතිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය direct placementඑකෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ." කියලා සියලුම නිලධාරීන් කියා සිටියා.

සියලුම නිලධාරීන් එහෙම නොවෙයි කියලා පුළුවන් නම්, ගියවර සාක්ෂිවලින් එකක් හෝ පෙන්වන්න. අනික් කාරණය, ඒ ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කළේ මේ පත්‍රිකාවෙන් කියලා තමයි එහිදී ප්‍රකාශ කළේ. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය, 10.07.2008 දිනැති පත්‍රිකාවෙන් තමයි, direct placements වලට move වුණේ. මෙහි සඳහන් වෙනවා, "improvement of market liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund". It states that the Board having considered the Paper approved of issuing treasury bonds to EPF and other captive sources at interest rate of five basis point above the secondary market rates through private placements and requesting the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary marketby actively engage in the secondary market operation. ගියවර අපට ලැබුණු සියලු සාක්ෂිවලින් සඳහන් කළේ, මේ ලියවිල්ලෙන්

තමයි direct placements වලට යොමු වුණේ කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ කාරණය නිවැරදිද කියලා, ඔබතුමා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් අපට පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒකට කවුරු හෝ උත්තර දෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

දැනට සිටින මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා උත්තර දෙන්න.

පී.සමරසිංහ මහතා

මම නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති. ඒ Board Paper එකෙන් තමයි, private placements කියන එක හඳුන්වා දුන්නේ. 1997 වර්ෂයේ තමයි bonds, introduce කළේ.ඒ Introduce කළේ සම්පූර්ණ auction. යම් කිසි හේතුවක් නිසා 2008 වර්ෂයේ මෙය තාවකාලිකව හඳුන්වා දුන්නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනවිරත්න මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ private placements වලට යන්න.

පී.සමරසිංහ මහතා

හැබැයි, එහි අනුපාතයක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. NSB හා EPF වාගේ කිහිපදෙනෙකුට විශේෂ rate එකකට යන්න කියලා කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමා හරියටම හරි. මොකද අපිට ආසිම් මහතාගේ උත්තරයේන් එළියට ආවේ නැහැ. ගියවර සියලුම නිලධාරීන් උත්තර දුන්නේ, auction ක්‍රමය දිගටම පැවතුණේ. මේ Board Paper එකෙන් ඒ auction ක්‍රමය වෙනස් වුණේ කියලා. මේ manual එකේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් වන්නේ, සියලු දේවල් ලබා ගත්තේ auction වලින්. යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් පමණක් මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන ආකාරයට direct placements වලින් ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියන එකයි. එහෙම ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. මෙහි විශාල වරදක් තිබෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිම දෙයක් Report එකේ නැහැ. මෙහි තියෙන්නේ, “EPF and other captive source” කියලා. මේ සම්බන්ධව Report එකක සඳහන් නොවන්නේ මොකද? මේ direct placement ගන්නේ “EPF and other captive source” වලින් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා

සඳහන් වන්නේ නැත්තේ මොන Report එකේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

Auditor General ගේ Report එකේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 17,18)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔය ලිපියේ දිනය කවදාද? (මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාව)

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මේ ලිපියේ දිනය 2008.07.10 එක ලිපියකින් මේ manual එකේ තිබුණු ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කරලා, රටේ පිළිගන්නා ක්‍රමවේදය බවට පත් කර තිබෙනවා. මේ රටේ පිළිගන්නා ක්‍රමය ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයද? අපේ මේ මුළු Report එකම තියෙන්නේ on that basis. So, it is flawed from the beginning. මෙතැනදී අපි පිළිගන්නවා මේ ක්‍රමවේදය. I will show you the 90 per cent of the other countries in the world where there is the auction system. We asked this question from the learned Members of the Central Bank, all of them agreed last time that the norm in the world is the auction system. It is there in America, England, Germany and in every country. When they change the system here there was no manual.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

මම ඇහුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයටද, අධිපතිතුමාටද යොමු කර තිබෙන්නේ? අධිපතිවරයා මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට දැනුම් දුන්නාම, ප්‍රතිපත්ති හදන්නේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මේ ලියවිල්ලෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්ති වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ කියලා අපට පිළිගන්න වෙනවා. මේ අවස්ථාවේදී 2008 වර්ෂයේ manual එක සංශෝධනය විය යුතුයි. ඒක මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරී මහත්වරුන් පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

සංශෝධනය වෙලා නැහැ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 19)

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I am asking from the Governor. What I understand is this. Normally, the practice of the Monetary Board is to go by the Manual

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Hon. Minister, my understanding is the Manual reflects the decisions of the Monetary Board. There is a changing policy. The Monetary Board can actually effect that change. It does not have to follow the Manual all the time. If a change is required, the Monetary Board would make that change and that would be reflected in the manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Why would it reflect on the Manual? Then, that becomes the practice.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Yes. Until the Monetary Board changes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

If it is not changed that must be the rule.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

If it is not changed in the Manual – All decisions of the Monetary Board should be reflected in the Manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Now I refer to you the item "B" of the Manual on page 8 – "Private and Direct Placements", you tell me what you understand from this language.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

You mean the B. (i)

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

That is right. That is the general rule of the Monetary Board. It is indicated here. The decision had been taken by the Monetary Board and it is, as Mr.Samarasiri said, far back in 1996 or 1997. When the bond system came in the normal practice was the auction system. Am I right?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I was not here. My understanding is there was a hybrid system at one point where there was a mixture of an auction as well as private placements.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

That came in 2008. Am I right?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

No, that came in 1998

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

A last occasion, when I asked from the officers of the Central Bank what they said was "about 80 per cent or 85 per cent was done through auctions and the rest was done through." That is the idea I got from the language depicts here. Any sane person will get that idea from this language. That was changed only in 2008. Am I right?

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

That is my understanding "when they move on to more ever private placements".

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara

No. You have said it was done in 1998.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

No. There was a mixed system.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Is it the Board paper of the Monetary Board on 2008.10.07? That is a confidential document. Can I read this to you? "I believe from the evidence that I have heard what they said was, ' the system was changed purely through this letter'".

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 22)

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

මම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරී, රත්නායක, 1997 වසරේදී තමයි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම ආරම්භ කළේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ auction ක්‍රමයට තමයි ගියේ. නමුත්, auction ක්‍රමය තුළින් දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්ණ මතු වුණා. Interest rate එක විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන අරමුදල් තිබෙනවා, ඒ අරමුදල්වලට auction ක්‍රමය හරහා එන්නේ නැතිව direct placementවලින් එන්න පුළුවන් කියන weighted

average rate එකට 1998 වසරේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අවසරයක් දුන්නා.Weighted Average rateඑක මත direct placement යනවා කියන එක ආරම්භ වුණේ 2008 වසරේදී නොවෙයි. Treasury bond කියන එක 1997 වසරේ ආරම්භ කරලා, මාස කිහිපයක් ගිහිල්ලා 1998 වසරේදී direct placementආරම්භ කළා. එය බාහිර පාර්ශවවලට විවෘත වුණේ නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන විශාල අරමුදල් වලට auction හරහා එන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. 1998 වසරේදී, පොලී අනුපාත ස්ථාවර කිරීමේ අරමුණත් ඇතිව direct placement ආරම්භ කළා. 1998වසරේ ඉඳලා මේ ක්‍රමය යන විට නැවතත් පොලී අනුපාත විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස්වීම්වලට ලක් වුණා. 2008 වසර ආසන්න කාලය වන විට මෙය මහ බැංකුව තුළ සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී auction ක්‍රමය විතරක් නොවෙයි තවත් ක්‍රම තිබෙනවා කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණයක් ගත්තා. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව, රක්ෂණ සමාගම් ඒ වාගේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන පද්ධතියක් අපේ රට තුළ තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතනවලට - weighted average rate - ඒ කියන්නේ බර තබන ලද සාමාන්‍ය පොලී අනුපාතය මත direct placement කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක 2008 වසරේදී ආරම්භ වුණේ. නමුත්, ඒක තිබෙන captive sources කියන එක define කරලා නැහැ. Define කරන්නේ නැති හේතුව වන්නේ, captive sources කියලා අදහස් කරන්නේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන. ඒවා primary dealers හරහා එන විට සමහර වෙලාවට විශාල වශයෙන් commission ගෙවන්න සිදු වෙනවා. ඒක නිසා රජයේ අරමුදල් පිරිවැය අඩුකර ගැනීම සඳහාත්, රටේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමයෙහි පොලි අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කර ගැනීම සඳහාත් යෙදූ ක්‍රමවේදයක් තමයි ඒක. ඒ සඳහා වැරදි interpretation දීම සුදුසු නැහැ. එහි තිබුණු යහපත් අරමුණු තමයි, රජයට අඩු පිරිවැයක් යටතේ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සහ අපේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමය තුළ පොලී අනුපාත අනවශ්‍ය විධියට ඉහළ පහල යාම වලක්වා ගැනීම. ඒක අදාළ මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහ Dr.Azim කියන මහත්වරුන් දෙදෙනාම මෙතැනදී සඳහන් කළා, මේ manual එකේ ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගත්ත policy decision එකක් කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා, රටට බලපාන ඔය වැදගත් තීන්දුව 2008 වසරේදී ගත්තා නම්, එය මේ manual එකට ඇතුළත් නොවුනේ ඇයි?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

2008 වසරේ දී ගත්ත තීරණය - මහ බැංකු තුළින් පාලනය වන අරමුදල්වලට direct placement වලට තිබුණු අවස්ථාව, 2004 වසර පමණ වන විට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය

නවත්වන්න සිදු වුණා. මොකද, රජයේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ක්‍රමවේදය electronic system එකකට වෙනස් වුණා. Primary dealer system ඇවිල්ලා, electronic system එනකොට, electronic systemයටතේ හැම primary dealer ආයතනයකටම එහෙම නැත්නම්, ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයට සම්බන්ධවන හැම ආයතනයකටම ගිණුමක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මහබැංකුවේ තිබෙන අරමුදල්වලට වෙන වෙන ගිණුම් නිකුත් කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක නිසා 2003 හෝ 2004 වසර වන විට - මට හරියටම දිනය මතක නැහැ. - ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අරමුදල්වලට සෘජු ක්‍රමය යටතේ එන්න තිබුණු අවස්ථාව අහිමි වුණා. එයට හේතුව, වෙන කිසිවක් නොවෙයි. ඒ අරමුදල්වලට වෙනම ගිණුම් ආරම්භ කිරීමට නොහැකි වීමයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි 2004 වසරේදී පමණ එය නැවැත්වුවේ. 2004 වසරේ ඉඳලා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් කාලය තුළ ඇති වෙච්ච වර්ධනයන් සලකා බලා තමයි 2008 වසරේදී ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමා කියන විදියට 2004 වසරේ ඉඳලා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් auction ක්‍රමය තමයි අනුගමනය කළේ.

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ඔව්. ඉන් බැහැර වෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 23)

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

Continuing my questions - මීට කලින් සිදු වූ Bond issue එකේදී- ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී රජයට විශාල මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබුණා කියලා රටේ ජීවත් වෙන මනුෂ්‍යයෙක් හැටියට මම දැන ගත්තා. මීට කලින් තිබුණු Bond issue එකේදී If there was a private placement වල ඒ අවශ්‍යතාවයට supply එකක් තිබුණද, නැද්ද කියලා මට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා

මීට කලින් අවස්ථා ගණනක් තිබුණු නිසා එහි කාලය සඳහන් කළා නම් ගොඩක් වටිනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

දළ වශයෙන් කාලය මේකයි කියන්න මම දන්නේ නැහැ. In general වශයෙන් මම අහන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ මේකයි, Private

placements කරද්දී ඒකට ඉල්ලුමක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපට ඒවා බලහත්කාරයෙන් දෙන්න බැහැ නේ. රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවට සරිලන මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ඉල්ලනවාද කියන sentiment එක දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. මම වයසින් බාල වුණාට, ආයෝජක උපදේශකවරයෙක් වශයෙන් අවුරුදු 5 ක් කටයුතු කළා. මෙතැනදී market sentiment කියන එක වැදගත් වෙනවා.Market sentiment එක තීරණය වෙනවා පසුගිය කාලයේ- එකකොට market sentiment එකේ demand එකක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා අපට දැන ගන්න පුළුවන්. මම අහන්නේ, මේ controversial issue එක වෙන්න කලින් market එකේ තිබුණු sentiment එක කොහොමද කියලායි. ඒ පිළිබඳ ප්‍රකාශයක් කරන්න දැනුමක් සහිත නිලධාරියෙක් සිටිනවාද?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I need the help of one of my colleagues who was actually involved in that process at that time.

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී.නානායක්කාර මහතා

මගේ නම ධම්මික නානායක්කාර. මම රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි ලෙස කටයුතු කළ කාලයේදී මේ Manual එක අධීක්ෂණය කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:ඔබතුමාගේ තනතුර කුමක්ද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී.නානායක්කාර මහතා

මම මූල්‍ය අංශපර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරනවා. මම 2015 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මස 09 වැනි වන තෙක් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ රාජකාරි කළා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, direct placements සඳහා අවශ්‍ය තරම් ඉල්ලුමක් තිබුණු බව මට පැහැදිලිවම කියන්න පුළුවන්. සෘජු auction ක්‍රමය නැත්නම්, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය සහ direct placements හරහා නිකුත් කර තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණය සංසන්දනය කිරීමෙන් ඒ ගැන අවබෝධ කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකට මම කරුණු දක්වන්නම්. විශේෂයෙන්ම විදේශීය ආයෝජකයන් ඔවුන්ට මුදල් තිබෙන අවස්ථාවල primary dealersහරහා පැමිණ direct placements හරහා ආයෝජනයන්කරනවා. Commission එකක් ගෙවන්න සිදු වන නිසා, විශේෂයෙන්ම සමහර විදේශීය ආයෝජකයන් Primary Dealers හරහා එන්න කැමති නැහැ. ඒක අපි අත්දැකීමෙන් දන්නවා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, තවත් කාරණයක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ. Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ ගන්නවාද, සෘජු Direct placements හරහා කොපමණ ගන්නවාද කියන

එක තීරණය කරන්නේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් නොවෙයි, Domestic Debt Management Committee කියන Committee එකෙන්. මාසයේ මුල් භාගයේදී Borrowing programme එක ඒ කමිටුවෙන් තීරණය කරනවා. ඊට අමතරව අදාල Auction එකේ ප්‍රතිඵල - වෙන්දේසියේ ප්‍රතිඵල - Auction Tender Committee එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව කරන්නේ ලිපිකරු වැඩ ටික පමණයි. තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයෙන්. මේ පිරිවැය යටතේ මෙපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා ඒ කමිටුවෙන් තීරණය කරනවා. ඊට පසුව "ඔයගොල්ලන්ට ඉතිරි ටික Direct placements හරහා Raise කරගන්න පුළුවන්ද? " කියලා ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් විමසනවා. "ඔව්, අපට පුළුවන්." කියලා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් කිව්වොත්, අපි කැමති වුනත්, අකැමැති වුණත් කුමන හෝ ක්‍රමයකින් රජයට අවශ්‍ය දිනට මුදල් සැපයීම කරන්න ඕනෑ. අපට ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා කිව්ව ගමන්ම Committee එකෙන් Direct placements හරහා ඒවා ගන්න කියලා තීන්දු කරනවා. Cut-off rate auction එකෙන් කීයක් ගන්නවාද කියන එක Committee එකේ තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමවේදය. මම රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි විධියට පත්වුණේ, 2012 වර්ෂයේ ජනවාරි මස 01 වැනිදායි. එදින සිට එතැනින් මම ඉවත් වනතුරු ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයයි. රජයේ ණය ගැනීමේ පිරිවැය benchmark එකක් විධියට ගන්න thirty year bond එක කැමතියි. මම රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළ කාලයේදී thirty year bond එක නිකුත් කලා. 12.50 සිට 8.75 වෙනකම් අපට ගෙනෙන්න පුළුවන් වුණා. මම නිවැරදි නම්, 9 කට ආසන්න මුදලකට Direct placements හරහා අවුරුදු 30 ක් දක්වා ණය ගන්න පුළුවන් වුණා. Direct placements එකෙන් රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කරගන්න රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරියන්ට Flexibility එකක් අවශ්‍ය අවකාශය සලස්වනවා. නැත්නම්, මුළු මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයම එකවර ගන්න ගියොත්, අනවශ්‍ය විධියට පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ පහළ යාම පමණයි සිදු වෙන්නේ.

(එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී.නානායක්කාර මහතා සම්බන්ධිතයි.)

ඒකෙන් ආයෝජකයන්ට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙළඳපොළ පිළිබඳව තිබෙන, දැක්ම නැත්නම් විශ්වාසය කඩා වැටෙනවා. ඒක බොහොමපැහැදිලිව ප්‍රදර්ශනය වුණා. 2015 වර්ෂයේ මැද විතර වෙද්දි විදේශීය ආයෝජකයන් රටින් පිටට යන්න පටන් ගත්තා. ඒකට හේතුව, පොලී අනුපාතයන් අනවශ්‍ය විධියට ඉහළ පහළ යාමයි. ඒ අනුව ඔවුන්ට ජාත්‍යන්තර ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතීන්ට අනුව වෙළඳපොළට mark-to-market කරලා ලොකු losses ගන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා. එක bond එකක සියයට 10ට ආයෝජනය කරලා, ඊළඟ bond එක සියයට 12 විධියට ඉහළ ගියොත්, සියයට 10ට ගත්ත bond එක ලොකු පාඩුවකට යන්නේ. එතකොට ආයෝජකයන් කවදාවත්

ආයෝජනය කරන්න කැමති වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මම ප්‍රශ්නයට සෘජු උත්තරයක් දෙනවා නම්, පැහැදිලිවමdirect placements හරහා රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවන් අපි සම්පාදනය කර තිබෙනවා. රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා, අපි කිසිම දවසක කියලා නැහැ. අඩුම පිරිවැයක් යටතේ අවශ්‍යතාවයන් සම්පාදනය කර තිබෙනවා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 34/35)

5.1.1 මහ බැංකුවේමූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/05/18/97 ට අනුව 1997 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මගින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. වෙළඳපලේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවක දී හෝ පොළි අනුපාතිකයන් අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවකදී වෙන්දේසි මගින් සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වූ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල යොදා ගත යුතු බව ද, එහිදී නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මේ නිසා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පොළී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලනය කිරීමේ යාන්ත්‍රණයක් ලෙස සෘජු ක්‍රමය මත අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම යොදා ගෙන තිබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

මම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරී, රත්නායක, 1997 වසරේදී තමයි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම ආරම්භ කළේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ auction ක්‍රමයට තමයි ගියේ. නමුත්, auction ක්‍රමය තුළින් දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්ණ මතු වුණා. Interest rate එක විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන අරමුදල් තිබෙනවා, ඒ අරමුදල්වලට auction ක්‍රමය හරහා එන්නේ නැතිව direct placementවලින් එන්න පුළුවන් කියන weighted average rate එකට 1998 වසරේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අවසරයක් දුන්නා.Weighted Average rateඑක මත direct placement යනවා කියන එක ආරම්භ වුණේ 2008 වසරේදී නොවෙයි. Treasury bond කියන එක 1997 වසරේ ආරම්භ කරලා, මාස කිහිපයක් ගිහිල්ලා 1998 වසරේදී direct placementආරම්භ කළා. එය බාහිර

පාර්ශවවලට විවෘත වුණේ නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන විශාල අරමුදල් වලට auction හරහා එන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. 1998 වසරේදී, පොලී අනුපාත ස්ථාවර කිරීමේ අරමුණත් ඇතිව direct placement ආරම්භ කළා. 1998වසරේ ඉඳලා මේ ක්‍රමය යන විට නැවතත් පොලී අනුපාත විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස්වීම්වලට ලක් වුණා. 2008 වසර ආසන්න කාලය වන විට මෙය මහ බැංකුව තුළ සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී auction ක්‍රමය විතරක් නොවෙයි තවත් ක්‍රම තිබෙනවා කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණයක් ගත්තා. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව, රක්ෂණ සමාගම් ඒ වාගේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන පද්ධතියක් අපේ රට තුළ තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතනවලට - weighted average rate - ඒ කියන්නේ බර තබන ලද සාමාන්‍ය පොලී අනුපාතය මත direct placement කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක 2008 වසරේදී ආරම්භ වුණේ. නමුත්, ඒක තිබෙන captive sources කියන එක define කරලා නැහැ. Define කරන්නේ නැති හේතුව වන්නේ, captive sources කියලා අදහස් කරන්නේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන. ඒවා primary dealers හරහා එන විට සමහර වෙලාවට විශාල වශයෙන් commission ගෙවන්න සිදු වෙනවා. ඒක නිසා රජයේ අරමුදල් පිරිවැය අඩුකර ගැනීම සඳහාත්, රටේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමයෙහි පොලි අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කර ගැනීම සඳහාත් යෙදූ ක්‍රමවේදයක් තමයි ඒක. ඒ සඳහා වැරදි interpretation දීම සුදුසු නැහැ. එහි තිබුණු යහපත් අරමුණු තමයි, රජයට අඩු පිරිවැයක් යටතේ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සහ අපේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමය තුළ පොලී අනුපාත අනවශ්‍ය විධියට ඉහළ පහල යාම වලක්වා ගැනීම. ඒක අදාළ මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවල තිබෙනවා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 23)

5.1.2 තවද මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/1/26/2008 හි කරුණු සැලකිල්ලට ගැනීමෙන් පසුව සහ රජයේ සුරකුම්පත් සම්බන්ධව පොළී අනුපාත ඉහළයාම සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් 2008 වර්ෂයේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකMB/PD/25/20/2008 ට අනුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලේ පවතින පොළී අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05 (Five Basis Points) ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාතයන් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් වෙළඳපොළ ද්‍රවශීලතාව ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

මේ ප්‍රශ්ණයට අදාළ, "Direct Placements" වලින් හෝ auction වලින් ගන්නවා" කියන මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය 2008 වසරේදී ගත්තා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා කලින් සඳහන් කලා.

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගත්ත තීරණයක්. Operation manual එක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් අනුමත වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු.අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය 2008 වර්ෂයේදී ඒ වාගේ තීරණයක් ගත්තා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා. එයින් පස්සේ අලුත් policy එකක්- ඒ කියන්නේ වැදගත්ම කාරණයක් ගැන මූලධර්ම වෙනසක් සිදු වුණා. ඉන් පස්සේ ඔය auctionවලට සහ Direct Placementsවලට අදාළ විධියට Operation manual එක සංශෝධනය වුණාද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒ පිළිබඳව සේපාල රත්නායක මහත්මයා කියාවි.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම එය පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තු 24 ක් පමණ තිබෙනවා.එක එක අණ පනත්වල තිබෙන විධි විධාන, rule and regulations වගේ දේවල් පදනම් කරගෙන මේවා ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා. ඊට අමතරව මහ බැංකුව ඒවාට අදාළව ගනිපු තීරණ තිබෙනවා. මේ සියල්ලම අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවල තිබෙනවා. ඒ මදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණ, නීතිවල තිබෙන විධිවිධාන රෙගුලාසිවල තිබෙන විධිවිධාන සලකා බලා ඒ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත හදන්නේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒ විශේෂඥ දැනුම තිබෙන්නේ ඒ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට. සමහර වෙලාවට ඒ Manual එක හැදුවට පස්සේ, ඒ අදාළ senior officer ට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා ඒකෙ අඩුපාඩු තිබෙනවාද කියලා බලන්න. එහෙම නැතිව ඒවා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ වාගේ එකක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ගියාම සෑහෙන්න කාලයක් යනවා කියවන්න. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒවාගේ කටයුත්තක නිරත වෙන්න බැහැ. ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ වාගේ විශේෂයෙන් වැදගත් තීරණ සඳහා තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කාලය වෙන් කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ auction කාර්ය පටිපාටිය ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් වැදගත් නොවන දෙයක් කියලාද? Direct placement සහ auctions මේ ප්‍රමාණයට යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා 2008 වසරේදී යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් ඇති කර ගත්තා නේ. ඊට අදාළ කාරණා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යන්න තරම් වැදගත් නැහැ කියලාද ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ.

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

නැහැ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කොතැනකවත් කියලා නැහැ "සියයට 20 ට යන්න, සියයට 80 ට යන්න" කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ මූලික වගකීම වෙන්නේ, තිබෙන වෙළඳපොළ අනුව අඩුම පිරිවැයට, අඩුම පොලී අනුපාතයට රජයට අරමුදල් රැස්කරලා දෙන එක. ඒක තමයි කාර්යභාරය.

ගරු.අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය විධිමත්ව කරන්න තමයි manual එකක් තිබෙන්නේ?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ ගැන තවදුරටත් පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වෙලාවේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කියන්නේ නැහැ. "Auction එකෙන් සියයට 20 ක් යන්න. Direct placement එකෙන් සියයට 80 ක් යන්න" කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒ වගේ දේවල් කියන්න බැහැ. මොකද, ඒ තීරණය ගන්න ඕනෑ විෂය දැනුම තිබෙන අයයි.

The Hon. AnuraPriyadarshanaYapa

System එක වෙනස් කිරීමේ අදහසක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට තිබුණාද? නැද්ද?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

තිබුණා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් ගන්නා තීරණ වෙනස් කරන්නෙත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන්මයි.

ගරු. අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා

Hybrid ක්‍රමයකට යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කර තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරිද?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

හරි

ගරු. අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා

ඒක තවම වෙනස් වෙලා නැද්ද?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතාගේ පිළිතුර

නැහැ

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

මට දැනගන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, 2008.01.07 වැනි දා ගත් තීරණය ගැන, 2008.10.07 වැනි දා ගත් තීරණය ගැනද, නැත්නම්, ඒ දෙකම එකතු වෙලා එන තීරණයක්ද? කවුරු හරි කෙනෙක් specific පිළිතුරක් ලබා දෙන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැනදි ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතුවෙනවා . මෙතුමා කියනවා, "මුදල් මණ්ඩලය යම් තීරණයක් ගත්තා නම්, ඒ තීරණය වෙනස් කළ යුත්තේත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයමයි." කියලා. අපි මුලින්ම මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය මොකක්ද කියලා දැනගන්න ඕනෑ ඔබතුමා කියන මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය මොකක්ද කියලා දැනගන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා කියන මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය මොකක්ද කියන එක යෝජනා අංකය සහ දිනය සහිතව කියන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන කථාව සත්‍යයක්ද කියලා බලන්න ඒක දැනගන්න ඕනෑ.

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

මේ අවස්ථාවේ ලිපි ලේඛන නොමැති නිසා දින සම්බන්ධයෙන් කියන්න අපහසුයි. නමුත්

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය අරමුදල් රැස් කරන ගමන්ම, වෙළඳ පොළේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාත ස්ථාවර කිරීමේ මූලික අරමුණු ඇතිව, 2008 වර්ෂයේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් එම තීරණය ගත්තා. කාලයක් ගත වන විට වරින් වර මෙම ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයේ සුළු සුළු වෙනස්කම් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් එම වෙනස් කිරීම්වලදී අවශ්‍ය මූලිකම තීරණය මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගන්නේ නැහැ. සමහර වේලාවට operations Department එකට දෙනවා. සමහර flexibility එකක්. ඒ අනුව තමයි කටයුතු කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය ඒ flexibility එකම නේ. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ප්‍රශ්න කළෙත්, මුල් තීරණය තිබියදී ඒ තීරණය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ගෙන යන්නේ නැතිව, මෙම තීරණය ගත් එක හරිද, වැරදිද කියලා නේ. ඒ වාගේම මෙය වෘත්තීමය කාරණයක්ද කියලාත් මතයක් ආවා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා

නැහැ නැහැ

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

මම කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමා කිව්ව දේ නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒ තීන්දුව ගත්තා. ඒක වෙනස් කරනවා නම්. නැවත වතාවක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයම ඒ තීන්දුව ගන්න ඕනෑ. පැහැදිලිව කිව්ව දේ ඒකනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි, මම තීරණ දෙකක් පරික්ෂා කර බැලුවා. මේ තීරණ මොවනාද කියලා මම විමසා සිටියා. 2008 වර්ෂයේ ජනවාරි මස 07 වැනිදා සහ 2008 වර්ෂයේ ඔක්තෝබර් මස 07 වැනි දා ගත් තීරණ දෙකක් මට පෙන්වා සිටියා. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ ඒ තීරණ දෙක ගැනද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක ඉතාම වැදගත් වෙනවා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි ඒ නිසයි ම කියන්නේ. මාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය පත්‍රිකා දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් ඒ තීරණය මොකක්ද, කොහොමද වුණේ කියලා කියන්න අද සුදානම්වෙලා ආවේ නැහැ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය මොකක්ද, ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ කොහොමද කියලා හරියටම කියන්න අපට අවස්ථාවක් ලබාදෙන්න. ඒවා ගැන ලේඛන සහිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අපට පුළුවන්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

2008 වර්ෂයේ ඒ විධියේ තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා. ඊට පසුව public auctionවලට යා යුතුයි කියලා හෝ public placement වලට යා යුතුයි කියලා වෙනත් තීන්දුවක් ගෙන නැහැ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට දැනට එහෙම තීරණයක් ගෙන නැහැ. නමුත් එය ලේඛන බලා හරියටම confirm කරගන්න ඕනෑ

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 25,26,27,28)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මට එක කාරණයක් නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න තිබෙනවා. EPF එකේ මුදල් bond වලට පරිහරණය කිරීම පිළිබඳව, 2008 ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ 07 දින දරන මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධව කාටද උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්.Governor උත්තර දෙනවාද? පී.සමරසිරි මහතා උත්තර දෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්ණය සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ඇහුවා නම් හරි. ප්‍රශ්ණය පිළිබඳව අවබෝධයක් නැතිව කාටවත් පිළිතුරු දෙනන් අමාරුයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ, 2008.10.07 දින තීරණය මඟින් තමයි EPF මුදල් Treasury bonds වලට ප්‍රතිපත්තිය එළිදැක්විලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

ඇත්තටම ඒ තීරණය ආවේ ඊට ඉස්සර වෙලා පළමුවැනි Board Meeting එක 2008.01.07 දින පැවැත්වුණා. ඔතැන Board paper එකක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා:2008.01.07 දින ලේඛනය පී.සමරසිරි මහත්මයා ළඟ තිබෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා:ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එම ලේඛනයෙන් නිශ්චිතව සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. මෙහිදී එම ලේඛනයෙන් ආවරණය වන මුදල් විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙන අරමුදල් මොනවාද කියලා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

අරමුදල් කියලා නැහැ. EPF and captive sources කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒක නොවෙයි කියන්නේ 2008.01.07 දින -

The Hon. Biaml Rathnayake

This document. EPF, ETF and NSB-

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා

එතැන කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

මොනවාද තිබෙන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා

එතැන තිබෙනවා EPF, ETF and NSB.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

සහ ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව, එතකොට 2008.01.07 කියන දවසට අදාළ තීරණය අරමුදල් තුනක්, EPF, ETF සහ ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව සම්බන්ධව අදාළයි. එම තීරණයට අදාළව 2008.01.07 දිනෙන් පසුව manual එකක් සංශෝධනය කළාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

ඒක මම කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

2008.10.07 ලේඛණයේ Board Paper එකේ අරමුණ තිබෙනවා. ඒ අරමුණ I,II වශයෙන් සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. පළමු වැනි අරමුණ තමයි, EPF අරමුදල් භාවිතා කිරීම. හැබැයි, පොලී මුදල පිළිබඳ කොන්දේසියක් තිබෙනවා.Interest rate 5 basis point කියලා තිබෙනවා. දෙවැනි කොන්දේසිය, ආපසු වතාවක් EPF අරමුදල් මණින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ තුළ යම් ක්‍රියාකාරීත්වයක් ඇති කිරීම ගැන. ඒක තමයි ඒ paper එකේ අරමුණ. දැන් එම ලේඛනයේ හතර වැනි ශීර්ෂය යටතේ ගත්ත තීරණ මොනවාද කියලා තිබෙනවා. එහි I සහ II වශයෙන් දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. අංක 1 තිබෙන්නේ, "To issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund" කියන වචනවලින් පස්සේ අත්අකුරෙන් ලියලා තිබෙනවා, "and other captive sources" කියලා. එම ස්ථානයේ ඒ වෙනස්කමට කිසිදු අත්සනක් නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම other captive sources කියලා කියන්නේ EPF නොවෙයි. ඒකනේ කියන්නේ"and" කියලා. ඔය "other captive sources" කියන නිගමනය Board Paper එකේ මුල් අරමුණුවලට ගැලපෙන්නේ නැහැ. දැන් ඊට අදාළව Board Meeting එකේ minutes අද දින ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

මම හිතන්නේ අපි ඒ minutes දුන්නා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මට එය පරීක්ෂා කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? (මේ අවස්ථාවේදී minutes ගරු ඇමතිතුමාට ගෙනවිත් දෙන ලදී.) Board Meeting minutes කියන්නේ මේක නොවෙයි. මට නිවැරදි Board minute එක තෝරලා දෙන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

උඩින්ම තිබෙන්නේ ඒක.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Annex 12 එක නොවෙයි. ඒක තමයි නිගමනය, ඒක නොවෙයි minute එක. Minute එක කියන්නේ Secretary maintain කරන ලේඛනයක් ඇති නේ, ඒක. එය දැන් නැති බව කියයි. එය අපට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මීට කලින් ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම් මහත්මයා කිව්වා, other captive sources කියන දේ මත තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලාකටයුතු කළේ කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා private placements වලට ගියේ කියලා.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම් මහතා

Captive sources define කරන්න කියලා තමයි- නමුත් Captive sources කියලා particularly define කරලා නැහැ කියලා තමයි කිව්වේ. විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයෝජනයක් තමයි ඒක.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ පෞද්ගලික අරමුදල්.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: පෞද්ගලික හෝ රාජ්‍ය ආයෝජන

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ආචාර්යතුමා, මේ විධියට EPF ගැන වෙනම Board Paper එකක් එන්නේ EPF මුදල් මේ විධියට Treasury bondsවල හෝ කොටස් වෙළඳපොළේ ආයෝජනය කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන කාරණය පිළිබඳව විශේෂිත ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය නිගමනයක් අවශ්‍ය වුණ නිසා ඒ EPF පනතේ තිබෙන යම යම් හේතු නිසා ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ විධියේ විශේෂිත order එකක්, විශේෂිත නිගමනයක් අරගෙන ආවේ.

එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා

EPF සම්බන්ධ මම කථා කරන්න යන්නේ නැහැ හේතුව මොකද, මට එය අදාළ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

EPF ගැන දන්න කවුද ඉන්නේ ?

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ, මේ සඳහන් කරන්නේ EPF එක ගැන ගත්ත තීරණයකට වඩා, රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණයේ අවශ්‍යතාව සඳහා ගත්ත තීරණයක්. EPF පනතේ තිබෙනවා අපිට ආයෝජනය කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක ගැටලුවක් නැති තැනක් ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම bonds වලට, EPF මුදල් පාවිච්චි කිරීම ඊට කලින් කරලා නැති නිසා, මෙහෙම විශේෂිත Board Paper එකක් අවශ්‍ය වුණා.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා

ඒක වැරදියි.Auction වලට අමතරව Private placement වලට දාන ඒවාට තමයි ඒ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත්.පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Auction එකට EPF මුදල් පාවිච්චි කරන එක තමයි රීතිය.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා

EPFAct එකේ තිබෙන විධියට ආයෝජනය කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. Auction එකෙන්ද කොහොමද කියලා, කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

ප්‍රායෝගික භාවිතය - practice එක - අනුව, වෙන්දේසියෙන් බැදුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා තමයි EPF මුදල් යෙදෙව්වේ.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා

මුල් කාලය ගත්තොත්, මුලින් සියල්ලම තිබ්ලා තිබෙන්නේ Central Bank එකේ ඒවා

අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙහෙම Board Paper එකක් ඕනෑ වුණේ ඇයි?

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා

Interest එකට ආපු Pressure එක වෙන්න ඇති කියලා මම විශ්වාස කරනවා Pressure එක අඩු කර ගන්න EPF එක භාවිත කර තිබෙන බව තමයි හැඟෙන්නේ. ඒ කාලයේ හිටපු නැති නිසා මම ඒ ගැන හරියටම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

කවුරු හරි තව විශේෂඥයෙක් ඉන්නවාද මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පිළිතුරු දෙන්න. අපි රදා පවතින්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා මත. 2008.10.07 දිනැති මේ Specific Board Paper ඕනෑ වුණේ ඇයි? මෙය අවශ්‍ය නම් බලන්න දෙන්නම්. 2008 වසරේදී EPF ගැන බලපු නිලධාරියෙක් ඉන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2008 වසර වන විට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළේ මම. ඔය Board Paper එක අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මම. ඒ නිසා මම පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න කැමතියි. 2008 වසර වන විට අපට තිබුණු ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාටම මතක ඇති විශේෂයෙන්ම යුධ කටයුතු සඳහා විශාල වශයෙන් ණය ගන්න වෙලා, රජයේ ණය බර තාවය විශාල වශයෙන් වැඩි වෙලා තිබුණා. ඒ කාලයේ වෙළඳ පොළේ පොලී අනුපාත පාලනය කිරීම අපට විශාල ප්‍රශ්නයක් වුණා. මේ හින්දා ගත්ත එක තීරණයක් තමයි මේ Board

Paper එක අපි EPF එක වෙනම auction එකට පිටින් අරගෙන අපි තීරණය කරන පොලි අනුපාතයක් යටතේ EPF සල්ලි රජයට දුන්නා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

EPF සල්ලි ආයෝජනය කිරීමේ වැඩි නම්‍යශීලිභාවයක් අවශ්‍ය වුණා, තරගකාරිව යන එකට අමතරව direct placements වලටත් EPF සල්ලි පාවිච්චි වුණා.

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට තව පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමකට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට මේ Board Paper එක දැම්මාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මෙය සාකච්ඡා කළාම, "සල්ලි හොයන්නේ කොහෙන්ද? අධිපතිතුමා කියපු විධියට අඩු පිරිවැයට සල්ලි ගන්නේ කොහෙන්ද ?" කියන එක තමයි ඒ අවස්ථාවේ තිබුණු ප්‍රශ්නය. එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළ, EPF එක විතරක් නොවෙයි අනිත් captive source මෙතැනට ගන්න කියලා. ඒක තමයි, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මේ ලේඛනය ගැන වගකීම ඔබතුමා භාර ගන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ඔව්. මේ ලේඛනය තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ -

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමා මේ ලේඛනයේ වගකීම භාර ගන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මේ ලේඛනය, කල් තියලා, නිගමනයත් එක්කමයි type කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සී.ජේ.පී.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ඔව්

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

නිගමනය කරන කොට නැති, ඉතාම බරපතළ අර්ථයක් තිබෙන "---- and other captive sources ----" කියන වචන ටික සහ ඒ ශීර්ෂයට නොගැළපෙන ඒ ක්ෂේත්‍රය මේ BoardPaper එකේ නිගමනයට ආවේ කොහාමද? ඔබතුමාට දොස් කියනවා නොවෙයි. දන්නවා නම් කියන්න, නැත්නම් "නැහැ" කියන්න

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

සාමාන්‍ය Board Paper එකක් දැම්මාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියනවා, අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රදානීන්ට ඇවිල්ලා, "මේකෙන් අදහස් කරන්නේ මොකක්ද?" කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න කියලා. එතැන අදහස් කරන මූලික හේතුව කිව්වාම, "අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙළඳද පොළේ පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කර ගන්නනම් EPF එක විතරක් නොවෙයි අනිත් captive sources මෙතැනට ගන්න" කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළා. ඒක තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේතීරණවල තිබෙන්නේ

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 38-41)

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ඡේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1.1 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල පාලනය වන්නේ කුමන ආයතනය යටතේද?

1958 අංක 15 දරන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල් පනත අනුව අරමුදලේ සියලුම පරිපාලන බලතල සහ කාර්යයන් කම්කරු කොමසාරිස් ජනරාල්වරයා සතු වන අතර, අරමුදලෙහි භාරකරු ලෙස අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණයට අදාළ බලතල, කාර්යයන් සහ වගකීම් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත පැවරී ඇත.

1.2 එම අරමුදලෙහි මුදල් මුදලට අගය (Value For Money/VFM)ට යටත්ව ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබන්නේද?

ඔව්

අරමුදලේ සුරක්ෂිතභාවය ආරක්ෂා කර ගනිමින්, ප්‍රතිලාභ ගෙවීම් සිදු කිරීමට හා අනෙකුත් වියදම් සපුරා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් පරිදි ද්‍රවශීලතාවයක් පවත්වාගනිමින්, අරමුදලේ සාමාජිකයන් වෙත දිගුකාලීන ධන මූර්ත ප්‍රතිලාභයක් ලබා දීම ඉලක්ක කොටගත් අරමුදලේ ආයෝජන ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනු ලබයි. ආයෝජන ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රකාශය සහ ආයෝජන වෙළඳමාර්ග උපදේශ විසින් අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල දැරීමට කැමති අවදානම් මට්ටම නිර්වචනය කරන අතර, ආයෝජනය සඳහා අරමුදල් වෙන් කිරීමට පදනම සපයනු ලබයි.

තවද, අරමුදලේ සමස්ත ආයෝජනයන්ගෙන් වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් රජයේ සුරැකුම්පත්හි ආයෝජන කර ඇති අතර, ව්‍යාපාර කොටස්වල සහ භාරකාර සහතිකපත් ඇතුළු සාංගමික බැඳුම්කරවලද අරමුදලේ දෛනික ද්‍රවශීලතා අවශ්‍යතාවයන් කළමනාකරණය කර ගැනීම සඳහා ඇති ප්‍රති විකුණුම් ගිවිසුම් වැනි ඉහළ ද්‍රවශීලතාවයන් සහිත වත්කම්වලද ආයෝජනය කර ඇත. තවද, අරමුදල විසින් සියලුම ද්‍රවශීලතා අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාලීම සඳහා විවිධ පරිණත කාල හා ඉහළ ද්‍රවශීලතා වත්කම් සහිත ප්‍රමාණවත් මුදල් (Amounts)/උපකරණ නඩත්තු කරයි. මෙසේ, ආයෝජනයන්හි මූල්‍ය සහ ආර්ථික ශක්‍යතාවය ඇගයීම තුළින් ආයෝජනයන් මුදලට අගයට යටත්ව ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබයි.

1.3 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සම්බන්ධයෙන් තොරතුරු මහබැංකුව විසින් පවත්වාගෙන යනු ලබයිද?

ඔව් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පහත සඳහන් තොරතුරු පවත්වා ගනියි.

- සාමාජිකයන්ගේ දායක මුදල් සහ අධිභාර රැස්කිරීම පිළිබඳ විස්තර
- සාමාජික ගිණුම් පවත්වාගෙන යාම
- අතිරික්ත මුදල් ආයෝජනය කිරීම
- සාමාජිකයන්ට සහ ඔවුන්ගේ නීතිමය හිමිකරුවන්ට ප්‍රතිලාභ ආපසු ගෙවීම
- සාමාජික ගිණුම්වලට පොලිය බැර කිරීම
- වාර්ෂික ගිණුම් සහ වාර්තා
- නිවාස ණය අනුමැතිය සඳහා සහභාගීත්ව ණය දෙන ආයතන වෙත සාමාජිකයන්ගේ ගිණුම් ශේෂ මත වගකීම් සහතික නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධ තොරතුරු.

1.4 පොළී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යාම /පාලනය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුවට ඇති වගකීම කුමක්ද?
දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්හි වෙනස්වීම සම්බන්ධ කිසිදු තීරණයක් නොගනී. නමුත්, සියයට සියයක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යටතේ, ඵලදා අනුපාත තීරණය කිරීමේ හැකියාව සීමිත‍ය

5.1.3 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහි අධිකාරි අමතා මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහි (Treasury Operation Department) අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල් විසින් එවන ලද අංක TO/DG/CFS/03 දරන හා 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දිනැති ලිපිය (ඇමුණුම xv) සමග 2015 මාර්තු මාසයට අදාලව ඉදිරිපත් කරන ඇති මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බිලියන 172 ක් විය. එහි 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින සඳහා පමණක් වූ රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බිලියන 13.550 ක් වන අතර මෙම අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් රු.බිලියන 1 ක් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියක් තුළින්ද ඉතිරි රු.බිලියන 12.550 සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ද සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීම මගින් රජයට අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරන කමිටුව DDMC) විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1300 පැයට(ඇමුණුම xvi) පවත්වන ලද රැස්වීමේදී නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් ද ඇතුළත් මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් 04 දෙනෙක්ගෙන් සැදුම්ලත් මෙම කමිටුවේ වගකීම වනුයේ දේශීය ණය ගැනුම් වියදම හා අවදානම අවම වන ආකාරයෙන් පවත්වා ගැනීමයි. (ඇමුණුම xvii). කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ මෙම රැස්වීම සඳහා එම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ නියෝජිතයා සහභාගී වී නොතිබුණි. එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් යටතේ එම පැමිණ නොසිටි සාමාජිකයාගේ එකඟත්වය විකල්ප ක්‍රමයකින් එනම් දුරකථනය මඟින් හෝ ලබාගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය. ඉන් පසු එනම් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින මෙම තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතිය ද (ඇමුණුම xvi) ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

ඔව්. ඔහු සහභාගී නොවීය. දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටු රැස්වීමට භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නියෝජිතයා ඇතුලු සියලුම සාමාජිකයන්ගේ සහභාගීත්වය ඉතා වැදගත් වන්නේය. කෙසේ නමුදු, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව නිරන්තරයෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සමග සම්බන්ධ වන අතර එමගින් යෝජිත අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීමේ සැලසුම්, රැස් කරන ලද අරමුදල් හා බැර කරන ලද අරමුදල් පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු යාවත් කාලීන කරනු ලැබේ.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටු රැස්වීම් වලට සියලු සාමාජිකයින් පැමිණීම ඉතා වැදගත් බව දක්වා ඇත.ඒ අනුව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ නියෝජිතයාගේ නොපැමිණීම ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ.ඒම සාමාජිකයා ඒකඟත්වය පසුව හෝ ලබා ගත් බවට නිශ්චිතව සනාථ කිරීමක් පිළිතුර මඟින් සනාථ කර නොමැත

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

මට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න කාරණා කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි මෙවැනි ණය අවශ්‍යතාවයක් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට ඇති වුණාම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය මහ බැංකුවත් එක්ක මේ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරනවාද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී රණසිරි මහතා.

සාකච්ඡා කරනවා

සභාපතිතුමා

සාකච්ඡා කරලා එම වැඩසටහන සකස් කරන්නේ කවුද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී රණසිරි මහතා.

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්තුමා සහභාගී වන Cash flow meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒකට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තමයි අනුමත කරගන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒකට ආයෙත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙ ලේකම්තුමාගේ අනුමැතිය අවශ්‍යද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී රණසිරි මහතා.

ඒ meeting එකේ අනුමැතිය තමයි අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒක කමිටුවක් නෙමෙයි. ඒ meeting එකේ නිශ්චිතව ඉන්න අය කියන්න.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ කමිටුවේදී ප්‍රධාන කටයුතු දෙකක් සිදු කරනවා. එකක් තමයි රජයට ලැබෙන ආදායම මාසයක්, මාස එකහමාරක කාලය ඉදිරියට තක්සේරු කරනවා.ඒ වාගේම ඒ කාලය තුල වියදම් පිළිබඳවත් ඇස්තමේන්තුවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ හිඟතාව - shortfall එක - තමයි මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා අපි සැලසුම් කරන්නේ අපේ ණය සීමාවට යටත්ව. සාම්ප්‍රදායිකව රැස්වෙන ඒ කමිටුව භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් රැස් වෙන ඒ කමිටුව භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් රැස් වන්නේ. ඒකට සියලුම නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරුන් සහභාගී වෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් කිහිප දෙනෙකුත් සහභාගී වෙනවා. මේ විෂය සම්බන්ධව දැනුම තිබෙන මහ බැංකුව සමග ගනුදෙනු කරන කිහිපදෙනෙකුත් සහභාගී වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ලේකම්තුමා, ඒ ණය ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදය සකස් කර ගත්තාට පස්සේ ඒක බැඳුම්කරවලින් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. Treasury Bills වලින් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, විදේශ ණය වෙන්න පුළුවන්- පසු විපරමක් සිදුවෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

මේ දක්වා එවැනි පසු විපරමක් කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් අපට දැනිලා නැහැ. නමුත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කියෙව්වාට පස්සේ එවැනි පසු විපරමක අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙන බව පෙනී යනවා. නමුත් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. පසු විපරමක් කරන්න වෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ ඒ ක්‍රියාවලියත් සම්බන්ධ කරගෙන. මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධ වන්නේ Monetary Law Act – MLA - මහ බැංකුවට අදාළ නීතිමය තත්ත්වය යටතේ. ඒ නීතිමය තත්ත්වයට බාධාවක් නොවන විධියට, ඒ ස්වාධීනත්වයට බාධාවක් නොවන විධියට අපි නීතිමය තත්ත්වයක් ඇති කර ගන්න ඕනෑ පසු විපරමක් කරන්න. මේ දක්වා එවැනි දෙයක් කරලා නැහැ. අපි ඒ පිළිබඳව සොයා බැලීමක් කරන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශය අනුව.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ වගේම ණය පොලී අනුපාත ඉහල යෑම නිසා වැඩිපුර ණය පොලී ගෙවීමට සිදු වෙනවානේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක රාජ්‍ය අයවැයට ගලපන්න ඕනෑ.එහෙම නේද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

නිවැරදියි ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා.

ඒ ණය පොලී ගෙවීමට මුදල් වෙන් කිරීමක් සිදු වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

ණය පොළී ගෙවීමත්, ඉදිරි වර්ෂය සඳහා සියලු වියදම් පුරෝකථනයක් කරලා තමයි අපි Appropriation Bill එක හරහා වාර්ෂිකව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. ජනවාරි 01 වැනිදා දක්වා දින 365ක කාලය තුළ ඒ පුරෝකථනවල බෙහෝදුරට වැඩිවීම් තමයි සිදුවන්නේ. ඒකට බලපාන ප්‍රධාන කරුණු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි පොලී අනුපාතය. අනෙක් එක තමයි විනිමය අනුපාතය. විනිමය අනුපාතය පිරිහීම විශේෂයෙන්ම ඒකට බලපානවා. වැඩිපුර පොලී ගෙවන්න වෙනවා. ඒ අනුව ණය සේවාකරණයට වැඩිපුර මුදල් යොදවන්න සිදු වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ලේකම්තුමා, ණය පොලී ඉහළ යාම පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලා මහ බැංකුවත් සමග සාකච්ඡාවක් කරලා ඇගයීමක් කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

මේ දක්වා ඒ පිළිබඳව නිල වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡාවක් වන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයෙක් විදිහට මුදල් ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සකස් කරගන්න වරින් වර මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී මේ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරනකොට කාලානුරූපව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂකතුමා රටේ සමස්ත ආර්ථික කාර්ය සාධනය පිළිබඳව අපට වරින්වර වාර්තා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. එහිදී මෙම කරුණ විශේෂයෙන් සලකා බලනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

Bond සම්බන්ධයෙන් secondary market එකේ සිදුවන ගණුදෙනු ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය තුළ තොරතුරු පවත්වාගෙන යෑමක් සිදු කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

නැහැ මේ දක්වා නැහැ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය අපේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දුන්නාට පස්සෙ ණය කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳවත්, විවිධ උපකරණ කවර ලෙස සකස් කරගන්නවාද යන්න පිළිබඳවත් මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය දැනුවත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ සමස්තයක් විධියට දෛනික කටයුතු වශයෙන්.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 34/35)

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara

Domestic Debt Management Committee එකේ දැන් ඉන්නේ කවුද?

ටී.එච්.බී.සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

දැනට මම ඉන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමා තමයි සභාපතිතුමා විධියට ඉන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට ඒ වැඩ කටයුතු කරන්න උපදෙස් ලැබෙන්නේ කොහෙන්ද?

ටී.එච්.බී.සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

Manual එකේ කරන ආකාරය තියෙනවා. ඒක පටන් ගැනීමේදී වෙන්නේ Ministry of Finance-Treasury එකෙන් Cash Flow එක අපට එවනවා. උදාහරණයක් විදියට ගත්තොත් ගිය මාසයේ අගදී අපට එවනවා, අගෝස්තු මාසේrequirements ටික මේක තමයි කියලා. දිනපතා අවශ්‍යතා දාලා, අපි කොච්චර borrow කරන්න ඕනෑද කියලා අපට දන්වා එවනවා. ඒකට අනුව තමයි DDMC එක කටයුතු කරන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

අපි දැන් මේ පරීක්ෂණය කරන කාරණය සම්බන්ධව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට යම් නියෝගයක් හෝ decision එකක් ලැබුණාද?

ටී.එච්.බී.සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඒ කාලපරිච්ඡේදයේ Mrs. Senawirathne තමයි superintendent විධියට හිටියේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Mrs. Senawirathne, එහෙම එකක් ලැබුණාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහි කොච්චරක් කියලාද දාලා තිබුණේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මාර්තු මාසයට රුපියල් බිලියන 172 ක්

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒකෙන් ඔබතුමියලා ගන්න හැදුවේ කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය

Auction එක තිබුණේ 27 වැනි දා. 27 වැනිදා ගන්න ඕනෑ 02 වැනිදා තියෙන settlement එකට. ඒකට අපට ඕනෑ වුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 13.5 ක්. ඒකෙන් ඒ වන විට රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5 ක් Treasury එකට fund කරලා තිබුණා. ඉතුරු එක තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

කීයක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය

රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක්

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියන 176 මෙන්න මේ කාලවකවානුවේදී ඕනෑ කියලාද, Treasury එක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දෙන්නේ? නැතිනම් මාසයට ඕනෑ ගණන කියනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය

සතිපතා අවශ්‍යයි කියලා අපට කියනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මේ සතියේ මෙපමණ ඕනෑ කියලා Treasury එකෙන් ඔබතුමියලාට දැනුම් දෙනවා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය

දවසින් දවස කියනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

දවසින් දවස මෙපමණ අවශ්‍යයි කියලා ඔබතුමියලාට දැනුම් දෙනවා. ඒ අනුව තමයි ඔබතුමියලා මේ කටයුතු කරන්නේ. එතකොට රුපියල් බිලියන 13 ක් අවශ්‍ය වෙලා තිබුණා. රුපියල් බිලියන 2 යි ගණනක් Treasury එකට යවා තිබුණා. ඉතිරි රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක ගණනට තමයි ඉල්ලා තිබුණේ. හැබැයි, ඔබතුමියලා පත්තරේ දැම්මේ රුපියල් බිලියන 1 යි. ඇයි රුපියල් බිලියන 1 ක් පත්තරේට දැම්මේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී 02 වැනි දා වන විට 30- year bond එකක් issue කරලා primary dealers ලාගෙන් රැස් කර ගන්න පුළුවන් ප්‍රමාණය රුපියල් බිලියනයක් කියලා අපි දැනගෙන හිටියා. ඊට වැඩිය වුණොත් වෙන්දේසි කරලා ඒක වැරදුණොත්, ඒක වැරදි තීරණයක් වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ඉතිරිය සෘජු නිකුත් කිරීම්වලින් ලබා ගන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

අනික් එක රුපියල් බිලියනයකට වඩා වැඩිපුර ගණනක් වුණොත් primary dealers ලා වැඩි ගණනක් -

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියනයක් ඉල්ලලා, එතැනින් පස්සේ නේ වැඩි කරන්න කියලා නියෝගය ආවේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියලා ඉන්න තැනටම ඇවිත් කථා කළා. Public Debt Management Department එකේ හිටපු කවුරු හරි ඉන්නවා නම් කියන්න. ඉතිහාසයේ කිසියම් දවසක මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයෙකු පහළ තමන්ගේ department එකට ඇවිත්, මෙය මෙපමණ ප්‍රමාණයකින් වැඩි කරන්න කියලා තිබෙනවාද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී.නානායක්කාර මහතා

මම 2012 වර්ෂයේ ජනවාරි මස 01 වැනි දා සිට 2015 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 09 වැනි දා වනතුරු රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි විධියට හිටියා. කිසිම දවසක මම ඉන්න කාලයේදී එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් උදා වුණේ නැහැ

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 36/37)

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා වෙත යොමු කල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ

01. මුදල් අවශතාවය තීරණය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන්

1.1 දෛනික හා මාසික මුදල් සැලැස්මක් තිබේද? ඔව්

1.2 එම සැලසුම් සකස් කිරීම සම්බන්ධ වගකීම කා සතු වේද?
සැලසුම සකස් කිරීමේ වගකීම මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය සතු වේ.

1.3 එම මාසික මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ ලේඛණය සඳහා තොරතුරු රැස්කර ගනු ලබන්නේ කෙසේද?
ආදායම් පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් රේගු දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, දේශීය ආදායම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සහ සුරා බදු දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ලබා ගන්නා අතර වියදම් අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳව විස්තර අමාත්‍යාංශ හා දෙපාර්තමේන්තු වලින් ලබා ගැනේ

1.4 ණය ගැණුම් මාධ්‍යයන් කලින් තීරණය කරනු ලබන්නේද? උදා- විදේශීය ණයගැණුම්,භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්/භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර
විදේශ ණය ගැනීම පිළිබඳව අයවැය පිළිබඳ අයවැය පිළියෙල කරන අවස්ථාවේ තීරණය කරනු ලබන අතර, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර, ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කර මගින් ණය ලබා ගැනීම වෙළඳපළ තත්වයන් මත තීරණය වේ.

1.5 මෙම ක්‍රමවේදයන් තීරණය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්වරයාගේ අනුමැතිය මත සිදුවන්නේද?නොමැතිනම් කමිටුවක් හරහා සිදු වේද?
මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් සමන්විත කමිටුවක් මගින් තීරණය වේ

1.6 මෙම ණයගැණුම් ක්‍රමවේදයන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය මහ බැංකුව සමග සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේද? ඔව්.

1.7 ණය ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදයන්ගේ සාර්ථකත්වය සම්බන්ධ පසු විපරමක් සිදුකරන්නේද?

විදේශ ව්‍යාපෘති ණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් විදේශ සම්පත් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පසු විපරමක් සිදු කරන අතර,දේශීයව ලබා ගන්නා ණය ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදය පිළිබඳ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පසු විපරම් සිදු කරයි.

1.8 එම වැඩසටහනෙහි යෝජනා වූ ණය ගැණුම් මාධ්‍යය මගින් ණය ලබා ගැනීම අපහසු වූයේ නම් ඒ සඳහා යොදා ගනු ලබන විකල්ප අවස්ථා කලින් තීරණය කර ගන්නේද?

ණය ලබා ගැනීමට නොහැකි බව තීරණය වන්නේ වෙන්දේසි වලින් පසුව බැවින් කල් තබා තීරණය කිරීම අපහසු වේ.

1.9 එම විකල්ප ක්‍රමවේදයන්හි වගකීම කා සතු වේද?මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

02. ණය පොළි ඉහළ සම්බන්ධයෙන්

2.1 ණය ලබා ගැනීම වැඩි වීම හේතුවෙන් වාර්ෂිකව ගෙවීමට සිදුවන වැඩිවන ණය පොළි සම්බන්ධයෙන් අයවැයෙහි ගැලපීමක් කරන්නේද?ඒ සඳහා මුදල් ප්‍රතිපාදන වෙන්කරන්නේද? ඔව්. මුදල් ප්‍රතිපාදන වෙන් කෙරේ.

2.2 වැඩිවන පොළී අනුපාත සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුව සමග සාකච්ඡා කර ඇගයීමක් කරන්නේද? ඔව්

2.3 එම ණය පොළි ගෙවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වගකිම දරන ආයතනය කුමක්ද?මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය වෙනුවෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සිදු කරයි.

2.4 ඒ සම්බන්ධයන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ වගකීම කුමක්ද? නියමිත දිනට ණය පොලිය ගෙවීමට අවශ්‍ය මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපාදන සම්පාදනය කිරීම.

2.5. සුරකුම්පත් ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහාභාණ්ඩාගාරයේ තොරතුරු පවත්වාගෙන යන්නේද? නැත.

03. දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව සම්බන්ධයෙන්

3.1 දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව පත් කිරීමේ බලතල කා සතුව පවතීද?

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය

3.2 එම කමිටුවේ සංයුතිය කුමක්ද?

රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී	- සභාපති
අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්	- භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම්
අධ්‍යක්ෂ	- ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ
අධ්‍යක්ෂ	- සංඛ්‍යා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

3.3 එම කමිටුව මුදලේ අගය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණ ගනු ලබන්නේ

කෙසේද?

දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව ඵලදා අනුපාතය පිළිබඳ කිසිදු තීරණයක් නොගන්නා බැවින් අදාළ නොවේ. මෙම තීරණය ගනු ලබන්නේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණඩලයෙනි. ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයෙහි විෂය ක්ෂේත්‍රය (Terms of reference) මේ සමඟ අමුණා ඇත.

3.4පොළී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යාම /පාලනය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් දේශීය ණය

කළමණාකරන කමිටුවට ඇති වගකීම කුමක්ද?
දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්හි වෙනස්වීම සම්බන්ධ කිසිදු තීරණයක් නොගනී. නමුත්, සියයට සියයක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යටතේ, ඵලදා අනුපාත තීරණය කිරීමේ හැකියාව සීමිතය.

3.5 කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් විසින් ගනු ලබන නීත්‍යානුකූ නොවූ හෝ ක්‍රියාවලියෙන් බැහැර වූ තීරණ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගනු ලබන විනයානුකූල ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයන් මොනවාද?
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව /භාණ්ඩාගාරයට සාමාන්‍ය විනය ක්‍රියාමාර්ග අදාලය.

3.6 මුදලේ අගය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් එම කමිටුවට ඇති වගකීම කුමක්ද?
ඉහත 3.3 යටතේ සැපයූ පිළිතුරු කරුණාකර බලන්න.

5.1.4 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කර සපුරා ගතයුතු රජයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වූ රු.බිලියන 261.683 ක් (මේ තුළ රු.බිලියන 89.683 ක් වූ වර්ෂය තුළ නැවත නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ද ඇතුළත් වේ.) සඳහා වූ රජයේ ණය ගැණුම් වැඩසටහන (Government Borrowing programme) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. එම වැඩසටහනට අනුව එකී සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් රු. බිලියන 89.683 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වලින්ද, රු.බිලියන 172 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මගින් ද ලබා ගැනීමටත්,එම රු.බිලියන 172 න් රු. බිලියන 1 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් ද, ඉතිරිය සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ද සපයා ගැනීමටත් තීරණය කර තිබුණි.

මෙම අනුමැතිය නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපති (SM) මගින් රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී (Superintendent of Public Debt) වෙත දැනුම් දී තිබුණද, (ඇමුණුම xvi) ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම එම කටයුතු ක්‍රියාත්මක නොවූ බව මාර්තු මාසය තුළදී සපුරා ගන්නා ලද රු. බිලියන 185.802 ක් වූ සම්පූර්ණ මුදලින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් රු. බිලියන 14.143 ක් පමණක් සපුරා ගෙන තිබීම (4.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වගුව පරිදි) හේතුවෙන් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva

The Governor, would you consider the decision to issue a particular paper? It may be an overnight call typed of paper, a three-months some other paper, can be a three, six or twelve-months Treasury Bills, a two, five, ten, twenty or thirty years Treasury

Bond or any sort of Government debts security. All these are securities. My question is as to what the criteria is you look for in deciding in what kind of instrument that you need to issue at a particular point in time? So, that is a general policy typed question so that we can frame the answer.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Now, the overall framework is decided at the beginning of the year. I was talking about in terms of that debt management strategy. The factors which go into that are first to see as to what the profile of debts that is failing due-in order the Treasury Bills and Bonds of different maturity as you spoke about because in most years, the Government of Sri Lanka needs incremental borrowings, the chances are we are not going to be able to retire any of that Treasury Bills or Bonds. So you are going to have rolled it-over. So, the first category is, those Bills and Bonds which are falling in due, and they will have to be rolled over. That is the first one.

Then, you have the governments' borrowings requirement for that particular year as embedded in the Appropriation Act. There, the technical people essentially take a call, taking into account, overall market developments related to what they see as the liquidity that is likely to be available in the market, the appetite amongst the market players for different types of instruments. There is survey of market that is done for that. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka conducts survey of markets. So, that is also taken into account and also to see as to where you will be able to raise more of the money. So, the liquidity market appetite and what is falling due in terms of past debts. I think that all probably will come in. I am sure that the specialists will be able to give you more information on that. But, these things are taken into account broadly.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva

Mr. Governor, what is the function of the appetite? Appetite is your dependent variable. It must be a function of some other variables.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Sure.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva

So, why would once have appetite for a short tenure paper or was a long tenure paper?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

If you anticipate that the Government is going to have to borrow more and more money, the natural expectation will be that interest rates will go up in the future; in which case, you will probably go for something of short tenure so that you can roll that money over at a higher interest rate in the future. If on the other hand, you think that they are going to be trajectory of fiscal consolidation and the Government

call on resources is going to decline, you may want to be in the short tenure in the market. So, that is in relation to the Governments' Budgetary Operations. But, also market players may take a call on other assets. If they think that the stock market is going to go=up or down and they want to shift money from the fixed income to the share market or if they want to move things to go into fixed deposits and etcetera. So, one is the Governments' debts Operations and it is called on resources that will impact on expectations and the other is the dynamic across different instruments.

(යොමුව : 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් මස 8 දිනැති වාචික සටහන)

5.1.5 එසේම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින නිකුත් කිරීමට සැලැසුම් කර තිබුණේ වසර 30 කින් කල්පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර වන අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කාලීන බැඳුම්කර සඳහා සාමාන්‍ය ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත් වීමක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහබැංකුව විසින් අපේක්ෂා කර නොතිබූ බවත් පොළී ඵලදා වක්‍රය වසර 30 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම මගින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළින් විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත්වීමක්ද අපේක්ෂා කර තිබූ බව මගින් අනාවරණය වී තිබුණි. එසේ වුවද විදේශ ආයෝජකයන් සිය ආයෝජන නැවත ආපසු ලබාගෙන ඇති බව 2015 වර්ෂයේ වාර්ෂික වාර්තාව මගින් තහවුරු කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම අපේක්ෂා සාර්ථක වී තිබුණේද යන්න ගැටළු සහගත විය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

Bond වෙළඳපොළට විදේශීය ආයෝජකයන්ට එන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ට අපි ඉඩ දීලා තිබුණා 2006 වර්ෂයේ විතර අපි පටන් ගත්තේ. තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණයෙන් සියයට පහක් පමණ විවෘත කළා. අවසාන කාලය වන විට ඒක සියයට 12.5 දක්වා වැඩි කර තිබුණා. එතකොට මුළු ප්‍රමාණයෙන් සියයට 12.5ක් දක්වා ප්‍රමාණයක් විදේශිකයන්ට එන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම සීමාවක් තිබුණා. නමුත් ඔය කාලය වන විට ඒක සෑහෙන්න දුරට අඩු වෙලා තිබුණා. විදේශිකයන්ගේ උනන්දුව අපේ රටේ ආයෝජනය කිරීම පිළිබඳ අඩු වෙලා තිබුණු ප්‍රමාණයත් එළියට ගිහින් තිබුණේ. ඒ අය ආවේ නැහැ. අලුතෙන් තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණයත් විකුණා ඒ අය එළියට ගියා ඒ කාලය වන විට.

(යොමුව :2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 11)

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඊලඟ කාරණය තමයි මේකත් එක්ක යන කාරණයක් Monetary Board එක ගන්නේ කීන්දුව- මේ ගොල්ලෝ බලන්නේ foreign investorsලා මේකට එනවාය කියන ප්‍රමාණයත් එක්ක තමයි මේක කරන්නේ. මම ඒක කියවන්නම් " The board was of the view that the issuing 30-year Treasury bonds would be favorable at this stage to extend the yield curve and reprofile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors" නමුත් කිසිදු foreign investorකෙනෙක් මේකට ආවේ නැහැ නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

නැහැ. එය අධිපතිතුමාගේ view එක. ඒක තමයි minute කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් මගේ දැනුමේ සහ අදහසේ හැටියට, අවුරුදු 30 bonds වලට විදේශ ආයෝජනයන්ගේ උනන්දුවක් නැහැ.

අධිපතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශ කළා, Board එකේ කිසිදු සාමාජිකයෙක් නැත්නම්, එය අනුමත වුණා සේ සලකා Board එකේ minute කරන්න කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 21)

5.1.6 මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු දිනයට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළ තුළ වසර 30 ක බැඳුම්කර සඳහා වූයේ සියයට 9.48 ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවැති අතර එම අනුපාතයන්ට ආසන්න අනුපාතයන්ගෙන් මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවද සිදුවෙයැයි අපේක්ෂාවක් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සතුව පැවති බව මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශණය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාචික සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් (වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්) පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේ දී අනාවරණය විය එසේ බලාපොරොත්තු වූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් සහිතව අධිමිලකට බැඳුම්කර විකිණීමට අමතරව ඉහත 4.2 ඡේදයේ දක්වා තිබූ පරිදි රජයට වැඩිමුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාව තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දින සහ 26 දින පිළිවෙලින් අන්තර්ජාලයේ සහ පුවත්පත්වල ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලද දැන්වීම්වලට අනුව ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 16 දෙනා වෙත වසර 30 ක කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන රු.බිලියන 1 ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සියයට 12.5 ක් වන පොළී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි.

මේ පිළිබඳව වූ ලංසු ලැබීමේ තොරතුරු වාර්තාව පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූයේ සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සහ ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් 16 දෙනෙකු විසින් රු.බිලියන 20.708 ක එකතු වටිනාකමක් දක්වා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ බවයි. තවද එම මුදලින් සියයට 75 ක් පමණ එනම් රු.බිලියන 15.531 ක් එක් පෞද්ගලික ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු විසින් සහ ඔහු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකුවන ලංකාබැංකුව මගින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ බවද නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ජේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ direct placements එකෙන් 11.75ට රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකක් ගත්තාද? ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට direct placement එකෙන් මේ වාගේ මුදල් අටයි දශම ගණනකට ගන්න පුළුවන් නම්, 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ direct placement එකෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකක් ගත්ත interest rate එකේ අගය කියන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

සැප්තැම්බර් මාසේ එකම bond එක දාලා 11.75ට ගත්තේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය කොච්චරද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ලියවිල්ලක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ කාලයේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපති වශයෙන් හිටියේ කවුද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී.නානායක්කාර

සභාපති හැටියට හිටියේ ආනන්ද සිල්වා මහතා. ඒ කාලයේත් රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි හැටියට හිටියේ මම. දැන් අපි මේ සංසන්දනය කරන්නේ හාත්පසින්ම වෙනස් කාලපරිච්ඡේද දෙකක්.2014 වර්ෂයේ ජනවාරි මාසයේ අපි 8.75ට ගත්තේ. මේ කියන පිරිවැයට අපි අරගෙන ඇත්තේ 2014 වර්ෂයේ සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොලේ වෙනස්කම් එක්ක සංසන්දනය කරලා බලන්න පුළුවන් පොලි අනුපාතයන් කොයි විධියට වෙනස් වෙලා තියෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ

අනුවයි තීන්දුව ගත යුත්තේ. එහෙම නැතුව ජනවාරි මාසයේ 8.75ට ගත්තා, සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ 11.75ට ගත්තා කියන දෙක compare කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමා මුලින් පැහැදිලිව කළේ, නිශ්චිතව අවුරුදු 30කට අදාල bond එකක් 8.5ටත් ගත්තා. හැබැයි, ඒ වාගේම ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය ඇතුලේ ඊලඟ පරිච්ඡේදයකදි තත්ත්වයන් වෙනස් වෙද්දි ඒක 11.5ටත් වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ.

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී.නානායක්කාර

සත්‍ය වශයෙන්ම

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 36)

5.1.7 දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් නිකුත් කිරීමට නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණේ රු.බිලියන 1 බැඳුම්කර පමණි. එසේ වුවද එම ප්‍රමාණය මෙන් දසගුණයකටත් වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වන දිනවෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන් ද අනතුරුව පැය 1230 සිට පැය 1310 , දක්වා පැවැත්වුනු අංක 2/2015 දරන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව (Treasury Bond Tender Committee) විසින් තීරණය කර තිබුණි මෙහිදි නිරීක්ෂණය වූ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ ඉහත තීරණය ගෙන ඇත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන්ද අනතුරුව බවය. මෙය ඉහත 5.1.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් රු.බිලියන 12.550 ක් සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් සපුරා ගැනීමට කර තිබූ තීරණයෙන් සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම බැහැර වීමකි. එම තත්ත්වය යටතේ එදින පැවතිවෙන්දේසියේදී 9.3510 සිට 11.7270 දක්වා වූ බරතැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්14දෙනෙකුට වසර 30 කින් කල්පිරෙන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන්රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් උපයා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළද වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට (අවම්ලට) නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රු.බිලියන 9.658 ක් පමණක් උපයා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබුණි. මෙහිදි අනාවරණය වූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ඉහත පරිදි සපයා ගත නොහැකි වූ රු.බිලියන 0.371 (රු.බිලියන10.058 - රු.බිලියන 9.687) ක මුදල වෙනත් කෙටිකාලින ප්‍රභවයකින් සපුරා ගැනීමට සිදුව තිබුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ කරුණු වලට අදාලව සභික සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත 5.1.8 යටතේ දක්වා ඇත.

5.1.8 ඉහත ඡේදයේ කරුණු අනුව නිරීක්ෂණය වන ඉතාම වැදගත් කරුණ වන්නේ 2015 මාර්තු 27 දින පැය 0830 සිට පැය 1100 දක්වා වූ වෙන්දේසිය පවත්වන අවස්ථාව වන විටත් එම වෙන්දේසිය මගින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දිනට අවශ්‍ය රු.බිලියන 13.550 ක් වූ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයද ඇතුළත් 2015 මාර්තු මස මාසික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයද ඇතුළත් දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශය මෙන්ම මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතියද, එනම් වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් වී ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය ලබා ගැනීමටත් පසුව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ ණය ගැණුම් වැඩසටහන සඳහා නිර්දේශය සහ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

ඉහත ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත දෙන ලද උපදෙස් (එකී උපදේශයේ උද්ධෘතයක් පහත දැක්වේ) ප්‍රකාරව ගන්නා ලද්දක් බව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි විසින් ලංසු සාරාංශ වාර්තාව (Bid Summery Report) මත අත්අකුරින් (ඇමුණුම xxvi)සටහන් කර තිබුණි. (එම සටහන තමන් විසින්ම තබන ලද සටහනක් බවට (ඇමුණුම xxvii) එම අධිකාරි විසින් වාචික සාක්ෂියක් මගින් තහවුරු කර තිබුණි).ඉහත සඳහන් සටහනට අමතරව එකී බැදුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය මගින්ම මෙම රු.බිලියන 10.058 ප්‍රමාණයක් සපයා ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනත් කිසිදු ලිඛිත සාක්ෂියක් විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොකෙරිණි. ඉහත ලිඛිත සටහනෙන් ප්‍රකාශිත උද්ධෘතය සහ එහි සිංහල පරිවර්තනය පහත දැක්වේ.

“Governor instructed to raise funds up to Rs.10 Billion taking into consideration additional fund requirement of the Government” (ඇමුණුමxxvii)

"රජයේ අතිරේක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳව සැලකිල්ලට ගැනීමෙන් පසු රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක් දක්වා අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීමට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා විසින් උපදෙස් දෙන ලදී."

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

- කිසියම් මාසයක් සඳහා යෝජිත අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීමේ ක්‍රම වේදය වෙළඳපල තත්ත්වයන් සලකා බලා දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් යෝජනා කරනු ලැබේ. අනතුරුව පවත්වනු ලබන කමිටු රැස්වීමේදී පෙර රැස්වීමේදී තීරණය කරන්නට යෙදුනු ක්‍රම වේදයේ ක්‍රියාත්මකභාවය පිළිබඳව සමාලෝචනයට ලක් කෙරේ.

- තවද දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශිත මාසික ණය රැස් කිරීමේ වැඩසටහන ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම පිළිබඳව (කිසියම් වෙනස්වීමක් සිදුව ඇත්නම් එයද ඇතුලත්ව) අධිපතිතුමාගේ අනුමැතිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබේ. එම නිසා 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින ඇතුලුව මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා අවැසි අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීම පිණිස සෘජු හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රම ඇතුළත් විවිධ ණය උපකරණ සම්බන්ධ විසිතර 2015.02.27 දින අනුමැතිය සඳහා යොමු කරන ලදී. එම යෝජිත සැලසුම්හි සිදු කරන ලද වෙනස්කම් ඊලඟ ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටු රැස්වීමේදී සාකච්ජාවට බඳුන් කරන ලදුව අදාළ අනුමත කිරීම් සඳහා යොමු කරන ලදී

- 2015 මාර්තු සඳහා අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීමේ සැලසුම් සම්බන්ධව ඉහළ කළමනාකාරීත්වය විසින් සිදු කරන්නට යෙදුණු වැදගත් නිරීක්ෂණ ඊලඟ මාසයේදී මධ්‍ය කාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ ක්‍රමෝපායන් සකස් කිරීමේදී සැලකිල්ලට ගන්නා ලදී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

මහබැංකුව විසින් ලබා දී ඇති පිළිතුර හා එකඟ විය නොහැක

පිළිතුරේ දක්වා ඇති ක්‍රම වේදය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි ඉදිරි කාර්යාලයෙහි (Front Office) කාර්යයන්වල 01 ඡේදය ප්‍රකාර අනුකූල නොවේ. අදාල වෙන්දේසියට පෙර පැවති වෙන්දේසිවලදී වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමට පෙර මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන ඇති බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ.

තවද මෙම වෙන්දේසියේදී නිකුත් කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කර තිබූ රු.බි.1 ක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය රු.බි 10.058 දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා උපදෙස් දී තිබීම පිළිබඳව කර තිබූ විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට පිළිතුරු දක්වා නොමැත. ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය එලෙසම තහවුරු වී ඇත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

Tender Board එකට වාඩි වෙන පිරිස තමන් මෙම bond එක ගන්න යන්නේ කවර ආකාරයෙන්ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව දන්නේ නැතිවද වාඩි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

Tender Board එකට වාඩි වෙනකොට ඊට කලින් අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහිල්ලා නිලධාරින්ට කියලා තිබුණා කලින් ක්‍රමයට කරන්න එපා කියලා. එතකොට ඒ පණිවිඩයTender මණ්ඩලයටත් ලැබිලා තිබුණා.Tender මණ්ඩලයේ වාඩි

වෙනකොට ඊට පැය භාගයකට විතර කලින් අධිපතිතුමා කිව්ව පණිවිඩය ඒගොල්ලන්ට ලැබුනාය කියන එක තමයි දැනුම් දෙන්නේ. නමුත් ඊට පෙර ඒක දැනුම් දීලා තිබුණේ නැහැ.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 05)

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

මට එකම කාරණාවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අහන්න ප්‍රශ්න කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. Theory ප්‍රශ්න නෙවෙයි. පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදාට අදාළ මෙම බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී රුපියල් බිලියන 13.5 ක් රජයෙන් ඉල්ලුවාම, ඒක ගැනීමට අදාළ කරන පළමු තීරණය ගත්තේ කුමන තැනින්ද? මෙතැන දැන් සිටින එහි ප්‍රධානියා කවුද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් එයට සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ, Tender Committee සභාපති ඉන්නවා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ හිටපු ණය අධිකාරී ඉන්නවා ඒ ඕනෑම නිලධාරියෙකුගෙන් ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න පුළුවන්. මා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති වුණාට මට භාරව තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒ අංශය භාර සහකාර අධිපති ඉන්නවා. ඔහුට ඒ පිළිබඳව උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

මගේ මූලධර්මය මේකයි. මෙය ක්‍රියාවලියක්නේ. මේ පිළිබඳව හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාට තිබෙන විවේචනය වාගේම මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය වුණේ කොහොමද කියලා බලා ගන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා දැන් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා system එක clean කියන එක අපේ නිගමනය නම්, පරීක්ෂණය අවශ්‍ය නැහැනේ. දැන් අලුත් කෙනෙකු ඇවිත් ඉන්නවා. අපට ඔහු සමඟ වැඩ කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා මම අහන්නේ,13.5 billion ගන්න විධිය decide කරපු පළමුවැනි තැන කොතනද? දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව. අතිරේක අධිකාරී ආසිම් මහත්මයාට ඒකට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම් අසීම් මහතා

The decision to raise fund comes from the DDMC – Domestic Debt Management Committee which decides on what basis we are going to give Treasury's cash flow needs

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ decision එක මත 13.5 billion ගන්න කටයුතු කළා. එතකොට පසු ගිය වාර්තාවේත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගන්න අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ auction එක වෙන තැනදීම හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ඇවිත් යම් කිසි නියෝගයක් දුන්නා කියලා. ඒ නියෝගය දුන්න කමිටුව හෝ Department එක මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒත් Dr.Azim. ඔබතුමාද ඉන්නේ?

Dr. M.Z.M Azim : I was the Additional Superintendent at that time.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: Who was the chief?

Dr. M.Z.M Azim

Mrs. Seneviratne

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඔබතුමියට තමයි ඒ වගකීම තිබුණේ. මෙය සම්පූර්ණ auction ක්‍රමයට ගන්න කියන කරුණ හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ ඔබතුමියට තමයි.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඔබතුමියන්ලා ඒ අනුව කටයුතු කළා.ඊලඟ පියවර මොකක්ද? 13.5 billion auction එකෙන් ගන්න ඔබතුමියට Governorගෙන් නියෝගයක් ආවා. ඒ අනුව ඔබතුමියන්ලා කටයුතු කළා. ඊලඟ step එක මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අපි department එකෙන් කොයි කොයි ප්‍රමාණය ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඒ proposal එක අපි ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට අරගෙන යනවා

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඔබතුමියන්ලා 13.5 billion raise කර ගන්න විධිය දැනගෙන tender committee එකට යනවා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය - ඔව්

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 13)

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

Tender Committee එකේ ඉන්නේ කවුද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා මමයි. ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂක, දේශීය මෙහෙයුම් කටයුතු දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂක හා ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ මෙහෙයවන Assistant Governors ලා ඉන්නවා.මේක Treasury bonds ගැන මගේ පළමුවැනි Tender Board එක. මෙහිදී සුපුරුදු පරිදි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ Technical report එකේ තියෙන්නේ ඒ bids ටික බලලා "මෙච්චර ගත්තොත් වියදම මෙච්චරයි" කියලා ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව කියනවා. ඒ ටෙන්ඩර් එකේ එක bond එකක් නෙවෙයි bonds කිහිපයක් තිබුණා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

කෙටියෙන් කිව්වොත්, ඔබතුම තමයි Tender Committee Chairman. ඔබතුමා තමයි decision එක ගන්නේ කොච්චර ගන්නවාද? කොයි විධියට ගන්නවාද? කාගෙන් ගන්නවාද? කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

අපි කාගෙන් ගන්නවාද කියලා දන්නෙ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය සම්බන්ධව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් recommendation එකක් ඔබතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද? කොච්චර විතරrecommendation එකක් දුන්නද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව්. අවසානයේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක් ගන්න recommendation එක ආවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 10 කොයි විධියටද ගන්නේ කියලා. recommend කළාද? දහයම auction එකෙන් ගන්න කිව්වාද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

auction වලින් 11.73 තමයි weighted average එක ඒ අවස්ථාවේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

දහයම auction තමයි. Direct Placement වලින් ගන්නද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

නැහැ

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

එහෙම මුකුත් recommendation ඒ අයගේ තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

Direct Placement කතා Tender Board එකේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ auction එක handle කරන්න රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් Tender Board එකට ඒ අයගේ Advice එක දුන්නාද? මේ වාර්තාවේ 2.6 කථාවක් තියෙනවාද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ අධිපතිතුමා එන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හදපු වාර්තාව.

සභාපතිතුමා -

ඒ වාර්තාව හදන්නේ කවුද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

Public Debt Department එකෙන

සභාපතිතුමා -

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් නිර්දේශ හදනවා නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශ තුළ විකල්ප නිර්දේශ කිහිපයක් තිබුණා. ඒ අතරින් එකක් තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක නිර්දේශයක් සහිතව ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක නිර්දේශය අපට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. ඒක අපට ඉදිරිපති කරන්න හදමින් පැවතුණ එකක්.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

වෙන්දේසිය 11.04 ට අවසන් වුණා. ඊට පස්සෙ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී, අතිරේක අධිකාරීවරුන් සහ FrontOffice එකේ ප්‍රධානියා එකතුවෙලා බලනවා. කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක් අපට මේකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා. ඒ අනුව අපේ තීරණය වුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කළා. ඒකෙන් අදහස් කළේ අපි ඒක ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම පමණයි. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවෙන් තමයි තීරණය ගන්නේ. ඒක අවසන් වුණාට පසුව අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැමිණීම සිද්ධ වුනා. ඒ වෙලාවේ අධිපතිතුමා සමග නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමන්ලා දෙදෙනෙක් පැමිණ සිටියා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ අතිරේක අධිකාරීතුමා ඉතාම විස්තර සහිතව පැහැදිලි කළා රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යෑම කිසිම ආකාරයකින් යෝජනා කරන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 14/15)

සභාපතිතුමා.

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට එවැනි යෝජනා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න Manual එකක් තියෙනවාද? මොකක් පදනම් කරගෙනද ඒ යෝජනා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම් ආසීම් මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ OperationManual එකේ TenderBoard එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලේඛණ Annexes විධියට පෙන්වා තියෙනවා. ඉන් එක් ලේඛණයකින් තමයි අපි නොයෙකුත් විකල්පයන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. එම අවස්ථාවේ වෙළඳපොළ තත්ත්වය මත රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යෝජනා කිරීම තමයි අපි ලෑස්ති කරලා තිබුණු විකල්පය.

සභාපතිතුමා.

ඒ Operational Manual එක හදන්නේ කවුද?

Dr.M.Z.M Azim

That was already prepare at that time. It was not prepared by us at that time. But it is being regularly monitored by the Internal Audit Department of the Central Bank and if there is anything different to that, it is discussed on a regular basis by the Audit Department.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඔබතුමා සහ ඔබතුමිය කියනවා ඒක Advice එකක් විතරයි. Order එකක් නෙවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා 2.6 ගන්න එක තමයි fair කියන එක ටෙන්ඩර් Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

නැහැ. ඊට ප්‍රථම අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණියා

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා

අන්තිමට කිව්ව කාරණය පැහැදිලි නැහැ.ඔබතුමිය නිර්දේශ කළා කිව්වේ මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක ප්‍රමාණය. අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ, එහෙම නෙවෙයි. රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ක් auction එකෙන් ගන්න කියලා. නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපි එකහෙලා කියා සිටියේ, මේ ප්‍රමාණයට යාම සුදුසු නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා

සුදුසු හැකියාවක් නැහැ කියලා ලිඛිතව දුන්නාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

නැහැ. සාකච්ඡාවක් කළා විතරයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා.

එතකොට TenderCommittee එකේදි ඔබතුමා සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් Rs.10 billion ම auction ක්‍රමයට යන්න තීන්දු කරද්දී, (Rs. 2.6 billion) යෝජනා කරද්දී නිලධාරී මහත්වරුන් කවුරුවත් ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ අකමැත්ත හරි කිසිම දෙයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ප්‍රකාශ කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

මෙහි මුලට ගියා නම් තවත් ලෙහෙසි වෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධව පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම පළ කළේ Rs.1billion ඉල්ලලා. අන්න එතැනින් තමයි පටන් ගන්න වෙන්නේ. පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම් පළ කලා Rs.1billion ඉල්ලලා. එතකොට මේකට bid කරපු අයගේ සිතුවිල්ල වුණේ Rs.1billion තමයි ගන්නේ කියන එකයි. Rs.1billion වලට තමයි Bank of Ceylon ඇතුළු ඉතිරි සියල්ලෝම bid කළේ. ඉතිහාසයේත් Rs.1billion ඉල්ලුවාම Rs.2 billionorRs.3 billion සමහර වෙලාවට අඩුවෙන් ගන්නවා, සමහර වෙලාවට වැඩියෙන් ගැනීමක් සිදු වෙනවා. එතකොට Rs.1billion ඉල්ලපු එකට ඔබතුමියන්ලාගේ කමිටුව යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණා Rs.2.5 billion ගැනීම අහිතකර තත්ත්වයක් නැහැ කියලා. මම හිතන විධියට ඒක ඇතුළු යෝජනා හයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 15)

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

යෝජනා හයක් යෝජනා කරලා තමයි ඔබතුමියන්ලා මේ කමිටුවට දමන්නේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමියන්ලා තව note එකකුත් දැමුවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

එතැනදී අධිපතිතුමා සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රකාශ කලාට පස්සේ "නැහැ රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යන්න ඕනෑ" කියනකොට මට සිදු වුණා FrontOffice එකට නියෝගයක් දෙන්න රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට තිබෙන විධියට මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්න කියලා.

මොකද FrontOffice එකෙන් තමයි මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ නිලධාරියාට නැවත වාරයක් ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න කටින් කියලා බැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම ඒ නිලධාරියාට Notes කලා Governorගේ additional fund requirement එකක් තියෙනවා, ඒ අනුව රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට වාර්තාව හදන්න කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර

එතකොට මේ Auction sheet එක සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමිය විමසීමක් කළේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඊට පසුව අපි අරගෙන ගියේ අර රුපියල් බිලියන 10 කියන යෝජනාව. ඒ නිසා අපි සභාපතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා. "අපේ තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ප්‍රමාණය, නමුත් අපි මේ වාර්තාවේ ගෙනාවේ නැහැ අද අධිපතිතුමා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනෙකු සමග පැමිණියාම අපි යෝජනා කරන වාර්තාවට කැමති නැති නිසා අපට සිදු වුණා රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක ප්‍රමාණයේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමට, මේ තමයි ඒ වාර්තාව" කියලා. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යෝජනා කළා මේ පිළිබඳව අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසීමක් කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

කලින් තිබුණු hybrid system එක අනුව නම් අපි කරන දේ තමයි පොඩි ගණනක් දමලා වෙළඳපොළේ ඒක වලනය වන විධිය බලනවා. බලලා අපි privet placement වලට යනවා. එතකොට අපි දමන්නේ Rs.1 billion or Rs.2 billion අවශ්‍යයි කියලා, නමුත් Rs.10 billion ගන්න බලාගෙන. අපි මුළුමනින්ම වෙන්දේසියෙන් ගන්නවා නම් අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණයම advertise කරන්න ඕනෑ නැද්ද? අපි යන්නේ වෙළඳපොළ වලනය සොයන්න නෙවෙයි. අපි යන්නේ මුළුමනින්ම වෙන්දේසියෙන් ගන්න නම් ඒ දැන්වීමේ සකස් විය යුතුයි නේද අපි ගන්න මුළු ප්‍රමාණයම?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක තමයි නිවැරදි ආකාරය. නමුත් මෙතැනදි පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම දමනකොට මෙහෙම කරන බව කවුරුවත් දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැනේ. එතකොට එහෙම කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ පසු කාලයක කරන කොට එහෙම මුළු ප්‍රමාණයම දමලා පොඩි පොඩි වෙනස්කම් වෙන්න ඇති. සමහර වෙලාවට එහෙම වෙනස් වුණු අවස්ථාත් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කලින් ප්‍රකාශයේදී කිව්වා සභාපතිතුමාට කිව්වා කියලා මේ ගැන Governorගෙන් අහන්න කියලා.Governor ගෙන් ඇහුවාද? කවුද ඇහුවේ? මම අහන්නේ මේ යෝජනාව ගැන. ඔබතුමාද ඇහුවේ?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 16)

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

TenderCommittee එකට ආවාම අපි ඇහුවා Rs. 1 billion දාලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක් ගන්නේ ඇයි කියලා. එතකොට කිව්වා " මේක ගන්න කියලා අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන්නා" කියලා ඒ වෙලාවේ මම ඇහුවා එහෙම උපදෙස් අනුව ගන්නවා නම් TenderBoard එකේ තිබෙන වගකීම මොකක්ද කියලා. ඒ මගේ පළමුවැනි TenderBoard එක. අපි ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළා. මට මේ ගැන විශ්වාසයක් නැහැ. මොකද, මේක වාචිකව කිව්ව දෙයක් නේ. අධිපතිතුමා කොහොම උපදෙස් දුන්නාද දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අධිපතිතුමා ඒ වෙලාවේ හැටියට උපදෙස් දෙනකොට කොහොමත් මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිගන්නවා. නැත්නම් වැඩ කරන්න අමාරුයි නේ. "අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා" කියන එකනෙ කියන්නේ. කොහෙවත් ලියලා තිබුණේ නැහැනේ. ඒ නිසා මම ඇහුවා " කොහොමද ඒක දැන ගන්නේ" කියලා.

පසුව TenderBoard එකට කථා කරලා කිව්වා "කොහොමටත් හොඳයි ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාට කථා කරන එක" කියලා. එතැනදී මම එළියට ඇවිත් අධිපතිතුමාට Call එකක් ගත්තා. මම ඒක හැම තැනම කියලා තිබෙනවා.මම දන්නේ නැහැ නමුත් අධිපතිතුමාට මොනවා හරි හේතු තිබෙන්න ඇති මෙහෙම කියන්න. මම අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඇහුවා මෙහෙම කිව්වෙ ඇයි, මේකෙ rationale එක මොකක්ද? කියලා. එතුමා rationale එකට හේතු දෙකක් කිව්වා.

එකක් තමයි අපේ ආණ්ඩුවට මුදල් විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් අවශ්‍ය වෙලා තිබෙනවා, මේක ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

යෝජනා කරපු රුපියල් බිලියන 10 weighted average එක තිබුණේ 11.73. එතුමා කියපු දෙවෙනි එක තමයි මේ Bond එක, 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ නිකුත් කරලා තිබුණු Bond එක තමයි නැවත නිකුත් කරන්නේ. එතකොට අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා "ඉදිරි සතියේ අපි පොළී අනුපාත වැඩි කරනවා , වෙනස් කරනවා" කියලා. ඒ වැඩි කරනවා කිව්වේ අපේ තිබුණා ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොලී අනුපාතවල සියයට 5 මට්ටමක්. මට්ටම් තුනක් තිබුනා. සියයට 5 මට්ටම, සියයට 6.5 මට්ටම අනෙක් එක මට හරියටම මතක නැහැ . සියයට 7 හෝ 7.5 මට්ටම. යම් කිසි බැංකුවක් ඇවිල්ලා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් තැන්පත් කළොත් දෙන්නේ සියයට 6.5 ක පොලී අනුපාතය. යම් කිසි මාසයක තුන් වරකට වඩා සල්ලි ගෙනල්ලා තැන්පත් කළොත් සියයට 6.5 ක පොලියක් දෙන්නේ නැහැ. සියයට 5යි දෙන්නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ තිබුණු ප්‍රතිපත්තිය වුණේ බැංකු තමන්ට තිබෙන අතිරික්ත සල්ලි මහ බැංකුවේ තැන්පත් කරලා නිකම් පොලී ගන්නේ නැතිව පුළුවන් තරම් ණය දෙන්න කියන එකයි. අන්න ඒ සියයට 5 තමයි පහළම පොලී අනුපාතය.

මේ නිසා අන්තර් බැංකු වෙළඳ පොළේ පොලී අනුපාත නිතරම සියයට 5 මට්ටමට තමයි ආවේ. මේ ගැන Board එකෙත් කථා කර කර සිටියේ. මොකද, market එකෙනුත් කිය කිය හිටියේ මේ පොලී අනුපාතය අයින් කරන්න කියලා. එතකොට අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා " ලබන සතියේ අපි මේ සියයට 5 අයින් කරනවා, අයින් කලාම වෙළඳපොළ පොලී අනුපාත ආපසු ඉහල නගිනවා" කියලා. පොලී අනුපාත ඉහළට නගින කොට ලංකාවේ තිබෙන පොලී ව්‍යුහය ආපසු 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයට

යනවා. සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයට ගියාම අර 30-yearbond එක නිකුත් කරපු වෙලාවේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය නැවතත් එනවා. එතකොට සියයට 10 ක් අර ගෙන මේ පොලී අනුපාතය දැනට වැඩි වුණාට ලබන සතියේ මේ සියයට 5 අයින් කළාට පස්සේ ඒක වැඩි වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ගිය අවුරුද්දේ ඒ bond එක මම හිතන විධියට රුපියලි බිලියන දෙකක් විතර අරගෙන තිබුණේ සියයට 11.75ට. මේ සැරේ අපි යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණේ සියයට 11.73ට. එතකොට අර සියය ට 5 අයින් කළාම පොලී අනුපාත ව්‍යුහය අතෙන්ට යනවා නම් මේකේ කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඉතාම තාක්ෂණික පිළිතුරක් තමයි ඒ දුන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේක ගැනීමේ වරදක් නැහැ කියන එක තමයි කිව්වේ

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

ඒ උපක්‍රමය හරි ගියාද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව්, හරි ගියා

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඕක සියයට 11.73 ද සියයට 11.75 ද කියන එක inisolationගන්න බැහැනේ. සියයට 11.73 ද සියයට 11.75 ද කියන එක අපි සාපේක්ෂව බලන්න ඕනෑ එදා වෙළඳපොළේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය අනුව . ඒක ඊට අවුරුද්දකට කලින් නිකුත් කරපු වෙලාවේ වෙළඳපොළේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය සහ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ පොලී අනුපාතය අතර තිබුණු වෙනස මොකක්ද? එහෙම නැත්නම් එම පොලී අනුපාතයමද තිබුණේ?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 16/17)

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

වෙනසක් තිබුනා

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඒක තමයි මම අහන්නේ. එතකොට වෙනසක් තිබුණා නම් ඒ වෙනස අඩු නම් ඒ කියන්නේ 2015 වෙළඳපොලේ සියයට 14ට තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා significantly අඩුයි නම් ඔබතුමා ඒ justificationඑක පිළිගත්තෙ කොහොමද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒක මෙහෙමයි කිව්වේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් TenderBoard එකේ යම් යම් තීරණ ගන්නකොට අපි සමහර දේවල් දන්නවා. ඉදිරි සතියේ වෙළඳපොලට වෙන්නේ කුමක්ද: මහ බැංකුවේ පොලී අනුපාතය මොන විධියේ වෙයිද? කියලා අපේ ලඟ දැනීමක් තිබෙනවා

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමාගෙන් පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි., සමාවෙන්න මේ ප්‍රශ්ණයේ පිළිතුර තවම අවසන් වුණේ නැහැ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒක තමයි, TenderBoard එකේ ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂ සහ පිරිස කරන්නේ ඒකයි. දැනට තිබෙන එකම නොවෙයිනේ බලන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

සමරසිරි නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙමනේ. අපි හිතනවා නම් අද 11.07.03 එක lowfigure එකක් කියලා, ඒ lowfigure එකක් කියලා කියන්නේ market එකෙත් ඒ වගේ ගණනක් තිබෙනවානම් නේ. නමුත් අද market එකේ තිබෙන්නේ 7.5 නම් 11.07.03 වැඩියි. මම අහන්නේ එතකොට, ඒ market එකේ තිබුණු පොලිය - 2014 පොලිය සහ 2015 ඔය කියන දවස වෙනකොට තිබුණු පොලිය අතර ලොකු වෙනස්කමක් වෙලා තිබුණාද නැද්ද කියන එකයි.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ වෙනස් කමක් තිබුණා. පොලී අනුපාත අඩුයි. ගොඩක් අඩුයි. සියයට 5 මට්ටම නිසා

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

එහෙමනම් කොහොමද එතකොට අර justification එක ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒක හරි. ඒ justification එක තාක්ෂණිකව හරි. . මොකද අපි යම් යම් තීරණ ගන්නකොට

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

මොකක්ද තාක්ෂණිකව හරි

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

අපි යම් යම් තීරණය ගන්නකොට මේ වෙලාවේ තියෙන එකම නොවෙයි බලන්නේ. අපේ ලඟ තිබෙන දැනුම අනුව දැන් මේ සතිය අන්තිමේ සල්ලි ටිකක් ආණ්ඩුවට එන්න පුළුවන්. අපේ දැනීම තිබෙන්නේ. වෙළඳපොලට සල්ලි එනවා. ඒ වගේ තොරතුරු අපි ලඟ තිබෙනවා. ඉදිරි මාසයේ වගේ පොලී අනුපාත, ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කරනවාද කියලා අපි දන්නවා. එතකොට අපි ඒවා දිහා බලලා තමයි මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ. එතකොට එතුමා කිව්වේ ලබන සතියේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ මේ කරුණ සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබුණා කියලානේ. ඒක නිසා අපි දන්නවා ලබන සතියේ මේ සියයට 05 ඉවත් කළාම මේ පොලී අනුපාත ටික ආපහු යනවා කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

එතකොට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහ ඔබතුමා හැරුණු විට තවත් කවුද ඔය තොරතුරු දැනගෙන හිටියේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

Discussion එක වුණේ ඔබතුමා

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

මේ Discussion එක තනියම එළියට ඇවිල්ලා කළේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ ඕක හැමෝම දැනගෙන හිටිය කාරණයක් නොවෙයි නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

පොළී අනුපාත වැඩි කරනවා කියලා අපි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ කථා කරනවා. අපේ Deputy Governorලා එහෙම දැනගෙන හිටියා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 17/18)

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

ඔබතුමා පෞද්ගලිකව දැනගෙන හිටියාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව්. මම දැනගෙන හිටියා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

කොපමණ විතර කාලයක් ගත කලාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

මම හිතන්නේ විනාඩි පහක් විතර කථා කළා. මම ඒ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡාවලදී සඳහන් කරලා ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා

දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා.අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වාට පස්සේ ලබන සතියේ අපි සියයට පහේ පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කරන නිසා මේ තීරණයට යමුයි කියලා යෝජනාවක් කළාය කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව් සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා

එතකොට ඔබතුමා මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරන්නේ පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ TenderBoard එක තිබෙන වෙලාවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ලබන සතියේ කියලා කිව්වොත් මාර්තු 02 වැනිදා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

මාර්තු 02 වැනිදා.

සභාපතිතුමා

නමුත් ඔබතුමන්ලා පෙබරවාරි 23 monetary board එකේ තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒකේ තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒකෙ paper එක මගේ ළඟ තිබෙනවා "ItemNo 2" කියලා. ඒකෙ ඔබතුමන්ලා කියලා තියෙන්නේ මේ විධියට. " Given the rising trend of market interest rates and rising growth of private sector credit and decide to maintain the policy interest rate at current level until the next month's monetary policy review" Until the next month. කිව්වොත් පෙබරවාරි 23 ඉඳන් මේ Current policy rate එක. ඔබතුමන්ලා interest rate එක maintain කරන්න ඕනෑ ඊලඟ මාසයේ 23 වෙනකම්. එතකොට කොහොමද අධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ අපි ලබන සතියේ මේක වෙනස් කරනවා කියලා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුදල් ප්‍රතිපත්ති- monetarypolicies සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම තමයි මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන වගකීම දරන්නේ. එතැනදී මට සඳහන් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ සභාපතිතුමා කිව්ව කාරණය හරියට හරි. පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළේ මුදල් පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. එතකොට එහෙම තීරණය කළ පදනම මත තමයි අපේ announcement කරලා, market expectation එක තිබුණේ, ඒක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ කියන පදනම මත තමයි ඒගොල්ලො ඒ තොරතුරු පදනම් කරගෙන bid කළේ. එතකොට ඒ අතරතුර මෙතුමාට අධිපතිතුමා කියලා තිබෙනවා ඒ කථාව. ඒ කථාවත් හරි. මොකද, ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම පොඩි නිවැරදි කිරීමක් මම කළොත්, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය 23 වැනිදා තීරණය කලාට 27 වැනිදා උදේ- මම සභාපතිත්වය දරන Market Operations Committee එක කියලා Committee එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි, දිනපතා පොලී අනුපාත ගැන, විනිමය අනුපාත ගැන, අපි ගන්න උපක්‍රම මොනවාද කියලා තීරණය කරන රැස්වීම. ඒ රැස්වීමට හදිස්සියෙම අධිපතිතුමා ඇවිල්ලා වාඩි උනා. ඒක මීට ඉස්සෙල්ලා මම කියලත් නැහැ. මගෙන් අහලත් නැහැ. මම Bribery Commission එකේ කියලා තිබෙනවා. මෙතනදී කියන්න අවස්ථාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒතනදී අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා අපට මේ පොලී අනුපාත සියල්ල ඉහල දාන්න ඕනෑ එදා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙනස් කරන්න එපා කියලා තීරණය කරපු සියයට 5 කියන සීමව ඉවත් කරලා, අද ඉඳලා සියයට 6.5ට සීමාවට යන්න

කියලා. ඒ විධියට එදා උදේ Market Operation Committee එකට අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන්නා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඔන්න ඔතැන තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. නන්දලාල් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා එතකොට එහෙම නම් interest rate එක වෙනස් කළේ කවදාද? පහේ rate එක ඉවත් කළේ කවදාද?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 19)

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

සියයට පහේ rate එක වෙනස් කරලා අපි එදාම හවස circular එක issue කළා. අධිපතිතුමා දීපු උපදෙස් මත, තුන්වැනිදා සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක වන පරිදි සියයට 5 සීමාව ඉවත් කරලා සියයට 6.5ට යනවා කියන එක ඇතුළත් කරලා එදාම අපි circular එකක් නිකුත් කළා. එසේ circular එකක් නිකුත් කරන්න පදනම් වුණේ අධිපතිතුමා එදත් ඇවිල්ලා මේකට intervene වෙලා මේ සියයට 5 කියන එක 6.5 කරන්න කියලා උපදෙස් දුන්න නිසයි. ඒක තමයි එතුමාට කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු. ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඔබතුමාගේ කමිටුවේ සංයුතිය කුමක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා.

අපේ කමිටුවේ සභාපති මම.අධ්‍යක්ෂ ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ, අධ්‍යක්ෂ දේශීය මෙහෙයුම්.Domestic Operations.

ගරු. ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

එතකොට ඒ කමිටුවේ අධිපතිතුමා සාමාජිකයෙක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා.

නැහැ.එදා තමයි අධිපතිතුමා ඒකට මුලින්ම ආවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

නිත්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක්ද කියලායි අහන්නේ?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා නිත්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතකොට එතුමා කවදාවත් ඔය විධියට කථා කරන්න ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ඔය ගන්න තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක උනේ තුන්වැනිදා ඉඳලාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

නැහැ 27 වැනිදා ඉඳලා

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

තුන්වැනිදා තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ මොකද, Immediately කරන්න බැහැ එදා තීරණය ගත්තාට, circular එක issue කළේ තුන්වැනිදා ඉඳලා ක්‍රියාත්මක වන පරිදි ඒක market එකේ circulate කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ tendercommittee එක ලැබෙන්න කලින්.මේ Telephone call එක එන්න කලින්.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව්. ඊට කලින්

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

එතකොට සමරසිරි මහත්තයා දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැති වුණාට ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන හිටියා ඒක සිද්ධ කරන බව

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

අපට instructions දීලා තිබුණා ඒක කරන්න කියලා. ඒ අනුව මම Diretor, Domestic Operationsට minute එකක් දැම්මා. අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන් පරිදි ඒ සඳහා පළමුවෙන්ම අධිපතිතුමාගේ ලිඛිතව අනුමැතිය ගන්න කියලා. ලිඛිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා එතුමා කිව්වා එක 27 වැනිදා minute එක මගේ ළඟ තිබෙනවා, "As instructed at the MOC, the circular to be circulated" කියලා ඒ circular එකේ copy එකක් හදලා ඒක අධිපතිතුමා ඇතුලත් කරලා, අධිපතිතුමා 27 වැනිදාම ඒකට අනුමැතිය දීලා තිබෙනවා circular එක issue කරන්න. ඒ circular එකේ තිබෙන විධියට ඒකෙ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ 5 per cent is withdrawn with effect from 02nd of March

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

එතකොට ඒක මේ transaction එකට අදාළ නැහැනේ?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

දැන් මේ තීන්දුව සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගත යුත්තේ Monetary Board එක නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක නිසා තමයි මේ විධියේ තීන්දු අරගෙන transaction එකට ඊලඟ Monetary Board එකට

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැනේ කවදාවත්

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒක කරන්නේ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඉස්සෙල්ලාම Monetary Board එකෙන් ආව තීන්දුවටනේ ඔබතුමන්ලා carry out කරන්නේ. එහෙම නැතිව ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දුවක් අරගෙන Monetary Board එකට ratify කරන්න යවන්නේ නැහැ නේ?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 19/20)

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කරන්නේ නැහැ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒක වෙන්නේ නැති දෙයක්නේ

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අධිපතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත කරලා, ඊලඟට Monetary Board එකේදී මේක ratify කළා. එතකොට ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ratify කළා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙන්න මේ තීන්දුවයි. නැතිව 100 per cent auction යන්න කියන තීන්දුව ratify කරලා නැහැ. මෙන්න මේක තමයි ratify කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතකොට ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්න මට ප්‍රශ්න දෙකක් තිබෙනවා.එකක් තමයි ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා කිව්වා වගේ ඒ ප්‍රමාණය ඇතුළත යන එක, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒවාට දැම්මා කියලා,Rs.1 billion නම්, දාන ගණන් හදන ප්‍රමාණය. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක කරලා නැහැ. 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින දී ඔබතුමන්ලා 40 කට අනුමැතිය ගත්තාට 77 ක් දක්වා ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක අපේ ඊලඟ issue එක. ඒක දෙවනුව කථා කලොත් හොඳයි. දෙක පටලවාගත්තොත්-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මම ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා නේ ඊට පස්සේ ඒවාගේ දිගටම කරයි කියලා, ගන්න ප්‍රමාණයම දැනුම් දුන්නාය කියලා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

සමහර අවස්ථාවල ගොඩක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.29 එක 31 එක ගත්ත ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා දෙගුණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒ වාගේම ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ඇමතිතුමා අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්නය සම්බන්ධයෙන් කරුණක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. එතුමා සඳහන් කළ 11.73 ක ප්‍රමාණය හරියටම හරි. මාසයක් පමණ ගත වූ පසුව, වෙළඳපොළේ එම ප්‍රමාණය සියයට 09 කට ආසන්න ප්‍රමාණයට අඩු වෙලා තිබුණා. නමුත් auction එක නිසා එම ප්‍රමාණය එක් වරම 11.73 දක්වා වැඩි වුණා. ඒ නිසා දවසක් තුළ සම්පූර්ණ interest rates වල structure එක upwards, shift වුණා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඔබතුමා ගේ සහ Governor ගේ උපදෙසින් පසුව ෙමාකක්ද කළේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

අපිට ඒ වෙලාවේ හැටියට අධිපතිතුමන්ලාට විරුද්ධව යන්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා කරනලද clarification එක අනුව, Tender Board එක Minute කලා.

සභාපතිතුමා.

අධිපතිතුමාගේ තීරණය අනුව Tender Board එක ඒ තීරණය ගත්තාට පසුව, ඒ Board එකේ සිටි කිසිවෙක් ඊට විරුද්ධ වුණේ නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

නැහැ

සභාපතිතුමා

මෙතැන සිටින අයගෙන් කවුරුන් හෝ ඒ සඳහා වගකියනවාද?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 21)

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

එහි සාමාජිකයෙක් හැටියට එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහත්මයා මෙතැන සිටිනවා.එතුමා ඒ ගැන කථා කරලා තිබුණා.

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි මම දැනට සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙක් හැටියට කටයුතු කරනවා. ඊට කලින් රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළා. ඒ වාගේම 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසය වන විට සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙක් හැටියට, රාජ්‍යණය භාරව කටයුතු කළා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කලින්ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්න සඳහා මම කෙටි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. මේ වෙලාවේ තිබුණු ප්‍රශ්ණය තමයි, අවුරුදු 30 ක බැඳුම්කරයකට ගියේ ඇයි කියන එක. ඒ අවස්ථාව වන විට market එකේ පොලී අනුපාතය සියයට 06ත් 8ත් අතර වාගේ තමයි තිබුණේ. ඒ වාගේම අඩු පොලී දිගු කාලීන බැඳුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කරන එක රජය වාගේ ණය ගන්නා ආයතනයකට වඩාත් හොඳයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි අපි අවුරුදු 30 ක බැඳුම්කරයකට කටයුතු කළේ. නමුත් අපේ සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රම වේදය වන්නේ අපට යම් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒ සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රමාණයම market එකට දැනුම් නොදීම. ඊට හේතුව තමයි, අපේ market එක එතරම් දියුණු තත්ත්වයක නොතිබීම. එසේ නැතිනම්, එය දැනගත් ගමන් ලාභ මත පදනම් වූ ආයතන primary dealer institutions ඒ අයගේ interest rate එක වැඩි කරනවා.ඒ වගේම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ ආයතනවල primary dealersලා16 දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ හැම කෙනෙක්ම අපි දමලා තිබෙන amount එකෙන් අඩු තරමේ සියයට 10 ක් හෝ bid කරන්න ඕනෑ. අපි Rs.1billion දැමුවාට පසුව, ඒ 16 දෙනාගෙන් අවම වශයෙන් Rs.1.6 billion ලැබෙනවා. නමුත් ඒ අය එහෙම නොවෙයි කරන්නේ. මහ බැංකුව Rs.1 billion නිවේදනය කළොත් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දෙගුණයක් තුන් ගුණයක් ගන්නවා කියන එක ඒ අය දන්නවා. ඒ නිසා සෑම අවස්ථාවකදීම bid වැඩිප්‍රමාණයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඉතිහාසයේ ඒ ප්‍රමාණය කී ගුණයක්ද?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දෙගුණයක් වගේ තමයි යන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

තුන්ගුණයක් කියමුකෝ

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

පස්ගුණයක් ගිය අවස්ථා තිබුණා. නමුත් ඒවා outlying.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

පස් ගුණයක් ගිය අවස්ථා තිබුණාද?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

එවැනි අවස්ථා දෙකයි තිබුණේ. නමුත් පස් ගුණයක් යනවාද කියන එක අපි තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ. මොකද, මහ බැංකුව විධියට අපට කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ රාජ්‍ය ණය රැස් කිරීම පමණක් නෙමෙයි. මුදල් ක්‍රමයේ ස්ථායීතාව පවත්වාගෙන යන්න ඕනෑ. අද එක පොලී අනුපාතයකට ගිහිල්ලා හෙට තවත් පොලී අනුපාතයකට ගියාම market එක destabilize වෙනවා. ඒක නිසා අපි අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් investorsලාට fair rate එකක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම සියයට දෙකක වගේ real interest rate එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ මත පදනම් වෙලා තමයි අපි ගන්නා ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ. ඒ වගේ පදනමක් ගත්තාම, market එකේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතයට ආසන්න පොලී අනුපාතයට තමයි ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව ගන්නා ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ. මොකද, market එකේ interest rate structure එක stabilize කරන්න ඕනෑනේ. මම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා ටෙන්ඩර් බෝඩ් එකට යන තෙක්, මේ වගේ policy decisions අරගෙන තියෙනවා කියන එක දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ. මම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් meeting එකකට සහභාගී වන්නේ විෂය මූලික කරගෙනයි. නමුත් මෙම recommendation එක දැක්කාම, මම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් විමසුවා මෙපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් ඇයි කියලා. මම ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඊට විරුද්ධවයි කටයුතු කළේ. එහිදී රජයට වැඩිපුර ණය අවශ්‍ය බවත්, අධිපතිතුමා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිය බවත් ඔවුන් සඳහන් කළා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 22)

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා:

කවුද කිව්වේ?

එස්. එස් රත්නායක මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරීතුමිය ඒ බව Tender Board එකේ සාමාජිකයන්ට දැනුම් දුන්නා. නමුත් රුපියල් බිලියන දහයක් ගන්නා විට පොළී අනුපාතය වැඩි වෙනවා. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා සඳහන් කල ආකාරයට අවුරුදු 30 ක බැඳුම්කරයක් පසුගිය අවුරුද්දේ නිකුත් කිරීම සහ මේ අවුරුද්දේ නිකුත් කිරීමඅතර weighted average rate එක compare කරන්න බැහැ.

ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී වෙළඳපොලේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය අනුව තමයි එය තීරණය වන්නේ. ඒක නිසා දළ වශයෙන් සමාන කරන්න බැහැ.රජයට මුදල් ඕනෑ බව අපි දන්නවා. නමුත් අපිට අවුරුදු 30 ක බැදුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කරනවාට වඩා වැඩි පොලී අනුපාතයකට වෙනත් කරුණු සලකා බලන්න තිබුණා. ඒක නිසා මම Tender Board එකේදි ප්‍රකාශ කළා. අපි වහම අධිපතිතුමා මුණගැසී, කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර වෙනත් ක්‍රමවේදයකට යමු කියලා. නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේ අධිපතිතුමා නිල කාර්යාලයේ නොසිටි නිසා අපට කරුණු පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් ලැබුනේ නැහැ.

ඒ වගේම එදින සිකුරාදා දිනයක්. දෙවෙනිදා කියන්නේ සඳුදා දිනයක් ඒ වනකොට රජයට මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබුණා. සභාපතිතුමා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අධිපතිතුමා සමග දුරකථනයෙන් කථා කරලා තිබුනා.එහිදී අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ මේ මුදලම ගන්න කියලායි. නමුත් අපට ඒ ගැන වෙනම තීරණයක් ගන්න බැහැ. මොකද, එදා සිකුරාදා දවසක් Direct placement එකත් නතර කරලායි තිබුණේ. ඒ නිසා රජයට මුදල් දෙන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැහැ. නමුත් සඳුදා වනවිට මුදල් දෙන්න ඕනෑ නිසා, රුපියල් බිලියන 10 සඳහා අපට එකඟ වෙන්න සිදු වුණා. නමුත් අපි ඒකට විරුද්ධ වුණා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ගියේ කවර සමාගම්වලටද කියලා ප්‍රතිශතයක් හැටියට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ඒක අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. අපි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ වෙන්දේසිය තිබුණාට පසුව, අඩුම පොළි අනුපාතයේ සිට වැඩිම පොළි අනුපාතය දක්වා එය rank කළා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඔබතුමා විරුද්ධයි කියලා tenderboard එකේදි කිව්වාද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා

ඔබතුමා වගකිව යුතු නිලධාරියෙක් හැටියට මෙහි බැරුරුමකම දැනගෙන, සෙනසුරාදා හෝ ඉරිදා නොවෙයි සිකුරාදා සවසම අධිපතිතුමාට කරුණු පැහැදිලි කරන්න තිබුණා නේද?

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා මෙහෙමයි දැන් මෙතන තිබෙන්නේ. There is a judgment call here. This is not a science. This is an art as much as it is a science. This is an art as much as it is a science. So, it is a position that you take given the future scenarios. The interest rates might go up: the exchange rates might change. You take a position on all these things and you take a judgment call whether it is not right or it is not wrong. In retrospect, you could say that you could

have made different decision. But, whether we should have gone for the entire 30 – year bond, on a 100 per cent auction, is a debatable matter. It is debatable because of the amount of interest that we have perhaps paid over and above what could have been our interest rate, if we utilized another option. So, the point I am trying to make hers is that the judgment may have been flawed. However, I do not think that we could say that the decision itself was either right or wrong. I do not know whether it makes sense.

However, I do not think we can say that the decision itself was either right or wrong. I do not know if I am making a sense.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 23)

Dr.P.N.Weerasinghe

I agree with you to a certain extent. But, Hon.Member, the issue here is that this was the Governor's judgment and no one else knew that judgment. So, if that was known to others, we could have issued those bonds in a more transparent manner. That means, if everyone in the market knew that this was the newly – changed policy, then we could have done the auction in a much better way. Here, the issue to me is this was the Governor's judgment and no one knew thatuntil the decision was taken. If you look at the way this particular company has bid-that is different story.

The Hon. (Dr) Harsha de Silva

Yes, that is a different story. I am not even going there, Mr.Weerasinghe. All what I am saying is.I do not think we can justify that the outcome of that decision was thedifference in the interest rate that we ended up paying and that was based on a judgment.

Dr.P.N Weerasinghe

That was not a judgment of any of other officers in the Central Bank.

The Hon. (Dr) Harsha de Silva

Yes. I grant you that.

The Hon. LakshmanKiriella : That paved the way for the Government to loose a few billions

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා, අපට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තවත් කාරණා තිබෙනවා. එකම කාරණාවක් සාකච්ඡා කරමින් ඉන්නේ නැතිව අපි මේ සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට කරගෙන යමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

මම අහන්නේ, Tender Board Committee එකේ සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් ප්‍රධානියා කිව්වාට පස්සේ ඒක පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ කියන මතය ගැනයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා තවත් එක් සාමාන්‍ය රජයේ ආයතනයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ වාගේම දෙවැනි කරුණ Tender Board Committee එක කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ විධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැද්ද? මේක මේ නිකම් ලෑලි ටෙන්ඩරයක් වාගේ දෙයක් නොවෙයි නේ. Governor කිව්වා තමයි, මෙතැන ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රධානියත් කියනවා "මේක එපා" කියලා, ඔබතුමා ඒත් decision එක ගන්නවා.

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ එහෙම එපා කිව්වා කියලා. අපි කවුරුත් සාමාන්‍යයන් අපේ concerns raise කළා. එක්කෙනෙක් එපා කිව්වා වගේ දෙයක් එතැන වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

නමුත් අවසානයේ තීරණය වුණේ ගන්න එක නේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක Tender Board Committee එකෙන්ම කරපු තීරණයක් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එතුමන්ලාගේ අවබෝධය, දැනුම, පරිචය එක්ක එතැන ඒ වාගේ තීරණ ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රමාණයක් කියලා කාටවත් මනින්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට මෙවැනි තීරණයක් ගැනීම සඳහා guidelines තිබෙන්නේ. අපි අහන manual එකේ තමයි ඒ guidelines තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ manual එක තිබුණාද? ඒ manual එකට අනුව මේ තීරණ ගත්තාද? ඒක සංශෝධනය කරලා තිබුණාද? එය සංශෝධනය කරන්න කවුරු හරි අනුමැතිය දීලා තිබුණාද? මෙන්න මේ කාරණා කවුරු හරි පැහැදිලි කරන්න. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට තමයි මේ කාරණා පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ manual එක අනුමත වෙලා තිබෙනවාද? ඒකට මොකක් හරි Board approval එකක් තිබෙන්න

ඕනෑ නේ. ඒක අනුව නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ. නැතිව ගෙදර බලාගෙන ඉදලා ගිහිල්ලා මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 23/24)

Dr.M.Z.M.Aazim

In fact the, the Board has not cleared that manual at that time. But, the Internal Audit Department of the Central Bank has been regularly monitoring whether the Public Debt Department is following the procedures set out in the operations manual. We have very much acted on the basis of what the manual has stated. But, the manual does notspecifically say that we should raise "x" amount or "y" mount. It has been the discretion that has been given to the Tender Board Committee. Of course, the Chairman of the Tender Board Committee and Mr.Rathnayake have mentioned that there were a lot of discussions. We had our views and we expressed those. We had no fallback in terms of direct issuance arrangement in the case of Rs.13.5 billion requirement that we wanted to raise. Then only we had to go with that Rs.10 billion option which was in fact, requested and –

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ manual එකට අනුමැතිය ගැනීමේ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ කාටද?

ආචාර්ය M.Z.M. අසීම් මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට සහ ඒ අදාළ සහකාර අධිපතිතුමා හරහා දැන් එය ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා.

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන හැම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව - කටම යම්කිසිoperations manual එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ හැම operations manual එකක්ම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය හෝ අධිපතිතුමා අනුමත කරන්නේ නැහැ. operations manual කියන එක Internal Audit Department එකෙන් audit කරන එක තමයි, තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය. එතකොට, cross – check කරන ක්‍රමය තමයි, Internal Audit Department එකෙන් operations manual එක බලලා, ක්‍රමවේදය හරිද වැරදිද කියලා බලනවා. නැත්නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන් නිර්දේශ කරනවා මේක වෙනස් කරන්න කියලා. එහෙම කිව්වාම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මඟින් operations manual කියන ඒවාට ඒ

යම්කිසි වෙනස්කම කරනවා.ඊට අමතරව investment guidelines කියලා දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ EPF එකේ, නැත්නම් අපේ resource management කරන වෙලාවන් වලදී investment decisions ගන්න කොට ඒවා අනිවාර්යයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළ guidelines තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒවා කොටස් දෙකක් තිබෙනවා Investment guidelines කියන ඒවා ඒ උඩ මට්ටමට ගිහිල්ලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් operations manuals කියන ඒවා දෙපාර්තමේන්තු විසිගණනක තිබෙනවා. Internal Audit Department එකේ වගකීම තමයි ඒවා බලලා, internal controls තිබෙනවාද බලලා ඒවා වෙනස් කිරීම.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා, ඒ වෙනකොට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අදාළව operations manual කියලා ලේඛනයක් තිබුණාද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ operation manual එක කෙටුම්පත් කළාට පස්සේ operation manual එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා කියන තීරණය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ කවදාද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

Operation manual කියන එක මේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පටන් ගත්ත කාලයේ ඉදලාම ඇවිල්ලා,කාලයෙන් කාලයට වෙනස් කර ගන්න document එකක්. ඒක dynamic document එකක්. ඒ කාලයට අවශ්‍ය විධියට එය වෙනස් කරනවා. නමුත්, එය කාලයෙන් කාලයට වෙනස් කරන්නේ internal controls හරියට තිබෙනවාද කියලා බලලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 24/25)

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා

මේ තීන්දුව ගැන කථා කරද්දී මේ තීන්දුව වෙනස් කලා කියලා කිව්වානේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා වාචිකව කෙසේ කියා සිටියත් TenderCommittee එක මේක වෙනස් කළා. එහෙම වුණේ? ඒ වගකීම ඔබතුමන්ලා භාර ගන්නවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක වෙනස් කළා.2008 වර්ෂයේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් තීන්දුවක් දීලා තිබුණා. නමුත් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකර auction එකකට ගියා. ඒකද කියන්නේ?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතාගේ පිළිතුර

නැහැ

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 27)

ගරු. අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතාගේ ප්‍රකාශය

මෙතුමන්ලාගෙන් අහන්න වෙන්නේ, මේ placement එකත් එක්ක අපේ ලංකාවේ පොලී අනුපාතය තිබුණු ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා ඉහල ගියාද නැද්ද කියලා. ඒකට උත්තර දුන්නා. වැදගත්ම දේ ඒකයි. අනෙක් ඔක්කොම පැත්තක තියන්න. මේ අත්තනෝමතික ක්‍රියාව නිසා ලංකාවේ පොලී අනුපාතය අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඉහළ ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියන එක තමයි මෙතන පැහැදිලි වෙමින් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක ප්‍රමාණවත් අනෙක් සියල්ලටම වඩා.

ගරු.ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඒක ප්‍රමාණවත් නැහැ.ඉහළ ගිය එක ඇත්ත. නමුත් එතැන මොකක් හෝ Whether there has been criminal negligence or some sort of liability is the question. It is true we all agree that interest rates went up.

The Hon. Anura Priyadarshana Yapa

What they said in their explanation was that if they had one for a hybrid system the interest rates would have been lower it would have been good for the country and it would have been better for the image of the Central bank.

The Hon.(dr) Harsha De Silva

All that is agreed, but whether it was a judgment call

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna

I do not see any problem in that. ඒ options තුනෙන් ඕනෑම option එකකට යන්න පුළුවන් Governor කිව්වේ, “Depending on the market we have to select whatever out of the three systems? According to what the Governor has mentioned, sometimes you do an auction to find out the interest rate and then you do a private placement. But on the other hand, then Governor also mentioned that when you do an auction since it is a thin market, the number of primary dealers are small, there can be manipulation. That implies to the other system also When you try to find out the interest rate then manipulation also can take place to get a different interest rate. As he said, there is no clear right or wrong method.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

If you are making a syllabus here we can talk like this. But, when we have a case like this we have to study that. We are not making a syllabus here. That can be done by an expert.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna

This is exactly what the Governorsaid.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා, මට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න. මම මුලින්ම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වා, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් අතරේ විවාදය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ තියා ගනිමු. ඒ සාකච්ඡාව මෙතැනට ගන්න එපා. කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම පමණක් අපි මෙතැන කර ගනිමු. නිලධාරින් නැතිව අපට මේ විවාදය කරන්න මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්න අවස්ථාව ඕනෑ තරම් තිබෙනවා. එතුමන්ලාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම තමයි වඩා වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. ඒ වාගේම තමයි තවදුරටත් කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට ඉඩකඩ නොලැබුණු අදහස් පල නොකරන ලද මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට මම ප්‍රමුඛතාවය දෙනවා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 29/30)

ගරු වීර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

සමරසිරි මහතාගෙන් දැන ගන්න පුළුවන්ද, ඔබතුමන් කලින් පැහැදිලි කළා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමන් එක්ක පැහැදිලි කළා කියලා, තාක්ෂණික කරුණු කිහිපයක් වන පොළී අනුපාතය 2014 වර්ෂය සහ මෙතැනට සම්පාත වන විධියට එතකොට පූර්ව නිගමනයක ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහල යනවා කියලා. ඒ පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහල යාමෙන් එතුමාට ඥාතීත්වයක් තිබෙන සමාගමකට තමයි වෙන්දේසියේදී ඒ ලාභය එන්නේ.

එතකොට පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යනවා කියලා පූර්ව නිගමනයක, අවබෝධයක ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ එකක්. පොලී අනුපාත ඉහල යෑමෙන් එතුමාට ඥාතීත්වයක් තිබෙන සමාගමකට තමයි වෙන්දේසියේදී එම ලාභය ලැබෙන්නේ. පූර්ව නිගමනයක ඉඳලා තිබෙනවානේ පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහල යනවා කියලා. ඒක දැනගෙන තමයි කරන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අත්දැකීම් තිබෙන නිලධාරියෙක් විදිහට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට කිව්වේ නැද්ද පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යාමෙන් රටේ ඇති වන මූල්‍ය තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද කියලා? ඒකෙදි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ මොකක්ද? මේක අවුරුද්දකට පසුව සිදු වුණු දෙයක්නේ.මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු තාක්ෂණික කරුණුවල ප්‍රතිඵල සාර්ථකද? අසාර්ථකද? ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුව ඒකෙන් රටට මොකක්ද වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ?

පී සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාව වන විට Tender Board එක ඒ තීරණය අරගෙන පස්වරු එකට විතර Tender Board එක රැස් වෙන්නේ. පැය ½ ක්, පැයක් වගේ කාලයක් ඇතුළත ඒ ටික අවසන් කරලා තීරණයක් අරගෙන වෙළඳපොළට දන්වන්න ඕනෑ. ඇත්තම කියනවානම් මට ඒ වෙලාවේ ඔහොම සාකච්ඡා කරන්න දැනීමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මට

ඒ අවස්ථාවේ ආරංචි වුණු විධියට අධිපතිතුමා අනෙක් Deputy – Governorsලා දෙදෙනාත් සමග තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ. එතැනත් ඔය විධියට පොලී අනුපාත පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා ඇති වෙලා තිබෙනවා. දැන් Dr. M.Z.M Azimකිව්වා, මේක වැඩි වුණොත් පොළී අනුපාත වැඩි වන නිසා එයත් විරුද්ධ වුණා කියලා. ඒ අවස්ථාව එහෙම වාද විවාද කරලා, සාකච්ඡා කරන වෙලාවක් නෙවෙයි. දැන් නම් අපි විවාද කරනවා.මේක අත්දැකීමෙන් කරන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක්නේ, මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

ගරු වීර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

ඔබතුමා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කලින් පැහැදිලි කරද්දී මට හැඟුනේ ඉතාම සාර්ථක ක්‍රමවේදයක් ලෙස හඟවමින් මෙතැනට කරුණු පැහැදිලි කළා කියලායි. ඔබතුමා ඒ වෙලාවේ හිටියා, තාක්ෂණික පැත්තෙන් හොඳ අවබෝධයකින් කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙන බව තමයි මට හැඟුනේ. මේ ඇති වෙලා තිබෙන ප්‍රතිඵලයත් සමග ඒකයි මම නැවත ඇසුවේ. ඔබතුමා දැන් කියනවා "මට ඒ ගැන ලොකු වැටහීමක් නැහැ" කියලා. ඔබතුමා මෙම ආයතනයේ කාලයක් සේවය කළ පරිනත නිලධාරියෙක්නේ. එතැනදී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට වඩා වැඩි දැනුමක් ඔබතුමාට තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

පී සමරසිරි මහතා

මේ තීරණය ගන්න තිබෙන වෙලාව අනුව ඒ වෙලාවේ මට හැඟුනා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ තාක්ෂණික කරුණක් කියන එක. ඒවා සම්බන්ධයෙන් විවිධ අදහස් තිබෙනවා. මට දැන් තිබෙන ආර්ථික විද්‍යා දැනුම අනුව මම පිළිගන්නේ මේ වෙළඳපොළ ක්‍රමය -auction- මත අඩුපාඩු තිබෙනවා කියලායි. දියුණු කරන්න තව ක්‍රමවේද දමන්න ඕනෑ. Raid කරන්න system දමන්න ඕනෑ. ITදමන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වගේ හුඟක් දේවල් තිබෙනවා. යම් කිසි කාලයක් තුළ ක්‍රියා කරන්න ඕනෑ. මම තව එකක් කියන්න කැමතියි. පොලී අනුපාත වැඩි වුණාය කියන එකම කියන්න අමාරුයි. පොලී අනුපාත කියන්නේ Government Security Market එකේ තිබෙන පොළී අනුපාතයත් සමග නෙවෙයි. මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති තිබෙනවා. රටේ Balance of payment ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. වෙළඳ පොලේ ද්‍රවශීලතා ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා.ඒවත් එක්ක තමයි වෙනස් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

මට තව කාරක සභාවකට යන්න තිබෙනවා. මට විනාඩියයි අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ .සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය. One billion auction එකෙන් ඔබතුමියලා යෝජනා හයක් tenderCommittee එකට යෝජනා කළානේ. ඒකෙදි ඔබතුමියලා යෝජනා කලේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5 යි. ඔබතුමියලා යෝජනා කලේරුපියල් බිලියන2.5 ක් ගැනීම උචිතයි කියලා තමයි යෝජනා කලේ. එතකොට ඔබතුමියලාගේ කමිටුවේ මතය එලෙස තිබියදී මේ ගණන රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට බලපෑවේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ නියෝගයද? වෙනත් කිසිදු හේතුවක් බලපාන්නේ නැතිව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ නියෝගය නිසා පමණද රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා වැඩි කලේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඇත්තටම ඒ වෙලාවේ රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව වුණේ රුපියල් මිලියන 13.2යි. ඒ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයසොයා ගැනීමට තමයි අපට මේ auction එක කිරීම අවශ්‍ය වුනේ. එතැනදි one billion වලට ගියේTreasury එකට කලින්ම 2.5 billion දීලා තිබුණ නිසායි. ඉතිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය සොයා ගන්න තමයි අපට අවශ්‍ය වුණේ.Auction එක මගින් one billion හෝ ඊට ළඟ ආසන්න මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් එකතු කරගන්න තමයි අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ. ඉතිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය අපි කරගෙන ආපු ක්‍රමයට direct issuance වලින් ලබා ගන්නයි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

2.5 billion නේ ඔබතුමියලා කලින් යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණේ. එහෙම නොවුනොත් ආර්ථික වශයෙන් පොලිය වැඩි වීමක් සහ පාඩුවක් සිදු වෙයි කියන එක තමයි ඔබතුමියලාගේ මතය වුණේ. එතකොට 2.5 billion යෝජනා කරලා තියෙද්දි රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යෑමට යෝජනා කරන්න සිදු වුනේ ඇයි?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

එතනදී අධිපතිතුමා කියා සිටියා අපට බිලියන 10 ක් සොයන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. අපට වෙන අවශ්‍යතාවන් තිබුණේ නැහැ. අපට තිබුණු අනෙක් අවස්ථාව.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 31/32)

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඒක තමයි. ඔබතුමියලා කලින් රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව දන්නවා. එසේ තිබියදී ඔබතුමියලා යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණා රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5 ක් කියලා.ඊට පසුව 10 දක්වා වැඩි වුණේ කොහොමද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වාම එතැනදී ප්‍රකාශයක් කලා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අදාළ නැහැ අදාළ නොවන්නේ එතුමියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව එතුමියගේ සීමාව තුළ එතුමියලාගේ යෝජනාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන නිසා. ඒක එතුමියගෙන් අහන එකේ තේරුම මොකක්ද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

එම ප්‍රශ්නය අවශ්‍යයි. අවශ්‍යතාව පැහැදිලි කරලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

අධිපතිතුමාගේ යෝජනාව නිසා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් දැම්මා. ඔබතුමා tender කමිටුව විධියට යම් හෙයකින් අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත්වීමකින් තොරව රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5ම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ tender කමිටුවට ආවා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා මොකක්ද ගන්න තීන්දුව?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ වෙලාවේ හැටියට අපි ඒ දෙකයි ගණන ගන්නවා. මොකද, ඒ වෙලාවේ තිබුන ක්‍රමය අනුව TenderBoard එකට ඇවිත් ඒ අය යෝජනා කරන යම් කිසි ගණනක් ගන්නවා.Tender මණ්ඩලය weighted average පදනම් කරගෙන balance එකට privet placement ගන්නවා. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමය.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න

ඒ කියන්නෙ එතැනින් රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5 ආවා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කමිටුවත් යෝජනා කරන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5 මයි.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතාගේ

රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5 හෝ ඒ කිට්ටු ගණනක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

එතකොට අවසාන වශයෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් ඉල්ලා තිබෙන අවස්ථාවක, රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකයි පහක් මේ කමිටු දෙකම යොජනා කර තිබියදී රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා යෑමට හේතුව අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත්වීම කියන නිගමනයට ඒම වැරදිද?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා

ඒක එසේ නොවුණ නම් auction එක යන්නේ නැහැ. හරිද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

පැහැදිලි නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

අපට මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී සහ මීට පෙර පැවති පරීක්ෂණවලදී අනාවරණය වුණු කරුණු අනුව රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව වශයෙන් තිබුණු one billion සඳහා auction එකට ගියා. ඒ auction එකෙන් 2.5 billioncutoff එක තමයි ඔබතුමියලාගේ කමිටුව යෝජනා

කළේ. ඒක ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවටත් දැම්මා. එතකොට, අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත්වීම නොවුණා නම් auction එකෙන් 2.5 billion ගැනීමයි සිදු වෙන්නේ. ඒක හරිද?

පී.සමරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක හරි

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඒක හරි. එච්චරයි දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. අපි මේ පශ්චාත් පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන්නේ අපි නව අධිපතිවරයා පිළිබඳ විශ්වාසයක් තබලා තිබෙනවා. අදින් පසුවවත් මේ අඩුපාඩුකම් සිදු නොවන ආකාරයට කටයුතු සිදුවීම ඉතාමත් උචිතයි. එහෙම නැතිව අපි මේ දෙය මත පමණක් එල්ලිගෙන ඉඳීම ප්‍රමාණවත් වන්නේ නැහැ. ඒකත් අපි සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewirathne

Governor, we want to wish you all the best. But you have to correct those mistakes. It is not the relevant officers. We are not blaming you. We all know what took place. Do the right thing. We wish you all the best.

Mr.Indrajit Coomaraswamy

I must tell you the Central Bnak has very, very good officers.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 33)

ගරු.අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ අනුව අදාළ Manuel එකේ 8(01) අනුව, හැකිතාක් දුරට - as much as possible - වෙන්දේසිය මගින් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීම තමයි රීතිය ඊළඟට - balance fund - ඉතිරිය රජය විසින් තීරණය කරන ක්‍රමවේදයකට සොයා ගැනීම. දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කවුද? මහත්මිය, මේ පරීක්ෂණයට විෂය වෙලා තිබෙන 27 වැනි දා සිදු වූ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව ගැනයි මම මේ නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ. එදා දවසේ මේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සිදු කිරීම පිළිබඳව තීරණය ගැනීමට නියමිතව තිබුණේ Tender Board එක. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒTender Board එකේ සාමාජිකයෙක් නොවෙයිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

නැහැ

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Tender Board එකේ ඒ තීරණය ගැනීමට පෙර රුපියල් බිලියන 01 ක සීමාවේ ඉදලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක් දක්වා වූ බැදුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයට යාම පිළිබඳව ඒ තීරණය Tender Board එක ඇතුළේ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වුණාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

සාකච්ඡා කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ Tender Board එකේ සාමාජිකයන්ව සිටියේ කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

Tender Board එකේ සභාපති විධියට සිටියේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, පී.සමරසිරි මහතා ඊට අමතරව, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරි, එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා සිටියා. Economic Research Department එක භාර සහකාර අධිපති,සී.පී.ඒ. කරුණාතිලක මහත්මයා සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි වශයෙන් මම සිටියා. ඒ වාගේම Domestic Operations Department එකේ Director සිටියා. Economic Research Department එකේ Director Mrs. Gunaratne and Additional Superintendentsලා දෙදෙනෙක් සිටියා. ඒ කියන්නේ ඔක්කෝම 08 දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු.අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

කමිටුවේ ප්‍රධානියා වන්නේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පී.සමරසිරි මහතා. ඔබතුමාගේ කමිටුවට, ඒ කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණ ගැනීමට හැකියාව ඇති, ප්‍රමාණවත් තරම් දැනුම ඇති, ජ්ෙෂ්ඨ පළපුරුදු නිලධාරි මණ්ඩලයක් සිටියාද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව්

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

27 වැනි දා සිදුවුණු තීරණ අතුරෙන් එක තීරණයක් තමයි, රුපියල් බිලියනයේ සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා යන්න තීරණය කරපු එක. ඒ වාගේම ඊට වඩා වැඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලැබිලා තිබුණත් රුපියල් බිලියන 10න් ඔබ්බට නොයන්නත් ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කළ. නිවැරදියිද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව්

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමාගේ මුලිකත්වයෙන් යුතුව සාමාජිකයන් 08 දෙනා ඒ මොහොතේ ඒ ගත්ත තීරණය, ඔබතුමාගේ වෘත්තිය විනිශ්චය අනුව ගත්ත තීරණයක්. හරි නේද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

නැහැ. මගේ තනි තීරණයක් නොවේ. Committee එකක් තිබුණා. ඒකේ Minutes තිබෙනවා. මම පෞද්ගලිකව-,

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමා පෞද්ගලිකව නොවෙයි කණ්ඩායමක් එක්ක ගත්ත තීරණයක්

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව් කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගත්ත තීරණයක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ට ගිහිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ට අඩු වුණා නොවෙයිද? කවුරුවත් රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ගන්න කියලා යෝජනා කළේ නැද්ද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

නැහැ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙම කළේ නැද්ද සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය?

සී.එම්ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

Department එකට Governorආපු වෙලාවේ ඉස්සෙල්ලාම කිව්වේ රුපියල් බිලියන 20 කියලා

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

විස්ස කියලා කිව්වා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඇයි ඔබතුමන් බොරු කියන්නේ?

පී.සමරසිංහ මහතා

අපිට එහෙම යෝජනාවක් ආවේ නැහැ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

විස්ස දහය දක්වා ඊට පසුව අඩුවුණා.

ගරු අජිත්.පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කියන පරිදි Governor යම් විධියක මතයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළ, රුපියල් බිලියන විස්සක් දක්වාම යා හැකිව තිබෙනවා කියලා. නමුත් සමරසිරි මහත්මයාගේ මූලිකත්වයෙන් යුත් කමිටුව, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී තීරණය

කළ, අපි විස්සට යන්නේ නැහැ. අපි උපරිම වශයෙන් යන්නේ දහයටයි කියලා? ඒක හරිද? දීපා මහත්මියගේ අදහස් පිළිගන්නේ නැද්ද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒක දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සිදු වූ දෙයක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියත්. අධිපතිතුමාත් අතර ඇති වූ සංවාදය ඔබතුමන් දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒකහරිද? අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියටද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්

සභාපතිතුමා

මෙතුමා මතු කළානේ, ඉස්සෙල්ලා ගන්න කියලා මෙතුමියට කියපු කාරනාව සමරසිංහ මහත්මයා නොදැන සිටියාද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය, එතුමියට අදහසක් කිබෙන්න ඕනෑ ඒ ගැන. ඒකයි මම ඇහුවේ.

අජිත් පි.පෙරේරා මහතා

එතුමිය තමයි නායිකාව. සමරසිරි මහතා ඔබතුමා කොපමණ කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවේ සේවය කර තිබෙනවාද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ වන විට අවුරුදු 30 ක්.

අජිත්.පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

බොහොම පළපුරුද්දක් තිබුණා සහ ජෙෂ්ඨත්වයක් තිබුණා, කෙළින් තීරණයක් අරගෙන රටට, ආයතනයට නිවැරදි තීරණයක් ගන්න. ඔබගේ මණ්ඩලය උපරිම විශ්වාසය අනුව එම තීරණය ගත්තා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගොස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 41/42/43)

සභාපතිතුමා

අධ්‍යක්ෂතුමිය ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අධිපතිතුමා මට මතයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළ කියලා කිව්වත්, එය මතයක් නොවෙයි. මට අන්තිමට කියලා ගියේ,"Do it"කියලා

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය සාක්ෂිවල කිසිම තැනෙක "Do it"කියලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අද තමයි "Do it"කියලා කිව්වා කියලා ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

අද තමයි ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ එහෙම දෙයක් කිව්වා කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමියගේ ප්‍රකාශයේ 18 වන පිටුව මම කියවන්නම් "Why do you not go for 10?"

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

පළමුවෙන්ම අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය ඒක.

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

Right' I am posing this question to you where have you stated that the Governor said, "Do it"? You gave evidence last time. So, I am asking you a question. Since I was not there, wanted to ask this question from you. Where have you said that Governor said, "Do it?"

The Hon. DayasiriJayasekara

Can you tell us about the conversation

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

Please let me finish this.

සභාපතිතුමා

මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මට පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමටයි මම අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අහන්නේ, "Do it" කියලා Governor සඳහන් කිරීම මෙතුමිය කොයි ස්ථානයේදී ද සඳහන් කළේ කියලා නේද අහන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සාක්ෂිවල දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න කළ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මොනවද කිව්වේ කියලා? So, let me finish this. Do not disturb because it is giving an undue advantage for the person to answer' So, let me finish it please. Decently I am asking a question.

Where have you stated in your evidence that Governor said, "Do it?"

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathne

Today I am saying

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

You have never said it before

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathne

No

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

What you said earlier was a suggestion by the Governor. You are an educated lady. You were under oath and you were giving evidence last time. If it is not, that Governor told you to do it, easily you could have said –

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මට ඇමතිතුමා කියන කොට තමයි මතක් වුණේ.

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe: ඇමතිතුමා නොවෙයි, you were discussing there with your peers. I saw that. If Governor had given directions to do it, you could have said, "He told me to do it." It is very easy. That is why I am asking you. You are an educated person and your qualifications are there.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

සමාව ගන්නවා

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සමාව ගන්න එපා. Can I say this?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, එහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් කෝප් සභාවේ කවුරු හෝ අහලා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

අහලා තිබෙනවා. Let me finish.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

I must make this request

සභාපතිතුමා

අධිපතිතුමා.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I think the Hon.Minister is very welcome to continue the line of questioning. But I think it will be very nice if it is can be done in a better environment. I do not want my colleagues to be put under undue pressure

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

May I say this, Hon. Chairman?

The Hon. Mahindananda Aluthgama

Do not give orders. Talk nicely.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

I am using the best language. My tone is for the question because that is an important question. She and even the Governor do not have to get bothered my tone and. I am using a very good language.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

This is the COPE. I direct a very decent question. All Iam asking is if she has lied, if she has not said it I have the right to ask that question. I am not forcing on her. I am not calling her names. So, I can ask that question.

The Hon.Mahindananda Aluthgama

Go ahead

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I am not talking to you I am talking to Chairman

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමා මට කථා කරන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Let me ask this question and finish. සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතන වැදගත් වන්නේ කාරණා දෙකයි. එක කාරණයක් තමයි මේ direct placements ක්‍රමයද පැවතියේ? මේ ක්‍රමවේදය ආවේ කොහොමද? මේක වෙනස් කළාද? මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන විධියට දෙකම තිබෙනවාද? Direct placements තිබෙනවා, auctions තිබෙනවා. මේක ඕනෑ වෙලාවකට auctions පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? මේකේ ඕනෑ වෙලාවටdirect placements පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? ඒක තමයි අදාළ ප්‍රශ්නය. ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයිමහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මේ කියන නිලධාරිනියට නියෝගයක් කළාද? නියෝගය කියන එක ඉංග්‍රී හාෂාවෙන් හෝ සිංහල භාෂාවෙන් නියෝගයක් වශයෙන් දක්වන්න ඕනෑ. කිසිම තැනක එතුමිය නියෝගයක් කළා කියන එක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ. එතුමිය Minute එකක් දාලා තිබෙනවා "Give a direction"කියලා නමුත් අධිපතිතුමා ඇහුවාම එතුමා කිව්ව උත්තරය තමයි ඒක අපි හබ කළේ නැහැ. "If I were you I will take this money" කියලා ගියා. අනෙක් වැදගත්ම කාරණය වන්නේ Dr. Azimමැතිතුමා කිව්වා, මේ ලියවිලි එතුමාගෙන් කලින් ඉල්ලුවා කියලා. පසුව එතුමාගේ සාක්ෂියේ සඳහන් කළා, එතුමා ගිහින් එම ලැයිස්තුව භාර දුන්නා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා

වෙන පටලන්න එපා. මෙතුමා කියන කාරණාවත්, තිබුණු දේවලුත්, ඔබතුමන්ලා කියාපු දේවලුත් සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල verbatim වශයෙන් තිබෙනවා. අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒවා ආයේත් බලන්න පුළුවන්. මෙතුමා දැන් කියන දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා. එදා කියාපු දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා. ඔබතුමා කියන දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

ආපු වේලාවේ ඉඳන් ඔබතුමා නේ කථා කරන්නේ. අපි මොකුත් කියන්නේ නැතුව අහගෙන ඉන්නවනේ. මොකක්ද මේකේ තේරුම? අපටත් අහන්න ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා.මෙතැනට ආපු වේලාවේ ඉඳන් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කිය කියා අහනවා.අපි ඒවා අහගෙන ඉන්නවා

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 43/44/45)

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසන් කර ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා, විශේෂයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එකේත් තිබෙනවා ඔබතුමියගේ එකම සාක්ෂිය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියට යම් කිසි ආකාරයක අවබෝධයක් ලබා දුන්නා කියන්න පුළුවන් එකම ආකාරය මට කේරෙන භාෂාවෙන් "Why do not go for ten", කියන එකයි. මේ හැර ඔබතුමිය වෙන භාෂාවකින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියට direction එකක් දීලා තිබෙනවා

කියලා ඔබතුමිය මීට පෙර දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් ලබා දුන්න සාක්ෂියක සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

කොහේ හරි තිබෙනවා නම් අපට පෙන්වන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා

සාක්ෂියක් දෙන්නේ අහන ප්‍රශ්න අනුව නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය පොරොන්දු වෙනවාද වෙන විධියකට එහෙම සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා කියලා

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මම minute කර ගත්තා කියලා මම සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

බොහොම ස්තුතියි. සභාපතිතුමා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ සියලු කාරණා සලකා බලා නිගමනය කර තිබෙන මේ report එක අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා යම් කිසි ආකාරයක direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා මෙහි තිබෙනවා. වෙන කිසිම දෙයක් සඳහන් කරලා නැනැ. ඔබතුමා ඒක වාර්තාගත කර ගන්න. ඊට පසුව ඕනෑම දෙයක් කරන්න. මෙතුමා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා ඉන් පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් බිලියන 10කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරියගෙන් (මෙතුමියගෙන්) ප්‍රශ්න කර තිබිණි. "Why do not go for ten", මේ හැර මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා වෙන ආකාරයකින් direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා මෙතුමිය විසින් කිසිම සාක්ෂියක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ කියන එක විතරක් වාර්තා කර ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමියට ඒ ගැන තව පැහැදිලි කරන්න තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මම ආපු ගමන් මේ සාක්ෂිය ප්‍රකාශ කළා. මීට කලින් මම Bribery Commission එකට ගියා. ඊට පෙර ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටුවට ගියා. එහෙදිත් මම ප්‍රකාශ කළා. සාකච්ඡාවලදීත් විස්තර කරලා කියලා තිබෙනවා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තුමස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 47/48)

එස්. එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට තවත් කරුණක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවසර දෙන්න. මම මෙම Tender Board Meeting එකේ සාමාජිකයෙක් වනවා. මීට පෙර පැවති කාරක සභාවේදී ඒ පිළිබඳව කරුණු පැහැදිලි කළා. එහිදී මම කිව්වා, මෙතෙක් පැහැදිලි කළ මූලධර්මයන්ට හා සිද්ධාන්තයන්ට බැහැර recommendation එකක් තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයට කරලා තිබුණේ කියලා.අපි සාමාන්‍ය ඉතිහාසයේ එකක් දමලා, ඒ offer කරපු amount එක වාගේ දෙකහමාර ගුණයක් හෝ තුන්ගුණයක් වාගේ ගමයි ගන්නේ. මම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව ඇතුළු අනෙකුත් නිලධාරින්ගෙන් පැහැදිලිව ඇහුවා, මෙවැනි recommendation එකක් කළේ ඇයි? අපි මෙවැනි තීරණ ගන්නේ කොහොමද? පොලී අනුපාතය විශාල ලෙස වෙනස් වෙනවා, ඒ නිසා රජයට දරන්න වන වියදම වැඩි වෙනවා කියලා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී එතුමිය කිව්වා,

අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණ instructions දුන්නා කියලා. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒ කාරණය පැහැදිලි ඇති නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ හැමෝම කිව්ව, මෙය කරන්න හොඳ නැති බව අධිපතිතුමා හමු වෙලා කියමු කියලා. නමුත් අපි එතැනට යන්න සුදානම් වන විට තමයි එතුමා කාර්යාලයේ නැති බව දැන ගත්තේ. අපි ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී තමයි direct placement ක්‍රමවේදය නතර කර ඇති බව දැන ගත්තේ. නමුත් සඳුදා වන විට රජයට සල්ලි දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ සල්ලි දෙන්න වෙනත් ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැති නිසා තමයි කලින් සදහන් කළ රුපියල් බිලියන දහය ගන්න සිදු වුණේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 48)

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම tender board එක පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ ඇයි?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I think the Deputy Governor in charge may answer it.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

තනි තීරණයක් නොගෙන කණ්ඩායමක් විධියට තීරණ ගැනීම සදහායි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා

මේ tender board එක වාඩි වෙලා කරන්නේ, කණ්ඩායමක් හැටියට තීන්දුවක් ගන්න එක නේ. එසේ නම් මේ tender board එක - කණ්ඩායමේ 08 දෙනා - ගත්තේ වැරදි තීන්දුවක්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

අපි tender board එකේදී අවශ්‍ය කරුණ සාකච්ඡා කර, තීරණයක් ගත්තා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා

Tender board එක ගත්ත තීන්දුව හරිද, වැරදිද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී තිබූ සාධක අනුව, tender board එක ගත්ත තීරණය හරි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලා 08 දෙනා හරි තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා

ඒ ඔබතුමන්ලා 08 දෙනාගේ තීන්දුවක්. හරිද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

හරි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක අවශ්‍යතාවයක් රටේ තිබුණා කියලා මීට කලින් සඳහන් වුණා. පසුව එම රුපියල් බිලියන 13න් රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න තීරණය කළා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 49)

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

නැහැ. රුපියල් බිලියන 03ක් කලින් ලබා ගෙන තිබුණා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකාරුණා මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී රටේ අවශ්‍යතාවය තිබුණා රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක්. ඉන් රුපියල් බිලියන 03ක් කලින් ලබාගෙන තිබුණා. ඉතිරි රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ගන්න තමයි තීරණය කළේ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙය පරීක්ෂණයක්. ඒ වාගේම tender board එක ගත් තීරණයක් හරි කියලා එක් නිලධාරියෙකුට පමණක් මෙතැන ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න බැහැ. මොකද, ඒ 08 දෙනාගේම ප්‍රකාශ මෙතැනට අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම මම අද check කළේ නැහැ. නමුත් පසුගිය කාරක සභාවේදී සමරසිරි මහතා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරු,

ඊට කලින් කාරක සභාවේදී ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරුවලට වඩා පරස්පර වුණා. එමකාරක සභාවේ සිටි නිසා, මම ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් බැලුවා.

අනෙක් එක තමයි, එදා පරීක්ෂණය කරන විට Governor එම තනතුරට පත් වෙන්න තමයි සිටියේ. නමුත් අද අලුත් Governor කෙනෙක් යටතේ මෙම පරීක්ෂණ සිදු කෙරෙනවා. එදා නැවතත් එතුමා ඒ තනතුරට පත් වෙන්න සිටි නිසා, ප්‍රශ්නවලට පිළිතුරු ලබා දීමේදී නිලධාරීන් තුළ බියක් හා චකිතයක් තබා ගෙන පිළිතුරු දීම සාධාරණයි. ආයතනය තුළ එම පරීක්ෂණය සිදු කරද්දී, නිලධාරීන්ට ඒ බලපෑම තිබුණා. එසේ තිබියදීත් ඇතැම් නිලධාරීන් ඉතාම අවංකව, තමන්ගේ තනතුරට අනුව සාක්ෂි දුන්නා. ඇතැම් අය එසේ කළේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා tender board එකේ 08 දෙනාම සමරසිංහ මහත්මයාගේ ප්‍රකාශය අනුමත කරනවාද කියලා අපට කියන්න අවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශය මගේ ප්‍රකාශයටත් බලපානවා. ඒ සඳහා යම් සම්බන්ධීකරණයක් කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Domestic Debt Management Committee එකේ සිටින නිලධාරී මහත්වරු සියලු දෙනාම මෙතැන ඉන්නවාද? කී දෙනෙක් පැමිණ සිටිනවාද? ඒ සිද්ධිය වන අවස්ථාවේ සිටි අයගෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා 06 දෙනා පමණක්ද, මෙතැන නැති තවත් අය සිටිනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ කාලයේ සිටි director කෙනෙක් මෙතැන නැහැ. Director (Statistics) ඉන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් එයත් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණිලා, ඔබතුමන්ලාට තමයි කිව්වේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

නැහැ. අපට කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වේ නැද්ද? කාටද කිව්වේ?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That was not to the Domestic Debt Management Committee, but to the Public Debt Department.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ඇවිල්ලා තමයි කිව්වේ. එතුමා ආවේ කීයට විතරද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

පළමු වරට 10.45ට පමණ තමයි ආවේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මෙය close කළේ කීයටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

11.00ට පමණ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා 10.45ට පමණ ආවා. දෙවැනි වතාවටත් ආවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා පළමු වරට පැමිණ කළ කථාව මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

එහිදී Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ ගත්තාද? කොපමණ claim කරලා තිබෙනවාද, කොපමණ Offer කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඇහුවා. ඉන් පසුව meeting එකක් තිබුණා.

එහිද අධිපතිතුමා, ඇගමැතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා රටේ වෙනත් මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා.

නමුත් ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ කර ගත්තේ නැහැ. මොකද, අපේ අවශ්‍යතාව වෙනත් එකක් නේ. මහා භාණ්ඩාරයෙන් යවපු Sundry requirement cash flow තමයි අපි fund raise කරන්නේ. ඒක තමයි අපි එතැනදී කථා කළේ. Auction එක අවසන් නැති නිසා අධිපතිතුමාට වෙනත් meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා ගියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මෙතුමිය කියන ආකාරයට මේ සිද්ධියක් වුණා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා තිදෙනාම පිළිගන්නවාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim: Yes.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

අධිපතිතුමා දෙවැනි වතාවට ඇවිල්ලා මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

Deputy Governorsලා දෙදෙනෙකු සමඟ පස්වරු 12.30ට පමණ දෙවැනි වතාවටත් අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණියා. ඒ වේලාව වන විට අපේ auction එක අවසන් වෙලා තිබුණා. Tender Board එකට යන auction sheetඑක සකස් කර තිබුණා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ වේලාවේ එතුමා සමග පැමිණි අනෙක් දෙදෙනා කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතා සහ දැනට retire වෙලා සිටින Mr.Ananda Silva පැමිණියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ දෙදෙනා සමග ඇවිල්ලා මොකද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

"Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ මුදල් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද?" කියලා ඇහුවා. අපි කිව්වා. "රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ක් තිබෙනවා" කියලා ඊට පසුව "20 billion කෝ?" කියලා තරයේ ඇහුවා. ඒ වේලාවේ අපි කිව්වා, "ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 20නුත් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් වැඩිම මුදල රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6යි" කියලා ඊට පසුව එතුමා කිව්වා, "අපේ අවශ්‍යතාවය සඳහා මේ සියල්ලම ගන්න" කියලා. ඒ වේලාවේ Dr. Azimතමයි කථා කළේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමා මොනවාද කිව්වේ?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim

I have very clearly pointed out to the Governor at that time the prevailing market interest rates and the levels that we could be hitting in case we are going to raise entire Rs.20 billion' When the Governor wanted to know, "Okey what was the September, 2014 or the previous thirty-year Treasuey bond auctions weighted out' We said "It was 11.75. Then,he said, "Why do you not accept at that level" Still, we said, "If we go for that level we are shifting the prevailing interest rates punch in the country by more than about 150 basis points' So, we have clearly clarified other possible repercussions. Not only once, if I am not mistaken, I have mentioned it more than four times. Then, I asked Deputy Governors also what their observations on this.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

What have they said? ඔබතුමා ඒකට දුන් පිළිතුර මොකක්ද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේ එතුමා කළ සියලු ප්‍රකාශ සමග මම එකඟ වෙනවා. එතැනදී ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආශිම් මහතා ඇවිල්ලා මේ sheet එක පෙන්වා සිටියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Sheet එක කියන්නේ, Primary Dealersලා ගත්ත නම් ලැයිස්තුව?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඔව්. නම් ලැයිස්තුව සමග bids අරවා මේවා තිබුණා. මුලින්ම එතැනදී තමයි, මෙතැනින් ඉරක් ගසා "Why do we not take Rs. 20 bilion" කියන කථාව විමසා සිටියේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

නම් ලැයිස්තුව පෙන්වා සිටියාද, ඉල්ලා ගත්තාද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ වේලාවේ මෙතුමා අතේ තිබුණු නාම ලේඛනය එතුමා අරගෙන බැලුවා

The Hon. DayasisriJayasekara

He took it from your hand

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ කියා සිටි conversation එක වුණා. ඊට පසුව "මේක වැඩියි" කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් යෝජනා කරන කොට, අධිපතිතුමා 10 කියන තැනට ඇඟිල්ල තියා පෙන්වා සිටිමින් "Take Rs. 10 billion" ගන්න කියලා උපදෙස් දුන්නා. ඒ වේලාවේ මමත්, අනෙක් නිලධාරිනුත් මේ නිලධාරි මහත්වරුත් එතැන සිටියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා instructions දුන්නා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනා පිළිගන්නවා. ඒක order එකක්ද, මේක ගන්න - "Do it" - කියලා කිව්වාද නැත්නම්, මේක ගන්න කියලා කිව්වාද, කොහොමද කිව්වේ?

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

බලපෑමක් සහිත ප්‍රකාශයක් ද කළේ?

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒ ගැන පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමන්ලා සමඟ අපි කටයුතු කිරීමේදී එක්, එක් අධිපතිතුමන්ලා කථා කරන විධිය සහ නියෝග ලබා දෙන විධිය වෙනස්. මෙතුමා නම්, ඉතාම කාරුණික විධියට - diplomatic - තමයි යම් දෙයක් කරමු කියලා කියන්නේ. ඒ එතුමාගේ පුද්ගලික චරිතය. නමුත් මේ conversation එකේදී අධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලිව තරයේ කියා සිටියා,රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා. ඒක තමයි එතුමිය කිව්වේ කියලා මම හිතනවා."Do it" කියන්නේ, ඒක summarize කරලා මෙන්න මේක තමයි අදහස වුණේ කියන එක මිසක් ඒ වචනයම නොවෙයි. ඒක තේරුම ගන්න ඕනෑ මේ sum

conversation එකේදී රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියන එක එතැන සිටි සියලු දෙනාටම පැහැදිලි වුණා.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

There was a one more instruction' "The Governor very clearly said that, "with this auction we can stop going for direct placements"

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

කරුණාකර නැවත කියන්න.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

"with this auction we can stop going for direct placements"

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා:"Direct placements වලට යන්නේ නැතිව auctions වලට යා යුතුයි". කියලා, ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර තීරණයක් ගත්තා කියලා, එතුමා ඒ අවස්ථාවේ කියා සිටියාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim:Not for us.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙම එකක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. හරි. එතුමා මේ තීරණය ගන්න කොට ඔබතුමිය රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ට වඩා ගන්න බැහැ කියලා කිව්වා. ඒකට ඔබතුමිය කුමක් හෝ note එකක් දැම්මාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමිය දමපු note එක මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ වන විට report එක හදලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි. ඒ නිසා රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට නැවත report එකක් හදන්න කියලා මගේ නිලධාරින්ට කියන්න ඕනෑ නිසා මම ඒකට note එකක් දැම්මා, "Governor instructed to place price upto Rs.10 billion taking into consideration of additional Sundry requirements of the Government". කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ decision එක යන්නේ කොහාටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ ටික ගත්තා ඊට පසුව අපි යෝජනා කරන රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 auction එකත් සහිතව රුපියල් බිලියන 10 auction එකත් දමලා Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. Tender Board එකට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරලා අපි පුද්ගලිකව කිව්වා, "Governor ඇවිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා කිව්වා නැත්නම්, අපේ යෝජනාව තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි" කියලා

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේ Tender Board එකේ ඔබතුමා ඇතුළුව තව කවුද සිටියේ? ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ තීරණය ගැන ඒ කියන්නේ, "Governor ඇවිල්ලා කථා කළාම අපි ලිඛිතව මෙහෙම එකක් දුන්නා. ඒ මත තමයි තටයුතු කරන්නේ කියලා, Tender Board එකේදී සාකච්ඡා කළාද?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

"අධික පොලි අනුපාතයකට මෙපමණ මුදලක් ගන්නේ ඇයි?" කියලා මා විමසා සිටි බව මම මීට කලිනුත් පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Tender Board එක විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලා ගත් තීරණය, "බලපෑමක් මත ගත් තීරණයක්" කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය ගත් තීරණය නිවැරදි බවද නැත්නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබුණු instructions මත ඒ තීරණය ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණා කියලාද ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

මීට කලිනුත් මම කිව්වා, ඒ තීරණයට අපට ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණු තීරණයක් කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 50/51/52/53)

The Hon.Harshana Rajakaruna

I would like to know, when a bond is issued, with whom the final decision lies and what was the decision that they made when it comes to this controversial matter.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Let me in two months that I have arrived-

The present situation, since I have been in this position, the final signature is placed by the Governor of the Central Bank. Now, there is a process for this. I mean it really starts with the Appropriation Act and out of the Appropriation Act, you get the Government's borrowings requirement in any particular year.

Then, there is the Debt Management programme that works out for the year, which is done in collaboration with the ministry of finance. There is a Committee for the

Debt Management which does that, and they decide to how much to raise under each instrument, by way of Treasury Bills, Bonds and etcetera. So, that is at the beginning of the year.

Then, there is also a broad Calendar that is worked out as to how this money will be raised. Now, of course, that can change as the year goes on; if the government needs more money, less money, or etcetera. But, there is a broad framework that was established. Then, when one gets to the point where a bond has to be raised and issued, that first level of engagement is with the Debt Management Committee in the Public Debt Department. So, they work out the framework, in terms of amount, the maturity and is done with the representative of the Ministry of Finance also involved in it and then Okay.

The Hon.Harshana Rajakaruna

If I may interrupt on the reason that they went for a Bond Issue but not a Bill was because there was a ceiling and upper limit to issue bonds. It was almost there. Am I right?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

At that time, I was not there. But my understanding is that the Treasury Bill limit was not increased at that time, I think it was Rs.850 billion. I think the Government tried to get it increased. But, they were not been able to get it through Parliament. So, that put greater honours, on raising money through bonds. Then, there is a process for that. There are two Committees which go through the process. First one is within the Public Debt Department and the Technical Committee. Then, we have the Tender Committee which signature is placed by the Governor of the Central Bank.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna

So, what was the decision taken by the Chairman of the Tender Committee? Is he the decision maker at the end?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

No, they make the recommendations which are finally to be signed by the Governor. So, there is a Tender Committee chaired by the Deputy Governor which makes the final recommendations.

(යොමුව : 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් මස 08 දිනැති වාචික සටහන)

5.1.9 තවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ මිල ගණන්, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි සඳහන් ක්‍රමවේදයට අනුව විවිධ වූ විශ්ලේෂණයන්ට ලක් කිරීමෙන් පසු සකසන ලද විවිධ විකල්ප(Option) 07 ක් අතුරින් 05 වන විකල්ප අවස්ථාව අනුගමනය කිරීම උචිත බවත්, රු.බිලියන 2.608 ක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් උපයා ගන්නා

ලෙසත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවටරාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ජේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් නිර්දේශ හදනවා නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශ තුළ විකල්ප නිර්දේශ කිහිපයක් තිබුණා. ඒ අතරින් එකක් තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක නිර්දේශයක් සහිතව ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක නිර්දේශය අපට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. ඒක අපට ඉදිරිපති කරන්න හදමින් පැවතුණ එකක්.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

වෙන්දේසිය 11.04 ට අවසන් වුණා. ඊට පස්සෙ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී, අතිරේක අධිකාරීවරුන් සහ Front Office එකේ ප්‍රධානියා එකතුවෙලා බලනවා. කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක් අපට මේකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා. ඒ අනුව අපේ තීරණය වුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කළා. ඒකෙන් අදහස් කළේ අපි ඒක ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම පමණයි. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවෙන් තමයි තීරණය ගන්නේ. ඒක අවසන් වුණාට පසුව අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැමිණීම සිද්ධ වුනා. ඒ වෙලාවේ අධිපතිතුමා සමග නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමන්ලා දෙදෙනෙක් පැමිණ සිටියා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ අතිරේක අධිකාරීතුමා ඉතාම විස්තර සහිතව පැහැදිලි කළා රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යෑම කිසිම ආකාරයකින් යෝජනා කරන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම් ආසිම් මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ OperationManualඑකේ TenderBoardඑකට ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලේඛණ Annexes විධියට පෙන්වා තියෙනවා. ඉන් එක් ලේඛණයකින් තමයි අපි නොයෙකුත් විකල්පයන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත්

කරන්නේ. එම අවස්ථාවේ වෙළඳපොළ තත්ත්වය මත රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යෝජනා කිරීම තමයි අපි ලෑස්ති කරලා තිබුණු විකල්පය.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා ගේ ප්‍රශ්නය

ඔබතුමා සහ ඔබතුමිය කියනවා ඒක Advice එකක් විතරයි. Orderඑකක් නෙවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා 2.6 ගන්න එක තමයි fair කියන එක ටෙන්ඩර් Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

නැහැ. ඊට ප්‍රථම අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණියා

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක ප්‍රමාණය. අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ, එහෙම නෙවෙයි. රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ක් auction එකෙන් ගන්න කියලා. නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපි එකහෙලා කියා සිටියේ, මේ ප්‍රමාණයට යාම සුදුසු නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

යෝජනා හයක් යෝජනා කරලා තමයි ඔබතුමියන්ලා මේ කමිටුවට දමන්නේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමියන්ලා තව note එකකුත් දැමුවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

එතැනදී අධිපතිතුමා සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රකාශ කලාට පස්සේ "නැහැ රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යන්න ඕනෑ" කියනකොට මට සිදු වුණා FrontOffice එකට නියෝගයක් දෙන්න රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට තිබෙන විධියට මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්න කියලා. මොකද FrontOffice එකෙන් තමයි මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ නිලධාරියාට නැවත වාරයක් ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න කටින් කියලා බැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම ඒ නිලධාරියාට Notes කලා Governorගේ additional fund requirement එකක් තියෙනවා, ඒ අනුව රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට වාර්තාව හදන්න කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඊට පසුව අපි අරගෙන ගියේ අර රුපියල් බිලියන 10 කියන යෝජනාව. ඒ නිසා අපි සභාපතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා. "අපේ තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ප්‍රමාණය, නමුත් අපි මේ වාර්තාවේ ගෙනාවේ නැහැ අද අධිපතිතුමා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනෙකු සමග පැමිණියාම අපි යෝජනා කරන වාර්තාවට කැමති නැති නිසා අපට සිදු වුණා

රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක ප්‍රමාණයේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමට, මේ තමයි ඒ වාර්තාව" කියලා. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යෝජනා කළා මේ පිළිබඳව අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසීමක් කරන්න කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 14/15/16)

5.1.10 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1110 පැයට පවත්වන ලද වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ විස්තරද ඇතුළත් වූ 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහනඑදිනම පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. අනුපාතිකයන් ස්ථාවර කිරීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල (EPF),ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමණාකරන සමාගම**(NSB)** සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රක්ෂණ සමාගම**(SLIC)** වෙත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට විමසන ලෙසවැනි අදහසක් දැක්වෙන සටහනක් සහ වර්ෂ 20,30 සහ 50 ලෙස එක් වර්ගයකින් රු.බිලියන 10 ක් බැගින් නිකුත් කර බැඳුම්කර රු.බිලියන 40 ක් රැස්කර ගන්නා ලෙස සටහනක් ද තබමින් 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන තුළ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින අනුමැතිය දී තිබුණි. එහිදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිවක් එම අනුමැතියෙහි සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි. එම සටහන් දෙක (අ) සහ (ආ) ලෙස පහත දක්වා ඇත.

(අ) "Raise Rs.40 bn through issue of 20,30,50 years of T-Bonds, 10 bn each"

(ආ) "EPF/NSB/SLIC to be asked to stabilize rates"

(කෙසේ වෙතත් මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් වර්ෂ 50 කින් කල් පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලෙසට ඉහත (අ) ලෙස දක්වා ඇති සටහනේ තිබුණද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිහිටුවීමෙන් අනතුරුව කිසිදු අවස්ථාවක වර්ෂ 30 ඉක්මවා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර නොතිබුණු බවත් එහි දක්වා ඇති සංයුතියේ එකතුව රු. බිලියන 40 ක් නොවන බවත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.)

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.1.11 ඉහත ඡේද අංක 5.1.10 න් විස්තර කළ පරිදි රු.බිලියන 40 ක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා දිගුකාලීන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සෘජු ක්‍රමයට නිකුත් කිරීමක් ද මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින අනුමත කර තිබුණද 2015

පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට මාර්තු 06 දින දක්වා කාලය තුළ සිදු වූ සිදුවීම් පෙළ එකී නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟ නොවන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. එනම් අවශ්‍ය සම්පූර්ණ මුදලම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවති වෙන්දේසියෙන් සපයා ගැනීම සිදුකර තිබූ අතර එය භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව විසින් අනුමත කර තිබුණි. එසේම 2015 මාර්තු 06 දින දක්වා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ඍජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම අනුමත කර නොතිබුණි. 2015 මාර්තු 06 දිනැති හා MB/ER/5/3/2015 අංක දරන මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවට අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී භාවිතා කරන ඍජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කළ දැනුවත් කිරීම පරිදි එය එදිනම අපරඅනුමැතියට (Ratification) ලක් කර ඇත. තවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 23 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේ සටහන් අනුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් එම සතිය තුළ වසර 30 ක පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියක් පැවැත්විය යුතු බවට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට උපදෙස් දීම හැර ඍජු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යොදා ගැනීම සඳහා කිසිදු තීරණයක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ලබා ගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ජේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

සභික සාමාජික ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

Before the 8th of January, 2015 almost 95 percent of it was through privet placements. But, afterwards almost 100 percent of it was through auction. So, what is the reason? Was there a Government Policy decision to go for 100 percent auctioning or was it a decision taken by the Central Bank or the Monetary Board? So, Can you please give a clarification on that?

මහ බැංකු අධිපති

Sometimes back we had a hybrid system whereby we would auction part of the issuance to try to have price discovery and then have privet placement on the basis of the price discovered through the auction process. Then, we moved on to a full placement as you mentioned Hon.Member and there were concerns

whether there was a best way to achieve the objectives that the Government had and we moved to a full auction system.

Now, we are reviewing all that. We are questioning whether in a very thin market, like Sri Lanka because we are a frontier market. Our financial and capital market are in order to develop as we would want to be going forward which intend upon developing it. But at this point, we are questioning as to whether the best possible way is a full auction. So, whether we moved back to some kind of hybrid system or not; is something that my colleagues who are knowledgeable about this area are studying. We will also take on the Board some of the finding comings out of the report of the Auditor General's Department to try to arrive at what we think is the best, the most transparent and the fairest system. So, we are working on getting towards that.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna

The Governor, I am questioning you not regarding the future but about the past.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා -

පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක කර සියයට 100 ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් යනවා කියන තීරණයට මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අනුමැතියක් ලැබිලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. තවමත් ලැබිලා නැහැ.ඒක සිදුවුණේ පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා උදේ වෙන්දේසියට පෙර අපි සියලු දෙනාම ඉන්න තැන. මින් ඉදිරියට වෙන්දේසිවලින් පමණක් කරන බවටත් අනෙක් ක්‍රමයට කරන්නේ නැති බවටත් අධිපතිතුමා වාචිකව ප්‍රකාශ කළා. එතකොටත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒක අනුමත කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඊට පස්සෙ Board Meeting එක තිබුණේ මාර්තු 06 වැනිදා අධිපතිතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඇවිල්ලා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා.පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා පැවැත්වුණු වෙන්දේසියේදී සම්පූර්ණයෙන් සියයට සියයක් වෙන්දේසිය පමණක් කළා කියලා.ඒ පිළිබඳව දැනුම් දීමක් කළා. නමුත් ඒකත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට ලක්වෙලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. මොකද සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට ලක් වෙන්න නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක අනුමැතියට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා ඒ තීරණයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේකෙදි දැනුම් දීමක් පමණයි කරලා තිබුණේ. එතකොට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අධිපතිතුමා 27 වෙනිදාට පෙර කිසිම දිනක, අපි කිසිම කෙනෙක් එක්ක ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබුණෙත් නැහැ. කිසිම කෙනෙකුට දැනුම් දීමක් කරලා තිබුණෙත් නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ නිසා තමයි Tender

Committee එක දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව අතර recommendation වෙන විධියට ඒ ගොල්ලො රුපියල් මිලියන 2.5 ක් විතරක් අරගෙන ඉතුරුවික replacement කරන්න කියලා නිර්දේශ කරලා තිබුණේ. එතැනදි දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහිල්ලා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්ව නිසා තමයි Tender Committee එක ඒ ආකාරයට තීරණය කරලා තිබුණේ

ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්ණයට මගේ කෙටි පිළිතුරයි ඒ. ඒකට නිසි අනුමැතිය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් තවමත් ලැබී නැහැ.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 04/05)

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අධිපතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත කරලා (සියයට 5 පොලී අනුපාත සීමාව ඉවත් කිරීමට අදාල circular එක issue කිරීම), ඊලඟට Monetary Board එකේදී මේක ratify කළා. එතකොට ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ratify කළා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙන්න මේ තීන්දුවයි. නැතිව 100 per cent auction යන්න කියන තීන්දුව ratify කරලා නැහැ. මෙන්න මේක තමයිratify කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 21)

සභාපති ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා

ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්න පුළුවන් කාටද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා.

තීරණ ගන්න පුළුවන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයටත් මොකද, කලින් - 2008 වසරේදී - මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගන්න තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ දෙක මිශ්‍ර කරලා තීරණ ගන්න කියලා. එතකොට ඒ තීරණය වෙනස් කරනවා නම් ගන්න පුළුවන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට පමණයි.

සභාපති ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය හැර ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න වෙනත් කාට හෝ පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

වෙනත් යෝජනා කරන්න පුළුවන්, පස්සෙ අපේ අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා අපි දැක්කා පස්සේ කාලයක අගමැතිතුමා කිව්වාය කියලා. එහෙම අගමැතිතුමා නිර්දේශ කලත් ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය නීතිමය ආකාරයට අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා.මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් නැතිව රජය - මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා හෝ

අගමැතිතුමා- යෝජනා කළත් ඒ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ගත්තාට පස්සෙ තමයි නීතිමය වශයෙන් ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ හැකි වන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

අගමැතිතුමා ඒ නිර්දේශය ලිඛිතව ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මම නම් ඒක පුද්ගලිකව දැකලා නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ ඒකත් පසුකාලීනව COPE එකෙන් අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසනකොට තමයි එතුමා කියලා තිබුනේ මේක අගමැතිතුමා තමයි කියලා තිබුණේ කියලා. නමුත් අපිත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරන වෙලාවේ අගමැතිතුමා කිව්ව කථාවක් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

අගමැතිතුමා විසින් ඒක ලිඛිතව ලබා දීමක් හෝ අගමැතිතුමාටඒහෙම බලයක් කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ලබා දීමක් හෝ සිද්ධ වෙලා නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට මම එහෙම ලිඛිත ලියවිල්ලක් දැකලා නැහැ. ඒක ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා නැහැ. පසුව Bribery Commission එකෙන් Tender Committee එකෙන්, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් විමර්ශන කිහිපයක් පැවැත්වුවා. ඒ කිසිම තැනකදී මාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට එහෙම ලියවිල්ලක් තවම ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

ඔබතුමා කිව්ව විධියට දැන් Tender මණ්ඩලයට වාඩි වෙලා නේ මේක බලන්නේ.එතකොට බලලා තමයි අපිට හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ. නමුත් දැන් මෙතැන එහෙම නොවේ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. Tender මණ්ඩලය බලලා,ඒක විවෘත කරලා පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට පෙර, පූර්ව තීරණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. මෙය මුළුමනින්ම ගන්නේ වෙන්දේසියක් මත කියලා.ඒ නිසා වෙන්දේසිය මත ගැනීම සිදු වන්නේ හැකිතාක් කියන එකට යටත්ව නොවෙයි. මුළුමනින්ම කියන එකට යටත්වයි.

(ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා සම්බන්ධිතයි)

මොකද, වාඩි වීමට පෙර අධිපතිතුමා විසින් වෙන්දේසියෙන් සියල්ල ගන්න කියලා තීරණයක් ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නේද සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව ක්‍රම තුනයි තිබෙන්නේ. සියයට 100 ක් auction ක්‍රමය සියයට 100 ක් direct placement ක්‍රමය, ඊලඟට ඒ දෙක මිශ්‍ර තවත් එක් ක්‍රමයක්. 2008 වසරේදී තීරණයක් ගත්තා මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට යනවා කියලා. මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට ගියා. එතකොට මේ සිද්ධිය වෙන තාක් මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට තමයි ගියේ. ඒ මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලැබුණා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුලින්ම ලැබිලා තිබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඒ අනුමැතිය මුලින්ම ලැබිලා ඒක දිගටම ගෙන ගියා. දිගටම ආපු මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට අනුමැතිය ලැබුණට මේ අදාල සිද්ධිය ඒ ගණයට වැටෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මේක යන්නේ සියයට 100 ක් auction ක්‍රමයට. ඒක තුන්වැනි ක්‍රමය. මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට ලැබුණු අනුමැතියට නැවත වතාවක් යනවා නම් " හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක්" කියලා නෙමෙයි වැටෙන්නේ සියයට 100 ක් කියලා. එතකොට මේ ක්‍රමයට නැවත වතාවක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගත යුතුයි. මම කියන කාරණය හරිද? වැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මම එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය

මුලුමනින්ම auction වලට යන්න කියන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කල මොකක් හරි ලියවිල්ලක් තිබේද? මහ බැංකුවේ නැද්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මගේ ළඟ නම් එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට මම දැකලා නම් නැහැ. තිබෙන එකම ලියවිල්ල වන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා දැනුම් දීම විතරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා

නමුත්, "දැනුම්දීමක්" සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් ගන්න වෙන්නේත් නැහැ.2008 වසරේදී ගත්ත ඒ තීරණය අපට ලැබෙන්න සලස්වන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 05/07/08)

ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා, Privet Placement එකක් වෙනුවට Auction එකක් කරපු නිසා සිදු වූ මිල වෙනස් වීම පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනයට අනුව අපි අර්ථකථනයක් කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපි දැන් මෙතන පිළිගත්තා මේ වැඩය ක්‍රමවේද තුනකට කරන්න පුලුවන් කියලා.මේ ක්‍රමවේද තුනෙන් එකක් හෝ නිවැරදි හෝ වැරදි ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඔබතුමා මට තාක්ෂණිකව කියන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ක්‍රමවේද තුනක් තියෙන්නේ- Options තුනක් තියෙනවා කියන එකයි. මගේ දැනුම අනුව මේක හරිද වැරදිද කියන එකට වඩා, වඩාත් සුදුසු මොකක්ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව මට කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඒක මටත් පුළුවන්. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් සෘජු ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නේ. මෙතැන නිවැරදි ක්‍රමයක් හෝ වැරදි ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා මට කියන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මට එක් ක්‍රමයක් නිවැරදිද වැරදිද කියලා කියන්න අපහසුයි. මොකද මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරියෙක් විදිහට මම කියන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය තිබෙන එකක් නම් ඒක නිවැරදියි.මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය නැති දෙයක් නම් ඒක වැරදියි. ඒක නීති විරෝධී වැඩක් කියලා.

ගරු ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය තිබුණාද නැද්ද කියන එක අපිට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, අපි hypothetically අහන්නේ මේ options තුනෙන් එක option එකක් නිවැරදි හෝ options දෙකක නිවැරදි හෝ options තුනම නිවැරදි වෙන්න හැකියාවක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswamy

May I Intervene?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva. Yes Governor

ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජිත් කුමාරස්වාමි මහතා

As this is a Question in terms of the options and not as to exactly what happened , I hope you will not mind me also commenting though I have come into the process later.As to which the best system is depends on the conditions and the nature of each market. For each market, different system is appropriate. On the face of it, an auction system is very fair and very transparent in principle. But if it is a very thin market , it is possible to manipulate it. So, you have to really think through carefully and sometimes, it may has to be through trial and error. You may think that you are introducing a very transparent system but that may not workout very well. So, to answer your question, there is no right or wrong way a priori. You have to fit the system to the conditions that exist in your market.

The Hon. (Dr) Harsha De Silva.

Precisely, that is what I wanted to know. Because, the issue at hand is whether one particular system was right or wrong. So, there is no right or wrong system. That is what I just wanted to establish at a technical level.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

අපට ක්‍රමවේදයක් පිළිබඳ සැලකිල්ලක් කරලා නිවැරදි මොකක්ද වැරදි මොකක්ද කියන එක කියන්න අපහසු නම්, යම් නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවක් ගැන සලකා එම ගනුදෙනුවේදී අනුගමනය කරන්නේ මොන ක්‍රමවේදයද කියන එක මත වෙන වාසි හෝ අවාසි කියන්න පුළුවන් නේද? එක් ගණුදෙනුවකට එක් ක්‍රමයක් ආදේශ කළාම අවාසි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් තවත් ගණුදෙනුවකදී ඒ ක්‍රමයම අනුගමනය කලාම වාසි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවකදී එම ගණුදෙනුව අරභයා අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන සැලකිල්ලක් කරලා ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය හොඳද, නරකද, වාසි අවාසිද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම හිතන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ වාර්තාවෙන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒක තමයි.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 09/10)

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

තව ප්‍රශ්ණයක් මතු වුනා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සඳහන් කලා විස්සයි අසූව වගේ rateඑක පවත්වාගෙන යනකොට, විස්සක් auction කරලා ඒ විස්සට ලැබෙන අගය මත direct placement කරනවා කියලා. ඒක හරිද? එහෙම Practice එකක් තිබුණාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

පසුගිය කාලය තුල බැලුවොත් සාමාන්‍ය වශයෙන් එහෙම තමයි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අවසර දෙනවා නම් හේතු කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

අන්තිමට කියපු දේ මට ඇහුණේ නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එහෙම උනේ ඇයි කියන එකට අවශ්‍ය නම් කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර දිය හැකියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

පැහැදිලි කර දෙන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම හේතුව වන්නේ, අපේ රටේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙළඳපොළ ඉතාම සුළු එකක්. ඒ වෙළඳපොළේ ප්‍රධානම ගණුදෙනුකරු විධියට එන්නේ සහ විශාලම fund එක EPF එක. ඒකෙන් සියයට හැත්තෑපහක් විතර ප්‍රමාණයක් EPF එක වාගේ එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. අනෙක් අය ඉතාම පොඩි අය. ඒ වාගේ පොඩි market එකක සියයට සියයක් තරහකාරී ලෙස කරන්න ගියොත් ඒ වගේ market එකකදී පොළී අනුපාත උච්ඡාවචනය වීම ඉතාම විශාලයි. ඒක ආර්ථිකයට සුදුසු නැහැ. ඒක නිසා තමයි සියයට හැත්තෑපහක් විතර අය පැත්තකට තැබුවහම නියම market value කියන එක තෝරා ගැනීමට පහසු ක්‍රමයට තමයි යම් කිසි market playersලාට ඒ අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්නේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙන්නේ පසු ගිය කාලයේ වුණෙත්

එහෙමයි. සියයට සියයක් ඒ වගේ ක්‍රමවේදයන් ගන්න ගියාම, අපේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තියේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවාට වඩා පොලී අනුපාත විශාල වශයෙන් ඉහල ගියා. මගේ විශ්වාසයේ හැටියට මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය පිළිබඳ ප්‍රධාන භාරකරු විධියට මහ බැංකුවේ පොලී අනුපාත එතරම් ඉහල යෑම රජයේ ආර්ථිකයටත්, රජයේ ණය ගැනීමටත් හොඳ නැහැ.අනෙක ඒ රටේ ස්ථාවරත්වයට,පුද්ගලික අංශයේ ණය ගැනීමටත් අවාසිදායකයි. මහ බැංකුව වශයෙන් අපේ එක්තරා වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා. පොලී අනුපාත කිසි ආකාරයකට වෙළඳපොළ අනුව හැසිරීමට ඉඩ දෙන ගමන්, ක්‍රමාණුකූලව ඒක ස්ථාවර තත්ත්වයට පත් කරගෙන ඉදිරියට යන්න මේ වගේ විශාල වශයෙන් අඩු වැඩි වීම් වැලැක්වීමට. ඒක නිසා තමයි එම ක්‍රමවේදය තුළින් යම්කිසි ආකාරයක ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් පවත්වාගන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ, විස්සයි අසූව වගේ ක්‍රම වේදයකින් පසුගිය කාලයේ ගිය නිසා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

විස්ස auction කරනකොටත් වෙළඳපොළ පුංචි වීම වාගේම වෙළෙඳ පොළේ playersලා ඉන්න ප්‍රමාණය අඩු වීම නිසා, යම් ආකාරයක manipulation එකක් එතැන විය හැකියි නේද? probability එක ගැන මම අහන්නේ. Governor කියපු අපේ market එකේ තිබෙන weakness එක 20 percent සම්බන්ධව වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. මොකද market එක දන්නවා මේ 20 percent based කරගෙන තමයි ඊලඟට rates වලට Central Bank එක යන්නේ කියලා. Epolicy එක Known policy එකක් එහෙම නැත්නම් 20 percent සම්බන්ධව auction එකේදි manipulation කරනවා නම් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එතැනදී කරන්න තිබෙන ඉඩකඩ ඉතාම අඩුයි. ඊට හේතුව මෙතැන flexibility එකක් තිබෙනවා. අපට තීරණය කරන්න සියයට විස්සක් ගන්නවාද, සියයට විසිපහක් ගන්නවාද, බිංදුවක් ගන්නවාද කියලා. එතකොට අපි හිතුවොත් ද්විතිය වෙළෙඳපොළේ market එකේදි interestrates වලට වඩා විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා කියලා, අපිට ඒක reject කරලා direct placement වලට යන්න පුළුවන් option එක තිබෙනවා. එතකොට අපට ඒක ගන්නම ඕනෑ කියලා එකක් නැහැ. market එකත් ඒක දන්න නිසා ඒ වෙළඳ පොළ ආසන්නයේම තමයි ඒ අය bid කරන්නේ. ඊට වඩා වැඩිපුර හෝ ගොඩක් වැඩියෙන් කළොත් අපි ඒක reject කරන්න ඕනෑ වෙලාවක පුළුවන්. මොකද ඒ වෙනුවට අපට ඉතිරිවික replacement වලින් ගන්න පුළුවන්. මේ යන ක්‍රමය තුළ එහෙම option එකක් නැතිව market එක දන්න නිසා ඒ අයට ඕනෑම ගණනකට දාන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද දන්නවා,

මේක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා, අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම අපි ඒක ගැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒගොල්ලන්ට ඒකෙන් manipulate කරන්න තිබෙන අවස්ථා වැඩී.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

මම හිතන්නේ මේ බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය ඉතාමත් සංකීර්ණ ක්‍රියාවලියක්. එවැනි සංකීර්ණ ක්‍රියාවලියක් නිසාම තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයක් මගින් මේ තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්න කියලා manual එකක් මගින් මහ බැංකුවේ නීති පනවා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේ දක්වා අපේ රටේ ඉතිහාසයේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියන සාමාජිකයෝ ස්වාධීනව ඒ යුතුකම විගකීම ඉටු කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේක කණ්ඩායමක් විධියට ගත යුතු තීන්දුවක්. අපි බලන්න ඕනෑ මේ ක්‍රම තුනෙන් මොන මොන ක්‍රමය හොඳද නැද්ද කියන එක තර්ක කිරීම අපට කරන්න පුළුවන්කමකුත් නැහැ. ඒක අපට කරන්න අවශ්‍යතාවයකුත් නැහැ. නමුත් ඒ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියකින් තොරව අධිපතිවරයාගේ පෞද්ගලික අභිමතාර්ථය මත පමණක් මේක ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම යන කරුණ තමයි මෙතැන සිදුවී ඇති වැරැද්ද. අපි ඒ නිසා ඒ පිළිබඳව කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ. මේ ක්‍රමවේදවලින් අපට තර්ක කිරීම් අඩු වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. සමහර විට අද කරපු එකට ඊලඟ සුමාන දෙකත් එක්ක බැලුවාම මේ දෙක සන්සන්දනාත්මකව බැලුවොත් පළමුවැනි සුමානයේ කරපු එකට වඩා වැඩි වාසි තිබෙන්න පුළුවන් ඊලඟ සුමානයේ කරපු එකට. මේකේ ස්වභාවය මේක තමයි. ඒ නිසා උපරිම වාසියක් රට වෙනුවෙන් ඒ තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්න තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඉන්නේ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීන්දු තීරණ අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. නමුත් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙතන එවැනි ආකාරයේ දෙයක් සිද්ධ නොවීම තමයි ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්, තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් සහ නීතිමය වශයෙන් වැරැද්ද වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 10/11)

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා

Bond එක issue කරලා තිබෙන්නේ අවුරුදු තිහකට තමයි. ඒක පළමුවැනි වතාවටද කරලා තිබෙන්නේ නැත්නම් මීට කලින් එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතාගේ පිළිතුර

මීට කලින් අවුරුදු 30 ට issue කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අවුරුදු 30 කට වගේ issue කරනකොට ලංකාවේ තිබෙන ප්‍රධාන බැංකු, රාජ්‍ය බැංකු සහ EPF,ETF අරමුදල්වලට ප්‍රමුඛත්වයක් ලබා දිය යුතුයි කියන අදහසක් නිල නොවන වශයෙන් තිබෙනවා නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

විශේෂයෙන් එවැනි ඒවාට ආයෝජනය කරන්නේ Pension Funds, insurance වගේ ඒවා තමයි ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් ආයෝජනය කරන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා

එවැනි තීන්දුවක් ගැනීමේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය නොතකා වසර 30 ක් වාගේ විශාල Bond එකක් මේ වාගේ auction එකකට යාමෙන් ඇති වන පාඩුව පිළිබඳ වගකීම කරන්නේ කවුද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මෙතනදී පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ අවුරුදු 30 ක Bond එකක් issue කරන්න ඕනෑ. කියන එකට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් ඊට කලින් අරන් තිබෙනවා. සියයට සියයක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන එකට තමයි අනුමැතිය නැත්තේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මේක අවුරුදු 30කට යන්න කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් කවදාද අනුමැතිය ගත්තේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

27 ට කලින් තිබුණ මුදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී ගත්තේ,

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

සතියකට කලින් නේද ගත්තෙ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒ සතියේ දවස් කිහිපයකට කලින් ගත්තේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා.

ඒකේ විස්තර ටික අපට බලන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එතැනදී ගරු ඇමතිතුමා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ අලුතින් අවුරුදු 30 bond එකක් issue කරනවා කියලා තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය අරන් තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් මීට ඉස්සර වෙලා අවුරුදු 30 bond issue කරලා තිබෙනවා ටෙන්ඩර් කොමිටිය මගින්

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මේ වගේ මුදලක් ගත්ත එකේ පරමාර්ථය මොකක්ද කියලා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවා නේද? ප්‍රාග්ධන වියදමක් සඳහාද? නැත්නම් පුනරාවර්ථන වියදමක් සඳහාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින් අපේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව දැනුම් දෙනවා ඊලඟ මාසයේ තිබෙන අවශ්‍යතාවය කොපමණද කියලා. ඒ අවශ්‍යතාවය අනුව තමයි වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මම කල්පනා කරන විධියට පොලී ගෙවීමට නම් අරන් තිබෙන්නේ, ඇයි අපි ණය පියවීම සඳහා නම් මේක අරන් තිබෙන්නේ, අපි අවුරුදු 30 ක් දක්වාම මේක ගත්තේ ඇයි කියන එකයි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්ණය. ප්‍රාග්ධන වියදමකට නම් අවුරුදු 30 ක කාල වකවානුවක් තුළ ගත්තාම කමක් නැහැ. එදිනෙදා කෙටි මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයන් වලට නම් මේක ගත්තේ. ඇයි අවුරුදු 30 කට ගියේ කියන කාරණය තමයි අපට බලන්න වෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක තර්කයක් විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කර තිබුණා මේ සිද්ධියේදී බිලියන 13.5ක් සඳුදා වනවිට අවශ්‍යයි කියලා කිව්වාම ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට නිදහස තිබෙනවා ඒක කොහොමද raise කරන්න ඔනෑ කියන එක මොන instrument එකද, කෙටි කාලීන එකක්ද දිගු කාලීන එකක්ද කියලා තීරණය කරන්න. ඒ අනුව මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අවුරුදු 30 ක එකක් නිකුත් කරනවා කියලා ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් තීරණය කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඒ අය තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් ගත් තීන්දුවක්. ඒක ගත්තේ ඇයි කියන එක.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 12)

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට පොඩි clarification එකක් තියෙනවා. මේ bond issue එක නිකුත් කරන අවස්ථාවේ රටේ අවශ්‍යතාව රුපියල් බිලියන 13යි ගණනක් කියලා කිව්වා නේ. එහෙම රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් අවශ්‍ය එකට රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක් සඳහා විතරක් අවසරයක් දෙන්නේ ඇයි?නිර්දේශ කළේ නැහැ. Governor ඇවිල්ලා ඒක රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා වැඩි කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒක අපි කලින් පැහැදිලි කර ගත්තා. ඔබතුමාට මෙතුමන්ලාගෙන් අහන්න අයිතිය තියෙනවා. ඒකෙ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එහි පොලී අනුපාතය මහ බැංකුවට වාසි වන සීමව තමයි, ඒ අය ලකුණු කරන්නේ Rs.2.6 billion කියලා.ඒක තියෙන්නේ auction එකෙන් ගන්න. ඉතුරුවික privet placements වලින් ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ option ඒක ඒ අය දෙනවා. ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව තියෙනවා. රුපියල් බිලියනයට සීමා කලා නම්, රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ට සීමා කළා නම්, රුපියල් බිලියන 10ට සීමා වූ අවස්ථාවේ, ආදී වශයෙන් එක් එක් අවස්ථාවේදී සිදු වූ අවාසියේ ස්වාභාවය.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

දැන් රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව මත සතිපතාම මුදල් අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය සතිපතාම යන ක්‍රමවේදයක්. මේ ප්‍රශ්නයෙන් පස්සේ අලුතින් තීන්දුවක් අරගෙන තියෙනවාද? ඉදිරියේදී privet placement වලට යනවාද? Auction වලට යනවාද? එහෙම තීන්දුවක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවාද?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

First one is I see no difficulty in meeting a request that the Member of the committee have the guidelines of the EPF and the Manual for the Public Debt Department. We will certainly, make that available. The second thing is I think from the discussion it has become clear that we need to give consideration to the architecture of the way we operate in the bond market as well as process and procedures. As the DSG Mr.Samarasiri said where we want to get to in the future is probably a full auction because that is very transparent and very fair. But we are on where near there yet because the architecture in our market is not ready for it. So we need to ask ourselves the question what are the development; as a Central Bank what we need to promote to go more towards a full auction process but we are certainly not ready for it yet.

The third point I would like to make is that you know because we had a quite a lot of discussion of the 30 year bond we need to develop the long term debt market. In the old days we used to get long – term loans from the World

Bank and the Asian Development Bank at very concessionary terms which we used to build our infrastructure. But now as a lower middle income country we are not eligible for those long –terms loans. If we can develop our long term debt market, that is all to the benefit of the country. In addition, a kind of investor who wants these long - term instruments is our insurance companies, for instance. Our level of insurance cover in this country is very law. But as income rise and as we progress hopefully, that coverage will increase and insurance companies, for instance. Our level of insurance cover in this country is very low. But as income rise and as we progress hopefully, that coverage will increase and insurance companies will need investments of a long term nature to match their kind of maturity requirements. This is again something we want to do because this one issue with a 30-year bond has caused difficulty does not mean that we should not develop the long – term debt market and I think certainly in the Central Bank, I am sure my colleagues would agree that, we need to do that. We will see what architecture again that we need to create to make sure that is done in a transparent and a credible way. With regard to as to whether we have taken some action already, because the things are being talking to you about our things which we are going to do so far but one or two actions I believe have already been taken. My colleagues will correct me if I am wrong.

For instance, we have strengthened the firewalls between the different stages of the process. As you know, the bond auction is a three step process from the beginning to the end and there are three committees. For instance, no longer can anybody serve on more than one committee. I think, that is the decision you talked about to strengthen the firewalls and balance. So, that is one step we have taken and we are going to look very carefully at the Auditor- General ‘s Report to see whether there are other lessons that we can learn in terms of strengthening our processes. So, both in terms of the overall architecture of the bond market and in terms of processes and procedures, we are looking at how we can improve it and my colleagues will come up with a paper which we want to put to the Monetary Board and get

the new architecture and processes and procedures approved. It is not casting stones. As we move forward, as our market develops, as it requires other things and as our knowledge improves, we will obviously review and revise that as we go along. But, we will be very happy to keep you informed about our thinking as we go forward.

සභාපතිතුමා

මම හිතන්නේ තවත් ප්‍රශ්න කිහිපයක් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාවය තිබෙනවා. ඇත්තටම මට මේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව අවශ්‍යතාව තිබෙන්නේ එක පුද්ගලයෙක් පිළිබඳව හෝ පුද්ගලයෙක් දෙන්නෙක් පිළිබඳව හෝ අඩුපාඩු පිළිබඳ දකින්න හෝ නොවෙයි. මේ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී රටට මූල්‍යම වශයෙන් පාඩුවක් සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවාද ඒ පාඩුව මකා ගන්නේ කොහොමද ඉදිරියට එවැනි දේවල් ඇති නොවන්න අපි ගන්න ඕනෑ පියවර මොකක්ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නයි. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට තිබෙන වගකීම, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට තිබෙන වගකීම පිළිබඳව බලන්න.

බැඳුම්කරයක කාලය තීරණය කිරීමේදී ඒ තීරණය ගන්න ව්‍යුහය පිළිබඳව. ඒකෙ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ කා අතද? ඒකට මහ බැංකුවේ දායකත්වය, අමාත්‍යාංශයේ දායකත්වය, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ දායකත්වය කොයි ආකාරයෙන්ද? එතකොට බැඳුම්කරයක කාලය තීරණය කරන්න ඔබතුමන්ලා කරන සමීක්ෂණයක් තිබෙනවාද? ඒ තොරතුරු කොහොමද සම්පාදනය කර ගන්නේ. ඒ සමීක්ෂණ පත්‍ර research papers ලබාගන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක පිළිබඳව. ඊලඟට විශේෂයෙන්ම අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මහා බැංකුවේම පාලනය යටතේ තිබෙන ආයතනයක්. තැරැව්කාර ආයතනයක් හැටියට කටයුතු කරද්දී ඒකට සම්බන්ධ වෙන ඒ පාලන ක්‍රමයන් පිළිබඳව අපට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාව තිබෙනවා. එතකොට ඔවුන්ගේ ආයෝජන අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ ආයෝජනValue for money ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුව කොහොමද යෙදවෙන්නේ කියන එක අපට පැහැදිලි කරගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ප්‍රශ්න ප්‍රමාණය ඔබතුමාට යොමු කරන්නම්. මම මේ සාරාංශය ඉදිරිපත් කළේ. ඒකටත් පුළුවන් තරම් ඔබතුමාගේ පිළිතුරු ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඉතාම කෙටියෙන් කියන්න කැමතියි. දැන් ඒ firewalls හදද්දී, පසුගිය එකේ දැනගන්න ලැබුනු දේ තමයි Governor ගේ involvement එක. පුද්ගලයා ඒ නිසා controlsවලට මේ Governor කවුරු වුණත් අද Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswamy ඉන්නවා. හෙට වෙන කෙනෙක්එන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකත් ඔබතුමාගේ firewall- එයාට පුළුවන් නම් Economic Policy Committee එකට chair කරන්න.

එයා Member නෙවෙයි Chair කරනවා, Decisions ගන්නවා. ඊට පස්සේ floor එකට ඇවිල්ලා order එකක් දෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ Tender Committee එකට call කරලා order එකක් දෙනවා. Finally, you are useless. ඒ නිසා firewalls හදන්න - බෑණා ඉන්න නිසාම නෙවෙයි මම කින්නේ, බෑණා කෙනෙක් නැති වුණත් deal එකක් කරන්න පුළුවන්නේ. දැන් බෑණා හිටපු නිසානෙ අපට මේක trace කරන්න ලෙහෙසි. බෑණා කෙනෙක් නැති වුණත් එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්නේ. ඒ නිසා ඒ වාගේ firewalls දාන්න කියලා Governor කොහොමද මේ process එකට involve වෙද්දී තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ limitation?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 38/39/40/41)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැනදී රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය communicate කරන, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය දැනුම් දීම නේ වැදගත් වන්නේ, සාමාජිකයෙක් වශයෙන් ලේකම්තුමා ඉන්නවා. නමුත්, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය දැනුම් දුන්නාම රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සහ අනෙකුත් මූලධර්ම සමඟ ගලපා ක්‍රියා කිරීම තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ පිළිබඳව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමගෙන් අපි පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමක් කර ගනිමු කෝ. මෙපමණ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් වැය වුණු ආකාරය, එදා තිබුණු අවශ්‍යතාව, එතකොට මේ සඳහා යොමු වෙන්න තිබුණු කාරණා පිළිබඳව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා පුළුවන් නම් කරුණාකරලා අපට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා

මේ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය policy එක පිළිබඳවයි. ඒක පොදු කාරණාවක් මේ කාරණාව විතරක් නෙවෙයි, පොදුවේ මහ බැංකුව තීරණ ගැනීමේදී ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක්- මොකද, මෙතැනදී අපි සාකච්ඡා වුණා නේ බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලියේදී බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය වෙනස් කිරීම පිළිබඳව. ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්නේ- එතැනදී තමයි මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය කියන වචනය ආවේත්, ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ගන්නේ කවුද කියන එක පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්නය මතු වුණේත්.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඉතා පැහැදිලියි අපි ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇහුවොත් ඒක නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. සභාපතිතුමා කිව්ව ආකාරයට ඒක අවශ්‍යද?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒක ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. එකේ ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාට පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑකම තිබෙන්නේ මේ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය අපට හැදුණේ ඇයි කියන එක සම්බන්ධව නේ. මේ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය හැදුනේ අපිට බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡාවක් ආවා, එතකොට අපිට අවසාන දවසකට කලින් සාකච්ඡාවේදී මතු වුණා මේක ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් කියන එක. එතකොට මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්න පුළුවන් කාටද? ඒකේ බලය තිබෙන්නේ කාටද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

That is Correct

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒකේ බලය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනුනේ කවුද කියන සාකච්ඡාවට තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්ණයට උත්තර ආවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රශ්ණය ඇසුවා නම් හරි. This is asked from the Governor, As you said, the decision is taken by the Governor.

Mr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

That is the overall policy.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

That is correct. Why are you not agreeing? Did the Government not taken that decision?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

මෙතැනදී පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, හැම වෙලාවේම රජයට ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ අරගෙන මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්ණය වන්නේ, මුදල් නීති පනත යටතේ රජය යෝජනා කරන යම් කිසි ප්‍රතිපත්ති ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේදී ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන ද ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුත්තේ කියලා නේ.එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවාද නැද්ද කියන එක ගැන.

එතකොට, එතැන තමයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ බලතල තිබෙන්නේ. ඕනෑම රජයකට, ප්‍රතිපත්ති අනුව මේ මේ දේවල් කරන්න කියලා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යෝජනා කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ යොජනාව සලකා බලා, තීරණය කර, ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ බලය ලැබෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළාට පසුවයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

My question was not that. ඔබතුමන්ගෙන් මම අහුවේ අනුමැතිය ගැනීම ගැන නොවෙයි. මම ඇහුවේ ආණ්ඩුවකට ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුවක් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා.

According to the way you explain, what I understood is that the decisions taken by the Government may become policies. Am I right?

Mr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

When it comes to those areas which falls within the remit of the Monetary Board, the Government can set the overall policy, but, as the Deputy Governor explained, the Monetary Board then would interpret how that should be implemented.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Correct. So, has that policy got to be in writing or how does it come? Can it be a statement made by the Hon. Prime Minister or can it be an indication made by the Minister of Finance? Can that be a mode of communication based on a statement because everything will not be sent to the Monetary Board in writing? That is what I want to get at. I know what it is, but I am asking about it from you.

Dr. P.N.Weerasinghe

The usual practice is, for example, if there is a Government decision made in Cabinet, then, it is sent to the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I would like the Government to answer.

Dr. P.N.Weerasinghe

Okay.

Mr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

I must tell you that I am of course new to the subject.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I know, but I want at least Secretary to answer.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරාමහතා

සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, Deputy Governorගේ පිළිතුර පැහැදිලියි. නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන විදියට කැබිනට් තීරණයක් මත විතරයි policies හැදෙන්නේ. ඒක නිවැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක නිවැරදි නැහැ. මම පැහැදිලි කරන්න ගියේ, කැබිනට් තීරණයක් එක ආකාරයක් කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඔබතුමා ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නයට මෙතුමා පිළිතුරු දෙමින් සිටිද්දී බාධා කිරීමක් වෙලා තමයි අතර මඟදී නතර වීම වුණේ. සංකීර්ණ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසා, අපි කලිනුත් මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරද්දී ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කළා. සමහර මාතෘකා, සමහර වචන අපිට ගොඩක් පැහැදිලි නැහැ. ඒ නිසා නිලධාරි මහත්මයෙක් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීම යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට අවසන් වනතුරු එයට සවන් දීලා, නැවත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම කරමු. අපිට ඕනෑ තරම් කාලය තිබෙනවා. මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගොඩක් දුරට සාකච්ඡා කරලා, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් අවබෝධයක් හැම දෙනාටම තිබෙන නිසා, ඒ අයට පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන අතුරු ප්‍රශ්නය සටහන් කරගෙන පසුව අහන්න. ඔබතුමාට පැහැදිලි කිරීමට තව කාලය අවශ්‍ය නම්, ඒ කාලය අරගෙන පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ප්‍රශ්ණ අහන්න. ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කලින් ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නයටයි මම පිළිතුරු දෙන්නේ. එහි ක්‍රම කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි, කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලතීරණයක් නම් Cabinet Minute එකකින් දන්වනවා. එතකොට, අපි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒක පත්‍රිකාවක් වශයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා, අනුමැතිය අරගෙන ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවා. දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය තමයි. ගරු අගමැතිතුමා හෝ මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා යම්කිසි ආකාරයක රැස්වීමකදී හෝ වෙනත් අවස්ථාවකදී, අධිපතිතුමට හෝ මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරියෙක්ට කිව්වා නම් මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න කියලා, ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ අධිපතිතුමා හෝ නිලධාරියා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් කරලා, අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන තමයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒක වාචිකව කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඒ කියපු දේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී සඳහන් කරලා, අනුමැතිය ගත්තාට පසුව තමයි එය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මේ ප්‍රශ්ණගත කරුණ සිදුවන අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමාද මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ වශයෙන් ක්‍රියා කළේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපතීත්වය සැමවිටම දරන්නේ අධිපතිතුමා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී, Public Debt Department එකේ සභාපති ධූරය දැරුවේ කවුද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

අධ්‍යක්ෂතුමා

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

සම්පූර්ණ නම මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමියගේ සම්පූර්ණ නම ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය

දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ සීමිත කාරණාවක්. අපිට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා, ආණ්ඩුවේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් ගැන මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ආවාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒ ගැන සලකා බලා අවශ්‍ය තීන්දු ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගන්නවා කියලා. මට දැනගන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ, ආණ්ඩුවේ තීන්දුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කොයි ආකාරයෙන්ද එන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒක කැබිනට් තීන්දුවක් මාර්ගයෙන් එනවාද? ගරු අගමැතිතුමාට යම් ප්‍රකාශයක් කරලා, එය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යොමු කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? මම හිතන්නේ ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ලේකම්තුමාට කරන්න පුළුවන්. එය පැහැදිලි කර ගත්තාට පසුව අපිට සාකච්ඡාව මෙතැනින් ඉදිරියට ගරගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා

එතැනදී සභාපතිතුමා විදියට මටත් සාධරණයක් ඉෂ්ඨ විය යුතුයි. මම මුලින්ම ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇසුවා, මට තවම එයට පිළිතුරක් ලැබුනේ නැහැ. එයට පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න කලින් නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා අතුරු ප්‍රශ්නවලට ගියේ. කලින් වතාවේදී, බැඳුමකර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් "ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක්" කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි වුණාට පස්සේ, "ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගැනීම් පාර්ශවයන් කවුද?" කියලා, අපි ප්‍රශ්නාවලියක් යොමු කළා. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට දීලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නාවලියේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබාදුන් පිළිතුරේ සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා "....මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව....." කියලා. දැන් එතකොට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මුදල් මණ්ඩල පනතේ එහෙම නම් ඒ කාරණය තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. 8 (01) යටතේ මුදල් මණ්ඩල පනතේ, ඒ කාරණය ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම නැහැ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය consist වෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකත්වය තිබෙනවා - "The person holding office for the time being as Secretary to the Ministry in charge of the subject

of Finance,…" එතකොට මෙතැන තිබෙනවා, මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා නියෝජනය කරමින්, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගේ ලේකම්තුමා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ඉන්නවා කියලා. එතකොට මේ කාරණාවේදී "අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තිය" කිව්වාට පස්සේ, කවුද මේ අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා හැටියට සලකන්නේ. මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයා නම් ගැටළුවක් නැහැ. මොකද, මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ ලේකම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් විදියට ඉන්නවා නේ. මට පැහැදිල කර ගන්න ඕනෑ ඒ කාරණය. අනික් කාරණා ඔබතුමන්ලා පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න. මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය "අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා" විදියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ඉන්වා කියලා, ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් කළේ කවුද? මොකද මෙහි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්ණය වන්නේ බැදුම්කර සම්බන්දයෙන් මෙහි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න බලය තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට. මෙහි "විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා" හෝ "අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා" විදියට සලකන්නේ කවුද කියන එකයි පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍ය.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, උදව්වක් විදියට පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. ඔය වේලාවේ සාමාන්‍ය මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා ඔය විෂය ආවරණය කළාට, ඒ කාලය වන විට විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා නොවෙයි. මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳව විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒක තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලා ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා විදියට සලකලාද මේ "අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා" විදියට නම් කළේ. ඒකයි මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එහි "විෂයභාර අමාත්‍යවරයා" කියලා සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔව්. "..... අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ....." කියලා පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. මම අහන්නේ ඒ ගැන.

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ අතිවිශේෂ ගැසට් පත්‍රය - 2015.09.21 මඟින් තමයි ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති අමාත්‍යාංශයට මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළත් වනනේ. ඒ අදාළමය නීතිමය පනත් මේ ගැසට් පත්‍රයේ ඇතුළත් වෙනවා. මීට කලින් මහ බැංකුව තිබුණේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ. "විෂයභාර අමාත්‍යවරයා" කියලා කියන්නේ - ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා තමයි මේ අමාත්‍යාංශයේ විෂයභාර අමාත්‍යතුමා. නමුත්, මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දු ගැනීමේ කාරණයේදී

මෙතුමන්ලා කථා කරන්නේ, අභ්‍යන්තර ප්‍රශ්ණයක් - මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළේ වෙච්ච සිදු වීමක් ගැන. පොදුවේ ගතහෝත්, 2015.09.21 වැනි දින සිට අපේ අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ තමයි ගැසට් කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ ඇමතිතුමා වන්නේ ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා.

සභාපතිතුමා

එතකොට මට ගැටලුවක් මතු වෙනවා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන කොට, අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා විදියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ නියෝජනයක් නැහැ. ඒකයි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්ණය.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

දැන් මෙතැන වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඔය ඇතිවෙලා තිබෙන වෙන්සකම් එක්ක, විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා policy guidelines මහ බැංකුවට දෙනවා කියන එක තමයි. Practice එක.

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරන්නේ, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා, තමුන්ගේ ලේකම්වරයා මාර්ගයෙන් දෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන තිබෙන අවස්ථාව තමයි මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා නොවන නිසා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍ය, ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන අමාත්‍ය ගරු රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාට එවැනි නියෝජිත තත්ත්වයක් මෙහි තිබුණේ නැහැ. එහෙම නම් policy guidelines දීම, වගකීම, උත්තරය හා ප්‍රායෝගික තත්ත්වය අනුව පෙනෙනවා. එය අගමැතිතුමාගේ රාජකාරියක්. මේක අපි තේරුම්ගත යුතුයි. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයාගේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනුව කළ යුතු එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා

මේකට සම්බන්ධ කාරණාවක් දෙවැනි උත්තරයේ තිබෙනවා. මුදල් පනත යටතේ තිබෙන්නේ නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් සාමාජිකයෙකු හැටියට ඉන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ subject to finance මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා. මුදල් ඇමතිතුමාගේ ලේකම්වරයා. දෙවැනි කාරණාව ඔබතුමන්ලා සඳහන් කරනවා මේ විදියට "එසේ ලබාගත් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් සංශෝධනය කිරීමේ බලය හිමි පාර්ශවය කවුරුන්ද?" කියලා. සංශෝධනය කිරීමේ බලය කියන එකට ඔබතුමන්ලා කෙලින්ම සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය. එහෙම නම් මෙහිදී ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්න එක අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුකූල වෙන්න ඕනෑ නම්, සංශෝධන කිරීම වුණත් නැවත සිද්ධ වෙන්න ඕනෑකම තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනුව බැලුවොත්, ඒකයි ඔබතුමන්ලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ, නිශ්චිතවම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියලා. මෙහිදී මා ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ, ලේකම්තුමා, බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තොත්, ඔබතුමන්ලාට පැහැදිලි කරනවා නම්, මේ මුදල්

මණ්ඩලයේ බලතල අනුව තිබෙන්නේ, ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගැනීම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සතු බවයි. උපදේශයක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුව කියන එක හරි. නමුත් බලතල සම්බන්ධයේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා බලතල වෙනස් කර ගත යුතුයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, මීට කලින් Governor සහභාගි වූ අපි කලින් කරපු පරීක්ෂණයේදී, ඩී.වී.ගුණසේකර සභාපතිතුමා ඉන්න කාලයේදීත් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබුණා. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයාට මෙතැන බලයක් නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ ගැසට් වෙලා නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළු ඒ ආයතන ටික පවරා ගැනීමේදී. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මුල සිටම ප්‍රශ්නයක් ලෙස තිබුණා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

බලයක් නැහැ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

ගැසට් වෙලා නැහැ කියන එක. එම ගැටලුව තමයි මෙතැනට එන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ විෂය, අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාගේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති අමාත්‍යාංශයේ විෂයයක් හැටියට ගැසට් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා

තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

ඒකේ දිනය කවදාද?

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා

2015.09.02

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

එතැනදී මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා බොහොම පැහැදිලිව කියනවා, ඔහුට බැඳුම්කරවලට යන එක ගැන උපදෙස් දුන්නේ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා කියලා? එතැනින් එහාට සිදු වූ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන තමයි අපට ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, අපි බොහෝ වේලාවක් මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විවාද කරනවා. අපි මෙහි යම් කාරණයක් සම්බන්දයෙන් තමයි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. එතකොට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ සිදු වූ කථා බහෙන් policy එක හැදෙන්න කොහොමද කියන එක. ආණ්ඩුව හදන policy එක යම් කිසි ආකාරයකින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ලැබෙනවා. ඒ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් policy එක තීන්දු කරන එක ගැන තමයි ඔබතුමා අදහස් කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මම අදහස් කරන එක නොවෙයි. රජයේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්ති. රජයේ fiscal policy එක. ඒක ඔබතුමන් කියන ආකාරයට රජය තීරණය කරලා, කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. නමුත් ඒකට අදාල කරලා නිශ්චිත කාරණාවක් හැටියට බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව. අපි මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී ඉන්නේ, රජයේ fiscal policy එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් නොවෙයි. බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක තමයි මම ප්‍රකාශ කළේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලිව කිව්වේ, when the Government takes a decision on the policy, that is intimated to the Monetary Board and then the Monetary Board takes a decision what to do beyond that. ඒක තමයි මට තේරුණු දෙය.

සභාපතිතුමා

උත්තරය දීමේදී ඒ විදියට නැහැ. උත්තරයේ ඒ විදියට ආවා නම් ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්ණය ලේකම්තුමා පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

මේ පිළිබඳව මෙතුමාගෙන් පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කර දෙන්න. රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රතපත්තිය පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe :

I think we will complicate it if you get someone else to talk about it.

අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමන්ගේ පුළුල් අදහසට අපි ගරු කරනවා. නමුත් අපි මේ ප්‍රශ්ණාවලිය එක්ක යමු.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

But it will deviate from the-

Hon. Lakshman Senawirathne :

We should not deviate

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe :

Because it is a very complicated matter. We have limited time.

The Hon. Ajith P.Perera

We should follow the line of questions.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහි අත්‍යාවශ්‍ය වන්නේ, සාමාන්‍ය සම්ප්‍රදායන් අනුව සිදුවන ක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද කියන එකයි. සමහර වෙලාවට පනතේ අකුරටම නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපිට අවශ්‍ය නම් ඉදිරියට එහෙම හදා ගන්න පුළුවන්. අපිට අවශ්‍ය කරන්නේ යම් කාරණයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් සිදු වූ සිදු වීමක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්. පුද්ගලයෝ හදාගෙන තමයි මේක අපි බලන්නේ. මේ වෙලාවේ අපිට මුළු ක්‍රමවේදයම හදා ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නැහැ. අපි දැන ගත යුතුයි මේක සම්ප්‍රදායක් ලෙස කොහොමද සිදු වෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ සිදු වන විට කවුද මේකට සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ. මට තේරුණ විදියට ආණ්ඩුවෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සම්බන්දයෙන් තීරණය ගත්තාම, ඒක දන්නවාද, ඉඛේම දැනුවත් වෙනවාද දන්නේ නැහැ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඊට පසු තීරණය කරනවා. ඉදිරි කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් කොහොමද කටයුතු කරන්නේ කියලා. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීන්දුව ගැනීම සඳහා වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙතැන තවත් අලුත් තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. මෙතැනදී විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා වන අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාට තමුන්ගේ නියෝජිතයෙකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට තුළ නැති නිසා, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සන්නිවේදනය කළ යුත්තේ කුමන ක්‍රමයකටදැයි කිසිම නීතියක සඳහන් වෙලා නැහැ. ඒක වැඩ පවරා ගැනීම පිළිබඳව තිබෙන යම් අවුල් සහගත තත්ත්වයක්. එවැනි අවස්ථාවක වඩාත් ප්‍රායෝගික සාධාරණ තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද කියලා සොයා බලන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

කලින් සාක්ෂිවලින් ලැබුණ දේ කෙටි කළොත්, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, "මට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් උපදෙස් දුන්නේ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා" කියලා තමයි සාක්ෂිවල වාර්තා වී තිබෙන්නේ. අපි දිගින් දිගටම විවාද නොකර මෙතැනින් ඔබ්බට ගියොත්, මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්ණය වන්නේ මහ බැංකු manual එක හදන්නේ කවුද කියන එක?

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

සමාවෙන්න, ඊට කලින් දෙවැනි ප්‍රශ්ණයට යන්න ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙනවාද? නැත්නම් ඔබතුමන්ගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි ඉදිරියට යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා

අපි මෙතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් අනුව තීරණයක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මේ තීරණය ගත්තා.අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා ඒ උපදෙස්

අධිපතිවරයා හරහා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යොමු කළා. ඒක නේ දැන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් ඒකප්‍රායෝගිකව එහෙමද විය යුත්තේ කියන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, ඔය කාරණය පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් මම අහන්න කැමතියි. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට policy එකක් ගැන නියෝගයක් කරනවා. රටේ නීතිය පිළිබඳව මා අහන්නේ. ඒක කරන්න මුදල් මණ්ඩලය බැඳිලා ඉන්නවාද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

He does not know that part. You cannot ask him. You must ask the Secretary –

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

Okay. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, දැන් අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට policy decision එකක් එවනවා, මේ කටයුත්ත කරන්න කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ පනතේ තිබෙනවා ඒවා ක්‍රියාත්මක කළයුතු ආකාරය. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා නියෝගයක් දුන් සැනින් ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? නමුත් එතුමන්ලාට එම පනතේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමය නිවැරදිනම් විතරයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්.සමරතුංග මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපේ රටේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ ගැනීමේ දුරාවලියක් තිබෙන්නේ. මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා කොහේ හෝ ගොස් ප්‍රකාශ කළාම, ඒක මම මුදල් ඇමතිගෙන් ගිහින් අහන්නේ නැහැ. මෙවැනි ප්‍රකාශයක් කළාද කියලා. එය මම සටහන් කරගෙන අදාල දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට හෝ ආයතනයට නියෝගයක් වශයෙන් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයාට නිකුත් කරනවා.

ඒ වගේම ගරු අගමැතිතුමා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ හෝ වෙනත් තැනක නිශ්චිත කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රකාශයක් කළාට පසුව - සමහර වේලාවට පොදු දේවලුත් කියනවා. නිශ්චිත කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපේ රටේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන ක්‍රමය තමයි, අමාත්‍යාංශ ප්‍රධානියා -ප්‍රධාන ගිණුම් දීමේ නිලධාරියා -ඒක සටහන් කරගෙන අදාළ අංශවලට දැනුම් දීලා ඒ පිළිවෙත් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න උපදෙස් දෙන එක. ධූරාවලිය අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්වරයාට වඩා ඉහළින් ඉන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ධූරාවලිය අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා, ලේකම්වරයෙක් සමඟ ගනුදෙනු සිදු කරන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ පරිපාලන අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ මහ බැංකුව තිබෙන විට මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගේ නියෝගයක්, ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය නියෝගයක්, එහෙම නැත්නම් අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයක් ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡාවට ගන්න කියලා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාට ලිඛිතව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එවන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී අපට එහෙම තත්ත්වයක් නැහැ. මොකද, පරිපාලනමය වශයෙන් අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ අමාත්‍යාංශයට තමයි ඒක ලැබෙන්නේ. ඒ ලැබෙන නියෝගය කෙලෙස සන්නිවේදනය කරනවාද - ලිඛිතව දෙනවාද, වාචිකව දෙනවාද, telephone call එකින් දෙනවාද -කියන එක පැහැදිලි නැහැ. කොහොම නමුත් අපි ව්‍යවස්ථානුකූව බැඳිලා ඉන්නවා අදාළ ඇමතිවරයාගේ අධීක්ෂණය සහ නියෝග යටතේ කටයුතු කරන්න. මේ නියෝගය

කෙලෙස ලැබෙනවාද කියන එක අපැහැදිලි වුණාට කෙලෙස ලැබුණත් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ලේකම්තුමා කියන අකාරයට අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ නිර්දේශයක්, යෝජනාවක් වාචිකව හෝ telephone එකෙන් හෝ මොන ක්‍රමයකින් හෝ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට -මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට - ලැබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාට ලැබෙන නියෝගය අගමැතිතුමාගෙන්, විෂයභාර ඇමතිවරයාගෙන්,එහෙම නැත්නම් රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන්නෙක් හැටියට සිටින කෙනෙකුගෙන් නේ ලැබෙන්නේ. නිශ්චිතව බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්දයෙන් කියමුකෝ. බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්දයෙන් ලැබුණු යෝජනාව, නිර්දේශය, අදහස අනිවාර්යෙන්ම මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ලැබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. මෙතැනදී මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළව ගත්තොත් අධිපතිතුමා මේ කාරක සභාවේ අවස්ථා දෙකකදී ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කළා, අවසාන අවස්ථාවේදී -පසුගිය අවස්ථාවේදී - අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියලා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශයට පත්කළා, එම යෝජනාව අගමැතිතුමාගේ යෝජනාවක් හැටියට නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න, අනුමත කරන්න ලැබුණාද, ඒ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා අනුමත කළාද කියලා අපි කලිනුත් කථා කළා. ඒකත් වැදගත් නේ. අගමැතිතුමා මේ යෝජනාව සම්බන්දයෙන් අදහස් වෙන් කළා නම් ඒ වෙනස් කිරීමට අදාළ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වුණාද කියන එක වැදගත් නේ.

Dr.Indrajit Coomaraswami

May I respond? As I was not the Governor, I cannot comment on the process as it took place at the time. But my reading of the Monetary Law Act is that sets out certain responsibilities for the Monetary Board. It is a very specific one. In those areas, of course, the Minster in charge whether the Prime Minister of whoever can indicate the government policy, but in the end, the Monetary Board has to take a decision as to the best possible cause of action when it comes to those specific areas, where the Monetary Law Act has bestowed responsibility to the Monetary Board. So, whoever the Minster is, he can obviously indicated the government policy et cetera, but in the end, the Monetary Board has to take a decision in terms of what the best possible cause of action is. That is how I see it.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, මෙතැනදී වැදගත් වන්නේ මෙපමණයි. අපිට ප්‍රශ්න දෙකයි තිබෙන්නේ. හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා අගමැතිතුමා මේ ප්‍රකාශය එතුමාට කළා කියලා. අපි මෙතැනට ඉදිරිපත් වන කරුණුවලින් අපේ රටේ monetary policy එක හදනවා නොවෙයි නේ. මේ policy එක කොහොමද එන්නේ, decide කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා හදනවා නම් මේ එන ක්‍රමය වැරදියි කියලා, ඒ ගැන සොයා බලන්න පුළුවන්. අපි බලන්නේ මේ රටේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද කියලායි. අපට අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ එපමණයි. ක්‍රමවේදය ඒක නම් ඒකට argue කරලා හරියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයෙන් පසුව ඉදිරියට යන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මේ

අවස්ථාවේදී වැදගත් වන්නේ අගමැතිතුමා මේ ප්‍රකාශය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කළාද කියන එක පමණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒ කාරණාව මේ සාකච්ඡාවේ අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදී අනාවරණය වුණා. අගමැතිතුමා මේ කරුණ කිව්වා කියලා තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

එහෙම නම් හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා

පැහැදිලියි නේ. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ එතැන නොවෙයි. අගමැතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කාරණාව මේ ගනුදෙනුව -බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය -සිදු වෙන්න කලින්, ඒ කියන්නේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් ඒ වෙනස්කම කරලා ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න කලින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ අනුමත කළාද කියන ප්‍රශ්නයයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වෙන්නත් එපායැ.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාට ගරුත්වය ඇතිවයි මේ කියන්නේ. අපි එතැනට අවාට නම් අපි මෙච්චර ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න වුවමනා නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමාට කලින්ම අහන්න තිබුණා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් මේක අනුමත වුණාද කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒක සාකච්ඡා වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාවක්.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒක තමයි. අපි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් මෙතැන සිටින නිලධාරීන් කිහිප දෙනෙක්ගෙන්ම කියවෙන්නේ ඒක ලියවිල්ලකින් දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක නෙවෙයි නේ. දැන් අපට ලේකම්තුමා කිව්වා, කථාවක් කළාමත් ඒක ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුවක් කියලා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

මම නම් ඒක පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

අපි පිළිගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා, අපි මෙතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ. අපි පිළිගන්නවාද නැද්ද කියන එක නෙවෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය. මෙහෙම ගියොත් අපට වෙන්නේ මෙතැන ඉඳන් රටේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති හදන්නයි. මේ කාරණාව පැත්තකින් තියලා ප්‍රතිපත්තිය කොහොමද මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එන්නේ, ඒ එන ක්‍රමවේදය හරිද කියන එක තමයි අපට

ඉදිරියට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න සිදු වන්නේ. අපට මෙතැනදී වැදගත් වන්නේ මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ආවාද කියන එකයි. ඒ එන ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්දයෙන් තමයි මේ නිලධාරි මහත්වරු තියන්නේ. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමවේදය.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මම මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා සමඟ එකඟ වන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක නොවෙයි මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්ණය. ඔය කියන දවසේ මේ රටේ තිබුණු කාර්යපටිපාටිය මොකක්ද කියන එකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය ශාස්ත්‍රීය කථාවක් නේ. ඔය කියන දවසේ ඔබතුමා හිටියේ නැහැ. මම මෙහෙම කියනවාට සමාවෙන්න. අපි එදා Manual එක ගෙන්වා ගත්තේ මම වාගේ ආගන්තුක කෙනෙකුට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නයි. ඔබතුමා කලින් හිටපු නිසා ගොඩක් දේවල් දන්වා ඇති. මම මේ ගැන මෙලෝ දෙයක් දන්නේ නැහැ. මම මෙම කමිටුවේ සාමාන්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක් විධියට මෙතැනට ඇවිත් තිබෙන්නේ මේ පිළිබඳව කිසිම දැනීමක් නැතිවයි. දැන් අහගෙන, කථා කරලා ටික ටික ඉගෙන ගන්නවා. අවසානයේ අපි නිගමනවලට එළඹෙනවා. මේ manual එක මොකක්ද? මොකක්ද තිබුණු කාර්ය පටිපාටිය? අපි second point එකේ ඉන්නේ. පළමු වැනි එක නිගමනය කරන අවස්ථාව නොවෙයි නේ, මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. දැන් ඒක හරි. ඒ ගැන අපි පසුව නිගමනය කරමු. Policy ප්‍රශ්ණය පිළිබඳ එදා තිබූ තත්ත්වය පැහැදිලි නේ. නිලධාරීන් කියනවා නම්, පරස්පරතොරතුරුක් නැත්නම් එපමණයි. ප්‍රශ්ණය තිබෙන්නේ වෙන තැනක. ඒ කියන්නේ ඔය කියන Monetary Board එක ඔය තීරණය ගත යුතුයි කියලා කියවානේ. ගත යුතු නම් Monetary Board එක කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ යම් කාර්යය පටිපාටියක් අනුවනේ. Monetary Board එකට mechanism එකක් නැතිව වැඩ කරන්න බැහැනේ. Monetary Board එක කටයුතු කළයුතු Mechanism එක කොහෙද තිබෙන්නේ? එදා අපට පිළිතුරක් දුන්නා, Manual එකේ තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ Manualමේ Manualඑකද? එච්චරයි. මේ Manual එකේ කොහෙද ඕක තිබෙන්නේ? අපි ඒ line එකේ යමුද? සමාවෙන්න, ඔබතුමාට බාධා කලාට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

එතැනට එන්න පුළුවන් නම් වඩා හොඳයි. මම එතැනට තමයි කලින් එන්න හැදුවේ. මෙතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්ණයත් සමඟ තමයි policy එක පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා වුණේ. ඒක තමයි මගේ ප්‍රශ්ණය. අපි කලින් විමසූ අවස්ථාවේදී කිව්වේmanual එක අනුව තමයි Monetary Boardඑක ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ කියලා. මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ සියලු සාක්ෂිවලින් මගේ දැනුම අනුව මට තේරුණේ ඒකයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

මම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා කරපු ප්‍රකාශය ගැන බරපතළ අවදානමක් දකිනවා. මට ඒ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඔබතුමා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා නේ. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා අගමැතිතුමා හෝ විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා යම් රැස්වීමක කථා කරනකොට, නැත්නම් තේ බොන තැනක මොකක් හරි කථාවකදී- (මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා විශාල පිරිසක් විරුද්ධත්වය පළ කරයි.)

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

හරි. මම ඒක ඉල්ලා අස් කර ගන්නම්. එතුමා කිව්වා යම් රැස්වීමකදීකථා කරන කොට- කරුණාකරලා මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුට කථා කිරීමේ අයිතිය දෙන්න. ඒක මට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. මෙම කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයෙක් ඉන්නවා. එම නිසා අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා යම් තැනක ප්‍රකාශයක් කරද්දී, රැස්වීමක යම් ප්‍රකාශයක් කරද්දි ලිඛිත නියෝගයක් නැතිව "මේවාගේ දෙයකට අපි මෙහෙම දෙයක් කරනවා" කිව්වාම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා minute කරලා ඒක නියෝගයක් හැටියට ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න යවනවා කියන එකද ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්.සමරතුංග මහතා

නැහැ. මට ඒ ගැන පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. උදාහරණයකින් මම මේක පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. මගේ ඇමතිතුමා පසු ගියදා සාලාව යුධ හමුදා කඳවුරේ ගිනි ගැනීම් සිද්ධිය ඇති වුණු වේලාවේ එතැනට ගිහින් දුකට පත් වුණු මිනිස්සු ඉදිරියේ කිව්වා "රුපියල් 10,000 ක් ගෙවන්න" කියලා. එතකොට රුපියල් 10,000 ගණනේ ගෙවන්න කියන එක මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා මට ලියලා දුන්නේ නැහැ. මම ඒ නියෝගය අරගෙන අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට කිව්වා "මේ සඳහා මුදල් වෙන් කරලා නැති නිසා මට මේකට මුදල් ටික වෙන් කරලා දෙන්න" කියලා. ඒ විදියටයි ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සකස් වෙන්නේ. මම ඒක මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගෙන් අහන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ ඒ විදියටයි.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනවිරත්න මහතා

කැබිනට් එකට ගිහින් approval එක ගන්නවා කියලා මෙතුමාට කලින් කියන්න බැරි වුණ නිසායි ප්‍රශ්ණය ඇති වුණේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ වාගේ දෙයක් තේ බොන තැනකදී කිව්වත් කමක් නැහැ. තේ බොද්දි කිව්වත් කැබිනට් එකට ගිහින් නේ කර ගන්නේ. ඔබතුමා තේ බොද්දි කියන ඒවාත් ලියා ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, මේකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. අපි අනවශ්‍ය තැන්වලට යනවා. මෙතුමා කියාපු කරුණු අනුවමුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා ලියලා එවන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒකයි වැදගත්කම That is a different thing

The Hon.Lakshman Senawirathne

He has to get the signature, when it goes to the Cabinet as a Cabinet Paper.

සභාපතිතුමා :

මෙම කාරණය වැටුප් වැඩි කිරීම් වාගේ වෙන වෙන උදාහරණවලට දමන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ලේකම්තුමාගේ අත්දැකීම් අනුව, බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය

තීරණයක් වෙනස් කිරීමට විෂය භාර ඇමතිතුමා හැටියට අගමැතිතුමා යෝජනා කළොත්, ඊළඟට ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද කරන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එය hypothetical වාගේම උභතෝකෝටික ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ. මොකද, එය එතුමාගේ විෂය නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක වැරදියි. You know why -දැනට සිටින මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පිළිතුරු දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා

වෙනත් උදාහරණවලින් ලේකම්තුමා අපහසුතාවයට පත් වන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ පිළිබඳව පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න. මෙම බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්දයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් -direct placements වලින් auctions වලට මාරු වීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් අගමැතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශ කළා නම්, ඊළඟට එය ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasighe

The Governor, it is for you.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් Monetary Board එකේ කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා එතුමා කිව්වා. ඒ නිසා මෙතැන අලුත් දෙයක් නැහැ. මුදල් පිළිබඳවයම්කිසි තීන්දුවක් ගන්නවා නම්, ඇමතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත හෝ ජනාධිපතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලයට ගිහින් තමයි ගන්නේ කියලා අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා සඳහන් කළා. අපට ඒක තමයි කරන්න තිබෙන ක්‍රියාවලිය.එම ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දු කොතැනින් ආවත්, "Monetary Board එකේ කථා කරලා අවශ්‍ය තීරණ ගත යුතු" කියලා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කලින් ප්‍රශ්නයේදී සඳහන් කළා. ඒ නිසා නැවත නැවතත් ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයම අහන්නඅවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියලායි මම හිතන්නේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 02-13)

සභාපතිතුමා

"සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධව ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් යතු කුමක්ද?" ඒකේ පළමුවැනි කරුණ, "එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගැනීමට හැකියාව ඇති පාර්ශවයන් කවුරුන්ද" කියන එක. ඒ සඳහා ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරේ

තිබෙනවා "අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින්" කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සම්බන්ධ Monetary Law Act එකේ මේ පිළිබඳව නිරීක්ෂණය වෙනකොට 8.1 යටතේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා දීපු පිළිතුර ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම පැහැදිලි වෙන්නේ නැහැ. 8.1 යටතේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා දීලා තිබෙන පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තමයි මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්නේ කියලාය.

ඒ නිසා අධිපතිතුමා, එහෙම නැත්නම් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමෙක් හෝ මේ පිළිබඳව වගකීම තිබෙන කෙනෙක් කාරණය පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කළොත් හොඳයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ දීලා තිබෙන පිළිතුරේ සහ Monetary Law Act එක යටතේ තිබෙන පිළිතුරේ තිබෙන වෙනස්කම මොකක්ද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න. Monetary Law Act – 8.1 එක සම්බන්ධව Monetary Board එකේ powers සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

මහ බැංකුව මුලින්ම ඉදිරිපත් කළ - දැනට මා අතැතිව තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ කාරණා එකින් එක කියන්න අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා නම් කථා කරමු. මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ පිළි අරගෙන තිබෙන කාරණා මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවට යොමු කළ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය පිළිබඳවයි. Report එක ගැන නොවෙයි. පළමු වැනි ප්‍රශ්නය ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

May I explain Hon. Chairman?

The Chairman

Yes.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

I think, regarding the actual decisions related to issuance of securities, the authority is the Monetary Board. That is what reflected in question 8. But, in question 1, I think thrust of the response is that the Monetary Board will operate within the overall framework set by the Government and the Ministerin charge in relation to certain targets in terms of overall direction of Government policy. So, within the Government objectives in terms of growth, employment, inflation etcetera, and also the fiscal outcomes in terms of Government's budgetary operations, all that will be taken into account when the Monetary Board takes its decisions regarding the issuance of bonds – Government securities. Of course, the Government also indicates the

requirement in terms of the money it needs from time to time. Really, the decisions taken by the Monetary Board flow out of this framework which comes from the Government and in the case of the Monetary Board, Minister in Charge of the subject.

සභාපතිතුමා

අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට ස්තූතිවන්ත වෙනවා. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, ඒ වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය නියෝජනය කරන රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති, රජයේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීන්දු කිරීම සඳහා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ නිලයක් දරන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් හැටියට නේද?

ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජිත් කුමාරස්වාමි

ඔව්

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 02-13)

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ජේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1.1 සුරකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් යනු කුමකද?

ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ රජයේ සුරකුම්පත් නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධ මෙහෙයුම් තීරණ ගැනීමට අදාල ව්‍යුහය සකස් කරයි.

1.2 එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ඇති පාර්ශවයන් කවුරුන්ද?

අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින්

1.3 එසේ ලබා ගත් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් සංශෝධනය කිරීමේ බලතල හිමි පාර්ශවයන් කවුරුන්ද? මුදල් මණ්ඩලය

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ජේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1.1 ණය ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා භාවිතා කරනු ලබන ණය උපකරණ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමයතීරණ ගනු ලබන්නේ කවුරුන් විසින්ද?

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය එක් එක් ණය උපකරණය යටතේ ණය ගැනීම සඳහන් කරන වාර්ෂික ණය සැලැස්ම අනුමත කිරීම මගින්.

1.2 එම තීරණ සඳහා භාවිතා කරනු ලබන තොරතුරු මොනවාද?

විසර්ජන පනතෙහි සඳහන් පරිදි වාර්ෂික ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය සමස්ත සාර්ව ආර්ථික තත්ත්වය සහ මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ උපායමාර්ගයන්.

1.3 එම තීරණ ගැනීම සඳහා විශේෂ වූ මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳපළ සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කරනු ලබන්නේද?

ඔව්.රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙළඳපොල සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කරයි.

1.4 එහිදී භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා තීරණයක් ගත්තේ නම් එම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරනු ලබන කාලය නිශ්චය කරනු ලබන්නේ කවුරුන් විසින්ද?

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ මාර්ගෝපදේශකත්වය මත

1.5 එම කාලය තීරණය කිරීම සඳහා භාවිතා කරනු ලබන නිර්ණායකයන් මොනවාද?රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් සකස් කරන මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ උපාය මාර්ගය

1.6 එම කාලය තීරණය කිරීම සඳහා යම් වෙළෙඳපළ සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කරනු ලබන්නේද? ඔව්

1.7 එසේ වෙළෙඳපළ සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කලේ නම් සමීක්ෂණ පත්‍රිකා ලබා ගත හැකි වන්නේ කෙසේද? අපේක්ෂිත ආයෝජකයන් සමඟ පවත්වන රැස්වීම් සහ දුරකථන සංවාද සහ මධ්‍ය කාර්යාලයේ යෙදවුම් මගින් සමීක්ෂණ සිදු කරයි.

1.8 භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී කූපන් පොළි අනුපාතය තීරණය කරන්නේ කෙසේද? නව නිකුතු සඳහා පොලී අනුපාතය පවතින වෙළඳපොළ තත්ත්වයන් සහ මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ උපායමාර්ගය පදනම් කරගෙන තීරණය කරයි.

1.9 බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොළී අනුපාතය ඉහල යාම නිසා සමස්ථ වෙළෙඳපළ පොළි අනුපාතයට වන බලපෑම පිළිබඳ පසු විපරමක් කරනු ලබන්නේද? ඔව්. ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින්

5.1.12 දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් පෙර අනුමත කර තිබූ පරිදි බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කරනු ලැබුවේ නම් එම වෙන්දේසියේ දී ලැබුණු මිල ගණන් අඩුම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයේ සිට ඉහළම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය දක්වා වර්ගීකරණය කිරීමෙන් පසු පහත දැක්වෙන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් 7 දෙනෙකුගෙන් බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 10.4652 ට රු.බිලියන 01 ක මුදල සපුරාගැනීමට පමණක් නොව රජයට රු.බිලියන 1.403 ක් දක්වාමුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. එසේ සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 11.7270 දක්වා වැඩි නොවනු ඇත.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.1.13 ඉහත තත්ත්වය ලංසු කැඳවීමේ තොරතුරු පත්‍රිකාවලට (Bid acceptance Information sheet) අනුව සකසන ලද පහත දැක්වෙන වගුවට අනුව අනාවරණය වේ. (ඉහත 01 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවය හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ගේ අනන්‍යතාවය හෙළි නොවන පරිදි එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉංග්‍රීසි අක්ෂරයකින් හඳුන්වාදී ඇත.) (වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

තවද ඉහත දැක්වූ පරිදි ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසිය රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් 7 දෙනා හැරුණුවිට එදිනට ලැබී තිබූ එකතුව රු.බිලියන 20.708 ක් වූ සියළුම මිල ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම්වලින් සියයට 75 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ පහත5.1.15 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති K ආයතනය ඇතුළු වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට අවස්ථාවක් නොතිබූ බව ඉහත වගුවෙන් පැහැදිලි වේ. එදින වෙන්දේසිය මගින් නිකුත් කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු.බිලියන 1 ක මුදල රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා වැඩිකිරීමට තීරණය කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 07 දෙනා අතර ද නොසිටි K ආයතනයට එදින නිකුත් කරන ලද මුළු බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකමින් සියයට 50 ක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 5 ක් ලබා ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව උදාවී තිබීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලක්ෂණයක් විය. මෙහිදී එම රු.බිලියන 5 කින් රු. බිලියන 2 ක් ඍජුවමත් රු. බිලියන 3 ක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා වක්‍රාකාරයෙනුත් ලබා ගැනීමට එම ආයතනය කටයුතු කර තිබුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.1.14 ඉහත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ දී සිදුවූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙහි අධීක්ෂණයට යටත් වන සහ ප්‍රාථමිකවෙන්දේසියෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් ඇති ආයතනයක් ලෙස සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයන් සහිත ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් සාපේක්ෂව අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගෙන තිබූ අතර අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයක් සහිතව පෞද්ගලික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් මිලදී ගැනීම හේතුවෙන් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ මූල්‍ය වාසිය අහිමි කර ගෙන තිබුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.1.15 ඉහත 5.1.3 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි 2015 මාර්තු 02 දිනට රාජ්‍ය ණය වාරික පියවීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයද නිශ්චිතව දක්වමින් 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව වෙත ලැබී තිබූ හෙයින් සුදුසු ක්‍රමෝපායන් භාවිතයෙන් එම මුදල ජනනය කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

ඒ අනුව අනවශ්‍ය ලෙස වට්ටම් ලබා දීමකින් තොරව සහ වෙළඳපළ පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් ඉහළ යාමට ඉඩ ප්‍රස්ථා විවර නොකරමින් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය නම් පහත දැක්වෙන විකල්ප ක්‍රමෝපායන් ද අනුගමනය කිරීමේ අවස්ථාව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(i). මහජන බැංකුවෙන් හා ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් දැනටමත් ලබා දී ඇති අයිරා පහසුකම් භාවිතාකර පසුව කෙටිකාලීන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් එම අයිරාව පියවා දැමීම.

(ii). සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ අතිරික්ත අරමුදල් තිබුණේ නම් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් එම අරමුදලෙන් මුදල් සපයා ගැනීම.

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වන විට සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් රු.බිලියන 3 කට ආසන්න මුදලක් රැස් කර තිබූ අතර 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින වන විට තිබූ ඉතිරි අවශ්‍යතාවය ද සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් රැස්කර ගත නොහැකි බවට කරුණු තහවුරු නොවූ හෙයින් එලෙස මුදල් රැස් කර ගැනීම. (1997 වර්ෂයේ සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක කර තිබූ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අසාර්ථක වී තිබූ බවට නිරීක්ෂණය නොවූ අතර තවදුරටත් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ලබා ගැනීම) .

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.1.16 මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට අදාලව පහත කරුණු නිරීක්ෂණය වීම හේතුවෙන් එය සැක සහිත ගනුදෙනුවක් බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

(i). වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් කිරීමට ඉතා ආසන්න කාලය තුළ එනම් අවසන් මිනිත්තු 08 තුළ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු.බිලියන 20.708 කින් රු.බිලියන 13.60 ක ලංසු ලැබී තිබීම.

(ii). ඉහතසඳහන්රු.බිලියන.13.60 කවටිනාකමතුළරු.බිලියන 13.00 ක් K ආයතනය වෙනුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

(iii). රු.බිලියන 01 ක් වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනිම.

(iv). K නමින් හඳුන්වා දී ඇති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරු වෙනුවෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව රු. බිලියන 13 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ පළමු අවස්ථාව වීම.

(v) රු. බිලියන 01 ක් සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී, K ආයතනය විසින් රු. බිලියන 2 ක් සෘජුවත් රු.බිලියන 13 ක් ලංකා බැංකුව හරහාත් වශයෙන් එකතුව රු.බිලියන 15 ක් සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ලංසු කැඳවා තිබූ වටිනාකම මෙන් 15 ගුණයක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් වීම

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.1.17 2015 මාර්තු 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හැකිව තිබූ විකල්ප ක්‍රම තුනක්සහ ඒවායේ ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි අවාසි වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් පහත දක්වා ඇත.

(i). 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අපේක්ෂා කළ පරිදි රු.බිලියන 01 ට සීමා කලේ නම් එම වටිනාකම ආවරණය වන පරිදි ලබා තිබූ ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය අනුව බැඳුම්කරයක ලංසු වටිනාකම රු.104.5073 ක් දක්වා පමණක් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කලේ නම් රු.මිලියන 1,403 ක් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. එලෙස එම වටිනාකමට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සීමා නොකිරීම නිසා පහත වගුවෙහි දැක්වෙන පරිදි රජයට රු.මිලියන 889 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.

(ii). රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේනතුව විසින් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව වෙත ලබාදුන් විකල්ප ක්‍රම දැක්වෙන පත්‍රිකාවේ (Option Sheet) නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ රු.මිලියන 2,608 ක බැඳුම්කර (බැඳුම්කරයක ලංසු වටිනාකම රු.102.20720 ක් වන පරිදි) බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ හැකියාව තිබුණි. එසේ නොකර

රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රජයට පහත වගුවෙහි ගණනය කර ඇති පරිදි රු.බිලියන 0.688 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.

(iii). තවද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරීම රු.බිලියන 1 ට සීමා නොකර මෙම වාර්තාවේ 5.1.18(ii) ඡේදයේ දක්වා තිබූ පරිදි මහ බැංකු අධිපති යෝජනා කළ රු.බිලියන 20 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කලේ නම් පහත වගුවෙහි ගණනය කර ඇති පරිදි රු.බිලියන 2.730 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක්රජයට සිදු වීමට ඉඩ තිබුණි.

තවද ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසි එම දිනට ක්ෂණිකව ඇති වූ/ඇති විය හැකි තත්ත්වය පමණක් වන අතර එමගින් දීර්ඝකාලීනව ඇතිවන බලපෑමද සළකා බැලුවහොත් එම විකල්ප අවාසි තවත් ඉහළ යාමට ඇති ඉඩකඩද බැහැර කළ නොහැක.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

2015 .02 . 27 වැනි දින රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත 100% ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා අනුගත විය යුතු බවට වාචිකව දැනුම් දීමත්, පසුව එම තීරණය 2015.03.06 දින පැවති මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමට වාර්තා කිරීමත් නිසා එකී විකල්පයන් වෙත අවධානය යොමු නොකළෙහිය

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

පිළිතුර පිළිගත හැක. වාචික උපදෙස් මත වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය 100% ක් අනුගමනය කලද මෙම වෙන්දේසියෙන් රැස්කර ගන්නා මුදල සීමා කර අප විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසි වලකා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. තවද ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දී ඇති පිලිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණ සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරයි.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

අපට ක්‍රමවේදයක් පිළිබඳ සැලකිල්ලක් කරලා නිවැරදි මොකක්ද වැරදි මොකක්ද කියන එක කියන්න අපහසු නම්, යම් නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවක් ගැන සලකා එම ගනුදෙනුවේදී අනුගමනය කරන්නේ මොන ක්‍රමවේදයද කියන එක මත වෙන වාසි හෝ අවාසි කියන්න පුළුවන් නේද? එක් ගණුදෙනුවකට එක් ක්‍රමයක් ආදේශ කළාම අවාසි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් තවත් ගණුදෙනුවකදී ඒ ක්‍රමයම අනුගමනය කලාම වාසි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවකදී එම ගණුදෙනුව අරභයා අනුගමනය කළ

යුතු ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන සැලකිල්ලක් කරලා ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය හොඳද, නරකද, වාසි අවාසිද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම හිතන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ වාර්තාවෙන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒක තමයි.

(යොමුව -2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 10)

ගරු රංජන් රාමනායක මහතා

මම study කර කර හිටියේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා, මම හිතනවා. පසු ගිය දවස්වල මතු වුණු බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමා through study එකක් කළා කියලා. ගරු ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා මේ පිළිබඳව අසමින් සිටියා. මේ සිද්ධිය Loss එකක්ද පාඩුවක්ද කියන එක. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධියෙන් මේ රටට යම් කිසි Lossඑකක් වුණාද? මට කෙටියෙන් කියන්න. Can you explain it in one word? Was there any loss?

Dr. Indrajit Coomarswamy

Let me just say that I am very keen on looking forward. I do not think that it is good for a Governor of the Central Bank to be second guessing and commenting on his predecessor. I would very much.

The Hon. RanjanRamanayake

According to your knowledge, is there any loss?

Dr. IndrajitCoomarswamy

As you know, A – I would like to study it further, B – Even if I knew the answer, I would prefer not to publicly say because if one Governor of the Central bank makes this kind of remarks about his predecessor, the confidence the world has in our country would be undermined. People in this country.

The Hon. RanjanRamanayake

But, this is people's money

Dr. IndrajitCoomarswamy

I understand, but that is why we have Sectoral Oversight Committees to do that job. I do not think it is a job of the successor.

(යොමුව -2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 42)

5.1.18 2015පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවතිවෙන්දේසියටඅදාලව ලබා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළරු. බිලියන 01 කබැදුම්කර වටිනාකමට එරෙහිව එකතුව රු. බිලියන 10.058 ක් ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට ගත් තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ක්‍රියා කලාපය ප්‍රබල ලෙස බලපා ඇති බව රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ අනු කමිටුව විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ සිදු කරන ලද විමර්ශණයේදී අදාල නිලධාරීන් විසින් ලබා දී ඇති වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්හි ඇති පහත කරුණු හේතුවෙන් තහවුරු විය.

(i). වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා අවසන් වූ ද පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් වූ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු. බිලියන 20 ක්ම නොගන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගෙන් විමසා තිබීම.

(ii). එලෙස රු. බිලියන 20 ක් දක්වා බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හොත් එය ඉතා ඉහළ පොළි අනුපාතිකයක් වන හෙයින් එය නුසුදුසු බව රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය සහ අතිරේක රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.අසීම් මහතා විසින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට අවධාරණය කර තිබීම.

(iii) ඉන්පසු මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රු.බිලියන10 කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ කර තිබීම (Why don't you go for 10 bn) හා ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී පවා රු.බිලියන 10 කට යාම නිසා ඉහළ (that too much)පොළී අනුපාතිකයක් බව අනාවරණය කර තිබීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඔබතුමා සහ ඔබතුමිය කියනවා ඒක Advice එකක් විතරයි. Orderඑකක් නෙවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා 2.6 ගන්න එක තමයි fair කියන එක ටෙන්ඩර් Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

නැහැ. ඊට ප්‍රථම අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණියා

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක ප්‍රමාණය. අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ, එහෙම නෙවෙයි. රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ක් auction එකෙන් ගන්න කියලා. නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපි එකහෙලා කියා සිටියේ, මේ ප්‍රමාණයට යාම සුදුසු නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා

සුදුසු නැහැ කියලා ලිඛිතව දුන්නාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

නැහැ. සාකච්ඡාවක් කළා විතරයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

මෙහි මුලට ගියා නම් තවත් ලෙහෙසි වෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධව පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම පළ කළේ Rs.1billion ඉල්ලලා. අන්න එතැනින් තමයි පටන් ගන්න වෙන්නේ. පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම් පළ කලා Rs.1billion ඉල්ලලා. එතකොට මේකට bid කරපු අයගේ සිතුවිල්ල වුණේ Rs.1billion තමයි ගන්නේ කියන එකයි. Rs.1billion වලට තමයි Bank of Ceylon ඇතුළු ඉතිරි සියල්ලෝම bid කළේ. ඉතිහාසයේත් Rs.1billion ඉල්ලුවාම Rs.2 billionorRs.3 billion සමහර වෙලාවට අඩුවෙන් ගන්නවා, සමහර වෙලාවට වැඩියෙන් ගැනීමක් සිදු වෙනවා. එතකොට Rs.1billion ඉල්ලපු එකට ඔබතුමියන්ලාගේ කමිටුව යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණා Rs.2.5 billion ගැනීම අහිතකර තත්ත්වයක් නැහැ කියලා. මම හිතන විධියට ඒක ඇතුළු යෝජනා හයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

ඔව්

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

යෝජනා හයක් යෝජනා කරලා තමයි ඔබතුමියන්ලා මේ කමිටුවට දමන්නේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමියන්ලා තව note එකකුත් දැමුවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

එතැනදී අධිපතිතුමා සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රකාශ කලාට පස්සේ "නැහැ රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යන්න ඕනෑ" කියනකොට මට සිදු වුණා FrontOffice එකට නියෝගයක් දෙන්න රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට තිබෙන විධියට මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්න කියලා. මොකද FrontOffice එකෙන් තමයි මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ

නිලධාරියාට නැවත වාරයක් ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න කටින් කියලා බැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම ඒ නිලධාරියාට Notes කලා Governorගේ additional fund requirement එකක් තියෙනවා, ඒ අනුව රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට වාර්තාව හදන්න කියලා.

(යොමුව -2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 15/16)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

27 වැනි දා සිදුවුණු තීරණ අතුරෙන් එක තීරණයක් තමයි, රුපියල් බිලියනයේ සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා යන්න තීරණය කරපු එක. ඒ වාගේම ඊට වඩා වැඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලැබිලා තිබුණත් රුපියල් බිලියන 10න් ඔබ්බට නොයන්නත් ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කළ. නිවැරදියිද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව්

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමාගේ මුලිකත්වයෙන් යුතුව සාමාජිකයන් 08 දෙනා ඒ මොහොතේ ඒ ගත්ත තීරණය, ඔබතුමාගේ වෘත්තිය විනිශ්චය අනුව ගත්ත තීරණයක්. හරි නේද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

නැහැ. මගේ තනි තීරණයක් නොවේ. Committee එකක් තිබුණා. ඒකේ Minutes තිබෙනවා. මම පෞද්ගලිකව-,

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමා පෞද්ගලිකව නොවෙයි කණ්ඩායමක් එක්ක ගත්ත තීරණයක්

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව් කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගත්ත තීරණයක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ට ගිහිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ට අඩු වුණා නොවෙයිද? කවුරුවත් රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ගන්න කියලා යෝජනා කළේ නැද්ද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

නැහැ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙම කළේ නැද්ද සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

Department එකට Governor ආපු වෙලාවේ ඉස්සෙල්ලාම කිව්වේ රුපියල් බිලියන 20 කියලා

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

විස්ස කියලා කිව්වා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඇයි ඔබතුමන් බොරු කියන්නේ?

පී.සමරසිංහ මහතා

අපිට එහෙම යෝජනාවක් ආවේ නැහැ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

විස්ස දහය දක්වා ඊට පසුව අඩුවුණා.

ගරු අජිත්.පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කියන පරිදි Governor යම් විධියක මතයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළ, රුපියල් බිලියන විස්සක් දක්වාම යා හැකිව තිබෙනවා කියලා. නමුත් සමරසිරි මහත්මයාගේ මුලිකත්වයෙන් යුත් කමිටුව, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී තීරණය කළ, අපි විස්සට යන්නේ නැහැ. අපි උපරිම වශයෙන් යන්නේ දහයටයි කියලා? ඒක හරිද? දීපා මහත්මියගේ අදහස් පිළිගන්නේ නැද්ද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒක දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සිදු වූ දෙයක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියත්. අධිපතිතුමාත් අතර ඇති වූ සංවාදය ඔබතුමන් දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒකහරිද? අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියටද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්

සභාපතිතුමා

මෙතුමා මතු කළානේ, ඉස්සෙල්ලා ගන්න කියලා මෙතුමියට කියපු කාරනාව සමරසිංහ මහත්මයා නොදැන සිටියාද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය, එතුමියට අදහසක් කිබෙන්න ඕනෑ ඒ ගැන. ඒකයි මම ඇහුවේ.

අජිත් පි.පෙරේරා මහතා

එතුමිය තමයි නායිකාව. සමරසිරි මහතා ඔබතුමා කොපමණ කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවේ සේවය කර තිබෙනවාද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ වන විට අවුරුදු 30 ක්.

අජිත්.පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

බොහොම පළපුරුද්දක් තිබුණා සහ ජෙෂ්ඨත්වයක් තිබුණා, කෙළින් තීරණයක් අරගෙන රටට, ආයතනයට නිවැරදි තීරණයක් ගන්න. ඔබගේ මණ්ඩලය උපරිම විශ්වාසය අනුව එම තීරණය ගත්තා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අධිපතිතුමා මට මතයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළ කියලා කිව්වත්, එය මතයක් නොවෙයි. මට අන්තිමට කියලා ගියේ,"Do it"කියලා

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය සාක්ෂිවල කිසිම තැනෙක "Do it"කියලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අද තමයි "Do it"කියලා කිව්වා කියලා ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

අද තමයි ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ එහෙම දෙයක් කිව්වා කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමියගේ ප්‍රකාශයේ 18 වන පිටුව මම කියවන්නම් "Why do you not go for 10?"

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

පළමුවෙන්ම අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය ඒක.

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

Right' I am posing this question to you where have you stated that the Governor said, "Do it"? You gave evidence last time. So, I am asking you a question. Since I was not there, wanted to ask this question from you. Where have you said that Governor said, "Do it?"

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara

Can you tell us about the conversation

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

Please let me finish this.

සභාපතිතුමා

මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මට පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමටයි මම අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අහන්නේ, "Do it" කියලා Governor සඳහන් කිරීම මෙතුමිය කොයි ස්ථානයේදී ද සඳහන් කළේ කියලා නේද අහන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සාක්ෂිවල දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න කළ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මොනවද කිව්වේ කියලා? So, let me finish this. Do not disturb because it is giving an undue advantage for the person to answer' So, let me finish it please. Decently I am asking a question.

Where have you stated in your evidence that Governor said, "Do it?"

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathne

Today I am saying

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

You have never said it before

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathne

No

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

What you said earlier was a suggestion by the Governor. You are an educated lady. You were under oath and you were giving evidence last time. If it is not, that Governor told you to do it, easily you could have said –

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මට ඇමතිතුමා කියන කොට තමයි මතක් වුණේ.

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe: ඇමතිතුමා නොවෙයි, you were discussing there with your peers. I saw that. If Governor had given directions to do it, you

could have said, “He told me to do it.” It is very easy. That is why I am asking you. You are an educated person and your qualifications are there.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

සමාව ගන්නවා

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සමාව ගන්න එපා. Can I say this?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, එහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් කෝප් සභාවේ කවුරු හෝ අහලා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

අහලා තිබෙනවා. Let me finish.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

I must make this request

සභාපතිතුමා

අධිපතිතුමා.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I think the Hon.Minister is very welcome to continue the line of questioning. But I think it will be very nice if it is can be done in a better environment. I do not want my colleagues to be put under undue pressure

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

May I say this, Hon. Chairman?

The Hon. Mahindananda Aluthgama

Do not give orders. Talk nicely.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

I am using the best language. My tone is for the question because that is an important question. She and even the Governor do not have to get bothered my tone and. I am using a very good language.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

This is the COPE. I direct a very decent question. All Iam asking is if she has lied, if she has not said it I have the right to ask that question. I am not forcing on her. I am not calling her names. So, I can ask that question.

The Hon.Mahindananda Aluthgama

Go ahead

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I am not talking to you I am talking to Chairman

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමා මට කථා කරන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Let me ask this question and finish. සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතන වැදගත් වන්නේ කාරණා දෙකයි. එක කාරණයක් තමයි මේ direct placements ක්‍රමයද පැවතියේ? මේ ක්‍රමවේදය ආවේ කොහොමද? මේක වෙනස් කළාද? මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන විධියට දෙකම තිබෙනවාද? Direct placements තිබෙනවා, auctions තිබෙනවා. මේක ඕනෑ වෙලාවකට auctions පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? මේකේ ඕනෑ වෙලාවටdirect placements පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? ඒක තමයි අදාළ ප්‍රශ්නය. ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයිමහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මේ කියන නිලධාරිනියට නියෝගයක් කළාද? නියෝගය කියන එක ඉංග්‍රී භාෂාවෙන් හෝ සිංහල භාෂාවෙන් නියෝගයක් වශයෙන් දක්වන්න ඕනෑ. කිසිම තැනක එතුමිය නියෝගයක් කළා කියන එක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ. එතුමිය Minute එකක් දාලා තිබෙනවා "Give a direction"කියලා නමුත් අධිපතිතුමා ඇහුවාම එතුමා කිව්ව උත්තරය තමයි ඒක අපි හබ කළේ නැහැ. "If I were you I will take this money" කියලා ගියා. අනෙක් වැදගත්ම කාරණය වන්නේ Dr. Azimමැතිතුමා කිව්වා, මේ ලියවිලි එතුමාගෙන් කලින් ඉල්ලුවා කියලා. පසුව එතුමාගේ සාක්ෂියේ සඳහන් කළා, එතුමා ගිහින් එම ලැයිස්තුව භාර දුන්නා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා

වෙන පටලන්න එපා. මෙතුමා කියන කාරණාවත්, තිබුණු දේවලුත්, ඔබතුමන්ලා කියාපු දේවලුත් සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල verbatim වශයෙන් තිබෙනවා. අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒවා ආයේත් බලන්න පුළුවන්. මෙතුමා දැන් කියන දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා. එදා කියාපු දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා. ඔබතුමා කියන දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

ආපු වේලාවේ ඉඳන් ඔබතුමා නේ කථා කරන්නේ. අපි මොකුත් කියන්නේ නැතුව අහගෙන ඉන්නවනේ. මොකක්ද මේකේ තේරුම? අපටත් අහන්න ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා.මෙතැනට ආපු වේලාවේ ඉඳන් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කිය කියා අහනවා.අපි ඒවා අහගෙන ඉන්නවා

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 42/43/44/45)

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසන් කර ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා, විශේෂයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එකේත් තිබෙනවා ඔබතුමියගේ එකම සාක්ෂිය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියට යම් කිසි ආකාරයක අවබෝධයක් ලබා දුන්නා කියන්න පුළුවන් එකම ආකාරය මට කේරෙන භාෂාවෙන් "Why do not go for ten", කියන එකයි. මේ හැර ඔබතුමිය වෙන භාෂාවකින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියට direction එකක් දීලා තිබෙනවා කියලා ඔබතුමිය මීට පෙර දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් ලබා දුන්න සාක්ෂියක සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

කොහේ හරි තිබෙනවා නම් අපට පෙන්වන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා

සාක්ෂියක් දෙන්නේ අහන ප්‍රශ්න අනුව නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය පොරොන්දු වෙනවාද වෙන විධියකට එහෙම සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා කියලා

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මම minute කර ගත්තා කියලා මම සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

බොහොම ස්තුතියි. සභාපතිතුමා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ සියලු කාරණා සලකා බලා නිගමනය කර තිබෙන මේ report එක අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා යම් කිසි ආකාරයක direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා මෙහි තිබෙනවා. වෙන කිසිම දෙයක් සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ඒක වාර්තාගත කර ගන්න. ඊට පසුව ඕනෑම දෙයක් කරන්න. මෙතුමා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා ඉන් පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් බිලියන 10කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරියගෙන් (මෙතුමියගෙන්) ප්‍රශ්න කර තිබිණි. "Why do not go for ten", මේ හැර මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා වෙන ආකාරයකින් direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා මෙතුමිය විසින් කිසිම සාක්ෂියක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ කියන එක විතරක් වාර්තා කර ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමියට ඒ ගැන තව පැහැදිලි කරන්න තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මම ආපු ගමන් මේ සාක්ෂිය ප්‍රකාශ කළා. මීට කලින් මම Bribery Commission එකට ගියා. ඊට පෙර ත්‍රී පුද්ගල කමිටුවට ගියා. එහෙදිත් මම ප්‍රකාශ කළා. සාකච්ඡාවලදීත් විස්තර කරලා කියලා තිබෙනවා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තුමස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 47/48)

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Domestic Debt Management Committee එකේ සිටින නිලධාරි මහත්වරු සියලු දෙනාම මෙතැන ඉන්නවාද? කී දෙනෙක් පැමිණ සිටිනවාද? ඒ සිද්ධිය වන අවස්ථාවේ සිටි අයගෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා 06 දෙනා පමණක්ද, මෙතැන නැති තවත් අය සිටිනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ කාලයේ සිටි director කෙනෙක් මෙතැන නැහැ. Director (Statistics) ඉන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් එයත් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණිලා, ඔබතුමන්ලාට තමයි කිව්වේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

නැහැ. අපට කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වේ නැද්ද? කාටද කිව්වේ?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That was not to the Domestic Debt Management Committee, but to the Public Debt Department.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ඇවිල්ලා තමයි කිව්වේ. එතුමා ආවේ කීයට විතරද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

පළමු වරට 10.45ට පමණ තමයි ආවේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මෙය close කළේ කීයටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

11.00ට පමණ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා 10.45ට පමණ ආවා. දෙවැනි වතාවටත් ආවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා පළමු වරට පැමිණ කළ කථාව මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

එහිදී Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ ගත්තාද? කොපමණ claim කරලා තිබෙනවාද, කොපමණ Offer කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඇහුවා. ඉන් පසුව meeting එකක් තිබුණා.

එහිද අධිපතිතුමා, ඇගමැතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා රටේ වෙනත් මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා.

නමුත් ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ කර ගත්තේ නැහැ. මොකද, අපේ අවශ්‍යතාව වෙනත් එකක් නේ. මහා භාණ්ඩාරයෙන් යවපු Sundry requirement cash flow තමයි අපි fund raise කරන්නේ. ඒක තමයි අපි එතැනදී කථා කළේ. Auction එක අවසන් නැති නිසා අධිපතිතුමාට වෙනත් meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා ගියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මෙතුමිය කියන ආකාරයට මේ සිද්ධියක් වුණා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා තිදෙනාම පිළිගන්නවාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim: Yes.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

අධිපතිතුමා දෙවැනි වතාවට ඇවිල්ලා මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

Deputy Governorsලා දෙදෙනෙකු සමඟ පස්වරු 12.30ට පමණ දෙවැනි වතාවටත් අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණියා. ඒ වේලාව වන විට අපේ auction එක අවසන් වෙලා තිබුණා. Tender Board එකට යන auction sheetඑක සකස් කර තිබුණා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ වේලාවේ එතුමා සමඟ පැමිණි අනෙක් දෙදෙනා කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතා සහ දැනට retire වෙලා සිටින Mr.Ananda Silva පැමිණියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ දෙදෙනා සමග ඇවිල්ලා මොකද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

"Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ මුදල් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද?" කියලා ඇහුවා. අපි කිව්වා. "රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ක් තිබෙනවා" කියලා ඊට පසුව "20 billion කෝ?" කියලා තරයේ ඇහුවා. ඒ වේලාවේ අපි කිව්වා, "ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 20නුත් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් වැඩිම මුදල රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6යි" කියලා ඊට පසුව එතුමා කිව්වා, "අපේ අවශ්‍යතාවය සඳහා මේ සියල්ලම ගන්න" කියලා. ඒ වේලාවේ Dr. Azimතමයි කථා කළේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමා මොනවාද කිව්වේ?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim

I have very clearly pointed out to the Governor at that time the prevailing market interest rates and the levels that we could be hitting in case we are going to raise entire Rs.20 billion' When the Governor wanted to know, "Okey what was the September, 2014 or the previous thirty-year Treasuey bond auctions weighted out' We said "It was 11.75. Then,he said, "Why do you not accept at that level" Still, we said, "If we go for that level we are shifting the prevailing interest rates punch in the country by more than about 150 basis points' So, we have clearly clarified other possible repercussions. Not only once, if I am not mistaken, I have mentioned it more than four times. Then, I asked Deputy Governors also what their observations on this.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

What have they said? ඔබතුමා ඒකට දුන් පිළිතුර මොකක්ද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේ එතුමා කළ සියලු ප්‍රකාශ සමග මම එකඟ වෙනවා. එතැනදී ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආශිම් මහතා ඇවිල්ලා මේ sheet එක පෙන්වා සිටියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Sheet එක කියන්නේ, Primary Dealersලා ගත්ත නම් ලැයිස්තුව?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඔව්. නම් ලැයිස්තුව සමග bids අරවා මේවා තිබුණා. මුලින්ම එතැනදී තමයි, මෙතැනින් ඉරක් ගසා "Why do we not take Rs. 20 bilion" කියන කථාව විමසා සිටියේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

නම් ලැයිස්තුව පෙන්වා සිටියාද, ඉල්ලා ගත්තාද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ වේලාවේ මෙතුමා අතේ තිබුණු නාම ලේඛනය එතුමා අරගෙන බැලුවා

The Hon. DayasisriJayasekara

He took it from your hand

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ කියා සිටි conversation එක වුණා. ඊට පසුව "මේක වැඩියි" කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් යෝජනා කරන කොට, අධිපතිතුමා 10 කියන තැනට ඇඟිල්ල තියා පෙන්වා සිටිමින් "Take Rs. 10 billion" ගන්න කියලා උපදෙස් දුන්නා. ඒ වේලාවේ මමත්, අනෙක් නිලධාරිනුත් මේ නිලධාරි මහත්වරුත් එතැන සිටියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා instructions දුන්නා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනා පිළිගන්නවා. ඒක order එකක්ද, මේක ගන්න - "Do it" - කියලා කිව්වාද නැත්නම්, මේක ගන්න කියලා කිව්වාද, කොහොමද කිව්වේ?

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

බලපෑමක් සහිත ප්‍රකාශයක් ද කළේ?

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒ ගැන පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමන්ලා සමඟ අපි කටයුතු කිරීමේදී එක්, එක් අධිපතිතුමන්ලා කථා කරන විධිය සහ නියෝග ලබා දෙන විධිය වෙනස්. මෙතුමා නම්, ඉතාම කාරුණිව විධියට - diplomatic - තමයි යම් දෙයක් කරමු කියලා කියන්නේ. ඒ එතුමාගේ පුද්ගලික චරිතය. නමුත් මේ conversation එකේදී අධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලිව තරයේ කියා සිටියා,රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා. ඒක තමයි එතුමිය කිව්වේ කියලා මම හිතනවා."Do it" කියන්නේ, ඒක summarize කරලා මෙන්න මේක තමයි අදහස වුණේ කියන එක මිසක් ඒ වචනයම නොවෙයි. ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ මේ sum conversation එකේදී රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියන එක එතැන සිටි සියලු දෙනාටම පැහැදිලි වුණා.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

There was a one more instruction' "The Governor very clearly said that, "with this auction we can stop going for direct placements"

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

කරුණාකර නැවත කියන්න.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

"with this auction we can stop going for direct placements"

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා:"Direct placements වලට යන්නේ නැතිව auctions වලට යා යුතුයි". කියලා, ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර තීරණයක් ගත්තා කියලා, එතුමා ඒ අවස්ථාවේ කියා සිටියාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim:Not for us.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙම එකක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. හරි. එතුමා මේ තීරණය ගන්න කොට ඔබතුමිය රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ට වඩා ගන්න බැහැ කියලා කිව්වා. ඒකට ඔබතුමිය කුමක් හෝ note එකක් දැම්මාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමිය දමපු note එක මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ වන විට report එක හදලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි. ඒ නිසා රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට නැවත report එකක් හදන්න කියලා මගේ නිලධාරින්ට කියන්න ඕනෑ නිසා මම ඒකට note එකක් දැම්මා, "Governor instructed to place price upto Rs.10 billion taking into consideration of additional Sundry requirements of the Government". කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ decision එක යන්නේ කොහාටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ ටික ගත්තා ඊට පසුව අපි යෝජනා කරන රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 auction එකත් සහිතව රුපියල් බිලියන 10 auction එකත් දමලා Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. Tender Board එකට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරලා අපි පුද්ගලිකව කිව්වා, "Governor

ඇවිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා කිව්වා නැත්නම්, අපේ යෝජනාව තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි" කියලා

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේ Tender Board එකේ ඔබතුමා ඇතුළුව තව කවුද සිටියේ? ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ තීරණය ගැන ඒ කියන්නේ, "Governor ඇවිල්ලා කථා කළාම අපි ලිඛිතව මෙහෙම එකක් දුන්නා. ඒ මත තමයි තටයුතු කරන්නේ කියලා, Tender Board එකේදී සාකච්ඡා කළාද?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

"අධික පොලි අනුපාතයකට මෙපමණ මුදලක් ගන්නේ ඇයි?" කියලා මා විමසා සිටි බව මම මීට කලිනුත් පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Tender Board එක විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලා ගත් තීරණය, "බලපෑමක් මත ගත් තීරණයක්" කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය ගත් තීරණය නිවැරදි බවද නැත්නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබුණු instructions මත ඒ තීරණය ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණා කියලාද ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

මීට කලිනුත් මම කිව්වා, ඒ තීරණයට අපට ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණු තීරණයක් කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 50/51/52/53)

5.1.19 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් තීරණය කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 9.48 ක් විය. එලෙස තිබියදී අදාල වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා සියයට 12.5 ක ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කර තිබුණි. තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසි සඳහා ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතය ලෙස සියයට 12.5 තීරණය කළ ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවීය. එලෙසම ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් යටතේ වර්ෂ 30 ක් වැනි දිගුකාලීන අමතර පිරිවැයද රජයට සිදුවන අවාසියක් ලෙස සැලකිය යුතු බවද නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ. මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ වර්ෂ 30 ක වැනි දිගුකාලීන බැඳුම්කරයක පොළී අනුපාතිකයේ සිදුවන ඉතා කුඩා වැඩිවීමකින් වුවද, රජයට විශාල මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවිය හැකිවීමය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

- 2015.12.27 දින වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද 12.5 % කූපනය සහිත නව 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරයෙහි (ISINLKB 0 3045 CO 13) නිකුතු දිනය 2015.03.01 වූ අතර එහි පියවීම් දිනය 2015.03.02 විය.
- එම අවස්ථාවට අදාළ කූපන් පොළිය, 2014 වසරේදී හා 2015 වසරේ මුල් කාලයේ දී වෙන්දේසි හා සෘජු නිකුතු හරහා නිකුත් කරන ලද 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරයෙහි 13.5% ක් වූ කූපන් පොළිය සහ සැසඳීමේදී අඩු අගයක් දක්වයි.
- කූපන් පොලිය තීරණය වනුයේ මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය ක්‍රමෝපායන් (MTDS) පවතින වෙළඳපල තත්ත්වයන්, අදාළ රඳවාගැනීමේ බදු අනුපාතයන් හා එම බැඳුම්කර අධිමිලක් හෝ අව මිලක් යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව නිකුත් කරන්නාගේ අපේක්ෂාවන් සහ මීට පෙර නිකුත් කළ සමාන වූ පරිනත කාලයන් සහිත වූ බැඳුම්කරයන්හි යොදාගත් කූපන් අනුපාතයන් අනුව වේ.

(MTDS) යනු ඉදිරි වසර 4 සඳහා රාජ්‍ය ණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පුරෝකථනය කරන ලද සැලැස්මක් වේ. ඒ සඳහා රටෙහි ණය, දළ දේශීය නිශ්පාදනයට දක්වන අනුපාතය, සමස්ත ණය ප්‍රමාණයෙහි කල් පිරීමට ඇති කාලයෙහි සාමාන්‍ය අගය, කෙටි කාලීන දේශීය ණය සහ මුළු ණය ප්‍රමාණය අතර අනුපාතයන් යනාදිය ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇත. එනමුත්, මෙම උපාය මාර්ගය රජයේ ආදායම් ප්‍රතිපත්ති තහවුරු කරගන්නා මාර්ගයන්, රාජ්‍ය ණය ගෙවීමේ පුරෝකථනයන් සහ විනිමය අනුපාතිකයන්හි හැසිරීම මතත් රඳා පවතී)

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

මෙම ඡේදයෙන් විගණනය විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇත්තේ ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතය වූ 12.5% තීරණය කල ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවීම, බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුකල දිනට ආසන්න දිනකදී වෙළඳපොල ඵලදා සාමාන්‍ය අනුපාතය වඩාත් අඩු අගයක් ගෙන තිබීම සහ දිගුකාලීන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරීමකදී පොලී අනුපාතිකයේ සිදුවන ඉතා කුඩා වැඩිවීමකින් රජයට විශාල මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදු විය හැකි බවයි.

පිළිතුර මගින් 12.5% ක ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතය ගණනය කල ආකාරය ඉදිරිපත් කර නැත. තවද වර්ෂ 30 ක බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 2014 වර්ෂය සහ 2015 වර්ෂයේ මුල් කාලයේදී (කූපන්) ස්ථාවර පොළිය සාපේක්ෂව වැඩි අගයක් ගෙන තිබූ බව පවසා තිබුණද මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවට අදාල කාලයේ තිබූ වෙළඳපොල සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය බෙහෙවින් අඩුව තිබීම පිළිබඳව කිසිදු අදහසක් දක්වා නොමැත. විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට පිළිතුරෙන් බලපෑමක් නොමැත.

තවද ඉහත සඳහන් 12.5% ක අගය ගණනයකල ආකාරය පසු අවස්ථාවකදී විගණනයට හෝ රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කලද එය විගණන ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ඉරි ඇදි කොටස ඉවත් වීමකට හැර විගණන ඡේදයේ සඳහන් වෙනත් කිසිදු නිරීක්ෂණයකට බලපෑමක් ඇති නොවේ.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.2.1 2016 මාර්තු 10 දින හා මාර්තු 24 යන දිනවල බැදුම්කර අලෙවි කිරීම සඳහා පවත්වා තිබූ වෙන්දේසි දෙකම අපේක්ෂා කල අනුපාතයන්ට වඩා වැඩි අනුපාතයන් දක්වමින් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් වීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබුණි.

කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙම අවස්ථාවලදී සෘජු ක්‍රමයට අරමුදල් ලබා ගැනීම කෙරෙහි අවධානය යොමු කර තිබූ බව අනාවරණය නොවීය.
ඉහත ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීමට හේතු වූයේ යැයි සලකන ලද අනුපාතයන් පහත වගුවෙහි වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් දැක්වේ.

අනතුරුව ඉහත (ආ) උපශීර්ෂයෙහි දැක්වෙන 2016 මාර්තු 29 දිනරුපියල්බිලියන 10 බැගින්වූවිවිධපරිනතකාලයන්සහිතකල්පිරෙනබැදුම්කර04 ක් එනම් රුපියල් බිලියන 40 ක බැදුම්කර නිකුතුවක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි.එහිදි එම නිකුත් කළ බැදුම්කර 04 සඳහා මිල ගණන් ලැබීම් හා එම මිල ගණන් පිළිගැනීම් පහත පරිදි විය. (වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)මෙහිදි නිරීක්ෂණය වන එක් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ රු.බිලියන.40 ක සීමාවකට කැඳවන ලද අතර එම මිල ගණන් මත තවත් අමතර රු.බිලියන 37.732 ක් (මුහුණත අගය) එනම් රු.බිලියන 77.732 ක් (මුහුණත අගය) දක්වා බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබීමයි. එලෙස මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ වටිනාකම ඉක්මවා නිකුත් කළ බැදුම්කර වලින් සියයට 60 ක් K ආයතනය හිමි කර ගෙන තිබුණි. එම ආයතනය විසින් විවිධ පොළී අනුපාතයන් යටතේ ඉහත සඳහන් බැදුම්කර වර්ග 04 හිමිකරගත් අනුපාතය විග්‍රහ කිරීමේදී පහත සඳහන් වගුව අනුව අනාවරණය වන්නේ අඩුම ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේදී පළමු බැදුම්කරයෙන් සියයට 0.5 ක් පමණක් හිමිකරගන්නා K ආයතනය ඉහළ ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේ නිකුත් කර ඇති අනෙක් බැදුම්කර තුනෙන් සියයට 35 ක සිට සියයට 44 ක් දක්වා ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට සමත් වී ඇති බවයි. එනම් වටිටම් ප්‍රමාණය වැඩිවන විට වැඩි බැදුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගෙන තිබීමය. (වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)වටිටම් අනුපාතයට බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා අපේක්ෂිත බැදුම්කරවල මුහුණත් අගය නොලැබීම නිසා වෙනත් කෙටිකාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයකින් එය සපුරා ගැනීම

තවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනැති බැදුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ රු.බිලියන 1 ක ප්‍රමාණය ඉක්මවා රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගෙන තිබීම හා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රු.බිලියන 40 ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා රු.බිලියන 77.73 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම හැරුනු විට එවැනි විශාල ලෙස අපේක්ෂිත සීමාවන් අභිබවා බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සළකා බලන ලද කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදුව නොමැති බව අනාවරණය විය. ඒ අනුව එම අපේක්ෂිත සීමා ඉතා විශාල ලෙස ඉක්මවා බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් එම එකිනෙක සීමාව ඉක්ම වූ කොටස හිමිකර ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව බහුලව K ආයතනයට හිමිවීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලෙස වර්ධනය වී ඇති බව පහත වගුවෙන් හා ප්‍රස්ථාරයෙන් අනාවරණය වේ. (වගුව සහ ප්‍රස්ථාරය වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

ඉහත 4.4 යටතේ සඳහන් කළ පරිදි සෘජු ක්‍රමයට අරමුදල් ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදය, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙහි තීරණයක් පරිදි 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටවූ හෙයින් එවැනි විකල්පයක් සඳහා අවධානය යොමු නොකළෙහිය.

- 2016 මාර්තු 24,29 සහ 31 දිනයන්හි දී පැවැත්වැත්වූ වෙන්දේසි තුනම පවත්වන ලදුයේ අප්‍රේල් මස 01 වැනි දිනට රජයට අවශ්‍යව තිබූ අරමුදල වූ රුපියල් බිලියන 105 රැස්කර ගැනීම සඳහාය.
- ඒ අනුව 2016 මාර්තු 24 දින ලංසු අගයන් ඉතා ඉහළ අගයක් ගන්නා ලද බැවින් ද, එහිදී ඉතා සුළු මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබාගැනීමට වුවද පොලී අනුපාතයන් විශාල වශයෙන් (පෙර වෙන්දේසිවල සාමාන්‍ය සහ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ පොලී අනුපාතයන්ට සංසන්දනාත්මකව) ඉහල දැමීමට සිදු වන බව පෙනුනි. ඒ අනුව, එම ලංසුවලින් යම්කොටසක් හෝ පිළිගතහොත්, ඉන් පසු පැවැත්වෙන වෙන්දේසිවල ලංසු එම උපනතිය අනුව යමින්, වඩාත් ඉහල අගයන් ගනු ලබනු ඇතැයිද අපේක්ෂා කළ හෙයින්, එම ලංසු මුළුමනින්ම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීමට තීරණය කරන ලදී
- ඒ අනුව 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින රුපියල් බිලියන 40 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කරයන් වෙන්දේසියට ඉදිරිපත් කෙරුණු අතර ලැබී තිබුණු ලංසු අගයන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන ලද පෙර වෙන්දේසියට සාපේක්ෂව වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අගයන් සහිත විය. ඒ අනුව මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී රුපියල් බිලියන 59.6 ක් (මුහුණත අගය රුපියල් බිලියන 77.1) ලබා ගැනීමට කටයුතු කිරීම උචිත වන බව තීරණය කෙරුණි.
- මෙහිදී තීරණය වූ පොළී අනුපාත පෙර ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළ අනුපාතවලට වඩා අඩු බව උදාහරණ සහිතව පහත සඳහන් සංඛ්‍යා සටහනෙහි දැක්වේ.

	9.25% 2020 A බැඳුම්කරය			10.25% 2025 A බැඳුම්කරය		
	2016.3.24 වෙන්දේසිය	2016.3.29 වෙන් දේසිය	වෙනස	2016.3.24 වෙන් දේසිය	2016.3.29 වෙන් දේසිය	වෙනස
වෙන්දේසියේදී						
i. රු.බි 5ක් ලබා ගත්තේ නම්						
Cut off	13.60	12.75	- 85	13.74	13.20	-54
WAYR	13.25	12.62	- 63	13.38	12.94	-44
iiරු. බි 10 ක් ලබා ගත්තේ නම්						
Cut off	14.50	13.00	- 150	14.00	13.82	-18
WAYR	13.60	12.78	-82	13.64	23.20	-44
iii 3/29ලබා ගත් ප්‍රමාණය සඳහා (පිළිවෙලින් රු.බි.10 සහ රු.බි.21.4 සඳහා						
Cut off	14.50	13.00	- 150	14.88	14.60	-28
WAYR	13.61	12.78	-83	14.10	13.80	-30

සංසන්දනය කිරීමේ පහසුව සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 24 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 යන දිනවල වෙන්දේසීන් දෙකම සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කර වූ 9.25% 2020 A සහ 10.25% 2025A යන බැඳුම්කරයන්හි පිළිගන්නා ලද ඉහළම ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය (Cut off) සහ බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය (WAYR) සලකා බලමු.

එහි සඳහන් කර ඇති අවස්ථා තුන සඳහාම රජයට වඩාත් වාසිදායක ලෙස 2016.03.29 වෙන්දේසියේ ඵලදා අගයන් තීරණය වී ඇති බව පැහැදිලි වේ.

- ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයට 2016 මාර්තු 29 පැවති මෙම වෙන්දේසියේදී විකල්ප 2 කට මුහුණ දීමට සිදු විය.

  (i) 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රුපියල් බි. 38 ක් වූ (මුහුණත අගය රු.බි.40) ලබා ගනිමින් අවශ්‍ය වූ මුළු මුදල වූ රු. බි 105 රැස් කිරීම සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 31 වන දින නැවත රු.බි.67 ක් (මුහුණත අගය රු.බි.85 ක්) ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා වෙන්දේසියක් පැවැත් වීම. හෝ

  (ii) 2016 මාර්තු 29 වෙන්දේසියේදී රු.බි.59 ක් (මුහුණත අගය රු.බි 77) ක් වූ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරමින්, 2016 මාර්තු 31 වන දින නැවත රු.බි 46 ක් (මුහුණත අගය රු.බි45 – 50 අතර) වූ වෙන්දේසියක් පැවැත්වීම.

මෙහිදී රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයත්, පොලී අනුපාත ඉහලයෑමේ හැකියාවත් සලකා බලමින්, අඩු අවධානමක් සහිත වූ (ii) හි දැක්වූ පිළිවෙත අනුගමනය කරන ලදී.

- වගුවෙහි සංඛ්‍යා වලින් දක්වා ඇති රුපියල් බිලියන 18.407 (රුපියල් බිලියන 77.732 - රුපියල් බිලියන 59.325) වෙනත් ප්‍රභවයකින් ලබාගෙන නොමැත.
- 2016 මාර්තු 29වෙන්දේසියෙන් රු. බිලියන 59.325 ක් සහ 2016 මාර්තු 31 වෙන්දේසියෙන් රු.බිලියන 46 ක් ලබා ගනිමින් අප්‍රේල් 01 දිනට අවශ්‍යව තිබූ මුළු මුදල වන රුපියල් බිලියන 105 ක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකි විය.

  එසේ වෙතත් ප්‍රභවයකින් මුදල් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් තිබේ නම්, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ඒ බව දන්වා සිටීමට කටයුතු කිරීම සම්ප්‍රදාය වේ. එවැනි දැනුම්දීමක් එම අවස්ථාවේ සිදු නොවීය.මෙම ඉහත තීරණයෙහි බලපෑම, ඊට පසුව පැවැත්වූ 2016 මාර්තු 31 වන දින වෙන්දේසියේදී ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් පහළ වැටීම මගින් මනාව පැහැදිලි වේ.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

පිළිතුර පිලිගත හැක.කෙසේ වෙතත් නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් නැත.

2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින වෙන්දේසියට වඩා 2016 මාර්තු 10 සහ මාර්තු 24 දිනයන්හිදී ලද ඵලදා අනුපාත සාපේක්ෂව ඉහල අගයක් ගෙන තිබූ බව විගණනය විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර තිබුණි. පිළිතුරු දැක්වීමේදී 2016 මාර්තු 10 වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳව කිසිවක් සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පිළිතුරු සැපයීමේදී අදාල කරගෙන ඇත්තේ 2016 මාර්තු 24 වන දින සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින නිකුත් කරන ලද සමාන පරිනත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කරවල ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පමණි. කෙසේ වෙතත් 2016 මාර්තු 10 දින ලබා ගැනීමට නියමිත බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකම රු. බි. 6 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 24 දින ලබා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කල රු.බි.20 ලබා ගත්තේ නම් පිළිවෙලින් උපරිම ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයන් 12.2363 ක් හා 13.1661 ක් වේ.

මෙම ඵලදා අනුපාත 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින හා සසඳා බලන විට පිළිවෙලින් 13.4226 ක් හා 14.0175 ක් වේ.

තවද ඉහත අවස්ථා දෙකකදී එනම් මාර්තු 10 හා 24 දිනයන්හිදී මිල ගණන් කැඳවන ලද එකතුව වූ රු. බි. 26 සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 14.2263 ක් වේ. ඒ අනුව ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වූ අවස්ථා දෙක හා සසඳා බලන විට මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී සමස්ථයක් ලෙස ඉහල ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් ගෙන ඇති බව පැහැදිලි වේ.

එකඟ විය නොහැක

2016.03.29 වෙන්දේසියේදී සම මිලට හෝ බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට නොහැකි වූ බැවින් අව මිලට නිකුත් කිරීමේදී රජයට අහිමිවන මුදල් පියවා ගැනීමට ඊට පසු අවස්ථාවේදී ඉහල වෙන්දේසි වටිනාකමකට යෑම රජයට සිදුවේ. මේ හේතුවෙන් රජයේ වගකීම ඉහලයයි.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.2.2 තවද මෙම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරු විසින් මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත්කර ඒවා අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සහ අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ ටෙන්ඩර් අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සන්සන්දනය කිරීමේදී K ආයතනයේ ලංසු ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වීම සාපේක්ෂව පහළ මට්ටමක පැවති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.2.3 මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් බැදුම්කර මිලදී ගත හැකි ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල විසින් 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින තුළදී නිකුත් කළ බැදුම්කරයන්ගෙන් ඵලදා අනුපාතය සියයට 12.20 ක සිට සියයට 12.45 ක් දක්වා පරාසයක් තුළ රු.බිලියන 9.736 (ඇමුණුම xxxix a) ක් වටිනා බැදුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් ලබා ගෙන තිබුණු බවයි. සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙම බැදුම්කර සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දිනට ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුනේ පහත පරිදි ඉතා අඩු බැදුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට බව පැහැදිලි වේ . එම තත්ත්වය ඇමුණුම (xxix b) හි තොරතුරු මඟින් පැහැදිලි වේ. ඒ අනුව එම සියලු ඉල්ලීම් සාර්ථක වී තිබූ අතර ඔවුන්ට අවශ්‍ය ඉතිරි බැදුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් මිලදී ගැනීමට අයදුම්කර හෝ නොමැතිව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් මිලදී ගෙන තිබීම ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී වේ. තවද මහ

බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ භාරකාරීත්වයේ පවතින ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙලෙස කටයුතු කිරීම පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකුව විසින් අවධානය යොමු නොකිරීම ද ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී තත්ත්වයකි. (සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ සාර්ථකත්වය වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

මෙම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් අපේක්ෂිත නාමික වටිනාකම වූ රු.බිලියන 40 ක් වෙනුවට රු.බිලියන 77.732 ක් දක්වා පිළිගෙන තිබුණි. එසේ නොකර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව මුහුණත වටිනාකම වූ රු.බිලියන 40 කට සීමා කලේනම් පහත වගුවේ ගණනය කර දක්වා ඇති රු.784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වාගත හැකිව තිබුණි.
(සීමාව ඉක්මවා පිළිගැනීම නිසා ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය දක්වන වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.3.1 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසුබොහෝ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබූ පළමු අවස්ථාවේ සිටම බැඳුම්කර වෙනුවෙන් වට්ටම් සහිත මිල ගණන් එනම් නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු අගයන්ට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් වී තිබුණු අතර එහි ප්‍රතිඵලය වූයේ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් ගෙන තිබීමයි. මෙමගින් රජයට අමතර පිරිවැයක් දැරීමට (ආයෝජකයන්ට වට්ටම් ලබා දීම) සිදු විය. එනම් මුහුණත අගය රු.100 ක බැඳුම්කර වට්ටම් සහිතව ඊට වඩා අඩු අගයකට අලෙවිකළද, බැඳුම්කරය කල් පිරීමේදී රුපියල් 100 බැගින් ආපසු ගෙවිය යුතු වීම හේතුවෙන් එම වට්ටම් වටිනාකම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කළ දිනයේදිම රජයේ අමතර වගකීමක් බවට පත්වීම වේ. වට්ටම් කළ අගයකට බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට අලෙවි කළද ඒවායේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළ මිල ඉහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළ විකිණීම මගින් වැඩි ලාභ ආන්තිකයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් ලැබෙන අතර එම තත්ත්වයන් තුළ රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසි සහගත තත්ත්වයක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදනුකරුවන් වෙත විතැන්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම පසුබිමතුළද සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයම සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති මිල ගණන් පිළිගෙන වෙන්දේසි මඟින්ම වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

කරුණාකර 4.2 සහ 5.1.19 යටතේ කරන්නට යෙදුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීම් වෙත අවධානය යොමු කරන්න.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

පිළිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් නැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.3.2 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසුව සිදු වූ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනස්කම් සමගම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වූ සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල, ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණ සමාගම, මහජන බැංකුව , ලංකා බැංකුව වැනි රාජ්‍ය ආයතන එම වෙන්දේසිවලින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ගැනීම දුර්වල වී තිබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

5.3.3 ඇතැම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිවලදී ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාත සමග මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම වෙන්දේසි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළ අවස්ථා ද විය. 2015 වර්ෂයේ සිට 2016 මැයි 31 දින දක්වා පැවති වෙන්දේසිවලින් වෙන්දේසි 5 ක් ඉහත තත්ත්වය තුළ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබුණද, 2014 වර්ෂයේදී එවැනි ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම් වාර්තා වී නොතිබුණි. ඒ අනුව නිරීක්ෂණය වනුයේ 2015 වර්ෂයේ දී සිදු කළ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනසින් පසුව ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව අපේක්ෂා කරන මිල ගණන්වලට වඩා ඉතා ඉහළ මිල ගණන්වලටද, මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් ඇති වී තිබීමය. එනම්ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල පවතින අනුපාතයන්ට සාපේක්ෂව ඉහළ අනුපාතයන් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කිරීමය. මෙම තත්ත්වය පහත දැක්වෙන රූපසටහන 2 මගින් පැහැදිලිවේ.(වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් භාවිතා කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඵලදායී අනුපාතයට වූ බලපෑම රූපසටහන වාර්තාවේදැක්වේ)

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

- 2015 මාර්තු මාසයෙන් පසු යම් යම් කාලපරිඡේදයන්හි ඵලදා අගයන් ඉහළ නැගුණු අතර, යම් යම් කාල පරාසයන්හිදී පහළ වැටෙන ප්‍රවනතාවයන්ද පෙන්නුම් කෙරුණි.
- උදාහරණයක් ලෙස 2015 ඔක්තෝම්බර් සිට දෙසැම්බර් මස මැද වන තෙක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ බැඳුම්කරයන්හි ඵලදා අගයන් ක්‍රමයෙන් පහත වැටුනි. ඔක්තෝම්බර් මස ස්වෛරීත්ව බැඳුම්කර (US$1.1 bn) නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් ද්‍රවශීලතාවය ඉහළ යාමත් මෙම කාලය තුලදී බැඳුම්කර මගින් ලබා ගන්නා ණය ප්‍රමාණයන් අඩු වීමත් මෙයට හේතු විය.

මෙම ඉහල යෑමේ ප්‍රවනතාවට විවිධාකාර හේතු සාධක ඇත. රජයට අරමුදල් වෙළඳපොලින් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා භාවිතා වූ සෘජු ක්‍රමය සහ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයන්හි මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමවේදය අත්හිටුවමින්, 100% වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගැනීමට තීරණය වීම වෙළඳපොළ පොලී අනුපාතයන්හි ඉහළ යාමට මූලික හේතුවක් ලෙස සැලකිය හැකිය. සෑම මසකම වාගේ බැඳුම්කර මගින් ලබා ගන්නා ණය ප්‍රමාණයන් ඉතා ඉහළ අගයක් ගැනීම, 2016 ජනවාරි මස සිට මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තීන් දැඩි කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් පාදකාංක 50 කින් ඉහළ දැමීම SRR අවශ්‍යතාවයන් පාදකාංක 150 කින් ඉහල දැමීම යන කරුණු මේ සඳහා මූලික වශයෙන් හේතු විය. විදේශිකයන් සතුව තිබූ ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැඳුම්කරයන් විශාල වශයෙන් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළෙහි විකිණීමත් මේ සඳහා ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් බලපාන ලදී. එහෙත් දෙසැම්බර් මස අග භාගයේදීත් 2016 පළමු භාගයේදීත් මෙම ඵලදා අගයන් නැවත ඉහළ යෑමේ ප්‍රවණතාවක් දැක්විණි.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

පිළිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් නැත. ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය එලෙසම තහවුරු වේ.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තවදුරටත් ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකර සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ඉදිරියට ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ දී ඉන් සිදුවන මූල්‍ය බලපෑම පිළිබඳව ප්‍රතිඵල විශ්ලේෂණයක් සිදුකර එම අධ්‍යයනය ප්‍රතිඵල හා නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟව එම තීරණය ගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවුණි.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.2 ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙන්දේසියේදී අවම්ලට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන එම බැඳුම්කර නැවතත් ක්ෂණිකව ඉහළ මිලට ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළ අලෙවි කිරීම තුළින් ලාභයක් ලැබීම අපේක්ෂා කරන අතර එමගින් රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසිය නොලැබුණි. මෙය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් බාහිර වූ පාර්ශවයන් විසින් වෙළඳපල පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් කෘතිමව හැසිරවීමක් ලෙසත්, මෙමගින් පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් පදනම් රහිතව උච්චාවනයට ලක්වන බවත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම තත්ත්වය පාලනය කිරීමේ වගකීම පැවරී ඇති මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය පියවර ගෙන තිබූ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.3 ඉහත **4.1** ඡේදයේ සඳහන් පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව පවතින මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපළ නියාමනය කිරීමේ වගකීම මැනවින් ඉටුකරලීම සඳහා මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපලෙහි හැසිරීම් රටාවන් පිළිබඳව වැදගත් සියළු දත්ත තමන් සතුකර ගත හැකි ක්‍රමවේදයක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වාගත යුතු වුවද, පහත දැක්වෙන නිරීක්ෂණයන් හේතුවෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට එම නියාමන කාර්යය මනාව කළ හැකිද යන්න ප්‍රශ්ණ ගතව ඇත.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

මේ හේතුවෙන් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනු සිදු කිරීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය වන මෘදුකාංග පද්ධතියක් (e-trading platform) සහ මධ්‍යම පියවීම් ක්‍රමයක් (Central Counterparty Settlement System) ඇති කිරීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය මූලික කටයුතු මහ බැංකුව සිදු කරමින් පවතී.

මෙම පද්ධතිය හඳුන්වා දෙන තෙක් තාවකාලිකව බ්ලූම්බර්ග් (Bloomberg) පද්ධතිය හරහා ද්විතියිකවෙළඳපොළ ගණුදෙනුවලට අදාළ සියලු විස්තර ලබා ගැනීමට හැකිවනු ඇත. එවිට ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ නියාමනය කිරීමේ කටයුතු වඩාත් කාර්යක්ෂමව කළ හැකි වනු ඇත.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

පිළිතුර අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තහවුරු වේ.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.4 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිකුත් කරනු ලබන බැඳුම්කර හඳුන්වාදීම සඳහා, ඒවායේ කල් පිරෙන දිනය පදනම් කර ගෙන සකස් කරන ලද ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් (International Security Identification Number) භාවිතා කරනු ලබයි. එකම දිනකදී පරිණත වන බැඳුම්කර කිහිපයක් වරින්වර නිකුත් කිරීමේ දී එම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා එම එකම ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් භාවිතා කිරීම නිසා ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේ දී එම බැඳුම්කරය කුමන දිනකදී නිකුත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කරයක්ද යන්න වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් හඳුනාගත නොහැකි බවට විගණනයට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.5 ශ්‍රී ලංකාමහ බැංකුව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේදි ලබා ගනුයේ ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකය සහ එම බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම සහ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු කළ දිනය යන තොරතුරු පමණක් බවත් එම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලෙහි අළෙවි වූ වටිනාකම හා ඵලදායි අනුපාත පිළිබඳ දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව නොමැති බව විගණනයට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ඡේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1.1 සුරකුම්පත් සම්බන්ධ ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපළ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුවේ දත්ත පද්ධතියක් පවත්වාගෙන යනු ලබන්නේද? ඔව්

1.2 එම දත්ත පද්ධතියෙහි අඩංගු තොරතුරු මොනවාද? හිමිකම සහ හිමිකම් පැවරීම මුහුණත අගය මත වාර්තා කරයි.

1.3 ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ නියාමනය කරනු ලබන්නේ කවුරුන් විසින්ද? ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

6.6 ඉහත **5.1.7** ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති පරිදි අවශ්‍ය මුළු මුදලම වෙන්දේසිය මඟින් සපුරා ගැනීමට ගෙන ඇති තීරණය ඉහත **5.1.1** ඡේදයේ ඇමුණුමේ සඳහන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු පොළී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලන වගකීම ඇතුළු කරුණු සළකා බලා ගන්නා ලද තීරණයක්ද යන්න පැහැදිලි නොවීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.7 එලෙසමඉහත **5.1.7** ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති තීරණය ගැනීමේදී ඉහත 5.1.2 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ඇමුණුමේ දැක්වෙන කරුණු හා තීරණය පිළිබඳ අවධානයක් යොමු කර තිබුණු බව පැහැදිලි නොවීම

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.8 තවද ඉහත **5.1.11** ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුවා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට තීරණයක් ගෙන තිබුණද ඉහත 01 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් මාර්ගෝපදේශය තුළ හෝ වෙන යම් ලිඛිත නීතියකගේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්,සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයක් ගැනීමේ අභිමතයක් තිබේද යන්න විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.9 ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් තීරණය ගැනීමෙන් පසුව මේ වන විට වර්ෂයකට ද වැඩි කාලයක් ගත වී තිබුණද එකී තීරණය හේතුවෙන් සෘජුවම හෝ වක්‍රව මූල්‍ය වෙළඳ පළට සිදු වී ඇති බලපෑම පිළිබඳව අධ්‍යයනයක් කර එම තාවකාලික අත්හිටුවීම ස්ථාවර කිරීමට, ඉවත් කිරීමට, නැවත සළකා බැලීමට හෝ වෙනයම් නිශ්චිත අනුපාතයක් මත සෘජු ක්‍රමය හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය තෝරාගැනීම වැනි විකල්ප ක්‍රමයක් අනුගමනය කළ යුතුද යන්න පිළිබඳව පසුවිපරමක් හෝ විධිමත් අධ්‍යයනයක් කළ බවට තොරතුරු විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.10 වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට අනුව වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගත් ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන් ඒවා ක්ෂණිකව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලෙහි අලෙවි කර අධික ලාභ ලබන්නේද එමගින් රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසියක් වෙනත් පාර්ශවයකට විතැන් වී තිබේද යන්න පිළිබඳ අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදුකිරීමට හෝ එවැනි අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදු කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය දත්ත තමන් සතු කර ගැනීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බවට තොරතුරුද විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින් ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.11 රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් මෙම වෙන්දේසිවලදී ලබා ගන්නා සාර්ථකත්වය අවම වීමට හා පෞද්ගලික අංශයන්හි එම සාර්ථකත්වය ඉහළ යාමට හේතු සොයා බලා රජයට අවම පිරිවැයක් සහිතව අරමුදල් රැස්කරදීමේ වගකීමද ඉටුවන පරිදි අවශ්‍ය නියාමනයන් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කටයුතු කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.12 තවද වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගත් පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් එම බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන ඉතා කෙටි දින ගණනකින් රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හෝ ආයතන වඩා අඩු පොළී අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගෙන තිබේද යන්න පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂා කළ බවට හෝ එලෙස කටයුතු සිදු වී තිබේනම් එලෙස රජයට සිදුවන මූල්‍ය අවාසිය අවම කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය නියාමනය කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ඡේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1.1 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල පාලනය වන්නේ කුමන ආයතනය යටතේද?

1958 අංක 15 දරන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල් පනත අනුව අරමුදලේ සියලුම පරිපාලන බලතල සහ කාර්යයන් කම්කරු කොමසාරිස් ජනරාල්වරයා සතු වන අතර, අරමුදලෙහි භාරකරු ලෙස අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණයට අදාළ බලතල, කාර්යයන් සහ වගකීම් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත පැවරී ඇත.

1.2 එම අරමුදලෙහි මුදල් මුදලට අගය (Value For Money/VFM)ට යටත්ව ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබන්නේද?

ඔව්

අරමුදලේ සුරක්ෂිතභාවය ආරක්ෂා කර ගනිමින්, ප්‍රතිලාභ ගෙවීම් සිදු කිරීමට හා අනෙකුත් වියදම් සපුරා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් පරිදි ද්‍රවශීලතාවයක් පවත්වාගනිමින්, අරමුදලේ සාමාජිකයන් වෙත දිගුකාලීන ධන මූර්ත ප්‍රතිලාභයක් ලබා දීම ඉලක්ක කොටගත් අරමුදලේ ආයෝජන ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනු ලබයි. ආයෝජන ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රකාශය සහ ආයෝජන වෙළඳමාර්ග උපදේශ විසින් අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල දැරීමට කැමති අවදානම් මට්ටම නිර්වචනය කරන අතර, ආයෝජනය සඳහා අරමුදල් වෙන් කිරීමට පදනම සපයනු ලබයි.

තවද, අරමුදලේ සමස්ත ආයෝජනයන්ගෙන් වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් රජයේ සුරකුම්පත්හි ආයෝජන කර ඇති අතර, ව්‍යාපාර කොටස්වල සහ භාරකාර සහතිකපත් ඇතුළු සාංගමික බැඳුම්කරවලද අරමුදලේ දෛනික ද්‍රවශීලතා

අවශ්‍යතාවයන් කළමනාකරණය කර ගැනීම සඳහා ඇති ප්‍රති විකුණුම් ගිවිසුම් වැනි ඉහළ ද්‍රවශීලතාවයන් සහිත වත්කම්වලද ආයෝජනය කර ඇත. තවද, අරමුදල විසින් සියලුම ද්‍රවශීලතා අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාලීම සඳහා විවිධ පරිණත කාල හා ඉහළ ද්‍රවශීලතා වත්කම් සහිත ප්‍රමාණවත් මුදල් (Amounts)/උපකරණ නඩත්තු කරයි. මෙසේ, ආයෝජනයන්හි මූල්‍ය සහ ආර්ථික ශක්‍යතාවය ඇගයීම තුළින් ආයෝජනයන් මුදලට අගයට යටත්ව ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබයි.

1.3 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සම්බන්ධයෙන් තොරතුරු මහබැංකුව විසින් පවත්වාගෙන යනු ලබයිද?

ඔව් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පහත සඳහන් තොරතුරු පවත්වා ගනියි.

- සාමාජිකයන්ගේ දායක මුදල් සහ අධිභාර රැස්කිරීම පිළිබඳ විස්තර
- සාමාජික ගිණුම් පවත්වාගෙන යාම
- අතිරික්ත මුදල් ආයෝජනය කිරීම
- සාමාජිකයන්ට සහ ඔවුන්ගේ නීතිමය හිමිකරුවන්ට ප්‍රතිලාභ ආපසු ගෙවීම
- සාමාජික ගිණුම්වලට පොලිය බැර කිරීම
- වාර්ෂික ගිණුම් සහ වාර්තා
- නිවාස ණය අනුමැතිය සඳහා සහභාගීත්ව ණය දෙන ආයතන වෙත සාමාජිකයන්ගේ ගිණුම් ශේෂ මත වගකීම් සහතික නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධ තොරතුරු.

6.13 පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් තමන් වෙනුවෙන් බැදුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් මගින් සිදුකිරීම තුළ රාජ්‍ය අංශයට හා පෞද්ගලික අංශයට ලැබෙන වාසිඅවාසි සළකා බලා රජයේ පිරිවැය අවම කිරීමට කටයුතු කළ බවට හෝ අවශ්‍ය නියාමනයන් කළ බවට කරුණු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවි කරුවකු ලෙස ක්‍රියා කිරීම සඳහා බලපත් නිකුත් කිරීමේදී අදාළ අපේක්ෂකයා පවතින අනෙක් ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවෙකු සමග කිසියම් හෝ සම්බන්ධයන් පවත්වාගෙන නොයන බව තහවුරු කරගනු ලැබේ.

එමෙන්ම ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන් තුළින් තරඟකාරී ලංසු බලාපොරොත්තු වන බැවින් ඔවුන් අතර එකඟතා සහිතව වෙන්දේසි සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් වීමක් අපේක්ෂා නොකෙරේ. මෙවැන්නක් සිදු වූ බවට වාර්තා වූ ප්‍රථම අවස්ථාව මෙය වේ. මෙම සිද්ධිය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව දැනගත් වහාම අදාළ දෙපාර්ශවයම වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡා සඳහා ගෙන්වන ලද අතර නිසි පැවැත්මක් සහිතව කටයුතු කරන ලෙස දන්වන ලදී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ.

පිළිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරයි.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

6.14 ඉහත 5.3.3 ඡේදයේ නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇති පොළී අනුපාතයන්හි ක්‍රමිකව ඉහළ යාමේ ප්‍රවණතාවය ඇති වීමට ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයෙහි සඳහන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය සෘජුව හෝ වක්‍රව හේතු වූයේද යන්න තීරණය කිරීමට තරම් ප්‍රමාණාත්මක විශ්ලේෂණයක්කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.1 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහබැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණවලදී මෙන්ම පවතින ක්‍රමවේදයන් වෙනස්කම්වලට භාජනය කිරීමේ දී සහ නව ක්‍රමවේදයන් හඳුන්වාදීමේ දී එමගින් රටේ ආර්ථිකයට සිදුවන ධන හෝ ඍණ බලපෑම් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අරමුණු වලට ඉන් සිදුවන බලපෑම දිගුකාලීන හා කෙටි කාලීන වශයෙන් සලකා බලා අදාල තීරණ වලට එළඹිය යුතු වන අතර එලෙස කටයුතු කල බවට පිළිගත හැකි සාක්ෂි අවශ්‍ය අවස්ථාවන් හි දී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට හැකිවන පරිදි පවත්වාගෙන යාම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.2 ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලද නියාමනය කිරීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු නොවන තත්ත්වයක් තුල මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල හැසිරවීමේ හා නියාමනය කිරීමේ කාර්යය වඩාත් ඵලදායිව ඉටුකිරීම අඩපන වීම වලක්වනු වස් අවශ්‍ය සියලු දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහබැංකුව සතුව පවත්වා ගැනීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති-තුමා ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොලේ ඇති වුණු ගනුදෙනුවත් ගැන නේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කළේ.ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් මේ ගනුදෙනුව ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළට -Secondary market එකටගියාට පස්සේ Secondary market එකේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වන්නේ කොහොමද කියන තොරතුරු පවත්වාගෙන යෑමක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව තුළ තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

අපේ Central Depository System -CDS- කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට ඉඩමක ඔප්පුව ලියාපදිංචි වෙනකොට හිමිකරු වෙනස් වුණොත් සටහන් වෙනවා වාගේ අපි බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කළ දවසේ සිට ඒක අනිත් අතට ගියේ කවදාද, කොයි වෙලාවේද? කියන එක ගිය තැන ඉඳලා ඉවර වෙන තැනට වනතුරු trace කරගෙන සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් CDS එක හරහා. එවැනි ක්‍රම වේදයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

අපේ මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණාවට අදාළව ගත්තොත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ මාර්තු 29 අතර කාලය තුළ සිදු වුණු බැදුම්කර ගනුදෙනු ක්‍රියාවලියේදී ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළේ ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න කියලා විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටියාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඉල්ලුවා. ඒ වුණාට CDS එකෙන් එහෙම බලන්න බැහැ. මොකද, Bond වල IC Number එකක් සහ Unit Number එකක් තිබෙනවා. කාටහරි දුන්නාට පස්සේ ඒ IC Number එකෙන් කලින් සහ පසුව ගත් ඒවා ඔක්කොම එකට තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. උදාහරණයක් විධියට IC Number එකත් සමඟ රුපියල් බිලියන 50 තිබෙනවා කියලා හිතමු. එසේ තිබුණාට එක් එක් දවසේ ඒවා කොහෙන් ගත්තද කියන තොරතුරු මොනවත් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා

මම එතරම් විස්තර ඇහුවේ නැහැ. මම ඇහුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කළාද මේ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී.සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව් ඉල්ලීමක් කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා

විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඒ පිළිබඳ යම් ආකෘති කාරණාවක්, පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද මෙන්න මේ තොරතුරු මෙන්න මේ විධියට ලබා දෙන්න කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව් මට මතක හැටියට ඒ ඉල්ලපු විධියට අපට තොරතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා

එහෙම ආකෘතියක් දුන්නාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව් මට මතක හැටියට දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා

එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

බැහැ කියලා නෙවෙයි කිව්වේ. ඒ තොරතුරු ගන්න බැහැ කියන එකයි කිව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ ආකෘතියට අනුව ගන්න බැහැ කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා

නැත්නම් ඒ ඉල්ලීම වෙන විධියකට ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළේ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන්?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

යම් ආකාරවලට ගන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් උදාහරණයක් විධියට මිල ගැන විමසීමක් කළොත් CDS එකේ මිල ගැන සඳහන් වන්නේ නැහැ. අයිති කෙනාගේ Account එකේ ප්‍රමාණය සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

ඇයි මිල සඳහන් නොවෙන්නේ?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඒ system එක හදලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒ විධියට. ඒ කියන්නේ CDS එකේ record වෙන්නේ ownership එක නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

උදාහරණයක් විධියට අපි කියමු "A" කියන bond එක අපි primary Market එකේ දැමුවා කියලා. මට කියන්න ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළේ bond dealers ලා ලාභ උපයන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළේ ලාභ උපයන්නේ buying and selling වලින්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

buying and selling වලින් තමයි ලාභ උපයන්නේ?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව්. Capital gains tax එක ගන්න පුළුවන් buying and selling වලින්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

Capital gains tax එක calculateකරන්නේ කොහොමද? අපි Capital gains tax එකක් ගහනවා නම් Capital gains tax එක ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළේ calculate කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ගනුදෙනු කරන මිල අපි ළඟ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

මම අහන්නේ ඒක නෙවෙයි. මම අහන්නේ සමරතුංග මහත්මයා Capital gains tax එකක් ගහන්න යනවානේ. Bond එකක Capital gains tax එක secondary market එකේ calculate කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියන්න කෝ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

මම ඒ ගැන අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් Capital gains tax එකක් ගහනවා නම් Capital gains tax එක අදාළ කොම්පැණිය ගත්තාද, නැද්ද, ගත්ත මිල කීයද, විකුණපු මිල කීයද, ඒ අනුව ලාභය කීයද කියන එක දැනුම්දීම කොම්පැණියේ වගකීම.මොකද secondary market එකේ එක එක ratesවලට create වෙනවා. නමුත් CDS එකේ record වෙන්නේ අයිතිය වෙනස්වීම මිසක් වෙනස් වුණු මිල සඳහන් වන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතකොට ඒ Company එක දෙන ගණන තමයි අපට දෙන්නේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව්. ආදායම්බදු රැස් කරනකොට ඒ පුද්ගලයාගේ ආදායම ගණනය කරන්නේ ඔහු declare කරන එක අනුවනේ. ආදායම් බදුවල මූලික ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ඒ කොම්පැණි විසින් income tax return එකsubmit කළ යුතු වීමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

ඒක හරි. අපි හිතමු

සභාපතිතුමා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ආදායම් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අවංකභාවයයි. මේ ගනුදෙනුවක තිබෙන අවංකභාවයයි අතර වෙනස ඔබතුමාට තේරෙනවා නේ

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා

මෙක bond මෙහි Business ක්‍රියාවලියක් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ companies පටන් අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ මේ කාර්යයට.ඒ නිසා ආදායම් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අවංකභාවය මේකෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්න බැහැ. මම අහන්නේ මෙච්චරයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔය හදපු system එකට අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලා සෑහීමකට පත් වෙනවාද, මහ බැංකුව මෙතෙක් සෑහීමකට පත් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද secondary market එකේ තිබෙන ගණුදෙනු පිළිබඳව, මිල පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු ප්‍රමාණවත් පරිදි ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබෙනවා කියලා? ඇත්තටම මේක වැදගත් වෙන්නේ අලුත් අධිපතිතුමාට.

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

අපි දැනට පවත්වාගෙන යන ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව රජය නිකුත් කළ සුරැක්ම්පත්වල අයිතිය වෙනස්වීම, කුමන පුද්ගලයාගේ ඉඳලා කුමන පුද්ගලයාට හුවමාරු වුණාද කියලා තමයි අපි සඳහන් කරන්නේ. එහිදී කුමන මිලකට හුවමාරු වුණාද කියන එක අපි දැනට සඳහන් කරගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

yield එකවත් නැහැ?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

නැහැ. නමුත්, එක කරුණක් තියෙනවා. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ ආයතනවලට වගකීමක් තියෙනවා,ඒ දවසේ ඒ අය ගනුදෙනු කළ සුරැකුම්පත් මිල ගණන් පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැනුම් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ දැනුම් දෙන තොරතුරු සමහර වෙලාවට සියයට 100 ක් නිවැරදි නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, වෙළඳ පොළේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය අනුව සුරැකුම්පත්වල මිල ගණන් වෙනස් වෙන්නෙ මේ ආකාරයට කියන එක අපට පදනම් කරගන්න වෙනවා. අපට මිනුම් දණ්ඩක් විධියට භාවිතා කරන්න වෙනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට සියයට 100ක් නිවැරදි නොවන්න පුළුවන්. අනික් කරුණ තමයි ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇහුවා කොහොමද මේ

සුරකුම්පත්වල මිල තීරණය වෙන්නේ කියලා. මා හිතන්නේ එතුමා දන්නවා.. සුරකුම්පත්වල මිල තීරණය වෙන්නේ පවතින මුදල් ප්‍රවාහය

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

I mean the whole point is to ride this wave. You are making capital gains on the changes in the yield to make billions in the bond market. That is how you do it. If you are now saying, “we have no way to check at what price these securities change hands" Mr. Governor, that is serious flaw. There is no way in which you can estimate if there has been any fraud or if there is some sort of query. How would you do this?

The Hon. HarshanaRajakaruna

Specially, if there is a capital gains tax is being introduced.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Capital gains tax එකෙන් මුදල් ගන්නේ කොහොමද?

Dr. M.Z.M Azim

In fact, for the question the Hon. Deputy Minister raised, what we are currently having is in the capital market the infrastructure available is a depository which records the ownership transfer which is not a trading platform where you probably see the price movements. But the Central Bank has already recognized that factor and already initiated developing a non-trading platform that is in the process. This might come up with the time frame and the Deputy Governor might be able to detail it to you. We have recognized that deficiency in the market as of now. But for the price details what you are doing at the moment is on site supervision.

සභාපතිතුමා

අධිපතිතුමා, අපි මෙය විශේෂයෙන් note කරනවා. හේතුව, මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන වගකීම නියාමනය කියන එක. විශේෂයෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ සහ ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළ සහ ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළ. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ පොළේ මේ විධියට ලොකු

හිදැසක් ඇතිවීමේ ඉඩකඩ තියෙනවා. ඒක බොහොම බරපතළ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඒ නිසා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විශේෂ ප්‍රතිකර්මයන් යෙදීමේ අවශ්‍යතාව තියෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා.

මම දැනගන්න කැමතියි. theoreticalපැත්ත නොවෙයි. අපි පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා issue කරපු bond එක විවිධ ආයතන ගත්තානේ. ඒ ගත්ත ආයතනවල ownership එක transfer වෙලා අවසානයේ ඒක land වෙලා තියෙන්නේ කොතනද කියලා මහ බැංකුවට මේ COPE කමිටුවට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක්ද කියන එක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

ownership එක කියන්න පුළුවන්ලු. price තමයි කියන්න බැරි?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලා යටතේ තිබෙන ආයතනයක් ගන්න නම්, price එක දන්නවා නේ. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ගත්තේ කීයටද කියලා කාගෙන්වත් දැන ගන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ. ඒක ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල් ගත්තේ කියටද කියලා දන්නවා?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 34/35/36/37/38)

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාවෙත යොමු කල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු

සුරකුම්පත් ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහාභාණ්ඩාගාරයේ තොරතුරු පවත්වාගෙන යන්නේද? නැත.

7.3 මහබැංකුව විසින් නිකුත් කල බැඳුම්කරයන් කල්පිරී මුදල් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා තමන් වෙත ඉදිරිපත් වන අවස්ථාව දක්වා එම බැඳුම්කරයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය හා ගණුදෙනු වන ආකාරය පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වා ගැනීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.4 රටක මහ බැංකුව කෙරෙහි පවතින විශ්වාසය එහි නිලධාරින් විසින් ගන්නාවූ තීන්දු තීරණවල අවංකභාවය මතද රඳාපවතින හෙයින් හා එම විශ්වාසය දේශීයව මෙන්ම අන්තර්ජාතික වශයෙන්ද නොකැල්ලව පවත්වාගත යුතු හෙයින් එම නිලධාරීන් ගන්නා වූ තීන්දු තීරණයන්ගේ අවංකභාවය කාල පමාවකින් තොරව ඒත්තු ගැන්විය හැකි පරිදි යම් යම් සීමාවන්ට යටත්ව හෝ විනිවිද භාවයකින් යුතුව කටයුතු කිරීම

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.5 නෛතික තත්ත්වයන්ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේඛයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද ඒවාටම සීමා නොවී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ කළමනාකරණ තීරණයන්ට බලපෑම් කළ හැකි මට්ටමේ නිලධාරින් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට සම්බන්ධිත ආයතන අතර යම් බැඳියාවන්හි ගැටීම් පවතින්නේ නම් සද්භාවය පෙරදැරි කරගෙන සුදුසු අනාවරණයක්ද සහිතව සිය කාර්යයන් ඉටු කිරීමට මහ බැංකුවේ ඉහළ කළමණාකාරීත්වය කටයුතු කිරීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.6 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන බොහෝ තීරණ සමස්ථ ආර්ථිකයට දිගුකාලීනව බලපෑම් ඇති කරවන අතර එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්,සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයන් ගැනීමේදී නිවැරදි පදනමකින් එම තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේද යන්න ස්වාධීන පාර්ශවයකගේ පරීක්ෂාවන්ට සහ අධීක්ෂණයකට ලක්වීම ඉතා වැදගත් වනුයේ එකී තීරණයන්ගෙන් ජනිතවන යහපත් මෙන්ම අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵලවලටද සමස්ථ ජනතාවට මුහුණ දීමට සිදුවන හෙයිනි. ඒ අනුව එවැනි සංකීර්ණ තීරණ විධිමත් ඇගයීමකින් තොරව ඉතාමත් සරලව හා ක්ෂණිකව ගෙන එමගින් යම් අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵල ඇති වී තිබේද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ඒ සඳහා බලවරමක් ඇති ආයතනයන්ට ලබා දීමට බාධා සිදුවන පරිදි මුදල් නීති පනතේ 45 වගන්තියේ සටහන් රහස්‍යතාවය සුරැකීමේ ප්‍රතිපාදන යොදා ගත නොහැකි වන පරිදි එම වගන්තිය සුදුසු පරිදි සංශෝධනයන්ට ලක් කළ යුතුය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.7 මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරතුරු නිවැරදිව හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර අනුව ලබා දී ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබේ. එහෙයින් රාජ්‍ය විගණනය විසින් එවැනි තොරතුරුවලින් හඳුනාගනු ලැබූ තොරතුරු මෙම වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුළත් නොකර එම තොරතුරු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ලබා දෙන බවත් සඳහන් කළ යුතුව ඇත.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ඡේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1. ඔබ වෙළෙඳපළ සංවේදී තොරතුරු ලෙස හඳුන්වන්නේ කුමන කාණ්ඩයට වැටෙන තොරතුරුද?

වෙනත් පාර්ශවයකට අයුතු ප්‍රයෝජනයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකිවන සිදුවීමට ආසන්න හෝ අනාගතය මූල්‍ය, විනිමය අනුපාත, පොලී අනුපාත සහ රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා තෙවන පාර්ශව සම්බන්ධ කරුණු ආදී සියලුම තොරතුරු.

2. එම තොරතුරු කුමන කාලයක් සඳහා සංවේදී තොරතුරු ලෙස පවත්වාගෙන යන්නේද?
වෙනත් පාර්ශවයක් විසින් එවැනි තොරතුරු අයුතු ප්‍රයෝජනයක් ලබාගැනීමට භාවිතා කිරීමට හැකියාවක් ඇති තෙක්.

3. එම සංවේදී තොරතුරු කා සතුව පවතින්නේද?
මෙම තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහා බැංකුව සහ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ විවිධ මට්ටමේ කාර්යයන්වල නියුතු වන කමිටු සාමාජිකයන්/ ආයතන සතුව මෙම තොරතුරු ඇත.

4. එම තොරතුරු තෙවන පාර්ශවයක් වෙත යාම නිසා ඇත වන බලපෑම(impact) කුමක්ද?
මෙවැනි තොරතුරුවලින් තෙවන පාර්ශවයක් අයුතු ප්‍රයෝජනක් ලබා ගැනීමට ඉඩ ඇත.

5. එම තොරතුරුවල රහස්‍යභාවය ආරක්ෂා කිරීමට හා පාලනය කිරීමට ගෙන ඇති පියවර මොනවාද?
ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව තුළ සුදුසු අභ්‍යන්තර පාලනයන් සහ ෆයර් වෝල්ස් (fairwalls) ස්ථාපිත කර ඇති අතර, අදාළ පුද්ගලයන් ව්‍යවස්ථානුකූලව රහස්‍ය භාවය පවත්වා ගැනීමට බැඳී ඇත.

7.8 ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් අතර බැදුම්කර වලට අදාළව සිදුවන අන්තර් ගනුදෙනු නියාමනය කිරීම සඳහා නිසි ක්‍රමවේදයක් මාර්ගෝපදේශ මගින් හඳුන්වාදිය යුතුය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ඡේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1.1 ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳුන් නියාමනය කිරීමේ බලයක් මහ බැංකුව සතු වේද? ඔව්

1.2 නිබෙනම් එසේ නියාමනය කිරීම සඳහා ගනු ලබන ක්‍රියාමාර්ග මොනවාද?

1. නියාමන සහ උපදෙස් නිකුත් කිරීම.
2. ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්ගේ කාර්යයන් ඇගයීම
3. එතැන් පරීක්ෂාව සහ දුරස්ථ පරීක්ෂාව

1.3 ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපළට ලංසු තැබිය හැකි උපරිම මුදලක් තීරණය කර තිබේද?
නැත

1.4 ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවකු ලෙස ලියාපදිංචි නොවූ ගණුදෙනුකරුවකු වෙනුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවකුට ලංසු තැබිය හැකිද? ඔව්

7.9 බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියට අදාළව ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන වෙන්දේසි වල අවසාන දිනය හා වේලාව යම් යම් අවස්ථාවලදී දීර්ඝකිරීම් අනුමත කර තිබූ අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝකිරීම් නොවැලැක්විය හැකි සහ සාධාරණීකරණය කළහැකි කරුණු වලට සීමා කළයුතුය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.10 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු නොවුවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු මෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ලබා දී ඇත. එසේ වුවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට විකල්පයන් ලෙස වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් දක්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. මේ වන විට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ පවතින අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල එම අධීක්ෂණයෙන් බැහැරව ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කළ හැකි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බවට පත් කිරීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කමිටුව විසින් මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල මෙම ඡේදයේ විෂයන්ට අදාල ප්‍රශ්ණ සහ එම පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ.

1.1 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල පාලනය වන්නේ කුමන ආයතනය යටතේද?

1958 අංක 15 දරන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල් පනත අනුව අරමුදලේ සියලුම පරිපාලන බලතල සහ කාර්යයන් කම්කරු කොමසාරිස්

ජනරාල්වරයා සතු වන අතර, අරමුදලෙහි භාරකරු ලෙස අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණයට අදාළ බලතල, කාර්යයන් සහ වගකීම් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත පැවරී ඇත.

1.2 එම අරමුදලෙහි මුදල් මුදලට අගය (Value For Money/VFM)ට යටත්ව ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබන්නේද?

ඔව්

අරමුදලේ සුරක්ෂිතභාවය ආරක්ෂා කර ගනිමින්, ප්‍රතිලාභ ගෙවීම් සිදු කිරීමට හා අනෙකුත් වියදම් සපුරා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් පරිදි ද්‍රවශීලතාවයක් පවත්වාගනිමින්, අරමුදලේ සාමාජිකයන් වෙත දිගුකාලීන ධන මූර්ත ප්‍රතිලාභයක් ලබා දීම ඉලක්ක කොටගත් අරමුදලේ ආයෝජන ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනු ලබයි. ආයෝජන ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රකාශය සහ ආයෝජන වෙළඳමාර්ග උපදේශ විසින් අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල දැරීමට කැමති අවදානම් මට්ටම නිර්වචනය කරන අතර, ආයෝජනය සඳහා අරමුදල් වෙන් කිරීමට පදනම සපයනු ලබයි.

තවද, අරමුදලේ සමස්ත ආයෝජනයන්ගෙන් වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් රජයේ සුරකුම්පත්හි ආයෝජන කර ඇති අතර, ව්‍යාපාර කොටස්වල සහ භාරකාර සහතිකපත් ඇතුළු සාංගමික බැඳුම්කරවලද අරමුදලේ දෛනික ද්‍රවශීලතා අවශ්‍යතාවයන් කළමනාකරණය කර ගැනීම සඳහා ඇති ප්‍රති විකුණුම් ගිවිසුම් වැනි ඉහළ ද්‍රවශීලතාවයන් සහිත වත්කම්වලද ආයෝජනය කර ඇත. තවද, අරමුදල විසින් සියලුම ද්‍රවශීලතා අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාලීම සඳහා විවිධ පරිණත කාල හා ඉහළ ද්‍රවශීලතා වත්කම් සහිත ප්‍රමාණවත් මුදල් (Amounts)/උපකරණ නඩත්තු කරයි. මෙසේ, ආයෝජනයන්හි මූල්‍ය සහ ආර්ථික ශක්‍යතාවය ඇගයීම තුළින් ආයෝජනයන් මුදලට අගයට යටත්ව ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබයි.

1.3 සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සම්බන්ධයෙන් තොරතුරු මහබැංකුව විසින් පවත්වාගෙන යනු ලබයිද?

ඔව් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පහත සඳහන් තොරතුරු පවත්වා ගනියි.

- සාමාජිකයන්ගේ දායක මුදල් සහ අධිභාර රැස්කිරීම පිළිබඳ විස්තර
- සාමාජික ගිණුම් පවත්වාගෙන යාම
- අතිරික්ත මුදල් ආයෝජනය කිරීම
- සාමාජිකයන්ට සහ ඔවුන්ගේ නීතිමය හිමිකරුවන්ට ප්‍රතිලාභ ආපසු ගෙවීම
- සාමාජික ගිණුම්වලට පොලිය බැර කිරීම
- වාර්ෂික ගිණුම් සහ වාර්තා
- නිවාස ණය අනුමැතිය සඳහා සහභාගිත්ව ණය දෙන ආයතන වෙත සාමාජිකයන්ගේ ගිණුම් ශේෂ මත වගකීම් සහතික නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධ තොරතුරු.

7.11 මේ වන විට ඉදිරි මාසයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය වෙතින් ලබා ගන්නා අතර අවම වශයෙන් එය ඉදිරි මාස තුනක කාලයක් දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ජේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.12 ඉහත පරිදි මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය ලබා ගන්නා ලද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරය කල් ඇතිව තීරණය කිරීම

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ජේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.13 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම. එනම් පසුගිය කාලය තුළ එක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බුන්වත්භාවයට පත්වීම හේතුවෙන් රජයද ඇතුළුව එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු සමග ගනුදෙනු කළ ආයෝජකයන් අසීරුතාවයට පත්ව ඇත. එවැනි තත්ත්වයන් වැලකෙන පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඔවුන් මූල්‍ය ශක්තීන් ඇතුළු අදාල චර්යාවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ජේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

7.14 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විගණකාධිපති වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති තොරතුරු අතර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකිය යුතු ලේඛන හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්ගෙන් විමසන ලදී. ඒ සඳහා පිළිතුරු ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරයකු දන්වා තිබුණේ, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අදාලව මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යයන් වර්ෂයේ විසර්ජන පනතින් අනුමත සීමාවන් තුළ රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය මාසික පදනමින් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ මහ බැංකුව වෙත දැනුම් දීමට සීමා වන බවයි. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණ කටයුතු භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යභාරය ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති සරල කාර්යයකට සීමා වන බවට විගණනයේදී එකඟ විය නොහැක

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

8.1 ඉහත5.1.17 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වා ගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.889,358,050 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය සහ 5.2.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වා ගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසිය ලෙස 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින පැවැති භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි දෙකේදී වලක්වා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබූ එකතුව රු.1,674,256,805 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වා ගැනීමට කටයුතු නොකිරීම පිළිබඳව බලධාරීන් වගකිවයුතු බව නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ.

තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමයට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට තීරණය ගත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා සිදුකර ඇති බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම්වලට අදාලව ද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි හෝ අවාසි ගණනය කළහොත් ඉහතින් දක්වන ලද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය තවදුරටත් ඉහළයාමේ හැකියාවක් පැවැතීමද බැහැර කළ නොහැක.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

අපට ක්‍රමවේදයක් පිළිබඳ සැලකිල්ලක් කරලා නිවැරදි මොකක්ද වැරදි මොකක්ද කියන එක කියන්න අපහසු නම්, යම් නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවක් ගැන සලකා එම ගනුදෙනුවේදී අනුගමනය කරන්නේ මොන ක්‍රමවේදයද කියන එක මත වෙන වාසි හෝ අවාසි කියන්න පුළුවන් නේද? එක් ගණුදෙනුවකට එක් ක්‍රමයක් ආදේශ කළාම අවාසි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් තවත් ගණුදෙනුවකදී ඒ ක්‍රමයම අනුගමනය කලාම වාසි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවකදී එම ගණුදෙනුව අරභයා අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන සැලකිල්ලක් කරලා ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය හොඳද, නරකද, වාසි අවාසිද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම හිතන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ වාර්තාවෙන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒක තමයි.

(යොමුව -2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 10)

8.2 මෙම වාර්තාව සැකසීමේ දී විගණකාධිපති වෙත අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු සහ ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේද වලින් අවධාරණය කර ඇති කරුණු අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ස්වකීය කාර්යය මෙහෙයවීමේ දී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයකුගෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරනු ලබන මට්ටමේ වෘත්තීමය විචක්ෂණභාවයකින් (Professional Due Care) යුතුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බව තහවුරු නොවීය.

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා -

පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක කර සියයට 100 ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් යනවා කියන තීරණයට මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අනුමැතියක් ලැබිලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. තවමත් ලැබිලා නැහැ.ඒක සිදුවුණේ පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා උදේ වෙන්දේසියට පෙර අපි සියලු දෙනාම ඉන්න තැන. මින් ඉදිරියට වෙන්දේසිවලින් පමණක් කරන බවටත් අනෙක් ක්‍රමයට කරන්නේ නැති බවටත් අධිපතිතුමා වාචිකව ප්‍රකාශ කළා. එතකොටත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒක අනුමත කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඊට පස්සෙ Board Meeting එක තිබුණේ මාර්තු 06 වැනිදා

අධිපතිතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඇවිල්ලා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා.පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා පැවැත්වුණු වෙන්දේසියේදී සම්පූර්ණයෙන් සියයට සියයක් වෙන්දේසිය පමණක් කළා කියලා.ඒ පිළිබඳව දැනුම් දීමක් කළා. නමුත් ඒකත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට ලක්වෙලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. මොකද සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට ලක් වෙන්න නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක අනුමැතියට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා ඒ තීරණයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේකෙදි දැනුම් දීමක් පමණයි කරලා තිබුණේ. එතකොට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අධිපතිතුමා 27 වෙනිදාට පෙර කිසිම දිනක, අපි කිසිම කෙනෙක් එක්ක ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබුණෙත් නැහැ. කිසිම කෙනෙකුට දැනුම් දීමක් කරලා තිබුණෙත් නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ නිසා තමයි Tender Committee එක දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව අතර recommendation වෙන විධියට ඒ ගොල්ලො රුපියල් මිලියන 2.5 ක් විතරක් අරගෙන ඉතුරුවික replacement කරන්න කියලා නිර්දේශ කරලා තිබුණේ. එතැනදි දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහිල්ලා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්ව නිසා තමයි Tender Committee එක ඒ ආකාරයට තීරණය කරලා තිබුණේ

ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට මගේ කෙටි පිළිතුරයි ඒ. ඒකට නිසි අනුමැතිය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් තවමත් ලැබී නැහැ.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 04/05)

සභාපතිතුමා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් නිර්දේශ හදනවා නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශ තුළ විකල්ප නිර්දේශ කිහිපයක් තිබුණා. ඒ අතරින් එකක් තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක නිර්දේශයක් සහිතව ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක නිර්දේශය අපට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. ඒක අපට ඉදිරිපති කරන්න හදමින් පැවතුණ එකක්.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

වෙන්දේසිය 11.04 ට අවසන් වුණා. ඊට පස්සෙ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී, අතිරේක අධිකාරීවරුන් සහ Front Office එකේ ප්‍රධානියා එකතුවෙලා බලනවා. කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක් අපට මේකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා. ඒ අනුව අපේ තීරණය වුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කළා. ඒකෙන් අදහස් කළේ අපි ඒක ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට

ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම පමණයි. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවෙන් තමයි තීරණය ගන්නේ. ඒක අවසන් වුණාට පසුව අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැමිණීම සිද්ධ වුනා. ඒ වෙලාවේ අධිපතිතුමා සමග නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමන්ලා දෙදෙනෙක් පැමිණ සිටියා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ අතිරේක අධිකාරීතුමා ඉතාම විස්තර සහිතව පැහැදිලි කළා රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යෑම කිසිම ආකාරයකින් යෝජනා කරන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම් ආසිම් මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ OperationManualඑකේ TenderBoardඑකට ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලේඛණ Annexes විධියට පෙන්වා තියෙනවා. ඉන් එක් ලේඛණයකින් තමයි අපි නොයෙකුත් විකල්පයන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. එම අවස්ථාවේ වෙළඳපොළ තත්ත්වය මත රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යෝජනා කිරීම තමයි අපි ලෑස්ති කරලා තිබුණු විකල්පය.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා ගේ ප්‍රශ්ණය

ඔබතුමා සහ ඔබතුමිය කියනවා ඒක Advice එකක් විතරයි. Orderඑකක් නෙවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා 2.6 ගන්න එක තමයි fair කියන එක ටෙන්ඩර් Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

නැහැ. ඊට ප්‍රථම අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණියා

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ක ප්‍රමාණය. අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ, එහෙම නෙවෙයි. රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ක් auction එකෙන් ගන්න කියලා. නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපි එකහෙලා කියා සිටියේ, මේ ප්‍රමාණයට යාම සුදුසු නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

යෝජනා හයක් යෝජනා කරලා තමයි ඔබතුමියන්ලා මේ කමිටුවට දමන්නේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමියන්ලා තව note එකකුත් දැමුවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

එතැනදී අධිපතිතුමා සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රකාශ කලාට පස්සේ "නැහැ රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යන්න ඕනෑ" කියනකොට මට සිදු වුණා FrontOffice එකට නියෝගයක් දෙන්න රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට තිබෙන විධියට මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්න කියලා.

මොකද FrontOffice එකෙන් තමයි මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ නිලධාරියාට නැවත වාරයක් ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න කටින් කියලා බැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම ඒ නිලධාරියාට Notes කලා Governorගේ additional fund requirement එකක් තියෙනවා, ඒ අනුව රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට වාර්තාව හදන්න කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඊට පසුව අපි අරගෙන ගියේ අර රුපියල් බිලියන 10 කියන යෝජනාව. ඒ නිසා අපි සභාපතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා. "අපේ තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ප්‍රමාණය, නමුත් අපි මේ වාර්තාවේ ගෙනාවේ නැහැ අද අධිපතිතුමා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනෙකු සමග පැමිණියාම අපි යෝජනා කරන වාර්තාවට කැමති නැති නිසා අපට සිදු වුණා රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක ප්‍රමාණයේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමට, මේ තමයි ඒ වාර්තාව" කියලා. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යෝජනා කළා මේ පිළිබඳව අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසීමක් කරන්න කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 14/15/16)

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියනයක් ඉල්ලලා, එතැනින් පස්සේ නේ වැඩි කරන්න කියලා නියෝගය ආවේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියලා ඉන්න තැනටම ඇවිත් කථා කළා. Public Debt Management Department එකේ හිටපු කවුරු හරි ඉන්නවා නම් කියන්න. ඉතිහාසයේ කිසියම් දවසක මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයෙකු පහළ තමන්ගේ department එකට ඇවිත්, මෙය මෙපමණ ප්‍රමාණයකින් වැඩි කරන්න කියලා තිබෙනවාද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී.නානායක්කාර මහතා

මම 2012 වර්ෂයේ ජනවාරි මස 01 වැනි දා සිට 2015 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 09 වැනි දා වනතුරු රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි විධියට හිටියා. කිසිම දවසක මම ඉන්න කාලයේදී එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් උදා වුණේ නැහැ

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 37)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

27 වැනි දා සිදුවුණු තීරණ අතුරෙන් එක තීරණයක් තමයි, රුපියල් බිලියනයේ සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා යන්න තීරණය කරපු එක. ඒ වාගේම ඊට වඩා වැඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලැබිලා තිබුණත් රුපියල් බිලියන 10න් ඔබ්බට නොයන්නත් ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කළ. නිවැරදියිද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව්

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමාගේ මුලිකත්වයෙන් යුතුව සාමාජිකයන් 08 දෙනා ඒ මොහොතේ ඒ ගත්ත තීරණය, ඔබතුමාගේ වෘත්තිය විනිශ්චය අනුව ගත්ත තීරණයක්. හරි නේද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

නැහැ. මගේ තනි තීරණයක් නොවේ. Committee එකක් තිබුණා. ඒකේ Minutes තිබෙනවා. මම පෞද්ගලිකව-,

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමා පෞද්ගලිකව නොවෙයි කණ්ඩායමක් එක්ක ගත්ත තීරණයක්

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඔව් කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගත්ත තීරණයක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ට ගිහිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ට අඩු වුණා නොවෙයිද? කවුරුවත් රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ගන්න කියලා යෝජනා කළේ නැද්ද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

නැහැ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙම කළේ නැද්ද සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය?

සී.එම්ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

Department එකට Governorආපු වෙලාවේ ඉස්සෙල්ලාම කිව්වේ රුපියල් බිලියන 20 කියලා

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

විස්ස කියලා කිව්වා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඇයි ඔබතුමන් බොරු කියන්නේ?

පී.සමරසිංහ මහතා

අපිට එහෙම යෝජනාවක් ආවේ නැහැ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

විස්ස දහය දක්වා ඊට පසුව අඩුවුණා.

ගරු අජිත්.පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කියන පරිදි Governor යම් විධියක මතයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළ, රුපියල් බිලියන විස්සක් දක්වාම යා හැකිව තිබෙනවා කියලා. නමුත් සමරසිරි මහත්මයාගේ මුලිකත්වයෙන් යුත් කමිටුව, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී තීරණය කළ, අපි විස්සට යන්නේ නැහැ. අපි උපරිම වශයෙන් යන්නේ දහයටයි කියලා? ඒක හරිද? දීපා මහත්මියගේ අදහස් පිළිගන්නේ නැද්ද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒක දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සිදු වූ දෙයක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියත්. අධිපතිතුමාත් අතර ඇති වූ සංවාදය ඔබතුමන් දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

දැනගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒකහරිද? අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියටද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්

සභාපතිතුමා

මෙතුමා මතු කළානේ, ඉස්සෙල්ලා ගන්න කියලා මෙතුමියට කියපු කාරනාව සමරසිංහ මහත්මයා නොදැන සිටියාද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය, එතුමියට අදහසක් කිබෙන්න ඕනෑ ඒ ගැන. ඒකයි මම ඇහුවේ.

අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එතුමිය තමයි නායිකාව. සමරසිරි මහතා ඔබතුමා කොපමණ කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවේ සේවය කර තිබෙනවාද?

පී.සමරසිරි මහතා

ඒ වන විට අවුරුදු 30 ක්.

අජිත්.පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

බොහොම පළපුරුද්දක් තිබුණා සහ ජෙෂ්ඨත්වයක් තිබුණා, කෙළින් තීරණයක් අරගෙන රටට, ආයතනයට නිවැරදි තීරණයක් ගන්න. ඔබගේ මණ්ඩලය උපරිම විශ්වාසය අනුව එම තීරණය ගත්තා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අධිපතිතුමා මට මතයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළ කියලා කිව්වත්, එය මතයක් නොවෙයි. මට අන්තිමට කියලා ගියේ,"Do it"කියලා

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය සාක්ෂිවල කිසිම තැනෙක "Do it"කියලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

අද තමයි "Do it"කියලා කිව්වා කියලා ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

අද තමයි ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ එහෙම දෙයක් කිව්වා කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමියගේ ප්‍රකාශයේ 18 වන පිටුව මම කියවන්නම් "Why do you not go for 10?"

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

පළමුවෙන්ම අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය ඒක.

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

Right' I am posing this question to you where have you stated that the Governor said, "Do it"? You gave evidence last time. So, I am asking you a question. Since I was not there, wanted to ask this question from you. Where have you said that Governor said, "Do it?"

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara

Can you tell us about the conversation

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

Please let me finish this.

සභාපතිතුමා

මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මට පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමටයි මම අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අහන්නේ, "Do it" කියලා Governor සඳහන් කිරීම මෙතුමිය කොයි ස්ථානයේදී ද සඳහන් කළේ කියලා නේද අහන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සාක්ෂිවල දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න කළ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මොනවද කිව්වේ කියලා? So, let me finish this. Do not disturb because it is giving an undue advantage for the person to answer' So, let me finish it please. Decently I am asking a question.

Where have you stated in your evidence that Governor said, "Do it?"

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathne

Today I am saying

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

You have never said it before

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathne

No

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe

What you said earlier was a suggestion by the Governor. You are an educated lady. You were under oath and you were giving evidence last time. If it is not, that Governor told you to do it, easily you could have said –

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මට ඇමතිතුමා කියන කොට තමයි මතක් වුණේ.

The Hon. SujeewaSenasinghe: ඇමතිතුමා නොවෙයි, you were discussing there with your peers. I saw that. If Governor had given directions to do it, you could have said, "He told me to do it." It is very easy. That is why I am asking you. You are an educated person and your qualifications are there.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

සමාව ගන්නවා

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සමාව ගන්න එපා. Can I say this?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, එහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් කෝප් සභාවේ කවුරු හෝ අහලා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

අහලා තිබෙනවා. Let me finish.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

I must make this request

සභාපතිතුමා

අධිපතිතුමා.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I think the Hon.Minister is very welcome to continue the line of questioning. But I think it will be very nice if it is can be done in a better environment. I do not want my colleagues to be put under undue pressure

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

May I say this, Hon. Chairman?

The Hon. Mahindananda Aluthgama

Do not give orders. Talk nicely.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

I am using the best language. My tone is for the question because that is an important question. She and even the Governor do not have to get bothered my tone and. I am using a very good language.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

This is the COPE. I direct a very decent question. All Iam asking is if she has lied, if she has not said it I have the right to ask that question. I am not forcing on her. I am not calling her names. So, I can ask that question.

The Hon.Mahindananda Aluthgama

Go ahead

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I am not talking to you I am talking to Chairman

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමා මට කථා කරන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Let me ask this question and finish. සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතන වැදගත් වන්නේ කාරණා දෙකයි. එක කාරණයක් තමයි මේ direct placements ක්‍රමයද පැවතියේ? මේ ක්‍රමවේදය ආවේ කොහොමද? මේක වෙනස් කළාද? මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන විධියට දෙකම තිබෙනවාද? Direct placements තිබෙනවා, auctions තිබෙනවා. මේක ඕනෑ වෙලාවකට auctions පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? මේකේ ඕනෑ වෙලාවටdirect placements පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? ඒක තමයි අදාළ ප්‍රශ්නය. ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයිමහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මේ කියන නිලධාරිනියට නියෝගයක් කළාද? නියෝගය කියන එක ඉංග්‍රී භාෂාවෙන් හෝ සිංහල භාෂාවෙන් නියෝගයක් වශයෙන් දක්වන්න ඕනෑ. කිසිම තැනක එතුමිය නියෝගයක් කළා කියන එක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ. එතුමිය Minute එකක් දාලා තිබෙනවා "Give a direction"කියලා නමුත් අධිපතිතුමා ඇහුවාම එතුමා කිව්ව උත්තරය තමයි ඒක අපි හබ කළේ නැහැ. "If I were you I will take this money" කියලා ගියා. අනෙක් වැදගත්ම කාරණය වන්නේ Dr. Azimමැතිතුමා කිව්වා, මේ ලියවිලි එතුමාගෙන් කලින් ඉල්ලුවා කියලා. පසුව එතුමාගේ සාක්ෂියේ සඳහන් කළා, එතුමා ගිහින් එම ලැයිස්තුව භාර දුන්නා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා

වෙන පටලන්න එපා. මෙතුමා කියන කාරණාවත්, තිබුණු දේවලුත්, ඔබතුමන්ලා කියාපු දේවලුත් සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල verbatim වශයෙන් තිබෙනවා. අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒවා ආයේත් බලන්න පුළුවන්. මෙතුමා දැන් කියන දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා. එදා කියාපු දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා. ඔබතුමා කියන දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

ආපු වේලාවේ ඉඳන් ඔබතුමා නේ කථා කරන්නේ. අපි මොකුත් කියන්නේ නැතුව අහගෙන ඉන්නවනේ. මොකක්ද මේකේ තේරුම? අපටත් අහන්න ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා.මෙතැනට ආපු වේලාවේ ඉඳන් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කිය කියා අහනවා.අපි ඒවා අහගෙන ඉන්නවා

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 42/43/44/45)

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසන් කර ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා, විශේෂයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එකේත් තිබෙනවා ඔබතුමියගේ එකම සාක්ෂිය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියට යම් කිසි ආකාරයක අවබෝධයක් ලබා දුන්නා කියන්න පුළුවන් එකම ආකාරය මට කේරෙන භාෂාවෙන් "Why do not go for ten", කියන එකයි. මේ හැර ඔබතුමිය වෙන භාෂාවකින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියට direction එකක් දීලා තිබෙනවා

කියලා ඔබතුමිය මීට පෙර දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් ලබා දුන්න සාක්ෂියක සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

කොහේ හරි තිබෙනවා නම් අපට පෙන්වන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා

සාක්ෂියක් දෙන්නේ අහන ප්‍රශ්න අනුව නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමිය පොරොන්දු වෙනවාද වෙන විධියකට එහෙම සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා කියලා

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මම minute කර ගත්තා කියලා මම සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

බොහොම ස්තුතියි. සභාපතිතුමා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ සියලු කාරණා සලකා බලා නිගමනය කර තිබෙන මේ report එක අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා යම් කිසි ආකාරයක direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා මෙහි තිබෙනවා. වෙන කිසිම දෙයක් සඳහන් කරලා නැනැ. ඔබතුමා ඒක වාර්තාගත කර ගන්න. ඊට පසුව ඕනෑම දෙයක් කරන්න. මෙතුමා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා ඉන් පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් බිලියන 10කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරියගෙන් (මෙතුමියගෙන්) ප්‍රශ්න කර තිබිණි. “Why do not go for ten”, මේ හැර මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා වෙන ආකාරයකින් direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා මෙතුමිය විසින් කිසිම සාක්ෂියක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ කියන එක විතරක් වාර්තා කර ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමියට ඒ ගැන තව පැහැදිලි කරන්න තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

මම ආපු ගමන් මේ සාක්ෂිය ප්‍රකාශ කළා. මීට කලින් මම Bribery Commission එකට ගියා. ඊට පෙර ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටුවට ගියා. එහෙදිත් මම ප්‍රකාශ කළා. සාකච්ඡාවලදීත් විස්තර කරලා කියලා තිබෙනවා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තුමස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 47/48)

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Domestic Debt Management Committee එකේ සිටින නිලධාරි මහත්වරු සියලු දෙනාම මෙතැන ඉන්නවාද? කී දෙනෙක් පැමිණ සිටිනවාද? ඒ සිද්ධිය වන අවස්ථාවේ සිටි අයගෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා 06 දෙනා පමණක්ද, මෙතැන නැති තවත් අය සිටිනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ කාලයේ සිටි director කෙනෙක් මෙතැන නැහැ. Director (Statistics) ඉන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් එයත් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණිලා, ඔබතුමන්ලාට තමයි කිව්වේ.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

නැහැ. අපට කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වේ නැද්ද? කාටද කිව්වේ?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That was not to the Domestic Debt Management Committee, but to the Public Debt Department.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ඇවිල්ලා තමයි කිව්වේ. එතුමා ආවේ කීයට විතරද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

පළමු වරට 10.45ට පමණ තමයි ආවේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මෙය close කළේ කීයටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

11.00ට පමණ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා 10.45ට පමණ ආවා. දෙවැනි වතාවටත් ආවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා පළමු වරට පැමිණ කළ කථාව මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

එහිදී Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ ගත්තාද? කොපමණ claim කරලා තිබෙනවාද, කොපමණ Offer කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඇහුවා. ඉන් පසුව meeting එකක් තිබුණා.

එහිද අධිපතිතුමා, ඇගමැතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා රටේ වෙනත් මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා.

නමුත් ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ කර ගත්තේ නැහැ. මොකද, අපේ අවශ්‍යතාව වෙනත් එකක් නේ. මහා භාණ්ඩාරයෙන් යවපු Sundry requirement cash flow තමයි අපි fund raise කරන්නේ. ඒක තමයි අපි එතැනදී කථා කළේ. Auction එක අවසන් නැති නිසා අධිපතිතුමාට වෙනත් meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා ගියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මෙතුමිය කියන ආකාරයට මේ සිද්ධියක් වුණා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා තිදෙනාම පිළිගන්නවාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim: Yes.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

අධිපතිතුමා දෙවැනි වතාවට ඇවිල්ලා මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

Deputy Governorsලා දෙදෙනෙකු සමඟ පස්වරු 12.30ට පමණ දෙවැනි වතාවටත් අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණියා. ඒ වේලාව වන විට අපේ auction එක අවසන් වෙලා තිබුණා. Tender Board එකට යන auction sheetඑක සකස් කර තිබුණා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ වේලාවේ එතුමා සමඟ පැමිණි අනෙක් දෙදෙනා කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතා සහ දැනට retire වෙලා සිටින Mr.Ananda Silva පැමිණියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ දෙදෙනා සමඟ ඇවිල්ලා මොකද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

“Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ මුදල් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද?” කියලා ඇහුවා. අපි කිව්වා. “රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ක් තිබෙනවා” කියලා ඊට පසුව “20 billion කෝ?” කියලා තරයේ ඇහුවා. ඒ වෙලාවේ අපි කිව්වා, “ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 20නුත් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් වැඩිම මුදල රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6යි” කියලා ඊට පසුව එතුමා කිව්වා, “අපේ අවශ්‍යතාවය සඳහා මේ සියල්ලම ගන්න” කියලා. ඒ වේලාවේ Dr. Azimතමයි කථා කළේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමා මොනවාද කිව්වේ?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim

I have very clearly pointed out to the Governor at that time the prevailing market interest rates and the levels that we could be hitting in case we are going to raise entire Rs.20 billion’ When the Governor wanted to know, “Okey what was the September, 2014 or the previous thirty-year Treasuey bond auctions weighted out’ We said “It was 11.75. Then,he said, “Why do you not accept at that level” Still, we said, “If we go for that level we are shifting the prevailing interest rates punch in the country by more than about 150 basis points’ So, we have clearly clarified other possible repercussions. Not only once, if I am not mistaken, I have mentioned it more than four times. Then, I asked Deputy Governors also what their observations on this.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

What have they said? ඔබතුමා ඒකට දුන් පිළිතුර මොකක්ද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේ එතුමා කළ සියලු ප්‍රකාශ සමග මම එකඟ වෙනවා. එතැනදී ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආශිම් මහතා ඇවිල්ලා මේ sheet එක පෙන්වා සිටියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Sheet එක කියන්නේ, Primary Dealersලා ගත්ත නම් ලැයිස්තුව?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඔව්. නම් ලැයිස්තුව සමග bids අරවා මේවා තිබුණා. මුලින්ම එතැනදී තමයි, මෙතැනින් ඉරක් ගසා “Why do we not take Rs. 20 bilion” කියන කථාව විමසා සිටියේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

නම් ලැයිස්තුව පෙන්වා සිටියාද, ඉල්ලා ගත්තාද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ වේලාවේ මෙතුමා අතේ තිබුණු නාම ලේඛනය එතුමා අරගෙන බැලුවා

The Hon. DayasisriJayasekara

He took it from your hand

පී.එන්.වීරසිහං මහතා

ඒ කියා සිටි conversation එක වුණා. ඊට පසුව "මේක වැඩියි" කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් යෝජනා කරන කොට, අධිපතිතුමා 10 කියන තැනට ඇඟිල්ල තියා පෙන්වා සිටිමින් "Take Rs. 10 billion" ගන්න කියලා උපදෙස් දුන්නා. ඒ වේලාවේ මමත්, අනෙක් නිලධාරිනුත් මේ නිලධාරි මහත්වරුත් එතැන සිටියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා instructions දුන්නා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනා පිළිගන්නවා. ඒක order එකක්ද, මේක ගන්න - "Do it" - කියලා කිව්වාද නැත්නම්, මේක ගන්න කියලා කිව්වාද, කොහොමද කිව්වේ?

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

බලපෑමක් සහිත ප්‍රකාශයක් ද කළේ?

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒ ගැන පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමන්ලා සමඟ අපි කටයුතු කිරීමේදී එක්, එක් අධිපතිතුමන්ලා කථා කරන විධිය සහ නියෝග ලබා දෙන විධිය වෙනස්. මෙතුමා නම්, ඉතාම කාරුණික විධියට - diplomatic - තමයි යම් දෙයක් කරමු කියලා කියන්නේ. ඒ එතුමාගේ පුද්ගලික චරිතය. නමුත් මේ conversation එකේදී අධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලිව තරයේ කියා සිටියා,රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා. ඒක තමයි එතුමිය කිව්වේ කියලා මම හිතනවා."Do it" කියන්නේ, ඒක summarize කරලා මෙන්න මේක තමයි අදහස වුණේ කියන එක මිසක් ඒ වචනයම නොවෙයි. ඒක තේරුම ගන්න ඕනෑ මේ sum conversation එකේදී රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියන එක එතැන සිටි සියලු දෙනාටම පැහැදිලි වුණා.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

There was a one more instruction' "The Governor very clearly said that, "with this auction we can stop going for direct placements"

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

කරුණාකර නැවත කියන්න.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

"with this auction we can stop going for direct placements"

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

“Direct placements වලට යන්නේ නැතිව auctions වලට යා යුතුයි”. කියලා, ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර තීරණයක් ගත්තා තියලා, එතුමා ඒ අවස්ථාවේ කියා සිටියාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim:Not for us.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙම එකක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. හරි. එතුමා මේ තීරණය ගන්න කොට ඔබතුමිය රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ට වඩා ගන්න බැහැ කියලා කිව්වා. ඒකට ඔබතුමිය කුමක් හෝ note එකක් දැම්මාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමිය දමපු note එක මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ වන විට report එක හදලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි. ඒ නිසා රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට නැවත report එකක් හදන්න කියලා මගේ නිලධාරින්ට කියන්න ඕනෑ නිසා මම ඒකට note එකක් දැම්මා, “Governor instructed to place price upto Rs.10 billion taking into consideration of additional Sundry requirements of the Government”. කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ decision එක යන්නේ කොහාටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය

ඒ ටික ගත්තා ඊට පසුව අපි යෝජනා කරන රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 auction එකත් සහිතව රුපියල් බිලියන 10 auction එකත් දමලා Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. Tender Board එකට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරලා අපි පුද්ගලිකව කිව්වා, “Governor ඇවිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා කිව්වා නැත්නම්, අපේ යෝජනාව තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි” කියලා

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේ Tender Board එකේ ඔබතුමා ඇතුළුව තව කවුද සිටියේ? ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ තීරණය ගැන ඒ කියන්නේ, “Governor ඇවිල්ලා කථා කළාම අපි ලිඛිතව මෙහෙම එකක් දුන්නා. ඒ මත තමයි තටයුතු කරන්නේ කියලා, Tender Board එකේදී සාකච්ඡා කළාද?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

“අධික පොලි අනුපාතයකට මෙපමණ මුදලක් ගන්නේ ඇයි?” කියලා මා විමසා සිටි බව මම මීට කලිනුත් පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Tender Board එක විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලා ගත් තීරණය, “බලපෑමක් මත ගත් තීරණයක්” කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය ගත් තීරණය නිවැරදි බවද නැත්නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබුණු instructions මත ඒ තීරණය ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණා කියලාද ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

මීට කලිනුත් මම කිව්වා, ඒ තීරණයට අපට ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණු තීරණයක් කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 50/51/52/53)

සභාපතිතුමා

නමුත් ඔබතුමන්ලා පෙබරවාරි 23 monetary board එකේ තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒකේ තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒකෙ paper එක මගේ ළඟ තිබෙනවා "ItemNo 2" කියලා. ඒකෙ ඔබතුමන්ලා කියලා තියෙන්නේ මේ විධියට. " Given the rising trend of market interest rates and rising growth of private sector credit and decide to maintain the policy interest rate at current level until the next month’s monetary policy review” Until the next month. කිව්වොත් පෙබරවාරි 23 ඉඳන් මේ Current policy rate එක. ඔබතුමන්ලා interest rate එක maintain කරන්න ඕනෑ ඊලඟ මාසයේ 23 වෙනකම්. එතකොට කොහොමද අධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ අපි ලබන සතියේ මේක වෙනස් කරනවා කියලා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුදල් ප්‍රතිපත්ති- monetarypolicies සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම තමයි මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන වගකීම දරන්නේ. එතැනදී මට සඳහන් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ සභාපතිතුමා කිව්ව කාරණය හරියට හරි. පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළේ මුදල් පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. එතකොට එහෙම තීරණය කළ පදනම මත තමයි අපේ announcement කරලා, market expectation එක තිබුණේ, ඒක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ කියන පදනම මත තමයි ඒගොල්ලො ඒ තොරතුරු පදනම් කරගෙන bid කළේ. එතකොට ඒ අතරතුර මෙතුමාට අධිපතිතුමා කියලා තිබෙනවා ඒ කථාව. ඒ කථාවත් හරි. මොකද, ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම පොඩි නිවැරදි කිරීමක් මම කළොත්, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය 23 වැනිදා තීරණය කලාට 27 වැනිදා උදේ- මම සභාපතිත්වය දරන Market Operations Committee එක කියලා Committee එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි, දිනපතා පොලී අනුපාත ගැන, විනිමය අනුපාත ගැන, අපි ගන්න උපක්‍රම මොනවාද කියලා තීරණය කරන රැස්වීම. ඒ රැස්වීමට හදිස්සියෙම අධිපතිතුමා ඇවිල්ලා වාඩි උනා. ඒක මීට ඉස්සෙල්ලා මම කියලත් නැහැ. මගෙන්

අහලත් නැහැ. මම Bribery Commission එකේ කියලා තිබෙනවා. මෙතනදී කියන්න අවස්ථාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒතනදී අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා අපට මේ පොලී අනුපාත සියල්ල ඉහල දාන්න ඕනෑ එදා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙනස් කරන්න එපා කියලා තීරණය කරපු සියයට 5 කියන සීමව ඉවත් කරලා, අද ඉඳලා සියයට 6.5ට සීමාවට යන්න කියලා. ඒ විධියට එදා උදේ Market Operation Committee එකට අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන්නා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඔන්න ඔතැන තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. නන්දලාල් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා එතකොට එහෙම නම් interest rate එක වෙනස් කළේ කවදාද? පහේ rate එක ඉවත් කළේ කවදාද?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 19)

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

සියයට පහේrate එක වෙනස් කරලා අපි එදාම හවස circular එක issue කළා. අධිපතිතුමා දීපු උපදෙස් මත, තුන්වැනිදා සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක වන පරිදි සියයට 5 සීමාව ඉවත් කරලා සියයට 6.5ට යනවා කියන එක ඇතුළත් කරලා එදාම අපි circular එකක් නිකුත් කළා. එසේ circular එකක් නිකුත් කරන්න පදනම් වුණේ අධිපතිතුමා එදත් ඇවිල්ලා මේකට intervene වෙලා මේ සියයට 5 කියන එක 6.5 කරන්න කියලා උපදෙස් දුන්න නිසයි. ඒක තමයි එතුමාට කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු. ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඔබතුමාගේ කමිටුවේ සංයුතිය කුමක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා.

අපේ කමිටුවේ සභාපති මම.අධ්‍යක්ෂ ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ, අධ්‍යක්ෂ දේශීය මෙහෙයුම්.Domestic Operations.

ගරු. ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

එතකොට ඒ කමිටුවේ අධිපතිතුමා සාමාජිකයෙක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා.

නැහැ.එදා තමයි අධිපතිතුමා ඒකට මුලින්ම ආවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

නිත්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක්ද කියලායි අහන්නේ?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතුමා නිත්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතකොට එතුමා කවදාවත් ඔය විධියට කථා කරන්න ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ඔය ගන්න තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක උනේ තුන්වැනිදා ඉඳලාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

නැහැ 27 වැනිදා ඉඳලා

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

තුන්වැනිදා තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ මොකද, Immediately කරන්න බැහැ එදා තීරණය ගත්තාට, circular එක issue කළේ තුන්වැනිදා ඉඳලා ක්‍රියාත්මක වන පරිදි ඒක market එකේ circulate කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ tendercommittee එක ලැබෙන්න කලින්.මේ Telephone call එක එන්න කලින්.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව්. ඊට කලින්

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

එතකොට සමරසිරි මහත්තයා දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැති වුණාට ඔබතුමා දැනගෙන හිටියා ඒක සිද්ධ කරන බව

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

අපට instructions දීලා තිබුණා ඒක කරන්න කියලා. ඒ අනුව මම Diretor, Domestic Operationsට minute එකක් දැම්මා. අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන් පරිදි ඒ සඳහා පළමුවෙන්ම අධිපතිතුමාගේ ලිඛිතව අනුමැතිය ගන්න කියලා. ලිඛිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා එතුමා කිව්වා එක 27 වැනිදා minute එක මගේ ළඟ තිබෙනවා, "As instructed at the MOC, the circular to be circulated" කියලා ඒ circular එකේ copy එකක් හදලා ඒක අධිපතිතුමා ඇතුලත් කරලා, අධිපතිතුමා 27 වැනිදාම ඒකට අනුමැතිය දීලා තිබෙනවා circular එක issue කරන්න. ඒ circular එකේ තිබෙන

විධියට ඒකෙ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ 5 per cent is withdrawn with effect from 02nd of March

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

එතකොට ඒක මේ transaction එකට අදාළ නැහැනේ?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

දැන් මේ තීන්දුව සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගත යුත්තේ Monetary Board එක නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක නිසා තමයි මේ විධියේ තීන්දු අරගෙන transaction එකට ඊලඟ Monetary Board එකට

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැනේ කවදාවත්

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒක කරන්නේ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඉස්සෙල්ලාම Monetary Board එකෙන් ආව තීන්දුවටනේ ඔබතුමන්ලා carry out කරන්නේ. එහෙම නැතිව ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දුවක් අරගෙන Monetary Board එකට ratify කරන්න යවන්නේ නැහැ නේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කරන්නේ නැහැ

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඒක වෙන්නේ නැති දෙයක්නේ

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අධිපතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත කරලා, ඊලඟට Monetary Board එකේදී මේක ratify කළා. එතකොට ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ratify කළා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙන්න මේ තීන්දුවයි. නැතිව 100 per cent auction යන්න කියන තීන්දුව ratify කරලා නැහැ. මෙන්න මේක තමයි ratify කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 19/20/21)

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඊලඟ කාරණය තමයි මේකත් එක්ක යන කාරණයක් Monetary Board එක ගන්නේ කීන්දුව- මේ ගොල්ලෝ බලන්නේ foreign investorsලා මේකට එනවාය කියන ප්‍රමාණයත් එක්ක තමයි මේක කරන්නේ. මම ඒක කියවන්නම් " The board was of the view that the issuing 30-year Treasury bonds would be favorable at this stage to extend the yield curve and reprofile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors" නමුත් කිසිදු foreign investorකෙනෙක් මේකට ආවේ නැහැ නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

නැහැ. එය අධිපතිතුමාගේ view එක. ඒක තමයි minute කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් මගේ දැනුමේ සහ අදහසේ හැටියට, අවුරුදු 30 bonds වලට විදේශ ආයෝජනයන්ගේ උනන්දුවක් නැහැ.

අධිපතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශ කළා, Board එකේ කිසිදු සාමාජිකයෙක් නැත්නම්, එය අනුමත වුණා සේ සලකා Board එකේ minute කරන්න කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 21)

8.3 මෙම වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේදී විගණකාධිපති වෙත හිමි බලතල හා විෂය සීමාවතුල කටයුතු කර ඇති බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ.ඉන් ඔබ්බට සාපරාධී හෝ විගණකාධිපතිට නිගමනය කල නොහැකි මට්ටමේ නීති විරෝධී කටයුතු සිදු වී ඇත්දැයි යන්න මෙහිදී පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් නොවුනු හෙයින් එවන් පරීක්ෂාවක් අවශ්‍යය නැතී යන්නේ නම් ඒ සඳහා විශේෂිත වූ ආයතනයන්හි සහය ලබා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව නිගමනය කරමි

විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත.

ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු

නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් නැත.

- මෙම විමර්ෂණයේදී පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ පරීක්ෂාවට ලක්වූ ක්ෂේත්‍රයන් හා අදාල යොමු පහත දක්වා ඇත.

  - ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ

    Mr.Harshana Rajakaruna

    Before the 8th of January, 2015 almost 95 percent of it was through privet placements. But, afterwards almost 100 percent of it was through auction. So, what is the reason? Was there a Government Policy decision to go for 100 percent auctioning or was it a decision taken by the Central Bank or the Monetary Board? So, Can you please give a clarification on that?

    ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජිත් කුමාරස්වාමි

    Sometimes back we had a hybrid system whereby we would auction part of the issuance to try to have price discovery and then have privet placement on the basis of the price discovered through the auction process. Then, we moved on to a full placement and there were concerns whether there was a best way to achieve the objectives that the Government had and we moved to a full auction system.

    Now, we are reviewing all that. We are questioning whether in a very thin market, like Sri Lanka because we are a frontier market. Our financial and capital market are in order to develop as we would want to be going forward which intend upon developing it. But at this point, we are questioning as to whether the best possible way is a full auction. So, whether we moved back to some kind of hybrid system or not; is something that my colleagues who are knowledgeable about this area are studying. We will also take on the Board some of the finding comings out of the report of the Auditor General's Department to try to arrive at what we think is the best, the most transparent and the fairest system. So, we are working on getting towards that.

    The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna

    The Governor, I am questioning you not regarding the future but about the past.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා.

පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක කර සියයට 100 ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් යනවා කියන තීරණයට මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අනුමැතියක් ලැබිලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. තවමත් ලැබිලා නැහැ. ඒක සිදු වුනේ පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා උදේ වෙන්දේසියට පෙර අපි සියලු දෙනාම ඉන්න තැන. මින් ඉදිරියට වෙන්දේසිවලින් පමණක් කරන බවටත් අනෙක් ක්‍රමයට කරන්නේ නැති බවටත් අධිපතිතුමා වාචිකව ප්‍රකාශ කළා. එතකොටත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒක අනුමත කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඊට පස්සෙ Board Meeting එක තිබුණේ මාර්තු 06 වැනිදා අධිපතිතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඇවිල්ලා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා.පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා පැවැත්වුණු වෙන්දේසියේදී සම්පූර්ණයෙන් සියයට සියයක් වෙන්දේසිය පමණක් කළා කියලා.ඒ පිළිබඳව දැනුම් දීමක් කළා. නමුත් ඒකත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට ලක්වෙලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. මොකද සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට ලක් වෙන්න නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක අනුමැතියට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා ඒ තීරණයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේකෙදි දැනුම් දීමක් පමණයි කරලා තිබුණේ. එතකොට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අධිපතිතුමා 27 වෙනිදාට පෙර කිසිම දිනක, අපි කිසිම කෙනෙක් එක්ක ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබුණෙත් නැහැ. කිසිම කෙනෙකුට දැනුම් දීමක් කරලා තිබුණෙත් නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ නිසා තමයි Tender Committee එක දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව අතර recommendation වෙන විධියට ඒ ගොල්ලො රුපියල් මිලියන 2.5 ක් විතරක් අරගෙන ඉතුරුවික replacement කරන්න කියලා නිර්දේශ කරලා තිබුණේ. එතැනදි දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහිල්ලා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්ව නිසා තමයි Tender Committee එක ඒ ආකාරයට තීරණය කරලා තිබුණේ

ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්ණයට මගේ කෙටි පිළිතුරයි ඒ. ඒකට නිසි අනුමැතිය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් තවමත් ලැබී නැහැ.

සභාපති ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා

ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්න පුළුවන් කාටද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා.

තීරණ ගන්න පුළුවන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයටත් මොකද, කලින් - 2008 වසරේදී - මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගන්න තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ දෙක මිශ්‍ර කරලා තීරණ ගන්න කියලා. එතකොට ඒ තීරණය වෙනස් කරනවා නම් ගන්න පුළුවන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට පමණයි.

සභාපති ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය හැර ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න වෙනත් කාට හෝ පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

වෙනත් යෝජනා කරන්න පුළුවන්, පස්සෙ අපේ අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා අපි දැක්කා පස්සේ කාලයක අගමැතිතුමා කිව්වාය කියලා. එහෙම අගමැතිතුමා නිර්දේශ කලත් ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය නීතිමය ආකාරයට අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා.මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් නැතිව රජය - මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා හෝ අගමැතිතුමා- යෝජනා කළත් ඒ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ගත්තාට පස්සෙ තමයි නීතිමය වශයෙන් ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ හැකි වන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

අගමැතිතුමා ඒ නිර්දේශය ලිඛිතව ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මම නම් ඒක පුද්ගලිකව දැකලා නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ ඒකත් පසුකාලීනව COPE එකෙන් අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසනකොට තමයි එතුමා කියලා තිබුනේ මේක අගමැතිතුමා තමයි කියලා තිබුණේ කියලා. නමුත් අපිත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරන වෙලාවේ අගමැතිතුමා කිව්ව කථාවක් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

අගමැතිතුමා විසින් ඒක ලිඛිතව ලබා දීමක් හෝ අගමැතිතුමාටඒහෙම බලයක් කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ලබා දීමක් හෝ සිද්ධ වෙලා නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට මම එහෙම ලිඛිත ලියවිල්ලක් දැකලා නැහැ. ඒක ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා නැහැ. පසුව Bribery Commission එකෙන් Tender Committee එකෙන්, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් විමර්ශන කිහිපයක් පැවැත්වුවා. ඒ කිසිම තැනකදී මාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට එහෙම ලියවිල්ලක් තවම ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා නැහැ

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා

ඔබතුමා කිව්ව විධියට දැන් Tender මණ්ඩලයට වාඩි වෙලා නේ මේක බලන්නේ.එතකොට බලලා තමයි අපිට හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ. නමුත් දැන් මෙතැන එහෙම නොවේ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. Tender මණ්ඩලය බලලා,ඒක

විවෘත කරලා පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට පෙර, පූර්ව තීරණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. මෙය මුළුමනින්ම ගන්නේ වෙන්දේසියක් මත කියලා.ඒ නිසා වෙන්දේසිය මත ගැනීම සිදු වන්නේ හැකිතාක් කියන එකට යටත්ව නොවෙයි. මුළුමනින්ම කියන එකට යටත්වයි.

(ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා සම්බන්ධිතයි)

මොකද, වාඩි වීමට පෙර අධිපතිතුමා විසින් වෙන්දේසියෙන් සියල්ල ගන්න කියලා තීරණයක් ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නේද සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව ක්‍රම තුනයි තිබෙන්නේ. සියයට 100 ක් auction ක්‍රමය සියයට 100 ක් direct placement ක්‍රමය, ඊලඟට ඒ දෙක මිශ්‍ර තවත් එක් ක්‍රමයක්. 2008 වසරේදී තීරණයක් ගත්තා මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට යනවා කියලා. මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට ගියා. එතකොට මේ සිද්ධිය වෙන තාක් මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට තමයි ගියේ. ඒ මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලැබුණා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුලින්ම ලැබිලා තිබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා

ඒ අනුමැතිය මුලින්ම ලැබිලා ඒක දිගටම ගෙන ගියා. දිගටම ආපු මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට අනුමැතිය ලැබුණට මේ අදාල සිද්ධිය ඒ ගණයට වැටෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මේක යන්නේ සියයට 100 ක් auction ක්‍රමයට. ඒක තුන්වැනි ක්‍රමය. මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට ලැබුණු අනුමැතියට නැවත වතාවක් යනවා නම් " හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක්" කියලා නෙමෙයි වැටෙන්නේ සියයට 100 ක් කියලා. එතකොට මේ ක්‍රමයට නැවත වතාවක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගත යුතුයි. මම කියන කාරණය හරිද? වැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මම එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය

මුලුමනින්ම auction වලට යන්න කියන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කල මොකක් හරි ලියවිල්ලක් තිබේද? මහ බැංකුවේ නැද්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මගේ ළඟ නම් එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට මම දැකලා නම් නැහැ. තිබෙන එකම ලියවිල්ල වන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා දැනුම් දීම විතරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා

නමුත්, "දැනුම්දීමක්" සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් ගන්න වෙන්නේත් නැහැ.2008 වසරේදී ගත්ත ඒ තීරණය අපට ලැබෙන්න සලස්වන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 04/05/07/08)

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

මෙතැනදී පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, හැම වෙලාවේම රජයට ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ අරගෙන මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ, මුදල් නීති පනත යටතේ රජය යෝජනා කරන යම් කිසි ප්‍රතිපත්ති ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේදී ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන ද ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුත්තේ කියලා නේ.එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවාද නැද්ද කියන එක ගැන.

එතකොට, එතැන තමයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ බලතල තිබෙන්නේ. ඕනෑම රජයකට, ප්‍රතිපත්ති අනුව මේ මේ දේවල් කරන්න කියලා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යෝජනා කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ යොජනාව සලකා බලා, තීරණය කර, ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ බලය ලැබෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළාට පසුවයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

My question was not that. ඔබතුමන්ගෙන් මම අහුවේ අනුමැතිය ගැනීම ගැන නොවෙයි. මම ඇහුවේ ආණ්ඩුවකට ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුවක් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා. According to the way you explain, what I understood is that the decisions taken by the Government may become policies. Am I right?

Mr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

When it comes to those areas which falls within the remit of the Monetary Board, the Government can set the overall policy, but, as the Deputy Governor explained, the Monetary Board then would interpret how that should be implemented.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Correct. So, has that policy got to be in writing or how does it come? Can it be a statement made by the Hon. Prime Minister or can it be an indication made by the Minister of Finance? Can that be a mode of communication based on a statement because everything will not be sent to the Monetary Board in writing? That is what I want to get at. I know what it is, but I am asking about it from you.

Dr. P.N.Weerasinghe

The usual practice is, for example, if there is a Government decision made in Cabinet, then, it is sent to the Central Bank

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I would like the Government to answer

Dr. P.N.Weerasinghe

Okay.

Mr.Indrajith Coomaraswami:

I must tell you that I am of course new to the subject

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I know, but I want at least Secretary to answer

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරාමහතා

සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, Deputy Governorගේ පිළිතුර පැහැදිලියි. නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන විදියට කැබිනට් තීරණයක් මත විතරයි policies හැදෙන්නේ. ඒක නිවැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒක නිවැරදි නැහැ. මම පැහැදිලි කරන්න ගියේ, කැබිනට් තීරණයක් එක ආකාරයක් කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඔබතුමා ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නයට මෙතුමා පිළිතුරු දෙමින් සිටිද්දී බාධා කිරීමක් වෙලා තමයි අතර මඟදී නතර වීම වුණේ. සංකීර්ණ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසා, අපි කලිනුත් මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරද්දී ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කළා. සමහර මාතෘකා, සමහර වචන අපිට ගොඩක් පැහැදිලි නැහැ. ඒ නිසා නිලධාරි මහත්මයෙක් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීම යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට අවසන් වනතුරු එයට සවන් දීලා, නැවත ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම කරමු. අපිට ඕනෑ තරම් කාලය තිබෙනවා. මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගොඩක් දුරට සාකච්ඡා කරලා, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් අවබෝධයක් හැම දෙනාටම තිබෙන නිසා, ඒ අයට පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන අතුරු ප්‍රශ්නය සටහන් කරගෙන පසුව අහන්න. ඔබතුමාට පැහැදිලි කිරීමට තව කාලය අවශ්‍ය නම්, ඒ කාලය අරගෙන පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ප්‍රශ්ණ අහන්න. ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කලින් ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නයටයි මම පිළිතුරු දෙන්නේ. එහි ක්‍රම කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි, කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලතීරණයක් නම් Cabinet Minute එකකින් දන්වනවා. එතකොට, අපි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒක පත්‍රිකාවක් වශයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා, අනුමැතිය අරගෙන ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවා. දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය තමයි. ගරු අගමැතිතුමා හෝ මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා යම්කිසි ආකාරයක රැස්වීමකදී හෝ වෙනත් අවස්ථාවකදී, අධිපතිතුමට හෝ මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරියෙක්ට කිව්වා නම් මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න කියලා, ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ අධිපතිතුමා හෝ නිලධාරියා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් කරලා, අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන තමයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒක වාචිකව කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඒ කියපු දේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී සඳහන් කරලා, අනුමැතිය ගත්තාට පසුව තමයි එය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මේ ප්‍රශ්ණගත කරුණ සිදුවන අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමාද මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ වශයෙන් ක්‍රියා කළේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපතීත්වය සැමවිටම දරන්නේ අධිපතිතුමා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී, Public Debt Department එකේ සභාපති ධූරය දැරුවේ කවුද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

අධ්‍යක්ෂතුමා

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

සම්පූර්ණ නම මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමියගේ සම්පූර්ණ නම ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය

දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ සීමිත කාරණාවක්. අපිට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා, ආණ්ඩුවේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් ගැන මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ආවාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒ ගැන සලකා බලා අවශ්‍ය තීන්දු ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගන්නවා කියලා. මට දැනගන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ, ආණ්ඩුවේ තීන්දුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කොයි ආකාරයෙන්ද එන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒක කැබිනට් තීන්දුවක් මාර්ගයෙන් එනවාද? ගරු අගමැතිතුමාට යම් ප්‍රකාශයක් කරලා, එය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යොමු කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? මම හිතන්නේ ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ලේකම්තුමාට කරන්න පුළුවන්. එය පැහැදිලි කර ගත්තාට පසුව අපිට සාකච්ඡාව මෙතැනින් ඉදිරියට ගරගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා

එතැනදී සභාපතිතුමා විදියට මටත් සාධරණයක් ඉෂ්ඨ විය යුතුයි. මම මුලින්ම ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇසුවා, මට තවම එයට පිළිතුරක් ලැබුනේ නැහැ. එයට පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න කලින් නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා අතුරු ප්‍රශ්නවලට ගියේ. කලින් වතාවේදී, බැදුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් "ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක්" කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි වුණාට පස්සේ,

“ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගැනීම් පාර්ශවයන් කවුද?” කියලා, අපි ප්‍රශ්ණාවලියක් යොමු කළා. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට දීලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්ණාවලියේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබාදුන් පිළිතුරේ සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා “.....මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව.....” කියලා. දැන් එතකොට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්ණය තමයි, මුදල් මණ්ඩල පනතේ එහෙම නම් ඒ කාරණය තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. 8 (01) යටතේ මුදල් මණ්ඩල පනතේ, ඒ කාරණය ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම නැහැ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය consist වෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකත්වය තිබෙනවා - “The person holding office for the time being as Secretary to the Ministry in charge of the subject of Finance,…” එතකොට මෙතැන තිබෙනවා, මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා නියෝජනය කරමින්, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගේ ලේකම්තුමා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ඉන්නවා කියලා. එතකොට මේ කාරණාවේදී “අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තිය” කිව්වාට පස්සේ, කවුද මේ අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා හැටියට සලකන්නේ. මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයා නම් ගැටළුවක් නැහැ. මොකද, මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ ලේකම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් විදියට ඉන්නවා නේ. මට පැහැදිල කර ගන්න ඕනෑ ඒ කාරණය. අනික් කාරණා ඔබතුමන්ලා පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න. මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය “අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා” විදියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ඉන්වා කියලා, ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් කළේ කවුද? මොකද මෙහි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්ණය වන්නේ බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්දයෙන් මෙහි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න බලය තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට. මෙහි “විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා” හෝ “අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා” විදියට සලකන්නේ කවුද කියන එකයි පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍ය

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, උදව්වක් විදියට පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. ඔය වේලාවේ සාමාන්‍ය මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා ඔය විෂය ආවරණය කළාට, ඒ කාලය වන විට විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා නොවෙයි. මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳව විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒක තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලා ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා විදියට සලකලාද මේ “අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයා” විදියට නම් කළේ. ඒකයි මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එහි “විෂයභාර අමාත්‍යවරයා” කියලා සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔව්. "..... අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ....." කියලා පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. මම අහන්නේ ඒ ගැන.

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ අතිවිශේෂ ගැසට් පත්‍රය - 2015.09.21 මඟින් තමයි ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති අමාත්‍යාංශයට මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළත් වනනේ. ඒ අදාළමය නීතිමය පනත් මේ ගැසට් පත්‍රයේ ඇතුළත් වෙනවා. මීට කලින් මහ බැංකුව තිබුණේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ. "විෂයභාර අමාත්‍යවරයා" කියලා කියන්නේ - ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා තමයි මේ අමාත්‍යාංශයේ විෂයභාර අමාත්‍යතුමා. නමුත්, මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දු ගැනීමේ කාරණයේදී මෙතුමන්ලා කථා කරන්නේ, අභ්‍යන්තර ප්‍රශ්නයක් - මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළේ වෙච්ච සිදු වීමක් ගැන. පොදුවේ ගතහෝත්, 2015.09.21 වැනි දින සිට අපේ අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ තමයි ගැසට් කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ ඇමතිතුමා වන්නේ ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා.

සභාපතිතුමා

එතකොට මට ගැටලුවක් මතු වෙනවා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන කොට, අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා විදියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ නියෝජනයක් නැහැ. ඒකයි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

දැන් මෙතැන වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඔය ඇතිවෙලා තිබෙන වෙන්සකම් එක්ක, විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා policy guidelines මහ බැංකුවට දෙනවා කියන එක තමයි. Practice එක.

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරන්නේ, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා, තමුන්ගේ ලේකම්වරයා මාර්ගයෙන් දෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන තිබෙන අවස්ථාව තමයි මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා නොවන නිසා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍ය, ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන අමාත්‍ය ගරු රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාට එවැනි නියෝජිත තත්ත්වයක් මෙහි තිබුණේ නැහැ. එහෙම නම් policy guidelines දීම, වගකීම, උත්තරය හා ප්‍රායෝගික තත්ත්වය අනුව පෙනෙනවා. එය අගමැතිතුමාගේ රාජකාරියක්. මේක අපි තේරුම්ගත යුතුයි. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයාගේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනුව කළ යුතු එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා

මේකට සම්බන්ධ කාරණාවක් දෙවැනි උත්තරයේ තිබෙනවා. මුදල් පනත යටතේ තිබෙන්නේ නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් සාමාජිකයෙකු හැටියට ඉන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ subject to finance මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා. මුදල් ඇමතිතුමාගේ ලේකම්වරයා. දෙවැනි කාරණාව ඔබතුමන්ලා සඳහන් කරනවා මේ විදියට "එසේ ලබාගත් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් සංශෝධනය කිරීමේ බලය හිමි පාර්ශවය කවුරුන්ද?" කියලා. සංශෝධනය කිරීමේ බලය කියන එකට ඔබතුමන්ලා කෙලින්ම සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය. එහෙම නම් මෙහිදී ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්න එක අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුකූල වෙන්න ඕනෑ නම්, සංශෝධන කිරීම වුණත් නැවත සිද්ධ වෙන්න ඕනෑකම තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනුව බැලුවොත්, ඒකයි ඔබතුමන්ලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ, නිශ්චිතවම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියලා. මෙහිදී මා ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ, ලේකම්තුමා, බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තොත්, ඔබතුමන්ලාට පැහැදිලි කරනවා නම්, මේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ බලතල අනුව තිබෙන්නේ, ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගැනීම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සතු බවයි. උපදේශයක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුව කියන එක හරි. නමුත් බලතල සම්බන්ධයේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා බලතල වෙනස් කර ගත යුතුයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, මීට කලින් Governor සහභාගි වූ අපි කලින් කරපු පරීක්ෂණයේදී, ඩී.වී.ගුණසේකර සභාපතිතුමා ඉන්න කාලයේදීත් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබුණා. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයාට මෙතැන බලයක් නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ ගැසට් වෙලා නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළු ඒ ආයතන ටික පවරා ගැනීමේදී. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මුල සිටම ප්‍රශ්නයක් ලෙස තිබුණා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

බලයක් නැහැ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

ගැසට් වෙලා නැහැ කියන එක. එම ගැටලුව තමයි මෙතැනට එන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ විෂය, අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාගේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති අමාත්‍යාංශයේ විෂයයක් හැටියට ගැසට් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා

තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

ඒකේ දිනය කවදාද?

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා

2015.09.02

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා

එතැනදී මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා බොහොම පැහැදිලිව කියනවා, ඔහුට බැඳුම්කරවලට යන එක ගැන උපදෙස් දුන්නේ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා කියලා? එතැනින් එහාට සිදු වූ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන තමයි අපට ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, අපි බොහෝ වේලාවක් මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විවාද කරනවා. අපි මෙහි යම් කාරණයක් සම්බන්දයෙන් තමයි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. එතකොට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ සිදු වූ කථා බහෙන් policy එක හැදෙන්න කොහොමද කියන එක. ආණ්ඩුව හදන policy එක යම් කිසි ආකාරයකින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ලැබෙනවා. ඒ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් policy එක තීන්දු කරන එක ගැන තමයි ඔබතුමා අදහස් කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මම අදහස් කරන එක නොවෙයි. රජයේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්ති. රජයේ fiscal policy එක. ඒක ඔබතුමන් කියන ආකාරයට රජය තීරණය කරලා, කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. නමුත් ඒකට අදාල කරලා නිශ්චිත කාරණාවක් හැටියට බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව. අපි මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී ඉන්නේ, රජයේ fiscal policy එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් නොවෙයි. බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක තමයි මම ප්‍රකාශ කළේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලිව කිව්වේ, when the Government takes a decision on the policy, that is intimated to the Monetary Board and then the Monetary Board takes a decision what to do beyond that. ඒක තමයි මට තේරුණු දෙය.

සභාපතිතුමා

උත්තරය දීමේදී ඒ විදියට නැහැ. උත්තරයේ ඒ විදියට ආවා නම් ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්ණය ලේකම්තුමා පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

මේ පිළිබඳව මෙතුමාගෙන් පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කර දෙන්න. රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රතපත්තිය පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I think we will complicate it if you get someone else to talk about it.

අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමන්ගේ පුළුල් අදහසට අපි ගරු කරනවා. නමුත් අපි මේ ප්‍රශ්ණාවලිය එක්ක යමු.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

But it will deviate from the-

Hon. Lakshman Senawirathne

We should not deviate

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Because it is a very complicated matter. We have limited time.

The Hon. Ajith P.Perera

We should follow the line of questions.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහි අත්‍යාවශ්‍ය වන්නේ, සාමාන්‍ය සම්ප්‍රදායන් අනුව සිදුවන ක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද කියන එකයි. සමහර වෙලාවට පනතේ අකුරටම නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපිට අවශ්‍ය නම් ඉදිරියට එහෙම හදා ගන්න පුළුවන්. අපිට අවශ්‍ය කරන්නේ යම් කාරණයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් සිදු වූ සිදු වීමක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්. පුද්ගලයෝ හදාගෙන තමයි මේක අපි බලන්නේ. මේ වෙලාවේ අපිට මුළු ක්‍රමවේදයම හදා ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නැහැ. අපි දැන ගත යුතුයි මේක සම්ප්‍රදායක් ලෙස කොහොමද සිදු

වෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ සිදු වන විට කවුද මේකට සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ. මට තේරුණ විදියට ආණ්ඩුවෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සම්බන්දයෙන් තීරණය ගත්තාම, ඒක දන්නවාද, ඉඛේම දැනුවත් වෙනවාද දන්නේ නැහැ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඊට පසු තීරණය කරනවා. ඉදිරි කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් කොහොමද කටයුතු කරන්නේ කියලා. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීන්දුව ගැනීම සඳහා වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙතැන තවත් අලුත් තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. මෙතැනදී විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා වන අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාට තමුන්ගේ නියෝජිතයෙකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට තුළ නැති නිසා, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සන්නිවේදනය කළ යුත්තේ කුමන ක්‍රමයකටදැයි කිසිම නීතියක සඳහන් වෙලා නැහැ. ඒක වැඩ පවරා ගැනීම පිළිබඳව තිබෙන යම් අවුල් සහගත තත්ත්වයක්. එවැනි අවස්ථාවක වඩාත් ප්‍රායෝගික සාධාරණ තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද කියලා සොයා බලන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

කලින් සාක්ෂිවලින් ලැබුණ දේ කෙටි කළොත්, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, ‘‘මට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් උපදෙස් දුන්නේ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා’’ කියලා තමයි සාක්ෂිවල වාර්තා වී තිබෙන්නේ. අපි දිගින් දිගටම විවාද නොකර මෙතැනින් ඔබ්බට ගියොත්, මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්ණය වන්නේ මහ බැංකු manual එක හදන්නේ කවුද කියන එක?

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

සමාවෙන්න, ඊට කලින් දෙවැනි ප්‍රශ්ණයට යන්න ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙනවාද? නැත්නම් ඔබතුමන්ගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි ඉදිරියට යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා

අපි මෙතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් අනුව තීරණයක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මේ තීරණය ගත්තා.අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා ඒ උපදෙස් අධිපතිවරයා හරහා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යොමු කළා. ඒක නේ දැන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් ඒකප්‍රායෝගිකව එහෙමද විය යුත්තේ කියන ප්‍රශ්ණය තිබෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, ඔය කාරණය පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් මම අහන්න කැමතියි. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට policy එකක් ගැන නියෝගයක් කරනවා. රටේ නීතිය පිළිබඳව මා අහන්නේ. ඒක කරන්න මුදල් මණ්ඩලය බැඳිලා ඉන්නවාද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

He does not know that part. You cannot ask him. You must ask the Secretary –

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

Okay. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, දැන් අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට policy decision එකක් එවනවා, මේ කටයුත්ත කරන්න කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ පනතේ තිබෙනවා ඒවා ක්‍රියාත්මක කළයුතු ආකාරය. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා නියෝගයක් දුන් සැනින් ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? නමුත් එතුමන්ලාට එම පනතේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමය නිවැරදිනම් විතරයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්.සමරතුංග මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපේ රටේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ ගැනීමේ දුරාවලියක් තිබෙන්නේ. මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා කොහේ හෝ ගොස් ප්‍රකාශ කළාම, ඒක මම මුදල් ඇමතිගෙන් ගිහින් අහන්නේ නැහැ. මෙවැනි ප්‍රකාශයක් කළාද කියලා. එය මම සටහන් කරගෙන අදාල දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට හෝ ආයතනයට නියෝගයක් වශයෙන් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයාට නිකුත් කරනවා.

ඒ වගේම ගරු අගමැතිතුමා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ හෝ වෙනත් තැනක නිශ්චිත කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රකාශයක් කළාට පසුව - සමහර වේලාවට පොදු දේවලුත් කියනවා. නිශ්චිත කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපේ රටේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන ක්‍රමය තමයි, අමාත්‍යාංශ ප්‍රධානියා -ප්‍රධාන ගිණුම් දීමේ නිලධාරියා -ඒක සටහන් කරගෙන අදාළ අංශවලට දැනුම් දීලා ඒ පිළිවෙත් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න උපදෙස් දෙන එක. ධුරාවලිය අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්වරයාට වඩා ඉහළින් ඉන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයන් ධුරාවලිය අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා, ලේකම්වරයෙක් සමඟ ගනුදෙනු සිදු කරන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ පරිපාලන අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ මහ බැංකුව තිබෙන විට මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගේ නියෝගයක්, ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය නියෝගයක්, එහෙම නැත්නම් අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයක් ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡාවට ගන්න කියලා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාට ලිඛිතව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එවන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී අපට එහෙම

තත්ත්වයක් නැහැ. මොකද, පරිපාලනමය වශයෙන් අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ අමාත්‍යාංශයට තමයි ඒක ලැබෙන්නේ. ඒ ලැබෙන නියෝගය කෙලෙස සන්නිවේදනය කරනවාද - ලිඛිතව දෙනවාද, වාචිකව දෙනවාද, telephone call එකින් දෙනවාද -කියන එක පැහැදිලි නැහැ. කොහොම නමුත් අපි ව්‍යවස්ථානුකූව බැඳිලා ඉන්නවා අදාළ ඇමතිවරයාගේ අධීක්ෂණය සහ නියෝග යටතේ කටයුතු කරන්න. මේ නියෝගය කෙලෙස ලැබෙනවාද කියන එක අපැහැදිලි වුණාට කෙලෙස ලැබුණත් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ලේකම්තුමා කියන අකාරයට අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ නිර්දේශයක්, යෝජනාවක් වාචිකව හෝ telephone එකෙන් හෝ මොන ක්‍රමයකින් හෝ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට -මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට - ලැබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාට ලැබෙන නියෝගය අගමැතිතුමාගෙන්, විෂයභාර ඇමතිවරයාගෙන්,එහෙම නැත්නම් රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන්නෙක් හැටියට සිටින කෙනෙකුගෙන් නේ ලැබෙන්නේ. නිශ්චිතව බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්දයෙන් කියමුකෝ. බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්දයෙන් ලැබුණු යෝජනාව, නිර්දේශය, අදහස අනිවාර්යෙන්ම මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ලැබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. මෙතැනදී මේ ප්‍රශ්ණයට අදාළව ගත්තොත් අධිපතිතුමා මේ කාරක සභාවේ අවස්ථා දෙකකදී ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කළා, අවසාන අවස්ථාවේදී -පසුගිය අවස්ථාවේදී - අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියලා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශයට පත්කළා, එම යෝජනාව අගමැතිතුමාගේ යෝජනාවක් හැටියට නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න, අනුමත කරන්න ලැබුණාද, ඒ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා අනුමත කළාද කියලා අපි කලිනුත් කථා කළා. ඒකත් වැදගත් නේ. අගමැතිතුමා මේ යෝජනාව සම්බන්දයෙන් අදහස් වෙන් කළා නම් ඒ වෙනස් කිරීමට අදාළ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වුණාද කියන එක වැදගත් නේ.

Dr.Indrajit Coomaraswami

May I respond? As I was not the Governor, I cannot comment on the process as it took place at the time. But my reading of the Monetary Law Act is that sets out certain responsibilities for the Monetary Board. It is a very specific one. In those areas, of course, the Minster in charge whether the Prime Minister of whoever can indicate the government policy, but in the end, the Monetary Board has to take a decision as to the best possible cause of action when it comes to those specific areas, where the Monetary Law Act has bestowed responsibility to the Monetary Board. So, whoever the Minster is, he

can obviously indicated the government policy et cetera, but in the end, the Monetary Board has to take a decision in terms of what the best possible cause of action is. That is how I see it.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, මෙතැනදී වැදගත් වන්නේ මෙපමණයි. අපිට ප්‍රශ්ණ දෙකයි තිබෙන්නේ. හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා අගමැතිතුමා මේ ප්‍රකාශය එතුමාට කළා කියලා. අපි මෙතැනට ඉදිරිපත් වන කරුණුවලින් අපේ රටේ monetary policy එක හදනවා නොවෙයි නේ. මේ policy එක කොහොමද එන්නේ, decide කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා හදනවා නම් මේ එන ක්‍රමය වැරදියි කියලා, ඒ ගැන සොයා බලන්න පුළුවන්. අපි බලන්නේ මේ රටේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද කියලායි. අපට අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ එපමණයි. ක්‍රමවේදය ඒක නම් ඒකට argue කරලා හරියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයෙන් පසුව ඉදිරියට යන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මේ අවස්ථාවේදී වැදගත් වන්නේ අගමැතිතුමා මේ ප්‍රකාශය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කළාද කියන එක පමණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒ කාරණාව මේ සාකච්ඡාවේ අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදී අනාවරණය වුණා. අගමැතිතුමා මේ කරුණ කිව්වා කියලා තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

එහෙම නම් හරි

සභාපතිතුමා

පැහැදිලියි නේ. ප්‍රශ්ණය තිබෙන්නේ එතැන නොවෙයි. අගමැතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කාරණාව මේ ගනුදෙනුව -බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය -සිදු වෙන්න කලින්, ඒ කියන්නේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් ඒ වෙනස්කම කරලා ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න කලින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ අනුමත කළාද කියන ප්‍රශ්ණයයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වෙන්නත් එපායැ.

ගරු සූජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාට ගරුත්වය ඇතිවයි මේ කියන්නේ. අපි එතැනට අවාට නම් අපි මෙච්චර ප්‍රශ්ණ අහන්න වුවමනා නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමාට කලින්ම අහන්න තිබුණා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් මේක අනුමත වුණාද කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒක සාකච්ඡා වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාවක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒක තමයි. අපි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් මෙතැන සිටින නිලධාරීන් කිහිප දෙනෙක්ගෙන්ම කියවෙන්නේ ඒක ලියවිල්ලකින් දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක නෙවෙයි නේ. දැන් අපට ලේකම්තුමා කිව්වා, කථාවක් කළාමත් ඒක ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුවක් කියලා

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

මම නම් ඒක පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

අපි පිළිගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා, අපි මෙතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ. අපි පිළිගන්නවාද නැද්ද කියන එක නෙවෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය. මෙහෙම ගියොත් අපට වෙන්නේ මෙතැන ඉඳන් රටේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති හදන්නයි. මේ කාරණාව පැත්තකින් තියලා ප්‍රතිපත්තිය කොහොමද මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එන්නේ, ඒ එන ක්‍රමවේදය හරිද කියන එක තමයි අපට ඉදිරියට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න සිදු වන්නේ. අපට මෙතැනදී වැදගත් වන්නේ මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ආවාද කියන එකයි. ඒ එන ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්දයෙන් තමයි මේ නිලධාරි මහත්වරු තියන්නේ. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමවේදය.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මම මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා සමඟ එකඟ වන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක නොවෙයි මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. ඔය කියන දවසේ මේ රටේ තිබුණු කාර්යපටිපාටිය මොකක්ද කියන එකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය ශාස්ත්‍රීය කථාවක් නේ. ඔය කියන දවසේ ඔබතුමා හිටියේ නැහැ. මම මෙහෙම කියනවාට සමාවෙන්න. අපි එදා Manual එක ගෙන්වා ගත්තේ මම වාගේ ආගන්තුක කෙනෙකුට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නයි. ඔබතුමා කලින් හිටපු නිසා ගොඩක් දේවල් දන්වා ඇති. මම මේ ගැන මෙලෝ දෙයක් දන්නේ නැහැ. මම මෙම කමිටුවේ සාමාන්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක් විධියට මෙතැනට ඇවිත් තිබෙන්නේ මේ පිළිබඳව කිසිම දැනීමක් නැතිවයි. දැන් අහගෙන, කථා කරලා ටික ටික ඉගෙන ගන්නවා. අවසානයේ අපි නිගමනවලට එළඹෙනවා. මේ manual එක මොකක්ද? මොකක්ද තිබුණු කාර්ය පටිපාටිය? අපි second point එකේ ඉන්නේ. පළමු වැනි එක නිගමනය කරන

අවස්ථාව නොවෙයි නේ, මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. දැන් ඒක හරි. ඒ ගැන අපි පසුව නිගමනය කරමු. Policy ප්‍රශ්ණය පිළිබඳ එදා තිබූ තත්ත්වය පැහැදිලි නේ. නිලධාරීන් කියනවා නම්, පරස්පරතොරතුරුක් නැත්නම් එපමණයි. ප්‍රශ්ණය තිබෙන්නේ වෙන තැනක. ඒ කියන්නේ ඔය කියන Monetary Board එක ඔය තීරණය ගත යුතුයි කියලා කියවානේ. ගත යුතු නම් Monetary Board එක කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ යම් කාර්යය පටිපාටියක් අනුවනේ. Monetary Board එකට mechanism එකක් නැතිව වැඩ කරන්න බැහැනේ. Monetary Board එක කටයුතු කළයුතු Mechanism එක කොහෙද තිබෙන්නේ? එදා අපට පිළිතුරක් දුන්නා, Manual එකේ තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ Manualමේ Manualඑකද? එච්චරයි. මේ Manual එකේ කොහෙද ඕක තිබෙන්නේ? අපි ඒ line එකේ යමුද? සමාවෙන්න, ඔබතුමාට බාධා කලාට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

එතැනට එන්න පුළුවන් නම් වඩා හොඳයි. මම එතැනට තමයි කලින් එන්න හැදුවේ. මෙතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්ණයත් සමඟ තමයි policy එක පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා වුණේ. ඒක තමයි මගේ ප්‍රශ්ණය. අපි කලින් විමසූ අවස්ථාවේදී කිව්වේmanual එක අනුව තමයි Monetary Board එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ කියලා. මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ සියලු සාක්ෂිවලින් මගේ දැනුම අනුව මට තේරුණේ ඒකයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

මම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා කරපු ප්‍රකාශය ගැන බරපතළ අවදානමක් දකිනවා. මට ඒ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඔබතුමා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා නේ. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා අගමැතිතුමා හෝ විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා යම් රැස්වීමක කථා කරනකොට, නැත්නම් තේ බොන තැනක මොකක් හරි කථාවකදී- (මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා විශාල පිරිසක් විරුද්ධත්වය පළ කරයි.)

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

හරි. මම ඒක ඉල්ලා අස් කර ගන්නම්. එතුමා කිව්වා යම් රැස්වීමකදීකථා කරන කොට- කරුණාකරලා මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුට කථා කිරීමේ අයිතිය දෙන්න. ඒක මට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. මෙම කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයෙක් ඉන්නවා. එම නිසා අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා යම් තැනක ප්‍රකාශයක් කරද්දී, රැස්වීමක යම් ප්‍රකාශයක් කරද්දි ලිඛිත නියෝගයක් නැතිව "මේවාගේ දෙයකට අපි මෙහෙම දෙයක් කරනවා" කිව්වාම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා minute කරලා ඒක නියෝගයක් හැටියට ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න යවනවා කියන එකද ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්.සමරතුංග මහතා

නැහැ. මට ඒ ගැන පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. උදාහරණයකින් මම මේක පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. මගේ ඇමතිතුමා පසු ගියදා සාලාව යුධ හමුදා කඳවුරේ ගිනි ගැනීම් සිද්ධිය ඇති වුණු වේලාවේ එතැනට ගිහින් දුකට පත් වුණු මිනිස්සු ඉදිරියේ කිව්වා "රුපියල් 10,000 ක් ගෙවන්න" කියලා. එතකොට රුපියල් 10,000 ගණනේ ගෙවන්න කියන එක මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා මට ලියලා දුන්නේ නැහැ. මම ඒ නියෝගය අරගෙන අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට කිව්වා "මේ සඳහා මුදල් වෙන් කරලා නැති නිසා මට මේකට මුදල් ටික වෙන් කරලා දෙන්න" කියලා. ඒ විදියටයි ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සකස් වෙන්නේ. මම ඒක මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගෙන් අහන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ ඒ විදියටයි.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනවිරත්න මහතා

කැබිනට් එකට ගිහින් approval එක ගන්නවා කියලා මෙතුමාට කලින් කියන්න බැරි වුණ නිසායි ප්‍රශ්ණය ඇති වුණේ

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ වාගේ දෙයක් තේ බොන තැනකදී කිව්වත් කමක් නැහැ. තේ බොද්දි කිව්වත් කැබිනට් එකට ගිහින් නේ කර ගන්නේ. ඔබතුමා තේ බොද්දි කියන ඒවාත් ලියා ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, මේකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. අපි අනවශ්‍ය තැන්වලට යනවා. මෙතුමා කියාපු කරුණු අනුවමුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා ලියලා එවන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒකයි වැදගත්කම That is a different thing

The Hon.Lakshman Senawirathne

He has to get the signature, when it goes to the Cabinet as a Cabinet Paper.

සභාපතිතුමා

මෙම කාරණය වැටුප් වැඩි කිරීම් වාගේ වෙන වෙන උදාහරණවලට දමන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ලේකම්තුමාගේ අත්දැකීම් අනුව, බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය

තීරණයක් වෙනස් කිරීමට විෂය භාර ඇමතිතුමා හැටියට අගමැතිතුමා යෝජනා කළොත්, ඊළඟට ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද කරන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එය hypothetical වාගේම උභතෝකෝටික ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ. මොකද, එය එතුමාගේ විෂය නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක වැරදියි. You know why -දැනට සිටින මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පිළිතුරු දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා

වෙනත් උදාහරණවලින් ලේකම්තුමා අපහසුතාවයට පත් වන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ පිළිබඳව පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න. මෙම බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්දයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් -direct placements වලින් auctions වලට මාරු වීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් අගමැතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශ කළා නම්, ඊළඟට එය ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasighe

The Governor, it is for you.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් Monetary Board එකේ කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා එතුමා කිව්වා. ඒ නිසා මෙතැන අලුත් දෙයක් නැහැ. මුදල් පිළිබඳවයම්කිසි තීන්දුවක් ගන්නවා නම්, ඇමතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත හෝ ජනාධිපතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලයට ගිහින් තමයි ගන්නේ කියලා අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා සඳහන් කළා. අපට ඒක තමයි කරන්න තිබෙන ක්‍රියාවලිය.එම ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දු කොතැනින් ආවත්, "Monetary Board එකේ කථා කරලා අවශ්‍ය තීරණ ගත යුතු" කියලා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කලින් ප්‍රශ්නයේදී සඳහන් කළා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 02-13)

- මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත

සභාපතිතුමා

විගණකාධිපති තුමා සමග පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම් අපි ඊයේ පෙරේදා කර ගත්තා. දැනට අපට තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම් කර ගන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එතුමන්ලාගේ අවබෝධය, දැනුම, පරිවය එක්ක එතැන ඒ වාගේ තීරණ ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රමාණයක් කියලා කාටවත් මනින්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට මෙවැනි තීරණයක් ගැනීම සඳහා guidelines තිබෙන්නේ. අපි අහන manual එකේ තමයි ඒ guidelines තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ manual එක තිබුණාද? ඒ manual එකට අනුව මේ තීරණ ගත්තාද? ඒක සංශෝධනය කරලා තිබුණාද? එය සංශෝධනය කරන්න කවුරු හරි අනුමැතිය දීලා තිබුණාද? මෙන්න මේ කාරණා කවුරු හරි පැහැදිලි කරන්න. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට තමයි මේ කාරණා පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ manual එක අනුමත වෙලා තිබෙනවාද? ඒකට මොකක් හරි Board approval එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒක අනුව නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ. නැතිව ගෙදර බලාගෙන ඉඳලා ගිහිල්ලා මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

Dr.M.Z.M.Aazim

In fact the, the Board has not cleared that manual at that time. But, the Internal Audit Department of the Central Bank has been regularly monitoring whether the Public Debt Department is following the procedures set out in the operations manual. We have very much acted on the basis of what the manual has stated. But, the manual does not specifically say that we should raise “x” amount or “y” mount. It has been the discretion that has been given to the Tender Board Committee. Of course, the Chairman of the Tender Board Committee and Mr.Rathnayake have mentioned that there were alot of discussions. We had our views and we expressed those. We had no fallback in terms of direct issuance arrangement in the case of Rs.13.5 billion requirement that we wanted to raise. Then only we had to go with that Rs.10 billion option which was in fact, requested and –

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ manual එකට අනුමැතිය ගැනීමේ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ කාටද?

ආචාර්ය M.Z.M. අසීම් මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට සහ ඒ අදාළ සහකාර අධිපතිතුමා හරහා දැන් එය ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා.

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන හැම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව - කටම යම්කිසි operations manual එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ හැම operations manual එකක්ම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය හෝ අධිපතිතුමා අනුමත කරන්නේ නැහැ. operations manual කියන එක Internal Audit Department එකෙන් audit කරන එක තමයි, තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය. එතකොට, cross – check කරන ක්‍රමය තමයි, Internal Audit Department එකෙන් operations manual එක බලලා, ක්‍රමවේදය හරිද වැරදිද කියලා බලනවා. නැත්නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන් නිර්දේශ කරනවා මේක වෙනස් කරන්න කියලා. එහෙම කිව්වාම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මඟින් operations manual කියන ඒවාට ඒ යම්කිසි වෙනස්කම කරනවා.ඊට අමතරව investment guidelines කියලා දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ EPF එකේ, නැත්නම් අපේ resource management කරන වෙලාවන් වලදී investment decisions ගන්න කොට ඒවා අනිවාර්යයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළ guidelines තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒවා කොටස් දෙකක් තිබෙනවා Investment guidelines කියන ඒවා ඒ උඩ මට්ටමට ගිහිල්ලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් operations manuals කියන ඒවා දෙපාර්තමේන්තු විසිගණනක තිබෙනවා. Internal Audit Department එකේ වගකීම තමයි ඒවා බලලා, internal controls තිබෙනවාද බලලා ඒවා වෙනස් කිරීම.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා, ඒ වෙනකොට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අදාළව operations manual කියලා ලේඛනයක් තිබුණාද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ operation manual එක කෙටුම්පත් කළාට පස්සේ operation manual එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා කියන තීරණය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ කවදාද?

පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

Operation manual කියන එක මේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පටන් ගත්ත කාලයේ ඉදලාම ඇවිල්ලා,කාලයෙන් කාලයට වෙනස් කර ගන්ත document එකක්. ඒක dynamic document එකක්. ඒ කාලයට අවශ්‍ය විධියට එය වෙනස් කරනවා. නමුත්, එය කාලයෙන් කාලයට වෙනස් කරන්නේ internal controls හරියට තිබෙනවාද කියලා බලලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 24-25)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් භාවිතා කරනු ලබන මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත පිළිබඳව සාක්ෂි දීම සඳහා, මේ නිලධාරීන් අතරින් වඩාත් අත්දැකීම් තිබෙන්නේ සමරසිංහ මහත්මයාටද? ඒ පිළිබඳව පරිවයක් තිබෙන්නේ කාටද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

Manual එක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ මේ Public Debt department එකෙන් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Manual එක සම්බන්ධව සාක්ෂි දීමට වඩාත් දැනුම ඇති නිලධාරියා කවුද?

සී.සමරසිංහ මහතා :Dr. ආසිම්ට තමයි පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

පසුගිය කාරක සභාවේදී ඔබතුමාගෙන් අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්ණවලින් මතු වූ කරුණක් තමයි Operational Manual එක. එම Operational Manual එක භාවිතා කරන්නේ කුමන කරුණු සඳහාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

Version 2 updated as at 31st July, 2013.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Public Debt Department, Operational Manual – Version 2 updated as at 31st July,2013. එම document එක පිළිබඳව අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

ඔව්

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙම ලේඛණය සකස් කරන්නේ කවුද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙම ලේඛණය අවසන් වරට සකස් කළේ කවදාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

2013 ජූලි 31

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එම සංශෝධනයන් සිදු කළ පසු, එය මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

එහි අනුමැතිය සඳහා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යා යුතු නැහැ. ඒ සංශෝධනයන් සිදු වෙන්නේ Operational Manual එකෙන් නේ.මුදල් මණ්ඩලය හෝ අදාල policies - අදාළ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණත් මෙතැන සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම එම ප්‍රතිපත්තීන් අනුමත කරන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයයි. ඒ පිළිබඳව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැන්වීමෙන් පසුව, අදාළ Manual එක අවශ්‍ය revisions or updates, we will bring into the Manual

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එම අත්පොත තුළ තිබෙන, බැඳුම්කර හා සම්බන්ධ වගන්තිය කුමක්ද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

There may be lots of sentences and references to the Bonds in the Manual.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

There may be private and direct placements. What is the Section?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

This refers to under the Item C. of page 8.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා Private/ Direct Placements ලෙස සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ එතැනද?

Dr.M.Z.M. Azim

Yes

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙම ලේඛණයේ මතුපිට ඇති ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනුව, බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පැවැත්විය යුතු බව සඳහන් වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය සහ direct placements හරහා රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කර ගත යුතුයි කියලා මෙහි සඳහන් වනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Okay. මෙම වගන්තිය අනුව පළමුව කළ යුත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමයි. ඒ වාගේම private placements වලට යා යුතු වන්නේ, වෙන්දේසියෙන් මුදල් ලබා ගත නොහැකි නම් පමණයි. පළමුauction එක තමයි auction. Auction එකෙන් ලැබෙන්නේ නැතිනම් - then, you have to go to the private placements.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

I do not think the Manual says like that but what says it says is either thought auctions or placements you should raise it. What it says is as much as possible from auctions.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙහි ඇති භාෂාව අනුව පැහැදිලි වන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හරහා හැකි තරම් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් සොයා ගැනීමට උත්සහ කළ යුතු බවයි. ඒක තමයි මූලධර්මය.That is the rule. ඒක තමයි රීතිය.

The Hon.Dayasiri Jayasekara

You can explain, Dr. Azim whether it is correct or not.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

අපි මේක විසඳා ගනිමු. වෙච්ච දේ වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මම අහන්නේ පොත ගැන පමණයි. ඔබතුමා අපහසුතාවට පත් කරනවා නොවෙයි. පොත අනුව වෙච්ච දේ vary වෙනවා නම්,අපි ඒ ගැන වෙනම ප්‍රශ්ණ කරන්නම්. මම අහන්නේ විෂය ගැන

දැනගෙනයි. මෙම Operational manual එක අනුව පළමුව auctions සඳහා ගොස් හැකි තරම් මුදලක් එකතු කර ගැනීමට කටයුතු කළ යුතුයි. එසේ ප්‍රමාණවත් මුදලක් එකතු කර ගැනීමට නොහැකි වන්නේ නම්, ඉතිරි මුදල එකතු කර ගැනීම සඳහා private placements කළ යුතුයි.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

My understanding as per the manual is, there is no first, second reference. පළමුව auctionsද, දෙවනුව private placements කියලා reference එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එයට අදාළ ස්ථානය ඉංග්‍රීසි භාෂාවෙන් කියවන්න.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

May I read that?

The Hon.Ajith P.Perera

Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe, allow him to read.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

Can you read it out, please?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

It is under Item B which only says about direct and private placements. But if you go to page No.3, there it is stated, 'Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme' which includes way everything. Page 8 mentions only about placements and auctions.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

That is what we wanted to know.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

When it comes to Item B (i) of the page 8, it states:

"Front Office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the Government

as indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs."

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මම මේ විධියට අහන්නම්කෝ. මෙම රීති මාලාවේ 8 වෙනි පිටුවේ "B" යටතේ, 'Private/Direct Placements' කියන මාතෘකාව තිබෙනවා. එහි මෙසේ සඳහන් වෙනවා.

"FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." එහි මුද්‍රණ දෝෂයක් තිබෙනවාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

No.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා :එහි අර්ථය කුමක්ද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

Placements සහ සෘජු නිකුතුවන් පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා කිරීමයි මෙහි සඳහන් වෙන්නේ. සෘජු නිකුතුවන්වලට පැමිණීමට පෙර, දෙවැනි sentence එක යටතේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, 'The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme…..'

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඇහුවේ ඒක නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ ප්‍රශ්ණයේදී එතුමා අපහසුතාවයට පත් කරන්න එපා. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. මෙතුමා අහන්නේ එක වාක්‍යයක් ගැන නේ. හැබැයි, ඒ වාක්‍ය අඩංගු තව ඡේදයක්ම තිබෙනවා. ඒ ඡේදයේ Full stop තියපු කොටස හරි. එතුමාට එහි අදහස පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ නම්, අදහස පැහැදිලි කරන්න එතුමාට ඉඩ දෙන්න. අපි ඒක පිළිගන්න හෝ නොපිළිගන්න එක වෙනම දෙයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ප්‍රශ්ණයක් අහනකොට ඒ ප්‍රශ්ණයට අදාළ පිළිතුරු දෙන්න මෙතුමන්ලා බැඳී සිටිනවා. එයට පිළිතුර ලබා දීමෙන් පසුව ඒකේ තේරුම මේකයි

කියන එක පැහැදිලි කරන්න එතුමාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, ගරු ඇමතිතුමා ප්‍රශ්නයක් විමසා සිටීමේදී, "මේ වාක්‍යයන් කියැවෙන්නේ මොකක්ද?" කියලා ඇහුවාම ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු ලබා දෙන්න ඕනෑ. පිළිතුරු දුන්නාට පසුව පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම දන්නා ආකාරයට ප්‍රශ්නයකට පිළිතුරු දියයුතු ක්‍රමවේදය ඒකයි. එහෙම නැතිව ප්‍රශ්නයක් විමසා සිටීමේදී ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු නොදී මේකේ තේරුම මේකයි කියලා පිළිතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ. මේ වාක්‍යයේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා අපි ඇහුවොත්, ඒ වාක්‍ය පටන් ගන්නා තැනක් සහ Full stop එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාක්‍යයෙන් සඳහන් වෙන දේ කිව්වාට පසුව එතුමාට පුළුවන් මේ වාක්‍යය්න් අදහස් වන්නේ මේකයි කියලා විස්තර කරන්න. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු නොදී ගියොත්, අපට කවදාවත් මේ ප්‍රශ්න විමසීම අවසන් කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒක නිවැරදියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එතුමාගේ ස්ථාවරයට මමත් එකඟ වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මට දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමට ඉඩ දෙන්න. තව කාරණයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ගැන සඳහන් කරනවාට සමාවෙන්න. මේක විශාල ප්‍රශ්නයක්නේ. Final point එකක් හරියට issue එක බලලා තමයි මම කථා කරන්නේ. බාධා කළොත් line එක කැඩෙනවා. උසාවියේදීවත් ප්‍රශ්න විමසීමකදී බාධා කරන්නේ නැහැ. මගේ මතයට ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ නැත්නම්, ඒ ගැන පසුව ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න.එහෙම නොවුණොත් සිත් රිදවීම් කරගන්න වෙනවා. මෙතුමන්ලා වෘත්තීමය සාක්ෂිකරුවන්. අවසානයේදී මෙතුමන්ලා සමඟ තිබෙන පෞද්ගලික රණ්ඩුවක් වාගේ වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මට ටිකක් අවසර ලබා දෙන්න.

ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද 2013.07.31 දිනෙන් අවසන් වූ operational manual හි 8 වැනි පිටුවේ "B" යටතේ ඇති ප්‍රතිපාදන අනුව අදහස් වන්නේ, "පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට ගොස් හැකි තරම් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීමට උත්සහ කළ යුතු බවත්, ශේෂයක් තිබේ නම් පමණක් private placements කළ යුතු බවත්" කියලා මම යෝජනා කරනවා. එම අදහසට ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

මෙම sentence එකෙහි විශේෂයෙන් "as much as possible" කියන එක යටතේ auctions වලින් කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගත යුතුද කියලා තීරණය කරනවා. As mush as possible කියන එක cost එකයි, risk එකයි, factor එකයි මත define වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, "as much as possible" කියන යෙදුම අනුව ඒ අර්ථය ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේ මූලධර්ම සමඟ ගැලපිය යුතුයි කියාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවම නොවෙයි, අපේ රාජ්‍ය ණය මුදල් එකතු කර ගැනීමේ Borrowing Programme හි Medium, Term Debt Management Strategy (MTDS) හි සඳහන් කරන direction එක මත cost and risk direction එකක් specify කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

20:80 අනුපාතය ඒ කියන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි 20 යි, private placements 80 යි කියන අනුපාතය මෙම manual එකේ යම් තැනෙක සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

මා දැනුවත්ව මේ manual එකේ කිසිදු තැනෙක 20:80 අනුපාතය කියලා සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට මෙම කාරණාවට අදාළව තවත් ප්‍රශ්ණ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට ප්‍රශ්ණයක් තිබෙනවා. Manual එකේ 3 වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, 'Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme කියලා. එහි තවදුරටත් මෙසේ සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා.

"Funds are raised through:

D. Auctions
E. Private placements
F. Rupee Loans

"A" කියන්නේ Auctions. ඒකෙන්, firstly auctions වලට යන්න ඕනෑ indicate වෙනවාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

No.Then, Rupee Loans come under C. We are not issuing rupee loans. For instance, may be after 2009, we have not issued rupee loans, if I am not mistaken.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා

A- Auctions, B- Private Placements කියලා ඒ විධියට දැම්මාට auctions firstly යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා එකක් නැද්ද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

There is no order as far as "A" and "B" concerned.

සභාපතිතුමා :තවත් ප්‍රශ්ණ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර එතරම් පැහැදිලි නැහැ. පසුගිය කාරක සභාවේදී මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ විමසීමකදී, "manual එකේ වගන්තියෙන් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් සියයට 80 ක්, සියයට 85 ක් පමණ - ගණනක් හරියට කිව්වේ නැහැ. -මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් සපුරාගෙන ඉතිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය direct placementඑකෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ." කියලා සියලුම නිලධාරීන් කියා සිටියා.

සියලුම නිලධාරීන් එහෙම නොවෙයි කියලා පුළුවන් නම්, ගියවර සාක්ෂිවලින් එකක් හෝ පෙන්වන්න. අනික් කාරණය, ඒ ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කළේ මේ පත්‍රිකාවෙන් කියලා තමයි එහිදී ප්‍රකාශ කළේ. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය, 10.07.2008 දිනැති පත්‍රිකාවෙන් තමයි, direct placements වලට move වුණේ. මෙහි සඳහන් වෙනවා, "improvement of market liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund". It states that the Board having considered the Paper approved of issuing treasury bonds to EPF and other captive sources at interest rate of five basis point above the secondary market rates through private placements and requesting the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary marketby actively engage in the secondary market operation. ගියවර අපට ලැබුණු සියලු සාක්ෂිවලින් සඳහන් කළේ, මේ ලියවිල්ලෙන් තමයි direct placements වලට යොමු වුණේ කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ කාරණය නිවැරදිද කියලා, ඔබතුමා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් අපට පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒකට කවුරු හෝ උත්තර දෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

දැනට සිටින මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා උත්තර දෙන්න.

පී.සමරසිංහ මහතා

මම නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති. ඒ Board Paper එකෙන් තමයි, private placements කියන එක හඳුන්වා දුන්නේ. 1997 වර්ෂයේ තමයි bonds, introduce කළේ.ඒ Introduce කළේ සම්පූර්ණ auction. යම් කිසි හේතුවක් නිසා 2008 වර්ෂයේ මෙය තාවකාලිකව හඳුන්වා දුන්නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනවිරත්න මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ private placements වලට යන්න?

පී.සමරසිංහ මහතා

හැබැයි, එහි අනුපාතයක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. NSB හා EPF වාගේ කිහිපදෙනෙකුට විශේෂ rate එකකට යන්න කියලා කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමා හරියටම හරි. මොකද අපිට ආසිම් මහතාගේ උත්තරයේන් එළියට ආවේ නැහැ. ගියවර සියලුම නිලධාරීන් උත්තර දුන්නේ, auction ක්‍රමය දිගටම පැවතුණේ. මේ Board Paper එකෙන් ඒ auction ක්‍රමය වෙනස් වුණේ කියලා. මේ manual එකේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් වන්නේ, සියලු දේවල් ලබා ගත්තේ auction වලින්. යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් පමණක් මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන ආකාරයට direct placements වලින් ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියන එකයි. එහෙම ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. මෙහි විශාල වරදක් තිබෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිම දෙයක් Report එකේ නැහැ. මෙහි තියෙන්නේ, “EPF and other captive source” කියලා. මේ සම්බන්ධව Report එකක සඳහන් නොවන්නේ මොකද? මේ direct placement ගන්නේ “EPF and other captive source” වලින් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා

සඳහන් වන්නේ නැත්තේ මොන Report එකේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

Auditor General ගේ Report එකේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමාට මම නැවතත් අවධාරණය කරනවා. ඔය කියන කාරණාවන් ඇතුළත් කරනවා නම් ඇතුළත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕන COPE Report එකක. Auditor General ගේ Report එකේ සඳහන් වන්නේ, 2015 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 වර්ෂයේ මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාලය තුළ මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදුකළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ඒ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳවයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමා නිවැරදියි. එතකොට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්ධව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට නිවැරදි අවබෝධයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. රටේ තිබෙන නීතිය මොකක්ද? මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තිබෙනක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද? ඒ සම්බන්ධව නොදැනුවත්ව Report එක ලියන්න බැහැ නේ. මේ manual එකට අනුව තමයි, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ලබාගත යුතුව ඇත්තේ. ඒක අපි පිළිගන්නවාද?Auditor General තුමාගේ තීන්දුව වෙලා තියෙන්නේ, නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය direct placements ක්‍රමය කියන එකයි. Direct placements ක්‍රමයක් ආවේ කොහෙන්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Auditor General තුමාගේ presentation එකේදීත් මම එතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ කළා. 80/20 ක්‍රමය පිළිබඳ මූලධර්ම සුදුසුයි කියලා ඔබතුමා කියනවාද කියලා. ප්‍රශ්ණය තියෙන්නේ, එහෙම policy එකක් නැහැ. Rule එක auction කිරීම.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

Auditor General තුමාගේ Rule එක විදියට අරගෙන තියෙන්නේ direct placements. මුළු Report එකම තියෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

අපට ඒක වෙනම සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම ඒ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා නම්, අපි ඒක වෙනම කථා කරමු.

The HON.Sujeewa Senasinghe

Okay. We will not talk about that. I want to establish this fact. ඔබතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය නිසා මම මේක කිව්වේ. නැතිනම් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා ඒක අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔය ලිපියේ දිනය කවදාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මේ ලිපියේ දිනය 2008.07.10 එක ලිපියකින් මේ manual එකේ තිබුණු ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කරලා, රටේ පිළිගන්නා ක්‍රමවේදය බවට පත් කර තිබෙනවා. මේ රටේ පිළිගන්නා ක්‍රමය ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයද? අපේ මේ මුළු Report එකම තියෙන්නේ on that basis. So, it is flawed from the beginning. මෙතැනදී අපි පිළිගන්නවා මේ ක්‍රමවේදය. I will show you the 90 per cent of the other countries in the world where there is the auction system. We asked this question from the learned Members of the Central Bank, all of them agreed last time that the norm in the world is the auction system. It is there in America, England, Germany and in every country. When they change the system here there was no manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

I am asking from the Governor. What I understand is this. Normally, the practice of the Monetary Board is to go by the Manual

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Hon. Minister, my understanding is the Manual reflects the decisions of the Monetary Board. There is a changing policy. The Monetary Board can actually effect that change. It does not have to follow the Manual all the time. If a change is required, the Monetary Board would make that change and that would be reflected in the manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Why would it reflect on the Manual? Then, that becomes the practice.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Yes. Until the Monetary Board changes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

If it is not changed that must be the rule.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

If it is not changed in the Manual – All decisions of the Monetary Board should be reflected in the Manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Now I refer to you the item "B" of the Manual on page 8 – "Private and Direct Placements", you tell me what you understand from this language.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

You mean the B. (i)

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

That is right. That is the general rule of the Monetary Board. It is indicated here. The decision had been taken by the Monetary Board and it is, as Mr.Samarasiri said, far back in 1996 or 1997. When the bond system came in the normal practice was the auction system. Am I right?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I was not here. My understanding is there was a hybrid system at one point where there was a mixture of an auction as well as private placements.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

That came in 2008. Am I right?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

No, that came in 1998

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

A last occasion, when I asked from the officers of the Central Bank what they said was "about 80 per cent or 85 per cent was done through auctions and the rest was done through." That is the idea I got from the language depicts here. Any sane person will get that idea from this language. That was changed only in 2008. Am I right?

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

That is my understanding "when they move on to more ever private placements".

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara

No. You have said it was done in 1998.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

No. There was a mixed system.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Is it the Board paper of the Monetary Board on 2008.10.07? That is a confidential document. Can I read this to you? "I believe from the evidence that I have heard what they said was, ' the system was changed purely through this letter'".

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

I must ask one of my colleagues to respond for that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe

Can you ask one of your colleagues to answer?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Let me ask them.

සභාපතිතුමා

සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු ඇමතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසානයිද?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Mr.S.S.Rathnayake, Assisatant Governor will answer

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

මම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරී, රත්නායක, 1997 වසරේදී තමයි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම ආරම්භ කළේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ auction ක්‍රමයට තමයි ගියේ. නමුත්, auction ක්‍රමය තුළින් දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්ණ මතු වුණා. Interest rate එක විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන අරමුදල් තිබෙනවා, ඒ අරමුදල්වලට auction ක්‍රමය හරහා එන්නේ නැතිව direct placementවලින් එන්න පුළුවන් කියන weighted average rate එකට 1998 වසරේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අවසරයක් දුන්නා.Weighted Average rateඑක මත direct placement යනවා කියන එක ආරම්භ වුණේ 2008 වසරේදී නොවෙයි. Treasury bond කියන එක 1997 වසරේ ආරම්භ කරලා, මාස කිහිපයක් ගිහිල්ලා 1998 වසරේදී directplacementආරම්භ කළා. එය බාහිර පාර්ශවවලට විවෘත වුණේ නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන විශාල අරමුදල්වලට auction හරහා එන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. 1998 වසරේදී, පොලී අනුපාත ස්ථාවර කිරීමේ අරමුණත් ඇතිව direct placement ආරම්භ කළා. 1998වසරේ ඉඳලා මේ ක්‍රමය යන විට නැවතත් පොලී අනුපාත විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස්වීම්වලට ලක් වුණා. 2008 වසර ආසන්න කාලය වන විට මෙය මහ බැංකුව තුළ සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී auction ක්‍රමය විතරක් නොවෙයි තවත් ක්‍රම තිබෙනවා කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණයක් ගත්තා. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව, රක්ෂණ සමාගම් ඒ වාගේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන පද්ධතියක් අපේ රට තුළ තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතනවලට - weighted average rate - ඒ කියන්නේ බර තබන ලද සාමාන්‍ය පොලී අනුපාතය මත direct placement කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක 2008 වසරේදී ආරම්භ වුණේ. නමුත්, ඒක තිබෙන captive sources කියන එක define කරලා නැහැ. Define කරන්නේ නැති හේතුව වන්නේ, captive sources කියලා අදහස් කරන්නේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන. ඒවා primary dealers හරහා එන විට සමහර වෙලාවට විශාල වශයෙන් commission ගෙවන්න සිදු වෙනවා. ඒක නිසා රජයේ අරමුදල් පිරිවැය අඩුකර ගැනීම සඳහාත්, රටේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමයෙහි පොලී අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කර ගැනීම සඳහාත් යෙදූ ක්‍රමවේදයක් තමයි ඒක. ඒ සඳහා වැරදි interpretation දීම සුදුසු නැහැ. එහි තිබුණු යහපත් අරමුණු තමයි, රජයට අඩු පිරිවැයක් යටතේ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සහ අපේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමය තුළ පොලී අනුපාත අනවශ්‍ය විධියට ඉහළ පහල යාම වලක්වා ගැනීම. ඒක අදාළ මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහ Dr.Azim කියන මහත්වරුන් දෙදෙනාම මෙතැනදී සඳහන් කළා, මේ manual එකේ ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගත්ත policy decision එකක් කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා, රටට බලපාන ඔය වැදගත් තීන්දුව 2008 වසරේදී ගත්තා නම්, එය මේ manual එකට ඇතුළත් නොවුනේ ඇයි?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

2008 වසරේ දී ගත්ත තීරණය - මහ බැංකු තුළින් පාලනය වන අරමුදල්වලට direct placement වලට තිබුණු අවස්ථාව, 2004 වසර පමණ වන විට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය නවත්වන්න සිදු වුණා. මොකද, රජයේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ක්‍රමවේදය electronic system එකකට වෙනස් වුණා. Primary dealer system ඇවිල්ලා, electronic system එනකොට, electronic systemයටතේ හැම primary dealer ආයතනයකටම එහෙම නැත්නම්, ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයට සම්බන්ධවන හැම ආයතනයකටම ගිණුමක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මහබැංකුවේ තිබෙන අරමුදල්වලට වෙන වෙන ගිණුම් නිකුත් කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක නිසා 2003 හෝ 2004 වසර වන විට - මට හරියටම දිනය මතක නැහැ. - ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අරමුදල්වලට සෘජු ක්‍රමය යටතේ එන්න තිබුණු අවස්ථාව අහිමි වුණා. එයට හේතුව, වෙන කිසිවක් නොවෙයි. ඒ අරමුදල්වලට වෙනම ගිණුම් ආරම්භ කිරීමට නොහැකි වීමයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි 2004 වසරේදී පමණ එය නැවැත්වුවේ. 2004 වසරේ ඉඳලා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් කාලය තුළ ඇති වෙච්ච වර්ධනයන් සලකා බලා තමයි 2008 වසරේදී ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමා කියන විදියට 2004 වසරේ ඉඳලා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් auction ක්‍රමය තමයි අනුගමනය කළේ.

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ඔව්. ඉන් බැහැර වෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

Very clear ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට තවත් කරුණක් යොමු කරනවා, ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ගන්න තීන්දුව තමයි මේ manual එකේ ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ කියලා. එතකොට මේ manual එකෙන් පරිබාහිරව කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ නම්, අනිවාර්යෙන්ම මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය තීන්දුවක් අරගෙන මේ manual එක සංශෝධනය විය යුතුයි. හරිද? ඔබතුමා මේ රටට වැදගත් වෙන විශාල කාරණා

ගණනාවක් කිව්වා interest rate එකයි සියල්ලම. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඔය තරම් උනන්දුවක් තිබුණා නම්, ඒ auction ක්‍රමය ගෙනැල්ලා මේ direct placement ක්‍රමයට සියයට 80 ක්, සියයට 90 ක් වගේ ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් වෙනස් කරනවා නම්, මේ manual එක වෙනස් කළේ නැත්තේ ඇයි? ඔබතුමන්ලා direct placement ක්‍රමයට එන්නේ 2008 වසරේදී නේ. 2004 වසරේ ඉඳලා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් auction ක්‍රමයෙන් ආවේ.

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒ auction ක්‍රමය අපිට පිළිගන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, manual එකේ සඳහන් වෙනවා, පුළුවන් කරම් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට ගිහිල්ලා, අවශ්‍ය නම් යම් කොටසක්- balance- ඉතිරිය direct placement එකෙන් සලසා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ 2008 වසරෙන් පස්සේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

2008 වසරේන් පසුව නොවෙයි. Manual එකේ දැනුත් එහෙමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ඒක හරි. 2008 වර්ෂයෙන් පසුව තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි ඔය විස්තර වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මේ manual එකෙන් විස්තර වන්නේ ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයද?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා මේ manual එකේ ඒ වගන්ති සංශෝධනය වුණේ 2008 වසරේදීද?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

Manual එක කියන එක දිගින් දිගටම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ, 2008 වසර වෙනකම් තිබුණේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය. ඔබතුමාම කිව්වා, 1998 වසරේ යම්කිසි direct placement ක්‍රමයක් හඳුන්වලා දුන්නා කියලා. නමුත්, තිබුණු ප්‍රායෝගික ප්‍රශ්ණ නිසා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයටම ආවා. අපට තිබෙන සාක්ෂි වලින් පේනවා ඒක වෙනස් වෙනවා කියලා. මහ බැංකුවේ අනිත් නිලධාරී මහත්වරුන් සියලු දෙනාම කිව්වේ - ඔබතුමා නොවෙයි- මේ ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කළේ 2008 වසරේ මෙන්න මේ Board Paper එකෙන් කියලා.

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

ඒක හරි. මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා, අසීම් මහත්මයා කිව්වා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ එහෙම තීන්දුවක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ තීන්දුව මේ manual එකට ඇවිල්ලා, manual එක සංශෝධනය වෙලා තමයි මේ manual එක සැකසෙන්නේ කියලා. මට, ඒ ගත්ත තීන්දුව මේ manualඒකෙන් පෙන්වන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා

සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමා දැන් ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්ණය ඇහුවා නේ. එතුමා ලබා දෙන පිළිතුර සාවධානව අහන්න සංයමයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම එතුමාට මොනවත් කිව්වේ නැහැ. දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මට බාධා කළා, ඒකයි මම කථා කළේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමා ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්ණයට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න නිලධාරී මහත්මයාට ඒක බාධාවක් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඒක දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට කියන්න. I did not disturb. So, you stop the person who disturbs me.

සභාපතිතුමා

මම සංයමයක් කියලා කිව්වේ ඔබකුමාට නොවෙයි. කාරක සභාවට එතුමාගේ පිළිතුර අහගන්න අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න කියලායි මම කිව්වේ. නිලධාරි මහත්මයා, ඔබතුමා පිළිතුරු ලබා දෙන්න.

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා

2008 වසරේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගත්ත තීරණය තමයි, මේ manual එකේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මම කලිනුත් සඳහන් කළා, captive sources කියන එක මුදල් මන්ඩලය නිර්වචනය කරලා නැහැ කියලා. මොකද, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට captive sources කියන එක නිර්වචනය කරන්න බැහැ. Captive sources කියන්නේ විශාල අරමුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙන ආයතන. NSB, Bank of Ceylon, People's Bank, EPF, Insurance companies. ඒ වාගේ ඒවා ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒක තමයි මෙහි මේ ලිහිල් භාෂාවෙන් ලියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ට මම නැවත ප්‍රශ්ණය යොමු කරනවා. ඔබතුමන් කිව්ව විධියට Board paper එකේ මේ තීන්දුව ගත්තා නම් මට පෙන්වන්න, මේ තීන්දුව කෝ Manual එකේ ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා?

සභාපතිතුමා

එතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී තිබෙන්නේ ඒක Manual එකේ ඇතුළත් නොවෙනවා කියලා නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මේ Order එක Manual එකේ එන්න ඕනෑ. එතුමා කියන්නේcaptive sources නිර්වචනය කරන්න බැහැ කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මෙහි දෙවැනි කොටසේ තිබෙනවා, මේ විධියට Page Number 2වල තිබෙනවා "Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programmes" කියලා. ඒකේ Auction, Private placements and Rupee loans කියන මේ තුනම සඳහන් වෙනවා. මේ ගෙනෙන සන්දේශය Manual එක වෙනස් කිරීම ගැන ගෙනෙන සන්දේශයක් නොවෙයිනේ. Manual එක මෙහෙමම තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඇතුළ ආපසු මේක ගෙනාවා කියලා පසු උදේ වෙනස් කරලා කියන්නේ නැහැනේ. ආපසු මේ

විදියට කරන්න කියලා නැවතත් වෙනස් කරනවාද? නැහැ. ඒ තුනෙන් එකකින් යන්න ඉඩ දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේක ගැන අපට වෙනත් ප්‍රශ්ණයක් තිබෙනවා. මටත් තිබෙනවා EPF, ETF සොරකම් කරපු එක ගැන කථා කරන්න. මෙතැන මගේ තර්කය සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ Auction, Private placements and Rupee loans කියන තුනම දාලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් කඩින්-කඩ ගෙනෙන Board papers වලින් සමහර විට කියන්න පුළුවන්. දැන් private placements වලට යමු; Rupee loans වලට යමු; කියලා යන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඒක Board paper එකකින් යන කාරණයක්. ඒක මත පසු දා උදේ Manual එක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

මෙතුමා කියන තර්කය නිවැරදි නම්, auction ක්‍රමය ගෙනෙන්නත් වෙන දෙයක් කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ ප්‍රශ්ණය තිබෙන්නේ auction ක්‍රමයට කොහොමද ආවේ කියන එක නේ. මෙතුමා කියනවා එහෙම වෙනස් වෙන්න නම්, එහෙම මොනවත් Manual එකේ ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලා. මේකේ සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා, auction පුළුවන්, direct placements පුළුවන්, මුදල් ගන්නත් පුළුවන් කියලා. එහෙම නම් මෙතුමන්ලා මේ මහ බැංකුවේ අවසානයට කරපු auction එකේ කිසිම වැරැද්දක් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන එකටම මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි, "as much as possible" කියන එක පැහැදිලි කරන්න මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමන්ගේ ඔය කාරණාවට අදාළ පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම අවසන් නිසාත්, තවත් බොහෝ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් මෙතැන සිටින නිසාත්, ඒ අයට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න. මම ඉදිරියට යනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්ණය මත පදනම්වන දෙයක් මේක.මම දැනගන්න කැමතියි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් හෝ ඔබතුමන් නම් කරන නියෝජිතයෙක්ගෙන් මේකේPrivate and direct placements කියන එකෙහි "Front office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." මොක්කද "as much as possible" කියන එකේ practical idea එක. මොකද"as much as possible" කියන්නේbroader meaning එකක්. අනෙක්

එක මේවා එක සමානයි එම්.ඒ.වාගේ එකක් නොවෙයි Economics කියන්නේ. මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි මොකක්ද "as much as possible" කියන්නේ. Value for money best practices ද මොනවාද? මොකද මම හිතනවා මේ Board paper එකේ idea එක මේකේ includeවෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I stand to be corrected by my colleagues who know much more about this than I do. My understanding is that there is a process through which these bonds and government securities take place. And there are different levels at which once the bids have been made, how the bids are assessed and accepted. So, in that process, the different committees will try to get as much money as possible for the government as cheaply as possible.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

When you say "as much as possible" one aspect is it should be cheap for the Government. It is Okay.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

That would be one criterion. So, they would also have to decide Cleary how much money to take and the cost. They would accept to raise that money. Now, my understanding of that first sentence is that there should be an attempt made to take as much money as possible through auctions within the parameters that the different committees set for themselves in terms of cost. They are trying to raise the money that the Government needs as cheaply as possible. That is my understanding. But, I would like to ask my colleagues, who are specialists in the Debt Department to elaborate on that or correct me if I am wrong.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ගරු ඔබතුමා උත්තරයක් කියන්න?

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

There are two officers who raised hands.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim will elaborate on what I said about auctions and direct placements.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

The Governor asked him to answer.

කේ.එම්.එම්.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, මම සිරිවර්ධන සහකාර අධිපති. ඒ වාගේම මම මීට අමතරව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි වශයෙන් කාරණා කිහිපයකට අවතීර්ණ වුණා. අධිපතිතුමා කියපු විදියට ණය ගැනීමේදී අපි හැම තිස්සේම බලන කරුණු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. ණයක් වෙළඳපොලෙන් ගන්න කොට cost එක වගේම risk එක තමයි හැම තිස්සෙම සලකා බලන්නේ කොච්චර අවධානමක් තිබෙනවාද? කොච්චර වියදමක් දරන්න වෙනවාද? ඒ අදාළ දවසේ අදාළ ණය ගැනීම් විධි කියන එක. එතකොට cheapest කියන එක එන්නේ, අපි හිතමු ලක්ෂ දහයක බැඳුම්කරයක් අද දින නිකුත් කරනවා නම්, අද දින ඒ ලක්ෂ දහයේ බැඳුම්කරයට ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොලේ මිලක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ interest rate එකක් තිබෙනවා. Price එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මේක හැමදාම දිනපතා අපි දන්නවා. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මේ තොරතුරු දිනපතා එකතු කරනවා. අද දුන්න සියයට දහයේ බැඳුම්කරයේ පොලිය තිබෙන්නේ සියයට දහය නම්,වෙළඳපොලෙන් අද ගන්න ඕනෑ සියයට 12 කට. අපි මුළු වෙළඳ පොලම රැවටීමක් කරනවා. ඒක එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැ අපි. ඒක තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ cheap කියලා කිව්වේ. එතකොට සියයට දහය හෝ දහයට අඩු හෝ දහයට ආසන්න මට්ටමකින් හෝ තමයි අපි ණය ගන්නේ. ඒකයි මගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමන් පැහැදිලි කරන කොටඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට එකතු වෙනවා නේද, මේකේ ඊළඟ ඡේදයේ තිබෙන කොටසේදී "The balance fund requirement of the Government has indicated in the approved borrowing programme" කියන එක. ඒ programme එක යටතේ තමයි ඒ කියන අවස්ථා ටික සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

මගේ ප්‍රශ්ණය "as much as possible" කියන එක "As much as possible" කියන එකේ clear definition එක practice එක අහන්න. එතකොට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා

කියන්නේ,cost ඇතුලේ නේ cheap කියන එක තියෙන්නේ. අපි ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය තීන්දු විය යුත්තේ, අපේ auctions තමයි අපේ main tool එක. බලන tool එක auction එක තමයි. Manual එක clear. ඒකට limit එකක් එනවා, "as much as possible" කියන එකෙන් cost එක අනුව. මම හරිද?

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

As I said, that is how it happened.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

එතකොට 07th October, 2008, Monetary Board decision එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. එතකොට decisionඑක ඔබතුමන් ළඟ තිබෙනවා. ඒ decisionඑකේ content එකයි, ඒ decision එකේ තිබෙන basis idea එකයි, Manual එකයි, මේ Page 8 එකේ "as much as possible" කියන paragraph එක ගත්තොත් ඒකත් එක්ක conflict එකක් තිබෙනවාද? මේ Board paper එකේ තිබෙන idea එකයි, මේ Manual එකේ මෙයයි අතර පරස්පරයක් තිබෙනවාද? මම දකින දේ මම කියන්නම්. මම දකිනවා මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි ඒක.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

I am assuming that this is a decision that the Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe read out.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

Yes. I can give it to you if you know it. "As much as possible" is a broader term you can put many things time to time.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I would say, again my colleagues would correct me if I am wrong. But I think this decision can be covered by what is in the Manual.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

That is what you think. This decision can be covered by what is in the manual.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

Yes.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

Why do you need a decision then?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, Decision එකේ තිබෙන අදහස මේ Manual එකේ තිබෙන එකෙන්cover වෙනවා කියලා record කර ගන්න කියලා ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒක පැහැදිලි කරගන්න. ඔබතුමාට ඉතාම වැදගත් එකක්. මට කථා කරනන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසා නොවෙයි. එහෙම තිබෙනවා නම් මේ decision එකේ ඇති අවශ්‍යතාව මොකක්ද? Monetary Board එකෙන් මේ Manual එකේ තිබෙන ටික cover වෙනවා නම් මේකට අමතරව decision එකක් ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමා සාවධානව සවන් දෙන්න. මේකේ තිබෙන decision ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ Manual එකේ decisions තිබෙනවා නම්-

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ ගත්ත එක මේකෙන් cover වෙනවා කියලා ඒ අයම පිළිගන්නවා නම්, අපට අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නැහැ නේ නැවත නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න. අපි නොවෙයි නේ අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

එතැනින් පසුව තමයි direct placements වලට shift වුණේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, අපි කැමති පිළිතුර ලැබෙන තෙක් ප්‍රශ්ණ කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක වැරදි ක්‍රමයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, කථා කරන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මම කියන්නේ එක කොල කැබැල්ලක් අරගෙන, එක decision එකක් අරගෙන- ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ වාගේ decisions අනන්තවත් ගන්න ඇති. හරිද? අපට ලැබිලා

තියෙන්නේ එක කොලයක් පමණයි. මට තේරෙන විදියට අපි දන්නේ නැහැ මේවා කොයි කොයි විදියට වෙනස් වුණාද කියලා. 2008ද, 2009ද, 2010ද කියලා-

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

සමාවෙන්න. මේක නිකම් කොල කැබැල්ලක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

හරි. ඒක නොවෙයි මම කිව්වේ. තවත් මේ වාගේ decisions ගත්තාද කියලා ඇහුවොත්, මේ වගේ decision ගත්ත කොල තව තියෙයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා

මේ වාගේ කොල තව ඇති

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

මේ වාගේ කොල තව තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I think, we need to understand that this is a Manual rather than a rule book. So, it basically sets out guidelines as to what should be done by the people in the Public Debt Department. The decision on the 07th of October, 2008 gives specific instructions as to how the sale government securities should be conducted. So, what you are saying on Page 8 under (b) (i) is really a very broad statement, which is the guideline within the Manual rather than a rule book. So, we must always remember that this is a Manual and not a rule book. The decision gives the officers involved in the process specific instructions. That is different. That is a board kind of guideline and this is the specific decision as to how the guidelines should be implemented.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara

Hon. Chairmen, that is why I said earlier also the Manual is not changed and the guidelines are going to be changed from time to time by the Monetary Board. That is how it happens.

The Hon. Indrajith Coomaraswami

This is broad and vague enough.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

That is what I am saying. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ ඒකයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා දිගින් දිගටමමේ වාගේ තීරණ ගන්න ඇති. හැබැයි අපට මේ කොලය පමණයි ලැබුණේ. ඒකත් එක්ක තමයි අපි මේ කථා කරගෙන යන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා සමහර වේලාවට කලින් තීරණය කරන්න ඇති auction එකෙන් මේ ටික ගන්නවා, private placements වලින් මේ ටික ගන්නවා කියලා. හැබැයි ලිඛිත guideline එකක් විදියට ගියේ මේක පමණද? එහෙමම නැත්නම් මීට කලිනුත් Monetary Board එකෙන් මේ වාගේ ලිඛිත guideline දීලා තිබෙනවාද? දැන් මේ කාරණාව vague නේ. සමහර වේලාවට ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් තීරණය කරනවා auction එකෙන් මෙපමණ ගනිමු, private placement එකෙන් මෙපමණ ගනිමු කියලා. හැබැයි, ඒ තීරණය ගන්නේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලා, කට්ටිය එකතු වෙලා. සමහර වේලාවට ඒක නැවත Monetary Board එකට දැනුම් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. සමහර වේලාවට Monetary Board එකේ තීන්දු අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලා කටයුතු කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. මෙහෙම කරන්න හෝ මෙන්න මෙහෙම කරන්න එපා කියලා මේ විදියට ලිඛිත guideline එකක් දුන්නේ මේ වතාවේ විතරද? මීට කලින් මේ වාගේ සිදුධිවලදී මේවා දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

The Hon. Indrajith Coomaraswami

My colleagues can answer that. Before that, I would also like to request my colleagues who are specialists in public debts to make sure that what I said was correct because I do not want to mislead the Committee. So, may I ask the specialists of the Public Debt Department whether what I said was correct and please, be very frank when I said that the language is board enough to cover the specific instructions in the Board decision of 2008? Can one of my colleagues of the Public Debt Department answer that?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim

Hon. Chairmen, as the Governor specifically stated, the decision reflected in 2008 Monetary Board has been accommodated in the current Version that you all are having in your hands as the Operational Manual of the Public Debt Department. Whenever a Board decision comes in, the Public Debt

Department faxes it and the Board decision is the decision the Public Debt Department follows. The Manual periodically get updated according to the decisions passed to us by the Monetary Board.

The Hon. DayasiriJayasekara

Is there any need to change the Manual according to the Monetary Board decision?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim

Exactly, The Board decision is taken into consideration and it is being factored into the Manual and the Manual what you see now and what you are having in your hands is reflected to highlight the fact that addition to the auctions the direct placements also accommodated.

The Hon. DayasiriJayasekara

What I am saying is, it is not very clear. The decision that the Monetary Board has taken is here. According to that, have you changed the Manual or not? Is there any necessity to change this Manual according to the decision that the Monetary Board has taken? Why did you not do that?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim

Yes.

The Hon. DayasiriJayasekara

Why did you not do that? If there is a necessity to change this manual according to the decision taken by the Monetary Board, why did you not do that?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim

We did change the manual in line with the Board decision and the manual that you are having already reflects the decision of the Monetary Board. So, it is there.

සභාපතිතුමා :ඔබතුමාට ඒ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවාද?

ටී.එච්.බී.සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

Central Bank එකෙන් Manual එක ආවේ කොහොමද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි. මම 2004 වර්ෂයේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නොවෙයි වෙනත් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවකයි සිටියේ.ඒ අවස්ථාවවන විට කිසිදු දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවක Manual එකක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. Manual එකේ අවශ්‍යතාවය දැනුනේ- අපි 2003, 2004 වර්ෂවලදී මේ සියල්ලම computerized කළා. එසේ computerize කරන විට ප්‍රශ්ණයක් මතු වුණා. මොකද, ඒ වැඩ කරන අය හදිසියේ - බෝම්බ පිපිරීමක්, earthquake එකක් සහ ජල ගැල්මක්- සේවයට පැමිණියේ නැතිනම්, මේ වැඩ ටික කර ගෙන යන්නේ කොහොමද කියන ප්‍රශ්ණය මතු වුණා. ඒ නිසා මේ Manual එකෙන් කෙරෙන වැඩ සියල්ලම අපි එක පොතකට ගනිමු කියන අදහසට ආවා. යම්කිසි අවස්ථාවක කවුරුන් හෝ සේවයට පැමිණියේ නැතිනම්, සිටින අය මේ system එකේ වැඩ කරන්නේ කොහොමද, ඒ සඳහා enter වෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා බලා ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙනවා. අපි එය කැබිනට් එකට දාලා, අත්සන් කර, සීල් තබා ඒ සඳහා වෙනම password එකක් තැබුවා. ඒ තුළින් වැඩකරගෙන යන්න පුළුවන් තත්ත්වයක් අපි නිර්මාණය කර ගත්තා. ඒ විධියට තමයි මෙය ටිකෙන් ටික ඉදිරියට ආවේ.

ඒ වාගේම අනෙක් කාරණය තමයි, මෙය තීරණය කරලා තිබෙන නීතිරීති, regulations මොනවාද කියලා යම් කෙනෙක් එකවරම නොදැන සිටීම.නමුත් අලුත් කෙනෙක් වැඩ කරන විට Monetary Board එකෙන් දුන් නීතිරීති සහ අපි introduce කළ සියල්ලම මෙහි summarize වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ සියලුම දේවල් නිවැරදිව මෙහි සඳහන් වෙනවා කියන එක, එයින් අදහස් වන්නේ නැහැ. උදාහරණයක් කියනවා නම්, වර්ෂය මුලදී borrowing programme එකක් Monetary Board එකට ගිහිල්ලා, approve කරනවා කියමු. නමුත් අපි එය Manual එකට දමන්නේ නැහැ, වෙනම තබා ගෙන කටයුතු කරනවා. දැන් Governor කිව්වා වාගේ, board system එකක් තමයි මෙහි ඇතැම් තැන්වල තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට අදාළව යම් යම් systems වල, ඒවා කරන ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන්නේ.Approvals, TOR terms of reference - වාගේ වැඩ කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය දේවල් තමයි මෙහි ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ වාගේම business continuity කියලා plans තිබෙනවා. ඊට අදාලව අපි මේවා සකස් කරගෙන තිබෙනවා. අපි Monetary Board එකේ approval සඳහා යන්නේ නැහැ කියන්නේ ඒ නිසයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

අපිට දැනට එවා තිබෙන එක Version II updated as of 31.07.2013. ඒ කියන්නේ, 2013.07.31 දිනට update කරන ලද Manual එක තමයි අපට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. මෙහි තිබෙන කාරණා මේ තුළ තිබෙනවා කියන එකද ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ?

ටී.එච්.බී.සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එහෙනම් ප්‍රශ්ණයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රධානියා විධියට ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්ණවලට උත්තර දුන්න නිසා, ඔබතුමාගෙන් මේ ප්‍රශ්ණය විමසනඑක පහසුයි. ඔබතුමාගේ ස්ථාවරය තමයි මැනුවල් එකේ 08 වැනි පිටුවේ, බී-1 හි සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන වචනවලට, 2008/20/25/පීඩී/එම්බී දරන 2008.10.07 දිනැති තීරණයේ හරය අන්තර්ගත වී තිබෙනවා කියන කාරණය. එය හරිද?

සභාපතිතුමා

අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, කලින් පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී ඒ කාරණය සනාථ වුණා නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මම එය පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නේ නැති නිසා නැවත ප්‍රශ්ණ කරනවා. කාරක සභාව හැටියට එකම කාරණයේ දිගින් දිගටම සිටින නිසයි මම මේ අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා විමසන ලද Board paper එක සහ Manual එකේ reflect වෙනවා කියන කාරණය මෙපමණ වේලා සාකච්ඡා කර තහවුරු කර ගත්තා නේද? මෙතැන කථා කළේ ඒක හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එක් එක් නිලධාරීන් එක් එක් අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න පුළුවන්. එකඟතාවයක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. වෙනස්කම් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. එවැනි වෙනස්කම මෙම

ක්‍රියාදාමය තුළ අපි දැක්කා. ඒ වාගේම කලින් inquiry එක තුළ තිබූ evidence වල වෙනසත් සංසන්දනයෙන් අපි දැක්කා. මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, 2008.10.07 දිනැති තීරණයේ අදහස Manual එකට අන්තර්ගත කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියන එක. එය තර්කානුකූල වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් හරිද කියලායි මම අහන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා

එය අධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ කාරණයේත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම බහුතරයක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ සාකච්ඡාවලත් ඒ අදහස තිබුණා. නැවත නැවතත් ඒ කාරණාවේම සිටින එකේ තේරුමක් තිබෙනවාද කියන එකයි මම අහන්නේ.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

Mr. Chairman, it might be helpful to the Committee, if I try and explain why I say that the Monetary Board decision is covered in this paragraph in the Manual. The decision essentially relates to how EPF funds and other captive source funds can be used through private placements. It does not in any way, contradict the statement in the first sentence which says, "Financing needs should be met as much as possible through auctions." It does not contradict that. It says how private placements can be raised through EPF and other captive sources and how that can be done. So, that is covered in the second sentence which basically says that you can arrange private placements. There is nothing in this which talks about balance between private placements and the auction. So, by not referring to that balance, it does not in any way contradict what is in B 1. Of the Manual.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami contd

That is why I said, it is covered.

සභාපතිතුමා

හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

මෙතැනදී private/direct placements මෙතුමන්ලාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම් අනුව මට තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ, මේක board definition එකක් කියලායි. It is a board definition, no doubt. What I mean by board definition is, it does not say it has to be 80 per cent private placements and 20 per cent auctions or the other way

around. That is what you mean. From the English that I know, it clearly says, as much as possible through auctions. It might not give you an exact percentage but it clearly says, as much as possible through auctions. If further explains by saying that the balance fund requirement if the Government as indicated in the approved borrowing programme may be arranged through private placements. මේකේදී ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කියනවා, that the majority should be through auctions කියලා. Is that what the manual says?

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

You are absolutely right Hon. Member. The thing is there is nothing in the Monetary Board decision of 2008 which goes against that.

The Hon. HarshanaRajakaruna

Absoutely.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

It is not talking about changing that balance.

The Hon. HarshanaRajakaruna

Exactly. I agree on that.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

The question asked of me was whether the Monetary Board decision of October 2008 is reflected or covered in the Manual? The reason why I said, "yes" was because private placements are permitted according to the Manual and there is nothing in the Monetary Board decision which goes against the stipulation, that as much as possible should be raised through auctions.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna

Absolutely.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

You can carry out what is in the Monetary Board decision and still raise as much as possible through auctions.

The Hon. HarshanaRajakaruna:

Exactly. That is exactly what I am saying.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසන කරුණ සම්බන්ධයෙන්ම විමසා පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට කරුණක් මටත් තිබෙනවා. මෙතුමාගේ කාරණාවලට එකතු කිරීමක් කරනවා. අපි කථා කරන්නේ 8 වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන (08) (i) ගැන නේ. හැබැයි, මේ Manual එකේ front office කියන first page එකේ තිබෙනවා."Front Office (FO) of the PDD is mainly responsible for mobilizing required funds for the Government at the lowest possible cost with a reasonable degree of risk through implementation of domestic borrowing programme approved by the Monetary Board" කියලා. එතැනදී මේ ක්‍රියාවලි සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ at the lowest possible cost වලට යටත්වයි. පූර්ව තත්ත්වය මේකයි. මේ පූර්ව තත්ත්වයට යටත්ව තමයි, Manual එකට private placements ද, direct placements ද, කියන ක්‍රියාවලියට යන්න ඕනෑ. එතැනදී "අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම රජයට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට සහ මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලියට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට at the lowest possible cost කියන තත්ත්වය යටතේ මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය කළ යුතුයි." කියලා තිබෙනවා. මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය පවතින්නේ ඒ යටතේ කියන එක අවධාරණය කිරීමට තමයි. මම මේක සඳහන් කරන්නේ. Cost and risk.

The Hon. BimalRthnayake:He categorically said, "cost and risk"

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 14/34)

- වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයේ හා සෘජු ක්‍රමයේ සංයුතිය

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

කලින් අනුගමනය කළ ක්‍රියාවලියේ කොටසක් auction කරනවා. ඉතුරු කොටස Privet Placement කරනවා. එතකොට කලින් ඒ auction කරලා ගන්න අගය auction කරලා මුළු අවශ්‍යතාවෙන් කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් එහෙම auction කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා
ඒකෙ ප්‍රමාණය මොකක්ද කියන එක Tender Committee එක සහ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ. බහුතරයක් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ අපි බැලුවහම දත්ත සියයට 80 ක් පමණ Direct Placement කියන ක්‍රමයෙන් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ. සියයට 20 ක් පමණ තමයි වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා
ඒක Practice එකෙන් ආව එකක්. 20 . 80 අනුපාතය Practice එකෙන් ආව එකක්

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව් ඒක කරන්න මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් තිබුණා

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

Ratio එකට අනුමැතියක් තිබුණාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

Ratio එකට අනුමැතියක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

Ratio එකට අනුමැතියක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

Ratio එක කියන්නේ යම් කිසි හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් අරගෙන ඉතුරු ප්‍රමාණය ගන්න කියලා තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

සමාවෙන්න,ඒක තේරුණේ නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් අරගෙන, ගත නොහැකි ප්‍රමාණය direct placement වලින් ගන්න කියලා තමයි අනුමැතිය තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

කියන්නේ හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක් ඒ කියන්නේ 1988 decision එක.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

2008

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

2008 decision එක කිව්වේ auction වලට ගිහිල්ලා ගන්න පුළුවන් තරම් ප්‍රමාණයක් auction වලින් ගන්න , එහෙම ගන්න බැරි ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා නම් direct placement කරන්න. ඉතින් එතකොට දැන් එහෙම නම් සියයට 100ක් ගන්න පුළුවන් නම් auction වලින්. එතකොට මුල් තීරණයයි ඔය දවසේ සිදුවීමයි. මම දන්නවා ගැටලුවක් තිබෙන බව. ඒක නොදැන අහනවා නොවෙයි. එය සිද්ධාන්තය වශයෙන් ගත්තොත් ඒ මුල් තීරණයයි ඔය දවස තුළ සිදුවීමයි අතර මුල් තීරණයට පරස්පරකමක් නැහැ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

මුල් තීරණයට තාක්ෂණිකව පරස්පරකමක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

මුල් තීරණයට තාක්ෂණිකව පරස්පරකමක් නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

නමුත් ඊට පස්සෙ දිගටම ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තිබෙනවා අර ක්‍රමය කරන්නෙ නැහැ කියන එකත් අධිපතිතුමා තරයේ ප්‍රකාශ කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ ඔය සිද්ධියෙන් පස්සේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

සිද්ධිය වුණු දවසේ ඉඳලා ඊට පස්සෙ දිගටම

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

ඊට පස්සෙ කියලා තිබෙනවා.ඒ කියන්නේ කොටින්ම 2008 තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒ තීරණය අනුව කිව්වේ හැකි තරම් auction කරලා ගන්න බලනවා. සියයට 20 ක් නොවේ 30 ක්, 80 ක්, 90ක් දක්වා යන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට Balance එකේ ප්‍රමාණය direct placement කරනවා. දැන් ඒ අනුව මේ නිශ්චිත දවසේ- මතභේදය තුඩු දුන් දවසේ තාක්ෂණිකව නිවැරදියි. නමුත් වෙන කාරණා නිසා අපි ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා. ඒකනෙ තත්ත්වය?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඒකට තව පොඩ්ඩක් කරුණු එකතු කරන්නම්. හැකි තරම් ගන්නවා කියන එක Practice වශයෙන් කරන්නේ. ඒ කාලය තුළ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළේ තිබෙන පොළී අනුපාතය සංසන්දනය කරලා, ඒ සංසන්දනය අනුව ඒ පොළී අනුපාතයේ ලොකු වෙනස්වීමක් වෙන්නේ නැතිව, ඒ ප්‍රමාණයට තමයි හැකි ප්‍රමාණය කියන එක තීරණය කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඊට වඩා හැකි නොවන ප්‍රමාණය, ඒ කියන්නේ පොළී අනුපාතය ඊට වඩා ගොඩක් වැඩි වෙනවා නම් සලකන්නේ හැකි නොවන ප්‍රමාණය කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ පොළී අනුපාතයට අනුකූල වන විධියට කියන එකනේ ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම තිබෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

අනුකූල වන විධියට

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ අනුකූල වන විධියට හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ Tender Committee එක නේද? එහෙම නැත්නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතාගේ පිළිතුර

Tender Committee එක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒක යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක Tender Committee නිර්දේශ කරලා අධිපතිතුමා අනුමත කරනවා.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 06/07)

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

තව ප්‍රශ්ණයක් මතු වුනා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සඳහන් කලා විස්සයි අසූව වගේ rateඑක පවත්වාගෙන යනකොට, විස්සක් auction කරලා ඒ විස්සට ලැබෙන අගය මත direct placement කරනවා කියලා. ඒක හරිද? එහෙම Practice එකක් තිබුණාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

පසුගිය කාලය තුල බැලුවොත් සාමාන්‍ය වශයෙන් එහෙම තමයි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අවසර දෙනවා නම් හේතු කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

අන්තිමට කියපු දේ මට ඇහුණේ නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එහෙම උනේ ඇයි කියන එකට අවශ්‍ය නම් කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර දිය හැකියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

පැහැදිලි කර දෙන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම හේතුව වන්නේ, අපේ රටේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙළඳපොළ ඉතාම සුළු එකක්. ඒ වෙළඳපොළේ ප්‍රධානම ගණුදෙනුකරු විධියට එන්නේ සහ විශාලම fund එක EPF එක. ඒකෙන් සියයට හැත්තෑපහක් විතර ප්‍රමාණයක් EPF එක වාගේ එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. අනෙක් අය ඉතාම පොඩි අය. ඒ වාගේ පොඩි marketඑකක සියයට සියයක් තරහකාරී ලෙස කරන්න ගියොත් ඒ වගේ market

එකකදී පොළී අනුපාත උච්ඡාවචනය වීම ඉතාම විශාලයි. ඒක ආර්ථිකයට සුදුසු නැහැ. ඒක නිසා තමයි සියයට හැත්තෑපහක් විතර අය පැත්තකට තැබුවහම නියම marketvalue කියන එක තෝරා ගැනීමට පහසු ක්‍රමයට තමයි යම් කිසි marketplayersලාට ඒ අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්නේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙන්නේ පසු ගිය කාලයේ වුණෙත් එහෙමයි. සියයට සියයක් ඒ වගේ ක්‍රමවේදයන් ගන්න ගියාම, අපේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තියේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවාට වඩා පොලී අනුපාත විශාල වශයෙන් ඉහල ගියා. මගේ විශ්වාසයේ හැටියට මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය පිළිබඳ ප්‍රධාන භාරකරු විධියට මහ බැංකුවේ පොලී අනුපාත එතරම් ඉහල යෑම රජයේ ආර්ථිකයටත්, රජයේ ණය ගැනීමටත් හොඳ නැහැ.අනෙක ඒ රටේ ස්ථාවරත්වයට,පුද්ගලික අංශයේ ණය ගැනීමටත් අවාසිදායකයි. මහ බැංකුව වශයෙන් අපේ එක්තරා වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා. පොලී අනුපාත කිසි ආකාරයකට වෙළඳපොළ අනුව හැසිරීමට ඉඩ දෙන ගමන්, ක්‍රමාණුකූලව ඒක ස්ථාවර තත්ත්වයට පත් කරගෙන ඉදිරියට යන්න මේ වගේ විශාල වශයෙන් අඩු වැඩි වීම් වැලැක්වීමට. ඒක නිසා තමයි එම ක්‍රමවේදය තුළින් යම්කිසි ආකාරයක ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් පවත්වාගන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ, විස්සයි අසූව වගේ ක්‍රම වේදයකින් පසුගිය කාලයේ ගිය නිසා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා

විස්ස auction කරනකොටත් වෙළඳපොළ පුංචි වීම වාගේම වෙළෙඳ පොළේ playersලා ඉන්න ප්‍රමාණය අඩු වීම නිසා, යම් ආකාරයක manipulation එකක් එතැන විය හැකියි නේද? probability එක ගැන මම අහන්නේ. Governor කියපු අපේ market එකේ තිබෙනweakness එක 20 percent සම්බන්ධව වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. මොකද market එක දන්නවා මේ 20 percentbased කරගෙන තමයි ඊලඟට rates වලට CentralBank එක යන්නේ කියලා. Epolicy එක Knownpolicy එකක් එහෙම නැත්නම් 20 percent සම්බන්ධව auction එකේදි manipulation කරනවා නම් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන් වීරසිංහ මහතා

එතැනදී කරන්න තිබෙන ඉඩකඩ ඉතාම අඩුයි. ඊට හේතුව මෙතැන flexibilityඑකක් තිබෙනවා. අපට තීරණය කරන්න සියයට විස්සක් ගන්නවාද, සියයට විසිපහක් ගන්නවාද, බිංදුවක් ගන්නවාද කියලා. එතකොට අපි හිතුවොත් ද්විතිය වෙළෙඳපොළේmarket එකේදි interestrates වලට වඩා විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා කියලා, අපිට ඒක reject කරලා directplacement වලට යන්න පුළුවන් option එක තිබෙනවා. එතකොට අපට ඒක ගන්නම ඕනෑ කියලා එකක් නැහැ. market එකත් ඒක දන්න නිසා ඒ වෙළඳ පොළ ආසන්නයේම තමයි ඒ අය bid

කරන්නේ. ඊට වඩා වැඩිපුර හෝ ගොඩක් වැඩියෙන් කළොත් අපි ඒක reject කරන්න ඕනෑ වෙලාවක පුළුවන්. මොකද ඒ වෙනුවට අපට ඉතිරිටික replacement වලින් ගන්න පුළුවන්. මේ යන ක්‍රමය තුළ එහෙම option එකක් නැතිව market එක දන්න නිසා ඒ අයට ඕනෑම ගණනකට දාන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද දන්නවා, මේක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා, අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම අපි ඒක ගැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒගොල්ලන්ට ඒකෙන් manipulate කරන්න තිබෙන අවස්ථා වැඩී.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 10/11)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද 2013.07.31 දිනෙන් අවසන් වූ operational manual හි 8 වැනි පිටුවේ "B" යටතේ ඇති ප්‍රතිපාදන අනුව අදහස් වන්නේ, "පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට ගොස් හැකි තරම් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීමට උත්සහ කළ යුතු බවත්, ශේෂයක් තිබේ නම් පමණක් private placements කළ යුතු බවත්" කියලා මම යෝජනා කරනවා. එම අදහසට ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

මෙම sentence එකෙහි විශේෂයෙන් "as much as possible" කියන එක යටතේ auctions වලින් කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගත යුතුද කියලා තීරණය කරනවා. As mush as possible කියන එක cost එකයි, risk එකයි, factor එකයි මත define වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, "as much as possible" කියන යෙදුම අනුව ඒ අර්ථය ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේ මූලධර්ම සමඟ ගැලපිය යුතුයි කියාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවම නොවෙයි, අපේ රාජ්‍ය ණය මුදල් එකතු කර ගැනීමේ Borrowing Programme හි Medium, Term Debt Management Strategy (MTDS) හි සඳහන් කරන direction එක මත cost and risk direction එකක් specify කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

20:80 අනුපාතය ඒ කියන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි 20 යි, private placements 80 යි කියන අනුපාතය මෙම manual එකේ යම් තැනෙක සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

මා දැනුවත්ව මේ manual එකේ කිසිදු තැනෙක 20:80 අනුපාතය කියලා සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 17)

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් කලින් අවසර ඉල්ලා සිටි පරිදි, මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙනුත් සහ මොන අධිපතිතුමා වුණත් කමක් නැහැ පිළිතුරු දුන්නාට, ratio එක අසුවයි විස්සයි කියලා. එහෙම regulation එකක් හෝ Board Paper එකක් හරි තිබෙනවා කියලාද විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව හෝ මහ බැංකුව කියන්නේ. නැත්නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා බලපු අවුරුද්දක් 2013 වර්ෂය හෝ 2014 වර්ෂයේ සිට, මේ සිද්ධිය දක්වා කාලය තුළ bonds ගත්ත විධිය තිබෙනවානේ. ඒ ගත්ත විධිය තුළ අවසානයේවෙලා තිබෙන results අනුවද ඔබතුමන්ලා අසුවයි විස්සයි හෝ හැත්තෑපහයි විස්සයි හරි කියලා කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමන්ට ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමන්ගෙන් දැනගන්න ඕනෑද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතුමාගෙනුත්. ඔබතුමාත් කියන්න.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා

පසු ගිය කාලයේ දිගටම අරන් තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ 4:3 එකේ analyze කරලා තිබෙනවා, ඒ ගත්ත ප්‍රමාණය. අවසාන උත්තරය එන්නේ ඒකයි. එහෙම නැතුව කොහේ හෝ තිබෙන සටහනක් විධියට නොවෙයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක පැහැදිලි කර කියලා තිබෙනවා 4:3 Item එකේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ ඒක මහ බැංකුවෙන් අරන් තිබෙන තීරණයක් නොවෙයි, ඒක practice එක ඇතුළේ වෙලා තිබෙන දෙයක්.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා

බොහෝ වෙලාවට වෙලා තිබෙන සිදුවීම කාරණා කිරිමේදී ඔය rate එකේ තමයි ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

නැතුව අසුවයි විස්සයි කියලා කොහේ හෝ Monetary Board එකේ decisionඑකක් අරගෙන නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සටහනේ තිබෙනවා "වැඩිදුර නිරීක්ෂණය වේ" කියලා.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 43)

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් කලින් ඇහුවේ 80:20 කියන අනුපාතය - bonds ගන්න කොට ඔබතුමන්ලා tools දෙකක් පාවිච්චි කරනවා නේ. 80:20 කියන අනුපාතය ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ regulation එකක් විධියට හරි, Board decision එකක් විධියට හරි තිබෙනවාද? එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒක best practices ඇතුළේ, අඩුම cost එක ඇතුළේ ගන්න ගිහින් ආපු අවසාන result එකද කියලා දැන ගන්න කැමැතියි.

Mr. IndrajithCoomaraswami

Hon Member, I must say I need to have some help from my colleague because at the moment, as you know, we are using a full auction system. So, what happened earlier, I am not aware whether there was an actual decision , Can any of my colleagues help me out of that?

එස්.එස්.රත්නායක මහතා: මම මේ කාරණය මීට පෙරත් පැහැදිලි කළා. අපි මේ තාක් පැහැදිලි කළා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අරගෙන තිබෙන තීරණ සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය පාලනය පිළිබඳ මූලධර්ම මත පදනම් වෙලා auction ක්‍රමයට සහ direct placement ක්‍රමයට යනවා කියලා. ඒකේ තිබෙන මූලධර්මය තමයි අඩු පිරිවැය සහ අඩු අවදානම. මේ පදනම මත යන කොට ඒ මූලධර්ම මත රජයට සහ රටට යහපත් වන විධියට රාජ්‍ය ණය රැස් කිරීමේදී අපි බොහෝ වේලාවට යොදා ගන්නේ අඩු පිරියව සහ වෙළඳ පොළේ පොලි අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කිරීම. අපි ඒ මතණය රැස් කිරීමේදී, ඉතිහාසය දිහා බලලා data එකතු කරලා - දත්ත එකතු කරලා - බැලුවාම ඔය සියයට 80:20 කියලා ඇති. හැබැයි අපි එහෙම නිර්නායකයක් තීරණය කරලා ඒ අනුව කටයුතු කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක පසු ගිය data බලන විට ලැබෙන outcome එකක් විතරයි.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 48)

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර මහතා

මම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සිටි කාලය තුළ, පසුගිය තොරතුරු ගවේෂණයන් කළොත්, ඒ කාලයේ තමයි වැඩිපුර සෘජු ක්‍රමයට direct placements ලබාගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.නමුත් අපි එය සිතා මතා කරන දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ වාගේම auction ක්‍රමය හරහා මෙපමණ ගන්න ඕනෑ, direct placement හරහා මෙපමණ ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් තීන්දුවක් දීලා නැහැ.Domestic Debt Management Committee එක මාසයේ මුල රැස්වී, සාකච්ඡා කර, එය ක්‍රියාවට නන්වද්දී වෙළඳ පොළේ සිදු වන උච්චාවචනයන් නිසා එය වෙනස් කරන්න වෙනවා. එහි ප්‍රතිඵලයක් හැටියට 20යි 80 හෝ වෙනත් අනුපාතයක් ලැබී තිබෙනවා. එය එම ක්‍රියාදාමයේ ප්‍රතිඵලයක් විනා ගත් තීරණයකට අනුගත වීමක් නොවෙයි කියන එකයි මට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 49)

- අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයා

සභාපතිතුමා

සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධව ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් යතු කුමක්ද?" ඒකේ පළමුවැනි කරුණ, "එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගැනීමට හැකියාව ඇති පාර්ශවයන් කවුරුන්ද" කියන එක. ඒ සඳහා ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරේ තිබෙනවා "අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින්" කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සම්බන්ධ Monetary Law Act එකේ මේ පිළිබඳව නිරීක්ෂණය වෙනකොට 8.1 යටතේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා දීපු පිළිතුර ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම පැහැදිලි වෙන්නේ නැහැ. 8.1 යටතේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා දීලා තිබෙන පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තමයි මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්නේ කියලාය.

ඒ නිසා අධිපතිතුමා, එහෙම නැත්නම් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමෙක් හෝ මේ පිළිබඳව වගකීම තිබෙන කෙනෙක් කාරණය පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කළොත් හොඳයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාමේදීලාතිබෙනපිළිතුරේසහMonetary Law Act එක යටතේ තිබෙන පිළිතුරේ තිබෙන වෙනස්කම මොකක්ද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න. Monetary Law Act – 8.1 එක සම්බන්ධව Monetary Board එකේ powers සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

මහ බැංකුව මුලින්ම ඉදිරිපත් කළ - දැනට මා අතැතිව තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ කාරණා එකින් එක කියන්න අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා නම් කථා කරමු. මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ පිළි අරගෙන තිබෙන කාරණා මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවට යොමු කළ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය පිළිබඳවයි. Report එක ගැන නොවෙයි. පළමු වැනි ප්‍රශ්නය ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

May I explain Hon. Chairman?

The Chairman

Yes.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

I think, regarding the actual decisions related to issuance of securities, the authority is the Monetary Board. That is what reflected in question 8. But, in question 1, I think thrust of the response is that the Monetary Board will operate within the overall framework set by the Government and the

Ministerin charge in relation to certain targets in terms of overall direction of Government policy. So, within the Government objectives in terms of growth, employment, inflation etcetera, and also the fiscal outcomes in terms of Government's budgetary operations, all that will be taken into account when the Monetary Board takes its decisions regarding the issuance of bonds – Government securities. Of course, the Government also indicates the requirement in terms of the money it needs from time to time. Really, the decisions taken by the Monetary Board flow out of this framework which comes from the Government and in the case of the Monetary Board, Minister in Charge of the subject.

සභාපතිතුමා

අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට ස්තූතිවන්ත වෙනවා. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, ඒ වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය නියෝජනය කරන රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති, රජයේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීන්දු කිරීම සඳහා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ නිලයක් දරන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් හැටියට නේද?

ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජිත් කුමාරස්වාමි

ඔව්

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැනදී රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය communicate කරන, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය දැනුම් දීම නේ වැදගත් වන්නේ, සාමාජිකයෙක් වශයෙන් ලේකම්තුමා ඉන්නවා. නමුත්, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය දැනුම් දුන්නාම රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සහ අනෙකුත් මූලධර්ම සමඟ ගලපා ක්‍රියා කිරීම තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

මෙතැනදී පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, හැම වෙලාවේම රජයට ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ අරගෙන මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ, මුදල් නීති පනත යටතේ රජය යෝජනා කරන යම් කිසි ප්‍රතිපත්ති ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේදී ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන ද ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුත්තේ කියලා නේ.එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවාද නැද්ද කියන එක ගැන.

එතකොට, එතැන තමයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ බලතල තිබෙන්නේ. ඕනෑම රජයකට, ප්‍රතිපත්ති අනුව මේ මේ දේවල් කරන්න කියලා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යෝජනා කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ යොජනාව සලකා බලා, තීරණය කර, ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ බලය ලැබෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළාට පසුවයි.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 2/3/4)

- මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ කාර්යභාරය

සභාපතිතුමා

මට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න කාරණා කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි මෙවැනි ණය අවශ්‍යතාවයක් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට ඇති වුණාම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය මහ බැංකුවත් එක්ක මේ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරනවාද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී රණසිරි මහතා.

සාකච්ඡා කරනවා

සභාපතිතුමා

සාකච්ඡා කරලා එම වැඩසටහන සකස් කරන්නේ කවුද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී රණසිරි මහතා.

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්තුමා සහභාගී වන Cash flow meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒකට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තමයි අනුමත කරගන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒකට ආයෙත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙ ලේකම්තුමාගේ අනුමැතිය අවශ්‍යද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී රණසිරි මහතා.

ඒ meeting එකේ අනුමැතිය තමයි අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒක කමිටුවක් නෙමෙයි. ඒ meeting එකේ නිශ්චිතව ඉන්න අය කියන්න.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ කමිටුවේදී ප්‍රධාන කටයුතු දෙකක් සිදු කරනවා. එකක් තමයි රජයට ලැබෙන ආදායම මාසයක්, මාස එකහමාරක කාලය ඉදිරියට තක්සේරු කරනවා.ඒ වාගේම ඒ කාලය තුල වියදම් පිළිබඳවත් ඇස්තමේන්තුවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ හිඟතාව - shortfall එක - තමයි මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා අපි සැලසුම් කරන්නේ අපේ ණය සීමාවට යටත්ව. සාම්ප්‍රදායිකව රැස්වෙන ඒ කමිටුව භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් රැස් වෙන ඒ කමිටුව භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් රැස් වන්නේ. ඒකට සියලුම නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරුන් සහභාගී වෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් කිහිප දෙනෙකුත් සහභාගී වෙනවා. මේ විෂය සම්බන්ධව දැනුම තිබෙන මහ බැංකුව සමග ගනුදෙනු කරන කිහිපදෙනෙකුත් සහභාගී වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ලේකම්තුමා, ඒ ණය ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදය සකස් කර ගත්තාට පස්සේ ඒක බැඳුම්කරවලින් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. Treasury Bills වලින් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, විදේශ ණය වෙන්න පුළුවන්- පසු විපරමක් සිදුවෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

මේ දක්වා එවැනි පසු විපරමක් කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් අපට දැනිලා නැහැ. නමුත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කියෙව්වාට පස්සේ එවැනි පසු විපරමක අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙන බව පෙනී යනවා. නමුත් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. පසු විපරමක් කරන්න වෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ ඒ ක්‍රියාවලියත් සම්බන්ධ කරගෙන. මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධ වන්නේ Monetary Law Act – MLA - මහ බැංකුවට අදාළ නීතිමය තත්ත්වය යටතේ. ඒ නීතිමය තත්ත්වයට බාධාවක් නොවන විධියට, ඒ ස්වාධීනත්වයට බාධාවක් නොවන විධියට අපි නීතිමය තත්ත්වයක් ඇති කර ගන්න ඕනෑ පසු විපරමක් කරන්න. මේ දක්වා එවැනි දෙයක් කරලා නැහැ. අපි ඒ පිළිබඳව සොයා බැලීමක් කරන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශය අනුව.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ වගේම ණය පොලී අනුපාත ඉහල යෑම නිසා වැඩිපුර ණය පොලී ගෙවීමට සිදු වෙනවානේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක රාජ්‍ය අයවැයට ගලපන්න ඕනෑ.එහෙම නේද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

නිවැරදියි ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා.

ඒ ණය පොලී ගෙවීමට මුදල් වෙන් කිරීමක් සිදු වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

ණය පොළී ගෙවීමත්, ඉදිරි වර්ෂය සඳහා සියලු වියදම් පුරෝකථනයක් කරලා තමයි අපි AppropriationBill එක හරහා වාර්ෂිකව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. ජනවාරි 01 වැනිදා දක්වා දින 365ක කාලය තුළ ඒ පුරෝකථනවල බෙහෝදුරට වැඩිවීම් තමයි සිදුවන්නේ. ඒකට බලපාන ප්‍රධාන කරුණු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි පොලී අනුපාතය. අනෙක් එක තමයි විනිමය අනුපාතය. විනිමය අනුපාතය පිරිහීම විශේෂයෙන්ම ඒකට බලපානවා. වැඩිපුර පොලී ගෙවන්න වෙනවා. ඒ අනුව ණය සේවාකරණයට වැඩිපුර මුදල් යොදවන්න සිදු වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

ලේකම්තුමා, ණය පොලී ඉහළ යාම පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලා මහ බැංකුවත් සමග සාකච්ඡාවක් කරලා ඇගයීමක් කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

මේ දක්වා ඒ පිළිබඳව නිල වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡාවක් වන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයෙක් විදිහට මුදල් ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සකස් කරගන්න වරින් වර මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී මේ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරනකොට කාලානුරූපව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂකතුමා රටේ සමස්ත ආර්ථික කාර්ය සාධනය පිළිබඳව අපට වරින්වර වාර්තා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. එහිදී මෙම කරුණ විශේෂයෙන් සලකා බලනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

Bond සම්බන්ධයෙන් secondary market එකේ සිදුවන ගණුදෙනු ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය තුළ තොරතුරු පවත්වාගෙන යෑමක් සිදු කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා

නැහැ මේ දක්වා නැහැ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය අපේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දුන්නාට පස්සෙ ණය කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳවත්, විවිධ උපකරණ කවර ලෙස සකස් කරගන්නවාද යන්න පිළිබඳවත් මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය දැනුවත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ සමස්තයක් විධියට දෛනික කටයුතු වශයෙන්.

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 34/35)

- ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොළ

සභාපතිතුමා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති-තුමා ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොලේ ඇති වුණු ගනුදෙනුවත් ගැන නේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කළේ.ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් මේ ගනුදෙනුව ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොළට -Secondary market එකට ගියාට පස්සේ Secondary market එකේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වන්නේ කොහොමද කියන තොරතුරු පවත්වාගෙන යෑමක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව තුළ තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා

අපේ Central Depository System -CDS- කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට ඉඩමක ඔප්පුව ලියාපදිංචි වෙනකොට හිමිකරු වෙනස් වුණොත් සටහන් වෙනවා වාගේ අපි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ දවසේ සිට ඒක අනිත් අතට ගියේ කවදාද, කොයි වෙලාවේද? කියන එක ගිය තැන ඉඳලා ඉවර වෙන තැනට වනතුරු trace කරගෙන සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් CDS එක හරහා. එවැනි ක්‍රම වේදයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා

විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කළාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඉල්ලුවා. ඒ වුණාට CDS එකෙන් එහෙම බලන්න බැහැ. මොකද, Bond වල IC Number එකක් සහ Unit Number එකක් තිබෙනවා. කාටහරි දුන්නාට පස්සේ ඒ IC Number එකෙන් කලින් සහ පසුව ගත් ඒවා ඔක්කොම එකට තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. උදාහරණයක් විධියට IC Number එකත් සමඟ රුපියල් බිලියන 50 තිබෙනවා කියලා හිතමු. එසේ තිබුණාට එක් එක් දවසේ ඒවා කොහෙන් ගත්තද කියන තොරතුරු මොනවත් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා

මම එතරම් විස්තර ඇහුවේ නැහැ. මම ඇහුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කළාද මේ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී.සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව් ඉල්ලීමක් කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා

විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඒ පිළිබඳ යම් ආකෘති කාරණාවක්, පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද මෙන්න මේ තොරතුරු මෙන්න මේ විධියට ලබා දෙන්න කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව් මට මතක හැටියට ඒ ඉල්ලපු විධියට අපට තොරතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා

එහෙම ආකෘතියක් දුන්නාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව් මට මතක හැටියට දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා

එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

බැහැ කියලා නෙවෙයි කිව්වේ. ඒ තොරතුරු ගන්න බැහැ කියන එකයි කිව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ ආකෘතියට අනුව ගන්න බැහැ කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා

නැත්නම් ඒ ඉල්ලීම වෙන විධියකට ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළේ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන්?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

යම් ආකාරවලට ගන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් උදාහරණයක් විධියට මිල ගැන විමසීමක් කළොත් CDS එකේ මිල ගැන සඳහන් වන්නේ නැහැ. අයිති කෙනාගේ Account එකේ ප්‍රමාණය සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

ඇයි මිල සඳහන් නොවෙන්නේ?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඒ system එක හදලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒ විධියට. ඒ කියන්නේ CDS එකේ record වෙන්නේ ownership එක නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

උදාහරණයක් විධියට අපි කියමු "A" කියන bond එක අපි primary Market එකේ දැමුවා කියලා. මට කියන්න ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළේ bond dealers ලා ලාභ උපයන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළේ ලාභ උපයන්නේ buying and selling වලින්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

buying and selling වලින් තමයි ලාභ උපයන්නේ?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඔව්. Capital gains tax එක ගන්න පුළුවන් buying and selling වලින්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

Capital gains tax එක calculateකරන්නේ කොහොමද? අපි Capital gains tax එකක් ගහනවා නම් Capital gains tax එක ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළේ calculate කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා

ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ගනුදෙනු කරන මිල අපි ළඟ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

මම අහන්නනේ ඒක නෙවෙයි. මම අහන්නේ සමරතුංග මහත්මයා Capital gains tax එකක් ගහන්න යනවානේ. Bond එකක Capital gains tax එක secondary market එකේ calculate කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියන්න කෝ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

මම ඒ ගැන අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් Capital gains tax එකක් ගහනවා නම් Capital gains tax එක අදාළ කොම්පැණිය ගත්තාද, නැද්ද, ගත්ත මිල කීයද, විකුණපු මිල කීයද, ඒ අනුව ලාභය කීයද කියන එක දැනුම්දීම කොම්පැණියේ වගකීම.මොකද secondary market එකේ එක එක ratesවලට create වෙනවා. නමුත් CDS එකේ record වෙන්නේ අයිතිය වෙනස්වීම මිසක් වෙනස් වුණු මිල සඳහන් වන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

එතකොට ඒ Company එක දෙන ගණන තමයි අපට දෙන්නේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව්. ආදායම්බදු රැස් කරනකොට ඒ පුද්ගලයාගේ ආදායම ගණනය කරන්නේ ඔහු declare කරන එක අනුවනේ. ආදායම් බදුවල මූලික ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ඒ කොම්පැණි විසින් income tax return එකsubmit කළ යුතු වීමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා.

ඒක හරි. අපි හිතමු

සභාපතිතුමා

නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ආදායම් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අවංකභාවයයි. මේ ගනුදෙනුවක තිබෙන අවංකභාවයයි අතර වෙනස ඔබතුමාට තේරෙනවා නේ

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා

ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා

මෙක bond මෙහි Business ක්‍රියාවලියක් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ companies පටන් අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ මේ කාර්යයට.ඒ නිසා ආදායම් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අවංකභාවය මෙකෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්න බැහැ. මම අහන්නේ මෙච්චරයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔය හදපු system එකට අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලා සෑහීමකට පත් වෙනවාද, මහ බැංකුව මෙතෙක් සෑහීමකට පත් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද secondary market එකේ තිබෙන ගණුදෙනු පිළිබඳව, මිල පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු ප්‍රමාණවත් පරිදි ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබෙනවා කියලා? ඇත්තටම මේක වැදගත් වෙන්නේ අලුත් අධිපතිතුමාට.

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

අපි දැනට පවත්වාගෙන යන ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව රජය නිකුත් කළ සුරැක්මිපත්වල අයිතිය වෙනස්වීම, කුමන පුද්ගලයාගේ ඉඳලා කුමන පුද්ගලයාට හුවමාරු වුණාද කියලා තමයි අපි සඳහන් කරන්නේ. එහිදී කුමන මිලකට හුවමාරු වුණාද කියන එක අපි දැනට සඳහන් කරගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

yield එකවත් නැහැ?

එස්.එස් රත්නායක මහතා

නැහැ. නමුත්, එක කරුණක් තියෙනවා. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ ආයතනවලට වගකීමක් තියෙනවා,ඒ දවසේ ඒ අය ගනුදෙනු කළ සුරැකුම්පත් මිල ගණන් පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැනුම් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ දැනුම් දෙන තොරතුරු සමහර වෙලාවට සියයට 100 ක් නිවැරදි නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, වෙළඳ පොළේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය අනුව සුරැකුම්පත්වල මිල ගණන් වෙනස් වෙන්නනෙ මේ ආකාරයට කියන එක අපට පදනම් කරගන්න වෙනවා. අපට මිනුම් දණ්ඩක් විධියට භාවිතා කරන්න වෙනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට සියයට 100ක් නිවැරදි නොවන්න පුළුවන්. අනික් කරුණ තමයි ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇහුවා කොහොමද මේ සුරැකුම්පත්වල මිල තීරණය වෙන්නේ කියලා. මා හිතන්නේ එතුමා දන්නවා. සුරැකුම්පත්වල මිල තීරණය වෙන්නේ කියලා මා හිතන්නේ එතුමා දන්නවා. සුරැකුම්පත්වල මිල තීරණය වෙන්නේ පවතින මුදල් ප්‍රවාහය

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

I mean the whole point is to ride this wave. You are making capital gains on the changes in the yield to make billions in the bond market. That is how you

do it. If you are now saying, “we have no way to check at what price these securities change hands" Mr. Governor, that is serious flaw. There is no way in which you can estimate if there has been any fraud or if there is some sort of query. How would you do this?

The Hon. HarshanaRajakaruna

Specially, if there is a capital gains tax is being introduced.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

Capital gains tax එකෙන් මුදල් ගන්නේ කොහොමද?

Dr. M.Z.M Azim

In fact, for the question the Hon. Deputy Minister raised, what we are currently having is in the capital market the infrastructure available is a depository which records the ownership transfer which is not a trading platform where you probably see the price movements. But the Central Bank has already recognized that factor and already initiated developing a non-trading platform that is in the process. This might come up with the time frame and the Deputy Governor might be able to detail it to you. We have recognized that deficiency in the market as of now. But for the price details what you are doing at the moment is on site supervision.

සභාපතිතුමා

අධිපතිතුමා, අපි මෙය විශේෂයෙන් note කරනවා. හේතුව, මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන වගකීම නියාමනය කියන එක. විශේෂයෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළ සහ ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළ සහ ද්විතීයික වෙළඳපොළ. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ පොළේ මේ විධියට ලොකු හිදැසක් ඇතිවීමේ ඉඩකඩ තියෙනවා. ඒක බොහොම බරපතළ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඒ නිසා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විශේෂ ප්‍රතිකර්මයන් යෙදීමේ අවශ්‍යතාව තියෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා.

මම දැනගන්න කැමතියි. theoreticalපැත්ත නොවෙයි. අපි පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා issue කරපු bond එක විවිධ ආයතන ගත්තානේ. ඒ ගත්ත ආයතනවල ownership එක transfer වෙලා අවසානයේ ඒක land වෙලා තියෙන්නේ කොතනද කියලා මහ

බැංකුවට මේ COPE කමිටුවට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක්ද කියන එක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා

ownership එක කියන්න පුළුවන්ලු. price තමයි කියන්න බැරි?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා

ඔබතුමන්ලා යටතේ තිබෙන ආයතනයක් ගන්න නම්, price එක දන්නවා නේ. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ගත්තේ කීයටද කියලා කාගෙන්වත් දැන ගන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ. ඒක ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල් ගත්තේ කියටද කියලා දන්නවා?

(යොමුව : 2016 ජූලි මස 07 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 34/35/36/37/38)

- සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

අද මෙතැනට ETF හා EPF එකෙන් ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නේ කවුද?

සභාපතිතුමා:අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලෙන් කවුද ඉන්නේ?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලෙන් කවුද ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නේ. ඔබතුමිය කවුද කියලා හඳුන්වා දෙනවාද?

කේ.එන්.එන්.එම්. බණ්ඩාර මහත්මිය

මම මල්කාන්ති බණ්ඩාර

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමියගේ තනතුර මොකක්ද?

කේ.එන්.එන්.එම්.බණ්ඩාර මහත්මිය

අධිකාරි- සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ඔබතුමියන්ලාට කරන්න තිබෙන කාර්යය directly ගන්නේ නැතිව ඇයි මේ බැංකුවක් හරහා ආවේ?

කේ.එන්.එන්.එම්.බණ්ඩාර මහත්මිය

ඇත්තටම මම අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට ගිහිල්ලා මාස දෙකයි. ඒ කාලයේ වැඩ කළේ ජයලත් මහත්මයායි.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා

මම තමයි ඒ කාලයේ හිටියේ. දැන් මම සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙක් විධියට කටයුතු කරන්නේ. ඒ කාලයේ මම අධිකාරී - සේවක අර්ථසාධක විධියට තමයි කටයුතු කළේ. අපි බැංකුවකින් ඇවිත් නැහැ. අපිට directly පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්. Directly විතරයි එන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා ඇමතිතුමා මේ කාරණා ටික මෙතැනින් අද දිනට අවසන් කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මට එක කාරණයක් නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න තිබෙනවා. EPF එකේ මුදල් bond වලට පරිහරණය කිරීම පිළිබඳව, 2008 ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ 07 දින දරන මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධව කාටද උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්.Governor උත්තර දෙනවාද? පී.සමරසිරි මහතා උත්තර දෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්ණය සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ඇහුවා නම් හරි. ප්‍රශ්ණය පිළිබඳව අවබෝධයක් නැතිව කාටවත් පිළිතුරු දෙනන් අමාරුයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ, 2008.10.07 දින තීරණය මඟින් තමයි EPF මුදල් Treasury bonds වලට ප්‍රතිපත්තිය එළිදැක්විලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

ඇත්තටම ඒ තීරණය ආවේ ඊට ඉස්සර වෙලා පළමුවැනි Board Meeting එක 2008.01.07 දින පැවැත්වුණා. ඔතැන Board paper එකක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

2008.01.07 දින ලේඛනය පී.සමරසිරි මහත්මයා ළඟ තිබෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

ඔව් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එම ලේඛනයෙන් නිශ්චිතව සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. මෙහිදී එම ලේඛනයෙන් ආවරණය වන මුදල් විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙන අරමුදල් මොනවාද කියලා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

අරමුදල් කියලා නැහැ. EPF and captive sources කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒක නොවෙයි කියන්නේ 2008.01.07 දින -

The Hon. Biaml Rathnayake

This document. EPF, ETF and NSB-

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා

එතැන කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

මොනවාද තිබෙන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා

එතැන තිබෙනවා EPF, ETF and NSB.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා:

සහ ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව, එතකොට 2008.01.07 කියන දවසට අදාළ තීරණය අරමුදල් තුනක්, EPF, ETF සහ ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව සම්බන්ධව අදාළයි. එම තීරණයට අදාළව 2008.01.07 දිනෙන් පසුව manual එකක් සංශෝධනය කළාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

ඒක මම කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

2008.10.07 ලේඛණයේ Board Paper එකේ අරමුණ තිබෙනවා. ඒ අරමුණ I,II වශයෙන් සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. පළමු වැනි අරමුණ තමයි, EPF අරමුදල් භාවිතා කිරීම. හැබැයි, පොලී මුදල පිළිබඳ කොන්දේසියක් තිබෙනවා.Interest rate 5 basis point කියලා තිබෙනවා. දෙවැනි කොන්දේසිය, ආපසු වතාවක් EPF අරමුදල් මණින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ තුළ යම් ක්‍රියාකාරීත්වයක් ඇති කිරීම ගැන. ඒක තමයි ඒ paper එකේ අරමුණ. දැන් එම ලේඛනයේ හතර වැනි ශීර්ෂය යටතේ ගත්ත තීරණ මොනවාද කියලා තිබෙනවා. එහි I සහ II වශයෙන් දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. අංක 1 තිබෙන්නේ, "To issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund" කියන වචනවලින් පස්සේ අත්අකුරෙන් ලියලා තිබෙනවා, "and other captive sources" කියලා. එම ස්ථානයේ ඒ වෙනස්කමට කිසිදු අත්සනක් නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම other captive sources කියලා කියන්නේ EPF නොවෙයි. ඒකනේ කියන්නේ"and" කියලා. ඔය "other captive sources" කියන නිගමනය Board Paper එකේ මුල් අරමුණුවලට ගැලපෙන්නේ නැහැ. දැන් ඊට අදාළව Board Meeting එකේ minutes අද දින ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

මම හිතන්නේ අපි ඒ minutes දුන්නා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මට එය පරීක්ෂා කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? (මේ අවස්ථාවේදී minutes ගරු ඇමතිතුමාට ගෙනවිත් දෙන ලදී.) Board Meeting minutes කියන්නේ මේක නොවෙයි. මට නිවැරදි Board minute එක තෝරලා දෙන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්.දිසානායක මහතා

උඩින්ම තිබෙන්නේ ඒක.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Annex 12 එක නොවෙයි. ඒක තමයි නිගමනය, ඒක නොවෙයි minute එක. Minute එක කියන්නේ Secretary maintain කරන ලේඛනයක් ඇති නේ, ඒක. එය දැන් නැති බව කියයි. එය අපට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මීට කලින් ආචාර්ය

එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම් මහත්මයා කිව්වා, other captive sources කියන දේ මත තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලාකටයුතු කළේ කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා private placements වලට ගියේ කියලා.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම් මහතා

Captive sources define කරන්න කියලා තමයි- නමුත් Captive sources කියලා particularly define කරලා නැහැ කියලා තමයි කිව්වේ. විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයෝජනයක් තමයි ඒක.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒ කියන්නේ පෞද්ගලික අරමුදල්.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා

පෞද්ගලික හෝ රාජ්‍ය ආයෝජන

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ආචාර්යතුමා, මේ විධියට EPF ගැන වෙනම Board Paper එකක් එන්නේ EPF මුදල් මේ විධියට Treasury bondsවල හෝ කොටස් වෙළඳපොළේ ආයෝජනය කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන කාරණය පිළිබඳව විශේෂිත ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය නිගමනයක් අවශ්‍ය වුණ නිසා ඒ EPF පනතේ තිබෙන යම යම් හේතු නිසා ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ විධියේ විශේෂිත order එකක්, විශේෂිත නිගමනයක් අරගෙන ආවේ.

එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා

EPF සම්බන්ධ මම කථා කරන්න යන්නේ නැහැ හේතුව මොකද, මට එය අදාළ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

EPF ගැන දන්න කවුද ඉන්නේ ?

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා

මම හිතන්නේ, මේ සඳහන් කරන්නේ EPF එක ගැන ගත්ත තීරණයකට වඩා, රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණයේ අවශ්‍යතාව සඳහා ගත්ත තීරණයක්. EPF පනතේ තිබෙනවා අපිට ආයෝජනය කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

ඒක ගැටලුවක් නැති තැනක් ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම bonds වලට, EPF මුදල් පාවිච්චි කිරීම ඊට කලින් කරලා නැති නිසා, මෙහෙම විශේෂිත Board Paper එකක් අවශ්‍ය වුණා.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා

ඒක වැරදියි. Auction වලට අමතරව Private placement වලට දාන ඒවාට තමයි ඒ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත්.පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Auction එකට EPF මුදල් පාවිච්චි කරන එක තමයි රීතිය.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා

EPFAct එකේ තිබෙන විධියට ආයෝජනය කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. Auction එකෙන්ද කොහොමද කියලා, කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

ප්‍රායෝගික භාවිතය - practice එක - අනුව, වෙන්දේසියෙන් බැදුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා තමයි EPF මුදල් යෙදෙව්වේ.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා

මුල් කාලය ගත්තොත්, මුලින් සියල්ලම තිබිලා තිබෙන්නේ Central Bank එකේ ඒවා

අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා : මෙහෙම Board Paper එකක් ඕනෑ වුණේ ඇයි?

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ.ජයලත් මහතා

Interest එකට ආපු Pressure එක වෙන්න ඇති කියලා මම විශ්වාස කරනවා Pressure එක අඩු කර ගන්න EPF එක භාවිත කර තිබෙන බව තමයි හැඟෙන්නේ. ඒ කාලයේ හිටපු නැති නිසා මම ඒ ගැන හරියටම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

කවුරු හරි තව විශේෂඥයෙක් ඉන්නවාද මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පිළිතුරු දෙන්න. අපි රදා පවතින්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා මත. 2008.10.07 දිනැති මේ Specific Board Paper ඕනෑ වුණේ ඇයි? මෙය අවශ්‍ය නම් බලන්න දෙන්නම්. 2008 වසරේදී EPF ගැන බලපු නිලධාරියෙක් ඉන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2008 වසර වන විට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළේ මම. ඔය Board Paper එක අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මම. ඒ නිසා මම පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න කැමතියි. 2008 වසර වන විට අපට තිබුණු ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාටම මතක ඇති විශේෂයෙන්ම යුධ කටයුතු සඳහා විශාල වශයෙන් ණය ගන්න වෙලා, රජයේ ණය බර තාවය විශාල වශයෙන් වැඩි වෙලා තිබුණා. ඒ කාලයේ වෙළඳ පොළේ පොලී අනුපාත පාලනය කිරීම අපට විශාල ප්‍රශ්නයක් වුණා. මේ හින්දා ගත්ත එක තීරණයක් තමයි මේ Board Paper එක අපි EPF එක වෙනම auction එකට පිටින් අරගෙන අපි තීරණය කරන පොලි අනුපාතයක් යටතේ EPF සල්ලි රජයට දුන්නා.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

EPF සල්ලි ආයෝජනය කිරීමේ වැඩි නම්‍යශීලිභාවයක් අවශ්‍ය වුණා, තරගකාරිව යන එකට අමතරව direct placements වලටත් EPF සල්ලි පාවිච්චි වුණා.

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට තව පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමකට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට මේ Board Paper එක දැම්මාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මෙය සාකච්ඡා කළාම, "සල්ලි හොයන්නේ කොහෙන්ද? අධිපතිතුමා කියපු විධියට අඩු පිරිවැයට සල්ලි ගන්නේ කොහෙන්ද ?" කියන එක තමයි ඒ අවස්ථාවේ තිබුණු ප්‍රශ්නය. එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළ, EPF එක විතරක් නොවෙයි අනිත් captive source මෙතැනට ගන්න කියලා. ඒක තමයි, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මේ ලේඛනය ගැන වගකීම ඔබතුමා භාර ගන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ඔව්. මේ ලේඛනය තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ -

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමා මේ ලේඛනයේ වගකීම භාර ගන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මේ ලේඛනය, කල් තියලා, නිගමනයත් එක්කමයි type කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සී.ජේ.පී.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

ඔව්

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

නිගමනය කරන කොට නැති, ඉතාම බරපතළ අර්ථයක් තිබෙන "---- and other captive sources ----" කියන වචන ටික සහ ඒ ශීර්ෂයට නොගැළපෙන ඒ ක්ෂේත්‍රය මේ Board Paper එකේ නිගමනයට ආවේ කොහාමද? ඔබතුමාට දොස් කියනවා නොවෙයි.දන්නවා නම් කියන්න, නැත්නම් "නැහැ" කියන්න

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

සාමාන්‍ය Board Paper එකක් දැම්මාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියනවා, අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රදානීන්ට ඇවිල්ලා, "මේකෙන් අදහස් කරන්නේ මොකක්ද?" කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න කියලා. එතැන අදහස් කරන මූලික හේතුව කිව්වාම, "අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙළඳද පොළේ පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කර ගන්නනම් EPF එක විතරක්

නොවෙයි අනිත් captive sources මෙතැනට ගන්න" කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළා. ඒක තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේතීරණවල තිබෙන්නේ

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 38/39/40/41)

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එම අත්පොත තුළ තිබෙන, බැඳුම්කර හා සම්බන්ධ වගන්තිය කුමක්ද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim :

There may be lots of sentences and references to the Bonds in the Manual.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

There may be private and direct placements. What is the Section?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

This refers to under the Item C. of page 8.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා

Private/ Direct Placements ලෙස සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ එතැනද?

Dr.M.Z.M. Azim

Yes

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙම ලේඛණයේ මතුපිට ඇති ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනුව, බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පැවැත්විය යුතු බව සඳහන් වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය සහ direct placements හරහා රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කර ගත යුතුයි කියලා මෙහි සඳහන් වනවා.

- **වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් හැකිතාක් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීම- As much as possible**

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

Okay. මෙම වගන්තිය අනුව පළමුව කළ යුත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමයි. ඒ වාගේම private placements වලට යා යුතු වන්නේ, වෙන්දේසියෙන් මුදල් ලබා ගත

නොහැකි නම් පමණයි. පළමු auction එක තමයි auction. Auction එකෙන් ලැබෙන්නේ නැතිනම් - then, you have to go to the private placements.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

I do not think the Manual says like that but what says it says is either thought auctions or placements you should raise it. What it says is as much as possible from auctions.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මෙහි ඇති භාෂාව අනුව පැහැදිලි වන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හරහා හැකි තරම් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් සොයා ගැනීමට උත්සහ කළ යුතු බවයි. ඒක තමයි මූලධර්මය.That is the rule. ඒක තමයි රීතිය.

The Hon.Dayasiri Jayasekara

You can explain, Dr. Azim whether it is correct or not.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

අපි මේක විසඳා ගනිමු. වෙච්ච දේ වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මම අහන්නේ පොත ගැන පමණයි. ඔබතුමා අපහසුතාවට පත් කරනවා නොවෙයි. පොත අනුව වෙච්ච දේ vary වෙනවා නම්,අපි ඒ ගැන වෙනම ප්‍රශ්ණ කරන්නම්. මම අහන්නේ විෂය ගැන දැනගෙනයි. මෙම Operational manual එක අනුව පළමුව auctions සඳහා ගොස් හැකි තරම් මුදලක් එකතු කර ගැනීමට කටයුතු කළ යුතුයි. එසේ ප්‍රමාණවත් මුදලක් එකතු කර ගැනීමට නොහැකි වන්නේ නම්, ඉතිරි මුදල එකතු කර ගැනීම සඳහා private placements කළ යුතුයි.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

My understanding as per the manual is, there is no first, second reference. පළමුව auctionsද, දෙවනුව private placements කියලා reference එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එයට අදාළ ස්ථානය ඉංග්‍රීසි භාෂාවෙන් කියවන්න.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

May I read that?

The Hon.Ajith P.Perera

Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe, allow him to read.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

Can you read it out, please?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

It is under Item B which only says about direct and private placements. But if you go to page No.3, there it is stated, 'Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme' which includes way everything. Page 8 mentions only about placements and auctions.

The Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe

That is what we wanted to know.

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

When it comes to Item B (i) of the page 8, it states:

"Front Office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs."

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

මම මේ විධියට අහන්නම්කෝ. මෙම රීති මාලාවේ 8 වෙනි පිටුවේ "B" යටතේ, 'Private/Direct Placements' කියන මාතෘකාව තිබෙනවා. එහි මෙසේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. "FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." එහි මුද්‍රණ දෝෂයක් තිබෙනවාද?

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim

No.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා

එහි අර්ථය කුමක්ද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්.අසීම්.මහතා

Placements සහ සෘජු නිකුතුවන් පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා කිරීමයි මෙහි සඳහන් වෙන්නේ. සෘජු නිකුතුවන්වලට පැමිණීමට පෙර, දෙවැනි sentence එක යටතේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, 'The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme…..'

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන)

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්ණය මත පදනම්වන දෙයක් මේක.මම දැනගන්න කැමතියි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් හෝ ඔබතුමන් නම් කරන නියෝජිතයෙක්ගෙන් මේකේPrivate and direct placements කියන එකෙහි "Front office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions."මොක්කද "as much as possible" කියන එකේ practical idea එක. මොකද"as much as possible" කියන්නේbroader meaning එකක්. අනෙක් එක මේවා එක සමානයි එම්.ඒ.වාගේ එකක් නොවෙයි Economics කියන්නේ. මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි මොකක්ද "as much as possible" කියන්නේ. Value for money best practices ද මොනවාද? මොකද මම හිතනවා මේ Board paper එකේ idea එක මේකේ includeවෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I stand to be corrected by my colleagues who know much more about this than I do. My understanding is that there is a process through which these bonds and government securities take place. And there are different levels at which once the bids have been made, how the bids are assessed and accepted. So, in that process, the different committees will try to get as much money as possible for the government as cheaply as possible.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

When you say "as much as possible" one aspect is it should be cheap for the Government. It is Okay.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

That would be one criterion. So, they would also have to decide Cleary how much money to take and the cost. They would accept to raise that money. Now, my understanding of that first sentence is that there should be an attempt made to take as much money as possible through auctions within the

parameters that the different committees set for themselves in terms of cost. They are trying to raise the money that the Government needs as cheaply as possible. That is my understanding. But, I would like to ask my colleagues, who are specialists in the Debt Department to elaborate on that or correct me if I am wrong.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා

ගරු ඔබතුමා උත්තරයක් කියන්න?

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

There are two officers who raised hands.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

Dr.M.Z.M.Azim will elaborate on what I said about auctions and direct placements.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

The Governor asked him to answer.

කේ.එම්.එම්.සිරිවර්ධන මහතා

සභාපතිතුමනි, මම සිරිවර්ධන සහකාර අධිපති. ඒ වාගේම මම මීට අමතරව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි වශයෙන් කාරණා කිහිපයකට අවතීර්ණ වුණා. අධිපතිතුමා කියපු විදියට ණය ගැනීමේදී අපි හැම තිස්සේම බලන කරුණු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. ණයක් වෙළඳපොලෙන් ගන්න කොට cost එක වගේම risk එක තමයි හැම තිස්සෙම සලකා බලන්නේ කොච්චර අවධානමක් තිබෙනවාද? කොච්චර වියදමක් දරන්න වෙනවාද? ඒ අදාළ දවසේ අදාළ ණය ගැනීම් විධි කියන එක. එතකොට cheapest කියන එක එන්නේ, අපි හිතමු ලක්ෂ දහයක බැඳුම්කරයක් අද දින නිකුත් කරනවා නම්, අද දින ඒ ලක්ෂ දහයේ බැඳුම්කරයට ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොලේ මිලක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ interest rate එකක් තිබෙනවා. Price එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මේක හැමදාම දිනපතා අපි දන්නවා. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මේ තොරතුරු දිනපතා එකතු කරනවා. අද දුන්න සියයට දහයේ බැඳුම්කරයේ පොලිය තිබෙන්නේ සියයට දහය නම්,වෙළඳපොලෙන් අද ගන්න ඕනෑ සියයට 12 කට. අපි මුළු වෙළඳ පොලම රැවටීමක් කරනවා. ඒක එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැ අපි. ඒක තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ cheap කියලා කිව්වේ. එතකොට සියයට දහය හෝ දහයට අඩු හෝ දහයට ආසන්න මට්ටමකින් හෝ තමයි අපි ණය ගන්නේ. ඒකයි මගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම.

සභාපතිතුමා

ඔබතුමන් පැහැදිලි කරන කොටඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට එකතු වෙනවා නේද, මේකේ ඊළඟ ඡේදයේ තිබෙන කොටසේදී "The balance fund requirement of the Government has indicated in the approved borrowing programme" කියන එක. ඒ programme එක යටතේ තමයි ඒ කියන අවස්ථා ටික සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

මගේ ප්‍රශ්ණය "as much as possible" කියන එක "As much as possible" කියන එකේ clear definition එක practice එක අහන්න. එතකොට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ,cost ඇතුලේ නේ cheap කියන එක තියෙන්නේ. අපි ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය තීන්දු විය යුත්තේ, අපේ auctions තමයි අපේ main tool එක. බලන tool එක auction එක තමයි. Manual එක clear. ඒකට limit එකක් එනවා, "as much as possible" කියන එකෙන් cost එක අනුව. මම හරිද?

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

As I said, that is how it happened.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

එතකොට 07th October, 2008, Monetary Board decision එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. එතකොට decisionඑක ඔබතුමන් ළඟ තිබෙනවා. ඒ decisionඑකේ content එකයි, ඒ decision එකේ තිබෙන basis idea එකයි, Manual එකයි, මේ Page 8 එකේ "as much as possible" කියන paragraph එක ගත්තොත් ඒකත් එක්ක conflict එකක් තිබෙනවාද? මේ Board paper එකේ තිබෙන idea එකයි, මේ Manual එකේ මෙයයි අතර පරස්පරයක් තිබෙනවාද? මම දකින දේ මම කියන්නම්. මම දකිනවා මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි ඒක.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

I am assuming that this is a decision that the Hon.Sujeewa Senasinghe read out.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

Yes. I can give it to you if you know it. "As much as possible" is a broader term you can put many things time to time.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami

I would say, again my colleagues would correct me if I am wrong. But I think this decision can be covered by what is in the Manual.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

That is what you think. This decision can be covered by what is in the manual.

Dr.Indrajith Coomaraswami

Yes.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake

Why do you need a decision then?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා

සභාපතිතුමා, Decision එකේ තිබෙන අදහස මේ Manual එකේ තිබෙන එකෙන්cover වෙනවා කියලා record කර ගන්න කියලා ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

ඒක පැහැදිලි කරගන්න. ඔබතුමාට ඉතාම වැදගත් එකක්. මට කථා කරනන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසා නොවෙයි. එහෙම තිබෙනවා නම් මේ decision එකේ ඇති අවශ්‍යතාව මොකක්ද? Monetary Board එකෙන් මේ Manual එකේ තිබෙන ටික cover වෙනවා නම් මේකට අමතරව decision එකක් ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමා සාවධානව සවන් දෙන්න. මේකේ තිබෙන decision ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ Manual එකේ decisions තිබෙනවා නම්-

සභාපතිතුමා

ඒ ගත්ත එක මේකෙන් cover වෙනවා කියලා ඒ අයම පිළිගන්නවා නම්, අපට අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නැහැ නේ නැවත නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න. අපි නොවෙයි නේ අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

එතැනින් පසුව තමයි direct placements වලට shift වුණේ.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 27)

සභාපතිතුමා

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසන කරුණ සම්බන්ධයෙන්ම විමසා පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට කරුණක් මටත් තිබෙනවා. මෙතුමාගේ කාරණාවලට එකතු කිරීමක් කරනවා. අපි කථා කරන්නේ 8 වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන (08) (i) ගැන නේ. හැබැයි, මේ Manual එකේ front office කියන first page එකේ තිබෙනවා."Front Office (FO) of the PDD is mainly responsible for mobilizing required funds for the Government at the lowest possible cost with a reasonable degree of risk through implementation of domestic borrowing programme approved by the Monetary Board" කියලා. එතැනදී මේ ක්‍රියාවලි සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ at the lowest possible cost වලට යටත්වයි. පූර්ව තත්ත්වය මේකයි. මේ පූර්ව තත්ත්වයට යටත්ව තමයි, Manual එකට private placements ද, direct placements ද, කියන ක්‍රියාවලියට යන්න ඕනෑ. එතැනදී "අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම රජයට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට සහ මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලියට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට at the lowest possible cost කියන තත්ත්වය යටතේ මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය කළ යුතුයි." කියලා තිබෙනවා. මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය පවතින්නේ ඒ යටතේ කියන එක අවධාරණය කිරීමට තමයි. මම මේක සඳහන් කරන්නේ. Cost and risk.

(යොමුව : 2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 දිනැති වාචික සටහන පිටුව 14-34)

ඇමුණුම 02

මහ බැංකුව විසින් 2015 වසර සඳහා නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශන කමිටු වාර්තාව

මහ බැංකුව විසින් 2015 වසර සඳහා නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශන කමිටු වාර්තාව

ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන, ආර්ථික කටයුතු සහ ළමා හා තරුණ කටයුතු සහ සංස්කෘතික අමාත්‍ය ධුර දරණ ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් පහත දැක්වෙන කරුණු පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනය කොට වාර්තා කිරීම සඳහා කමිටුවක් පත් කරන ලදී.

එම විමර්ශනය සඳහා පහත සඳහන් කරුණු අන්තර්ගත විය.

1. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ලංකා රුපියල් බිලියනයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ නිවේදනය සිදු කිරීමට හේතුව
2. එම නිකුතුවට අනුව සෑම ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවකුටම අදාළ වන්නාවූ සිදුවීම් මාලාව සහ අදාළ සංඛ්‍යාලේඛන විභාග කිරීම
3. වර්ෂ 2012 ජනවාරි 01 දා සිට මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත ලැබී ඇති ඉල්ලුම් සහ ඒ අනුව කරන ලද නිකුත් කිරීම්, වෙන්දේසි කිරීම් මගින් සහ පෞද්ගලික බෙදා දීම් මගින් සිදු කර ඇති ආකාරය විභාග කිරීම

මේ කාර්යය ඉෂ්ට කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන අමාත්‍යවරයා වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරන අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් හිටපු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයකු වූ ඩබ්ලිව්. ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතාගේ සහාය ලබා දෙන ලදී. ඩබ්ලිව්. ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතා ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය තාක්ෂණිකමය කටයුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් සහයෝගය ලබාදෙන ලදී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් රුපියල් බිලියන එකක වටිනාකමකින් යුත් බැඳුම්කර සඳහා අයදුම්පත් කැඳවීමට හේතුව

කමිටුව විසින්, මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගෙන් සහ එම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේම සහකාර අධිකාරී ආචාර්ය ආසිමි මහතාගෙන් තොරතුරු විමසා සිටින ලදී.

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ එම නිළධාරීන්ට අනුව පහත දැක්වෙන කරුණු හෙළිදරව් විය.

1. දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරණ කමිටුවේ උපදෙස් අනුව මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය ඇස්තමේන්තු කරනුයේ මසකට පෙර ය. භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂක ජෙනරාල් එම්.එස්.ඩී. රනසිරි මහතා විසින් 2015.02.20 දාතමින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී වෙත එවන ලද ලිපියක පිටපතක් ද අප වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කෙරිණි. ලැබෙන ආදායම සහ මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණයට ගත යුතු මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය එම ලිපියේම ඇමුණුමක ඇත. එම ඇමුණුමට අනුව 2015.03.02 වන විට ණයට ගත යුතු ප්‍රමාණය වන්නේ

රුපියල් 13,550,000,000/- (රුපියල් බිලියන 13.550) කි. එම ලිපියට අනුව මේ මුදල් සියල්ල ලබා ගත යුතු වන්නේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මගින් පමණකි. පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමේ පහසුව සඳහා එහි පිටපත X1 වශයෙන් මීට අමුණා ඇත.

2. 2015 පෙබරවාරි 23 දා පැවති රැස්වීමේදී මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය (Monitory Board) X2 යනුවෙන් අමුණා ඇති (රැස්වීම් අංක 4/2015) පහත සඳහන් තීරණ වලට එළඹී ඇත.

"2.3 විදේශ ආයෝජකයන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර පිළිබඳව දැක්වූ උනන්දුව නිසා මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී මෙසේ තිස් අවුරුදු භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම වඩාත් ඵලදායී වනු ඇතැයි මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට අවබෝධ විය. ඒ අනුව තිස් අවුරුදු භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් වෙන්දේසියක් අදාල සතිය තුළදී පවත්වන්නැයි මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී හට උපදෙස් දෙනු ලැබූ අතර අනාගතයේදී පවුම් බැඳුම්කර යුරෝ නිෂ්කාෂණ විනිමය අනුබ ලැයිස්තුගත කළ යුතු යැයි ද උපදෙස් දෙනු ලැබිණි."

3. මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 23 දිනට පෙර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි කිරීම මගින් අරමුදල් රැස්කර ගැනීමේ උචිතභාවය පිළිබඳව කරුණු දක්වා තිබුණේ සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් අධෛර්යය කිරීමට වෙළඳපළේ රුචිකත්වය පිළිබඳව ද සැලකිල්ලට ගනිමිනි. මෙය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ක්‍රියාන්විත උපදෙස් මාලාවේ (ඡේද 3 (a) 10 පිටුවේ) දැක්වෙන උපදෙස්වලට අනුකූල වේ.

3.1 සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් (පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම්)

මේ අවස්ථාවේදී පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම් වශයෙන් පොදු ව්‍යවහාරයේ භාවිතා වන සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් කුමක් ද යන්න විග්‍රහ කිරීම වැදගත්ය. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ලබා ගත් තොරතුරුවලට අනුව සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කරනුයේ රජයේ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීමේ තථ්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවයට වඩා අඩු ප්‍රමාණයකටය. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තු නිළධාරීන් පැහැදිලි කළ පරිදි මෙයට හේතුව වන්නේ රජයේ නියම ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය වෙළඳපළ දැනගත් කල්හි ඔවුන් වැඩි පොලී ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහා ඉල්ලුම්පත් යොමු කිරීමයි.

3.2 එම නිසා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව රජයේ නියම අවශ්‍යතාවයට වඩා අඩු ප්‍රමාණයකට බිල්පත් නිකුතුවක් ප්‍රකාශයට පත්කරන අතර සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වෙන්දේසි කරන ලද ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා දෙගුණයක් හෝ දෙකහමාරකට වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් පිළිගැනීම සිදුකරනු ලබයි. අනතුරුව ඉතිරිය සපුරාගැනීම සඳහා සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් කැඳවීමට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් සැලසුම් කරන ලදී.

3.3 සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් හරහා උපයාගත් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය සුරැකුම් පත් වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලත් ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා වැඩි බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී. ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තු නිලධාරීන් සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් වඩාත් ප්‍රතිඵලදායී ක්‍රියාදාමයක් ලෙස හැඳින්වුවද අප විසින් කරුණු විමසන ලද ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන් කියා සිටියේ එම ක්‍රියාදාමය විනිවිදභාවයෙන් අඩු බවයි.

ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපති වූත්, වැඩබලන මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවූත් සමරසිරි මහතාද මේ කරුණ සනාථ කළේය.

3.4 පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම් පිළිබඳව පිළිගත් ක්‍රමවේදයක් නොමැති බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී. විශේෂ උපදෙස් අනුව සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් නිකුත් කළ බවට වන වාර්තා හැර පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත් තීරණ ගනු ලැබුවේ කෙසේදැයි පිළිබඳව සඳහනක් නොමැත. මේ සමඟ අමුණා ඇති X3 ලේඛණයට අනුව රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් 90% කට වඩා ලබාගෙන ඇත්තේ සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් මඟින් බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී. මේ ක්‍රියාව වෙන්දේසිවලදී ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන්ගේ සහභාගිත්වය කෙරෙහි සැලකියයුතු අන්දමින් බලපා ඇති බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කෙරේ. ඇත්තෙන්ම, 2015.02.27ට ප්‍රථම, ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන්ගේ ඉල්ලුම 30 - 50 අතර වූ අතර කලාතුරකින් එය තරමක් ඉහළ ගොස් තිබුණි. 2015.02.27ට පසු (පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම් අත්හිටුවීම මත) මහ බැංකුවට 130-170 අතර ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇත.

4. **මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යළිත් ආරම්භ කිරීමේ වැදගත්කම ඔහු පැහැදිලි කළේය. පසුගිය රජය දේශීය වශයෙන් හා අන්තර්ජාතික වශයෙන් විශාල මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ණයට ගෙන ඇති බව හෙළිකළ ඔහු, ණය බර උතුරා ගොස් ඇති බව පැහැදිලි කළේය. එම ණය 2014 දී උපරිමය ඉක්මවා ගොස් ඇති බව පෙන්වා දුන් ඔහු, පසුගිය රජය පුරුද්දක් වශයෙන් වාණිජ බැංකුවලින් හැකි තරම් ණය ලබා ගත් බව ද පෙන්වා දුන්නේය. සේවක භාරකාර අරමුදලින් ණය ලබාගත් පසුගිය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ඒවා වාණිජ බැංකුවල ආයෝජනය කළ බවත්, වාණිජ බැංකුවලට විදේශ රටවලින් ණය ගැනීමට උපදෙස් දුන් බවත් වැඩබලන මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා තව දුරටත් හෙළි කළේය. මේ තත්වය මත ලංකා බැංකුව විසින් ඩොලර් බිලියනයක් ලබාගෙන ඇති බවත් හෙතෙම සඳහන් කළේය. ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව විසින් ඩොලර් බිලියනයක් ද, DFCC බැංකුව විසින් ඩොලර් මිලියන 200 ක්ද ලබාගෙන ඇත. තමා ජනවාරි 23 වන දා වැඩ භාර ගත් විට ඩොලර් මිලියන 500 ක හිඟ මුදලක් ගෙවීමට නියමිතව තිබූ නමුත් එය ගෙවීමට එම අවස්ථාවේ මහ බැංකුව සතුව විදේශ විනිමය ප්‍රතිපාදන නොතිබූ හෙයින් වෙළඳපළේ අවාසිදායක තත්වයක් නිර්මාණය වූ බවත් හෙතෙම ප්‍රකාශ කළේය.**

5. **තිස් අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරවලට යාමට හේතුව විමසූ විට ඔහු ප්‍රකාශ කළේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයත්, ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවත් එකතුව දීර්ඝකාලීන බැඳුම්කරවලට යාමට තීන්දු කොට ඉන් පසුව ආපස්සට කටයුතු කිරීමට අදහස් කළ බවයි. කෙටිකාලීන පදනමක් මත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළහොත් පොලී ප්‍රමාණය ඉහළ යාමට ඇති ඉඩකඩ වැඩි බවත් එමඟින් පොලිය විශාල ලෙස ඉහළ යා හැකි බවත් ඔහු පැහැදිලි කළේය.**

6. **පොළී ප්‍රමාණය ඉහළ යාමෙන් ඇති වන බලපෑම කුමක්දැයි ප්‍රශ්න කළ විට ඔහු කියා සිටියේ හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ ක්‍රමය වූයේ මාසය පුරාවටම පොළී ප්‍රමාණය 5% දක්වා තබා**

ගනිමින් දින තුනකට පමණක් එය වෙනස් කිරීම නිසා වෙළඳ පොළ තුළ අවුල් සහගත තත්වයක් උද්ගත වූ බවයි. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සිය මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි තීරණයක් ගෙන නොතිබීම එවකට වෙළඳපළ තුළ අපැහැදිලි තත්වයක් ඇතිකිරීමට හේතු විය. වෙළඳපළ විසින් පොළී අනුපාතය තීරණය කළ යුතු යැයි තමා විශ්වාස කරන බවත් 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ පටන් ජනාධිපතිවරණය දක්වා කෘතිම ලෙස පොළී ප්‍රමාණය පහත දැමීම පිළිබඳව එකඟ විය නොහැකි බවත් හෙතෙම පැවසීය. අරමුදල් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා වෙළඳපළ මත පදනම් වූ ක්‍රමයක් කරා ගමන් කිරීම සහ එසේ වෙළඳපල මඟින් මෙහෙයවනු ලබන අරමුදල් ලබාගැනීමේ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී මිල නිර්ණය කිරීම තහවුරු කිරීමට ඔහු විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයට උපදෙස් දෙන ලදී.

7. මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තියේ සාර්ථකත්වය පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්න කරන ලදුව ඵලදායී සහභාගිත්වයක් වෙළඳපළ තුළ ඇති බව පැවසූ ඔහු මහ බැංකුව වෙළඳපළ තුළ ඉතා විශාල වශයෙන් මුදල් උපයාගන්නා බවත් ප්‍රකාශ කළේය. යම්කිසි ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් ඔහුට වාසි වන පරිදි ඔහු ක්‍රියා කළේ දැයි අපි ඔහුගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කළ අතර, ඊට පිළිතුරු දෙමින් ඔහු කියා සිටියේ ඔහු එසේ නොකල බවත්, සිය අභිලාෂය වූයේ රජය වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීම මිස කවුරුන් ඒ සඳහා මුදල් යොදනවාද යන්න සොයා බැලීම නොවූ බවත්ය. ඊට පෙර මාසයේ අතිරේක අරමුදල් සොයා ගැනීම තරමක් දුරට අසාර්ථක වූ නිසා ඔහුගේ අදහස වූයේ අතිරේක අරමුදල් රජය වෙනුවෙන් ලබා ගැනීමයි.

8. 2015 මාර්තු 02 වන දා වන විට රජයේ අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රුපියල් බිලියන 13.550 ක් වූ හෙයින් රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දක්වා තිස් අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කිරීම නිවේදනය කිරීමට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තීරණය කරන ලදී. මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ අංක 4/2015 දරණ වාර්තාව මඟින් තිස් අවුරුදු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර පිළිබඳව විශේෂයෙන් සඳහන් කර තිබුණ ද එම බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය කොපමණක් වන්නේ දැයි මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය විසින් තීරනය කර නොතිබුණි. මේ ක්‍රියාදාමය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අදාළ කටයුත්තක් ලෙස ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තු අත් පොතේ සඳහන් ය.

<u>සෑම ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවකු හා සම්බන්ධව ඉහත කී බැඳුම්කර කටයුත්තට අදාල සිදුවීම් හා මූලික සංඛ්‍යා දත්ත</u>

9. තිස් අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරයට (12.50% 2045 A) අදාළ පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම සහ පුවත්පත් නිවේදනය පළ කර ඇත. 2015.02.27 දින ඉල්ලුම් අවසන් කරන වේලාවෙදී රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ඉල්ලීම් 36 ක් ලැබී තිබූ අතර ඒවායේ සංඛ්‍යා දත්ත පහත දැක්වේ.

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දා සිදු කෙරුණු වෙන්දේසියට ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ඉල්ලුම්.

BIDS SUBMITTED BY PRIMARY DEALERS FOR THE AUCTION HELD ON 27TH FEBRUARY 2015

Name of the Primary Dealer	Bid (Mn)	Price	Yield Net Of Tax	Accepted bids (Mn)	Bid %
Acuity Securities Ltd	50	112.01	9.99	50	15%
	100	86.74	13.00	-	
First Capital Treasuries Ltd	100	110.95	10.09	100	10%
Entrust Securities PLC	50	104.5	1074	50	10%
	50	103.11	10.89	50	
Employees Provident Fund	500	104.5	10.74	500	200%
	1000	104.2	10.99	100	
	500	99.99	11.29	500	
Peoples Bank	100	102.2	10.99	100	10%
Natwealth Securities Ltd	50	102.20	10.99	50	10%
	50	99.99	11.25	50	
Seylan Bank PLC	1250	95.8	11.75	1250	125%
Wealth Trust Securities PLC	50	93.87	11.99	50	10%
	50	90.17	12.50	50	
HSBC	100	90.17	12.50	100	10%
Pan Asia Banking Corporation	250	90.17	12.50	250	50%
	150	88.42	12.75	-	
	100	86.74	12.99	-	
Capital Alliance	100	90.17	12.50	100	10%
Commercial Bank of Ceylon	50	86.74	12.99	-	10%
	50	86.08	13.10	-	
Union Bank	50	76.48	14.75	-	10%
	50	74.21	15.20	-	
Sampath Bank PLC	100	62.62	18.00	-	10%
Perpetual Treasuries	250	97.87	11.50	250	200%
	250	95.83	11.75	500	
	500	93.87	11.99	500	
	1000	91.99	12.24	1000	
Bank of Ceylon	8	119.33	9.35	8	
	500	109.39	9.99	500	
On behalf of Perpetual Treasuries	3000	90.16	12.50	3000	
	5000	88.40	12.75	-	
	5000	86.76	12.99	-	

10. ඉහත සඳහන් කර ඇති පරිදි ඉදිරිපත් වූ ඉල්ලුම්වල වටිනාකම රුපියල් 20,708,000,000/- කි. මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය විසින් කලින් නිකුත් කළ උපදෙස් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තු අත්පොතේ (10 පිටුව 3(a) ඡේදය) හා අනුකූල වන හෙයින් වෙළඳපලෙන් අදාළ අරමුදල් රජය වෙනුවෙන් ලබා ගැනීමට ඇති හැකියාව ගැන සොයා බලන මෙන් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ඉල්ලීමක් කර ඇත.

11. පහසුවෙන් බලා ගැනීම සඳහා X4 වශයෙන් ලකුණු කොට ඔවුන්ගේ නිර්දේශ සහිතව මීට අමුණා ඇති ලියවිල්ල රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලදී. එම වාර්තාවට අනුව, 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දා පැවති ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී (රැස්වීම් අංක 02/2015) උද්ගතව තිබූ තත්වය සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන රු. 10,058,000,000/- ඉල්ලුම 11.73% WAYR බද්දට යටත්ව පිළිගැනීමට ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය විසින් අනුමැතිය දෙන ලද්දේ රජය මුහුණ පා තිබූ

    a) දැඩි මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව ;
    b) ඉල්ලුම මගින් පෙන්නුම් කරන ලද වෙළඳපල තුළ පවත්නා දැඩි ද්‍රවශීලිතා මට්ටම; සහ
    c) 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයට පෙර පැවති පොළී අනුපාත ව්‍යුහය

සැලකිල්ලට ගනිමිනි.

12. එම කමිටුව විසින් 2012.01.01 සිට ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය සඳහා පත්ව සිටි සාමාජික සැකැස්ම ගැනත් සිය අවධානය යොමු කරන ලදී.
භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය පහත සඳහන් සාමාජිකයින්ගෙන් සමන්විත ය.
    1. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව භාර නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපති - සභාපති
    2. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව භාර සහකාර මහ බැංකු අධිපති
    3. මිළ ස්ථායිතා අංශය භාර මහ බැංකු අධිපති
    4. මහජන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිවරයා
    5. අධ්‍යක්ෂ, ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
    6. අධ්‍යක්ෂ, දේශීය මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
    7. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අතිරේක අධිකාරිවරයා

13. රැස්වීම් අංක 2/2015 වාර්තා සටහන්වලට අනුව රු.10,058,000,000/- වටිනා බැඳුම්කර පිලිගැනීමේ තීරණය භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයින් විසින් අනුමත කල අතර පැමිණීමේ ලැයිස්තුවට අනුව ඒ සඳහා සහභාගි වූ සාමාජිකයින් පහත දැක්වේ :

1. **ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා** - DG(S)
2. **එස්.රත්නායක මිය** – AG(S)
3. **සී.ජී.ඒ. කරුණාතිලක මහතා** - AG(KL)
4. **සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මිය** – SPD(PDD)
5. **ජී.ඩබ්ලිව්.වී.එන්.ආර්. රොඩ්රිගෝ මහතා** - DDO(DOD)
6. **එස්. ගුණරත්න මිය** - DER(ERD)
7. **යූ. එල්. මුතුගල මිය** - ASPD(PDD)
8. **ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්. ආසිම් මහතා** - ASPD(PDD)

14. **ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව රුපියල් 13,000,000,000/- වටිනා ඉල්ලුමක් කර තිබුණේ Perpetual Treasuries වෙනුවෙන් බව ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට පෙනී ගියේය. ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරු සහ Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරද්දීත් ඔවුන් ප්‍රකාශ කළේ ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවෙකු වෙන්දේසියක දී තවත් ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් ඉල්ලීම් කළ ප්‍රථම අවස්ථාව මෙය බවයි.**

15. **ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරු ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට කියා සිටියේ වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් රුපියල් 13,000,000,000/- ක් සඳහා ඉල්ලුම් කිරීමේදී බැංකු පාලක මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් ලබා නොගත් බවත් ගණුදෙනුවෙන් පසුව වුවද මේ පිළිබඳව ලංකා බැංකු පාලක මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් නොකළ බවයි. මෙය ණය පහසුකම් සැලසීමේ කාර්යයක් නොවන බවත් ඔහු ප්‍රකාශ කළේය. මේ පිළිබඳව ඔහුගෙන් තවදුරටත් ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමේදී ලංකා බැංකු ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරු කියා සිටියේ Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම බැඳුම්කර ඉල්ලුම ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා දුරකතන ඇමතුමක් දුන් බවත් එබඳු ඉල්ලුමක් සඳහා අරමුදල් ලබාගනුයේ රක්ෂණ සමාගමක් හරහා බවත් සඳහන් කළ බවයි. ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරු මෙතරම් විශාල ඉල්ලුමක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ඇයි දැයි Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කළ විට ඔහු පිළිතුරු දුන්නේ "ආවොත් අතේ තමයි" යනුවෙනි. (එම ප්‍රකාශයෙන් අදහස් කළේ ගණුදෙනුව සාර්ථක වුවහොත් ඉන් විශාල ලාභයක් ලැබිය හැකිය යන්නයි).**

16. **කෙසේ වෙතත් Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමේදී ඔවුන්ට මෙම ගණුදෙනුව සඳහා මුදල් ලැබෙනුයේ රක්ෂණ සමාගමකින් බව තමා නොකී බව ඔහු ප්‍රකාශ කළේය. ඒ සමඟම තමා ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරු සමඟ "ආවොත් අතේ තමයි" යන කියමන නොකී බවත් එය කියන ලද්දේ ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරුවා විසින් බවත් හෙතෙම පැවසීය. පහත සඳහන් කරුණු පිළිබඳව පරස්පර විරෝධතා ඇති බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරනු ලබයි.**

ඇ. වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලවා භවත් ගණුදෙනුකරුවෙකුට බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ඉල්ලීම් කිරීමට නීතියෙන් තහනමක් නැතත් මෙය අසාමාන්‍ය සිදුවීමකි.

ආ. ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරුවා මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී ක්‍රියා කර ඇත්තේ ලංකා බැංකු පාලක මණ්ඩලයේ අවසරයකින් තොරව වන අතර ගණුදෙනුවෙන් පසුව වුවත් මෙම කටයුත්ත පිළිබඳව ලංකා බැංකු පාලක මණ්ඩලයට දැනුම් දීම අතපසු කර ඇත.

ඈ. ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගණුදෙනුකරුවා මෙම කාර්යයේදී සිය වගකීම හරි හැටි ඉටු කිරීමට අපොහොසත් වී ඇති බව ඉහත සඳහන් සමාගමේ අරමුදල් ලබා ගන්නා ක්‍රමය පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් නොකිරීමෙන් පැහැදිලිවේ.

ඉ. ලංකා බැංකු ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරුවාගේ Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියාගේ ප්‍රකාශ පරස්පර විරෝධී වූ අතර එම කටයුත්ත විනිවිද භාවයෙන් තොර බව පැහැදිලි විය.

ඊ. දෙදෙනා විසින්ම කළ ප්‍රකාශයන් එකිනෙකට පරස්පර විරෝධී විය.

17. Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම සුරැකුම් පත් වෙන්දේසියේදී ක්‍රියා කර ඇති ආකාරය කරුණු දෙකක් මත අසාමාන්‍ය බව කමිටුව නිරීක්ෂණය කළේය.

ඇ. ඔවුන් කලින් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති ඉල්ලුම් නිරීක්ෂණය කිරීමේදී බැඳුම්කරයක වටිනාකම රුපියල් 1,000,000,000/- වෙද්දී රුපියල් 2,000,000,000/- ඉල්ලුම් කිරීම කමිටුවේ සැලකිල්ලට බදුන්විය.

ආ. තවත් කරුණක් වූයේ ප්‍රකාශයට පත් බැඳුම්කරයේ වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියනයක් වෙද්දී ඉහත කී සමාගම රුපියල් 13,000,000,000/- වටිනා බැඳුම්කර ඉල්ලුමක් සඳහා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සහය පැතීමයි.

18. මෙම වෙන්දේසියේදී Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම සිය ඉල්ලුම ඉදිරිපත් කළ අසාමාන්‍ය පිළිවෙල ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමේදී එහි ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියා පහත සඳහන් අයුරින් පිළිතුරු දෙන ලදී.

ඇ. ව්‍යාපෘතින් ගණනාවකට ගෙවීම් සිදු කිරීමට ඇති බැවින් රජය විසින් අසාමාන්‍ය ලෙස බැඳුම්කර ඔස්සේ විශාල මුදලක් ලබාගැනීමට කටයුතු කර ඇති බව ඔවුන් හොඳින් දැන සිටි බවයි.

ආ. මේ පිළිබඳව අභ්‍යන්තර තොරතුරු ඔවුන් දැන සිටියේ දැයි ප්‍රශ්න කරන ලදුව ඔහු පිළිතුරු දුන්නේ එවන් තොරතුරු ප්‍රසිද්ධියට පත් වී තිබුණු බවත් එය අභ්‍යන්තර රහස් තොරතුරක් හැටියට සැලකිය නොහැකි බවත් ය.

ඈ. ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා තම ඉල්ලුම ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට පියවර ගත්තේ ඇයි දැයි යන්න පිළිබඳව කමිටුව විසින් ඔහුගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කළ විට ඊට පිළිතුරු වශයෙන් ඔහු කියා සිටියේ ගෙවීම් සඳහා විශාල වශයෙන් මුදල් අවශ්‍ය වන හෙයින් ලංකා බැංකුවේ ස්ථාවරභාවය

නිසා එම බැංකුවේ සහාය මෙම කටයුත්තට ලබා ගැනීම සුදුසු යැයි හැඟී ගිය බවයි. ඒ සමඟම Acuity Holdings සමාගමේ සහය ලබා ගැනීමටත් තමා බලාපොරොත්තු වූ නමුත් එහි අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයා නොසිටි හෙයින් එම අවස්ථාව මග හැරුණු බව ද හෙතෙම ප්‍රකාශ කළේය.

ඈ. Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම සෑම විටම ආක්‍රමණශීලි අයුරින් ක්‍රියා කරන අතර මෙය ඊට නොවෙනස් බව කියා සිටි ඔහු, Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ආක්‍රමණශීලි පිළිවෙත නිසා මහ බැංකුව, ඔවුන්ගේ ඉල්ලුම් ඇතැම් අවස්ථාවලදී ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළ බව ද ප්‍රකාශ කළේය.

ඉ. පිළිගත් ඉල්ලුම්වලින් 50% ක් ලබා ගැනීමට ඔවුන් සමත් වූයේ වෙළඳපල ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වය පිළිබඳව ඔවුන් සුපරීක්ෂාකාරී ලෙස විග්‍රහ කළ නිසා යැයි ප්‍රකාශ කෙරිණි.

19. Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ලංසු තැබීමේ ක්‍රමය හා පිළිගත් ඉල්ලුම්වලින් 50% ක් ලබා ගැනීම අසාමාන්‍ය බව කමිටුව විසින් මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී. කමිටුවට ලබා දී ඇති සීමිත බලතල නිසා මෙම කමිටුවට ඉහත සඳහන් ක්‍රියාදාමය ගැන නිගමනයකට පැමිණිය නොහැක. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ඉහත සඳහන් ගණුදෙනුවේදී මහජන මුදල් වැය කිරීම සිදු කෙරෙන නිසාත් මහජන සුබ සිද්ධිය තකා රජයේ මූල්‍ය රෙගුලාසි උල්ලංඝණය වී ඇත් දැයි සොයා බලනු සඳහාත් නිසි රාජ්‍ය අධිකාරියක් මඟින් මේ පිළිබඳව සම්පූර්ණ විභාගයක් පැවැත්වීම සුදුසු යැයි කමිටුව නිර්දේශ කරයි.

20. ඒ අතරම ලංකා බැංකුව රාජ්‍ය බැංකුවක් වන හෙයින් එම බැංකුවේ ගණුදෙනු කාමරයේ වැඩ කටයුතු ගැන සම්පූර්ණ පරීක්ෂණයක් ලංකා බැංකුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය විසින් පැවැත්විය යුතු බවත් අවශ්‍ය වුවහොත් වෝහාරික විගණනයක් සිදුකිරීමද කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කරනු ලබයි. එක් එක් පුද්ගලයන්ගේ හිතුමතයට ගත් තීරණ වෙනුවෙන් ලංකා බැංකුවේ මුදල් විශාල වශයෙන් යෙදවීම පිළිබඳව ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැනුම්කරු සහ ඔහුට ඉහලින් සිටින නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ලංකා බැංකුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය විසින් නිදහසට කරුණු විමසිය යුතු යැයි කමිටුව විසින් තවදුරටත් නිරීක්ෂණය කරනු ලබයි.

21. එම බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාදාමය නිසා රජයට යම් කිසි මූල්‍ය පාඩුවක් සිදුවී ඇත් දැයි යන්නත්, එසේ වී නම් දළ වශයෙන් එය කොතෙක් විය හැකි ද යන්නත් පිළිබඳව කමිටුවට ලබා දී තිබූ නියෝගවලට පිටස්තරව වුව ද කමිටුව විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගෙනුත්, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරී ආචාර්ය ආසිමි සහ වැඩබලන මහ බැංකු අධිපති සමරසිරි මහතාගෙනුත් ප්‍රශ්න කරන ලදී. එම නිලධාරීන් තිදෙනාම කියා සිටියේ මේ කටයුත්ත නිසා රජයට කිසියම් පාඩුවක් සිදුව ඇති බව පිළිගත නොහැකි වන්නේ, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඇති වෙළඳපොල තත්ත්වය විවිධ අවස්ථාවන්හි දී වෙනස් වන නිසාත්, අලෙවි කරන බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය වෙනස් වන නිසාත් බවයි. මේ අවස්ථාවේදී සමරසිරි මහතා ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර නඩුවේ තීන්දුව රැගත් නඩු

අංක SCFR457/2012 හි පිටපතක් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ අතර එහි එක්තරා ඡේදයකට කමිටුවේ විශේෂ අවධානය යොමු කරන ලෙසත් එය ඒ අයුරින්ම වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් කරන ලෙසත් ඉල්ලා සිටියේය.

ශ්‍රී පවන් විනිසුරු (එවකට) :

"සංකීර්ණ ආර්ථික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා සම්බන්ධ කටයුතුවලදී ගනු ලබන සෑම තීරණයක්ම අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ප්‍රත්‍යක්ෂමූලකව සිදුකළ යුතු බව අප අමතක නොකළ යුතු අතර ඒ අනුව දැඩි රාමුවක පිහිටා හෝ දැඩි මතවල එල්බ ගෙන එහි වලංගුභාවය අත්හදා බැලීම සිදුකළ නොහැක. ....."

22. මේ කාර්යයේදී රජයට පාඩුවක් වූයේ නම් ඒ පිළිබඳව විභාග කිරීමට රජයට, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට හෝ මහජන සුබ සිද්ධිය තකා කටයුතු කරන කිනම් සංවිධානයකට හෝ බාධාවක් නොමැති බව කමිටුව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි.

23. කමිටුවට ලැබුණු තොරතුරු මත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ වැඩ කටයුතුවල කිසිදු විනිවිදභාවයක් නොමැති බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරනු ලබයි. ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව අතර සිදු කෙරෙන කාර්යන් පිළිබඳව කිසිදු විධිමත් අධීක්ෂණයක් සිදු නොවේ. එම අංශයට ලැබෙන දුරකතන ඇමතුම් එමෙන්ම ලැබෙන ලියකියවිලි පිළිබඳ කිසිම වාර්තාවක් නොමැත. එමෙන්ම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සහ ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් අතර හුවමාරු වන ඉලෙක්ට්‍රොනික කෙටි පණිවුඩ සහ විද්‍යුත් තැපැල් යනාදිය පිළිබඳව කිසිදු අධීක්ෂණයක් සිදු නොවේ.

24. රජයේ ඉතාමත් වැදගත් වූත් රහස්‍යවූත් තොරතුරු සම්බන්ධ කටයුතු රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් සිදු කරන බැවින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවත් ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවනුත් අතර සිදු කෙරෙන කාර්යන් පාලනය කිරීමේ සහ අධීක්ෂණය කිරීමේ විධිමත් යාන්ත්‍රණයක් නොපමාව ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුතු බව කමිටුව විසින් අවධාරණය කරනු ලබයි.

25. මහ බැංකුවට අදාළ සංඛ්‍යා දත්ත රැගත් ඉතා රහසිගත ලියකියවිලි පවා මහජනයා වෙත අනාවරණය වී ඇති බව මෙම කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී. අදාළ ලියවිල්ල වෙබ් අඩවිවල, පුවත් පත්වල සහ පුද්ගලයන් අතරේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අත්සන සහිතව හුවමාරු වන බව දැකීමෙන් මහ බැංකුවේ ඉතා ආරක්ෂිත පරිසරයක තිබිය යුතු රහසිගත තොරතුරු පිටවීම ගැන සහ මහ බැංකුවේ පාරිශුද්ධභාවය ගැන සැකයක් මතුවේ. එම ලියවිල්ල මහජනයා අතරට පත්වීම පිළිබඳව මේ දක්වා කිසිඳු අභ්‍යන්තර පරීක්ෂණයක් කර නැති බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් කමිටුවට දැනගන්නට ලැබුණි.

26. ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවන් බොහෝ දෙනෙකු දැක්වූ අදහස් පරිදි බැංකුවේ රහස් තොරතුරු බොහෝ අවස්ථාවන්හිදී පිටස්තරයන් අතට පත්ව ඇති බවත් කමිටුව නිරීක්ෂණය කළේය. මෙම නිරීක්ෂණය අසන්නට ලැබුණු චෝදනාවක් පදනම් කොට ගෙන කෙරෙන ප්‍රකාශයක්

ලෙස හැඳින්වීමට කමිටුව ප්‍රවේසම් වී ඇත. කෙසේ වෙතත් ආරක්ෂිතව තිබිය යුතු තොරතුරු ඇතුළත් ලියවිල්ලක් මහජනතාව අතට පත්වීමෙන් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ආරක්ෂා කෙරුණු රහසිගත තොරතුරුවල රහස්‍යභාවය උල්ලංඝණය වී ඇත. මේ සිද්ධිය සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන නිසි රාජ්‍ය අධිකාරියක් මඟින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ කටයුතුත් එහි නිලධාරීනුත් මහ බැංකුවේ අනෙක් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලත් ඒවායේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ කටයුතු පිළිබඳවත් සොයා බැලීමට ක්‍රියාකළ යුතු යැයි කමිටුව සිය නිරීක්ෂණවල සඳහන් කරයි.

27. ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ වාණිජ ක්ෂේත්‍රයේ ජීවනාලිය හැසිරවීමේදී එහි නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරුන් සහ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ පාරිශුද්ධභාවය රැකගනිමින් එහි වගකීම් නිසි අයුරින් ඉටු කරනු ඇතැයි පිළිබඳව මහජනතාව තුළ පවත්නා අපේක්ෂාවන් අසාධාරණ නොවේ.

2012 ජනවාරි 01 වන දා සිට මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත වෙන්දේසි කිරීම් සහ පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම් හරහා ලැබුණු ලංසු සහ කරන ලද නිකුත් කිරීම්

28. 2012 සිට මේ දක්වා කාලසීමාවේදී සුරැකුම්පත් වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා එකම එක ලිපිගොනුවක් තිබූ අතර සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් සඳහා ලිපි ගොනු 4 ක් පමණ ඇති බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී.

29. සමරසිරි මහතා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද පහත දැක්වෙන සංඛ්‍යා දත්ත සහිත ලියවිල්ලක් ද කමිටුවේ නිරීක්ෂණයට ලක්විය.

වර්ෂය	වෙන්දේසිය	පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම්	මුළු ගණන	වෙන්දේසි අනුපාතිකය	වෙන්දේසි	පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම්
2012	59.3	788.6	847.9	14.3	7.0	93.0
2013	201.2	815.9	1017.1	5.1	19.8	80.2
2014	27.8	832.9	860.7	31.0	3.2	96.8

30. භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් බොහොමයක් අලෙවි කර ඇත්තේ පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම්වලට නිසා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ ක්‍රියාශීලි සහභාගීත්වය අහිමි වී ඇතැයි සමරසිරි මහතා ඉහත දැක්වෙන වගුව ඉදිරිපත් කරමින් විස්තර කළේය. මූලික අවශ්‍යතාවන් සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා සිදු කරන ලද සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිවලට අනුකූල නොවන බවත් ඒ මහතා පෙන්වා දුන්නේය.

31. හැකි සෑම විටම මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාගැනීම වෙන්දේසි මඟින් ඉටු කරගත යුතු බව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තු අත්පොතෙහි විශේෂයෙන් සඳහන් කර ඇති බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරනු ලබයි. වෙන්දේසි ඉක්මවා ගොස් පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම්වලට ඉඩ දීම යහපත් ප්‍රවේශයක් නොවන බවත් එය ඵලදායී සහභාගීත්වයට අහිත කර ක්‍රියාදාමයක් වන අතර විනිවිද භාවයෙන් තොර බවත් ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවන් ද තහවුරු කළහ.

32. 2015 ට පෙර පැවති ක්‍රම විනිවිදභාවයෙන් තොරවූ අතර ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුවේ ඵලදායී තත්ත්වයටත් හානි කර වූ බව සමරසිරි මහතා තවදුරටත් පැහැදිලි කළේය. 2014 මැයි 27 වන දා සිදු කළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් වෙන්දේසීන්ට අදාළ ලියවිල්ලක් (X5 ඇමුණුම) ඉදිරිපත් කළ සමරසිරි මහතා එම අවස්ථාවේදී ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ කිසිදු සාමාජිකයෙකුගේ සහභාගිත්වයක් හෝ ඒ පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡාවක් සිදු කර නොමැති බවත් අනාවරණය කළේය. ඊට අදාළ ලියවිල්ලට අත්සන් තබා තිබුනේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිවරයාත් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාත් පමණකි. ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුවේ කිසිදු සාමාජිකයෙකු මෙම ලියවිල්ල දැක නැති බවත් ඔවුන්ගේ අත්සන් එම ලියවිල්ලේ නොමැති බවත් ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුවේ රැස්වීමක් ගැන කිසිදු සඳහනක් එම ලියවිල්ලේ නැති බවත් ඔහු අනාවරණය කළේය.

33. පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම් නිරීක්ෂණය කරන විට ඒවා කිසිදු වැදගත්කමින් තොර බව කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී. වෙන්දේසි කිරීම් මඟින් මීට පෙර නිකුත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කර සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් වශයෙන් පෙනී ගිය අතර එහි යම් ස්ථිරභාවයක්, විනිවිදභාවයක් සහ ක්‍රියාකාරී සහභාගිත්වයක් තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් සෑම ගණුදෙනුකරුවෙකුටම සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් කිරීමට අවස්ථාව ලබාදුන්නේ යැයි කමිටුව හමුවේ ප්‍රකාශ කළද එම ප්‍රකාශ ඔප්පු කිරීම සඳහා දුරකතන වාර්තා, විද්‍යුත් තැපැල් හෝ වෙනත් කිසිදු ලියවිල්ලක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට ඔවුහු අපොහොසත් වූහ. 2012 දක්වා දිවෙන කාල සීමාව තුළ දී කිසිදු ලිඛිත සාක්ෂියක් නොතිබීම ගැන කමිටුවේ දැඩි සැලකිල්ල යොමු විය.

34. ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩල කමිටුවේ නිසි සහභාගිත්වයෙන් තොරව කිසිදු ලිඛිත සාක්ෂියකින් තොරව සෘජු ඉල්ලුම් සඳහා ලැබෙන ඇමතුම් පටිගත නොකොට වෙන්දේසී පවත්වා ඇති බැවින් මෙදා සිට 2012 වසර දක්වා කාලය තුළ සිදු කර ඇති වෙන්දේසී පිළිබඳව සම්පූර්ණ විභාගයක් පැවැත්වීම සුදුසු යැයි කමිටුව අදහස් කරයි.

35. 2012. ජනවාරී 01 වන දා සිට සිදු කර ඇති සෘජු ඉල්ලුම්වලට අදාළ ලියකියවිලි බහුලත්වය නිසා ඊට අදාළ ගණන් මිණුම් මෙම වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කිරීම පළක් නැති ව්‍යායාමයක් වනු ඇත. කෙසේ වෙතත් කමිටුව පහත දැක්වෙන කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදු කර ඇති පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම් පිළිබඳව සුපරීක්ෂාකාරීව අධ්‍යයනය කර ඇත.

    අ. 2012 ජනවාරී 01 සිට ජූනි දක්වා ඇතුළත් 11 වන වෙළුම
    ආ. 2012 ජූලි සිට දෙසැම්බර් දක්වා ඇතුළත් 12 වන වෙළුම
    ඇ. 2013 ජනවාරී සිට දෙසැම්බර් දක්වා ඇතුළත් 13 වන වෙළුම
    ඈ. 2014 ජනවාරී සිට දෙසැම්බර් දක්වා ඇතුළත් 14 වන වෙළුම

36. වෙන්දේසිවලදී ඉදිරිපත් වුණු ඉල්ලුම් හා පිළිගත් සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම්වලට අදාළ ලියකියවිලි ද කමිටුවේ පරීක්ෂාවට බඳුන් විය.

    අ. 2012 ජනවාරී සිට ජූලි දක්වා ඇතුළත් 16 වන වෙළුම
    ආ. 2013 සිට 2015.03.17 දක්වා ඇතුළත් 02 වන සහ 03 වන වෙළුම

37. නිකුත් කරන ලද සුරැකුම්පත් කිසිදු විටක අවසන් කර නොතිබූ බවත් අවුරුදු ගණනාවකට පෙර නිකුත් කරන ලද කල් ඉකුත් වූ සුරැකුම්පත් එවාහි කල් පිරීමේ කාලය මත නැවත සකස් කොට වසර ගණනාවකට පසුව පෞද්ගලික ඉල්ලුම් ලෙස තබා ඇති බවත් කමිටුව විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී. මේ ක්‍රියා මාර්ගය විනිවිදභාවයෙන් තොර වන අතර එය සැකසහිත ක්‍රියාවන් සිදුකිරීමටද අනුබලයක් විය.

38. මෙම කමිටුව පත් කරන ලද්දේ සීමිත බලතල යටතේ කරුණු සොයා වාර්තා කිරීමට පමණක් බව කමිටුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශ කරයි. මෙම වාර්තාව මඟින් හෙළිදරව් කර ඇති කරුණුවලට පිළියම් යෙදීමටත් එවැනි දේවල් වැලැක්වීමට අවශ්‍ය ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගන්නා ලෙසත් කමිටුව ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන ආර්ථික කටයුතු ළමා හා තරුණ කටයුතු, යෞවන කටයුතු, සංස්කෘතික කටයුතු බාර අමාත්‍යවරයා වූ ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගෙන් කාරුණිකව ඉල්ලා සිටී.

39. කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා ඇතුලු සාමාජිකයින් විසින් කමිටුව ඉදිරියේ කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමටත් අවශ්‍ය වූ විට අදාල ලියකියවිලි ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙනුත් සහය දැක්වූ සැමට සිය අවංක ස්තුතිය පළකර සිටියි. සභාපතිවරයා සහ කමිටුවේ අනෙකුත් සාමාජිකයින් විසින් විශේෂයෙන්ම මෙම පරීක්ෂණ කටයුත්තේ දී කමිටුවට අප්‍රමාණ මග පෙන්වීමක් සහ සහායක් දැක්වූ ඩබ්ලිව්. ඒ. විජේවර්ධන මහතාගේ අනූපම සහය කෘතඥතා පූර්වකව සිහිපත් කරනු ලබයි.

40. අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය කාර්යාලයේ ලේකම් සමන් ඒකනායක, දමයන්ති විජේසිංහ, රසීනා ෂෙරිෆ් සහ අනූෂා කුරේ යන මහත්ම මහත්මීන් ගෙන් ලද සහයෝගයත් කමිටුව කෘතඥතා පූර්වකව සිහිපත් කරයි. ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යංශයේ මහාචාර්ය ලේකම් කිත්සිරි ලියනගේ මහතාටත් ඔහුගේ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයටත් කමිටුවේ ස්තුතිය පුදකර සිටියි.

ගාමිණී පිටිපන
නීතීඥ
සභාපති

මහේෂ් කළුගම්පිටිය
නීතීඥ
කමිටු සාමාජික

චන්දිමාල් මෙන්ඩිස්
නීතීඥ
කමිටු සාමාජික

ඇමුණුම 03

ඇමුණුම 03
இகணப்பு 03
Annexure 03

<u>ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහා බැංකුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි සිට 2016 මාර්තු දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති විසින් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවට 2016 ජූලි 05 වන දින කරන ලද ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම (Power Point Presentation)</u>

පැමිණ සිටි -

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රවුෆ් හකීම් මහතා
ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා
ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා
ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජධීර මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා

නිශාන්ති වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය, කාරක සභාවේ ලේකම්

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩබ්ලිව්. පී. සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති;
එස්. එම්. ඩී. එස්. එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්. එස්. අයි. ජයරත්න මිය, විගණන අධිකාරී; විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
එන්. එස්. කොඩිතුවක්කු මිය, විගණන අධිකාරී; විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
ජේ. ඊ. පුෂ්පකුමාර මහතා, ගිණුම් විධායක; විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
යූ. අයි. අතුකෝරල මිය, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
එස්. ජී. ටී. ඉන්දික මහතා, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

සභාපතිතුමා : සියළු දෙනාගෙනුත් ඒ වාගේම විගණකාධිපති තුමා ඇතුළු විගණකාධිපති තුමාගේ නිලධාරීන් සියළු දෙනාම පිළිගන්නවා. අද අපි යොදා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ විශේෂයෙන්ම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන පැහැදිළි කිරීම සහ ඒ presentation එක පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කිරීම. ඒකේදී මම මුලින්ම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීම, ඒ presentation එකට සවන් දීලා ඊට පස්සේ ඒක තුළින් මතු වෙන ගැටළු සහ සාකච්ඡා කළ යුතු කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කරන්න කියලා යෝජනා කරනවා. මුලින්ම මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට යෝජනා කරනවා මුලින්ම ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා.

විගණකාධිපති: සභාපතිතුමා ඇතුළු සියළුම සාමාජිකයන්ගෙන් අවසරයි. අපි කෝප් කමිටුවේ ඉල්ලීම පරිදි වාර්තාවක් සකස් කළා. මේ බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන්. ඒ වාර්තාව තවදුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඒ අභ්‍යන්තරයට ගමන්

කිරීම සඳහා තමයි අද දවස අප යොදා ගන්නේ. මේ මගේ presentation එක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන ඒ එක එක chapters පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි ගොඩනගලා තියෙන්නේ. වෙන විශේෂ අලුත් දෙයක් නැහැ. ඒකමයි කරලා තියෙන්නේ. නමුත් අපි තියෙන දේ විස්තර කරන එකයි කරන්නේ. මේ කෝප් කමිටුවේ මාර්තු 6 දී මට දුන්න ඉල්ලීම අනුව තමයි මේ සකස් කිරීම ඇත්තටම අද සිද්ද වෙන්නේ. මේකෙදී කාරණා පැහැදිලි කිරීමට මත්තෙන් අපි ඉතාමත් වැදගත් කාරණයක් අවබෝධ කර ගන්න අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා. මොකද මේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පසුගිය වාර්තා ගණනාවක් සකස් කළා. ඒ එක එක committee තිබුණා. ඒ committees වෙන වෙනම TOR දීලා තිබුණා. ඒ committees තියෙන TOR වල තිබුණ සීමා සහිත බව නිසා ඒ එක කමිටුවකින්වත් ලබා ගත් අවසන් ප්‍රතිඵලය වැදගත් කමක් නොගත්තා. ඒකට හේතුව යම් යම් ආකාරයේ එම වාර්තාවල සීමා පැනවීම් තිබුණු නිසා. විෂය පථය ඉතාමත්ම සීමා කර තිබුණු නිසා. නමුත්, විගණකාධිපතිගේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමේදී කෝප් කමිටුව විසින් එවැනි කිසිම limitation එකක්, සීමාවක් පැනෙව්වේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා විගණකාධිපතිට හැකියාවක් ලැබුණා මේ ප්‍රශ්නය දිහා රටක් හැටියට රජයක් හැටියට බලන ක්‍රමවේදය තුළ බලන්න. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ වාර්තාව මෙච්චර එලියට එන්න හැකි වුණේ. කෙසේ වෙතත් පැහැදිළිව කියන්න ඕනෑ මේක විගණකාධිපතිගේ ස්වාධීන මතය කියන කාරණය ඉතාමත් පැහැදිලිව සටහන් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද නැත්නම් මේක අවසාන වාර්තාවක් හැටියට දකිමින් නොයෙකුත් ප්‍රශ්න ඇති කර ගන්නවා. මේ opinion එක පිළිගන්නවාද නැද්ද කියන එක කෝප් කමිටුවේ කාර්යය. සහ බලධරයින්ගේ කාර්යය විගණකාධිපති සිද්ධ කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ස්වාධීන පුද්ගලයෙක් හැටියට රජයේ ස්වාධීන පුද්ගලයා හැටියට මේ කාරණය ස්වාධීනව විග්‍රහ කිරීම කියන කාරණය තමයි මෙතැනදී වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ ස්වාධීන මතයක් කියන කාරණය වැදගත් වෙනවා. හැබැයි මෙම මතය ප්‍රකාශ කිරීම සඳහා විගණකාධිපති විසින් යොදා ගත්ත සීමාවන් තමයි concern කළ යුතු area මෙතැනදී ඉතාමත් සැලකිලිමත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද වෙනත් committees වලට වඩා විගණකාධිපතිට මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් බැලීමේදී වැදගත්ම කාරණා කීපයක් කෙරෙහි අවධානය යොමු කරන්නත් සිද්ධ වුණා. ඒ වැදගත්ම කාරණය තමයි **v.f.m.** කියලා අපි හඳුන්වන්නේ value for money රටට මේ ක්‍රියාදාමයේදී මුදලේ අගය ආරක්ෂා වෙන ආකාරයට ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙලා තිබෙනවාද කියන කාරණය. ඒ නිසා මේක ඉතාමත්ම ගැඹුරට ගිහිල්ලා මේ මුදලේ රටේ මුදල් ආරක්ෂා වන ආකාරයට මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිද්ධ වුණාද කියන කාරණය විවෘතව බැලීම මෙතැනදී සිද්ධ වුණා. දෙවැනි කාරණය තමයි whether the decision are to the best option present and future. මේ තීරණ ගැනීමේදී මේ ඉතාමත්ම සුදුසු හොඳම තීරණය ද මේ අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ කියන කාරණය බලන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද හේතුව විගණකාධිපතිගේ විෂය පථය යටතේ ඔහුට තියෙන්නේ රජයේ ආයතන, රජයේ සේවකයෝ, රජයේ නිලධාරීන් සියළුම දෙනා ක්‍රියාත් මකවීමේදී හොඳම තමන්ට භාර දී තිබෙන කර්තව්‍යය ඉතාමත්ම හොඳ තීරණ ගැනීමෙන් ඉදිරියට යනවාද කියන එක (management decisions) judgment නියමාකාරයෙන් කර තිබෙනවාද කියන එක බැලීම. මේ කාරණයේදී ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම උසාවියකට ගිහිල්ලා නීතියකින් witness එක්ක ඔප්පු කරන කාරණයකට එහා ගිය කාරණයක් මේක. ඒ නිසා සමහර වෙලාවට දකිනවා මේක උසාවි ගිහිල්ලා තීරණයක් ගන්න බැහැ කියලා නමුත් best option කියන එක judgmental හැබැයි විගණකාධිපතිට තිබෙන බලතල අනුව ඔහුට පුළුවන් මේ decision එක best option එක නොවෙයි කියන එක දකින්න යම් යම් සාධාරණ හේතූන් මත. ඒ සාධාරණ හේතූන් අපි දිගින් දිගටම analyze කළා. ඒක වර්තමානයට නොවෙයි අනාගතයට කොතරම් දුරට රටේ ආර්ථිකයට බලපානවාද එහෙම නැත්නම් මේ ක්‍රමවේදයට බලපානවාද කියන කාරණය තවුරටත් විග්‍රහ කිරීම කළා. ඊට එහා ගියාම due care of the government officials කියන කාරණය ඉතාමත්ම වැදගත්. විගණකාධිපතිට තියෙන බලතල හැටියට රජයේ සේවකයෙක්, officer කෙනෙක් තමන්ගේ රාජකාරිය කිරීමේදී රාජකාරී තීරණ ගැනීමේදී රාජකාරිමය professional විචක්ෂණභාවයෙන් ඇතුව ඒ කටයුත්ත කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියන කාරණය අනිවාර්යෙන්ම සලකා බලන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මේ සිද්ධියේදී ඒ නිසා විගණකාධිපති වාර්තා සකස් කිරීමේදී ඉතාමත්ම වැදගත් කාරණයක් හැටියට දැක්කා ඒ තනතුරට දීලා තිබෙන professional judgment ගැනීම සඳහා දීලා තිබෙන official capacity එක අනුව ඔහු මේ විචක්ෂණභාවයෙන් යුක්තව මේ කටයුත්ත කළාද කියන කාරණයට යන්න. මේ කාරණය කර ගෙන තමයි මේ තීරණ ගත්තේ. ඊලඟට ඉතාමත්ම වැදගත් කරණය තමයි මේ transparency should be maintain but not any cost කියන issue එක. මොකද අපි මේ සිද්ධිය දැක්කාම සිද්ධියේ මුල

ඉඳලා දකින කාරණයක් හැටියට දකින්නේ මේ විනිවිදභාවය වර්ධනය කර ගැනීම සඳහා ගොඩක් මේ වෙනස්කම් සිද්ධ කළා කියලා. හැබැයි විනිවිදභාවය කියන එකට සීමාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක අපට දරාගන්න බැරි වියදමකින් ඒ විනිවිදභාවය අරගෙන වැඩක් නෑ. ඒ නිසා විනිවිදභාවය ගන්න මට මේකේ සීමාව ගහන්න බැහැ. හැබැයි ඒ වුණාට reasonable පුද්ගලයෙකුට කියන්න පුළුවන් මේ විනිවිදභාවය මේ වගේ වියදමක් කරලා ගන්න එකේ තේරුමක් නෑ කියලා. අන්න එතැනදී ආයෙත් අර v.f.m. තත්ත්වෙට විගණකාධිපති පත් වෙනවා. ඔහුට සිද්ධ වෙනවා බලන්න මේ transparency එක අරගත්තේ සාධාරණ වියදමකින්ද ඒ වියදම ඉසිලිය හැකි වියදමක්ද කියන කාරණය. මෙන්න මේ කාරණා ටික අපි අනිවාර්යෙන්ම පැහැදිලිව මතක තියා ගන්නවා විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව criticize කරන කොට මොකද නැත්නම් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වැරදි උත්තරයක් තමයි ඉදිරියේදී එන්නේ. මොකද මේ වගේ පුළුල් පරාසයක ඉඳගෙන තමයි මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කලේ. ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමේදී තර්කානුකූලව උසාවියකින් ඔප්පු කරන කාරණාවලට එහා ගිහිල්ලා ඔහුගේ ස්වාධීන මතයක් හැටියට තමයි මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කියන කාරණය සහිතව අපිට මේ කාරණය කතා කරන්න වෙනවා. එතකොට මේ සඳහා අපි පරීශීලනය කරපු documents ඔක්කොම අපි සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒවා අපේ වාර්තාවේ තියෙනවා. මම ඒ නිසා ඒ ගැන කතා කරන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඊලඟට limitation copes අපි පැහැදිලිව ඇතුලත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ limitation වල ඔක්කෝම තියෙනවා මොන මොන සීමාවන් යටතේද අපට මේ දේ කරන්න සිද්ධ වුනේ කියලා. ඒ සීමාවන් අපි ඔක්කොම සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඊලඟට අපි central bank role එක ගත්තොත් ඒ role එකේ වැදගත්ම කාරණය තමයි මේ primary object එකේ තියෙන්නේ maintenance of the economic price stability of the Sri Lanka කියන කාරණය. ඊලඟට මේ stability එක ගොඩ නැඟීම සඳහා central bank එක කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන කාරණය. ඒ එක්කම ..... භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ treasury security බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීමේ සම්පූර්ණ බලය තියෙන්නේ භාණ්ඩාගාරයට කියන කාරණය. ඊලඟට government එකේ agent කෙනෙක් හැටියට ඔහු කටයුතු කරනවා කියන කාරණය. Securities ප්‍රධාන කොටස් දෙකකට බෙදෙනවා මම වැඩි කාලයක් ගන්නේ නැහැ මේ theoretical පැත්ත කතා කරන්න. Treasury bonds and treasury bolls මේ දෙක එකතු වුණාම තමයි government securities කියන එක හඳුන්වන්නේ. ඒකෙන් treasury bills කියලා කියන්නේ වර්ෂයකට වඩා අඩු කාලයකට රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සඳහා ගන්න යෙදන paper එකක් තමයි Treasury bill කියලා කියන්නේ. Treasury bonds කියලා කියන්නේ වර්ෂයට වැඩි කාලයකට අවශ්‍ය ණය ඒ කියන්නේ කෙටි කාලීනව නොව දිගු කාලීනව ණය ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒ ණය සඳහා යම් කිසි පිළිගත් interest rate එකක් පදනම් කර ගෙන අපි coupon rate කියලා කියනවා. Interest rate කියන එකට පදනම් කර ගෙන නිකුත් කරන paper එකට තමයි treasury bonds කියන එකෙන් හඳුන් වන්නේ. එතකොට treasury bonds බොහෝ වෙලාවට අවුරුද්දකට දෙසැරයක් half a year වලට interest ගෙවන gross value එක රුපියල් සියයක වටිනාකමක් තියෙන paper එකක්. එතකොට මේ treasury bonds issue කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රධාන කොටස් දෙකක් අනුගමනය කරනවා. මේක ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්න දේට මම මේක ඔක්කොම එක මට්ටමට මේක අරගන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසා මගේ presentation එකට කියන්නේ. ඒ issue කිරීමේ ක්‍රම දෙක තමයි එකක් direct placement method, අනෙක auction method කියන එක. ඒ කියන්නේ direct අදාළ පුද්ගලයින්ට primary dealer ට කතා කරලා මේක කරන්න පුළුවන් අනෙක් එක වෙන්දේසියකට ගිහිල්ල වෙන්දේසියෙන් මේ කාරණය සිදු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ක්‍රම දෙක පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි මේ treasury bonds issue කිරීම සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේ yield rate කියලා කියන්නේ මේ සඳහා ලැබෙන ප්‍රතිලාභය මොකක්ද කියලා තීරණය කිරීමේ ප්‍රධාන ක්‍රම දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. පළවෙනි එක තමයි ලහම තියෙන treasury bonds auction එකේ price එක පදනම් කර ගෙන මේ decide කරන එක. දෙවැනි එක තමයි secondary market එකේ තියෙන ඒ maturity අවුරුදු 30 නම් අවුරුදු 30 maturity එකක් තියෙනවා නම් secondary market එකේ market එක issue කරලා අන්න ඒකේ තියෙන මිල පදනම් කර ගෙන interest rate එක decide කරන එක තමයි මේ දෙවෙනි ක්‍රමය. එතකොට මේ කියන මේ අපි තේරුම් ගන්න ඕන මේ කාරණය, මේ ප්‍රශ්නය විග්‍රහ කිරීමේදී වැදගත් වන තැන මේ coupon rate එක කියන කාරණය හරහා treasury එකට භාණ්ඩාගාරයට ලාභාලාභ එන්නේ කොහොමද මේකෙන් මේ issue කිරීමේදී කියන එක. එතකොට මේ coupon rate එක හැම වෙලාවේම මේ weighted average yield rate කියන එකට වඩා වැඩි නම් එතැනදී අනිවාර්යෙන්ම premium එකකට ඒ කියන්නේ වැඩි මිලකට තමයි මේ

treasury bill නිකුත් කරන්නේ. රුපියල් සියයක treasury bill රුපියල් 105 ක් හම්බ වෙනවා bond එකක් issue කලාම. එක gain එක රුපියල් 05 ක gain එකක් හම්බ වෙනවා. මම ඊලඟ slide එකේ explain කරන්නම්. ඒක government එකට ලාභයක් වෙනවා. එතකොට coupon rate එක සමාන වුනොත් එහෙම weighted average yield value වලට එතකොට per value ඒ කියන්නේ issue කරන 100ටම තමයි issue කරන්නේ ඒ නිසා no gain no loss. ඒ එක්කම මේකේ අනිත් එක coupon rate එක අඩු නම් හැම වෙලාවෙම yield rate එකට වඩා එතැනදී අනිවාර්යෙන්ම එන්නේ discount rate එකක්. Discount rate එක කියලා කියන්නේ government එකට issue කරපු වෙලාවේම loss එකක් වෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ ගණන් නොවෙයි රුපියල් සියයකට issue කරන කොට රුපියල් 75 ක් හරි, 80 ක් හරි, 90 ක් හරි හම්බ වෙන්නේ. එතකොට එතනම loss එක වෙනවා සියයට 90 ට දුන්නොත් 90 යි හම්බ වෙන්නේ. හැබැයි release කරන කොට රුපියල් 100 ක් ගෙවන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මේක සුළු example එකකින් කිව්වොත් රුපියල් සියයක face value එකක් තියෙන එක bid value එක bid කරලා ආවාම පස්සේ 105 ක් වෙනවා නම් premium එකක් හම්බ වෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ රුපියල් 05 ක් ලාබයි ආණ්ඩුවට. Release කරන වෙලාවේ රුපියල් 100 යි ගෙවන්න වෙන්නේ. මේ 05 කැපිටල් gain එකක් හැටියට gain එකක් හැටියට ඒ වෙලාවේදීම හම්බ වෙනවා. හැබැයි 100 එක 100 ට නම් issue කලේ 05 value එක zero කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මේක settle කරන වෙලාවට රුපියල් 100 තමයි ගෙවන්න වෙන්නේ. Plus interest කියන කාරණයේ. හැබැයි රුපියල් 100 එක අපි රුපියල් 95 ට නම් bill කරලා අරගත්තෙ එතකොට මෙතැනදීම රුපියල් 05 ක් අලාභ වෙනවා මොකද release කරන වෙලාවේ රුපියල් 100 ක් අනිවාර්යෙන් ගෙවන්න වෙනවා. ඒ එක්කම මේ වෙලාවේ auction එකක් ඉවර වුණ ගමන් ම රුපියල් 95 ක් තමයි treasury සල්ලි හම්බ වෙන්නේ. රුපියල් 100 වෙනුවට. රුපියල් 100 ක් auction කළාට 95 යි හම්බ වෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේක තමයි මේ case එකේ තියෙන ලොකුම issue එක. එතකොට මේ වෙනස වෙන්න ප්‍රධානම හේතු දෙකක් තියෙනවා. එකක් තමයි primary market එක below ද primary coupon rate එකට වඩා අඩු වන අවස්ථාවකදී එහෙම නැත්නම් future market එකේදී interest rate එක පිළිබඳව පහළ යාමක් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා නම් එතකොට ඒ වගේ පහළ හෝ ඉහළ යාමක් කියන කාරණා දෙක පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි මේ වෙනස් කම සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ. අපි හඳුන් වනවා interest rate එකේ හඳුන් වන්නේ ඒකයි. ඊලඟට අපි අවොත් එහෙම මේ වර්තමාන bond issue එකට එතකොට 2014 ජනවාරි ඉඳලා මාර්තු වෙනකම් ම මේ මම මෙච්චර වෙලා කියපු කාරණයත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ කරපුවාම මේ කාරණා දෙකම පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි bonds issue කරලා තියෙන්නේ. එකක් auction එක, auction එකෙන් සියයට 20 ක් විතර auction කරලා තියෙනවා. ඉතුරු ටික ඔක්කොම private placement එහෙම නැත්නම් මේ direct placement කියන කාරණා පදනම කර ගෙන තමයි bond issue එක කරලා තියෙන්නේ. මේක කරන්න ප්‍රධාන හේතුව තමයි මේ auction එක කියන කාරණය ලංකාවේ super open economy එකක් නොවේ තියෙන්නේ මොකද බොහොම ටික දෙනෙක් ඉන්නේ primary dealers ලා එතකොට මේකට අපිට පුළුවන් කමක් නෑ අමෙරිකාවේ තියෙන විදියේ ක්‍රමවේදය පාවිච්චි කරන්න. මොකද ඇමෙරිකාවේ sub primary bonds auction එකේ ඉන්නවා ලක්ෂයක් විතර. ඒ නිසා එකතුවෙලා කවදාවත් මිලක් තීරණය කරන්න බෑ. ලංකාවේ ඉන්නේ 17 දෙනයි. අවසර 17 දෙනයි එක table එකේ ඉඳ ගන්න. E.P.F එකත් එක්ක 17 යි. ඒ 17 ඒක වෙනස් වෙනවා අවුරුද්දෙන් අවුරුද්ද එක එක්කෙනා අඩු වෙනවා. එතකොට මේ ටික දෙනාට හවසය එක මේසේ ඉඳගන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට එහෙම වුණොත් වෙන්නේ මේ Auction එකේ තියෙන මේ price එක පිළිබඳව doubt එකක් පෙන්නනවා. ඒ නිසා තමයි පසුගිය කාලේ දිගටම කළේ මේ auction එකට ගිහිල්ලා auction එකෙන් නියම කර ගන්නා මිල auction එකට පොඩි ගානක් දාලා ඒකේ නියම කර ගන්නා මිල පදනම් කර ගෙන private placement වලට යනවා. මොකද ඒ private placement වලට ගොඩක් වෙලාවට සහභාගී වුණේ රජයේ අනෙකුත් ආයතන ETF, EPF banks වල people's bank, NSB වගේ තැන්. ඒ නිසා ඒගොල්ලන්ට කියනවා මෙන්න market අද දින price එක ඒ නිසා ගන්න කියලා. එහෙම කරලා තමයි මේ 80 ගත්තේ. ඒ නිසා price control එකක් වගේම

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: .....අර 16 දෙනාගෙන් අමතරවත් ගන්න පුළුවන් ද?

විගණකාධිපති : බෑ direct placement ගන්නේ ඒ 17, 16 දෙනාම තමයි. Primary dealers යන්න බෑ එතැනින් එහාට. ඒ කොටසින් තමයි ඒක කෙරෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Direct dealersලාට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

විගණකාධිපති: ඔව්

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: direct placement ආණ්ඩුවේ ආයතනවලට දාන්න පුළුවන්ද?

විගණකාධිපති: ආණ්ඩුවේ ආයතන කියලා එකක් නැහැ. Primary dealers තමයි ඒ ටික කරන්නේ. ඒ Primary dealers ඇතුලේ ඉන්නවා ආණ්ඩුවේ ආයතන. ඒ කියන්නේ. EPF, ETF

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා කියනවා 20% ක් Auction කරලා ඒකෙන් price එකක් තේරුම් අරගෙන ඊට පස්සේ directs පෙන්නන්න කියලා. ඒකනේ කියන්නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ.

2014 සමස්ථය තමයි 2080. හැබැයි මොකක් හරි අපි ගනුදෙනුවක් පටන් ගන්නවා නම් ඒ ගනුදෙනුවේදී යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙන්දේසියට දානවා නම්. ඒ වෙන්දේසියේදී අපි හොයා ගන්නවා වෙළෙඳ පොළ කොහොමද සැරි සරන්නේ කියලා. ඒකේ ගන්නවා average rate එක අරගෙන ඒ average rate එකට තමයි offer කරනවා අනෙක් තැන්. අපි එතැනින් හොයා ගන්නේ වෙළෙඳපොලේ වලනය පිළිබඳ දළ අදහසක් අපි ගන්නවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි සමාවෙන්න අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ presentation එක ඉවර වෙන්න දෙමු ද? ඊට පස්සේ ඔබ තුමන්ලාගේ තියෙන ගැටළු සටහන් කර ගෙන ..

අපි එකතුව සාකච්ඡා කරමු මේ.....

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ගැටළු ටික සටහන් කර ගෙන නැවත මතු කරමු.

විගණකාධිපති : මොකද මම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පැත්තේ ඉන්නේ. අපි ඔක්කොම එකට මේ අවධානය වැඩි කර ගැනීමක් තමයි මෙතැනදී සිද්ධ කරන්නේ. අපට ඒක දියුණු කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම හරි කියලා අපි කියන්නෙත් නෑ. මේක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම හරි කියලා කියනවාත් නොවෙයි. නමුත් මේකෙන් වුණේ අර control base එක හදා ගත්ත එක හැම වෙලාවේම අර මේ auction එකට ගියත් මේ auction එකේ අවසානය ගොඩක් land වෙන්නේ රජයේ ආයතන මත නිසා මේක තේරුම් ගත්ත central bank එක මේක තේරුම් අරගෙන මේ තැන්වලට ගියා. නමුත් 2015 අප්‍රේල් වල ඉඳලා මේක 100%ක්ම auction එකට ගියා. එතකොට තනිකරම ..... price එක auction එකේ ආයෙමත් replacement එකක් price එකක් decide වුණේ නෑ. ඒ නිසා තමයි ලොකුම issue එක තිබුණේ. එතකොට මෙන්න මේ කට්ටිය තමයි primary dealers හැටියට අපේ list එකේ තියෙන්නේ, අපේ list එකේ. ඒක ඉඳලා හිටලා එක්කෙනා දෙන්නේ එහේ මෙහේ වෙනවා වර්ෂයෙන් වර්ෂයට නමුත් 2015 list එක 16 දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඊට අමතරව ETF එක.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මේ සිද්ධියට පදනම් කර ගන්නේ මොකක්ද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක වෙනම application කරලා කරන list එකක් ඒක ඇත්තටම conditions ..... ගොඩක් තියෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ හැකියාව, capacity ඒ පිළිබඳව. එතකොට අපේ මේ කතා කරන කාල සීමාවට අදාළ කාලයේදී recommend කරලා තිබුණ ආකාරයට තමයි මේ government borrowings මාර්තු මාසයට ඉල්ලලා තිබුණා 2015 බිලියන 261 ක්. ඒ බිලියන 261 ගැනීම සඳහා recommend කරලා තිබුණේ D.D.M.C. එකෙන්. ඒ කියන්නේ Domestic Debt Management Committee එක මේ ආකාරයට 172 ක් අරගන්නවා treasury bonds. 89 ක් bonds ගන්නවා reissue treasury bond මේ අවුරුද්දේ repayment එකක් කරනවා. ඒ repayment එක කරලා එහෙමම repayment කරනවා. එතකොට සල්ලි ටිකක් අතට එන්න ඒවාට. මේ 172 න් 171 ක් direct placement එකක් auction එක් යන්නත් තමයි plan එක තියෙන්නේ. Plan එක approved plan එක තියෙන්නේ මේකේ. එතකොට මේ approved plan එක පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි Auction වලට ගමන් කරන්නේ.

.....

මේක D.D.M.C.එකේදී approve කරලා තියෙනවා මේ 27 වෙනිදා තමයි approve කරලා තියෙන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: bond issue එකකට approve කරපු එක.

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්. ඔව් එදා approve කරලා තිබුණු එක. එතකොට මේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සම්පූර්ණ මාර්තු මාසෙට ද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව් සම්පූර්ණ මාර්තු මාසෙට. මේ programme එකට approve කරපු programme එක.

එතකොට එහෙම තිබුණත් මෙන්න මේක තමයි Plan එක approve කරලා තිබුණේ හැබැයි ඊලඟට

27 වෙනිදා ක්‍රියා කලාපය දිහා බැලුවාම මේ විදියට තමයි යනනේ. Plan කරපු එකේ තිබුණ One Billion Auction. 12.5 Billion එක කොටසේ තිබුණේ Direct Placement

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔය Plan එක ගියවර කෝප් කමිටුවේදී ඔබතුමා මේ වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන නේ මේක හැදුවේ

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගියවර කෝප් කමිටුවට මේ මහ බැංකුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණේ නෑ නේද?

විගණකාධිපති: ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණා. අපේ සටහනේ තියෙනවා.

එතකෙට මේ 10 Billion ම මේ Auction එකෙන් ගත්තා Direct Placement වලින් කීයක්වත් කළේ නෑ. එතැන තමයි මේ issue එක පටන් ගන්න ප්‍රධාන තැනක් හැටියට දකින්නේ. එතකොට Monetary Board එකේ decide කරලා තිබුණා මේ 30 Years Bond Issue කරන්න. දැන් මම මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්න මොකද විගණකාධිපතිගේ අවසාන නිගමනය කොටස් තුනකට කැඩෙනවා. පළවෙනි එක Professional Due Care නෑ කියන එක. දෙවැනි එක තමයි මේ නිසා සිදු වෙච්ච අලාභය. තුන්වැනි එක මේක තවදුරටත් අවශ්‍ය නම් වෙනත් investigation එකකට යන්න කියන කාරණය. Due Care එක හරියට Practice වුනේ නෑ කියන එක තැන් මම මේ ගමන්ම කියාගෙන යන්නම්. නැත්නම් ඒ ගැන මුල ඉඳන් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න වෙන නිසා. මේ Monetary Board එක 30 year Bond වලට Issue කරන්න කියලා decide කලේ ඇයි කියලා කිසිම තැනක හරියටම සාක්ෂි නැහැ. කොහොමද කළේ කියන එක. හැබැයි 30 Years අරගෙන මොකද කළේ කියලා අපි ගිහිල්ලා හොයලා බැලුවා. ඇත්තටම මේක වෙලා තිබුනේ පරණ Funds, Treasury Bond වගයක් ඉතුරුවෙලා issue කරපුවාගේ Interest Pay කරන්න තමයි මේ 12 Billion පාවිච්චි කරලා තිබුණේ. එතකොට අපි professional careness එක ගැන කතා කරන කොට අපිට සිද්ධ වෙනවා බලන්න ඇත්තටම අවුරුදු 30 ක Bond එකක් issue කරන්න ඕනද මේ අවුරුද්දේ මේ Interest Payment එකක් කරන්න කියලා. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය Recurrent interest Payment එකක්. අවුරුද්දක Bond එකක් අරගෙන තමයි ඇත්තටම කරන්න දුන්නේ. මොකද මේක Payment එක අවුරුදු 30 කට කරන්න අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. නමුත් ඒ Decision එක ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් Monetary Board එකේ Paper එකක් තියෙනවා. ඒ Paper එකේ කියනවා Participation of the foreign investment එනවා නිසා ඒ ගොල්ලන් ට participate වෙනවා 30 Years වලට ගත්තේ කියලා. Foreign Investment එකෙන් කිසිම දෙයක් ගත්තා කියලා මේ වෙනකම් ඔප්පු වෙලා නැහැ. ඒ නිසා නැවතත් Central Bank එකේ expectation forecast එක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම fail වෙලා කියන කාරණය පැහැදිලිව ඔප්පු වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා foreign investors ලා ගෙන් ගත්තා කියන එක අපට කිසිම අවස්ථාවක දකින්න ලැබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: What was the Monetary Board's view?' What excuses they have given?

විගණකාධිපති: Excuse නම් මොනවත් සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ. Monetary Board එක decide කරලා තියෙනවා issue කරන්න කියලා 30 Year Bond වලට. එතකොට 30 Year Bond issue කරන්න ඇයි Reason ... අපට paper එකක් හම්බ වුණා. මේක Foreign Investors ලා අවුරුදු 30ක වාගේ Bond Issue එකක් කරපුවාම පස්සේ ඒ ගොල්ලන් market එකට එනවා. ඒ ගොල්ලන් මේ මිලදී ගන්නවා කියන කාරණය තමයි report කරලා තියෙන්නේ. හැබැයි issue කරලා තියෙන මුළු Bond .....100% ගත්තාම මේ Local Primary Dealers ලා අරන් තියෙන්නේ. ඒවා අවසානයේ land වෙලා තියෙන්නේ E.P.F. එකට කියන එක මම ඉස්සරහදී ඔප්පු කරන්නම්. ඒ නිසා එහෙම මේ Foreign Investors ලා ඇවිල්ලා මේවා මිලදී ගත්තා කියලා කිසිදු සාක්ෂියක් අපට ලැබුනේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මේ Expectation එක කිසිම reasonable research එකක් කරලා හෝ forecast එකක් කරලා හෝ ලබා ගත් දෙයක් නෙවෙයි කියන එක ඉතාමත්ම පැහැදිලි වෙනවා ඒ යටතේ. ඊලඟට Bond issue එකේදී අපට Expected Deal Rate එක පිළිබඳව බරපතල ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා. මොකද හේතුව මම අර ඉස්සෙල්ලා කිව්වා rate එක ගන්න ක්‍රම දෙකක් තියෙනවා කියලා. පළවෙනි එක තමයි අර market එකේ තියෙන rate එක ඉස්සෙල්ලා rate එක බලන එක. ඒ rate එක ඇත්තටම ඒ වෙන කොට තිබුණ rate එක 9.5. එතකොට 9.5 rate එකක් තියෙන තැනක 12.5 ඇයි decide කළේ කියන එකට කිසිම උත්තරයක් අපට තාම සොයා ගන්න හම්බ වුනේ නැහැ. ඊලඟට Actual Yield Rate එක ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා 9.35 වල ඉඳලා 11 වෙන කම් ම. ඉතින් ඒක පිළිබඳව තමයි ලොකුම ගැටළුව.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : 10 Million වල ද පරාසය එන්නේ 01 Million වල ද?

විගණකාධිපති : මුළු hall එකේ යන පරාසය. ඒක තමයි ලොකු වෙන්නේ. Range එක තමයි මේ එන්නේ. Last Week එකේ තිබුන Second Market Yield Rate එක තමයි 9.5. ඒකයි. එතකොට මේක අපි 9.5 අපට දෙන්නේ. Range එකක් තියෙන්නේ Yield වල. ඊලඟට මේ 27 February submit කරපු එක ගත්තාම කට්ටියත් එක්ක එකතු වෙලා මේ 25% යි අපි අර..... කියලා අපි අර හඳුනන්නේ 75% total එකෙන් submit කරලා තියෙනවා Bond එක. 25 ක් තමයි අනිත් ඔක්කොම එකතු වෙලා කරලා තියෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේ කාරණයත් එක්කම ඊලඟට පැන නගින වැදගත්ම සිද්ධිය තමයි මම අර ඉස්සෙල්ලා කියපු discount එකට තමයි මේ 10 Billion ගියපු නිසා විශාල discount එකක් ගියා. ඒ discount එක ගියපු නිසා Face Value එක 10 Billion වුණාට amount හම්බ වුණේ 9.6 Billion. එතනම Gap එක 3.71 Billion loss එකක් වෙනවා. මොකද අර 01 Billion වලින් නතර කළා නම් ඒක ඒ ප්‍රමාණය එහෙමම නතර වෙනවා. මොකද මේ loss එක government එකට වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද 01 Billion තමයි Auction එකට ගිහිල්ලා තිබුනේ. ඒ 01 Billion

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : 01 Billion ..... වැඩි වෙලාද නැත්නම් Billion වෙලාද නැත්නම් පහළට ඇවිල්ලාද?

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. 01 Billion ගියොත් Premium එකට යන්නේ. 102 කට යන්නේ. 01 Billion වලට ගියානම් රුපියල් 04 ක ලාභයක් හම්බ වෙනවා. 01 Billion Placement වලට ගියා නම්. නමුත් මේකේ 10 Billion වලට යාම නිසා මේක බහිනවා 90 ට ඒ බැසීම නිසා ඒ වෙලාවේදී 371 Billion loss වෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : ඒ වෙලාවේ සිද්ධ වන පාඩුවක් හැටියට. ඒ පාඩුව තමයි අපි ඇත්තටම Identity කරන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අපි loss කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කිරීම සුදුසුද කියලා මෙතැන මගේ තාක්ෂණික ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා. ඔය interest rate එක නේ. rate එක high වුණා කියලා තමයි මම කියන්නේ. loss එකක් වුනා කියලා

විගණකාධිපති : අපි ඒක governmentry සිදු වන අවාසිය කියලා අපි ඒක හඳුන්වන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Loss කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරන්න එපා මොකද ඒක mislead වෙනවා.

විගණකාධිපති : අවාසිය කියන එක අපි ගමුකෝ ඉතින්.

අවාසිය ඉංග්‍රීසියට පාවිච්චි කරන කොට වෙන වචනයක් නැති නිසා අවාසිය කියලා අපි පාවිච්චි කරනවා ඇත්තටම. මේ අවාසිය කියන එකෙන් අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්නේ ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් මේ 371 Billion හොයා ගන්නා ආයුධයක් කරනවා. අවශ්‍යතාවයට 371 Billion නැති වුණා. මදි වුණා. මොකද 10 Billion ඕනෑ කම තිබුණා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඇත්තටම මේකේ Technical Point එකක් මම ගේන්නේ විගණකාධිපති තුමා දැන් Face Value එකට වඩා මේක අඩු වෙන්නේ වැඩි වෙන්නේ Interest Rate එක අනුව නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ Par Value එක මොකක්ද Par Value එකට වඩා Interest එක වැඩද අඩුද කියන එක එතකොට මෙතැනදී අවාසිය කියන එක technical correct වෙන්න නම් අපි කියන්න ඕනේ මේකට ගෙවන interest rate මේකයි කියලා. Interest rate එක වැඩිද අඩුද කියන එක ඒ මත සිදු වෙනවා.

විගණකාධිපතිතුමා : අපි ඉස්සරහට යමු. ඉස්සරහදී කතා වෙනවා. ඊලඟ Professional Due Care එක නැති වෙන එක ගැන මම මේ අතරේ සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. මම නැවත කියන්නේ නෑ. දැන් මේ Auction එක තිබුනේ 27 වෙනිදා 08.30 ඉඳලා 11.00 වෙනකම්. ඊලඟට Tender Board එක තිබුණේ 12.30 ඉඳලා 01.00 වෙනකම්. ඊලඟට D.D.M.C. තිබුණේ 1.00. ඉඳලා මේ මුළු Programme එක. Governor මේ programme එක Approved කරන්නේ මාර්තු 02 දා. මේ ඔක්කොම සිද්ධ වෙලා ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ තමයි මේ programme එක දැන් එය 10 Billion වලට යනවා ඊට පස්සේ මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇති වෙන කොට තමයි මේ Approval එකට යන්නේ. Approval එකක් අරගෙන තිබුණේ නෑ. ඊලඟට Monetary Board එකට ගිහිල්ලා තිබුණේ නැහැ මේ issue එක..... තමයි දෙන්නේ approval එක දෙන්න බෑ නේ. මේ ප්‍රසිද්ධියේ සිද්ධ වෙලා ඉවරයි. ඒ නිසා මාර්තු 06 වැනිදා තමයි ratify කරන්නේ. ඒ නිසා එතැනදීත් පැහැදිලිවම අපට මේ Professional Due Care නෑ කියන තැනට තමයි මේ අපේ opinion එක develop කර ගන්න අපි ගොඩනගාගත්තු දේවල් මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ..කාගෙවත් approval නැතුව අරන් තියෙන්නේ Auction එකක් ගනන්.

විගණකාධිපති : Governor. එයා පැහැදිලිව Order කරනවානේ issue කරන්න කියලා 10 Billion Auction එකේදී. එතැනදී....

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ නියෝගය පමණද තියෙන්නේ නැත්නම් ඊට කලින් එයා කතා කරලා කියනවාද Auction එකක් කරන්න කවුද Auction එකක් කරන්නේ කියලා ?

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. කොහොමත් Auction එකට යන්න ඕනෑ නේ. 01 Billion වලට යන්න Auction එකට යන්න ඕනෑ. Auction එකේදී කවුරුත් Lay Out කරනවා. ඊට පස්සේ මේක auction එක කොතැනින්ද නතර කරන්නේ cut off point එක තීරණය කරන එක තමයි ප්‍රශ්නෙ තියෙන්නේ cut of point එක එකෙන් ගන්නවාද? 10 න් ගන්නවාද 20 න් ගන්නවාද කියන එක

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එතැන තමයි යන්නේ.

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ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : Tender Board එකට උඩින් Technical Evaluation Committee එකක් තියෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්. පී. සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා :ඒකට තමයි D.D.M.C. කියන්නේ. ඒ මාසයේ programme එක අනුමත කරන්නේ Domestic Debt Management Committee යෙන් තමයි ඒක කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා ඒකෙන් තමයි Tender Board එකට යන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්. පී. සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : නෑ.D.D.M.C එකෙන් ඒ ගන්න purpose එක ඒ දවසේ තියෙන tender එක යන්නේ නෑ. ඒක මුළු මාසෙම තියෙන programme එකේ තමයි අනුමත කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : හරිද ඒක?

විගණකාධිපති: ඒ නිසා මේකේ Auction එක අපි සඳහන් කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ..... මොකක්ද මොකක්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : සාමාන්‍ය නොවෙයි.

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ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : සාමාන්‍ය දීපු කටඋත්තර තියෙනවා නේ. මේ inquire එකට දීපු කටඋත්තර තියෙනවා.

විගණකාධිපති : අපි මේකේ ඇතුලටත් අරගත්තා. ඒකේ තියෙනවා මේක. එතකොට මේ Tender එක අනුව P.D.D. එක recommend කරලා තියෙනවා Auction 07 ක්. ඒ Auction වලින් කීපයක් තමයි මෙතැනදී වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. මොකද ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ officers ලා දීලා තියෙන recommendation එක තමයි recommended up to 2.6 Billion කියන එක. නමුත් Tender Board එක accept කරනවා 10 Billion මේ වෙලාවේ. මොකද මේකේ ඉතාමත් පැහැදිලිව documentary ම තියෙනවා Tender Board එක accept කරන ගාන 2.6 Billion. මේක නතර කරන්න. මෙතැනින් එහාට ගියොත් විශාල අලාභයක් සිද්ධ වනවා කියන කාරණය.

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විගණකාධිපති : Department එක. ඒ Auction එකෙන් පස්සේ මේ ගොල්ලෝ confirm කරනවා ඒ document එක තියෙනවා.

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විගණකාධිපති : ඒ Tender Board එක ....

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : Tender Board එකට තියෙන්නේ මිලදී ගැනීම් ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කිරීමේ බලයක් නෑ නේ. තීරණය කිරීම පමණයි Tender Board එකට තියෙන්නේ.

ඊට පස්සේ recommendation 10.6 ක් කියන එක කවුද තීරණය කරන්නේ.

ඒක මේ..... යෝජනාවේ තියෙනවා. මොකද ඒගොල්ලන්ට තමයි තීරණය කිරීමේ බලය තියෙන්නේ.

Auction එක ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ Auction එකේ..... කරනවා .

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ඩබ්ලිව්. පී. සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : PDD එක තමයි නිර්දේශයක් දෙනවා එක එක Auctions දීලා. ඒ Auction වලින් තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලෝ හොඳම Auction කියන එක නිර්දේශයක් දෙනවා මේක තමයි කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒකෙන් තමයි යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒක නිර්දේශයක් විතරයි. ඉන්න Tender Committee එක තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඇත්තටම එයාලා Front Office එක නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Public Debt department එකේ Front Office එකෙන් තමයි එයාලා යම් කිසි Recommendation එකක් දෙනවා. බලයක් නෑ.recommendation එකක් දෙනවා. හැබැයි ඒක scientific recommendation එකක්.

විගණකාධිපති : Bunch එක හදන්නේ එක එක Bunch හදලා ඉවර වෙලා අඩුම වියදමක් යන එක මේ ගොල්ලෝ හදා ගන්නවා. ඒ හදලා මේක තමයි මේ .....

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : පස්සේ 01 Million එක මේ Governor කියනවා 10 Billion කරන්න කියලා. 10 Billion වලට යන කොට මේකේ පාඩුවක් දැකලාද මේ ගොල්ලෝ කියන්නේ නෑ 2.6 Million වලින් නවත්තන්න කියලා.

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව් මේකේ මේ Auction 07 ක් හදනවා ඒ Auction හදන්නේ

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.....

විගණකාධිපති : මේ මමත් ඔය පැත්තේ ඉන්නේ. මමත් ඔය පැත්තේ ඉන්නවා කියලා හිතාගෙන ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එතකොට මේ Auctions ගණනවාක් තියෙනවා මේ Auctions වලින් P.D.D. එක කියනවා මෙන්න මේ best solution එක minimum rate එක Maintain කරන්නත් ඒ එක්කම Government එකට අඩුම වියදමින් මේ Purchase මේ අවශ්‍ය funds ටික supply කර ගන්න කියන කාරණය. ඒ නිසා ඒ ගොල්ලන් දැනට 2.6 හඳුනාගෙන දානවා. නමුත් Tender Board එක accept කරනවා අර 10 Billion වලට. එතකොට accept කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් තියෙන note එක තමයි මේ Governor ගේ involvement එක. Governor ඒ වෙලාවේ instruction දෙනවා. Governor instructed to raise up to 10 Billion කියලා තමයි සටහන Minute එක ලැබුණු superintend of Public Debt දාන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ අනුව තමයි මේ 10 Billion වලට යන්න කටයුතු කරන්නේ. හැබැයි මේ professional Due care ගැන කතා කරද්දී මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් එනවා. කොයි වෙලාවේදීවත් Governor order කරන්නේ නෑ. මේ method එක මේක direct යනවාද එහෙම නැත්නම් Auction යනවාද කියන එකවත් කරන්නේ නැහැ. එතකොට 10 Million යනවා කියන කතාව විතරයි සටහන් කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒකේ හරිම weak statement එකක්. Powerful නිලධාරියත් එක්ක තමයි. ඊලඟට මේ එක්කම ඊලඟ අවස්ථාව මාර්තු 02 වෙනකොට මෙතුමා තවත් අත්අකුරින්ම Minute එකක් දානවා Board එකට.ඒ කියන්නේ Board Programme එක සම්බන්ධයෙන්. Raise the 40 Billion through issue of 20/30/50 years Treasury Bonds 10 Billion each

කියලා. එතකොට මේ statement එක ඇතුලෙම හරිම. ඉතාමත්ම දුර්වල statement එකක්. සියළුම ගනුදෙනු ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ. Professional Due Care නැති එක ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම ලංකා ඉතිහාසයේ කවදාවත් අවුරුදු 50 ට Bond issue කරලා නෑ. ඒ කියන්නේ 30 තමයි maximum ගිහිල්ලා තියෙන්නේ. එතකොට 50 Years කියන එක එයාගේ අත්අකුරින්ම ඇත්තටම ඒ ගැන අවබෝධයක් නෑ කියන එක ඉතාමත්ම පැහැදිලියි. දෙවැනි කාරණය.10 Billion each කියලා මේ සටහනේ දෙනවා. හැබැයි කියනවා 30 Billion issue කරන්න කියලා. එතකොට එහෙමවත් Due Care එක නෑ කියන එක. මම මේ Professional Due Care කියන එකට විතරයි මම address කරන්නේ විගණකාධිපති හැටියට. එතකොට ඒ කියන්නේ එතැන දෙයියන්ගේ නියෝගය වගේ තමයි Governor ඒ නියෝගය ඇහුවාට පස්සේ accept කරනවා. ඒ නියෝගයේ තියෙන weakness මම මේ කියන්නේ Professional Due Care එක නැති කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන්.ඊලඟට ඔහු කියනවා එතැනම E.P.F. , N.S.B. and Sri Lanka Insurance Cooperation to ask to establish rate කියලා. හැබැයි Governor බෑ Sri Lanka Insurance Cooperation Directive දෙන්න. මේ Primary Dealer කෙනෙක් නෙවෙයි. E.P.F. එකත් N.S.B. ටත් ඒ කාරණය පුළුවන්. නමුත් කිව්වාට මේ කාරණා එකක් වත් සම්පූර්ණ වෙලා නෑ. Auction එකට තමයි මේ කාරණය ගිහිල්ලා තියෙන්නේ. මේකේ ඇත්තට අදහස Placement යන්න කියලා. නමුත් ක්‍රියාව වෙනකොට ඒ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ආපහු Auction එකට ඒක යනවා. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ interest ඉහළ යාම විශාල වශයෙන් සිද්ධ වන්නේ. එතකොට අපි ඊලඟට මම මේ report එකේ තියෙන paras තමයි මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. වෙන මොනවත් මේ අලුත් දෙයක් මේකේ ඇතුලේ නැහැ. ඒ para එකේ තියෙන දේවල් තව පොඩ්ඩක් explain කරන එකයි කරන්නේ. එතකොට 25 වෙනිදා D.V. at direct placement සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම හැබැයි මේ ratify කරන්නේ මාර්තු 06 වෙනිදා. Ratify කරන එක කරන්නේ. මේකේ කියන්නේ Monetary Board decided to temporally

suspend private placement කියන කතාව තමයි එතැනදී සඳහන් වෙන්නේ හැබැයි ඒ ratification එකත් එක්ක temporally මේව එක තමයි එතැනදී දෙන්නේ. ඊලඟට 23 Monetary Board Minute එකේම තියෙනවා instructor to Public Debt department ..... කියන අර කාරණය නිතරම කියනවා. ඒකේ ඇත්තට ඔප්පු වෙනවා ඒ නිසා .....Decision to issue a bond..... කියලා. මේ ..... දෙන දවසේ ඇත්තටම එහෙම දෙයක් කෙරිලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒක තමයි ඒකේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ. එතකොට Bid accepted the limit of the One Billion අපි දැන් කියපු Auction එකට දාපු One Billion වලට limit කළොත් ඇති වන තත්ත්වය තමයි මේක. අපි මේ 06 දෙනාට අපි මේ නම් පාවිච්චි කළේ නෑ. A කියලා අපි සටහන් කළේ. මෙතැනින් නතර වෙනවා මෙතැනින් නතර වුණාම ඇති වන situation එක තමයි මේ තියෙන්නේ. ඇත්තටම Yield Rate එක 10.4 වලින් නතර වෙනවා If the auction limited to one Billion all the dealers up to the Company K

අපිට මේ secret issue එකක් තියෙනවා නේ. මේ නම් දන්නවා ඇති. ඉතින් අපිට ඒ වගකීම භාර ගන්න බැරි නිසා අපි එහෙම කළේ He made bid up to 20 Billion

මෙතැන අපි නතර කළා නම් අපිට මේ 1.3 Billion Issue කරලා 1.4 Billion ගන්න තිබුණා. එතකොට Billion විතර තව additional premium එකක් Government එකට එනවා මේ නතර කරලා Placement වලට ගියා නම්.ඊලඟට අපි මේ මේ කාරණය තවදුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කළොත් සැක සහිතයි කියන කාරණයට 27 වෙනදි අපි ගත්තේ Bid received 20 Billion වලට හම්බ වෙලා තියෙනවා time ..... එකක් දීලා තියෙනවා. Auction එක තිබුණු කාලය. ඒ කාලය තුළ 7.1 Billion තමයි Auction එකට හම්බ වෙලා තිබුණේ bids එකෙන් 2 Billion K Institution වලට කියන එකට ඉතුරු ප්‍රමාණය other institution වලින් තමයි තිබුණේ. හැබැයි last 8 Minutes වල තවත් 13 Billion වල bid එකක් එනවා. ඒ bid එක එන්නේ අනිත් **K** Institution එක හරහා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : එතකොට Primary Dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට ඉද්දී

විගණකාධිපති : ..... Primary Dealer කෙනෙක් තවත් Primary Dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා request එකක් එවලා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ඔබතුමා ඒ වාර්තාව ඔප්පු කර දාලා තිබෙනවාද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්. ඔක්කොම දාලා තියෙනවා. අපි මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : එතකොට ඒකෙදි බිලියන 13 ක් වෙනවා **K** කියන සමාගමෙන් එතකොට .6 යි එන්නේ අනෙක් ආයතන ඔක්කෝගෙන්ම එතකොට decide කරලාද ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය.

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : decide කරලා නෑ නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : Auction එක වහලා නෑ නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : 10 Billion discharge කරලා නෑ.

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : විගණකාධිපති තුමා මම දැක්කා..... තියෙනවා වැඩිපුර වෙලා දුන්නා කියලා. එහෙම කතාවක් තියෙනවාද

විගණකාධිපති : අපි විනාඩි 04 ක් දීලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ඒක අපි මෙතැනට ගත්තේ නෑ. ඒ issue එක අපට හරියට Justification ගන්න බැරි නිසා. ඒක තියෙනවා කාරණයක් හැටියට. නමුත් අපි firm කරන්න පුළුවන් ටික විතරයි අපි presentation එකක් හැටියට අපි මෙතැනට අරගත්තේ.

ඒවා කතාවේ හැටියට තිබුණට

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්. මේ කාලයට ඒකත් අදාළ වෙනවා කියන කතාව තියෙනවා. නමුත් අපිට ස්ථීර figures තමයි අපි අරගෙන තියෙන්නේ මොකද justify කරන්න පුළුවන් figures විතරයි විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට කළ හැකි කාරණයක් හැටියට. ඊලඟට මේ නිසා unusual high rate ගිය නිසා මේ rate එක එන්නේ 13 ඉල්ලන්නේ 11 ඉඳලා 12.7 rate එකට highest Rate වලට මේක යන්නේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ issue එක වෙනස් වෙන්නේ.මොකද මේකට.....ගියාද නැද්ද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය. ඒ rate එකට ආපු නිසා තමයි මේ issue එක දරුණු වුණේ මෙතැන තිබුණු rate එකට 7 8 වගේ කියලා තියෙන්නේ 9 දශම ගානේ ගියානම් මේ issue එක එන්නේ නෑ. ඊට වඩා rate එකකට

ගිහිල්ලා accept කරපු නිසා තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පැන නැඟුනේ.

..... කලින් ..... දැන් අන්තිමට බලපු එක. දැන් මේ 8 Billion 7.1 Billion එකේ යන්නේ 9.25 ද.

පටන් ගන්නේ 9.25වලින්. නමුත් ඒක යනවා

7.1 Billion එක කේ වල 2 Billion ගිහිල්ලා ඒ ඔක්කොම යන rate එක කීයද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක කියන්න අමාරු කලවමේනේ ඔක්කොම තියෙන්නෙ. දළ වශයෙන් 11 විතර rate එකේ තියෙන්නේ. විශාල rate එකක් එනවා. අපි මේ Unusual හැටියට දකින්නේ ඇත්තටම මේ transaction එකේ 13 Billion අන්තිම විනාඩි අටේ 13 Billion වගේ offer එකක් වෙනත් මාර්ගයක් හරහා වැඩි rate එකට පැමිණීම නිසා ඒ සැකය ඇත්තටම ගොඩ නැගෙනවා. මොකද ඒ සැකයත් එක්ක ගොඩක් දේවල් තව develop වෙනවා අපි ඒවා සාකච්ඡා කරමු. එතකොට අර මේ කියන 13 Billion එක Central Bank එක 15 Billion වලින් Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා තමයි එන්නේ. Bank of Ceylon වලින් නැවත ..... එකට තමයි මේ දෙන්නම Primary Dealers ලා. ..... 2 Billion තමයි **K** එකෙන් ඉල්ලන්නේ. නමුත් Bank of Ceylon වලත් 13 Billion ඉල්ලුම් කරනවා. එතකොට මේ decision එක අපිට පෙන්නන්න පුළුවන් මේ ආකාරයට. Invite කරලා තිබුණේ 01 Billion. Auction ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා 20 Billion. Accept කරනවා 10 Billion.10 Billion accept කිරීමේදී වෙන දේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරමු. මේ තමයි අර Auction එක paper එක පත්තරේ තිබුණ එක 01 Billion වලට දාලා. එතකොට මේ loss formula එක මේ විදියට සකස් වෙන්නේ. මම formula එකට යන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා මම මේ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරන්නම්. අපි මේ විගණකාධිපතිගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන loss calculation එක කරපු ආකාරය. මේ කාරණා තුනක් යටතේ, Auction තුනක් යටතේ අපි ඒක calculate කළා. එකක් ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේ One Billion Accept කරන්න ඕන. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම legally valid amount එක Auction එකට දාලා තිබුණු. ඒ Auction එකට ගත්ත One Billion අරගත්තොත් එහෙම One Billion වලට අපි accept යටතේ ගත්තා නම් අපට ඇති වන තත්ත්වය මේ දෙක අතර වෙනස. එතකොට මේ One Billion වලට limit කළා නම් මේක නතර වෙන්නේ ඒ කියන්නේ ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේ 104 කියන Rate එකේ තමයි මේ Auction එක accept කරලා තිබුණේ. එතකොට Price එක 119 ඉඳලා 104 premium එක මේ ගානට ඇවිල්ලා 104ට වගේ තමයි premium එක තියෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේ වෙලාවේදී මේක නතර කළා නම් 104 ගානේ ඒ කියන්නේ රුපියල් 04 ක, 04% ක ලාභයක් රජයට හම්බ වෙනවා මේක නතර කළා නම්. එතකොට ඇත්තටම estimate loss එකක් සිදු වෙන්නේ නැහැ. Loss කියන වචනයට අවාසිය කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරමුකෝ. හැබැයි මෙතැනින් පල්ලෙහාට යන්න යන්න මෙතැන හම්බ වෙන්න තිබුණු 104 ඊලඟට 103 වෙනවා. එතකොට 103 වුණාම මෙච්චරක් අපිට ඇත්තටම පාඩු වෙනවා. 104, 103 තිබුණු එක 102 වෙනවා. 102 ආයේ මේ විදියට අඩු වෙලා අඩු වෙලා යනවා ඒ නිසා මෙතැන නතර නොකර නිසා මෙන්න මේ කාරණා, අපි මෙතැන පල්ලෙහාට තව යනවා නේ එතකොට මේ බලන්න අන්තිමට මෙහාට එනකොට මේ අන්තිමට 90ට ගන්නේ. එතකොට මේ Bond එකේ රුපියල් 10 ක් loss වෙනවා. අන්තිමට මේ ඔක්කොම 90 ට තමයි අරගන්නේ. 90ට අර ගන්න කොට මේ වෙලාව වෙන කොට 889 Million loss එකක් මේකේ point එකේ රජයට සිද්ධ වෙනවා මොකද මේ point එක නතර කරලා මේ ටික ඔක්කොම යන්න තිබුණා මේ Provident Fund වලට මේ rate එකට ගමන් කිරීමේ හැකියාව එහෙම තමයි ඉතිහාසයේ දිගටම සිද්ධ වුණේ. එතකොට ඉතිහාසයේ සිද්ධ වුණ දේ හොඳයි ද නරකයි ද කියන එක මම කියන්නේ නෑ පළවෙනි එක, දෙවැනි එක මම කිව්වා at any Cost එකෙන් අනිවාර්යෙන්ම බැහැර වෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට වෙන්නේ Transparency At Any Cost කියන base එකට තමයි මේ යන්නේ. Transparency මේකේ එකම case එක තියෙන්නේ මේක කරන්න් Primary Dealers ලා අතර මේ private placement කිරීම නිසා සාධාරණයක් මේ අතරේ ඉෂ්ඨ වෙන්නේ නෑ කියන තර්කය ඇරෙන්න වෙන තර්කයක් ගොඩ නැගිලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඊට අමතරව තව තර්කයක් ගොඩ නැගෙනවා මේක open market ගිහිල්ලා interest freely handle වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන කාරණය. ඒකත් හරි. නමුත් අර කාරණය ගත්තායින් පස්සේ මේ 17 දෙනාගේ transparency ය develop කරන්න මෙච්චර මුදලක් වැය කළ යුතුද කියන සංකල්පය තමයි ඇත්තටම විගණකාධිපතිවරයා හැටියට රටේ මුදල් සම්බන්ධයෙන් V.F.M. ගැන කතා කරන කොට අපි කතා කළේ. ඒක අපි පුළුවන් තරම් explain කිරීම නිසා තමයි අපි මේ කාරණය සඳහන් කළේ. ඊලඟට අපි මේ කාරණයත් එක්ක කිව්වොත් එහෙම අර officers ලා තීරණය කරපු වගකිව යුතු නිලධාරීන් Central Bank එකේ ..... කරපු rate

එක මෙතැනින් නතර වෙන්න බෑ. එහෙනම් ඒ ගොල්ලො කිව්වේ මෙතැනින් එහාට යන්න එපා. මේ ගොල්ලෝ repeatedly මේ 04 වතාවක් කියලා තියෙනවා මෙතැනින් එහාට යන්න එපා මේ interest rate එකට ගියොත් එහෙම මේ economy එකට ලොකු damage එකක් වෙනවා කියලා. ඒවා records ඔක්කොම තියෙනවා. නමුත් ඒ දේ සිද්ධ වුණේ නෑ. එතැන නතර වුණා නම් ඇති වන situation එක තමයි අපි මෙතැන explain කරන්නේ. මෙතැන ඉඳලා ආපසු අපි ඒ කාරණයට යනවා. 102 Bench Mark එක තියෙන්නේ. ඒ bench mark එකේ ඉඳලා නැවත පල්ලෙහාට යනකොට අඩු වෙන ප්‍රමාණය තියෙන්නේ. ඒ ප්‍රමාණය ගත්තාම එතැන 688 Billion තියෙනවා. නමුත් අපි මෙතැන 1/3 යි මේ Auction ගන්නේ.ඊට අමතරව Governor කිව්ව 20 Billion වලටම, Governor මේ වෙලාවෙන් කියනවා 20 Billion වලට යන්න කියලා. නමුත් 10 Billion වලින් මේ ගොල්ලෝ නතර කර ගන්නවා කොහොමහරි.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : .....10 Billion වලට යන්න කියලා අපිට කලින් ඒක ඇහුනේ නෑ නේ.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : මුළු ප්‍රමාණයම ගන්න කියලා යෝජනාවක් කරනවා Governor. එතකොට Officers ලා කියනවා ඒක එපා කියලා. ඒක අර minutes වල තියෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : 10 Billion ගන්න කියලා නේ අපිට දැන් මෙතැන note එකක් දෙන්නේ. ඊට කලින් .....

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : ඊට කලින් කියනවා..... කියලා. එතකොට 20 Billion ම එතකොට යෝජනා වෙනවා. Why don't you go for more කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : 10 Million වලින්.....

ඒක අර නිලධාරීන් දුන්න සාක්ෂිවල තියෙනවා.

...අනුමත කරන්නේ 20.1 Billion කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ මේ ඔක්කොම ආවයින් පස්සේනේ මේ තීරණය කරන්නේ. අපි 1 ක් ගන්නවාද, 10 ක් ගන්නවාද, 20 ක් ගන්නවාද කියලා

විගණකාධිපති : හැබැයි Auction එකේ 20 Billion වෙනකම් ඔක්කොම එනවා නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හැබැයි return document එකක් විදියට තියෙන්නේ 10 Billion ගන්න කියන එක විතරයි.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : නිලධාරීන් ඔක්කොම සාක්ෂි දීලා තියෙනවාද

විගණකාධිපති : 20 Billion ගන්න කිව්වාම නතර වෙනවා. ඒ සාක්ෂි ඔක්කොම verbatim එකේ තියෙනවා. Verbatim එක කියෙව්වා නම් ඇමතිතුමා ඒකේ ඔක්කොම තියෙනවා. Superintendent of Public Debt & Additional Superintendent of Public Debt දෙන්නාගේම සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල තියෙනවා ඒක. අපි මේක example එකක් විදියට පෙන්නනන් කළේ. අපේ calculation එක මෙහාට යන්නේ නැහැ. 01 Billion වලින් අපි නතර කරනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : මෙහෙම arguments යන්න ඉතිහාසයේ කවදාවත් ඔහොම එකක් වෙලා නැහැ නේ. කවදාවත් මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති ඇවිල්ලා කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ 10 ක් ගන්න 15 ක් ගන්න 20 ක් ගන්න කියලා.

විගණකාධිපති : මේක systematic ක්‍රමයක් තියෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මෙහෙමයි සභාපතිතුමා මීට කලින් වුණේ Private Placement එකට නේ. එතකොට කවුද ගන්නේ කියන එක අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. එයාට කියන්න පුළුවන් මෙයාට දෙන්න කියලා එහෙම නැත්නම් අරයාට දෙන්න කියලා. ඒ arguments මෙතැන valid වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද එහෙම එකක් මීට කලින් වෙලා නැහැ නේ.

ඒක තමයි මම මුලින් කිව්වේ Transparency should not be at any cost කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : ..... කොච්චර ගෙවන්න ඕනෑද කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : අන්න right එක තමයි issue එක. ඊලඟට එහෙම වුණත් ඒ කියන ජාතියේ අව මිලකට ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ Private Placement වලදී බොහොම මෙච්චර විශාල අවමිලකට ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගිහිල්ලාද දන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් බහුතරය ගිහිල්ලා තියෙන්නේ.....එකකට.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා : Private Placement එකේ දී 30 වලට අඩු වෙලා තියෙනවා නේද මේ වගේ.

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ මෙච්චර මෙහෙම බැහැලා නැහැ. 80 ට 70 වෙනකම් බැහැලා නැහැ. දැන් මේකේ 70ට බහිනවා. 2016 එකේ.

Oral evidence in respect of 20 Billion වලට ගන්න කතාව ඔක්කොම තියෙනවා. මේ කතාව ඔක්කොම record වෙලා තියෙන්නේ Parliament record වල

විගණකාධිපති : ඊලඟට අසීම් කියලා අනිත් එක්කෙනා ඉන්නවා නේ . Additional Superintend of P D එතුමා තමයි මේක ගොඩක් මේව කරන්නේ. මේ presentation එකේ තියෙන ටික තමයි ඔය දාලා තියෙන්නේ

ඩබ්ලිව්. පී. සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : record කරලා තියෙන්නේ. නමුත් මේකේ verbatim එක ගිය සැසිවාරයේ තිබ්බිච්ච .....

ඔය Report එකේ නම්බර් එකක් තියෙන්නේ. මේ උඩ තියෙන්නේ. මේ හැම එකකම chapter number එක තමයි මේ තියෙන්නේ. මේ chapter number එකෙන් කියන දේ තමයි මේ explain කරන්නේ තව දුරටත්. මම මුලින්ම කිව්වා ඒක. එතකොට S 118 Chapter එකේ තියන ටික තමයි මම තවදුරටත් explain කරන්නේ. අපි මේක දිහා බලන්න ඕනෑ විදිය මම මේ කියන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ. නිකම් argue කරන්නේ නැතුව. .....මේ කියන දවසට 9.48 යි. ඊලඟට Secondary Market එක Yield rate මේ දවසට 10.03යි. හැබැයි ..... 27 වෙනිදාට 12.5 යි. .....

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විගණකාධිපති : 12.5 යි. 12.4 වුනොත් එහෙම අවුරුද්ද අන්තිමේ loss එක Billion One විතර සමහර විට calculate කෙරෙයි. මේ point එක 5, 4 කළොත්. ඒ වගේ ලොකු variation එකක් තියෙනවා මේ point එකක. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා නවයයි හතරයි, දහයයි පහයි, දොලහයි හතරයි අතර අපට දෙකක් වගේ පෙනුනාට මේකේ gap එක huge gap එකක්.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එහෙමමත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මොකද ඔය 9.48 කියන yield එක මොන year එකටද අවුරුදු 30 ටද.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්. similar maturities. ඒ කියන්නේ.....

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හැබැයි 12.5 කියන්නේ ඒ කොටඩ් interest rate එක නේ.ඕක Auction එකෙන්, Bond එකෙන් එන rate එක නෙවෙයි නේ.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : නෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඕක coupon එක නේ. ඔය 12.5 discount Bond එකක්. coupon එකක් නෑ නේ?

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : coupon එකක් තියෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : coupon එකයි Yield එකයි එක වුනොත් තමයි .....

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. ඒක එක වුනොත් Primary එකක් නෑ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එතකොට 12.5 15 වුනත්, 10 වුනත් අතර මම හිතන්නේ නෑ එතැනින් මේ හොරකමක් වුණා කියලා. එතැනින් වෙන්නේ නෑ. ඒක technical coupon rate එක විතරයි.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නෑ. technical coupon rate එක .....මේ rate එක decide කිරීමට.....

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විගණකාධිපති : coupon rate එක කියන්නේ ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතය. හැම මේවකටම ගෙවන rate එක තමයි coupon rate එක equal interest rate එක. ඒ කියන්නේ අපි decide කරන Bond එකේ interest rate එක.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හිතන්න ඔයාට තියෙනවා කියලා මේක Bond එක නම්. මේ Bond එකේ coupon කියලා තිබුණා. ඉස්සර අපිට හාල් පොත් තිබුණේ. හාල් පොත වගේ මෙහෙම මෙහෙම කපලා තියෙනවා coupon. ඊට පස්සේ මාස 06 න් 06ට තමයි ඔයාට interest එක ගෙවන්නේ. එතකොට පළවෙනි coupon එක ඔයා ඉරලා දුන්නාම ඒ ගොල්ලෝ 12.5% ක් ඔයාට ගෙවනවා. එතකොට ඔයා මේක අරගෙන තියෙන්නෙ ලක්ෂයකට නම් මේ coupon එක දුන්නාම 12,500 ක් ඔයාට දෙනවා. ඊලඟ මාස 06 න් පස්සේ ඊලඟ coupon එක ඔයා ඉරලා දෙනවා. එතකොට ඔයාට තවත් 12,500 ක් දෙනවා. යනාදී වශයෙන් මේක අවුරුදු 10 ක Bond එකක් නම් මාස 06 න් 06ට 20 පාරක් ඔයාට මේ coupon කපලා සල්ලි ගන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙමනම් මොකක්ද මේ Yield එකයි coupon එකයි අතර තියෙන වෙනස, අපි හිතන්න අද තියෙන market එකට අනුව market එකේ interest rate එක 15%යි කියලා. ඔයාගේ අතේ තියෙන coupon එකේ Bond එක 12.5% කියමු. එතකොට මේක එච්චර වටිනාකමක් නෑ. ඔයාගේ අතේ තියෙන.....එක එච්චර වටින්නේ නෑ. ඉතින්

ඒ නිසා ඒක discount එක එක්කෝ අල්ලන් ඉන්නවා. නැත්නම් අඩු ගානට ගන්නවා. හිතන්න market එකේ interest rate එක 10%යි කියලා. හැබැයි අපේ අතේ තියෙන Bond එක ඊට වඩා ගොඩක් වටිනවා. එතකොට ඒක 12.5% යි. ඒ නිසා තමයි ඒකට වැඩිපුර ගෙවන්නේ. එතකොට 12.5 ක coupon එකක් තියෙන Bond එකකට කවුරු හරි වැඩිපුර ගෙවලා ගන්නවා කියන්නේ ඒ ගොල්ලෝ විශ්වාස කරනවා ඉදිරියේදී interest rate එක පල්ලෙහාට යනවා. ඒ නිසා මට මේක අතේ තියාගෙන ඉන්න එකත් වටිනවා.

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Secondary Market එකට විතරයි.

Thank You.

විගණකාධිපති : අපට මෙතැන තියෙන issue එක ඇත්තටම ඒක නෙවෙයි. අපිට මෙතැන තියෙන issue එක තමයි මම මේ compare කරන්න විතරයි මේ figure එක දැම්මේ. මේ වෙලාව වෙන කොට fix rate එක අනිත් ඒවායේ තිබුණේ Treasury Bills වල එහෙම තිබුණේ 8% වගේ. එතකෙට 9, 10 percent තිබිලා මේ 12.5% එකේ කොහොමද decide කළේ කියන එක. එතකොට මේක ලොකු gap එකක්. ඒ gap එක නිසා තමයි ගොඩක් මේක market වුනේ. මොකද හේතුව මේක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් පවතින rate එකට වඩා ඇත්තටම වැඩියි. ඒ issue එක නිසා. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා මේකට අපි හරි වැරදි කියන්නේ නෑ. මොකද හේතුව මේකේ insider මොනවත් තියනවාද කොහොමද මේක calculate වුණේ කියලා technical ගොඩක් තියෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ඒවා ගැන අපි හොයන්න ගියේ නැහැ. නමුත් බැලූ බැල්මට පේන දේ අපිට තේරෙනවා 12.5 බලාපොරොත්තු වන rate එකට වඩා වැඩි rate එකක්. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ කාරණය වුණේ.මෙන්න මෙතැන ඔබතුමන්ලාට මතක ඇති මම පෙන්නුවා, මෙන්න මේක වුණේ ඔය කේස් එක නිසා තමයි. මොකද මේ market rate එක ..... කරලා යන නිසා තමයි අන්තිම මොහොතේ අඩු rate එකට මේ ටික ගියා ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ අන්තිම විනාඩි අටේ මේ 30 Billion request එක කරලා මේක එලියට ගියේ. මොකද මේක ඉතාමත්..... ඊලඟ දවසේ මීට වඩා huge එකකට premium එකකට යනවා කියන එක market එකේ ඉන්න කෙනෙක් දන්නවා. ඒ නිසා තමයි අපිට ඇත්තටම ඒ කාරණය ඔප්පු වෙනවා. මම පෙන්නන්නම් ඊලඟට වෙලා තියෙන දේ. ඒ තමයි පළවෙනි Bond එකේ තත්ත්වය. ඉතින් ඔය විදියට ඕක අවසාන වෙනවා. විවේකයක් අවශ්‍ය නෑ නේද අපි ඉස්සරහට යමු නේ.

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විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. ඊලඟ Bond එකට යන්නේ අපි. ඊලඟ Bond එක කොටස් තුනකට කැඩිලා තමයි යන්නේ.

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විගණකාධිපති : ඊලඟ Bond එක March 29 වෙන්න කලින් 2016 Bond දෙකක් refuse වුණා මෙන්න මේ කාල සීමාවේ. reject කළා 3.10 සහ 3.24. දැන් මේක reject වුණේ ඇයි කියලා මගේ අහන්න එපා. මේ ටික විතරක් බලා ගන්න. එතකොට මේක reject කරන අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ Bond එකේ තිබුණ interest rate එක තමයි මේ interest rate එක.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : 3.10 , 3.24 Bond Issue දෙකක් කළා.

විගණකාධිපති : Accept කළේ නෑ. Auction එකේ තිබ්බා. reject කළා. සාධාරණ මිලකට ආවේ නෑ කියලා ඒ Bond එක reject කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : කීයද ඒ ගාන?

ඒක අපි Yield Rate එකෙන් ගමු. Yield Rate එක වැඩියි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : Yield Rate එක වැඩියි.?

ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : කීය කීයද දාලා තිබුනේ?

නෑ මේ අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණයට තියෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ඉල්ලුවේ කීයද?

විගණකාධිපති : documents බලලා කියන්න ඕන. දෙකම reject කළා. Price එකේ ප්‍රශ්න නිසා. ඊලඟට මේ reject කිරීම නිසා Government එකේ fund requirement එක විශාල වශයෙන් දැන් වැඩි වෙනවා demand එක. මේ පැත්තෙන් pressure එක වැඩි වුණා. ඊලඟට තමයි issue කරන්නේ 10 ඒවා 04කට 40 ක්. Date එක 3/10, 3/24 නේ.

ඔව්.

3/24 cancel කරලා ....

2016/3/29.

මේක 10 අරක 24 අරක 29.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : ඒ අතර අරගෙන තිබුණාද?

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. මෙතැන වෙනකොට හොඳටම tide වෙලා Goveenment එක. මොකද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය නිසා. එතකොට මේ 29 issue කරනවා

එල්. එස්. අයි. ජයරත්න මිය : අතරට පොඩි එකක් අරගෙන තියෙනවා. නමුත් අවසාන වශයෙන් මෙතැනට තමයි ඒක pressure වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ඒ කවදාද ඒක අරගෙන තියෙන්නේ?

විගණකාධිපති : 17 වෙනිදා.

17 වෙනිදා කීයක් අරන් තියෙනවාද ?

එල්. එස්. අයි. ජයරත්න මිය : Seven Eight Billion විතර. accept කරලා තියෙන්නේ One Billion Three Hundred Five. Six Billion Six Hundered Twenty..... තුනකින් දෙකක් reject කරලා එකක් අරගෙන තියෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : 7 Billion?

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්.

ඒ rate එක කියන්න.

එල්. එස්. අයි. ජයරත්න මිය : ඒකේ rates ටික චුට්ටක් බලන්න ඕන.

විගණකාධිපති :දැන් මේ Bonds 04 තමයි ඊලඟට ප්‍රශ්නෙ වෙන්නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : separate Bonds 04 ක් හැටියට 10 Billion issue කරන්නෙ. ඒ 10 Billion වලට demand එක එනවා 142 Billion bid කරනවා. Bid කරනකොට

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විගණකාධිපති : හැබැයි එතකොට 40 Billion තමයි Auction එකට දාලා තියෙන්නේ. Auction කරන්නේ. හැබැයි මේකෙන් bid accept කරනවා 77 Billion.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : 77 Billion අවශ්‍යතාවය කොහොමද පැන නැඟුනේ?

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : ඒ අර reject කරපු නිසා pressure එක ආවා Government එකට.

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එල්. එස්. අයි. ජයරත්න මිය : 22 ක් ගෙවන්න තියෙනවා ඊලඟ දවසේ. monthly cash requirement එක එනවා නේ..

ඒ කියන්නේ pressure එකක් නිර්මාණය කෙරුවාද?

ඔව්.

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ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Financial Ministry එකෙන් inform කරනවා නේ ministry එකට. මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයට.

ඒක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මුලින්ම මාර්තු මුල.....

මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය මත ඇත්තටම අපි ඊට අනුව නේ Bond issue කරන්නේ.

ඔව්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : එතකොට දැන් 40 Billion කියලා කියන්නේ ඊට අනුව රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවය වෙලා තිබුන ගාන විය යුතුයි නේ.

ඔව්.–

Press realease එකේ කීයද තියෙන්නේ ඕකේ.

29 March නේ?

20 March ..... එකේ තියෙන්නේ කීයද? 40 Billion තමයි ..... එකේ තියෙන්නේ. එතකොට ගන්නවා 77.

විගණකාධිපති : requirement එකේ තියනවා නමුත් අපි මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නය තියෙන්නේ හැම වෙලාවෙම invite කරපුවාම පස්සේ මේකේ අර concept එක ගොඩනැඟෙන්නේ ඒ විදියට.

නමුත් ..... තියෙනවා නේ වැඩිපුර ගන්න නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : ඉතුරු ටික Placement වලින් තමයි එන්නේ. මොකද ..... එක්ක යන්න පුළුවන් පසුගිය කාලේ සිදු වෙලා තිබුනේ ඒ විදියට. දැන් මේකේ වුනේ නොදන්වා Auction එකට ගියාම Auction එකේ inside වලින් ආපු කෙනාට පුළුවන් වැඩිපුර request කරන්න. එතැනයි issue එක තියෙන්නේ.

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විගණකාධිපති : එකක් නෙවෙයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන්..... එකේ හැටියට දෙකක් ඉල්ලුවොත් එකක් Auction කරනවා. එකක් ඉල්ලුවොත් 100 ක් request කරන ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබුනේ නැහැ. මේකේ දකින්න. ඒකයි වෙලා තියෙන්නේ.

.....

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක දිගින් දිගටම papers වල ලියවිලා තියෙනවා. verbitim වල ලියවිලා තියෙනවා ඒ කාරණය.

හැම වෙලාවෙම 10 ගුණයකට ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ. එකක් ගත්තොත්

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : දෙගුණයක්, තුන්ගුණයක් ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : economics වල තියෙන මොකක්හරි තියරි එකක්ද?

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. theory එකක් නෙවෙයි. demand එකක් කරන්නත් විශාල වියදමක් යනවා. මොකද අතේ සල්ලි තියාගෙන මොකක්වත් කරනවා නෙවෙයි. එහෙම නම්. ..... කරගෙන Primary Dealers ලා on behalf of somebody else තමයි මේ request එක කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඒ request එක හොයන්න ආවොත් තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ ඔය විදියට කරන්න එහෙම නැත්නම් focus කරලා බලන්න forecast එකකට ගිහිල්ලා future මේක dispose කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා දින කීපයක් ඇතුලත. එහෙම නැත්නම් මේ Bllion ගානක් අරගෙන ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට invest කරන්න බැහැ ඒක ඇත්තටම.ඉතින් ඒ නිසා ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගිහිල්ලා ආයෙමත් ..

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක රඳා පවතින්නේ නැද්ද Govenment එකේ ඒ වෙලාවේ තියෙන requirements, ඒ වෙලාවේ ඒ වෙනකොට Govenment එක තියෙන යම් යම් issue මත රඳා පවතින්නේ නැද්ද? Double ගන්නවාද? තුන් ගුණයක් ගන්නවාද? නැත්නම් අරකෙන් භාගෙද ගන්නේ? ඒක කවුරුහරි තීරණය කරන්න මොකක්ද Policy එක ඒකේ?

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම Policy එක කියන්නේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශේ අවශ්‍යතාවය. Monthly Cash Flow හදනවා ..... එක තමයි ඉල්ලලා එවන්නේ මට මේ මාසේ මෙච්චර අවශ්‍යයි කියලා. එතකොට ඒක තමයි Policy එක. එතකොට daily මාසෙම අරගෙන සකස් කරනවා. ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම Request එක කරන්නේ. ඔක්කොම. මොකද Bond issue කරන්නේ Tresury යේ request එක මත.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : දෙගුණය තුන්ගුණය ගන්නවා කියන ඒ කතාව මොකක්ද?

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. නෑ. ඒහෙම එකක් නෑ. ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයක් විතරයි මොකද හේතුව Bond market එක පාලනය කිරීම සඳහා පසුගිය කාලයේ ගෙන ගිය ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි. ඒක ලංකාවේ විතරක් නෙවෙයි. ඒ option දෙකම ගොඩක් රටවල කෙරෙනවා. Auction එකයි, Placement එකයි දෙකම පදනම් කර ගෙන යන්නේ. අපි හුඟක් වෙලාවට ලංකාවේ කරන්නේ ලංකාවේ පොඩි market එකක් නිසා. ඒකට Primary Dealers ලා 17 දෙනෙක් ඉන්න නිසා ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඕනෑ වෙලාවක මේක එකතු වෙලා කරන්න පුළුවන් නිසාත් ඊලඟට මේවගේ long terms අන්තිමේදී land වෙන්නේ ආපසු E.P.F. එකේ කියලා කොහේ හරි කාරණයත් නිසා Placement වලට තමයි හැම වෙලාවේම ගියේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, දැන් ඔය 16 දෙනාටම එකම මේසේ වාඩි වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා නේද ඔබතුමා පටන් ගත්තේ? ඇත්තටම ඔය 16 දෙනාට ඔය Private Placement වලදී ඔය 16 දෙනාට තම තමන් කතා කරලා වැඩි කර ගත හැකිනේ.

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක තමයි ඇත්තටම මම කිව්වේ. ..... කියලා මම කිව්වේ ඒකයි.

විගණකාධිපති : ඉතින් transperency නැති වුණාමත් .....

විගණකාධිපති : එක තමයි transperency Government එකට Cost එක එන එකයි මම කියන්නේ. ආණ්ඩුව පැත්තෙන්. එතකොට ඒක මේ Cost එක transperency develop කරන්න ..... Cost එකක් දැරිය යුතුද කියන issue එකයි. ඒ transperency develop කරන්න වෙන ක්‍රමවේදයක් භාවිතා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : .....Policy නේ. ඒක හරිද වැරදිද කියලා..

ඒක අපි කතා කරමු.

විගණකාධිපති : විගණකාධිපතිට ගැටළුවක් නැහැ. Value for Money නැත්නම් ..... Explain කරන්න වෙනවා.

Policy decision අරගෙන නෑ.

විගණකාධිපති : ඇත්තටම ඒ වගේ Policy decision එකක් ඇමතිතුමා, අරගෙනත් නැහැ.මේක අපි සාකච්ඡා කරමු කෝ. මම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පැත්තේ ඉඳන් කතා කරන්නේ. එතකොට මේ කාරණයේදී ආයෙත් අපි කතා කරනවා offered Forty Billion accepted 77

Billion. Excess ... thirty seven thousand..... Billion එතකොට මේකෙන් අරගෙන තියෙනවා.

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විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. හරි Thirty Seven Thousand Billion.

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ මෙතැන වැරදීමක්. කොමාව එන්න ඕන. නැත්නම් මෙතැන ඩොට් එක එන්න ඕන. එතකොට ඒ Thirty Seven Billion වලින් ඔක්කොම Billion වෙනවා. 60% ගිහිල්ලා තිබුණේ අර **K** Institution එකට. අපි ඒ පැත්තට යන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ නැහැ මොකද බාහිර ඒවා ගැන අපිට එච්චර මේව කරන්න බැරි නිසා.ඊලඟට 40% තමයි අනිත් පැත්තට යන්නේ.

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විගණකාධිපති : excess එක. මේ තර්ටි සෙවන් කියලා ගන්නේ ඒකයි. ඔව්. excess එකෙන් 60%ක්.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මුළු offer එකෙන් කීයද දන්නේ නෑ.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : මුළු offer එකෙන් අපි calculate කරලා ගන්නම්.

එල්. එස්. අයි. ජයරත්න මිය : මුළු Offer එකෙන් ..... Billion. ඊලඟට 39.3 % තුන්වෙනි එකට 44.7 %.

මේ total list එක නේ.

මේ total list එක. අර ඉස්සෙල්ලා කතා කළේ.

මේ total එකෙන් ගත්තාම මේ issue එක මෙතැන තියෙනවා. .....

විගණකාධිපති : මේ total එකේ මේ issue එක තියෙනවා **K** Institute එකේ.fix 04 මේ මේ Auction 04 ක් තියෙනවා. 40,40,40. ඊලඟ එකේ point 05 ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා. ඊලඟ එකේ 39% ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා. ඊලඟ එකේ 44 ඊලඟ එකේ 35. මේවා තමයි rates . Yield Rate එක 13. ..... වෙනකම් Yield Rate එක ගිහින් තියෙනවා.

විගණකාධිපති : ඕක තමයි ඔය compare කරන්න ඕන.

විගණකාධිපති : අර දෙකක් cancel කළේ. එකේ rate එක මේකත් එක්ක තමයි compare කරන්න ඕන.11යි. මේක ගියා අරක reject කරපු නිසා තමයි ඇත්තටම ඒක obious වෙනවා. මොකද අපට ඒ concept එක ගොඩනගන්න වෙනවා. ඒක reject කරලා තිබෙනවා reasons දිහා බැලුවාම.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒ නතර කිරීමේ බලය කාටද තියෙන්නේ?

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක Tender Board එකට පුළුවන් ඕන තරම් Reject වෙලා තියෙනවා මෑත ඉතිහාසයේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : නමුත් ඒ reject වෙලා නැවත ගොඩනැගීමේදි තියෙන්නේ වාසි සහගත තත්ත්වයක්.

විගණකාධිපති : මේකේ Reason එක හැටියට දෙන්නේ interast rate එක වැඩියි කියන එක. එහෙනම් ඒක ඊලඟට ගන්න එපැයි අඩු rate එකකට.

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ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : තව තියෙනවාද?

විගණකාධිපති : තියෙනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : මට එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා මේකත් එක්කම. **K** කම්පැනිය කියලා කම්පැනිය අපට හොයලා දෙන්න. අපේ ඉල්ලීමක්.

විගණකාධිපති : කතානායකතුමාගෙන් අහන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : නෑ එහෙම නෙවෙයි මම කිව්වේ. **K** කොම්පැනිය කියන කොම්පැනිය මේකට ආවේ කවදාද? ඒකත් එක්ක අපට පසුගිය කාලේ ඒ ගොල්ලෝ අරගෙන තියෙන අවස්ථා මොනවාද? කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක් අරගෙන තියෙනවාද? කියන එක අපට හොයලා දෙන්න පුළුවන් නම් කේ කියන නමින්ම හොයලා දෙන්න කෝ.

විගණකාධිපති : අපි මම හිතන්නේ වඩාත් සුදුසුයි බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් කියලා ඒ ගත්තා නම්. අපි කථානායකතුමාට දීපු report එකේ ඔක්කොම තියෙනවා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජධීර මහතා : අපි අහන ප්‍රශ්නයකට පිළිතුරක් වශයෙන් දෙන්න බැරිද අපිට.

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. ඒක secrect document එකක් කියලා නේ ඒ ගොල්ලෝ පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ. මොකද මාව අමාරුවේ දාන්නනේ ඒ ගොල්ලෝ හදන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මම ඒකට අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රතිකර්මය කලේ ඒකයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජධීර මහතා : ආවේ committee එකට නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. Committee එකට Secrect දුන්නේ ඔක්කොම එලියේ නේ. ඒකනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අද මෙහෙමයි අද තියෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාව ගැන පැහැදිලි කිරීම නේ.එතකොට වාර්තාවේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව යටතේ K Institution කියලා තමයි ආයතනය නම් කරලා තියෙන්නේ. ඒ ආයතනය ගැන පැහැදිලි කරන්නෙ ඒ ආයතනය ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලා අපි committee ය හැටියට පරීක්ෂා කරන්න ඕනෑ නම් කථානායකතුමා ලඟ තියෙන වාර්තාව අරගෙන බලන්න පුළුවන්.

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව් Central Bank එක අනිද්දා එනවා නේ. ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : ..... තමයි ඔබතුමා ඔය වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. එතකොට කතානායකතුමා ..... මන්ත්‍රීතුමත් ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය මතු කළා. එතකොට අපිවත් විශ්වාස නොකර අපි කොහොමද මේ පරීක්ෂණයට දායක වෙන්නේ? අපි කොහොමද තොරතුරු හොයන්නේ. නෑ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙන එක හරි. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය කෝප් කමිටුවේම අපිව සැකයට ලක් වීම අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපිව සැක කරනවා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයත් තියෙනවා.

විගණකාධිපති : ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒකේ අනිත් පැත්ත මන්ත්‍රීතුමා වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද මට ඇත්තට නියෝග කරන්න පුළුවන් කථානායකතුමා තමයි මේ report හදන්න මේවා කරන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් අපි මේ කමිටුවත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරන්න කරන වැඩක් විතරයි මේක. එතකොට ඒ නිසා වාර්තා කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ මට කථානායකතුමාට. ඒ නිසා තමයි කථානායකතුමා ගාව ඒක තිබ්බේ. මෙතැනින් එන්න කියන එක. Channel එක එන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : සහයෝගයක් ඉල්ලුවේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : නෑ මෙතැනින් එහාට යන්න මේ කියන සමාගම මේ කරුණු හොයා ගන්න ඕන. මේ සමාගම මොකක්ද? කොයි කාලෙද? නමුත් අපි පැටලිලා ඉන්නාව මෙතැනින් එහාට.

.විගණකාධිපති: දන්නවානේ ඕක ඉතින් මගේ කටින් ගන්න හදන්නේ.

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සභාපතිතුමා : මේ excess එකේ precentage එක.

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ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජධීර මහතා : අපේ උපකල්පනයන් අපි හදා ගන්න ඕනේ මෙතැන යම් කිසි අවාසිය විතරක් නොවෙයි මූල්‍ය දූෂණයක් තිබුණද කියන එකත් අපි හිතන්න ඕනේ committeeය හැටියට. ඒ නිසා ඒකටයි අපි ඇහුවේ. ඔබතුමාට හානියක් නම්.....

විගණකාධිපති : හරි එතකොට අපි තවදුරටත් ඒ Bond 04 explain කරනවා. කේ එකට excess එක. අර excess 33 Million ඉහල ගිහින් තියෙන ආකාරය මෙතැන තියෙන්නේ. මේ K කියන්නේ 40 Billion Bond 04 ම total එකෙන් excess 37 Billion එක කොහොමද **K** Institution එකට ගියේ කොහොමද කියන එක. පළවෙනි එකේ ඉඳලා නෑ ඇත්තටම. දෙවැනි එකේ ඉඳලා rate එක අඩුයි. ඒකයි. දෙවෙනි එකේ ඉඳලා මේකෙන් 69% ක් මේකෙන් 94% ක් 42% ක් වශයෙන් ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා. අනිත් ටිකට තමයි ඉතුරු ටික ගිහිල්ලා තියෙන්නේ. ඉතින් ඒ ගිය ආකාරය තමයි draft එකේ තියෙන්නේ. K Institution එකත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධතා අනෙක් institution එකත් එක්ක compare කරලා.ඊලඟට මෙතැන තමයි ඊලඟ ප්‍රශන්ය තියෙන්නේ. ඒ ගමන් කිරීම නිසා අර 40 Billion අර විදියට 70% ගිය නිසා Face Value එක සහ හම්බ වුණු amount එක අතර difference එක තමයි මේ calculate වෙලා තියෙන්නේ. මේ ටික අතර difference එක විතරක් 18 Billion තියෙනවා. මෙතැන ගියොත් එහෙම. ඒ කියන්නේ මෙතැන හම්බ වෙලා තියෙන්නේ මේ amount එක Face Value එක.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ බිලියන 18 ක පාඩුවක්.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : ලොස් එකක් කියන්න බැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ බිලියන 18 ක් වෙනත් ක්‍රම වලින් හොයන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ආණ්ඩුව බිලියන 18 ක් උපයන්න එපායැ තව කොහෙන් හරි.

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්.

විගණකාධිපති : පොලිය නෙවෙයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම. Cash requirement එක මේ ටික අපි 40 Billion නේ ගන්න හදන්නේ. එතකොට 40 Billion කියන්නේ මේ තියෙන්නේ Face Value එක.

ගෙවීමේ පොළිය

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. මන්ත්‍රීතුමා පොලිය නොවෙයි. Discount එක.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ඉතින් ඒකනේ පොලිය කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : පොලිය කියන්නේ coupon rate එකේ තියෙන 12.5.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Yield එක ගත්තොත් coupon rate එක කියන්නේ coupon එකෙන් දෙන පොලිය. මේ දෙන්නේ Yield එක නිසා market එකෙන් determine වන පොලිය.

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්. ඒක තමයි.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මොකද coupon කියන එක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඕන officer කෙනෙක්ට ලියන්න පුළුවන්. 15 ලියන්න පුළුවන්. 12 ලියන්න පුළුවන්.හැබැයි පොලිය කිව්වාම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒ දෙකම එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මේ තමයි market එකෙන් determine වන පොලිය.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : මෙතැන තියෙන්නේ අපි බිලියන 28 ක් ගත්තට ඇත්ත වටිනාකම අපිට හම්බ වෙලා තියෙන්නේ බිලියන 21 යි. ඒ කියන්නේ 100ක එකක් අපි ආසන්න වශයෙන් ගිහිල්ලා තියෙන්නේ 77ට වගේ.

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව් අපි ඒක පෙන්නන්නම්.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක කිසිම දවසක loss එකක් කියලා කියන්න බෑ.

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ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නෑ නෑ එතැනට යන්න එපා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා.

විගණකාධිපති :මේක බලලා අපි කතා කරමු කෝ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නෑ. චුට්ටක් ඉන්න කෝ.

මම මෙහෙම කතාවක් කියන්නම් කෝ. Coupon එකක් නැති Bond එකක් interest rate එක determine වෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියන්න. Treasury Bills වල coupon තියෙනවාද කියන්න.

කවුරුත් ඉල්ලන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

එතකොට Treasury Bill එකේ coupon එකක් නෑ. එතකොට Treasury discout Bond කියලා තියනවා අවුරුද්ද 30 ඒවත් තියෙනවා coupon නැති. සමහර ඒවාගේ coupon තියෙනවා. සමහර ඒවාගේ නෑ. Coupon නැති Bond එකක intrest Rate එක තමයි ඔන්න ඕක.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : ඒක මෙහෙමයි මේක අපිට ඇවිල්ලා තියෙන්නේ අවාසියකින්.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නෑ. අවාසි වාසි නෙවෙයි.....

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. මම හිතන්නේ වැරදි තර්කයක ඉන්නේ. ඔබතුමා කියපු තර්කය පිළිගන්නවා කිසි අවුලක් නැහැ. මෙතැන කතා කරන්නේ එක නොවෙයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම. අපට රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තියෙනවා 40 Billion cash හැබැයි ඒ 40 Billion වලට Face Value එකට issue කරනවා. issue කරාට ඒ 40 Billion discount එනවා විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක. අපිට හම්බ වෙන්නේ 70යි 80 යි ඒ වගේ ගණන්. අන්තිමට cash requirement එක 18 Billion වලින් short වෙනවා ආණ්ඩුවට.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ මෙහෙම තියෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ අපි 40 ක් issue කරලා අපි 77 ක් ගන්න යන නිසා තමයි මෙච්චර අඩු අගයකට අපිට යන්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක හරි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : ඒකයි තියෙන ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක හරි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : අපි 40ක් issue කරලා 77කට යන නිසා අපිට පහළ අගයකට යන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක හරි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : එතකොට තමයි අවසාන වශයෙන් මට හිතෙන විදියට 77 ක..

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නෑ නෑ අනුර මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ තර්කය මම පිළිගන්නවා. හැබැයි ඒ තර්කය අපට කියන්න බෑ loss එකක් කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මොකද ඔය gap එක කියන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔය gap එක තමයි market එකෙන් determine වන interest rate එක.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : නමුත් අපේ .....එකෙන් තමයි මේ.....එකේ තියෙනවා ඔය last 28 Billion ගිහිල්ලා තියෙන්නේ 14.23 වලට. .....interest rate එක.

.....

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඉතින් එක තමයි loss කියන්නෙ.

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විගණකාධිපති : අපි total එක Auction එකට එන නිසා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අපි මෙතැන argument එකකට යන්න ඕනෑ නෑ. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න මම මෙතැන argument එකකට යන්න උත්සාහ කරනවා නෙවෙයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, අපි හරියට technically correct වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මම කිසිම විදියකට පිළිගන්නේ නෑ මේක loss එකක් කියලා. මේක loss එකක් කියලා අපට අර්ථකථනය කරන්න බෑ. මම කියන එක අහන්නකෝ පොඩ්ඩක්. මේක අපි කියන්නේ පොලිය හැදෙන්නේ ක්‍රම දෙකකින්. එක ක්‍රමයක් තමයි fix දෙන පොලිය. ඒක තමයි coupon එක. අනිත් එක තමයි market එකෙන් determine වෙන පොලිය. ඒ market එකෙන් පොලිය determine වෙන්නේ ඒ market එකේ rate එක මොකක්ද? ඉදිරියේදී තව කොච්චර මුදල් අවශ්‍ය වෙයි ද? අපට ඉල්ලමක් පෑදෙයි ද? ඔය සියළුම දේවල් එක්ක තමයි මිනිස්සු පොලිය determine කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඔය දෙකේ එකතුව තමයි Face Value එකයි, මේ අපට ලැබෙන actual එක. Face Value එකයි actual එකයි තමයි market එකෙන් determine වෙන පොලිය, coupon එකේ ලියලා තියෙන පොලිය තමයි අපි administratively දෙන පොලිය. ඔය දෙකේ එකතුව සමහර වෙලාවට දෙපැත්තට වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

විගණකාධිපතිතුමාහරි ඔබතුමා කියන එක 100% ක් මම පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත් මෙතැන තියන ප්‍රශ්නය ඒකතමයි. මොකද එතැනට ගියේ මේ සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රමාණය ඔප්ෂන් එකට යන නිසා. මොකද market එකේ position එකක් නෑ. ඒනිසා තමයි Placement වලට ගියේ. මොකද Placement වලට ගිහිල්ලා අපට මේ 70ට බහින එක නතර කර ගන්න තිබුණා.

විගණකාධිපති : .....නිබුණේ ඒකනේ 100 ක් ..... වෙලා තිබුණා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ මේක ප්‍රධානම හේතුව මේ Auction කිරීම නිසා තමයි මේ අවාසිය ලැබිලා තියෙන්නේ කියලා?

විගණකාධිපති : සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම Auction කිරීම නිසා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : සම්පූර්ණ Auction කිරීම නිසා කියලා.

විගණකාධිපති : .....එකේ අඩුපාඩු විතරයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒ විදියට කල්පනා කරන කොට .....

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : Auction කිරීමයි, ඒ ගන්නා ලද ප්‍රමාණය වැඩි කිරීමයි කියන දෙකම පදනම් වෙනවා...

.....

විගණකාධිපති : .....Auction එක අරගෙන, ඒක fix කරලා, ...

ඒක Policy ප්‍රශ්නයක් කරනවාද? නැද්ද? කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : Auction කරන එක අපි Policy. අපි Policy කියන්නේ අපේ ආණ්ඩුවේ

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමා හිතන .....

විගණකාධිපති : එහෙම පොලිසියක් කරන්නේ නැහැ කොහේවත්.ඒක ආණ්ඩුව ගත යුතු Policy එකක් නොවෙයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම එහෙම Policy එකක් නැහැ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම කියනවා නම් ඒක Monetary Board එකෙන් ගන්න ඕන decision එකක්.මම එතැනත් Professional Due Care කියන තැනට මම එතැනත් ගන්නවා.මොකද එහෙම reaserch එකක්වත් කරලා නැහැ මේ දෙක වෙනස් වුණොත් මොකද වෙන්නේ කියලා.

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක ලිඛිතව නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Unsolicted

විගණකාධිපති : මම මේක යන්නද ඉදිරියට. ඕවා අපි පස්සේ කතා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් නිශ්ශබ්ද වෙලා එක එක්කෙනා ප්‍රශ්න කතා කරන්න.

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ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මොනවද ඉගෙන ගන්නේ. මගේ opinion එක මට කියන්න පුළුවන්.

විගණකාධිපති: -මේක පිළිගන්න කියනවා නෙවෙයි. කාටවත් කියන්නේ නැහැ මේක පිළිගන්න කියලා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: අපේ Argumrnt එක ටෙක්නිකලි .....

විගණකාධිපති: ..... අන්න ඒකයි. එහෙම කිසිම Issue එකක් නැහැ. මේක Opinion එකක් විතරයි.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති: ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කරන්න අවසානයේ කමිටුව විදියට මොකක්ද කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

විගණකාධිපති : අපි මේ කමිටුවට Paper එකක් දෙනවා. මේ කමිටුවට පුළුවන් Paper එකට එහා ඕනෑ පැත්තකට දෝලනය වෙන්න පුළුවන්. කිසිම Issue එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම තමයි අපි හිතුවේ.

විගණකාධිපති: -මම යන්නද ඊලඟ Point එකට? හරි එතකොට අපි මේ Bond එකෙත් 10 Billion තමයි. එතකොට 10 Billionවලින් නතර කළා නම් එන estimate අපි කියපු අර පාඩුව තමයි, ඒ අවාසිය ගත්තාම මොකද මේ බලන්න මේකේ අර මුල ඉඳන් නියම වෙලා තියෙන මිල ගණන් ප්‍රමාණය. 10 Billion ඒවා වෙනම 04 ක් යන්නේ. ඒ 04ට පළවෙනි එකේ problem එකක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේක අපිට අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ඒ value එකට ගන්න වෙනවා.ඒක 08 Billion තියෙන නිසා ඒ value එකට.ඊට පස්සේ ගැනීමේදී අපි placement වලට යන්නේ නැතුව auction වලට යන නිසා මේ තමයි ඇවිල්ලා තියෙන price එක.එතකොට මේ 75. සෙවනි ෆෝ වලට ගිහිල්ලා තමයි මේ rate එක හැදිලා තියෙන්නේ. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා මේ rate එකයි අපි decide කර ගන්න මේ rate එකයි අතර difference එක තමයි අපි ඔය රජයට අයිති අවාසිය හැටියට ගණනය කරලා තියෙන්නෙ මොකද මේක අන්තිමට ඊලඟ bond එකට එන කොට යනවා 70ට යනවා.100 ක් ගත්තාම 70 යි හම්බ වෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේක .....එතකොට මේ විදියට ගිහිල්ලා මේ විදියට ගණනය කරන amount එක තමයි මේ විදියට මේක හරි logical මේ calculation එක. මොකද අපි එතැනින් එහාට කොහේවත් අපි අලාභය එන ඒවා එහෙම නැත්නම් .....ඔය කියන විදියට අඩුවැඩි වෙනවා. මොනවත් කතා කරලා නැහැ. අපි එකම දේ විගනකාධිපති හැටියට කියන්නෙ මේ කියන විදියට නීත්‍යානුකූලව auction කරපු amount එකට auction කරපු date එකට auction කරපු figure එකට අරගෙන ඉතුරු ටික පරණ විදියට placement කරලා ගත්තා නම් එහෙම මේ amount එක මෙතැනට එනකම් ඉතුරු කරන්න තිබුණා කියන කාරණය තමයි කියන්නේ. ඒ දෙකේ වෙනස රජයට එදාට මූල්‍යමය වශයෙන් අලාභයක් අවාසියක් වුණා. මේ තීරණය මෙතැන නොගැනීම කියන කාරණය යන නිසා මේ professional due care එක නෑ කියන තැන තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ වාර්තාව නිර්මාණය කරන්නේ. මේ වාර්තාව

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විගණකාධිපති : ඔව් අන්තිමට 70ට දක්වා අඩු වෙලා තියෙනවා. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා තමයි ලොකු වෙනස බිලියන ඒ ගාන ආවේ. මෙන්න මේ කාරණය නිසා තමයි 18 Billion difference එක එන්නේ. ඒ difference එක ඒ පැත්තෙන් තර්ක කළත් තමයි මොකද මට නම් තේරෙන විදියට. ඇත්තටම මේ mission එක මෙතැන නතර කළා නම් මේ පාඩුව වෙන්නේ නැහැ ඇත්තටම.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : සමහර විට අපට මේ පාඩුව යන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : එතකොට අපි අතර ගිහිල්ලා .....වෙන්න පුළුවන් ඒක. ඒ කියන්නේ අපි අතරව පහළට තව හොයන්න යන නිසා 77 දක්වා යන නිසා අපිට බිලියන 18ක පාඩුවක් සිද්ද වෙනවා. ඇත්තටම අපි 60 වගේ නතර වුණා නම් අපිට තව 17 කින් ඒ 17 ඇතුලේ පාඩුවම තියෙන්න පුළුවන් 10 ක් විතර. ඒ කියන්නේ අපි වැඩිපුර 17 ක් ගන්න යන නිසා ඒක අස්සේ පාඩුවම තියෙන්න පුළුවන් 10 ක් විතර. කිසිම තේරුමක් නැහැ. ඇයි අපි 60 ඉඳන් 60න් නතර කරලා 77ට යන්නේ නැතුව හිටියා නම් එතැන නතර වුණා නම් ඒක නෙවෙයි වෙන්නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : අපි ඊලඟ කෑල්ල යමු ද? ඊලඟට ඒක පැහැදිලි වෙනවා ඇති අර ඊලඟට අපි ගත්තොත් එහෙම තව අපේම අයතනයත් එක්ක E.P.F. එකත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ වුණොත් එහෙම දැන් Provident fund එක මේ high rate එකට මේ primary delears ලා ගාවට ගිහිල්ලා ගන්නවා low rate එකට ඇත්තටම Secondery market එකට ගිහිල්ලා ගන්න පුළුවන් කමක් තියෙනවා. ඉතින් ඒක තමයි මෙතැන තියෙන ලොකුම issue එක. Primary market එකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් Secondery market එකෙන් වැඩි මිලට අර ගන්නවා.ගන්නවා කියන්නේ වෙන rate එකකට.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : **.....**මුදලක් පාඩු වෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුව යටතේ.

විගණකාධිපති : අන්න හරි මම ඒක තමයි අර professional due care යටතේ identify කරන කම් මොකද ඔහුගේ ගිණුම යටතේ පාලනය වන.....එකක්. මේ විදියට ගන්නවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අධිපතිවරයා යටතේ සෘජුව තියෙන එකක්ද ඒකත්?

විගණකාධිපති : අධිපතිවරයා යටතේ. එතකොට මේක switch වෙන විදියක් මම කියන්නම්. මේක දැක්කාම තේරෙයි ඒක. මේ කියන example එකට ඔය කියන කාරණය ටිකක් අපි identify කළා. මේකේ **K** institute එක එනවා. **K** institute එක තමයි primary dealer හැටියට මේ promote එක අරගන්නේ. අරගෙන මෙයා D.F.C.C. bank එකට මේක දෙනවා. ඒක තවත් P කියන තවත් ආයතනයකට අලෙවි කරනවා. ඒක ආයේ D.F.C.C.එකට අලෙවි කරනවා. අයෙත් K එකට එනවා. කේ එක ආයෙත් D.F.C.C.එකට එනවා. D.F.C.C. එකෙන් නම් කරනවා E.P.F.එකට.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : මේ අතර මැදින් කරන්නේ rate එක අඩු කර ගන්නවා. ඒ ගොල්ලන් අතරමැද සිද්ධ වෙන ගණුදෙනුවක් මේක.K ගන්නවා මොකද price එක අඩු කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා : .....D.F.C. C.බෑන්ක් එක. K එකේ .....එක එන්නේ අන්තිම sale එකෙන්.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අන්තිම sale එකේන නෙවෙයි. ඩී.එෆ් ට විකුණන එකයි, primary market එකෙන් ගන්න දෙකයි අතර වෙනස.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : මෙතැනට ආයෙමත් K primary market එකෙන් directly ගන්න කොට .....

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එයා rate එකක් ගෙවලා ගත්තා නේ primary එකෙන්? හැබැයි එයා E.P.F.එකත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. එයා පොඩි.....දානවා ඩී.එෆ්.එකෙන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : එතකොට K ගන්න සම්පූර්ණ එක ඔය ක්‍රියාවලියද වෙන්නේ

විගණකාධිපති : සිම් එකේ number එකට ඕන ගානකට කැඩෙනවා. ඕන ගානකට කඩන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : මේ රටාවමද ගිහින් තියෙන්නේ සමස්තය නැත්නම්?

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : Example දෙකක් විදියට බැලුවම යන රටාව තමයි ඕක.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ ඔය බැංකු ටිකමද ඉන්නේ ඕකේ.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. Primary Dealers ටික තමයි ඕක ඇතුලේ ඉන්නේ. D.F. Bank කියන එක ඔය ගෙන්වන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අරකත් D.F.C.C. Pan Asia.

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ මේක Example එකක් හැටියට තමයි කිව්වේ. අපි නම් කියනනේ නැහැ. Rate හරි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : දැන් ගන්නකෝ පළවෙනි එක. පළවෙනි එක ඇත්තටම සිද්ධ වුණ දෙයක්ද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්.

විගණකාධිපති : මාර්තු පළවෙනිදා ගත්තු එක අප්‍රේල් 25 වෙන කොට මෙතැනට Land වෙලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ ඇත්තටම සිද්ධ වුණ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගණුදෙනුවකට.තවත් තියෙනවා කීපයක්.

විගණකාධිපති : ගණුදෙනු දෙකක් අපි Example එකක් විදියට අරගෙන තියෙන්නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : මේක මාර්තු 27 Bond එක සහ අනිත්

විගණකාධිපති : අන්න ඒක තමයි මම හිතන්නේ.

මන්ත්‍රීතුමා - මේක කොහොමද ආවේ.

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : transfer එක විතරයි. Yield Rate එක දෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Yield Rate එක දෙන්නෙ නැහැ?

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : Yield Rate එක දෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ .....

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : නෑ මේකේ fundamental තියෙන issue එක තමයි Yield Rate එක .....එකත් Governor ගේ යටතේ තියෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා - විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මහ බැංකුවේ CDS එකේ තියෙනවා නේද Secondery market ඔක්කොම.

විගණකාධිපති : මේ ටිකේ තියෙනවා. නමුත් Yield Rate ටික ඔක්කොම .....

විගණකාධිපති : yield rate නෑ කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලෝ In writing දීලා තියෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : CDS එකේ තිබිය යුතුයි.

විගණකාධිපති : .....තියෙනවා ඒකේ අපි recommendation ගොඩක් දැම්මා බලන්න මගේ recommendation.

සභාපතිතුමා - නැත්නම් බෑ නේ දැන්.

.....

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඔය සල්ලි ගිහිල්ලා ලොරියකින් බානවා නොවෙයි. ඕක electronically නේ වෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඕක අපිට දැන් isolation බලන්න බෑ. දැන් මේක 13 යි 14 ½ ට නේ ගත්තේ. ඊට පස්සේ මාසයක් ගියා නේ ඔය rate එක complete වෙන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔය මාසේ අතරතුර Market Rate එකට මොකද වුණේ? Market Rate එකත් බැස්සා නම් එතකොට මහ ලොකු profit එකක් මෙතැන නැහැ.

විගණකාධිපති : නැහැ මෙතැන issue එක තියෙන්නෙ මෙතැන නොවෙයි. මේ ගොල්ලන්ට එකතු වෙලා manipulate පුළුවන් Market Rate එක.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එක තමයි මාසයක් කියන්නේ කෙටි කාලයක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : අවුරුදු 30කට ගත්ත එකක් මාසයක් ඇතුළත දඩබඩ ගාලා ආතාරින්නේ කොහොමද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඇමතිතුමා අනිත් අයට අවුරුදු 30ක Bond එකක් අරගෙන වැඩක් නැහැ. එක්කෝ E.P.F. එක. එක්කෝ Insurance Fund එක. එක්කෝ N.S.B. වෙන්න ඕනෑ. (බාධා කිරීමක්) මේක අප්‍රේල් 29 වෙන කොට තමයි මෙතැනට Land වෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒ E.P.F. landing එකනේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : K.D. ලා ඉවර වෙන්නේ කොච්චර දවසකටද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඒ rate එකට අපි හෙව්වේ නැහැ. ඒක අපිට ටිකක් අමාරුයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : තව එකක් තියෙනවා. දැන් අවසාන 40 Billion එක තියෙනවා නේ?

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : K ගත්තා E.P.F. එක ගත්තේ නැහැ. K ට ගන්න E.P.F. එකෙන් තමයි සල්ලි දුන්නේ.

විගණකාධිපති : ඒවා නෙවෙයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඇයි E.P.F. එකෙන් ගත්තේ නැත්තේ කියන Issue එක තමයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම තියෙන්නේ. (බාධා කිරීමක්.)

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ Primary Market එකෙන් ගන්න හැකියාව තියෙද්දී ඇයි එයා Secondary Market එකෙන් අඩු Rate එකකට ගන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි දුන්නද නැද්ද කියලා හොයා ගමු. එතකොට ප්‍රශ්නය තියෙන්නෙ Money Market එකේ Repo කරලා E.P.F. එකේ එහෙම කරපු එකේ E.P.F. එකට මේ Auction එකට යන්න බැරි වුණේ කියන එක.

විගණකාධිපති : Primary Market එකෙන්ම ගන්න තිබුණා එයාට. ..

විගණකාධිපති : හොඳයි ඊට පස්සේ අපි yield රේට් එක, එක එක දවසට වැඩි වෙලා තියෙන .....අපිට rate එක විතරයි බලන්න තියෙන්නේ ඒකේ. අළුත් rate එකත් මේ Auction එකට මාරු වීම නිසා මේ සිදු වෙච්ච දේ මේ rate යන ක්‍රමය. නමුත් 2016 දී උඩින් පටන් ගන්නේ. මේ හේතුව නිසා තමයි අපි මේ කියන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ. මොකද මේ rate එකේ increase එක පටන් ගන්නවා මේ හේතුව නිසා. Auction එකෙන් පස්සේ. මොකද අර දෙකේ difference එක කෙලින්ම මේක බලපාන්නේ ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේකට නෙවෙයි. මුළු රටේ තියෙන සියළුම interest range එකටම බලපාලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා කිව්වානේ අර E.P.F. එකට ගිය එකේ දැන් ඔය March 29 Bond එකද ඔය දැන් කියන්නෙ?

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්. March 29 Bond එක April 29 වෙන කොට land වෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරියටම මාසයකින් land වෙනවා නේ?

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව්.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒකේ මුළු series එකම follow කළාද?

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ. සමහර තොරතුරු අපිට ඇත්තටම ගන්න බෑ. අපි බොහොම අමාරුවෙන් තමයි කෙටි කාලයක් තිබුණේ ඒ තොරතුරු ගන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ randomly ගත්තාද?

විගණකාධිපති : අපි මේ කීපයක් select කරලා ගත්තේ. ඒකත් example දෙකකට limit කරන්න වුණා අපිට.තොරතුරු නැති නිසා. මොකද In writing ම ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දීලා තියෙනවා Secondary Market එකේ තොරතුරු නෑ කියලා. අපිට ඒක නිසා yield rate එහෙම ගන්න බෑ එක එක්කෙනා දුන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හැබැයි එක series එකක් follow කරගෙන follow කරගෙන ගියා.

විගණකාධිපති : .....

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් yield Curve එක ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් explain කරනවාද? ඒ කියන්නේ රටේම interest rate වැඩි වුණාද? ඔබතුමා කිව්ව කතාව පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරනවාද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක දැන් හොඳටම අපට පැහැදිලියි නේ 8, 9 තිබුණ interest rate එක දැන් 12.5ට ගියා නේ. මේ සිදුවීමත් එක්තරා විදියකට බලපානවා. Interest rate එක decide වෙන්නේ Treasury Bond එක rate plus එක. එතකොට.....base කරගෙන තමයි ඔය .....ඔක්කොම 40%ට යන්නේ. ඒ 40% හැදෙන්නේ හැම වෙලාවෙම Bond Rate එක plus එක. ඒ නිසා තමයි දැන් Golden Key එකේ ..... වැඩි නිසා.ඒක තමයි Bench Mark එක. ඒ Bench Mark එක මත තමයි සම්පූර්ණ සමස්ථයම තීරණය වන්නේ. ඒ Bench Mark එක වෙන්න ප්‍රධාන හේතුව Treasury Bond වල fact එක Zero. එහෙම තමයි.....කරන්නේ. ඒ නිසා Interest Rate equal එතකොට එතැනට ඉඳලා ආයතනයේ Risk එක වැඩි වෙන විදියට එකතු වෙවී එකතු වෙවී යනවා. ඒ විදියට තමයි අලුත් Interest Rate එක, එක එක තැන්වල හැදෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි...එනකොට 30% වෙන්නේ ඒකනේ. මොකද risk factor වැඩියි. ඒ risk factor එක හැදෙන්නෙත් Treasury plus Risk කියන දෙක එකතු වෙලා තමයි ඒක හැදෙන්නේ.අවසාන වශයෙන් මගේ conclusion එක විගණකාධිපතිගේ conclusive එක කාරණා තුනකට කැඩුනා එකක් තමයි actually රජයට වුණ අවාසිය කියන එක. අපි අර Bond දෙක විතරයි කළේ. තවත් series අතරේ අපට මේකට attension නිසා ඒ දෙක විතරයි ගත්තේ. ඒ දෙකේ අර කියපු අවම Rate එක නිසා Discount එකට ගිහිල්ලා එදාට particular Date එකට ඒ.....සේ Decision එක නොගැනීම නිසා වෙව්ව අලාභය විතරමයි මේ Calculate කරලා තියෙන්නේ. ඒක තමයි අපි කියන්නේ 1.6 බිලියන් කියලා. ඊලඟට අනිත් කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම කියන්නෙ නැහැ. මම මෙච්චර වෙලා කිව්වා. Professional Due Careness එක කොහොමද මෙකේ ඇතුලේ Develop වෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒක මම හිතන්නේ හොඳටම පැහැදිලියි.ඊලඟ කාරණය අපි සඳහන් කළේ futher investigation අවශ්‍ය නම් යන්න පුළුවන්. කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මේක විගණාධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය විතරයි. ඒ මතය ගොඩනැගීම සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම V.F.M. මත Value For Money Concept එක Base කරගෙන විගණකාධිපතිට තිබෙන බලතල භාවිතා කරලා තමයි රටේ අවශ්‍යතාව, රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාව සහ Official පුද්ගලයෙක් තමන්ගේ Professional Care කිරීම හරහා රජයට අලාභයක් සිදු නොවෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක පදනම පමණයි කළේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි ඔය විදියට අපි විස්තර කළේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා පෙන්නුවා විස්සයි අසූවයි කියලා පෙන්නලා ඒක 5.1 හරි එකයි දෙක හරි , එක පැත්තක 100 තියෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා ඒ පොඩි ප්‍රමණයක් Auction, Auction කරනවා කියන එක මට සමාවෙලා කියන්න මම මෙලෝ දෙයක් මේ Economics දන්නේ නැහැ. මම නීතිඥයෙක්. නමුත් මම මේවා ගැන ආධුනිකයි. මම අහන්නේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් තේරුම් ගන්න. මට පක්ෂපාතීත්වයක් තියෙනවා. නමුත් මට මේ කමිටුව ඇතුළේ එහෙම දෙයක් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම අහන්නේ ඒක නිසා. දැන් එතැන ඔබතුමා තර්කයක් කිව්වා 20 යි 80 කියන ඒ කතාව කියලා එතැන ටිකක් Auction කියලා rate එක බලනවා කියලා. ඒක logical නැහැ නේද ? විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ටිකක් Auction කළාම ඒකෙන් කොහොමද හරි rate එකක් ගන්නේ? 20%ක් Auction කරලා.

විගණකාධිපති : ඔබතුමා කියන කතාව 100% ක් නිවැරදියි. ඔය complete pure Open Market එකකට. හරියට හරි ඔය කතාව. ඔය logical නෑ කියන කතාව මම පිළිගන්නවා.ප්‍රශ්නය තියෙන්නේ මේ මිල ලංකාව වගේ රටක තීරණය කරන්නෙ කොහොමද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය. මොකද හේතුව මේ පොඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් පස්සේ විශාල හමා යාමක් සිද්ධ වෙනවා ලංකාවේ. හැබැයි ඒ එක්කම අපිට මේ මිල පාලනය කර ගැනීමක්, Interest පාලනය කර ගැනීමක් අවශ්‍යයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ ක්‍රමදෙක භාවිතා කළේ කලින්. අපි එකයි කියන්නේ මේ තියන rate එක පදනම් කරගෙන

එක්කෝ අලුත් rate එකක් decide කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඊටත් වඩා හොඳම දේ තමයි market එකට ගිහිල්ලා බලලා තව ප්‍රමාණයක් දාලා market value එක බැලුවා. බලලා ඒක decide කළා. හැබැයි අර logic එකක් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ එතැනින් එහාට. මොකද මේ සල්ලි ඔක්කොම ගිහිල්ලා land වෙන්නේ Government Institution වලට. ඒ නිසා තමයි ඒ ඉතුරු ටික ඒ ආයතනවලට කතා කරලා කිව්වා මෙන්න Market එකේ Rate එක ඕගොල්ලන් අරගන්න කියලා. එතකොට E.P.F. එකට කතා කරලා කිව්වා ගන්න, ලංකා බැංකුවට කතා කරලා කිව්වා තව ටිකක් ගන්න. එහෙම පුළුවන්නම් කියලා. ඒ විදියට අර ටික ගත්තා. එතකොට අර rate එකේ නතර වෙනවා රටම. ඔබතුමා කියන logic හරියට හරි මම පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : මම මේ කියන්නේ දර්ශීය තත්ත්වය. මම මූලධර්ම ගැන කතා කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒක එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා ලංකාව වගේ රටකට එහෙම හරි නැහැ කියලා. ලංකාව වගේ රටකට එහෙම හරි නැහැයි කියන එක ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම සාපේක්ෂ දෙයක් නේ. මොකද මෙතැන allegation එක. මෙතැන සෙල්ලම් කරනවා කියන එක Private Placement කරද්දී කලින්නුත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබුණා. ඔතැන හිටියේ සියයට සියයක් ආණ්ඩුවේ අය විතරක් නොවෙයි නේ. ඔතැන හිටියා Private අය. එතකොට සුළු ප්‍රමාණයෙන් හරි ඔය K ත් හිටියා. ඒ නිසා මෙතැන හැමදාම යම් විදියක bias දෙයක් වුණා. Private Placement කරද්දී එක එක අයට ගියා කියන චෝදනාව තිබුණා. අපි පෞද්ගලිකව නොදන්න මිනිස්සු හැටියට දර්ශීය විදියට විශ්වාස කළා Tenders හරි compititive මොනවා හරි ක්‍රමයකට ඒව ගැලපෙන්නේ නැති තැන් තියෙනවා. නමුත් එහෙම හොඳයි කියලා. එතකොට ඔබතුමාගේ ඔය Opinion එක Justify කළා. ඒ කියන්නේ ලංකාව වගේ Market එකකට 100% Competitive Biting ගැලපෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක Justify කරන්න තියෙන evidence මොනවාද?

විගණකාධිපති : හොඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඊට කලින් තියෙනවා Open Market එකට යන්න මොනවා හරි තියෙනවාද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය. එහෙම එකක් ඇත්තේ නැහැ පළමුවෙන් ම. මොකද මේ Market එකට එහා යන්න මොකක්ද පදනම් වේවිව කාරණය කියන එක research papers එකක් තියෙන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම මොනවත් research paper එකක් නැහැ. ඒකට තියෙන එකම දේ Central Bank එකේ Governor කියනවා ඇමරිකාවේ, එංගලන්තයේ ඔක්කොම Open Market System එක තියෙන්නේ. හැබැයි මම දන්නේ නැහැ ඇමරිකාවෙත් දෙකම mix එකක් යන්නේ. මේ වගේ base කරගෙන. (බාධා කිරීමක්) පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. එතකොට ඒ නිසා මමත් ඔයගොල්ලන්ගේ පැත්තේ, මම මේ තේරුම් කරලා දෙන්න කියන්නේ. මට වැඩක් නෑ මේ ප්‍රශ්නය. එතකොට මේතැනදී අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා Government එක පැත්තෙන් ගත්තාට පස්සේ Government එකට අවම පොලියකට මේක පවත්වාගෙන යන්න. මොකද තනිකර බර රජයට එන නිසා කියන කාරණයත් එක්ක. එතකොට ඊලඟ කාරණය ගත්තාම මේ අයතන ඔක්කොම ගිහිල්ලා රජයේ ආයතන නම් purchase කරන්නේ එතකොට ඒක land වෙනවා එතැනට. ඒ වියදමත් අතන එකයි. එතකොට මැද කොහේ හරි ගිහිල්ලා නතර වෙනවා. අපි Private Market එකත් ඉන්න ඕනෑ කියන කාරණය යටතේ ඒවා ඔක්කොම justify කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා තමයි මම මුලින්ම කිව්වේ transparency should noy be any cost කියලා. ඒ නිසා එතැන reasonable place එකක් තියෙන්න ඕනෑ. මේකේ වෙලා තියෙන Damage එක මේ කාරණය නිසා ගොඩක් වැඩියි. නමුත් මෙතැනින් ඉවත් වීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි Research එකක් Central Bank එක වත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයවත් කළ බවට කිසිම Information එකක් නැහැ. ඒ Information එක තිබුණත් අනිවාර්යෙන්ම Justify වෙනවා Interest Rate එක මේ විදියට ඉහළ යාම හරහා. මේ හේතුව නිසායි මේක සිද්ධ වුණේ කියන එක. මේතැන තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය තියෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : දැන් අපි සිදුවීමක් ගැන සාක්ෂිඟ නොකොට දර්ශීය තත්ත්වයන් ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. එතකොට මේ දෙකේම ගැටළු තියෙනවා. දර්ශීය තත්ත්වයට ගියොත් මේ දෙකම ගැටළු තියෙනවා නේ. හැබැයි දැන් මේ සාකච්ඡාව ගන්නේ යම් නිශ්චිත සිදුවීමක් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ වෙලා. ඒකයි මෙතැන වැදගත් කම තියෙන්නේ. එතකොට එතෙක් අනුගමනය කරන ලද ක්‍රමවේදයක් වෙනස් කරනවා නිශ්චිත වෙනස් කිරීම සඳහා වූ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් නැහැ. අපි One Billion වලට ගිහිල්ලා අපි බිලියන 20.2 ක් වගේ එනවා නේ? එතකොට මහබැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ඒ විස්සම ගන්න කියලා නියෝගයක් දෙනවා. ඒ නියෝගය තිබියදී Tender Board එක කියනවා නෑ මේකේ අවාසිය අවම කර ගන්න නම් අපි ගන්න ඕන බිලියන් 2.6 ක් වගේ මම මේ කියන්නේ එතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස කියලා. නමුත් බලකිරීම මත අපි බිලියන 10කට යනවා. ඒ බිලියන 10ට යනකොට අපිට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගත යුතු පොලී

අනුපාතිකය වැඩි ඉහළ අනුපාතිකයකට යනවා. ඒ ඉහළ අනුපාතයකට යන සමාගම නිශ්චිත ලෙසම මහබැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ ඥාතීත්වයක් තියෙනවා.එතකොට මෙන්න මේ සමස්ථ ක්‍රියාවලියත් එක්ක තමයි අපි මේ ගණුදෙනුව දිහා බලන්න ඕනෑ. අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ නිශ්චිත තත්ත්වයන් එක්ක අන්තර් සබඳතාවයන් ගැන සැලකිල්ලක් දක්වලා.ඒක අත්හැරලා ගණුදෙනුවක් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : සිද්ධිය ගැන නිගමනය නොවෙයි. මගේ අවසාන නිගමනය ගැන මම දැන මෙතැන කියන්න කැමති නැහැ. නමුත් මෙතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට සහ නිගමනවල පළවෙනි නිගමනයට පදනම වෙලා තියෙන්නේ මේ සම්පූර්ණ Auction වලට යැම නොයෑම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රතිපත්ති. Policy එක. දර්ශීය තත්ත්වය කතා කරන්නේ මේකට පාදක කර ගන්න. එහෙම නැතුව මේ මුළු එක සුද්ද කරන්න නොවෙයි.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මම පොඩි විග්‍රහයක් කරන්නම්. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ආවේ 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ නොවෙයි. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ආවේ අවුරුදු 50කට කලින්. මොකක්ද ප්‍රශ්නය?. අපි තේරුම් ගමු ප්‍රශ්නය මොකක්ද කියලා.ප්‍රශ්නය ආවේ ආණ්ඩුවට ඕනෑ එක පැත්තකින් මුදල්. අනිත් පැත්තෙන් කවුද ආණ්ඩුවට මේ ණය දෙන්නේ. ණය දෙන පුද්ගලයෝ ඉන්නවා. මූලික වශයෙන්ම අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල තමයි මේ ණය වැඩිපුරම ආණ්ඩුවට දෙන්න පටන් ගත්තේ. එතකොට මේ ආයතන දෙකම මහ බැංකුව ඇතුලට දැම්මා. මහ බැංකුව කියනවා මට බිලියන් 50 ක් ඕනෑ ණය අද, අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලත් මහ බැංකුව ඇතුලෙන්ම කියලා කියනවා "හරි මම ඔයාට බිලියන් 50 ක් දෙන්නම්." එතකොට සේවකයාගේ ඉතිරිකිරීම් තමයි අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල කියලා කියන්නේ. වෙන කාගේ වත් සල්ලි නොවෙයි. අපි අවුරුදු ගණනක් වැඩ කරලා ඉතුරු කරපු සල්ලි ටික තමයි ඔතැන තියෙන්නේ. එතකොට ප්‍රශ්නයක් පැන නැඟුනා කාටද වැඩිපුර බලයක් තියෙන්නේ කියලා. සේවකයාටද? මහ බැංකුවටද? මහ බැංකුවට තමයි වැඩිපුර බලය තිබුණේ. එතකොට මහ බැංකුව කිව්වා" ඔයා මට මේ සල්ලි දෙන්න. මම ඔයාට සියයට පහක් නැත්නම් සියයට තුනක් දෙන්නම්" කියලා. කාලයක් තිස්සේ සියයට දෙකේ, සියයට තුනේ පොලියකට තමයි අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට මේවා දුන්නේ. ඉලංගරත්න මහතා 1948 අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ පනතේ, වෙන කිසිම පනතක නැහැ. සියයට දෙකයි දශම පහක් මේකට පොලිය දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කියනවා. සියයට දෙකයි දශම පහක් පොළිය දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කියන්නේ ඒ දවස්වල අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල Bond rate එක තිබුනේ සියයට එකයි. එතකොට මෙතැන තියෙනවා පොළී ජාති දෙකක්. එකක් තමයි nominal පොළිය. අනිත් එක තමයි real පොලිය. මූර්ත වටිනාකම. එතකොට මේ මූර්ත වටිනාකම තමයි මම විශ්වාස කරන්නේ ඉලංගරත්න මහතා කියන්න ඇති 2 1/2% ක් දෙන්න කියලා. එතකොට එහෙම නැත්නම් nominal පොලිය හැමදාම උඩට පල්ලෙහාට යනවා නේ.කාලයක් තිස්සේ මේ වැඩේ මේ විදයටම සිද්ධ වුණා. සිද්ධ වුණාම A.S.ජයවර්ධන ලාගේ කාලේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් ගත්තා "නෑ අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට මේ විදියට අඩු පොලියක් දෙනවාට වඩා ඔවුන්ටත් සාධාරණ පොලියක් දීම සඳහා තරඟකාරීව අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලක් මේ Bond වලට ඇප බඳින්න ඕනෑ කියලා මේ Auction system පටන් ගත්තේ ඒ කාලේ. ඊට පස්සේ ඔන්න ඔය හේතුව නිසා තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, අපි වගේ පුද්ගලයෝ අවුරුදු ගණනක් තිස්සේ මේ හැන්සාඩ් මම පෙන්වන්නම් ඔබතුමාට research කරලා නෑ කියපු නිසා. මගේ හැන්සාඩ් කියවලා බලන්න, මම හන්සාඩ් 10 ක් පෙන්වන්නම් ඔබතුමාට මේ තර්කය ගේනවා. මම කියනවා මේ මූලික ප්‍රශ්නය අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මහ බැංකුව ඇතුලේ තියා ගැනීම නිසා තමයි මේ ගැටළුව මතු වෙලා තියෙන්නේ. එක්කෝ අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ආණ්ඩුවට සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම අයිති අරමුදලක් හැටියට වෙනම ප්‍රතිස්ථාපනය කරන්න ඕනෑ. කොහොම හරි අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට වැඩිපුර පොළියක් හම්බ වෙනවා කියන්නේ ඉතුරු කරපු ජනතාවගේ මුදල්වලට වැඩිපුර පොළියක් හම්බ වෙනවා කියන එක. එතකොට ඔන්න ඕක තමයි තර්කය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, Auction එකට යැම. Auction එකට යැමේ එක තර්කයක්.

විගණකාධිපතිතුමා- මම ඒකට උත්තර දෙන්නම්. හරිම සතුටුයි ඒ කතාව. හරිම වැදගත්. නමුත් මෙතැන තියෙන ප්‍රශ්නය ඕක නොවෙයි. ඔතැන තියන ප්‍රශ්නය දැන් අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලත් මෙතැන තියෙන්නේ. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලත් Primary Dealer කෙනෙක්. ඇයි අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මේකට bid කරන්නේ නැත්තේ?. පළවෙනි Issue එක.(බාධා කිරීමක්) මට මේ කාරණය කියන්න දෙන්න කෝ. මම කියන්නේ මෙතුමා කියන කතාව හරියට හරි ඒක වැදගත් කතාවක්. එතකොට 12.5 වලට issue කරන වෙලාවේ ඇයි Primary Dealer හැටියට E.P.F. එක ගිහිල්ලා මේක ගන්නේ නැත්තේ? පළවෙනි එක. මොකද E.P.F. එක භාරව ඉන්නේ Central

Bank එක. මම Professional Due Care ගැන මේ මම කතා කරන්නේ. මම විගණකාධිපති හැටියට. දෙවැනි එක මේ Primary Dealer කෙනෙක් හැටියට මේ E.P.F. එක ඉන්දෙද්දී මේ Rate එක මග නතර කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්නේ ඇයි? මේ Secondary Market එකට ගිහිල්ලා. මොකද private placement එක ඕන තරම් තියෙනවා Bond මෘකට් එක Purchase කරන්න. ඒ දේ කරන්නේ නැතුව ඒ rates ඔක්කොම අඩු කරලා මෙතුමා කියපු තැනට ආපහු එනවා E.P.F. එක. මොකද ඔක්කොම මග හලනවා ලාභ තියෙන එක. අපි ලාභය නේ කතා කරන්නේ. Interest Rate එක හරි. නමුත් ලාභය මග හැලෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මෙතුමාගේ තර්කය හරි. මම කිසිම විදියකට එතැන ප්‍රශ්න කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මම ඔබතුමා එක්ක එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ මේ කාරණයට. දැන් මෙතැන කිව්වා වගේ දර්ශීය දේවල් කතා කරන්න බැහැ. හැබැයි මේ කාරණය දිහා සාමාන්‍ය වෘත්තිකයෙක් හැටියට බැලුවාම මට පේනවා මේකේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම පදනම වෙලා තියෙන්නේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ Policy Decision එක. අර At Any Cost නෙවෙයි මේ Transparency තියෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඕක තමයි කතාව. දැන් ඒ ගැන මට පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා සභාපතිතුමා, දැන ගන්න. මේ සමාවෙන්න මම මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහනවාට. මම මේ නරක දෙයක් අහන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ තිබෙන පෞද්ගලික ගෞරවයත්, ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමටත් ස්තූතිවන්ත වෙමින් මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නම්. දැන් ඔය Policy ප්‍රශ්නය Economics ප්‍රශ්න. මේ ආර්ථික විද්‍යා ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ. ගණන් මිනුම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. ගණන් මිනුම් හදලා තියෙනවා ඔබතුමා. නිවැරදිව හදලා තියෙනවා. ඇත්තවශයෙන්ම ඔබතුමාගේ ගණන් මිනුම් අනුව අර විශාල එකක් තියෙන්නේ. අති විශාල නොවෙයි විශාල පාඩුවක් තියෙනවා. ඒවත් අපි පිළිගමු කෝ. එතකොට ඒ ගණන් මිනුම්වලට පදනම් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ යම් වෘත්තීමය විනිශ්චයක්. මේ වැඩේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම Auction යාම පිළිබඳ දෝෂයක්. ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්ති දෝෂය පිළිබඳ ඒක මූලිකයි. ඒක නේ අංක එකේ නිගමනය. එතකොට එහෙම ප්‍රතිපත්ති කාරණයක් ගැන නිගමනය කරන්න අවශ්‍ය කරන ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව පිළිබඳ මූල්‍යමය සුදුසුකම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තියෙනවා. සමහර විට මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මම ඇහුවේ නැත්නම් මගේ හෘදය සාක්ෂිය ඉඩ දෙන්නේ නැහැ.කලින් මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවා ඔබතුමා Accountant විතරයි නේද කියලා. ඔබතුමා කොහොමද මහ බැංකු අධිපති වෙන්නේ Accountant කෙනෙක් විතරක් වෙලා කියලා. ඒ නිසා මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් අහනවා ඒ ඕනෑ කරන Economic සම්බන්ධ තිබෙන විශේෂඥතාවය ඔබතුමාට හෝ ඔබතුමාගේ ආයතනයට තියෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් මාන්නප්පෙරුම මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ඉවර වුණාම ඊලඟ ප්‍රශ්නය කතා කරන්න.

විගණකාධිපති : මම බොහොම සන්තෝෂයි ඒ වගේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇසීම සම්බන්ධයෙන්. මගේ පශ්චාත් උපාධිය ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව. මම පශ්චාත් උපාධියක් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව සම්බන්ධයෙන්. ඒ නිසා ඒක වෙනම කතාවක්. නමුත් ඒක අදාළ නැහැ මෙතැනට. අපි Limitations හැටියට දාලා තියෙනවා මේ ආර්ථික විද්‍යාඥ දැනුම නැහැ. මොකද Central Bank එකෙන් අපිට මේක ගන්න විදියක් නැහැ. ඊලඟට අපිට පිටින් ගන්න විදියකුත් නැහැ. මොකද මේ Secrecy ..... එක නිසා. ඒ නිසා අපේ දැනුමෙන් තමයි මේක කරගෙන ගියේ. නමුත් මට ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව සම්බන්ධව පශ්චාත් උපාධියක් තියෙන නිසා මට ඒ දැනුම තියෙනවා. නමුත් මම ඒක මෙතැනට ලඟු කරන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ නැහැ. ..... ඒ නිසා ඒ පැත්තට යන්න පුළුවන් කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. හැබැයි එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඔය ප්‍රතිපත්ති කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරන්න අපි වැඩි කැමැත්තක් නැහැ. මොකද Decision එකක් අරගෙන නැහැ කොහේවත් මේ වන කල්නුත් ඔය Auction වලට යන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට මෙහෙම කරන්න විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, (බාධා කිරීමක්)

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : අපි හැමදෙනාම මේ සාමකාමීව යන්නේ. දැන් 3.3 බලලයි මේක කිව්වේ. 3.3 වල තියෙනවා විෂයපථය සීමා වීම. ඒ කියන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තියෙන සීමා වීම. ‘‘ මෙම වාර්තාව තුලින් ඉස්මතු කර ඇති නිරීක්ෂණයන් නිගමනයන් එළඹීමේදී මාගේ විෂය පථය මතු දැක්වෙන් සීමා කිරීම්වලට යටත්ව තිබූ බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ‘‘. 3.3 කියනවා, ‘‘අදාළ විෂය ගත කරුණු පිළිබඳ විෂය බද්ධ පෘථුල දැනුමක් සහිත මූල්‍ය හා ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයන්ගේ සහාය ලබා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් නොතිබීම‘‘. එතකොට මම නිසි ගෞරව සහිතව ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ මෙතැන අපිට යම් විදියක මේ කමිටුවට අවශ්‍යයි Independent Economic.

හර්ෂ මහත්තයා Independent එක්කෙනෙක් නෙවෙයි.

විගණකාධිපති : ඒක මම පැහැදිලිව මගේ Report එකේ කියලා තියෙනවා මොකද .....

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : නෑ. නෑ.. ඔයා බය වෙන්න එපා. එතකොට මම..... ඉල්ලන්නේ එතකොට අපේ වැඩවලට සම්බන්ධ නැති වෙච්ච, දේශපාලන වැඩ වලට සම්බන්ධ නැති වෙච්ච ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයෝ ඉන්නවා නේ. එවැනි එක්කෙන්ගේ දෙන්නෙක්ගේ opinion එක්ක සහ Expert එක අපට දෙන්න. අපට මේ කමිටුවට දෙන්න. (බාධා කිරීමක්)

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : මේ තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ විෂයපථය එතුමාගේ විෂයපථයට අනුව තමයි මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තියෙන්නේ. කෝප් සභාවට ඒක පිළිගන්නේ නැතුව තවදුරටත් ආර්ථික විශේෂඥවරු ගන්නවා නම් ඒක මෙතැන වැඩක්. ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වැඩක් නෙවෙයි. කවුරුහරි කියනවා නම් ස්වාධීන අය ඕනෑ කියලා මම හිතන්නේ නෑ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා තරම් ස්වාධීන කෙනෙක් හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා එලියෙන්. ඔය හැමදෙනාම .....Economics වලට. කවුද නමක් දෙකක් කියන්න. ඒ නිසා අපිට තියෙනවා අපි කැමති වුණත් අකමැති වුණත් ව්‍යවස්ථානුකූලව ස්වාධීන යයි කියා පිහිටුවා ගත්ත ආයතනයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතනය ගැනත් අපි විශ්වාස කරන්නේ නැත්නම් ඒ ආයතනයේ වාර්තා ගැනත් විශ්වාස කරන්නේ නැත්නම් එතැනින් එහාට කවුද අපි විශ්වාස කරන්නේ. මම කියන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ විශයපථයට යටත්ව එතුමාගේ සීමා මායිම් සහිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තියෙනවා වාර්තාවක්. මේක අපි ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙන්නත් ඕනෑ එතුමා ඒක සඳහන් කරලාත් තිබීම. සමහර අය ඒක සඳහන් කරන්නේත් නැහැ. එතුමා සඳහන් කරලාත් තියෙනවා සීමාකම්. එතකොට අපි තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ මේක සෑහීමකට පත් වෙන්නේ නැතුව තවත් ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයන්ට යන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒක මෙතැන කාර්ය භාර්යයක්. ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමට හෝ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ කාර්ය භාර්යයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අපිට කිසිම Audit එකක් කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා. මේ .....ගියොත් Auditor General Department වැඩක් නැති වෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : මෙතැනින් එහාට මේ වාර්තාවේ අපිට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්න බැරි නම් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා යටතේ මීට කලින් කරපු රාජ්‍ය ආයතනත් අපි බොරු කියලා පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් බොරුවක් නේ වෙන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙතැනින් එහාට කරපු ඒවත් එහෙනම් අර රාජ්‍ය ආයතන සම්බන්ධයෙන් කරපු නිර්ණායක ඒවත් ඔක්කොම වැරදියි ඒවා. නැත්නම් මහබැංකුව විතරක් අමුතු සර්වබලධාරී වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. මෙතැනින් එහාට කරපුවත් වැරදි වෙන්න ඕන මෙතැනින් අනාගතයේදී කරන ඒවත් අපිට පිළිගන්න බැරි වෙන්න ඕන. සභාපතිතුමා අපි ආයතන ගණනාවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මේ කොප් කමිටුව ..... ඔබතුමා එවපු වාර්තාත් එක්ක. අපි ඒවාට බොහෝ දේවල් ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තියෙනවා. ඊලඟ එක තමයි මීට කලිනුත් වාර්තා පදනම් කරගෙන ..... මම හිතුවා මේ වාර්තා කියවද්දිම ඔබතුමාගේ ඔය අවංක කමට හරි මොකක් හරි එකකට මේකට යටත්ව කියලා දාපු එකම දුර්වලකම විදියටත් මම කල්පනා කළා මේක කියවා ගෙන යද්දිම. යම් කෙනෙකුට මේක මතු කරන්න පුළුවන් ඕනෑ වෙලාවක දැනුම මදි කියන එක. ඊලඟ එක තමයි කලින් අපි මේ වාර්තා පරීක්ෂා කරද්දීත් පැහැදිලිවම මේක සැලසුම් සහගත සාපරාධී කියන එක ගත්තොත් ඒ ඝනයට වැටෙනවා නේ. ඉලක්කම්වලින් අපිට මේක අඩුද වැඩිද පාඩුද නැද්ද ලාභද ඔක්කොම හදන්න පුළුවන්. පාඩුව අපි කාගේවත් සාක්කුවට යන්නේ නැහැ. මේක රටට නේ වෙන්නේ. දැන් 9% තිබ්බිච්ච බැංකු පොලිය 14% දක්වා නැගලා තියෙනවා. දැන් ඒක මේ වාර්තාවෙත් පෙන්වලා දීලා තියෙනවා. ඒක අපි කවුරුත් ගෙවනවා. ඉතින් ඒක නිසා අපිට මේක ඇතුලේ වෙච්ච සිදුවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් හරි පැහැදිලියි. මේ ඉලක්කම් ගැන කතා කරන කොට. නමුත් තවදුරටත් අපි සාධාරණව හොයනවා නම් අපි සාධාරණව හොයමු. අපි කා වෙනුවෙන්ද ඒ සාධාරණය ඉෂ්ඨ කරන්නේ කියන එක බලන්න ඕන. ආපසු අර Direct Placement ඊට පස්සේ වෙන්දේසිය මේක අපි කලින් වාර්තාවලත් දැනුත් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් ඔය කොහේවත් ආවේ තීරණයක් නොවෙයි. අගමැතිතුමා විතරක් කියලා තිබුණා අපි මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියට ගියා කියලා. මහබැංකු අධිපතිවරයාත් කලින් වාර්තාවේ කියලා තිබුණා "මම මේ තීරණය ගත්තේ අගමැතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි " කියලා. ඒක කියලා තිබුණා. ඉතින් ඒක නිසා ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් කොහේවත් ආවාද කියලා කොහේවත් වාර්තාවක රජයේ පිළිගත්ත මහබැංකු වාර්තාවේ හරි මොනවා හරි තැනකවත් මේවගෙත් නැහැ. ඉතින් මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි වාද විවාද කරලා විවිධ

පැතිවලට යන්නේ නැතුව මේ නිශ්චිත කරුණ විතරක් හරියට විග්‍රහ කර ගත්තොත් යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : ..... කියපු කාරණය මම සියයට සියයක් පිළිගන්නවා. ඒ කියන්නේ මෙම ලේඛනය ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරනවා නොවෙයි. මෙම ලේඛනයේම තියෙන කරුණක් අනුව අපි කියන්නේ මෙම වැඩිදුරටත් Independent වෙන කවුරුත් නැහැයි කියලා කියනවා නම් ඒක මම දන්නේ නැහැ ඒක මට කියන්න බැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා බොරු කියනවා, ඇත්ත කියනවා කියලා කාරණයක් නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන ඒවා පිළිගන්න අපි මෙතැන ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන ඒවා වැරදි නම් වැරදියි කියනවා, හරි නම් හරි කියනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සර්වබලධාරී කියලා අපි පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම කොහෙද තියෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ වැඩේ ඉතාම ලස්සනට කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙන ගමන් ඒ වාගේම මේ වාර්තාව තුළම ඔබතුමා අවංකව ඔබතුමාට තිබෙන සීමාවන් සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන නිසාමත් ඒ වාගේම මූලධර්ම වශයෙන් මගේ හදවතට එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැති ප්‍රශ්නයක් මෙතැන තියෙන නිසා, මම ඉල්ලා හිටින්නේ ඔබතුමාගෙන් අපි උත්සාහ කරලා බලමු කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට බැරිද මේ කාරණාව. අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මතු කරන කාරණාවේ තියෙන්නේ මේ ක්‍රියාවලියට පදනම් වෙච්ච ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ සලකා බලන්න නම් ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ ටික ගන්න වෙන්නේ අපිට පළමුවෙන්ම මේ ක්‍රියාවලියට Direct Placement වල ඉඳලා Total Auction යන්න ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගත්තේ කොහොමද? කවදාද? කොතැනදීද? ඊට පස්සේ ඒක දිගටම පවත්වාගෙන ගියාද? ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් නම් ඒක දිගටම තියෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ..... Direct Placement වලට යන්න බෑ නේ.එතකොට Auction වලින් ආයේ Direct Placement වලට එක අවස්ථාවක් හරි නොගියාද? මේ දිගටම Auction විතරද තියෙන්නේ? ඒක නේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් කියන්නේ. එවැනි කාරණා ගැන අපිට ඊලඟ 07 වැනිදාට හරි ඉදිරියේදී මහ බැංකුව කැඳවලා විමසන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට මම කියන්නේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් අපි මේ වාර්තාව අභියෝග කරනවා වෙනුවට Central Bank එකත් එක්ක කතා කරන්න ඕන ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ ටික අපට දෙන්න කියලා. ඒකයි අපි කරන්න ඕන. ඒකට අපි හිතන්නේ නැහැ Independent Body එකක් හොයන්න වෙයි කියලා. අපියි හොයා ගන්න ඕන ඒක. Committee එකයි හොයා ගන්න ඕන. Committee එක ඒක ඉල්ලන්න ඕන මහ බැංකුවෙන්. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන්. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයයි වග කියන්න ඕන, ගත්ත ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ මෙතැනට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඉතින් අපි ඒක හින්දා ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ පිළිබඳව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් විමසමු.සටහන් කර ගන්න ඒක ලේකම් තුමා. මට පොඩි උදව්වක් කරලා දෙන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා කියන ඒ අර්ථය පිළිගන්න ගමන් මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ දැන් මහ බැංකුව කියන දේත් අපි පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ නෑ නේ. අපි ස්වාධීන මන්ත්‍රීවරු නේ. මේ කෝප් කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෝ නේ. දැන් මහ බැංකුව ඒ ගත්ත ප්‍රතිපත්ති තිබුණා කියන්න කෝ. එහෙම ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් ගත්තා නම් ඒක හරිද වැරදිද කියලා නිශ්චය කිරීමේ අයිතියක් මේ කෝප් කමිටුවට නැද්ද? එතකොට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳ ආර්ථික විද්‍යාත්මක සිද්ධාන්ත තියෙනවාද ලෝකයේ කොහොමද සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ? මෙතුමා බොහොම පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා ලංකාව වගේ රටකට මේ Transparency හරියන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. මට ඔතැනයි ගැටළුව තියෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නෑ මම කියන්නේ මේකයි, ඒක අපි Government එක ගත්ත රජයේ තීරණයක් කියන එක අපි හදාරලා මේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ දැනුම අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලා තව පුද්ගලිකවත් හදාරලා තවදුරටත් දන්න ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුගෙන් Consultation අරගෙන ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මතය තමයි මෙතැන ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමන්ලා තමයි ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕන. අපි දන්නේ නැති පිරිසක් හැමෝගේම අහලා මෙතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක නෙවෙයි මෙතැන තියෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා තමයි මෙතැන ඉන්න 26 දෙනාම තම තමන්ගේ ස්ථාවර තියෙන්න ඕන. මේක පිළිබඳව. තමන්ගේ ස්ථාවරවලදී ඒ ස්ථාවර පෝෂණය කර ගන්න ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුගෙන් උපදෙස් ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා :අපි ඉතිහාසයේ ඉඳලා මේ අවුරුදු ගණනක් මේ කෝප් කමිටුවේ කාගෙන්වත් Expert ලාගෙන් ගෙන්වලා ප්‍රශ්න කරලා හෝ සාකච්ඡා කරලා ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ මෙතැනට ගෙනැල්ලා නැහැ. මේකේ දන්න විදියට කෝප් කමිටුවේ ඉන්න සාමාජිකයින් තමයි විවිධ තීන්දු තීරණ අරගෙන ක්‍රියා කළේ. ඒ විදියට තමයි Public Accounts Committee එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ. මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඉන්න කොට වෙන කවුරුත් ගෙන්වන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා : මෙතුමාගේ වාර්තාව අපි එදා කෝප් කමිටුවේදී පිළිගත්තා. මෙතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තියෙනවා 33 වන පිටුවේ මෙම වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට හිමි බලතල හා විෂය සීමාව තුළ කටයුතු කර ඇති බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ. ඉන් ඔබ්බට සාපරාධීව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට නිගමනය කළ නොහැකි .....කටයුතු සිදුව ඇත්නම් මෙහිදී පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් නොවන හෙයින් එවන් පරීක්ෂාවන් අවශ්‍ය යැයි හැඟෙන්නේ නම් ඒ සඳහා සුදුසු ආයතනයකින් සහාය ලබා ගැනීම සුදුසු යැයි කියලා එතුමා නිර්දේශ කරලා තියෙනවා. එම නිසා අපිට මෙතුමා කියපු එක මේ අංකය යටතේ අපට යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අල්ලස් කොමිසමේ අධිකරණ පැත්තෙනුත් බලපු වාර්තාවක් තියෙනවා. අපිට පුළුවන්ද ඒ අල්ලස් කොමිසමේ වාර්තාව ගෙන්වන්න?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : Forencic ඔඩිට් එකක් කරමු කියලා මම එදා යෝජනා කළා. මේකට අපි ඒ වැඩේ කරමු. ඒ සඳහා තමයි. ඒක එතුමා තීරණය කරලා තියෙනවා. ඒ තීරණය දීලා තියෙන්නේ අපේ සභාවට තීරණය කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : මට පොඩි ගැටළුවක් තියෙනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, විශේෂයෙන්ම අපි මේ හැම දෙයක්ම අවසානයේදී ඔබතුමාගේ තර්කයක් වෙලා තියෙන්නේ Policy Decision එක ගැන නේ? අපිට Private Placement එකේ ඉඳන් ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා Auctions වලට. එතැනදී මේ Policy Decision එකක් අරගෙන නෑ කියන මතයක් ඔබතුමාගේ තියෙනවාද?

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ මම මගේ මතය එතනැට ලඝු කරන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම කරන්නේත් නැහැ. එහෙම කරන්නත් එපා. එහෙම කළොත් හරි අපරාධයක් වෙනවා. මම Professional Due Care කියන එක මුල ඉඳලම කතා කලේ ඒක තමයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : මේ Professional Due Care කියන එක නොවෙයි ඊට කලින් ඔබතුමා කියලා තියෙනවාමේ 1.8 Billion මේ අවාසියක් වෙලා තියෙන ඒකට හේතුව වෙලා තියෙන්නේ Auction වලට ගිය එක. ඔබතුමා එතැන පැහැදිලිවම කියලා තියෙනවා නේ? ඔබතුමා ඒකේදී පැහැදිලිවම කියලා තියෙනවා. මෙතැනදී විශේෂයෙන්ම මට තියෙන දැනුම අනුව ඒ වගේ Decision එකක් අරගෙන තියෙනවා. ඒ Decision එක පිළිබඳව, මොකද මම දන්න තරමට එතැනින් එහාට අරගත්ත Private Placement ඔක්කෝගෙම zero zero zero තියෙන්නේ. මට පෙනෙන හැටියට මෙතැන Policy Decision එකක් අරගත්ත හින්දා වෙන්න ඇති මේ ඔක්කොම 100% Auction ගිහිල්ලා තියෙන්නේ. දැන් එහෙම Policy Decision එකක් හින්දා නම්, මේ Central Bank එක මේ විදියට කටයුතු කළේ මෙතැන තියෙන ගැටළු ගොඩක් විසඳෙනවා. ඒ කාරණාව ගැන අපි දැන ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක තියෙනවා. මෙහෙම Decision එකක් අරගෙන තියෙනවාද? උපදෙස් ලැබිලා තියෙනවාද කියන එක? එතකොට ඒක Central Bank Governor විතරක් නෙවෙයි Monetary Board එකෙන් Decision එකක් ඇවිල්ලා තියෙනවාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : දැන් මුලින්ම අපි තීරණයකට එන්න ඕනෑ අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා එදා හිටියේ නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව එදා සභාගී වුණ අපි පිළිගත්තා මේ වාර්තාව. එතකොට ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට අදත් අයිතිය තියෙනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නේ නැත්නම් අදත් සටහන් කරන්න මේකේ මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. එතකොට අපි ඒ තීරණයට එන්න ඕනෑ.එතකොට අපි මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නවා ඒක පළමුවෙන්ම කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඊලඟට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ බොහොම පැහැදිලිව තියෙනවා එතුමා මේ පරීක්ෂණය කිරීමේදී එතුමාට තිබුණු සීමාවන්. ඒ සීමාවන් තුළ පරීක්ෂණය කරලා එතුමා තීරණය කරලා තියෙනවා බිලියන 1.6ක පාඩුවක් සිද්ධ වෙලා තියෙනවා. සහ ඒ මහබැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ ඒ තනතුරේ රාජකාරී කටයුතු කිරීම පිළිබඳව ප්‍රධාන කරුණු කීපයක් එතුමා ඒ සීමිත බලතල අනුව සහ සීමිත පරාසය තුල දී කරන ලද පරීක්ෂණ අනුව අනාවරණය වෙලා තියෙනවා.එතකොට ඒ වගේම එතුමා අන්තිමට කියනවා මේ පරීක්ෂණයේදී මේ කරුණු අනාවරණය වෙලා තියෙනවා. එතකොට ඒ බිලියන 1.6ක පාඩුවක් සිදු වුණා කියන එක එතුමා තහවුරු කරනවා. එතකොට එතුමාගේ ක්‍රියාකලාපය පිළිබඳවත් එතුමා තහවුරු කරනවා. මේ කාරක සභාවට අවශ්‍ය නම් මීට වඩා වැඩි පාඩුවක් වෙලා තියෙනවාද කියලා තවදුරටත් ඕනෑ නම් තමයි පිට ආයතනවල සහාය ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා එතුමා යෝජනා කරන්නේ. ඉතින් අපිට මේ බිලියන 1.6 පාඩුව ලොකුයි අපිට. ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තියෙන්නේ අර දීපු තීන්දුවට වෙනම උපදෙස් ගන්න කියන එක නොවෙයි. මේවා ස්ථීරයි. බිලියන 1.6ක පාඩුවක් වෙලා තියෙනවා. ක්‍රියා කලාපය මෙන්න මේකයි , ඊට අමතරව තවදුරටත් ඕනෑ නම් අපිට අල්ලස් දූෂණ හෝ මොනව හෝ

කරන්න කියන එකයි, මේක පටලවා ගන්න එපා මගේ පෞද්ගලික අදහස. ඒ වගේම මේ කාමරයේදීම Recording තියෙනවා මේ Private Placement සහ Auction කියන මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුව ගැනීම පිළිබඳවත්, නියමිත නීතිරීති අනුගමනය කරලා නැහැයි කියන එක මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වාචිකව කියලා තියෙනවා. ඒක අපේ Sub Committee වාර්තාවේ තියෙනවා. ඒකත් මම ඉතාමත් වගකීමකින් යුතුව කියනවා. අපිට ඔප්පු කරන්න පුළුවන්. මහබැංකුව ආපුදෙන්. අපි ඒ ප්‍රශ්න ටික අහන්නම්. ඒකට ඔබතුමන්ලා හිටියේ නැහැ. එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය එතකොට මේක මහබැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ පෞද්ගලික තීන්දුවක් මත ගත්ත ඒකක්. මහබැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයා මේක Private Placement වලින් Auction එකට යාමේදී අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ක්‍රියාමාර්ගය අනුගමනය කරලා නැහැ. ඒකටත් ඉතාමත් පැහැදිලි සාක්ෂි ඔප්පු කළ හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක් තියෙනවා.ඉතින් ඒ නිසා අපි යෝජනා කරන්නේ දැන් මේ මෙතුමාගේ වාර්තාව අපි අනුමත කරනවා. ඒ අනුව මහබැංකුව අපි ගෙන්වලා මාසයක් විතර ඇතුලත වැඩිම මාසයකට වැඩිය යන්න බැහැ. මේ පිළිබඳව තීන්දුවක් අපි අනිවාර්යෙන්ම දෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපි පැය 24ම හරි මේකට කාලය මිඩංගු කරනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : සභාපතිතුමා තව ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා හිටපු මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමා දැන් ඒ තනතුරේ නැහැ. එතකොට එතුමාට තියෙන්නේ විදේශීය පුරවැසිභාවයක්. එතුමා මේ රටින් පිට වුණොත් එහෙම එතුමා කැඳවලා හරි ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න අපිට අයිතියක් තියෙයිද? මොකක්ද ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තියෙන්නේ?

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එද්දි මට ගොඩක් උන හැදිලා මෙතැනට ඇවිල්ලා වාඩි වෙලා හිටියා. හැබැයි මම එකඟ වුනේ නැහැ එදා ප්‍රතිපත්ති හේතුවක් නිසා සිදුවුණ Loss එකක් කියලා මම එදා පිළිගත්තෙත් නැහැ මම දැන් එකඟ වෙන්නෙත් නැහැ. ඒක Point Out කර ගන්න. ඒක ලියා ගන්න මොකද එකඟ වෙනවා කිව්වොත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මට මගේ consent එකත් එක්ක ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : දැන් ලසන්ත ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු දේට ඉතාමත් ගෞරව සහිතව මා කියන්නේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නවා කියලා කාර්ය පටිපාටියක් නැහැ. තියෙන්නත් බැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව මත පදනම් වෙලා තමයි මේ පරීක්ෂණ කෙරෙන්න ඕන. අපි ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා මේ වාර්තාවක් සකස් කිරීම ගැන. මේ වාර්තාව හරි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. වැරදි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. කොටසක් හරි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. කොටසක් වැරදි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා හිතන්න එපා මේ නගන තර්ක කවුරු හරි සුද්ද කරන්න කරනවා කියලා. එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. මේ ගැන අපිටත් පෞද්ගලික ස්ථාවරයන් තියෙනවා. ඒ ගැන මම අවබෝධ කර ගන්න කියන්නේ. වැඩි කතන්දර ඕන නෑ කියන්න. එහෙමයි කියලා අමුවෙන් දේවල් පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ නෑ. ඒ නිසා ඒ Tone එක එච්චර මට ඇල්ලුවේ නෑ. "කමිටුව පිළිගත්තා" ඒ මොකටද පිළිගන්නේ. මේ කොපිය දුන්නාම විගණකාධිපති කියන දේ අමුවෙන් පිළිගන්න මේ කමිටුව මොකටද? ඒ නිසා මේ වාර්තාව ස්තුති පූර්වකව ලබා ගනිමි.මේ වාර්තාව මත පදනම් වෙලා මේ වාර්තාව යා යුතුයි. ඒ නිසා ඒකයි ස්ථාවරය. ඒක සකස් කළාට ස්තුතියි. මෙවැනි කමිටු පිළිබඳ ලෝකයේ මමත් ගිහින් තියෙනවා පාඨමාලා කීපයකට වෙන රටවල් වල. මම ඉගෙන ගත්ත විදියට එංගලන්තයේත් ඇමරිකාවේත්, මෙවැනි කමිටුවලට විශේෂඥයන් කැඳවනවා. මට ඉගැන්නුවා මතකයි බ්‍රිතාන්‍ය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගුවන් යානා ගැන ගුවන් යානා තාක්ෂණය නොවෙයි. ඒකෙත් තියෙනවා Value For Money. ඒ Value For Money කියන ප්‍රශ්නයේදී ඒ කියන Standards හරිද? ඒ Economics හරිද කියලා බලන්න ඒ Economics ලා සාක්කියට කැඳවලා තියෙනවා. බොහොම Famous Textbook case එකක්. ඒ නිසා විශේෂඥයන් කැඳවීම කියන එක Upset නැහැ. ඒක ලෝකය පිළිගත්ත එකක්.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න මම හිතාගෙන හිටියේ විවේචනයක් තියෙනවා ලොක්කා වෙනුවෙන් ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා කියලා. මට verify කර ගන්න ඕන මේ වැඩේ. දැන් Perpertual සමාගම සහ Governor අතර ඥාති සම්බන්ධයක් තියෙනවාද ඒකේ?

විගණකාධිපති : දන්නේ නැහැ. අපි ඒවා වෙක් කරන්න ගියේ නැහැ අපිට අදාළ නැහැ ඒවා.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා : එතකොට මේ Commercial බැංකුව හරහා මීට පෙර ඉතිහාසයේ Perpertual සමාගම මීට පෙර ගණුදෙනු කරලා තියෙනවාද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඒකත් අදාළ නැහැ මොකද අපි එච්චර එහා ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා : විනාඩි හතර තව විනාඩි හතරකට දික් කර ගත්තේ ඉහත එහෙම දික් කර ගැනීමක් කරලා තියෙනවාද ඉතිහාසයේ?

අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති : ඒකත් අපි බලලා නැහැ.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා : ඉතින් ඒක බලන්නේ නැතුව කොහොමද මෙහෙම Report එකක් දෙන්නේ?

විගණකාධිපති : මෙහෙමයි .....

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා : බැලූ බැල්මට ඥාතිවරයාට උදව්වක් කරලා තියෙනවා කියලා ඔබතුමා හිතනවාද?

විගණකාධිපති : වාර්තාවේ කිසිම තැනක ඔය කියන කාරණය සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ..... Primary Dealer කෙනෙකුගේ කාර්යයක් සඳහා සහභාගී වෙච්ච ප්‍රථම අවස්ථාව. එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ Registar COmpany එකකට මීට ඉස්සෙල්ලා B.O.C. එක සම්බන්ධ වෙලා තියෙනවාද?

විගණකාධිපති : COncept එකක් හැටියට ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වෙලා නැහැ. එහෙම වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අනිත් පුද්ගලයා මම හිතන්නේ ..... Money පාවිච්චි කළ කියලා තමයි.....

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ පෞද්ගලික සමාගමක් B.O.C. Money පාවිච්චි කරලා මිලදී ගැනීම කරගෙන එහෙම එකක්ද?

විගණකාධිපති : ඔව් එහෙම එකක් තමයි.

සභාපතිතුමා - මෙහෙම තේරුම් ගන්න කෝ. ඔයා රහපාන Film එකක ඔයා වගේම තව කෙනෙක් රහපාන්නේ නැහැ.

විගණකාධිපති : B.O.C. එකත් Primary Dealer කෙනෙක්. එතකොට B.O.C. එක Direct ගන්නවා මිසක් තවත් Primary Dealer කෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් පෙනී සිටින්නේ නැහැ. ..... වැරදියි.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා : එතකොට මොනවා හරි ප්‍රශ්නයක් වුණොත් වගකීමක් ගන්නවාද B.O.C. එක.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ..... නමුත් මෙතැන තියෙන වැරැද්ද B.O.C.එක Primary Dealer කෙනෙක් හින්දා they bided ඒ ගොල්ලන්නුත් මේ Auction එකට ඇතුල් වෙන්න තිබ්බා. මෙතැන ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ඇතුල් වෙන්නේ නැතුව අරකට මුදල් දීලා තියෙනවා. ඒ මුදල් දුන්න එක වැරැද්දක් නොවෙයි.

විගණකාධිපති : නෑ මුදල් දුන්න එක වැරැද්දක් නොවෙයි. ඒ බැංකුවේ Business එක නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : සභාපති G.M. ආවා. සභාපති G.M. කිව්වා එයාලා දන්නේ නැහැ ..... තමයි මේකට අනුමැතිය දීලා තියෙන්නේ කියලා. අපි Bank of Ceylon එකට කිව්වා මේකට Inquire එකක් කරලා මේකට Report එකක් ගෙන්වන්න කියලා. Chairman G.M. පිළිගත්තා එයාලාගේ කිසිදු අනුමැතියකින් තොරව තමයි මේ පහසුකම දුන්නේ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා - අපිට ක්‍රම දෙකක් තියෙනවා මෙතැන. මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මම කියන්න හදන්නේ මේකයි. සිද්ධාන්ත ඇත්ත කියලා ඔප්පු වෙන්නේ ඒවා ප්‍රායෝගිකව භාවිතාවට නැඟුනාට පස්සේ නේ. මේක ඇතුලේ Loss එකක් සහ ප්‍රශ්නයක් පේනවා නේ. Expert ලා අරගොල්ලෝ මේ ගොල්ලෝ ඔක්කොම අපිට ඕනෑ වෙන්නේ සිද්ධාන්ත විතරක් තියෙනවා නම්. සිද්ධාන්තය ඇතුලේ සිද්ධියක් තියෙනවා. ඒ සිද්ධියෙන් වෙච්ච හානියක් තියෙනවා. එකක් නොවෙයි දෙකක් තියෙනවා. අපි ගත්තේ නැහැ මාර්තු 31 ක Bond Issue එකක් තියෙනවා 50 Billion. සිද්ධාන්තය වැදගත් සිද්ධාන්තය Practically ඔප්පු වෙලා තියෙනවා අසාර්ථකයි කියලා. Policy හරි මොනවා හරි. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා strategy තියෙනවා නම් තව සැහෙන කාලයක් මේක අදින්න අපිට එහෙම පුළුවන්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධව මම ඉතාම පැහැදිලිව කියනවා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අපිට ඒක පැත්තක තියන්න. අපි ගෙන්වනවා Timber Corperation එක. ඒකට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා වාර්තාවක් දෙනවා. අපි මහබැංකුවට මේ නගන අවිස්වාසය නම් පදනම් කර ගන්නේ අපිට ඒක කරන්නත් බැහැ. අපිට හැම වෙලාවේම හැම Corperation එකකටම අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සත්‍ය ලෙස පිළිඅරගෙන තමයි කරන්නේ. නමුත් අපි දන්නවා විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙනුත් අඩුපාඩු වෙන බව. විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් ඔක්කොම සියයට සියයක්ම සුපරියටම කරනවා නෙවෙයි නේ. නමුත් අපි හැම Corperation එකක්ම මෙතැන Check කරන්නේ එතුමා දෙන වාර්තා එවෙලේ බලලා. අපි Study කරලාත් නෙවෙයි මෙතැනට එන්නේ සමහර වෙලාවට. අපි එවෙලේ බලලා ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා. අපි විශ්වාසයක ඉන්නවා. සහ අවුරුදු ගණනාවක් තිස්සේ එතුමාගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව ඒ තමන්ගේ නිවැරදිභාවය සහ වගකීම් සම්පන්න භාවය වාර්තාවල ඔප්පු කරලා තියෙනවා. ඒ නිසා අපි

මහබැංකුවේදී විතරක් අපි ඒකෙන් වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඒකයි මගේ තර්කය.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : මම ඌණ පූර්ණයක් කරන්නේ. අපි ඒ වගේ වෙලාවල දී අර විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ගේන වාර්තාව ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා වගේම අනෙක් අතට අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙනුත් ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා සමහර වෙලාවට මේක වැරදි නේද විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියලා. හැබැයි සමස්ථයක් විදියට අපි සමස්ථ වාර්තාව පිළිඅරගෙන තමයි ඒක අපි ප්‍රශ්න කිරීම්වලට භාජනය කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා - මට කාරණා කීපයක් මතු කරන්න තියෙනවා. මට දැනෙන දේ තමයි මීට කලින් ලංකා බැංකුව සම්බන්ධ වීම පිළිබඳව ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම් අවශ්‍යයි කියලා මට හිතෙනවා.ඒ නිසා මම යෝජනා කරනවා කාරක සභාව අනුමත කරනවා නම් අද මීට කලින් කරපු සාක්ෂි සටහන් දැනට අර ලේඛනයට ඇතුල් කරලා තියෙනවා. කථානායකතුමාගේ. ඒක Membersලට අපිට ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන්.ඒක හරි නේ එහෙමනම්. අනුමතයි. හැමෝටම ඒක අපි ලබා දෙන්නම්. එතකොට තේරෙන්වා මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සිද්ධ වෙච්ච ආකාරය. ඊලඟට මහබැංකුව සාක්ෂි සටහන් කරපු තවත් පරීක්ෂණයත් තියෙනවා, ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවලත් යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට තියෙනවා, අල්ලස් හෝ දූෂණ කොමිසමේ. එතකොට අපිට කාරක සභාව හැටියට ඉල්ලීමක් කරන්න පුළුවන් අල්ලස් හෝ දූෂණ කොමිසමට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් සහිත අල්ලස් හෝ දූෂණ කොමිසමේ වාර්තාව අපට ඉල්ලීමක් කරන්න.මේ තීරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ගත්ත තීරණය මෙන්න මෙහෙමයි වුණේ. ඒකේ කරුණුවලට එදා ගියේ නැති බව ඇත්ත. නමුත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කොටස් කීපයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කාර්යබහුලව, වෙහෙසකරව හිටියා වුණාට අපි වෙහෙසකරව හිටියේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා අපට ඒ ටික හොඳට ඇහුනා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළා විෂයපථයේ සීමාව.ඒවාගේම ලේඛන පරීක්ෂා කිරීම ආකාරය. මේ වාර්තාව හදන්න ගත්ත ක්‍රමවේදය. ඊලඟට එතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළා ඉතා පැහැදිලිව නිරීක්ෂණයන්. ඊට පස්සේ එතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළා ඒ නිරීක්ෂණ පදනම් කර ගත් නිගමනයන්. ඒ ටික අපි මෙතැනදී පිළිගත්තා, මෙන්න මේ ආකාරයට.

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ඕක තමයි අපි තීරණය කළේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, මේ ඉදිරිපත් කළ කරුණු අපි..... ඒක මත පදනම් වෙලා අපි වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරනවා. කෝප් කමිටුවෙන් ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඕක තමයි තීරණය කළේ. ඒ තීරණය තමයි අපි දන්නා තරමට සියළුම ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා අපි එකඟ වුණා ඊට වැඩිය දේවල් කියන්නේ නැතුව මේ කාරණාව විතරක් අපි මාධ්‍යවලට වුනත් කියමු කියලා. මම ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා හැම දෙනාමත් ඒ සීමාවේ හිටියා. ඒක තමයි ගත්ත තීරණය.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මාධ්‍යවල පලවෙලා තියෙනවා මම අද හරි ඊයේ හරි පත්තරවල තිබුණා කවුරුහරි මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් ප්‍රකාශ කලා කියලා මේ වාර්තාව විපක්ෂයේ දේශපාලඥයකුට දීලා තියෙනවා කියලා මීට කලින්. ඒකත් මම හිතන්නේ බේරා ගන්න ඕනෑ සභාපතිතුමා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මම ලබා ගත්තා. ඒක ඇත්තටම මම කණගාටු වෙනවා එහෙම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් කිව්වා කියනවා නම්. හැබැයි මම මේක පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ.ලංකාදීප ජූලි මාසේ තුන්වැනි ඉරිදා පත්තරේ තියෙන්නේ. හැබැයි මේක නෝට් කරන්න ඕනෑ කාරක සභාවේදී සහ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කළා මේ ගැන පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න කියලා. මම හිතාගෙන හිටියා ඒක අවසාන මොහොතේදී දෙන්න. මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී. නමුත් ඔබතුමා ඒක මතු කළ නිසා මම ඒක ගන්නවා.ඒකේ තියෙන්නේ " විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව දෙමළෙන් නැති වීම ගැටළුවක් ඇමති ස්වාමිනාදන් කීය. ඒ වාර්තාව ඇතුලේ ලොකු ප්‍රශ්න නැහැ වගෙයි මහබැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයටත් ඔය වාර්තාව යවලා ඒ අයගේ අදහස් ලබා ගන්න කෝප් එකේ සියළු දෙනා එකඟයි කියලා ආරංචියි. දයා ගමගේ කීය. ජනාධිපති, අගමැති කථානායකට කලින් මහින්ද රාජපක්ෂටත් කොපියක් යවලා කියලා ආරංචියි. එයා වාර්තාවේ කරුනුවලට මුලින්ම උත්තර දුන්නේ ඒ නිසාද දන්නේ නැහැ. රංජන් රාමනායක කී විට පිරිස මූණට මූණ බලා ගත්හ" ඒක තමයි තිබුණේ. ඒක මත පදනම් වෙලා නැවත විගණකාධිපතිවාර්තාව කලින්ම විපක්ෂයේ දේශපාලකයෝ අතට පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන්නැයි ඇමතිවරු අගමැතිගෙන් ඉල්ලයි කියලා නැවත ජූලි 04 වැනිදා පුවත් පත්වල් තියෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ කාරණාවා මම පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ විගණකාධිපති වෙනුවෙන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : දයාසිරි ඇමතිතුමා මම කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි අපිට මේ ගැන..... කරනවා නොවෙයි. නමුත් දැන් මේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳ රටේ ඇතිවෙලා තියෙන මතයයි. අපිට දේශපාලන පක්ෂ තියෙනවා. අපිව ආරක්ෂා කරන්න අපිව වෙනුවෙන් කතා කරන්න තව සීයක් ඉන්නවා. නමුත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට එහෙම නැහැ. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා මම ඊයේ දැක්කා හඳුන්නෙත්ති මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ගිය ..... එකේදිත් විශාල සැකයක් මතු කරන්න හැදුවා මේ කතාවට බලපෑමක් වුණා කියලා. ඒ මාධ්‍යතුමිය.බලන් ඉන්න මිනිස්සු ඔබතුමා කියන එක එච්චරම තේරුම් ගන්නවාද? එතුමිය ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මොකද මේ news එක හරිම බරපතල තත්ත්වයක්. ඒ කියන්නේ පුද්ගලයෙක් වශයෙන් එතුමාට බලපානවා. දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට බලපානවා. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා මම කියන්නේ අපිට මේක සැහැල්ලුවෙන් තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් වුණාට මේක වැරදියි. ඒ නිසා ඇත්තටම මේකට දෙයක් කෙරෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා හිතෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇත්තටම මම මීට කලින් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාත් දන්නවා, කමිටුවට ආයතන කැඳවන කොට ආයතනවල පූර්ව සාකච්ඡාවක් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එක්ක මම කර ගන්නවා. මට ඒ ගැන අවබෝධය ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ documents .හැබැයි මම මේ කාරණාවේදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට කිව්වේ මටවත් කියන්න එපා ඔබතුමා ඒකත් කාරක සභාවේදී මට ලබා දෙන්න කියලා.එහෙම තමයි සිද්ධ වුනේ. ඒකත් කාරක සභාවේදී ලබා ගත්තේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරියේදී තමයි මගේ කොපි එකත් මම ලබා ගත්තේ. එහෙම දෙයක් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ පැත්තෙන් සිද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ කියන එක මම සහතික වෙනවා සම්පූර්ණ වශයෙන්ම.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : මේ කාරක සභාවට දෙන්න කලින් පිටපතක් ගියා කියලාද?

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම නේ මේ කියලා තියෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : එහෙම කියවෙන්නේ නැනේ

සභාපතිතුමා : අපි මේ කාරණයත් කියන්න ඕනෑ. දෙමළ පිටපත දෙමළ පරිවර්ථනය ඇත්තටම ඊයේ තමයි ලැබිලා තියෙන්නේ. ඒක භාෂා පරිවර්ථන කාර්ය බහුලත්වය නිසා. හැබැයි ඊයේ දිනයේම ඒක මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට e-mail කරලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : හැබැයි එදා සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ..... එතුමාගෙන් කිසිම විරෝධයක් ආවේ නෑ හැබැයි පත්තරයට ලියන්න වෙයි අපිට මේ committee එක විදියටවත් කරුණා කරලා මේවා ලියනකොට දේශපාලන ප්‍රශ්න ඕනෑ එකක් කර ගන්න නමුත් මේ වගේ COPE committee එකක ප්‍රශ්නත් ඔය විදියට දැම්මාම ඒක හරි වැරදියි ඒක.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි අවසන් කරනවා මේ විදියට. අපි 07 වැනිදාට මහබැංකුව කැඳෙව්වාට පස්සේ .....

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු කාරණය ගැන මම කියන්නේ. මේ වාර්තාවේ වෙනසක් තියෙනවා. වෙනදා මම දැකලා තියෙනවා audit reportවල මේ විෂයපථය සීමා වීමේදී මේ විශේෂඥතාවය මොකද මෙතැන policy ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා. policy විතරක් නෙවෙයි. අපිට වාද නැතුව ඉතුරු ටිකත් අපිට මේවා කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. මේ policy desicion එකේදී 100% ක් auction..... යන්න ගත්ත තීරණය තමයි මේ ගණන් හදලා තියෙන්නේ. පළවෙනි නිහමනය තියෙන්නෙ එතැන. එතැන තමයි monetary loss එක first part එක. මූල්‍යමය පාඩුව පිලිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නය ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය දෝෂයක් කියලා තමයි මෙතුමා කියන්නේ.මම කියන්නේ ඒක ඇත්තද නැත්තද කියලා ඒක වෙනම බලන්න ඕන. ඒ නිසා ඒක අවංකව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, නිශ්චිතව තමන්ට තියෙන ..... ගැන නැති බව පිළිඅරගෙනත් තියෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මම කියන්නේ ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය හරි වැදගත් එකක් මොකද මූල්‍යමය දෝශය පිළිබඳ කාරණය මෙතැන වැදගත්ම දෙයක් නිසා. මම හිතනවා මේවා මේ අවුරුදු ගණන් යන දේවල් නෙවෙයි. මොකද මම කලින් දෙයක් ඔබතුමාට කිව්වා. වෙනත් රටවල තියෙන කමිටුවල රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍ය පිළිබඳ තියෙන කමිටුවල expertලා call කරනවා. මීට කලින් මේ කමිටුවේ call කරලාද නැද්ද කියලා මම දන්නේ නැහැ. මම දැන් තමයි මේ කමිටුවේ ඉන්නේ. නමුත් මම කිලින් P.A.C. ඉඳලා තියෙනවා. මගේ ඉල්ලීම call කරන්න කියලා. call කරන්න බැහැ කියලා කියනවා නම්, අපි සීමා වෙනවා කියලා තීරණය කරනවා නම් අපි එහෙම තීරණය කරගමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : අපි අර central bank එකත් එක්ක කතා කරලා ඊට පස්සේ අපි ඒ ගැන කතා කරමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : මගේ යෝජනාව තියෙන්නේ මෙහෙම අපි පළමුකොටම බලන්න

ඕනෑකම තියෙනවා එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් අරගෙන තියෙනවාද කියලා. මොකද එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් අරගෙන තියෙනවානම් විතරයි අපිට තියෙන්නේ ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය හොඳද නරකද කියලා විශේෂඥයන්ගෙන් අහන එක. හැබැයි දැනට ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා තිබෙන කරුණු අනුව එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් අරගෙන නැහැ කොතැනකවත්. එතකොට එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් අරගෙන නැතුව තිබියදී අපි මොකටද අහන්නෙ ප්‍රතිපත්ති හරිද වැරදිද කියලා. එහෙම අයිතියක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : අපි ඔක්කොම දේශපාලඥයෝ. අපි මේ කොහාටද යන්නේ? අපි බබ්බු නෙමෙයි නේ. ඒ නිසා අපි කවුරුත් දන්නවා ගොනා හැරෙද්දී මොන කෙසෙල් පැළේටද කියලා. අපි කරුණාකරලා කමිටුවක් හැටියට තීරණයකට එමු. මේක ලැජ්ජාවකට භාජනය කරන්න යන්න එපා. ඒ නිසා අපි තීන්දු කීපයකට එමු මොනවාද කරන්න තියෙන්නේ කියලා. මහ බැංකුව අනිද්දා එනවා. අපි ඔක්කෝටම තියෙනවා ප්‍රශ්න රාශියක් මහ බැංකුවෙන් අහන්න. මහබැංකුව we can't let them go free අපි හොඳටම දන්නවා යම් දෙයක් සිද්ධ වෙලා තියෙනවා කියලා. අපි හැමදාම මේවා ගැන කතා කරනවා. දැන් මෙතැන තව ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති. අපි ඒකටත් එමු. හිටපු මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ගැන. ඒ ගොල්ලන්වත් ගෙන්නවන්න ඕනෑ. Give me a minute. ඒවා විය යුතුයි. අනිවාර්යෙන්ම. කිසි කෙනෙකුට ඒවා නතර කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්නත් එපා. හැබැයි අපි ඉදිරිපිට තියෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මේක. අපිට ඇස් පනාපිට පෙනෙනවා යම් දෙයක්. ඇස් පනාපිට යම් දෙයක් පෙනෙද්දී කරුණා කරලා මන්ත්‍රීවරු හැටියට යම් තීන්දුවකට, නිකම් මේ බොරුවට මේක එහාට මෙහාට මේවා කර ගත්තාට මදි.

ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා : සභාපතිතුමා, මෙතැනදී යම් දෙයක් අපි පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. අපි බොහොම පැහැදිලිව කියනවා අපි මේ කතා කරන්නේ කිසි කෙනෙකු සුද්ද කරන්නට නෙවෙයි. ඒක පැහැදිලිවම කියන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද මෙතැන මතයක් ගොඩනැගෙනවා අපි මේක අදින්න හදනවා, අපිට මේක අදින්න ඕනෑ කමකුත් නැහැ. මොකද අර ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න ඇමතිතුමා කිව්වා වගේ අපිටත් මේක ඉක්මනට දෙකෙන් එකක් ඉවර කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද පසුගිය වෙච්ච ඒවා ඔක්කොම යට යනවා මේකෙන්.මොක අපි පසුගිය එක ගෙනැල්ලා යම් තැනකට ගෙනැල්ලා මේක නිසා නතර කරලා තියෙනවා. එහෙනම් මේක ඉක්මනට ඉවර කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද මේ කරනවා වගේ නෙවෙයි. ඔය වගේ 10 ගුණයක් වෙලා තියෙනවා. මම කියන්නේ මෙතුමා එදා බොහොම මහන්සි වෙලා ඒ වාර්තාව ගෙනාවා. අපිට වාර්තාව පිළිගැන්නුවා. අපි මේක පිළිගත්තා කියනවා. කෙසේ වෙතත් අපිට මේ කරුණු ඉදිරියටත් කතා කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කතා කිරීමේදී, මේක විභාග කිරීමේදී යම් කිසි කාගේ හරි පිටස්තර කෙනෙකුගේ අපිට මේකට සහයෝගය අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒකත් අපි ලබා ගමු. මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ ඒකට අපි සීමාවන් දාලා ඒක අපි මෙහෙම කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ මේක පදනම්ම කරගෙන යා යුතුයි කියන ඒ මතයේ මම නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ මගේ පෞද්ගලික මතය. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේත් කියලා තියෙනවා එතුමා සීමාවන් යටත්ව මේක කරලා තියෙන්නේ. ඒනිසා මේක අවශ්‍ය නම් යම් කිසි දෙයක් කරන්න ඒකට එතුමා ඒ අවස්ථාවත් දීලා තියෙනවා. ඒනිසා මම කියන්නේ පරීක්ෂණ කරලා, තව කවුරුහරි ගෙන්වන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒකත් කරලා, එදා දයාසිරි ඇමතිතුමා කිව්ව වගේ මේක මොන audit එකක්ද කියලා (බාධා කිරීමක්.) Forensic Audit එකක් කරමු.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : Forensic Audit ගැන මේ සති දෙකේම දිගටම මම කියෙව්වා.මේකේදී පැහැදිලිව හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් expertලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් පැහැදිලිව කියලා තියෙනවා මෙන්න මෙතැනින් මෙන්න මෙතැනට සල්ලි ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා සල්ලි ගියේ මෙන්න මේ වෙලාවේ. මෙන්න මේ වෙලාවේ මෙන්න මෙතැනින් කතා කරලා තිබුණා. මේ සියළු කාරණා, අපිට නොකියපු කාරණා විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් Forensic Audit එකෙන් හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක රස පරීක්ෂක තත්ත්වයේ තියෙන වැඩ පිළිවෙලක්. ඒක නතර වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ වගේ හොයා ගත්ත ජනාධිපතිවරුන්ගේ විශාල ප්‍රශ්න ගණනාවක් ඒ මේවා වල තියෙනවා. කරුණාකරලා Forensic Audit ගැන කියවලා බලන්න. මම වෙන කාරණයක්ක හින්දා නෙවෙයි මම කිව්වේ. අපි expertලා ගෙන්වනවා නම් මම විශ්වාස කරන්නේ නැහැ ලංකාවේ expertලා විවිධ මත අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ගන්න පුළුවන් විවිධ තැන්වලදී. ඒ නිසා මම ඒක පිළිගන්න සූදානම් නැහැ. ඒක නිසා මම කියන්නේ අපි සියළු දෙනාට එකඟ වෙන් පුළුවන් විද්‍යාත්මක ක්‍රමවේදයක් මේකත් පිළිගන්න බැරිනම් අපි පාවිච්චි කරමු කියලා තමයි මගේ යෝජනාව තියෙන්නෙ.ලෝකේ වෙන companies තියෙනවා. මම කියන්නේ ඒවා අපි ගෙන්වා ගමු. වෙන කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ.ලංකාවේ companies නැහැ මම දන්නා විදියට.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා : ඔය විදියට අපි යනවා නම් අපිට කිසි දෙයක් කර ගන්න බැහැ. එතකොට ඔකේ සීමාව මොකක්ද? එක දවසක කියන්න පුළුවන් ග්‍රීසියේ මුදල් තැන්පත් කිරීම පිළිබඳවත් audit එකක් කරමු. එතකොට මොකක්ද වෙන්නේ? E.P.F.එකේ මුදල් දාලා E.P.F. එකේ මුදල් හානි කිරීම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්න ගණනාවක් තියෙනවා. එතකොට ඒවා කොහොමද අපි කර ගන්නේ. එහෙනම් අපිට කිසිවක් කරගන්න හම්බ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒකෙන් පෙන්වන්නේ අපේ අසාර්ථක කම. සහ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව කෙරෙහි තිබෙන විශ්වාසයේ බිඳවැටීම, සභාවක් හැටියට. ඒ නිසා මම කියන්නේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කළ වාර්තාවක් තියෙනවා, ඒ වාර්තාවේ පැහැනඟින ගැටළු තියෙන්න පුළුවන්.ඒ ගැටළු අපි මහබැංකුවෙන් නිරාකරණය කර ගන්නවා. මහබැංකුව විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන අදහස් මෙතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කෝප් සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අදහස් මත පදනම්ව වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් ඒවා තියෙනවා. නොවෙන්න පුළුවන් ඒවා තියෙනවා. විකල්ප වාර්තාවක් ඕනෑ නම් දෙන්න පුළුවන් කාට හරි. මොන ආකාරයට හරි කමක් නෑ වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුයි. ක්‍රම තුනයි තියෙන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව, මහ බැංකුවේ අදහස්, අපිට තිබෙන අදහස්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කිව්වේ ඒකයි. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉන්න තැන මම ඉල්ලීම කරන්නේ එහෙම එපා කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා අපි මේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දෙන වාර්තාවවත් අපි ඉස්සෙල්ලා හරියට අධ්‍යනය කරන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් ඒකට මේ ප්‍රසන්ටේෂන් එක පාවිච්චි කර ගන්න. ඊලඟට ඔබතුමන්ලා මීට කලින් මේ කාරක සභාව දින 14 ක් රැස් වෙලා ගත්ත සාක්ෂි සටහන් වාර්තාවක් තියෙනවා. ඒකේ සාක්ෂි දුන්න කට්ටියට දැන් කියන්න බැහැ මම ඒක නොවෙයි කිව්වේ කියලා. ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් ටික කියවන්න. ඒවා නිෂ්චිතයි. ඒ නිෂ්චිත සාක්ෂි සටහන් ටික කියවලා ඊට පස්සේ අපි දැන් මහ බැංකුව කැඳවනවා. 07 වෙනිදාට අපිට සාක්ෂි සටහන් ඔක්කොම කියවලා ඉවර කර ගන්න බැහැ. අපි තව දවසක් දා ගමු ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. හැබැයි මහ බැංකුව කැඳවලා ඒ ටිකෙන් මූලික කොටස නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න පුළුවන් නම් අපිට ඒක මත පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම ප්‍රමාණවත් නැහැ කියලා කවුරුහරි කතා කරනවා නම් එතකොට තීරණයක් ගමු. දැන් හැබැයි පූර්ව නිගමනයක ඉන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මහබැංකුව කැඳවන්න කලින්, අර සාක්ෂි සටහන් අධ්‍යනය කරන්න කලින්, විශේෂඥ සහයෝගයක් ඕනෑද නැද්ද කියන එක. මම කියන්නේ අපි එහෙම දැන් ඉන්නේ ඇයි ඉක්මනටම. අපි ඒකට යමු ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ කලින් සාක්ෂි සටහන් සාක්ෂි වශයෙන් පාවිච්චි කරන්න කියලාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අධ්‍යනය කරන්න ඔබතුමන්ලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී පෙරේරා මහතා : මම ඒ කමිටුවේ හිටියේ නැහැ. සාක්ෂි කාරයෝ මට හම්බ වුණේ නැහැ. මට අහන්න ප්‍රශ්න තියෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් ඔබතුමා අධ්‍යනය කරලා ඔබතුමාට ඒත්තු යනවා නම් මේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාවටයි මේ වෙච්ච ක්‍රියාවලියටයි අදාළව ඔබතුමා.....

....වෙනවා නම් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අපි කියන්නේ කෝප් එකේ වෙච්ච සාක්ෂි ගන්න කියලා නේ. වෙන තැනක වෙච්ච දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : .... දැන් උදාහරණයක් විදියට Perpertual කියන ඒ සමාගම one billion ඉල්ලුවාම එයාලා thirteen billion දැම්මා. දැන් මේ හේතුව හොයන්න අපි මොන උපදේශකද කැඳවන්න ඕනෑ.ඒ සිතුවිල්ල Perpertual එකට පහල වෙන්න මොකක්ද හේතුව? හොයන්න පුළුවන් කවුද අපි උපදේශක කැඳවන්නේ? One billion ඉල්ලුවා. අනිත් අය සේරම 1.3billion දැම්මා. Perpertual දැම්මා 13 billion. එතකොට ඒ කට්ටියට 13 billion දාන්න මනස ඇති වෙන්න අපි මොන උපදේශකද ගෙන්වන්නේ? අපි ඉස්සෙල්ලා ඒ උපදේශක ගෙන්වමු.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක විහිළුවක් නෙවෙයි. මමත් යම්කිසි අදහසක් දෙන්නම්. දැන් ඔය Perpertual Treasuries අවුරුදු 05ක් තිස්සේ market එකේ කළේ ඔය ..... යටින් කියන්නේ අරූ information දුන්නා, inside information අධිපතිවරයා බෑණාට දුන්නා. ඔතනනේ මනසේ තියෙන්නේ. ඒක තමයි දැන් අපි හැමෝම කියන්නේ. මේ පුද්ගලයෝම මේ වැඩේම මේ governor එන්න කලින් කළා. මම මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ P.A.C. එකේ දිගින් දිගටම මේ චෝදනාව කළා. නමුත් ඒකට කිසිම පියවරක් ගැනුනේ නැහැ. Information ගිය තැන් එකකට

වඩා තියෙන්න පුළුවන් කියන මතයට අපිට එන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා. inside information දිය හැකි පුද්ගලයෝ ගණනාවක් ඉඳලා තියෙනවා. එතැනදී අර සිතුවිල්ල පහළ වුණේ කොහොමද? අර සිතුවිල්ල පහල වෙන්න කවුද catalist වුණේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ප්‍රස්තාර බැලුවාම කියන්න පුළුවන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා..... එයාගේ performance එයාගේ ඥාතියා නැති කාලේ එයා රුපියල් මිලියන 200, 300 maximum 700 ඉන්නේ. එයා 2015 එයාගේ ඥාතියා Governor වුණාට පස්සේ එයාගේ වර්ධනය තියෙනවා සියයට 70 ක්. එයාගේ මේ මාස පහේ තියෙනවා මහබැංකු වාර්තා ෙගන්වන්න පුළුවන් මේ මාස පහේ එයා සියයට අසූවකට ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගත්තොත් මිලියන තුන් හාරසීයේ කරපු කෙනා billion 40ට ගිහිල්ලා තියෙනවා. මම ඒකයි කිව්වේ ප්‍රායෝගිකව සිද්ධාන්ත වශයෙන් බලන්න අපිට කරුණක් තියෙනවා. අනිත් එක ඔබතුමා කියනවා නම් ඔය ආයතනය මීට කලිනුත් inside information මත කරලා තියෙනවා කියලා මම හිතන්නේ case done. අපිට කරන්න දෙයක් එහෙනම් නැහැ. ඥාතියා නැතුවත් එයා මෙහෙම කරලා තියෙනවා නම්, ඥාතියා ඉන්දෙද්දී එයාගේ performanceවල විශාල වෙනසකුත් තියෙනවා නම් එයාට වාසිදායක වන අපිට investigation එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : ඥාතියා නැතුව පොඩ්ඩක් කළා. ඥාතියා ඇවිල්ලා තව වැඩි කර ගත්තා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජධීර මහතා : සභාපතිතුමා එක්කෙනා හතර පස් පාර කතා කරනවා මම වචන දෙකක් කතා කරන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කෝප් කමිටුවට මේ බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය පිළිබඳ වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. තාම ඒ වාර්තාව මත පදනම්ව අපි සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. අපි නිහමන නෑ මේකේ. අපි වාර්තාව පිළිගත්තා. නමුත් මේ රජයට සිදු වූ අවාසිය පාඩුව හෝ මේ ක්‍රියාදාමය වංක චේතනාවෙන් සිදු කළාද නැද්ද යන්න තීරණය කිරීම අපට අයිති දෙයක්. දැන් ඔය උපකල්පනවල ඉන්නවා කියලා කියනවා නේ. ඔය උපකල්පන තියෙනවා. සමහරුන්ට නොතිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. දැන් ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම එහෙම දෙයක් සිද්ධ වුණා නම් ඒක මූල්‍ය අපරාධයක්. මූල්‍ය අපරාධ රටේ හොයන කොට කිසිවෙකුටත් සමාව දිය නොහැකියි. ඒ නිසා එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් අපි අධ්‍යනය කරන්න මේ වාර්තාව මත පදනම් වෙලා, එතුමා කියලා නැහැ එහෙම එකක්. එතුමාගේ නිහමන නිරීක්ෂණ තියෙනවා. දැන් අපි අනිත් ආයතනය 07 වැනිදා කැඳවන්නේ ඒකට. මේ වාර්තා අවශ්‍ය නැත්නම් පිළිගන්න, මම නම් ඒකට එන්නෙත් නැහැ. වැඩක් නැහැ නේ එන්න. මේ මත පදනම්ව අපි රජයට අලාභයක් සිදු කරලා තියෙනවාද? එහෙම නැත්නම් වංචනික චේතනාවෙන් එවැනි අලාභයක් කිරීමට ඔහු ක්‍රියා කරලා තියෙනවාද? ඒකට වගකිව යුත්තන් කවුද කියන එක අපි තීරණයකට ආවොත් අර එතුමා කියන ඉදිරි පියවරයන්ට අපිට යන්න පුළුවන්.ඉතින් ඒ නිගමනවලට බහින්ට තමයි අපි ඊලඟ සාකච්ඡාවලට යන්න සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ. මම කියනවා එහෙම නිගමනයකට එනවා නම් ඒ නිහමනය තමයි කෝප් අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකට කවුරුත් එකඟ නැත්නම් අපිට වෙනත් අතුරු වාර්තාවකින් තවත් වාර්තාවකින් තවත් කරුණු කියන්න පුළුවන්. ඔක්කොම එක වාර්තාවට බැඳෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.පොදු අදහසට විරුද්ධ වෙනත් අදහසක් තියෙනවා නම් ඒ අදහස ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බාධාවක් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා අපි මේක හරියට, එතුමාගේ රාජකාරිය එතුමා කරලා තියෙන්නේ. එතුමාගෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්න බැහැ රට ගොඩනගන ආර්ථික විද්‍යාඥයාගේ චුවමනාව. දැන් ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මෙතැනට ගෙනෙන ආර්ථික විද්‍යාඥයාට එතුමාගේ දක්ෂතාවය නැහැ.විගණනය පිළිබඳ දක්ෂතාවය නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඉතින් ඒක නිසා මේ ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව නෙවෙයි පදනම් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේ විගණනය පිළිබඳ ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම අපේ තියෙන විශ්වාසය එතුමා පැහැදිව කියලා තියෙනවා. ඇයි? මෙහෙම එකක් කරන්නේ අපි. ඊලඟට පූර්වාදර්ශයක් දෙන්න සමාජයට. පාර්ලිමේන්තුව ඇතුලේ අපි විනිවිදභාවයෙන් යුතුව වැඩ කරන්නේ. රජයට කිසිදු අලාභයක් නොවන ආකාරයෙන් මූල්‍ය පාලනය නිසි විදියට දුෂණය නතර කරන්නේ. ඒකනේ අපි කරන්නේ. ඉතින් ඒ සඳහා ඒ පදනම හැටියට අපි මේක පිළිඅරගෙන. මම නම් මේක පිළිගන්නවා, මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු. අපි ඉදිරි සාකච්ඡා දිනට ෙගන්නලා අවසන් නිගමනයකට එමු.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : මම නවක මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවටත්, මෙම සභාවටත්, හැබැයි මම පැහැදිලි ප්‍රකාශයක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද අපිට පරීක්ෂණ කරන්න ගොඩාක් දේවල් තියෙන කොට අපි මේ පරීක්ෂණය වෙනම අරගෙන තියෙනවා. හේතුව තමයි රටේ ගොඩනැඟුනු මතයක් නිසා. අනික රටේ ගොඩක් වෙලාවට මේ ගැන තීන්දු තීරණ අරගෙන වේදිකාවල කතා කරනවා. තීන්දු කරලත් ඉවරයි දඬුවම් කරලත් ඉවරයි. සියළු දේ කරලා ඉවරයි. දැන් මෙතැන අපේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ

මතය සහ නිහමනයන් තමයි මෙතැන ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තියෙන්නේ. අපි එදා මේක භාර ගත්තේ මේ සියළු මතය පිළිගන්නවා කියන චේතනාවෙන් නොවෙයි. අපි මේ දුන්න වාර්තාව අරගෙන මේ වාර්තාවෙන් ඉදිරි කටයුතු කර ගෙන යනවා කියලයි අපි මේක පිළිගත්තේ. ඒ නිසා කියන්න ගත්තේ මේක පිළිගත්තා කියන එකයි, මේක අරගෙන ඉස්සරහට යනවා කියන මතයයි දෙකක්. අපි විශේෂයෙන්ම මේක අධ්‍යනය කරනවා සමානවම අපිට තියෙනවා තව පරීක්ෂණ කීපයක් කරන්න ඉස්සරහට. ඒ පරීක්ෂණ ඔක්කොම කළාට පස්සේ තමයි පිළිගත්ත දේට එන්නේ අපි. අන්න එදාට තමයි අපි කවුරු හරි පිළිගන්නවාද නැද්ද කියලා තීන්දු තීරණ අරගන්නේ. ඒක තීන්දු තීරණ අරගත්තාට පස්සේ තමයි පිළිගත්තා කියන එක එන්නේ. ඒක තමයි හරි වාර්තාව වෙන්නේ. ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න අවශ්‍ය කරන මූලික ලියවිල්ල හැටියට මේක අපි භාර ගත්තා කියන එක තමයි මේක අපි භාර ගත්තා කිව්වේ. ඒක අපි පැහැදිලිව කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඊලඟ කාරණය තමයි මේක ගැන අපි දිගින් දිගටම කතා කරන්න හේතුව වුණේ අපි දන්නවා මූල්‍ය සම්බන්ධතාවය තියන වරදවල් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි කියන්නේ දඬුවම් දෙන්න කියලා තමයි. අපිත් හැමදාම බලාගෙන ඉන්නවා මේ දඬුවම් දෙන්නේ නැති ප්‍රශ්නයට. ඒ නිසා දඬුවම් දෙන්න අවශ්‍ය වැඩ පිළිවෙල කතා කරද්දී මේකටත් එක්ක තව ගොඩාක් දේවල් තියෙනවා ගන්න. ඒ නිසා අපි ඒ ඔක්කොම ගමු. ඒ ඔක්කොම අරගෙන ඉස්සරහට යමු. අපි තව ඉල්ලීමක් කළේ, දැනුම සම්බන්ධව අපි ඉල්ලීමක් කළේ හේතුව මෙතැන තියෙන්නේ වෙනම විශයක්.එකක් තමයි පළවෙනි කාරණය අපට කියලා තියෙනවා මහ බැංකුව කියන්නේ පරිශුද්ධ තැනක් කියන එක. එතැනින් තමයි රටේ මූල්‍ය විශේෂයෙන් පාලනය වන තැන. එතැන එහෙම වෙන නිසා තමයි එතැන රහස්‍යභාවය රකිනවා කියලා සමහර දේවල් රැකලා තියෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා අපි කියනවා නම් මෙතැන වැරදි වෙලා තියෙන දේ රැක ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කියනවා නම් අපිට මේ ගැන දැනුම වැඩියෙන් ගන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා. අපි මේ කෝප් කමිටුව ඇතුලේදි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැත්නම් මීට පරිභාහිරව වෙන්න පුළුවන්. කොහොම හෝ අපිට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් කිසි දැනුමක් ගත යුතු වෙනවා. ඒ සම්බන්ධව මීට වඩා දැනුම තියෙන අය එක්ක. මොකද ඒකට හේතුව එතකොට අපිට ඉස්සරහට යන්න ලේසියි. ඒකට විතරක් නෙවෙයි. තව මේකේ ගන්න තියෙන කරුණු කාරණා රාශියක් තියෙන නිසා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මෙහෙම කරමු. 07 වැනිදාට මහබැංකුව කැඳවලා මේ විගනකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පදනම් කරගෙන සාකච්ඡා කරනවා කියන එකට ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් එකඟයි නේ. මම ඉල්ලීමක් කරනවා ඒක නිසා මේක note කරන්න, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ඒ නිලධාරීන් ඉස්සරහ අභියෝගයට ලක් කරන්නේ නැතුව ඒකේ කරුණු පාවිච්චි කරලා ඒක පදනම් කරගෙන තව වැඩිදුරටත් අවශ්‍ය දේවල් එතැනින් අහගමු. අද මතු වුණා නේ. මහබැංකුවෙන්, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන්, පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න දේවල්. ඒ ටික පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න විතරක් ඒ අවස්ථාව යොදා ගනිමු. මොකද විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ගැන අපි අතර ගැටළු තියෙනවා වගේ අදහසක් එතැනට ගියොත් අපිට මේ පරීක්ෂණය එතැනින් කර ගන්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලීම කරන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පදනම් කරගෙන සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යමු. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සහ මහබැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් සමඟ. ඊට පස්සේ අපිට අවස්ථාවක් නැවත හදා ගන්න පුළුවන්, අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තියෙනවා නම් ආයෙ කමිටුවේ කතා කරමු.දැනට ඉන්න මහබැංකු අධිපතිවරයා සහ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කැඳවනවා.සියළු දෙනාගෙන්ම ඉල්ලීමක් කරනවා මේ වාර්තාව පොත සීමිතයි. ඒ නිසා නැවත පැමිණෙන විට රැගෙන එන්න. අද යනකොට මතක ඇතුව ගෙනියන්න.

(කාරක සභාව කල්තැබිණි)

ඇමුණුම 04

ඇමුණුම 04
இகணப்பு 04
Annexure 04

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව
2016 ජූලි මස 07 වැනි බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා

පැමිණ සිටි :

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපති)
ගරු රවුෆ් හකීම් මහතා
ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන මහතා
ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා
ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා
ගරු වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා
ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු මාවෙ සෝ. සේනාධිරාජා මහතා
ගරු එස්. ශ්‍රීතරන් මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි :

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති;
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි;
එන්.එස්. කොඩිතුවක්කු මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි;
යූ.අයි. අතුකෝරල මහත්මිය, විගණන පරීක්ෂක;
ආර්. සේමසිංහ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්, රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යවසාය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩී.සී.ඩබ්ලිව්. හපුගොඩ මහත්මිය, අතිරේක අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සහ මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින් කැඳවීමට පෙර වැඩ කටයුතු පහසු කර ගැනීමට න්‍යාය පත්‍රයක් සකස් කර ගත්තා. පළමුව නිවේදන කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. මෙම කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජික මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්ව කටයුතු කළ ගරු වේලු කුමාර මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඉල්ලා අස් වෙන බවට අපට පෙරේදා ලිඛිතව දැනුම් දුන්නා. ආණ්ඩු පක්ෂයේ සභානායක කාර්යාලයෙන් තමයි අපට ඒ බව දැනුම් දුන්නේ. අපි ඒක නැවත කථානායකතුමාට යොමු කළා. පෙරේදා අපි තීරණය කළා බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ සියලුම සාක්ෂි සටහන් අධ්‍යයනය කිරීම සඳහා කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජික මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට ලබා දීමට. සීමිත පිටපත් ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙන්නේ. එම නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා නැවත මෙම කටයුතුවලට සම්බන්ධ වෙන හැම අවස්ථාවකම පිටපත් රැගෙන එන්න කියලා. සියලුම සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට අද පිටපත් ලබා දෙනවා. නිලධාරින් සමඟ සාකච්ඡාව පවත්වා ගෙන යන්න මගේ පැත්තෙන් මේ විධියට යෝජනාවක් තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් සකස් කළ වාර්තාව අපි දැනට මහ බැංකු නිලධාරින්ට ලබා දීලා නැහැ. අපි මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින්ට භාෂා තුනෙන්ම එම වාර්තාව ලබා දීලා සතියක පමණ කාලයක් තුළ ඔවුන්ගේ නිරීක්ෂණ ලබා ගැනීමට කටයුතු කරමු. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහ ඔහුගේ

නිලධාරින්ගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම් සහ ප්‍රශ්න ඇසීම සීමිත කාලයක් තුළ සිදු කරමු. ඒ කියන්නේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් පැයක් පමණ කාලයකදී දැනට කර ගන්න පුළුවන් ප්‍රමාණයට නිලධාරින්ගෙන් මන්ත්‍රීවරු දැනුවත් වෙන එක මුලින් කර ගනිමු. මන්ත්‍රීවරු තම තමන්ගේ පුද්ගලික අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම ඊළඟ කොටසේදී සිදු කරමු. කොටස් දෙකක් හැටියට කටයුතු කරමු. මන්ත්‍රීවරු, මන්ත්‍රීවරු අතර විවාදයකට යොමු නොවී ඉන්නවා නම් වඩා හොඳයි කියන එක තමයි මගේ අදහස. ඒ ප්‍රමාණයෙන් අද අපට සාකච්ඡා කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඉදිරියේදී තවත් දවසක් යොදා ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නම් අපි කැඳවමු.

එම්.අයි.එම්. රෆීක් මහතා, ලේකම්, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා, රාජ්‍ය ලේකම්, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; යූ.ජී. රත්නසිරි මහතා, අතිරේක ලේකම්, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; එස්.එම්. චන්ද්‍රපාල, ප්‍රධාන මූල්‍ය නිලධාරි, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා, ප්‍රධාන ගණකාධිකාරි, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; පී.ඒ. කාන්ති මෙනෙවිය, ප්‍රධාන අභ්‍යන්තර විගණක, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජීත් කුමාරස්වාමි මහතා, අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; මනෝහරි රාමනාදන් මහත්මිය, පත්කල අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල සාමාජික, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා, භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය; ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; පී. සමරසිරි මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එස්. ලංකාතිලක මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා, සහකාර අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; කේ. ඩී. රණසිංහ මහතා, සහකාර අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා, සහකාර අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; පී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.එන්.ආර්. රොද්‍රිගු මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ (අභ්‍යන්තර මෙහෙයුම්), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය, අධ්‍යක්ෂ (තොරතුරු තාක්ෂණ), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා, අධිකාරි, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; කේ.එම්.එම්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ (ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය, අතිරේක අධිකාරි, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ් එම්. ආසීම් මහතා, අතිරේක අධ්‍යක්ෂ (සංඛ්‍යාලේඛන), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; කේ.ජී.පී. සිරිකුමාර මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධ්‍යක්ෂ (නීති හා අනුකූලතා), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එම්.එස්.ඩී. රනසිරි මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්, භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය, විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මීට කලින් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ සහයෝගය ලබා ගත්තා 2015 පෙබරවාරි සිට මැයි මාසය දක්වා වුණු බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව ඇති වුණු තත්ත්වය පිළිබඳව වාර්තාවක් සකස් කර ගන්න. මූලික පදනම් වාර්තාවක් හැටියට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාවේ පිටපත් අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාට අද ලබා දෙනවා. සිංහල, ඉංග්‍රීසි, දෙමළ යන භාෂා තුනෙන්ම ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ පිටපත් ලබා ගෙන ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒ පිළිබඳව යම් පැහැදිලි කිරීම් තිබෙනවා නම්, නිරීක්ෂණයන් තිබෙනවා නම් සතියක් ඇතුළත එනම්, 14 වැනි දා වන විට අපට ලබා දෙන්න.

මම කලිනුත් කිව්ව විධියට ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා සහ නිලධාරි මණ්ඩලයෙන් බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව යම් පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම් අවශ්‍ය නම් එයට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව අපි අධ්‍යයනය කළ නිසා කාටත් ඒ ගැන යම් අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැන පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවස්ථාවක් තිබෙනවා. විශේෂයෙන්ම ඊට කලින් නව අධිපතිතුමා හැටියට තේරී පත් වුණු ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජීත් කුමාරස්වාමි මහතාට අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම්, එයට මම අවස්ථාවක් ලබා දෙනවා. මේ අපි මුණ ගැසෙන පළමුවන අවස්ථාව. අපි ඔබතුමා සුභදව පිළිගන්නවා.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, let me first, at the outset say that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka is fully committed to cooperate with this Committee. We thank the Auditor-General for his Report. We want to be as open as possible about this process. I got the Report last evening from the Hon. Speaker. My Colleagues are going through it very carefully and as per your request, we will submit our comments before the 14th . We are also happy to answer any questions that the Members of the Committee have for us and finally what I want to say is that if this Committee has any specific recommendations, measures which would improve our systems, our processes and procedures, again, we are happy to take them on board.

So, the three kind of messages that I would like to convey to summarize are: we are fully committed to cooperation; we want to be as open as possible and we would welcome any recommendations to improve the way we conduct our business.

සභාපතිතුමා: කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජික ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට දැන් අවස්ථාව තිබෙනවා අදාළ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් මේ බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව විමසීමට සහ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවටත් අදාළ කර ගන්න පුළුවන් ආකාරයට තමන්ට තිබෙන ගැටලු නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න. මම යෝජනා කරනවා මම මුලින් ඉදිරිපත් කළා වාගේම ඒ සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත් සීමිත කාලයක් අර ගනිමු කියලා. ඊට පසුව සභික මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමන්ගේ අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මුලින්ම නිලධාරීන් සමඟ පැහැදිලි කිරීම් කර ගන්න කියා ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නිලධාරීන් කිව්වේ මුලින්ම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සමඟ පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමද?

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සමඟ පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම් අපි ඊයේ පෙරේදා කර ගත්තා. දැනට අපට තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම් කර ගන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මම හිතන විධියට මේ වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලාට දැන් තමයි ලැබුණේ. කෙසේ වෙතත් රජයට අවාසියක් හැටියට Rs. 1.6 billion ගණනක් නේද තිබෙන්නේ? ඒකට ප්‍රධානතම හේතුවක් වශයෙන් අපට දැන ගන්නට ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා, bonds issue කරන කොට රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වෙනසක් සිදු කර තිබෙන බව. දෙයාකාරයකින් එය සිදු කරන්න පුළුවන්.

There are two ways. One is private placement and the other is through auction. So, before the 08th of January, 2015 almost 95 per cent of it was through private placements. But, afterwards almost 100 per cent of it was through auction. So, what is the reason? Was there a Government policy decision to go for 100 per cent auctioning or was it a decision taken by the Central Bank or the Monetary Board? So, can you please give a clarification on that?

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: As you know, Hon. Member it was before my time. I will try to layout certain principles or thoughts that I have. Then, I will ask some of my senior Colleagues to give you a specific answer if I may. I think, sometimes back we had a hybrid system whereby we would auction part of the issuance to try to have price discovery and then have private placements on the basis of the price discovered through the auction process. Then, we moved on to a full placement, as you mentioned Hon. Member and there were concerns whether there was a best way to achieve the objectives that the Government had and we moved to a full auction system.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswamy continued:

Now, we are reviewing all that. We are questioning whether in a very thin market, like Sri Lanka because we are a frontier market. Our financial and capital markets are in order to develop as we would want to be going forward which intend upon developing it. But at this point, we are questioning as to whether the best possible way is a full auction. So, whether we moved back to some kind of hybrid system or not; is something that my colleagues who are knowledgeable about this area are studying. We will also take on the Board some of the finding comings out of the Report of the Auditor-General's Department to try to arrive at what we think is the best, the most transparent and the fairest system. So, we are working on getting towards that.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: The Governor, I am questioning you not regarding the future but about the past.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම සිංහලෙන් විස්තර කරන්නම්. අවශ්‍ය නම් ඉංග්‍රීසියෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන්. පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක කර සියයට 100ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් යනවා කියන තීරණයට මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අනුමැතියක් ලැබිලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. තවමත් ලැබිලා නැහැ. ඒක සිදු වුණේ පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා උදේ වෙන්දේසියට පෙර අපි සියලු දෙනාම ඉන්න තැන, මින් ඉදිරියට වෙන්දේසිවලින් පමණක් කරන බවටත්, අනෙක් ක්‍රමයට කරන්නේ නැති බවටත් අධිපතිතුමා වාචිකව ප්‍රකාශ කළා. එතකොටත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒක අනුමත කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ Board Meeting එක තිබුණේ මාර්තු 06 වැනිදා. අධිපතිතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඇවිල්ලා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා; පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා පැවැත්වුණු වෙන්දේසියේදී සම්පූර්ණයෙන් සියයට සියයක් වෙන්දේසිය පමණක් කළා කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව දැනුම් දීමක් කළා. නමුත් ඒකත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට ලක් වෙලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. මොකද, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට ලක් වෙන්න නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක අනුමැතියට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා, ඒ තීරණයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේකෙදී දැනුම් දීමක් පමණයි කරලා තිබුණේ. එතකොට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අධිපතිතුමා 27 වෙනිදාට පෙර කිසිම දිනක, අපි කිසිම කෙනෙක් එක්ක ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබුණෙත් නැහැ; කිසිම කෙනෙකුට දැනුම් දීමක් කරලා තිබුණෙත් නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ නිසා තමයි Tender Committee එක දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව අතර recommendation වෙන විධියට ඒ ගොල්ලෝ රුපියල් මිලියන 2.5ක් විතරක් අරගෙන, ඉතුරු ටික replacement කරන්න කියලා නිර්දේශ කරලා තිබුණේ. එතැනදී දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහිල්ලා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්ව නිසා තමයි Tender Committee එක ඒ ආකාරයට තීරණය කරලා තිබුණේ. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට මගේ කෙටි පිළිතුරයි ඒ. ඒකට නිසි අනුමැතියක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් තවමත් ලැබිලා නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Tender Board එකේ වාඩි වෙන පිරිස තමන් මෙම bond එක ගන්න

යන්නේ කවර ආකාරයෙන් ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව දන්නේ නැතිව ද වාඩි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: Tender Board එකට වාඩි වෙන කොට ඊට කලින් අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහිල්ලා නිලධාරීන්ට කියලා තිබුණා කලින් ක්‍රමයට කරන්න එපා කියලා. එතකොට ඒ පණිවුඩය Tender මණ්ඩලයටත් ලැබිලා තිබුණා. Tender මණ්ඩලයේ වාඩි වෙන කොට ඊට පැය භාගයකට විතර කලින් අධිපතිතුමා කිව්ව පණිවුඩය ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ලැබුණාය කියන එක තමයි දැනුම් දෙන්නේ. නමුත් ඊට පෙර ඒක දැනුම් දීලා තිබුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්න පුළුවන් කාටද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: තීරණ ගන්න පුළුවන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයටත්. මොකද, කලින් -2008 වසරේදී - මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගත්ත තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ දෙක මිශ්‍ර කරලා තීරණය ගන්න කියලා. එතකොට ඒ තීරණය වෙනස් කරනවා නම් ගන්න පුළුවන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට පමණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලය හැර ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න වෙනත් කාට හෝ පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: වෙනත් යෝජනා කරන්න පුළුවන්, පස්සේ අපේ අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා අපි දැක්කා, පස්සේ කාලයක අගමැතිතුමා කිව්වාය කියලා. එහෙම අගමැතිතුමා නිර්දේශ කළත් ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය නීතිමය ආකාරයට අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් නැතිව රජය - මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා හෝ අගමැතිතුමා - යෝජනා කළත්, ඒ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ගත්තාට පස්සේ තමයි නීතිමය වශයෙන් ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ හැකි වන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අගමැතිතුමා ඒ නිර්දේශය ලිඛිතව ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මම නම් ඒක පුද්ගලිකව දැකලා නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ ඒකත් පසුකාලීනව COPE එකෙන් අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසන කොට තමයි එතුමා කියලා තිබුණේ මේක අගමැතිතුමා තමයි කියලා තිබුණේ කියලා. නමුත් අපිත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරන වෙලාවේ අගමැතිතුමා කිව්ව කථාවක් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ දැනට දකින විධියට, අගමැතිතුමා විසින් ඒක ලිඛිතව ලබා දීමක් හෝ අගමැතිතුමාට එහෙම බලයක් කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ලබා දීමක් හෝ සිද්ධ වෙලා නැහැ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට මම එහෙම ලිඛිත ලියවිල්ලක් දැකලා නැහැ. ඒක ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා නැහැ. පසුව Bribery Commission එකෙන්, Tender Committee එකෙන්, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් විමර්ශන කිහිපයක් පැවැත්වුවා. ඒ කිසිම තැනකදී මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට එහෙම ලියවිල්ලක් තවම ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි. කලින් අනුගමනය කළ ක්‍රියාවලියේ කොටසක් auction කරනවා. ඉතුරු කොටස private placement කරනවා. එතකොට කලින් ඒ auction කරලා ගන්න අගය auction කරලා-මුළු අවශ්‍යතාවෙන් කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් එහෙම auction කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ ප්‍රමාණය මොකක්ද කියන එක Tender Committee එක සහ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ. බහුතරයක් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ අපි බැලුවාම දන්න සියයට 80ක් පමණ direct placement කියන ක්‍රමයෙන් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ. සියයට 20ක් පමණ තමයි වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හැබැයි, ඒක practice එකෙන් ආව එකක්. 20:80 අනුපාතය practice එකෙන් ආව එකක්.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක කරන්න මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් තිබුණා.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ ratio එකට අනුමැතියක් තිබුණාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: Ratio එකට අනුමැතියක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Ratio එකට අනුමැතියක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: Ratio එක කියන්නේ යම් කිසි හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් අරගෙන, ඉතුරු ප්‍රමාණය ගන්න කියලා තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න, ඒක තේරුණේ නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් අරගෙන, ගත නොහැකි ප්‍රමාණය direct placementsවලින් ගන්න කියලා තමයි අනුමැතිය තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක්. ඒ කියන්නේ 1988 decision එක.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: 2008.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2008 decision එක කිව්වේ auctionsවලට ගිහිල්ලා ගන්න පුළුවන් තරම් ප්‍රමාණයක් auctionsවලින් ගන්න, එහෙම ගන්න බැරි ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා නම් direct placements කරන්න. ඉතින් එතකොට දැන් එහෙම නම් සියයට 100ක් ගන්න පුළුවන් නම් auctionsවලින්. එතකොට මුල් තීරණයයි, ඔය දවසේ සිදුවීමයි- මම දන්නවා ගැටලුවක් තිබෙන බව. ඒක නොදැන අහනවා නොවෙයි. එය සිද්ධාන්තය වශයෙන් ගත්තොත් ඒ මුල් තීරණයයි ඔය දවස තුළ සිදුවීමයි අතර මුල් තීරණයට පරස්පරකමක් නැහැ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මුල් තීරණයට තාක්ෂණිකව පරස්පරකමක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මුල් තීරණයට තාක්ෂණිකව පරස්පරකමක් නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: නමුත් ඊට පස්සේ දිගටම ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තිබෙනවා- අර ක්‍රමය කරන්නේ නැහැ කියන එකත් අධිපතිතුමා තරයේ ප්‍රකාශ කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ ඔය සිද්ධියෙන් පස්සේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: සිද්ධිය වුණ දවසේ ඉඳලා ඊට පස්සේ දිගටම.

ගරු අජිත්. පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ කොටින්ම 2008 තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒ තීරණය අනුව කිව්වේ හැකි තරම් auction කරලා ගන්න බලනවා. සියයට 20ක් නොවේ 30ක්, 80ක්, 90ක් දක්වා යන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට balance එකේ ප්‍රමාණය direct placement කරනවා. දැන් ඒ අනුව මේ නිශ්චිත දවසේ- මතභේදයට තුඩු දුන් දවසේ- තාක්ෂණිකව නිවැරදියි. නමුත් වෙන කාරණා නිසා අපි ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා. ඒකනේ තත්ත්වය?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒකට තව පොඩ්ඩක් කරුණු එකතු කරන්නම්. හැකි තරම් ගන්නවා කියන එක practice වශයෙන් කරන්නේ. ඒ කාලය තුළ ද්වීතියක වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය සංසන්දනය කරලා, ඒ සංසන්දන අනුව ඒ පොලී අනුපාතයේ ලොකු වෙනස්වීමක් වෙන්නේ නැතිව, ඒ ප්‍රමාණයට තමයි හැකි ප්‍රමාණය කියන එක තීරණය කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඊට වඩා හැකි නොවන ප්‍රමාණය, ඒ කියන්නේ පොලී අනුපාතය ඊට වඩා ගොඩක් වැඩි වෙනවා නම් සලකන්නේ හැකි නොවන ප්‍රමාණය කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ පොලී අනුපාතයට අනුකූල වන විධියට කියන එක නේ ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම තිබෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: අනුකූල වන විධියට.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අනුකූල වන විධියට හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නෙත් Tender Committee එක නේද? එහෙම නැත්නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: Tender Committee එක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒක යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක Tender Committee නිර්දේශ කරලා අධිපතිතුමා අනුමත කරනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්ව විධියට දැන් Tender මණ්ඩලය වාඩි වෙලා නේ මේක බලන්නේ. එතකොට බලලා තමයි අපි හැකි ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ. නමුත් දැන් මෙතැන එහෙම නොවේ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. Tender මණ්ඩලය බලලා, ඒක විවෘත කරලා පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට පෙර, පූර්ව තීරණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා, මෙය මුළුමනින්ම ගන්නේ වෙන්දේසියක් මත කියලා. ඒ නිසා වෙන්දේසිය මත ගැනීම සිදු වන්නේ හැකිතාක් කියන එකට යටත්ව නොවයි, මුළුමනින්ම කියන එකට යටත්වයි.

මොකද, වාඩිවීමට පෙර අධිපතිතුමා විසින් වෙන්දේසියෙන් සියල්ල ගන්න කියලා තීරණයක් ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නේද සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව ක්‍රම තුනයි තිබෙන්නේ. සියයට 100ක් auction ක්‍රමය, සියයට 100ක් direct placement ක්‍රමය, ඊළඟට මේ දෙක මිශ්‍ර තවත් එක ක්‍රමයක්. 2008 වසරේදී තීරණයක් ගත්තා මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට යනවා කියලා. මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට ගියා. එතකොට මේ සිද්ධිය වෙන තාක් මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයකට තමයි ගියේ. ඒ මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලැබුණා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මුලින්ම ලැබිලා තිබුණා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ අනුමැතිය මුලින්ම ලැබිලා ඒක දිගටම ගෙන ගියා. දිගටම ආපු මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට අනුමැතිය ලැබුණාට මේ අදාළ සිද්ධිය ඒ ගණයට වැටෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මේක යන්නේ සියයට 100ක් auction ක්‍රමයට. ඒක තුන්වැනි ක්‍රමය. මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයට ලැබුණු අනුමැතියට නැවත වතාවක් යනවා නම් "හැකි ප්‍රමාණයක්" කියලා නොවෙයි වැටෙන්නේ, සියයට100ක් කියලා. එතකොට මේ ක්‍රමයට නැවත වතාවක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගත යුතුයි. මම කියන කාරණය හරිද වැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මම එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මුලුමනින්ම auctionsවලට යන්න කියන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කළ මොකක් හරි ලියවිල්ලක් තිබේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මගේ ළඟ නම් එහෙම එකක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මහ බැංකුවේ නැද්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට මම දැකලා නම් නැහැ. තිබෙන එකම ලියවිල්ල වන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා දැනුම් දීම විතරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත්, "දැනුම්දීමක්" සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් වෙන්නේත් නැහැ. 2008 වසරේදී ගත්ත ඒ තීරණය අපට ලැබෙන්න සලස්වන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපේ පහසුව සඳහා මේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධ සාකච්ඡා වට ගණනාවක් අනු කාරක සභාව විසින් කරගෙන ගියා. එහිදී මේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධව පැමිණිලා, වාචිකව කට උත්තර දීපු අය සිටිනවා. අපට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි ඒ නිලධාරින් මෙතැන ඉන්නවාද, නැත්නම් විශ්‍රාම ගිහිල්ලාද කියලා. මම නම් ටික කියන්නම්. Mr. W.A. Wijewardena, former Deputy Governor. එතකොට එතුමා මෙතැන නැහැ. Dr. R.H.S. Samaratunga, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා ඉන්නවා. එම්.එස්.ඩී. රනසිරි මහතා, Treasury Operations ඉන්නවා. යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය ඉන්නවා. Dr. M.Z.M. Azeem ඉන්නවා. Mr. H.A. Karunaratna, Secretary to the Monetary Board. එතුමා දැන් ඉන්නේ කොහේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා මෙතැනට ඇවිත් නැහැ. නමුත් බැංකුවේ ඉන්නවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපිට අවශ්‍ය වුණොත් එතුමා ගෙන්වා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: පුළුවන්. හිටපු අධිපතිතුමා එතුමාව තාවකාලිකව තනතුරෙන් ඉවත් කර ඉඳලා ගිය සතියේ නව අධිපතිතුමා නැවත එතුමාව ඒ තනතුරට පත් කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා බැංකුවේ ඉන්නවා නේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ආර්.ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මහතා?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා දැනට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයෙක් විධියට ක්‍රියා කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා දැන් ඉන්නේ කොහේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා දැන් විශ්‍රාම ගිහිල්ලා ඉන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා විශ්‍රාම ගිහිල්ලා. අපට අවශ්‍යතාවක් වුණොත් කැඳවා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Mrs. M. Ramanathan ඉන්නවා. ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා ඉන්නවා. Mr. S. Pathumanapan, Middle Office, EPF?

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: He is not here now.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා බැංකුවේ ඉන්නවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වා මහතා ඉන්නවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා හිටපු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරයෙක්. එතුමා දැන් විශ්‍රාම ගිහිල්ලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කලින් සඳහන් කළ සිද්ධිය වෙන කාලයේ එතුමා ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා. එතුමා මෙතැනට ඇවිත් කට උත්තර දීලා තිබෙනවා. පී. සමරසිරි මහතා ඉන්නවා, සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා ඉන්නවා. Mr. N.W.G.R.D. Nanayakkara, Director, FSRCD?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා බැංකුවේ ඉන්නවා අද මෙතැනට ඇවිත් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා දැන් ඉන්න තනතුර මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා දැනුත් ඉන්නේ ඒ තනතුරේම තමයි. 2015ට පෙර එතුමා තමයි ණය අධිකාරී විධියට හිටියේ.

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: Mr. L.S. Fernando, Manager, PDD?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමත් මෙතැන නැහැ. නමුත් බැංකුවේ ඉන්නවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතුමා තවමත් මේ තනතුරේමද ඉන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා වෙන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවකට මාරු කරලා ඉන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මාරු කිරීම සිදු කළේ කවදාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා දැන් ඉන්නේ Welfare Department එකේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපට අවශ්‍ය වුණොත් එතුමා ගෙන්වා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: පුළුවන්.

The Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna: Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe, Deputy Governor ඉන්නවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා, private placement එකක් වෙනුවට auction එකක් කරපු නිසා සිදු වූ මිල වෙනස් වීම පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනයට අනුව අපි අර්ථකථනයක් කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපි දැන් මෙතැන පිළිගත්තා මේ වැඩය ක්‍රම වේද තුනකට කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. මේ ක්‍රමවේද තුනෙන් එකක් හෝ, නිවැරදි හෝ වැරදි ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඔබතුමා මට තාක්ෂණිකව කියන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ක්‍රමවේද තුනක් කියන්නේ - options තුනක් තිබෙනවා කියන එකයි. මගේ දැනුම අනුව මේක හරිද වැරදිද කියන එකට වඩා, වඩාත් සුදුසු මොකක්ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව මට කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මටත් පුළුවන්. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඍජු ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නේ. මෙතැන නිවැරදි ක්‍රමයක් හෝ වැරදි ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා මට කියන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මට එක ක්‍රමයක් නිවැරදිද, වැරදිද කියලා කියන්න අපහසුයි. මොකද, මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරියෙක් විධියට මම කියන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය තිබෙන එකක් නම් ඒක නිවැරදියි, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය නැති දෙයක් නම් ඒක වැරදියි; ඒක නීති විරෝධී වැඩක් කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය තිබුණාද නැද්ද කියන එක අපිට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, අපි hypothetically අහන්නේ මේ options තුනෙන් එක option එකක් නිවැරදි හෝ options දෙක්ක නිවැරදි හෝ options තුනම නිවැරදි වෙන්න හැකියාවක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: May I intervene?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Yes, Governor.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: As this is a question in terms of the options and not as to exactly what happened, I hope you will not mind me also commenting though I have come into the process later. As to which the best system is depends on the conditions and the nature of each market. For each market, different system is appropriate. On the face of it, an auction system is very fair and very transparent in principle. But, if it is a very thin market, it is possible to manipulate it. So, you have to really think through carefully and sometimes, it may has to be through trial and error. You may think that you are introducing a very transparent system but that may not workout very well. So, to answer your question, there is no right or wrong way a priori. You have to fit the system to the conditions that exist in your market.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Precisely, that is what I wanted to know. Because, the issue at hand is whether one particular system was right or wrong. So, there is no right or wrong system.

That is what I just wanted to establish at a technical level.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට ක්‍රමවේදයක් පිළිබඳ සැලකිල්ලක් කරලා නිවැරදි මොකක්ද වැරදි මොකක්ද කියන එක කියන්න අපහසු නම්, යම් නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවක් ගැන සලකා එම ගනුදෙනුවේදී අනුගමනය කරන්නේ මොන ක්‍රමවේදයද කියන එක මත වෙන වාසි හෝ අවාසි කියන්න පුළුවන් නේද? එක් ගනුදෙනුවකට එක ක්‍රමයක් ආදේශ කළාම අවාසි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, තවත් ගනුදෙනුවකදී ඒ ක්‍රමයම ආදේශ කළාම වාසි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවකදී එම ගනුදෙනුව අරඹයා අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන සැලකිල්ලක් කරලා ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය හොඳද, නරකද, වාසිද අවාසිද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම හිතන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ වාර්තාවෙන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒක තමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තව ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සඳහන් කළා, විස්සයි අසූවක් වාගේ rate එක පවත්වාගෙන යන කොට, විස්සක් auction කරලා ඒ විස්සට ලැබෙන අගය මත direct placement කරනවා කියලා. ඒක හරිද? එහෙම practice එකක් තිබුණාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: පසු ගිය කාලය තුළ බැලුවොත් සාමාන්‍ය වශයෙන් එහෙම තමයි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අවසර දෙනවා නම් හේතු කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අන්තිමට කියපු දේ මට ඇහුණේ නැහැ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම වුණේ ඇයි කියන එකට මට අවශ්‍ය නම් කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර දිය හැකියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පැහැදිලි කර දෙන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම හේතුව වන්නේ, අපේ රටේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙළෙඳ පොළ ඉතාම සුළු එකක්. ඒ වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ප්‍රධානම ගනුදෙනුකරු විධියට එන්නේ සහ විශාලම fund එක EPF එක. ඒකෙන් සියයට හැත්තෑපහක් විතර ප්‍රමාණයක් EPF එක වාගේ එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. අනෙක් අය ඉතාම පොඩි අය. ඒ වාගේ පොඩි market එකක සියයට සියයක් තරගකාරී ලෙස කරන්න ගියොත් ඒ වාගේ market එකකදී පොලී අනුපාත උච්ඡාවනය වීම ඉතාම විශාලයි. ඒක ආර්ථිකයට සුදුසු නැහැ. ඒක නිසා තමයි සියයට හැත්තෑපහක් විතර අය පැත්තකට තැබුවාම නියම market value කියන එක තෝරා ගැනීමට පහසු ක්‍රමයට තමයි යම්කිසි market playersලාට ඒ අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්නේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙන්නේ පසු ගිය කාලයේ වුණෙත් එහෙමයි. සියයට සියයක් ඒ වාගේ ක්‍රමවේදයෙන් ගන්න ගියාම, අපේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තියේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවාට වඩා පොලී අනුපාත විශාල වශයෙන් ඉහළ ගියා. මගේ විශ්වාසයේ හැටියට මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය පිළිබඳ ප්‍රධාන භාරකරු විධියට මහ බැංකුවේ පොලී අනුපාත එතරම් ඉහළ යාම රජයේ ආර්ථිකයටත්, රජයේ ණය ගැනීමටත් හොඳ නැහැ. අනෙක් ඒක රටේ ස්ථාවරත්වයට, පුද්ගලික අංශයේ ණය ගැනීමටත් අවාසිදායකයි. මහ බැංකුව වශයෙන් අපේ එක්තරා වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා, පොලී අනුපාත යම්කිසි ආකාරයක වෙළෙඳ පොළ අනුව හැසිරීමට ඉඩ දෙන ගමන්, ක්‍රමානුකූලව ඒක ස්ථාවර තත්ත්වයට පත් කර ගෙන ඉදිරියට යන්න මේ වාගේ විශාල වශයෙන් අඩු වැඩි වීම වැළැක්වීමට. ඒක නිසා තමයි එම ක්‍රමවේදය තුළින් යම්කිසි ආකාරයක ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතයක් පවත්වා ගන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ, විස්සයි අසූව වාගේ ක්‍රමවේදයකින් පසු ගිය කාලයේ ගිය නිසා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විස්ස auction කරනකොටත් වෙළෙඳ පොළ පුංචි වීම වාගේම වෙළෙඳ පොළේ playersලා ඉන්න ප්‍රමාණය අඩු වීම නිසා, යම් ආකාරයක manipulation එකක් එතැන විය හැකියි නේද? Probability එක ගැන මම අහන්නේ. Governor කියපු අපේ market එකේ තිබෙන weakness එක 20 per cent සම්බන්ධව වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද market එක දන්නවා මේ 20 per cent based කරගෙන තමයි ඊළඟට rates වලට Central Bank එක_යන්නේ කියලා._**E** policy එක known policy <u>එකක්.</u> එහෙම නම් 20 per cent සම්බන්ධව auction එකේදී manipulation කරනවා නම් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතැනදී කරන්න තිබෙන ඉඩකඩ ඉතා අඩුයි. ඊට හේතුව මෙතැන flexibility එකක් තිබෙනවා. අපට තීරණය කරන්න සියයට විස්සක් ගන්නවාද, සියයට විසිපහක් ගන්නවාද, බිංදුවක් ගන්නවාද කියලා. එතකොට අපි හිතුවොත් ද්විතිය වෙළෙඳ පොළේ, market එකේදී interest ratesවලට වඩා විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා කියලා, අපිට ඒක reject කරලා direct placementවලට යන්න පුළුවන් option එක තිබෙනවා. එතකොට අපට ඒක ගන්නම ඕනෑ කියලා එකක් නැහැ. Market එකත් ඒක දන්න නිසා ඒ වෙළෙඳ පොළ ආසන්නයෙන් තමයි ඒ අය bid කරන්නේ. ඊට වඩා වැඩිපුර හෝ ගොඩක් වැඩියෙන් කළොත් අපි ඒක reject කරන්න ඕනෑ වෙලාවක පුළුවන්. මොකද ඒ වෙනුවට අපට ඉතිරි ටික replacementවලින් ගන්න පුළුවන්. මේ යන ක්‍රමය තුළ එහෙම option එකක් නැතුව market එක දන්න නිසා ඒ අයට ඕනෑම ගණනකට දාන්න පුළුවන්, මොකද දන්නවා, මේක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා, අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම අපි ඒක ගන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඒකෙන් manipulate කරන්න තිබෙන අවස්ථාව වැඩියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Bond වෙළෙඳ පොළට විදේශීය ආයෝජකයින්ට එන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: විදේශක අයෝජකයින්ට අපි ඉඩ දීලා තිබුණා 2006 වර්ෂයේ විතර අපි පටන් ගත්තේ. තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණයෙන් සියයට පහක් පමණ විවෘත කළා. අවසාන කාලය වන විට ඒක සියයට 12.5 දක්වා වැඩි කර තිබුණා. එතකොට මුළු ප්‍රමාණයෙන් සියයට 12.5ක් දක්වා ප්‍රමාණයක් විදේශිකයන්ට එන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම සීමාවක් තිබුණා. නමුත් ඔය කාලය වන විට ඒක සෑහෙන දුරට අඩු වෙලා තිබුණා. විදේශිකයන්ගේ උනන්දුව අපේ රටේ ආයෝජනය කිරීම පිළිබඳ අඩු වෙලා තිබුණු ප්‍රමාණයක් එළියට ගිහින් තිබුණේ. ඒ අය ආවේ නැහැ.

අලුතෙන් තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණයත් විකුණා ඒ අය එළියට ගියා ඒ කාලය වන විට.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මම හිතන්නේ මේ බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය ඉතාමත් සංකීර්ණ ක්‍රියාවලියක්. එවැනි සංකීර්ණ ක්‍රියාවලියක් නිසාම තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයක් මගින් මේ තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්න කියලා manual එකක් මගින් මහ බැංකුවේ නීති පනවා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේ දක්වා අපේ රටේ ඉතිහාසයේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියන සාමාජිකයෝ ස්වාධීනව ඒ යුතුකම වගකීම ඉටු කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේක කණ්ඩායමක් විධියට ගතයුතු තීන්දුවක්. අපි බලන්න ඕනෑ. මේ ක්‍රම තුනෙන් මොන මොන ක්‍රමය හොඳද නැද්ද කියන එක තර්ක කිරීම අපට කරන්න පුළුවන්කමකුත් නැහැ. ඒක අපට කරන්න අවශ්‍යතාවයකුත් නැහැ. නමුත් ඒ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියකින් තොරව අධිපතිවරයාගේ පෞද්ගලික අභිමතාර්ථය මත පමණක් මේක ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම යන කරුණ තමයි මෙතැන සිදු වී ඇති වැරැද්ද. අපි ඒ නිසා ඒ පිළිබඳව කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ. මේ ක්‍රමවේදවලින් අපට තර්ක කිරීම් අඩු වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. සමහර විට අද කරපු එකට ඊළඟ සුමාන දෙකත් එක්ක බැලුවාම, මේ දෙක සන්දන්දනාත්මකව බැලුවොත් පළමුවැනි සුමානයේ කරපු එකට වඩා වැඩි වාසි තිබෙන්න පුළුවන් ඊළඟ සුමානයේ තරපු එකට. මේකේ ස්වභාවය මේක තමයි. ඒ නිසා උපරිම වාසියක් රට වෙනුවෙන් ඒ තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්න තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඉන්නේ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීන්දු තීරණ අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. නමුත් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙතැන එවැනි ආකාරයේ දෙයක් සිද්ද නොවීම තමයි ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්, තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් සහ නීතිමය වශයෙන් වැරැද්ද වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගෙන් මම ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. පළමුවෙන්ම අපේ නිගමන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ නැතිව නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් පැහැදිලි කිරීම් කර ගනිමු. ඊට පසුව මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් අපේ අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම වෙනම කර ගන්න.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මගේ පළමුවැනි ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මේ bond එක issue කරලා තිබෙන්නේ අවුරුදු තිහකට තමයි. ඒක පළමුවැනි වතාවටද කරලා තිබෙන්නේ නැත්නම් මීට කලින් එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මීට කලින් අවුරුදු 30ට issue කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අවුරුදු 30කට වාගේ issue කරනකොට ලංකාවේ තිබෙන ප්‍රධාන බැංකු, රාජ්‍ය බැංකු සහ EPF, ETF අරමුදල්වලට ප්‍රමුඛත්වයක් ලබා දිය යුතුයි කියන අදහසක් නිල නොවන වශයෙන් තිබෙනවා නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: විශේෂයෙන් එවැනි ඒවාට ආයෝජනය කරන්නේ pension funds, insurance වාගේ ඒවා තමයි ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් ආයෝජනය කරන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: එවැනි තීන්දුවක් ගැනීමේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය නොතකා වසර 30ක් වාගේ විශාල bond එකක් මේ වාගේ auction එකකට යාමෙන් ඇති වන පාඩුව පිලිබඳ වගකීම කරන්නේ කවුද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැනදී පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. අවුරුදු 30ක bond එකක් issue කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන එකට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් ඊට කලින් අරන් තිබෙනවා. සියයට සියයක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන එකට තමයි අනුමැතිය නැත්තේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේක අවුරුදු 30කට යන්න කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් කවදාද අනුමැතිය ගත්තේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: 27ට කලින් තිබුණා මුදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී ගත්තේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: සතියකට කලින් නේද ගත්තේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒ සතියේ දවස් කිහිපයකට කලින් ගත්තේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒකේ විස්තර ටික අපට බලන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එතැනදී ගරු ඇමතිතුමා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ අලුතෙන් අවුරුදු 30 bond එකක් issue කරනවා කියලා තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය අරන් තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් මීට ඉස්සර වෙලා අවුරුදු 30 bonds issue කරලා තිබෙනවා ටෙන්ඩර් කොමිටිය මගින්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ වාගේ මුදලක් ගත්ත එකේ පරමාර්ථය මොකක්ද කියලා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවා නේද? ප්‍රාග්ධන වියදමක් සඳහාද නැත්නම් පුනරාවර්තන වියදමක් සඳහාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්.වීරසිංහ මහතා: මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින් අපේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව දැනුම් දෙනවා ඊළඟ මාසයේ තිබෙන අවශ්‍යතාවය කොපමණද කියලා. ඒ අවශ්‍යතාවය අනුව තමයි වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම කල්පනා කරන විධියට පොලී ගෙවීමට නම් අරන් තිබෙන්නේ, ඇයි අපි ණය පියවීම සඳහා නම් මේක අරන් තිබෙන්නේ, අපි අවුරුදු 30ක් දක්වාම මේක ගත්තේ ඇයි කියන එකයි තබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. ප්‍රාග්ධන වියදමකට නම් අවුරුදු 30ක කාල වකවානුවක් තුළ ගත්තාම කමක් නැහැ. එදිනෙදා කෙටි මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයන්වලට නම් මේක ගත්තේ. ඇයි අවුරුදු 30 කට ගියේ කියන කාරණය තමයි අපට බලන්න වෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තර්කයක් විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කර තිබුණා, මේ සිද්ධියේදී බිලියන 13.5ක් සඳුදා වන විට අවශ්‍යයි කියලා කිව්වාම ණය දෙපර්තමේන්තුවට නිදහස තිබෙනවා ඒක කොහොමද raise කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක මොන instrument එකද, කෙටි කාලීන එකක්ද දිගු කාලීන එකක්ද කියලා තීරණය කරන්න.

ඒ අනුව මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අවුරුදු 30ක එකක් නිකුත් කරනවා කියලා ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් තීරණය කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඒ අය තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් ගත් තීන්දුවක්. ඒක ගත්තේ ඇයි කියන එක -

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මට එකම කාරණාවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අහන්න ප්‍රශ්න කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. Theory ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. පෙබරවාරි 27වැනි දාට අදාළ මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී රුපියල් බිලියන 13.5ක් රජයෙන් ඉල්ලුවාම, ඒක ගැනීමට අදාළ කරන පළමු තීරණය ගත්තේ කුමන තැනින්ද? මෙතැන දැන් සිටින එහි ප්‍රධානින් කවුද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් එයට සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ, Tender Committee සභාපති ඉන්නවා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ හිටපු ණය අධිකාරී ඉන්නවා. ඒ ඕනෑම නිලධාරියෙකුගෙන් ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න පුළුවන්. මා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති වුණාට මට භාරව තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒ අංශය භාර සහකාර අධිපති ඉන්නවා. ඔහුට ඒ පිළිබඳව උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මගේ මූලධර්මය මේකයි. මෙය ක්‍රියාවලියක් නේ. මේ පිළිබඳව හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාට තිබෙන විවේචනය වාගේම මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය වුණේ කොහොමද කියලා බලා ගන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා දැන් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා system එක clean කියන එක අපේ නිගමනය නම්, පරීක්ෂණ අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. දැන් අලුත් කෙනෙකු ඇවිත් ඉන්නවා. අපට ඔහු සමඟ වැඩ කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා මම අහන්නේ, 13.5 billion ගන්න විධිය decide කරපු පළමු වැනි තැන කොතැනද? දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව. අතිරේක අධිකාරී ආසිම් මහත්මයාට ඒකට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්න ඒක decide කළේ කොහොමද කියලා?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The decision to raise fund comes from the DDMC – Domestic Debt Management Committee which decides on what basis we are going to give Treasury's cash flow needs.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ decision එක මත 13.5 billion ගන්න කටයුතු කළා. එතකොට පසු ගිය වාර්තාවේත් තිබෙනවා, ඒ ගන්න අවස්ථාවේදී -ඒ auction එක-වෙන තැනදීම හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ඇවිත් යම් කිසි නියෝගයක් දුන්නා කියලා. ඒ නියෝගය දුන්න කමිටුව හෝ department එක මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එත් Dr. Azim ඔබතුමාද ඉන්නේ?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I was the Additional Superintendent at that time.

The Hon. Bimal Ratnayake: Who was the chief?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Mrs. Seneviratne.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමියට තමයි ඒ වගකීම තිබුණේ. මෙය සම්පූර්ණ auction ක්‍රමයට ගන්න කියන කරුණ හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ ඔබතුමියට තමයි.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමියන්ලා ඒ අනුව කටයුතු කළා. ඊළඟ පියවර මොකක්ද? 13.5 billion auction එකෙන් ගන්න ඔබතුමියට Governorගෙන් නියෝගයක් ආවා. ඒ අනුව ඔබතුමියන්ලා කටයුතු කළා. ඊළඟ step එක මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපි department එකෙන් කොයි කොයි ප්‍රමාණ ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඒ proposal එක අපි ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට අර ගෙන යනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමියන්ලා 13.5 billion raise කර ගන්න විධිය දැනගෙන Tender Committee එකට යනවා?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Tender Committee එකේ ඉන්නේ කවුද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා මමයි. ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂක, දේශීය මෙහෙයුම් කටයුතු දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂක හා ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ මෙහෙයවන Assistant Governorsලා ඉන්නවා. මේක Treasury bonds ගැන මගේ පළමු වැනි Tender Board එක. මෙහිදී සුපුරුදු පරිදි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ technical report එකේ තියෙන්නේ ඒ bids ටික බලලා "මේච්චර ගත්තොත් වියදම් මේච්චරයි" කියලා ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව කියනවා. ඒ ටෙන්ඩර් එකේ එක bond එකක් නොවෙයි bonds කිහිපයක් තිබුණා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: කෙටියෙන් කිව්වොත්, ඔබතුමා තමයි Tender Committee Chairman. ඔබතුමා තමයි decision එක ගන්නේ කොච්චර ගන්නවාද, කොයි විධියට ගන්නවාද, කාගෙන් ගන්නවාද කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අපි කාගෙන් ගන්නවාද කියලා දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය සම්බන්ධව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් recommendation එකක් ඔබතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: කොච්චර විතර recommendation එකක් දුන්නාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අවසානයේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න recommendation එක ආවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 10 කොයි විධියටද ගන්නේ කියලා recommend කළාද? දහයම auction එකෙන් ගන්න කිව්වාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Auctions වලින් 11.73 තමයි weighted average එක ඒ අවස්ථාවේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: දහයම auctions තමයි. Direct Placements වලින් ගන්නද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම මොකුත් recommendation ඒ අයගේ තිබුණේ නැද්ද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Direct placement කථා Tender Board එකේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ auction එක handle කරන රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් Tender Board එකට ඒ අයගේ advice එකක් දුන්නාද? මේ වාර්තාවේ 2.6 කථාවක් තියෙනවාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ අධිපතිතුමා එන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හදපු වාර්තාව.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාර්තාව හදන්නේ කවුද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Public Debt Department එකෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන්නේ, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් නිර්දේශ හදනවා නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශ තුළ විකල්ප නිර්දේශ කිහිපයක් තිබුණා. ඒ අතරින් එකක් තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ක නිර්දේශයක් සහිතව ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ.

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ක නිර්දේශය අපට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. ඒක අපට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හදමින් පැවැතුණ එකක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අධ්‍යක්ෂකතුමිය, ඔබතුමිය පැහැදිලි කරන්න?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: වෙන්දේසිය 11.4ට අවසන් වුණා. ඊට පස්සේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී, අතිරේක අධිකාරීවරුන් සහ Front Office එකේ ප්‍රධානියා එකතු වෙලා බලනවා, කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක් අපට මේකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා. ඒ අනුව අපේ තීරණය වුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ක ප්‍රමාණයක් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කළා. ඒකෙන් අදහස් කළේ අපි ඒක ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම පමණයි. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවෙන් තමයි තීරණය ගන්නේ. ඒක අවසන් වුණාට පසුව අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැමිණීම සිද්ධ වුණා. ඒ වෙලාවේ අධිපතිතුමා සමඟ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමන්ලා දෙන්නෙකු පැමිණ සිටියා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ අතිරේක අධිකාරීතුමා ඉතාම විස්තර සහිතව පැහැදිලි කළා රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යෑම කිසිම ආකාරයකින් යෝජනා කරන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට එවැනි යෝජනා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න Manual එකක් තියෙනවාද? මොකක් පදනම් කරගෙනද ඒ යෝජනා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආසිම් මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ Operational Manual එකේ Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලේඛන Annexes විධියට පෙන්වා තියෙනවා. ඉන් එක් ලේඛනයකින් තමයි අපි නොයෙකුත් විකල්පයන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. එම අවස්ථාවේ වෙළෙඳ පොළ තත්ත්වය මත රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ක් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යෝජනා කිරීම තමයි අපි ලෑස්ති කරලා තිබුණු විකල්පය.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ Operational Manual එක හදන්නේ කවුද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That was already prepare at that time. It was not prepared by us at that time. But it is being regularly monitored by the Internal Audit Department of the Central Bank and if there is anything different to that, it is discussed on a regular basis by the Audit Department.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා සහ ඔබතුමිය කියනවා ඒක advice එකක් විතරයි. Order එකක් නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා 2.6 ගන්න එක තමයි fair කියන එක Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. ඊට ප්‍රථම අධිපතිතුමා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණියා.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා: අන්තිමට කිව්ව කාරණය පැහැදිලි නැහැ. ඔබතුමිය නිර්දේශ කළා කිව්වේ මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අපි වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ක ප්‍රමාණය. අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ, එහෙම නොවෙයි. රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් auction එකෙන් ගන්න කියලා. නමුත්, ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපි එකහෙලා කියා සිටියේ, මේ ප්‍රමාණයට යාම සුදුසු නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා: සුදුසු නැහැ කියලා ලිඛිතව දුන්නාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. සාකච්ඡාවක් කළා විතරයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතකොට Tender Committee එකේදී ඔබතුමා සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් Rs. 10 billionම auction ක්‍රමයට යන්න තීන්දු කරද්දි, (Rs. 2.6 billion) යෝජනා කරද්දි නිලධාරී මහත්වරුන් කවුරුවත් ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ අකමැත්ත හරි කිසිම දෙයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ප්‍රකාශ කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙහි මුලට ගියා නම් තවත් ලෙහෙසි වෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධව පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම පළ කළේ Rs. 1 billion ඉල්ලලා. අන්න එතැනින් තමයි පටන් ගන්න වෙන්නේ. පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම පළ කළා Rs. 1 billion ඉල්ලලා. එතකොට මේකට bid කරපු අයගේ සිතුවිල්ල වුණේ Rs. 1 billion තමයි ගන්නේ කියන එකයි. Rs. 1 billionවලට තමයි Bank of Ceylon ඇතුළු ඉතිරි සියල්ලෝම bid කළේ. ඉතිහාසයේත් Rs. 1 billion ඉල්ලුවාම -Rs. 2 billion or Rs. 3 billion- සමහර වෙලාවට අඩුවෙන් ගන්නවා, සමහර වෙලාවට වැඩියෙන් ගැනීමක් සිදු වෙනවා. එතකොට Rs. 1 billion ඉල්ලපු එකට ඔබතුමියන්ලාගේ කමිටුව යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණා Rs. 2.5 billion ගැනීම අභිතකර තත්ත්වයක් නැහැ කියලා. මම හිතන විධියට ඒක ඇතුළුව යෝජනා හයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: යෝජනා හයක් යෝජනා කරලා තමයි ඔබතුමියන්ලා මේ කමිටුවට දමන්නේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමියන්ලා තව note එකකුත් දැමුවා නේද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: එතැනදි අධිපතිතුමා සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රකාශ කළාට පස්සේ "නැහැ, රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යන්න ඕනෑ"

කියන කොට මට සිදු වුණා Front Office එකට නියෝගයක් දෙන්න රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට තිබෙන විධියට මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්න කියලා. මොකද, Front Office එකෙන් තමයි මේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ නිලධාරියාට නැවත වාරයක් ඒ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න කටින් කියලා බැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම ඒ නිලධාරියාට notes කළා Governorගේ additional fund requirement එකක් තියෙනවා, ඒ අනුව රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට වාර්තාව හදන්න කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතකොට මේ auction sheet එක සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමිය විමසීමක් කළේ නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඊට පසුව අපි අර ගෙන ගියේ අර රුපියල් බිලියන 10 කියන යෝජනාව. ඒ නිසා අපි සභාපතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා, "අපේ තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 ප්‍රමාණය, නමුත් අපි මේ වාර්තාවේ ගෙනාවේ නැහැ, අද අධිපතිතුමා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනෙකු සමඟ පැමිණියාම අපි යෝජනා කරන වාර්තාවට කැමති නැති නිසා අපට සිදු වුණා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක ප්‍රමාණයේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමට, මේ තමයි ඒ වාර්තාව" කියලා. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යෝජනා කළා මේ පිළිබඳව අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසීමක් කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කලින් තිබුණු hybrid system එක අනුව නම් අපි කරන දේ තමයි පොඩි ගණනක් දමලා වෙළෙඳපොළේ ඒක වලනය වන විධිය බලනවා. බලලා අපි private placementsවලට යනවා. එතකොට අපි දමන්නේ Rs. 1 billion or Rs. 2 billion අවශ්‍යයි කියලා, නමුත් Rs. 10 billion ගන්න බලාගෙන. අපි මුළුමනින්ම වෙන්දේසියෙන් ගන්නවා නම් අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණයම advertise කරන්න ඕනෑ නැද්ද? අපි යන්නේ වෙළෙඳපොළ වලනය සොයන්න නොවෙයි. අපි යන්නේ මුළුමනින්ම වෙන්දේසියෙන් ගන්න නම් ඒ දැන්වීමේ සකස් විය යුතුයි නේද අපි ගන්න මුළු ප්‍රමාණයම?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි නිවැරදි ආකාරය. නමුත් මෙතැනදි පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම දමන කොට මෙහෙම කරන බව කවුරුවත් දැන ගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ නේ. එතකොට එහෙම කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ පසු කාලයක කරන කොට එහෙම මුළු ප්‍රමාණයම දමලා පොඩි පොඩි වෙනස්කම් වෙන්න ඇති. සමහර වෙලාවට එහෙම වෙනස් වුණු අවස්ථාත් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කලින් ප්‍රකාශයේදී කිව්වා සභාපතිතුමාට කිව්වා කියලා මේ ගැන Governorගෙන් අහන්න කියලා. Governorගෙන් ඇහුවාද? කවුද ඇහුවේ? මම අහන්නේ මේ යෝජනාව ගැන. ඔබතුමාද ඇහුවේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. Tender Committee එකට ආවාම අපි ඇහුවා Rs. 1 billion දාලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්නේ ඇයි කියලා. එතකොට කිව්වා "මේක ගන්න කියලා අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන්නා" කියලා. ඒ වෙලාවේ මම ඇහුවා එහෙම උපදෙස් අනුව ගන්නවා නම් Tender Board එකේ තිබෙන වගකීම මොකක්ද කියලා. ඒ මගේ පළමුවැනි Tender Board එක. අපි ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළා. මට මේ ගැන විශ්වාසයක් නැහැ. මොකද, මේක වාචිකව කිව්ව දෙයක් නේ. අධිපතිතුමා කොහොම උපදෙස් දුන්නාද දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අධිපතිතුමා ඒ වෙලාවේ හැටියට උපදෙස් දෙන කොට කොහොමත් මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිගන්නවා. නැත්නම් වැඩ කරන්න අමාරුයි නේ. කවුරුත් සහයෝගයෙන් වැඩ කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. "අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා" කියන එක නේ කියන්නේ. කොහෙවත් ලියලා තිබුණේ නැහැ නේ. ඒ නිසා මම ඇහුවා "කොහොමද ඒක දැන ගන්නේ" කියලා.

පසුව Tender Board එකට කථා කරලා කිව්වා "කොහොමටත් හොඳයි ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාට කථා කරන එක" කියලා. එතැනදි මම එළියට ඇවිත් අධිපතිතුමාට call එකක් ගත්තා. මම ඒක හැම තැනම කියලා තිබෙනවා. මම දන්නේ නැහැ, නමුත් අධිපතිතුමාට මොනවා හරි හේතු තිබෙන්න ඇති මෙහෙම කියන්න. මම අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඇහුවා "මෙහෙම කිව්වේ ඇයි, මේකේ rationale එක මොකක්ද?" කියලා. එතුමා rationale එකට, හේතු දෙකක් කිව්වා.

එකක් තමයි, අපේ ආණ්ඩුවට මුදල් විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් අවශ්‍ය වෙලා තිබෙනවා, මේක ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

යෝජනා කරපු රුපියල් බිලියන 10 weighted average එක තිබුණේ 11.73. එතුමා කියපු දෙවැනි එක තමයි මේ bond එක, 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ නිකුත් කරලා තිබුණු bond එකක් තමයි නැවත නිකුත් කරන්නේ. එතකොට අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා "ඉදිරි සතියේ අපි පොලී අනුපාත වැඩි කරනවා, වෙනස් කරනවා" කියලා. ඒ වැඩි කරනවා කිව්වේ අපේ තිබුණා ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොලී අනුපාතවල සියයට 5 මට්ටමක්. මට්ටම් තුනක් තිබුණා. සියයට 5 මට්ටම, සියයට 6.5 මට්ටම, අනෙක් එක මට හරියටම මතක නැහැ. සියයට 7 හෝ 7.5 මට්ටම. යම්කිසි බැංකුවක් ඇවිල්ලා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් තැන්පත් කළොත් දෙන්නේ සියයට 6.5 පොලී අනුපාතය. යම්කිසි මාසයක තුන්වරකට වඩා සල්ලි ගෙනැල්ලා තැන්පත් කළොත් සියයට 6.5ක පොලියක් දෙන්නේ නැහැ, සියයට 5යි දෙන්නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ තිබුණු ප්‍රතිපත්තිය වුණේ බැංකු තමන්ට තිබෙන අතිරික්ත සල්ලි මහ බැංකුවේ තැන්පත් කරලා නිකම් පොලී ගන්නේ නැතිව පුළුවන් තරම් ණය දෙන්න කියන එකයි. අන්න ඒ සියයට 5 තමයි පහළම පොලී අනුපාතය.

මේ නිසා අන්තර් බැංකු වෙළෙඳපොළේ පොලී අනුපාත නිතරම සියයට 5 මට්ටමට තමයි ආවේ. මේ ගැන Board එකෙත් කථා කර කර සිටියේ. මොකද, market එකෙනුත් කිය කියා හිටියේ මේ පොලී අනුපාතය අයින් කරන්න කියලා. එතකොට අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා "ලබන සතියේ අපි මේ සියයට 5 අයින් කරනවා, අයින් කළාම වෙළෙඳපොළේ පොලී අනුපාත ආපසු ඉහළට නගිනවා" කියලා. පොලී අනුපාත ඉහළට නගින කොට ලංකාවේ තිබෙන පොලී ව්‍යුහය ආපසු 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයට යනවා. සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයට ගියාම අර 30-year bond එක නිකුත් කරපු වෙලාවේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය නැවතත් එනවා. එතකොට සියයට 10ක් අර ගෙන මේ පොලී අනුපාතය දැනට වැඩි වුණාට ලබන සතියේ මේ සියයට 5 අයින් කළාට පස්සේ ඒක වැඩි වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ගිය අවුරුද්දේ ඒ bond එක මම හිතන

විධියට රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකක් විතර අර ගෙන තිබුණේ සියයට 11.75ට. මේ සැරේ අපි යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණේ සියයට 11.73ට. එතකොට අර සියයට 5 අයින් කළාම පොලී අනුපාත ව්‍යූහය අතෙන්ට යනවා නම් මේකේ කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඉතාම තාක්ෂණික පිළිතුරක් තමයි ඒ දුන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේක ගැනීමේ වරදක් නැහැ කියන එක තමයි කිව්වේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ උපක්‍රමය හරි ගියාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, හරි ගියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඕක සියයට 11.73ද, සියයට 11.75ද කියන එක in isolation ගන්න බැහැ නේ. සියයට 11.73ද, සියයට 11.75ද කියන එක අපි සාපේක්ෂව බලන්න ඕනෑ එදා වෙළෙඳපොළේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය අනුව. ඒක ඊට අවුරුද්දකට කලින් නිකුත් කරපු වෙලාවේ වෙළෙඳපොළේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය සහ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ පොලී අනුපාතය අතර තිබුණු වෙනස මොකක්ද? එහෙම නැත්නම් එම පොලී අනුපාතයමද තිබුණේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: වෙනසක් තිබුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම අහන්නේ, එතකොට වෙනසක් තිබුණා නම් ඒ වෙනස අඩු නම්- ඒ කියන්නේ, 2015 වෙළඳපොළේ සියයට 14ට තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා significantly අඩුයි නම් ඔබතුමා ඒ justification එක පිළිගත්තේ කොහොමද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක මෙහෙමයි කිව්වේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් tender board එකේ යම් යම් තීරණ ගන්නකොට අපි සමහර දේවල් දන්නවා. ඉදිරි සතියේ වෙළෙඳපොළට වෙන්නේ මොකක්ද; මහ බැංකුවේ පොලී අනුපාතය මොන විධියේ වෙයිද? කියලා අපේ ළඟ දැනීමක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමාගෙන් පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සමාවෙන්න මේ ප්‍රශ්නයේ පිළිතුර තවම අවසන් වුණේ නැහැ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක තමයි, tender board එකේ ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂ සහ පිරිස කරන්නේ ඒකයි. දැනට තිබෙන එකම නොවෙයිනේ බලන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සමරසිරි, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙමනේ. අපි හිතනවා නම් අද 11.07.03 ඒක low figure එකක් කියලා, ඒ low figure එකක් කියලා කියන්නේ market එකෙත් ඒ වාගේ ගණනක් තිබෙනවා නම් නේ. නමුත් අද market එකේ තිබෙන්නේ 7.5 නම් 11.07.03 වැඩියි. මම අහන්නේ එතකොට, ඒ market එකේ තිබුණු පොලිය - 2014 පොලිය සහ 2015 ඔය කියන දවස වෙනකොට තිබුණු පොලිය අතර ලොකු වෙනස්කමක් වෙලා තිබුණා ද නැද්ද කියන එකයි.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ වෙනස්කමක් තිබුණා. පොලී අනුපාත අඩුයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගොඩක් අඩුවෙලා තිබුණාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ගොඩක් අඩුයි. සියයට 5 මට්ටම නිසා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම නම් කොහොමද එතකොට අර justification එක ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක හරි. ඒ justification එක තාක්ෂණිකව හරි. මොකද අපි යම් යම් තීරණ ගන්න කොට-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකක්ද තාක්ෂණිකව හරි.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම පැහැදිලි කරන්නම් ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි. අපි යම් යම් තීරණ ගන්න කොට මේ වෙලාවේ තියෙන එකම නොවෙයි බලන්නේ. අපේ ළඟ තිබෙන දැනුම අනුව දැන් මේ සතිය අන්තිමේ සල්ලි ටිකක් ආණ්ඩුවට එන්න පුළුවන්. අපේ දැනීම තිබෙන්නේ. වෙළෙඳපොළට සල්ලි එනවා. ඒ වාගේ තොරතුරු අපි ළඟ තිබෙනවා. ඉදිරි මාසයේ වාගේ පොලී අනුපාත, ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කරනවා ද කියලා අපි දන්නවා. එතකොට අපි ඒවා දිහා බලලා තමයි මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ. එතකොට එතුමා කිව්වේ ලබන සතියේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ මේ කරුණ සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබුණා කියලානේ. ඒක නිසා අපි දන්නවා ලබන සතියේ මේ සියයට 05 ඉවත් කළාම මේ පොලී අනුපාත ටික ආපහු යනවා කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහ ඔබතුමා හැරුණු විට තවත් කවුද ඔය තොරතුරු දැනගෙන හිටියේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Discussion එක වුණේ ඔබතුමා-

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේ discussion එක තනියම එළියට ඇවිල්ලා කළේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ ඕක හැමෝම දැන ගෙන හිටිය කාරණයක් නොවෙයි නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: පොලී අනුපාත වැඩි කරනවා කියලා අපි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ කථා කරනවා. අපේ Deputy Governorsලා එහෙම දැන ගෙන හිටියා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා පෞද්ගලිකව දැන ගෙන හිටියාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. මම දැන ගෙන හිටියා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කොපමණ විතර කාලයක් ගත කළාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ විනාඩි පහක් විතර කථා කළා. මම ඒ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡාවලදී සඳහන් කරලා ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වාට පස්සේ ලබන සතියේ අපි සියයට පහේ පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කරන නිසා මේ තීරණයට යමුයි කියලා යෝජනාවක් කළාය කියලා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව් සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට ඔබතුමා මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරන්නේ පෙබරවාරි 27වැනිදා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ tender board එක තිබෙන වෙලාවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලබන සතියේ කියලා කිව්වොත් මාර්තු 02වැනිදා

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මාර්තු 02වැනිදා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත් ඔබතුමන්ලා පෙබරවාරි 23 Monetary Board එකේ තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒකේ paper එක මගේ ළඟ තිබෙනවා "Item No. 2" කියලා. ඒකේ ඔබතුමන්ලා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මේ විධියට. "Given the rising trend of market interest rates and rising growth of private sector credit and decided to maintain the policy interest rate at current level until the next month's monetary policy review". Until the next month කිව්වොත් පෙබරවාරි 23 ඉඳන් මේ current policy rate එක. ඔබතුමන්ලා interest rate එක maintain කරන්න ඕනෑ ඊළඟ මාසයේ 23 වෙනකම්. එතකොට කොහොමද අධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ අපි ලබන සතියේ මේක වෙනස් කරනවා කියලා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මුදල් ප්‍රතිපත්ති - monetary policies- සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම තමයි මහා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන වගකීම දරන්නේ. එතැනදී මට සඳහන් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ සභාපතිතුමා කිව්ව කාරණය හරියට හරි. පෙබරවාරි 23 වැනිදා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළේ මුදල් පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. එතකොට එහෙම තීරණය කළ පදනම මත තමයි අපේ announcement කරලා, market expectation එක තිබුණේ, ඒක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ කියන පදනම මත තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ඒ තොරතුරු පදනම් කර ගෙන bid කළේ. එතකොට ඒ අතරතුර මෙතුමාට අධිපතිතුමා කියලා තිබෙනවා ඒ කථාව. ඒ කථාවත් හරි. මොකද, ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම පොඩි නිවැරදි කිරීමක් මම කළොත්, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය 23වැනිදා තීරණය කළාට, 27වැනිදා උදේ- මම සභාපතීත්වය දරන Market Operations Committee එක කියලා Committee එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි, දිනපතා පොලී අනුපාත ගැන, විනිමය අනුපාත ගැන, අපි ගන්න උපක්‍රම මොනවාද කියලා තීරණය කරන රැස්වීම. ඒ රැස්වීමට හදිසියේම අධිපතිතුමා අවිල්ලා වාඩි වුණා. - ඒක මීට ඉස්සෙල්ලා මම කියලාත් නැහැ, මගෙන් අහලත් නැහැ, මම Bribery Commission එකේ කියලා තිබෙනවා. මෙතැනදි කියන්න අවස්ථාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. - එතැනදී අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා අපිට මේ පොලී අනුපාත සියල්ල ඉහළ දාන්න ඕනෑ, එදා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙනස් කරන්න එපා කියලා තීරණය කරපු සියයට 5 කියන සීමාව ඉවත් කරලා, අද ඉඳලා සියයට 6.5ට සීමාවට යන්න කියලා. ඒ විධියට එදා උදේ Market Operations Committee එකට අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන්නා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔන්න ඔතැන තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. නන්දලාල් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා එතකොට එහෙම නම් interest rate එක වෙනස් කළේ කවදාද? පහේ rate එක ඉවත් කළේ කවදාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: සියයට පහේ rate එක වෙනස් කරලා අපි එදාම හවස circular එකක් issue කළා. අධිපතිතුමා දීපු උපදෙස් මත, තුන්වැනිදා සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක වන පරිදි සියයට 5 සීමාව ඉවත් කරලා සියයට 6.5ට යනවා කියන එක ඇතුළත් කරලා එදාම අපි circular එකක් එකක් නිකුත් කළා. එසේ circular එකක් නිකුත් කරන්න පදනම වුණේ අධිපතිතුමා එදත් ඇවිල්ලා, මේකට intervene වෙලා මේ සියයට 5 කියන එක 6.5 කරන්න කියලා උපදෙස් දුන්න නිසායි. ඒක තමයි එතුමාට කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ කමිටුවේ සංයුතිය මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: අපේ කමිටුවේ සභාපති මම. අධ්‍යක්ෂ ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ, අධ්‍යක්ෂ දේශීය මෙහෙයුම් -Domestic Operations-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට ඒ කමිටුවේ අධිපතිතුමා සාමාජිකයෙක් ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. එදා තමයි අධිපතිතුමා ඒකට මුලින්ම ආවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නිත්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක්ද කියලායි අහන්නේ?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතුමා නිත්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතකොට එතුමා කවදාවත් ඔය විධියට කථා කරන්න ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ඔය ගත්ත තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ තුන්වැනිදා ඉඳලාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. 27 වැනිදා ඉඳලා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: තුන්වැනිදා තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ- මොකද, immediately කරන්න බැහැ. එදා තීරණය ගත්තාට, circular එක issue කළේ තුන්වැනිදා ඉඳලා ක්‍රියාත්මක වන පරිදි ඒක market එකේ circulate කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ tender committee එක ලැබෙන්න කලින්. මේ telephone call එක එන්න කලින්.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. ඊට කලින්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට සමරසිරි මහත්මයා දැන ගෙන හිටියේ නැති වුණාට ඔබතුමා දැන ගෙන හිටියා ඒක සිද්ධ කරන බව.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: අපට instructions දීලා තිබුණා ඒක කරන්න කියලා. ඒ අනුව මම Director, Domestic Operationsට minute එකක් දැම්මා, අධිපතිතුමා උපදෙස් දුන් පරිදි ඒ සඳහා පළමුවෙන්ම අධිපතිතුමාගේ ලිඛිතව අනුමැතිය ගන්න කියලා. ලිඛිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා එතුමා කිව්ව එක- 27 වැනිදා minute එක මගේ ළඟ තිබෙනවා, "As instructed at the MOC, the circular to be circulated" කියලා ඒ circular එකේ copy එකක් හදලා ඒක අධිපතිතුමා ඇතුළත් කරලා, අධිපතිතුමා 27 වැනිදාම ඒකට අනුමැතිය දීලා තිබෙනවා circular එක issue කරන්න. ඒ circular එකේ තිබෙන විධියට ඒකේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ 5 per cent is withdrawn with effect from 02nd of March.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතකොට ඒක මේ transaction එකට අදාළ නැහැනේ?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දැන් මේ තීන්දුව සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ගත යුත්තේ Monetary Board එක නේද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක නිසා තමයි මේ විධියේ තීන්දු අරගෙන ratification එකට ඊළඟ Monetary Board එකට -

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ කවදාවත්.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඒක කරන්නේ -

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඉස්සෙල්ලාම Monetary Board එකෙන් ආව තීන්දුවට නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා carry out කරන්නේ. එහෙම නැතිව ඔබතුමන්ලා තීන්දුවක් අරගෙන Monetary Board එකට ratify කරන්න යවන්නේ නැහැ නේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒක වෙන්නේ නැති දෙයක් නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අධිපතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත කරලා, ඊළඟට Monetary Board එකේදී මේක ratify කළා. එතකොට ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ratify කළා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙන්න මේ තීන්දුවයි. නැතිව 100 per cent auction යන්න කියන තීන්දුව ratify කරලා නැහැ. මෙන්න මේක තමයි ratify කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතකොට ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්න මට ප්‍රශ්න දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මැතිතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ ඒ ප්‍රමාණය ඇතුළත යන එක, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒවාට දැම්මා කියලා; මෙපමණ ප්‍රමාණයකට යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. Rs. 1 billion නම්, දාන ගණන හදන ප්‍රමාණය. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක කරලා නැහැ. 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින දී ඔබතුමන්ලා 40කට අනුමැතිය ගත්තාට 77ක් දක්වා ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අපේ ඊළඟ issue එක. ඒක දෙවනුව කථා කළොත් හොඳයි. දෙක පටලවා ගත්තොත්-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවේ සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා නේ ඊට පස්සේ ඒවාගේ දිගටම කරයි කියලා; ගන්න ප්‍රමාණයම දැනුම් දුන්නාය කියලා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: සමහර අවස්ථාවල ගොඩක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. 29 එක 31 එක ගත්ත ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා දෙගුණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඊළඟ කාරණය තමයි මේකත් එක්ක යන කාරණයක්. Monetary Board එක ගන්නේ තීන්දුව- මේ ගොල්ලෝ බලන්නේ foreign investorsලා මේකට එනවාය කියන ප්‍රමාණයත් එක්ක තමයි මේක කරන්නේ.

මම එය කියවන්නම්, "The Board was of the view that the issuing 30-year Treasury bonds would be favourable at this stage to extend the yield curve and reprofile the debt service as there is good interest shown by foreign investors." නමුත් කිසිදු foreign investorකෙනෙක් මේකට ආවේ නැහැ නේ.

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. එය අධිපතිතුමාගේ view එක. ඒක තමයි minute කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් මගේ දැනුමේ සහ අදහසේ හැටියට, අවුරුදු 30 bondsවලට විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ගේ උනන්දුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙහි තිබෙන්නේ "The Board was of the view.." Board එකේ view එක කියලා නේ.

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශ කළා, Board එකේ කිසිදු සාමාජිකයෙක් නැත්නම්, එය අනුමත වුණා සේ සලකා Board එකේ minute කරන්න කියලා. ඒ වාගේම ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ඇමතිතුමා අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්නය සම්බන්ධයෙන් කරුණක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. එතුමා සඳහන් කළ 11.73ක ප්‍රමාණය හරියටම හරි. මාසයක් පමණ ගත වූ පසුව, වෙළඳ පොළේ එම ප්‍රමාණය සියයට 09කට ආසන්න ප්‍රමාණයට අඩු වෙලා තිබුණා. නමුත් auction එක නිසා එම ප්‍රමාණය එක් වරම 11.73 දක්වා වැඩි වුණා. ඒ නිසා දවසක් තුළ සම්පූර්ණ interest ratesවල structure එක upwards, shift වුණා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ සහ Governorගේ **උපදෙසින් පසුව** මොකක්ද කළේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අපිට ඒ වේලාවේ හැටියට අධිපතිතුමන්ලාට විරුද්ධව යන්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා කරන ලද clarification එක අනුව, Tender Board එක minute කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමාගේ තීරණය අනුව Tender Board එක ඒ තීරණය ගත්තාට පසුව, ඒ Board එකේ සිටි කිසිවෙක් ඊට විරුද්ධ වුණේ නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතැන සිටින අයගෙන් කවුරුන් හෝ ඒ සඳහා වගකියනවාද?

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: එහි සාමාජිකයෙක් හැටියට එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහත්මයා මෙතැන සිටිනවා. එතුමා ඒ ගැන කථා කරලා තිබුණා.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම දැනට සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙක් හැටියට කටයුතු කරනවා. ඊට කලින් රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළා. ඒ වාගේම 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසය වන විට සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙක් හැටියට, රාජ්‍ය ණය භාරව කටයුතු කළා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කලින් ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්න සඳහා මම කෙටි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. **මේ වේලාවේ තිබුණු** ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, අවුරුදු 30ක බැඳුම්කරයකට ගියේ ඇයි කියන එක. ඒ අවස්ථාව වන විට market එකේ පොලී අනුපාතය සියයට 06ත් 08ත් අතර වාගේ තමයි තිබුණේ. ඒ වාගේම අඩු පොලී අනුපාතයකට දිගු කාලීන බැඳුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කරන එක රජය වාගේ ණය ගන්නා ආයතනයකට වඩාත් හොඳයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි අපි අවුරුදු 30ක බැඳුම්කරයකට කටයුතු කළේ. නමුත් අපේ සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමවේදය වන්නේ, අපට යම් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නම්, ඒ සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රමාණයම market එකට දැනුම් නොදීම. ඊට හේතුව

තමයි, අපේ market එක එතරම් දියුණු තත්ත්වයක නොතිබීම. එසේ නැතිනම්, එය දැනගත් ගමන් ලාභ මත පදනම් වූ ආයතන -primary dealer institutions- ඒ අයගේ interest rate එක වැඩි කරනවා. ඒ වාගේම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ ආයතනවල primary dealersලා 16 දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ සෑම කෙනෙක්ම අපි දමලා තිබෙන amount එකෙන් අඩු තරමේ සියයට 10ක් හෝ bid කරන්න ඕනෑ. අපි Rs. 1 billion දැමුවාට පසුව, ඒ 16 දෙනාගෙන් අවම වශයෙන් Rs. 1.6 billion ලැබෙනවා. නමුත් ඒ අය එහෙම නොවෙයි කරන්නේ. මහ බැංකුව Rs. 1 billion නිවේදනය කළොත්, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දෙගුණයක් තුන්ගුණයක් ගන්නවා කියන එක ඒ අය දන්නවා. ඒ නිසා සෑම අවස්ථාවකදීම bids වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉතිහාසයේ ඒ ප්‍රමාණය කී ගුණයක්ද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දෙගුණයක් වාගේ තමයි යන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: තුන්ගුණයක් කියමු කෝ.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: පස්ගුණයක් ගිය අවස්ථා තිබුණා. නමුත් ඒවා outlying.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: **පස්ගුණයක් ගිය අවස්ථා තිබුණාද?**

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: එවැනි අවස්ථා දෙකයි තිබුණේ. නමුත් පස්ගුණයක් යනවාද කියන එක අපි තමයි තීරණය කරන්නේ. මොකද, මහ බැංකුව විධියට අපට කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ රාජ්‍ය ණය රැස් කිරීම පමණක් නොවෙයි, මුදල් ක්‍රමයේ ස්ථායීතාවත් පවත්වා ගන්න ඕනෑ. අද එක පොලී අනුපාතයකට ගිහිල්ලා, හෙට තවත් පොලී අනුපාතයකට ගියාම market එක destabilize වෙනවා. ඒක නිසා අපි අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් investorsලාට fair rate එකක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම සියයට දෙකක වාගේ real interest rate එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ මත පදනම් වෙලා තමයි අපි ගන්නා ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ. ඒවාගේ පදනමක් ගත්තාම, market එකේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතයට ආසන්න පොලී අනුපාතයකට තමයි ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව ගන්නා ප්‍රමාණය තීරණය කරන්නේ. මොකද, market එකේ interest rate structure එක stabilize කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. මම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා ටෙන්ඩර් බෝඩ් එකට යන තෙක්, මේ වාගේ policy decisions අරගෙන තියෙනවා කියන එක දැන ගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ. මම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් meeting එකකට සහභාගී වන්නේ විෂය මූලික කර ගෙනයි. නමුත් මෙම recommendation එක දැක්කාම, මම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් විමසුවා මෙපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් ඇයි කියලා. මම ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඊට විරුද්ධවයි කටයුතු කළේ. එහිදී රජයට වැඩිපුර ණය අවශ්‍ය බවත්, අධිපතිතුමා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිය බවත් ඔවුන් සඳහන් කළා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කවුද කිව්වේ?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිතුමිය ඒ බව Tender Board එකේ සාමාජිකයින්ට දැනුම් දුන්නා. නමුත් රුපියල් බිලියන දහයක් ගන්නා විට පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩි වෙනවා. **ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා සඳහන් කළ ආකාරයට, අවුරුදු 30ක බැඳුම්කරයක් පසු ගිය අවුරුද්දේ නිකුත් කිරීම සහ මේ අවුරුද්දේ නිකුත් කිරීම අතර weighted average rate එක compare කරන්න බැහැ.** ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී වෙළඳ පොළේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය අනුව තමයි එය තීරණය වන්නේ. ඒක නිසා දළ වශයෙන් සමාන කරන්න බැහැ. රජයට මුදල් ඕනෑ බව අපි දන්නවා. නමුත් අපිට අවුරුදු 30ක බැඳුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කරනවාට වඩා, වැඩි පොලී අනුපාතයකට වෙනත් කරුණු සලකා බලන්න තිබුණා. ඒක නිසා මම Tender Board එකේදී ප්‍රකාශ කළා, අපි වහාම අධිපතිතුමා මුසගැසී, කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර වෙනත් ක්‍රමවේදයකට යමු කියලා. නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේ අධිපතුමා නිල කාර්යාලයේ නොසිටි නිසා අපිට කරුණු පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ.

ඒ වාගේම එදින සිකුරාදා දිනයක්. දෙවැනිදා කියන්නේ සඳුදා දිනයක්. ඒ වන කොට රජයට මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබුණා. සභාපතිතුමා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අධිපතිතුමා සමඟ දුරකථනයෙන් කථා කරලා තිබුණා. එහිදී අධිපතිතුමා කිවුවේ, මේ මුදලම ගන්න කියලායි. නමුත් අපට ඒ ගැන වෙනම තීරණයක් ගන්න බැහැ. මොකද, එදා සිකුරාද දවසක්, direct placements එකත් නතර කරලායි තිබුණේ. ඒ නිසා රජයට මුදල් දෙන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැහැ. නමුත් සඳුදා වන විට මුදල් දෙන්න ඕනෑ නිසා, රුපියල් බිලියන 10 සඳහා අපට එකඟ වෙන්න සිදු වුණා. නමුත් අපි ඒකට විරුද්ධ වුණා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ගියේ කවර සමාගම්වලටද කියලා ප්‍රතිශතයක් හැටියට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. අපි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ වෙන්දේසිය තිබුණාට පසුව, අඩුම පොලී අනුපාතයේ සිට වැඩිම පොළී අනුපාතය දක්වා එය rank කළා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා විරුද්ධයි කියලා Tender Board එකේදී කිව්වාද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා වගකිව යුතු නිලධාරියෙක් හැටියට මෙහි බැරෑරුම්කම දැනගෙන, සෙනසුරාදා හෝ ඉරිදා නොවෙයි සිකුරාදා සවසම අධිපතිතුමාට කරුණු පැහැදිලි කරන්න තිබුණා නේද?

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා මෙහෙමයි දැන් මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ. There is a judgment call here. This is not a science. This is an art as much as it is a science. So, it is a position that you take given the future scenarios. The interest rates might go up; the inflation might go up; the exchange rates might change. You take a position on all these things and you take a judgment call whether it is not right or it is not wrong. In retrospect, you could say that you could have made a different decision. But, whether we should have gone for the entire 30-year bond, on a 100 per cent auction, is a debatable matter. It is debatable because of the amount of interest that we have perhaps paid over and above what

could have been our interest rate, if we utilized another option. So, the point I am trying to make hers is that the judgment may have had its flaws; the judgment may have been flawed. However, I do not think that we could say that the decision itself was either right or wrong. I do not know whether it makes sense.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva continued.

However, I do not think we can say that the decision itself was either right or wrong. I do not know if I am making a sense.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: I agree with you to a certain extent. But, Hon. Member, the issue here is that this was the Governor's judgment and no one else knew that judgment. So, if that was known to others, we could have issued those bonds in a more transparent manner. That means, if everyone in the market knew that this was the newly-changed policy, then we could have done the auction in a much better way. Here, the issue to me is this was the Governor's judgment and no one knew that until the decision was taken. If you look at the way this particular company has bid- That is a different story.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Yes, that is a different story. I am not even going there, Mr. Weerasinghe. All what I am saying is, I do not think we can justify that the outcome of that decision was the difference in the interest rate that we ended up paying and that was based on a judgment.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: That was not a judgment of any of the other officers in the Central Bank.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Yes. I grant you that.

The Hon. Lakshman Kiriella: That paved the way for the Government to loose a few billions.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා, අපට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තවත් කාරණා තිබෙනවා. එකම කාරණාවක් සාකච්ඡා කරමින් ඉන්නේ නැතිව අපි මේ සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට කරගෙන යමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම අහන්නේ, Tender Board Committee එකේ සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් ප්‍රධානියා කිව්වාට පස්සේ ඒක පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ කියන මතය ගැනයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා තවත් එක් සාමාන්‍ය රජයේ ආයතනයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ වාගේම දෙවැනි කරුණ Tender Board Committee එක කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ විධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැද්ද? මේක මේ නිකම් ලෑලි ටෙන්ඩරයක් වාගේ දෙයක් නොවෙයි නේ. Governor කිව්වා තමයි, මෙතැන ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රධානියත් කියනවා "මේක එපා" කියලා, ඔබතුමා ඒත් decision එක ගන්නවා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ එහෙම එපා කිව්වා කියලා. අපි කවුරුත් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපේ concerns raise කළා. එක්කෙනෙක් එපා කිව්වා වගේ දෙයක් එතැන වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නමුත් අවසානයේ තීරණය වුණේ ගන්න එක නේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක Tender Board Committee එකෙන්ම කරපු තීරණයක් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එතුමන්ලාගේ අවබෝධය, දැනුම, පරිචය එක්ක එතැන ඒ වාගේ තීරණ ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රමාණයක් කියලා කාටවත් මනින්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට මෙවැනි තීරණයක් ගැනීම සඳහා guidelines තිබෙන්නේ. අපි අහන manual එකේ තමයි ඒ guidelines තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ manual එක තිබුණාද? ඒ manual එකට අනුව මේ තීරණ ගත්තාද? ඒක සංශෝධනය කරලා තිබුණාද? එය සංශෝධනය කරන්න කවුරු හරි අනුමැතිය දීලා තිබුණාද? මෙන්න මේ කාරණා කවුරු හරි පැහැදිලි කරන්න. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට තමයි මේ කාරණා පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ manual එක අනුමත වෙලා තිබෙනවාද? ඒකට මොකක් හරි Board approval එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒක අනුව නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ. නැතිව ගෙදර බලාගෙන ඉඳලා ගිහිල්ලා මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

Dr. M.Z.M. Aazim: In fact, the Board has not cleared that manual at that time. But, the Internal Audit Department of the Central Bank has been regularly monitoring whether the Public Debt Department is following the procedures set out in the operations manual. We have very much acted on the basis of what the manual has stated. But, the manual does not specifically say that we should raise "x" amount or "y" amount. It has been the discretion that has been given to the Tender Board Committee. Of course, the Chairman of the Tender Board Committee and Mr. Rathnayake have mentioned that there were a lot of discussions. We had our views and we expressed those. We had no fallback in terms of direct issuance arrangement in the case of Rs. 13.5 billion requirement that we wanted to raise. Then only we had to go with that Rs. 10 billion option which was in fact, requested and-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ manualඑකට අනුමැතිය ගැනීමේ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ කාටද?

ආචාර්ය M.Z.M. අසීම් මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට සහ ඒ අදාළ සහකාර අධිපතිතුමා හරහා දැන් එය ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා.

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන හැම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවකටම යම්කිසි operations manual එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ හැම operations manual එකක්ම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය හෝ අධිපතිතුමා අනුමත

කරන්නේ නැහැ. Operations manual කියන එක Internal Audit Department එකෙන් audit කරන එක තමයි, තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය. එතකොට, cross-check කරන ක්‍රමය තමයි, Internal Audit Department එකෙන් operational manual එක බලලා, ක්‍රමවේදය හරිද වැරදිද කියලා බලනවා. නැත්නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන් නිර්දේශ කරනවා මේක වෙනස් කරන්න කියලා. එහෙම කිව්වාම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මඟින් operations manuals කියන ඒවාට ඒ යම්කිසි වෙනස්කම කරනවා. ඊට අමතරව investment guidelines කියලා දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නෙ EPF එකේ, නැත්නම් අපේ resource management කරන වෙලාවන් වලදී investment decisions ගන්න කොට ඒවා අනිවාර්යයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළ guidelines තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒවා කොටස් දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. Investment guidelines කියන ඒවා ඒ උඩ මට්ටමට ගිහිල්ලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් operations manuals කියන ඒවා දෙපාර්තමෙන්තු විසිගණනක තිබෙනවා. Internal Audit Department එකේ වගකීම තමයි ඒවා බලලා, internal controls තිබෙනවාද බලලා ඒවා වෙනස් කිරීම.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා, ඒ වෙනකොට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අදාළව operations manual කියලා ලේඛනයක් තිබුණාද?

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ operations manual එක කෙටුම්පත් කළාට පස්සේ operations manual එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා කියන තීරණය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ කවදාද?

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: Operations manual කියන එක මේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පටන් ගත්ත කාලයේ ඉඳලාම ඇවිල්ලා, කාලයෙන් කාලයට වෙනස් කර ගත්ත document එකක්. ඒක dynamic document එකක්. ඒ කාලයට අවශ්‍ය විධියට එය වෙනස් කරනවා. නමුත්, එය කාලයෙන් කාලයට වෙනස් කරන්නේ internal controls හරියට තිබෙනවාද කියලා බලලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළ, "direct placementsවලින් හෝ auctionsවලින් ගන්නවා" කියන මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය 2008 වසරේදී ගත්තා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා කලින් සඳහන් කළා.

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගත්ත තීරණයක්. Operations manual එක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් අනුමත වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලය 2008 වසරේදී ඒ වාගේ තීරණයක් ගත්තා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා. එයින් පස්සේ අලුත් policy එකක් - ඒ කියන්නේ වැදගත්ම කාරණයක් ගැන මූලධර්ම වෙනසක් සිදු වුණා. ඉන් පස්සේ ඔය auctionsවලට සහ direct placementsවලට අදාළ විධියට operations manual එක සංශෝධනය වුණාද?

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව සේපාල රත්නායක මහත්මයා කියාවි.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම එය පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තු 24ක් පමණ තිබෙනවා. එක එක අනපනත්වල තිබෙන විධි විධාන, rules and regulations වාගේ දේවල් පදනම් කරගෙන මේවා ක්‍රියාත්මක වනවා. ඊට අමතරව, මහ බැංකුව ඒවාට අදාළව ගනිපු තීරණ තිබෙනවා. මේ සියල්ලම අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවල තිබෙනවා. ඒ මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණ, නීතිවල තිබෙන විධි විධාන, රෙගුලාසිවල තිබෙන විධිවිධාන, රීතිවල තිබෙන විධිවිධාන සලකාබලා ඒ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි මෙහයුම් අත් පොත හදන්නේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒ විශේෂඥ දැනුම තිබෙන්නේ ඒ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට. සමහර වෙලාවට ඒ manual එක හැදුවාට පස්සේ, ඒ අදාළ senior officerට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා ඒකේ අඩුපාඩු තිබෙනවාද කියලා බලන්න. එහෙම නැතිව ඒවා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ වාගේ එකක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ගියාම සෑහෙන කාලයක් යනවා කියවන්න. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒ වාගේ කටයුත්තක නිරත වෙන්න බැහැ. ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ වාගේ විශේෂයෙන් වැදගත් තීරණ සඳහා තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කාලය වෙන් කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ auction කාර්ය පටිපාටිය ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් වැදගත් නොවන දෙයක් කියලාද? Direct placements සහ auctions මේ ප්‍රමාණයට යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා 2008 වසරේදී යම් ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් ඇති කර ගත්තා නේ. ඊට අදාළ කාරණා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යන්න තරම් වැදගත් නැහැ කියලාද ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, නැහැ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කොතැනකවත් කියලා නැහැ "සියයට 20ට යන්න, සියයට 80ට යන්න" කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියලා තිබෙන්නේ; මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ මූලික වගකීම වෙන්නේ, තිබෙන වෙළෙඳ පොළ අනුව අඩුම පිරිවැයට, අඩුම පොලී අනුපාතයට රජයට අරමුදල් රැස්කරලා දෙන එක. ඒක තමයි කාර්ය භාරය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය විධිමත්ව කරන්න තමයි Manual එකක් තිබෙන්නේ?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ ගැන තවදුරටත් පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වේලාවේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කියන්නේ නැහැ, "auction එකෙන් සියයට 20ක් යන්න, direct placement එකෙන් සියයට 80ක් යන්න." කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒ වාගේ දේවල් කියන්න බැහැ. මොකද, ඒ තීරණය ගන්න ඕනෑ විෂය දැනුම තිබෙන අයයි.

The Hon. Anura Priyadharshana Yapa: System එක වෙනස් කිරීමේ අදහසක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට තිබුණාද, නැද්ද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: තිබුණා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් ගන්නා තීරණ වෙනස් කරන්නේත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන්මයි.

The Hon. Anura Priyadharshana Yapa: Hybrid ක්‍රමයකට යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කර තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරිද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: හරි.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: ඒක තවමත් වෙනස් වෙලා නැහැ?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට දැනගන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, 2008.01.07වැනි දා ගත් තීරණය ගැනද, 2008.10.07වැනි දා ගත් තීරණය ගැනද, නැත්නම්, ඒ දෙකම එකතු වෙලා එන තීරණයක්ද? කවුරු හරි කෙනෙක් specific පිළිතුරක් ලබා දෙන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැනදී ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වෙනවා. මෙතුමා කියනවා, "මුදල් මණ්ඩලය යම් තීරණයක් ගත්තා නම්, ඒ තීරණය වෙනස් කළ යුත්තේත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයමයි." කියලා. අපි මුලින්ම මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය මොකක්ද කියලා දැනගන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා කියන මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය මොකක්ද කියන එක යෝජනා අංකය සහ දිනය සහිතව කියන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන කථාව සත්‍යයක්ද කියලා බලන්න ඒක දැනගන්න ඕනෑ.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: මේ අවස්ථාවේ ලිපි ලේඛන නොමැති නිසා දින සම්බන්ධයෙන් කියන්න අපහසුයි. නමුත්-

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. නලින් බණ්ඩාර ජයමහ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජිකයකු නොවන නිසාත්, මේ වේලාවේ කාරක සභාව රැස්වෙලා කටයුතු කරගෙන යන නිසාත්, මීළඟ සභා වාරයේදී අවසරය ඇතිව ඔබතුමා සහභාගි කරවා ගන්න කටයුතු කරන්නම්.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය අරමුදල් රැස් කරන ගමන්ම, වෙළඳ පොළේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාත ස්ථාවර කිරීමේ මූලික අරමුණු ඇතිව, 2008 වර්ෂයේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් එම තීරණය ගත්තා. කාලයත් ගත වන විට වරින් වර මෙම ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයේ සුළු සුළු වෙනස්කම් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් එම වෙනස් කිරීම්වලදී අවශ්‍ය මූලිකම තීරණය මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගන්නේ නැහැ. සමහර වේලාවට Operations Department එකට දෙනවා. සමහර flexibility එකක්. ඒ අනුව තමයි කටයුතු කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය ඒ flexibility එකම නේ. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ප්‍රශ්න කළෙත්, මුල් තීරණය තිබියදී ඒ තීරණය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ගෙන යන්නේ නැතිව, මෙම තීරණය ගත් එක හරිද, වැරදිද කියලා නේ. ඒ වාගේම මෙය විෂ්තිමය කාරණයක්ද කියලාත් මතයක් ආවා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමා කිව්ව දේ නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒ තීන්දුව ගත්තා. ඒක වෙනස් කරනවා නම්, නැවත වතාවක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයම ඒ තීන්දුව ගන්න ඕනෑ. පැහැදිලිව කිව්ව දේ ඒක නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි, මම තීරණ දෙකක් පරීක්ෂා කර බැලුවා. මේ තීරණ මොනවාද කියලා මම විමසා සිටියා. 2008 වර්ෂයේ ජනවාරි මස 07වැනි දා සහ 2008 වර්ෂයේ ඔක්තෝබර් මස 07වැනි දා ගත් තීරණ දෙකක් මට පෙන්වා සිටියා. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ ඒ තීරණ දෙක ගැනද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් කෙනෙක් වගකීමකින් යුතුව එය පැහැදිලි කරන්න. ඊට අදාළ documents ඔබතුමන්ලා සතුව ඇති නේ.

ඒ තීන්දුව සොයා ගන්නකම් හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ තීන්දුව ගැන කථා කරද්දී මේ තීන්දුව වෙනස් කළා කියලා කිව්වා නේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා වාචිකව කෙසේ කියා සිටියත්, tender committee එක මේක වෙනස් කළා. එහෙමද වුණේ? ඒ වගකීම ඔබතුමන්ලා භාරගන්නවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක වෙනස් කළා. 2008 වර්ෂයේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් තීන්දුවක් දීලා තිබුණා. නමුත් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකර auction එකකට ගියා. ඒකද කියන්නේ?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: 2008 වර්ෂයේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියන එක අපි දැනගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මමත් අහන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මම පැහැදිලිව අහන්නේ, මෙතුමන්ලා මේ තීන්දුව වෙනස් කළාද, ඒ වගකීම මෙතුමන්ලා භාරගන්නවාද කියලායි. එහෙම තීන්දුවක් තිබුණා. එය වෙනස් කළා කියලා කිව්වා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය ගැන පැහැදිලි කරන්න මට අයිතියක් නැහැ. නමුත් ඔය කියන original decision එක මොකක්ද කියලා මුලින්ම බලමු කෝ. Original decision එක බලලා original decision එකෙන් vary වෙලාද, vary වෙන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එක නේ බලන්න ඕනෑ. අපි ඒ ගැන බලමු කෝ. එපමණයි නේ, දැන ගන්න තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මොකක්ද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: Original decision එක සම්බන්ධයෙන්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2008.01.07 සහ 2008.10.07 දින තීරණ දෙකද කියලා check කරලා බලන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාව-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි, "මම හිතන්නේ" කියලා පිළිතුරු දෙන්න එපා. This is a very important issue.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඉතාම වැදගත් වෙනවා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. ඒ නිසයි මම කියන්නේ. මාගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් ඒ තීරණය මොකක්ද, කොහොමද වුණේ කියලා කියන්න අද සූදානම්වෙලා ආවේ නැහැ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය මොකක්ද, ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ කොහොමද කියලා හරියටම කියන්න අපට අවස්ථාවක් ලබා දෙන්න. ඒවා ගැන ලේඛන සහිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අපට පුළුවන්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ private placementවලට හෝ auctionවලට යන්න ඕනෑ කියන-

සභාපතිතුමා: දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි, එය note කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ නිසා මට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න. දැනට 2008.01.07 සහ 2008.10.07 දිනවල හෝ ඊට ආසන්න දිනවල මුදල් මණ්ඩල වාර්තා අනුව සෘජු ක්‍රමයට සහ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට යන දෙයාකාරයට හෝ වෙනත් ආකාරයකට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ කටයුතු පිළිබඳ මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණ තිබේ දැයි සොයා බලා පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවට ඉතා ඉක්මනින් දැනුම් දෙන බවටත්, සත්‍යක් ඇතුළත එම වාර්තා ලබා දෙන බවටත් මහ බැංකු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා පොරොන්දු වෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපට ඒවායේ පිටපත් ඕනෑ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ ඉතිහාස ගත කාරණා සියල්ල ගැන කල්පනා කර බැලීමේදී, මේ විධියේ තීන්දුවක් ගත යුත්තේ සහ මෙවැනි තීන්දුවක් ගත හැක්කේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයටද නැත්නම්, වෙන කාට හරිද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒ තීරණය ගත යුතුයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: තීරණයේ වෙනසක් කරනවාද, නැද්ද කියන සියල්ල තීන්දු කරන්න ඕනෑ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒක වෙන කාටවත් පෞද්ගලිකව ගන්න පුළුවන් තීන්දුවක් නොවෙයි?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: 2008 වර්ෂයේ ඒ විධියේ තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා. ඊට පසුව public auctionවලට යා යුතුයි කියලා හෝ public placementවලට යා යුතුයි කියලා වෙනත් තීන්දුවක් ගෙන නැහැ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මගේ දැනීමේ හැටියට දැනට එහෙම තීරණයක් ගෙන නැහැ. නමුත් එය ලේඛන බලා හරියටම confirm කරගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මට තව ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මහ බැංකු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි, අපි පොඩ්ඩක් මහ බැංකුවෙන් පස්සට යමු කෝ. මම හිතනවා, මේ තීරණ වෙනස් කිරීම ඉතිහාසයේදී කළේ කොහොමද කියන එකත් precedent එකක් ගැනීමේදී වැදගත් වෙනවා කියලා. What has been the precedent. උදාහරණයක් හැටියට, අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල කොටස් වෙළෙඳ පොළේ සමාගම්වල ආයෝජනය කරද්දී, මම හිතන විධියට investment guideline එකේ 5 (e) කියන කොටස වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක මට හරියටම මතක නැහැ. මේක operational handbook එකක් නොවෙයි, investment guideline එක. එහි සඳහන් වෙනවා, "අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල blue chip companiesවල ආයෝජනය කළ යුතුයි. මූල්‍ය සමාගම්වල ආයෝජනය නොකළ යුතුයි." කියලා. ඒකට හේතූන් පවා සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. නමුත් මම දැන් ඒවා කියන්න කාලය ගන්නේ නැහැ. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය දිගටම සිද්ධ වුණා. 2009 වර්ෂයේදී හෝ 2010 වර්ෂයේදී එය උල්ලංඝනය වුණා. උල්ලංඝනය වෙලා මහ බැංකුව විසින් අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල හරහා පෞද්ගලික බැංකුවල කොටස් ලබා ගත්තා; නොයෙකුත් අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු පත් කරලා ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වුණා. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී අපි දිගින් දිගටම මේ පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්න කළා. එතකොට අපි ඇහුවා, "මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය වෙනස් කළේ කවුද, මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය වෙනස් කරන්න හේතු වුණේ මොකක්ද, මේකට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ගත්තාද?" කියලා. නමුත් වසර කිහිපයක් යනකම් ඒ ප්‍රශ්නවලට පිළිතුරු ලැබුණේ නැහැ. පසු කාලයකදී එවකට සිටි මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා පාර්ලිමේන්තු විවාදයකදි සඳහන් කළා, " අපි මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය යම් කිසි දිනයක වෙනස් කළා." කියලා. එය වෙනස් කළේ practically ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න පටන් ගෙන වසර කිහිපයකට පසුවයි කියලාත් කිව්වා. මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය මෙතැන තිබෙන precedent එක මොකක්ද කියන එකයි.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Ratification එකක් තිබුණාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මන්ත්‍රී Board එකෙන් ratification එක කළාද, නැද්ද කියලා මම හරියට දන්නේ නැහැ. මේ වනතුරු අපට මේ පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ලැබිලා නැහැ.

ගරු(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු මේ අවස්ථාවෙන් පසුව ලබා ගන්න අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා. මම කියන්නේ. ඉතිහාසයේ අපි දැකලා තියෙනවා, මේ තීරණ යම් යම් පුද්ගලයන් විසින් යම් යම් අවධිවලදී වෙනස් කිරීම්වලට භාජනය කර තිබෙනවා. මම වැරදිනම් කරුණාකරලා නිවැරදි කරන්න. ඒ පූර්වාදර්ශයත් එක්ක තමයි. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියකින් තොරව මේ ක්‍රියාවලියත් මෙතැන සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දු ගන්නේත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන්මද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ ආයෝජන සම්බන්ධව තීරණ ගන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපේ scope එක, අපේ සීමාවක් අපට හදා ගන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මා මේ ප්‍රශ්න යොමු කරන්නේ, කාලයක් තිස්සේ මේ තීරණ ගත්තේ කොහොමද කියන ප්‍රශ්නයේදී. නැතුව මම මේක independently ගෙනෙන දෙයක් නොවෙයි. මේ decisions ගන්න කොට කලින් කොහොමද සිද්ධ වුණේ. ඒ සිද්ධ වීමේ precedent එකක් මෙතැන තිබෙනවාද කියන එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් පමණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තාවක් සම්පාදනය කිරීමයි අපේ කාර්ය භාරය. මේක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කරද්දී අපට යම් කාල නිර්ණයක සීමාවක් තිබෙන්න වෙයි. අපි එතැනට ගියොත් එතැනින් කෙනෙකුට කියන්න පුළුවන් මෙතැනිනුත් එහාට මහ බැංකුව පටන් ගත්ත දවස දක්වාම අපට යන්න වෙනවා. ඒක අපි මෙතැන වෙනම තීරණය කරමු. අද තිබෙන්නේ මෙතුමන්ලාගෙන් තහවුරු කර ගැනීමේ තාක්ෂණික කරුණු ටික.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: It is about procedure as to how-

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මෙතුමන්ලාගෙන් අහන්න වෙන්නේ, මේ placement එකත් එක්ක අපේ ලංකාවේ පොලී අනුපාතය තිබුණු ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා ඉහළ ගියාද නැද්ද කියලා. ඒකට උත්තර දුන්නා. වැඳගත්ම දේ ඒකයි. අනෙක් ඔක්කොම පැත්තක තියන්න. මේ අත්තනෝමතික ක්‍රියාව නිසා ලංකාවේ පොලී අනුපාතය අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඉහළ ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියන එක තමයි මෙතැන පැහැදිලි වෙමින් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක ප්‍රමාණවත් අනෙක් සියල්ලටම වඩා.

ගරු(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක ප්‍රමාණවත් නැහැ. ඉහළ ගිය එක ඇත්ත. නමුත් එතැන මොකක් හෝ- Whether there has been criminal negligence or some sort of liability is the question. It is true we all agree that interest rates went up.

The Hon. Anura Priyadharshana Yapa: What they said in their explanation was that if they had gone for a hybrid system the interest rates would have been lower it would have been good for the country and it would have been better for the image of the Central Bank.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: All that is agreed, but whether it was a judgment call-

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: I do not see any problem in that. ඒ options තුනෙන් ඕනෑම option එකකට යන්න පුළුවන්. Governor කිව්වේ, "Depending on the market, we have to select whatever out of the three systems? According to what the Governor has mentioned, sometimes you do an auction to find out the interest rate and then you do a private placement. But on the other hand, the Governor also mentioned that when you do an auction since it is a thin market, the number of primary dealers are small, there can be manipulation. That implies to the other system also. When you try to find out the interest rate then manipulation also can take place to get a different interest rate. As he said, there is no clear right or wrong method.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: If you are making a syllabus here we can talk like this. But, when we have a case like this we have to study that. We are not making a syllabus here. That can be done by an expert.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: This is exactly what the Governor said.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා, මට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න. මම මුලින්ම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වා, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් අතරේ විවාදය පාර්මේන්තුවේ තියා ගනිමු. ඒ සාකච්ඡාව මෙතැනට ගන්න එපා. කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම පමණක් අපි මෙතැන කර ගනිමු. නිලධාරීන් නැතිව අපට මේ විවාදය කරන්න මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්න අවස්ථාව ඕනෑ තරම් තිබෙනවා. එතුමන්ලාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම තමයි වඩා වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. ඒ වාගේම තමයි තවදුරටත් කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට ඉඩකඩ නොලැබුණු, අදහස් පල නොකරන ලද මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට මම ප්‍රම්බතාවය දෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මතු වූ කරුණු ගැන සාරාංශ ගත කර ගන්න. පළමුවෙනි එක තමයි "operation manual" කියලා වචනයක් ගැන ආවා. මම මේ විෂය දන්නේ නැති ආගන්තුකයෙක් නිසා, ඒ වාගේම කලින් කමිටුවේත් සිටියේ නැති නිසා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට අවශ්‍යයි operation manual එක බලන්න. මේ ක්‍රියා පටිපාටිය හරියට සිද්ධ වුණාද කියලා පරීක්ෂා කරලා බලන්න. ඒ වාගේම investment guideline ගැන කථා වුණා. එතකොට මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය හරියට වුණාද කියලා සොයා බලන්න සහ එහෙම එකක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා බලන්න මට අවශ්‍යයි investment guideline එකක්. මම හිතනවා අනෙක් අයටත් අවශ්‍ය ඇති කියලා. මේවා මට කල් තියා අවශ්‍යයි අධ්‍යයනය කරලා, පාඩම් කරලා එන්න. මෙතැනට ආවාට පසු කියවන්න වෙලාවක් නැහැ. ආසන්න වශයෙන් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම පරීක්ෂණයේ පරාසය පුළුල් එකක්. හේතුව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණු තුනක් ගැන කියනවා. ඒවා නම් අලාභය, වෘත්තීමය පරිවය සහ සාපරාධී වගකීම. ඒ නිසා මේ පරීක්ෂණය ඔය කාරණා තුන ගැනම යා යුතු වෙනවා. මේ පරීක්ෂණය එක පුද්ගලයෙක් හෝ එක සිද්ධියක් සීමිත කර ගෙන කළොත් ඒක රටට කරන අසාධාරණයක් වෙනවා. මේ ක්‍රියා දාමය වැරදියි නම්, අපරාධයක් නම්, වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයෝ ගණනාවක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ නිසා මේක original තීරණය ගත්ත පුද්ගලයා ගැන පමණක් පරීක්ෂණ කරන්න සීමා වෙන්න එපා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අවශ්‍ය පරාසය වාර්තාවේ නිගමනය මගින් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දීලා තිබෙනවා. එමනිසා පුළුල් පරාසයට යන්න අවශ්‍යයි, ඒ සඳහා අපට බලය තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පරාසය පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡාව අපිට කාරක සභාවේදී කර ගන්න ඕනෑ තරම් අවස්ථාව තිබෙනවා. තොරතුරු ඉල්ලා ගැනීම තමයි දැන් කර ගන්න තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකේදී ඔබතුමන්ලාට operational manual එකයි investment guideline එකයි දෙන්න පුළුවන් කම තිබෙනවා.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: Operational manual එක කියන එක දැනටම ලොකු report එකේ annex කරලා තිබෙනවා. මෙහි investment guideline එක කියලා එකක් මේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට අදාළ නැහැ. මොකද investment - international operations - කරන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි EPF එතකොට ඒවාට තමයි investment guideline කියන්නේ. මේකෙන් කරන්නේ investment කරන එක නොවෙයි කරන්නේ, ණය ගැනීමක්. එතකොට මෙයට investment guideline කියලා දෙයක් අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය සභාපතිතුමා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මට පෙන්වා දුන් ස්ථානය අනුව ඔබතුමාට දින දෙකක් කිව්වා. ඒ දෙකේ තිබෙන්නේ EPF සහ ETF හැසිරීම ගැන. අපි "කේ" කියලා හඳුන්වන player කෙනෙක් ගැන මේ

වාර්තාවේ හඳුන්වා දෙනවා. ඒ කේ කියන සමාගම මෙතැනට ආපු විධියත්, ඒ අයට අයුතු වාසියක් ලැබුණාද කියලා සොයා බලද්දී EPF සහ ETF හැසිරීම ඉතා වැදගත්. එතැන එන්නේ investment එතැන තිබෙනවා conflict of interest තත්ත්වයක්. ඔබතුමන්ලාම තමයි EPF පාලනය කරන්නේ. ඒක නිසා අපි දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ ඇයි EPF එක ඒ වෙලාවේ එහෙම හැසිරුණේ කියලා. Narrow down කරන්න එපා. මෙතැන තිබෙනවා ප්‍රශ්න කිහිපයක්.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියපු එක ගැන පැහැදිලි කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ, EPF එකේ investment guideline එක දෙන්න පුළුවන්. Public Debt Department එකට තිබෙන්නේ operational manual එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමනි, අපේ Membersලා 26 දෙනාට documentsවල ඔබතුමන්ලා භාර දුන් ඒවායේ. කථානායකතුමාට භාර දුන් document එකේ තිබෙනවා. හැම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුටම පුද්ගලිකව ඒ operational manual එක පරිශීලනය කරන්න අපහසු නිසා, operational manual එකේ පිටපත් අපට ලබා දෙන්න. ඒ වාගේම අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලින් ඉල්ලීමක් කරන්න ලේකම්තුමිය, investment profile එක ගැන investment guideline එක අපට ලබා ගන්න. ඒක සතියක් ඇතුළත අපට ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සමරසිරි මහතාගෙන් දැන ගන්න පුළුවන්ද, ඔබතුමන් කලින් පැහැදිලි කළා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමන් එක්ක පැහැදිලි කළා කියලා, තාක්ෂණික කරුණු කිහිපයක් වන පොලී අනුපාතය 2014 වර්ෂය සහ මෙතැනට සමපාතවන විධියට. එතකොට පූර්ව නිගමනයක ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යනවා කියලා. ඒ පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යාමෙන් එතුමාට ඥාතීත්වයක් තිබෙන සමාගමකට තමයි වෙන්දේසියේදී ඒ ලාභය එන්නේ.

එතකොට පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යනවා කියලා පූර්ව නිගමනයක, අවබෝධයක ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ එකක්. පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යාමෙන් එතුමාට ඥාතීත්වයක් තිබෙන සමාගමකට තමයි වෙන්දේසියේදී එම ලාභය ලැබෙන්නේ. පූර්ව නිගමනයක ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා නේ පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යනවා කියලා. ඒක දැනගෙන තමයි කරන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අත්දැකීම් තිබෙන නිලධාරියෙක් විධියට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට කිව්වේ නැද්ද පොලී අලුපාතය ඉහළ යාමෙන් රටේ ඇති වන මූල්‍ය තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද කියලා? ඒකේදී බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ මොකක්ද? මේක අවුරුද්දකට පසුව සිදු වුණු දෙයක් නේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු තාක්ෂණික කරුණුවල ප්‍රතිඵල සාර්ථකද, අසාර්ථකද? ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුව ඒකෙන් රටට මොකක්ද වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාව වන විට Tender Board එක ඒ තීරණය අරගෙන - පස්වරු එකට විතර Tender Board එක රැස් වෙන්නේ. පැය ½ ක්, පැයක් වාගේ කාලයක් ඇතුළත ඒ ටික අවසන් කරලා තීරණයක් අරගෙන වෙළඳ පොළට දන්වන්න ඕනෑ. ඇත්තම කියනවා නම් මට ඒ වේලාවේ ඔහොම සාකච්ඡා කරන්න දැනීමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මට ඒ අවස්ථාවේ ආරංචි වුණු විධියට අධිපතිතුමා අනෙක් Deputy-Governorsලා දෙදෙනාත් සමඟ තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ. එතැනත් ඔය විධියට පොලී අනුපාත පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා ඇති වෙලා තිබෙනවා. දැන් Dr. M.Z.M. Azim කිව්වා, මේක වැඩි වුණොත් පොළී අනුපාත වැඩි වෙන නිසා එයත් විරුද්ධ වුණා කියලා. ඒ අවස්ථාව එහෙම වාද විවාද කරලා, සාකච්ඡා කරන වේලාවක් නොවෙයි. දැන් නම් අපි වාද විවාද කරනවා. මේක අත්දැකීමෙන් කරන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක් නේ, මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කලින් පැහැදිලි කරද්දි මට හැඟුනේ ඉතාම සාර්ථක ක්‍රමවේදයක් ලෙස හඟවමින් මෙතැනට කරුණු පැහැදිලි කළා කියලායි. ඔබතුමා ඒ වේලාවේ හිටියා, තාක්ෂණික පැත්තෙන් හොඳ අවබෝධයකින් කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙන බව තමයි මට හැඟුනේ. මේ ඇති වෙලා තිබෙන ප්‍රතිඵලයත් සමඟ ඒකයි මම නැවත ඇසුවේ. ඔබතුමා දැන් කියනවා "මට ඒ ගැන ලොකු වැටහීමක් නැහැ" කියලා. ඔබතුමා මෙම ආයතනයේ කාලයක් සේවය කළ පරිණත නිලධාරියෙක් නේ. එතැනදී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට වඩා වැඩි දැනුමක් ඔබතුමාට තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේ තීරණය ගන්න තිබෙන වේලාව අනුව ඒ වේලාවේ මට හැඟුණා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ තාක්ෂණික කරුණක් කියන එක. ඒවා සම්බන්ධයෙන් විවිධ අදහස් තිබෙනවා. මට දැන් තිබෙන ආර්ථික විද්‍යා දැනුම අනුව මම පිළිගන්නේ මේ වෙළඳ පොළ ක්‍රමය -auction- මත අඩුපාඩු තිබෙනවා කියලායි. දියුණු කරන්න තව ක්‍රමවේද දමන්න ඕනෑ. Raid කරන්න systems දමන්න ඕනෑ. IT දමන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේ හුඟක් දේවල් තිබෙනවා. යම් කිසි කාලයක් තුළ ක්‍රියා කරන්න ඕනෑ. මම තව එකක් කියන්න කැමැතියි. පොලී අනුපාත වැඩි වුණාය කියන එකම කියන්න අමාරුයි. පොලී අනුපාත කියන්නේ Government Securities Market එකේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතයත් සමඟම නොවෙයි. මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති තිබෙනවා. රටේ balance of payment ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. වෙළඳ පොළේ ද්‍රවශීලතා ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. ඒවාත් එක්ක තමයි වෙනස් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට තව කාරක සභාවකට යන්න තිබෙනවා. මට විනාඩියයි අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ. සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය, one billion auction එකෙන් ඔබතුමියලා යෝජනා හයක් tender committee එකට යෝජනා කළා නේ. ඒකේදී ඔබතුමියලා යෝජනා කළේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5යි. ඔබතුමියලාගේ මතය අනුව රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5ක් ගැනීම උචිතයි කියලා තමයි යෝජනා කළේ. එතකොට ඔබතුමියලාගේ කමිටුවේ මතය එලෙස තිබියදී මේ ගණන රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට බලපෑවේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ නියෝගයද? වෙනත් කිසිදු හේතුවක් බලපාන්නේ නැතිව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ නියෝගය නිසා පමණද රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා වැඩි කළේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඇත්තටම ඒ වේලාවේ රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව වුණේ රුපියල් මිලියන 13.2යි. ඒ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය සොයා ගැනීමට තමයි අපට මේ auction එක කිරීම අවශ්‍ය වුණේ. එතැනදී one billionවලට ගියේ Treasury එකට කලින්ම 2.5 billion දීලා තිබුණ නිසායි. ඉතිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය සොයා ගන්න තමයි අපට අවශ්‍ය

වුණේ. Auction එක මඟින් one billion හෝ ඊට ළඟ ආසන්න මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් එකතු කර ගන්න තමයි අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ. ඉතිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය අපි කර ගෙන ආපු ක්‍රමයට direct issuanceවලින් ලබා ගන්නයි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 2.5 billion නේ ඔබතුමියලා කලින් යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණේ. එහෙම නොවුණොත් ආර්ථික වශයෙන් පොලිය වැඩි වීමක් සහ පාඩුවක් සිදු වෙයි කියන එක තමයි ඔබතුමියලාගේ මතය වුණේ. එතකොට 2.5 billion යෝජනා කරලා තියෙද්දි රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යෑමට යෝජනා කරන්න සිදු වුනේ ඇයි?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: එතැනදී අධිපතිතුමා කියා සිටියා අපට බිලියන 10ක් සොයන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. අපට වෙන අවශ්‍යතාවන් තිබුණේ නැහැ. අපට තිබුණ අනෙක් අවස්ථාව -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි. ඔබතුමියලා කලින් රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව දන්නවා. එසේ තිබියදී ඔබතුමියලා යෝජනා කරලා තිබුණා රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5ක් කියලා. ඊට පසුව 10 දක්වා වැඩි වුණේ කොහොමද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වාම එතැනදි ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා -

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අදාළ නැහැ. අදාළ නොවන්නේ එතුමියගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව එතුමියගේ සීමාව තුළ එතුමියලාගේ යෝජනාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන නිසා. ඒක එතුමියගෙන් අහන එකේ තේරුම මොකක්ද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එම ප්‍රශ්නය අවශ්‍යයි. අවශ්‍යතාව පැහැදිලි කරලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අධිපතිතුමාගේ යෝජනාව නිසා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් දැම්මා. ඔබතුමා tender කමිටුව විධියට යම් හෙයකින් අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත් වීමකින් තොරව රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5ම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ tender කමිටුවට ආවා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා මොකක්ද ගන්න තීන්දුව?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ හැටියට අපි ඒ දෙකයි ගණන ගන්නවා. මොකද, ඒ වේලාවේ තිබුණ ක්‍රමය අනුව Tender Board එකට ඇවිත් ඒ අය යෝජනා කරන යම් කිසි ගණනක් ගන්නවා. Tender මණ්ඩලය weighted average එක පදනම් කර ගෙන balance එකට private placement ගන්නවා. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමය.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ එතැනින් රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5 ආවා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කමිටුවත් යෝජනා කරන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5මයි.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5 හෝ ඒ කිට්ටු ගණනක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට අවසාන වශයෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් ඉල්ලා තිබෙන අවස්ථාවක, රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකයි පහක් මේ කමිටු දෙකම යෝජනා කර තිබියදී රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා යෑමට හේතුව අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත් වීම කියන නිගමනයට ඒම වැරදිද?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒක එසේ නොවුණා නම් auction එක යන්නේ නැහැ. හරිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: පැහැදිලි නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපට මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී සහ මීට පෙර පැවති පරීක්ෂණවලදී අනාවරණය වුණු කරුණු අනුව රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව වශයෙන් තිබුණ one billion සඳහා auction එකකට ගියා. ඒ auction එකෙන් 2.5 billion cutoff එක තමයි ඔබතුමියලාගේ කමිටුව යෝජනා කළේ. ඒක ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවටත් දැම්මා. එතකොට, අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත්වීම නොවුණා නම් auction එකෙන් 2.5 billion ගැනීමයි සිදුවන්නේ. ඒක හරිද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක හරි. එච්චරයි දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. අපි මේ පශ්චාත් පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන්නේ. අපි නව අධිපතිවරයා පිළිබඳ විශ්වාසයක් තබලා තිබෙනවා. අදින් පසුවවත් මේ අඩුපඩුකම් සිදු නොවන ආකාරයට කටයුතු සිදුවීම ඉතාමත් උචිතයි. එහෙම නැතිව අපි මේ දෙය මත පමණක් එල්ලීගෙන ඉඳීම ප්‍රමාණවත් වන්නේ නැහැ. ඒකත් අපි සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewirathne : Governor, we want to wish you all the best. But you have to correct those mistakes. It is not the relevant officers. We are not blaming you. We all know what took place. Do the right thing. We wish you all the best.

Mr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy : I must tell you the Central Bank has very, very good officers.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමා, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා අවස්ථා කිහිපයක් ගත්ත නිසා දැන් මගේ අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න. මට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න කාරණා කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි මෙවැනි ණය අවශ්‍යතාවක් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට ඇති වුණාම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය මහ බැංකුවත් එක්ක මේ පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා කරනවාද?

එම්. එස්. ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: සාකච්ඡා කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: සාකච්ඡා කරලා එම වැඩසටහන සකස් කරන්නේ කවුද?

එම්. එස්. ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්තුමා සහභාගි වන cash flow meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒකට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තමයි අනුමත කර ගන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට ආයෙත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාගේ අනුමැතිය අවශ්‍යද?

එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා: ඒ meeting එකේ අනුමැතිය තමයි අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක කමිටුවක් නොවෙයි? ඒ meeting එකේ නිශ්චිතව ඉන්න අය කියන්න.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ කමිටුවේදී ප්‍රධාන කටයුතු දෙකක් සිදු කරනවා. එකක් තමයි රජයට ලැබෙන ආදායම මාසයක්, මාස එකහමාරක් කාලය ඉදිරියට තක්සේරු කරනවා. ඒ වාගේම ඒ කාලය තුළ වියදම් පිළිබඳවත් ඇස්තමේන්තුවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ හිඟතාව - shortfall එක - තමයි මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා ගැනීම

සඳහා අපි සැලසුම් කරන්නේ අපේ තිබෙන ණය සීමාවට යටත්ව. සාම්ප්‍රදායිකව රැස් වෙන ඒ කමිටුව භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් රැස් වෙන්නේ. ඒකට සියලුම නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරුන් සහභාගී වෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ සියලුම දෙපාර්තමේන්තු ප්‍රධානීන් සහභාගී වෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් කිහිප දෙනෙකුත් සහභාගී වෙනවා. මේ විෂය සම්බන්ධව දැනුම තිබෙන මහ බැංකුව සමඟ ගනුදෙනු කරන කිහිප දෙනෙකුත් සහභාගී වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමා, ඒ ණය ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදය සකස් කර ගත්තාට පස්සේ -ඒක බැඳුම්කරවලින් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, Treasury billsවලින් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, විදේශ ණය වෙන්න පුළුවන් - පසුවිපරමක් සිදු වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මේ දක්වා එවැනි පසුවිපරමක් කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් අපට දැනිලා නැහැ. නමුත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කියෙව්වාට පස්සේ එවැනි පසුවිපරමක අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙන බව පෙනී යනවා. නමුත් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. පසු විපරමක් කරන්න වෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ ඒ ක්‍රියාවලියත් සම්බන්ධ කර ගෙන. මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධ වන්නේ Monetary Law Act – MLA - මහ බැංකුවට අදාළ නීතිමය තත්ත්වය යටතේ. ඒ නීතිමය තත්ත්වයට බාධාවක් නොවන විධියට, ඒ ස්වාධීනත්වයට බාධාවක් නොවන විධියට අපි නීතිමය තත්ත්වයක් ඇති කර ගන්න ඕනෑ පසුවිපරමක් කරන්න. මේ දක්වා එවැනි දෙයක් කරලා නැහැ. අපි ඒ පිළිබඳව සොයා බැලීමක් කරන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ අනුව.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාගේම ණය පොලී අනුපාත ඉහළ යෑම නිසා වැඩිපුර ණය පොලී ගෙවීමට සිදු වෙනවා නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක රාජ්‍ය අයවැයට ගළපන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නේද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: නිවැරදියි ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ණය පොලී ගෙවීමට මුදල් වෙන් කිරීමක් සිදු වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ණය පොලී ගෙවීමත්, ඉදිරි වර්ෂය සඳහා සියලු වියදම් පුරෝකථනයක් කරලා තමයි අපි Appropriation Bill එක හරහා වාර්ෂිකව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. ජනවාරි 01 වැනි දා සිට දෙසැම්බර් 31 වැනි දා දක්වා දින 365ක කාලය තුළ ඒ පුරෝකථනවල බොහෝදුරට වැඩිවීම් තමයි සිදු වන්නේ. ඒකට බලපාන ප්‍රධාන කරුණු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි පොලී අනුපාතය. අනෙක් එක තමයි විනිමය අනුපාතය. විනිමය අනුපාතය පිරිහීම විශේෂයෙන්ම ඒකට බලපානවා. වැඩිපුර පොලී ගෙවන්න වෙනවා. ඒ අනුව ණය සේවාකරණයට වැඩිපුර මුදල් යොදවන්න සිදු වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමා, ණය පොලී ඉහළ යාම පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලා මහ බැංකුවත් සමඟ සාකච්ඡාවක් කරලා ඇගයීමක් කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මේ දක්වා ඒ පිළිබඳව නිල වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡාවක් වන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයෙකු විධියට මුදල් ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සකස් කර ගන්න වරින් වර මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී මේ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරන කොට කාලානුරූපව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ අධ්‍යක්ෂතුමා රටේ සමස්ත ආර්ථික කාර්ය සාධනය පිළිබඳව අපට වරින් වර වාර්තා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. එහිදී මෙම කරුණ විශේෂයෙන් සලකා බලනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Bonds සම්බන්ධයෙන් secondary market එකේ සිදුවන ගනුදෙනු ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය තුළ තොරතුරු පවත්වා ගෙන යෑමක් සිදු කරනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: නැහැ, මේ දක්වා නැහැ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය අපේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දුන්නාට පස්සේ ණය කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳවත්, විවිධ උපකරණ කවර ලෙස සකස් කරගන්නවාද යන්න පිළිබඳවත් මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය දැනුවත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ සමස්තයක් විධියට දෛනික කටයුතු වශයෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා, ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොලේ ඇති වුණු ගනුදෙනුවක් ගැන නේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කළේ. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොලෙන් මේ ගනුදෙනුව ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොළට -secondary market එකට - ගියාට පස්සේ secondary market එකේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වන්නේ කොහොමද කියන තොරතුරු පවත්වා ගෙන යෑමක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව තුළ තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. අපේ Central Depository System-CDS- කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට ඉඩමක ඔප්පුව ලියාපදිංචි වෙන කොට හිමිකරු වෙනස් වුණොත් සටහන් වෙනවා වාගේ අපි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ දවසේ සිට ඒක අතින් අතට ගියේ කවදාද, කොයි වෙලාවේද කියන එක ගිය තැන ඉඳලා ඉවර වෙන තැනට වනතුරු trace කර ගෙන සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් CDS එක හරහා. එවැනි ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේ මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණාවට අදාළව ගත්තොත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ මාර්තු 29 අතර කාලය තුළ සිදු වුණු බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනු ක්‍රියාවලියේදී ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොළේ ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න කියලා විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටියාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක විෂය භාර නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති සමරසිංහ මහතා දන්නවා ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කළාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඉල්ලුවා. ඒ වුණාට CDS එකෙන් එහෙම බලන්න බැහැ. මොකද, bondsවල IC Number එකක් සහ Unit Number එකක් තිබෙනවා. කාටහරි දුන්නාට පස්සේ ඒ IC Number එකෙන් කලින් සහ පසුව ගත් ඒවා ඔක්කොම එකට තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. උදාහරණයක් විධියට IC Number එකත් සමඟ රුපියල් බිලියන 50 තිබෙනවා කියලා හිතමු. එසේ තිබුණාට එක් එක් දවසේ ඒවා කොහෙන් ගත්තාද කියන තොරතුරු මොනවත් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම එතරම් විස්තර ඇහුවේ නැහැ. මම ඇහුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කළාද මේ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඔව්, ඉල්ලීමක් කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඒ පිළිබඳ යම් ආකෘති කාරණාවක්, පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළාද මෙන්න මේ තොරතුරු මෙන්න මේ විධියට ලබා දෙන්න කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඔව්. මට මතක හැටියට ඒ ඉල්ලපු විධියට අපට තොරතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම ආකෘතියක් දුන්නාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඔව්, මට මතක හැටියට දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: බැහැ කියලා නොවෙයි කිව්වේ. ඒ තොරතුරු ගන්න බැහැ කියන එකයි කිව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ආකෘතියට අනුව ගන්න බැහැ කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැත්නම් ඒ ඉල්ලිම වෙන විධියකට ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොළේ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන්?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: යම් යම් ආකාරවලට ගන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් උදාහරණයක් විධියට මිල ගැන විමසීමක් කළොත් CDS එකේ මිල ගැන සඳහන් වන්නේ නැහැ. අයිති කෙනාගේ Account එකේ ප්‍රමාණය සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇයි මිල සඳහන් නොවෙන්නේ?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඒ system එක හදලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒ විධියට. ඒ කියන්නේ CDS එකේ record වෙන්නේ ownership එක නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: උදාහරණයක් විධියට අපි කියමු "A" කියන bond එක අපි primary market එකේ දැමුවා කියලා. මට කියන්න ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොළේ bond dealersලා ලාභ උපයන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොළේ ලාභ උපයන්නේ buying and sellingවලින්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Buying and sellingවලින් තමයි ලාභ උපයන්නේ?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඔව්. Capital gains tax එක ගන්න පුළුවන් buying and sellingවලින්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Capital gains tax එක calculate කරන්නේ කොහොමද? අපි capital gains tax එකක් ගහනවා නම් capital gains tax එක ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපොළේ calculate කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ගනුදෙනු කරන මිල අපි ළඟ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම අහන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි. මම අහන්නේ සමරතුංග මහත්මයා capital gains tax එකක් ගහන්න යනවා නේ. Bond එකක Capital gains tax එක secondary market එකේ calculate කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියන්න කෝ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මම ඒ ගැන අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් capital gains tax එකක් ගහනවා නම් ඒ capital gains tax එක අදාළ කොම්පැණිය ගත්තාද, නැද්ද, ගත්ත මිල කීයද, විකුණපු මිල කීයද, ඒ අනුව ලාභය කීයද කියන එක දැනුම් දීම කොම්පැණියේ වගකීම. මොකද, secondary market එකේ එක එක ratesවලට create වෙනවා. නමුත් CDS එකේ record වෙන්නේ අයිතිය වෙනස්වීම මිසක් වෙනස් වුණු මිල සඳහන් වන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතකොට ඒ company එක දෙන ගණන තමයි අපට දෙන්නේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. ආදායම් බදු රැස් කරන කොට ඒ පුද්ගලයාගේ ආදායම ගණනය කරන්නේ ඔහු declare කරන එක අනුව නේ. ආදායම් බදුවල මූලික ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ඒ කොම්පැණි විසින් income tax retune එක submit කළයුතු වීමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි. අපි හිතමු-

සභාපතිතුමා: නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ආදායම් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අවංකභාවයයි, මේ ගනුදෙනුවක තිබෙන අවංකභාවයයි අතර වෙනස ඔබතුමාට තේරෙනවා නේ.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක bonds. මෙහි business ක්‍රියාවලියක් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ companies පටන් අර ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ මේ කාර්යයට. ඒ නිසා ආදායම් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අවංකභාවය මේකෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්න බැහැ. මම අහන්නේ මෙච්චරයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔය හදාපු system එකට අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලා සෑහීමකට පත් වෙනවාද, මහ බැංකුව මෙතෙක් සෑහීමකට පත් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද secondary market එකේ තිබෙන ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳව, මිල පිළිබඳව, තොරතුරු ප්‍රමාණවත් පරිදි ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබෙනවා කියලා? ඇත්තටම මේක වැදගත් වෙන්නේ අලුත් අධිපතිතුමාට.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: අපි දැනට පවත්වාගෙන යන ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව රජය නිකුත් කළ සුරැකුම්පත්වල අයිතිය වෙනස්වීම, කුමන පුද්ගලයාගේ ඉඳලා කුමන පුද්ගලයාට හුවමාරු වුණාද කියලා තමයි අපි සඳහන් කරන්නේ. එහිදී කුමන මිලකට හුවමාරු වුණාද කියන එක අපි දැනට සඳහන් කර ගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: Yield එකවත් නැහැ?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ. නමුත්, එක කරුණක් තියෙනවා. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ ආයතනවලට වගකීමක් තියෙනවා, ඒ දවසේ ඒ අය ගනුදෙනු කළ සුරැකුම්පත් මිල ගණන් පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැනුම්

දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ දැනුම් දෙන තොරතුරු සමහර වෙලාවට සියයට 100ක් නිවැරැදි නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය අනුව සුරැකුම්පත්වල මිල ගණන් වෙනස් වෙන්නේ මේ ආකාරයට කියන එක අපට පදනම් කර ගන්න වෙනවා. අපට මිනුම් දණ්ඩක් විධියට භාවිත කරන්න ඒ තොරතුරු භාවිතා කරන්න වෙනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට සියයට 100ක් නිවැරැදි නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. අනික් කරුණ තමයි ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇහුවා කොහොමද මේ සුරැකුම්පත්වල මිල තීරණය වෙන්නේ කියලා. මා හිතන්නේ එතුමා දන්නවා. සුරැකුම්පත්වල මිල තීරණය වෙන්නේ පවතින මුදල් ප්‍රවාහය -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම අහන්නේ. I mean the whole point is to ride this wave. You are making capital gains on the changes in the yield to make billions in the bond market. That is how you do it. If you are now saying, “we have no way to check at what price these securities change hands”, Mr. Governor, that is a serious flaw. There is no way in which you can estimate if there has been any fraud or if there is some sort of query. How would you do this?

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Specially, if there is a capital gains tax is being introduced.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: Capital gains tax එකෙන් මුදල් ගන්නේ කොහොමද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: In fact, for the question the Hon. Deputy Minister raised, what we are currently having is in the capital market the infrastructure available is a depository which records the ownership transfer which is not a trading platform where you probably see the price movements. But the Central Bank has already recognized that factor and already initiated developing a non-trading platform that is in the process. This might come up with the time frame and the Deputy Governor might be able to detail it to you. We have recognized that deficiency in the market as of now. But for the price details what you are doing at the moment is on site supervision.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමා, අපි මෙය විශේෂයෙන් note කරනවා. හේතුව, මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන වගකීම නියාමනය කියන එක. විශේෂයෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සහ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ මේ විධියට ලොකු හිඳැසක් ඇතිවීමේ ඉඩකඩ තියෙනවා. ඒක බොහොම බරපතළ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඒ නිසා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විශේෂ ප්‍රතිකර්මයන් යෙදීමේ අවශ්‍යතාව තියෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම දැන ගන්න කැමැතියි, theoretical පැත්ත නොවෙයි. අපි පෙබරවාරි 27වැනි දා issue කරපු bond එක විවිධ ආයතන ගත්තා නේ. ඒ ගත්ත ආයතනවල ownership එක transfer වෙලා අවසානයේ ඒක land වෙලා තියෙන්නේ කොතැනද කියලා මහ බැංකුවට මේ COPE කමිටුවට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? කොච්චර ප්‍රමාණයක්ද කියන එක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Ownership එක කියන්න පුළුවන්ලු. Price තමයි කියන්න බැරි?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා යටතේ තිබෙන ආයතනයක් ගත්තා නම්, price එක දන්නවා නේ. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ගත්තේ කීයටද කියලා කාගෙන්වත් දැන ගන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ. ඒක ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාගේම ආයතනයක් නේ. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල් ගත්තේ කීයටද කියලා දන්නවා?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට පොඩි clarification එකක් තියෙනවා. මේ bond issue එක නිකුත් කරන අවස්ථාවේ රටේ අවශ්‍යතාව රුපියල් බිලියන 13යි ගණනක් කියලා කිව්වා නේ. එහෙම රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් අවශ්‍ය එකට රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ක් සඳහා විතරක් අවසරයක් දෙන්නේ ඇයි? නිර්දේශ කළේ නැහැ. Governor ඇවිල්ලා ඒක රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා වැඩි කළා .

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒක අපි කලින් පැහැදිලි කර ගත්තා. ඔබතුමාට මෙතුමන්ලාගෙන් අහන්න අයිතිය තියෙනවා. ඒකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එහි පොලී අනුපාතය මහ බැංකුවට වාසි වන සීමාව තමයි, ඒ අය ලකුණු කරන්නේ Rs. 2.6 billion කියලා. ඒක තියෙන්නේ auction එකෙන් ගන්න. ඉතුරු ටික ගන්න බැරිකමක් නැහැ. ඉතුරු ටික private placements වලින් ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ option එක ඒ අය දෙනවා. ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව තියෙනවා. රුපියල් බිලියනයට සීමා කළා නම්; රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ට සීමා කළා නම්; රුපියල් බිලියන 10ට සීමා වූ අවස්ථාවේ; ආදී වශයෙන් එක් එක් අවස්ථාවේදී සිදු වූ අවාසියේ ස්වභාවය.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: දැන් රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව මත සතිපතාම මුදල් අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය සතිපතාම යන ක්‍රමවේදයක්. මේ ප්‍රශ්නයෙන් පස්සේ අලුතින් තීන්දුවක් අර ගෙන තියෙනවාද? ඉදිරියේදී private placementsවලට යනවාද? Auctions වලට යනවාද? එහෙම තීන්දුවක් අර ගෙන තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: විශේෂයෙන් අලුත් අධිපතිතුමා ඒ ගැන අවධානය යොමු කරන්න.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: Perhaps, I can come in for that. My colleagues are preparing a paper which will put up to the Monetary Board. Looking at our level of development what is the best process. Intuitively, it seems at a hybrid process would be the best at this point. I would like to wait till my colleagues, who are more technically qualified than I am, come with the options. But that is how we would go. But how we exactly structure that process is something that they will work on. We will put up the paper to the Monetary Board and get that cleared in

terms of the process in the future. While I have the floor may I just make two-three quick points?

The Chairman: Yes.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: First one is I see no difficulty in meeting a request that the Members of the Committee have the guidelines of the EPF and the Manual for the Public Debt Department. We will certainly, make that available. The second thing is I think from the discussion it has become clear that we need to give consideration to the architecture of the way we operate in the bond market as well as process and procedures. As the DSG, Mr. Samarasiri said where we want to get to in the future is probably a full auction because that is very transparent and very fair. But we are no where near there yet because the architecture in our market is not ready for it. So we need to ask ourselves the question what are the development; as a Central Bank what we need to promote to go more towards a full auction process but we are certainly not ready for it yet.

The third point I would like to make is that you know because we had a quite a lot of discussion of the 30-year bond we need to develop the long-term debt market. In the old days we used to get long-term loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank at very concessionary terms which we used to build our infrastructure. But now as a lower middle income country we are not eligible for those long-term loans. If we can develop our long-term debt market, that is all to the benefit of the country. In addition, a kind of investor who wants these long-term instruments is our insurance companies, for instance. Our level of insurance cover in this country is very low. But as income rise and as we progress hopefully, that coverage will increase and insurance companies will need investments of a long term nature to match their kind of maturity requirements. This is again something we want to do because this one issue with a 30-year bond has caused difficulty does not mean that we should not develop the long-term debt market and I think certainly in the Central Bank, I am sure my colleagues would agree that, we need to do that. We will see what architecture again that we need to create to make sure that is done in a transparent and a credible way. With regard to as to whether we have taken some action already, because the things are being talking to you about our things which we are going to do so far but one or two actions I believe have already been taken. My colleagues will correct me if I am wrong.

For instance, we have strengthened the firewalls between the different stages of the process. As you know, the bond auction is a three-step process from the beginning to the end and there are three Committees. For instance, no longer can anybody serve on more than one Committee. I think, that is the decision you talked about to strengthen the firewalls and to make sure that we have better checks and balances. So, that is one step we have taken and we are going to look very carefully at the Auditor-General's Report to see whether there are other lessons that we can learn in terms of strengthening our processes. So, both in terms of the overall architecture of the bond market and in terms of processes and procedures, we are looking at how we can improve it and my Colleagues will come up with a paper which we want to put to the Monetary Board and get the new architecture and processes and procedures approved. It is not casting stones. As we move forward, as our market develops, as it requires other things and as our knowledge improves, we will obviously review and revise that as we go along. But, we will be very happy to keep you informed about our thinking as we go forward.

Thank you.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම හිතන්නේ තවත් ප්‍රශ්න කිහිපයක් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාව තිබෙනවා. ඇත්තටම මට මේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව අවශ්‍යතාව තිබෙන්නේ එක පුද්ගලයෙක් පිළිබඳව හෝ පුද්ගලයෙක් දෙන්නෙක් පිළිබඳව හෝ අඩුපාඩු පිළිබඳ දකින්න හෝ නොවෙයි. මේ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී රටට මූලාශ්‍රමය වශයෙන් පාඩුවක් සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවාද, ඒ පාඩුව මකා ගන්නේ කොහොමද, ඉදිරියට එවැනි දේවල් ඇති නොවන්න අපි ගන්න ඕනෑ පියවර මොකක්ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නයි. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට තිබෙන වගකීම, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට තිබෙන වගකීම පිළිබඳව බලන්න.

මෙතැන ඉන්න ඔබතුමන්ලා හැම දෙනාටම, හෘදසාක්ෂියෙන්ම තේරෙනවා යම් යම් ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගනිද්දී අපට කණ්ඩායමක් හැටියට සාමූහිකව තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නවා වෙනුවට පුද්ගලිකව බලපෑම් මත තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්න සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියන එක. ඒ වාගේම අපේ තිබෙන වැරදි වළක්වා ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදයන්ගේ තිබෙන දුර්වලතාව. ඒවා නිවැරදි කර ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක පිළිබඳව තමයි අපට මේ කාර්යයේදී සලකන්න වෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මම හිතන්නේ ඒ සඳහා ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් අවශ්‍ය සහෝගය අපට ලැබෙයි කියලා. ඒ වාගේම තවදුරටත් අපට ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් තොරතුරු ලබා ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නම්, එහෙම නැත්නම් නිලධාරීන් කැඳවන්න අවශ්‍ය නම් අපි ඒ දේ කරමු.

හැබැයි, විශේෂයෙන්ම මම මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරද්දී ඒකේ තිබෙන සම්පූර්ණභාවය වෙනුවෙන් ලබා ගත යුතු තවත් තොරුතුරු අවශ්‍ය නම් අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාව සම්බන්ධ

කර ගන්නවා. මෙන්න මේ කාරණා පිළිබඳව- මම ලකුණු කළ කාරණා අනුව මූලික හරය කියන්නම්.

බැඳුම්කරයක කාලය තීරණය කිරීමේදී ඒ තීරණ ගන්න ව්‍යුහය පිළිබඳව. ඒකේ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ කා අතද? ඒකට මහ බැංකුවේ දායකත්වය, අමාත්‍යාංශයේ දායකත්වය, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ දායකත්වය කොයි ආකාරයෙන්ද? එතකොට බැඳුම්කරයක කාලය තීරණය කරන්න ඔබතුමන්ලා කරන සමීක්ෂණයක් තිබෙනවාද? ඒ තොරතුරු කොහොමද සම්පාදනය කර ගන්නේ. ඒ සමීක්ෂණ පත්‍ර -research papers- ලබා ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක පිළිබඳව. ඊළඟට විශේෂයෙන්ම අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මහා බැංකුවේම පාලනය යටතේ තිබෙන ආයතනයක්. තැරැව්කාර ආයතනයක් හැටියට කටයුතු කරද්දී ඒකට සම්බන්ධ වෙන ඒ පාලන ක්‍රමයන් පිළිබඳව අපට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාව තිබෙනවා. එතකොට ඔවුන්ගේ ආයෝජන, අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලේ ආයෝජන "value for money" ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුව කොහොමද යෙදවෙන්නේ කියන එක අපට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ප්‍රශ්න ප්‍රමාණය ඔබතුමාට යොමු කරන්නම්. මම මේ සාරාංශය ඉදිරිපත් කළේ. ඒකටත් පුළුවන් තරම් ඔබතුමාගේ මූලිකත්වය යොදලා සියලු දෙනාගේම පිළිතුරු ලබා දෙන්න. මම හිතන්නේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට තවත් වැඩිදුර පැහැදිලි කිරීම අවශ්‍ය නම් අවස්ථාව ගන්න පුළුවන්. අදට මේ කටයුතු නතර කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි එක comment එකක් තිබෙනවා. I will make that comment with your permission. මේ Monetary Board එක ලේකම්තුමා දැන් පත් කරලා ඉවරද?

එම්.අයි.එම්. රෆීක් මහතා: Vacancy එකක් තිබෙනවා.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: I think that vacancy will be considered by the Constitutional Council today. There is one more and I think that that person's name has gone up to the Constitutional Council.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: It would be better to have constituted the Monetary Board fully. There are five Members. Is it?

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: Among the five members, two are Ex-officio Members; the Governor and the Secretary to the Treasury and there are three independent Members.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: That is, two plus three. So, currently who are on the Monetary Board?

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: We have got two Ex-officio Members, ST and myself and then, we have Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan and Mr. Chrishantha Perera and a new name has gone up to the Constitutional Council.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy, දැන් ඒක කමිටුව බලන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක්. අපි Monetary Board එකෙන් Membersලා තෝරනවා Constitutional Council එකට. ඒකේ Chairman විධියට Governor තෝරනවා executive authority එකෙන්. ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ matter එකක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක Constitutional change එකෙන් අපි කරන්න ඕනෑ. අලුත් Constitution එකේ ඒක එනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි Governor තෝරන්නේ නැහැ ඒ විධියට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අලුත් Constitution ඒකේ එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ ඒක අපි කරන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක්. අනෙක් එක මම කියන්න කැමැතියි structure එක හදද්දී-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මගේ comment එක ඉවර කරන්න දෙන්න.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: Okay.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ ඒක එහෙම කළොත් හොඳයි. මහා ලොකු ආන්දෝලනයකට තුඩු දීලා තිබුණු මේ ප්‍රශ්නයේදී, කෙසේ වෙතත් ඔබතුමාගේ පත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව මුළු රටේම ලොකු බලාපොරොත්තුවක් තිබෙනවා. පක්ෂ - විපක්ෂ, joint Opposition සියලුම දෙනා ඔබතුමාගේ පත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව හොඳ කියනවා. ඉතින් අපි ඔබතුමාගෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා, නැවත මේ වාගේ ප්‍රශ්න නොවන විධියට මේ වැඩ පිළිවෙළ ඉදිරියට ගෙනි යන්න කියලා. ඒ සඳහා අපි ඔබතුමාට හදපත්ලෙන්ම සුභ පතනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඉතාම කෙටියෙන් කියන්න කැමැතියි, දැන් ඒ firewalls හදද්දී, පසු ගිය එකේ දැන ගන්න ලැබුණු දේ තමයි Governorගේ involvement එක. පුද්ගලයා. ඒ නිසා controlsවලට මේ Governor කවුරු වුණත් අද Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy ඉන්නවා, හෙට වෙන කෙනෙක් එන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න කියන්න. ඒකත් ඔබතුමාගේ firewall - එයාට පුළුවන් නම් Economic Policy Committee එකට Chair කරන්න. එයා Member නොවෙයි Chair කරනවා, decisions ගන්නවා. ඊට පස්සේ floor එකට ඇවිල්ලා order එකක් දෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ Tender Committee එකට call කරලා order එකක් දෙනවා. Finally, you are useless. ඒ නිසා firewalls හදන්න - බෑණා ඉන්න නිසාම නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ, බෑණා කෙනෙක් නැති වුණත් deal එකක් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. දැන් බෑණා හිටපු නිසානේ අපට මේක trace කරන්න ලෙහෙසි. බෑණා කෙනෙක් නැති වුණත් එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. ඒ නිසා ඒ වාගේ firewalls දාන්න කියලා Governor කොහොමද මේ process එකට involve වෙද්දී තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ limitations?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊළඟට විශේෂයෙන්ම අපේ කටයුතු අවසන් කරමු නේ? එසේ නම් ඊළඟ දිනය දැනටම තීරණය කර ගන්න වෙනවා.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: May I just say one thing? In response to the Deputy Minister, I can give him one assurance and that is, I will do my utmost to have credibility. I think, in my

comments to my Colleagues in the Central Bank, I said that there were three things, three values that we want to abide by and have deeply inculcated in our working culture and they were, integrity, technical excellence and professionalism and that is what we all want to be guided by. I know, it is a very onerous task being the Governor of the Central Bank. I am less nervous than I was three days ago simply because of the quality of my Colleagues. I am very confident that we have an excellent team and if we can create the right environment for them to work, we will make this country proud. I am sure of that. So, we will give you the guarantee that we will absolutely try to do that. I think, it can be done with the team I have.

ගරු රංජන් රාමනායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට එක ප්‍රශ්නයක්වත් අහන්න අවස්ථාවක් දුන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අවස්ථාවක් ගත්තේ නැහැ. අවස්ථාවක් දුන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කිසි කෙනෙකුට කියන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමා එහෙම කියන එක වැරදියි. කිසි කෙනෙකුට අවස්ථාවක් නොදී හිටියේ නැහැ. හැම කෙනෙකුටම අවස්ථාවක් දුන්නා.

ගරු රංජන් රාමනායක මහතා: මම study කර කර හිටියේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා, මම හිතනවා. පසු ගිය දවස්වල මතු වුණු බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමා thorough study එකක් කළා කියලා. ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා මේ පිළිබඳව අසමින් සිටියා. මේ සිද්ධිය loss එකක්ද, පාඩුවක් ද කියන එක. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධියෙන් මේ රටට යම් කිසි loss එකක් වුණාද? මට කෙටියෙන් කියන්න. Can you explain it in one word? Was there any loss?

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: Let me just say that I am very keen on looking forward. I do not think that it is good for a Governor of the Central Bank to be second guessing and commenting on his predecessors. I would very much -

The Hon. Ranjan Ramanyake: According to your knowledge, is there any loss?

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: As you know, A - I would like to study it further, B – Even if I knew the answer, I would prefer not to publicly say because if one Governor of the Central Bank makes this kind of remarks about his predecessor, the confidence the world has in our country would be undermined. People in this country-

The Hon. Ranjan Ramanyake: But, this is people's money.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: I understand, but that is why we have Sectoral Oversight Committees to do that job. I do not think it is a job of the successor-

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජධීර මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව තීන්දුවක් ගැනීම අප සතුයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමාගේ පිළිතුර සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම යමක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, ඔබතුමා මට මුලින්ම හමු වුණේ අදයි. නමුත් ඔබතුමා මීට පෙර මාධ්‍යට දැක්වූ ප්‍රතිචාරයන් මම දැක්කා. ඒ මත ඉඳගෙන, මේ පරීක්ෂණ කටයුත්තේ මූලිකත්වය දරන කෙනෙක් හැටියට මම ඔබතුමා සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් අදහස් දැක්වීමක් කළා. ඔබතුමා සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒ දැක්වූ අදහස් නිවැරදියි කියා මම විශ්වාස කරනවා. එය නිවැරදියි කියා පිළිගත හැකි මට්ටමේ පිළිතුරක් ඔබතුමාගෙන් ලැබුණා. ඒ පිළිතුරු මත, විශේෂයෙන්ම මෙතෙක් සිදු වූ ක්‍රියාවන්ට වඩා හොඳින් ක්‍රියාකරන මහ බැංකුවක් අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා. එය ඔබතුමාට කරන්න පුළුවන් කියන විශ්වාසය මට තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මම එය අගය කරන්වා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මම හොඳ නරක මනින්නේ භාවිතාවෙන්. ඒ නිසා උණුසුම්ව හොඳ නරක පිළිබඳ නිගමනයකට එන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඇතැම් චරිත කොපමණ ස්වාධීන වුවත්, වෙනත් බලවේග විසින් හසුරුවන බව අපි දන්නවා. ඒ තමයි ලාංකීය දේශපාලනයේ ස්වභාවය. ඔබතුමා එවැනි කෙනෙක් නොවේවා කියා මා ප්‍රාර්ථනා කරනවා. ඒ වාගේම මහ බැංකුව අපේ රටේ ඉදිරි මූල්‍ය ස්ථාවරත්වය ආරක්ෂා කිරීමට කෙලෙස කටයුතු කරයිද කියා කෝප් කමිටුවේ අපි බලා සිටිනවා. බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමන්ලා දෙපොළට යම් අදහස් දැක්වීමක් කරන්න තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම මේ පිළිබඳව ඌන පූර්ණයක් කරන්නම්. ඔබතුමා මහ බැංකුවේදී ඉදිරිපත් කළ කථාව ඇසීමෙන් අපිට ලොකු බලාපොරොත්තුවක් ඇති වුණා. ඒ වාගේම ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජධීර මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශය සම්බන්ධයෙන්ද මම එකඟ වෙනවා. මොකද, ඔබතුමාගේ ඉතිහාසය සම්බන්ධයෙන් වාගේම මේ දක්වා හැසිරීම තුළ අපිට හොඳ තත්ත්වයක් පෙනෙනවා. නමුත් මෙම තනතුර ලබා ගත්තාට පසුව ඉතිහාසයෙන් උරුම වන දේවල් බැලුවාම, එය පහසු වන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, කොතරම් විචක්ෂණ පුද්ගලයෙක් වුවත්, කොතරම් ඉහළ අධ්‍යාපනයක් තිබුණත් අපි දේශපාලනය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉගෙන ගනිමින් සිටිනවා. ඒ වාගේම අපි විධායකයට ආවට පසුවත් මෙහි තිබෙන අමාරුකම් ඉගෙන ගනිමින් සිටිනවා. නමුත් ඔබතුමාට මේ වගකීම නිවැරදිව දරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා, තවත් අවුරුදු කිහිපයකින් තමයි අපිට බලන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ. අපි ඔබතුමාට සුභ පතනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: සියලු දෙනාටම බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

(සාක්ෂිකරුවෝ නික්ම ගියහ)

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි)

ඇමුණුම 05

ඇමුණුම 05
இகணப்பு 05
Annexure 05

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව
2016 අගෝස්තු මස 12 වැනි සිකුරාදා

පැමිණ සිටි :

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපති)
ගරු වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි :

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති;
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි;
එන්.එස්. කොඩිතුවක්කු මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි;
ඩී.සී.ඩබ්ලිව්. හපුගොඩ මහත්මිය, අතිරේක අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්, රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යවසාය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා, රාජ්‍ය ලේකම්, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; යූ.ජී. රත්නසිරි මහතා, අතිරේක ලේකම්, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; එස්.එම්. චන්ද්‍රපාල, ප්‍රධාන මූල්‍ය නිලධාරි, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා, ප්‍රධාන ගණකාධිකාරි, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; පී.ඒ. කාන්ති මෙනෙවිය, ප්‍රධාන අභ්‍යන්තර විගණක, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජිත් කුමාරස්වාමි මහතා, අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා, භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; මනෝහරී රාමනාදන් මහත්මිය, පත්කල අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල සාමාජික, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; සී.පී.ආර්. පෙරේරා මහතා, පත්කල අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල සාමාජික, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; නිහාල් ෆොන්සේකා මහතා, පත්කල අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල සාමාජික, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; පී. සමරසිරි මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එස්. ලංකාතිලක මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා, සහකාර අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා, සහකාර අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; කේ. ඩී. රණසිංහ මහතා, සහකාර අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා, සහකාර අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; කේ.එම්.එම්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා, සහකාර අධිපති සහ අධ්‍යක්ෂ (ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; පී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඩී.එන්.ආර්. රොද්‍රිගෝ මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ (අභ්‍යන්තර මෙහෙයුම්), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය, අධ්‍යක්ෂ (තොරතුරු තාක්ෂණ), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ (මූල්‍ය අංශ පර්යේෂණ), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව;

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා, අධිකාරී, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; කේ.එන්.එන්.එම්. බණ්ඩාර මහත්මිය, අධිකාරී (සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය, අතිරේක අධිකාරී, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ් එම්. ආසිම් මහතා, අතිරේක අධ්‍යක්ෂ (සංඛ්‍යා ලේඛන), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; කේ.ජී.පී. සිරිකුමාර මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධ්‍යක්ෂ (නීති හා අනුකූලතා), ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එස්. ඔබේසේකර මහතා, ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ කළමනාකරු, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එස්. පදුමනාපන් මහතා, ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ කළමනාකරු, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්. හර්ෂප්‍රිය මහතා, ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ සහකාර අධිකාරී, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්, භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: සියලු දෙනාම සාදරයෙන් පිළිගන්නවා. අද අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාව කැඳවූවේ මෙතෙක් පවත්වා ගෙන ආපු බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡාවේ ඉදිරි කටයුතු සඳහා. 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කර තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් සකස් කරපු වාර්තාව අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාට පසුගිය අවස්ථාවේදී ලබා දුන්නා. ඒ වාර්තාවෙන් පැන නැඟුණු ප්‍රශ්න අපි මෙතැනදීම ඉදිරිපත් කළා. 2016 ජූලි 28 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පැත්තෙනුත් අපට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නවලට පිළිතුරු ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාට අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙනුත් කාරක සභාවට පිළිතුරු ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලැබුණු නිරීක්ෂණයන් අපි නැවත විගණකාධිපතිතුමාටත් යොමු කළා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් අපට ඒ සඳහා පිළිතුරු ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිරීක්ෂණ පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම් ඒ සියලුම කොටස් සහිතව අපි ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට දැන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙනවා. මේ කරුණු අධ්‍යයනයේදී පෙනෙන දෙයක් තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණය, මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර, මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණය පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන බව. එය මේ කාරක සභාවේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාටත් බලන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ වාගේම සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

මෙහිදී බැලූ බැල්මට, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පිළිතුරු පිළිගැනීම්වල සහ ඒ ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම්වල ලොකු පරස්පරතා, ගැටලු නැති බවයි පෙනෙන්නේ. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට ඒක තවදුරටත් අධ්‍යයනය කරන්න පුළුවන්. මහ බැංකුව එවූ පිළිතුර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට යවා තිබෙනවා.

ලේකම්තුමා, මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව දිගින් දිගටම වාර ගණනාවක් සාකච්ඡා කර ගෙන එන නිසා, මේ ක්‍රියාවලියේ යම් කිසි තැනකට එන්න අවශ්‍යතාවකුත් තිබෙනවා. ඒකෙදී ඔබතුමන්ලා කළ පැහැදිලි කිරීම්වලින් කාරක සභාවට මතු වෙන කරුණු ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

විශේෂයෙන්ම මහ බැංකුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබා දුන් ප්‍රතිචාර පිළිබඳව- බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධව යොමු කළ ප්‍රශ්න සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රතිචාර පිළිබඳව පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ මුලින්ම සාකච්ඡා කළොත්, ඒකෙදී ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ කියන කොටසේ, කාරක සභාවේ අපි මීට කලින් මතු කළ අවස්ථාවේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. “සුරකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධව ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් යනු කුමක්ද?” ඒකේ පළමුවැනි කරුණ, “එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගැනීමට හැකියාව ඇති පාර්ශ්වයන් කවුරුන්ද” කියන එක. ඒ සඳහා ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරේ තිබෙනවා “අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින්” කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සම්බන්ධ Monetary Law Act එකේ මේ පිළිබඳව නිරීක්ෂණය වෙනකොට 8.1 යටතේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා දීපු පිළිතුර ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම පැහැදිලි වෙන්නේ නැහැ. 8.1 යටතේ දී ඔබතුමන්ලා දීලා තිබෙන පිළිතුරේ සඳහන්ව තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තමයි මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්නේ කියලායි.

ඒ නිසා අධිපතිතුමා, එහෙම නැත්නම් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමෙක් හෝ මේ පිළිබඳව වගකීම තිබෙන කෙනෙක් කාරණය පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කළොත් හොඳයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ දීලා තිබෙන පිළිතුරේ සහ Monetary Law Act එක යටතේ තිබෙන පිළිතුරේ තිබෙන වෙනස්කම මොකක්ද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න. Monetary Law Act – 8.1 එක සම්බන්ධව Monetary Board එකේ powers සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

මහ බැංකුව මුලින්ම ඉදිරිපත් කළ- දැනට මා අතැතිව තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ කාරණා එකින් එක කියන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා නම් කථා කරමු. මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ පිළිඅරගෙන තිබෙන කාරණා. මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවට යොමු කළ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය පිළිබඳවයි. Report එක ගැන නොවෙයි. පළමු වැනි ප්‍රශ්නය ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: May I explain Hon. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: I think, regarding the actual decisions related to issuance of securities, the authority is the Monetary Board. That is what reflected in question 8. But, in question 1, I think, thrust of the response is that the Monetary Board will operate within the overall framework set by the Government and the Minister in charge in relation to certain targets in terms of overall direction of Government policy. So, within the Government objectives in terms of growth, employment, inflation et cetera, and also the fiscal outcomes in terms of Government's budgetary operations, all that will be taken into account when the Monetary Board takes its decisions regarding the issuance of bonds – Government securities. Of course, the Government also indicates the requirement in terms of the money it needs from time to time. Really, the decisions taken by the Monetary Board flow out of this framework which comes from the Government and in the case of the Monetary Board, Minister in Charge of the subject.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, ඒ වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය නියෝජනය කරන රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති, රජයේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීන්දු කිරීම සඳහා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ නිලයක් දරන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් හැටියට නේද?

ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජීත් කුමාරස්වාමී මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැනදී, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය communicate කරන, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය දැනුම් දීම නේ වැදගත් වන්නේ. සාමාජිකයෙක් වශයෙන් ලේකම්තුමා ඉන්නවා. නමුත්, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය දැනුම් දුන්නාම රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සහ අනෙකුත් මූලධර්ම සමඟ ගලපා ක්‍රියා කිරීම තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ පිළිබඳව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් අපි පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමක් කර ගනිමු කෝ. මෙපමණ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් වැය වුණු ආකාරය, එදා තිබුණු අවශ්‍යතාව, එතකොට මේ සඳහා යොමු වෙන්න තිබුණු කාරණා පිළිබඳව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා පුළුවන් නම් කරුණාකරලා අපට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: We have already discussed that.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය policy එක පිළිබඳවයි. ඒක පොදු කාරණාවක්. මේ කාරණාව විතරක් නොවෙයි, පොදුවේ මහ බැංකුව තීරණ ගැනීමේදී ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක්- මොකද, මෙතැනදී අපි සාකච්ඡා වුණා නේ බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලියේදී බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය වෙනස් කිරීම පිළිබඳව. ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ගන්නේ- එතැනදී තමයි මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය කියන වචනය ආවේත්, ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ගන්නේ කවුද කියන එක පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්නය මතු වුණේත්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඉතා පැහැදිලියි අපි ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇහුවොත් ඒක නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. සභාපතිතුමා කිව්ව ආකාරයට ඒක අවශ්‍යද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකේ ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාට පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑකම තිබෙන්නේ මේ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය අපට හැදුණේ ඇයි කියන එක සම්බන්ධව නේ. මේ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය හැදුනේ- අපිට බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡාවක් ආවා; එතකොට අපිට අවසාන දවසට කලින් සාකච්ඡාවේදී මතු වුණා මේක ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් කියන එක. එතකොට මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්න පුළුවන් කාටද, ඒකේ බලය තිබෙන්නේ කාටද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකේ බලය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ කවුද කියන සාකච්ඡාවට තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තරය ආවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇසුවා නම් හරි. This is asked from the Governor. As you said, the decision is taken by the Governor.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: That is the overall policy.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct. Why are you not agreeing? Did the Government not take that decision?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැනදී පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, හැම වෙලාවේම රජයට ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ අරගෙන මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ, මුදල් නීති පනත යටතේ රජය යෝජනා කරන යම් කිසි ප්‍රතිපත්ති ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේදී ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන ද ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුත්තේ කියලා නේ. එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවා ද නැද්ද කියන එක ගැන.

එතකොට, එතැන තමයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ බලතල තිබෙන්නේ. ඕනෑම රජයකට, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති අනුව මේ මේ දේවල් කරන්න කියලා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යෝජනා කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ යෝජනාව සලකා බලා, තීරණය කර, ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ බලය ලැබෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළාට පසුවයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: My question was not that. ඔබතුමාගෙන් මම ඇහුවේ අනුමැතිය ගැනීම ගැන නොවෙයි. මම ඇහුවේ ආණ්ඩුවකට ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුවක් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා. According to the way you explain, what I understood is that the decisions taken by the Government may become policies. Am I right?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: When it comes to those areas which falls within the remit of the Monetary Board, the Government can set the overall policy, but, as the Deputy Governor explained, the Monetary Board then would interpret how that should be implemented.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Correct. So, has that policy got to be in writing or how does it come? Can it be a statement made by the Hon. Prime Minister or can it be an indication made by the Minister of Finance? Can that be a mode of communication based on a statement because everything will not be sent to the Monetary Board in writing? That is what I want to get at. I know what it is, but I am asking about it from you.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: The usual practice is, for example, if there is a Government decision made in Cabinet, then, it is sent to the Central Bank.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I would like the Governor to answer.

Dr. P.N. Weerasinghe: Okay.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: I must tell you that I am of course new to the subject.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I know, but I want at least the Secretary to answer.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, Deputy Governorගේ පිළිතුර

පැහැදිලියි. නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට කැබිනට් තීරණයක් මත විතරයි policies හැදෙන්නේ. ඒක නිවැරදිද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒක නිවැරදි නැහැ. මම පැහැදිලි කරන්න ගියේ, කැබිනට් තීරණයත් එක ආකාරයක් කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමා ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නයට මෙතුමා පිළිතුරු දෙමින් සිටිද්දි බාධා කිරීමක් වෙලා තමයි අතර මහදී මේ නතර වීම වුණේ. සංකීර්ණ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසා, අපි කලිනුත් මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරද්දි ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කළා. සමහර මාතෘකා, සමහර වචන අපිට ගොඩක් පැහැදිලි නැහැ. ඒ නිසා නිලධාරි මහත්මයෙක් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරද්දි, ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීම යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට අවසන් වන තුරු එයට සවන් දීලා, නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කිරීම කරමු. අපිට ඕනෑ තරම් කාලය තිබෙනවා. මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගොඩක් දුරට සාකච්ඡා කරලා, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් අවබෝධයක් හැම දෙනාටම තිබෙන නිසා, ඒ අයට පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන අතුරු ප්‍රශ්න සටහන් කරගෙන පසුව අහන්න. ඔබතුමාට පැහැදිලි කිරීමට තව කාලය අවශ්‍ය නම්, ඒ කාලය අරගෙන පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න. ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කලින් ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නයටයි මම පිළිතුරු දෙන්නේ. එහි ක්‍රම කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි, කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල තීරණයක් නම් Cabinet Minute එකකින් දන්වනවා. එතකොට, අපි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ඒක පත්‍රිකාවක් වශයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා, අනුමැතිය අරගෙන ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවා. දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය තමයි, ගරු අගමැතිතුමා හෝ මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා යම්කිසි ආකාරයක රැස්වීමකදී හෝ වෙනත් කිසියම් අවස්ථාවකදී, අධිපතිතුමාට හෝ මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරියෙක්ට කිව්වා නම් මෙන්න මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න කියලා, ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ අධිපතිතුමා හෝ නිලධාරියා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය දැනුවත් කරලා, අනුමැති ලබාගෙන තමයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නෙ. එතකොට එක වාචිකව කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. නමුත්, ඒ කියපු දේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී සඳහන් කරලා, අනුමැතිය ගත්තාට පසුව තමයි එය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ ප්‍රශ්නගත කරුණු සිදුවන අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමාද මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ වශයෙන් ක්‍රියා කළේ?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපතිත්වය සැම විටම දරන්නේ අධිපතිතුමා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී, Public Debt Department එකේ සභාපති ධුරය දැරුවේ කවුද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: අධ්‍යක්ෂතුමා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සම්පූර්ණ නම මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ සම්පූර්ණ නම ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ සීමිත කාරණාවක්. අපිට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා, ආණ්ඩුවේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් ගැන මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ආවාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒ ගැන සළකා බලා අවශ්‍ය තීන්දු ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගන්නවා කියලා. මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ, ආණ්ඩුවේ තීන්දුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කොයි ආකාරයෙන්ද එන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒක කැබිනට් තීන්දුවක් මාර්ගයෙන් එනවාද? ගරු අගමැතිතුමාට යම් ප්‍රකාශයක් කරලා, එය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යොමු කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? මම හිතන්නේ ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ලේකම්තුමාට කරන්න පුළුවන්. එය පැහැදිලි කර ගත්තාට පසුව අපිට මේ සාකච්ඡාවමෙතැනින් ඉදිරියට කරගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැනදී සභාපතිතුමා විධියට මටත් සාධාරණයක් ඉෂ්ට විය යුතුයි. මම මුළින්ම ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇසුවා, මට තවම එයට පිළිතුරක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ. එයට පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න කලින් නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා අතුරු ප්‍රශ්නවලට ගියේ. කලින් වතාවේදී, බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් "ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක්" කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි

චුණාට පස්සේ, "ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගැනීමේ පාර්ශ්වයන් කවුද?" කියලා, අපි ප්‍රශ්නාවලියක් යොමු කළා. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට දීලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නාවලියේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරේ සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා "....මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව..." කියලා. දැන් එතකොට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මුදල් මණ්ඩල පනතේ එහෙම නම් ඒ කාරණය තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. 8 (01) යටතේ මුදල් මණ්ඩල පනතේ, ඒ කාරණය ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම නැහැ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය consist වෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකත්වය තිබෙනවා - "The person holding office for the time being as Secretary to the Ministry in charge of the subject of Finance,.." එතකොට මෙතැන තිබෙනවා, මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා නියෝජනය කරමින්, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගේ ලේකම්තුමා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ඉන්නවා කියලා. එතකොට මේ කාරණාවේදී "අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තිය" කිව්වාට පස්සේ, කවුද මේ අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයා හැටියට සළකන්නේ. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාවරයා නම් ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මොකද, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාවරයාගේ ලේකම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් විධියට ඉන්නවා නේ. මට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ ඒ කාරණය. අනික් කාරණා ඔබතුමන්ලා පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න. මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය "අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයා" විධියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ඉන්නවා කියලා, ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් කලේ කවුද? මොකද, මෙහි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් මෙහි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගන්න බලය තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට. මෙහි "විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා" හෝ "අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයා" විධියට සලකන්නේ කවුද කියන එකයි පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍ය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, උදව්වක් විධියට පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. ඔය වෙලාවේ සාමාන්‍ය මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා ඔය විෂය ආවරණය කළාට, ඒ කාලය වන විට විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා නොවෙයි. මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳව විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යාවරයා ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යාවරයා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලා ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යාවරයා විධියට සලකලාද මේ "අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයා" විධියට නම් කළේ. ඒකයි මට දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එහි "විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යාවරයා" කියලා සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. "....අදාළ අමාත්‍යාවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තීන්ට අනුකූලව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ.." කියලා පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. මම අහන්නෙ ඒ ගැන.

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ අති විශේෂ ගැසට් පත්‍රය - 2015.09.21 මඟින් තමයි ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති අමාත්‍යාංශයට, මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ. ඒ අදාළ නීතිමය පනත් මේ ගැසට් පත්‍රයේ ඇතුළත් වෙනවා. මීට කලින් මහ බැංකුව තිබුණේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ. "විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යාවරයා" කියලා කියන්නේ - ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා තමයි මේ අමාත්‍යාංශයේ විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යතුමා. නමුත්, මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දු ගැනීමේ කාරණයේදී මෙතුමන්ලා කථා කරන්නේ, අභ්‍යන්තර ප්‍රශ්නයක් - මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළේ වෙච්ච සිදු වීමක් ගැන. පොදුවේ ගත්තොත්, 2015.09.21 වැනි දින සිට අපේ අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ තමයි ගැසට් කරන්නේ. එතකොට, ඒ ඇමතිතුමා වෙන්නේ ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට මට ගැටලුවක් මතු වෙනවා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන කොට, අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යාවරයා විධියට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ නියෝජනයක් නැහැ. ඒකයි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දැන් මෙතැන වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඔය ඇතිවෙලා තිබෙන වෙනස්කමත් එක්ක, විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා policy guidelines මහ බැංකුවට දෙනවා කියන එක තමයි practice එක.

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරන්නේ, මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා, තමුන්ගේ ලේකම්වරයා මාර්ගයෙන් දෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන තිබෙන අවස්ථාව තමයි මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයා නොවන නිසා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍ය, ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන අමාත්‍ය ගරු රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාට එවැනි නියෝජිත තත්ත්වයක් මෙහි

තිබුණේ නැහැ. එහෙම නම් policy guidelines දීම, වගකීම, උත්තරය හා ප්‍රායෝගික තත්ත්වය අනුව පෙනෙනවා. එය අගමැතිතුමාගේ රාජකාරියක්. මේක අපි තේරුම් ගත යුතුයි. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයාගේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනුව කළ යුතු එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකට සම්බන්ධ කාරණාවක් දෙවැනි උත්තරයේ තිබෙනවා, මුදල් පනත යටතේ තිබෙන්නේ නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් සාමාජිකයෙකු හැටියට ඉන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ subject to finance මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා. මුදල් ඇමතිතුමාගේ ලේකම්වරයා. දෙවැනි කාරණාව ඔබතුමන්ලා සඳහන් කරනවා මේ විධියට. "එසේ ලබා ගත් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් සංශෝධනය කිරීමේ බලය හිමි පාර්ශ්වය කවුරුන්ද?" කියලා. සංශෝධනය කිරීමේ බලය කියන එකට ඔබතුමන්ලා කෙලින්ම සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය. එහෙම නම් මෙහිදී ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්න එක අදාල අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුකූල වෙන්න ඕනෑ නම්, සංශෝධනය කිරීම වුණත් නැවත සිද්ධ වෙන්න ඕනෑ කම තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනුව බැලුවොත්, ඒකයි ඔබතුමන්ලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ, නිශ්චිතවම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියලා. මෙහිදී මා ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ, ලේකම් තුමා, බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තොත්, ඔබතුමන්ලාට පැහැදිලි කරනවා නම්, මේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ බලතල අනුව තිබෙන්නේ, ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගැනීම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සතු බවයි. උපදේශයක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුව කියන එන හරි. නමුත් බලතල සම්බන්ධයේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා බලතල වෙනස් කර ගතයුතුයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මීට කලින් Governor සභාගි වූ අපි කලින් කරපු පරීක්ෂණයේදී, ඩිව් ගුණසේකර සභාපතිතුමා ඉන්න කාලයේදීත් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබුණා. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයාට මෙතැන බලයක් නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ ගැසට් වෙලා නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළු ඒ ආයතන ටික පවරා ගැනීමේදී.මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මුල සිටම ප්‍රශ්නයක් ලෙස තිබුණා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: බලයක් නැහැ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගැසට් වෙලා නැහැ කියන එක. එම ගැටලුව තමයි මෙතැනට එන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ විෂය, අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාගේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති අමාත්‍යාංශයේ විෂයයක් හැටියට ගැසට් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා: තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ දිනය කවදාද?

ශාන්ත බණ්ඩාර මහතා: 2015.09.02

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතැනදී මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා බොහොම පැහැදිලිව කියනවා, ඔහුට බැඳුම්කරවලට යන එක ගැන උපදෙස් දුන්නේ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා කියලා? එතැනින් එහාට සිදු වූ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන තමයි අපට ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, අපි බොහෝ වේලාවක් මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විවාද කරනවා. අපි මෙහි යම් කාණයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. එතකොට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ සිදු වූ කථා බහෙන් policy එක හැදෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක. ආණ්ඩුව හදන policy එක යම්කිසි ආකාරයකින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ලැබෙනවා. ඒ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් policy එක තීන්දු කරන එක ගැන තමයි ඔබතුමා අදහස් කරන්නේ/

සභාපතිතුමා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මම අදහස් කරන එක නොවෙයි. රජයේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්ති. රජයේ fiscal policy එක. ඒක ඔබතුමන් කියන ආකාරයට රජය තීරණය කරලා, කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරලා, ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. නමුත් ඒකට අදාල කරලා නිශ්චිත කාරණාවක් හැටියට බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව. අපි මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී ඉන්නේ, රජයේ fiscal policy එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් නොවෙයි. බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක තමයි මම ප්‍රකාශ කළේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලිව කිව්වේ, when the Government takes a decision on the policy, that is intimated to the Monetary Board and

then the Monetary Board takes a decision what to do beyond that. ඒක තමයි මට තේරුණු දෙය.

සභාපතිතුමා: උත්තරය දීමේදී ඒ විධියට නැහැ. උත්තරයේ ඒ විධියට ආවා නම් ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්නය ලේකම්තුමා පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න.

.ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේ පිළිබව මෙතුමාගෙන් පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කර දෙන්න. රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I think we will complicate it if you get someone else to talk about it.

අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමන්ගේ පුළුල් අදහසට අපි තරු කරනවා. නමුත් අපි මේ ප්‍රශ්නාවලියත් එක්ක යමු.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But it will deviate from the-

Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: We should not deviate.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Because it is a very complicated matter. We have a limited time.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: We should follow the line of questions.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහි අත්‍යවශ්‍ය වන්නේ, සාමාන්‍ය සම්ප්‍රදායන් අනුව සිදු වන ක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද කියන එකයි. සමහර වෙලාවට පනතේ අකුරටම නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපිට අවශ්‍ය නම් ඉදිරියට එහෙම හදා ගන්න පුළුවන්. අපිට අවශ්‍ය කරන්නේ යම් කාරණයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් සිදු වූ සිදු වීමක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්. පුද්ගලයෝ හදා ගෙන තමයි මේක අපි බලන්නේ. මේ වෙලාවේ අපිට මුළු ක්‍රමවේදයම හදා ගන්න අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නැහැ. අපි දැන ගතයුතුයි මේක සම්ප්‍රදායක් ලෙස කොහොමද සිදු වෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ සිදු වන විට කවුද මේකට සම්බන්ධවෙන්නේ. මට තේරුණ විධියට ආණ්ඩුවෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණය ගත්තාම, ඒක දන්වනවාද; ඉබේම දැනුවත් වෙනවාද දන්නේ නැහැ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඊට පසු තීරණය කරනවා. ඉදිරි කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් කොහොමද කටයුතු කරන්නේ කියලා. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීන්දුව ගැනීම සඳහා වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට. .

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැන තවත් අලුත් තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. මෙතැනදී විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා වන අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතාට තමුන්ගේ නියෝජිතයෙකු මුදල් මණ්ලයට තුළ නැති නිසා, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සන්නිවේදනය කළයුත්තේ කුමක ක්‍රමයකටදැයි කිසිම නීතියක සඳහන් වෙලා නැහැ. ඒක වැඩ පවරා ගැනීම පිලිබඳව තිබෙන යම් අවුල් සහගත තත්ත්වයක්. එවැනි අවස්ථාවක වඩාත් ප්‍රායෝගික සාධාරණ තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද කියලා සොයා බලන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් සාක්ෂිවලින් ලැබුණ දේ කෙටි කළොත්, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, " මට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් උපදෙස් දුන්නේ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා" කියලා තමයි සාක්ෂිවල වාර්තා වී තිබෙන්නේ. අපි දිගින් දිගටම විවාද නොකර මෙතැනින් ඔබ්බට ගියොත්, මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ මහ බැංකු manual එක හදන්නේ කවුද කියන එක ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න, ඊට කලින් දෙවැනි ප්‍රශ්නයට යන්න ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙනවාද? නැත්නම් ඔබතුමන්ගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි අපි ඉදිරියට යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මෙතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් අනුව තීරණයක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මේ තීරණය ගත්තා. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා ඒ උපදෙස් අධිපතිවරයා හරහා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යොමු කළා. ඒක නේ දැන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් ඒක ප්‍රායෝගිකව ඒක එහෙමද විය යුත්තේ කියන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඔය කාරණය පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් මම අහන්න කැමතියි. අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යම් policy එකක් ගැන නියෝගයක් කරනවා. රටේ නීතිය පිළිබඳව මා අහන්නේ. ඒක කරන්න මුදල් මණ්ඩලය බැඳිලා ඉන්නවාද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He does not know that part. You cannot ask him. You must ask the Secretary-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: Okay. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා, දැන් අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට policy decision එකක් එවනවා, මේ කටයුත්ත කරන්න කියලා. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ පනතේ තිබෙනවා ඒවා ක්‍රියාත්මක කළයුතු ආකාරය. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා නියෝගයක් දුන් සැනින් ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? නමුත් එතුමන්ලාට එම පනතේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමය නිවැරදිනම් විතරයි ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස් සමරතුංග මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපේ රටේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ ගැනීමේ දුරාවලියක් තිබෙන්නේ. මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා කොහේ හෝ ගොස් ප්‍රකාශ කළාම, ඒක මම මුදල් ඇමතිතුමාගෙන් ගිහින් අහන්නේ නැහැ, මෙවැනි ප්‍රකාශයක් කළාද කියලා. එය මම සටහන් කර ගෙන අදාල දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට හෝ ආයතනයට නියෝගයක් වශයෙන් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයාට නිකුත් කරනවා.

ඒ වාගේම ගරු අගමැතිතුමා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ හෝ වෙනත් තැනක නිශ්චිත කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රකාශයක් කළාට පසුව - සමහර වේලාවට පොදු දේවලුත් කියනවා. නිශ්චිත කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපේ රටේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන ක්‍රමය තමයි, අමාත්‍යාංශ ප්‍රධානියා -ප්‍රධාන ගිණුම් දීමේ නිලධාරියා- ඒක සටහන් කර ගෙන අදාළ අංශවලට දැනුම් දීලා ඒ පිළිවෙත් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න උපදෙස් දෙන එක. ධුරාවලිය අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්වරයාට වඩා ඉහළින් ඉන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ධුරාවලිය අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා, ලේකම්වරයෙක් සමඟ ගනුදෙනු සිදු කරන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ පරිපාලන අධික්ෂණය යටතේ මහ බැංකුව තිබෙන විට මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගේ නියෝගයක්, ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය නියෝගයක්, එහෙම නැත්නම් අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයක් ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡාවට ගන්න කියලා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාට ලිඛිතව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එවන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී අපට එහෙම තත්ත්වයක් නැහැ. මොකද, පරිපාලනමය වශයෙන් අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ අමාත්‍යාංශයට තමයි ඒක ලැබෙන්නේ. ඒ ලැබෙන නියෝගය කෙලෙස සන්නිවේදනය කරනවාද -ලිඛිතව දෙනවාද, වාචිකව දෙනවාද , telephone call එකින් දෙනවාද- කියන එක පැහැදිලි නැහැ. කොහොම නමුත් අපි ව්‍යවස්ථානුකූලව බැඳිලා ඉන්නවා අදාළ ඇමතිවරයාගේ අධීක්ෂණය සහ නියෝග යටතේ කටයුතු කරන්න. මේ නියෝගය කෙලෙස ලැබෙනවාද කියන එක අපැහැදිලි වුණාට කෙලෙස ලැබුණත් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමා කියන ආකාරයට අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ නිර්දේශයක්, යෝජනාවක් වාචිකව හෝ telephone එකෙන් හෝ මොන ක්‍රමයකින් හෝ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට -මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට- ලැබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාට ලැබෙන නියෝගය අගමැතිතුමාගෙන්, විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයාගෙන්, එහෙම නැත්නම් රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන්නෙක් හැටියට සිටින කෙනෙකුගෙන් නේ ලැබෙන්නේ. නිශ්චිතව බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් කියමුකෝ. බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ලැබුණු යෝජනාව, නිර්දේශය, අදහස අනිවාර්යෙන්ම මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ලැබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. මෙතැනදී මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළව ගත්තොත් අධිපතිතුමා මේ කාරක සභාවේ අවස්ථා දෙකකදී ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කළා, අවසාන අවස්ථාවේදී -පසු ගිය අවස්ථාවේදී- අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියලා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කළා, එම යෝජනාව අගමැතිතුමාගේ යෝජනාවක් හැටියට නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න, අනුමත කරන්න ලැබුණාද, ඒ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා අනුමත කළාද කියලා අපි කලිනුත් කථා කළා. ඒකත් වැදගත් නේ. අගමැතිතුමා මේ යෝජනාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් අදහස වෙනස් කළා නම් ඒ වෙනස් කිරීමට අදාළ යෝජනාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වුණාද කියන එක වැදගත් නේ.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: May I respond? As I was not the Governor, I cannot comment on the process as it took place at that time. But my reading of the Monetary Law Act is that it sets out certain responsibilities for the Monetary Board. It is

a very specific one. In those areas, of course, the Minister in charge whether the Prime Minister or whoever can indicate the government policy, but in the end, the Monetary Board has to take a decision as to the best possible cause of action when it comes to those specific areas, where the Monetary Law Act has bestowed responsibility to the Monetary Board. So, whoever the Minister is, he can obviously indicate the government policy et cetera, but in the end, the Monetary Board has to take a decision in terms of what the best possible cause of action is. That is how I see it.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මෙතැනදී වදගත් වන්නේ මෙපමණයි. අපට ප්‍රශ්න දෙකයි තිබෙන්නේ. හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා අගමැතිතුමා මේ ප්‍රකාශය එතුමාට කළා කියලා. අපි මෙතැනට ඉදිරිපත් වන කරුණුවලින් අපේ රටේ monetary policy එක හදනවා නොවෙයි නේ. මේ policy එක කොහොමද එන්නේ, decide කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා හදනවා නම් මේ එන ක්‍රමය වැරදියි කියලා, ඒ ගැන සොයා බලන්න පුළුවන්. අපි බලන්නේ මේ රටේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද කියලායි. අපට අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ එපමණයි. ක්‍රමවේදය ඒක නම් ඒකට argue කරලා හරියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයෙන් පසුව ඉදිරියට යන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මේ අවස්ථාවේදී වැදගත් වන්නේ අගමැතිතුමා මේ ප්‍රකාශය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට කළාද කියන එක පමණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒ කාරණාව මේ සාකච්ඡාවේ අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදී අනාවරණය වුණා. අගමැතිතුමා මේ කරුණ කිව්වා කියලා තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: පැහැදිලියි නේ. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ එතැන නොවෙයි. අගමැතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කාරණාව මේ ගනුදෙනුව - බැදුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය- සිදු වෙන්න කලින්, ඒ කියන්නේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් ඒ වෙනස්කම කරලා ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න කලින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තුළ අනුමත කළාද කියන ප්‍රශ්නයයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වෙන්නත් එපායැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාට ගරුත්වය ඇතිවයි මේ කියන්නේ. අපි එතැනට ආවාට නම් අපි මෙච්චර ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න වුවමනා නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමාට කලින්ම අහන්න තිබුණා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් මේක අනුමත වුණාද කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක සාකච්ඡා වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාවක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. අපි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් මෙතැන සිටින නිලධාරීන් කිහිප දෙනෙක්ගෙන්ම කියවෙන්නේ ඒක ලියවිල්ලකින් දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක නොවෙයි නේ. දැන් අපට ලේකම්තුමා කිව්වා, කථාවක් කළාමත් ඒක ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුවක් කියලා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මම නම් ඒක පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි පිළිගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා, අපි මෙතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ. අපි පිළිගන්නවාද නැද්ද කියන එක නොවෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය. මෙහෙම ගියොත් අපට වෙන්නේ මෙතැන ඉඳන් රටේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති හදන්නයි. මේ කාරණාව පැත්තකින් තියලා ප්‍රතිපත්තිය කොහොමද මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට එන්නේ, ඒ එන ක්‍රමවේදය හරිද කියන එක තමයි අපට ඉදිරියට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න සිදු වන්නේ. අපට මෙතැනදී වැදගත් වන්නේ මේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට ආවාද කියන එකයි. ඒ එන ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි මේ නිලධාරි මහත්වරු කියන්නේ. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමවේදය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා සමඟ එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක නොවෙයි මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. ඔය කියන දවසේ මේ රටේ තිබුණු කාර්යපටිපාටිය මොකක්ද කියන එකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය ශාස්ත්‍රීය කථාවක් නේ. ඔය කියන දවසේ ඔබතුමා හිටියේ නැහැ. මම මෙහෙම කියනවාට සමාවෙන්න. අපි එදා Manual එක ගෙන්වා ගත්තේ මම වාගේ ආගන්තුක කෙනෙකුට

පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නයි. ඔබතුමා කලින් හිටපු නිසා ගොඩක් දේවල් දන්නවා ඇති. මම මේ ගැන මෙලෝ දෙයක් දන්නේ නැහැ. මම මෙම කමිටුවේ සාමාන්‍ය සාමාජිකයෙක් විධියට මෙතැනට ඇවිත් තිබෙන්නේ මේ පිළිබඳ කිසිම දැනීමක් නැතිවයි. දැන් අහගෙන, කථා කරලා ටික ටික ඉගෙන ගන්නවා. අවසානයේ අපි නිගමනවලට එළඹෙනවා. මේ Manual එක මොකක්ද? මොකක්ද තිබුණු කාර්ය පටිපාටිය? අපි second point එකේ ඉන්නේ. පළමු වැනි එක නිගමනය කරන අවස්ථාව නොවෙයි නේ, මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. දැන් ඒක හරි. ඒ ගැන අපි පසුව නිගමනය කරමු. Policy ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳ එදා තිබුණ තත්ත්වය පැහැදිලි නේ. නිලධාරීන් කියනවා නම්, පරස්පර තොරතුරක් නැත්නම් එපමණයි. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ වෙන තැනක. ඒ කියන්නේ ඔය කියන Monetary Board එක ඔය තීරණය ගත යුතුයි කියලා කියනවා නේ. ගත යුතු නම් Monetary Board එක කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ යම් කාර්ය පටිපාටියක් අනුව නේ. Monetary Board එකට mechanism එකක් නැතිව වැඩ කරන්න බැහැ නේ. Monetary Board එක කටයුතු කළ යුතු mechanism එක කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ? එදා අපට පිළිතුරක් දුන්නා, Manual එකේ තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ Manual එක, මේ Manual එකද? එව්වරයි. මේ Manual එකේ කොහේද ඕක තිබෙන්නේ? අපි ඒ line එකේ යමුද? සමාවෙන්න, ඔබතුමාට බාධා කලාට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතැනට එන්න පුළුවන් නම් වඩා හොඳයි. මම එතැනට තමයි කලින් එන්න හැදුවේ. මෙතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයත් සමඟ තමයි policy එක පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා වුණේ. ඒක තමයි මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය. අපි කලින් විමසූ අවස්ථාවේදී කිව්වේ Manual එක අනුව තමයි Monetary Board එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ කියලා. මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ සියලු සාක්ෂිවලින් මගේ දැනුම අනුව මට තේරුණේ ඒකයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා කරපු ප්‍රකාශය ගැන බරපතළ අවදානමක් දකිනවා. මට ඒ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඔබතුමා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා නේ. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා අගමැතිතුමා හෝ විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා යම් රැස්වීමක කථා කරන කොට, නැත්නම් තේ බොන තැනක මොකක් හරි කථාවකදී-

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විශාල පිරිසක් විරුද්ධත්වය පළ කරයි.)

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: හරි. මම ඒක ඉල්ලා අස් කර ගන්නම්. එතුමා කිව්වා යම් රැස්වීමක කථා කරන කොට - කරුණාකරලා මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුට කථා කිරීමේ අයිතිය දෙන්න. ඒක මට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. මෙම කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයෙක් ඉන්නවා. එම නිසා අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා යම් තැනක ප්‍රකාශයක් කරද්දි, රැස්වීමක යම් ප්‍රකාශයක් කරද්දි ලිඛිත නියෝගයක් නැතිව "මේවාගේ දෙයකට අපි මෙහෙම දෙයක් කරනවා" කිව්වාම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා ඒක minute කරලා ඒක නියෝගයක් හැටියට ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න යවනවා කියන එකද ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: නැහැ. මට ඒ ගැන පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. උදාහරණයකින් මම මේක පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. මගේ ඇමතිතුමා පසු ගියදා සාලාව යුද හමුදා කදවුරේ ගිනි ගැනීම් සිද්ධිය ඇති වුණු වේලාවේ එතැනට ගිහින් දුකට පත් වුණු මිනිස්සු ඉදිරියේ කිව්වා "රුපියල් 10,000ක් ගෙවන්න" කියලා. එතකොට රුපියල් 10,000 ගණනේ ගෙවන්න කියන එක මුදල් ඇමතිවරයා මට ලියලා දුන්නේ නැහැ. මම ඒ නියෝගය අරගෙන අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට කිව්වා "මේ සඳහා මුදල් වෙන් කරලා නැති නිසා මට මේකට මුදල් ටික වෙන් කරලා දෙන්න" කියලා. ඒ විධියටයි ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සකස් වෙන්නේ. මම ඒක මුදල් ඇමතිවරයාගෙන් අහන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ ඒ විධියටයි.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: කැබිනට් එකට ගිහින් approval එක ගන්නවා කියලා මෙතුමාට කලින් කියන්න බැරි වුණ නිසායි ප්‍රශ්නය ඇති වුණේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ වාගේ දෙයක් තේ බොන තැනකදි කිව්වත් කමක් නැහැ. තේ බොද්දි කිව්වත් කැබිනට් එකට ගිහින් නේ කර ගන්නේ. ඔබතුමා තේ බොද්දී කියන ඒවාත් ලියා ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මේකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. අපි අනවශ්‍ය තැන්වලට යනවා. මෙතුමා කියාපු කරුණු අනුව මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා ලියලා එවන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකයි වැදගත්කම. That is a different thing.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: He has to get the signature, when it goes to the Cabinet as a Cabinet Paper.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම කාරණය වැටුප් වැඩි කිරීම් වාගේ වෙන වෙන උදාහරණවලට දමන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ලේකම්තුමාගේ අත්දැකීම් අනුව, බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් වෙනස් කිරීමට විෂය භාර ඇමතිතුමා හැටියට අගමැතිතුමා යෝජනා කළොත්, ඊළඟට ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද කරන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එය hypothetical වාගේම **උභතෝකෝටික ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ**. මොකද, එය එතුමාගේ විෂය නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක වැරදියි. You know why - දැනට සිටින මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පිළිතුරු දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා: වෙනත් උදාහරණවලින් ලේකම්තුමා අපහසුතාවයට පත් වන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ පිළිබඳව පිළිතුරු දෙන්න. මෙම බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක්- direct placementsවලින් auctionsවලට මාරු වීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් අගමැතිතුමා ප්‍රකාශ කළා නම්, ඊළඟට එය ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The Governor, it is for you.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් Monetary Board එකේ කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා එතුමා කිව්වා. ඒ නිසා මෙතැන අලුත් දෙයක් නැහැ. මුදල් පිළිබඳව යම්කිසි තීන්දුවක් ගන්නවා නම්, ඇමතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත හෝ ජනාධිපතිතුමාගේ උපදෙස් මත කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලයට ගිහින් තමයි ගන්නේ කියලා, අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා සඳහන් කළා. අපට ඒක තමයි කරන්න තිබෙන ක්‍රියාවලිය. එම ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දු කොතැනින් ආවත්, "Monetary Board එකේ කථා කරලා අවශ්‍ය තීරණය ගත යුතු" කියලා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කලින් ප්‍රශ්නයේදී සඳහන් කළා. ඒ නිසා නැවත නැවතත් ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයම අහන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියලායි මම හිතන්නේ.

ඒ වාගේම අපි අද විවාද කරනවාද? එසේ නැතිනම්, මුලින්ම නිලධාරි මහත්වරුන් සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර, අවසානයේදී අපි අතර මෙය විසඳා ගන්නවාද කියලා දැන ගැනීමට කැමතියි. මොකද, අපේ COPE කාරක සභාව එක් වරක් මහ බැංකු නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කළා. ඉන් පසුව අපේ කණ්ඩායමේ 25 දෙනා අතර සාකච්ඡා කළා. නමුත් මෙතැන ක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද කියලා මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා සඳහන් කළ කාරණය ඉතා වැදගත් වෙනවා. මොකද, අපි අතර වාද කර ගැනීම හෝ නිගමනවලට පැමිණීම මේ අවස්ථාවේදී නොකළ යුතුයි. **ඔබතුමා** සාදා තිබෙන line එක අනුව, නිලධාරින්ගෙන් හෝ වෙනත් සාක්ෂිකරුවන් සිටිනවා නම් ඔවුන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කිරීම සඳහා අපි එක එක සාමාජිකයාට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න ඕනෑ. එසේ නැතිව හරි වැරැද්ද මෙතැන් තීරණය කරන්න ගියාම අවසානයක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ ඒ නිගමන මත තවත් ප්‍රශ්න මතුවෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා වාර කිහිපයක් පැවැත් වීමෙන් පසුව, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් ඒ පිළිබඳව වාර්තාවක් මෙම කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඉන් පසුව එම වාර්තාව මහ බැංකුව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කර, මහ බැංකුවේ නිරීක්ෂණද ලබා ගත්තා. එකී නිරීක්ෂණ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් තහවුරු කර ගත් බවට වූ වාර්තාවක්, අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලබා දී තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම **මෙම ක්‍රියාවලියේ තිබෙන තාක්ෂණික කරුණු සහ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කරුණු** නිරාකරණය කර ගැනීමේ ගැටලු අපි මහ බැංකුව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කළා. එම ගැටලුවලට මහ බැංකුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කළ පිළිතුරු තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින් අද මෙතැනට කැඳවලා සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ, ඒ පිළිතුරු සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව සෑහීමකට පත්

වෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියන කාරණය පමණයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒ පිළිබඳව ගැටලු තිබෙනවා නම් අහන්න පුළුවන්. මට තිබුණු ප්‍රශ්නය මම නිරාකරණය කර ගත්තා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එක දිගට මේ ප්‍රශ්න ටික අහන්න මට අවසර දෙන්න කියලා ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම සඳහන් කළ policy එක අනුව කටයුතු කරනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. ප්‍රශ්න ඇසීම පමණයි කරන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Only the Hon. Chairman can intervene and stop it. Others do not have **authority to make** any remarks.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් භාවිතා කරනු ලබන මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත පිළිබඳව සාක්ෂි දීම සඳහා, මේ නිලධාරීන් අතරින් වඩාත් අත්දැකීම් තිබෙන්නේ **සමරසිරි** මහත්මයාටද? ඒ පිළිබඳව පරිචයක් තිබෙන්නේ කාටද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Manual එක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ මේ **Public Debt** Department එකෙන් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Manual එක සම්බන්ධව සාක්ෂි දීමට වඩාත් දැනුම ඇති නිලධාරියා කවුද?

සී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Dr. ආසිම්ට තමයි පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පසුගිය කාරක සභාවේදී ඔබතුමාගෙන් අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්නවලින් මතුවූ කරුණක් තමයි Operational Manual එක. එම Operational Manual එක භාවිතා කරන්නේ කුමන කරුණු සඳහාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: Version 2 updated as at 31st July, 2013.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Public Debt Department, Operational Manual –Version 2 updated as at 31st July, 2013. එම document එකපිළිබඳව අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙම ලේඛණය සකස් කරන්නේ කවුද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙම ලේඛණය අවසන් වරට සකස් කළේ කවදාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: 2013 ජූලි 31.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම සංශෝධනයන් සිදු කළ පසු, එය මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කළාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: එහි අනුමැතිය සඳහා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යා යුතු නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ සංශෝධනයන් සිදු වෙන්නේ Operational Manual එකෙන් නේ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය හෝ අදාළ policies- අදාළ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණත් මෙතැන සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම එම ප්‍රතිපත්තීන් අනුමත කරන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයයි. ඒ පිළිබඳව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැන්වීමෙන් පසුව, අදාළ Manual එක අවශ්‍ය revisions or updates, we will bring into the Manual-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම අත්පොත තුළ තිබෙන, බැඳුම්කර හා සම්බන්ධ වගන්තිය කුමක්ද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: There may be lots of sentences and references to the Bonds in the Manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There may be private and direct placements. What is the Section?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim : This refers to under the Item C. of page 8.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Private/direct placements ලෙස සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ එතැනද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim : Yes.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙම ලේඛණයේ මතුපිට ඇති ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනුව, බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පැවැත් විය යුතු බව සඳහන් වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය සහ direct placements හරහා රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කර ගත යුතුයි කියලා මෙහි සඳහන් වනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Okay. මෙම වගන්තිය අනුව පළමුව කළ යුත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමයි. ඒ වාගේම private placementsවලට යා යුතු වන්නේ, වෙන්දේසියෙන් මුදල් ලබා ගත නොහැකි නම් පමණයි. පළමු auction එක තමයි auction. Auction එකෙන් ලැබෙන්නේ නැතිනම් - then, you have to go to the private placements.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I do not think the Manual says like that but what it says is either through auctions or placements you should raise it. What it says is as much as possible from auctions.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙහි ඇති භාෂාව අනුව පැහැදිලි වන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හරහා හැකි තරම් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් සොයා ගැනීමට උත්සාහ කළ යුතු බවයි. ඒක තමයි මූලධර්මය. That is the rule. ඒක තමයි රීතිය.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: You can explain, Dr. Azim whether it is correct or not.

අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි මේක විසඳා ගනිමු. වෙච්ච දේ වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මම අහන්නේ පොත ගැන පමණයි. ඔබතුමා අපහසුතාවට පත් කරනවා නොවෙයි. පොත අනුව වෙච්ච දේ vary වෙනවා නම්, අපි ඒ ගැන වෙනම ප්‍රශ්න කරනම්. මම අහන්නේ විෂය ගැන දැනගෙනයි. මෙම operational manual එක අනුව පළමුව auctions සඳහා ගොස් හැකි තරම් මුදලක් එකතු කර ගැනීමට කටයුතු කළ යුතුයි. එසේ ප්‍රමාණවත් මුදලක් එකතු කර ගැනීමට නොහැකි වන්නේ නම්, ඉතිරි මුදල එකතු කර ගැනීම සඳහා private placements කළ යුතුයි.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: My understanding as per the manual is, there is no first, second reference. පළමුව auctionsද, දෙවනුව private placements කියලා reference එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එයට අදාළ ස්ථානය ඉංග්‍රීසි භාෂාවෙන් කියවන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: May I read that?

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe, allow him to read.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you read it out, please?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is under Item B which only says about direct and private placements. But, if you go to page No. 3, there it is stated, 'Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme' which includes way everything. Page 8 mentions only about placements and auctions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what we wanted to know.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: When it comes to Item B (i) of the page 8, it states:

"Front Office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම මේ විධියට අහන්නම් කෝ. මෙම රීති මාලාවේ 8වැනි පිටුවේ "B"යටතේ, 'Private/Direct Placements' කියන මාතෘකාව තිබෙනවා. එහි මෙසේ සඳහන් වෙනවා,

"FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." එහි මුද්‍රණ දෝෂයක් තිබෙනවාද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහි අර්ථය කුමක්ද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආශිම් මහතා: Placements සහ සෘජු නිකුතුවන් පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා කිරීමයි මෙහි සඳහන් වෙන්නේ. සෘජු නිකුතුවන්වලට පැමිණීමට පෙර, දෙවැනි sentence එක යටතේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, 'The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved Borrowing Progarmme….'

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඇහුවේ ඒක නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයේදී එතුමා අපහසුතාවට පත් කරන්න එපා, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. මෙතුමා අහන්නේ එක වාක්‍යයක් ගැන නේ. හැබැයි, ඒ වාක්‍ය අඩංගු තව ඡේදයක්ම තිබෙනවා. ඒ ඡේදයේ full stop තියපු කොටස හරි. එතුමාට එහි අදහස පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ නම්, අදහස පැහැදිලි කරන්න එතුමාට ඉඩ දෙන්න. අපි ඒක පිළිගන්න එක හෝ නොපිළිගන්නා එක වෙනම දෙයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන කොට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළ පිළිතුරු දෙන්න මෙතුමන්ලා බැඳී සිටිනවා. එයට පිළිතුර ලබාදීමෙන් පසුව ඒකේ තේරුම මේකයි කියන එක පැහැදිලි කරන්න එතුමාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, ගරු ඇමතිතුමා ප්‍රශ්නයක් විමසා සිටීමේදී "මේ වාක්‍යයෙන් කියැවෙන්නේ මොකක්ද?" කියලා ඇහුවාම ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු ලබා දෙන්න ඕනෑ. පිළිතුරු දුන්නාට පසුව පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම දන්නා ආකාරයට ප්‍රශ්නයකට පිළිතුරු දිය යුතු ක්‍රමවේදය ඒකයි. එහෙම නැතිව ප්‍රශ්නයක් විමසා සිටීමේදී ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු නොදී මේකේ තේරුම මේකයි කියලා පිළිතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ. මේ වාක්‍යයේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා අපි ඇහුවොත්, ඒ වාක්‍ය පටන් ගන්නා තැනක් සහ full stop එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාක්‍යයේ සඳහන් වෙන දේ කිව්වාට පසුව එතුමාට පුළුවන් මේ වාක්‍යයෙන් අදහස් වෙන්නේ මේකයි කියලා විස්තර කරන්න. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු නොදී ගියොත්, අපට කවදාවත් මේ ප්‍රශ්න විමසීම අවසන් කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නිවැරදියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතුමාගේ ස්ථාවරයට මමත් එකඟ වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මට දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමට ඉඩ දෙන්න. තව කාරණයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ගැන සඳහන් කරනවාට සමාවෙන්න. මේක විශාල ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ. මේක final point එකක්. හරියටම issue එක බලලා තමයි මම කථා කරන්නේ. බාධා කළොත් line එක කැඩෙනවා. උසාවියේදීවත් ප්‍රශ්න විමසීමකදී බාධා කරන්නේ නැහැ. මගේ මතයට ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ නැත්නම්, ඒ ගැන පසුව ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න. එහෙම නොවුණොත් සිත් රිදවීම් කර ගන්න වෙනවා. මෙතුමන්ලා වෘත්තිමය සාක්ෂිකරුවන්. අවසානයේදී මෙතුමන්ලා සමඟ තිබෙන පෞද්ගලික රණ්ඩුවක් වාගේ වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මට ටිකක් අවසර ලබා දෙන්න.

ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද 2013.07.31 දිනෙන් අවසන් වූ operational manualහි 8වැනි පිටුවේ "B"යටතේ ඇති ප්‍රතිපාදන අනුව අදහස් වන්නේ, "පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට ගොස් හැකි තරම් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීමට උත්සාහ කළ යුතු බවත්, ශේෂයක් තිබේ නම් පමණක් private placements කළ යුතු බවත්" කියලා මම යෝජනා කරනවා. එම අදහසට ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආශිම් මහතා: මෙම sentence එකෙහි විශේෂයෙන් "as much as possible" කියන එක යටතේ auctionsවලින් කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගත යුතුද කියලා තීරණය කරනවා. As much as possible කියන එක cost එකයි, risk එකයි, factor එකයි මත define වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, "As much as possible" කියන යෙදුම අනුව ඒ අර්ථය ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේ මූලධර්ම සමඟ ගැලපිය යුතුයි කියාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආශිම් මහතා: ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවම නොවෙයි, අපේ රාජ්‍ය ණය මුදල් එකතු කර ගැනීමේ Borrowing Programmeහි Medium Term Debt Management Strategy

(MTDS)හි සඳහන් කරන direction එක මත cost and risk direction එකක් specify කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 20:80 අනුපාතය ඒ කියන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි 20යි, private placements 80යි කියන අනුපාතය මෙම manual එකේ යම් තැනෙක සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආශිම් මහතා: මා දැනුවත්ව මේ manual එකේ කිසිදු තැනෙක 20:80 අනුපාතය කියලා සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට මෙම කාරණාවට අදාළව තවත් ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. Manual එකේ 3වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, 'Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme කියලා. එහි තවදුරටත් මෙසේ සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා.

"Funds are raised through:

A. Auctions

B. Private placements

C: Rupee Loans

"A" කියන්නේ Auctions. ඒකෙන්, firstly auctionsවලට යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා indicate වෙනවාද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No. Then, Rupee Loans come under C. We are not issuing rupee loans. For instance, maybe after 2009, we have not issued rupee loans, if I am not mistaken.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: A – Auctions, B – Private placements කියලා ඒ විධියට දැම්මාට auctions firstly යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා එකක් නැද්ද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: There is no order as far as "A" and "B" concerned.

සභාපතිතුමා: තවත් ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර එතරම් පැහැදිලි නැහැ. පසු ගිය කාරක සභාවේදී මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න විමසීමේදී, "manual එකේ වගන්තියෙන් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය තමයි පිළිගත් ක්‍රමය, ඒ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් සියයට 80ක්, සියයට 85ක් පමණ -ගණනක් හරියට කිව්වේ නැහැ.- මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් සපුරාගෙන ඉතිරි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය direct placement එකෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ." කියලා සියලුම නිලධාරීන් කියා සිටියා.

සියලුම නිලධාරීන් එහෙම නොවෙයි කියලා පුළුවන් නම්, ගියවර සාක්ෂිවලින් එකක් හෝ පෙන්වන්න. අනික් කාරණය, ඒ ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කළේ මේ පත්‍රිකාවෙන් කියලා තමයි එහිදී ප්‍රකාශ කළේ. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය, 10.07.2008 දිනැති පත්‍රිකාවෙන් තමයි, direct placements වලට move වුණේ. මෙහි සඳහන් වෙනවා, "improvement of market liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund". It states that the Board having considered the Paper approved of issuing treasury bonds to EPF and other captive sources at interest rate of five basis point above the secondary market rates through private placements and requesting the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in the secondary market operation. ගියවර අපට ලැබුණු සියලු සාක්ෂිවලින් සඳහන් කළේ, මේ ලියවිල්ලෙන් තමයි direct placements වලට යොමු වුණේ කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ කාරණය නිවැරැදි ද කියලා, ඔබතුමා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් අපට පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට කවුරු හෝ උත්තර දෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැනට සිටින මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා උත්තර දෙන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති. ඒ Board Paper එකෙන් තමයි, private placements කියන එක හඳුන්වා දුන්නේ. 1997 වර්ෂයේ තමයි bonds, introduce කළේ. ඒ

introduce කළේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් auction. යම් කිසි හේතුවක් නිසා 2008 වර්ෂයේ මෙය තාවකාලිකව හඳුන්වා දුන්නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ private placements වලට යන්න?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: හැබැයි, එහි අනුපාතයක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. NSB හා EPF වාගේ කිහිපදෙනෙකුට විශේෂ rate එකකට යන්න කියලා කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා හරියටම හරි. මොකද, අපට ආසිම් මහතාගේ උත්තරයෙන් එළියට ආවේ නැහැ. ගියවර සියලුම නිලධාරින් උත්තර දුන්නේ, auction ක්‍රමය දිගටම පැවතුණේ. මේ Board Paper එකෙන් ඒ auction ක්‍රමය වෙනස් වුණේ කියලා. මේ manual එකේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් වන්නේ, සියලු දේවල් ලබා ගත්තේ auctions වලින්. යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් පමණක් මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන ආකාරයට direct placements වලින් ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියන එකයි. එහෙම ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. මෙහි විශාල වරදක් තිබෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිම දෙයක් Report එකේ නැහැ. මෙහි තියෙන්නේ, "EPF and other captive sources" කියලා. මේ සම්බන්ධව Report එකක සඳහන් නොවන්නේ මොකද? මේ direct placement ගන්නේ "EPF and other captive sources" වලින් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැත්තේ මොන Report එකේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Auditor-Generalගේ Report එකේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට මම නැවතත් අවධාරණය කරනවා. ඔය කියන කාරණාවන් ඇතුළත් කරනවා නම් ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ, COPE Report එකක. Auditor-Generalගේ Report එකේ සඳහන් වන්නේ, 2015 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 වර්ෂයේ මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාලය තුළ මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ඒ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳවයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා නිවැරැදියි. එතකොට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්ධව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට නිවැරැදි අවබෝධයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. රටේ තිබෙන නීතිය මොකක්ද? මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද? ඒ සම්බන්ධව නොදැනුවත්ව Report එක ලියන්න බැහැ නේ. මේ manual එකට අනුව තමයි, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගත යුතුව ඇත්තේ. ඒක අපි පිළිගන්නවාද? Auditor-General තුමාගේ කීන්දුව වෙලා තියෙන්නේ, නිවැරැදි ක්‍රමය direct placements ක්‍රමය කියන එකයි. Direct placements ක්‍රමයක් ආවේ කොහෙන්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Auditor-General තුමාගේ presentation එකේදීත් මම එතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කළා. 80/20 ක්‍රමය පිළිබඳ මූලධර්මය සුදුසුයි කියලා ඔබතුමා කියනවාද කියලා. ප්‍රශ්නය තියෙන්නේ, එහෙම policy එකක් නැහැ. Rule එක auction කිරීම.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Auditor-Generalතුමා rule එක විධියට අරගෙන තියෙන්නේ direct placements. මුළු Report එකම තියෙන්නේ-

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට ඒක වෙනම සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම ඒ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා නම්, අපි ඒක වෙනම කථා කරමු.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. We will not talk about that. I want to establish this fact. ඔබතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය නිසා මම මේක කිව්වේ. නැතිනම් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා ඒක අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔය ලිපියේ දිනය කවදාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ ලිපියේ දිනය 2008.07.10. එක ලිපියකින් මේ manual එකේ තිබුණු ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කරලා, රටේ පිළිගන්නා ක්‍රමවේදය බවට පත් කර තිබෙනවා. මේ රටේ පිළිගන්නා ක්‍රමය ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයද? අපේ මේ මුළු Report එකම තියෙන්නේ on that basis. So, it is flawed from the beginning. මෙතැනදී අපි පිළිගන්නවා මේ ක්‍රමවේදය. I will show you the 90 per cent of the other countries in the

world where there is the auction system. We asked this question from the learnered Members of the Central Bank, all of them agreed last time that the norm in the world is the auction system. It is there in America, England, Germany and in every country. When they change the system here there was no manual-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔය letter එක යොමු කරලා තියෙන්නේ කොහේටද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ letter එක හැම තැනටම යොමු කරලා. ගියවර පරීක්ෂණයට යොමු කළා. ඔබතුමා ගියවර හිටියා නේද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම ඇහුවේ මුල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයටද, අධිපතිතුමාටද යොමු කර තිබෙන්නේ? අධිපතිවරයා මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට දැනුම් දුන්නාම, ප්‍රතිපත්ති හදන්නේ මුල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ ලියවිල්ලෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්ති වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ කියලා අපට පිළිගන්න වෙනවා. මේ අවස්ථාවේදී 2008 වර්ෂයේ manual එක සංශෝධනය විය යුතුයි. ඒක මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරී මහත්වරුන් පිළිගන්නවාද?

ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: සංශෝධනය වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම අහන්නේ ඔබතුමාගෙන් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: කාගෙන්ද අහන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: I am asking the Governor of the Central Bank. He knows the policy. I am just asking a common sense question. What we understand is the manual is the guideline for the Monetary Board. Am I right?

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමාට උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ වාගේම මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ නිලධාරීන් සියලු දෙනාම කැඳවා තිබෙන්නේ, අධිපතිතුමාට සහාය සඳහායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එහෙම නම් මට ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. කවුරු හරි උත්තර දෙන්න උදව් කරනවා නම්, මට එතුමාගෙන් අහන්න පුළුවන්. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාට, ඔබතුමාගෙන් අවසර අර ගෙන කාගේ හෝ උදව්වක් කරන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, එතුමා උත්තර දෙන්න යන විට ඇන ඇන වෙන කාටවත් උත්තර දෙන්න බැහැ. එහෙම වුණොත් මේ COPE කමිටුවේ අපට කටයුතු කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා නිශ්ශබ්දවන්න. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ ඇමතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරලා ඉවර කරන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔයගොල්ලෝ කියන්න හදන්නේ මේ report එක ගත්ත විධිය වැරදියි කියලා නේ?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ ගොල්ලෝ ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඕනෑ පුද්ගලයාගෙන් විතරක් ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා. ඔයාලා ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහත්මයාගෙනුයි, අනෙක් මහත්මයාගෙනුයි ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා. සමරතුංග මහත්මයා ඒකට උත්තර දුන්න හැටි අපි දැක්කා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කරුණාකරලා නිශ්ශබ්ද වෙන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඉතා කරුණාවෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා- මේ ඇමතිවරුන් එක්ක, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් එක්ක වාද විවාද කරලා බැණ ගන්න නොවෙයි මම මෙතැනට ආවේ. මම ඉතා පැහැදිලි ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු කළේ. අපි මෙතැනදී සංවේගයෙන් වැඩ කරමු. අපි සියලු දෙනාම වැදගත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු වශයෙන් කලින් එකඟ වුණා සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාට විතරයි කථා කරන කෙනෙක් නවත්වන්න හෝ කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න හෝ අයිතිය තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. මෙතැනදී අපි දෙපැත්තට වෙලා, වාද විවාද කර ගන්න හෝ කෑ-කෝ ගහන්න යනවා නම් වැඩක් නැහැ නේ. මෙතුමාම කිව්වා අපි පොඩි ළමයින් වාගේ කියලා. ඉතින් අපි පොඩි ළමයින් වාගේ මෙතැන හැසිරෙන්න හොඳ නැහැ. මම ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා නම්, ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමා අදහසක් දැක්වුවා නම් මට ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ඒක හරිද, වැරදි ද කියන එක අන්තිමට තීන්දු කරන්නේ සභාපතිතුමා. That is the thing. ඔබතුමාට මම මේ කියන්නේ පැහැදිලි ක්‍රමවේදයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්. කවුරු හෝ අපි නියෝජිතයෙකුගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන කොට ඒ නියෝජිතයා අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මෙතැනදි පිළිතුරු දෙන්න ඕනෑ. මේ COPE එක කියන්නේ ඉතාමත් සංකීර්ණ, ඒ වාගේම වැදගත් කමිටුවක්. මේ කමිටුවේදී හිටගෙන, වටේ යමින් කථා කර කර උත්තර දෙන්න බැහැ. මේ COPE එකේ අපි නිලධාරි මහත්වරුන්-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මම බලාගන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා බැලුවේ නැති නිසා මම මේ කියන්නේ. එහෙම උත්තර දෙන්න බැහැ, පිටින් ඉඳලා සහයෝගයෙන් කරන්න බැහැ. එතුමාට අවශ්‍ය නම් ඔබතුමාගෙන් අවසර අරගෙන කාගෙන් හරි ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැතිව අතින් ඇදලා උත්තර දෙන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. මගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම මම කරන්නම්. මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා ඇතුළු නිලධාරි මණ්ඩලය අපි දැන් කැඳවලා තිබෙන්නේ; මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා ඇතුළු නිලධාරි මණ්ඩලයත් කැඳවලා තිබෙන්නේ. අධිපතිතුමාට උත්තර දෙන්න තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නයකට විෂයයක් අදාළ කර ගෙන, අධිපතිතුමාට අභිමතයක් තිබෙන, අධිපතිතුමා කැමති නිලධාරියෙක්ගේ සහයෝගය ගන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නම් අධිපතිතුමාම පිළිතුරු දෙනවා කියලා එකක් නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ ලේකම්තුමාටත් එහෙමයි. ලේකම්තුමාට අදාළ පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ අනෙකුත් ඕනෑම නිලධාරියෙකුට අදහස පැහැදිලි කරන්න බලය දෙන්නත් ලේකම්තුමාට පුළුවන්. ඒ වාගේම කථා කරන්න, කියන්නත් පුළුවන්. අදහස් අහන්නත් පුළුවන්. කනට කරලා අහන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ කැමැත්තක්. අපට තිබෙන්නේ අධිපතිතුමාගේ වගකීම යටතේ, අධිපතිතුමා වෙනුවෙන් ඕනෑම නිලධාරියෙක් උත්තර දෙන එක අහන එක විතරයි. එහිදි අපට නිලධාරියෙක් නම් කරන්න බැහැ. අධිපතිතුමා කියනවා නම් මම වෙනුවෙන් අහවලා උත්තර දෙනවා කියලා, එතකොට ඒ සඳහා අදාළ පුද්ගලයා දෙන උත්තරය අපට අහන්න පුළුවන්. මේකදී, අපි මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා හැටියට සංයමයක් තියා ගනිමු. අධිපතිතුමා උත්තර දෙන්නේ කවුරු හරහා ද, කා නම් කරලා ද කියලා අපි නියෝගය දෙන්න යන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඒක අපි කරන්න යන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා නම් අහන්න අධිපතිතුමා කැමති කෙනෙක් ඒකට උත්තර දෙන්න අදාළ කර ගනිව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ සඳහා මම ඔබතුමා සමඟ එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ අපි ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇහුවාම වෙන කාටවත් ඒකට උත්තර දෙන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඒ ප්‍රශ්න අහන කෙනා තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ මම.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා නම් ඔබතුමා අදාළ කෙනාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලෝ උත්තර දෙන එක තීරණය කරයි.

ගරු මහින්දාන්නද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එයා කාගෙන් ඇහුවත් එයට පුළුවන් උත්තර දෙන්න. නැත්නම් අපි එක්කෙනෙක්ගෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Bimal Ratnayake: We have seen the practice; you do not jump on him.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කරන්න එපා. අපි මීට කලින් හොඳට කළා.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe, in fairness to everybody, let me tell you one thing very frankly. After you came here only this started in this. Let the Chairman to take the decision. Once he takes the decision, we are in no position to argue about.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let me say something. You cannot make personal remarks such as “after I came here, it is

happening". I am asking questions. I am not getting up and shouting at anybody. I am asking relevant questions. If somebody has a problem with it then they cannot answer.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න. අධිපතිතුමා තීරණය කරයි අධිපතිතුමා උත්තර දෙනවාද, එහෙම නැත්නම් අදාළ කෙනෙක් සම්බන්ධ කර ගන්නවාද කියලා. ඔබතුමා අදාළ කෙනාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කාර්ය පටිපාටි පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙවැනි කාරක සභාවක සාක්ෂිකරුවන් කැඳවීම කියලා කාර්ය පටිපාටියක් තිබෙනවාද? මම මේවා දන්නේ නැති නිසා අහන්නේ. කරුණාකරලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දිවුරුම්පිට සාක්ෂි ගැනීමේ කාර්ය පටිපාටියක් තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එවැනි විටක ඒ සාක්ෂි ගැනීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ ඒ සාක්ෂි යොමු කරන ක්‍රමය. මෙතැන ගැටලු මතු වුණු ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි එක පුද්ගලයෙක්ගෙන් යම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇහුවාම ඒ පුද්ගලයාට උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්. නැත්නම්, එයාට තව කෙනෙක්ගේ ආධාර අරගෙන උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්. එවැනි සාධාරණ අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට එවැනි වෙලාවක ඒ අවසරය ගත යුත්තේ කාගෙන්ද? ඒ සාක්ෂිකරුම ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තර දීමේ වගකීම මාරු කරනවාද? එසේ නැත්නම් සභාපතිතුමා ඒ සඳහා අවසරය දිය යුතුද? ඒ වාගේම ඔබතුමාට තව දෙයක් කියන්නම්, මෙම පරීක්ෂණයේදී නිශ්චිත මැදිහත්වීම පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා ඒ සටහන පිළිබඳව අවබෝධ කරලා ඇති. ඔය මැදිහත්වීටම උත්සාහ කරන තැනැත්තා මීට කලින් පරීක්ෂණයේදී දුන් ස්ථාවරයයි පසු ගිය දින දෙකේදී දුන් ස්ථාවරයයි අතර පරස්පරතාවක් තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, why do we not ask from the particular people?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම වගකීමෙන් කියන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He will decide. Others cannot decide.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නිශ්චිත මැදිහත්වීමේ sensitiveකමක් තිබෙනවා. මෙතරම් කෑකෝ ගැසීම් මම අනුමත කරන්නේ නැහැ. එසේ නම් අපි මීට වඩා ප්‍රවේශසම් සහගත ක්‍රියාවලියක් අනුගමනය කරන්න ඕනෑ. හේතුව මොකද, මේ මැදිහත්වීමට උත්සාහ කරන තැනැත්තාගේ සාක්ෂි පරස්පරයි. මේ දුන් පිළිතුරයි, මීට කලින් දුන් පිළිතුරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වෙනමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමා ඒක හිතේ තියාගෙන සාධාරණයක් ඉෂ්ට කරන්න. ඒ නිසා එක එක්කෙනාට ඕනෑ විධියට මේවා සෙල්ලමට ගන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ ඇමතිතුමා ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසානයිද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I am asking from the Governor. What I understand is this. Normally, the practice of the Monetary Board is to go by the Manual.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: Hon. Minister, my understanding is the Manual reflects the decisions of the Monetary Board. There is a changing policy. The Monetary Board can actually effect that change. It does not have to follow the Manual all the time. If a change is required, the Monetary Board would make that change and that would be reflected in the Manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why would it reflect on the Manual? Then, that becomes the practice.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: Yes. Until the Monetary Board changes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: If it is not changed that must be the rule.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: If it is not changed in the Manuel- All decisions of the Monetary Board should be reflected in the Manual.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Now I refer to you the item "B" of the Manual on page 8 – " Private and Direct Placements", you tell me what you understand from this language.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: You mean the B. (i)

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is right. That is the general rule of the Monetary Board. It is indicated here. The decision had been taken by the Monetary Board and it is, as Mr. Samarasiri said, far back in 1996 or 1997. When the bond system came in the normal practice was the auction system. Am I right?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: I was not here. My understanding is there was a hybrid system at one point where there was a mixture of an auction as well as private placements.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That came in 2008. Am I right?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: No, that came in 1998.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: At the last occasion, when I asked from the officers of the Central Bank what they said was "about 80 per cent or 85 per cent was done through auctions and the rest was done through…". That is the idea I got from the language depicts here. Any sane person will get that idea from this language. That was changed only in 2008. Am I right?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: That is my understanding "when they move on to moreover private placements".

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: No. You have said it was done in 1998.

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: No. There was a mixed system.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Is it the Board Paper of the Monetary Board on 2008.10.07? That is a confidential document. Can I read this to you? "I believe from the evidence that I have heard what they said was, 'the system was changed purely through this letter'."

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: I must ask one of my colleagues to respond for that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can you ask one of your colleagues to answer?

Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: Let me ask them.

සභාපතිතුමා: සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු ඇමතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාගන් ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසානයිද?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: Mr. S.S. Rathnayake, Assistant Governor will answer.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: මම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරි, රත්නායක. 1997 වසරේදී තමයි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම ආරම්භ කළේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ auction ක්‍රමයට තමයි ගියේ. නමුත්, auction ක්‍රමය තුළින් දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න මතු වුණා. Interest rate එක විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන අරමුදල් තිබෙනවා, ඒ අරමුදල්වලට auction ක්‍රමය හරහා එන්නේ නැතිව direct placement වලින් එන්න පුළුවන් කියන weighted average rate එකට 1998 වසරේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අවසරයක් දුන්නා. Weighted average rate එක මත direct placement යනවා කියන එක ආරම්භ වුණේ 2008 වසරේදී නොවෙයි. Treasury bond කියන එක 1997 වසරේ ආරම්භ කරලා, මාස කිහිපයක් ගිහිල්ලා 1998 වසරේදී direct placement ආරම්භ කළා. එය බාහිර පාර්ශ්වවලට විවෘත

වුණේ නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන විශාල අරමුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අරමුදල්වලට auction හරහා එන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. 1998 වසරේදී, පොලී අනුපාත ස්ථාවර කිරීමේ අරමුණත් ඇතිව direct placement ආරම්භ කළා. 1998 වසරේ ඉඳලා මේ ක්‍රමය යන විට නැවතත් පොලී අනුපාත විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස්වීම්වලට ලක් වුණා. 2008 වසර ආසන්න කාලය වන විට මෙය මහ බැංකුව තුළ සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී auction ක්‍රමය විතරක් නොවෙයි තවත් ක්‍රම තිබෙනවා කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණයක් ගත්තා. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන්, ලංකා බැංකුව, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව, රක්ෂණ සමාගම් ඒ වාගේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන පද්ධතියක් අපේ රට තුළ තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතනවලට - weighted average rate - ඒ කියන්නේ බර තබන ලද සාමාන්‍ය පොලී අනුපාතය මත direct placement කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක 2008 වසරේදී ආරම්භ වුණේ. නමුත්, ඒකේ තිබෙන captive sources කියන එක define කරලා නැහැ. Define කරන්නේ නැති හේතුව වන්නේ, captive sources කියලා අදහස් කරන්නේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන. ඒවා primary dealers හරහා එන විට සමහර වෙලාවට විශාල වශයෙන් commission ගෙවන්න සිදු වෙනවා. ඒක නිසා රජයේ අරමුදල් පිරිවැය අඩු කර ගැනීම සඳහාත්, රටේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමයෙහි පොලී අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කර ගැනීම සඳහාත් යෙදූ ක්‍රමවේදයක් තමයි ඒක. ඒ සඳහා වැරදි interpretation දීම සුදුසු නැහැ. එහි තිබුණු යහපත් අරමුණු තමයි, රජයට අඩු පිරිවැයක් යටතේ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සහ අපේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමය තුළ පොලී අනුපාත අනවශ්‍ය විධියට ඉහළ පහළ යාම වලක්වා ගැනීම. ඒක අදාළ මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහ Dr. Azim කියන මහත්වරුන් දෙදෙනාම මෙතැනදී සඳහන් කළා, මේ manual එකේ ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගත්ත policy decision එකක් කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා, රටට බලපාන ඔය වැදගත් තීන්දුව 2008 වසරේදී ගත්තා නම්, එය මේ manual එකට ඇතුළත් නොවුනේ ඇයි?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: 2008 වසරේ දී ගත්ත තීරණය-, මහ බැංකුව තුළින් පාලනය වන අරමුදල්වලට direct placement වලට තිබුණු අවස්ථාව, 2004 වසර පමණ වන විට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය නවත්වන්න සිදු වුණා. මොකද, රජයේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ක්‍රමවේදය electronic system එකකට වෙනස් වුණා. Primary dealer system ඇවිල්ලා, electronic system එනකොට, electronic system යටතේ හැම primary dealer ආයතනයකටම එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයට සම්බන්ධ වන හැම ආයතනයකටම ගිණුමක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ තිබෙන අරමුදල්වලට වෙන වෙන ගිණුම් නිකුත් කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක නිසා 2003 හෝ 2004 වසර වන විට - මට හරියටම දිනය මතක නැහැ - ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අරමුදල්වලට සෘජු ක්‍රමය යටතේ එන්න තිබුණු අවස්ථාව අහිමි වුණා. එයට හේතුව, වෙන කිසිවක් නොවෙයි, ඒ අරමුදල්වලට වෙනම ගිණුම් ආරම්භ කිරීමට නොහැකි වීමයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි 2004 වසරේදී පමණ එය නැවැත්වූවේ. 2004 වසරේ ඉඳලා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් කාලය තුළ ඇති වෙච්ච වර්ධනයන් සලකා බලා තමයි 2008 වසරේදී ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට 2004 වසරේ ඉඳලා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් auction ක්‍රමය තමයි අනුගමනය කළේ.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඔව්. ඉන් බැහැර වෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Very clear ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට තවත් කරුණක් යොමු කරනවා, ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ගන්න තීන්දුව තමයි මේ manual එකේ ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ කියලා. එතකොට, මේ manual එකෙන් පරිබාහිරව කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ නම්, අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය තීන්දුවක් අරගෙන මේ manual එක සංශෝධනය විය යුතුයි. හරිද? ඔබතුමා මේ රටට වැදගත් වෙන විශාල කාරණා ගණනාවක් කිව්වා interest rate එකයි සියල්ලම. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඔයතරම් උනන්දුවක් තිබුණා නම්, ඒ auction ක්‍රමය ගෙනැල්ලා මේ direct placement ක්‍රමයට සියයට 80ක්, සියයට 90ක් වෙග් ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් වෙනස් කරනවා නම්, මේ manual එක වෙනස් කළේ නැත්තේ ඇයි?

ඔබතුමන්ලා direct placement ක්‍රමයට එන්නේ 2008 වසරේදී නේ. 2004 වසරේ ඉඳලා 2008 වසර වෙනකම් auction ක්‍රමයනේ ආවේ.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ auction ක්‍රමය අපිට පිළිගන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, manual එකේ සඳහන් වෙනවා, පුළුවන් තරම් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට ගිහිල්ලා, අවශ්‍ය නම් යම් කොටසක් - balance- ඉතිරිය direct placement එකෙන් සලසා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ 2008 වසරෙන් පස්සේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 2008 වසරෙන් පසුව නොවෙයි. Manual එකේ දැනුත් එහෙමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක හරි. 2008 වර්ෂයෙන් පසුව තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි ඔය විස්තර වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ manual එකෙන් විස්තර වන්නේ ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ manual එකේ ඒ වගන්තිය සංශෝධනය වුණේ 2008 වසරේදී ද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: Manual එක කියන එක දිගින් දිගටම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ, 2008 වසර වෙනකම් තිබුණේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය. ඔබතුමාම කිව්වා, 1998 වසරේ යම්කිසි direct placement ක්‍රමයක් හඳුනවලා දුන්නා කියලා. නමුත්, තිබුණු ප්‍රායෝගික ප්‍රශ්න නිසා 2004 වසර වන විට ඒක නැවතිලා, 2008 වසර වෙනකම් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයටම ආවා. අපට තිබෙන සාක්ෂිවලින් පේනවා ඒක වෙනස් වෙනවා කියලා. මහ බැංකුවේ අනිත් නිලධාරී මහත්වරුන් සියලු දෙනාම කිව්වේ - ඔබතුමා නොවෙයි - මේ ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කළේ 2008 වසරේ මෙන්න මේ Board Paper එකෙන් කියලා.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක හරි. මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා, අසීම් මහත්මයා කිව්වා, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ එහෙම තීන්දුවක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ තීන්දුව මේ manual එකට ඇවිල්ලා, manual එක සංශෝධනය වෙලා තමයි මේ manual එක සැකසෙන්නේ කියලා. මට, ඒ ගත්ත තීන්දුව මේ manual එකෙන් පෙන්වන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමා දැන් ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවා නේ. එතුමා ලබා දෙන පිළිතුර සාවධානව අහන්න සංයමයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම එතුමාට මොනවත් කිව්වේ නැහැ. දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මට බාධා කළා, ඒකයි මම කථා කළේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ඇසූ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න නිලධාරී මහත්මයාට ඒක බාධාවක් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඒක දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට කියන්න. I did not disturb. So, you stop the person who disturbs me.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම සංයමයක් කියලා කිව්වේ ඔබතුමාට නොවෙයි. කාරක සභාවට එතුමාගේ පිළිතුර අහ ගන්න අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න කියලායි මම කිව්වේ. නිලධාරිමහත්මයා, ඔබතුමා පිළිතුර ලබා දෙන්න.

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: 2008 වසරේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ගත්ත තීරණය තමයි, මේ manual එකේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මම කලිනුත් සඳහන් කළා, captive sources කියන එක මුදල් මණ්ඩලය නිර්වචනය කරලා නැහැ කියලා. මොකද, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට captive sources කියන එක නිර්වචනය කරන්න බැහැ. Captive Sources කියන්නේ විශාල අරමුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙන ආයතන. NSB, Bank of Ceylon, People's Bank, EPF, Insurance companies. ඒ වාගේ ඒවා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒක තමයි මෙහි මේ ලිහිල් භාෂාවෙන් ලියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ට මම නැවත ප්‍රශ්නය යොමු කරනවා. ඔබතුමන් කිව්ව විධියට Board paper එකේ මේ තීන්දුව ගත්තා

නම් මට පෙන්වන්න, මේ තීන්දුව කෝ Manual එකේ අතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා?

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී තිබෙන්නේ ඒක Manual එකේ ඇතුළත් නොවෙනවා කියලා නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ order එක Manual එකේ එන්න ඕනෑ. එතුමා කියන්නේ captive sources නිර්වචනය කරන්න බැහැ කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙහි දෙවැනි කොටසේ තිබෙනවා, මේ විධියට Page Number 2 වල තිබෙනවා, "Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing progrmmes" කියලා. ඒකේ Auction, Private placement and Rupee loans කියන මේ තුනම සඳහන් වෙනවා. මේ ගෙනෙන සන්දේශය Manual එක වෙනස් කිරීම ගැන ගෙනෙන සන්දේශයක් නොවෙයි නේ. Manual එක මෙහෙමම තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඇතුළ ආපසු මේක ගෙනාවා කියලා පසු උදේ වෙනස් කරලා කියන්නේ නැහැනේ. ආපසු මේ විධියට කරන්න කියලා නැවතත් වෙනස් කරනවාද? නැහැ. ඒ තුනෙන් එකකින් යන්න ඉඩ දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේක ගැන අපට වෙනත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මටත් තිබෙනවා EPF, ETF සොරකම් කරපු එක ගැන කථා කරන්න. මෙතැන මගේ තර්කය සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ Auction, Private placement and Rupee loans කියන තුනම දාලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් කඩින්-කඩ ගෙනෙන Board papers වලින් සමහර විට කියන්න පුළුවන්. දැන් private placementsවලට යමු; Rupee loansවලට යමු; කියලා යන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඒක Board paper එකකින් යන කාරණයක්. ඒක මත පසු දා උදේ Manual එක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා කියන තර්කය නිවැරදි නම්, auction ක්‍රමය ගෙනෙන්නත් වෙන දෙයක් කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ මේ auction ක්‍රමයට කොහොමද ආවේ කියන එක නේ. මෙතුමා කියනවා එහෙම වෙනස් වෙන්න නම්, එහෙම මොනවත් Manual එකේ ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලා. මේකේ සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා, auction පුළුවන්, direct placements පුළුවන්, මුදල් ගන්නත් පුළුවන් කියලා. එහෙම නම් මෙතුමන්ලා මේ මහ බැංකුවේ අවසානයට කරපු auction එකේ කිසිම වැරැද්දක් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන එකටම මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි, "as much as possible"කියන එක පැහැදිලි කරන්න මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාට.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ගේ ඔය කාරණාවට අදාළ පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම අවසන් නිසාත්, තවත් බොහෝ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් මෙතැන සිටින නිසාත්, ඒ අයට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න. මම ඉදිරියට යනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්නය මත පදනම් වන දෙයක් මේක. මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් හෝ ඔබතුමන් නම් කරන නියෝජිතයෙක්ගෙන් මේකේ private and direct placements කියන එකෙහි "Front office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions." මොකක්ද "as much as possible" කියන එකේ practical idea එක. මොකද "as much as possible"කියන්නේ broader meaning එකක්. අනෙත් එක මේවා එස් සමානයි එම්.ඒ වාගේ එකක් නොවෙයි Economics කියන්නේ. මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි මොකක්ද "as much as possible"කියන්නේ. Value for moneyද best practicesද මොනවාද? මොකද මම හිතනවා මේ Board paper එකේ idea එක මේකේ include වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: I stand to be corrected by my colleagues who know much more about this than I do. My understanding is that there is a process through which these bonds and government securities take place. And, there are different levels at which once the bids have been made, how the bids are assessed and accepted. So, in that process, the different committees will try to get as much money as possible for the government as cheaply as possible.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: When you say "as much as possible" one aspect is it should be cheap for the Government. It is okay.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: That would be one criterion. So, they would also have to decide clearly how much money to take and the cost. They would accept to raise that money. Now, my understanding of that first sentence is that there should be an attempt made to take as much money as possible through auctions within the parameters that the different committees set for themselves in terms of costs. They are trying to raise the money that the Government needs as cheaply as possible. That is my understating. But, I would like to ask my colleagues, who are specialists in the Debt Department to elaborate on that or correct me if I am wrong.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු ඔබතුමා උත්තරයක් කියන්න?

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: There are two officers who raised hands.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: Dr. M.Z.M. Azim will elaborate on what I said about auctions and direct placements.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: The Governor asked him to answer.

කේ.එම්.එම්. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මම සිරිවර්ධන. සහකාර අධිපති. ඒ වාගේම මම මීට අමතරව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි වශයෙන් කාරණා කිහිපයකට අවතීරණ වුණා. අධිපතිතුමා කියපු විධියට ණය ගැනීමේදී අපි හැම තිස්සේම බලන කරුණු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. ණයක් වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් ගන්න කොට cost එක වගේම risk එක තමයි හැම තිස්සේම සලකා බලන්නේ කොච්චර අවධානමක් තිබෙනවාද? කොච්චර වියදමක් දරන්න වෙනවාද? ඒ අදාළ දවසේ අදාළ ණය ගැනීම් විධි කියන එක. එතකොට cheapest කියන එක එන්නේ, අපි හිතමු ලක්ෂ දහයක බැඳුම්කරයක් අද දින නිකුත් කරනවා නම්, අද දින. අද දින ඒ ලක්ෂ දහයේ බැඳුම්කරයට ද්විතියික වෙළඳ පොළේ මිලක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ interest rate එකක් තිබෙනවා; price එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මේක හැමදාම දිනපතා අපි දන්නවා. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මේ තොරතුරු දිනපතා එකතු කරනවා. අද දුන්න සියයට දහයේ බැඳුම්කරයේ පොලිය තිබෙන්නේ සියයට දහය නම්, වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් අද ගන්න ඕනෑ සියයට 12කට. අපි මුළු වෙළෙඳ පොළම රැවටීමක් කරනවා. ඒක එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැ අපි. ඒක තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ cheap කියලා කිව්වේ. එතකොට සියයට දහය හෝ දහයට අඩු හෝ දහයට ආසන්න මට්ටමකින් හෝ තමයි අපි ණය ගන්නේ. ඒකයි මගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන් පැහැදිලි කරන කොට ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට එකතු වෙනවා නේද, මේකේ ඊළඟ ඡේදයේ තිබෙන කොටසේදී "The balance fund requirement of the Government has indicated in the approved borrowing programme" කියන එක. ඒ programme එක යටතේ තමයි ඒ කියන අවස්ථා ටික සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය "as much as possible" කියන එක. "As much as possible" කියන එකේ clear definition එක practice එක අහන්න. එතකොට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ, cost ඇතුලේ නේ cheap කියන එක තියෙන්නේ. අපි ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය තීන්දු විය යුත්තේ, අපේ auctions තමයි අපේ main tool එක. බලන tool එක auction එක තමයි. Manual එක clear. ඒකට limit එකක් එනවා, "as much as possible" කියන එකෙන් cost එක අනුව. මම හරිද?

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: As I said, that is how it happened.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතකොට 7th October, 2008, Monetary Board decision එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. එතකොට decision එක ඔබතුමන් ළඟ තිබෙනවා. ඒ decision එකේ content එකයි, ඒ decision එකේ තිබෙන basic

idea එකයි, Manual එකයි, මේ Page 8 එකේ "as much as possible" කියන Paragraph එක ගත්තොත් ඒකත් එක්ක conflict එකක් තිබෙනවාද? මේ Board paper එකේ තිබෙන idea එකයි, මේ Manual එකේ මෙයයි අතර පරස්පරයක් තිබෙනවාද? මම දකින දේ මම කියන්නම්. මම දකිනවා. මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි ඒක.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: I am assuming that this is a decision that the Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe read out.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: Yes. I can give it to you if you know it. "As much as possible" is a broader term you can put many things time to time.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: I would say, again my colleagues would correct me if I am wrong. But I think this decision can be covered by what is in the Manual.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: That is what you think. This decision can be covered by what is in the Manual.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why do you need a decision then?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, Decision එකේ තිබෙන අදහස මේ Manual එකේ තිබෙන එකෙන් cover වෙනවා කියලා record කර ගන්න කියලා ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න. ඔබතුමාට ඉතාම වැදගත් එකක්. මට කථා කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසා නොවෙයි. එහෙම තිබෙනවා නම් මේ decision එකේ ඇති අවශ්‍යතාව මොකක්ද? Monetary Board එකෙන් මේ Manual එකේ තිබෙන ටික cover වෙනවා නම් මේකට අමතරව decision එකක් ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමා සාවධානව සවන් දෙන්න. මේකේ තිබෙන decision ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ Manual එකේ decisions තිබෙනවා නම් -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගත්ත එක මේකෙන් cover වෙනවා කියලා ඒ අයම පිළිගන්නවා නම්, අපට අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ නේ නැවත නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න. අපි නොවෙයි නේ අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතැනින් පසුව තමයි direct placementsවලට shift වුණේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, අපි කැමැති පිළිතුර ලැබෙන තෙක් ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක වැරදි ක්‍රමයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, කථා කරන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම කියන්නේ එක කොල කැබැල්ලක් අරගෙන, එක decision එකක් අරගෙන - ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ වාගේ decisions අනන්තවත් ගන්න ඇති. හරිද? අපට ලැබිලා තිබෙන්නේ එක කොලයක් පමණයි. මට තේරෙන විධියට අපි දන්නේ නැහැ මේවා කොයි කොයි විධියට වෙනස් වුණාද කියලා. 2008ද, 2009ද, 2010ද කියලා -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමා වෙන්න. මේක නිකම් කොල කැබැල්ලක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: හරි. ඒක නොවෙයි මම කිව්වේ. තවත් මේ වගේ decisions ගත්තාද කියලා ඇහුවොත්, මේ වගේ decision ගත්ත කොල තව තියෙයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මේ වගේ කොල තව ඇති.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ වාගේ කොල තව තිබෙනවා.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: Sir, may I respond? In fact, Hon. State Minister, Sujeewa Senasinghe raised a very important point. I think, we need to understand that this is a Manual rather than a rule book. So, it basically sets out guidelines as to what should be done by the people in the Public Debt Department. The decision on the 07th of October, 2008 gives specific instructions as to how the sale of government securities should be conducted. So, what you are

saying on Page 8 under (b) (i) is really a very broad statement, which is the guideline within the Manual rather than a rule book. So, we must always remember that this is a Manual and not a rule book. The decision gives the officers involved in the process specific instructions. That is different. That is a broad kind of guideline and this is the specific decision as to how the guidelines should be implemented.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: Hon. Chairman, that is why I said earlier also the Manual is not changed and the guidelines are going to be changed from time to time by the Monetary Board. That is how it happens.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: This is broad and vague enough.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: That is what I am saying. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ ඒකයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා දිගින් දිගටම මේ වගේ තීරණ ගන්න ඇති. හැබැයි අපට මේ කොලය පමණයි ලැබුණේ. ඒකත් එක්ක තමයි අපි මේ කථා කර ගෙන යන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා සමහර වේලාවට කලින් තීරණය කරන්න ඇති auction එකෙන් මේ ටික ගන්නවා, private placementsවලින් මේ ටික ගන්නවා කියලා. හැබැයි ලිඛිත guideline එකක් විධියට ගියේ මේක පමණද? එහෙම නැත්නම් මීට කලිනුත් Monetary Board එකෙන් මේ වාගේ ලිඛිත guidelines දීලා තිබෙනවාද? මම කියන එක ඔබතුමාට තේරෙනවාද? දැන් මේ කාරණාව vague නේ. ඒක බොහොම පැහැදිලි නේ. සමහර වේලාවට ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් තීරණය කරනවා auction එකෙන් මෙපමණ ගනිමු, private placement එකෙන් මෙපමණ ගනිමු කියලා. හැබැයි, ඒ තීරණය ගන්නේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලා, කට්ටිය එකතු වෙලා. සමහර වේලාවට ඒක නැවත Monetary Board එකට දැනුම් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. සමහර වේලාවට Monetary Board එකේ තීන්දු අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලා කටයුතු කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. මෙහෙම කරන්න හෝ මෙන්න මෙහෙම කරන්න එපා කියලා මේ විධියට ලිඛිත guideline එකක් දුන්නේ මේ වතාවේ විතරද? මීට කලින් මේ වාගේ සිද්ධිවලදී මේවා දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: My colleagues can answer that. Before that, I would also like to request my colleagues who are specialists in public debts to make sure that what I said was correct because I do not want to mislead the Committee. So, may I ask the specialists of the Public Debt Department whether what I said was correct and please, be very frank when I said that the language is broad enough to cover the specific instructions in the Board decision of 2008? Can one of my colleagues of the Public Debt Department answer that?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who is the head of the Public Debt Department?

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: Mr. T.H.B. Sarathchandra.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So, let him answer.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එතුමා ඒක කියයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා : "My colleagues" කිව්වාම, someone gets up and say. We will listen to them.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමා කියන කෙනාට ඉඩ දෙන්න. ඒක එතුමා කියයි. මම එහෙම කියන්න කැමති නැහැ. අධිපතිතුමාට නියෝගයක් දීලා එයාගෙන් නොවෙයි, මෙයාගෙන් අහන්න කියලා ඔබතුමා කියන්න එපා. ඒක ගැළපෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේක විකාරයක් නේ. මේක එක්සත් ජාතික පක්ෂයේ ශාඛා සමිතියක්ද?

The Chairman: Mr. Governor, you can select the person.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: We do not want to waste our time here.

The Chairman: How you can say it?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We have to decide. He never mentioned a name.

සභාපතිතුමා: No. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේ විධියට හැසිරෙන්න එපා. මේක නරක ආදර්ශයක්. Mr. Governor, you can select the person.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: Hon. Chairman, we have several specialists here. But to avoid –

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමා කරුණාකරලා වාඩි වෙන්නකෝ. කලින් මහත්මයෙක් නැගිට්ටා නේ. අධිපතිතුමා කියාපු ගමන් ඔබතුමා නැගිට්ටා. ඔබතුමා කියන්න. තව කවුරු හරි ඉන්නවා නම් පසුව කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා මුලින් ආරාධනා කරපු නිලධාරී මහත්මයාට අදහස් දක්වන්න කියලායි මම කියන්නේ.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswami: Please, be frank.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Hon. Chairman, as the Governor specifically stated, the decision reflected in 2008 Monetary Board has been accommodated in the current Version that you all are having in your hands as the Operational Manual of the Public Debt Department. Whenever a Board decision comes in, the Public Debt Department faxes it and the Board decision is the decision the Public Debt Department follows. The Manual periodically get updated according to the decisions passed to us by the Monetary Board.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: Is there any need to change the Manual according to the Monetary Board decision?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly. The Board decision is taken into consideration and it is being factored into the Manual and the Manual what you see now and what you are having in your hands is reflected to highlight the fact that in addition to the auctions the direct placements also accommodated.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: What I am saying is, it is not very clear. The decision that the Monetary Board has taken is here. According to that, have you changed the Manual or not? Is there any necessity to change this Manual according to the decision that the Monetary Board has taken? Why did you not do that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: Why did you not do that? If there is a necessity to change this manual according to the decision taken by the Monetary Board, why did you not do that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We did change the manual in line with the Board decision and the manual that you are having already reflects the decision of the Monetary Board. So, it is there.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට ඒ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: Central Bank එකෙන් Manual එක ආවේ කොහොමද කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි. මම 2004 වර්ෂයේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නොවෙයි වෙනත් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවකයි සිටියේ. ඒ අවස්ථාව වන විට කිසිදු දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවක Manual එකක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. Manual එකේ අවශ්‍යතාවය දැනුනේ- අපි 2003, 2004 වර්ෂවලදී මේ සියල්ලම computerized කළා. එසේ computerize කරන විට ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා. මොකද, ඒ වැඩ කරන අය හදිසියේ -බෝම්බ පිපිරීමක්, earthquake එකක් සහ ජල ගැල්මක්- සේවයට පැමිණියේ නැතිනම්, මේ වැඩ ටික කර ගෙන යන්නේ කොහොමද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය මතු වුණා. ඒ නිසා මේ Manual එකෙන් කෙරෙන වැඩ සියල්ලම අපි එක පොතකට ගනිමු කියන අදහසට ආවා. යම්කිසි අවස්ථාවක කවුරුන් හෝ සේවයට පැමිණියේ නැතිනම්, සිටින අය මේ

system එකේ වැඩ කරන්නේ කොහොමද, ඒ සඳහා enter වෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා බලා ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙනවා. අපි එය කැබිනට් එකට දාලා, අත්සන් කර, සීල් තබා ඒ සඳහා වෙනම password එකක් තැබුවා. ඒ තුළින් වැඩ කර ගෙන යන්න පුළුවන් තත්ත්වයක් අපි නිර්මාණය කර ගත්තා. ඒ විධියට තමයි මෙය ටිකෙන් ටික ඉදිරියට ආවේ.

ඒ වාගේම අනෙක් කාරණය තමයි, මෙය තීරණය කරලා තිබෙන නීතිරීති, regulations මොනවාද කියලා යම් කෙනෙක් එකවරම නොදැන සිටීම. නමුත් අලුත් කෙනෙක් වැඩ කරන විට Monetary Board එකෙන් දුන් නීතිරීති සහ අපි introduce කළ සියල්ලම මෙහි summarize වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ සියලුම දේවල් නිවැරදිව මෙහි සඳහන් වෙනවා කියන එක, එයින් අදහස් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. උදාහරණයක් කියනවා නම්, වර්ෂය මුලදී borrowing programme එකක් Monetary Board එකට ගිහිල්ලා, approve කරනවා කියමු. නමුත් අපි එය Manual එකට දමන්නේ නැහැ, වෙනම තබා ගෙන කටයුතු කරනවා. දැන් Governor කිව්වා වාගේ, broad system එකක් තමයි මෙහි ඇතැම් තැන්වල තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට අදාළව යම් යම් systemsවල, ඒවා කරන ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන්නේ. Approvals, TOR – terms of reference- වාගේ වැඩ කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය දේවල් තමයි මෙහි ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ වාගේම business continuity කියලා plans තිබෙනවා. ඊට අදාළව අපි මේවා සකස් කර ගෙන තිබෙනවා. අපි Monetary Board එකේ approval සඳහා යන්නේ නැහැ කියන්නේ ඒ නිසයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපිට දැනට එවා තිබෙන එක Version II updated as of 31.07.2013. ඒ කියන්නේ, 2013.07.31 දිනට update කරන ලද Manual එක තමයි අපට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. මෙහි තිබෙන කාරණා මේ තුළ තිබෙනවා කියන එකද ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එහෙනම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රධානියා විධියට ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්නවලට උත්තර දුන්න නිසා, ඔබතුමාගෙන් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය විමසන එක පහසුයි. ඔබතුමාගේ ස්ථාවරය තමයි මැනුවල් එකේ 08 වැනි පිටුවේ, බී-1 හි සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන වචනවලට, 2008/20/25/පීඩී/එම්බී දරන 2008.10.07 දිනැති තීරණයේ හරය අන්තර්ගත වී තිබෙනවා කියන කාරණය. එය හරිද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, කලින් පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී ඒ කාරණය සනාථ වුණා නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම එය පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නේ නැති නිසා නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා. කාරක සභාව හැටියට එකම කාරණයේ දිගින් දිගටම සිටින නිසයි මම මේ අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා විමසන ලද Board paper එක සහ Manual එකේ reflect වෙනවා කියන කාරණය මෙපමණ වේලා සාකච්ඡා කර තහවුරු කර ගත්තා නේද? මෙතැන කථා කළේ ඒක නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එක් එක් නිලධාරීන් එක් එක් අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න පුළුවන්. එකඟතාවයක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. වෙනස් කම් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. එවැනි වෙනස්කම් මෙම ක්‍රියාදාමය තුළ අපි දැක්කා. ඒ වාගේම කලින් inquiry එක තුළ තිබූ evidenceවල වෙනසත් සංසන්දනයෙන් අපි දැක්කා. මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, 2008.10.07 දිනැති තීරණයේ අදහස Manual එකට අන්තර්ගත කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියන එක. එය තර්කානුකූල වෙන්න පුළුවන්, නමුත් හරිද කියලායි මම අහන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: එය අධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ කාරණයේත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම බහුතරයක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ සාකච්ඡාවලත් ඒ අදහස තිබුණා. නැවත නැවතත් ඒ කාරණාවේම සිටින එකේ තේරුමක් තිබෙනවාද කියන එකයි මම අහන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙය මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වය පිළිබඳ කෙරෙන පරීක්ෂණයක් නේ. මෙතැන සිටින එක් අයෙක්

හැර, වැඩි පිරිසක් මේ ප්‍රශ්නයේ කොටස්කරුවන් වෙනවා. ඒ අය දෙන පිළිතුරු එලෙසම පිළිගන්නවා නම්, අපි පරීක්ෂණ කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කාරණය තවත් කාගෙන්ද අහන්න තිබෙන්නේ? අධිපතිතුමාත් ඒ කාරණය කියනවා. නිලධාරින්ගෙනුත් ඒ කාරණය අහුවා. ඒ නිසා එකම කාරණය නැවතත් අහන එකයි මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. නමුත් ප්‍රශ්න ඇසීමේ අයිතිය ඔබතුමාට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මෙය ඉතාම වැදගත් ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඒ නිසා මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් කල්පනා කරනවා නම්, මෙතැන ඉන්න තවත් නිලධාරී මහත්වරුගේ අදහස් අවශ්‍යයි කියලා ඒ සඳහා අවස්ථාව දෙන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් නිලධාරින් තුන්දෙනක් කථා කළා. ඒ තුන්දෙනා එක් අදහසක් කිව්වා. නමුත් වෙනත් අදහසක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා අපි දැන ගන්න කැමතියි?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න බැරිද?

සභාපතිතුමා: පුළුවන්, ඒ සඳහා අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එසේ නැත්නම් ඒක වාර්තා කරලා, අපි මෙය අවසන් කරමු. මේ කාරක සභාවේ අපිට වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම මේ පිළිබඳව රටේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් මේ කාරණය පිළිබඳව බොහෝ බරපතළ දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. අපිටත් හෘද සාක්ෂියක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අය කියන දේ as it is **භාර ගෙන,** ඒක තමයි සාක්ෂිය කියලා කියනවා නම් අපි මොනවාටද? මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් එංගලන්ත පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ක්‍රමය මම බලන් ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම මම ඉගෙන ගන්න ගියා. එහි තිබෙනවා, සාක්ෂි කරුවන්ගේ ප්‍රකාශ පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා නම්- මෙතැන උසාවිය වාගේ ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා කියලා ඇතැම් අය කියනවා මට ඇහුණා. එංගලන්තයේ සහ ඇමරිකාවේ කොංග්‍රස් එකේ, උසාවිය වාගේ තමයි ප්‍රශ්න කරන්නේ. මම ඒවා රූපවාහිනියෙන් බලන් ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා නම් රූලෙන් රූලට, නීතියෙන් නීතිය ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, මෙහි වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි මේ විධියට සීමා වෙන්න ලෑස්ති නැහැ. මේ තීරණය ආණ්ඩුව මත බලපානව, පුද්ගලයන් මත බලපානව, පුරවැසියන් මත බලපානවා. ඒ වාගේම සාමාජිකයන් වන අපි මත බලපානවා. අහන්න ඕනෑ ප්‍රශ්න අපි මෙතැන අහන්නේ නැතිනම්, එය අපේ කීර්තියට බලපානවා. ඒ නිසා මේ නිලධාරින් වෙන් වෙන්ව කැඳවා සාක්ෂි ගන්න ඕනෑ නම්, දිව්රුම් පිට ගනිමු කියලායි මම කියන්නේ. නමුත් එපමණ දුර යන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. අපි සාකච්ඡාව කළේ මෙය දවසින් දෙකින් අවසන් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා නේ. නමුත් අහන ප්‍රශ්න සීමා කරන්න හදනවා නම්, ඒ විධියට කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: එතුමා සෑහීමකට පත් වෙන්නේ නැතිනම් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: I have my own point of view.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: Mr. Chairman, it might be helpful to the Committee, if I try and explain why I say that the Monetary Board decision is covered in this paragraph in the Manual. The decision essentially relates to how EPF funds and other captive source funds can be used through private placements. It does not in any way, contradict the statement in the first sentence which says, “Financing needs should be met as much as possible through auctions.” It does not contradict that. It says how private placements can be raised through EPF and other captive sources and how that can be done. So, that is covered in the second sentence which basically says that you can arrange private placements. There is nothing in this which talks about balance between private placements and the auction. So, by not referring to that balance, it does not in any way contradict what is in B 1. Of the Manual.

That is why I said, it is covered.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මෙතැනදී private/direct placements මෙතුමන්ලාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම් අනුව මට තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ, මේක broad definition එකක් කියලායි. It is a broad definition, no doubt. What I mean by broad definition is, it does not say it has to be 80 per cent private placements and 20 per cent auctions or the other way around. That is what you mean. From the English that I know, it clearly says, as much as possible through auctions. It might not give you an exact percentage but it clearly says, as much as possible through auctions. It further explains by saying that the balance fund requirement of the Government as indicated in the approved borrowing programme may be arranged through private placements. මේකේදී ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කියනවා, that the majority should be through auctions කියලා. Is that what the manual says?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: You are absolutely right Hon. Member. The thing is, there is nothing in the Monetary Board decision of 2008 which goes against that.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Absolutely.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: It is not talking about changing that balance.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Exactly. I agree on that.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: The question asked of me was whether the Monetary Board decision of October 2008 is reflected or covered in the Manual? The reason why I said, "yes" was because private placements are permitted according to the Manual and there is nothing in the Monetary Board decision which goes against the stipulation, that as much as possible should be raised through auctions.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Absolutely.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: You can carry out what is in the Monetary Board decision and still raise as much as possible through auctions.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Exactly. That is exactly what I am saying.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසන කරුණ සම්බන්ධයෙන්ම විමසා පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට කරුණක් මටත් තිබෙනවා. මෙතුමාගේ කාරණාවලට එකතු කිරීමක් කරනවා. අපි කථා කරන්නේ 8වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන (08) (i) ගැන නේ. හැබැයි, මේ Manual එකේ Front Office කියන first page එකේ තිබෙනවා, "Front Office (FO) of the PDD is mainly responsible for mobilizing required funds for the Government at the lowest possible cost with a reasonable degree of risk through implementation of domestic borrowing programme approved by the Monetary Board" කියලා. එතැනදී මේ ක්‍රියාවලි සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ at the lowest possible costවලට යටත්වයි. පූර්ව තත්ත්වය මේකයි. මේ පූර්ව තත්ත්වයට යටත්ව තමයි, Manual එකට private placementsද, direct placementsද කියන ක්‍රියාවලියට යන්න ඕනෑ. එතැනදී "අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම රජයට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට සහ මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලියට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට at the lowest possible cost කියන තත්ත්වය යටතේ මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය කළ යුතුයි." කියලා තිබෙනවා. මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය පවතින්නේ ඒ යටතේ කියන එක අවධාරණය කිරීමට තමයි මම මේක සඳහන් කරන්නේ. Cost and risk.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: He categorically said, "cost and risk".

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Continuing my questions - මීට කලින් සිදු වූ bond issue එකේදී- ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී රජයට විශාල මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණා කියලා රටේ ජීවත්

වෙන මනුෂ්‍යයෙක් හැටියට මම දැන ගත්තා. මීට කලින් තිබුණු bond issue එකේදී if there was a private placementවල ඒ අවශ්‍යතාවට supply එකක් තිබුණාද, නැද්ද කියලා මට දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මීට කලින් අවස්ථා ගණනක් තිබුණු නිසා එහි කාලය සඳහන් කළා නම් ගොඩක් වටිනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දළ වශයෙන් කාලය මේකයි කියන්න මම දන්නේ නැහැ. In general ..... වශයෙන් මම අහන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ මේකයි, Private placements කරද්දී ඒකට ඉල්ලුමක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපට ඒවා බලහත්කාරයෙන් දෙන්න බැහැ නේ. රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවට සරිලන මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ඉල්ලනවාද කියන sentiment එක දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. මම වයසින් බාල වුණාට, ආයෝජක උපදේශකවරයෙක් වශයෙන් අවුරුදු 5ක් කටයුතු කළා. මෙතැනදී market sentiment කියන එක වැදගත් වෙනවා. Market sentiment එක තීරණය වෙනවා පසු ගිය කාලයේ- එතකොට market sentiment එකේ demand එකක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා අපට දැන ගන්න පුළුවන්. මම අහන්නේ, මේ controversial issue එක වෙන්න කලින් market එකේ තිබුණු sentiment එක කොහොමද කියලායි. ඒ පිළිබඳ ප්‍රකාශයක් කරන්න දැනුමක් තිබෙන නිලධාරියෙක් සිටිනවාද?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: I need the help of one of my colleagues who was actually involved in that process at that time.

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර මහතා: මගේ නම ධම්මික නානායක්කාර. මම රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි ලෙස කටයුතු කළ කාලයේදී මේ Manual එක අධීක්ෂණය කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ තනතුර කුමක්ද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර මහතා: මම මූල්‍ය අංශ පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරනවා. මම 2015 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මස 09වැනි වන තෙක් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ රාජකාරි කළා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, direct placements සඳහා අවශ්‍ය තරම් ඉල්ලුමක් තිබුණු බව මට පැහැදිලිවම කියන්න පුළුවන්. සෘජු auction ක්‍රමය නැත්නම්, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය සහ direct placements හරහා නිකුත් කර තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණය සංසන්දනය කිරීමෙන් ඒ ගැන අවබෝධ කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකට මම කරුණු දක්වන්නම්. විශේෂයෙන්ම විදේශීය ආයෝජකයන් ඔවුන්ට මුදල් තිබෙන අවස්ථාවල primary dealers හරහා පැමිණ direct placements හරහා ආයෝජනයන් කරනවා. Commission එකක් ගෙවන්න සිදු වන නිසා, විශේෂයෙන්ම සමහර විදේශීය ආයෝජකයන් primary dealers හරහා එන්න කැමති නැහැ. ඒක අපි අත්දැකීමෙන් දන්නවා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, තවත් කාරණයක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ. Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ ගන්නවාද, සෘජු direct placements හරහා කොපමණ ගන්නවාද කියන එක තීරණය කරන්නේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරින් නොවෙයි, Domestic Debt Management Committee කියන Committee එකෙන්. මාසයේ මුල් භාගයේදී borrowing programme එක ඒ කමිටුවෙන් තීරණය කරනවා. ඊට අමතරව අදාළ auction එකේ ප්‍රතිඵල -වෙන්දේසියේ ප්‍රතිඵල- Auction Tender Committee එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව කරන්නේ ලිපිකරු වැඩ ටික පමණයි. තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයෙන්. මේ පිරිවැය යටතේ මෙපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා ඒ කමිටුවෙන් තීරණය කරනවා. ඊට පසුව "ඔයෙගාල්ලන්ට ඉතිරි ටික direct placements හරහා raise කර ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?" කියලා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් විමසනවා. "ඔව්, අපට පුළුවන්." කියලා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරින් කිව්වොත්, අපි කැමති වුණත්, අකමැති වුණත් කුමන හෝ ක්‍රමයකින් රජයට අවශ්‍ය දිනට මුදල් සැපයීම කරන්න ඕනෑ. අපට ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා කිව්ව ගමන්ම committee එකෙන් direct placements හරහා ඒවා ගන්න කියලා තීන්දු කරනවා. Cut-off rate auction එකෙන් කීයක් ගන්නවාද කියන එක committee එකේ තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමවේදය. මම රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි විධියට පත් වුණේ, 2012 වර්ෂයේ

ජනවාරි මස 01වැනි දායි. එදින සිට එතැනින් මම ඉවත් වනතුරු ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයයි. රජයේ ණය ගැනීමේ පිරිවැය benchmark එකක් විධියට ගන්න Thirty Year Bond එක කැමතියි. මම රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළ කාලයේදී Thirty Year Bond එක නිකුත් කළා. 12.50 සිට 8.75 වෙනකම් අපට ගෙනෙන්න පුළුවන් වුණා. මම නිවැරදි නම්, 9කට ආසන්න මුදලකට direct placements හරහා අවුරුදු 30ක් දක්වා ණය ගන්න පුළුවන් වුණා. Direct placements එකෙන් රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කර ගන්න රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරින්ට flexibility එකක් -අවශ්‍ය අවකාශය- සලස්වනවා. නැත්නම්, මුළු මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයම එකවර ගන්න ගියොත්, අනවශ්‍ය විධියට පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ පහළ යාම පමණයි සිදු වෙන්නේ.

ඒකෙන් ආයෝජකයන්ට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙළෙඳ පොළ පිළිබඳව තිබෙන දැක්ම, නැත්නම් විශ්වාසය කඩා වැටෙනවා. ඒක බොහොම පැහැදිලිව ප්‍රදර්ශනය වුණා. 2015 වර්ෂයේ මැද විතර වෙද්දි විදේශීය ආයෝජකයන් රටින් පිටට යන්න පටන් ගත්තා. ඒකට හේතුව, පොලී අනුපාතයන් අනවශ්‍ය විධියට ඉහළ පහළ යාමයි. ඒ අනුව ඔවුන්ට ජාත්‍යන්තර ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතීන්ට අනුව වෙළෙඳ පොළට mark-to-market කරලා ලොකු losses ගන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා. එක bond එකක සියයට 10ට ආයෝජනය කරලා, ඊළඟ bond එක සියයට 12 විධියට ඉහළ ගියොත්, සියයට 10ට ගත්ත bond එක ලොකු පාඩුවකට යන්නේ. එතකොට ආයෝජකයන් කවදාවත් ආයෝජනය කරන්න කැමැති වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මම ප්‍රශ්නයට සෘජු උත්තරයක් දෙනවා නම්, පැහැදිලිවම direct placements හරහා රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවන් අපි සම්පාදනය කර තිබෙනවා. රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා, අපි කිසිම දවසක කියලා නැහැ. අඩුම පිරිවැයක් යටතේ අවශ්‍යතාවන් සම්පාදනය කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම නම් මේ manual එක වැරැදියි. තර්කය ඒක නම්, මේ manual එක වැරැදියි.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: Manual එකේ තියෙන්නේ, වැඩිම auction එකට යන්න කියලා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ direct placement එකෙන් 11.75ට රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකක් ගත්තාද? ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට direct placement එකෙන් මේ වාගේ මුදල් අටයි දශම ගණනකට ගන්න පුළුවන් නම්, 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ direct placement එකෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකක් ගත්ත interest rate එකේ අගය කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමට දැන් ඒකට උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර: මට උත්තර දෙන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කාරණාවට නිශ්චිතව උත්තර දෙන්න, ඔබතුමා ළඟ තොරතුරු තියෙනවාද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර: මගේ ළඟ තොරතුරු නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ තොරතුරු දන්න අය ඉන්නවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: සැප්තැම්බර් මාසේ එකම bond එක දාලා 11.75ට ගත්තේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය කොච්චරද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන දෙකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ලියකියවිල්ලක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ කාලයේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සභාපති වශයෙන් හිටියේ කවුද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර: සභාපති හැටියට හිටියේ ආනන්ද සිල්වා මහතා. ඒ කාලයේත් රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි හැටියට හිටියේ මම. දැන් අපි මේ සංසන්දනය කරන්නේ හාත්පසින්ම වෙනස් කාලපරිච්ඡේද දෙකක්. 2014 වර්ෂයේ ජනවාරි මාසයේ අපි 8.75ට ගත්තේ. මේ කියන පිරිවැයට අපි අර ගෙන ඇත්තේ 2014 වර්ෂයේ සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ වෙනස්කම්

එක්ක සංසන්දනය කරලා බලන්න පුළුවන් පොලී අනුපාතයන් කොයි විධියට වෙනස් වෙලා තියෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ අනුවයි තීන්දුව ගත යුත්තේ. එහෙම නැතුව ජනවාරි මාසයේ 8.75ට ගත්තා, සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ 11.75ට ගත්තා කියන දෙක compare කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මුලින් පැහැදිලි කළේ, නිශ්චිතව අවුරුදු 30කට අදාළ bond එකක් 8.5ටත් ගත්තා. හැබැයි, ඒ වාගේම ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය ඇතුලේ ඊළඟ පරිච්ඡේදයකදී, තත්ත්වයන් වෙනස් වෙද්දි ඒක 11.5ටත් වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ.

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර: සත්‍ය වශයෙන්ම.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekera: Domestic Debt Management Committee එකේ දැන් ඉන්නේ කවුද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: දැනට මම ඉන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමා තමයි සභාපතිතුමා විධියට ඉන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට ඒ වැඩ කටයුතු කරන්න උපදෙස් ලැබෙන්නේ කොහෙන්ද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: Manual එකේ කරන ආකාරය තියෙනවා. ඒක පටන් ගැනීමේදී වෙන්නේ Ministry of Finance –Treasury එකෙන් cash flow එක අපට එවනවා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට ගත්තොත් ගිය මාසයේ අගදී අපට එවනවා, අගෝස්තු මාසේ requirements ටික මේක තමයි කියලා. දිනපතා අවශ්‍යතා දාලා, අපි කොච්චර borrow කරන්න ඕනෑද කියලා අපට දන්වා එවනවා. ඒකට අනුව තමයි DDMC එක කටයුතු කරන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපි දැන් මේ පරීක්ෂණය කරන කාරණය සම්බන්ධව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට යම් නියෝගයක් හෝ decision එකක් ලැබුණාද?

ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා: ඒ කාලපරිච්ඡේදයේ Mrs. Senevirathne තමයි superintendent විධියට හිටියේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: Mrs. Senevirathne, එහෙම එකක් ලැබුණාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එහි කොච්චරක් කියලාද දාලා තිබුණේ ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මාර්තු මාසයට රුපියල් බිලියන 172ක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒකෙන් ඔබතුමියලා ගන්න හැදුවේ කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Auction එක තිබුණේ 27වැනි දා. 27වැනිදා ගන්න ඕනෑ 02වැනිදා තියෙන settlement එකට. ඒකට අපට ඕනෑ වුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 13.5ක්. එකෙන් ඒ වන විට රුපියල් බිලියන 2.5ක් Treasury එකට fund කරලා තිබුණා. ඉතුරු එක තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: කීයක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 176 මෙන්න මේ කාලවකවානුවේදී ඕනෑ කියලාද, Treasury එක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දෙන්නේ? නැතිනම් මාසයට ඕනෑ ගණන කියනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සතිපතා අවශ්‍යයි කියලා අපට කියනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ සතියේ මෙපමණ ඕනෑ කියලා Treasury එකෙන් ඔබතුමියලාට දැනුම් දෙනවා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: දවසින් දවස කියනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දවසින් දවස මෙපමණ අවශ්‍යයි කියලා ඔබතුමියලාට දැනුම් දෙනවා. ඒ අනුව තමයි ඔබතුමියලා මේ කටයුතු කරන්නේ. එතකොට රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් අවශ්‍ය වෙලා තිබුණා. රුපියල් බිලියන 2යි ගණනක් Treasury එකට යවා තිබුණා. ඉතිරි රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක ගණනට තමයි ඉල්ලා තිබුණේ. හැබැයි, ඔබතුමියලා පත්තරේ දැම්මේ

රුපියල් බිලියන 1යි. ඇයි රුපියල් බිලියන 1ක් පත්තරේට දැම්මේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී 02වැනි දා වන විට 30-year bond එකක් issue කරලා primary dealers ලාගෙන් රැස් කර ගන්න පුළුවන් ප්‍රමාණය රුපියල් බිලියනයක් කියලා අපි දැන ගෙන හිටියා. ඊට වැඩිය වුණොත් වෙන්දේසි කරලා ඒක වැරැදුණොත්, ඒක වැරැදි තීරණයක් වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ඉතිරිය සෘජු නිකුත් කිරීම්වලින් ලබා ගන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අනික් එක රුපියල් බිලියනයකට වඩා වැඩිපුර ගණනක් වුණොත් primary dealersලා වැඩි ගණනක්-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියනයක් ඉල්ලලා, එතැනින් පස්සේ නේ වැඩි කරන්න කියලා නියෝගය ආවේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියලා ඉන්න තැනටම ඇවිත් කථා කළා. Public Debt Management Department එකේ හිටපු කවුරු හරි ඉන්නවා නම් කියන්න. ඉතිහාසයේ කිසියම් දවසක මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයකු පහළ තමන්ගේ department එකට ඇවිත්, මෙය පෙමණ ප්‍රමාණයකින් වැඩි කරන්න කියලා තිබෙනවාද?

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර: මම 2012 වර්ෂයේ ජනවාරි මස 01වැනි දා සිට 2015 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 09වැනි දා වනතුරු රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරි විධියට හිටියා. කිසිම දවසක මම ඉන්න කාලයේදී එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් උදා වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: Rs. 1 billion requirement එක වැඩි කරන්න කියලා හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මේ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් තිබෙන ගැටලු නිරාකරණය කර ගැනීමට තමයි, මේ නිලධාරීන් සමඟ අද මේ සාකච්ඡාව කළේ. අපි දැනට ඉන්නේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් භාවිතා කරන manual එක සම්බන්ධ ප්‍රශ්නයේ. මේක මූලික කාරණය. ඊට අමතරව මේ ගනුදෙනුව හා සම්බන්ධ අනිකුත් කාරණා පිළිබඳව අපි මීට කලින් සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒ කාරණා සාක්ෂි සටහන් හැටියට තියෙනවා. ඔබතුමා ඔය කියන කාරණාව නැවත නැවත සාකච්ඡා කර තියෙනවා. අවශ්‍ය නම් කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

නැත්නම් මම කියන්නේ මේ කාරණා ටික කථා කරන්න වෙලාව ඉතුරු කර ගන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ඒ කාරණා මේ ක්‍රියාවලියත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ කිරීමේ සම්පූර්ණ අයිතිය ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙනවා. මට ඒකයි පැහැදිලි කරන්න වුවමනා වුණේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අද මෙතැනට ETF and EPF එකෙන් ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නේ කවුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලෙන් කවුද ඉන්නේ?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලෙන් කවුද ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නේ. ඔබතුමිය කවුද කියලා හඳුන්වා දෙනවාද?

කේ.එන්.එන්.එම්. බණ්ඩාර මහත්මිය: මම මල්කාන්ති බණ්ඩාර.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ තනතුර මොකක්ද?

කේ.එන්.එන්.එම්. බණ්ඩාර මහත්මිය: අධිකාරි - සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමියන්ලාට කරන්න තිබෙන කාර්යය directly ගන්නේ නැතිව ඇයි මේ බැංකුවක් හරහා ආවේ?

කේ.එන්.එන්.එම්. බණ්ඩාර මහත්මිය: ඇත්තටම මම අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට ගිහිල්ලා මාස දෙකයි. ඒ කාලයේ වැඩ කළේ ජයලත් මහත්මයායි.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: මම තමයි ඒ කාලයේ හිටියේ. දැන් මම සහකාර අධිපතිවරයෙක් විධියට කටයුතු කරන්නේ. ඒ කාලයේ මම අධිකාරි - සේවක අර්ථසාධක විධියට තමයි කටයුතු කළේ. අපි බැංකුවකින් ඇවිත් නැහැ. අපිට directly පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්. Directly විතරයි එන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ඇමතිතුමා මේ කාරණා ටික මෙතැනින් අද දිනට අවසන් කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට එක කාරණයක් නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න තිබෙනවා. EPF එකේ මුදල් bondවලට පරිහරණය කිරීම පිළිබඳව, 2008 ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ 07 දින දරන

මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ සම්බන්ධව කාටද උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්. Governor උත්තර දෙනවාද? පී. සමරසිරි මහතා උත්තර දෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්නය සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ඇහුවා නම් හරි. ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳව අවබෝධයක් නැතිව කාටවත් පිළිතුරු දෙන්න අමාරුයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, 2008.10.07 දින තීරණය මඟින් තමයි EPF මුදල් Treasury bondsවල ආයෝජනය කිරීම පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි ප්‍රතිපත්තිය එළිදැක්විලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: ඇත්තටම ඒ තීරණය ආවේ ඊට ඉස්සර වෙලා. පළමුවැනි Board Meeting එක 2008.01.07 දින පැවැත්වුණා. ඔතැන Board papers එකක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2008.01.07 දින ලේඛනය පී. සමරසිරි මහත්මයා ළඟ තිබෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්, ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම ලේඛනයෙන් නිශ්චිතව සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා; මෙහිදී එම ලේඛනයෙන් ආවරණය වන මුදල් විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙන අරමුදල් මොනවාද කියලා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: අරමුදල් කියලා නැහැ. EPF and captive sources කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි කියන්නේ 2008.01.07 දින-

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: This document. EPF, ETF and NSB-

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: එතැන කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මොනවාද තිබෙන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: එතැන තිබෙනවා EPF, ETF and NSB.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සහ ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව. එතකොට 2008.01.07 කියන දවසට අදාළ තීරණය අරමුදල් තුනක්, EPF, ETF සහ ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව සම්බන්ධව අදාළයි. එම තීරණයට අදාළව 2008.01.07 දිනෙන් පසුව manual එකක් සංශෝධනය කළාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක මම කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2008.10.07 ලේඛනයේ Board Paper එකේ අරමුණ තිබෙනවා. ඒ අරමුණ I, II වශයෙන් සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. පළමු වැනි අරමුණ තමයි, EPF අරමුදල් භාවිතා කිරීම. හැබැයි, පොලී මුදල පිළිබඳ කොන්දේසියක් තිබෙනවා. Interest rate 5 basis point කියලා තිබෙනවා. දෙවැනි කොන්දේසිය, ආපසු වතාවක් EPF අරමුදල් මඟින් ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ තුළ යම් ක්‍රියාකාරීත්වයක් ඇති කිරීම ගැන. ඒක තමයි ඒ paper එකේ අරමුණ. දැන් එම ලේඛනයේ හතර වැනි ශීර්ෂය යටතේ ගත්ත තීරණ මොනවාද කියලා තිබෙනවා. එහි I සහ II වශයෙන් දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. අංක I තිබෙන්නේ, "To issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund" කියන වචනවලින් පස්සේ අත්අකුරෙන් ලියා තිබෙනවා, "and other captive sources" කියලා. එම ස්ථානයේ ඒ වෙනස්කමට කිසිදු අත්සනක් නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම other captive sources කියලා කියන්නේ EPF නොවෙයි. ඒකනේ කියන්නේ "and" කියලා. ඔය "other captive sources" කියන නිගමනය Board Paper එකේ මුල් අරමුණුවලට ගැලපෙන්නේ නැහැ. දැන් ඊට අදාළව Board Meeting එකේ minutes අද දින ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ අපි ඒ minutes දුන්නා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට එය පරීක්ෂා කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? (මේ අවස්ථාවේදී minutes ගරු ඇමතිතුමාට ගෙනවිත් දෙන ලදී.) Board Meeting minutes කියන්නේ මේක නොවෙයි. මට නිවැරදි Board minute එක තෝරලා දෙන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: උඩින්ම තිබෙන්නේ ඒක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Annex 12 එක නොවෙයි. ඒක තමයි නිගමනය; ඒක නොවෙයි minute එක. Minute එක කියන්නේ Secretary maintain කරන ලේඛනයක් ඇති නේ, ඒක. එය දැන් නැති බව කියයි, එය අපට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මීට කලින් ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහත්මයා කිව්වා, other captive sources කියන දේ මත තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලා කටයුතු කළේ කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා private placementsවලට ගියේ කියලා.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: Captive sources define කරන්න කියලා තමයි- නමුත් Captive sources කියලා particularly define කරලා නැහැ කියලා තමයි කිව්වේ. විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයෝජනයක් තමයි ඒක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ පෞද්ගලික අරමුදල්.

ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: පෞද්ගලික හෝ රාජ්‍ය ආයෝජන.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ආචාර්යතුමා, මේ විධියට EPF ගැන වෙනම Board Paper එකක් එන්නේ EPF මුදල් මේ විධියට Treasury bondsවල හෝ කොටස් වෙළෙඳපොළේ ආයෝජනය කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන කාරණය පිළිබඳව විශේෂිත ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය නිගමනයක් අවශ්‍ය වුණ නිසා. ඒ EPF පනතේ තිබෙන යම් යම් හේතු නිසා. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ විධියේ විශේෂිත order එකක්, විශේෂිත නිගමනයක් අරගෙන ආවේ.

එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා: EPF සම්බන්ධ මම කථා කරන්න යන්නේ නැහැ. හේතුව මොකද, මට එය අදාළ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: EPF ගැන දන්න කවුද ඉන්නේ?

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ, මේ සඳහන් කරන්නේ EPF එක ගැන ගත්ත තීරණයකට වඩා, රාජ්‍ය ණය කලමනාකරණයේ අවශ්‍යතාව සඳහා ගත්ත තීරණයක්. EPF පනතේ තිබෙනවා අපිට ආයෝජනය කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක ගැටලුවක් නැති තැනක්. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම bonds වලට, EPF මුදල් පාවිච්චි කිරීම ඊට කලින් කරලා නැති නිසා, මෙහෙම විශේෂිත Board Paper එකක් අවශ්‍ය වුණා.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි. Auction වලට අමතරව private placement වලට දාන ඒවාට තමයි ඒ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Auction එකට EPF මුදල් පාවිච්චි කරන එක තමයි රීතිය.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: EPF Act එකේ තිබෙන විධියට ආයෝජනය කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. Auction එකෙන්ද කොහොමද කියලා, කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ප්‍රායෝගික භාවිතය - practice එක - අනුව, වෙන්දේසියෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා තමයි EPF මුදල් යෙදෙව්වේ.

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: මුල් කාලය ගත්තොත්, මුලින් සියල්ලම තිබිලා තිබෙන්නේ Central Bank එකේ ඒවා.

අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙහෙම Board Paper එකක් ඕනෑ වුණේ ඇයි?

ආර්.ඒ.ඒ. ජයලත් මහතා: Interest එකට ආපු pressure එක වෙන්න ඇති කියලා මම විශ්වාස කරනවා. Pressure එක අඩු කර ගන්න EPF එක භාවිත කර තිබෙන බව තමයි හැඟෙන්නේ. ඒ කාලයේ හිටපු නැති නිසා මම ඒ ගැන හරියටම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කවුරු හරි තව විශේෂඥයෙක් ඉන්නවාද මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පිළිතුරු දෙන්න. අපි රඳා පවතින්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා මත. 2008.10.07 දිනැති මේ specific Board Paper එක ඕනෑ වුණේ ඇයි? මෙය අවශ්‍ය නම් බලන්න දෙන්නම්. 2008 වසරේදී EPF ගැන බලපු නිලධාරියෙක් ඉන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2008 වසර වන විට රාජ්‍ය ණය

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී වශයෙන් කටයුතු කළේ මම. ඔය Board Paper එක අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නෙත් මම. ඒ නිසා මම පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න කැමැතියි. 2008 වසර වන විට අපට තිබුණු ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාටම මතක ඇති විශේෂයෙන්ම යුධ කටයුතු සඳහා විශාල වශයෙන් ණය ගන්න වෙලා, රජයේ ණය බර තාවය විශාල වශයෙන් වැඩි වෙලා තිබුණා. ඒ කාලයේ වෙළෙඳ පොළේ පොලී අනුපාත පාලනය කිරීම අපට විශාල ප්‍රශ්නයක් වුණා. මේ හින්දා ගත්ත එක තීරණයක් තමයි මේ Board Paper එක. අපි EPF එක වෙනම auction එකට පිටින් අරගෙන, අපි තීරණය කරන පොලී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ EPF සල්ලි රජයට දුන්නා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: EPF සල්ලි ආයෝජනය කිරීමේ වැඩි නම්‍යශීලිභාවයක් අවශ්‍ය වුණා, තරගකාරීව යන එකට අමතරව direct placements වලටත් EPF සල්ලි පාවිච්චි වුණා.

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට තව පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමකට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න. මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට මේ Board Paper එක දැම්මාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මෙය සාකච්ඡා කළාම, "සල්ලි හොයන්නේ කොහෙන්ද? අධිපතිතුමා කියපු විධියට අඩු පිරිවැයට සල්ලි ගන්නේ කොහෙන්ද?" කියන එක තමයි ඒ අවස්ථාවේ තිබුණු ප්‍රශ්නය. එතකොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළා, EPF එක විතරක් නොවෙයි අනිත් captive sources මෙතැනට ගන්න කියලා. ඒක තමයි, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ ලේඛනය ගැන වගකීම ඔබතුමා භාර ගන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්. මේ ලේඛනය තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමා මේ ලේඛනයේ වගකීම භාර ගන්නවාද?

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ ලේඛනය, කල් තියලා, නිගමනයත් එක්කමයි type කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නිගමනය කරන කොට නැති, ඉතාම බරපතළ අර්ථයක් තිබෙන "... and other captive sources..." කියන වචන ටික සහ ඒ ශීර්ෂයට නොගැළපෙන ඒ ක්ෂේත්‍රය මේ Board Paper එකේ නිගමනයට ආවේ කොහොමද? ඔබතුමාට දොස් කියනවා නොවෙයි. දන්නවා නම් කියන්න, නැත්නම් "නැහැ" කියන්න.

සී.ජේ.පී. සිරිවර්ධන මහතා: සාමාන්‍ය Board Paper එකක් දැම්මාම, මුදල් මණ්ඩලය කියනවා, අදාළ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රධානීන්ට ඇවිල්ලා, "මේකෙන් අදහස් කරන්නේ මොකක්ද?" කියලා පැහැදිලි කරන්න කියලා. එතැන අදහස් කරන මූලික හේතුව කිව්වාම, "අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළේ පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කර ගන්න නම්, EPF එක විතරක් නොවෙයි අනිත් captive sources මෙතැනට ගන්න" කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කළා. ඒක තමයි මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණවල තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ අනුව අදාළ Manuel එකේ 8(01) අනුව, හැකි තාක් දුරට -as much as possible- වෙන්දේසිය මඟින් මුදල් සොයා ගැනීම තමයි රීතිය. ඊළඟට - balance fund- ඉතිරිය රජය විසින් තීරණය කරන ක්‍රමවේදයකට සොයා ගැනීම. දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කවුද? මහත්මිය, මේ පරීක්ෂණයට විෂය වෙලා තිබෙන 27වැනි දා සිදු වූ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව ගැනයි මම මේ නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ. එදා දවසේ මේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සිදු කිරීම පිළිබඳව තීරණය ගැනීමට නියමිතව තිබුණේ Tender Board එක. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ Tender Board එකේ සාමාජිකයෙක් නොවෙයිද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Tender Board එකේ ඒ තීරණය ගැනීමට පෙර රුපියල් බිලියන 01ක සීමාවේ ඉඳලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් දක්වා

වූ බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයට යාම පිළිබඳව ඒ තීරණය Tender Board එක ඇතුලේ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වුණාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සාකච්ඡා කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ Tender Board එකේ සාමාජිකයන්ව සිටියේ කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Tender Board එකේ සභාපති විධියට සිටියේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, පී. සමරසිරි මහතා. ඊට අමතරව, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරි, එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා සිටියා. Economic Research Department එක භාර සහකාර අධිපති, සී.පී.ඒ. කරුණාතිලක මහත්මයා සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි වශයෙන් මම සිටියා. ඒ වාගේම Domestic Operations Department එකේ Director සිටියා. Economic Research Department එකේ Director Mrs. Gunaratne and Additional Superintendentsලා දෙදෙනෙක් සිටියා. ඒ කියන්නේ ඔක්කෝම 08 දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කමිටුවේ ප්‍රධානියා වන්නේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පී. සමරසිරි මහතා. ඔබතුමාගේ කමිටුවට, ඒ කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණ ගැනීමට හැකියාව ඇති, ප්‍රමාණවත් තරම් දැනුම ඇති, ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ, පළපුරුදු නිලධාරි මණ්ඩලයක් සිටියාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 27වැනි දා සිදු වුණු තීරණ අතුරෙන් එක තීරණයක් තමයි, රුපියල් බිලියනයේ සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා යන්න තීරණය කරපු එක. ඒ වාගේම ඊට වඩා වැඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලැබිලා තිබුණත් රුපියල් බිලියන 10න් ඔබ්බට නොයන්නත් ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කළා. නිවැරදියි ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ මූලිකත්වයෙන් යුතුව සාමාජිකයන් 08 දෙනා ඒ මොහොතේ ඒ ගත්ත තීරණය, ඔබතුමාගේ වෘත්තීය විනිශ්චය අනුව ගත්ත තීරණයක්. හරි නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. මගේ තනි තීරණයක් නොවෙයි. Committee එකක් තිබුණා. ඒකේ Minutes තිබෙනවා. මම පෞද්ගලිකව-,

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා පෞද්ගලිකව නොවෙයි කණ්ඩායම එක්ක ගත්ත තීරණයක්.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්. කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගත්ත තීරණයක්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 20ට ගිහිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ට අඩු වුණා නොවෙයිද? කවුරුවත් රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ගන්න කියලා යෝජනා කළේ නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එහෙම කළේ නැද්ද සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Department එකට Governor ආපු වෙලාවේ ඉස්සෙල්ලාම කිව්වේ රුපියල් බිලියන 20 කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: විස්ස කියලා කිව්වා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි ඔබතුමන් බොරු කියන්නේ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අපිට එහෙම යෝජනාවක් ආවේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: විස්ස දහය දක්වා ඊට පසුව අඩු වුණා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කියන පරිදි Governor යම් විධියක මතයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළා, රුපියල් බිලියන විස්සක් දක්වාම යා හැකිව තිබෙනවා කියලා. නමුත් සමරසිරි මහත්මයාගේ මූලිකත්වයෙන් යුත් කමිටුව, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී තීරණය කළා, අපි විස්සට යන්නේ නැහැ. අපි උපරිම වශයෙන් යන්නේ දහයටයි කියලා? ඒක හරිද? දීපා මහත්මියගේ අදහස් පිළි ගන්නේ නැද්ද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒක දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සිදු වූ දෙයක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දීපා සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියත්. අධිපතිතුමාත් අතර

ඇති වූ සංවාදය ඔබතුමන් දැන ගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: දැන ගෙන සිටියේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරිද? අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියටද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතුමා මතු කළානේ, ඉස්සෙල්ලා ගන්න කියලා. මෙතුමියට කියපු කාරණාව සමරසිංහ මහත්මයා නොදැන සිටියාද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය, එතුමියට අදහසක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ ඒ ගැන. ඒකයි මම ඇහුවේ.

අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතුමිය තමයි නායිකාව. සමරසිරි මහතා ඔබතුමා කොපමණ කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවේ සේවය කර තිබෙනවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඒ වන විට අවුරුදු 30ක්.

අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: බොහොම පළපුරුද්දක් තිබුණා සහ ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨත්වයක් තිබුණා, කෙළින් තීරණයක් අරගෙන රටට, ආයතනයට නිවැරදි තීරණයක් ගන්න. ඔබගේ මණ්ඩලය උපරිම විශ්වාසය අනුව එම තිරණය ගත්තා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් කලින් අවසර ඉල්ලා සිටි පරිදි, මම දැන ගන්න කැමතියි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙනුත් සහ මොන අධිපතිතුමා වුණත් කමක් නැහැ පිළිතුරු දුන්නාට, ratio එක අසූවයි විස්සයි කියලා. එහෙම regulation එකක් හෝ Board Paper එකක් හරි තිබෙනවා කියලාද විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව හෝ මහ බැංකුව කියන්නේ. නැත්නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා බලපු අවුරුද්දක් 2013 වර්ෂය හෝ 2014 වර්ෂයේ සිට, මේ සිද්ධිය දක්වා කාලය තුළ bonds ගත්ත විධිය තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ ගත්ත විධිය තුළ අවසානයේ වෙලා තිබෙන results අනුවද ඔබතුමන්ලා අසූවයි විස්සයි හෝ හැත්තෑපහයි විස්සයි හරි කියලා කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ට ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් දැන ගන්න ඕනෑද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතුමාගෙනුත්. ඔබතුමාත් කියන්න.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: පසු ගිය කාලයේ දිගටම අරන් තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ 4:3 එකේ analyze කරලා තිබෙනවා, ඒ ගත්ත ප්‍රමාණය. අවසාන උත්තරය එන්නේ ඒකයි. එහෙම නැතුව කොහේ හෝ තිබෙන සටහනක් විධියට නොවෙයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක පැහැදිලි කර කියලා තිබෙනවා 4:3 Item එකේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඒක මහ බැංකුවෙන් අරන් තිබෙන තීරණයක් නොවෙයි, ඒක practice එක ඇතුළේ වෙලා තිබෙන දෙයක්.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: බොහෝ වෙලාවට වෙලා තිබෙන සිදු වීම කාරණා කිරීමේදි ඔය rate එකේ තමයි ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැතුව අසූවයි විස්සයි කියලා කොහේ හෝ Monetary Board එකේ decision එකක් අරගෙන නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සටහනේ තිබෙනවා "වැඩිදුර නිරීක්ෂණය වේ" කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධ්‍යක්ෂතුමිය ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අධිපතිතුමා මට මතයක් ප්‍රකාශ කළා කියලා කිව්වත්, එය මතයක් නොවෙයි. මට අන්තිමට කියලා ගියේ, "Do it" කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමිය සාක්ෂිවල කිසිම තැනෙක "Do it" කියලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: අද තමයි "Do it" කියලා කිව්වා කියලා ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අද තමයි ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ එහෙම දෙයක් කිව්වා කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමියගේ ප්‍රකාශයේ 18 වන පිටුව මම කියවන්නම්. "Why do you not go for 10?"

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: පළමුවෙන්ම අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය ඒක.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Right. I am posing this question to you. Where have you stated that the Governor said, "Do it"? You gave evidence last time. So, I am asking you a question. Since I was not there, wanted to ask this question from you. Where have you said that Governor said, "Do it?"

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: Can you tell us about the conversation?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Please let me finish this.

සභාපතිතුමා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මට පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමටයි මම අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමා අහන්නේ, "Do it" කියලා Governor සඳහන් කිරීම මෙතුමිය කොයි ස්ථානයේදී ද සඳහන් කළේ කියලා නේද අහන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සාක්ෂිවල දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න කළා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මොනවද කිව්වේ කියලා? So, let me finish this. Do not disturb because it is giving an undue advantage for the person to answer. So, let me finish it please. Decently I am asking a question.

Where have you stated in your evidence that Governor said, "Do it?"

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathne: Today I am saying.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You have never said it before.

Mrs. C.M.D.N.K. Senevirathne: No.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What you said earlier was a suggestion by the Governor. You are an educated lady. You were under oath and you were giving evidence last time. If it is not, that Governor told you to do it, easily you could have said –

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මට ඇමතිතුමා කියන කොට තමයි මතක් වුණේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: ඇමතිතුමා නොවෙයි, you were discussing there with your peers. I saw that. If Governor had given directions to do it, you could have said, "He told me to do it." It is very easy. That is why I am asking you. You are an educated person and your qualifications are there.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: සමාව ගන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සමාව ගන්න එපා. Can I say this?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, එහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් කෝප් සභාවේ කවුරු හෝ අහලා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අහලා තිබෙනවා. Let me finish.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: I must make this request.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමා.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: I think the Hon. Minister is very welcome to continue the line of questioning. But I think it will be very nice if it is can be done in a better environment. I do not want my colleagues to be put under undue pressure.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: May I say this, Hon. Chairman?

The Hon. Mahindananda Aluthgamage: Do not give orders. Talk nicely.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I am using the best language. My tone is for the question because that is an important question. She and even the Governor do not have to get bothered my tone and. I am using a very good language.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is the COPE. I direct a very decent question. All I am asking is if she has lied, if she has not said it I have the right to ask that question. I am not

forcing on her. I am not calling her names. So, I can ask that question.

The Hon. Mahindananda Aluthgamage: Go ahead.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I am not talking to you. I am talking to Chairman.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මට කථා කරන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let me ask this question and finish. සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන වැඳගත් වෙන්නේ කාරණා දෙකයි. එක කාරණයක් තමයි මේ direct placements ක්‍රමයද පැවතියේ? මේ ක්‍රමවේදය ආවේ කොහොමද? මේක වෙනස් කළාද? මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන විධියට දෙකම තිබෙනවාද? Direct placements තිබෙනවා; auctions තිබෙනවා. මේක ඕනෑ වෙලාවකට auctions පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? මේකේ ඕනෑ වෙලාවට direct placements පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? ඒක තමයි අදාළ ප්‍රශ්නය. ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මේ කියන නිලධාරිනියට නියෝගයක් කළාද? නියෝගය කියන එක ඉංග්‍රීසි භාෂාවෙන් හෝ සිංහල භාෂාවෙන් නියෝගයක් වශයෙන් දක්වන්න ඕනෑ. කිසිම තැනෙක එතුමිය නියෝගයක් කළා කියන එක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ. එතුමිය Minute එකක් දාලා තිබෙනවා "Give a direction." කියලා. නමුත් අධිපතිතුමා ඇහුවාම එතුමා කිව්ව උත්තරය තමයි ඒක අපි හබ කළේ නැහැ. "If I were you I will take this money." කියලා ගියා. අනෙක් වැදගත්ම කාරණය වන්නේ Dr. Azim මැතිතුමා කිව්වා, මේ ලියවිලි එතුමාගෙන් කලින් ඉල්ලුවා කියලා. පසුව එතුමාගේ සාක්ෂියේ සඳහන් කළා, එතුමා ගිහින් එම ලැයිස්තුව භාර දුන්නා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: වෙන පටලන්න එපා. මෙතුමා කියන කාරණාවත්, තිබුණු දේවලුත්, ඔබතුමන්ලා කියාපු දේවලුත් සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල verbatim වශයෙන් තිබෙනවා. අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒවා ආයේත් බලන්න පුළුවන්. මෙතුමා දැන් කියන දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා. එදා කියාපු දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා. ඔබතුමා කියන දේ ගැන කලබල වෙන්නත් එපා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසාසායක මහතා: ආපු වේලාවේ ඉඳන් ඔබතුමා නේ කථා කරන්නේ. අපි මොකුත් කියන්නේ නැතිව අහගෙන ඉන්නවා නේ. මොකක්ද මේකේ තේරුම? අපටත් අහන්න ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. මෙතැනට ආපු වේලාවේ ඉඳන් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කිය කියා අහනවා. අපි ඒවා අහගෙන ඉන්නවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට මේ කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගෙන් එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න තිබෙනවා. කීයටද මේ කාරක සභාව අවසන් කරන්නේ? ඔබතුමන්ලා මොකක් හරි තීරණය කරන්න. අවසන් කරන වේලාවකුත් තිබෙන්න එපායැ. අද සාකච්ඡාව අවසන් කරන්නේ කීයටද? රෑ වෙනකම් මෙතැන ඉන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාට විධායක බලය තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා තීන්දු කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා අදහස් දක්වන විට සීමාවක් හදා ගන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මතු කරපු කාරණාවට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරද්දී තමයි එතුමිය කථා කළේ. මම සිතුවේ එතුමිය ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න යනවා කියලායි. එතුමිය "මට ප්‍රකාශයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙනවා" කියලා තමයි ඒ කාරණය කිව්වේ. ඒ කාරණය මත නැවත හරස් ප්‍රශ්න එම අවස්ථාවේ අහනවාද, වෙන වේලාවක අහනවාද, අපි ඒ කාරණාව පිළිගන්නවාද, නැද්ද කියන එක වෙනම දෙයක්. එතුමිය ඒ වේලාවේ නැගිටලා නේ "මට ප්‍රකාශයක් කරන්න තිබෙනවා කියලා" ඉදිරිපත් කළේ. ඒ ගැන තමයි ඔබතුමා දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක වැදගත්ම දේ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: වැදගත්ම දේ වුණත් ඔබතුමා ඒ අවස්ථාවේ අහපු විධිය අනුව තමයි එතුමියට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න සිදු වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමිය පිළිතුරු දුන්නා නේ. එතුමියට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ඒක එක්තරා සීමාවක් ඇතුළත සිදු කළ යුතුයි. නැවත ප්‍රශ්න ඇසීමේ අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. එතුමිය කරපු ප්‍රකාශය පිළිබඳ ඔබතුමන්ලා නැවත අහන ප්‍රශ්නවලට පිළිතුරු නොදී ඉන්නත් එතුමියට පුළුවන්කම තිබුණා. මොකද, එතුමිය හිතලා කැමැත්තෙන් තමයි ඒ ප්‍රකාශය කළේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට අධිපතිතුමාගේ පිළිතුර ලැබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මට මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසන් ඉඩ කරන්න දෙන්නකෝ. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලා ඕනෑ තීරණයක් ගන්න. අත්‍යවශ්‍ය කාරණයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මමත් ඒ විධියට ඉන්නම්. මමයි ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරක් දුන්නේ නැතිව නේ තවම යන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let me continue. Why are you blocking me?

සභාපතිතුමා: මම එහෙම block කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මට අවස්ථාව දුන්නා. මට මේ කාරණාව අවසන් කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මෙතැන අපි අවබෝධයෙන් කරන වැඩයි, හැම වේලාවේම misuse කරන එකයි දෙකක්. මම ප්‍රශ්නය අහන කොට මම කිව්වා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් සහ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් පිළිතුරු බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා කියලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ පිළිතුර ලැබුණා. මේ පැත්තට හැරෙන කොට තමයි එතුමිය පිළිතුරු දුන්නේ. එතකොට ගරු සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ප්‍රශ්න වගයක් අහන්න පටන් ගත්තා. මම ඒකත් එක්ක හැපෙන්න ගියේ නැහැ. ඒකෙන් කියන්නේ නැහැ මගේ අදහස withdraw කළා කියලා. මට ඒකෙන් suffer වෙන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මෙතැන කාටවත් misuse කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. එම නිසා ඔබතුමා, සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන් මට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න Governorගේ අදහසට ඇහුන් කන් දෙන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: First, let me finish this.

The Hon. Bimal Ratnayake: I am asking this from the Hon. Chairman not from you because I raised the question first.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට මේක මේ විධියට කර ගෙන යන්න බැහැ. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයේ තමයි අපි හිටියේ. මම මේ තත්ත්වය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කරනවා. මට මේ විධියට මේක කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම සභාපතිතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න අවසර ඉල්ලුවා. Let me finish it.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මතු වුණේ ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළව දෙන ලද පිළිතුරේදී නේ. අධිපතිතුමාගේ පිළිතුර දෙන්නේ නිලධාරිතුමිය කියලායි මම විශ්වාස කළේ. නමුත් ඒ නිලධාරිතුමිය මතු කළේ වෙන කාරණයක්. එම නිසා නේ පැටලුනේ. මට ඒක නතර කරන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරලා ඔබතුමාගේ අවස්ථාව ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට තත්පර 10ක් දෙනවාද මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා තත්පර 10 තමයි හැම තිස්සේම ඉල්ලන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එච්චර නේ මම කථා කරන්නේ. ඊට පසුව නවත්වනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ අපි මේ COPE එකෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ - කරුණාකර මට කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කථා කරන්නකෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, අපි ඔක්කොම එක කාරණයක් උදෙසා නේ මේ කමිටුවට එන්නේ. අපි මේකෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්නේ සියලු කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් නිවැරදි අවබෝධයක් ලබා ගැනීම. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාද ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවේ, ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයෙන් මේ කාරණාව මතු වුණාද කියන එක නොවෙයි

වැදගත් වන්නේ. ඉතා වැදගත් කාරණාවක් මතු වුණාට පසුව ඒක නිරාකරණය කර ගැනීමයි අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ. මේකේ වැදගත්ම දේ තමයි Public Debt Department එකට direction එකක් ලැබුණා කියලා තිබෙනවා Governorගෙන්. ඒ කාරණය කියන්නේ මේ නිලධාරිතුමිය. ඒ හැර සමරසිංහ මහත්මයාවත්, Public Debt Department එකේ වෙන කවුරුවත් එහෙම නියෝගයක් ලැබුණා කියලා සඳහන් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒක වැදගත්ම කාරණය වෙන්න පුළුවන් ඔබතුමාට. තව මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් ප්‍රශ්න කරන අවස්ථාවේ ඒ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න තිබෙන අයිතිය මම ආරක්ෂා කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මට අවස්ථාව දුන්නාට පසුව ලබා දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම නැවතත් කියන්නේ ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මතුකරපු ප්‍රශ්නයට තමයි මේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම කෙරුණේ. ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු ලැබුණාද නැද්ද කියන එක මම පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ එතුමාගෙන්. එතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට අවස්ථාව විවර කරන්නේ නැතිව -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා නේ මට අවස්ථාව දුන්නේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අර මහත්මියගේ ප්‍රකාශයට ඔබතුමායි මැදිහත්වුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මට අවස්ථාව දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අවස්ථාව දුන්න එක වරදක් නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමාට සංයමයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ ඒක අවසන් කර ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අවසන් කර ගන්න ඔබතුමා මට සංයමයක් දෙන්න එපායැ. මගේ අසංයමයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ නේ. මම ප්‍රශ්න අහගෙන යන කොට මට බාධා කළා. ඔබතුමා මට අවස්ථාවක් දුන්නා සභාපති වශයෙන් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න. මම අහගෙන යන කොට අනෙක් අය බාධා කරන කොට ඔබතුමා මගේ සංයමයක් ගැන කතා කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසන් කර ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමිය සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා, විශේෂයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එකේත් තිබෙනවා ඔබතුමියගේ එකම සාක්ෂිය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියට යම් කිසි ආකාරයක අවබෝධයක් ලබා දුන්නා කියන්න පුළුවන් එකම ආකාරය මට තේරෙන භාෂාවෙන්, "Why do not go for ten?" කියන එකයි. මේ හැර ඔබතුමිය වෙන භාෂාවකින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඔබතුමියට direction එකක් දීලා තිබෙනවා කියලා ඔබතුමිය මීට පෙර දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් ලබා දුන්න සාක්ෂියක සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද නැද්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කොහේ හරි තිබෙනවා නම් අපට පෙන්වන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සාක්ෂියක් දෙන්නේ අහන ප්‍රශ්න අනුව නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමිය පොරොන්දු වෙනවාද වෙන විධියකට එහෙම සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා කියලා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මම minute කර ගත්තා කියලා මම සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බොහොම ස්තුතියි. සභාපතිතුමා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ සියලු කාරණා සලකා බලා නිගමනය කර තිබෙන මේ report එක අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා යම් කිසි ආකාරයක direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා මෙහි තිබෙනවා. වෙන කිසිම දෙයක් සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ඒක වාර්තාගත කර ගන්න. ඊට පසුව ඕනෑම දෙයක් කරන්න. මෙතුමා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා ඉන් පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් බිලියන 10කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරියගෙන් (මෙතුමියගෙන්) ප්‍රශ්න කර තිබිණි. "Why do not go for ten?" මේ හැර මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා වෙන ආකාරයකින් direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා මෙතුමිය විසින් කිසිම

සාක්ෂියක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ කියන එක විතරක් වාර්තා කර ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමියට ඒ ගැන තව පැහැදිලි කරන්න තිබෙනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: මම ආපු ගමන් මේ සාක්ෂිය ප්‍රකාශ කළා. මීට කලින් මම Bribery Commission එකට ගියා. ඊට පෙර ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටුවට ගියා. එහෙදිත් මම ප්‍රකාශ කළා. සාකච්ඡාවලදීත් විස්තර කරලා කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් කලින් ඇහුවේ 80:20 කියන අනුපාතය - bonds ගන්න කොට ඔබතුමන්ලා tools දෙකක් පාවිච්චි කරනවා නේ. 80:20 කියන අනුපාතය ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ regulation එකක් විධියට හරි, Board decision එකක් විධියට හරි තිබෙනවාද? එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒක best practices ඇතුළේ, අඩුම cost එක ඇතුළේ ගන්න ගිහින් ආපු අවසාන result එකද කියලා දැන ගන්න කැමැතියි.

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: Hon. Member, I must say I need to have some help from my colleague because at the moment, as you know, we are using a full auction system. So, what happened earlier, I am not aware whether there was an actual decision, Can any of my colleagues help me out of that?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: මම මේ කාරණය මීට පෙරත් පැහැදිලි කළා. අපි මේ තාක් පැහැදිලි කළා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අරගෙන තිබෙන තීරණ සහ රාජ්‍ය ණය පාලනය පිළිබඳ මූලධර්ම මත පදනම් වෙලා auction ක්‍රමයට සහ direct placement ක්‍රමයට යනවා කියලා. ඒකේ තිබෙන මූලධර්මය තමයි අඩු පිරිවැය සහ අඩු අවදානම. මේ පදනම මත යන කොට ඒ මූලධර්ම මත රජයට සහ රටට යහපත් වන විධියට රාජ්‍ය ණය රැස් කිරීමේදී අපි බොහෝ වේලාවට යොදා ගන්නේ අඩු පිරිවැය සහ වෙළඳ පොළේ පොලි අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කිරීම. අපි ඒ මත ණය රැස් කිරීමේදී, ඉතිහාසය දිහා බලලා data එකතු කරලා -දත්ත එකතු කරලා- බැලුවාම ඔය සියයට 80:20 කියලා ඇති. හැබැයි අපි එහෙම නිර්නායකයක් තීරණය කරලා ඒ අනුව කටයුතු කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක පසු ගිය data බලන විට ලැබෙන outcome එකක් විතරයි.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට තවත් කරුණක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවසර දෙන්න. මම මෙම Tender Board Meeting එකේ සාමාජිකයෙක් වනවා. මීට පෙර පැවැති කාරක සභාවේදී ඒ පිළිබඳව කරුණු පැහැදිලි කළා. එහිදී මම කිව්වා, මෙතෙක් පැහැදිලි කළ මූලධර්මයන්ට හා සිද්ධාන්තයන්ට බැහැර recommendation එකක් තමයි රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මඟින් ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයට කරලා තිබුණේ කියලා. අපි සාමාන්‍ය ඉතිහාසයේ එකක් දමලා, ඒ offer කරපු amount එක වාගේ දෙකහමාර ගුණයක් හෝ තුන්ගුණයක් වාගේ තමයි ගන්නේ. මම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව ඇතුළු අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් පැහැදිලිව ඇහුවා, මෙවැනි recommendation එකක් කළේ ඇයි? අපි මෙවැනි තීරණ ගන්නේ කොහොමද? පොලී අනුපාතය විශාල ලෙස වෙනස් වෙනවා, ඒ නිසා රජයට දරන්න වන වියදම වැඩි වෙනවා කියලා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී එතුමිය කිව්වා, අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණ instructions දුන්නා කියලා. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒ කාරණය පැහැදිලි ඇති නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ හැමෝම කිව්වා, මෙය කරන්න හොඳ නැති බව අධිපතිතුමා හමු වෙලා කියමු කියලා. නමුත් අපි එතැනට යන්න සූදානම් වන විට තමයි එතුමා කාර්යාලයේ නැති බව දැන ගත්තේ. අපි ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී තමයි direct placement ක්‍රමවේදය නතර කර ඇති බව දැන ගත්තේ. නමුත් සඳුදා වන විට රජයට සල්ලි දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ සල්ලි දෙන්න වෙනත් ක්‍රම වේදයක් නැති නිසා තමයි කලින් සඳහන් කළ රුපියල් බිලියන **දහය ගන්න** සිදු වුණේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එම කාරණා නැවත වතාවක් ප්‍රකාශ කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නැහැ කියලායි මම හිතන්නේ. මොකද, මීට කලින් මේ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කර තිබෙනවා. දැන් කථා කිරීම සඳහා නිලධාරී මහත්වරුන් දෙදෙනෙක් අත එසෙව්වා. ඒ පිළිබඳව **ධම්මික** මහත්මයාගේ අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

එන්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ආර්.ඩී. නානායක්කාර මහතා: මම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සිටි කාලය තුළ, පසුගිය තොරතුරු ගවේෂණයන් කළොත්, ඒ කාලයේ තමයි වැඩිපුර සෘජු ක්‍රමයට direct

placements ලබා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් අපි එය සිතා මතා කරන දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ වාගේම auction ක්‍රමය හරහා මෙපමණ ගන්න ඕනෑ, direct placement හරහා මෙපමණ ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් තීන්දුවක් දීලා නැහැ. Domestic Debt Management Committee එක මාසයේ මුල රැස්වී, සාකච්ඡා කර, එය ක්‍රියාවට නන්වද්දී වෙළඳ පොළේ සිදු වන උච්චාවචනයන් නිසා එය වෙනස් කරන්න වෙනවා. එහි ප්‍රතිඵලයක් හැටියට 20යි 80 හෝ වෙනත් අනුපාතයක් ලැබී තිබෙනවා. එය එම ක්‍රියාදාමයේ ප්‍රතිඵලයක් විනා ගත් තීරණයකට අනුගත වීමක් නොවෙයි කියන එකයි මට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම tender board එක පත් කර තිබෙන්නේ ඇයි?

Mr. Indrajith Coomaraswami: I think the Deputy Governor in charge may answer it.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: තනි තීරණයක් නොගෙන කණ්ඩායමක් විධියට තීරණ ගැනීම සඳහායි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මේ tender board එක වාඩි වෙලා කරන්නේ, කණ්ඩායමක් හැටියට තීන්දුවක් ගන්න එක නේ. එසේ නම් මේ tender board එක - කණ්ඩායමේ 08 දෙනා-ගත්තේ වැරදි තීන්දුවක්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: අපි tender board එකේදී අවශ්‍ය කරුණ සාකච්ඡා කර, තීරණයක් ගත්තා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: Tender board එක ගත්ත තීන්දුව හරිද, වැරදිද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී තිබූ සාධක අනුව, tender board එක ගත්ත තීරණය හරි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා 08 දෙනා හරි තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ ඔබතුමන්ලා 08 දෙනාගේ තීන්දුවක්. හරිද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා: හරි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක අවශ්‍යතාවයක් රටේ තිබුණා කියලා මීට කලින් සඳහන් වුණා. පසුව එම රුපියල් බිලියන 13න් රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න තීරණය කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු නිහාල් ගලප්පත්ති මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මෙම කාරක සභාවට සහභාගී වෙනවාද?

ගරු නිහාල් ගලප්පත්ති මහතා: ඔව්.

(සභාපතිතුමා මේ අවස්ථාවේදී කාරක සභාවට සහභාගී වීම සඳහා ගරු නිහාල් ගලප්පත්ති මහතාට අවසර ලබා දෙන ලදී.)

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. රුපියල් බිලියන 03ක් කලින් ලබා ගෙන තිබුණා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී රටේ අවශ්‍යතාවය තිබුණා රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක්. ඉන් රුපියල් බිලියන 03ක් කලින් ලබා ගෙන තිබුණා. ඉතිරි රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ගන්න තමයි තීරණය කළේ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙය පරීක්ෂණයක්. ඒ වාගේම tender board එක ගත් තීරණය හරි කියලා එක් නිලධාරියෙකුට පමණක් මෙතැන ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න බැහැ. මොකද, ඒ 08 දෙනාගේම ප්‍රකාශ මෙතැනට අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම මම අද check කළේ නැහැ. නමුත් පසුගිය කාරක සභාවේදී සමරසිරි මහතා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරු, ඊට කලින් කාරක සභාවේදී ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරුවලට වඩා පරස්පර වුණා. එම කාරක සභාවේ සිටි නිසා, මම ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් බැලුවා.

අනෙක් එක තමයි, එදා පරීක්ෂණය කරන විට Governor එම තනතුරට පත් වෙන්න තමයි සිටියේ. නමුත් අද අලුත් Governor කෙනෙක් යටතේ මෙම පරීක්ෂණ සිදු කෙරෙනවා. එදා නැවතත් එතුමා ඒ තනතුරට පත් වෙන්න සිටි නිසා, ප්‍රශ්නවලට පිළිතුරු ලබා දීමේදී නිලධාරීන් තුළ **බියක්** හා චකිතයත් තබා ගෙන පිළිතුරු දීම සාධාරණයි. ආයතනය තුළ එම පරීක්ෂණය සිදු කරද්දී, නිලධාරීන්ට ඒ බලපෑම තිබුණා. එසේ තිබියදීත් ඇතැම් නිලධාරීන් ඉතාම අවංකව, තමන්ගේ තනතුරට අනුව සාක්ෂි දුන්නා. ඇතැම් අය එසේ කළේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා tender board

එකේ 08 දෙනාම සමරසිංහ මහත්මයාගේ ප්‍රකාශය අනුමත කරනවාද කියලා අපට කියන්න අවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශය මගේ ප්‍රකාශයටත් බලපානවා. ඒ සඳහා යම් සම්බන්ධීකරණයක් කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: Domestic Debt Management Committee එකේ සිටින නිලධාරි මහත්වරු සියලු දෙනාම මෙතැන ඉන්නවාද? කී දෙනෙක් පැමිණ සිටිනවාද? ඒ සිද්ධිය වන අවස්ථාවේ සිටි අයගෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා 06 දෙනා පමණක්ද, මෙතැන නැති තවත් අය සිටිනවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ කාලයේ සිටි director කෙනෙක් මෙතැන නැහැ. Director (Statistics)ඉන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් එයත් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණිලා, ඔබතුමන්ලාට තමයි කිව්වේ-

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: නැහැ. අපට කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වේ නැද්ද? කාටද කිව්වේ?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: That was not to the Domestic Debt Management Committee, but to the Public Debt Department.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතුමා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ඇවිල්ලා තමයි කිව්වේ. එතුමා ආවේ කීයට විතරද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: පළමු වරට 10.45ට පමණ තමයි ආවේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙය close කළේ කීයටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: 11.00ට පමණ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතුමා 10.45ට පමණ ආවා. දෙවැනි වතාවටත් ආවාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතුමා පළමු වරට පැමිණ කළ කථාව මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඊ.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: එහිදී Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ ගත්තාද, කොපමණ claim කරලා තිබෙනවාද, කොපමණ Offer කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඇහුවා. ඉන් පසුව meeting එකක් තිබුණා. එහිදී අධිපතිතුමා, අගමැතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා රටේ වෙනත් මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා.

(සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය සම්බන්ධිතයි.)

නමුත් ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ කර ගත්තේ නැහැ. මොකද, අපේ අවශ්‍යතාව වෙනත් එකක් නේ. මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් යවපු sundry requirement cash flow තමයි අපි fund raise කරන්නේ. ඒක තමයි අපි එතැනදී කථා කළේ. Auction එක අවසන් නැති නිසා අධිපතිතුමාට වෙනත් meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා ගියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙතුමිය කියන ආකාරයට මේ සිද්ධියක් වුණා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා තිදෙනාම පිළිගන්නවාද?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අධිපතිතුමා දෙවැනි වතාවට ඇවිල්ලා මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: Deputy Governorsලා දෙදෙනෙකු සමඟ පස්වරු 12.30ට පමණ දෙවැනි වතාවටත් අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණියා. ඒ වේලාව වන විට අපේ auction එක අවසන් වෙලා තිබුණා. Tender Board එකට යන auction sheet එක සකස් කර තිබුණා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ එතුමා සමඟ පැමිණි අනෙක් දෙදෙනා කවුද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතා සහ දැනට retire වෙලා සිටින Mr. Ananda Silva පැමිණියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ දෙදෙනා සමඟ ඇවිල්ලා මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: "Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ මුදල් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද?" කියලා ඇහුවා. අපි කිව්වා, "රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් තිබෙනවා." කියලා. ඊට පසුව "20 billion කෝ?" කියලා තරයේ ඇහුවා. ඒ වේලාවේ අපි කිව්වා, "ඒ රුපියල් බිලියන 20නුත් අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් වැඩිම මුදල රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6යි." කියලා. ඊට පසුව එතුමා කිව්වා, "අපේ අවශ්‍යතාව සඳහා මේ සියල්ලම ගන්න." කියලා. ඒ වේලාවේ Dr. Azim තමයි කථා කළේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමා මොනවාද කිව්වේ?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim: I have very clearly pointed out to the Governor at that time the prevailing market interest rates and the levels that we could be hitting in case we are going to raise entire Rs. 20 billion. When the Governor wanted to know, "Okay what was the September, 2014 or the previous thirty-year Treasury bond auctions weighted out. We said, "It was 11.75. Then, he said, "Why do you not accept at that level". Still, we said, "If we go for that level we are shifting the prevailing interest rates punch in the country by more than about 150 basis points. So, we have clearly clarified other possible repercussions. Not only once, if I am not mistaken, I have mentioned it more than four times. Then, I asked Deputy Governors also what their observations on this.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: What have they said? ඔබතුමා ඒකට දුන් පිළිතුර මොකක්ද?

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ එතුමා කළ සියලු ප්‍රකාශ සමඟ මම එකඟ වෙනවා. එතැනදී ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. ආශිම් මහතා ඇවිල්ලා මේ sheet එක පෙන්වා සිටියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: Sheet එක කියන්නේ, Primary Dealersලා ගත්ත නම් ලැයිස්තුව?

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, නම් ලැයිස්තුව සමඟ bids අරවා මේවා තිබුණා. මුලින්ම එතැනදී තමයි, මෙතැනින් ඉරක් ගසා "Why do we not take Rs. 20 bilion." කියන කථාව විමසා සිටියේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නම් ලැයිස්තුව පෙන්වා සිටියාද, ඉල්ලා ගත්තාද?

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ මෙතුමා අතේ තිබුණු නාම ලේඛනය එතුමා අරගෙන බැලුවා.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: He took it from your hand.

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියා සිටි conversation එක වුණා. ඊට පසුව "මේක වැඩියි." කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් යෝජනා කරන කොට, අධිපතිතුමා 10 කියන තැනට ඇඟිල්ල තියා පෙන්වා සිටිමින් "Take Rs. 10 billion." ගන්න කියලා උපදෙස් දුන්නා. ඒ වේලාවේ මමත්, අනෙක් නිලධාරිනුත්, මේ නිලධාරි මහත්වරුත් එතැන සිටියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතුමා instructions දුන්නා කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනා පිළිගන්නවා. ඒක order එකක්ද, මේක ගන්න - "Do it."- කියලා කිව්වාද නැත්නම්, මේක ගන්න කියලා කිව්වාද, කොහොමද කිව්වේ?

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: බලපෑමක් සහිත ප්‍රකාශයක්ද කළේ?

පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගැන පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමන්ලා සමඟ අපි කටයුතු කිරීමේදී එක්, එක් අධිපතිතුමන්ලා කථා කරන විධිය සහ නියෝග ලබා දෙන විධිය වෙනස්. මෙතුමා නම්, ඉතාම කාරුණික විධියට - diplomatic- තමයි යම් දෙයක් කරමු කියලා කියන්නේ. ඒ එතුමාගේ පුද්ගලික චරිතය. නමුත් මේ conversation එකේදී අධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලිව තරයේ කියා සිටියා, රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා. ඒක තමයි එතුමිය කිව්වේ කියලා මම හිතනවා. "Do it" කියන්නේ, ඒක summarize කරලා මෙන්න මේක තමයි අදහස වුණේ කියන එක මිසක් ඒ වචනයම නොවෙයි. ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේ sum conversation එකේදී රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියන එක එතැන සිටි සියලු දෙනාටම පැහැදිලි වුණා.

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim: There was a one more instruction. The Governor very clearly said that, "with this auction we can stop going for direct placements".

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: කරුණාකර නැවත කියන්න.

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim: "With this auction we can stop going for direct placements".

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: "Direct placements වලට යන්නේ නැතිව auctionsවලට යා යුතුයි." කියලා, ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර තීරණයක් ගත්තා කියලා, එතුමා ඒ අවස්ථාවේ කියා සිටියාද?

Dr. M.Z.M.Azim: Not for us.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එහෙම එකක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. හරි. එතුමා මේ තීරණය ගන්න කොට ඔබතුමිය රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ට වඩා ගන්න බැහැ කියලා කිව්වා. ඒකට ඔබතුමිය කුමක් හෝ note එකක් දැම්මාද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔව්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමිය දමපු note එක මොකක්ද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ වන විට report එක හදලා තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි. ඒ නිසා රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට නැවත report එකක් හදන්න කියලා මගේ නිලධාරින්ට කියන්න ඕනෑ නිසා මම ඒකට note එකක් දැම්මා, "Governor instructed to place price upto Rs. 10 billion taking into consideration of additional sundry requirements of the Government". කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ decision එක යන්නේ කොහාටද?

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ ටික ගත්තා. ඊට පසුව අපි යෝජනා කරන රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 auction එකත් සහිතව රුපියල් බිලියන 10 auction එකත් දමලා Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. Tender Board එකට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරලා අපි පුද්ගලිකව කිව්වා, "Governor ඇවිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කියලා කිව්වා. නැත්නම්, අපේ යෝජනාව තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි." කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේ Tender Board එකේ ඔබතුමා ඇතුළුව තව කවුද සිටියේ? ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ තීරණය ගැන ඒ කියන්නේ, Governor ඇවිල්ලා කථා කළාම අපි ලිඛිතව මෙහෙම එකක් දුන්නා. ඒ මත තමයි කටයුතු කරන්නේ කියලා, Tender Board එකේදී සාකච්ඡා කළාද?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: "අධික පොලී අනුපාතයකට මෙපමණ මුදලක් ගන්නේ ඇයි?" කියලා මා විමසා සිටි බව මම මීට කලිනුත් පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: Tender Board එක විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලා ගත් තීරණය, "බලපෑමක් මත ගත් තීරණයක්" කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතුමා ප්‍රශ්න කරන ආකාරය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මා විරුද්ධ වෙනවා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. එක ගොඩට අරගෙන ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න බැහැ. වෙන් වෙන්ව ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙතුමා ඉතා දීර්ඝ වේලාවක් ප්‍රශ්න කළා. මටත් ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න තිබෙනවා. මගේ ප්‍රශ්න ටික අහන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැවත දිනයක් යොදා ගන්න පුළුවන්. දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ප්‍රශ්න විමසීම අවසන් කරන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය ගත් තීරණය නිවැරදි බවද නැත්නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලැබුණු instructions මත ඒ තීරණය ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණා කියලාද ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ?

එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා: මීට කලිනුත් මම කිව්වා, ඒ තීරණය අපට ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණු තීරණයක් කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ තීරණය නිවැරදි තීරණයක් නොවෙයි, යම්කිසි බලපෑමක්

මත මේ තීරණය ගන්න සිද්ධ වුණු නිසා තමයි මේක කළේ කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා හතරදෙනාම පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට දැන් නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම වෙනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසන් කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා සමඟ මම කලින් සාකච්ඡා කරද්දී, "සවස 6.00ට අවසන් කරමු." කියලා එකඟ වුණා. මෙතුමාගේ කාරණාව නිසා මම ඉඩ ලබා දුන්නා. මොකද, එක් මාතෘකාවක් හෝ අවසන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. එතුමා සවස 6.00ට ප්‍රශ්න විමසීම අවසන් කළා. අපට නැවත දිනයක් යොදාගෙන ප්‍රශ්න විමසීම කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. දැනට මෙම කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු අවසන් කරනවා. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනා රැඳී සිටින්න.

ගරු ලේකම්තුමාටත්, අධිපතිතුමාටත් කියන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේදී සාකච්ඡා කරන මෙම ප්‍රශ්නය ඉතා සංවේදී මාතෘකාවක් බව ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාම දන්නවා. මේ මාතෘකාව රටත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ වෙන, මහ බැංකුවේ යම් ක්‍රියාවලියක් සමඟ සම්බන්ධ වෙන, ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලාටත් යම් යම් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ගන්න සිද්ධ වෙන මාතෘකාවක්. නමුත් මේක දිගින් දිගටම පවත්වාගෙන යන්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා අදාළ සාක්ෂි සටහන් කළ නිලධාරින් ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් ඇතුළත් ක්‍රියාවලිය සහිත ලේඛන රැගෙන මීළඟ දින පැමිණෙන්න කියලා, මම ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කරනවා.

ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පැත්තෙන් පිළිතුරු දෙන විට මට තේරෙන විධියට, නැවත නැවත repeat කරන ස්වභාවයක් තියෙන්නේ. කලින් සාක්ෂි දීපු අයට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා, ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් මත පදනම්ව අදහස් පළ කරන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ උත්තරවලින් මෙම සාකච්ඡාව ඇදී ගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ කියලා මා විශ්වාස කරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබාදීපු සාක්ෂි සටහන් තිබෙන නිසා, කලින් ලබාදුන් පිළිතුරු මත ඒවා පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්. අවශ්‍යතාව අනුව අපි නැවත ඔබතුමන්ලා කැඳවන්නම්. ඒ කැඳවනවාද නැද්ද කියන එක කාරක සභාවෙන් තීරණය කරලා, ඔබතුමන්ලාට දැනුම් දෙන්නම්.

Mr. Indrajith Kumaraswamy: Hon. Chairman, thank you very much. Of course, we want to cooperate as much as possible, because we understand the importance of the work of COPE generally and this specific task that COPE has. This is only my second session. I am told that this ground has been covered several times as you have indicated. I would ask with humility that we do not go over the same ground again and again if the proceedings been recorded as you yourself indicated because this is a very stressful experience for the public officials who have been involved in this and to put them through the same thing again and again, I do not think is very fair, Sir. Thank you.

සභාපතිතුමා: Thank you very much. ඔබතුමන්ලාට යන්න පුළුවන්. බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

(සාක්ෂිකරුවෝ නික්ම ගියහ.)

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ උපදෙස් අවශ්‍යයි අපට මෙය ඉදිරියට කර ගෙන යන්න. අද සිදු වූ පිළිවෙළ හොඳ නැහැ. මෙතැනදී නිලධාරින් එකට තියලා ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා; රවුමට අහනවා; නැවත අහනවා; එක් අයෙකු නැඟිට්ටනවා අමතක වූ දේ කියනවා; නැවත කියනවා. මෙහෙම හරියන්නේ නැහැ. හැම කෙනාටම වටිනාකමක් තියෙනවා නේ. කාර්ය පටිපාටිය ගැන manual එක තියෙනවා. ඒ ගැන විමසුව ප්‍රමාණය ඇති කියලා හිතනවා. අන්තිමට සිද්ධ වුණ දේ මොකක්ද? Governor ගේ involvement එක මොකක්ද? ඔහුගේ සීමාවෙන් පිට involve වුණාද? ඒවා තමයි ප්‍රශ්න. මගේ යෝජනාව තමයි, අදාළ අය විතරක් අපි වෙන වෙනම දිවුරුම් මත සාක්ෂියට කැඳවා, එහි බරපතළකම තේරුම් කර දෙමු. දවසට සාක්ෂි පහක්,හයක් හෝ දහයක් අර ගෙන ඒ එක් එක්

සාක්ෂිකරු බැගින් කැඳවලා අවසන් කරලා මෙය close කරලා දමමු. නැතිනම් මේ ක්‍රමයට ගියාම මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙනවා. එක එක්කෙනා contradict වෙනවා. ඒ අය එකම ආයතනයේ වැඩ කරන නිලධාරීන්. මේක එක් අයෙකු විතරක් කරපු දෙයක් නොවෙයි. එක එක්කෙනා කැඳවලා ඒ සාක්ෂිකරුවාගේ සාක්ෂි අවසන් කරමු. ඔහුව නැවත කැඳවන්න බැහැ. හැමෝටම අවස්ථාව දෙනවා. රණ්ඩු වෙන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. මට අහන්න බැරි වුණා කියන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. One by one ඉවර කරමු. එතකොට evidence part එක ඉවරයි. ඊට පස්සේ procedure තියෙන්නේ. ඒ ගැන ප්‍රමාණවත් තරම් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. එක් කාරණාවක් තියෙනවා. මේ COPE කමිටුවේ අපි සියලු දෙනාගේම ගරුත්වය ආරක්ෂා කර ගත යුතුයි. අපි යම් යම් කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනස් මත දරනවා. හැබැයි, අපි ප්‍රශ්න කරද්දි මේ සාක්ෂි මත තමයි, මේ කමිටුව ගන්න තීන්දුව තීරණය වෙන්නේ. මේ නිලධාරීන් සාකච්ඡා කර ගෙන තමයි එන්නේ. දැන් ඒ නිලධාරීන් උත්තර දුන්නේ එහාට මෙහාට කථා කර ගෙනයි. මම ඒක බලා ගෙන හිටියා. විශේෂයෙන්ම සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කිව්වාම, එහා පැත්තේ හිටිය ආසිම් මහත්තයා කිව්වා මෙහෙම කියන්න කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ එතුමිය එහෙම කිව්වා. වීරසිංහ මහත්තයා කිව්වා එහෙම එකක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. අදහස ආවේ මෙහෙමයි කියලා. අපි ප්‍රශ්න අහද්දි අධිපතිතුමා, අපි කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ විධියත් අපට කියලා දෙනවා. මේ COPE කමිටුවේ ඔබතුමා සහ අපි මීට වඩා හොඳට ප්‍රශ්න අහලා තියෙනවා. අපි ගියවර මහ නැඟුම ආයතනය කැඳවූ අවස්ථාවේදී කවුරුත් මෙහෙම කථා කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ. මහ නැඟුම ආයතනය කැඳවූ අවස්ථාවේදී “Coat ඇඳගෙන ඇවිත් හොරකම් කරලා” කියලාත් අපි කිව්වා. ඒවාටවත් අපට කවුරුත් මොනවත් කිව්වේ නැහැ. අපේ ගෞරවයත් ආරක්ෂා කර ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ. අපට මෙතැනට ඇවිත් නිලධාරීන් ඉස්සරහා හෑල්ලුවට පත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. මගේ tone එක අඩු කර ගන්න කියලා Governor කියනවා නම්, ඔබතුමාත් මගේ tone එක අඩු කර ගන්න කියනවා නම්, tone වල ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි නේ. මගේ භාෂාව හොඳ නැතිනම්, මම වෙන මොනවා හරි කියනවා නම් ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමේදී ඔබතුමා සමඟ කථා කිරීමේදී “ ඔබතුමා උත්තරයක් දෙන්න.” කියලා අපට කියන්න පුළුවන්. අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්නේ නිවැරැදි උත්තරය. එහෙම තමයි උත්තර ගන්නේ. එහෙම නැතිනම් අපට plan කරලා උත්තර දෙන්න පුළුවන්. මෙහිදී අපි ඉතා ගෞරවයෙන් ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ, අපේ ගරුත්වයත් ආරක්ෂා කරන්න. මේ එන නිලධාරීන්ට අවශ්‍ය විධියට අපව හසුරුවන්න එපා. ඔබතුමා ඒක පසුව මට කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වැරැදියි. එහෙම වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේ මහ බැංකුව අද විතරක් මම කැඳවූ එකක් නොවෙයි. මහ බැංකුව බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන්ම දිගටම කැඳෙව්වා. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක දන්නවා. ඔබතුමාටත් අත් දැකීමක් ඇති. අපි බොහොම සංයමයකින් නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ දේවල්, ඔවුන්ගෙන් පැහැදිලි කරගෙන අපි අතර තිබෙන වෙනස්කම් සාකච්ඡා කරලා තියෙනවා. මේ වාගේ තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වුණේ නැහැ. මමත් සෑහෙන්න කළකිරීමෙන් අද ඉන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු පොදුවේ පවත්වාගෙන යන විට ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. මම ඒක අවංකව කියන්න ඕනෑ. විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එන්නේ අපට උදව් කරන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලාට උදව් කරන්න; මට උදව් කරන්න. මම ඒ විෂය දන්න කෙනෙකු නොවෙයි. නමුත්, එතුමා දන්න විෂය දැනුම අනුව මට උදව් කරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔතැන ඉඳගෙන මැදිහත් වෙනවා නම්, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මට කුටු කුටු ගානවා, කියලා. ඒක වැරැදියි. නිලධාරීන් ඉදිරිපිටදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමා හා අපි ඉන්න ඕනෑ එක පැත්තක. මේක බොහොම බරපතළ තත්ත්වයක්. තවදුරටත් එහෙම වුණොත්, මේක මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කළ යුතු තත්ත්වයක්. ඒ නිසා කිසිම මන්ත්‍රීවරයකු එහෙම කරන්න එපා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට මා සම්බන්ධව ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා නම්, මම මේකට සුදුසු නැත්නම්, ඒක වෙනම තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා සමහර කාරණා-

සභාපතිතුමා: මම අහන්නේ කාගෙන්ද? මට අහන්න කෙනෙක් නැහැ. මේ කාරණාව කලින්

හත්වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ඇති තරම් සාක්ෂි සටහන් අර ගෙන තිබෙන කාරණාවක්. ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් දැන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේ manual සියල්ල ඇතුළත් කරලා තියෙනවා. රහස්‍ය වාර්තා එහෙම නැතිනම් සංවේදී තොරතුරු කියන ඒවා ඇතුළත් කරලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කොහේද ඇතුළත් කරලා තියෙන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාවේ සියල්ල නැහැ. ඒක තමයි අපේ ප්‍රශ්නය.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇයි සියල්ල නැත්තේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාවේ තියෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාවේ ඒ සියලු සටහන් තියෙනවා. ඒ සියලු සටහන් තිබෙන බව ඔබතුමන්ලාට දීපු වාර්තාවේත් තියෙනවා. එහි හත්වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ සාක්ෂි සටහන් තියෙනවා. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට දීපු වාර්තාවේ annexවල තියෙනවා. ගරු කථානායකතුමාගේ භාරයේ තියෙනවා. අවශ්‍ය නම් ගිහින් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ යුතුකම වන්නේ, මේ සාක්ෂි සටහන් සියල්ල අධ්‍යයනය කර ගෙන අවශ්‍ය දේවල් පිටපත් කර ගෙන මෙතැනට ඇවිත් මේ කාරණාවට අදාළ කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු ඉක්මන් කරන්න මට උදව් කරන එකයි. ඒකට අවශ්‍ය කරන ලේඛනයක් තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලාට අද ලබා දුන්නේ. මේ ලේඛනය අනුව අද දින ඔබතුමන්ලාට කරන්න තිබුණේ, අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ප්‍රශ්නවලට අදාළව මතු වන ගැටලු ඒ නිලධාරින්ගෙන් නිරාකරණය කර ගැනීම. මට තිබුණේ ගැටලු දෙකයි. එයින් එකක් මම නිරාකරණය කර ගත්තා. අනික් එක පිළිවෙළට යන විට නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න තිබුණා. අනික් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ටත් තිබුණු ගැටලු නිරාකරණය කර ගෙන, එහෙම බැරි නම් ඒ සඳහා කාලයක් අර ගෙන මේ කටයුත්ත ඉවර අවසන් කරන්න තිබුණේ. එහෙම නැතිනම් මේ වාර්තාවට අදාළ දේවල් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න තිබුණේ. පැහැදිලි කර ගෙන ඒ නිලධාරින් යවලා, අවශ්‍ය දේවල් කථා කරන්න තිබුණේ. ඒ අනුව මම මෙහෙම යෝජනාවක් කරනවා. ඊළඟට පාර්ලිමේන්තුව රැස්වන 23වැනි දා හවස 2.30ට කාරක සභාව රැස් වෙමු. එහිදී පැයක් අර ගෙන මේක අපි අවසන් කරන ක්‍රමය ගැන timeline එකක් හා roadmap එකක් හදා ගනිමු. ඒක අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කරන ක්‍රමය ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරමු. එතකොට මේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ එකඟතාවක් ඇති නොවෙනවා නම්, තවත් අය සාක්ෂි සඳහා කැඳවන්න ඕනෑ කියලා හිතනවා නම්, ඒක වාර්තාවකට ඇතුළත් කරලා, ඒ අයත් කැඳවා මෙය අවසන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ අවසන් කිරීමේදී සියලු දෙනාටම එකම මතයකට එන්න බැරි වෙනවා නම්, ඒක අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කරමු. මෙතැනදී debate කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මෙතැනදී කාරක සභාව හැටියට අපට පොදු මතයකට එන්න බැරි නම්, එක එක්කෙනාගේ මතවල වෙනස්කම් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ වෙනස්කම් සහිත මතය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා, මේක debate කරන්න ඕනෑ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී නේ. දැන් මෙතැන සමහර කාරණාවලදී අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී කරන්න ඕනෑ කටයුත්තත් කරනවා නේ. ඇයි අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුව කරන්න ඕනෑ දේ කරන්නේ. අපි කරන්න ඕනෑ මේ ගැන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමයි. 23වැනි දා අපි ගන්න ඕනෑ ක්‍රියාමාර්ගය සම්බන්ධව ඔබතුමන්ලාට roadmap එකක් හදන්න බැරි නම්, මම මේ තිබෙන තත්ත්වය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කරනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කථා කළේ නැත්තේ තරහට. මම කථා කළා නම් නිලධාරින්ට මීට වැඩිය ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙනවා. මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කර ගන්න ගියා. මෙතුමන්ලා දෙදෙනාම කිව්වා එහෙම අහන්න බැහැ කියලා. මම රජයේ ගිණුම් කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට හිටියා. මම කෝප් කමිටුවේත් හිටියා. දැන් අවුරුදු 12ක් මම කාරක සභාවේ හිටියා. අපි දන්නේ නැති ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබුණොත් උදව් කරන්න තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එන්නේ. අපි එතුමාගෙන් අහලා තමයි මේ කටයුත්ත කරන්නේ. ඒ නිසා කරුණාකර එහෙම කරන්න එපා. අපි දන්නේ නැති දෙයක්

විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් අහන්න, සභාපතිතුමාටත් පුළුවන්. දෙවැනි කාරණාව තමයි, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට තමයි මූල්‍ය පිළිබඳව සියලු කටයුතු සොයා බැලීමේ වගකීම තියෙන්නේ. COPE කමිටුවෙන් තමයි ඒ ගැන සියල්ල සොයා බලන්නේ. මෙතැනදී අපි සියලුම දේශපාලන පක්ෂ පැත්තකින් තියලා නිවැරැදි දේ කරන්න ඕනෑ. අපි පැත්තක් ගන්න හොඳ නැහැ. මම මේ COPE කමිටුවේ ඉන්න විට අපි හිටපු ආණ්ඩුව කාලයේ විවිධ දූෂණ, චෝදනා එනවා. ඒවා පරීක්ෂා කරනවා. අපි ඒවා නිවැරැදි කරන්න යන්නේ නැහැ නේ. වැරැදි නම් අපි පාඩුවේ ඉන්නවා. මම කියන්නේ, අපි සියලු දෙනාම මේ උත්තරීතර කාරක සභාවේ ගෞරවය නැති කරන්නේ නැතුව, නිවැරැදි දේ වෙනුවෙන් කථා කරමු. කවුරු හෝ වැරැදි කරනවා නම්, අපි වැරැදි හොයමු. අපි එක එක්කෙනා නිවැරැදි කරන්න ගියොත් මේක කරන්න බැහැ. මම සියලුම සහෝදර සාමාජිකයන්ගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ, මේ වෙලාවේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ගොරවන්න එපා. නිලධාරින්ට ගොරවන්න එපා. අපි සියලු දෙනාම එක අරමුණක හිඳිමු. මේ සියල්ල මේ රටේ මිනිසුන්ගේ සල්ලි නේ. ඒ නිසා අපි මේ කාරක සභාවේ ගෞරවය නැති කරන්නේ නැතුව, සියලු දෙනාම සාධාරණය වෙනුවෙන් කටයුතු කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා. මේ දෙන සාක්ෂි එකකට එකක් පරස්පරයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ගිහින් බලන්න. කලින් දීපු සාක්ෂි හා මේ දැන් දෙන සාක්ෂි පරස්පරයි. කලින් සාක්ෂිවලින් සියලු කාරණා ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තියෙනවා. නැවත කැඳෙව්වාට මෙය අවසන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. හැම කාරණාවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්ම දිගින් දිගටම අපට ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න සිදු වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා කලින් සාක්ෂි මත තීන්දුවක් ගන්නවාද, අලුතින් සාක්ෂි යම් මට්ටමකට අර ගෙන තීන්දුවක් ගන්නවාද කියලා ඔබතුමා තීරණයක් ගන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම් දිගටම නිලධාරින් කැඳවලා සාක්ෂි ගන්නවාද කියලා ඔබතුමා තීරණය කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා තවත් තොරතුරු එකතු කරන්න ඉඩ තියෙද්දි මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මූලික ලියවිල්ලක් හැටියට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුවක් වශයෙන් මේ කාරක සභාව පිළිගත්තා. ඒ නිසා තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ඒ වාර්තාව අපි මහ බැංකුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ. ඒ වාර්තාවට අදාළව මහ බැංකුවෙන් නිරීක්ෂණ ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිරීක්ෂණ මත මහ බැංකුවේ එකඟතාවක් නැතිනම්- අපට තේරෙන්නේ නැතුව මහ බැංකුවේත් වෙනස්කම් තියෙනවා නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට දැන් දීපු කොළය බලන්න. එහි මහ බැංකුවට අදාළ වෙනස්කම් තියෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මහ බැංකුව උත්තර නොදීපු ඒවාත් තියෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ උත්තර නොදුන්න විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ ඒ අය පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. උත්තර දෙන්න බැරිව වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නැවත පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්න පහට මම ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානය යොමු කරනවා. මේ කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමාට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් එකඟතාවක් නැති නම්, ඔබතුමාට ඒ සඳහා වෙනම ලියවිල්ලක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමා ඒ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන අවස්ථාවේ හිටියේ නැති නිසා වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මට ඒක ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඊළඟට මහ බැංකුවට යෝජනා ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඔක්කොම records තියෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා verbatim records සියල්ල නැවත අහන්න. අහලා බලලා තීරණයක් ගන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතෙක් COPE කමිටුවේ ආයතන ගණනාවක් කැඳවා කාරණා කිහිපයක් ගැන අපි සාකච්ඡා කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ සාකච්ඡාවලදී අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන ගැටලුවකින් තොරව ඒවා පිළිබඳව සාක්ෂි අර ගෙන විමර්ශනය කළා. මොකද, මේ ආයතන වඩා සක්‍රීය විධියට ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන්න තිබුණු ඕනෑකම නිසා. මේ බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධියේදීත් අපි විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව එදා පිළි අරගෙන, ඒ මත

පිහිටා ක්‍රියා කරන්නේ මෙවැනි දේවල්වලින් රටට අලාභයක් නොවන, වෙනත් කෙනෙකුට අයුතු වාසියක් නොවන විධියට රට හැසිරවීමට මේ කටයුතු කරන්නේ. එහෙම නැතුව කවුරුවත් ගැන අපට පෞද්ගලික ක්‍රෝධයක් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා තමන්ට ඕනෑ උත්තරය ලැබෙන තුරු නැවත නැවත කැඳවා සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ගියොත් මෙය මේ සැසිවාරයත් අවසන් වනතුරු යනවා. නැවත දිවුරුම් ප්‍රකාශ අර ගෙන කටයුතු කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. මම නම් දකින්නේ දැනටමත් ලැබුණු තොරතුරු තීන්දුවක් දීම සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත්. නමුත්, තවදුරටත් විනිවිදභාවයෙන් යුක්තව කටයුතු කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නම්, ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය දිනයක් තීන්දු කර ගෙන කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත්, අද අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය එදාටත් අහනවා නම්, මූලික කමිටුවේ-ඩිව්. ගුණසේකර මහතා හිටපු කමිටුවේදී අහපු ප්‍රශ්නය නැවත මෙතැනදී අහනවා නම්, මේක ප්‍රායෝගික වෙන්නේ නැහැ. කාලය අපතේ යැවීමක් විතරයි. ඒ හේතුව මත තමයි ගැටුම් ඇති වෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා සභාපතිතුමා මේ තත්ත්වය පාලනය කරන්න කියලා මා ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කාර්යය ලේසි නැහැ. අපි පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: අපි සූදානම් නම් ලේසියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට පාලනය කරන්න බැරිකමක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදය රකින්නත් ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදය කියලා බහුබූත ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදයට ඉඩ දෙන්න එපා. මට වචනයක්වත් කථා කරන්න ලැබුණේ නැහැ නේ. අනික් අය කථා කළා. එතකොට ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදය මොකක්ද? එහෙම ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදයක් මගේ ළඟ නම් නැහැ. ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදය තියෙන්න ඕනෑ යම් සම්ප්‍රදායක් තුළයි. ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදය රකින්න ගිහින් අවුරුදු ගණනක් මේ කාරණය කථා කරනවා. ඒ නිසා මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ගැන යම් කාරණාවක් මතු වුණාම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් අහන්න ඔබතුමාට සම්පූර්ණ අයිතිය තියෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව මත පිහිටා අපි ක්‍රියා කරන්නේ. අපි සියල්ල දන්න බුද්ධිමතුන් නොවෙයි නේ. ඒ කාරණා ගැන විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් තොරතුරු දැන ගැනීමේ අයිතිය ඔබතුමාටත් තියෙනවා. මටත් තියෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානය යොමු කරනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ 3:3 යටතේ එතුමා සඳහන් කරලා තියෙනවා, " අදාළ විෂයගත කරුණු පිළිබඳ විෂයානුබද්ධ පෘථුල දැනුමක් සහිත මූල්‍ය හා ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයන්ගේ සහාය ලබා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් නොතිබීම සහ මෙම වාර්තාවේ පළමු ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය පිළිබඳ ගැටලු සහගත තත්ත්වය නිසා එවැනි සහායක් ලබා ගැනීම ප්‍රමාණකාරී වීම." එහෙම තියෙද්දි ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ මත තීන්දු කරනවා නම්, මගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා, මෙහෙම මූල්‍ය දැනුම සම්බන්ධව අවබෝධයක් නැතිව මේ මත ඉතා සංකීර්ණ කාරණයක් අපි තීන්දු කරනවා නම්, එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පොදු මතය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම එකඟ වෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි මේ සියලුම ආයතන සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති-තුමාගේ වාර්තා මත පදනම් වෙලා තමයි වැඩ කරන්නේ. අපිට ඒක ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම ඒ ගැන විවාදයකට යන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා 23වැනිදා හවස 2.30ට රැස් වෙන්න. නිලධාරින් නැතුව කාරක සභාව හැටියට roadmap එකක් සකස් කරන්න. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සමඟ එකඟ වෙනවාද නැද්ද කියලා තීරණය කරන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම් මගේ තීරණය මම කාරක සභාවට දැනුම් දෙනවා. 23වැනිදා හවස 2.30ට රැස් වෙලා පැයක කාලයක් ලබා ගන්න. වරාය අධිකාරියත් එදිනට ගෙන්වන්න තිබෙන නිසා පැයක ඇතුළත අවසන් කරන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සියලුම ලේඛන එදිනට අර ගෙන එන්න. අපට වෙනත් ලේඛන ලබා දෙන්න බැහැ.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.)

ඇමුණුම 06

ඇමුණුම 06
இகணப்பு 06
Annexure 01

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව
2016 සැප්තැම්බර් මස 08 වැනි බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා

පැමිණ සිටි:
ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපති)
ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා
ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු එස්. ශ්‍රීතරන් මහතා
ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහරූෆ් මහතා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:
එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩබ්ලිව්.පී. සී. චික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති;
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරී;
එන්.එස්. කොඩිතුවක්කු මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරී;

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජිත් කුමාරස්වාමි මහතාගෙන් සාක්ෂි විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි අවසානයට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධව සාකච්ඡාව තිබුණු දවසේ Governor කැඳවා, මහ බැංකුවේ ස්ථාවරය පිළිබඳව එතුමාගෙන් statement එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තීරණය කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Procedure එක පිළිබඳව.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මගේ අදහස අනුව නම්, එහෙම කැඳවන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. එතුමා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා හැටියට පත් වුණේ මේ මෑතකදී. ඊට කලින් සිදු වූ සිදුවීම් ගැන අහන්න පුළුවන්ද? මොකද, සෑම මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයකුම ක්‍රියා කරන්නේ, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ඇතිවයි. විශේෂයෙන් බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අනුමත කරන විධියටයි. එවැනි අවස්ථාවකදී, අපි එතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ මොකක්ද? එහෙම නිලධාරීන් ගෙන්වා සාක්ෂි විමසීම අසාධාරණයි කියලා මා හිතනවා. එය මාගේ තර්කය හැටියට සාධාරණ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම කරන්න හොඳ නැහැ. අපි COPE එකේ කවදාවත් එහෙම කරලා නැහැ. මම මේ කමිටුවේ සභාපති වශයෙන් ඉඳලා තිබෙනවා. අපි සෑම අවස්ථාවකම රජයේ ප්‍රධාන නිලධාරීන්ගේ ගෞරවය ආරක්ෂා කළා. එහෙම නොවුණොත් ඒක අපට ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙයි.

The Hon. Lakshman Seneviratne: He would be humiliated.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙය අපි සීමාව ඉක්මවා යාමක් කියලා හිතෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම කැඳවන්න පුළුවන් නිලධාරීන් කවුද? කැඳවන්න බැරි නිලධාරීන් කවුද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් කැඳවන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, මුළු මහ බැංකුවේම ඉන්න මෙයට සම්බන්ධ සියලුම නිලධාරීන් කැඳවා ප්‍රකාශ සටහන් කර ගෙන අවසන්. අපට දැන් ඉතිරි වෙලා තියෙන්නේ මේ අලුතින් පත් වූ මහ බැංකු අධිපති විතරයි. අධිපතිගේ පත්වීම නම් වෙනම පත්වීමක් කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන් දිගටම මහ බැංකුවේ සිටින අය. ඒ සියලුදෙනාගෙන්ම ප්‍රකාශ සටහන් කර ගෙන තිබියදී, මේ සඳහා කිසිම සම්බන්ධයක් නැති, ඒ කාලයේ මේ සඳහා සම්බන්ධ නොවුණු මෑතකදී පත් වූ අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් අපට ඉගෙන ගන්න තියෙන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: ඔහුට කියන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ එදා සිදු වූ සිදුවීම් ගැන නොවෙයි. අනාගතයේ කරන දේවල් ගැනයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට අහන්න වෙන්නේ එදා සිදු වූ දේවල් ගැනයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අනාගතය ගැන විතරක් නොවෙයි. පසු ගිය දවස්වල ඔබතුමා හිටියේ නැහැ නේ. පසු ගිය දවස්වල බොහොම අවිධිමත්ව - සමාවෙන්න මම එහෙම කියනවට - ඒ කියන්නේ එක දවසක් බොහොම අනවශ්‍ය විධියට වාද විවාද ඇති වෙලා ගත වුණා. මහ බැංකුවේ කාර්යය මොකක්ද? මහ බැංකුවේ මතය මොකක්ද? විශේෂයෙන්ම මහ බැංකුවේ කාර්ය පටිපාටිය පිළිබඳ ස්ථාවරය මොකක්ද? කියන එක ගැන අවිනිශ්චිතකමක් මතු වුණා. මෙතැනදී Auditor-General අපේ ඉල්ලීම පරිදි යම් වාර්තාවක් සකස් කර ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපි එය පදනම් කර ගෙන ඉදිරියට යනවා. ඒ සඳහා මහ බැංකුව කියන ආයතනය උත්තරයක් දුන්නා. ඊට පස්සේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් අපට සහාය වෙන්න, Auditor-Generalගේ Report එකත් මහ බැංකුවේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමත් අතර තිබෙන වෙනස්කම් හා එකඟතා පිළිබඳව සවිස්තරාත්මක සටහනක් ලබා දුන්නා. ඒ සටහනෙන් අනතුරුව අපි මහ බැංකුවේ සියලුම නිලධාරීන් කැඳෙව්වා. ඒ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් දිවුරුම් මත සාක්ෂියක් ගන්නේ නැතිව, සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමයට අවිධිමත්ව ප්‍රශ්න විමසුවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අවිධිමත්ව නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: දිවුරුම් මත සාක්ෂි ගැනීම කියා දෙයක් COPE එකේ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අවිධිමත්ව කියන්නේ දිවුරුම් මත සාක්ෂි නොවෙයි කියන එකයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපි කමිටුවල ප්‍රශ්න අහන විධියට " ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?" කියලා එක් එක් නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා. ඒ අනුව මහ බැංකුවේ කාර්ය පටිපාටික කාරණා පිළිබඳව අවිනිශ්චිතතා තිබෙනවා; පරස්පරතා තියෙනවා; විශේෂයෙන්ම operations manual එක ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම පිළිබඳව යම් වෙනස්කම් තියෙනවා. ඒක මේ සටහන බැලුවාමත් පැහැදිලි වෙනවා. මහ බැංකුවේ ස්ථාවරය මොකක්ද? මහ බැංකුවේ වෘත්තීමය මතය මොකක්ද? කියන කාරණා ගැන අදහස් දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. උදාහරණයක් විධියට අපේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් සකස් කරපු සංසන්දනාත්මක සටහනේ ඇති එකඟ නොවන ස්ථාන පිළිබඳව විස්තරාත්මකව ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමක් මීට කලින් සිද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ. යම් යම් බාධා වුණා. මම ඒවාට දොසක් කියනවා නොවෙයි. නමුත්, අවසානයේ එය පිළිවෙළකට විමසීමක් කරලා නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම පසු ගිය දවසේ මේ සාක්ෂි විමසීම කියන කාරණය අවසන් කරන්න අපි එකඟතාවකට පැමිණියා. ඒ පිළිබඳව අපේ වාදයක් නැහැ නේ. කාර්ය පටිපාටික කාරණා ගැන මන්ත්‍රීවරයකු වශයෙන් මට පැහැදිලි කර ගත යුතු කාරණා කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක සාමාජිකයකු වශයෙන් මට තිබෙන අයිතියක්. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් එහෙම ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න බැරි නම් කමක් නැහැ. කමිටුවෙන් එහෙම තීරණයක් දෙනවා නම් දෙන්න. මගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මට කාරණා කිහිපයක් දැන ගන්න තියෙනවා. ඒ කාරණා ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න මම කැමැතියි. එහෙම හොඳ නැත්නම් හොඳ නැහැ කියලා කමිටුවෙන් තීරණයක් ගන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඇත්තටම අපි මේ විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව අනුමත කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව අනුමත කර නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි එක් අවස්ථාවක අනුමත කරගෙන නේ-

සභාපතිතුමා: අනුමත කළා නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පදනමක් හැටියට සලකා ගෙන ඉදිරි සාකච්ඡාව කර ගෙන යන්න. ඒක අනුමත කළා නම් ප්‍රශ්නය මෙතැනින් ඉවරයි නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පදනමක් ලෙස ගනිද්දි, ඇත්තටම මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු සියලුම නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරපු වාර්තාව පදනම් කරගෙන තමයි විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව හැදුවේ.

අපේ පදනම වෙන්නේ, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව නොවෙයි, කලින් කරපු පරීක්ෂණය. ඒ පරීක්ෂණය මත තමයි විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව හැදිලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලා තවත් පරීක්ෂණ කළේ ඊට අදාළ සටහන් ඔස්සේ ගිහිල්ලා නේ. ඒක නේ පදනම වුණේ. ඒ පදනම තමයි, නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කරන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මේ කාරක සභාවට කැඳවන්න පදනම් කර ගත් ප්‍රධානම හේතුව වුණේ, එක් එක් අයගේ පරස්පරතා තිබෙන නිසා නිල වශයෙන් මහ බැංකුවේ ස්ථාවරය අපට අපට දැනගන්න ඕනෑ නිසා නේ. වෙනත් කිසිම හේතුවක් මෙතැන නැහැ නේ. කවුරු හරි කෙනෙක් එක තීරණයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 2016 වර්ෂයේ අගෝස්තු මස 12වැනි දා මේ කාරක සභාවේදී තීරණය කළා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රකාශ ලබාගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒ අනුව තමයි, අද දින එතුමා කැඳවා තිබෙන්නේ. මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මේ විවාදය නොවෙයි. එදින ඒක තීරණය කළා. අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් නියෝජනය කරමින්, අවසානයේ පොදුවේ සියලු දෙනාම එකඟ වුණා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් දිවුරුම්පිට ප්‍රකාශයක් ගනිමු කියලා. අපි කථා කරන්නේ නිශ්චිත කාරණයක් ගැන පමණයි නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, මහ බැංකුවේ යම් කාලයකදී වුණු බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන නේ කථා කරන්නේ. ඒ ක්‍රියාවලියට එතුමා සම්බන්ධ නොවුණු කෙනෙක් නේ. එතුමාට තිබෙන්නේ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා කියන වගකීම පමණයි. ඒ වගකීම යටතේ එතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන කරුණු පිළිගන්නවා නම්, එතුමා නැවත කැඳවා දිවුරුම්පිට ප්‍රකාශයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියන මතයේ තමයි මම ඉන්නේ. ඒක අවශ්‍යද, නැද්ද කියලා කාරක සභාව විධියට තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම කියන්නේ ඒ කාරණාව යළි සලකා බලන්න කියලායි. අද මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා නැවත හරවා යවන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට එතුමාගෙන් දැනගන්න මොනවා හෝ කරුණක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒවා දැනගෙන එතුමාගෙන් statement එකක් අරගෙන එතුමා මුදා හරිමු. ඒක දිවුරුමක් මත කරනවාද, නැද්ද කියන එක කාරක සභාව තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම මේ ගැන කල්පනා කරලා බැලුවා. එදින මම තමයි මේ යෝජනාව කළේ. ඒ වාගේම එතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කළ යුතුයි කියලා මම සටහන් කර ගත් සිහලු කාරණා තාක්ෂණික කාරණා මිසක් සිද්ධිමය -එදා දවසේ මොකක්ද වුණේ කියන- කාරණා නොවෙයි. ඒ නිසා දිවුරුම් මත සාක්ෂි ලබා ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මම දරන ස්ථාවරය ඉවත් කර ගන්න කැමැතියි. හැබැයි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සෑම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්ටම අදාළ point එක අවසන් වන තුරු බාධාවකින් තොරව ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න ඕනෑ, කියන ඉල්ලීම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. මෙතැන comfortable නැති තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. මම ඒක කියන්නේ මට තිබෙන පුහුණුවත් එක්කද කියලා මම දන්නේ නැහැ. යම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන කොට බාධා ඇති වෙනවා. මම මේ කියන්නේ මිත්‍රත්වයෙන් යුතුවයි, තරහෙන් කියන දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ නිසා ඊට යටත්ව දිවුරුම් පිට සාක්ෂි දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන අදහස මම ඉවත් කර ගන්නවා.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දිවුරුම් පිට සාක්ෂි ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා, එදා කිව්වේ මෙතුමා නේ. දිවුරුම් පිට සාක්ෂි ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියන මතයට සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා එකඟයි කියලා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කැඳවමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: දිවුරුම් පිට සාක්ෂි ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන ප්‍රශ්නය දැන් අවසන් නේ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක අවසානයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට තවත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. එක් එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයාට මේක පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න කියලා ප්‍රමාණවත් විධියට බාධාවකින් තොරව කාලය ලබා දෙන්න ගියොත් ඊළඟ සැසි වාරයටත් මේක ගෙනයන්න වෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඒකට යම් කිසි සීමාවක් සාදා ගනිමු.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: Previous කරුණු ගැන අහන්න බැහැ නේ. අනාගත කරුණයක් ගැන අහන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා මේකට සම්බන්ධ නොමැති නිසා, මේකේ ක්‍රියාදාමය ගැන පමණයි නේ අහන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: උදාහරණයක් විධියට, අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්නයක් මත තවත් මන්ත්‍රීවරයකට අතුරු කාරණාවක් මතු

වෙන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, එතුමා තනි පුද්ගලයෙක් නිසා, ඒ ගැන දිගින් දිගටම හරස් ප්‍රශ්න අහලා එතුමා අපහසුතාවට පත් කරන එක ගැලපෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. එහෙම නැතිව ප්‍රශ්න කරමු. මම ඒක පාලනය කරන්නම්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මගේ හිතවත් අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කිව්වාට, අපට අවිනිශ්චිතකමක් ඇති වෙලා නැහැ. මට ඇති වෙලාත් නැහැ. මම දන්නා ආකාරයට බොහෝ දෙනකුටත් අවිනිශ්චිතතාවක් ඇතිවෙලා නැහැ. අපි බොහෝ දේවල් ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළා. නමුත් අපි ප්‍රශ්න කළේ අවිධිමත් විධියට නොවෙයි. අපි වචනයක් වචනයක් නෑර අවශ්‍ය විධියට ප්‍රශ්න ඇහුවා. ඔබතුමා හැසිරීම පිළිබඳවත් කථා කළා. එදා අපි හැසිරුණු ආකාරය ගැන ඇත්තටම කණගාටු වෙන්න ඕනෑ. එදා හරිම පහත් විධියේ හැසිරීමක් තිබුණේ. රාජ්‍ය නිලධාරීන්ට තර්ජනය කළ එකයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තර්ජනය කිරීමයි කිසි සේත්ම අපි පිළිගන්නේත් නැහැ, අනුමත කරන්නේත් නැහැ. ඒ ගැන අපි ගැන කණගාටු වෙනවා. අපි ඒ පහත් තත්ත්වයට නොවැටිය යුතුයි.

ඒ වාගේම මෙතුමාගෙන් අපට මහ බැංකුවේ ස්ථාවරය ගැන අහන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, එදා වුණු සිදුවීම ගැන මෙතුමාගෙන් අහන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒකට එතුමාට උත්තර දෙන්න අයිතියකුත් නැහැ, අපට අහන්න අයිතියකුත් නැහැ, අපට ඒ ගැන අහන්න යුතුකමකුත් නැහැ. හැබැයි, මගේ මතය හැටියට නම්, අපි ඒ දේවල් කරලා අවසානයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා දක්ෂ නීතීඥවරයෙක්. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් උසාවියක සිදු වන්නේ ප්‍රශ්න අහලා අවසන් වෙලා නැවත ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා. සමහර වේලාවට ඉදිරිපත් වෙන සමහර කරුණු අනුව තමන්ට වාසි වෙන ආකාරයට ඒවා හරවා ගන්න නැවත ප්‍රශ්න විචාරණවා. ඒ ස්වභාවයක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා එතරම් ගැඹුරට හිතන්න එපා. මම අවසානයට ප්‍රශ්න විමසීම කරන්නම්. මට ඒ තරම් දෙයක් කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. නමුත් මම මගේ අයිතිය අත්හරින්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මම මේ අහන්නේ පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමටයි. ව්‍යවස්ථාව අනුව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තිබෙන බලතල සහ සීමා මොනවාද කියලා මම බැලුවා. ඉන් එහා ගිය පරීක්ෂණයක් ගැන කථා කළා නේ. ඒකත් කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එකඟ නම් සහ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ පමණයි. ඒ විධියට තමයි ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ තිබෙන ප්‍රතිපාදන අනුව ඒ වාගේ පරීක්ෂණයක් කරනවා නම් කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි මේ කියන සියලු දේවල් සටහන් වෙනවා. අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කිව්වේ එතුමාගේ මතය ගැනයි. එතුමාට ඒකට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. එතුමාගේ අදහස් දැක්වීමේදී කියැවුණා "අවිධිමත් පරිදි සාක්ෂි කැඳෙව්වා." කියලා. අනු කාරක සභාවට ඔබතුමාත්, අනුර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාත්, අපි තිදෙනාම ඒ සාකච්ඡාවට සහභාගි වුණා. එදින 29දෙනකුට ආසන්න පිරිසක් කැඳෙව්වා. ඔවුන් කිව්ව සියලු දේවල් මේකේ තිබෙනවා. කාරක සභාවක් හැටියට, අපි මේ කරලා තිබෙන්නේ වැරැද්දක් නම්, පාර්ලිමේන්තු කාරක සභා ඉතිහාසයම වැරැදි වෙන්න ඕනෑ, අවිධිමත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ නිසා මේක අවිධිමත් නැහැ කියලා මුලින්ම කියන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට ඒ ගැන මට කියන්න තිබෙන දේ තමයි, දිවුරුමක් පිට ගන්නා ප්‍රකාශය විධිමත් සහ දිවුරුමක් නැතිව කරන සාක්ෂි විමසීම අවිධිමත් නම්, සියලු දේ විධිමත් කිරීම උදෙසා දැනට කැඳවා තිබෙන සෑම ආයතනයකම සෑම නිලධාරියකුගෙන්ම දිවුරුම් පිට සාක්ෂි විමසීමක් කරන්න වෙනවා. ඒක වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මතු වීම නිසාම මේ ගැන මම අධ්‍යයනයක් කළා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒක උපුටා දක්වන්න කැමැතියි. පාර්ලිමේන්තු බලතල හා වරප්‍රසාද පනතේ "පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසින් හෝ ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණය විසින් දඬුවම් කළ හැකි වැරදි" කියන කොටස යටතේ, "පාර්ලිමේන්තුව ඉදිරියේ හෝ කාරක සභාවේදී සාක්ෂිකරුවකු වශයෙන් ඇත්ත සහවා කථා කිරීම හා වෙනත් විෂමාචාරයන්" කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා දිවුරුමක් ගත්තත්, නැතත් කාරක සභාවේදී සත්‍ය ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුයි. එහෙම නැත්නම්, ඒක ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණයෙන් දඬුවම් ලැබිය හැකි කාරණාවක්. සෑම දේකදීම දිවුරුමක් නොගත්තත්, කාරක සභාවේදී ඉදිරිපත් කරන කරුණු සත්‍ය විධියට පිළිගෙන අපි කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම්, අපට සෑම දිනකම, සෑම සැසි වාරයකදීම, සෑම නිලධාරියකුගෙන්ම දිවුරුම් ගන්න වෙනවා.

ඒ වාගේම ඔබතුමන්ලාට දැනුම්දීමට කාරණාවක් තිබෙනවා. කථානායකතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කළ පුළුල් වාර්තාව ඕනෑ කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි කථානායකතුමාගෙන් ඒ ගැන ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලීමක්

කළා. කථානායකතුමා මා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර එය ලිඛිතව ලබා දී තිබෙනවා. පිටපත් 26ක් තිබෙනවා. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා 26දෙනාටම ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාත් එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මේක විශාල ලේඛනයක් නිසා මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාටම භාෂා තුනෙන්ම අවශ්‍යද කියලා දැනගන්න ඕනෑ. අපි සටහනක් ලබා දෙනවා, ඒකේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවශ්‍ය භාෂාව කුමක්ද කියලා ලකුණු කරලා දෙන්න. නැත්නම්, එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයකුට භාෂා තුනෙන්ම ලබා දෙන්න වෙනවා. ඒක විශාල වියදමක් දරන්න වෙන කටයුත්තක් නේ. ඒ නිසා තමන් කැමැති language එක මොකක්ද කියලා කියන්න. ඒ එකඟතාව අනුව අපි දැන් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කැඳවමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපිට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් විමසිය යුතු ප්‍රශ්න නැහැ. නමුත් අපි ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ඇමතිතුමාගේ අවශ්‍යතාවය මත අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙමු. ඒ අනුව අපි මුලින්ම මෙතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්න ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඊළඟට අපටත් අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න. මොකද, අපි කියන දේවල් වාර්තා ගත වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ එතුමාගේ අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නොවෙයි, කමිටුවක් හැටියට ගත් තීරණයක් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ විධියට කථා කරන්න එපා. මෙතැන අජිත් පී. පෙරේරාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි නේ තිබෙන්නේ. මම මුලින්ම ප්‍රශ්න විමසන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා සෑම මන්ත්‍රීවරයකුටම ප්‍රශ්න විමසීම සඳහා සාධාරණ කාලයක් ලබා දෙන්න අවශ්‍යයි. එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් පමණක් දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න විමසන්න ගියොත් එය එතරම් හොඳ තත්ත්වයක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාටම මේ ගැන අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ අවබෝධය මත අපි මේ කටයුතු කරමු. ප්‍රශ්න විමසීමට පෙර මට මෙතුමාට නිර්දේශයක් දෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙය මෙතරම් ලඝු කරන්න හදන්න එපා. මොකද, ප්‍රශ්නය මේ තරම් සරල කරලා විසඳා දෙන්නයි උත්සාහ කළේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම මෙතැනට පැමිණෙන්න ප්‍රමාද වූ නිසා, මෙතැන ගත් තීරණය මොකක්ද කියලා මට කෙටි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අගෝස්තු මස 12 වැනිදා මෙම කාරක සභාව තීරණය කළා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා කැඳවා විසඳා ගැනීමට තිබෙන යම් යම් ගැටලු සහ මහ බැංකුවේ ස්ථාවරය පිළිබඳව එතුමාගෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමක් කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි කියලා. එදින ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ඇමතිතුමා යෝජනා කළේ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා දිවුරුමක් මත ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීම කළ යුතුයි කියලායි. නමුත් අද අපි සාකච්ඡා කර තීරණයක් ගත්තා එතුමාගෙන් දිවුරුමක් අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ, ලබා දෙන සාක්ෂි සටහන් දිවුරුමකින් තොරව ලබා ගනිමු කියලා. නමුත් එතුමා තනි පුද්ගලයෙක් හැටියට තමයි අපි කැඳවන්නේ. ඒ නිසා අධිපතිතුමා අපහසුතාවට පත් නොවන ආකාරයට ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීම කර ගනිමු. ඒ වාගේම එක දිගට සෑම කෙනෙක්ම ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා වෙනුවට යම් සීමාවකට යටත්ව අවබෝධයකින් යුතුව මේ කටයුතු කරමු කියලායි අපි යෝජනා කර ගත්තේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි written submission එකක් ගනිමු. ප්‍රශ්නය අවසන් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමා ලබා දෙන පිළිතුර කාරක සභාව හැටියට පිළිගන්නවා නම් ඊළඟට එන අවශ්‍යතාවය අනුව අපි ඒක බලමු. මොකද, ඒ සියලුම දේ report වෙනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Report වෙන එක ඇත්ත. නමුත් පස්සෙ කියයි අරක කිව්වා, මේක කිව්වා, කිව්වේ නැහැ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ. අපි වාර්තාවක් ගනිමු. මොකද, මෙතැනින් කෙරෙන්නේ කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා වන කාරණාවල සාරාංශයක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම නේ. අද දවසේ අධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන කරුණුවලින් එකතු වන කොටසත් අපේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරමු. නමුත් මෙතැනින් අවසන් තීරණයක් ගන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම සෑම දිනකම COPE එකටත්, ඊට කලින් PAC එකටත් උනන්දුවෙන් සහභාගී වන සාමාජිකයෙක් හැටියට මගේ අදහසත් සැලකිල්ලට ගන්න කියලා ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. අපි විමසන ප්‍රශ්නවලට, සමස්ථයක් හැටියට පිළිතුරක් එතුමාගෙන් අත්සනින් ලබා ගනිමු. **අත්සනක් ලබා ගත්තා** කියලා වැරැද්දක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි අවශ්‍යතාවය අනුව ඒ තීරණය ගනිමු. මොකද, අපේ ප්‍රශ්නවලට එතුමාට අද පිළිතුරු දෙන්න නොහැකි නම් පසුව ලිඛිතව දෙන්න එපායැ.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කාරක සභාව වෙත කැඳවන ලදී.)

අධිපතිතුමා ඉතාම ගෞරවයෙන් අප කාරක සභාව හමුවේ පිළිගන්නවා. විශේෂයෙන් අගොස්තු මස 12 වැනිදා මහ බැංකුව කැඳවන ලද අවස්ථාවේදී අපි තීරණය කළා මහ බැංකුව හැටියට ඔබතුමා නැවතත් කැඳවා, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට තිබෙන කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට අවස්ථාවක් ලබා දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒ වාගේම අපි එහිදී තීරණය කළා, ඔබතුමාගෙන් සාක්ෂි විමසීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒ නිසා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ අවශ්‍යතාවය අනුව, පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම සඳහා ප්‍රශ්න ඉදිරිපත් කරයි. එතැනදී බොහොම විවෘතව ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස් පල කිරීමට නිදහස තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම ඒ සඳහා වැඩිදුර පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් මේ මොහොතේ කරන්න අපහසු නම්, ඔබතුමාගේ අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන්ගේ සහාය ලබා ගැනීමටද ඉදිරියේදී ඉඩකඩ සලසා දීමට පුළුවන්.

අපි මේ කාරක සභාව ආරම්භ කිරීමට පෙර ඔබතුමාට යම් කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමක් කරන්න තිබෙනවාද කියා දැන ගැනීමට කැමතියි. එසේ නැතිනම් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: Thank you Hon. Chairman. Let me first say that, of course, I am here to cooperate fully with the Committee. I understand that you have a very important and onerous task to perform and I stand ready to assist in any way that I can. Of course, I have been in the job for two months. A number of the things that you are concerned about happened before my time. But, I am happy to talk about what is happening now and how we are trying to improve the situation. I can certainly address those sort of issues but, I am happy to answer any questions. If I have difficulty in answering them here, I hope you will give me the opportunity to make a written submission having consulted my colleagues who have specialized knowledge in this area and also who have been in the banking service for a longer period than I have been.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාගේම ඔබතුමාට දැනුම් දෙන්න ඕනෑ, අපි මීට කලින් සාකච්ඡා කළේ යම් දිවුරුමක් මත ඔබතුමාගෙන් සාක්ෂි විමසන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි. නමුත් එවැනි අවශ්‍යතාවයක් නැහැ කියලා කාරක සභාවේ සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් එකඟතාවකට පැමිණියා. ඒ අනුව අවශ්‍ය පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම් සිදු කිරීම සඳහා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට අවස්ථාව තිබෙනවා.

Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy: Thank you very much for that. I understand, as I said, the importance of the work of this Committee and the need for me to respect the integrity and the credibility of the work of the Committee.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: I would like to know, when a bond is issued, with whom the final decision lies and what was the decision that they made when it comes to this controversial matter.

Mr. Indrajith Coomarswami: Let me in these two months that I have arrived –

The present situation, since I have been in this position, the final signature is placed by the Governor of the Central Bank. Now, there is a process for this. I mean it really starts with the Appropriation Act and out of the Appropriation Act, you get the Government's borrowings requirement in any particular year.

Then, there is the Debt Management Programme that works out for the year, which is done in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance. There is a Committee for the Debt Management which does that, and they decide as to how much to raise under each instrument, by way of Treasury Bills, Bonds and etcetera. So, that is at the beginning of the year.

Then, there is also a broad Calendar that is worked out as to how this money will be raised. Now, of course, that can change as the year goes on; if the Government needs more money, less money, or etcetera. But, there is a broad framework that was established. Then, when one gets to the point where a bond has to be raised and issued, the first level of engagement is with the Debt Management Committee in the Public Debt Department. So, they work out the framework, in terms of the amount, the maturity and is done with the representative of the Ministry of Finance also involved in it and then Okay.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: If I may interrupt on the reason that they went for a Bond issue but not a Bill was because there was a ceiling and upper limit to issue bonds. It was almost there. Am I right?

Mr. Indrajith Coomarswami: At that time, I was not there. But my understanding is **that** the Treasury Bill limit was not increased at that time, I think it was Rs. 850 billion. I think the Government tried to get it increased. But they were not been able to get it through Parliament. So, that **put greater honours**, on raising money through bonds. Then, there is a process for that. There are two Committees which go through the process. First one is within the Public Debt Department and the Technical Committee. Then, we have the Tender Committee which is chaired by the Deputy Governor. Once they have done over that, then the final signature is placed by the Governor of the Central Bank.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: So, what was the decision taken by the Chairman of the Tender Committee? Is he the decision maker at the end?

Mr. Indrajith Coomarswami: No, they make the recommendations which are finally to be signed by the Governor. So, there is a Tender Committee chaired by the Deputy Governor which makes the final recommendations.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මම ඔබතුමාට යෝජනා කරනවා නිශ්චිතව එම ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල තිබෙන නිසා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවක ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න කියලා. එම ගනුදෙනුවේදී සිදු වුණේ කොහොමද කියන එකට පිළිතුරු දෙනවාට වඩා ඒක පහසු වෙයි. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවකින් කොහොමද කරන්නේ කියලා අර ගනුදෙනුව ගැන කියාපු ගමන් අපි අපේ බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව නිශ්චිත කරනවා. එහෙම නැතිව ඔබතුමා පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තිය පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නවා නම් හොඳයි කියලායි මම යෝජනා කරන්නේ.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: The Governor, would you consider the decision to issue a particular paper? It may be an overnight call typed of paper, a three-months some other paper; can be a three, six or twelve-months Treasury Bills, a two, five, ten, twenty or thirty years Treasury Bond or any sort of Government debts security. All these are securities. My question is as to what the criteria **is you** look for in deciding in what kind of instrument that you need to issue at a particular point in time? So, that is a general policy typed question so that we can frame the answer.

Mr. Indrajith Coomarswami: Now, the overall framework is decided at the beginning of the year. I was talking about in terms of that debt management strategy. The factors which go into that are first to see as to what the profile of debts that is falling due in order the Treasury Bills and Bonds of different maturity as you spoke about because in most years, the Government of Sri Lanka needs incremental borrowings, the chances are we are not going to be able to retire any of that Treasury Bills or Bonds. So, you are **going to have rolled it-over.** So, the first category is, those Bills and Bonds which are falling in due, and they will have to be rolled over. That is the first one.

Then, you have the governments' borrowings requirement for that particular year as embedded in the Appropriation Act. There, the technical people essentially take a call, taking into account, overall market developments related to what they see as the liquidity that is likely to be available in the market, the appetite amongst the market players for different types of instruments. There is a survey of market that is done for that. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka conducts survey of markets. So, that is also taken into account and also to see as to where you will be able to raise more of the money. So, the liquidity market appetite and what is falling due in terms of past debts. I think that all probably will come in. I am sure that the specialists will be able to give you more information on that. But, these things are taken into account broadly.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Mr. Governor, what is the function of the appetite? Appetite is your dependent variable. It must be a function of some other variables.

Mr. Indrajith Coomarswami: Sure.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: So, why would once have appetite for a short tenure paper or was a long tenure paper?

Mr. Indrajith Coomarswami: If you anticipate that the Government is going to have to borrow more and more money, the natural expectation will be that interest rates will go up in the future; in which case, you will probably go for something of short tenure so that you can roll that money over at a higher interest rate in the future. If on the other hand, you think that they are going to be trajectory of fiscal consolidation and the Government call on resources is going to decline, you may want to be in the short tenure in the market. So, that is in relation to the Governments' Budgetary Operations. But, also market players may take a call on other assets. If they think that the stock market is going to go-up or down and they want to shift money from the fixed income to the share market or if they want to move things to go into fixed deposits and etcetera. So, one is the Governments' Debts Operations and it is called on resources that will impact on expectations and the other is the dynamic across different instruments.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: If I were to ask you Mr. Governor, would there be different views on market movement; would there be different views on government's fiscal consolidation ability; and therefore, would there be different views on the future interest rate? Because, you know the interest rate from time T to time T+1 and from time T+1 to time T+2 is connected based on what we believe; the interest rates are going to be down the road. That is what we called the yield curve; how steep or flat the yield curve is. So, my question is an important one. Can there be differences of opinion among the market players as to what the future interest rates are going to be?

Dr. Indrajit Coomarswamy: Most certainly, there can be. Because, for instance, even in terms of the short-term, when the Central Bank Monetary Policy Committees meet here or abroad, if you take a survey of 10 or 15 economies, you will get varying views as to what is going to happen even during the course of that week. So, if you are taking a view as to three, six, twelve months or the medium-term, people will have different views.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Mr. Governor, the penultimate question on this round is, have there been instances where either the issuers or the investors have made investment decisions and found out that their original call was wrong?

Dr. Indrajit Coomarswamy: Of course, that happens a lot of the time. Because the market is driven by a mixture of fundamentals and sentiments. Even the fundamentals are difficult to predict sometimes. As you know, economics is not a very exact science. The sentiments are even more volatile. So, this rather volatile mix of fundamentals and sentiments can throw things out significantly.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Mr. Governor, my last question to you is, is there a specific science of determining what the tenure and the yield to maturity on the coupon should be?

Dr. Indrajit Coomarswamy: No. That is a judgment call in the end. We have to take a reading of the market conditions. But, of course we have a committee compromising six or seven people who are knowledgeable around the table and taking that call.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: So, am I correct to assess as to what you, as a professional, an economist and somebody with decades of experience, are saying is that mistakes can be made in making a call of tenure and yield?

Dr. Indrajit Coomarswamy: Mistakes can be made and even what are perceived to be mistakes can sometimes be a narrative to justify it. As you know, economics is such that it is not an exact science.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: It is not an exact science. That is all for the moment.

සභාපතිතුමා: අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න අවස්ථාව තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Anura Priyadarshana Yapa: If there are no further questions, then, let us go home.

සභාපතිතුමා: සියලු දෙනාටම ප්‍රශ්න නැති බවයි තේරෙන්නේ. අපේ ඉල්ලීම පරිදි පැහැදිලි කිරීම් ලබා දෙන්න අද දින පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා සහභාගීවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි එතුමාට ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා. ඔබතුමාට බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

Dr. Indrajit Coomarswamy: Thank you very much, Hon. Chairman and the Members of the Committee.

සභාපතිතුමා: Draft report එක අපි සැප්තැම්බර් 13 වැනිදා දෙනවා කියලා කිව්වේ. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් කියනවා තවත් දවස් කීපයක් අවශ්‍යයි කියලා. සැප්තැම්බර් 20 වෙන කොට මේ කාරණාත් ඇතුළත් කරලා, කාරක සභාවේ draft එක අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාට තැපෑලෙන් ලබා දෙන්නම්. ඊට පසුව අපි ඒ සඳහා ඉදිරි දිනයක් යොදා ගනිමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ draft එක කොහෙන්ද එන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Draft එක- ඔබතුමාත් ඒකේ දවසක්, දෙකක් හිටියා. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ අලුත් ව්‍යවස්ථාව සම්පාදනය කරන draft එක- ඒ draft එක office එකෙන් නොවෙයිනේ හැදෙන්නේ. Draft එක හැදෙන්න ඕනෑ සාමාජිකයින්ගෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපි කලින් තීරණය කළානේ. දැන් මේකේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරු-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා කියන කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් කියනවා නම් ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් තමයි වාර්තාව හදන්නේ කියලා අපි කලින් වතාවේ තීරණය කළා. ඒකට සංශෝධන නැත්නම්-

සභාපතිතුමා: සංශෝධන දෙන්න පුළුවන්; යෝජනා දෙන්න පුළුවන්; අදහස් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. සාකච්ඡා කරන්න දෙයක් දෙන්න අපිට තිබෙන්න එපායැ. අපි මේ පිළිබඳව කලින් කථා කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මම මේ කඩාකප්පල් කරනවා නොවෙයි. අපිට සාධාරණ අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න. මෙතැන draft එක කිව්වාම පැහි කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. මේ draft එකේ Auditor-Generalගේ පැත්තෙන් එන opinion එක තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඊළඟට, Governorගේ පැත්තෙන් එන opinion එක තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඊට පස්සේ, අපි ප්‍රශ්න කරද්දි ඒ ප්‍රශ්නවලට ලැබුණු පිළිතුරුවලට ප්‍රකාරව ඒ position එකත් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඔය කියන කරුණු තුන එකතු වෙලා තමයි draft එකක් හැදෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක මෙතැන ලිව්වට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. නමුත් ඔය කාරණා සියල්ල අපේ draft එකේ තියෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියන්න මහතා: මෙහෙන් ලියලා, Membersලාටත් ඕනෑ නම් in writing දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මොනවා හෝ දෙයක් කථා කරන්න අපට මූලික ලියැවිල්ලක් තිබෙන්න එපායැ. ඒ මූලික ලියවිල්ල අපිට ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් තමයි හදන්න වෙන්නේ. අපිට වෙන හදන්න තැනක් නැහැනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ මතය ඊට වඩා වෙනස්. මගේ මතය තමයි ලියවිල්ලක් හදනවා වෙනුවට මූලික පියවර වෙන්න ඕනෑ අපි විසඳා ගත යුතු ප්‍රශ්න හඳුනා ගැනීමයි. ඒ කියන්නේ අපි එකඟ වෙන කරුණු මොනවාද කියලා. මේ පරීක්ෂණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි එකඟ වන කරුණු බොහෝ වැඩියි. අපිට debatable කරුණු කිහිපයයි තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට අපි එකඟ වන කරුණු මොනවාද කියලා ඒ එකඟතාවන් වාර්තා වුණොත් ඒක ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට ලියන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ කියන්නේ specific issue එකක්. සිද්ධිය, ප්‍රමාණය, මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය ඒ දේවල් ගැන ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට එකඟ වුණු කරුණු ගැන ලියන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට debatable ප්‍රශ්න පහක් විතර ඉතුරු වෙනවා. ඒ debatable ප්‍රශ්න ගැන ලේකම් කාර්යාලය original draft එකක් කරන එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙනවා.

මම ඒ කාරණය කියන්නේ මේ inquiry එක ගිය විධියේ හැටියටයි, ප්‍රසිද්ධියේ කියලා තිබෙන කාරණාවල හැටියටයි සමහර specific කාරණා ගැන- ලේකම් කාර්යාලය කියන්නේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම නිලධාරින් නේ. ඒ අයට debatable ප්‍රශ්න ගැන මතයක් තිබෙන්න බැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා විධියට ඔබතුමා draft එකක් හදනවා නම් ඒක වෙනම කථාවක්. ඒ අයිතිය ඔබතුමාට තිබෙනවා කියලා මම පිළිගන්නවා. ඒක මම නැහැයි කියන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා draft එකක් හදලා, ඒ draft එක මත ඊළඟ discussion එක යන්න ඕනෑ කියනවා නම් මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. මම මේ කියන්නේ මේක Parliament එකේ දවස්

දෙක - තුනක debate එකකින් නතර වෙන report එකක් නේ. ඒකේ යථාර්ථය අපි දන්නවා නේ.

ඒ නිසා අපේ කමිටුවට ගෞරවයක් වශයෙන් සාමාජිකයින්ගේ විවිධ මත නියෝජනය වීමට opportunity එකක් දෙන්න නම්- මම හිතන්නේ ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා ඒ එකඟ වෙන කාරණා පිළිබඳව initial agreement එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ, කාර්යාලයට ලියන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට report එකෙන් සියයට 80ක් හැදෙනවා. හැබැයි debatable issues ගැන-

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන කාරණයෙන් පැහැදිලි වන්නේ, ලේකම් කාර්යාලය හදන draft එක, අපි අවසාන ලියවිල්ලක් විධියට සාකච්ඡා කළොත් තමයි ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය එන්නේ. එහෙම දෙයක් නොවෙයි මේ කරන්න යන්නේ. ලේකම් කාර්යාලය වෙනුවෙන්; කමිටුව වෙනුවෙන්, මම එහි සම්පූර්ණ වගකීම භාර ගන්නවා. මෙහිදී සිදු වන්නේ, මෙතෙක් සිදු වුණු මුළු ක්‍රියාවලියේදී "මෙන්න මේ මේ දේවල් සාකච්ඡා වුණා." කියලා, සාකච්ඡා කළ කරුණු ටික එක ලියවිල්ලකට අරගෙන, ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට දෙන එකයි. එහි අඩු වෙන්න ඕනෑ මොනවාද, වැඩි වෙන්න ඕනෑ මොනවාද, එයින් නිර්දේශ කරන්න ඕනෑ මොනවාද කියන එක කරන්නේ ෙම් කාරක සභාවෙන්. ඒක ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට කරන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමා ඔය කියන කාරණාව ගත්තොත්, මෙහි නිර්දේශ මොනවාද කියලා හෝ මෙහි මතයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හෝ ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට බැහැ. ඒ වාගේ දෙයක් සිදු කරන්නේ නැහැ. අපට එයට ඉඩ දෙන්න. නැත්නම් දැන් තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය හැමදාම කථා කර කර යනවා විතරයි මොනවත් කරන්නේ නැහැ. අපි මීට කලින් ඇහුවෙත් එහෙම තමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම Public Accounts Committee එකේ Report එක හදලා අවසානයි. කලින් හදපු draft එක Membersලාට දැම්මා. මෙතුමා අද සංශෝධන දුන්නා. 21 වෙනි දා සියලුම ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් එකතු වෙලා එය සාකච්ඡා කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් එක වචනයක්වත් අතින් දමන්නේ නැහැ. සිදු වුණු දෙය පිළිවෙළකට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම පමණයි කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට වෘත්තීමය වශයෙන් දැනුමක් අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයේ ක්‍රියාවලියේ සිදු වන්නේ මෙතැන සිදු වුණු දේවල් වාර්තා කිරීම.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට එය තේරෙනවා. නමුත් නිගමන?

සභාපතිතුමා: කාරක සභාවෙන් තමයි නිගමන හදන්න ඕනෑ. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට බැහැ නිගමන හදන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Understanding එක ඒක නම් අපි ඒ විධියට කරමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මොකද, අපි debatable issues ඒවා විධියට ගණන් ගන්න වෙන්නේ සහ කොපමණ පිරිසකට debatableද කියලා දැන ගන්න වෙන්නේ වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළාට පස්සේ තමයි. ඒක final draft එකක් නොවෙයි. අපට දැන ගැනීම සඳහා දෙන ලියවිල්ලක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සියලු දෙනාගේම පහසුව සඳහා අපි paragraphs වශයෙන් ලියන්නේ නැතිව මේක points and sub points විධියට ලියුවොත් හොඳයි නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි පළමුවෙන්ම ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට බාධාවකින් තොරව තිබෙන කරුණු ටික ලියලා දෙන්න ඉඩ දෙමු. ඊට පස්සේ ඒකට වෙනස් අදහසක් තිබෙනවා නම් අපි සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් ලබා දෙන ලියවිල්ලට ඕනෑම සංශෝධනයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතකොට අපේ එකඟත්වය තමයි, ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් වෙන කෙටුම්පතේ අඩංගු වෙන්න ඕනෑ යම්කිසි කාරණා පමණයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Facts report පමණයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Facts report එකේ තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ එහිදී කියවුණේ මොනවාද කියලා. අපට පහසුයි මෙය කොටස්වලට වෙන් කර ගන්න හැකි නම්. එතකොට, අපිට තේරුම් ගන්නත් පහසුයි; කියවන්නත් පහසුයි; සාකච්ඡා කරන්නත් පහසුයි. එතකොට, "අපි සාකච්ඡා කළ මූලික කරුණු මේවා. මේකට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය වුණේ මේක, මහ බැංකුවේ මතය වුණේ මේක, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය වුණේ මේක." කියලා අපිට පහසුවෙන් බලා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආරම්භය හැටියට ගත්තොත්, ගරු අගමැතිතුමා විසින් පත් කළ කමිටුවක් තිබුණා. ඒ කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව තමයි මුලින්ම අපේ කාරක සභාවට ලබා දුන්නේ. ඒකේ නිර්දේශයත් තිබෙනවා. අපිට එතැනින් පටන් අරගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පාර්ලිමේන්තු ක්‍රියාවලිය සහ ස්ථාවර නියෝග අනුව අපිට ෙමයට විතරක් වෙනස් විධියට කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ. එහෙම වුණොත් අනිත් ඒවත් වෙනස් කරන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපි වෙනස් කරන්න නොවෙයි කථා කරන්නේ. අපි කථා කරන්නේ මේ වැඩේ කරන විධිය ගැන. මේ ගැන හැමෝටම ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ කාරක සභාවේදී සාකච්ඡා කරන සියලුම දේවල් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කරන්න මම බැඳිලා ඉන්නවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ ගැන බය වෙන්න එපා; කිසි ගැටලුවක් තියා ගන්න එපා, මම සියල්ලම වාර්තා කරන්නම්.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.)

ඇමුණුම 07

සටහන් පත්‍රය
MINUTE PAPER

ඇමුණුම 07
இகணப்பு 07
Annexure 07

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ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය
MONETARY BOARD

CONFIDENTIAL

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක : MB/PD/25/20/2008
Board Paper No. :
ලිපි ගොනු අංක : 08/11/003/0060/002
File No. :

රැස්වීම් අංක : 25/2008
Meeting No. :

විෂය අංක : 20
Item No. :

දිනය : 7.10.2008
Date :

20. සටහන : *MINUTE :* Improvement of Market Liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund (EPF)

The Board having considered the paper approved of :

(a) Issuing Treasury Bonds to EPF and other captive sources at an interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and

(b) Requesting the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engaging in secondary market operations.

TRUE COPY

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

TO: S/PD
Thro' AG(P)

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රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 25/2008

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Item No. : ๑๐

දිනය :
Date : 07.10.2008

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/25/๒๐ /2008

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ලිපිගොනු අංකය :
File No. : 08/11/003/0060/002

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

TABLED BOARD PAPER

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board

මාතෘකාව : IMPROVEMENT OF MARKET LIQUIDITY THROUGH ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
SUBJECT: OF EMPLOYEES' PROVIDENT FUND.

The purpose of this Board Paper is to seek the Monetary Board approval to;

(i) Issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at an interest rate 5 basis points above the rates prevailed in the secondary market through private placements; and

(ii) Request EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations.

2. It has been observed an emerging pressure on the government borrowing programme since mid September 2008. The main contributory factors include excessive government borrowings from domestic sources, delay in government borrowing from external foreign currency sources, newly developed turmoil in the international capital market and continuous shortfall in liquidity in the domestic market. As a result, there is a high risk of increasing the interest rates in the domestic market and the possibility of funding through the Central Bank to meet borrowing shortfalls.

3. In this context, it would be advisable to adopt a market stabilisation process by inviting the EPF to play an active role in both the primary market, preventing upward pressure in the primary market and actively trading in the secondary market thereby improving liquidity in the government securities market.

4. Accordingly, the Monetary Board is invited to approve;

(i) to issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at a interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and,

(ii) to request the EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations.

DG(W) S/MB AG(P) S/PD

M A R C Cooray
Secretary

17 JAN 2003
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සටහන් පත්‍රය
MINUTE PAPER

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය
MONETARY BOARD

CONFIDENTIAL

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/1/26/2008

ලිපි ගොනු අංක :
File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

රැස්වීම් අංක : *Meeting No.* : 1/2008

විෂය අංක : *Item No.* : 26

දිනය : *Date* : 07.01.2008

සටහන : *MINUTE* : 26. **Proposed Yield Structure for Treasury Bonds to be Mobilised through direct Placements in 2008**

The Chairman informed the Board that the CBSL has been concerned about the unwarranted increases in the interest rates on government securities. Against this background, he informed that he had requested the Departments of Public Debt and Economic Research to come up with proposals with respect to the issue of government debt instruments and also aiming at minimizing the interest rate differentials between the primary and the secondary markets. The Board discussed the proposal in detail.

The Official Member was of the view that the investors mentioned in the paper, namely, the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF), Employees' Trust Fund (ETF) and the National Savings Bank (NSB), should not be treated alike as the cost structure in mobilizing funds by these three institutions differ. He also emphasized the need to take a realistic inflation forecast and stated that during the first half of the current year inflation is likely to remain high as several projects will continue to incur costs towards completion, whilst defence expenditure is unlikely to reduce and that certain adjustments in the administered prices will also have to be made. He further mentioned that in addition to the three institutions mentioned in the paper, the Public Debt Department should also look at several other sources such as different funds. He was also of the view that auctioning of government securities should aim at sources with more liquid funds.

(P.T.O)

The Board taking into consideration the views expressed by the members, approved :

(a) to allow the EPF to invest in longer term Government papers based on long term inflationary expectations plus 4 percent real rate of return and 2 percent risk premium to cover the errors in inflation projections;

(b) ETF also to be offered investment opportunities in Government paper on the same basis;

(c) for Superintendent of Public Debt (SPD) to negotiate with NSB for investments in Government paper, based on yield rates proposed in the paper; and

(d) For the Monetary Board to review the rates after April, 2008.

The Board requested SPD to report back to the Board with the progress on the proposal. The Board also requested CBSL to review the primary dealer system as this doesn't seem to raise funds from the market in an effective manner.

TRUE COPY

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

TO : SPD
DER
S/EPF

2015 පෙබරවාරි සිට 2016 මැයි මස දක්වා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී සිදුවී ඇති මූල්‍ය අක්‍රමිකතා සොයාබැලීම සඳහා විශේෂ කාරක සභාවක් වශයෙන් පත්කරනු ලැබූ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව

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මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/1/28/2008

රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 1/2008

ලිපිගොනු අංකය :
File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 28

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව :
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

දිනය :
Date : 7.1.2008

TABLED BOARD PAPER

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board

මාතෘකාව :
SUBJECT : PROPOSED YIELD STRUCTURE FOR TREASURY BONDS TO BE MOBILISED THROUGH DIRECT PLACEMENTS IN 2008

The purpose of this Board Paper is to;

(i) inform the Monetary Board of the plan of direct placements on Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans in 2008 to be arranged through the captive type investors.

(ii) seek the Monetary Board approval for the yield structure proposed for medium and long term direct placements on Treasury bonds and Rupee loans.

Introduction

According to the government cash flow for 2008, government expects to raise Rs 355 bn from domestic rupee sources by issuing Treasury bonds and Rupee loans. The main investor group operating in the long term debt market is state owned and state managed captive type sources. Major captive investors are EPF, NSB and ETF. Resource availability with these captive sources in 2008 is estimated at Rs 300 bn. (EPF –Rs 183 bn, NSB – Rs 83 bn and ETF – Rs 33 bn). The annual investment programmes of these captive sources indicated that Rs 235 bn would be invested in Treasury bonds while the balance to be invested in Treasury bills and other instruments.

Based on the above estimates, Rs 120 bn has to be collected from non captive sources mainly from Treasury bonds and Rupee loans through auction process to meet the borrowing requirement. In addition, Rs 9 bn is to be raised through new Treasury bills as indicated in the Cash Flow totaling Rs 129 bn borrowings from non captive market sources. This amount excludes the re-issue of maturing Treasury bills during the year estimated at Rs. 690 bn.

In 2008, the government's borrowings requirement from the domestic market through Treasury bonds and Rupee loans is excessive and not be able to raise through the normal auction process at a reasonable yield rates. Therefore, it would be advisable to raise funds available with captive type investors through direct placements. Further, considering the bunching problem in the domestic debt, it is suggested to issue long term securities in order to lower the refinancing risk in the future. Since, there is no active yield curve for long term maturities, this paper has proposed

suitable rate structure for long term maturities based on the medium term inflation targets given by the Economic Research Department.

Proposed Yield Rate Structure

The Medium Term Macroeconomic Framework has targeted a downward inflation path as given in Table 1 and on which the proposed rate structure is based.

Table 1
Inflation Targets as per MT Macroeconomic Framework

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
11.0%	9.0%	7.0%	5.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%

Based on these inflation targets, a proposed yield rate structure is estimated taking in to account real returns of 3% - 4% and appropriate risk premium for future market risks. The proposed yield rate structure for different maturities is given below. Details of the yield rate analysis is attached (Annex 1).

Table 2
Proposed Yield Rate Structure (After Tax)

Maturity	2 yrs	3yrs	4 yrs	5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	9 yrs	10 yrs	15 yrs.
Yield (%)at Real return of 4%	16.70%	15.85%	15.10%	14.40%	13.80%	13.46%	13.20%	13.00%	12.80%	12.60%
Yield(%) at Real return of 3%	15.80%	14.90%	14.15	13.40%	12.90%	12.45%	12.15%	11.95%	11.80%	11.55%

Possible Implications

- Shifting of a large share of fund mobilization program through direct placements would help lower the amount to be raised through the auction process thereby reducing the pressure on the market yield.
- However, this has a negative impact on the domestic debt market development.
- Initially, there would be a dual rate structure for similar maturities that would distort the market operations since current market rates are above the proposed rate structure due to high inf onary expectations.
- Possibi mark to market losses for captive holders until the entire debt market stabilize around the proposed rate structure.
- Captive holderswould keep these securities in their investment portfolio in order to avoid mark to market losses.

- Captive holders could not trade or sale these bonds without capital losses if duel rate structure continues.
- This would have some impact on Primary Dealer operations reducing their operation in primary and secondary markets.

Considering the above issues, it is suggested to issue long term bonds with 6,8, 10 and 15 years tenure for direct placements. The proposed rates for these bonds (net of taxes) are 13.90%, 12.15%, 11.80% and 11.55% respectively.

Since the domestic debt market is volatile in the recent past, it is proposed to review this rate structure at end of April 2008, taking into consideration the development in debt market and macroeconomic environment in the economy.

The Monetary Board approval is sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placements of Treasury bonds and Rupee loans in respect of captive investors such as EPF, NSB and ETF during January-April 2008.

DG(W) SMB AG(P) Actg. SPD

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

A Proposal for the Yield Rates (Based on Inflation expectations)

Method 1

Nominal Interest Rates Which Would Equate

Net Present Value At Given Real Rate Of Return

Maturity Years	Without Market Risk Premium at Real rate of					Market Risk Premium	With Market Risk Premium at Real rate of					Remarks
	0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	4.00%		0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	4.00%	
2	12.70%	13.65%	14.59%	15.53%	16.46%	*0.25%*	12.95%	13.90%	14.84%	15.78%	16.71%	After Tax Rate
3	11.53%	12.49%	13.45%	14.40%	15.34%	*0.50%*	12.03%	12.99%	13.95%	14.90%	15.84%	
4	10.51%	11.49%	12.46%	13.43%	14.39%	*0.70%*	11.21%	12.19%	13.16%	14.13%	15.09%	
5	9.55%	10.55%	11.54%	12.52%	13.50%	*0.90%*	10.45%	11.45%	12.44%	13.42%	14.40%	
6	8.76%	9.78%	10.78%	11.79%	12.78%	*1.10%*	9.86%	10.88%	11.88%	12.89%	13.88%	
7	8.19%	9.21%	10.24%	11.25%	12.26%	*1.20%*	9.39%	10.41%	11.44%	12.45%	13.46%	
8	7.75%	8.79%	9.82%	10.85%	11.87%	*1.30%*	9.05%	10.09%	11.12%	12.15%	13.17%	
9	7.41%	8.46%	9.50%	10.53%	11.56%	*1.40%*	8.81%	9.86%	10.90%	11.93%	12.96%	
10	7.13%	8.19%	9.24%	10.28%	11.32%	*1.50%*	8.63%	9.69%	10.74%	11.78%	12.82%	
15	6.30%	7.38%	8.46%	9.53%	10.59%	*2.00%*	8.30%	9.38%	10.46%	11.53%	12.59%	
2	14.11%	15.16%	16.21%	17.25%	18.29%		14.39%	15.44%	16.49%	17.53%	18.57%	Before Tax Rate
3	12.81%	13.88%	14.94%	16.00%	17.05%		13.37%	14.43%	15.49%	16.55%	17.60%	
4	11.68%	12.76%	13.84%	14.92%	15.99%		12.46%	13.54%	14.62%	15.70%	16.77%	
5	10.62%	11.72%	12.82%	13.92%	15.01%		11.62%	12.72%	13.82%	14.92%	16.01%	
6	9.74%	10.86%	11.98%	13.09%	14.20%		10.96%	12.08%	13.20%	14.32%	15.42%	
7	9.10%	10.24%	11.37%	12.50%	13.62%		10.43%	11 57%	12.71%	13.83%	14.96%	
8	8.61%	9.77%	10.91%	12.05%	13.19%		10.06%	11.21%	12.36%	13.50%	14.63%	
9	8.23%	9.40%	10.55%	11.70%	12.84%		9.79%	10.95%	12.11%	13.26%	14.40%	
10	7.93%	9.10%	10.26%	11.42%	12.57%		9.59%	10.76%	11.93%	13.09%	14.24%	
15	7.00%	8.20%	9.40%	10.59%	11.77%		9.22%	10.42%	11.62%	12.81%	13.99%	

Inflation Expectations (Forecasts)

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	>2017
15.00%	11.00%	9.00%	7.00%	5.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%

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Legislation relating to public debt

1. Monetary Law Act No.58 of 1949.
2. Local Treasury Bill Ordinance No. 8 of 1923.
3. Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance No.7 of 1937.
4. Treasury Certificates of Deposit Act No. 9 of 1989.
5. Tax Reserve Certificates Act No. 22 of 1957.
6. National Housing Act No. 37 of 1954.
7. State Mortgage and Investment Bank Law No. 13 of 1975.
8. Urban Development Authority Law No. 41 of 1978.
9. Ceiling on Housing Property Law No. 1 of 1973.
10. Loans (Special Provisions) Act No. 40 of 1982.
11. Foreign Loans Act No. 29 of 1957.
12. Appropriation Acts pertaining to each financial year.

Front Office

Front Office (FO) of the PDD is mainly responsible for mobilizing required funds for the government at the lowest possible cost with reasonable degree of risk through implementation of the domestic borrowing programme approved by the Monetary Board. In order to mobilize the required funds of the government, FO issues Treasury bills (T-bills), Treasury Bonds (T-bonds), Inflation Linked Bonds (ILBs), Rupee Securities (RSs), Sri Lanka Development Bonds(SLDBs) and Sri Lanka Nation Building Bonds (SLNBBs). In addition, FO issues certificates for Housing Bonds on behalf of the Government on the requests made by the Ministry of Housing and Construction under section 28 (1) and 28 (2) of the Ceiling on Housing Property Law. Further, FO carries out any other special requests made by the Secretary to the Treasury/Treasury Operations Department (TOD) of Ministry of Finance (MOF) for special funding requirements with the approval of the Deputy Governor/Governor.

The following are the major activities carried out by the FO.

1. Assisting to prepare annual domestic borrowing programme for approval of the Monetary Board based on the borrowing limit authorized in the Appropriation Act.
2. Raising funds by implementing borrowing programme
3. Monitoring market developments
4. Other activities carried out by the FO

1. Preparation of the borrowing programme

A. Once the annual gross borrowing limit of the government is approved and declared by the Parliament through the Appropriation Act for a respective year, an instrument-wise annual debt issuance programme for government debt securities has to be prepared by the Middle Office (MO) for approval of the Monetary Board of the CBSL. The FO of the PDD provides assistance in preparing instrument-wise annual borrowing program.[1] Once the Monetary Board approval is obtained, the FO attend to the following:

[1] The procedure for preparing the annual borrowing programme is given in detail in the section on Middle Office.

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i. Preparation of the Order Papers and prospectus for T-bonds and RSs in order to obtain required authorization of the Finance Minister as stipulated in the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance (RSSO).

ii. Reservation of gazette numbers in consultation with the Government Printing Department for publication of gazette notifications of T-bonds and RSs.

B. Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC)

The Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC) is the committee responsible for taking decisions on raising funds from domestic market with a view to minimizing the cost and risk of government public debt. DDMC meetings are held monthly in order to decide on the borrowing programme for the subsequent month. The Terms of Reference (TOR) of the DDMC is given in (Appendix FO-1). In this regard, FO has to attend to the followings;

i. One week prior to beginning of each month, prepare the monthly borrowing programme for the forthcoming month on the basis of the approved annual borrowing programme, the cash flow requirements of the government for the respective month obtained from Treasury and resources available in the market. The monthly borrowing programme consists of details on dates of proposed auctions, the size of auctions, maturity period, planned private placements and special arrangements if any.
ii. Make arrangement for the meetings.
iii. Submit the monthly issuance programme recommended by the DDMC for the Governor's approval.
iv. Communicate the details of the approved borrowing programme and debt service payments to be made to the PDs.
v. At the end of the each year prepare gazette notifications for all T-bonds, RSs, SLDBs and ILBs issued during the year.
vi. Make necessary arrangements with the Government Printing Department to publish relevant gazette notifications. The formats of the gazette notifications (in three languages) of RSs and T-bonds are given in the (Appendix FO-2 and FO-3).

2. Raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme

Funds are raised through;

A. Auctions
B. Private placements
C. Rupee Loans

A. Auctions

i. Conducting auctions, downloading bids and generating reports of T-bills/ T-bonds

a. Government securities are issued through auctions conducted by the PDD. Auctions are conducted on the electronic platform. Primary Dealers, who maintains funds accounts (current accounts) and securities accounts with CBSL are members of this electronic platform and can place their bids for the auctions through this electronic platform. Other investors can participate in the primary auctions through the PDs. For this purpose, the investors need to open accounts with a bank/Primary Dealer which is called as CDS Account.

b. The PDD, in consultation with the TOD, issues an indicative half-yearly auction calendar for T-bonds which contain information about the tenor of security and the period during which auctions will be held.

c. Each series of T-bill and T-bond is identified by a number called, "International Securities Identification Number (ISIN)" and prior to announcement of a series, ISIN for such series that is being issued has to be obtained by the FO through e-mail from the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE). In case of T-bills, since all T-bill issues for the coming year are known in advance, ISINs for such issues can be obtained from CSE before the beginning of the year. However, ISINs for T-bonds have to be obtained at the time of introducing a new series for the first time to the market.

d. FO with the assistance of Communications Department makes arrangements to publish advertisements in three languages in two national newspapers for T-bill (Appendix FO-4) and T-bond issues (Appendix FO–5) inviting bids for auctions from the public. Advertisements with regard to T-bills are usually published in

newspapers two days prior to the auction date while T-bond advertisements appear one day prior to the auction. These auction details are provided to the public through electronic media also.

e. FO should announce each auction to the market through the electronic bidding facility provided by the Central Bank by 8:30 a.m. of the date of the auction. (See Auction guidelines).

f. PDs are able to enter their bids electronically to the system only after the announcement of auction is made by the FO through the system. Auctions are closed automatically at the scheduled time (at 11.00 a.m.) by the system. However, closing time for bidding at the auction can be extended if there is any valid reason (e.g. system failure etc.) with the approval of the SPD/DSPD.

g. If a PD is unable to send bids before the closing time because of a system error, such a PD should inform the FO about their inability to send bids before the closing time and should make necessary arrangements to provide their bid details with authorized signatories to the FO through facsimile within the time specified by the FO.

h. Any bids once transmitted to the FO, cannot be withdrawn. Therefore, any editing of bids entered into the system by PDs should be undertaken before transmitting them to the FO.

i. If a PD requests to make any corrections for bids already submitted to the FO such corrections have to be approved by the SPD/ASPD.

j. If there are bids submitted through facsimile by PDs as mentioned in the section (G) above, such bids have to be entered by the FO to the system prior to downloading bids for processing under the supervision of a Staff Officer in the FO.

k. After a tender is closed by the system automatically and bids sent by PDs through facsimile are entered to the system if any, bids have to be downloaded and required reports have to be generated through the PC dedicated for auctions. (See Auction guidelines). Bids are serially numbered automatically by the system.

l. Samples of reports required to be generated after processing bids of a T-bill auction are given in (Appendix FO-6, FO-7 and FO-8)

m. Samples of reports required to be generated after processing bids of a T-bond auction are given in (Appendix FO-9, FO-10 and FO-11).

ii. Tender Board meetings on T-bills and T-bond auctions.

a. After closing of each T-bill and T-bond auction, the FO prepares following documents to be submitted to the Treasury Bill/Bond Tender Board Committee which takes decisions on the amount to be accepted that gives the lowest and optimal cost and risk combination (The TOR of the Treasury bill/bond Tender Board is attached in the (Appendix FO-12)).

   i) The summary report giving different types of options with different combinations of cut off/ weighted average prices including the departmental recommendation based on the existing market conditions. The summary report also includes results of the previous relevant auction and basic bid details of the current auction (Appendix FO-13 for T-bills and FO-14 for T-bonds).

   ii) A Table with primary and secondary market yield rates and the yield curve (Appendix FO-15 and for T-bills and FO-16 for T-bonds).

b. The FO makes arrangements in advance, by inviting all members of the Tender Board to attend at the scheduled time for the meeting on the date of auction. The Tender Board meets normally at 12.30 p.m. after each auction.

c. Members of the Tender Board discuss on existing liquidity position of the market, current market rates and market perceptions, current monetary policy stance and expected reserve money targets, and cash flow requirements of the government in deciding the optimal option of a particular Tender.

d. The decision of the Tender Board is submitted for the information and approval of the Governor (as the case may be) by SPD with a brief note giving existing market developments and respective auction outcome (Appendix FO-17 for T-bills and FO-18 for T-bonds).

iii. Releasing Results of T-bills and T-bond auctions.

a. As soon as the approval of the Governor is obtained for the decision of the Tender Board, PDs are informed about the outcome through the network system (Appendix FO-19 for T-bills). The PDs are able to download through the system all information on their successful bids as well as total bids received, total ,bids accepted and the weighted average yield rate/s of the auction.

b. Soon after the auction results are released to the market, details on successful bids are automatically transferred to the SSS System for crediting to relevant PD accounts subject to settlements on the due date. The FO makes arrangements;

(i) With Communication Department to publish a press notice as given in (Appendix FO-20 for T-bills and FO-21 for T-bonds) on auction outcome.

(ii) To provide information on auctions to the BO, MO, SSSS/CDS

(iii) And Supervision Division (SD) for recording, operational and analytical purposes as follows.

BO, MO and SSSS/CDS - FO 22, FO-23 (T-bills) and FO 24 (T-bonds)
SD - FO 8, 15A and 24 (T-bills) FO 11, 16 and 24 (T- bonds)

(iv) To provide information to the General Treasury via fax for their accounting purposes.

(v) To provide information to CSE for their information (Appendix FO-25 for T-bills and FO-26 for T-bonds) and

(vi) To submit the report in (Appendix FO-27 for T-bills and FO-28 for T-bonds) to the chairperson of the T-bill/bond Tender Board, (DG) for his/her approval.

iv. Conducting auctions, downloading bids and generating reports of SLDBs

a. FO conducts a market survey to estimate the market appetite for Foreign currency (FX) denominated bonds. If there is positive response, FO makes arrangements to obtain the Monetary Board approval to issue SLDBs. The Board Paper among other things includes current market appetite for FX denominated bonds, current position of government borrowings, fund

requirements of the government and observations of the Economic Research Department on the issue of such bonds.

b. In Order to obtain the necessary approval, FO prepares relevant schedule (Appendix FO-29) to be sent to the General Treasury to obtain approval of the Minister in charge in the subject of Finance (Appendix FO-30) for the issue of SLDBs.

c. On the receipt of President's authorization, FO appoints Designated Agents (DAs) to carry out trading in SLDBs and a Paying Agent (PA) to facilitate fund transfers/settlement. FO requests the Expression of Interest (EOI) from all commercial banks and PDs to appoint them as DAs (Appendix FO-31). In the case of appointing of a PA, the FO requests EOI from selected commercial banks with their charges and procedures expected to be followed as a PA (Appendix FO-32). Considering the proposals sent by commercial banks, PDD selects one bank as a PA (Appendix FO-33). All commercial banks and PDs who have given consent to appoint as DAs are appointed as DAs (Appendix FO-34). Front Office prepares DA and PA agreements (Appendix FO-35 and 36) with legal consultation and makes necessary arrangements to sign those agreements by the SPD and the relevant parties concerned before the respective SLDB auction.

d. Offer Document and brochure of the specific issue of SLDBs are prepared and published in the CBSL website prior to the scheduled auction date of the series (Appendix FO-37 and FO-38), at least one week prior to the auction. If any change in the Offer Document is required, the Exchange Control Department and the Legal Department have to be consulted as necessary to sort out the conditional and legal issues. One week prior to the auction, an advertisement on the issue with all details has to be published in newspapers (Appendix FO-39). Offer Documents are provided to DAs before the auction date. DAs have to submit their bids by filling tender applications available with the Offer Document. In general, 5 business days are provided for DAs to submit their bids to the PDD.

e. The FO has to accept written Tender applications from DAs during the week given for submission of the bids for the Tender.

f. On the closing date of the auction, FO opens bids, feeds required details of applications to the system and generate required reports from the system (Appendix FO-40 to FO-41).

v. Tender Board meetings on SLDB auctions:

a. Based on auction details, a summary report (Appendix FO-42) is prepared for the submission to the SLDB Tender Board[2] at which a decision on the auction is taken. The decision of the Tender Board is then submitted for the information and approval of the Governor by SPD (Appendix FO-43).

vi. Releasing results of SLDB auctions:

a. When the decision of the Tender Board is received, FO;
b. Sends Letters of Acceptance to all successful subscribers with accepted tender details including instructions for fund transfers (Appendix FO-44)
c. forwards auction details to BO, MO, Paying Agents, the General Treasury for information and necessary actions.
d. sends press notice on the auction results to the media and newswires (Appendix FO-45).
e. Issue of certificates to relevant parties has to be done by BO
f. Documents generated after accepting bids are given in (Appendix FO-46, 47 and 48)

g. When there is a request for a transfer of SLDB, a transfer application has to be issued by the FO to the transferor (Appendix FO-49). FO has to receive the relevant certificate/s from the transferor along with the transfer application.

h. If the transfer application is in order, FO cancels the existing certificate/s submitted by the transferor and inform the BO the transfer details such as the name/s of new holders and effective date of transfer/s on the same date in order to issue a fresh certificate/s to the transferee.

B. Private/ Direct Placements

i. FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the Government as

[2] The SLDB Tender Board is similar to the T-bill/bond Tender Boards.

indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs.

ii. Initially, FO communicates with relevant institutions to make arrangements for placements. In case of T-bills and T-bonds, placements are arranged at weighted average yield rate (WAYR) / below or at a rate between WAYR and the cut-off yield rate of respective previous auction or at a rate decided by the relevant authorities (General Treasury, Governor or SPD). When there is no respective auction for particular instrument, the prevailing market rate is applied with the consent of the Governor/SPD or the General Treasury.

iii. In case of private placements with regard to Rupee securities an administrative rate decided by the authorities is applied.

iv. Based on agreed tenor, yield rate and settlement date etc., FO prepares deal documents with payment instructions for private placements and send them to the relevant parties with whom the placements have been made (Appendix FO-50 to FO-51 for T-bills and FO-52 for T-bonds).

v. Information on placements has to be forwarded to MO, BO and CDS of the PDD.

vi. A covering approval is obtained from the relevant Assistant Governor/Deputy Governor overseeing the PDD and the Governor for all private placements of T-bills and T-bonds made in a month usually soon after the relevant month.

vii. Placements can be arranged with the CBSL;

a. at the request of the DOD

b. at the request of the general Treasury and with the approval of the G/DG

c. to cover any shortfall of the cash flow with relevant approval of the DG.

C. Raising funds through RSs

i. In general, RSs are issued to captive investors such as NSB, EPF, ETF and pension funds and are made as private placements.

ii. When RSs are issued to Public, the Registrar of Public Debt on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka should invite applications from public for subscriptions for RSs, which is on float. When RSs are open for public, an advertisement is published in the Newspapers calling for subscriptions (Appendix FO-53).

iii. Procedure to be followed by applicants is released in local Newspapers and in the CBSL website by the FO for the information of the public (Appendix FO-54) Applications for RSs is issued by the FO at the request by investors (Appendix FO-55).

iv. Duly perfected applications together with a cheque for the due amount to be subscribed have to be forwarded to the FO by investors.

v. The Subscription list opened for each loan will be closed only after the loan is fully subscribed or when the SPD/Registrar of Public Debt instructs to close the loan.

vi. A copy of the application has to be sent to BO with relevant cheque on the date of receipt of each application and cheque. The value date of a particular subscription is the date on which the subscriptions are credited to the DST's account.

vii. Upon receipt of confirmation from BO regarding realization of cheques submitted by investors, for a particular loan, FO maintains a separate register for each loan and makes arrangements to print stock certificates for each subscriber.

viii. Printed certificates are checked by the officer in-charge and sent to relevant subscribers after obtaining the signature of the SPD/Registrar of Public Debt.

ix. Information relating to subscription of RSs has also to be sent to the MO to update the domestic debt database.

x. When there is a request for a transfer of RSs, a transfer application has to be issued by the FO to the transferor (Appendix FO-56). FO has to receive the relevant certificate/s from the transferor along with the transfer application.

xi. If the transfer application is in order, FO cancels the existing certificate/s submitted by the transferor and issue a fresh certificate/s to the transferee. Transfer details such as the name/s of new holders and effective date of transfer/s have to be sent to the BO on the same date.

3. Monitoring market developments

A. Interaction with market participants, i.e. state institutions, Primary Dealers, the General Treasury, institutional investors and Central Bank departments, especially Domestic Operations Department, Economic Research Department and Finance Department to assess the market trends and market appetite.

B. Disseminate information to the market participants on the borrowing programme, debt management practices, debt data, yield rates, secondary market information and development on the fiscal front in order to improve public awareness.

C. Collect two-way quotes of the market for government securities, examine quotes made by the market participants and disseminate weekly market report (Appendix FO-57) based on such information to relevant parties.

D. Communicate timely and effectively on the current developments in these markets and their impact on upcoming auctions and fund raising activities to the management for decision making.

4. Other activities carried out by the Front Office

A. Preparation of the Daily Market Report (Appendix FO-58) – Each morning (by 9.30 – 10.00 a.m.) the FO prepares the Daily Market Report, incorporating information on both domestic and international capital markets, to circulate among the Senior Management. The Report includes the following information:-

B. primary and secondary market yield rates of government securities, secondary market yields rates of the International Sovereign Bonds and movements in US Treasuries,

C. money market information (call money rates, Repo Rates, liquidity position in the domestic market, details of auctions that is Overnight Repo and Reverse Repo Auctions, Term Repo and Reverse Repo Auctions, Outright Sales/Purchases of T-bills, etc.) information on the Government Overdraft with the two state banks,

D. debt statistics such as Total Debt, Outstanding T-bills, T-bonds, SLDBs, Rupee Loans, foreign investments in T-bills and T-bonds, Gross Borrowing Limit and the utilization, Gross holdings of T-bills by CBSL.

E. Economic indicators such as inflation data, exchange rates, information on equity market.

F. Prefunding with the Treasury/CBSL.

G. Preparation of the Daily Transaction Summary – by end of every business day the FO has to submit to the Senior Management the details of transactions committed including amount, maturity date and yield rate etc. for each transaction. The Daily Transaction Report has to be prepared even if no transactions are executed (Appendix FO-59).

H. Preparation of the Implementation Plan of the government borrowing program monthly to be submitted for the information of the Governor.

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Annexure 09

කෙටුම්පතකි

2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කර තිබුනු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනය කරනු ලබන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ යෝජිත ඉදිරි වැඩ පිළිවෙල
(මාර්ග සිතියම)

1. කාරක සභා සාකච්ඡා වාර

    1.1. මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාව වෙත මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති ඇතුළු අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන් විසින් දෙන ලද වාචික සාක්ෂිවලින් අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු

    (කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් වෙත ලබා දී ඇත)

    1.2. විගණකාධිපති විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් 2015 සහ 2016 සිදු කර තිබුනු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම_පිළිබඳව සකසන ලද වාර්තාව

    (කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් වෙත ලබා දී ඇත)

2. මහ බැංකුව වෙත ලැබුනු ලියකියවිලි සාකච්ඡාවට භාජනය කිරීම

    2.1. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අත්පොත

    2.2. විගණකාධිපති විසින් සකසන ලද ප්‍රශ්නාවලියට මහ බැංකුවෙන් සහ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් ලද අදහස් /මතය

    2.3. 2008.01.07 දින සහ 2008.10.07 දින මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය

    (කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් වෙත ලබා දී ඇත)

3. වාචික සාක්ෂි විමසා බැලීම

    3.1. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

4. කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවක් සැකසීම

5. කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව සාකච්ඡාවට භාජනය කිරීම

6. අවශ්‍ය සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කිරීම

7. අවසන් වාර්තාව සැකසීම

8. වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම

ඇමුණුම 10

ඇමුණුම 10
இகணப்பு 10
Annexure 10

2015 පෙබරවාරි සිට 2016 මැයි දක්වා කාලය තුල ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති විශේෂ වාර්තාව සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද පිළිතුරට විගණකාධිපතිගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම

4.1 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ආර්ථික හා මිල ස්ථායිතාවය පවත්වාගෙනයාම ද මූලික අරමුණු ලෙස සළකා ස්ථාපිත කර ඇති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පස් දෙනෙකුගෙන් සමන්විත මහ බැංකු මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ ප්‍රධානියා ද වන මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙහෙයවනු ලැබේ (ඇමුණුම vii). තවද මුදල් නීති පනතේ 19(1) වගන්තිය පරිදිමහ බැංකු අධිපති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියා ද වේ. (ඇමුණුම viii) මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ දැනුම්දීම මත රජයේ ඉදිරි මාසික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරාලීම සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් (Treasury Securities) එනම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් (Treasury Bills) හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර (Treasury Bonds) නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ වගකීම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් දරනු ලබයි(ඇමුණුම ix). වර්ෂයකට වඩා අඩු කාලයකින් කල් පිරෙන (Maturity) අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කරනු ලබන අතර වර්ෂයකට වැඩි දිගු කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරයි. මෙම බැඳුම්කරයක මුහුණත වටිනාකම (Face Value) රුපියල් 100 ක අගයක් ගනී. මෙහිදී මහ බැංකුව විසින් රජය වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් සපයා දීම සිදුකරනු ලබන අතර මුදල් නීති පනතේ 106 (1) වගන්තියට (ඇමුණුම x) අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව රජයේ නියෝජිතයකු ලෙස කටයුතු කරන බව දක්වා ඇත. මෙම සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා සුදුසුකම්ලත් ආයතන 16 ක් 2015 වර්ෂය අවසාන වන විට ලියාපදිංචි කර තිබූ අතර, 2016 වර්ෂයේ දී ඉන් එක් ආයතනයක් ඉවත් වී ඇත (ඇමුණුම vi). එම ආයතන අතර රාජ්‍ය මෙන්ම පෞද්ගලික ආයතන ද වේ. මෙම ආයතන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් / වෙළඳුන් (Primary Dealers) ලෙස හඳුන්වනු ලබයි. තවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලටද ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොලෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදීගැනීමට අවසර ලබා දී තිබේ.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයන් 2 ක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි.ඉන් පළමු ක්‍රමය වූයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන දැන්වීමක් අනුව ඉහතින් සඳහන් කරන ලද ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් මිලගණන් කැඳවා ඒ අනුව බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි (auction) මඟින් අවශ්‍ය මුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමයි. දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය වූයේ සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට සුරකුම්පත් නිකුත්කිරීම හෙවත් පෞද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයයි (Direct Placement/Private Placement). මෙම දෙවන ක්‍රමයේ දී සිදුවූයේ මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන ලද බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඉපයුම්/ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් (Weighted Average yield Rate) මත ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම් සඳහාඅවස්ථාව ලබාදීම වේ. මෙහිදී මෙම බරතැබූ ඉපයීම් අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීම ක්‍රම 2 ක් අනුව සිදු කරනු ලැබේ. එක් ක්‍රමයක් වන්නේ ආසන්නතම පෙර කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේ දී සමාන කල්පිරීමේ කාලයක් (Maturity Period) සහිත බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් හි බරිත සාමාන්‍ය අගය ඵලදා අනුපාතය ලෙස ගැනීම වේ. අනෙක් ක්‍රමය වන්නේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලේ (Secondary Market) පවතින සමාන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර ඵලදා අනුපාත පදනම් කරගෙන නැවත ඵලදා අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීමයි. සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වෙන්දේසි දින හැර අනෙකුත් සෑම වැඩකරන දිනයකම විවෘතව පවතින අතර බැඳුම්කරමිලදී ගැනිමට කැමති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පෙර තීරණය කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් යටතේ, අලෙවියට ඇති බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගැනීමට අයදුම්කළ හැකිය. භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවක දී අනුගමනය කරනු ලබන ක්‍රියාවලිය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි (Public Debt Department Operation Manual) දක්වා තිබේ.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

4.2 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර පොළී අනුපාතයකට (Coupon Rate/Interest Rate) විවිධ පරිණත කාලසීමාවන් සඳහා නිකුත් කරනු ලබයි. එලෙස නිකුත් කරනු ලබන බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකමට අනුව පොළී අනුපාතය මත අර්ධ වාර්ෂිකව රජය විසින් පොළී ගෙවනු ලබයි. (ඇමුණුම xi). බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියන්හිදී ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන පොළි අනුපාතයක් මත පදනම්ව විවිධ මිල ගණන් යටතේ ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. එම ලංසු අධිමිලකට (Premium) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වැඩි මිලකට, සමමිලට (at par) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට සමාන වූ මිලකට සහ අවමිලට (Discount) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වඩා අඩු වූ මිලකටද ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. මෙහිදි ඔවුන් විසින් අධිමිලට ඉල්ලුම්කළ හොත් බැඳුම්කරයේ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පොළි අනුපාතයට වඩා පහළ අගයක් ගන්නා අතර සම මිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන අගයක්ද, අවමිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක්ද ගනු ලබයි. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට ඉහළින් ඇති ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට වඩා අවමිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත්, පොළී අනුපාතය හා ඵලදා අනුපාතය සමාන වන විට බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට නිකුත් වන බවත්, පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා පහළින් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී මුහුණත අගයට ඉහළ වූ අධිමිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත් දැක්විය හැක. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් අධිමිලක් ලැබෙන අතර එයින් රජයට අමතර මූල්‍ය වාසියක් ලැබේ. එමෙන්ම පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතයට එනම් වට්ටම් අනුපාතයකින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් රජයට මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදු වේ. පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන ඵලදා අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළහොත් රජයට අමතර වාසියක් හෝ අවාසියක් සිදුනොවේ. **මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර**

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

බැඳුම්කරයක් සම මිලට, අධි මිලට හෝ අව මිලට නිකුත් කිරීම තීරණය වන්නේ සාර්ව ආර්ථික කරුණු රාශියක් මත වේ. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් වැඩිමනත් විස්තර 5.1.19 යටතේ දක්වා ඇත.

අව මිලට, සම මිලට හෝ අධි මිලට නිකුත් කිරීම, නිකුත් කරන්නා වෙත ලාභයක් හෝ පාඩුවක් හෝ ලෙස නිගමනය නොකළ හැකි වන අතර එහි ණය සේවාකරණ පිරිවැය තීරණය වනුයේ පරිණත ඵලදා අනුපාතය (Yield to Maturity (YTM))තුලිනි. තවද, දැනටමත් නිකුත් කර ඇති බැඳුම්කරයක් නැවත නිකුත් කිරීමේදී අදාල මිල තීරණය වනුයේ ණය කළමනාකරණයේදී සලකා බැලෙන අනෙකුත් සාධක මතයි.

කෙසේ නමුදු නව නිකුතුවකදී මිල බොහෝ විට තීරණය වනුයේ අදාළ වෙළඳපල තත්වයන් මත වන අතර එම මිල මුහුණත වටිනාකමට ආසන්න අගයක් ගනු ඇත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

පිළිතුර හා ඒකඟ විය නොහැක. බැඳුම්කර අවමිලට නිකුත්කරන විට රජයට මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවන බවත් ,අධිමිලට නිකුත් කරන විට රජයට මූ්ය වාසියක් ලැබෙන බවත් විගණය විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇත..ඒනම් රුපියල් 100 ක බැඳුම්කරයක් රුපියල් 90 ක අවමිලකට නිකුත්කලද රජයට වන වගකීම රු.100 ක් වන අතර එයින් රු.10 ක මුදලක් රජයට අහිමි වේ.ඒලෙස අහිමි වන මුදල හේතුවෙන් රජයට සිදුවන්නේ මූල්‍ය අවාසියකි.ඒ අනුව අධිමිලට හෝ අවමිලට නිකුත් කිරීම තුල රජයට පිළිවෙලින් මූල්‍ය වාසියක් හා මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවන බවට නිගමනය කිරීම තාර්කික නිගමනයකි.

මෙම අවාසිය පහත අවස්ථා 03 යටතේ තවදුරටත් දැක්විය හැක.

නාමික අගයට අඩු මිලකට නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රජයට අඩු මුදලක් ලැබීම.

නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු වටිනාකමක් රජය විසින් ලබා ගත්තද කල් පිරීමේදී නාමික අගයම ගෙවිය යුතු වීම.

නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු වටිනාකමක් ලබා ගත්තද කල් පිරීම දක්වා නාමික අගය මත පොලී ගෙවීමට සිදුවීම.

4.3 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016මැයි මාසය දක්වා රජයේ මූදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයෙන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් සපුරා ගත් ආකාරය පහත වගුවේ දැක්වේ.(වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ) කෙසේ වෙතත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා ඉහත සඳහන් ක්‍රම දෙකම අනුගමනය කර තිබුණද, එදින සිට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් තාවකාලිකව සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

4.3 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016මැයි මාසය දක්වා රජයේ මූදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයෙන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් සපුරා ගත් ආකාරය පහත වගුවේ දැක්වේ.(වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ) කෙසේ වෙතත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින දක්වා ඉහත සඳහන් ක්‍රම දෙකම අනුගමනය කර තිබුණද, එදින සිට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් තාවකාලිකව සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

4.4 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය මුළුමනින්ම ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා වූ මාස 15 ක කාලය තුළ, සෘජු ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදාගත් මාසයන්ද වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත් මාසයන් ද මෙම ක්‍රම දෙකම යොදාගත් මාසයන්ද, පැවති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. කෙසේ වුවත් එම මාස 15 ක කාලය තුළ නිකුත් කළ සමස්ථ බැඳුම්කරයන්ගෙන් සියයට 80 කට වඩා සෘජු ක්‍රමය යොදාගෙන නිකුත් කර තිබුණු බව වැඩි දුරටත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

2015.02.27 දින දක්වා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සෘජු හා වෙන්දේසි යන දෙආකාරයටම සිදු කරන ලද අතර එතැන් පටන් නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යටතේ පමණක් සිදු කරන ලදී

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

මහ බැංකුව නිරීක්ෂණය පිළිගෙන ඇත. ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තහවුරු වී ඇත.

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5. නිරීක්ෂණයන්

5.1 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිදු කළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම

5.1.1 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/05/18/97 (ඇමුණුම xii) ට අනුව 1997 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මගින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. වෙළඳපලේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවක දී හෝ පොළි අනුපාතිකයන් අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවකදී වෙන්දේසි මගින් සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වූ අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල යොදා ගත යුතු බව ද, එහිදී නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මේ නිසා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පොළී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලනය කිරීමේ යාන්ත්‍රණයක් ලෙස සෘජු ක්‍රමය මත අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම යොදා ගෙන තිබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත

5.1.2 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

තවද මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/1/26/2008 හි කරුණු (ඇමුණුම xiii) සැලකිල්ලට ගැනීමෙන් පසුව සහ රජයේ සුරකුම්පත් සම්බන්ධව පොළී අනුපාත ඉහළයාම සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් 2008 වර්ෂයේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි.පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකMB/PD/25/20/2008 ට අනුව (ඇමුණුම xiv) මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලේ පවතින පොළී අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05 (Five Basis Points) ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාතයන් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් වෙළඳපොළ ද්‍රවශීලතාව ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.3 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහි අධිකාරි අමතා මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙහි (Treasury Operation Department) අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල් විසින් එවන ලද අංක TO/DG/CFS/03 දරන හා 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දිනැති ලිපිය (ඇමුණුම xv) සමග 2015 මාර්තු මාසයට අදාලව ඉදිරිපත් කරන ඇති මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බිලියන 172 ක් විය. එහි 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින සඳහා පමණක් වූ රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බිලියන 13.550 ක් වන අතර මෙම අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් රු.බිලියන 1 ක් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියක් තුළින්ද ඉතිරි රු.බිලියන 12.550 සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ද සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීම මගින් රජයට අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරන කමිටුව DDMC) විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1300 පැයට(ඇමුණුම xvi) පවත්වන ලද රැස්වීමේදී නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නියෝජිතයෙක් ද ඇතුළත් මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් 04 දෙනෙක්ගෙන් සැදුම්ලත් මෙම කමිටුවේ වගකිම වනුයේ දේශීය ණය ගැනුම් වියදම හා අවදානම අවම වන ආකාරයෙන් පවත්වා ගැනීමයි. (ඇමුණුම xvii). කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ මෙම රැස්වීම සඳහා එම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ නියෝජිතයා සහභාගී වී නොතිබුණි. එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් යටතේ එම පැමිණ නොසිටි සාමාජිකයාගේ එකඟත්වය විකල්ප ක්‍රමයකින් එනම් දුරකථනය මඟින් හෝ ලබාගත් බවට තොරතුරු

අනාවරණය නොවීය. ඉන් පසු එනම් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින මෙම තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතිය ද (ඇමුණුම xvi) ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

ඔව්. ඔහු සහභාගී නොවීය. දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටු රැස්වීමට භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නියෝජිතයා ඇතුලු සියලුම සාමාජිකයන්ගේ සහභාගීත්වය ඉතා වැදගත් වන්නේය. කෙසේ නමුදු, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව නිරන්තරයෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සමග සම්බන්ධ වන අතර එමගින් යෝජිත අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීමේ සැලසුම්, රැස් කරන ලද අරමුදල් හා බැර කරන ලද අරමුදල් පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු යාවත් කාලීන කරනු ලැබේ.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටු රැස්වීම් වලට සියලු සාමාජිකයින් පැමිණීම ඉතා වැදගත් බව දක්වා ඇත.ඒ අනුව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ නියෝජිතයාගේ නොපැමිණීම ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ.ඒම සාමාජිකයා ඒකඟත්වය පසුව හෝ ලබා ගත් බවට නිශ්චිතව සනාථ කිරීමක් පිළිතුර මඟින් සනාථ කර නොමැත.

5.1.4 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කර සපුරා ගතයුතු රජයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය වූ රු.බිලියන 261.683 ක් (මේ තුළ රු.බිලියන 89.683 ක් වූ වර්ෂය තුළ නැවත නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් ද ඇතුළත් වේ.) සඳහා වූ රජයේ ණය ගැණුම් වැඩසටහන (Government Borrowing programme) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි.එම වැඩසටහනට අනුව එකී සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයෙන් රු. බිලියන 89.683 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වලින්ද, රු.බිලියන 172 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මඟින් ද ලබා ගැනිමටත්,එම රු.බිලියන 172 න් රු. බිලියන 1 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් ද, ඉතිරිය ඍජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් ද සපයා ගැනීමටත් තීරණය කර තිබුණි.

මෙම අනුමැතිය නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපති (SM) මඟින් රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී (Superintendent of Public Debt) වෙත දැනුම් දී තිබුණද, (ඇමුණුම xvi) ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම එම කටයුතු ක්‍රියාත්මක නොවූ බව මාර්තු මාසය තුළදී සපුරා ගන්නා ලද රු. බිලියන 185.802 ක් වූ සම්පූර්ණ මුදලින් ඍජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් රු. බිලියන 14.143 ක් පමණක් සපුරා ගෙන තිබීම (4.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වගුව පරිදි) හේතුවෙන් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.5 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

එසේම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින නිකුත් කිරීමට සැලැසුම් කර තිබුණේ වසර 30 කින් කල්පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර වන අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කාලීන බැඳුම්කර සඳහා සාමාන්‍ය ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත් වීමක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහබැංකුව විසින් අපේක්ෂා කර නොතිබූ බවත් පොළී ඵලදා වක්‍රය වසර 30 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම මඟින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළින් විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත්වීමක්ද අපේක්ෂා කර තිබූ බව (ඇමුණුම xviii)මඟින් අනාවරණය වී තිබුණි. එසේ වුවද විදේශ ආයෝජකයන් සිය ආයෝජන නැවත ආපසු ලබාගෙන ඇති බව 2015 වර්ෂයේ වාර්ෂික වාර්තාව මඟින් තහවුරු කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම අපේක්ෂා සාර්ථක වී තිබුණේද යන්න ගැටළු සහගත විය. (ඇමුණුම xix)

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.6 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මෙම බැදුම්කර නිකුතු දිනයට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළ තුළ වසර 30 ක බැදුම්කර සඳහා වූයේ සියයට 9.48 ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවැති අතර (ඇමුණුම xx) එම අනුපාතයන්ට ආසන්න අනුපාතයන්ගෙන් මෙම බැදුම්කර නිකුතුවද සිදුවේයැයි අපේක්ෂාවක් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සතුව පැවති බව මහ බැංකු බැදුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශණය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාචික සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන් (වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්) පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේ දී අනාවරණය විය (ඇමුණුම xxi). එසේ බලාපොරොත්තු වූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් සහිතව අධිමිලකට බැදුම්කර විකිණීමට අමතරව ඉහත 4.1 ඡේදයේ දක්වා තිබූ පරිදි රජයට වැඩිමුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාව තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දින සහ 26 දින පිළිවෙලින් අන්තර්ජාලයේ සහ පුවත්පත්වල ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලද දැන්වීම්වලට අනුව ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 16 දෙනා වෙත වසර 30 ක කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන රු.බිලියන 1 ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර සියයට 12.5 ක් වන පොළී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි(ඇමුණුම xxii).

මේ පිළිබඳව වූ ලංසු ලැබීමේ තොරතුරු වාර්තාව (ඇමුණුම xxiii) පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූයේ සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සහ ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් 16 දෙනෙකු විසින් රු.බිලියන 20.708 ක එකතු වටිනාකමක් දක්වා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ බවයි. තවද එම මුදලින් සියයට 75 ක් පමණ එනම් රු.බිලියන 15.531 ක් එක් පෞද්ගලික ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු විසින් සහ ඔහු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකුවන ලංකාබැංකුව මගින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ බවද නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.7 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් නිකුත් කිරීමට නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණේ රු.බිලියන 1 බැදුම්කර පමණි. එසේ වුවද එම ප්‍රමාණය මෙන් දසගුණයකටත් වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වන දිනවෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන් ද අනතුරුව පැය 1230 සිට පැය 1310 , දක්වා පැවැත්වුනු අංක 2/2015 දරන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව (Treasury Bond Tender Committee) විසින් තීරණය කර තිබුණි (ඇමුණුම xxiv). මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ ඉහත තීරණය ගෙන ඇත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන්ද අනතුරුව බවය. මෙය ඉහත 5.1.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් රු.බිලියන 12.550 ක් ඍජු ක්‍රමයෙන් සපුරා ගැනීමට කර තිබූ තීරණයෙන් සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම බැහැර වීමකි. එම තත්ත්වය යටතේ එදින පැවතිවෙන්දේසියේදී 9.3510 සිට 11.7270 දක්වා වූ බරතැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්14දෙනෙකුට වසර 30 කින් කල්පිරෙන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් (ඇමුණුම xxv) රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් උපයා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළද වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට (අවමිලට) නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රු.බිලියන 9.658 ක් පමණක් උපයා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබුණි. මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ඉහත පරිදි සපයා ගත නොහැකි වූ රු.බිලියන 0.371 (රු.බිලියන10.058 - රු.බිලියන 9.687) ක මුදල වෙනත් කෙටිකාලින ප්‍රභවයකින් සපුරා ගැනීමට සිදුව තිබුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.8 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත ඡේදයේ කරුණු අනුව නිරීක්ෂණය වන ඉතාම වැදගත් කරුණ වන්නේ 2015 මාර්තු 27 දින පැය 0830 සිට පැය 1100 දක්වා වූ වෙන්දේසිය පවත්වන අවස්ථාව වන විටත් එම වෙන්දේසිය මගින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දිනට අවශ්‍ය රු.බිලියන 13.550 ක් වූ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයද ඇතුළත් 2015 මාර්තු මස මාසික මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයද ඇතුළත් දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශය මෙන්ම මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතියද, එනම් වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් වී ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය ලබා ගැනිමටත් පසුව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ ණය ගැණුම් වැඩසටහන සඳහා නිර්දේශය සහ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

ඉහත ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත දෙන ලද උපදෙස් (එකී උපදේශයේ උද්ධෘතයක් පහත දැක්වේ) ප්‍රකාරව ගන්නා ලද්දක් බව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි විසින් ලංසු සාරාංශ වාර්තාව (Bid Summery Report) මත අත්අකුරින් (ඇමුණුම xxvi)සටහන් කර තිබුණි. (එම සටහන තමන් විසින්ම තබන ලද සටහනක් බවට (ඇමුණුම xxvii) එම අධිකාරි විසින් වාචික සාක්ෂියක් මගින් තහවුරු කර තිබුණි).ඉහත සඳහන් සටහනට අමතරව එකී බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය මගින්ම මෙම රු.බිලියන 10.058 ප්‍රමාණයක් සපයා ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනත් කිසිදු ලිඛිත සාක්ෂියක් විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොකෙරිණි. ඉහත ලිඛිත සටහනෙන් ප්‍රකාශිත උද්ධෘතය සහ එහි සිංහල පරිවර්තනය පහත දැක්වේ.

“Governor instructed to raise funds up to Rs.10 Billion taking into consideration additional fund requirement of the Government” (ඇමුණුමxxvii)

"රජයේ අතිරේක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳව සැලකිල්ලට ගැනීමෙන් පසු රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ක් දක්වා අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීමට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා විසින් උපදෙස් දෙන ලදී."

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

කිසියම් මාසයක් සඳහා යෝජිත අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීමේ ක්‍රම වේදය වෙළඳපල තත්ත්වයන් සලකා බලා දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් යෝජනා කරනු ලැබේ. අනතුරුව පවත්වනු ලබන කමිටු රැස්වීමේදී පෙර රැස්වීමේදී තීරණය කරන්නට යෙදුනු ක්‍රම වේදයේ ක්‍රියාත්මකභාවය පිළිබඳව සමාලෝචනයට ලක් කෙරේ.

තවද දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශිත මාසික ණය රැස් කිරීමේ වැඩසටහන ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම පිළිබඳව (කිසියම් වෙනස්වීමක් සිදුව ඇත්නම් එයද ඇතුලත්ව) අධිපතිතුමාගේ අනුමැතිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබේ. එම නිසා 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින ඇතුලුව මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා අවැසි අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීම පිණිස සෘජු හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රම ඇතුළත් විවිධ ණය උපකරණ සම්බන්ධ විසිතර 2015.02.27 දින අනුමැතිය සඳහා යොමු කරන ලදී. එම යෝජිත සැලසුම්හි සිදු කරන ලද වෙනස්කම් ඊලඟ ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටු රැස්වීමේදී සාකච්ඡාවට බඳුන් කරන ලදුව අදාළ අනුමත කිරීම් සඳහා යොමු කරන ලදී

2015 මාර්තු සඳහා අරමුදල් රැස් කිරීමේ සැලසුම් සම්බන්ධව ඉහළ කළමනාකාරීත්වය විසින් සිදු කරන්නට යෙදුණු වැදගත් නිරීක්ෂණ ඊලඟ මාසයේදී මධ්‍ය කාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ ක්‍රමෝපායන් සකස් කිරීමේදී සැලකිල්ලට ගන්නා ලදී.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

මහබැංකුව විසින් ලබා දී ඇති පිළිතුර හා එකඟ විය නොහැක

පිළිතුරේ දක්වා ඇති ක්‍රම වේදය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි ඉදිරි කාර්යාලයෙහි (Front Office) කාර්යයන්වල 01 ඡේදය ප්‍රකාර අනුකූල නොවේ. අදාල වෙන්දේසියට පෙර පැවති වෙන්දේසිවලදී වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමට පෙර මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන ඇති බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ.

තවද මෙම වෙන්දේසියේදී නිකුත් කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කර තිබූ රු.බි.1 ක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය රු.බි 10.058 දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා උපදෙස් දී තිබීම පිළිබඳව කර තිබූ විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට පිළිතුරු දක්වා නොමැත. ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය එලෙසම තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.9 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

තවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ මිල ගණන්, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි සඳහන් ක්‍රමවේදයට අනුව විවිධ වූ විශ්ලේෂණයන්ට ලක් කිරීමෙන් පසු සකසන ලද විවිධ විකල්ප(Option) 07 ක් අතුරින් 05 වන විකල්ප අවස්ථාව අනුගමනය කිරීම උචිත බවත්, රු.බිලියන 2.608 ක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් උපයා ගන්නා ලෙසත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවටරාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම xxvi)

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.10 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1110 පැයට පවත්වන ලද වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ විස්තරද ඇතුළත් වූ 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහනඑදිනම පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ (ඇමුණුම xvi) දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. අනුපාතිකයන් ස්ථාවර කිරීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල (EPF),ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමණාකරන සමාගම(NSB) සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රක්ෂණ සමාගම(SLIC) වෙත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට විමසන ලෙසවැනි අදහසක් දැක්වෙන සටහනක් සහ වර්ෂ 20,30 සහ 50 ලෙස එක් වර්ගයකින් රු.බිලියන 10 ක් බැගින් නිකුත් කර බැඳුම්කර රු.බිලියන 40 ක් රැස්කර ගන්නා ලෙස සටහනක් ද තබමින් (ඇමුණුම xvi) 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන තුළ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින අනුමැතිය දී තිබුණි. එහිදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිවක් එම අනුමැතියෙහි සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි. එම සටහන් දෙක (අ) සහ (ආ) ලෙස පහත දක්වා ඇත.

(අ) “Raise Rs.40 bn through issue of 20,30,50 years of T-Bonds, 10 bn each”

(ආ) “EPF/NSB/SLIC to be asked to stabilize rates”

(කෙසේ වෙතත් මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් වර්ෂ 50 කින් කල් පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලෙසට ඉහත (අ) ලෙස දක්වා ඇති සටහනේ තිබුණද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිහිටුවීමෙන් අනතුරුව කිසිදු අවස්ථාවක වර්ෂ 30 ඉක්මවා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර නොතිබුණු බවත් එහි දක්වා ඇති සංයුතියේ එකතුව රු. බිලියන 40 ක් නොවන බවත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය.)

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.11 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත ඡේද අංක 5.1.10 න් විස්තර කළ පරිදි රු.බිලියන 40 ක මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා දිගුකාලීන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සෘජු ක්‍රමයට නිකුත් කිරීමක් ද මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින අනුමත කර තිබුණද (ඇමුණුම xvi) 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට මාර්තු 06 දින දක්වා කාලය තුළ සිදු වූ සිදුවීම් පෙළ එකී නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟ නොවන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. එනම් අවශ්‍ය සම්පූර්ණ මුදලම 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවති වෙන්දේසියෙන් සපයා ගැනීම සිදුකර තිබූ අතර එය භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව විසින් අනුමත කර තිබුණි. එසේම 2015 මාර්තු 06 දින දක්වා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම අනුමත කර නොතිබුණි. 2015 මාර්තු 06 දිනැති හා MB/ER/5/3/2015 අංක දරන මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවට (ඇමුණුම xxviii) අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී භාවිතා කරන සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම

පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කළ දැනුවත් කිරීම පරිදි එය එදිනම අපරඅනුමැතියට (Ratification) ලක් කර ඇත. තවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 23 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේ සටහන් අනුව (ඇමුණුම xviii) මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් එම සතිය තුළ වසර 30 ක පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියක් පැවැත්විය යුතු බවට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට උපදෙස් දීම හැර සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යොදා ගැනීම සඳහා කිසිදු තීරණයක් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ලබා ගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.12 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් පෙර අනුමත කර තිබූ පරිදි බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කරනු ලැබුවේ නම් එම වෙන්දේසියේ දී ලැබුණු මිල ගණන් අඩුම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයේ සිට ඉහළම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය දක්වා වර්ගීකරණය කිරීමෙන් පසු පහත දැක්වෙන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් 7 දෙනෙකුගෙන් බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 10.4652 ට රු.බිලියන 01 ක මුදල සපුරාගැනීමට පමණක් නොව රජයට රු.බිලියන 1.403 ක් දක්වාමුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. එසේ සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 11.7270 දක්වා වැඩි නොවනු ඇත.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.13 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත තත්ත්වය ලංසු කැඳවීමේ තොරතුරු පත්‍රිකාවලට (Bid acceptance Information sheet) අනුව සකසන ලද (ඇමුණුම xxv) පහත දැක්වෙන වගුවට අනුව අනාවරණය වේ. (ඉහත 01 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවය හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ගේ අනන්‍යතාවය හෙළි නොවන පරිදි එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉංග්‍රීසි අක්ෂරයකින් හඳුන්වාදී ඇත.) (වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

තවද ඉහත දැක්වූ පරිදි ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසිය රු.බිලියන 1 කට සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් 7 දෙනා හැරුණුවිට එදිනට ලැබී තිබූ එකතුව රු.බිලියන 20.708 ක් වූ සියළුම මිල ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම්වලින් සියයට 75 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ පහත5.1.15 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති K ආයතනය ඇතුළු වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට අවස්ථාවක් නොතිබූ බව ඉහත වගුවෙන් පැහැදිලි වේ. එදින වෙන්දේසිය මගින් නිකුත් කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු.බිලියන 1 ක මුදල රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා වැඩිකිරීමට තීරණය කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 07 දෙනා අතර ද නොසිටි K ආයතනයට එදින නිකුත් කරන ලද මුළු බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකමින් සියයට 50 ක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 5 ක් ලබා ගැනීමේ (ඇමුණුම xxv) අවස්ථාව උදාවී තිබීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලක්ෂණයක් විය. මෙහිදී එම රු.බිලියන 5 කින් රු. බිලියන 2 ක් සෘජුවමත් රු. බිලියන 3 ක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා වක්‍රාකාරයෙනුත් ලබා ගැනීමට එම ආයතනය කටයුතු කර තිබුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.14 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරීමේ දී සිදුවූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙහි අධීක්ෂණයට යටත් වන සහ ප්‍රාථමිකවෙන්දේසියෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් ඇති ආයතනයක් ලෙස සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල වැඩි එලදා අනුපාතිකයන් සහිත ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් සාපේක්ෂව අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගෙන (ඇමුණුම xxix b) තිබූ අතර අඩු එලදා අනුපාතිකයක් සහිතව පෞද්ගලික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් මිලදී ගැනීම හේතුවෙන් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ මූල්‍ය අවාසිය අහිමි කර ගෙන තිබුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.15 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත 5.1.6 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි 2015 මාර්තු 02 දිනට රාජ්‍ය ණය චාරික පියවීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයද නිශ්චිතව දක්වමින් 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව වෙත ලැබී තිබූ හෙයින් සුදුසු ක්‍රමෝපායන් භාවිතයෙන් එම මුදල ජනනය කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

ඒ අනුව අනවශ්‍ය ලෙස වට්ටම් ලබා දීමකින් තොරව සහ වෙළඳපළ පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් ඉහළ යාමට ඉඩ ප්‍රස්ථා විවර නොකරමින් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය නම් පහත දැක්වෙන විකල්ප ක්‍රමෝපායන් ද අනුගමනය කිරීමේ අවස්ථාව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

මහජන බැංකුවෙන් හා ලංකා බැංකුවෙන් දැනටමත් ලබා දී ඇති අයිරා පහසුකම් භාවිතා කර පසුව කෙටි කාලීන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් එම අයිරාව පියවා දැමීම.

සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ අතිරික්ත අරමුදල් තිබුණේ නම් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් එම අරමුදලෙන් මුදල් සපයා ගැනීම.

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වන විට සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් රු.බිලියන 3 කට ආසන්න මුදලක් රැස් කර තිබූ අතර 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින වන විට තිබූ ඉතිරි අවශ්‍යතාවය ද සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් රැස්කර ගත නොහැකි බවට කරුණු තහවුරු නොවූ හෙයින් එලෙස මුදල් රැස් කර ගැනීම. (1997 වර්ෂයේ සිට ක්‍රියාත්මක කර තිබූ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අසාර්ථක වී තිබූ බවට නිරීක්ෂණය නොවූ අතර තවදුරටත් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ලබා ගැනීම) .

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.16 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට අදාලව පහත කරුණු නිරීක්ෂණය වීම හේතුවෙන් එය සැක සහිත ගනුදෙනුවක් බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් කිරීමට ඉතා ආසන්න කාලය තුළ එනම් අවසන් මිනිත්තු 08 තුළ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු.බිලියන 20.708 කින් රු.බිලියන 13.60 ක ලංසු ලැබී තිබීම.

ඉහතසඳහන්රු.බිලියන.13.60 කවටිනාකමතුළරු.බිලියන 13.00 ක් K ආයතනය වෙනුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

රු.බිලියන 01 ක් වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී රු.බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම.

K නමින් හඳුන්වා දී ඇති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරු වෙනුවෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව රු. බිලියන 13 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ පළමු අවස්ථාව වීම.

රු. බිලියන 01 ක් සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී, K ආයතනය විසින් රු. බිලියන 2 ක් සෘජුවත් රු.බිලියන 13 ක් ලංකා බැංකුව හරහාත් වශයෙන් එකතුව රු.බිලියන 15 ක් සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ලංසු කැඳවා තිබූ වටිනාකම මෙන් 15 ගුණයක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් වීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.17 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2015 මාර්තු 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හැකිව තිබූ විකල්ප ක්‍රම තුනක්සහ ඒවායේ ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි අවාසි වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් පහත දක්වා ඇත.

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අපේක්ෂා කළ පරිදි රු.බිලියන 01 ට සීමා කලේ නම් එම වටිනාකම ආවරණය වන පරිදි ලබා තිබූ ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය අනුව බැඳුම්කරයක ලංසු වටිනාකම රු.104.5073 ක් දක්වා පමණක් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කලේ නම් රු.මිලියන 1,403 ක් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. එලෙස එම වටිනාකමට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සීමා නොකිරීම නිසා පහත වගුවෙහි දැක්වෙන පරිදි රජයට රු.මිලියන 889 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේනතුව විසින් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව වෙත ලබාදුන් විකල්ප ක්‍රම දැක්වෙන පත්‍රිකාවේ (Option Sheet) නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ රු.මිලියන 2,608 ක බැඳුම්කර (බැඳුම්කරයක ලංසු වටිනාකම රු.102.20720 ක් වන පරිදි) බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ හැකියාව තිබුණි. එසේ නොකර රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රජයට පහත වගුවෙහි ගණනය කර ඇති පරිදි රු.බිලියන 0.688 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.

තවද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරීම රු.බිලියන 1 ට සීමා නොකර මෙම වාර්තාවේ 5.1.18(ii) ඡේදයේ දක්වා තිබූ පරිදි මහ බැංකු අධිපති යෝජනා කළ රු.බිලියන 20 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කලේ නම් පහත වගුවෙහි ගණනය කර ඇති පරිදි රු.බිලියන 2.730 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසියක්රජයට සිදු වීමට ඉඩ තිබුණි.

තවද ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසි එම දිනට ක්ෂණිකව ඇති වූ/ඇති විය හැකි තත්ත්වය පමණක් වන අතර එමගින් දීර්ඝකාලීනව ඇතිවන බලපෑමද සළකා බැලුවහොත් එම විකල්ප අවාසී තවත් ඉහළ යාමට ඇති ඉඩකඩද බැහැර කළ නොහැක.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

2015 .02 . 27 වැනි දින රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත 100% ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා අනුගත විය යුතු බවට වාචිකව දැනුම් දීමත්, පසුව එම තීරණය 2015.03.06 දින පැවති මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමට වාර්තා කිරීමත් නිසා එකී විකල්පයන් වෙත අවධානය යොමු නොකළෙහිය.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

පිළිතුර පිළිගත හැක. වාචික උපදෙස් මත වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය 100% ක් අනුගමනය කලද මෙම වෙන්දේසියෙන් රැස්කර ගන්නා මුදල සීමා කර අප විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසි වලකා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. තවද ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දී ඇති පිලිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණ සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරයි.

5.1.18 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2015පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවතිවෙන්දේසියටඅදාලව ලබා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළරු. බිලියන 01 කබැඳුම්කර වටිනාකමට එරෙහිව එකතුව රු. බිලියන 10.058 ක් ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට ගත් තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ක්‍රියා කලාපය ප්‍රබල ලෙස බලපා ඇති බව රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ අනු කමිටුව විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ සිදු කරන ලද විමර්ශණයේදී අදාල නිලධාරීන් විසින් ලබා දී ඇති වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්හි ඇති පහත කරුණු හේතුවෙන් තහවුරු විය.

වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා අවසන් වූ ද පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් වූ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු. බිලියන 20 ක්ම නොගන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගෙන් විමසා තිබීම.

එලෙස රු. බිලියන 20 ක් දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හොත් එය ඉතා ඉහළ පොළි අනුපාතිකයක් වන හෙයින් එය නුසුදුසු බව රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය සහ අතිරේක රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසඩ්.එම්.අසීම් මහතා විසින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට අවධාරණය කර තිබීම.

ඉන්පසු මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රු.බිලියන10 කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ කර තිබීම (Why don't you go for 10 bn) හා ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී පවා රු.බිලියන 10 කට යාම නිසා ඉහළ (that too much)පොළී අනුපාතිකයක් බව අනාවරණය කර තිබීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.1.19 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් තීරණය කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 9.48 ක් විය. එලෙස තිබියදී අදාල වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා සියයට 12.5 ක ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතයක් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කර තිබුණි. තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසි සඳහා ස්ථාවර පොළී අනුපාතය ලෙස සියයට 12.5 තීරණය කළ ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවීය. එලෙසම ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් යටතේ වර්ෂ 30 ක් වැනි දිගුකාලීන අමතර පිරිවැයද රජයට සිදුවන අවාසියක් ලෙස සැලකිය යුතු බවද නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ. මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ වර්ෂ 30 ක වැනි දිගුකාලීන බැඳුම්කරයක පොළී අනුපාතිකයේ සිදුවන ඉතා කුඩා වැඩිවීමකින් වුවද, රජයට විශාල මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවිය හැකිවීමය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

2015.12.27 දින වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද 12.5 % කූපනය සහිත නව 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරයෙහි (ISINLKB 0 3045 CO 13) නිකුතු දිනය 2015.03.01 වූ අතර එහි පියවීම් දිනය 2015.03.02 විය.

එම අවස්ථාවට අදාළ කූපන් පොළිය, 2014 වසරේදී හා 2015 වසරේ මුල් කාලයේ දී වෙන්දේසි හා සෘජු නිකුතු හරහා නිකුත් කරන ලද 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරයෙහි 13.5% ක් වූ කූපන් පොළිය සහ සැසඳීමේදී අඩු අගයක් දක්වයි.

කූපන් පොලිය තීරණය වනුයේ මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය ක්‍රමෝපායන් (MTDS) පවතින වෙළඳපල තත්ත්වයන්, අදාළ රඳවාගැනීමේ බදු අනුපාතයන් හා එම බැඳුම්කර අධිමිලක් හෝ අව මිලක් යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව නිකුත් කරන්නාගේ අපේක්ෂාවන් සහ මීට පෙර නිකුත් කළ සමාන වූ පරිනත කාලයන් සහිත වූ බැඳුම්කරයන්හි යොදාගත් කූපන් අනුපාතයන් අනුව වේ.

(MTDS) යනු ඉදිරි වසර 4 සඳහා රාජ්‍ය ණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පුරෝකථනය කරන ලද සැලැස්මක් වේ. ඒ සඳහා රටෙහි ණය, දළ දේශීය නිශ්පාදනයට දක්වන අනුපාතය, සමස්ත ණය ප්‍රමාණයෙහි කල් පිරීමට ඇති කාලයෙහි සාමාන්‍ය අගය, කෙටි කාලීන දේශීය ණය සහ මුළු ණය ප්‍රමාණය අතර අනුපාතයන් යනාදිය

ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇත. එනමුත්, මෙම උපාය මාර්ගය රජයේ ආදායම් ප්‍රතිපත්ති තහවුරු කරගන්නා මාර්ගයන්, රාජ්‍ය ණය ගෙවීමේ පුරෝකථනයන් සහ විනිමය අනුපාතිකයන්හි හැසිරීම මතත් රඳා පවතී)

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

මෙම ඡේදයෙන් විගණනය විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇත්තේ ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතය වූ 12.5% තීරණය කල ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවීම, බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුකල දිනට ආසන්න දිනකදී වෙළඳපොල ඵලදා සාමාන්‍ය අනුපාතය වඩාත් අඩු අගයක් ගෙන තිබීම සහ දිගුකාලීන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරීමකදී පොලී අනුපාතිකයේ සිදුවන ඉතා කුඩා වැඩිවීමකින් රජයට විශාල මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදු විය හැකි බවයි.

පිළිතුර මගින් 12.5% ක ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතය ගණනය කල ආකාරය ඉදිරිපත් කර නැත. තවද වර්ෂ 30 ක බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 2014 වර්ෂය සහ 2015 වර්ෂයේ මුල් කාලයේදී (කූපන්) ස්ථාවර පොළිය සාපේක්ෂව වැඩි අගයක් ගෙන තිබූ බව පවසා තිබුණද මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවට අදාල කාලයේ තිබූ වෙළඳපොල සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය බෙහෙවින් අඩුව තිබීම පිළිබඳව කිසිදු අදහසක් දක්වා නොමැත. විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට පිළිතුරෙන් බලපෑමක් නොමැත.

තවද ඉහත සඳහන් 12.5% ක අගය ගණනයකල ආකාරය පසු අවස්ථාවකදී විගණනයට හෝ රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කලද එය විගණන ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ඉරි ඇඳි කොටස ඉවත් වීමකට හැර විගණන ඡේදයේ සඳහන් වෙනත් කිසිදු නිරීක්ෂණයකට බලපෑමක් ඇති නොවේ.

5.2 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින සිදුකළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

5.2.1 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

(i) 2016 මාර්තු 10 දින හා මාර්තු 24 යන දිනවල බැඳුම්කර අලෙවි කිරීම සඳහා පවත්වා තිබූ වෙන්දේසි දෙකම අපේක්ෂා කල අනුපාතයන්ට වඩා වැඩි අනුපාතයන් දක්වමින් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් වීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම xxxi).

කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙම අවස්ථාවලදී සෘජු ක්‍රමයට අරමුදල් ලබා ගැනීම කෙරෙහි අවධානය යොමු කර තිබූ බව අනාවරණය නොවීය.

ඉහත ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීමට හේතු වූයේ යැයි සලකන ලද අනුපාතයන් පහත වගුවෙහි වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් දැක්වේ.

(ii) අනතුරුව ඉහත (ආ) උපශීර්ෂයෙහි දැක්වෙන 2016 මාර්තු 29 දිනරුපියල්බිලියන 10 බැගින්වූවිවිධපරිනතකාලයන්සහිතකල්පිරෙනබැඳුම්කර04 ක් එනම් රුපියල් බිලියන 40 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි.එහිදි එම නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කර 04 සඳහා මිල ගණන් ලැබීම් හා එම මිල ගණන් පිළිගැනිම් පහත පරිදි විය. (වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)මෙහිදි නිරීක්ෂණය වන එක් වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ රු.බිලියන.40 ක සීමාවකට කැඳවන ලද අතර එම මිල ගණන් මත තවත් අමතර රු.බිලියන 37.732 ක් (මුහුණත අගය) එනම් රු.බිලියන 77.732 ක් (මුහුණත අගය) දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබීමයි. එලෙස මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ වටිනාකම ඉක්මවා නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කර වලින් සියයට 60 ක් K ආයතනය හිමි කර ගෙන තිබුණි. එම ආයතනය විසින් විවිධ පොළී අනුපාතයන් යටතේ ඉහත සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර වර්ග 04 හිමිකරගත් අනුපාතය විග්‍රහ කිරීමේදී පහත සඳහන් වගුව අනුව අනාවරණය වන්නේ අඩුම ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේදී පළමු බැඳුම්කරයෙන් සියයට 0.5 ක් පමණක් හිමිකරගන්නා K ආයතනය ඉහළ ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේ නිකුත් කර ඇති අනෙක් බැඳුම්කර තුනෙන් සියයට 35 ක සිට සියයට 44 ක් දක්වා ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට සමත් වී ඇති බවයි. එනම් වට්ටම් ප්‍රමාණය වැඩිවන විට වැඩි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගෙන තිබීමය. (වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

(iii) මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කළ දිනයට පෙර පැවති වෙන්දේසිදෙකම ප්‍රතික්ෂේපකර තිබූ පදනම් වූ ඵලදා අනුපාත වැඩිවීම මෙම වෙන්දේසියේ දී ද එලෙසම නිරීක්ෂණය වුවද, ඉහළම ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්ට එනම් සියයට 14.0742 ක් දක්වා ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබුණි. මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ඉහත අවස්ථා දෙකෙහිදීම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන ලද අනුපාත ඉක්මවා මෙවර අනුපාතය පිළිගැනිමය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

(i) ඉහත 4.4 යටතේ සඳහන් කළ පරිදි සෘජු ක්‍රමයට අරමුදල් ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදය, මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙහි තීරණයක් පරිදි 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටවූ හෙයින් එවැනි විකල්පයක් සඳහා අවධානය යොමු නොකළෙහිය.

(ii) 2016 මාර්තු 24,29 සහ 31 දිනයන්හි දී පැවැත්වැත්වූ වෙන්දේසි තුනම පවත්වන ලදුයේ අප්‍රේල් මස 01 වැනි දිනට රජයට අවශ්‍යව තිබූ අරමුදල වූ රුපියල් බිලියන 105 රැස්කර ගැනීම සඳහාය.

ඒ අනුව 2016 මාර්තු 24 දින ලංසු අගයන් ඉතා ඉහළ අගයක් ගන්නා ලද බැවින් ද, එහිදී ඉතා සුළු මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබාගැනීමට වුවද පොලී අනුපාතයන් විශාල වශයෙන් (පෙර වෙන්දේසිවල සාමාන්‍ය සහ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ පොලී අනුපාතයන්ට සංසන්දනාත්මකව) ඉහල දැමීමට සිදු වන බව පෙනුනි. ඒ අනුව, එම ලංසුවලින් යම් කොටසක් හෝ පිළිගතහොත්, ඉන් පසු පැවැත්වෙන වෙන්දේසිවල ලංසු එම උපනතිය අනුව යමින්, වඩාත් ඉහල අගයන් ගනු ලබනු ඇතැයිද අපේක්ෂා කළ හෙයින්, එම ලංසු මුළුමනින්ම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීමට තීරණය කරන ලදී

ඒ අනුව 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින රුපියල් බිලියන 40 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කරයන් වෙන්දේසියට ඉදිරිපත් කෙරුණු අතර ලැබී තිබුණු ලංසු අගයන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන ලද පෙර වෙන්දේසියට සාපේක්ෂව වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අගයන් සහිත විය. ඒ අනුව මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී රුපියල් බිලියන 59.6 ක් (මුහුණත අගය රුපියල් බිලියන 77.1) ලබා ගැනීමට කටයුතු කිරීම උචිත වන බව තීරණය කෙරුණි.

(iii) මෙහිදී තීරණය වූ පොළී අනුපාත පෙර ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළ අනුපාතවලට වඩා අඩු බව උදාහරණ සහිතව පහත සඳහන් සංඛ්‍යා සටහනෙහි දැක්වේ

	9.25% 2020 A බැඳුම්කරය			10.25% 2025 A බැඳුම්කරය		
	2016.3.24 වෙන්දේසිය	2016.3.29 වෙන්දේසිය	වෙනස	2016.3.24 වෙන්දේසිය	2016.3.29 වෙන්දේසිය	වෙනස
වෙන්දේසියේදී						
i. රු.බි 5ක් ලබා ගත්තේ නම්						
Cut off	13.60	12.75	- 85	13.74	13.20	-54
WAYR	13.25	12.62	- 63	13.38	12.94	-44
iiරු. බි 10 ක් ලබා ගත්තේ නම්						
Cut off	14.50	13.00	-150	14.00	13.82	-18
WAYR	13.60	12.78	-82	13.64	23.20	-44
iii 3/29ලබා ගත් ප්‍රමාණය සඳහා (පිළිවෙලින් රු.බි.10 සහ රු.බි.21.4 සඳහා						
Cut off	14.50	13.00	-150	14.88	14.60	-28
WAYR	13.61	12.78	-83	14.10	13.80	-30

සංසන්දනය කිරීමේ පහසුව සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 24 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 යන දිනවල වෙන්දේසීන් දෙකම සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කර වූ 9.25% 2020 A සහ 10.25% 2025A යන බැඳුම්කරයන්හි පිළිගන්නා ලද ඉහළම ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය (Cut off) සහ බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය (WAYR) සලකා බලමු.

එහි සඳහන් කර ඇති අවස්ථා තුන සඳහාම රජයට වඩාත් වාසිදායක ලෙස 2016.03.29 වෙන්දේසියේ ඵලදා අගයන් තීරණය වී ඇති බව පැහැදිලි වේ.

ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයට 2016 මාර්තු 29 පැවති මෙම වෙන්දේසියේදී විකල්ප 2 කට මුහුණ දීමට සිදු විය.

2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රුපියල් බි. 38 ක් වූ (මුහුණත අගය රු.බි.40) ලබා ගනිමින් අවශ්‍ය වූ මුළු මුදල වූ රු. බි 105 රැස් කිරීම සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 31 වන දින නැවත රු.බි.67 ක් (මුහුණත අගය රු.බි.85 ක්) ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා වෙන්දේසියක් පැවැත් වීම. හෝ

2016 මාර්තු 29 වෙන්දේසියේදී රු.බි.59 ක් (මුහුණත අගය රු.බි 77) ක් වූ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරමින්, 2016 මාර්තු 31 වන දින නැවත රු.බි 46 ක් (මුහුණත අගය රු.බි45 – 50 අතර) වූ වෙන්දේසියක් පැවැත්වීම.

මෙහිදී රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයත්, පොලී අනුපාත ඉහලයෑමේ හැකියාවත් සලකා බලමින්, අඩු අවධානමක් සහිත වූ (ii) හි දැක්වූ පිළිවෙත අනුගමනය කරන ලදී.

(iv) මෙම ඉහත තීරණයෙහි බලපෑම, ඊට පසුව පැවැත්වූ 2016 මාර්තු 31 වන දින වෙන්දේසියේදී ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් පහළ වැටීම මගින් මනාව පැහැදිලි වේ.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

(i) පිළිතුර පිලිගත හැක. කෙසේ වෙතත් නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් නැත.

(ii) 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින වෙන්දේසියට වඩා 2016 මාර්තු 10 සහ මාර්තු 24 දිනයන්හිදී ලද ඵලදා අනුපාත සාපේක්ෂව ඉහල අගයක් ගෙන තිබූ බව විගණනය විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර තිබුණි. පිළිතුරු දැක්වීමේදී 2016 මාර්තු 10 වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳව කිසිවක් සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පිළිතුරු සැපයීමේදී අදාල කරගෙන ඇත්තේ 2016 මාර්තු 24 වන දින සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින නිකුත් කරන ලද සමාන පරිනත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කරවල ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පමණි. කෙසේ වෙතත් 2016 මාර්තු 10 දින ලබා ගැනීමට නියමිත බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකම රු. බි. 6 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 24 දින ලබා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කල රු.බි.20 ලබා ගත්තේ නම් පිළිවෙලින් උපරිම ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයන් 12.2363 ක් හා 13.1661 ක් වේ.

(iii) මෙම ඵලදා අනුපාත 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින හා සසඳා බලන විට පිළිවෙලින් 13.4226 ක් හා 14.0175 ක් වේ.

(iv) තවද ඉහත අවස්ථා දෙකකදී එනම් මාර්තු 10 හා 24 දිනයන්හිදී මිල ගණන් කැඳවන ලද එකතුව වූ රු. බි. 26 සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 29 වන දින ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 14.2263 ක් වේ. ඒ අනුව ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වූ අවස්ථා දෙක හා සසඳා බලන විට මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී සමස්ථයක් ලෙස ඉහල ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් ගෙන ඇති බව පැහැදිලි වේ.

වගුව 9 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා අපේක්ෂිත බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත් අගය නොලැබීම නිසා වෙනත් කෙටිකාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයකින් එය සපුරා ගැනීම

තවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනැති බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ රු.බිලියන 1 ක ප්‍රමාණය ඉක්මවා රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගෙන තිබීම හා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රු.බිලියන 40 ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා රු.බිලියන 77.73 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම හැරුනු විට එවැනි විශාල ලෙස අපේක්ෂිත සීමාවන් අභිබවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සළකා බලන ලද කාල සීමාව තුළ සිදුව නොමැති බව අනාවරණය විය. ඒ අනුව එම අපේක්ෂිත සීමා ඉතා විශාල ලෙස ඉක්මවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් එම එකිනෙක සීමාව ඉක්ම වූ කොටස හිමිකර ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව බහුලව K ආයතනයට හිමිවීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලෙස වර්ධනය වී ඇති බව පහත වගුවෙන් හා ප්‍රස්ථාරයෙන් අනාවරණය වේ. (වගුව සහ ප්‍රස්ථාරය වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

වගුවෙහි සංඛ්‍යා වලින් දක්වා ඇති රුපියල් බිලියන 18.407 (රුපියල් බිලියන 77.732 - රුපියල් බිලියන 59.325) වෙනත් ප්‍රභවයකින් ලබාගෙන නොමැත.

2016 මාර්තු 29වෙන්දේසියෙන් රු. බිලියන 59.325 ක් සහ 2016 මාර්තු 31 වෙන්දේසියෙන් රු.බිලියන 46 ක් ලබා ගනිමින් අප්‍රේල් 01 දිනට අවශ්‍යව තිබූ මුළු මුදල වන රුපියල් බිලියන 105 ක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකි විය.

එසේ වෙතත් ප්‍රභවයකින් මුදල් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් තිබේ නම්, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට ඒ බව දන්වා සිටීමට කටයුතු කිරීම සම්ප්‍රදාය වේ. එවැනි දැනුම්දීමක් එම අවස්ථාවේ සිදු නොවීය.

වෙන්දේසිය සිදු වූ දිනය	ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරැකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය (ISIN)	කල්පිරෙන කාලය	වෙන්දේසි කරන ලද මුළු වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	ගෙවන ලද මුළු වටිනාකම රු.බිලියන	වෙනස රු.බිලියන
2016.03.29	**LKB00520E014**	**10 Y 2 M**	**10.272**	**8.734**	**1.538**
	LKB01025C157	**8 Y 11 M**	**21.475**	**16.250**	**5.225**
	LKB01226F014	**4 Y 1 M**	**17.010**	**13.161**	**3.848**
	LKB01530E152	**14 y 1 M**	**28.975**	**21.180**	**7.794**
	එකතුව		**77.732**	**59.325**	**18 407**

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

එකඟ විය නොහැක

2016.03.29 වෙන්දේසියේදී සම මිලට හෝ බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට නොහැකි වූ බැවින් අව මිලට නිකුත් කිරීමේදී රජයට අභිමිවන මුදල් පියවා ගැනීමට ඊට පසු අවස්ථාවේදී ඉහල වෙන්දේසි වටිනාකමකට යෑම රජයට සිදුවේ. මේ හේතුවෙන් රජයේ වගකීම ඉහලයයි.

5.2.2 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

තවද මෙම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරු විසින් මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත්කර ඒවා අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සහ අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ ටෙන්ඩර් අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සන්සන්දනය කිරීමේදී K ආයතනයේ ලංසු ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වීම සාපේක්ෂව පහළ මට්ටමක පැවති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.2.3 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගත හැකි ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල විසින් 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින තුළදී නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කරයන්ගෙන් ඵලදා අනුපාතය සියයට 12.20 ක සිට සියයට 12.45 ක් දක්වා පරාසයක් තුළ රු.බිලියන 9.736 (ඇමුණුම xxxix a) ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් ලබා ගෙන තිබුණු බවයි. සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දිනට ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුනේ පහත පරිදි ඉතා අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට බව පැහැදිලි වේ . එම තත්ත්වය ඇමුණුම (xxix b) හි තොරතුරු මඟින් පැහැදිලි වේ. ඒ අනුව එම සියලු ඉල්ලීම් සාර්ථක වී තිබූ අතර ඔවුන්ට අවශ්‍ය ඉතිරි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළෙන් මිලදී ගැනීමට අයදුම්කර හෝ නොමැතිව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙන් මිලදි ගෙන තිබීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වේ. තවද මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ භාරකාරීත්වයේ පවතින ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙලෙස කටයුතු කිරීම පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකුව විසින් අවධානය යොමු නොකිරීම ද ප්‍රශ්නකාරී තත්ත්වයකි. (සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ සාර්ථකත්වය වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

මෙම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් අපේක්ෂිත නාමික වටිනාකම වූ රු.බිලියන 40 ක් වෙනුවට රු.බිලියන 77.732 ක් දක්වා පිළිගෙන තිබුණි. එසේ නොකර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව මුහුණත වටිනාකම වූ රු.බිලියන 40 කට සීමා කලේනම් පහත වගුවේ ගණනය කර දක්වා ඇති රු.784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වාගත හැකිව තිබුණි.

(සීමාව ඉක්මවා පිළිගැනීම නිසා ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය දක්වන වගුව වාර්තාවේ දැක්වේ)

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.3 2015පෙබරවාරිමස 27 දිනසෘජු ක්‍රමයටබැඳුමකරනිකුත්කිරීමතාවකාලිකවඅත්හිටුවීමෙන් පසුව එම සිදුවීමට අදාළව ඇති වූ තත්ත්වයන්

5.3.1 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසුබොහෝ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබූ පළමු අවස්ථාවේ සිටම බැඳුම්කර වෙනුවෙන් වට්ටම් සහිත මිල ගණන් එනම් නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු අගයන්ට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් වී තිබුණු අතර එහි ප්‍රතිඵලය වූයේ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් ගෙන තිබීමයි. මෙමගින් රජයට අමතර පිරිවැයක් දැරීමට (ආයෝජකයන්ට වට්ටම් ලබා දීම) සිදු විය. එනම් මුහුණත අගය රු.100 ක බැඳුම්කර වට්ටම් සහිතව ඊට වඩා අඩු අගයකට අලෙවිකළද, බැඳුම්කරය කල් පිරීමේදී රුපියල් 100 බැගින් ආපසු ගෙවිය යුතු වීම හේතුවෙන් එම වට්ටම් වටිනාකම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කළ දිනයේදීම රජයේ අමතර වගකීමක් බවට පත්වීම වේ. වට්ටම් කළ අගයකට බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට අලෙවි කළද ඒවායේ ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළ මිල ඉහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළ විකිණීම මඟින් වැඩි ලාභ ආන්තිකයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් ලැබෙන අතර එම තත්ත්වයන් තුළ රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසි සහගත තත්ත්වයක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදනුකරුවන් වෙත විතැන්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම පසුබිමතුළද සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයම සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති මිල ගණන් පිළිගෙන වෙන්දේසි මඟින්ම වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

කරුණාකර 4.2 සහ 5.1.19 යටතේ කරන්නට යෙදුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීම් වෙත අවධානය යොමු කරන්න.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

පිළිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් නැත.

5.3.2 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසුව සිදු වූ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනස්කම් සමගම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වූ සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල, ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණ සමාගම, මහජන බැංකුව , ලංකා බැංකුව වැනි රාජ්‍ය ආයතන එම වෙන්දේසිවලින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ගැනීම දුර්වල වී තිබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

5.3.3 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඇතැම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිවලදී ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාත සමග මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම වෙන්දේසි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළ අවස්ථා ද විය. 2015 වර්ෂයේ සිට 2016 මැයි 31 දින දක්වා පැවති වෙන්දේසිවලින් වෙන්දේසි 5 ක් ඉහත තත්ත්වය තුළ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබුණද, 2014 වර්ෂයේදී එවැනි ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම් වාර්තා වී නොතිබුණි. ඒ අනුව නිරීක්ෂණය වනුයේ 2015 වර්ෂයේ දී සිදු කළ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනසින් පසුව ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව අපේක්ෂා කරන මිල ගණන්වලට වඩා ඉතා ඉහළ මිල ගණන්වලටද, මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් ඇති වී තිබීමය. (ඇමුණුම xxxiii) එනම්ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල පවතින අනුපාතයන්ට සාපේක්ෂව ඉහළ අනුපාතයන් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කිරීමය. මෙම තත්ත්වය පහත දැක්වෙන රූපසටහන 2 මගින් පැහැදිලි වේ.(වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් භාවිතා කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඵලදායි අනුපාතයට වූ බලපෑම රූපසටහන වාර්තාවේදැක්වේ)

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

2015 මාර්තු මාසයෙන් පසු යම් යම් කාලපරිඡේදයන්හි ඵලදා අගයන් ඉහළ නැගුණු අතර, යම් යම් කාල පරාසයන්හිදී පහළ වැටෙන ප්‍රවනතාවයන්ද පෙන්නුම් කෙරුණි.

උදාහරණයක් ලෙස 2015 ඔක්තෝම්බර් සිට දෙසැම්බර් මස මැද වන තෙක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ බැඳුම්කරයන්හි ඵලදා අගයන් ක්‍රමයෙන් පහත වැටුනි. ඔක්තෝම්බර් මස ස්වෛරීත්ව බැඳුම්කර (US$1.1 bn) නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් ද්‍රවශීලතාවය ඉහළ යාමත් මෙම කාලය තුලදී බැඳුම්කර මගින් ලබා ගන්නා ණය ප්‍රමාණයන් අඩු වීමත් මෙයට හේතු විය.

මෙම ඉහල යෑමේ ප්‍රවනතාවට විවිධාකාර හේතු සාධක ඇත. රජයට අරමුදල් වෙළඳපොලින් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා භාවිතා වූ සෘජු ක්‍රමය සහ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයන්හි මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමවේදය අත්හිටුවමින්, 100% වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගැනීමට තීරණය වීම වෙළඳපොළ පොලී අනුපාතයන්හි ඉහළ යාමට මූලික හේතුවක් ලෙස සැලකිය හැකිය. සෑම මසකම වාගේ බැඳුම්කර මගින් ලබා ගන්නා ණය ප්‍රමාණයන් ඉතා ඉහළ අගයක් ගැනීම, 2016 ජනවාරි මස සිට මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තීන් දැඩි කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රතිපත්ති පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් පාදකාංක 50 කින් ඉහළ දැමීම SRR අවශ්‍යතාවයන් පාදකාංක 150 කින් ඉහල දැමීම යන කරුණු මේ සඳහා මූලික වශයෙන් හේතු විය. විදේශිකයන් සතුව තිබූ ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැඳුම්කරයන් විශාල වශයෙන් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළෙහි විකිණීමත් මේ සඳහා ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් බලපාන ලදී. එහෙත් දෙසැම්බර් මස අග භාගයේදීත් 2016 පළමු භාගයේදීත් මෙම ඵලදා අගයන් නැවත ඉහළ යෑමේ ප්‍රවණතාවක් දැක්විණි.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

පිළිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් නැත. ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය එලෙසම තහවුරු වේ.

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6 පද්ධති දුර්වලතා

6.1 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තවදුරටත් ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකර සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ඉදිරියට ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේ දී ඉන් සිදුවන මුල්‍ය බලපෑම පිළිබඳව ප්‍රතිඵල විශ්ලේෂණයක් සිදුකර එම අධ්‍යයනය ප්‍රතිඵල හා නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟව එම තීරණය ගත් බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවුණි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

6.2 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙන්දේසියේදී අවම්ලට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන එම බැඳුම්කර නැවතත් ක්ෂණිකව ඉහළ මිලට ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල තුළ අලෙවි කිරීම තුළින් ලාභයක් ලැබීම අපේක්ෂා කරන අතර එමගින් රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසිය නොලැබුණි. මෙය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් බාහිර වූ පාර්ශවයන් විසින් වෙළඳපල පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් කෘතිමව හැසිරවීමක් ලෙසත්, මෙමගින් පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් පදනම් රහිතව උච්චාවනයට ලක්වන බවත් නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම තත්ත්වය පාලනය කිරීමේ වගකීම පැවරී ඇති මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය පියවර ගෙන තිබූ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

ඒ අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වී ඇත.

6.3 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත 3.1 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව පවතින මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපළ නියාමනය කිරීමේ වගකීම මැනවින් ඉටුකරලීම සඳහා මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපළෙහි හැසිරීම් රටාවන් පිළිබඳව වැදගත් සියළු දත්ත තමන් සතුකර ගත හැකි ක්‍රමවේදයක් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වාගත යුතු වුවද, පහත දැක්වෙන නිරීක්ෂණයන් හේතුවෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට එම නියාමන කාර්යය මනාව කළ හැකිද යන්න ප්‍රශ්ණ ගතව ඇත.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මේ හේතුවෙන් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනු සිදු කිරීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය වන මෘදුකාංග පද්ධතියක් (e-trading platform) සහ මධ්‍යම පියවීම් ක්‍රමයක් (Central Counterparty Settlement System) ඇති කිරීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය මූලික කටයුතු මහ බැංකුව සිදු කරමින් පවතී.

මෙම පද්ධතිය හඳුන්වා දෙන තෙක් තාවකාලිකව බ්ලූම්බර්ග් (Bloomberg) පද්ධතිය හරහා ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ ගණුදෙනුවලට අදාළ සියලු විස්තර ලබා ගැනීමට හැකිවනු ඇත. එවිට ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ නියාමනය කිරීමේ කටයුතු වඩාත් කාර්යක්ෂමව කළ හැකි වනු ඇත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

පිළිතුර අනුව විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තහවුරු වේ.

6.4 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිකුත්කරනු ලබන බැඳුම්කර හඳුන්වාදීම සඳහා, ඒවායේ කල්පිරෙන දිනය පදනම් කර ගෙන සකස් කරන ලද ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් (International Security Identification Number) භාවිතා කරනු ලබයි. එකම දිනකදී පරිණත වන බැඳුම්කර කිහිපයක් වරින්වර නිකුත් කිරීමේ දී එම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා එම එකම ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් භාවිතා කිරීම නිසා ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේ දී එම බැඳුම්කරය කුමන දිනකදී නිකුත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කරයක්ද යන්න වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් හඳුනාගත නොහැකි බවට විගණනයට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.5 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේදි ලබා ගනුයේ ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකය සහ එම බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම සහ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු කළ දිනය යන තොරතුරු පමණක් බවත් එම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළඳපළෙහි අළෙවි වූ වටිනාකම හා ඵලදායි අනුපාත පිළිබඳ දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව නොමැති බව විගණනයට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.6 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති පරිදි අවශ්‍ය මුළු මුදලම වෙන්දේසිය මඟින් සපුරා ගැනීමට ගෙන ඇති තිරණය ඉහත 5.1.1 ඡේදයේ ඇමුණුමේ සඳහන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු පොළී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලන වගකීම ඇතුළු කරුණු සළකා බලා ගන්නා ලද තීරණයක්ද යන්න පැහැදිලි නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.7 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

එලෙසම ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති තීරණය ගැනීමේදී ඉහත 5.1.2 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ඇමුණුමේ දැක්වෙන කරුණු හා තීරණය පිළිබඳ අවධානයක් යොමු කර තිබුණු බව පැහැදිලි නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.8 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

තවදුරුහත 2.1 ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති පරිදි සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුවා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට තීරණයක් ගෙන තිබුණද ඉහත 01 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් මාර්ගෝපදේශය තුළ හෝ වෙන යම් ලිඛිත නීතියකගේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්,සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයක් ගැනීමේ අභිමතයක් තිබෙද යන්න විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.9 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් තීරණය ගැනීමෙන් පසුව මේ වන විට වර්ෂයකට ද වැඩි කාලයක් ගත වී තිබුණද එකී තීරණය හේතුවෙන් සෘජුවම හෝ වක්‍රව මූල්‍ය වෙළඳ පළට සිදු වී ඇති බලපෑම පිළිබඳව අධ්‍යයනයක් කර එම තාවකාලික අත්හිටුවීම ස්ථාවර කිරීමට, ඉවත් කිරීමට, නැවත සළකා බැලීමට හෝ වෙනයම් නිශ්චිත අනුපාතයක් මත සෘජු ක්‍රමය හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය තෝරාගැනීම වැනි විකල්ප ක්‍රමයක් අනුගමනය කළ යුතුද යන්න පිළිබඳව පසුවිපරමක් හෝ විධිමත් අධ්‍යයනයක් කළ බවට තොරතුරු විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.10 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට අනුව වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගත් ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන් ඒවා ක්ෂණිකව ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලෙහි අලෙවි කර අධික ලාභ ලබන්නේද එමගින් රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසියක් වෙනත් පාර්ශවයකට විතැන් වී තිබෙද යන්න පිළිබඳ අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදුකිරීමට හෝ එවැනි අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදු කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය දත්ත තමන් සතු කර ගැනීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බවට තොරතුරුද විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.11 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් මෙම වෙන්දේසිවලදී ලබා ගන්නා සාර්ථකත්වය අවම වීමට හා පෞද්ගලික අංශයන්හි එම සාර්ථකත්වය ඉහළ යාමට හේතු සොයා බලා රජයට අවම පිරිවැයක් සහිතව අරමුදල් රැස්කරදීමේ වගකීමද ඉටුවන පරිදි අවශ්‍ය නියාමනයන් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කටයුතු කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.12 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

තවදවටිටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගත් පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් එම බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන ඉතා කෙටි දින ගණනකින් රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හෝ ආයතන වඩා අඩු පොළී අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගෙන තිබේද යන්න පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂා කළ බවට හෝ එලෙස කටයුතු සිදු වී තිබේනම් එලෙස රජයට සිදුවන මූල්‍ය අවාසිය අවම කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය නියාමනය කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

6.13 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් තමන් වෙනුවෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් මගින් සිදුකිරීම තුළ රාජ්‍ය අංශයට හා පෞද්ගලික අංශයට ලැබෙන වාසිඅවාසි සළකා බලා රජයේ පිරිවැය අවම කිරීමට කටයුතු කළ බවට හෝ අවශ්‍ය නියාමනයන් කළ බවට කරුණු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවි කරුවකු ලෙස ක්‍රියා කිරීම සඳහා බලපත් නිකුත් කිරීමේදී අදාළ අපේක්ෂකයා පවතින අනෙක් ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවෙකු සමග කිසියම් හෝ සම්බන්ධයන් පවත්වාගෙන නොයන බව තහවුරු කරගනු ලැබේ.

එමෙන්ම ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන් තුළින් තරහකාරී ලංසු බලාපොරොත්තු වන බැවින් ඔවුන් අතර එකඟතා සහිතව වෙන්දේසි සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් වීමක් අපේක්ෂා නොකෙරේ. මෙවැන්නක් සිදු වූ බවට වාර්තා වූ ප්‍රථම අවස්ථාව මෙය වේ. මෙම සිද්ධිය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව දැනගත් වහාම අදාළ දෙපාර්ශවයම වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡා සඳහා ගෙන්වන ලද අතර නිසි පැවැත්මක් සහිතව කටයුතු කරන ලෙස දන්වන ලදී.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

පිළිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරයි.

6.14 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත 5.3.3 ඡේදයේ නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇති පොළී අනුපාතයන්හි ක්‍රමිකව ඉහළ යාමේ ප්‍රවණතාවය ඇති වීමට ඉහත 5.1.7 ඡේදයෙහි සඳහන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය සෘජුව හෝ වක්‍රව හේතු වූයේද යන්න තීරණය කිරීමට තරම් ප්‍රමාණාත්මක විශ්ලේෂණයක්කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

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7. නිර්දේශ

7.1 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රීලංකාමහබැංකුවවිසින් ගනු ලබන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණවලදී මෙන්ම පවතින ක්‍රමවේදයන් වෙනස්කම්වලට භාජනය කිරීමේ දී සහ නව ක්‍රමවේදයන් හඳුන්වාදීමේ දී එමගින් රටේ ආර්ථිකයට සිදුවන ධන හෝ සෘණ බලපෑම් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අරමුණු වලට ඉන් සිදුවන බලපෑම දිගුකාලීන හා කෙටි කාලීන වශයෙන් සලකා බලා අදාල තීරණ වලට එළඹිය යුතු වන අතර එලෙස කටයුතු කල බවට පිළිගත හැකි සාක්ෂි අවශ්‍ය අවස්ථාවන් හි දී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට හැකිවන පරිදි පවත්වාගෙන යාම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.2 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලද නියාමනය කිරීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු නොවන තත්ත්වයක් තුල මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල හැසිරවීමේ හා නියාමනය කිරීමේ කාර්යය වඩාත් ඵලදායිව ඉටුකිරීම අඩපන වීම වලක්වනු වස් අවශ්‍ය සියලු දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහබැංකුව සතුව පවත්වා ගැනීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.3 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මහබැංකුවවිසින්නිකුත්කලබැඳුම්කරයන්කල්පිරීමුදල්ලබාගැනීමසඳහාතමන්වෙතඉදිරිපත් වන අවස්ථාව දක්වා එම බැඳුම්කරයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය හා ගණුදෙනු වන ආකාරය පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වා ගැනීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.4 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

රටකමහ බැංකුව කෙරෙහි පවතින විශ්වාසය එහි නිලධාරීන් විසින් ගන්නාවූ තීන්දු තීරණවල අවංකභාවය මතද රඳාපවතින හෙයින් හා එම විශ්වාසය දේශීයව මෙන්ම අන්තර්ජාතික වශයෙන්ද නොකැලැල්ව පවත්වාගත යුතු හෙයින් එම නිලධාරීන් ගන්නා වූ තීන්දු තීරණයන්ගේ අවංකභාවය කාල පමාවකින් තොරව ඒත්තු ගැන්විය හැකි පරිදි යම් යම් සීමාවන්ට යටත්ව හෝ විනිවිද භාවයකින් යුතුව කටයුතු කිරීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.5 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

නෛතිකතත්ත්වයන්ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේඛයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද ඒවාටම සීමා නොවී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ කළමනාකරණ තීරණයන්ට බලපෑම් කළ හැකි මට්ටමේ නිලධාරීන් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට සම්බන්ධිත ආයතන අතර යම් බැඳියාවන්හි ගැටීම් පවතින්නේ නම් සද්භාවය පෙරදැරි කරගෙන සුදුසු අනාවරණයක්ද සහිතව සිය කාර්යයන් ඉටු කිරීමට මහ බැංකුවේ ඉහළ කළමණාකාරීත්වය කටයුතු කිරීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.6 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන බොහෝ තීරණ සමස්ථ ආර්ථිකයට දිගුකාලීනව බලපෑම් ඇති කරවන අතර එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්,සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයන් ගැනීමේදී නිවැරදි පදනමකින් එම තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේද යන්න ස්වාධීන පාර්ශවයකගේ පරීක්ෂාවන්ට සහ අධීක්ෂණයකට ලක්වීම ඉතා වැදගත් වනුයේ එකී තීරණයන්ගෙන් ජනිතවන යහපත් මෙන්ම අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵලවලටද සමස්ථ ජනතාවට මුහුණ දීමට සිදුවන හෙයිනි. ඒ අනුව එවැනි සංකීර්ණ තීරණ විධිමත් ඇගයීමකින් තොරව ඉතාමත් සරලව හා ක්ෂණිකව ගෙන එමගින් යම් අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵල ඇති වී තිබේද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ඒ සඳහා බලවරමක් ඇති ආයතනයන්ට ලබා දීමට බාධා සිදුවන පරිදි මුදල් නීති පනතේ 45 වගන්තියේ සටහන් රහස්‍යතාවය සුරැකීමේ ප්‍රතිපාදන යොදා ගත නොහැකි වන පරිදි එම වගන්තිය සුදුසු පරිදි සංශෝධනයන්ට ලක් කළ යුතුය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.7 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරතුරු නිවැරදිව හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර (ඇමුණුම xxxiv) එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර (ඇමුණුම iii) අනුව ලබා දී ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබේ. එහෙයින් රාජ්‍ය විගණනය විසින් එවැනි තොරතුරුවලින් හඳුනාගනු ලැබූ තොරතුරු මෙම වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුළත් නොකර එම තොරතුරු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ලබා දෙන බවත් සඳහන් කළ යුතුව ඇත.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.8 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් අතර බැඳුම්කර වලට අදාළව සිදුවන අන්තර් ගනුදෙනු නියාමනය කිරීම සඳහා නිසි ක්‍රමවේදයක් මාර්ගෝපදේශ මගින් හඳුන්වා දිය යුතුය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.9 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියට අදාළවප්‍රසිද්ධකරනු ලබන වෙන්දේසිවල අවසාන දිනය හා වේලාව යම් යම් අවස්ථාවලදී දීර්ඝ කිරීම් අනුමත කර තිබූ අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කිරීම් නොවැලැක්විය හැකි සහ සාධාරණීකරණය කළ හැකි කරුණුවලට සීමාකළ යුතුය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.10 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු නොවුවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු මෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ලබා දී ඇත. එසේ වුවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට විකල්පයන් ලෙස වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් දක්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. මේ වන විට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ පවතින අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල එම අධීක්ෂණයෙන් බැහැරව ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කළ හැකි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බවට පත් කිරීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.11 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මේ වන විට ඉදිරි මාසයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය වෙතින් ලබා ගන්නා අතර අවම වශයෙන් එය ඉදිරි මාස තුනක කාලයක් දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.12 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත පරිදි මහා භාණඩාගාරය ලබා ගන්නා ලද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරය කල් ඇතිව තීරණය කිරීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.13 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම. එනම් පසුගිය කාලය තුළ එක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බුන්වත්භාවයට පත්වීම හේතුවෙන් රජයද ඇතුළුව එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු සමග ගනුදෙනු කළ ආයෝජකයන් අසීරුතාවයට පත්ව ඇත. එවැනි තත්ත්වයන් වැලකෙන පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඔවුන් මූල්‍ය ශක්තීන් ඇතුළු අදාල වර්යාවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

7.14 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විගණකාධිපති වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති තොරතුරු අතර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකිය යුතු ලේඛන හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්ගෙන් විමසන ලදී. ඒ සඳහා පිළිතුරු ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරයකු දන්වා තිබුණේ, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අදාලව

මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යයන් වර්ෂයේ විසර්ජන පනතින් අනුමත සීමාවන් තුළ රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය මාසික පදනමින් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ මහ බැංකුව වෙත දැනුම් දීමට සීමා වන බවයි. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණ කටයුතු භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්ය භාරය ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති සරල කාර්යයකට සීමා වන බවට විගණනයේදී එකඟ විය නොහැක.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

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8. නිගමන

8.1 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

ඉහත 5.1.17 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වාගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.889,358,050 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය සහ 5.2.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වා ගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසිය ලෙස 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින පැවැති භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි දෙකේදී වලක්වා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබූ එකතුව රු.1,674,256,805 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වා ගැනීමට කටයුතු නොකිරීම පිළිබඳව බලධාරීන් වගකිවයුතු බව නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ.

තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමයට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට තීරණය ගත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා සිදුකර ඇති බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම්වලට අදාලව ද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි හෝ අවාසි ගණනය කළහොත් ඉහතින් දක්වන ලද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය තවදුරටත් ඉහළයාමේ හැකියාවක් පැවැතීමද බැහැර කළ නොහැක.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

කරුණාකර 4.2, 5.1.17 හා 5.2.1 යටතේ කරන්නට යෙදුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීම් වෙත අවධානය යොමු කරන්න.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

පිළිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයට බලපෑමක් නොමැත.

8.2 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මෙම වාර්තාව සැකසීමේ දී විගණකාධිපති වෙත අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු සහ ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේද වලින් අවධාරණය කර ඇති කරුණු අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ස්වකීය කාර්යය මෙහෙයවීමේ දී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයකුගෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරනු ලබන මට්ටමේ වෘත්තීමය විචක්ෂණභාවයකින් (Professional Due Care) යුතුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බව තහවුරු නොවීය.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

8.3 විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය

මෙම වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේදී විගණකාධිපති වෙත හිමි බලතල හා විෂය සීමාව තුල කටයුතු කර ඇති බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ. ඉන් ඔබ්බට සාපරාධී හෝ විගණකාධිපතිට නිගමනය කල නොහැකි මට්ටමේ නීති විරෝධී කටයුතු සිදු වී ඇත්දැයි යන්න මෙහිදී පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් නොවුනු හෙයින් එවන් පරීක්ෂාවක් අවශ්‍යය හැඟී යන්නේ නම් ඒ සඳහා විශේෂිත වූ ආයතනයන්හි සහය ලබා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව නිගමනය කරමි.

මහ බැංකුවේ පිළිතුර

මහ බැංකුව විසින් අදහස් දක්වා නොමැත.

පිළිතුර පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය තව දුරටත් තහවුරු වේ.

පොදු නිරීක්ෂණ - ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති පහත දැක්වෙන පොදු නිරීක්ෂණ ප්‍රයෝජනවත් වන අතර ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඇවැසි විශ්ලේෂණාත්මක අධ්‍යයනයක් සමඟින් ණය සුරැකුම්පත් වෙළඳපොළ වර්ධනය පිණිස හා ණය කළමනාකරණ මෙහෙයුම් කටයුතු වැඩි දියුණු කිරීම් යනාදිය හඳුන්වා දීමට හැක.

සෘජු නිකුතු වෙන්දේසිය අත්හිටුවීමට හා ප්‍රමාණයන් පදනම් කර සිදු කරන වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පිළිබඳ ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය, ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් වන පිරිවැය හා ප්‍රතිලාභද (Cost-Benefit estimation) ඇස්තමේන්තු කිරීම ඇතුළත් විශ්ලේෂණය කිරීමක් සහිතව තවදුරටත් අධ්‍යයනය කළ යුතු බව.

ලෝක බැංකුවේ සහ ආසියානු සංවර්ධන බැංකුවේ සහයෝගය ඇතිව මේ පිළිබඳව අධ්‍යයනයක් කරමින් පවතින අතර, මෙකී අධ්‍යයනය නිමවීමෙන් පසුව මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් සුදුසු පරිදි කටයුතු කරනු ඇත.

රාජ්‍ය ණය සුරැකුම්පත් මූල්‍ය පිරිවැයෙහි සිදු වන විචලනයන් අඩු කිරීම.

ඉදිරි මූල්‍ය කටයුතු පැහැදිලිව දක්වන මූල්‍ය ප්‍රවාහ ප්‍රකාශයන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කෙරේ. එම මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශයන්හි ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම වර්තමානයේ සිදු කරන්නාක් මෙන් ඉදිරි මාසයක කාලයකට සීමා නොකොට වඩාත් දිගු කාලීන පරාසයකට ලබා දෙනමෙන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව නිරතුරුව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටී. එවැනි දිගු කාලීන මූල්‍ය ප්‍රවාහ ප්‍රකාශයන් නොමැති වීම හේතුකොට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ඉදිරි ණය සේවාකරණ ඇස්තමේන්තු පමණක් පදනම් කොට දේශීය හා විදේශීය අංශ තුළින් ඉදිරි ණය රැස්කිරීම් සඳහා සැලසුම් විසර්ජන පනතේ සීමවන්ට යටත්ව සිදු කරනු ලැබේ.

එමෙන්ම රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින්, පවත්නා වෙළඳපොළ තත්ත්වයන් මධ්‍ය කාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ ක්‍රමෝපායන් (Medium Term debt management strategic- MTDS)සහ අපේක්ෂිත අවදානම් පිරිවැය ප්‍රමුඛතා (Risk cost priorities) සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම හා අදාල කූපන් පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් මෙන්ම එම සුරැකුම්පත් අධි/අව/සම මිලට නිකුත් කිරීම සලකා බලනු ලැබේ.

ලෝකය පුරා භාවිතා කරනු ලබන ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරැකුම්පත් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංක ක්‍රමය (ISIN) ඉදිරියටත් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනු ලැබේ. පිළිගත් ණය කළමනාකරණ පරිවයන් අනුව නව ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරැකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයන් සහිතව නව සුරැකුම්පත් කාණ්ඩයන් නිකුත් කරන්නාසේම දැනටමත් නිකුත්කර ඇති ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරැකුම් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකයන් නැවත වෙළඳපොළට විවෘත කර එමගින් එම සුරැකුම්පත්වල ද්‍රවශීලතාවය වැඩි දියුණු කරවන අතර එසේ නිකුත් කරන ලද සුරැකුම්පත් එහි මුල් කල්පිරීමේ කාලය වෙනුවට කල් පිරීම ඇති ඉතිරි කාලය සඳහා පමණක් නැවත නිකුත් කිරීම ඉදිරියේදීත් සිදු කරනු ඇත.

මීට අතිරේකව සම්මත පරිවයන්ට අනුව, රජයේ අරමුදල් ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රියාවලි තුළ ආරක්ෂණ උපක්‍රමයත් (Fire Walls) හා අනෙකුත් ක්‍රියා පටිපාටීන් (Procedures) බොහෝ කාලයක් තිස්සේ පවත්වාගෙන යනු ලැබේ. මෙම රාජකාරිමය කටයුතුවල නියැලෙන නිලධාරීන් විසින් අදාළ තීරණ ගැනීම ඉතාමත් යහපත් චේතනාවෙන් යුතුව, ණය කළඹෙහි පිරිවැය අවම කිරීම හා අවදානම අඩු කිරීම ප්‍රමුඛත්වයෙහි ලා සලකමින්, ජාත්‍යන්තරව පිළිගත් පරිවයන්ට අනුකූලව සිදු කරනු ලැබ ඇත.

තවද 2016.05.10 වැනි දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් තීරණය කළ පරිදි සියලු ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන් සමග වෙළඳපොළ ප්‍රවර්ධනයන් පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු බෙදා ගැනීම සඳහා පෙර ලංසු රැස්වීම () පැවැත්වීම කටයුතු කරන ලදී.

විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිරීක්ෂණය

විගණන පොදු නිරීක්ෂණ ප්‍රයෝජනවත් බව දක්වා ඇත. තවද අදාල තීරණය පිළිබඳව ජාත්‍යන්තර ආයතනවල සහය ඇතිව අධ්‍යනයක් කරමින් පවතින බව පිළිතුරේ සඳහන් කර ඇත. එය යහපත් තත්ත්වයක් වුවද මූල්‍ය පනතේ 8.1 වගන්තිය ප්‍රකාරව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙහි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට හිමි බලතලවලට අනිසි බලපෑමක් ඇති නොවන පරිදි කටයුතු කිරීම ඉතා වැදගත් බව විගණනයේ අදහසයි.

ඇමුණුම 11

ඇමුණුම 11
இகணப்பு 11
Annexure 11

මහ බැංකුව වෙත යොමු කල යුතු ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය

1. ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් යොමු කල යුතු ප්‍රශ්න

1.1. සුරුකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් යනු කුමක්ද?

1.1.1. පිළිතුර - **ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ රජයේ සුරුකුම්පත් නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධ මෙහෙයුම් තීරණ ගැනිමට අදාළ ව්‍යුහය සකස් කරයි.**

1.2. එවැනි ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණයක් ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ඇති පාර්ශවයන් කවුරුන්ද?

1.1.2. පිළිතුර - **අදාළ අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුව මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින්**

1.3. එසේ ලබා ගත් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් සංශෝධනය කිරීමේ බලතල හිමි පාර්ශවයන් කවුරුන්ද?

1.1.3. පිළිතුර - **මුදල් මණ්ඩලය**

2. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් භාවිතා කරනු ලබන මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත

2.1. මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සකස් කරනු ලබන්නේ කා විසින්ද?

1.2.1. පිළිතුර - **රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින්**

2.2. මෙම අත්පොත සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා දෙනු ලබන්නේ කවුරුන් විසින්ද?

1.2.2. පිළිතුර - **රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිතුමා**

2.3. එම අත්පොතෙහි සංශෝධන සිදුකරන අකාරය කුමක්ද?

1.2.3. පිළිතුර - **අදාළ නීති, රෙගුලාසි, නියාමන සහ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ වෙනස්වන විට සහ/හෝ අලුත් නිති, රෙගුලාසි, නියාමන සහ ප්‍රතිපත්ති තීරණ අදාළ අධිකාරිය විසින් හඳුන්වාදීමේදී අත්පොත ඊට අනුකූලව වෙනස් කරනු ලැබේ.**

2.4. එම සංශෝධන සඳහා පූර්ව අනුමැතියක් ලබා ගන්නේද?

1.2.4. පිළිතුර - **අදාළ අධිකාරිය විසින් අනුමත කර ඇති වෙනස්වීම් සහ/හෝ අලුත් ඇතුළත් කිරීම් සඳහා පමණක් සංශෝධන සිදුකරන බැවින් පූර්ව අනුමැතියක් අවශ්‍ය නොවේ.**

2.5. අවසන් වරට මෙම අත්පොත සංශෝධනය කරන ලද්දේ කිනම් දිනකද?

1.2.5. පිළිතුර - **2013 ජූලි 31, මෑත කාලයේදී සිදුකරන ලද වෙනස් කිරීම් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කරමින් සිටී.**

2.6. මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා ගන්නේ නම් එසේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගත යුතු බව සඳහන් නීත්‍යානුකූල ලියවිල්ල කුමක්ද?

1.2.6. පිළිතුර - **අදාළ නොවේ.**

2.7. මෙම අත්පොතෙහි සඳහන් ක්‍රියාමාර්ග අනුගමනය කල යුතු බවට නිලධාරීන්ට වගකීමක් පවතීද?

1.2.7. පිළිතුර - ඔව්.

2.8. එසේ ක්‍රියාමාර්ග අනුගමනය නොකිරීම හේතුවෙන් නිලධාරීන්ට එරෙහිව විනය ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් පවතීද?

1.2.8. පිළිතුර - ඔව්.

3. සංවේදී තොරතුරු සම්බන්ධව

3.1. ඔබ වෙළෙඳපළ සංවේදී තොරතුරු ලෙස හඳුන්වන්නේ කුමන කාණ්ඩයට වැටෙන තොරතුරුද?

1.3.1. පිළිතුර - වෙනත් පාර්ශ්වයකට අයුතු ප්‍රයෝජනයක් ලබාගැනීමට හැකිවන සිදුවීමට ආසන්න හෝ අනාගත මූල්‍ය, විනිමය අනුපාත, පොලී අනුපාත සහ රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති තෙවන පාර්ශ්ව සම්බන්ධ කරුණු ආදී සියලුම තොරතුරු

3.2. එම තොරතුරු කුමන කාලයක් සඳහා සංවේදී තොරතුරු ලෙස පවත්වාගෙන යන්නේද?

1.3.2. පිළිතුර - වෙනත් පාර්ශ්වයක් විසින් එවැනි තොරතුරු අයුතු ප්‍රයෝජනයක් ලබාගැනීමට භාවිතා කිරීමට හැකියාවක් ඇති තෙක්.

3.3. එම සංවේදී තොරතුරු කා සතුව පවතින්නේද?

1.3.3. පිළිතුර - මෙම තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ සහ මුදල් අමාතයාංශයේ විවිධ මට්ටමේ කාර්යයන්වල නියුතු වන කමිටු සාමාජිකයන්/ආයතන සතුව මෙම තොරතුරු ඇත.

3.4. එම තොරතුරු තෙවන පාර්ශවයක් වෙත යාම නිසා ඇත වන බලපෑම(impact) කුමක්ද?

1.3.4. පිළිතුර - මෙවැනි තොරතුරුවලින් තෙවන පාර්ශ්වයක් අයුතු ප්‍රයෝජනයක් ලබාගැනීමට ඉඩ ඇත.

3.5. එම තොරතුරුවල රහස්‍යභාවය ආරක්ෂා කිරීමට හා පාලනය කිරීමට ගෙන ඇති පියවර මොනවාද?

1.3.5. පිළිතුර - ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව තුළ සුදුසු අභ්‍යන්තර පාලනයක් සහ ෆයර් වෝල්ස් (fire walls) ස්ථාපිත කර ඇති අතර, අදාළ පුද්ගලයන් ව්‍යවස්ථානුකූලව රහස්‍යභාවය පවත්වාගැනීමට බැඳී ඇත.

4. භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර

4.1. ණය ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා භාවිතා කරනු ලබන ණය උපකරණ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ගනු ලබන්නේ කවුරුන් විසින්ද?

1.4.1. පිළිතුර - මුදල් මණ්ඩලය එක් එක් ණය උපකරණය යටතේ ණය ගැනීම සඳහන් කරන වාර්ෂික ණය සැලැස්ම අනුමත කිරීම මගින්

4.2. එම තීරණ සඳහා භාවිතා කරනු ලබන තොරතුරු මොනවාද?

1.4.2. පිළිතුර - විසර්ජන පනතෙහි සඳහන් පරිදි වාර්ෂික ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය සමස්ත සාර්ව ආර්ථික තත්ත්වය සහ මධ්‍ය කාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ උපාය මාර්ගයන්

4.3. එම තීරණ ගැනීම සඳහා විශේෂ වූ මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳපළ සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කරනු ලබන්නේද?

1.4.3. පිළිතුර - ඔව්. රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙළෙඳපොළ සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදුකරයි.

4.4. එහිදී භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා තීරණයක් ගත්තේ නම් එම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරනු ලබන කාලය නිශ්චය කරනු ලබන්නේ කවුරුන් විසින්ද?

1.4.4. පිළිතුර - රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ මාර්ගෝපදේශකත්වය මත

4.5. එම කාලය තීරණය කිරීම සඳහා භාවිතා කරනු ලබන නිර්ණායකයන් මොනවාද?

1.4.5. පිළිතුර - රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් සකස් කරන මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ උපාය මාර්ගය

4.6. එම කාලය තීරණය කිරීම සඳහා යම් වෙළෙඳපළ සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කරනු ලබන්නේද?

1.4.6. පිළිතුර - ඔව්

4.7. එසේ වෙළෙඳපළ සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කලේ නම් සමීක්ෂණ පත්‍රිකා ලබා ගත හැකි වන්නේ කෙසේද?

1.4.7. පිළිතුර - අපේක්ෂිත ආයෝජකයන් සමග පවත්වන රැස්වීම් සහ දුරකථන සංවාද සහ මධ්‍ය කාර්යාලයේ යෙදවුම් මගින් සමීක්ෂණ සිදුකරයි.

4.8. භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී කූපන් පොළි අනුපාතය තීරණය කරන්නේ කෙසේද?

1.4.8. පිළිතුර - නව නිකුතු සඳහා කූපන් පොලී අනුපාතය පවතින වෙළඳපොළ තත්ත්වයන් සහ මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ උපායමාර්ගය පදනම් කරගෙන තීරණය කරයි.

4.9. බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොළී අනුපාතය ඉහල යාම නිසා සමස්ථ වෙළෙඳපළ පොළි අනුපාතයට වන බලපෑම පිළිබඳ පසු විපරමක් කරනු ලබන්නේද?

1.4.9. පිළිතුර - ඔව්. ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින්

5. *සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල*

5.1. සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල පාලනය වන්නේ කුමන ආයතනය යටතේද?

1.5.1. පිළිතුර - 1958 අංක 15 දරන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල් පනත අනුව අරමුදලේ සියලුම පරිපාලන බලතල සහ කාර්යයන් කම්කරු කොමසාරිස් ජනරාල්වරයා සතුවන අතර, අරමුදලෙහි භාරකරු ලෙස අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණයට අදාළ බලතල, කාර්යයන් සහ වගකීම් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත පැවරී ඇත.

5.2. එම අරමුදලෙහි මුදල් මුදලට අගය (Value For Money/VFM) ට යටත්ව ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබන්නේද?

1.5.2. පිළිතුර - ඔව්.

අරමුදලේ සුරක්ෂිතභාවය ආරක්ෂා කරගනිමින්, ප්‍රතිලාභ ගෙවීම් සිදුකිරීමට හා අනෙකුත් වියදම් සපුරා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් පරිදි ද්‍රවශීලතාවයක් පවත්වා ගනිමින්, අරමුදලේ සාමාජිකයන් වෙත දිගුකාලීන ධන මූර්ත ප්‍රතිලාභයක් ලබාදීම ඉලක්ක කොටගත් අරමුදලේ ආයෝජන ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනු ලබයි. ආයෝජන ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රකාශනය සහ අායෝජන වෙළෙඳ මාර්ග උපදේශ විසින් අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල දැරීමට කැමති අවදානම් මට්ටම නිර්වචනය කරන අතර, ආයෝජනයන් සඳහා අරමුදල් වෙන්කිරීමට පදනම සපයනු ලබයි.

තවද, අරමුදලේ සමස්ත ආයොජනයන්ගෙන් වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් රජයේ සුරැකුම්පත්හි ආයෝජනය කර ඇති අතර, ව්‍යාපාර කොටස්වල සහ භාරකාර සහතිකපත් ඇතුළු සාංගමික බැඳුම්කරවල ද අරමුදලේ දෛනික ද්‍රවශීලතා අවශ්‍යතාවයන් කළමනාකරණය කරගැනීම සඳහා ඇති ප්‍රතිවිකුණුම් ගිවිසුම වැනි ඉහළ ද්‍රවශීලතාවයන් සහිත වත්කම්වල ද ආයෝජනය කර ඇත. තවද, අරමුදල විසින් සියලුම ද්‍රවශීලතා අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාලීම සඳහා විවිධ පරිණත කාල හා ඉහළ ද්‍රවශීලතා වත්කම් සහිත ප්‍රමාණවත් මුදල් (Amounts)/ උපකරණ නඩත්තු කරයි. මෙසේ, ආයෝජනයන්හි මූල්‍ය සහ ආර්ථික ශක්‍යතාවය ඇගයීම තුළින් ආයෝජනයන් මුදලට අගයට යටත්ව ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබයි.

5.3. සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සම්බන්ධයෙන් තොරතුරු මහබැංකුව විසින් පවත්වාගෙන යනු ලබයිද?

1.5.3. පිළිතුර - ඔව්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පහත සඳහන් තොරතුරු පවත්වා ගනියි.

සාමාජිකයන්ගේ දායක මුදල් සහ අධිභාර රැස්කිරීම පිළිබඳ විස්තර
සාමාජික ගිණුම් පවත්වාගෙන යාම
අතිරික්ත මුදල් ආයෝජනය කිරීම
සාමාජිකයන්ට සහ ඔවුන්ගේ නීතිමය හිමිකරුවන්ට ප්‍රතිලාභ ආපසු ගෙවීම
සාමාජික ගිණුම්වලට පොලිය බැරකිරීම
වාර්ෂික ගිණුම් සහ වාර්තා
නිවාස ණය අනුමැතිය සඳහා සහභාගිත්ව ණය දෙන ආයතන වෙත සාමාජිකයන්ගේ ගිණුම් ශේෂ මත වගකීම් සහතික නිකුත් කිරීම
සම්බන්ධ තොරතුරු

6. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපොළ පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු

6.1. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳුන් නියාමනය කිරීමේ බලයක් මහ බැංකුව සතු වේද?

1.6.1. පිළිතුර - **ඔව්**

6.2. නිබෙනම් එසේ නියාමනය කිරීම සඳහා ගනු ලබන ක්‍රියාමාර්ග මොනවාද?

1.6.2. පිළිතුර -

1. **නියාමන සහ උපදෙස් නිකුත් කිරීම**
2. **ප්‍රාථමික අලෙවිකරුවන්ගේ කාර්යයන් ඇගයීම**
3. **චිතැන් පරීක්ෂාව සහ දුරස්ථ පරීක්ෂාව**

6.3. ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපළට ලංසු තැබිය හැකි උපරිම මුදලක් තීරණය කර නිබේද?

1.6.3. පිළිතුර - **නැත**

6.4. ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවකු ලෙස ලියාපදිංචි නොවූ ගණුදෙනුකරුවකු වෙනුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවකුට ලංසු තැබිය හැකිද?

1.6.4. පිළිතුර - **ඔව්**

7. ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු

7.1. සුරකුම්පත් සම්බන්ධ ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපළ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුවේ දත්ත පද්ධතියක් පවත්වාගෙන යනු ලබන්නේද?

1.7.1. පිළිතුර - **ඔව්**

7.2. එම දත්ත පද්ධතියෙහි අඩංගු තොරතුරු මොනවාද?

1.7.2. පිළිතුර - **හිමිකම සහ හිමිකම් පැවරීම මුහුණත අගය මත වාර්තා කරයි.**

7.3. ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳපොළ නියාමනය කරනු ලබන්නේ කවුරුන් විසින්ද?

1.7.3. පිළිතුර - **ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව**

8. දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව සම්බන්ධයෙන්

8.1. දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව පත් කිරීමේ බලතල කා සතුව පවතීද?

1.8.1. පිළිතුර - **මුදල් මණ්ඩලය**

8.2. එම කමිටුවේ සංයුතිය කුමක්ද?

1.8.2. පිළිතුර - **රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී - සභාපති**
අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල් - භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම්
අධ්‍යක්ෂ - දේශීය මෙහෙයුම් කටයුතු
අධ්‍යක්ෂ - ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ
අධ්‍යක්ෂ - සංඛ්‍යාන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව

8.3. එම කමිටුව මුදලේ අගය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණ ගනු ලබන්නේ කෙසේද?

1.8.3. පිළිතුර - **දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව ඵලදා අනුපාතය පිළිබඳ කිසිදු තීරණයක් නොගන්නා බැවින් අදාළ නොවේ. මෙම තීරණය ගනු**

ලබන්නේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයෙනි. ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයෙහි විෂය ක්ෂේත්‍රය (Terms of Reference) මේ සමග අමුණා ඇත.

8.4. පොළී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යාම /පාලනය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුවට ඇති වගකීම කුමක්ද?

1.8.4. පිළිතුර -

8.5. කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් විසින් ගනු ලබන නීත්‍යානුකූ නොවූ හෝ ක්‍රියාවලියෙන් බැහැර වූ තීරණ සම්බව්ධයෙන් ගනු ලබන විනයානුකූල ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයන් මොනවාද?

1.8.5. පිළිතුර -

8.6. මුදලේ අගය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් එම කමිටුවට ඇති වගකීම කුමක්ද?

1.8.6. පිළිතුර -

ඇමුණුම 12

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මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට යොමු කල යුතු ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය

01. මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය තීරණය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන්

1.1 දෛනික හා මාසික මුදල් සැලැස්මක් තිබේද?
ඔව්

1.2 එම සැලසුම් සකස් කිරීම සම්බන්ධ වගකීම කා සතුවේද?
සැලසුම් සකස් කිරීමේ වගකීම මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය සතුවේ.

1.3 එම මාසික මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ ලේඛණය සඳහා තොරතුරු රැස්කර ගනු ලබන්නේ කෙසේද?
ආදායම් පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් රේගු දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, දේශීය ආදායම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සහ සුරා බදු දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ලබා ගන්නා අතර වියදම් අවශ්‍යතාවය පිළිබඳව විස්තර අමාත්‍යාංශ හා දෙපාර්තමේන්තු වලින් ලබා ගැනේ. ණය සේවා ගෙවීම් පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහා බැංකුවෙන් ලබා ගැනේ.

1.4 ණය ගැණුම් මාධ්‍යයන් කලින් තීරණය කරනු ලබන්නේද? උදා- විදේශීය ණයගැණුම්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් / භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර
විදේශීය ණය ගැනීම පිළිබඳව අයවැය පිළියෙල කරන අවස්ථාවේ තීරණය කරනු ලබන අතර, භාණ්ඩාර බිල්පත්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර, ශ්‍රී ලංකා සංවර්ධන බැඳුම්කර මගින් ණය ලබා ගැනීම වෙළඳ පළ තත්වයන් මත තීරණය වේ.

1.5 මෙම ක්‍රමවේදයන් තීරණය කිරීම මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්වරයාගේ අනුමැතිය මත සිදුවන්නේද? නොමැතිනම් කමිටුවක් හරහා සිදුවේද?
මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් සමන්විත කමිටුවක් මගින් තීරණය වේ.

1.6 මෙම ණයගැණුම් ක්‍රමවේදයන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය මහ බැංකුව සමග සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේද?
ඔව්

1.7 ණය ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදයන්ගේ සාර්ථකත්වය සම්බන්ධ පසු විපරමක් සිදුකරන්නේද?
විදේශීය ව්‍යාපෘති ණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් විදේශ සම්පත් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පසු විපරම් සිදු කරන අතර, දේශීයව ලබා ගන්නා ණය ලබා ගැනීම් ක්‍රම වේදය පිළිබඳ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පසු විපරම් සිදු කරයි.

1.8 එම වැඩසටහනෙහි යෝජනා වූ ණය ගැණුම් මාධ්‍යය මගින් ණය ලබා ගැනීම අපහසු වූයේ නම් ඒ සඳහා යොදා ගනු ලබන විකල්ප අවස්ථා කලින් තීරණය කර ගන්නේද?
ණය ලබා ගැනීමට නොහැකි බව තීරණය වන්නේ වෙන්දේසි වලින් පසුව බැවින් කල් තබා තීරණය කිරීම අපහසුවේ.

1.9 එම විකල්ප ක්‍රම වේදයන්හි වගකීම කා සතු වේද?
මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

02. ණය පොළී ඉහළ යෑම සම්බන්ධයෙන්

2.1 ණය ලබා ගැනීම වැඩිවීම හේතුවෙන් වාර්ෂිකව ගෙවීමට සිදුවන වැඩිවන ණය පොළී සම්බන්ධයෙ
අයවැයෙහි ගැලපීමක් කරන්නේද? ඒ සඳහා මුදල් ප්‍රතිපාදන වෙන්කරන්නේද?

ඔව්. මුදල් ප්‍රතිපාදන වෙන් කෙරේ.

2.2 වැඩිවන පොළී අනුපාත සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුව සමග සාකච්ඡා කර ඇගයීමක් කරන්නේද?

ඔව්.

2.3 එම ණය පොළී ගෙවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වගකීම දරන ආයතනය කුමක්ද?
මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය වෙනුවෙන් ණය පොළිය ගෙවීම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහා බැංකුව සිදු කරයි.

2.4 ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ වගකීම කුමක්ද?
නියමිත දිනට ණය පොළිය ගෙවීමට අවශ්‍ය මුල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපාදන සම්පාදනය කිරීම.

03. සුරකුම්පත් ද්විතියික වෙළඳපොළ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ තොරතුරු පවත්වාගෙන යන්නේද?
නැත.

ඇමුණුම 13

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පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව

2016 ජූනි මස 08 වැනි බදාදා

පැමිණ සිටී:

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපති)
ගරු රවූෆ් හකීම් මහතා
ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා
ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා
ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා
ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටී:

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩබ්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති;
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහතා, විගණන අධිකාරී;
ඩී.සී.ඩබ්ලිව්. හපුගොඩ මහතා; අතිරේක අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්, රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යාපාර දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;

එම්.අයි.එම්. රහීක් මහතා, ලේකම්, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; යූ.ජී. රත්නසිරි මහතා, අතිරේක ලේකම්, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; එස්.එම්. චන්ද්‍රපාල මහතා, ප්‍රධාන මූල්‍ය නිලධාරී, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ඩබ්ලිව්.ආර්. දිසානායක මහතා, ප්‍රධාන ගණකාධිකාරී, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; පී.ඒ. කාන්ති මහත්මිය, ප්‍රධාන අභ්‍යන්තර විගණක, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය; ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා, ලේකම්, මූදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය; එම්.එස්.ඩී. රනසිරි මහතා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජනරාල්, මූදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය; අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා, අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; පී. සමරසිරි මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; එස්. ලංකාතිලක මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව; ටී.එච්.බී. සරත්චන්ද්‍ර මහතා, අධිකාරී, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව, විමසන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම කාරක සභාව සඳහා අද දින හදිසියේම ඔබතුමන්ලා කැඳවීමට පාදක වූයේ, නිශ්චිත කරුණක් සම්බන්ධයෙන සාකච්ඡා කිරීම සඳහායි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙත යොමු කරන ලද ලිපියක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අද දිනයේ සාකච්ඡා කිරීමට ඊයේ කාරක සභාවේදී තීරණයක් ගත්තා. එම ලිපිය ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ සහ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අවධානය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා, පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව, 2016 ජූනි මස 08 වැනි දින. "ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මෑත කාලයේදී සිදු කළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳ වාර්තාව". පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් ඉල්ලා සිටි පරිදි ඉහත සඳහන් වාර්තා පිළියෙල කිරීම සඳහා මාගේ විධානය අනුව, මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ විගණන කටයුතු භාර විගණන අධිකාරිවරිය විසින් කටයුතු කරන ලදී.

02. ඒ අනුව නිශ්චිත කාල සීමාවක් තුළ සිදු කළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳ විස්තර සපයන ලෙස ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිවරයාගෙන් 2016 මැයි 11 (අදාළ ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම i ලෙස යා කර ඇත) සහ 2016 මැයි 17 (අදාළ ලිපියේ පිටපත අමුණුම ii ලෙස යා කර ඇත) ඉල්ලා සිටියද, අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු අප වෙත ලබා නොදුන් හෙයින් එකී තොරතුරු නොපමාව අප වෙත ලබා නොදුනහොත් ඒ බව පාර්ලිමේන්තුව වෙත වාර්තා කිරීමට සිදු වන බව 2016 මැයි 25 (ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම iii ලෙස යා කර ඇත) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති වෙත දැනුම් දෙන ලදී.

03. බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ වාර්තා පිළියෙල කිරීම සඳහා අප විසින් ඉල්ලා ඇති නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙන මෙන් එලෙස ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද නමුදු 2016 ජූනි 02 වන දින (අදාළ ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම iv ලෙස යා කර ඇත) රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිවරයා විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ විගණන අධිකාරිවරිය වෙත දන්වා තිබුණේ, ඉල්ලා ඇති පරිදි බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳ නිශ්චිත දත්තයන් සූදුසු පරිදි ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා සිය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට පහසුකම් සලසා දෙන ලෙසට, ඔහුට මහ බැංකු

කළමනාකරණයෙන් උපදෙස් ලැබී ඇති බවත්, ඒ අනුව විගණන නිලධාරීන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත එවා පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කර අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු රැස්කර ගන්නා ලෙසත්ය.

04. අනතුරුව 2016 ජූනි 03 දිනැතිව මා අමතන ලද "නියෝජ්‍ය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයෙකුගේ විගණන කටයුතු සඳහා තොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීම" මැයෙන් වූ ලිපිය (ලිපියේ පිටපත ඇමුණුම v ලෙස යා කර ඇත) මහින්ද බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීමට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන්ට පහසුකම් සලසා ඇති හෙයින් අවශ්‍ය වන නිශ්චිත දත්තයන් එකී පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමෙන් ලබා ගත හැකි බව දන්වා තිබුණි.

05. තවද, විගණන කාර්යන් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය පරිදි විශේෂයෙන් සකසන ලද තොරතුරු ලබා දීම මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ට අදාළ කාර්යයක් නොවන බවත්, එය විගණන නිලධාරීන්ගේ වගකීමක් බවත් ඉහත ඡේදය සඳහන් ලිපිය දක්වා තිබුණද ඒ පිළිබඳව මා එකඟ නොවන බව කරුණාවෙන් දන්වනු කැමැත්තෙමි.

06. මේ අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් අප විසින් ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද තොරතුරු ලබා දීම සෘජුවම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර නොතිබුණද පහත සඳහන් හේතූන් මත උක්ත වාර්තා පිළියෙල කිරීමට නොහැකි විය හැකි බව හෝ පිළියෙළ කිරීම ප්‍රමාද විය හැකි බව ඔබ කමිටුව වෙත කරුණාවෙන් දන්වමි.

(අ) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉතා විශාල ගනුදෙනු සංඛ්‍යාවක් සහ දත්ත සංඛ්‍යාවක් පරිගණක ජාලය තුළ පවතින බැවින් අපගේ නිලධාරීන්ට අදාළ නිශ්චිත දත්ත ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා එකී සියලුම දත්තයන් පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට සිදු වන බැවින් සහ ඒ සඳහා විෂයානුබද්ධ විශේෂඥ දැනුමක් අවශ්‍ය වන බැවිනුත් ක්ෂණිකව අදාළ තොරතුරු උපුටා ගැනීම ප්‍රායෝගිකව අපහසුවීම.

(ආ) ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු පිළිබඳ ඉල්ලා සිටින නිශ්චිත දක්තයන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් මීට පෙර ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද අවස්ථාවලදී එකී තොරතුරු ඉතා සුළු කාලයක් තුළ ලබා දී තිබියදී, මෙවර බවුන්ගේ පොත්පත් පරීක්ෂා කර බලා තොරතුරු උපුටා ගන්නා ලෙස දැනුම් දීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වීම.

(ඇ) මහ බැංකුව විසින් මෙවර යෝජනා කර ඇති ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කර විශාල කාලයක්ද වැය කර අදාළ තොරතුරු මාගේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් සොයා ගනු ලැබුවද, ඒවායේ නිවැරදි භාවය පිළිබඳව නැවතත් මහ බැංකුව වෙතින් සනාථ කරගත යුතු වීම හේතුවෙන් එකවරම මහ බැංකුව විසින් අපට අවශ්‍ය නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු සැපයීම වඩාත් කාර්යක්ෂමව හා නිවැරදිව උක්ත වාර්තා පිළියෙළ කිරීමට හේතු වන බව අවබෝධ වීම.

07. තවද, විගණන කටයුතු සඳහා සුදුසු පරිදි සකසන ලද මෙම නිශ්චිත තොරතුරු මා වෙත ලබා නොදීම මඟින් අදාළ වාර්තාව කාරක සභාව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට ඔනෑකමින්ම බාධා පැමිණවීමට මහ බැංකු කළමනාකරණය විසින් කටයුතු කරන බව නිශ්චිතව සඳහන් කළ නොහැකි වුවද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු කළමනාකරණය විසින් මාගේ ව්‍යවස්ථාපිත කටයුතු ඉටු කිරීම ප්‍රමාද වන අයුරින් වෙහෙස කර ක්‍රියාවලියකට මගේ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලය පත් කිරීමට උත්සාහ කරමින් මගේ විෂය පථය සීමා කිරීමට පසුබිම සැකසීම පිළිබඳව නොසතුට පළ කිරීමට සිදුව ඇති බවද කරුණාවෙන් දන්වමි.

එච්.එම් ගාමිනී විජේසිංහ,

විගණකාධිපති.

අද මේ කාරක සභාවට ඔබතුමන්ලා කැඳවන්න හේතු වූණු ප්‍රධාන කාරණාව වන්නේ, මේ ලිපියේ සඳහන් වන කරුණයි. මේ ලිපියේ සඳහන් කරුණු අනුව, මීට කලින් මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් මෙවැනි දත්ත කොරතුරු ඉල්ලා සිටි අවස්ථාවලදී කටයුතු කළ ආකාරයට වෙනස් ආකාරයකින් දීර්ඝ ක්‍රියාවලියක් අනුගමනය කරමින් කටයුතු කරන්න උත්සාහ දරා තිබෙන බව පැහැදිලි වනවා. මොකද විශේෂයෙන්ම, ඒ දත්ත තිබෙන තැන් පෙන්වා මෙන්න මෙතැන තිබෙනවා, කැමැති එකක් තෝරා ගන්න කියලා කියනවාට වඩා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට අවශ්‍ය කොරතුරු, අවශ්‍ය format එකෙන් මෙතුමන්ලා ඉනා පැහැදිලි ලෙස මේ ඇමුණුම්වල සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එවැනි පැහැදිලි ලෙස දැනුම් දීමක් කර තිබෙද්දී ඒ කොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න නොහැකි වන ආකාරයේ ක්‍රියාවලියක් එහෙම නැත්නම්, ඒ කොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීම අපහසු කරවන ආකාරයේ ක්‍රියාවලියක් අනුගමනය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඇයි කියන එකයි අපට තිබෙන ගැටලුව. කාරක සභාව හැටියට අපිත් මේ ගැන කනගාටු වනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ කටයුතුවලට මෙවැනි බාධා කිරීමක් සිද්ධ කිරීම, ව්‍යවස්ථාපිතව ගත්කොත් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට පැවැරිලා තිබෙන, මේ කාරක සභාවට පැවැරිලා තිබෙන කටයුතුවලට යම් ආකාරයකින් සිදු කරපු බාධා කිරීමක් හැටියට තමයි අපට සලකන්න සිද්ධ වන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණාව ගැන තමයි අද අපි කථා කරන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ. බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව රටෙත් විශාල අන්දෝලනයක් තිබෙන නිසා මේ ගැන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට අපි විධිමත් පරිදි, වග කිවයුතු ආකාරයකින් වාර්තා කිරීමක් අවශ්‍ය වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තා කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්න පුළුවන් කොරතුරු අපට සම්පාදනය කර දීමේ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ කාරක සභාව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට මෙවැනි වාර්කාවක් සැකසීම භාර කළේ. එවැනි තත්ත්වයකට යම් හෝ බාධාවක් සිදු වන ආකාරයෙන් කටයුතු සිද්ධ වනවා නම්,

මෙම කාරක සභාවේ වගකීම තමයි. අපි හම්බවට ඔබතුමන්ලාව කැඳවා මේ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම. එම පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ, මේක මීට වඩා කාර්යක්ෂම සහ විධිමත් කර ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදයක් අපි සකස් කර ගැනීමයි. ඒකට තමයි මේ කැඳවීම අපි සිද්ධ කළේ. මේ ගැන අදහස් දක්වපු ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කවත් සිටිනවා. මේ කාරණාවේදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමාටත් එතුමාගේ පැත්තෙන් කවත් කරුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳව රට ඇතුළේ විශාල ආන්දෝලනයක් තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, අපට ඒ සඳහා නිශ්චිත පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ, මේ කාරක සභාවට ඔබතුමන්ලාව කැඳවා, ප්‍රශ්න කරලා, ඒ ප්‍රශ්නවලට පිළිතුරු ලබා ගැනීමෙන් පසුවයි. දැන් අපට ඒකටත් ඉඩක් නැති තැනට තමයි මේ පත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට විරුද්ධව මොනවත් කරලා නැහැ කියලා සිතමු. මොකක්වත් වෙලා නැහැ කියමු. අඩුම තරමේ එහෙම නොකර තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒක එළියට යන්නේ නැහැ. මූළු රට වටේම වෙන කථාවක් තමයි දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට විරුද්ධව පැතිර යන්නේ. ඒකේ දෙපැත්තම තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ තොරතුරු අපට දැනුම් දෙන්නේ නැත්නම් මේක විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ බලය පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් විතරක් නොවෙයි, මේ කමිටුවේ ගෞරවය පිළිබඳවත් විශාල ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති කර තිබෙනවා. පාර්ලිමේන්තුව සහ මේ කමිටුව හෑල්ලුවට ලක් කරන වැඩපිළිවෙළක් මේ කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. අද අපට කථා කරන්න, මෙතැන ඒ **documents** නැහැ. වෙනදාට ප්‍රශ්න කරලා, මොකක්ද වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා කථා කරන්න අපට **documents** තිබුණා. ඒ ටික කර ගන්නවත් අද **document** එකක් අපි ළඟ නැති තැනට පත් කරලායි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරු දෙදෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා නේද? මූලින්ම මම මේ අහන ප්‍රශ්නවලට පොඩ්ඩක් පිළිතුරු දෙන්න. අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරුන් විධියට, ඔබතුමන්ලාට අමාත්‍යාංශ මට්ටමින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ලබා දෙන්න බැරි තොරතුරු මොනවත් තිබෙනවාද? අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරුන් විධියට,

ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් මූල්‍ය කටයුතු සහ කාර්ය සාධනය සම්බන්ධව පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව හෝ රජයේ ගිණුම් පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙතුවෙන් ලිඛිත කොරතුරු විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉල්ලුවොත්, දෙන්න බැරි කොරතුරු තිබෙනවාද? අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරු දෙදෙනා කියන්න.

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කොරතුරු සම්පාදනය පිළිබඳව මට නම් කවදාවත් ගැටලුවක් වෙලා නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉල්ලන කොරතුරු සැපැයීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් එහෙම ගැටලුවක් අපට මතු වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරුන් දෙදෙනාම කියන්න, මේ කාරක සභාව වෙතුවෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා යම්කිසි ආකාරයක ඉල්ලීමක් කළොත්, රටේ පවතින නීතිය අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලාට දෙන්න බැරි, නීතියෙන් දෙන්න එපා කියලා තිබෙන කොරතුරු තිබෙනවාද?

ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: මගේ අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ නම් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ අමාත්‍යාංශයේ?

එම්.අයි.එම්. රහීක් මහතා: මගේ අමාත්‍යාංශයේත් එහෙමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට මහ බැංකුවෙන් මේ ලිපිය එවවේ කවුද? අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කවුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක එවලා තිබෙන්නේ Mr. P. Samarasiri, Deputy Governor. එකේත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒකත් පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු දයාස්ිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: සමරසිරි මහත්මයා කියන්නේ කවුද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සමරසිරි මහත්මයා, මේ ලිපිය අත්සන් කළේ ඔබතුමාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, මම අත්සන් කළේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එවපු මේ ලිපිය දැක්කාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, දැක්කා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ ලිපිය කියෙව්වාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, කියෙව්වා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඔය කතාතුරේ අවුරුදු කීයක්ද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති තනතුරේ අවුරුදු 03යි. මහ බැංකු සේවාවේ අවුරුදු 33යි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ කාරක සභාවට අවස්ථා ගණනාවකදී ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා නේද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා නිකම් කොරතුරු එව්වා නොවෙයි. Format එකක් එව්වේ. ඒ format එකේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන සංඛ්‍යා ලේඛන ටික දාලා තියන්න කියලා විතරයි ඉල්ලුවේ. ඊළඟට, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට මේ ඉල්ලපු කොරතුරු ලබා නොදුන්නොත් නීතිමය තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද? සාමාන්‍යයෙන් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට, මේ කාරක සභාවට වැරැදි කොරතුරු දුන්නොත්, ඒ සම්බන්ධව ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාව යටතේ කුමන ආකාරයේ නීතියකටද යටත් වන්නේ කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපි රාජ්‍ය නිලධාරීන් වශයෙන් එහෙම වැරැදි කොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහෙම වැරැදි කොරතුරු දුන්නොත්, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් තිබෙන නීතිමය තත්ත්වය දන්නවාද? මේ කාරක සභාවට සහ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට නීතිමය වශයෙන් කරන්න පුළුවන් දේ ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අහන ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තර දීලා ඉන්න.

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: අපි වැරැදි කොරතුරු දීමක් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් මෙතැන නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තර දෙන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නීතිමය තත්ත්වය දන්නවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: වැරැදි තොරතුරක් ලබා දුන්නොත්, දඩුවම් ලබන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වැරැදි තොරතුරු හෝ ඉල්ලන තොරතුරු ලබා නොදුන්නොත් යනාදී මේ සියල්ලම එකම ගණයට වැටෙන්නේ. මේ තොරතුරු ලබා ගන්න පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. මේ තොරතුරු ලබා ගන්න බාධා වෙන ක්‍රම දෙකයි තිබෙන්නේ. එක්කෝ වැරැදි තොරතුරු දෙන එක, එක්කෝ තොරතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ කියන එක. එතකොට, මෙහෙම දෙයක් වුණොත්, නීතිමය තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවාද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම මේ ලිපිය ලියුවේ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තොරතුරු ලබා දීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගැටලු ඇති වුණු පළමුවැනි අවස්ථාව මෙය නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට ඔය format එක පූරවා තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න බැරි වුණේ ඇයි?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මේකේ තව documents තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැනදී අපි ඇත්ත තත්ත්වය බැලුවොත්, එතුමා තොරතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා නැහැ. එතුමා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ එකැනින් මහ බැංකුවට ඇවිල්ලා තොරතුරු ගන්න කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කී වැනි ලිපියද? පළමුවැනි ලිපියට දීපු උත්තරය මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පළමුවැනි ලිපිය නොවෙයි. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, දැන් තිබෙන ලිපිය අපි ගනිමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මූලින් ලිපිය මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මූලිනුම බැහැ කියනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: දෙවැනි ලිපියේ කිව්වේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: දෙවැනි ලිපියට අනුව නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා තොරතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා නැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි එතුමාට අවස්ථාව දෙමු, පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ඔව්, පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කළොත් මේක තේරෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ පැත්තෙනුත් මේ තොරතුරු ඉල්ලා සිටි අවස්ථාවන් පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා, ලේකම්තුමන්ලා සහ නිලධාරී මණ්ඩලයත් ඒ අවබෝධය ලබා ගත්තොත් හොඳයි. ඒ ඉල්ලීම ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ආකාරය ගැන විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දැන් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරයි.

ගාමිණී වියෙස්සිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ letter එක ලියන්න කලින් සමරසිරි මහතා මා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කළා. මට over the phone කථා කළා. මම හිතන විධියට, ඒ කථා කිරීමෙන් පසුව තමයි එතුමා මේ ලිපිය ලිව්වේ. නමුත්, අපි මේ ඉල්ලන තොරතුරුවල රහස්‍යතාව පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා. මොකද, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අවුරුදු 03කට මේ තොරතුරු එළියට දෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක එතුමා මට පැහැදිලි කළා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ පිළිබඳව තිබෙන secrecy අවශ්‍යතාවක් පිළිබඳ මට තර්ක කරන්න පුළුවන්කමක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මම කිව්වා, "කමක් නැහැ. මට ඒක ලියලා එවන්න" කියලා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එහෙම නීතියක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගාමිණී වියෙස්සිංහ මහතා: එතුමා මට විස්තර කළේ, මේවා sensitive and secret details, මේවා මෙච්චර කාලයක් පවත්වා ගැනීම අවශ්‍යයි කියලායි. මගේ report එක හදන්න මටම ඒක කියලා හරියන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම අපි දෙදෙනා ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළා.

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මට පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මෙතුමාට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න කෝ.

3.20)/කුමාර(මාරසිංහ)/**අනුර දිසානායක මහතා:** ඊළඟට මොකක්ද විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ.....

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: රීළඟට මොකක්ද විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ? රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා එකඟතාවකට ආවා. එය ඔබතුමාට තර්ක කරන්න බැහැ නේ. රීළඟට මොකක්ද වුණේ?

ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපති හැටියට මට අවශ්‍ය වුණේ information එක නේ. ඒවා දෙන්න බැරි නම්, ඒ ටික ලියලා එවන්න කියලා මම එතුමාට කිව්වා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ ඇවිල්ලා තොරතුරු ගන්න කියලා අවස්ථාවක් දුන්නාද?

ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඒ ටික තමයි මෙම ලිපියේ ලියලා එවලා තිබෙන්නේ. අපි format එකක් එක්ක තමයි මේක යැව්වේ. මේ format එකට information අවශ්‍යයි කියලා. ඒ format එකට අනුව තොරතුරු දෙන්න හැකියාවක් නැහැ කියලා තමයි මෙම ලිපියේ ලියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ නැවත ගෙනයන්න කියන අදහසක් එහි තිබෙනවාද?

ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. එතුමා කියන කාරණය තමයි මේවා රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු නිසා ඒ තොරතුරු එළියට ගියොත් ඒ responsibility එක භාර ගන්න සිදු වෙයි කියන එක. එහෙම තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඇත්තටම මමත් කැමති නැහැ ඒ responsibility එක භාර ගන්න. එම නිසා මම කිව්වා ඒක සටහන් කරලා දෙන්න කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ නේ මේ අපි හදිස්සියේ-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වාද එනැනට ඇවිල්ලා collect කරගන්න කියලා?

ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, ඒ information මේ letter එකෙන් එවලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙම තොරතුරු රහස්‍ය නිසා දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා, පළමුවැනි අස්ථාවේදී කිව්වා. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා දෙන්න බැරි ඒවා ලිඛිතව

දෙන්න කියලා. අනතුරුව ඔවුන් දන්වා සිටියා "අපි දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඇවිල්ලා ගෙනයන්න" කියලා. එතකොට මෙහි අරමුණ මොකක්ද බලන්න? වාක්‍ය පැත්තකින් තියන්න කෝ. උත්සාහය වන්නේ ලබා නොදීමට දරන ප්‍රයත්නයක්. එහෙම තමයි මේකෙන් පෙන්නුම් කරන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකේ දෙපැත්තක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගේ මහතා: අපි ඔක්කෝම පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රීවරු. අපේ පක්ෂ වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ඉන්න මන්ත්‍රීවරු. එතකොට මූල්‍ය බලය. අනුමත කිරීමේ සම්පූර්ණ බලය තිබෙන්නේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවටයි. ඒ පිළිබඳ සොයා බැලීමේ බලය තිබෙන්නේත් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවටයි. ඒකට තමයි COPE කමිටුව තිබෙන්නේ. COPE කමිටුවට තමයි කැඳවන්නේ. ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ඇමතිතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ මේක රටේ දිගින් දිගටම කථා කරන මාතෘකාවක්. ඉතාම බරපතළ මාතෘකාවක් මේක. COPE කමිටුවට බැරි නම් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට මෙම කරුණ ගෙනැල්ලා උත්තර දෙන්න, මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් ඇති වැඩේ මොකක්ද? ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට නිවැරදි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. සමහර විට ඔබතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ මේකේ වැරැද්දක් නැති වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. මේ පිළිබඳව ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා හැමදාම කථා කරනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඇමතිවරු විධියට අපට ගිහිල්ලා මිනිස්සුන්ට කියන්න දෙයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. එක පැත්තකින් බනිනවා අපි මෙක ආරක්ෂා කරනවා කියලා. අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් කියනවා මෙතැන හොරකමක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. මොනවා හරි දෙයක් සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ විධිමත් පරීක්ෂණයෙන් පස්සේ. එතකොට අපට ඕනෑ දෙයක් කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම කියන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අනෙක් කාරණය තමයි කවදාවත්ම ක්‍රිසිම ආයතනයක් කියලා නැහැ COPE කමිටුවෙන් ඉල්ලන වාර්තා

දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා. මමත් මේකේ අවුරුදු ගණනක් හිටියා නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාත් එය දන්නවා. ඔබතුමාගේ ආයතනයේ අය ඉන්නවා. මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්තුමා කියනවා, කවදාවත් එතුමාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් පැන නඟින්නෙ නැහැ ඉල්ලන වාර්තා දෙනවා කියලා. මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයටත් එහා තිබෙන ආයතන මොනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මහ බැංකු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට පෙර මට කාරණයක් ගැන දැනගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඉන් පසුව ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කිරීම කළොත් හොඳයි. ඔබතුමා මෙම ලිපිය යවන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාටයි. නමුත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉල්ලීම සිදු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙනුයි. Hierarchy අනුව ගත්තාම අදාළ පුද්ගලයා හැටියට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා තමයි මෙම ලිපිය යවන්න ඕනෑ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ අවබෝධය සහිතවද ඔබතුමා මෙම ලිපිය යවන්නේ? ඒ කියන්නේ, අධිපතිතුමාගේ වගකීම සහිතවද ලිපිය යවන්නේ? ඒක නිශ්චිතව කිව්වාම හරි.

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මූදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් කතා කරලා මට බලතල පැවරුවා මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එක්ක කථා කරලා එය විසඳන්න කියලා. ඒ අනුව තමයි මම මෙම ලිපිය ලිව්වේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: "විසඳන්න" කියන එකෙන් අදහස් කළේ ඔබතුමාට තොරතුරු දෙන්න එපා කියන එකද? නැත්නම් ඔබතුමාද ඔය තනි තීන්දුව ගත්තේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු ඇමතිතුමා, එතුමාට සම්පූර්ණ පැහැදිලි කිරීම කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. බාධා කරන්න එපා.

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තොරතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා අපි කියලා නැහැ කියන එක පළමුවෙන්ම කියන්න ඕනෑ. මම උදාහරණයක් කියන්නම්. මම අවුරුදු 6ක් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එක්ක මහ බැංකුවේ විගණන කටයුතු මෙහෙයවීම සිදු කළා. මූදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම් වශයෙන් මම අවුරුදු 5ක් හිටියා. මූදල් මණ්ඩලයේ

ලේකම් හරහා කමයි විගණන කටයුතු සම්බන්ධ සියලු ඉල්ලීම් සිදු කළේ. එතකොට මම කමයි ඒ මෙහෙයවීම කළේ. එම නිසා මෙම ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන මම දන්නවා. ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව කමයි මෙය සිදු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේ පළමුවැනි අවස්ථාව නොවෙයි. අතීතයේ ඉඳලාම මෙම කටයුතු කළා. සමහර දේවල්වල කොරතුරු කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැතිව අපි ලබා දෙනවා. නමුත් මේක එකඟ වෙච්ච ක්‍රියාදාමයක්. මම මෙම ලිපියට අදාළ ලිපි ලේඛන ඉදිරිපත් කළා. සමහර විට තමුන්නාන්සේලාට ඒවා ලැබෙන්න නැතිව ඇති. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙම කොරතුරු පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක සම්බන්ධව නීතිපතිතුමාගේ opinion එකකුත් මෙහි තිබෙනවා. අපි කොරතුරු දෙන්න එපා කියන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කවදද opinion එකක් දීලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතුමාට පැහැදිලි කරන්න දෙන්න.

ගරු දයාස්රි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ opinion එක කියවන්න බලන්න. පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නවා නම් ඒකත් එක්ක යන එක හොඳයි.

.සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමාට පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. එතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමෙදී මතු වන ගැටලු මටත් තිබෙනවා. මම ඒවා සටහන් කර ගන්නවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාත් සටහන් කරගෙන පසුව ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න. ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එක්ක අවුරුදු 6ක් විගණන කටයුතු කළා කියලා මම කිව්වා. ඒ ඉහළ මට්ටමින් විගණන කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙන දැනුම අනුව තුමයි මෙම කටයුත්ත කළේ. අපි මේ කථා කරන්නේ සංවේදී තොරතුරු සම්බන්ධවයි. "සංවේදී තොරතුරු" කියන්නේ, මෙම අවස්ථාවේ යම් යම් අයට නොයා යුතු තොරතුරු තිබෙනවා. මොකද, ඒ අයට එම තොරතුරු ගියොත් අපේ රාජකාරිය කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා. ඒ හේතුව මම මෙම ලිපියේ සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එම "සංවේදී තොරතුරු" කියන පදනම මත විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එක්ක අතීතයේ සටහන් ලිපි ගනුදෙනු කළා. ඒ අනුව අප එකඟවෙච්ච ක්‍රියාදාමයක් තිබෙනවා. අතීතයේදී සෑම වෙලාවකදීම අපි කළේ ඒ

වාගේ තොරතුරු තිබුණාම අපි ඒ නිලධාරීන්ට කියනවා, කාර්යාලය ඇතුළට ඇවිල්ලා බලාගෙන අවශ්‍ය ඒවා copy කරගෙන යන්න කියලා. Photocopy කරගෙන යන්න, සම්පූර්ණ ලේඛන රැගෙන යාම එතරම් හොඳ නැහැ කියලා අපි කියනවා. අපි එකඟවෙලා එම කටයුතු කරනවා. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන්, අපි බැංකුවකට ගිහිල්ලා පරීක්ෂා කළාට එම පරීක්ෂණ වාර්තාවල යම් පුද්ගලයින් සම්බන්ධ නොයෙකුත් දේවල් තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, අපි ඒවා එළියට දෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ මහත්වරු කාර්යාලය ඇතුළට ඇවිල්ලා ලේඛන බලලා එම නිරීක්ෂණ සටහන් කර ගෙන යනවා.

ඒ වාගේම මූදල් මණ්ඩලයේත් යම් යම් ප්‍රතිපත්ති, තීරණ තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒවා දෙන්නේ නැහැ. නිලධාරීන් ඇවිල්ලා අපිත් එක්ක කථා කරලා, මූදල් ලේකම් කාර්යාලය ඇතුළේ ඉඳලා පරීක්ෂා කරලා අවශ්‍ය දේවල් සටහන් කර ගෙන යනවා. අපි කිව්වේ මේකටත් ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයම අනුගමනය කරන්න කියලායි. මොකද, මේ වේලාවේ මෙම තොරතුරු සම්බන්ධව විවිධ අංශ සහ මහජනතාව අතර විශාල උනන්දුව තිබෙනවා. ඒ තොරතුරු පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ අපේ රාජ්‍ය සේවය පිළිබඳව යම් යම් බලපෑම් ඇතිවන විධියට බව අපි දන්නවා. මම එක හේතුවක් කියන්නම්. අපි මේ විධියේම යම් කිසි විදේශ විනිමය ආයෝජනයක් කරලා තිබුණා. එහි යම් යම් තොරතුරු විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් රැගෙන ආවා. යම් කිසි විධියකින් එම වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ආවා. ඒ වාර්තාව පදනම් කරගෙන අයථා පාලනයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුවට විරුද්ධව Supreme Court එකේ නඩුවක් පැවරුවා. අවුරුදු 3ක් එම නඩුව පැවතුණා. ඒ ලබාගත් තොරතුරු වැරදි විධියට කමිසි වාර්තා වෙලා තිබුණේ. ඒක ඉතාම සංවේදී තොරතුරක්. එම තොරතුරු සම්බන්ධව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කවදාරටත් පරීක්ෂා කරන විට-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: "සංවේදී" කියන වචනයෙන් ඔබතුමා අදහස් කරන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සංවේදී කියන වචනයේ තිබෙන සම්බන්ධය මොකක්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාටත් සාධාරණ කාලයක් ලබා දෙනවා. ඒ නිසා හරියට කථා කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: කාලය සම්බන්ධව ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. සෑම කෙනෙකුටම කථා කරන්න, අදහස් දක්වන්න අවස්ථාව තිබෙනවා. එම නිසා පිළිවෙලකට එම අදහස් පැහැදිලි කර ගනිමු. මට මේ කාරණාව ගැන පැහැදිලි කරන්න. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කරලා මෙම ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳන්න මැදිහත් වෙන්න කියලා, මූදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී තමයි ඔබතුමාට වගකීම් පැවරුනේ කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වා. මූදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා මූදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සාමාජිකයෙක් නේ. ඔබතුමා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවබෝධයක් - දැනුමක්- ඇත්ද නැටියේ?

(ආචාර්ය) ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකුවේ අභ්‍යන්තර ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වයන් පිළිබඳව -කොරතුරු දීම හෝ නොදීම පිළිබඳව- අපි දැනුවත් වෙලා නැහැ. හැබැයි මේම,-

සභාපතිතුමා: මම අහන්නේ මේම නිශ්චිත කාරණය ගැනයි.

(ආචාර්ය) ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: අද උදෑසන මෙම කාරක සභාවට කැඳෙව්වාට පසුව මම විමසිමක් කළා, මෙම කටයුත්ත සිදු නොවුණේ කුමන පදනමක් මතද කියලා. එතකොට මට කොරතුරක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

(ආචාර්ය) ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා සම්බන්ධීකරණ)

2004 පෙබරවාරි මාසේ 12 වැනිදා "Accountability and audit of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka" කියන මතෘකාව යටතේ ජනාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් මේ විෂය සම්බන්ධයෙන් දීපු මතය -opinion- පිළිබඳව වාර්තාවක් මට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒක ගැන දැනුවත් වෙලා තමයි මම මෙතැනට ආවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ කවදාද?

(ආචාර්ය) ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: අද උදේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම අහන්නේ ඒක නෙමෙයි. මෙතුමා පැහැදිලි කරන්නේ මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්න කියලා මෙතුමාට වගකීම පැවරුවේ, මූදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් කියලා. ඒ ගැන ඔබතුමා දැනුවත්ව සිටියාද?

(ආචාර්ය) ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: ඒක අනිවාර්යයෙන් ඉඳලා මූදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් පවරා සාමූහිකව ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණු දෙයක්. ඒක තමයි, එතුමා පැහැදිලි කළේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නැතුව මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණාව නෙමෙයිද?

(ආචාර්ය) ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග මහතා: නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මහ බැංකු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදී මතු කළා සංවේදී තොරතුරු කියන කාරණය සහ photocopies මගින් තොරතුරු පිටතට ගෙනියන්න කළ ඉල්ලීමක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ format එකෙන් කළ ඉල්ලීම සංවේදී තොරතුරු ඉල්ලීමක්ද? ඒ වාගේම මේ format එකෙන් කරන ඉල්ලීමට අනුව format එකේ කරුණු පූරවා දීමේ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ නිලධාරීන් හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලාට නේ? මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ සරල ප්‍රශ්නයක්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙන්න මේ තොරතුරු අපට පූරවා දෙන්න කියලා ඉල්ලීමක් කරනවා. මේ ඉල්ලන්නේ තොරතුරුනේ, දත්ත - data - නෙමෙයි. ඒ කටයුත්ත කරන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරී මහත්වරුන්. ඒ අය ඒක පූරවා දුන්නාට පස්සේ එය පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ මෙකැනදී.

ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙය ඊට වඩා පුළුල් ලෙස සලකා, මේ ඔක්කොම දේවල් ඉල්ලනවා; එළියට ගෙනියන්න ඉල්ලනවා; photocopy කර ගන්න ගෙනියනවා; වාගේ අදහසකට ආවේ ඇයි? මේ ඉල්ලන දේ දෙන්න තිබුණු අපහසුතාව මොකක්ද? පළමු වන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මේ format එකෙන් ඉල්ලන තොරතුරු. මේවා සංවේදී තොරතුරු හැටියට ඔබතුමා සලකනවාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ format එකෙන් විකරක් නොවෙයි ඉල්ලුවේ. රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරිතුමා ඉන්නවා. එයා කමයි ඉස්සෙල්ලාම ඒ සඳහා සම්බන්ධ වුණේ. එහිදී ඉල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ මේ format එක නොවෙයි. සම්පූර්ණ -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මේ format එක දැක්කාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: මම දැක්කා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ඒ format එක දැකලානේ උත්තර ලිව්වේ.

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: Format එක විකරක් නොවෙයි. මට වාර්තා කළ ආකාරයට සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ලංසු පිළිබඳ මූලික සටහන් computersවලින් copies ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා ළඟ ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ලිපියක් තිබෙනවාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන ආකාරයට, ඔබතුමාට ණය අධිකාරි හෝ කවුරු හරි කියලා තිබෙනවා මේවා දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: නැහැ. මම කිව්වේ එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒවා ඉල්ලලා නැහැ නේ?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට බොරු කියන්නේ ඇයි?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ format එකේ තිබෙන තොරතුරු තමයි ඉල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. එහි ඔය ඔබතුමා කිව්ව ලංසුවල කාරණා තිබෙනවාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ලංසුවල කාරණා තමයි ඉල්ලා තියෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මොනවාද ඉල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ? එකිනෙක කියන්න! ඉල්ලලා තියෙන පළමු වැනි එක මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: දෙන්න බැරි තොරතුරු මොනවාද කියන්න?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ ප්‍රශ්නය දැන් වටේට වටේට යනවා. එතුමා කියන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ කාර්යාලයේ අයට ඇවිල්ලා මේ තොරතුරු ගන්න කියලා. එතුමා දැන් දෙන්න බැහැ කියන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට ප්‍රශ්නය තියෙන්නේ, මේ තොරතුරු ලබා නොදීම හේතු කොට ගෙන මේ පිළිබඳව අවසාන වාර්තාවක් හදා ගන්න අපට බැරි වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබුණා. නමුත්, මේ තොරතුරු ගැන සම්පූර්ණයෙන් සඳහන් වන්නේ නැහැ. එතකොට තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ, මේ වාර්තාව සම්පූර්ණ කර ගන්න බැරි වුණේ මහ බැංකුව තොරතුරු ලබා නොදීම නිසා කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, කාලයක් තිස්සේ ලබාදීලා නැහැ නේ. ඒක නේ එතුමා කියන්නේ. අවුරුදු හයක් තිස්සේ -

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මහ බැංකු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමා කියපු කරුණු කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. මෙතුමා ඉස්සෙල්ලාම කිව්ව කරුණ තමයි, මූදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් එතුමාට පැවරුවා කියලා -මේ නිශ්චිත කරුණ පිළිබඳව කියන වචනය කිව්වේ නැති වුණාට- මේ කරුණ නිරාකරණය කරන්න කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ මූදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් මෙතුමාට කිව්වා මේක එකඟකාවකට ඇවිල්ලා අවසන් කරන්න කියලා. නමුත්, මූදල් මණ්ඩලය නියෝජනය කරන භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ ලේකම්තුමා කියනවා, " නැහැ. ඒක මේ නිශ්චිත කරුණ පිළිබඳව නොවෙයි. ඈත අතීතයේ ගන්නා ලද තීරණයක් මත තමයි එතුමා කටයුතු කර තිබෙන්නේ කියලා." දෙවැනි කරුණ වශයෙන් මෙතුමා කිව්වා, මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන ඒවාට අමතරව විශාල තොරතුරු ප්‍රමාණයක් ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ අපි ඇහුවා, මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන ඒවාට අමතරව ලිඛිතව මොනවා හරි

ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවාද? ඒ මොනවාද? කියලා. එකකොට එකුමා කිව්වා, එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. මේවා කමයි ඉල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන ආකාරයට නිකාමකාම කොරකුරු ලබාදීම වැළැක්වීමේ අරමුණින් කටයුතු කරලා, අපි ඉදිරිපිටදී එය වසන් කර ගැනීමට දරන ප්‍රයත්නයක් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු මඟින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: වහන්නේ නැතුව අපි මෙක හොයමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම කවදාවත් මේවා වහන්නේ නැහැ.ඔය ඉල්ලපු ලිප්ය ගන්න. ඔය template එක මට දෙන්න. මෙතැන එක ප්‍රශ්නයයි තියෙන්නේ. මේ ලිප්යෙන් ඉල්ලනවා, analysis of bond details and list of primary dealers. එකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමාට ජනවාරි 14 සිට මැයි 16 වැනිදා දක්වා auction sheet of the rejected auctions දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම නම් කියන්නේ, ඔය විධියට අරක දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද, මෙක දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද, කියලා අහන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියන එකයි. ඒවා දෙන්න කියලා කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය, ඔබතුමන්ලා වගකියන්නේ කාටද?

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: You were referring to the Opinion of the Attorney-General. Do both of you have that Opinion with you now? That Opinion was given by the letter dated 12th February, 2004. Is that correct?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: By that, the Attorney General has replied to certain questions that have been put to the Attorney General, first, by the Auditor General and secondly, by the Central Bank. You are relying in terms of item 4 of the Opinion given by the Attorney General. I will read that out to you. "

In terms of Article 154 (5) of the Constitution and Section 43 of the Monetary Law Act, the Central Bank would be obliged to divulge all information and documents available to the Auditor General insofar as they are applicable to the audit." That is with regard to the audit. It further states, "The Auditor General should bear in mind that certain information contained in documents of the Central Bank would be of a sensitive nature and therefore, avoid disclosing such information-" Now, "avoid disclosing such information" means the Auditor General should not disclose that information to others. It is not about the Central Bank disclosing information to the Auditor General. That is understood. So, you have to make them available to the Auditor General and the Auditor General must take care not to disclose that information to anybody else. But, as you know very well, that does not apply to Parliament. Here, the Auditor General acts for and on behalf of Parliament. A Committee of Parliament exercises the powers of Parliament. The Auditor General is requiring information as an agent of Parliament as directed by Parliament, not even in his capacity as the Auditor General for the purpose of his audit. So, according to the Attorney General, there is no information that can be withheld from the Auditor General when he requires that information from you. It only cautions the Auditor General not to disclose it to others. But, it says, "-doing so, if necessary, only with the concurrence of the Central Bank". That also he can do but with the concurrence of the Central Bank. But, you will agree that does not apply to Parliament. He does not have to get the permission of the Central Bank to disclose it to Parliament. Surely, you know that. Parliament is exercising its powers under the Constitution in requiring certain

information and using the Auditor General as its agent to acquire this information. So, where, in this Opinion, did you get the idea that the Central Bank can refuse it or even say, "Come and get it here" ?

There is nothing in this Opinion, as far as I can see, where you can refuse to send the information. There is nothing in this Opinion that says," You can ask Parliament to come there and look at your documents and then come back." What gave you the idea that you can tell Parliament to come to your building to look at your documents and go off without sending it here? The Attorney-General has not said that even in this Opinion.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Hon. Sumanthiran, but I think that there is a practical issue. When you are asking for lots of information, - now, you are talking of reams of information -

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: We read only one paragraph. I was on their obligation and even from this Opinion, it is very, very clear that you are entirely obliged to disclose all information. There is nothing that is exempt.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: It has been misinterpreted by the officers to the Secretary as well. ලේකම්තුමාවත් නොමඟ යවන විධියට තමයි එය කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට එතුමාත් හිතාගෙන ඉන්නේ මේක දෙන්න එපා කිව්වා කියලා. උදේ එතුමාට කථා කරලා කියලා තියෙන්නේ Opinion එකක් එවලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. එතුමාත් ඒ දේ විශ්වාස කළා. ඒ දෙය වැරදියි නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේ කාරණා කිව්වේ නීත්‍යානුකූලභාවය දිහා බලලායි. එතුමා කරන ලද අර්ථ නිරූපනයට වඩා වෙනත් යමක් මේ නිලධාරි මහතුන්ට කියන්න තිබෙනවාද? නිශ්ශබ්දකාවයෙන් පෙනෙන්නේ එහෙම දෙයක් නැහැ කියලායි සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මහ බැංකු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි, සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමට වෙනස් දෙයක් - වෙනස් අදහසක්- ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙනවාද?

Mr. P. Samarasiri: Yes, I can explain. The Hon. Member mentioned about our refusing information to the Parliament. We did not mean that. This is the information requested by the Auditor-General for his normal audit. It is a normal audit, not a specific audit by the Parliament.

The Chairman: It will be decided by the Auditor-General.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: This is a serious issue. Even, about the normal audit, what does your Opinion say?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ COPE කමිටුව හෑල්ලුවට ලක් කරන්න එපා සභාපතිතුමා , you give a Order.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: No, even for a normal audit, this opinion says that you must give it.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට ඔය සඳහන් වී තිබෙන තොරතුරුත් සම්පූර්ණ කර ගෙන අනිද්දා පස්වරු තුනට පැමිණෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: You had the audacity to write this letter.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ඔයගොල්ලන්ව audit කරන්න යන්නේ නැහැ. අපි කවුරුත් audit කරන්න යන්නේ නැහැ. දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව තමයි audit කරන්නේ. මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ව audit කරන්න යන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අපි මොනවා audit කරන්නද?

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: Do not forget one thing. He had the audacity to write that letter.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Do not put all the blame on him. He was going by what has been happening in the past. There is sensitive information and non-sensitive information as well. Perhaps, some of this information is sensitive to extent that is why the Attorney-General has clearly specified that you must safeguard the secrecy of that information.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක sensitiveද නැද්ද කියන එක අදාළ කාරණයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ sensitiveness එක අදාළ වෙන්නේ Auditor-General විසින් ඒ තිබෙන කාරණා එලියට දැන්නොත් තමයි. නමුත් එතුමා ඒවා ගන්නේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ කාරක සභාවේ ප්‍රයෝජනය සඳහායි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි එහෙම ඔබතුමන්ලාව සෑක කරනවා නම්, පසු ගිය සිදු වූ දේවල්වලට ඔබතුමන්ලා තමයි ඉස්සෙල්ලාම සෑක කරන්නේ. දැන් මේ ඔබතුමන්ලා මතු කරන්නේ සෑකයක් නේ. එහෙම සෑකයක් තිබෙනවා නම් අත්‍ය ක්‍රියාදාමයත් එක්ක ගත්විට පාර්ලිමේන්තුව පළමුවෙන්ම විශ්වාස කරන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාව. ඔබතුමන්ලාව නොවෙයි. තොරතුරු දැන්නොත් කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා සෑකයේ කරුණක් නේ මතු කරන්නේ. පසු ගිය බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රශ්නයේදී මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළෙන් නේ තොරතුරු සියල්ලම එළියට ගිහිල්ලා තිබුණේ. විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් නොවෙයි නේ. අතීතයේ සිට මේ දක්වා මහ බැංකුව සම්බන්ධ ප්‍රශ්නවලදී විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව නොවෙයි නේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මහ බැංකුව සම්බන්ධ තොරතුරු විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට භාර දීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට නේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. රජයේ ඕනෑම ආයතනයක් විගණනයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් වග කියන්නේ විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට නේ. පාර්ලිමේන්තුව වුණත් විගණනයක් භාර දෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට නේ. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවා. අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයාගේ සිට හැම කෙනෙක්ම ඔය

කොරතුරු අධ්‍යයනය කර තිබෙනවා නේ. ඔය දේවල් නොදැන නොවෙයි කථා කරන්නේ. යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට අපිත් ඒ ගැන අවබෝධයක ඉන්නවා නේ. ඒ නිසා අපි කවුරුත් දන්නේ නැහැ කියන මට්ටමෙන් යන්නේ නැතිව ඒ විධියට යමු. ඔබතුමන්ලා නොයෙකුත් තර්ක ගෙනෙයි. අපිට ඒවා වැඩක් නැහැ. අපිට අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ මේ රටේ තිබෙන මූදල්වලට මොකද වුණේ කියලා දැන ගන්නයි. ඒ මූදල්වලට ඔබතුමන්ලා කොච්චර වග කිව්වාද? කලින් ඒවා විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් විගණනය වුණා නම් දැන් ඒවා විගණනය කරන්න බැරි ඇයි? මේ ගැන විගණනය කරන්න ජනාධිපතිතුමා, අගමැතිතුමා, කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලයේ කවුරුත් හෝ අපි කවුරුත් මහ බැංකුවට යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ දේ භාර දීලා තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට. එතකොට අවශ්‍ය කොරතුරු එතැනට ලබා දීම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වගකීමක් වෙනවා. ලේකම්තුමා එවැනි වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

එම්.අයි.එම් රහීක් මහතා: තිබෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක පැහැර හැරීමට මොකක් හෝ ප්‍රශ්නයක් එකැන තිබෙනවා . ඒකයි මේ අහන්නේ. මෙම සිද්ධියට සම්බන්ධව මහ බැංකුවේ කලින් තිබුණ වාර්තා ටික අපි දැක්කා. ඒ මූළු සිද්ධියම මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ **deal** එක සම්බන්ධව හැම කරුණක්ම අඩංගු වාර්තාව අපි කියෙව්වා. එවැනි අතීතයක් තිබියදී කමයි නැවත මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මතු වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: අතීතයේ සිදු වීම් ගණනාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අතීතයට එහා අතීතයකුත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා ඔබතුමන් මොකද මේ ගැන කියන්නේ?

Mr. Rafeek, you have to answer this. You are responsible for this. You are the Secretary.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට කථා කරන්න දෙන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා කනගාටුයි. මේ අය හිතාගෙන ඉන්නවා නම් මේ රටේ ඉන්නේ-

සභාපතිතුමා: වීරකුමාර මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, කියන දෙයක් මට කියන්න කෝ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මට තත්පරයක් දෙන්න. මෙකැන පක්ෂ නායකයෝ ඉන්නවා, දේශපාලන නායකයෝ ඉන්නවා, ඇමතිවරු ඉන්නවා, මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් හිතන් ඉන්නවා නම් කාරක සභාවට ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්න අපි ගොන්නු කියලා. මෙම කමිටුව නොමග යවන්න හදනවා නම් මේ කෝප් එකෙන් වැඩක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කවුරුවත් හිතන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ අපි. මෙකැනදී අපිට කරුණු කමයි වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. නැතුව ආවේග නොවෙයි. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා හැම දෙනාගෙන්ම මම ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා, ආවේගවලින් නිලධාරිමහත්වරුන් අපහසුතාවට පත් කරන්න එපා කියලා. අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ මෙහි සත්‍ය තත්ත්වය විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා කරුණු අනාවරණය කර ගැනීමයි. ඔබතුමන්ගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමෙදී ඔබතුමන් කිව්වා, මේක **normal audit** එකක් කියලා. එයින් ඔබතුමා අදහස් කරනවාද **normal audit** එකකට නම් දෙන්න අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ප්‍රමාණය මෙපමණයි කියලා. එහෙම සමාවක් තිබෙනවාද අද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම එතැන්නේ අදහස් කළේ. **Normal audit** වලදී අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එක්ක අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රියාදාමයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ක්‍රියා දාමය කමයි මම යෝජනා කර තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමෙදී ඔබතුමන්ම පිළි ගත්තා, මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණය, විශේෂ ආන්දෝලනයක් තිබෙන විවාදාත්මක කාරණයක් කියල. එතකොට නිශ්චිත වශයෙන්ම මේ කරුණු ඉල්ලන්නේ ඒ කාරණයට අදාළව කියලා බැලූ බැල්මට පෙනෙනවා නේද?

පී. සමරසිරි මහතා: පෙනෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ විෂය දැනුම අනුවත් පෙනෙනව මූදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන්ම මේ කාරණය නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න කියලා ඔබතුමන්ට පැවරෙන විටම මේක **normal audit** එකක් නොවෙයි. මේක විශේෂ කාරණයක් වෙනවා. මේක තවදුරටත් **normal audit**එකක් විධියට සලකා කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ. අනෙක් කාරණය **normal audit** එකක් සහ විශේෂ **audit** එකක් කියලා දෙකක් නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කරුණු ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා නම්, ඒ කරුණු දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද, බැරිද කියන එක විතරයි අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ. ඊට පසුව මොකක්ද කරන්නේ කියලා පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තීරණය කරයි. ඒ කරුණු අනුව එහි වැදගත්කම, නොවැදගත්කම, ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම තීරණය කරන්නේ ඔබවත්, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාවත් නොවෙයි. ඒක තීරණය කරන්නේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුව. අපටත් තිබෙන්නේ මේ කාරණාව අනුව කරුණු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමයි. සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමාත් පැහැදිලි කළ ආකාරයට නීතිපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම වන්නේ, "මහ බැංකුව අවශ්‍ය සියලු කරුණු විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට වාර්තා කළ යුතුයි. එහි තිබෙන තත්ත්වය අනුව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එය ඉදිරිපත් කරන ආකාරය තීරණය කර ගනියි" කියන එකයි. මෙතැනදී ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පැත්තෙන් පැහැදිලිවම පැහැර හැරීමක් සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

මෙහි 1 සිට 10 දක්වා ඉල්ලා තිබෙන කරුණු ,-

Auction sheet of rejected auctions from January 2014 to May 2016; reasons for the rejections; analysis of the bond issues detailed according to the following table කියලා table එකකට නේ මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණා ඉල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ කාරණාවල ඔබතුමා සඳහන් කළ, දෙන්න බැහැ කියන "sensitive documents"වල මොකක්ද තිබෙන්නේ? මේ කරුණු දහයෙන් කියන්නකෝ. අරය කිව්වා, මෙයා කිව්වා, විගණකාධිපතුමා මෙච්චර ඉල්ලුවා කියලා කට වචනයෙන් කියන දේ පැහැදිලිවම ඔබතුමාට ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන බලතල අනුව කටවචනයෙන් ඉල්ලන දේවල් දෙන්න එපා; ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලන දේවල් පමණක් දෙන්න කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්. ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා තිබෙන දේවල්වලින් ලබා දිය නොහැකි බවට ඔබතුමා තීරණය කළ "ඇවිත් බලාගන්න" කියන කොරතුරු මොනවාද? ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ rejected list එක දෙන්න බැහැ කියලාද?

ජී. සමරසිරි මහතා: එක එක පුද්ගලයින්ගේ නම්, ගම් සහ ඉලක්කම් තිබෙන ඒවාට තමයි අපි කියන්නේ ඉතාම සංවේදී කොරතුරු කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මීට කලින් විගණනවලදී එවැනි කොරතුරු, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉල්ලලාක් නැද්ද? දීලාක් නැද්ද?

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මා දන්නා විධියට නම් Auditor-General ඉල්ලන කොරතුරු නොදී ඉන්න බැහැ. නමුත් පුද්ගලයින්ගේ නම්, ගම් ගැන ඔබතුමාට මොකවත් කියන්න බැහැ. Auditor-Generalට closed session එකක් ඇතුළේ මේ කමිටුවට කරුණු දක්වන්න පුළුවන්. වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන අවස්ථාවේදී ඒවා කොයි විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද කියලා සභාපතිතුමාට තෝරා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපිට මේ විධියට කොරතුරු ගන්න බැරි වුණා නම්, ලංකා පුත්‍ර බැංකුවෙන් රුපියල් කෝටි ගණන් දුන්න ඒවා සොයා ගන්න

ලැබෙන්නේත් නැහැ. එහෙම පුද්ගලයන් විධියට තොරතුරු ලබාගත් නිසා තමයි පාර්ලිමේන්තුව දැන ගත්තේ, ලංකා පුත්‍ර බැංකුවෙන් රුපියල් කෝටි ගණනක් එක් එක් පුද්ගලයින් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒ නිසා මේ තොරතුරු ඔබතුමන්ලා එළියට දෙන්නේ නැත්නම්, Auditor-Generalගෙන් එළියට යන්නෙත් නැහැ. නමුත් එහෙම නැතිවත් දැන් බොහෝ තොරතුරු එළියට ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. කරුණාකරලා ඔබතුමන්ලා Auditor-Generalට අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ටික දෙන්න. ඒ වාගේම Auditor-General අපිට report එක දෙන්න. එතැනින් පස්සේ මේ කමිටුවේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරලා තමයි කීන්දුවක් ගන්නේ. අපට අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු නැතුව අපිට කථා කරන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට තේරෙනවා නේ. එක පැත්තකින් මෙච්චර ගත්තා කියනවා, අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් ගත්තේ නැහැ කියනවා. අපිට ඒ ගැන දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු අපිට වුවමනායි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, sensitive issue එකක් කියන්නේ මේ bonds ගත්තේ කවුද කියන එකද? මොකක්ද රහස? ඔබතුමන්ට බැරි නම් bonds ගත්ත අයගේ ලැයිස්තුව අපි කියන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධ විගණන කටයුතු කෝප් එකක් තමයි විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට භාර දුන්නේ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මීට කලින් කෝප් එකට ඇවිත් ගිහින් මාධ්‍යවලට කියලා තිබුණා, බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් මොනවත් විමසුවේ නැහැ කියලා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපිට ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් අහන්න දෙයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මොකද, අපිට තිබුණේ ඒ ගැන පරීක්ෂණයක් පවත්වන එකයි. අපි කෝප් එකේදී තීරණයක් ගත්තා මේ ගැන පරීක්ෂණයක් පවත්වන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒ තීරණය අනුව තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කටයුතු කරන්නේ. ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සියලු තොරතුරු ලබා දීමේ වගකීම මහ බැංකුව සතුයි. එහිදී මේ තොරතුරු දෙන්න බැහැ, මේ තොරතුරු දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. මේ පරීක්ෂණයේදී ඉල්ලන තොරතුරුවලට අමතරව තවත් තොරතුරු අවශ්‍ය වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, අද මේ කමිටුව තීරණය කළොත් මේ tormat එකේ තිබෙන තොරතුරු පමණක්

දෙන්න කියලා, එහිදී ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්න පුළුවන් ඉල්ලුවේ එච්චරයි කියලා. මේ බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව අවශ්‍ය යැයි සලකන සියලු තොරතුරු මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබාදිය යුතුයි. ඒවා ලබා දීමේ වගකීම, ප්‍රධාන ගණුන් දීමේ නිලධාරීන් හැටියට අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමන්ලා දෙදෙනාම දැරිය යුතුයි. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙය serious issue එකක් හැටියට ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ තොරතුරු ලබා දීමේ වගකීම line Ministry එකේ ලේකම්තුමාට පවරන්න ඕනෑ. මූදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමා මේකට අදාළ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමනි, මේ ඉල්ලා තිබෙන තොරතුරු සතියක් ඇතුළත අපට ලබා දෙන්න කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම අවශ්‍ය යැයි සැලකෙන අනෙකුත් තොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා ඉඩකඩ තියෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, three days ඇති. Monday කැඳවන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතුමන්ලාගෙන් අහන්න කොපමණ කාලයක් අවශ්‍යද කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා අයීක්ෂණය කරන්න ඕනෑ කාරණය මේකයි. මේ තත්ත්වය යටතේ විගණන නිලධාරීන් මොනම ආකාරයෙන්වත් අපහසුතාවකට පත් වන්න බැහැ.

Mr. M.I.M. Rafeek: We will try to give it within one week, Sir.

සභාපතිතුමා: අද ජූනි 08 වැනි දා නේ. ජූනි මස 15 වැනි දා වන විට මේ තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: They may have practical problems. Chairman, do you have a practical problem of giving them one week?

The Hon. Mahindananda Aluthgamage: It should come to Parliament within a week, not to the Auditor-General. So, they should send it to the Auditor-General before that one week. It has to be received by Parliament within one week.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමා, මේ කටයුත්ත සම්පූර්ණයෙන් අධීක්ෂණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම මෙහි තිබෙන බැරුම්කම සහ වැදගත්කම පිළිබඳව පළමුවෙන්ම සලකන්න ඕනෑ කියලා ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කරනවා. මෙහි සම්පූර්ණ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ, මේ කටයුතු භාර දීම, ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය නිදහස ලබා දීම, විගණන අංශයන්ට අවශ්‍ය සහාය ලබා දීම මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා භාරයේ තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. මෙහි සම්පූර්ණ වගකීම මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා හැටියට ඔබතුමා භාර ගත යුතුයි. ඔබතුමාට මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තවත් විශේෂයෙන් කියන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවාද?

Mr. Arjuna Mahendran: Hon. Chairman, I want to make an explanation on some comments made by the Hon. Sumanthiran. There is no order from the Attorney-General saying that we have to hide this information or to give it anybody. What has been stated, as I understand in the letter, is that the Auditor-General and the Central Bank have to come to some sort of mutual understating to prevent sensitive information from going into the public domain. That is all that we are trying to restrain ourselves here. So, we had a mutual understanding where Auditor-General's staff, who are based in the Central Bank, will examine this information. So, I think the Deputy Governor has done this in good faith. We did not mean any disrespect to this Hon. Committee or anybody. But, we will definitely in one week's time provide you all the information you want. There is no problem at all.

The Hon. Rauff Hakeem: *With your permission, Mr. Chairman, arising from* what the Hon. Sumanthiran said, shall I make a few comments on this issue? I was

examining these papers. It appears to me that there is a small systemic problem between the Auditor-General's Department and the Central Bank. This has been going on for years. Even during the period of the former Auditor-General, Mr. Mayadunne, there were exchange of letters indicating that there had been a systemic problem of getting audit and probity of the audit to be restricted in certain areas. When you see the exchange of letters you can see that. Also here there is a relevant paragraph - the penultimate paragraph in paragraph 4 - where the Attorney-General states?

"In terms of Article 154 (5) of the Constitution and Section 43 of the Monetary Law Act, the Central Bank would be obliged to divulge all information and documents available to the Auditor-General, in-so-far-as they are applicable to the audit. The Auditor-General should bear in mind certain that information contained in the documents of the Central Bank would be of a sensitive nature and therefore, avoid disclosing such information - doing so, if necessary only with the concurrence of the Central Bank. In any event, it would be prudent and appropriate for the Auditor-General to communicate with the Monetary Board the reasons for seeking sensitive information and consider the observations of the Board before proceeding."

So, that is what the Attorney-General's, 'say', in regard to this. Therefore, there is some kind of request by the AG in regard to dealing with this sensitive issue - be in consultation, explain and sort this out. That is what is meant.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: The issue here is this. You do not even have to consider all of that because if the reasons for seeking sensitive information, not relating to Parliament for some other reason, then the Auditor-General probably will have to talk to the Monetary Board and the Board can decide and make its observations before proceeding. But when it is done at the instance of Parliament, I do not think the Board can consider whether it is necessary for Parliament to have a look at it or not. This question does not arise. This is the exercise by Parliament – of the powers given to

Parliament under the Constitution. I do not want to say anything about the Auditor-General's opinion.

The Attorney-General has cited all Sections of the law in the rest of his opinion where he says, "It is obligatory on the part of the Central Bank to disclose to the Auditor-General." This is a part that he cites where there is no legal authority. This is just his own opinion. We do not know, where he plucked it from. Nevertheless, even going by some fanciful ideas that the Attorney-General seems to have got when writing this opinion, still you are obliged to divulge information. You cannot cover under anything else. That is the position.

The Hon. Anura Priyadharshana Yapa: My argument is this. Now we are looking at the actions taken by the Central Bank previously. The Auditor-General is probing that. I think they will have to provide information to that extent. So, it is up to the Auditor-General to tell us, what the sensitive information is and it should be disclosed only to the Committee and not to others.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: May I suggest, one thing. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට කෑරිද - Can the Auditor-General not speak to the Attorney-General? I am just -

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: No. Why do they go and ask for Attorney-General's opinion? අපි Attorney-General ගේ opinion එකක් පිළිබඳව විමසීමේ අවශ්‍යතාව කුමක්ද? What is the necessity?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමන්ලා within one week මේක දෙනවා කියලා කිව්වා නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ සාකච්ඡාව දැන් අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Central Bank එකේ, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරිනුත් ඉන්නවා නේ. එතුමන්ලා සතියකින් ඒ තොරතුරු දෙනවා කියලා කිව්වා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කාරණයේදී සියලු දෙනාම වගකීමෙන් සහ සංයමයෙන් යුතුව කටයුතු කරන ලෙස ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. හැමදෙනාටම බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

(සාක්ෂිකරුවෝ නික්ම ගියහ.)

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.)

ඇමුණුම 14

ඇමුණුම 14
இகணைப்பு 14
Annexure 14

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව.
2016 සැප්තැම්බර් මස 23 වන සිකුරාදා

පැමිණ සිටි:

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්' රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි;

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාම ගෞරවයෙන් පිළි ගන්නවා. අද දින අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාට මහා බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ලේකම් කාර්යාලය විසින් සකස් කරන ලද

වාර්තාවේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළා. එහි ඉංග්‍රීසි සහ දෙමළ පරිවර්තන කෙටුම්පත් ලබා දී තිබෙනවා. ඊට අමතරව සිංහල කෙටුම්පතත් ලබා දුන්නා. ඊට අමතරව කථානායකතුමාගේ අවසරයත් අපට ලැබුණා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවත් එක්ක ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කථානායකතුමාට දුන්නු සන්වේදී තොරතුරු සහිත වාර්තාව සවිස්තර වාර්තාව කාරක සභාවේ සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට ලබා දෙන්න. ඒකේත් අපි සියලුම පිටපත් අවශ්‍ය භාෂාවෙන් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගෙන් භාෂාව මොකක්ද කියලා ලබා ගෙන සියලුම පිටපත් ලබා දී තිබෙන්නේ. මේ ලේඛනය ගැන පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කළොත් මා මුලින් සඳහන් කර ඇති ආකාරයට ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් මෙහි නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේක අධ්‍යනයට සුදුසු ආකාරයට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් පිළියෙල කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ ඇතුළත් කරුණුත් ඒ වාගේම මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවා වාචික සාක්ෂිවලින් අනාවරණය වූ සියලු කරුණුත් සම්පින්ඩනය කර හදන ලද සම්පින්ඩන ලේඛනයක් විතරයි. එතකොට මේ ලේඛනයේ තිබෙන කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කරලා, තව එකතු වෙන්න තිබෙන දේවල් එකතු කරලා, මේකේ සංශෝධනය වෙන්න ඕනෑ කරුණු සංශෝධනය කරලා මේකට නිර්දේශ හැටියට අතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ දේවල්, මේ ලේඛනය පිළි ගන්නවා නම් මේ ලේඛනයට නිර්දේශයන් හැටියට කාරක සභාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කරුණුත් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විසින් ලිඛිතවම ලබා දීලා ලේකම් කාර්යාලය විසින් වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමටයි තිබෙන්නේ. අපි මෙතෙක් කල් කරන ලද මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් කැඳවා කරන ලද විමර්ශන කටයුතු අවසන් කර තිබෙනවා. අපට තිබෙන්නේ මෙම විමර්ශනයේදී අපි අනාවරණය කර ගත්ත කරුණු පදනම් කර ගෙන මේ ලේඛනය කෙටුම්පතක් ලෙස සාකච්ඡා කරනවා නම් සාකච්ඡා කරලා මේ ලේඛනය මත පදනම් කර ගත්ත පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙන අවසන් වාර්තාවක් සකස් කිරීමටයි. මේකේදී මෙයට අවශ්‍ය කරන ඇමුණුම් සියල්ලම වාගේ මේ ලේඛනයට හදපු වාර්තාව, කෙටුම්පතකට අදාළ කරන ඇමුණුම් සියල්ලම ඇතුල් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ යටතේ විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව, ඒ වාගේම මෙය පටන් ගන්න මූලික වූ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ත්‍රි පුද්ගල

කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව ඇමුණුමක් ලෙස තිබෙනවා. පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා, එම ඇමුණුම පරිගණකයෙන් scan කරද්දී අවස්ථා දෙකක, තැන් දෙකක තමයි කොටස් හැටියට මේකට ඇවිත් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක එක් තැනෙකට එකතු කර ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකේ ඉංග්‍රීසි පිටපතේ හතරවැනි පිටුව නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සිංහල එකෙත් හතරවැනි පිටුව නැහැ. ඒක මගහැරී තිබෙනවා. මමත් මෙතුමියට ඒක කිව්වා. ඒක අපට ලබා දෙන්න.

ඊළඟට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද presentation එකේ පරිවර්ථනය තිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින් විසින් කාරක සභාව හමුවේ අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදී ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්. අවසානයේ මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා ඇවිත් කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද අවස්ථාව දක්වා. අපි සම්පූර්ණ කෙටුම්පතටම ඇතුළත් කළේ නැහැ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ සම්පූර්ණ වාර්තාව. ඒක අවසාන වාර්තාව සකස් කරන වෙලාවේදී එය අතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට වෙනම මුද්‍රණය කරලා දීලා තිබෙන නිසා. මුද්‍රණ ක්‍රියාවලියක් නේ නැවතත් වෙන්නේ. ඒක සහ Manual Report එකේ සියලුම කොටස්, මුළු Manual Report එකම ඇතුළත් කළෙත් නැහැ. එකේ සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වූ කොටස්වල උපුටනයන් ටික කෙටුම්පතට ඇතුල් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ සියල්ලම නැවත කථානායකතුමාට භාර දුන් පුළුල් ලේඛනයේ ඒ සියලු කාරණා තිබෙනවා. තව එක ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට, ඇමුණුම්වලට එන්න ඕනෑ කරන දෙයක් තිබෙනවා, අපි මහ බැංකුවෙන් සහ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා ලබා ගත් ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය සහ ප්‍රශ්නාවලියට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒවා කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ,

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා අවසන් වුණාට පසුව අපි තවත් කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම සඳහා මහ බැංකුවට සහ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට ප්‍රශ්නාවලියක් යැව්වා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නාවලියයි, ඒ ප්‍රශ්නාවලියට ලැබුණු පිළිතුරුයි යන කොටස අතුලත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: වැඩිපුර ප්‍රශ්නය වූ කාරණය ඕකනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකෙන් සාකච්ඡා කරපු ටික තිබෙනවා. Verbatim Reports සාකච්ඡා වූ කරුණුයි තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් ඉල්ලන ලද ආකාරය තමයි මෙහි නැත්තේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ප්‍රශ්න ටික නැත්තේ. ඒ ප්‍රශ්න ටික අපට දැන් දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මහ බැංකුවෙන් ඉල්ලා එවලා තිබුණා නේ පත්‍රිකාවක් fill කරලා එවන්න කියලා. අපි ප්‍රශ්න කළාට පස්සේ දෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් ආවාට පසුව නේද ඒ පත්‍රිකාව ලැබුණේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවත් හදලා අවසන් වුණාට පසුව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සාකච්ඡා කරන කොට අපට තව ප්‍රශ්න වගයක් පැණ නැගුනා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නාවලියක් අපි හදලා විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට යැව්වා. ඒකට ලැබුණු පිළිතුරු ටික. ඒ කාරණා සියල්ලම අපට ලැබුණා නේ. විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට ලැබුණ ඒවා නේ ඔය පුළුල් ලේඛනයේ ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. දැන් අපි එහි පිටපත් ටික ලබා දෙන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කෙටුම්පත පිළිබඳ තවත් සංශෝධන වශයෙන් ඇතුල් කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම් වෙනස් කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ කරුණු ටිකක් සාකච්ඡා කරලා, අපට මේක ඉදිරියට සාකච්ඡා කරගෙන යන ක්‍රමයක්, අවසාන වාර්තාව බවට මෙය පත් කරන ක්‍රමයක් සාකච්ඡා කරනවා නම් හොඳයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: පිටුඅංක 11 හි 2015.02.27 වන දින සිදු කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධව මේකේ දීලා තිබෙන, එතෙක් අනුගමනය කරන ලද ක්‍රියා මාර්ගය. ඒ කියන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දුන්න වාර්තාවේ කොටසක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: 3වන කාරණාව කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ උඩින්. 3 වන කාරණාව පටන් ගන්නේම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දුන්නු වාර්තාවේ කරුණු තමයි එහි සම්පින්ඩනය කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එකේ තිබෙන්නේ " මහ බැංකුව මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ අධීක්ෂණ මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක M.V./P.D 0597ට අනුව 1997 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මගින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණ බවද, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවකදී හෝ කුලී බැඳුම්කර අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවකදී වෙන්දේසි මගින් සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වන අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල් යොදා ගෙන නොමැති බවද පත්‍රිකාවේ දක්වා ඇති විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි"එතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ මුලින්ම පෙන්වන ලද කාරණා ටික. 1997 සිට එන ලද ක්‍රමවේදය.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ පත්‍රිකා අංකය යටතේ එහෙම තිබෙනවා කියන එක. එය විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා කියන එක. මෙතෙක් අනුගමනය කරපු ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන කියන්න තමයි ඒක තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මෙහි සියලුම තොරතුරු අඩංගු වෙලා තිබෙනවා ඔබතුමන්ලා හදලා තිබෙන ලිපි ගොනුවේ. මේකෙන් නිවැරදි තොරතුරු අරන් සකස් කරලා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන එක තමයි කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී කැමති කෙනෙකුට පිළිගන්න හෝ ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන්න පුළුවන්. මෙහි දිගින් දිගටම අපි කිව්වා, ඩිව් ගුණසේකර සභාපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් කමිටුවක් පරීක්ෂණය කළා. ඒ අය නිගමනයකට ආවා. ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වුවා. අපි යම් නිගමනයකට ආවා. මේ දෙකම එකතු කරලා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට දුන්නා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා යම් නිගමනයකට ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා. මේක එක් කොළයකට ගත්තා නම්, පසු ගිය කාලයේ කරන ලද වැරදි ගනුදෙනු තිබෙනවා නම් සභාපතිතුමා, වෙනම සොයන්න පුළුවන්. අපි සොයන්නේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන්. මේකට කල් ගියා වැඩියි. මේ ගනුදෙනුවේ කාරණය නම් කොළ දෙකකට එකතු කරන්න ලෙහෙසියි. මේකේ කබීර් හෂීම් ඇමතිතුමන්ලා, මලික් සමරවික්‍රම ඇමතිතුමන්ලාට භාණ්ඩාගාරයට ගිහින් මුදල් ඉල්ලන්න කරපු පළමුවැනි රැස්වීමේ ඉඳලා, එයින් එහාට පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 27 වැනිදා Bond Issue එකේ ඉඳලාම වෙච්ච දේවල්, ටෙන්ඩර් කල් ගියපුවා, සියල්ලම ගත්තාම මේක ඉතා පැහැදිලිව පේනවා සියලු දෙනාගේම සාක්ෂි. මට මේ දවස්වල නිදහස් නිසා ඊයේ රෑ තුන විතර වෙනකම් මම කියෙව්වා. සාමාන්‍ය මේ තරම් කියවන්නේ නැහැ. ඔක්කොම notes දාගෙන ආවා. පිටු දෙසිය ගණනක් කියෙව්වා. ඒ නිසා මට මේ දවස්වල නිදහස් නිසා පළමු වතාවට කියෙව්වා. මේ පොත ගැන ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් අහන්න මට කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ඊයේ හොඳට කියෙව්වා. රෑට නින්ද යන්නේ නැහැ, මකුණෝ කනවා නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියවපු ඒවා අනුව නම්, මේ ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කොළ දෙකක වාර්තාවක් හදන්න පුළුවන්. මේ කමිටුව මෙපමණ පිටු ගණනක් ලියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ, කොළ දෙකක් හොඳටම ප්‍රමාණවත්. මේ ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගනුදෙනුව ආරම්භයේ සිට මෙන්න මේක වෙලා තිබෙනවා, මේ පාඩුව වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කොළ දෙකකින් සඳහන් කරන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා. පෙර ගනුදෙනු ගැන හෝ එක එක්කෙනාගේ සාක්ෂි මේකට ඇතුළත් කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් හැටියට අලුතෙන්ම හුවාදක්වන්න උත්සාහ කරනවා. ඒක තමයි දැන් කරන්නේ. හැබැයි, මේක government policy එකක් නොවෙයි. මේක government policy එකක් නම්, government policy එකක් වෙන ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. අනෙක් එක තමයි, මේක Monetary Board එක සම්මත කරලා නැහැ නේ. මේක Monetary Board එක අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් Monetary Board එක අනුමත කරලා නැහැ. මම දකින විධියට නම්, මේ පිළිබඳව මෙපමණ කථා කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ, පෙබරවාරි 27වැනි දා සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳව කොළ දෙකකින් ලියන්න පුළුවන්. මේක ගැන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී විවාද කරන්න පුළුවන්. නැත්නම්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දෙන ලද වාර්තාව මේ විධියට දිගින් දිගටම අභියෝගයට ලක් කරන්න ගියොත්, පසු ගිය කාලයේ (ආචාර්ය) විජයදාස රාජපක්ෂ ගරු ඇමතිතුමා, හිටපු ගරු ඇමති ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මැතිතුමා ඇතුළු සියලු දෙනා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ සියලුම දේවල්වලට පිළිගැනීමක් නැති වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මම කියන්නේ, මේක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරමු කියලායි. මම මේ පොත කියවලා බැලුවා, එක් තැනෙක

විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, "මම කියන දේ සියයට 100ක්ම නිවැරදියි කියලා හිතන්න එපා." කියලා. එතුමාම ඒක කියනවා. මම කියන්නේ, මේ ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳ පැහැදිලිව මේකේ තිබෙන දේ මොකක්ද, මහ බැංකුවේ වර්තමාන අධිපතිතුමා වුණත් සමහර දේවල් ගැන දරන මත මේකේ ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙනවා. මේ ගනුදෙනුව වුණු ආකාරය ගැන, ඒකෙන් වුණු පාඩුව මෙන්න මේ ආකාරයට වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා කොළ දෙකකින් ලියමු. ඊට පසුව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට පුළුවන්, මේ ගැන සොයා බලන්න මීට වඩා විධිමත් කමිටුවක් පත් කරන්න කියන්න, මීට වඩා professionals කමිටුවක් පත් කරලා මේ ගැන තවත් සොයා බලන්න කියලා කියන්න. ඒ නිසා මේක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මේක තවත් කල් දමන්නේ ඇයි? මේක ගැන දිගින් දිගටම කථා කරන එක COPE එකටත් හොඳ නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියන්න කැමැති නැති වුණත් මේක කියන්න ඕනෑ, මේකට දැන් ලොකු බලපෑමක් එල්ල වෙමින් යනවා. මේකට ඔබතුමා කොපමණ pressureද කියලා මම දන්නවා. මෙතැන මාධ්‍ය නැති නිසායි මම කියන්නේ, මේ කමිටුවට එන්න කලින් ඔබතුමාට කොපමණ pressure එකක් තිබෙනවාද, ඔබතුමාට කීදෙනෙකු කථා කරනවාද කියලාත් මම දන්නවා. මේ Committee එකේ මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් කථා කරලා අවසන් වෙනකොට තවත් මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුගෙන් calls එනවා. අපි තවම මේ ගැන එළියේ කථා කළේ නැහැ. මොකද, COPE එකේ වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා. මම අද වෙනකම් එළියට ගිහිල්ලා මේ ගැන කථා කළේ නැහැ. මොකද, COPE එකේ සාමූහික එකඟතාවක් තිබෙනවා "කියන්න එපා." කියලා. ඒ නිසා කියන්නේ නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ ගැන දිගින් දිගටම කථා කරන්න ගියොත්, මම නම් මේ ගැන ලිඛිතව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ලියලා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී කථා කරනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි සාදාගත්ත timetable එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒක අනුව වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ කවදාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ 20වැනි දා තමයි, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා අවසන් දිනය යොදා ගත්තේ. Timetable එක අනුව අපි වැඩ කරගෙන ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ 3වැනි සතියේදී පාර්ලිමේන්තුව රැස්වෙන්නේ නැහැ, 4වැනි සතියේ තමයි රැස්වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 4වැනි සතියේ ඉදිරිපත් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: එදිනට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට මේක පිළිගන්නවා නම් හරිම පහසුයි. මේ කරුණුවලට අදාළ කෙටුම්පත පොදුවේ පිළිගන්නවා නම්, ඊළඟ දින අපට වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඒකට යම් කිසි කාලයක් යොදා ගනිමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි timetable එකකට කටයුතු කරනවා නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ඒකට විරුද්ධත්වයක් ප්‍රකාශ කරනවා නොවෙයි. අපි කියන්නේ එකම දෙයයි. මෙතුමාට මේ පොතේ පිටු ඔක්කෝම කියවන්න අවස්ථාව ලැබුණා. ඒ නිසා එතුමාට මේ ගැන ලොකු දෙයක් කියන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, අපට මේක කියවන්න අවස්ථාව ලැබුණේ නැහැ. පැහැදිලිව ඒක කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ නිසා මෙතුමා හා සමානවම අපටත් මේ පොත කියවන්න පුංචි කාලයක් ඕනෑ. එහෙම නැතිව මේක කල් යවන්න අපට අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. නමුත් විශේෂයෙන්ම අලුත් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් හැටියට අපට මේ ගැන විශේෂ අධ්‍යයනයක් කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි. ඒ කාලය මේ කාලයට සමානයි. අපි කියන්නේ නැහැ, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන දිනය වෙනස් කරන්න කියලා. ඒ එක දිනයක්වත් වෙනස් කරන්න එපා, ඒ දිනයට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. නමුත්, අද මේක සාකච්ඡා කරනවා හා සමානව යම් දෙයක් මෙතැනදී අපි ඉගෙන ගන්නවා, මේක බලනවා. ඒ වාගේම ඉතිරි කොටසත් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තවත් දිනයක් දෙන්න. එතැනින් අවසන් කරන්න, ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අපිට කවුරුවත් බලපෑම් කරලාත් නැහැ, අපි කාටවත් බලපෑම් කරන්න යන්නේත් නැහැ. අපි දන්නා විධියට මෙතුමාටත් කාගෙන්වත් කිසිම බලපෑමක් නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒක එතුමාගේ මුහුණ බැලුවාම කියන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මුහුණ බලලා ඒවා කියන්න යන්න එපා. මට කිසිම බලපෑමක් නැහැ. ඒක මට අවශ්‍යත් නැහැ, මෙතැනට බලපෑමක් අදාළ වෙන්නේත් නැහැ නේද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මම මේ ගැන එළියට ගිහිල්ලාවත් කියන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම දෙයක් නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට ඒ විධියේ කිසිම බලපෑමක් නැහැ, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒ විධියේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාම මට සහයෝගය දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඔබතුමා බලපෑම්වලට යටත් වුණා කියලා මම කිව්වේ නැහැ. ඒ ගෞරවය ඔබතුමාට තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් හෝ කවුරු හෝ මාධ්‍යවල මේ ගැන කථා කරන දේවල් මට අදාළ නැහැ. මම ඒවාට උත්තර දෙන්න යන්නේත් නැහැ, ඒක මට අදාළත් නැහැ. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා දෙන සහයෝගය තමයි මට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. මෙතැනදී අවශ්‍ය වන සහයෝගය ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් මට ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට වෙනස් වූ අදහස් තිබෙනවා නම්, වෙනස් වූ මත තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒවා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අවස්ථාව තිබෙනවා, ඒකට කිසිම බාධාවක් නැහැ. සෑම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුට ඒ ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදී අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් කර ගන්න එපා. මේ කරුණුවලින් කථා කරන්න තිබෙන කරුණු ගැන පිටුවෙන් පිටුව හෝ ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදය හෝ සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට තුන්වැනි සතියේදී ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හිටියේ. දෙවැනි සතිය යොදා ගනිමු. ඒ කියන්නේ, 25වැනි දා හෝ 26වැනි දා. 4වැනි සතියේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුව රැස් වෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ කාරණා 10න් දෙකක් හෝ තුනක් අද අවසන් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහෙම කරමු. බිමල් රත්නායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාටත්, ඔබතුමාටත් මම අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්නම්. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව යොදාගෙන තිබෙන්නේ 4වැනි දාට පමණයි. ඒ ආයුර්වේද සංස්ථාව කැඳවීමටයි. 5,6,7 දින තුනම අපට තිබෙනවා. මම යෝජනා කරනවා, මේකේ නිර්දේශ සකස් කරන්න එක දිගටම ඒ දින තුනම යෙදා ගනිමු කියලා. 7වැනි දා අවසන් දිනය බවට පත් කර ගනිමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 5වැනි දා යොදා ගනිමු. අවශ්‍ය නම් 6වැනි දාත් යොදා ගනිමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපි 4වැනි දා ආයුර්වේද සංස්ථාව කැඳවීමට පමණයි යොදා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා මේ වාර්තාව සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම කියවලා පෞද්ගලිකව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නිර්දේශ සහ යෝජනා තනි, තනිව 5වැනි දා වෙන කොට - 5වැනි දාට කලින්- ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් හොඳයි කියලා, මම මේ යෝජනා කරනවා. ඒක තමයි වඩාත් හොඳම ක්‍රමය. ඒකෙදී ඔබතුමන්ලාට කුමක් හෝ වෙනස් කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම්, පිටුවෙන් පිටුව වුණත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ ඒවා සඳහන් කරන්න. 5වැනි දා වෙන කොට පොදු නිර්දේශයන් ලබා දෙන්න. ඒ නිර්දේශයන් ගැන 5වැනි දා සාකච්ඡා කරලා වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන් පොදු නිර්දේශ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්නත්, වෙනස්කම් තිබෙනවා නම්, වෙනස්කම් විධියට ඒවා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. 6වැනි දා අවසන් දිනය බවට පත් කර ගනිමු. බිමල් රත්නායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ වාර්තාවේ තාක්ෂණික දෝෂ කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලා කලින් කථා කළාද කියලා දන්නේ නැහැ, මම PAC Report එකේ press conference එකට සහභාගි වෙලා පැමිණි නිසායි ප්‍රමාද වුණේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ටික කියන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එකක් තමයි, පිටු අංක 17හි රුපියල් බිලියන 1.403 වෙනුවට තිබෙන්නේ රුපියල් 1,403 කියලායි. ඒක රුපියල් බිලියන 1.403 කියලා නිවැරදි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඊට පසුව පිටු අංක 18හිත් රුපියල් බිලියන 20.708 වෙනුවට තිබෙන්නේ, රුපියල් 20,708 කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක 20.708 කියලා වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔව්, 20වැනි පිටුවේත් ඒ විධියටම තිබෙනවා. ඒකත් රුපියල් බිලියන 20.708 කියලා නිවැරදි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම තවත් ඇමුණුම් දෝෂයක් තිබෙනවා, අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයාගේ කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව ගැන. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා දැක්කාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ගැන අපි කථා කළා. ඒ කොටස ස්ථාන දෙකක තිබෙනවා. ඒක එකට එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: පිටු අංක 52හි තිබෙනවා, මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් ප්‍රකාශ කළ කරුණු කියන එකේ අවසාන ඡේදයේ "මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලද දින උදෑසන 10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ." කියලා. එතැන පැමිණියේ කවුද කියලා තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. පැහැදිලිද? 52වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා, "මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලද දින උදෑසන 10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් පැමිණ ඇද්ද, කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක ඉල්ලුමක් පැවතියේද යනාදී කරුණු විමසූ බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදි." කියලා. එතැන පැමිණියේ කවුද කියන එක තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. කවුරු හෝ කතෘවරයෙක් ඉන්න ඕනෑ නේ. පැමිණියේ කවුද කියලා තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැනට "මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා" කියලා ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පසුව තිබෙන්නේ, විවාදාත්මක කරුණු. ඒවා ගැන කථා කරන වේලාවට සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාගේ තවත් corrections තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒවා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඒක වඩාත් හොඳයි. ඊට පසුව මූලික කාරණාවලට යන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 62වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කියවීම ගැන. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒ වාර්තාව කියවන දිනයේ අපි long discussion එකකට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, සියලු දෙනාම මේ ගැන පැහැදිලි කරනකොට පුළුල් සාකච්ඡාවකට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Presentation එක දිනයේදී.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක කියවනකොට සියලු දෙනාගේම ප්‍රශ්න එදින නිරාකරණය වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එදා මේ සෑම විෂයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්ම clarifications අහලා තිබෙනවා. මේකේ පිටු අංක 65 සහ 95 බැලුවා නම්, මේ ෙක් අවධානයට යොමු කළ යුතු සියලු කාරණා ගැන විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සමඟ arguments කරලාත් තිබෙනවා.

මේකේ ලොකු discussion එකක් ඇති වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ගොඩක් අය clear කර ගෙන යම් එකඟතාවකට ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා. දැන් ආපහු මඩේ දමලා සෝදනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: වාර්තාව සකස් කර ගන්නයි දැන් හදන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි සියල්ල කථා කළා. ආයේ සෝද සෝද මඩේ දමන්නේ නැහැ. දැන් අවසන් කරන්න යන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට වෙනම කරුණු කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ මාර්තු මාස සිදුවූ ගනුදෙනු දෙකේ අලාභය වශයෙන් එතුමා ගණන් හදලා තිබෙන්නේ, එදින සිදු වුණු පාඩුව වශයෙන් එතුමා දකින එක. නමුත් කාරක සභාව විධියට එය ප්‍රමාණවත් නැහැ. මොකද, අවුරුදු 30කට නේ දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේවා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ අවුරුදු 30කට. අපි අලාභය දකිනවා නම් දැකිය යුත්තේ අවුරුදු 30ටමයි. එම නිසා විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් හරි, එම හැකියාව තිබෙන වෙන තැනකින් හරි, මහ බැංකුවෙන්ම වුණත් කමක් නැහැ. අවුරුදු 30කට වෙන හානිය කොපමණද කියලා එකතු විය යුතුයි කියන යෝජනාව මම කරනවා. ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට එකතු වීමක් විධියට නොවෙයි.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒක කරන්න ගියොත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙනවා. ඔක්කොම vague වෙනවා. එම නිසා තමයි ඒක කළේ නැත්තේ. Particular point එකේ 100 per cent sure කරන්න පුළුවන් figure එක විතරක් මේකට දැම්මේ ඒකයි. අනෙක් ඔක්කොම vary වෙනවා interest rate එකත් එක්ක. එම නිසා අහවල් දේය කියන එක පිළිබඳව තරක කරන්න හරි අමාරුයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන අලාභය කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරන්න බැහැ කියලා අපි තීරණය කළා. ලාභය, අලාභය කියලා එකක් මෙතැන නැහැ. වාසි, අවාසි ගැන විතරයි කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: අවාසි තමයි කතා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. අවාසි කියන වචනය තමයි පාවිච්චි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: වචනයේ ලොකු වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. පාඩුවක් වුණා කියන එක කියන්න බැහැ. අලාභයක් වුණා කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. මොකද, අපි අවසාන වශයෙන් කළ සාකච්ඡාවේ - මම theory එක විතරයි කතා කරන්නේ. අපි එතැනදී කිව්වා - මේක අවසාන වෙන හැටි බලන්න. මහ බැංකුවේ අලුත් Governor - මොන පිටුවේද ඒක තිබෙන්නේ? දෙසිය හතළිස් ගණන් නේද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව කියන්නේ pure science එකක් නොවෙයි කියාපු එකද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 245.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක මේකට අදාළ නැහැ. එහෙම ගත්තාම mathematics වුණත් pure science එකක් නොවෙයි. යවන රොකට් පුපුරන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 245 පිටුවේ කතාව බලන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: F = ma දමලා ගැහුවාම රොකට් පුපුරනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. මෙම වාර්තාවේ 245 පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා මේක "judgement call" එකක් කියලා. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපට හරියටම තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්ද එක පැත්තකින් මොන ප්‍රමාණයක් මොන interest rate එකට ගන්න ඕනෑද, අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් මොන ප්‍රමාණයක් මොන interest rate එකට දෙන්න ඕනෑද කියන ප්‍රශ්නයට විෂයානුබද්ධ පිළිතුර මොකක්ද කියලා මම ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජිත් කුමාරස්වාමී මහතාගෙන් ඇහුවා. 244 පිටුවේ අවසාන ඡේදය ගන්නකෝ. මට විනාඩි දෙක තුනක් දෙන්න. මොකද, මේක වැදගත්.

"If I were to ask you, Mr. Governor, would there be different views on market movement; would there be different views on government's fiscal consolidation ability; and therefore, would there be different views on the future interest rate?"

Would there be different views on the future interest rate? ඒක තමයි වැදගත් එක. අපට මෙතැන ඉඳලා ඉදිරියේදී interest rate එක අඩු වෙයිද, වැඩි වෙයිද කියන එක පිළිබඳව කියන්න බැහැ. ඊළඟට මෙහි තව දුරටත් තිබෙනවා;

"Because, you know the interest rate from time T to time T+1 …" -අද ඉඳලා ලබන වසර. ඊළඟට "…and from time T+1 to time T+2 …" -පළමු වැනි වසර අවසන් වෙලා දෙවැනි වසරට යනවා. දැන් ඉඳලා පළමු වැනි වසර. පළමු වැනි අවසර අවසන් වෙලා දෙවැනි වසර. "…the interest rate from time T to time T+1 and from time T+1 to time T+2 is connected based on what we believe - the interest rates are going to vary further down the road. That is what we called, "The Yield Curve; how steep or flat the yield curve is." - yield curve එකක් කියන්නේ ඉදිරියේදී interest rate එක වැඩි වෙනවාද, අඩු වෙනවාද කියන එකයි. Then, I went on to ask, "So, my question is an important one. Can there be differences of opinion among the market players as to what the future interest rates are going to be?"

ප්‍රශ්නය හරි පැහැදිලියි. ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි වෙළඳ පොළේ නොයෙක් අයට ඉදිරියේදී පොලි අනුපාතය ගැන විවිධ මත තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එක. එහෙම විවිධ මත තිබෙන්න පුළුවන් නම්, එක පුද්ගලයෙකුට එක මතයක් ගන්න පුළුවන්, තව පුද්ගලයෙකුට තව මතයක් ගන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට Governorගේ පිළිතුර තමයි "Most certainly, there can be." -ඔව්. එසේ විය හැකියි. He has further explained, "Because, for instance, even in terms of the short-term, when the Central Bank Monetary Policy Committees meet here or abroad, if you take a survey of 10 or 15 economies, you will get varying views as to what is going to happen even during the course of that week. So, if you are taking a view

as to three, six, twelve months or the medium-term, people will have different views." එතකොට ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපි අවුරුදු 30ක් ගත්තාම එම අවුරුදු 30 interest rate එක ඉහළ යයිද, පහළ යයිද කියන එක පිළිබඳව අද අපට කියන්න බැහැ. අවුරුදු 30ක yield curve එකක් අද මේ රටේ ඇත්තටම නැහැ. මොකද, secondary market එක දියුණු වෙලා නැති නිසා. Secondary market එක දියුණු වෙලා තිබෙනවා නම් අපට මේ තීරණය ගැන, ලාභය අලාභය කියන එක ගැන කථා කරන්න හැකියාවක් තිබෙනවා. අපට එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. මොකද, අපේ secondary market එක develop වෙලා නැති නිසා.

මගේ ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි - "Mr. Governor, the penultimate question on this round is, have there been instances where either the issuers or the investors have made investment decisions and found out that their original call was wrong?"

මීට කලින් මෙහෙම සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවාද? අපි තීරණයක් ගන්නවා මේ interest rate එකට අපි ගත යුතු ප්‍රමාණය මෙපමණයි කියලා. නමුත් ඒක වැරදිලා තිබෙන අවස්ථා තිබෙනවාද? Then, Dr. Coomaraswamy replied, "Of course, that happens a lot of the time, because the market is driven by a mixture of fundamentals and sentiments." Sentiments කියන්නේ අපේ මතය. අපි කොයි විධියටද හිතන්නේ කියන එක. ඒකට function එකක් නැහැ. There, he went on to say, "Even the fundamentals are difficult to predict sometimes. As you know, economics is not a very exact science. The sentiments are even more volatile. So, this rather volatile mix of fundamentals and sentiments can throw things out significantly."

එතකොට එතුමා පැහැදිලි කරන්නේ theory එක තිබෙනවා, අපේ මතයක් තිබෙනවා කියලායි. කේන්නැමැති ආර්ථික විද්‍යාඥයා ඕකට කියන්නේ animal instinct කියලායි. ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, රණසිංහ ප්‍රේමදාස ජනාධිපතිතුමා සිටිය කාලයේ අපට ගොඩක් investments ආවා. ගොඩක් මිනිස්සු invest කළා. ණය අරගෙන buildings හැදුවා, factories හැදුවා. එතකොට interest rate එක කීයද දන්නවාද? සියයට 20යි, සියයට 22යි. නමුත් ඒ අය ඒක කළා. මොකද, ඒ අය බලාපොරොත්තු වුණා ඒ investment එකෙන් පසුව ඒ අයට result එකක් එයි කියලා. මගේ අවසාන ප්‍රශ්නය.

"Mr. Governor, my last question to you is, is there a specific science of determining what the tenure and the yield to maturity on the coupon should be?"

අපට කියන්න පුළුවන් ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවාද? අපි මේ ප්‍රමාණය මෙන්න මේ rate එකට ගත යුතුයි කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? Then, Dr. Coomaraswamy replied, "No. That is a judgement call in the end. We have to take a reading of the market conditions. But, of course we have a committee compromising six or seven people who are knowledgeable around the table and taking that call."

මම කියනවා, "So, am I correct to assess as to what you, as a professional, an economist and somebody with decades of experience, are saying is that mistakes can be made in making a call of tenure and yield?" කොච්චර කාලයකට ගන්න ඕනෑද? කොච්චර interest rate එකක් තිබිය යුතුද? කියලා. අවසාන ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තරය, "Mistakes can be made and even what are perceived to be mistakes can sometimes be a narrative to justify it. As you know, economics is such that it is not an exact science." ගරු බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මෙතැන ගැටලුකාරී තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙන බව මා පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත්, අපට මෙතැන තිබෙන දත්තවලින්, මෙන්න මේ හේතුව නිසා මෙච්චර අලාභයක් සිදු වුණා කියන එක කියන්න හැකියාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව අනාගතයේ පොලී අනුපාතය ගැන කියන්න බැහැ, එච්චර අවදානමක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඇත්ත. ඒ නිසා තමයි ඒක TEC එකට දාලා, Tender Board එකට දාලා Governorට යන්න ඕනෑ. අපි කියන්නේ Governor එතැනට ගිහින් කරපු දේ වැරැදියි. ඒ පාඩුව, ඒ අවදානම ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් හදලා තිබෙනවා. අපි කියන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔය තර්කයම- ගරු හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා එදා අහද්දි කියපු දේම- මහ බැංකුවේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති සමරසිරි මහතා ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර නඩුව සම්බන්ධව උසාවියට කියලා තියෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා. මා හිතන්නේ ඒ නඩුව පසුව ඉවත් කළා. මගේ අවබෝධයේ හැටියට ඔය කාරණාවම තමයි කියලා තියෙන්නේ. පිටු අංක 108හි අංක 21හි තිබෙනවා, එය පිටු අංක 109ටත් යනවා. එය බලන්න. " මේ අවස්ථාවේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති සමරසිරි මහතා- ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර නඩුවේ තීන්දුව රැගත් නඩු අංක .....පිටපතක් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ අතර, එහි එක්තරා ඡේදයකට කමිටුවේ විශේෂ අවධානය යොමු කරන ලෙසත්, එය ඒ අයුරින්ම වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් කරන ලෙසත් ඉල්ලා සිටියේය." ඊට පස්සේ විනිශ්චයකාරවරයා කියපු එකක් එතැන quote කරනවා. "සංකීර්ණ ආර්ථික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා සම්බන්ධ කටයුතුවලදී ගනු ලබන සෑම තීරණයක්ම අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ප්‍රත්‍යක්ෂ මූලිකව සිදු කළ යුතු බව අප අමතක නොකළ යුතු අතර, ඒ අනුව දැඩි රාමුවක පිහිටා හෝ දැඩි මතවල එල්බ ගෙන එහි වලංගුභාවය අත් හදා බැලීම සිදු කළ නොහැක." මම කියන්නේ මෙයින් රටට පාඩුවක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවත් පැහැදිලිව පාඩුවක් නේ. රටට යුරෝ මිලියන 82ක වාගේ පාඩුවක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවට අයත් subject එකක් pure science එකක් නොවෙයි කියන එකෙන් තමයි- ඒ ඇතුළු තවත් කරුණු තියෙන්න ඇති. නඩුව ගැන මා දන්නේ නැහැ.-මෙතැනදී දැන් මතු කරන්නේත් ඒ කරුණමයි. එහෙම ගත්තොත් ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව සම්බන්ධව බැංකුවට හෝ කිසිම ආයතනයකට වැරැද්දක් එන්න බැහැ. ඒක ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඒ නිසා තමයි ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ, ඒ මූලධර්ම ඉගෙන ගෙන ඒ මූලධර්මවල වැරැදි වෙන්න පුළුවන් නිසා, පියවරෙන් පියවර යන්න ඕනෑ ක්‍රමවේදයක් හදලා තියෙන්නේ. ඒ වාගේම best practices පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ. manuals පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි, ගිය සතියට කලින් සතියේ තිබුණු වෙළෙඳ පොළ interest rate එක පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ. ඒ සියල්ලම කරලාත් වැරැදෙනවා නම්, ඒක විශේෂ එකක් නම් තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්. මේ තිබුණු ක්‍රමවේදය, උපාය මාර්ගය හා ප්‍රතිපත්තිය වෙනස් කරලා, ඊට පස්සේ mechanism එකේ තමන්ට අයිති නැති කමිටුවලට මැදිහත් වෙලා directions දීලා, ඒ පිළිබඳව වගකීම දරන නිලධාරීන් මෙයින් රටට හානියක්, මහ බැංකුවට අලාභයක් වෙනවා කියලා කියද්දි තමයි, ගරු හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන වචන අනුව කිව්වොත්, මේ අවාසිය වෙලා තියෙන්නේ. මේක ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව pure science එකක් නොවීමේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. මම මේක උදාහරණයක් විධියට ගත්තේ, ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවෙන් බේරෙන්න පාවිච්චි කරලා තියෙන්නේත් ඔය තර්කයමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව හා මේ ගනුදෙනුව ගොඩාක් වෙනස්. ඒකට හේතුව ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කරවල අපි ආයෝජනය කළේ-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම කිව්වේ සමරසිරි මහත්මයාම නඩුව settle කරන්න පාවිච්චි කරපු එකම තර්කය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධියේදී වුණේ, අපේ මිනිස්සුගේ සල්ලි ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කරවල ආයෝජනය කළා. ඒක අර සක්විති මුදලාලි ළඟ සල්ලි තැන්පත් කළා වාගේ වැඩක් නේ වුණේ. ඒ අය අපට නැවත සල්ලි දුන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහිදීත් අපට උපකල්පනය කරන්න පුළුවන්, මේ සල්ලි ආයෝජනය කරන අවස්ථාවේදී මෙහෙම ආර්ථිකය තිබුණා. අපි අපේක්ෂා කළා ඒක ඉදිරියට වර්ධනය වෙයි කියලා. ඒ නිසා අපි ලාභ අපේක්ෂාවෙන් තමයි ආයෝජනය කළේ කියලා, ඔය තර්කය ගෙන එන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක අවිනිශ්චිත නිසා කියලා. බැලූ බැල්මට පේනවා එහෙම අවිනිශ්චිතතාවක් නැහැ. අනෙක් සාධක සියල්ලෙන්ම තහවුරු කර තිබෙනවා, ඒක බිඳ වැටෙන ආර්ථිකයක් කියලා. මේ ගනුදෙනුවේදීත් එහෙමයි. මෙහිදීත් අපට තර්කය ගෙන එන්න පුළුවන්, මෙහෙම තිබුණාට, අනාගතයේදී පොලී අනුපාත ඉහළ යා හැකියි. ඒ කියන්නේ පොලී අනුපාත විචලනය මොන අවස්ථාවේදීත් විය හැකිව තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා සත්භාවයෙන් යුතුව මේ ආයෝජනය කළා. නමුත්, එහි බලපෑමක් ඇති වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. හැබැයි, දැන් තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි ඒක මේ අනුගමනය කළ යුතු සියලු ක්‍රමයන් අනුගමනය කර අවසානයේ ලැබී තිබෙන ප්‍රතිඵලයද කියන එක.

ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවේදී වාගේම අනෙකුත් සාධක විසින්, මේක මිලදී ගත්තේ කවුද, මේක රුපියල් බිලියන 5 දක්වා වැඩි කරන විට කවර සමාගමක් වෙනද ගියේ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත්වීම යන ඒ අතුරු සාධක මඟින් ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව වාගේම මේකත් වංචනික ක්‍රියාවක් බව පෙන්නුම් කරනවා. ග්‍රීක් බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවත් ඒකෙන් තමයි තහවුරු වෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: පරමාදර්ශ සටහන් පාඨ ගන්නවා නම්, නිශ්චිත case එකෙන් case එකට වෙනම ගන්න ඕනෑ. මිනිස්සුන්ට වරදින්න පුළුවන් වාගේ පරමාදර්ශ දේවල්. ඒවා හැම දෙයකටම ගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය වෙන්දේසියට ගිහින්, computer print එක ආවාට පසුව TEC එක අනුමත කරලා, එතැනින් Tender Board එක අනුමත කරලා, Governor අත්සන් කරලා අනුමැතිය දීලා රුපියල් බිලියන 100ක් පාඩු වුණා කියලා අපි හිතමු. ආණ්ඩුව වගකීම භාර ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන ගැටලු කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි, අපේ ගරු මහින්දානන්ද මන්ත්‍රීතුමාත් කිව්වා ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව. ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාව මේකට ගේන්න බැහැ. ඒකට හේතුව, ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාව COPE එකේ පරීක්ෂණ කරලා ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. ඒක draft එකක් පමණයි. අපි ඒ අවස්ථාවේ හිටියේ නැහැ. අපි හිටියා නම්, මෙවැනි ප්‍රශ්න ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී මතු කරනවා. ඒ නිසා අපට මෙවැනි ප්‍රශ්න මතු කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන ඒවා මේ වාර්තාවට ගෙනැල්ලා, ඒක මත පදනම් වෙලා අපට පිළිතුරු සපයන්න හැකියාවක් නැහැ. මම සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ඒ මතයේ නැහැ. ඒක note කර ගන්න. ඒක කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මම සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ඒ මතයේ ඉන්නවා කියලා note කර ගන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි මෙහෙම හිතමු. අපි වෙනත් ශූරියකින් නඩුව විභාග කරලා, ඒ ශූරිය මඟදී නවත්වලා තවත් ශූරියක් ඉදිරියේ විභාග කරන විට පරණ ශූරියේදී කියපු කථා ගේන්න බැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක පැහැදිලි කිරීමේ වගකීමක් තිබෙන නිසා මම එය පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. මෙතැනට ඩිව් ගුණසේකර සභාපතිතුමාගේ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව අදාළ කර ගෙන නැහැ. ඒකට හේතුව, මම අනුපිළිවෙළ කිව්වොත්, ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව මෙයට ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒකට හේතුව, මේ විමර්ශනයට පදනම වුණේ ඒක තමයි. ඊට පස්සේ එවකට තිබුණු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර සභාපතිතුමාගේ කාරක සභාවෙන් ඒකට අනු කාරක සභාවක් පත් කළා. ඒක මෙහි සටහන් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව ප්‍රධාන කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කර අනුමත කරලා, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කලින් එදින පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසිරුවා හැරියා. ඒ නිසා ඒ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව අපට මේකට අදාළ කර ගන්න බැහැ. නැවත 08වැනි පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසින් මාව සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් පත් කරලා මේ කාරක සභාව ආරම්භ කළාට පසුව, අපි කාරක සභාව හැටියට තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒ තමයි, ඒ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව අපට අදාළ කර ගන්න බැහැ. නමුත්, ඒ අනු කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න හදපු verbatim -ඒ කැඳවූ නිලධාරීන් ලබා දුන් සාක්ෂි සටහන්-පදනම් කරගෙන, පදනම් කර ගන්න පුළුවන් වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරන්න විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට භාර දුන්නා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සකස් කළේ, ඒ opinion එක ගත්තේ ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් පදනම් කර ගෙනයි. ඊට පස්සේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ඒ වාර්තාව මේ කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

ඒ වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි අපි විමර්ශන ආරම්භ කළේ. අපි විමර්ශන කළ දින ගණන 05වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව සැදීම සඳහා, ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් කුමන ප්‍රමාණයකින් උපයෝගී කර ගත්තාද?

ගාමිණී ජයසිංහ මහතා: අපි Central Bank එක සහ අනෙකුත් ආයතන සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණ ගැනීමේදී ලැබෙන උත්තරවලට සාධාරණ evidence තිබෙනවාද කියන එක, evidenceවලට යම් යම් අවස්ථාවල භාවිත කරනවා මිසක් එහි quantify කිරීමක් හෝ වෙන මොනවත් කරලා නැහැ. මේ කථා කළ සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීමන්ත්‍රීන්ලා කථා කළේ, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධ කර ගෙන

නොවෙයි. මොකද, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවට ඔය කියන කාරණා කිසිවක් touch කළේ නැහැ. මේ "අවිනිශ්චිත" කියන වචනය විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ කොතැනකවත් සඳහන් වන්නේ නැහැ. එම නිසා තමයි විගණකාධිපති particular point එකේ සිදු වූ අලාභය ගැන පමණක් කථා කළේ. එම particular point එකේ සිදු වූ අලාභය, ඔය කියන future ratesවලට කිසිදු සම්බන්ධයක් නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ, Rs. 1 billion ගන්න ඕනෑ තැනට Rs. 10 billion ගැනීම නිසා, ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී රුපියල් 100ට-102ට ගන්න තිබුණ එක රුපියල් 70ට ගැනීම නිසා සිදු වූ අලාභය පමණයි calculate කළේ. ඒ නිසා Rs. 1.6 billion කියන එක, interest rate එකේ විචලතාවට සම්බන්ධ කර ගන්න එපා කියලා මම ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. මොකද, එතැනට ගිහින් නැහැ කියලා විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ කොටසක් ලෙස පැහැදිලිවම සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු කථානායකතුමාට ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසුව, නැවත අපිට ලබා දුන් ප්‍රධාන වාර්තාවේ ඇමුණුමක් වශයෙන් ඒ සියලු සාක්ෂි සටහන් තිබෙන නිසා අපි ඒ ගැන තර්කයක් ගොඩ නගා ගැනීම තේරුමක් නැහැ. අපි එතැනින් නැවත මුලට යන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ගරු හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට ඒ සඳහා විරුද්ධ වෙන්න අයිතියක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් අපි ඒ ගැන නැවත විවාද කරන එකේ තේරුමක් නැහැ. මොකද, අපි ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් පදනම් කර ගෙන තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙය කොහෙමද සිදු වුණේ කියලා, කථාව පෙළ ගැස්වීමට තමයි ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් පාදක කර ගත්තේ. ඒක තමයි විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් කළේ. නමුත් ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් මත, තර්ක ගොඩ නගා ගන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Opinion එකට ඒක අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගාමිණී ජයසිංහ මහතා: ඒ නිලධාරින් නැවත කැඳෙව්වත් ඒ ටිකම නේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි දිගටම "අලාභය" කියන වචනය තමයි පාවිච්චි කළේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. කිසිම තැනක "අලාභය" කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරලා නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව "අවාසිය හෝ වාසිය" කියලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සමඟ තර්කයකට යනවා නොවෙයි. දැන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සඳහන් කළෙත් "අලාභය" කියලා නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළ පළමු වැනි දවසේම මම කිව්වා, "අපිට ඒක පිළිගන්න බැහැ" කියලා. මම හිතන්නේ ඒක presentation එකේ ඇති කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Presentation එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: උදාහරණයක් හැටියට, "ඩිව් ගුණසේකර" කමිටුවේ මම සිටියා නම්, මම ඔය line එක තමයි ගන්නේ. නමුත් ඒ කමිටුවේ මම සිටියේ නැති නිසා ඒ line එක ගන්න හැකියාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. අපි මේක උසාවියක් කියලා හිතුවොත්, උසාවියේ නීතිඥයා අසන ප්‍රශ්නයට තමයි defendant උත්තර දෙන්නේ. නඩුවක වුණත් මෙය වැරදිද-නිවැරදිද කියලා තීරණය වන්නේ, ඒ නීතිඥයා සත්‍ය තොරතුරු සොයා ගැනීමට උත්සාහ කරන්නේ කොයි ආකාරයටද කියන ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය මතයි. නමුත් ඒ ප්‍රශ්න කිරීම පිළිබඳව මට සෑහීමකට පත් වෙන්න බැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මෙය පුද්ගලික දෙයක් නොවෙයි නේ. ඔබතුමා ගැන මගේ සියයට සියයක විශ්වාසය තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණයට අභියෝගය කරනවා නොවෙයි. මම මේ ගැන කියන්නේ තර්කානුකූලවයි. මම එදා කිව්වේ, අපිට "අලාභය" කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරන්න කිසි විටෙකත් බැහැ කියන එකයි. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමා ඒක පිළිගෙන, "අලාභයක් නැති අවාසියක්" හැටියට පාවිච්චි කරමු කියලා අපිට කිව්වා. ඒ නිසා මම කියන්නේ, කුමන හෝ ගැටලුවක් මෙතැන තිබෙනවා කියන එකයි. නමුත් මට පෙනෙන හැටියට ඒක පැටලිලායි තිබෙන්නේ. අපි කවුරුන් හෝ කුමන හෝ වැඩක් කර තිබෙන බව මේකෙන් පෙනෙනවා. මෙයට සම්පූර්ණ වැරදිකරු මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයා කියන්න තරම් සාක්ෂි මෙතැන නැහැ. නමුත් කුමන හෝ දෙයක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා, මම ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත් මම කියන්නේ අනෙක් කිසිදු

සාක්ෂියක් එපා, මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයා මෙතැනට පැමිණ කළ ප්‍රකාශයේ recording එක අරගෙන අහන්න. ඒ ටික ඇති කරුණු තේරුම් ගන්න. අනෙක් අය කියපු දේවල් මොනවත් ඕනෑ නැහැ. මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයා -අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන්- මෙතැන පැය දෙකක් වාඩිවෙලා සිටියදී එතුමාගෙන් අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්න සහ ඒ සඳහා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරු බලන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තිබෙන්නේ මොන පිටුවේද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ සියලුම සාක්ෂි මෙතැන නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාවේ වෙන්න ඇති.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක අපේ ප්‍රධාන වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ළඟ තිබෙන පුළුල් පොතේ ඒක තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාවද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකේ සාක්ෂි සටහන් ටික තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාව නොවෙයි, නිලධාරීන්ගේ සාක්ෂි සටහන් වාර්තාව නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපිට මූලික නිගමනයට එන්න නම්, ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාව පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා මම තර්කානුකූලවයි අහන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාව නොවෙයි කියලා මම නැවතත් කියනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ස්ථාවරයක් අරගෙන, ඒ ස්ථාවරයේ සිට පස්සට ගණන හදන්න බැහැ. අපි ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් පිළිගෙන වැඩ කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ඊට පස්සේ Governor ගෙන්නුවා නේද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ. පරණ Governor අවේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ කමිටුවේ මමත් සිටියා, මෙතුමත් සිටියා. පාර්ලිමේන්තුව වෙනස් වුණා. එහෙනම්, අනාගතයේදී කවුරුන් හෝ කියයි මේකත් පිළිගන්න බැහැ කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේ ප්‍රධාන වාර්තාවේ ඕක තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒක පිළිගෙන වැඩ කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව සම්මත වූ වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි නේ. මේක කෙටුම් පතක්. සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරු මේකට එකඟ වෙලා නැහැ. ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත. සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් එකඟ වෙලා නැති වාර්තාවක්, අපි මේකට පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: අපි උපයෝගී කරගන්නේ, ඒ වාර්තාවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් වී තිබෙන නිගමන නම්, ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි. නමුත් අපි කිසි සේත්ම ඒ වාර්තාවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් වී තිබෙන නිගමන මෙතැනට උපයෝගී කර ගන්නේ නැහැ. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ඒ කමිටුවට පැමිණ කරන ලද ප්‍රකාශය තමයි උපයෝගී කර ගත්තේ. නිගමන අතර පරස්පරතාවන් තිබුණා. අවසන් කර ගන්න බැරි වුණා. ඒ නිසා නිගමන අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. නමුත් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා මේ කෝප් සභාවට පැමිණ, මෙහි බලයට යටත්ව ඉදිරිපත් කළ ප්‍රකාශයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි. මම ඒ ගැන අවධාරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ අපි කථා කරන දේ record වෙන Hansard Report එක තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ වාගේ මෙතැන කථා කළ දේවල් වාර්තා ගත වූ, record වූ සාක්ෂි සටහන්. උදාහරණයක් විධියට, ''මම අඬනවා'' කිව්වොත්, එහි ලියවිලා තිබෙනවා ''මම අඬනවා'' කියලා.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී කවුරුන් හෝ ප්‍රශ්න අහන ආකාරයට තමයි එතුමා ඒ සාක්ෂි ලබා දෙන්නේ කියලා, මෙතුමා තර්කයක් ගේනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, කාට හෝ පුළුවන් තමන් තෝරා ගන්නා පාරක සාක්ෂි අහලා ගෙන යන්න, වෙනත් පාරක් නැතිනම්. නමුත් ඊට පසුවත් අවස්ථා ගණනාවකදී මේ අය මෙතැනට කැඳෙව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේ කෙටුම් පත සකස් කර තිබෙන්නේ ඒ සාක්ෂි මත පමණක් පදනම්ව නොවෙයි. ඒ සාක්ෂි හා තවත් බොහෝ කරුණු පදනම් කර ගෙන විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සකස් කළ වාර්තාවත්, ඒ වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන නැවත අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදී මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු අධිපතිතුමා, වර්තමාන අධිපතිවරු, නිලධාරීන් කැඳවා ලබා ගත් සියලු සාක්ෂිත් එකතු කරලා තමයි එය සකස් කර තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී අපි දියනයක් කිව්වොත්, වෙලාවක් කිව්වොත්, තැනක් කිව්වොත් ඒවා වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ නේ. අපි කොහොමද ඒවා වෙනස් කරන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මෙතුමා මූලික සාකච්ඡාවලට ආවා නම්, මෙතරම් කථා කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා, මට සරල උදාරහණයක් කියන්න දෙන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මෙතුමා මූලික සාකච්ඡාවට ආවා නම් මේ පිළිබඳව මෙපමණ කථා කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. මෙතුමා ඒ රැස්වීම්වලට ආවේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා එදා හිටියා නම් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මතු වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා, මම පුංචි උදාරහණයක් කියන්නම්. මිනීමැරුම් සිද්ධියක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොලීසියේ entry එකක් දමනවා. ඒක මහේස්ත්‍රාත් උසාවියට යනවා, ඊට පස්සේ මහාධිකරණයට යනවා, ඊටත් පස්සේ Court of Appeal යනවා. මේ උසාවි තුනටම යන්නේ එකම කටඋත්තරය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි. මේක වැරදියි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අගමැතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි, මේක හරි නැත්තේ මොකද කියලා මම කියන්නම්. ඒක හරි මොකද, ඒ සියල්ලම signed and sealed ඒවා. ඒවා agree වෙලා නඩු තීන්දු දීපු ඒවා. Judgesලා අත්සන් කළ ඒවා. නමුත්, මේක අපි අත්සන් කරලා දීපු එකක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: තීන්දුව වැරදි නිසා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තීන්දුව වැරදි වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතුමා කියන්නේ සාක්ෂි සටහන් ගැන. මෙතුමා කියන්නේ නිලධාරීන් දුන්න සාක්ෂි-

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමාට ඔය තරම් දෙයක් තේරෙන්නේ නැති එක ගැන මට පුදුමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට තේරෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: තීන්දුවේ හා සාක්ෂි සටහන් අතර වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සාක්ෂි සටහන් කියන්නේ දැන් මෙහෙමනේ-

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි තීන්දු ගණන් ගන්නේම නැහැ. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියා ගෙන ආව දෙයට බාධා වුණා. එතුමාට කථා කරන්න දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අගමැතිතුමාගේ කමිටුව ඉදිරිපත් කළ වාර්තාවත් මේ ක්‍රියාවලියට හවුල් වුණානේ. බලගතු වෙනත් ආයතනයකින් පවා පරීක්ෂණය කරන්න කියලා ඒ වාර්තාවෙන් නේ යෝජනා කළේ.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කාරක සභාවෙන් නික්ම ගියේය.)

එතකොට සාක්ෂි සටහන්වලට අමතරව මේකේ 106 වැනි පිටුව බැලුවොත්, ඒකේ තිබෙන්නේ අගමැතිතුමාගේ ත්‍රිපුද්ගල කමිටුවේ ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ නිරීක්ෂණ. 106 වැනි පිටුවේ 14 වැනි අංකය අරගෙන බලන්න. ඒකේ තිබෙනවා, "ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් වටිනා මුදලක් ඉල්ලුම් කර තිබුණි." ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා මෙතැන නැතිව ඉතුරු ටික කියලා වැඩක් නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මගේ කථාවත් එතුමා නැතිව කියලා වැඩක් නැහැ. මම basics කථා කරන්නේ. දැන් මෙතුමා පදනම් කරපු අවාසිය, මේක auction එකකට ගිය නිසා සිද්ධ වුණු අවාසියක් හැටියට තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව අනුව මූලික වශයෙන් සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. Auction එකක් නිසා. දැන් මෙතැනදී

මම දකින දේ තමයි රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය, අපි පසු ගිය කාලයේත් මේ direct placementsවලට විරුද්ධව හඬ නැඟුවා. අපි මැතිවරණයට ගියෙත් විශාල වශයෙන්ම තමන්ගේ හෙංචයින්ට දෙනවා ආදි ඒ ඒ කාරණා අනුව අපි මේවා සෑම දෙයක්ම auction කරනවා කියන මතයෙන්. අපේ රුපියල් ලක්ෂ 10 ව්‍යාපෘති වුණත් ඒ ක්‍රමයට යන්නේ. රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මම දකින හැටියට අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා ඉතා පැහැදිලිව ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙත් සඳහන් කළා, auction ක්‍රමයටයි යන්නේ කියන එක පිළිබඳව. ඒක එක කාරණාවක්.

අනෙක් කාරණාව, අපේ රජයට මුදල් අවශ්‍ය වෙන කොට එක්කෝ Treasury Bonds, එක්කෝ Treasury Bills ලබා ගන්නවා. නමුත්, මේ වෙලාවේ අපට Treasury Bills ceiling එකටම වගේ ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණේ. ඒ නිසා Treasury Bills නිකුත් කරන්න බැහැ. මොකද, Treasury Bills නිකුත් කිරීමේ යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා රජයකට ගන්න බැහැ. ඒ සඳහා පාර්ලිමේන්තුව අවසර දුන්නෙත් නැහැ. එතකොට දැන් අපට වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ Treasury Bonds- මම පෞද්ගලිකවත් දන්නවා, ඒ දවස්වල මගේ මැතිවරණ කොට්ඨාසයේ පාරවල් 16ක විතර සංවර්ධන කටයුතු නතර කරලා තිබුණා. පෞද්ගලිකව මම මේ කථා කරන්නේ, පාරවල් 16ක විතර සංවර්ධන කටයුතු ජනවාරි 08 වැනි දායින් පස්සේ නතර වුණා. අපි පුදුම pressure එකක් දමනවා, ඒ දවස්වල මහා මාර්ග ඇමති විධියට කටයුතු කළේ ගරු කබීර් හාෂීම් මැතිතුමා. අපි කොහොමද මැතිවරණයෙන් පස්සේ ගමට යන්නේ, මේ වැඩ ටික සියල්ලම නතර වෙලා. එතකොට කියනවා ඒවා කරන්න රජයට මුදල් නැහැ කියලා. ඉතා පැහැදිලිවම රජයට විශාල මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණා. මම හිතන හැටියට ඒක නිසාම තමයි Treasury Bondsවලට ප්‍රායෝගිකවම මෙපමණ මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ගන්න අත්‍යවශ්‍ය වුණේ. හදිසියට, ඉක්මනට ගන්න තිබුණු එකම ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි මේ කාරණාව.

එතකොට අපට මේ වෙලාවේ Treasury Bond එකක් තුළින්- රජයේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් ඒ දවස්වල තිබුණා. එතුමා කිව්ව ආකාරයට රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක ප්‍රමාණයක අවශ්‍යතාවක් රජයට තිබුණා. ඒකෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් තමයි ගත්තේ. එතකොට රජයේ තිපත්තිමය වෙනසක් වුණා නම් auction එකකින් කරන්න, කොහොමද පාඩුවක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා කියන්නේ, ඒ පිළිබඳව මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි. පළමුවැනි එක තමයි අගමැතිතුමා මේ ප්‍රශ්නය සිද්ධ වුණාට පස්සේ අහපු ප්‍රශ්නයකට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී ප්‍රකාශයක් කළේ. ඒ වෙලාවේ තමයි කිව්වේ අපි මෙහෙම තීරණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා. එතකොට එවැනි තීරණයක් ගැනීම- මොකද, අගමැතිතුමාගේ දුරකථන ඇමතුමක් හෝ ප්‍රකාශයක් හෝ දේව වාක්‍යයක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ හැම එකක්ම - දැන් අය වැය ලේඛනයේ වුණත් බදු මුදල් වැඩි කරනවා කියලා මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා කිව්වාට එහෙම බදු වැඩි කරන්න බැහැ. ඒ Bill එක හරියට ගෙනැල්ලා ඒ බදු සංශෝධනය කරන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, VAT Bill එක හිරවෙලා තිබෙන එකනේ. එහෙම කරන්න ගිහිල්ලා තමයි ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණයෙන් තීන්දුව දුන්නේ ඒක කරන්න බැහැ කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ අගමැතිතුමාට හෝ මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයාට හෝ ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රකාශනයක් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, ප්‍රකාශ කරන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ක්‍රියාවට නැඟීම සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට පළමු කොටම ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය මේ ගොල්ලෝ අනුගමනය කරලා නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ ගොල්ලෝ නිලධාරීන්. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට තිබෙන එකම ප්‍රතිපත්තිය තමයි එතෙක් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට නිශ්චිත ලෙස හඳුනා ගෙන තිබෙන ප්‍රතිපත්ති. මොකද, ඒක කොතැනකදීවත් වෙනස් කරලා නැහැ. කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලයේදී හෝ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී හෝ ඒක වෙනස් කරලා නැහැ. ඒක තමයි පළමුවැනි එක.

දෙවැනි එක තමයි, ඔබතුමා කියන හරි. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වෙත් මේ තිබෙන අපේ හොඳ සංකල්ප කැත දේවල් වහගන්න උපයෝගී කර ගන්න හොඳ නැහැ කියලයි. දැන් බලන්න Rs. one billion අපි ඉල්ලනවා. Rupees one billion ඉල්ලන කොට ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් දෙන්නම් කියන්නේ උපරිම ප්‍රමාණය කොපමණද? උපරිම දෙන්නම් කියන්නේ Rs. 1 billionනේ. Rupees one billion ඉල්ලන කොට ඊට වඩා දෙන්න පිස්සුවක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. Rupees one billion ඉල්ලන කොට Rs. 5 billion දෙන්නම් කියන්නේ ඇයි? Rupees one billion ඉල්ලන කොට මහ බැංකුවෙන්

බැණුගේ සමාගම Rs. 5 billion දෙන්නම් කියනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? මෙයා Rs. 1 billion ඉල්ලුවාට Rs. Rs. 10 billion ගන්න බව අරයා දන්නවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මම ඔතැනට මේ කාරණය එකතු කරන්නම්. අගමැතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ 107 වැනි පිටුවේ (ආ) බලන්න. "තවත් කරුණක් වූයේ ප්‍රකාශයට පත් බැඳුම්කරයේ වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියනයක් වෙද්දී, ඉහත කී පර්පචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර ඉල්ලුමක් සඳහා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සහාය පැතීමයි." ඒක අගමැතිතුමාගේ කමිටුවම පුදුමයට පත් කරනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට බිලියනය-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ කථාවටම අදහසක්. මේක market speculation නේ. මම දන්න විධියට ඔතැන ඉන්න buyersලා රජයට කොපමණ අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා ද නැද්ද කියන එක දන්නවා. එක ක්‍රමවේදයක් තමයි market research එකක් කරලා ලබා ගන්න එක. අනෙක් එක තමයි-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒක බැණුා නේ කළේ. බැණුා විතරයි දන්නේ. ඒකයි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි, මම කියන්නේ-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන පරිදි, මේ රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දැම්මාට මෙපමණ මුදල් අර්බුදයක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා, ඒ නිසා වැඩිපුර මුදල් ගන්න ඉඩ තිබෙනවා කියලා සමාගමට උපකල්පනය කරන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, ඒ හැම උපකල්පයක්ම-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ හැම වෙලාවේම එක බිලියනයයි කියලා කිව්වාට බිලියන 05-06ක් ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි ඒ හැම උපකල්පනයක්ම පරණ සාධක මත සලකන්න ඕනෑ. පරණ සාධකවල Rs. 1 billion අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ Rs. 3 billion නම් තමයි උපරිමය ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ. පහු ගිය කාලයේ ඒවා සොයා බැලුවොත් Rs. 1 billion අරගෙන Rs. 3 billion ගියේ. මේක Rs. 10 billion නොවෙයි. මෙතැන Rs. 20 billion ගන්න කියනවා.

දිලංකා/ තක්ෂිලා - 3.55 - එතකොට Rs. 20 billion ගන්න කියන නිසා තමයි ....

එතකොට, Rs. 20 billion ගන්න කියන නිසා තමයි බැණුා 13ක් දමලා තිබෙන්නේ. මොකද, Rs. 10 billion විතරක් ගන්නවා නම්, බැණුා 13ක් දමන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා, අපි මූල ධර්ම මත පමණක් නොවෙයි මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන බැලුවොත්, ක්‍රියාවලිය හරි පැහැදිලියි. මගේ තීරණය නම්, මේ වාර්තාවට මේ සමාගමේ නමත්, ඒ සමාගමේ ඥාතීත්වයත් එන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි. එහෙම නැත්නම් මේක හරියට එළියට එන්නේ නැහැ. නැත්නම් මේ ගනුදෙනුව එළියට එන්නේ, කිසිම සම්බන්ධයක් නැති ඉහළින් තිබෙන company එකක් එක්ක මේ ගනුදෙනුව වෙනවා කියලා. එතකොට අපිට, "මෙතැන එහෙම සම්බන්ධයකට සාධක නැහැ." කියලා හිතන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, මෙහි එහෙම සාධකයකුත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පරණ හැන්සාඩ් වාර්තා අරගෙන බැලුවොත්, දැන් අපි කථා කරන පුද්ගලයා සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවුරුදු 04ක් තිස්සේ මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී විවේචන ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට මතක ඇති, මම මේ charts පෙන්වලා ඇහුවා, "මේක මෙහෙම වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?" කියලා. පාර්ලිමේන්තු හැන්සාඩ් වාර්තාවල මේ පුද්ගලයා පිළිබඳව මා විසින් කළ විවේචනවලින් පමණක්ම ජේනවා, මේ පුද්ගලයා Stock Market එකේ, මේ game එක තමයි දිගටම කළේ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපිට ඒ කරුණු බලලා මේ වාර්තාව ගැන තීරණය කරන්න බැහැ. මොකද, මෙහිදී පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ මාර්තු මාසයේ කියලා නිශ්චිතවම දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන බැණුාගේ කථාව වෙන නිසා තමයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. මේ පුද්ගලයාගේ මාමා, මහ බැංකු අධිපති වෙන්න කලින්, මේ පුද්ගලයාට මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳ අති විශාල ලෙස චෝදනා ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේ මට්ටමට ගේන්න එපා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, එතුමා කලිනුත් දූෂිත පුද්ගලයෙක්, මාමා නිසා තවත් වැඩි වුණා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන තර්කය අනුව, මීට පෙරත් කළු ව්‍යාපාරයක් ලෙස ආන්දෝලනයට තුඩු දී තිබෙන සමාගමටම මේක නැවත දුන්නා කියලා වාර්තාවට එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ, මාමා සහ බෑණා කියන කාරණයට කලින් ඒ පුද්ගලයා ඒ වාගේ වැඩ කරපු කෙනෙක් කියලා. අපට ඥාතීත්වය මතම මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වුණා කියන තැනට එන්න බැහැ. මොකද, එතුමාට, කලින් කොහෙන් හරි inside information ලැබුණා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඥාතීත්වය මතම විතරක් මේකට එන්න බැහැ කියන එක හරි. හැබැයි, මෙවැනි ඥාතීත්වයකුත් තිබුණා කියලා අපි අවධාරණයට ලක් කළ යුතුව තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒකට බය වෙන්නේ ඇයි? මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය ඒකයි. සමහර විට මේ මුළු ගනුදෙනුවම ඥාතීත්වය මත සිදු නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, අපිට සාධාරණ සැකයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම, ඔහු ඥාතියෙක් කියලා ඔප්පු කරන්න පුළුවන් සාධක තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා සහ අයථා ලෙස විශාල මුදලක් උපයා ගන්නා ලද සමාගම අතර තිබෙන ඥාතීත්වය කිව්වොත් තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්නයේ තිබෙන බැරෑරුම්කම මතු වෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම එතුමා සමඟ සියයට සියයක් එකඟයි. නමුත්, මේක ඥාතීත්වය මතම වෙච්ච දෙයක් කියලා අපිට කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක මතම කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. නමුත්, මෙන්න මේ ඥාතීත්වය තිබෙන සමාගමක් සමඟ මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වුණා කියන එකත් අපි අවධාරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම බයෙන් කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මම අවුරුදු හතරක් තිස්සේ මේ ගැන කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා. මම කියන්නේ, ''මේක ඥාතීත්වය මත වුණා. මාමාගෙයි බෑණාගෙයි සම්බන්ධය මත, මාමා බෑණාට උදව් කළා'' කියන තැනට එන්න බැහැ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේ වාර්තාවක එහෙම දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ අපිට එතැනට යන්න බැහැ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේ වාර්තාව එතැනට ගිහින් නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙහිදී, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඥාතීත්වය හෝ සමාගම කුමක්ද කියන එක පදනම් කරගෙන නැහැ. මේ ගනුදෙනුවේ මූල ධර්ම මොනවාද කියන එක මත පදනම් වෙලා තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ මූල ධර්ම මත මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා වාගේම මොවුන් අතර තිබෙන ඥාතීත්වයේ ස්වභාවය නිසා, මෙතැන තිබෙන සැකය තවත් තීව්‍ර වෙනවා කියන කරුණත් එන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක මඟ හරින්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අනුර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපට ඥාතීත්වයක් තිබුණා කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක මතම කියලා කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකුව සියයට සියයක්ම රාජ්‍ය ආයතනයක්ද එහෙම නැත්නම් semi-governmentද කියලා මට දැන ගන්න පුළුවන්ද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි වීජේසිංහ මහතා: සියයට සියයක් රාජ්‍ය ආයතනයක්. නමුත්, ස්වාධීන ආයතනයක්.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ස්වාධීන ආයතනයක් නම්, ආණ්ඩුව මොන policy decisions ගත්තත්, ආණ්ඩුව කියන දේ කරන්න මහ බැංකුව බැඳිලා නැහැ. Monetary Board එක අනුමත කරන්නම ඕනෑ. Government policy මොනවා කථා කළත්, Monetary Board එක අනුමත කළේ නැත්නම් මේ Government policy කියන එකේ දිගින් දිගටම එල්ලීමේ තේරුමක් නැහැ. මේක සාමාන්‍යයෙන් රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය නම්, රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය විය යුත්තේ අගමැතිවරයා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාට දැනුම් දීම නොවෙයි. Monetary Board එකට එවලා, Monetary Board එක අනුමත කළාට පස්සේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව කිරීම. ඒ නිසා දිගින් දිගටම අපි Government policy කියන එකේ එල්ලීමෙන්

වැඩක් නැහැ. මේක මේ වෙන පැත්තකට යොමු කරන්නයි යන්නේ. ඒ නිසා ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කරුණාකරලා, මහ බැංකුව කියන්නේ ස්වාධීන ආයතනයක්. රජයේ දෙන නියෝග පිළිපදින්න මහ බැංකුව බැඳිලා නැහැ. ආණ්ඩුව දෙන නියෝග වැරදි නම්, ඒක වැරදියි කියලා කියන්න Monetary Board එකට පුළුවන්. ඒක තමයි ස්වාධීන ආයතනයක් කියන්නේ. ඒ නිසා Government policy කියන එකේ එල්ලිලා ඉන්න එපා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගිය වතාවේ නව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පැමිණි වෙලාවෙත් යම්කිසි කරුණකට operation manual එක ගෙනැල්ලා, Board Papers අපි බැලුවා. නැවතත් හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මතු කළ කාරණය ගැන බැලුවොත්, මම හිතන්නේ Monetary Board එක රජය කියන දේට වගකියනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා විවාද කරනවාට වඩා, මේ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී මහ බැංකුව, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ම අනුමත කරගෙන තිබුණු ක්‍රියාවලි අනුගමනය කළාද කියන එකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මතු කළ කාරණය වෙනම කාරණයක්. "එහෙම ඕනෑය" කියලත් ඒකට තර්ක කරන්න පුළුවන්. "රටක අගමැතිට එහෙම යම්කිසි නියෝගයක්, අදහසක් දෙන්න බැරි නම්, රටක් කරන්නේ කොහොමද?" කියලා, ඒ වාගේ තර්කයකුත් එන්න පුළුවන්. ඊට වඩා නිශ්චිත කරුණක් තිබෙනවා. Monetary Board එක අනුමත කිරීමෙන් පස්සේ පමණයි ඔය කියන මිලදී ගැනීම් ක්‍රියාවලිය වෙනස් කළ හැක්කේ. එය වෙනස් කරලා නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ අපි නැවත නැවත එය ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. එය මෙතැන ඔප්පු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක clear. Monetary Board එක එහෙම decision එකක් අරගෙන නැහැ. ඒ සම්බන්ධව අපි operation manual එක ගෙනැල්ලා ප්‍රශ්න කළා. ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙහි 46, 47 පිටුවල බැලුවොත්, ඔය "auction"කියන ප්‍රශ්නය. ඕක නේ ගත්තේ. "..වෙළඳාමෙන් ගන්න කියන එක රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියක්...." කියන එක වෙනම ගත්තා. 46, 47 කියන පිටු දෙකම බලන්න. අලුත් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ අදහස අපි ගත්තා. මොකක්ද මේ "as much as possible through auction", 46 වන පිටුවේ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම බලන්න. "....යන්න පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා සඳහන් කළේ තම අදහසට අනුව ඉන් හැහෙන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මඟින් අවම පිරිවැයක් යටතේ රජයට උපරිම මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් සම්පාදනය කර දිය යුතු බවයි. මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් **2008.10.07** තීරණය මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොතෙහි අඩංගු කරුණු මඟින් පිළිඹිබු වන බව තමන් විශ්වාස කරන බවද අධිපතිවරයා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත නියමයන් අඩංගු පොතක් නොව, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව කළ යුතු කාර්යන් පිළිබඳ මාර්ගෝපදේශන ඇතුළත් පුස්තකයක් වන බවද ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. 2008.10.07 ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයන් එදින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ යුතු ආකාරය සඳහන් වන විශේෂිත උපදෙස් ඇතුළත් වන පත්‍රිකාවක් බවත් මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොතෙහි ඇතුළත් වන්නේ පුළුල් අර්ථයක් සහිත ප්‍රකාශයක් බවත් එය මාර්ගෝපදේශයක් මිස නියමයක් නොවන බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී....". ඒ නිසා, ඊට පස්සේ 47 වැනි පිටුවේත් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ඉතා පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා, "as much as possible through auction"යන්නෙන් හැගෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියන එක. එහි පැහැදිලිව තිබෙනවා, "lowest possible cost with a …" ඒ කියන්නේ, "අඩු වියදමකින් අඩු අනතුරුදායක තත්ත්වයකින් තමයි මේක ගන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම්, අර 20:80 කියලා ratio එකකුත් නැහැ." කියලා දිගටම සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

එම නිසා මම හිතන්නේ, අගමැතිතුමාට Monetary Board එකට බලපෑමක් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය මෙතැනට අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. Monetary Board එකේ නීතින්ට අනුව පමණයි මහ බැංකුවට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට තනිකර auctionsවලින් ගැනීමට අදාළ කරන Monetary Board decision එකකුත් නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම auctionsවලින් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා operations manual එකේ නැති බව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා කියලා තිබෙනවා, "- as much as possible through auctions with low cost and low risk" මම හිතන්නේ ඒක නිරවුල් වුණා. නැවත නැවත මතු වන නිසා මම කියන්නේ, නැවත නැවත නොගෙන ඉදිමු කියලා .

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන

කොට අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන ලද කථාව තමයි ඔබතුමන් කිව්වේ "at whatever cost, it should have been-"

The Hon. Bimal Ratnayake: Value for money.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : Transparency at whatever cost වෙන්න බැහැ කියලා කිව්වේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Transparency at whatever cost වෙන්න බැහැ කියන එක තමයි ඔබතුමන් කිව්වේ. මම ඒක පිළි ගන්න සූදානම් නැහැ. ඒ auction එක හරහා, මේකේ තිබෙනවා අවුරුදු පනහක විග්‍රහයක් කළා. **මේකෙ** තිබුණ conflict of interest එක සම්බන්ධයෙන්. ඒ නිසා කළ යුත්තේ auction එක කියන එක. Private placement එකෙන් transparency එකක් නැහැ. Auction එකෙන් තමයි transparency එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලේ සල්ලි නම් invest කරන්න පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට maximum benefit එක, return එක එන්න ඕනෑ. Maximum benefit එක return එක එන්නේ නැත්තේ මහ බැංකුව හරහාම තමයි අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලත් ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ කියන එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි සාකච්ඡා කරලා දින යොදා ගත් විධියට අවසන් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ observation එක වුණේ, ඔබතුමාගේ අවසන් conclusion එක වුණේ, මේක auction එකෙන් ගත්ත එක වැරදියි කියලා.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, එහෙම එකක් නැහැ

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Can I see that document? "At whatever cost" අන්න ඒක මට මතක නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවත් එක්ක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අපි එතුමාගේ වාර්තාව අනුමත කරන්න යනවා නොවෙයි නේ. අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව අනුමත කරන්න යනවා නම් තමයි ඒකත් බලපාන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී එතුමා කිව්වා, එය කළයුතු වන්නේ කොපමණ පිරිවැයක් දරමින්ද? ඒක මත ඒක depend වෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අකෙත් එක හර්ෂ ඇමතිතුමා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා නිවැරදිව කිව්වානේ, hybrid system එක තමයි හොඳම. මොන tool එක පාවිච්චි කරලා හෝ low risk and low cost විධියටයි කරන්න ඕනෑ. සහ රජයට මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය සොයලා දෙන්නත් ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම conclusion එකක් ආවේ, ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතාගේ සභාපතිත්වයෙන් තිබුණු Subcommittee එක විසින් එතැනට මේක ගිය නිසා. ඒ conclusion එක ආවේ අපේ Committee එකෙන් නොවෙයි නේ. අපේ Committee එකට කලින් Subcommittee එකේ හේතුව මතනේ ඒ conclusion එක ආවේ. අපි කථා කළේ ඊට පසුව නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ දිනය මොකක්ද?

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: කරුණාකරලා විගණකාධිපතිගේ වාර්තාව එහාට මෙහාට සම්බන්ධ කරන්න එපා. මේක තනිකරම ස්වාධීන වාර්තාවක් ලෙස ගියේ. ඔය දේවල් සාකච්ඡාවට බඳුන් කළාට, ඔය කිසි දෙයකට පදනම් කර ගත්තේ නැහැ. අපි වෙනම මාර්ගයක ගිය නිසා ඔය කියන interest rate එක කිසි දෙයක් සම්බන්ධ කර ගත්තේ නැහැ. අපේ particular point එකේ මේ තීරණ ගැනීමේදී ඒ නිලධාරින් due profession care එක පදනම් කර ගෙන වැඩ කළාද කියන කාරණය විතරමයි මගේ වාර්තාවේ සාකච්ඡා කර තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක පැහැදිලිවම හොඳින්ම කියලා තිබෙනවා. මේ අලාභය තනිකරම අවාසියි කියන කාරණය 15 වන පිටුවේ කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අවසානයේ ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ මොකක්ද කියන එක මට කියන්න?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ presentation එක ඉදිරිපත් කරපු report එකේ තිබෙනවා . ඒකත් පරිවර්ථනය කරලා මේකේ තිබෙනවා නේ. .

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන් හැම වෙලාවේම කියනවානේ auction එකේ කට්ටියට පසු ගිය කාලයේ private placementsවලට ගිහින් අරගත්තා. නමුත් auction එකට ගියාට පසුව ඒ secrecy එක නැති වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මෙහෙම දෙයක් වෙනවා කියලා. එහෙම වීම කියන එකේදී අලුත් auction එකට යාම නිසා ඇති වන huge cost එක හරහා ඒ transparency එක ගැනීමේ තේරුමක් නැහැ කියන කථාව විතරයි මම එතැන කිව්වේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකට මම සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම එකඟ නැහැ. එක් මම දකින විධියට අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ, කාලයක් තිස්සේ transparency එක හරහා පළමුවැනි පාර වැඩි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් කාලයත් එක්ක වැඩිපුර premium එකක් ගෙවන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. Transparency is the best. Transparency තිබෙනවා නම් - Transparency තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන එක හරි. නමුත් ඔබතුමන් කියන සම්පූර්ණ auction ත්‍රමයෙන්ම කරන්න Monetary Board decision එකක් නැහැ. අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒකට වැරදියි කියලා පිළි ගත්තත්, Monetary Board decision එකක් නැහැ සම්පූර්ණ auctionsවලින් කරන්න. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය පැත්තකින් තියලා අපේ ඇත්ත විෂයට එමු.

ඔබතුමන්ලා බලන්න 106 සහ 107 වන පිටුවල තිබෙන අගමැතිතුමාගේ කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව. ඒක හරිම clear මේ transaction එකේ තිබෙන වැරදි ගැන. අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පමණක් නොවෙයි නේ පදනම් කර ගන්නේ. 106(14) "ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් වටිනා ඉල්ලුම් කර තිබුණි." ඒකේ නමත් එක්කම තිබෙනවා, "Perpetual Treasuries Limited වෙනුවෙන් බව ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට පෙනී ගියේය. ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැණුම්කරු සහ Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගමේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරීගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරද්දී ඔවුන් ප්‍රකාශ කළේ ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවෙකු වෙන්දේසියකදී තවත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් ඉල්ලීම් කළ ප්‍රථම අවස්ථාව මෙය බවයි." ඊට පසුව 15ට යන්න. "ලංකා බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන ගැණුම්කරු ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට කියා සිටියේ වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් බිලියන 13ක් සඳහා ඉල්ලුම් කිරීමේ බැංකු පාලක මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියක් ලබා නොගත් බවයි." බිලියන 13ක් එනවා Chairman දන්නේ නැහැ. 107 බලන්න. අපිට අකමැති දේවල් අමතක කරලා වැඩ කරන්න බැහැ නේ. අපි අකමැති තිබෙනවා නම් දේවල් පිළි ගන්න ඕනෑ. 17හි උඩ බලන්න. "වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලවා තවත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවකුට බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ඉල්ලුම් කිරීමට නීතියෙන් තහනමක් නොමැති වුවත් මෙය අසාමාන්ය සිදු වීමක්." මෙය අසාමාන්ය සිදු වීමක්. මේ කවුද කියන්නේ අගමැතිතුමාගේ කමිටුව. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Lawyersලා තුන් දෙනෙක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පසුව දිගටම ගියාම මම කලින් කිව්ව එක තිබෙනවා. "තවත් කරුණක් වූ එය ප්‍රකාශයට පත් බැඳුම්කරයේ වටිනාකම රුපියල් බිලියනයක් වෙද්දී ඉහත කී සමාගම බිලියන 13ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර ඉල්ලුමක් සඳහා ලංකා බැංකුවේ සහාය පැතීම." විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ඕනෑ නැහැ මේක ඇති.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේකට තව සම්බන්ධ පුද්ගලයෝ ගොඩක් ඉන්නවා. මාමයි බෑණයි වඩා එහා ගිය ගනුදෙනුවක් මේක.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේ මුළු ක්‍රියාවලියම දූෂිත, අසාමාන්ය එකක් කියලා අග්‍රාමාත්යවරයාම වාර්තාවේ කියලා තිබෙනවා. මම අගමැතිතුමාගේ එක උපුටලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි අපි සොයන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම නම් කියන්න ඕනෑ අගමැතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවෙන් මෙයා නිදහස් වෙලා නිර්දෝශ වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා . මම නොවෙයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවේ මේ පියවර ගැන අපි මේ වාර්තාව දාන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් මේ ගොල්ලන්ට ලංකා

බැංකුවෙන් මෙපමණ මුදලක් ලබා දෙන්න අනුමත කළේ කවුද කියලාත් නැවත සොයා බැලිය යුතුයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මේක ලංකා බැංකුවටත් නිර්දේශයක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. මේකේ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති ගැනත් නිර්දේශක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේ වාර්තාවට ලංකා බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියා පටිපාටිය ගැන සඳහන් විය යුතුයි. ඒ ගැන විවාදයක් නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි නිර්දේශ දෙන්නම්. මෙහි පැහැදිලිව අධිපතිතුමාට අමතරව මේ අය කියලා තියෙනවා . අපි කියන්නේ සභාපතිතුමා, මේක මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා ගැනම කථා කරන්නේ සියලුම දෙනා. නමුත් මෙතැන පැහැදිලිව කථා කරද්දී තේරුණා, මේක අධිපතිතුමාට තනිවම order එකක් දීලා කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? ණය මණ්ඩලය ඉන්නේ ඒකටද? Tender Board Committee එක ඉන්නේ ඒකටද? ඒ අයගේ රාජකාරි දෙකේ පැහැදිලිව වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා . 50 වන පිටුවේ ඔවුන් කියනවා " මෙහිදී රුපියල් මිලියන 1 සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා මුදලක් සපයා ගැනීමට ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය ඉහත සඳහන් නිලධාරීන් විසින් වෘත්තීමය විනිශ්චය අනුව කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයක් බව තමුන් පිළි ගන්නා බව" කාරක සභා නැගූ ප්‍රශ්නයට සභාපතිතුමා පිළිතුරු දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මොන පිටුවේද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: 50වන පිටුවේ 11 බලන්න. 2015.02.27 වන දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධව දීපු උත්තරයේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම කිව්වේ සමරසිරි මහතා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සභාපති සහ සියලුම දෙනා ඉන්නකොට තමයි මෙයා මේ කථාව කියන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පසුව 54 වන පිටුවට එන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එයා කියලා තිබෙනවා. එයා කියපු එක අනෙක් අයගේ මතයත්, මොකද එයා කියන්නේ එයා ගැන විතරක් නොවෙයි අනෙක් අයත් එක්ක නේ.

හැබැයි, අනෙක් අය ඒකේ දරපු මතය වෙනම කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තිබෙන්නේ කොතැනකද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ මතය කොතැනද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ කිව්වා, ඒක Report එකේ තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒ නිලධාරීන් 8දෙනාගෙන් නිලධාරීන් 6දෙනෙකු ඇවිල්ලා හිටියා. ඒ 6දෙනාම කිව්වා, "අපි විරුද්ධ වුණා." කියලා. හරියටම මට මතක නැහැ, ඒක 54වැනි පිටුවේ වාගේ තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එහෙම එකක් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකේ correction එකත් ගැන මම සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒක තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ, ඒක ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: Tender Board එකේ සභාපතිතුමාගෙන් මම ඇහුවා, "මේ ගත්ත තීන්දුව හරිද, වැරදිද?" කියලා. එතුමා කිව්වා, "මේ ගත්ත තීන්දුව හරි." කියලා. එහෙම නම්, එතුමා "හරි" කියලා කියද්දී අනෙක් අය ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ, "නැහැ, ඒක වැරදියි" කියලා කියන්න. ඒ වේලාවේ කවුරුවත් ඉදිරිපත් වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් කිව්වා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එදා නම් කවුරුවත් ඉදිරිපත් වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාවේදී කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක Verbatimsවල තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් නැඟිටලාම කිව්වා, "ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය ගත් තීරණය නිවැරදි බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේද, නැතහොත් යම් බලපෑමක් සිදු වූයේද යන්න කාරක සභාවෙන් විමසූ අතර, එය ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයට ගැනීමට සිද්ධ වූ තීරණයක් බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් සඳහන් කළා." කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ලේකම්තුමිය හරියටම බලන්න, එතැනදී ඒ නිලධාරීන් වෙන වෙනම නැඟිටලා "ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඒකට එකඟ වුණේ නැහැ." කියලා කිව්වා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මෙතැන නැහැ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒ පිටුව මොකක්ද කියලා කියන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: පිටු අංක 54.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කොටසත් එක්ක කියන්න, ඒක පහසුයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම කිව්වේ, 50 (11) ගැනයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක නිවැරදියි. 50වැනි පිටුවේ 11හි තිබෙන්නේ, "පී. සමරසිරි මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදි." කියලායි. ඒක නිවැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: කණ්ඩායමක් හැටියට තීරණය කළා කියලා කියන එකට අනෙක් අය එකඟ වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒකේ එතුමා කථා කරද්දී, මේකේ කරුණු දැක්වීම අනුව ඒකේ පළමුවෙන්ම තිබෙනවා නේද, "ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයෙන්..." කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පසුව තිබෙන ටික කියවන්න.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: "ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සභාපති, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පී. සමරසිරි, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරි එස්. අධිකාරි, ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පී. කරුණාතිලක, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි ටී.එම්. සෙනෙවිරත්න, ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ ගුණරත්න මහත්මිය සහ අතිරේක Superintendantsවරු දෙදෙනෙක් සිටි බව අනාවරණය කරන ලදි. මහ බැංකු අධිපති කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෙකු නොවන බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදි." මේ කමිටුවේ මහ බැංකු අධිපති නැහැ. ඊට පසුව තමයි, රුපියල් බිලියන 1 සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය වෘත්තිමය වශයෙන් ගත්ත තීන්දුවක් හැටියට ඒ ගොල්ලන් පිළිතුර හැටියට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා හරියටම ඒ සියලු වාක්ය ටික කියවන්න කෝ. "මෙහිදී රුපියල් බිලියන 1 සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක මුදලක්,-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: "මෙහිදී රුපියල් බිලියන 1 සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක මුදලක් සපයා ගැනීමට ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය ඉහත සඳහන් නිලධාරීන් විසින් වෘත්තිමය විනිශ්චය අනුව කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයක් බව තමන් පිළිගන්නා බව කාරක සභාවෙන් නහන ලද ප්‍රශ්නයකට පිළිතුරු වශයෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු සභාපති පී. සමරසිරි මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදි."

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: පී. සමරසිරි මහතා තමයි ඒ විධියට කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට පස්සේ අනෙක් අය නැඟිටලා විරුද්ධ වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කොහේද විරුද්ධ වුණා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මෙතැනට ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක තමයි ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපි කියන නිසා නොවෙයි, ඒක සොයලා මෙතැනට ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: සොයලා ඇතුළත් කරන්න කියන්නේ, අලුතෙන් ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑද?

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, ඒක Verbatimsවල තිබිය යුතුයි. ඒක මෙතැනට ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කියන්නේ, නිලධාරීන් විරුද්ධ වුණා කියන එක. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාත් දන්නවා. ඒක අපි කවුරුත් දැක්ක දේ සහ දන්නා දේ නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ වේලාවේ කවුරුවත් විරුද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: විරුද්ධ වුණා, මට හොඳට මතකයි. එක් මහත්මියක් සහ කොණ්ඩය දිගට තිබුණු කෙනා විරුද්ධ වුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මමත් දැක්කා. මෙතැන මගේ සංශෝධනයකුත් තිබුණා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම එක දෙයක් කියන්නම්, කවුරුවත් විරුද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ. දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු ඇමතිතුමා කිව්වා, මේක මේ විධියට අහලා බැහැ, ඒකට වෙනම කමිටුවක් තියන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. නමුත් මෙතැන සිටි කවුරුවත් විරුද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක Verbatimsවල බලමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. 52වැනි පිටුවේ ටිකක් බරපතළ වාක්‌යයක් තිබෙනවා. කාරක සභාවේ අදහස කියන එකේ තිබෙනවා, ''මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් සමහර නිලධාරීන් විසින් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද අවස්ථාවන්හි දක්වන අදහස්වල පරස්පරවිරෝධිතාවන් නිරීක්ෂණය වූ බවත් ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදි. මෙහිදී හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉදිරියේ සාක්ෂි ලබාදීමේ යම් බියක් හා චකිතයක් ඇති වීම සාධාරණ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදි.'' ඒක කොහොමද ආවේ? අපි බයට බොරු සාක්ෂි දුන්නා කියලාද කියන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ, ඔබතුමා ඒක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් කියවා බැලුවොත් තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක මේකේ තිබෙනවා. සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා,-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ විධියට දමන්න අපට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා කියලා මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක Unprofessional. ඒක ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මගේ යෝජනාව, ඒක ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නිලධාරීන්ට පහර ගැසීමක් නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න කෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි පිටුවෙන් පිටුවට සාකච්ඡා කරමු. එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලාට විරෝධතාවන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ තමයි, අලුත් Governor කිව්වේ, ''Do not pressure my colleagues'' කියලා. එතුමා ඒ වචනයම නොවෙයි, ඊට කිට්ටු වචනවලින් කිව්වේ. ඒක Hansard Report එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ, ''හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉදිරියේ සාක්ෂි ලබාදීමේ යම් බියක් හා චකිතයක් ඇති වීම සාධාරණ බව'' කියලා. මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ, අපට ඒ විධියේ නිගමනයක් කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම නම්, ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මේ සාක්ෂි පරස්පරයි කියලාත් එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් කිව්වා. ඒ සාක්ෂි පරස්පරයි කියලා කිව්වේ, සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කිව්වාම, ''Do it'' කියලා කිව්වා කියලා, එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයකු කිව්වා සාක්ෂි පරස්පරයි කියලා. ඒ වාගේ ''බයයි'' කියන එකත් කිව්වේ තවත් එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයකු පමණක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයකු කිව්ව නිසා ''සාක්ෂි පරස්පරයි.'' කියලා තිබෙන එකත් ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, ඒක headlines විධියට පත්තරවලත් පළ වුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම නම්, ඒවා ඉවත් කරන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, කිසිම දෙයක් ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලායි. මොකද, මේවා සිද්ධ වුණු දේවල්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: This is very unprofessional. මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ, හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා මොනවා කළත්, එක තැනෙකදිවත් මෙතැනට ඇවිල්ලා ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ''කථා කරන්න එපා.'' කියලා order කළා කියලා. එහෙම දෙයක් වුණේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම ඒකට විරුද්ධයි. ඔහු අනෙක් වෘත්තියවේදීන් බය කළා කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. මොකද, මම හිටපු කිසිම දවසක එහෙම වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක මෙතැනදී නොවෙයි නේ වෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මේකට ඇතුළත් කරන එක වැරදියි නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපති නැති වුණාට, නැවත ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගිහිල්ලා ආයතනයේ එකට වැඩ කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඉස්සෙල්ලා කථා කළ විධියයි, පසුව කථා කළ විධියයි අපි දැක්කා. මෙතැනදි බය කළේවත්, ඒ විධියේ කිසිම දෙයක් කළේවත් නැහැ. අපි මෙතැන හිටියා නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හොඳම දේ මේක නැවත අහන්න පුළුවන් නේ. මේක මාරාන්තික ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ. ඕනෑ නම්, මේක නැවත අහලා එහෙම දෙයක් වුණාද, නැද්ද කියලා ලේකම්තුමියට බලන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කවුද මේක කිව්වේ, කාරක සභාවේ මේ විධියේ අදහසක් ආවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්, වීරකුමාර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මෙතැනදී ඒක පැහැදිලිවම කිව්වා. ඒක Verbatimsවලත් ඇති.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: "Do it" කියන එක මම දැන් කියනවා. ඒක ඒ වේලාවේ මට ඇති වෙච්ච තත්ත්වයන් යටතේ මම කිව්වේ නැහැ." කියලා සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කිව්වාට පසු, මෙතැනදී වීරකුමාර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගෙන් ලොකු විරෝධයක් ආවා, ඒක ඉල්ලා අස්කරගන්න කියලා. එතුමිය ඒක ඉල්ලා අස්කර ගත්තේ නැහැ, ඒකට සමාව ඉල්ලා සිටියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකටද සමාව ඉල්ලුවේ? එදා මම ලංකාවේ හිටියේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "Do it"කියලා කිව්ව එක කලින් දිනයේ කිව්වේ නැතිව එදින කිව්ව නිසා. ඒක Verbatimsවල ඇති. ඔබතුමන්ලාට Verbatims ටිකත් ඔක්කෝම දුන්නාට පසුව මට නැවත ඒ එකින් එක මතක් කර කර කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එතුමිය එදා කිව්වේ, I do not -

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් මට මතක් වුණා කියලා තමයි එතුමිය ඒක කිව්වේ. "ඒක ඒ වේලාවේ නොකිව්වේ ඇයි?" කියලා එතුමියට තර්ජනය කළාට පස්සේ, "මම සමාව භජනය කරනවා." කියලා එතුමිය කිව්වා. ඒකත් මේකේ සටහන් කර තිබෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ තමයි වීරකුමාර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා සහ තවත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු කීපදෙනෙකු කිව්වේ එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම නම්, ඒකට විරුද්ධයි. මොකද, ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මැතිතුමාගේ කමිටුව ඉදිරියේ දුන් සාක්ෂි පිළිගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා එක වේලාවක ඔබතුමන්ලා කියලා, එතුමිය ඉස්සෙල්ලා දුන් සාක්ෂිය පසු අවස්ථාවක වෙනස් කළ එක සාධාරණයි කියලා තවත් වේලාවක කියනවා නම්, ඒක වැරදියි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියනවා නොවෙයි, වෙච්ච දේ ගැනයි මම කිව්වේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සාක්ෂි වෙනස් කිරීමක් නොවෙයි වුණේ, එතුමිය සාක්ෂි වෙනස් කිරීමක් කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සාක්ෂි වෙනස් කිරීමක් තමයි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: එතුමිය සාක්ෂි වෙනස් කිරීමක් කළා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔව්, සාක්ෂි වෙනස් කිරීමක් කළා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: පැහැදිලිවම ඉස්සෙල්ලා verbal එකේ කියපු කථාවයි, පස්සේ verbal එකේ කියපු කථාවයි වෙනස්, ඒක දෙකක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: It is a very important point නේ. මෙතැනදී 10ක් ගන්න කියන එක කිව්වේ, "Do it" කියලාද, Why do you not go for ten" කියලාද කිව්වාම, ඒ දෙක අතර වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක භාවිත කිරීමේදී වෙනසක් නැහැ, ඔය දෙකම එකයි. ඒකයි මම කිව්වේ, ඒකේ ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ කියලා. මේ වෙච්ච වැරැද්ද - clear and cut. මම කියන්නේ, ඒක එදා වුණු දෙයක් නේ, ඒ නිසා ඒක ඉවත් කරනවා නම් තර්කයක් මත ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි. වංචාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම, "Do it" කියලා කිව්වත් වංචාව වෙනස් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙහෙම කිව්වාම, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා මේගොල්ලන් බය කරලා මේගොල්ලන්ට බොරු සාක්ෂි දෙන්න කිව්වා කියන එක තමයි අදහස් වෙන්නේ. සාධාරණව අපට එහෙම කියන්න පුළුවන් කියලා මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: වැඩේ clean නිසා මේකට අපට සාක්ෂි වුවමනා වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: සොරකමක් සිද්ධ වුණා, සොරකම වහන්න උත්සාහ කළා කියලා ලියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. "සොරකම සිද්ධ වුණා." කියලා ලියමු, එපමණයි. සොරකමක් සිද්ධ වුණා, ඒක වහන්න හැදුවා කියලා නේ මේ ලියන්න හදන්නේ. අපි ඒක ලියන්නේ නැතිව සිටිමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කෙටුම්පත් ලේඛනයේ කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කරනවා නම්, ඒකට ක්‍රමයක් සාදා ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා කියනවා නම්, පොදුවේ මේ, මේ කරුණු පිළිගන්නවා කියලා ඒවා පිළිගෙන, සංශෝධන හැටියට කොටස් එකතු කරනවා නම්, ඒවා ලිඛිතව දෙනවාද නැත්නම්, ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද, එහෙමත් නැත්නම්, මේක ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදය සාකච්ඡා කරනවාද කියන එක කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ ඕනෑම විධියකට කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එතුමා නම්, ඇතුළේ සිටියදී මේ සියල්ලම කියෙව්වා කිව්වා නේ. ඇත්තටම අපට මේ සියල්ලම කියවන්න බැරි වුණා. ඒ නිසා මේ සියල්ලම කියවලා බලන්න අපට තව එක දවසක් දෙන්න. ඉතිරි ටික කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා එදිනට තීන්දු කරමු. ඊට පස්සේ නිර්දේශ ලිඛිතව දෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා බලමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම අපි මේක කියවන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි කලින්ම එකඟතාවකට එන්න ඕනෑ මේ ටික ඔක්කොම පැත්තකින් තියා ගෙන අපේ හිතේ තිබෙන දේවල් කිය කිය ඉන්නවාද කියලා. එතකොට අපට හැමදාම මේ ගැන කථා කර කර ඉන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක අදාළ නැහැ. එම නිසා අපට එන්න ඕනෑකම තිබෙනවා - ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් තිබෙනවා නේ. ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අදහස් ටිකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා, මෙන්න මේ විධියට වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් ඒවා ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ හැටියට දෙන්න. ඒ වගේම ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ කෙටුම්පතේ එකඟ නොවන කොටස් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ පිටුවේම දමන්න පුළුවන්. යම් මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් යම් ඡේදයකට එකඟ නැත්නම් - ඔබතුමා කියාපු ආකාරයට- එකඟ නැහැ කියලා දමන්න පුළුවන්. අනෙක් අය එකඟ නම් එකඟ අයගේ නම් ටික දමන්න පුළුවන්. එකඟ නැති අයගේ නම් ටික දමන්න පුළුවන්. තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ විධිය දමන්න පුළුවන්. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මේක එහෙම අවසන් කරමු. එහෙම නැත්නම් අපට පූර්ව අදහස් ගැන හිත හිතා, හිතේ තිබෙන අදහස් කිය කිය ඉන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට මොකුත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තව ඉදිරියට යන ක්‍රියාවලියක් තියෙයි. ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තීරණය කරයි. අද ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන මූලික සංශෝධන ටික ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. අපේ ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඔක්තෝබර් 5 වැනි දිනට ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන සංශෝධන ලිඛිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. පිටුවෙන් පිටුව වෙන්න පුළුවන්, ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදය වෙන්න පුළුවන්. හැම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්ටම තමන්ගේ නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා මම ඉල්ලීමක් කරනවා. අපි කවුරුත් ලොකු අධ්‍යයනයක් කළා නේ. සාමාන්‍ය දැනීමකින් අපි කවුරුත් මේකට මැදිහත් වුණා. තම තමන්ගේ අවබෝධයේ තරමට නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන්න. අපි මෙතැන 26 දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. කරුණු බැලුවාම ඒ අයගේ පොදු නිර්දේශ ටික අපට වෙනම දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඊට අමතරව සියලු නිර්දේශ වාර්තාවට ඇතුල් කරන්නම්. එහෙම කරලා අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දමමු.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දෙන ලද වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි අපි මේ සමීක්ෂණය කළේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. ඒක විතරක් නොවෙයි. අපි එතැනින් ගොඩක් ඉදිරියට ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒක පදනමක් හැටියට අරගෙන, ඒක පිළිගනිමින් තමයි - අපේ එකඟතාව තිබුණේ එහෙමයි. මේ පිටු ගණන් තිබෙන ඒවා බලලා මහ දීර්ඝ submissions හදනවාට වඩා මම බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ ඒ නිගමනවලට මම දරන මතය පිළිබඳ වාර්තාවක් ලබා දෙන්නයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ලිඛිතව දෙන්න. බොහොමම ස්තුතියි. ඒක තමයි වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: එකඟද නැද්ද ? එච්චරයි. මේකේ කරුණු පදනම් කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. එපමණයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම විගණකාධිපතිවරයා කියාපු එක මතක් කරලා දෙන්නම්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත කථාව. ඒක නේ වුණේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා report එකක් හැදුවා. ඒ report එක තමයි මේකට මුලිකවම පදනම් වෙන්නේ. ඒක මත තමයි අනෙක් ඒවා මේකට add වෙන්නේ. මම වැරදියි කියනවා නොවෙයි. ඒක තමයි යථාර්ථය.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි හැම වාර්තාවම හදන්නේ එහෙම නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාව පදනම් වෙන්නේ ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනුකමිටුවේ සොයා ගැනීම් මත.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ. අපට අපහාස කරන්න එපා. ඩිව් ගුණසේකර කමිටු වාර්තාවක් මෙතැන නැහැ. නිලධාරින් දීපු සාක්ෂි තිබෙන්නේ. මේකට කමිටු වාර්තාව කියන්න එපා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ දිනය කියන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මැයි 26.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇයි ඔබතුමා මේක -

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: 2016.06.29

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි කවදාද මේ අය ගෙන්නුවේ? ඊට පස්සේ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මේකේ තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. ජුනි 29 විගණකාධිපතිතුමා වාර්තාව දීලා ඉවරයි. ඊට පසුව තමයි අපි මහ බැංකුවේ අය ගෙන්වන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ. මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින් ගෙන්වලා ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න කලින් තමයි වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්නේ. එම වාර්තාවේ තමයි කියන්නේ මෙවැනි අවාසියක්, මෙවැනි අලාභයක් සිදු වුණා කියලා. ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. එතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පාදක කර ගන්නේ ඩිව් ගුණසේකර සහ ඊට කලින් තිබුණු ඒවා-

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. ඔබතුමා මේක මුල ඉඳලා කියවන්නකෝ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට කලින් තිබෙනවා අගමැතිවරයාගේ ත්‍රි පුද්ගල වාර්තාව.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මේවා කරන්න එපා. ඩිව් ගුණසේකර කමිටු වාර්තාව එක්ක කිසිම සම්බන්ධයක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට ඔබතුමන්ලා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලපු තොරතුරුවලින් ලැබුණ තොරතුරුත් ඇතුළත් කළා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: විගණනයෙන් ලබා ගත් තොරතුරු බැලුවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපට කියන්න බැහැ නේ ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාව මේකට පදනම් වුණේ නැහැ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා මේක විභිලුවක් කර ගන්න එපා. මම ඉතාම තදින් අවධාරණය කරනවා. මෙහෙම වුණොත් අපි, ඔබතුමන්ලා මොකුත්ම කළේ නැති මට්ටමකට පත් වෙනවා. අපි අපි විසින්ම හැල්ලු කර ගන්නවා. ඒක කරන්න එපා. මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට මුලින්ම කියන්නම්. ඇමුණුම්වලින් පසුව දෙවැනි පිටුව බලන්න. 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා වූ මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදුකර තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් කරන ලද විමර්ශනය පිළිබඳ වැදගත් තොරතුරු සැකවින්. එතැනින් පටන් ගන්නකෝ. මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ අනුකාරක සභාව පත් කළ දිනය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: 2015.05.20 දින. අනුකාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් ටික තිබෙනවා ඩිව් ගුණසේකර සභාපතිතුමාගේ නමින්. වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් ගන්නා ලද දින. දින 12ක් තිබෙනවා. එම දින 12 සටහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: වාචික සාක්ෂි ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා අනු කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද නිලධාරින්. දිනත් එක්ක, 2015.05.26 සිට 2015.06.23 දක්වා කැඳවපු අයගේ නම් තිබෙනවා. ඒකේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන ලංකා බැංකුවේ සභාපති ආදී සියලු නිලධාරින් කැඳවලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව මඟින් පත් කරන ලද අනුකමිටුවක් මඟින් 2015 මාර්තු මස මහ බැංකුවේ සිදු කරන ලද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විමර්ශනය කොට වාර්තාවක් සකස්

කළද එම වාර්තාව පිළිබඳ අනු කමිටුවේ හා කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් අතර එකඟතාවක් ඇති නොවුණ අතර 2015 පෙබරවාරි 26 දින හත් වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසුරුවා හරින ලද හෙයින් එම වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට අවකාශ නොලැබුණි. පැහැදිලි නේ. පසුව 2015.08.17 වැනි දින මහ මැතිවරණය පවත්වන ලද අතර 2015.09.01 වන දින 8 වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ වැඩ කටයුතු ආරම්භ කරන ලදී. 2015.11.26 වැනි දින ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රී) 8 වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ සභාපති වශයෙන් ඒකඡන්දයෙන් තේරී පත් විය. ඉන් පසුව 8 වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ නම් ටික තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අනුව 2016.01.26 දින සිට කාරක සභාව ආයතන විමර්ශනය කිරීම ආරම්භ කරන ලද අතර 2016.02.25 වැනි දින විගණකාධිපති වාර්තා අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ කටයුතු විමර්ශනය කරන ලදී. අපි එදා මහ බැංකුව කැඳෙව්වා. අපි ඒක කැඳෙව්වේ ආයතනයක් විධියට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මේකට අදාළ වුණේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොදුවේ. ඔබතුමාට මතක ඇති එදා කාරක සභාව අවසානයේ එම නිලධාරීන් නික්ම ගිය පසුව අපි තීරණය කලා මේ සම්බන්ධව විමර්ශනයක් ආරම්භ කළ යුතුයි කියලා. 2016.05.06 දින කාරක සභාව විසින් 2015, 2016 වසර තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් සති දෙකක් ඇතුළත වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරන ලෙස විගණකාධිපති වෙත නියෝග කරන ලදී. ඒ අපේ කමිටුවෙන්. ඒ අනුව 2015, 2016 වසරවල බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති වෙත තොරතුරු ලබා දීම පිළිබඳ පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා අපි නැවත 2016.06.08 වන දින මහ බැංකුව කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳෙව්වා. එහෙම කැඳවන්න සිදු වුණේ අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට නිර්දේශයක් දුන්නා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳ වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. හරිද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ සඳහා ඒ අය ලේඛණ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ කිව්වාට පසුව අපි කැඳෙව්වේ. එතකොට මෙතැන කොහෙත්ම ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මොකද, පෙබරවාරි මස 25 කැඳවලා තිබෙනවා. මැයි මස 6 වැන දින කැඳවලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊට පසුව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අපට වාර්තාවක් දුන්නා. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ verbatim හොඳට බලන්න. එහි බොහොම පැහැදිලිව තිබෙනවා මේ විමර්ශනයට කලින් කැඳවලා ලබා ගත්ත සියලු වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්. අපි මුල සිට නැවත එම නිලධාරීන් සියලු දෙනා කැඳවන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ. කැඳවලා ගත්ත වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් තිබෙනවා. ඒක වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි. හැන්සාඩ් එක. මේකේ තිබෙන record වුණු සටහන්. එක එක නිලධාරීන් කියපු කරපු දේවල් ටික විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි ඒවා විතරක් නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මතයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරද්දි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට අවශ්‍ය ලිපිලේඛන විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ පරිවය අනුව පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒවා පාවිච්චි කරලා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ කාරක සභාවට වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒක කථානායකතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒක මත පදනම්ව අපිට මේ විමර්ශනයේ ඉතිරි කටයුතු කළ හැකිය කියලා එකඟතාවකට පත් වුණා. අපි එහෙම එකඟතාවකට ආවේ නැත්නම් අපට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයා ඇතුළු අනෙක් අය කැඳවන්න බැහැ. ඒ එකඟතාව අනුව තමයි අපි මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා සහ අනෙක් නිලධාරීන් කැඳවලා මෙන්න මේ ඉදිරි දිනවල - විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් කාරක සභාවට කරුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කළා. එම පැහැදිලි කිරීම ගැන අපි මහ බැංකුවට දැනුම් දුන්නා. මහ බැංකුව අවස්ථා කිහිපයක කැඳවලායි මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය කළේ. දැන් ඒකේ තිබෙන ගැටලුව මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනු කාරක සභාවෙන් 12වතාවක් මේ අය කැඳෙව්වා නේ. එහි සාක්ෂි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න යොදා ගත්තා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න පමණක් නොවෙයි. මේ කාරක

සභාවේ තීරණයක් අර ගෙන, ඒ වාචික සටහන් මේ පරීක්ෂණය සඳහා පාවිච්චි කරන්න සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ලබා දුන්නා. ඒක පාවිච්චි කරන එක හෝ නොකරන එක ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වැඩක්. මේ කාරක සභාවේ සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් ලබා දී තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම අහන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි. මම කියන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ලබා දෙන විට ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනු කාරක සභාවේ කෙටුම්පත පාවිච්චි කළා. ඒ හරහා තමයි එහි conclusions තිබුණේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ හරහා දුන්නේ නැහැ. මගේ වාර්තාවේ පාවිච්චි කරපු අනෙක් ඔක්කොම-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අනෙක් ඒවා පාවිච්චි කළේ නැහැ කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Report එක හදන්න ඒ සාක්ෂි සටහන් යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට උපයෝගී කර ගෙන තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, ඒ report එක අපේ අතට ලැබුණාට පසුව, ඒ report එක මත පදනම්ව සාකච්ඡා ගොඩාක් තිබුණා. අපට මෙතැනදී ආරම්භයක් වශයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාවේ අනෙකුත් කරුණු සියල්ලම සම්බන්ධයෙන් නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න ඕනෑ තරම් අවස්ථා තිබුණා. නැවත එතැනටම යන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමාගේ පහසුවට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් සකස් කරපු වාර්තා ටිකත් මම කියන්නම්. පහත සඳහන් ලේඛන පරීක්ෂා කිරීම-

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැන කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඔබතුමා අපට අවස්ථාව දුන්නා. අපි කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් හෝ තනි තනියෙන් තම තමන්ගේ කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කළා. මෙතුමාත් අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. අපි කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද නැද්ද කියන එක, කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් හෝ තනි තනිව අපට තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා අපි නැවත වතාවක් 05වැනි දා ඒකට අවශ්‍ය කරුණු ටික ලබා දෙන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: 05වැනි දා හා 06වැනි දා යන දවස් දෙකේ රැස්වෙලා අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැතිනම් නැවත කථා කරන්නේ, මහ බැංකුවේ auction එකට වෙන්නත් කලින් සිද්ධි පිළිබඳව නේ. ඒවා වැඩක් නැහැ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: කමිටුවෙන් දෙන ලද නියෝග මත හදපු වාර්තාව තමයි, අපි පදනම් කර ගන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාවට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා යම් යම් දේවල් පදනම් කර ගන්න ඇති. හැබැයි, අපි ඒ වාර්තාව ඇති තරම් කාලයක් සාකච්ඡා කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා වාර්තාව හැදුවා නේ. ඒ වාර්තාව හදලා conclusions වගයක් දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය. කාරක සභාවේ මතය නොවෙයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය දුන්නා. ඒ සඳහා මීට කලින් සාකච්ඡා කරපු දේවල් පාදක වුණා. ඊට පස්සේ අපි නැවත ඒ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කළා. මම අහන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අලුතින් සිද්ධ වූ සාකච්ඡා පදනම් කර ගෙන ගෙන, ඒවා පිළිබඳ taking that into account තව වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද, නැද්ද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. ඒක තීරණය කරන්නේ කාරක සභාවෙන් නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: මගෙන් වාර්තාවක් දෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් audit එකක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Audit එකක් නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අපට වාර්තාවක් දුන්නා. ඊට පස්සේ සාකච්ඡාවක් කළා. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා නැවත අපට වාර්තාවක් ලබා දෙන්න ඕනෑ නැද්ද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: දෙනවා නම් නැවත මම දෙන්න ඕනෑ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට තමයි. COPE එකේ වාර්තා පදනම් කර ගෙන මට වාර්තාවක් හදන්න බැහැ. ඒක COPE කමිටුවෙන් හදන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් හදන්න ඕනෑ ලේකම් වාර්තාව නේ. එහි draft එක ඔබතුමන්ලාට හදලා දීලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාව හදන්න ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනු කමිටුවේ සාක්ෂිත් පාවිච්චි කළා. මම ප්‍රශ්න කරන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන්, මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා වුණු කරුණු පාදක කර ගෙන ඒ වාර්තාව සංශෝධනය කරන්නේ නැත්තේ ඇයි?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: COPE එකේ වාර්තා අර ගෙන මට වාර්තාවක් හදන්න බලය නැහැ. ඒක තියෙන්නේ COPE එකේ සභාපතිතුමාට හා ලේකම්ට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා වාර්තාව හැදුවා නේ. අපි ඔබතුමාට කිව්වා සති දෙකකින් වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න කියලා. ඔබතුමා ඒ වාර්තාව හදන්න පාවිච්චි කළ, එක වැදගත් සාක්ෂි ප්‍රමාණයක් තියෙන්නේ ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනු කමිටුවේ වාර්තාවේ. ඒවා පමණක් නොවෙයි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් පදනම් විරහිත කථාවක්. ඒක අපි read කළා මොනවාද තියෙන්නේ කියලා බලන්න. ඒ මිනිසුන් නැවත කැඳවා සාකච්ඡා කරලා, සෑහෙන වැඩ කොටසක් කරලා මේ වාර්තාව හැදුවේ. මේ වාර්තාව ලඝු කරන්න එපා. පුදුම මහන්සියක් වෙලා හදපු වාර්තාවක්. ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනු කමිටුවේ report එක මෙතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා ගෙන, අපි ඒක read කළා. ඉන් එහාට අපි ඒ වාර්තාවේ දේවල් කිසිම තැනක quote කරලාවත් නැහැ. අනෙක් සියලුම දේවල්-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඒක කෙලින්ම කියන්න වෙනවා. මෙහි ඩිව් ගුණසේකර වාර්තාවේ කිසිම දෙයක්-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපේ වාර්තාවෙන් ලියමු. පැහැදිලිව ඒක ලියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක යථාර්ථය නොවෙයි නේ. එහි සාක්ෂි මේ වාර්තාවට පාවිච්චි කළා නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි අද සාකච්ඡා කරනවා කිව්වේ draft එක නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: අපි යම් කිසි තැනක Minutes කරලා තියෙනවා. ඒවා ඕනෑ නම් delete කරලා තියෙනවා. එහෙම කළා කියලා මගේ conclusions එකේ කිසිම වෙනසක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාව නැවත වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු එක නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: කොහොමත් ඒක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා මා සමඟ antagonize වෙන්න එපා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දන්නවා මම කොයි වෙලාවේත් එහෙම -

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. මම කිව්වේ මගේ බලය. මට COPE එකේ වාර්තා අරගෙන හදන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනු කමිටුවේ සාක්ෂි පාවිච්චි කළේ නැහැ කියලා, ඔබතුමා කියන කථාව මම පිළිගන්න සූදානම් නැහැ. එහෙම නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමාට වැරැද්දක් කියනවා නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා වාර්තාව හදන විට ඒ සාක්ෂි පාවිච්චි කළා. නැහැ කියනවා නම්, ඒක වැරැදියි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම පාවිච්චි කළාට වරදක් නැහැ. ඒ සාක්ෂි පාවිච්චි කළාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මම ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා කියන්නේ නැහැ. පාවිච්චි කළේ නැහැ කියලා, කියන්න බැහැ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: පාවිච්චි කළා. නමුත්, අපේ base එක ඒක නොවෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ සාක්ෂි පමණක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ තර්කය වන්නේ මේකයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ report එක හදන්න පරණ ඉදිරිපත් වූ සාක්ෂි උපයෝගී කර ගත්තා. ඒ මත මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළා. හැබැයි, ඊට පස්සේ නැවත සාක්ෂි කැඳවා තිබෙනවා. ඒ සාක්ෂි මත පදනම්ව, නැවත report එක revise කරන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැද්ද? එතකොට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා, ඒ ඉදිරිපත් වූ සාධකවලට අමතරව විශේෂයෙන් අවධානය යොමු කළ යුතු සාධකයක් නොමැති නිසා, නැවත මෙය සාකච්ඡාවට බඳුන් කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය මම සෘජුවම අහන්නම්. ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා පැහැදිලි කළ දේ තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය.

ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සම්පාදනය කර විට ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනු කමිටුවේ සාක්ෂි භාවිත කළා. ඒවාම පමණක් නොවෙයි. ඒවාත් භාවිත කළා; අනෙකුත් ඒවාත් භාවිත කළා. මම මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ, කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරයකු හැටියටයි. එතැනදී තර්කානුකූල ප්‍රශ්න ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අපට අවස්ථාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. අපි ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව පිළිබඳ තර්කානුකූල ප්‍රශ්න ඉදිරිපත් කරන විට, එතැනදී ලබා දුන්නාට වඩා වෙනස් උත්තර මෙතැනදී ලබා දුන්නා. ඒ වාර්තාව මේ සාක්ෂි සමඟ නැවත සංශෝධනය විය යුතුයි කියලා, මා විශ්වාස කරනවා. මොකද, ඒ වාර්තාව හදන්න කලින් සාක්ෂි පාවිච්චි කළා නම්, මේ සාක්ෂිත් පාවිච්චි විය යුතුයි කියන මතය මට තිබෙනවා. ඒකට හේතුව තමයි-

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි හදන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව නම් ඔබතුමා කියන දේ නිවැරැදියි. නමුත්, අපි මේ හදන්නේ COPE කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට මේ නියෝගය දීමට පෙර, පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 26වැනි දා පොදුවේ මහ බැංකුව කැඳවා තිබෙනවා. පොදුවේ කිව්වාම බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව හෝ ඕනෑම එකක් පිළිබඳව කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඒවා කථා කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඩිව් ගුණසේකර අනු කමිටුව තිබුණු කාලයේ මමත් හිටියේ නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ තර්කය වන්නේ, මේ නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් මේ ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න සිද්ධ වුණේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවෙන් පසුව කියන එක නේ. හැබැයි, අපට පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 26වැනි දා මහ බැංකුව පොදුවේ කැඳවූ දවසේ මේ කාරණයත් කථා කළ හැකිව තිබුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: කථා කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව කථා කළේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ නිසා අවස්ථාව අහිමිවීමක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහිදී මේ විධියට කථා කළා. මේ බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳව වෙනම අර ගෙන සාකච්ඡා කළ යුතුයි කියලා කථා කළා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: පෞද්ගලිකව මමත් මේ ගැන දැන ගත්තේ එදා.

අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එකක් තමයි අපි මේකට පාදක කර ගන්න ඕනෑ සාධක. අපේ report එකක් නේ දැන් අපිට හදන්න තියෙන්නේ. ඒ report එක හදන්න, අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ Report එක පදනම් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඉන් පසුව මේ කාරක සභාව තුළ ඇති වූ සාකච්ඡාව පදනම් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. එතැනින් එහා කාර්යභාරය තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට නොවෙයි. උදාහරණයක් විධියට මහජන බැංකුව කැඳෙව්වා කියලා අපි හිතමු. මහජන බැංකුව කැඳවන අවස්ථාවේදී, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අපිට audit report එකක් දෙනවා. ඒ audit report එක මත පදනම්ව, අපි මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. ඒ විධියට සාකච්ඡා කර, අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට කියන්නේ නැහැ, "දැන් ඔබතුමා audit report එකක් දුන්නා, ඒ මත පදනම්ව අපි මේවා සාකච්ඡා කළා, ඒ නිසා අලුතින් එකක් දෙන්න" කියලා. අපි කරන දේ තමයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවත්, ඒ මත පදනම්ව අපි මෙතැන ගොඩනගන ලද සාකච්ඡාවත් පදනම් කර ගෙන කාරක සභාව විසින් වාර්තාවක් සකස් කර දෙන එක. දැන් අපිට තිබෙන්නේ ඒ කාර්ය නේ. නැතිනම් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා හැමදාම report එකක් දෙනවා, අපි ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. නමුත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒ සාකච්ඡාවෙන් පසුව, නැවත report එකක් හදන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ තර්කයෙන් භාගයක් මම පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ තර්කය වන්නේ, නව වාර්තාව හදන්න කලින් වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගත්තා කියන එක නේ. උදාහරණයක් විධියට, ඊට කලින් මහජන බැංකුව කැඳවූ අවස්ථාවේදී කරන ලද සාකච්ඡා, ඊළඟ audit report එක සැදීමට පාදක කර ගන්නවා කියන එක සඳහන් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මෙතුමන්ලා මහජන බැංකුව පිළිබඳ report එකක් අද ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, ඊට කලින් මහජන බැංකුව කැඳවූ අවස්ථාවේදී ඉදිරිපත් කළ තොරතුරු මෙතුමන්ලා පාදක කර ගන්නවා. ඒ report එක බලලා කියනවා, කලින් මේ කාරක සභාවට කැඳෙව්වා, මේ නිර්දේශ ලබාදී තිබුණා, මේ නිර්දේශ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙලා නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එතැනයි මෙතැනයි අතර ලොකු වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, අපි මහජන බැංකුව **කැඳවූ අවස්ථාවේදී** කාරක සභාවක් හැටියට තීරණයක් ගන්න ඇති ''මේක අපි පිළිගන්නවා'' කියලා. නමුත් මෙතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට පදනම් කර ගත් සාක්ෂි, කාරක සභාව හැටියට පිළිඅරගෙන නැහැ. එතැනයි ගැටලුව තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සාක්ෂි පිළිගත්තේ නැත්තේ නැහැ, වාර්තාවක් හදලා පිළිගත්තේ නැහැ. සාක්ෂි පිළිගත්ත නිසා නේ තිබෙන්නේ. අපි දිවුරුම් දීලා නේ සාක්ෂි ගත්තේ. කාරක සභාව ඒ සාක්ෂි පිළිඅරගෙන තියෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙවැනි කාරක සභාවකට කවුරුන් හෝ පැමිණ සාක්ෂියක් ලබා දෙනවා නම්, ඒ සාක්ෂිය එදා සිට මේ කාරක සභාව තුළ තිබෙන වාක්‍යයක් නේ. නමුත් ඒ සාක්ෂිය මත පදනම්ව හදන report එක පිළිබඳ අපිට විවාද තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපි කිසියම් අයතනයක සභාපතිවරයෙක් කැඳවනවා, එතුමා සාක්ෂියක් දෙනවා, ඒ සාක්ෂිය අපි ළඟ තිබෙනවා. නමුත් අපි ඒ වාර්තාව අනුමත කරලා තමයි-

උදාහරණයක් හැටියට, කලින් කාරක සභාවට අපි ආයතනයක් කැඳවා, එහි සභාපතිවරයාට කියනවා, මෙපමණ ණය මුදලක් තිබෙනවා, එය අය කර ගෙන නැහැ කියලා. එහිදී එතුමා කියනවා, මෙන්න මේ මේ නිසා අය කර ගන්න බැරි වුණා කියලා. අපි ඊළඟට ''ඔබතුමා පසුගිය අවස්ථාවේදී මෙහෙම කිව්වා'' කියලා එය පදනම් කර ගන්නවා එතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න. යම් ආයතනයක් කාරක සභාවට කැඳවලා, එදායින් ඒක අවසන් කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මේක continuously යන ක්‍රියාවලියක්. ඒ ක්‍රියාවලියට හැමදාමත් කරන දේ තමයි, අනෙක් එකේ තිබෙන අන්තර් සම්බන්ධතාවත් එක්ක යන එක. නමුත් අන්තර් සබඳතාව ගන්නේ වාර්තාවෙන් පමණක් නොවෙයි. ඒ තුළ සිදු වන සාච්ඡාව තුළින් එම අන්තර් සම්බන්ධතාව ගන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපි කාරක සභාව හැටියට ඔබතුමා කියන දේ පිළිගත්තොත් මේ කාරක සභාව ලොකු අර්බුදයකට යනවා. මොකද, අපට එක ආයතනයක් කැඳවන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ එක අවස්ථාවකදී පමණක් වෙනවා නේ. අපි හිතමු, රජයේ ආයතනයක් වන LRC එක කැඳවුවා කියලා. අපි ඒ ආයතනය 2012දී තමයි කැඳවලා තිබෙන්නේ. එහිදී අපි දීපු නිර්දේශ තිබෙනවා, නිගමන තිබෙනවා, සාකච්ඡා කරන ලද කරුණු තිබෙනවා. අපි මේ ආයතනය නැවතත් 2016 කැඳෙව්වොත්, ඒ කැඳවන විට මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් නොසිටින්නත් පුළුවන්, නිලධාරින් නොසිටින්නත් පුළුවන්. නමුත් රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍ය පාලනයේ අඛණ්ඩතාව වෙනුවෙන්, අපි ඔවුන්ගෙන් අහනවා කලින් දීපු මෙන්න මේ නිර්දේශයන් ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකළේ ඇයි කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ සියයට සියයක ගරුත්වය ඔබතුමාට තිබෙනවා. මේක වැරදි විධියට ගන්න එපා. මම කියන්නේ, ඒ සියලු දේවල් සම්මත වූ ඒවා කියලා නේ. ඒවා accept කරපුවා. නමුත් මේක කෙටුම්පතක්.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: අපි හිතමු, වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ සභාගත කළා කියලා. ඒ වාර්තාව සභාගත කිරීමට පෙර අපි යම් ආයතනයක් දෙවරක්-තුන්වරක් කැඳවලා තිබෙනවා. යම් ආයතනයක් පළමු වතාවට කැඳවලා, එකෙන් වාර්තාවක් හදලා, එය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කර අවසන් කරලා නැහැ. වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට පෙර අවස්ථා ගණනාවකදී අපි ඒ ආයතනය කැඳවා තිබෙනවා. අපි එතැනදී කරන සාකච්ඡාවන් ඊළඟ කමිටුවට වාර්තා කර ගන්නවා. මේකත් එහෙමයි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. අපි මේ ආයතනය කැඳවලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් අපි එහි වාර්තාව හදලා අවසන් කර නැහැ. ඒ කැඳවූ සාකච්ඡාවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය, අපි වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන තෙක් අඛණ්ඩව ගෙන යනවා. මෙය අනෙකුත් ක්‍රියාවලීන්ට දියත් වන ආකාරයටම තමයි දියත් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණයට එක කොන්දේසියක් මත එකඟ වෙනවා. මේක නීතිමය කාරණාවක්. ඔබතුමා මට වඩා පාර්ලිමේන්තුව පිළිබඳ දන්නවා නේ. මෙතැන අපේ කාරක සභා දෙකක්. එකම කාරක සභාවක් විසින් නැවත කැඳවීම, කිසිදු ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මම ඔබතුමා සමඟ එකඟ වෙනවා. නමුත් මේ කාරක සභාව වෙන කාරක සභාවක් නේ.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: COPE සභාවක් අවසන් වෙන විට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවත් අවසන් වෙනවා නම්, අවසානයට වාර්තාවක් දීලා නැහැ. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට අවසන් වෙන්න නම්, එහෙම වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවත් අවසන් වෙනවා,

කොප් සභාපත් අවසන් වෙනවා, වාර්තාව අවසන් වෙනවා. නමුත් එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ. වාර්තාවක් අවසන් නොවී කෝප් සභාවේ අඛණ්ඩතාව ඉදිරියට යනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියනවා නම් මම ඒක පිළිගන්න සූදානම්.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: "අපි ගිය අවුරුද්දේ ඔබතුමන්ලා කැඳෙව්වා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඔබතුමන්ලා කියපු ඒවා" කියලා අපි දැනුත් ගන්නවා. එවැනි ආයතන දැනුත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ තර්කය මම පිළිගන්න සූදානම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කරුණ සම්බන්ධයෙන් වන සාකච්ඡාව දැන් අවසන් කරමු. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට සාධාරණය ඉෂ්ට වෙන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසා මම මේ කාරණයත් කියන්න ඕනෑ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ වාර්තාවට අදාළව ලේඛණ හැටියට පරීශීලනය කර තිබෙන්නේ, 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශන සඳහා වූ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ අනුකාරක සභාව විසින් පත් කරන ලද පරීක්ෂාවට අදාළ වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් පමණක් නොවෙයි. එතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ පිටු අංක 01හි සහ 02හි ඒ බව සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්න හදන දේ මම කියන්නම්. පසුගිය කෝප් කාරක සභාව මේ ප්‍රශ්නය සැලකිය යුතු ප්‍රමාණයකින් දේශපාලන අරමුණක් වෙනුවෙන් උපයෝගී කර ගත්තා. ඒක අපි දන්නවා නේ. එහි තිබූ කලබලය, එය දියත් වූ ආකාරය, එහි තිබූ බලය සහ එහි සංයුතිය විසින් මහ මැතිවරණයට පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසුරුවා හැරීමට පෙර යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට අවසන් වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා වේගවත් ප්‍රයත්නයක් තිබුණා. ඒ ප්‍රයත්නය තුළ, මේ වාර්තාවේ සමබරතාව යම් ආකාරයකට ගිලිහී ඇතිද කියන සාධාරණ සැකය ඔබතුමාට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරිය හරි.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක නේ ඔබතුමා මතු කරන්නේ. නමුත් මෙතැනදී ගනු ලබන්නේ එහි තිබෙන වාර්තාවක් නෙවෙයි, ඒ කාරක සභාව හමුවට පැමිණ ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද සාක්ෂි සටහන් නේ. එම සාක්ෂි යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට උපයෝගී කර ගෙන, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් වාර්තාවක් දීලා තිබෙනවා. එතෙක් ක්‍රියාවලිය -සාක්ෂි කැඳෙව්වා නම් හෝ ගිහින් පරීක්ෂා කළා නම්- ඒ වාර්තාවෙන් අවසන් වී තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවෙන් එය අවසන් කර, එතැන් සිට අලුත් ආරම්භයක් තිබෙනවා. අපි සැලකිය යුතු කාලයක් තිස්සේ ඒ වාර්තාව මත පදනම්ව සාකච්ඡා කර තිබෙනවා. අපිට ඒ වාර්තාවෙන් එක් එක් පුද්ගලයා ලබා දුන් සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල තිබෙන පරස්පරතා සම්බන්ධයෙන් විමසීමට පුළුවන්. ඒ විධියට සාක්ෂි දීලා, අද ඔබතුමා මෙහෙම කියනවා කියලා අහන්න පුළුවන්. අපි ඒ සියලුම දේවල් අවසන් කර ගෙන ඉදිරියට ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා කාරක සභාව හැටියට ඒ සියල්ලම සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන, වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අවස්ථාව අපිට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම හිතන්නේ මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කරන එක වඩාත් පහසුයි කියලා. මොකද, බැරිවෙලාවත් වැරදිලා හරි මෙතුමා කියන කාරණා එක්ක බලද්දී මත දෙකක් තිබුණොත් මොකද වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය ගන්නවා. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කරලා තිබෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මතයක් දිලා තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. මෙතෙක් කාලයක් අපි ඒවා ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව නොවෙයි කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නමුත්, අපි හැමදාම වාර්තාවක් හදන විට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ තමයි එයට ඇතුළත් කළේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ නොවෙයි එතුමාගේ නිගමන.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නිගමනයන් තුනක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි ඒ නිගමනයන් ඇතුළත් කළා. නිගමනයන් පසෙක තැබුවේ නැහැ. අපි ලොකු හාස්කමක් කළා නොවෙයි. එතුමා දෙන වාර්තාව සාකච්ඡා කරලා, අපි වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරලා දැම්මා. එච්චරයි කළේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඒ ගැන මෙච්චර කථා කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කථා කරලා බලන්නේ වෙනත් අඩු පාඩු තිබෙනවාද කියලා හොයා ගන්නයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කථා කරලා බලන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙම කියපු එක හරිද, මෙහෙම කියපු එක වැරදිද, කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැනදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ conclusion එකක් තිබුණා "value for money"-

The Hon. Bimal Ratnayake: Value for money for professional due care.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට හරියටම එය මතක නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ transparency එක ලබා ගන්න කොච්චර වැයක් දැරිය යුතුද, ඒ නිසා transparencyම නොවෙයි මෙහි අවසාන- මට හරියට එය මතක නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Transparency කියන එක ඇතුළෙන් වාසි අවාසි සිදු වන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි transparency කියන්නේ.

ගරු අශෝක අබේසිංහ මහතා: Least cost එක තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒකෙන් තමයි එය රැකෙන්නේ. ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ආකාරය, ඒ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ආකාරයේ තිබෙන දුබලතාවන්, ඒ දුබලතාවන් හේතු කොටගෙන ඇති වී තිබෙන පාඩුව, එය නිශ්චිත විය යුතුයි. ඒ වාගේම, ඒ පාඩුව ඇති වීම සඳහා අපි උපකල්පනය කරන කරුණු මොනවාද? මේ ඥාතීත්වය බලපාලා තිබෙනවාද; මේ හදිස්සිය බලපාලා තිබෙනවාද කියන කරුණු සියල්ලම එතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, දැන් ඒවාට කැමැති නැති කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්නවා නම් මොකද කරන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම නම්, අපි යටින් "star" mark එකක් දාලා සඳහන් කරමු "මේ කරුණ සඳහා මේ මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ එකඟතාවක් නැහැ" කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණන රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඒ ගැන කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළේ මතයක්. එතුමාගේ මතයත් පාවිච්චි කරලා, මේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ නිර්දේශයනුත් එකතු කරලා, මේ දීලා තිබෙන සැකැස්මට අනුව අවසාන වාර්තාවක් හදන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ අවසාන වාර්තාවට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය පමණක් නොවෙයි, මේ කාරක සභාවේ මතයත් වැදගත් වනවා. මේ කාරක සභාවේ මතයට ගැලපෙන විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලා නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් නම්, එක් එක් කෙනා පුද්ගලිකව ඔය කියන දේවල් ටික 05 වෙනි දාට ලිඛිතව අපිට දෙන්න, අපට ඒකෙන් වාර්තාවක් හදන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ සිදු වෙච්ච සාකච්ඡා අනුව නිර්දේශ කියන්නේ වෙන එකක්. නමුත්, මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පැහැදිලිව ඕනෑ. ඒක ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ආකාරය, ගනුදෙනුවේ තිබෙන දුබලතාවන්, එම දුබලතාවන් හේතුවෙන් ඇති වූ පාඩු, එම දුබලතාවන් ඇති වීම සඳහා බලපාන ලද කරුණු, ඊට පස්සේ නිගමනයන්. "නිගමනයන්" කියලා අදහස් කරන්නේ, "මේක CID යවන්න ඕනෑද, FCID යවන්න ඕනෑද, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඉක්මනින් Immigration and Emigration Department එක දැනුවත් කරලා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ passport එක අත් හිටුවන්න කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑද" කියන ඒවා. මේකට තිබෙන දඬුවම කියන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමියට වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම ගැන අදහසක් කියන්න තිබෙනවා. අපි එයට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙමු.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: වෙනත් subjects වාගේ නොවෙයි, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර කියන්නේ අපට අලුත් දෙයක්. අපිත් තවම මේ ගැන අධ්‍යයනය කරමින් තමයි ඉන්නේ. ඒ නිසා 05 වෙනි දාට කාරක සභාව විධියට අපි සියලු දෙනාම එකතු වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කළොත් හොඳයි කියන එකයි මගේ අදහස.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමියලා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එක මත පදනම් වෙලා අපිට වාර්තාවක් හදලා දෙන්න. මෙතුමා පැහැදිලිව ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ආකාරය පැහැදිලි කරනවා. ඒ ගනුදෙනුවේ තිබුණු දුබලතාවන් පැහැදිලි කරනවා. ඒ දුබලතාවන් හේතුවෙන් ඇති වූ පාඩු පැහැදිලි කරනවා. ඒ පාඩු ඇති වීමට හේතු වූ

සාධක පැහැදිලි කරනවා. ඊට පස්සේ මොකක්ද කියන එක අපි නිර්දේශ කරමු. ඒකට නේ අපේ සාකච්ඡාව ගියේ. නැත්නම් ආයෙත් ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය හොයනවා කියන්නේ මේ සාකච්ඡාවම නැවත කරනවා කියන එක තමයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: පසු ගිය COPE වාර්තාවලදී සියලු දෙනා මේවාට එකඟ වුණා. ඒක නිසා තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනවලට එකඟතාවක් ආවේ. නමුත්, මම නම් හිතන්නේ නැහැ මෙතැනදී එහෙම සියයට 100ක එකඟතාවක් එයි කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන අපහැදිලිතාවක් කාටවත් නැහැ නේ. මෙන්න මේ දිනයේ බිලියන එකක් නිකුත් කරන්න කටයුතු කළා. එය බිලියන 10 දක්වා වැඩි කළා. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පළමුවෙන්ම බිලියන 20ක් ඉල්ලන්න කියලා කිව්වා. බිලියන 20ක් කියන එක අනතුරුදායකයි කිව්වා. ඊට පස්සේ එය බිලියන 10 දක්වා අඩු කළා. බිලියන 10 දක්වා අඩු කරන එකට කණ්ඩායමක් විරුද්ධයි කියලා කිව්වා. නමුත් සභාපතිවරයා ඒකට එකඟතාව පළ කළා. ඒක නේ ක්‍රියාවලිය. ඊට පස්සේ සිදු වූ පාඩුව, මේ නිසා පොලී අනුපාතය මේ ප්‍රමාණයට ඉහළ ගියා, මෙපමණ මුදලක් ඒ සඳහා දුන්නා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතැනදී අපි කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්නවා නේ පාඩුවක් වුණේ නැහැ කියන තැන.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි ඒකට අවාසි කියලා දමමු. ඊට පස්සේ අපි "star"mark එකක් දමලා "තවත් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් කණ්ඩායමක්" කියලා, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නමත් දාලා "මෙන්න ෙමික ඒ ගොල්ලන් තීරණය කළේ මේ විධියටයි" කියලා සටහන් කරමු. නැත්නම් මේ ලොකු වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දැම්මාම වෙන්නෙත් අපි කරන දෙයම තමයි. "මෙයා කියලා තියෙන්නේ මේක, මෙයා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මේක" කියලා ආයෙත් තර්ක කරනවා. එහෙම නොවෙයි. "මෙන්න මේ තිබෙන්නේ කරුණු" කියලා අපි report එකක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂණන රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම නැත්නම් අපි සියලු දෙනාටම එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් කරුණු ටික අපි ඉස්සර වෙලා ගොනු කරමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි මේකේ පෙළගැස්ම හැදුවාට පස්සේ තමයි යම් කරුණක් පිළිබඳ විරෝධයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒක සටහන් කරන්න අපිට පුළුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපි දැනට ඒක දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අපි දැන් තියෙන තර්ක අනුව පෙළගැස්ම හදනවා. ඒක හැදුවාට පස්සේ, අපිට එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ පරිච්ඡේද එකතු කරන්නත්, ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ පරිච්ඡේද ඉවත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. එහෙම බැරි විවාදයක් තිබෙන ඒවාට "මෙන්න මේ අය මේකට එකඟයි, මේකට විරුද්ධයි" කියලා සටහන් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුනි, මේක හොඳ තත්ත්වයක්. දැන් මම ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් මෙහෙම අහන්නම්. අපි දැන් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු අනු පිළිවෙළක් තිබෙනවා. වාර්තාවක් විධියට එන කොට මේ අනු පිළිවෙළ වෙනස් වෙන්න වෙයි. මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් මේ ගැන කාරණා ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය හැඳින්වීම. එහිදී, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සහ අනුගමනය කළ ක්‍රමවේදයන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව ගැනද? නැත්නම් පොදු කථාවද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ෙම් ගනුදෙනුවට අදාළ පොදු කථාව ඉස්සර වෙලා කියන්න ඕනෑ නේ. මේ වාර්තාව කියෙව්වාම ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්. මුලින්ම තිබෙන්නේ පොදු කථාව. පොලී අනුපාත, ඊළඟට, ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ සිදු කර තිබුණු භාණ්ඩාගර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවෙන් උපුටා ගත් කරුණු තිබෙනවා. කලින් සඳහන් කළ පොදු ක්‍රියාවලියට අමතරව. එහි නැවතත් මේ ගනුදෙනුවට අනුගමනය කළ ක්‍රියා මාර්ගය, ක්‍රියා පිළිවෙළ තිබෙනවා. අදාළ කාලය තුළ රටේ මූල්‍ය තත්ත්වය. 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව ප්‍රායෝගිකව සිදු වුණු ආකාරය. අපිට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ කාරණය ඒකයි. එයත් මෙහි පැහැදිලි කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහිදී අපි සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එකේ කරුණු - ඒක නේ මූලික වුණේ. මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වුණු අවස්ථාව, එහි විකල්ප ක්‍රියා මාර්ග, ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව කරපු නිර්දේශය

ක්‍රියාත්මක කළා නම් ඇති වෙන තත්ත්වය, Perpetual Treasuries නම්, ඒකට ලංසු තැබීමේ ස්වභාවය. මේ සියල්ලම තිබෙනවා. එතකොට ඒක මත තමයි-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙය බැලුවාම සාක්ෂි එහෙමත් තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒවා ඇමුණුම්. මේ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව පිටු අංක 57න් අවසන් වනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: වාර්තාවට ඇමුණුම් ටික කොහොමත් අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඇමුණුම් ටික නොවෙයි, වාර්තාවේ පළමු පිටු 57, අපි වාද විවාද කරපුවා තිබෙනවා. ඒවා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වැඩක් නැහැ. "කාරක සභාව මෙහෙම කිව්වා. අධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙම කිව්වා" කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ විවාදය personalize වෙනවා. එහෙම නැතුව, පිටු ප්‍රමාණය 10ක්ද, 20ක්ද කියන එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අපි එක කථාවක් කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නිශ්චිත විය යුතුයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි 05 වෙනි දාට එකතු වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙහි පිටු අංක 53 ගත්තොත්, "...සියලුම මුදල් ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස තමන් ප්‍රකාශ කළ බව සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය සඳහන් කළාය." කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේ දේවල් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ආකාරයට "මෙන්න මේවා අයින් කරන්න, මෙන්න මේවා එකතු කරන්න" කියලා, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ අවශ්‍ය ටික ලබා දුන්නා නම් පහසුයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මගේ අවසාන කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම. මම ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන කාරණය පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත්, මේ දීපු කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ අපි පාදක කර ගන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කියලා මෙතැන භාවිතා කරන අර දේශපාලන ක්‍රියාවලිය ඇතුළේ සාක්ෂි කැඳවලා කරපු වාර්තාව නේ. ඒක අපි කවුරුත් පිළිගන්නවා නේ. එතැන දේශපාලන අරමුණක් තිබුණු බව කවුරුත් දන්නවා. එතකොට මම විශ්වාස කරනවා එහෙම නම් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කියලා අපි මේකේ භාවිතා කරන වාර්තාවට මේ කාරක සභාවේ සාක්ෂිත් ඇතුළත් විය යුතුයි කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතැනදී මෙහෙමයි, ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා කියන තර්කය හරි. හැබැයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ නිගමනයට එන්නේ සාක්ෂි මත නොවෙයි. එතුමා සාක්ෂි හැදෑරීමකට භාජන කරනවා; ඒවා අධ්‍යයනය කරනවා; ඒක වෙනම දෙයක්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒ අනෙකුත් ලිපිලේඛන සියල්ල පරිශීලනය කරලා, එතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කළ ස්වාධීන නිර්දේශය-

සභාපතිතුමා: ස්වාධීන මතය.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ස්වාධීන මතය තමයි මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ සඳහා වෙන වෙන දේවල්, පත්තරේ කියපු දේවල් බලන්න ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඕනෑ නම් ඒ මතය අපට පිළිනොගන්න වුණත් පුළුවන්. ඒ මතය මේ කාරක සභාවට පිළිනොගෙන ඉන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මොකද, අපි කවුරුත් දන්නවා-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මම කියන්න හදන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ Report එක කියන කොට එහි ස්වාධීනත්වය නිසා ඒකට තිබෙන බලවත්භාවය වැඩියි. හැබැයි, ඒක සකස් කර ගන්න වැරදි සාක්ෂි පදනම් කර ගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා අපි හිතමුකෝ. වැරදි සාක්ෂි හෝ බලහත්කාරයෙන් දුන් සාක්ෂි. ඒ නිසා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ Report එක කියන කොට මේ තිබෙන බලවත්භාවය අර වෙන සාධක, බලහත්කාරයෙන් දුන්, වෙනත් බලපෑමක් මත ඇති වුණු සාධක මත මේක ගොඩනැඟිලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා වඩාත් හොඳයි අලුත් සාධක මත පදනම් වූ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවක් එනවා නම්. ඒක නේ මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: හැබැයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්නේ, ඒ මත එල්බ ගෙන හෝ ඒවාට යටත් වීමෙන් නොවෙයි. එතුමා මේ වාර්තාව හදන්නේ තමන්ගේ ස්වාධීන වාර්තාවක් ලෙස.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මම පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ සඳහා පත්තරවල වාර්තා එතුමා කියවන්න ඇති. TV debatesවල විකාශය වුණු ඒවා බලන්න ඇති. අගමැතිතුමාගේ

වාර්තාව බලන්න ඇති. මම කියන්නේ එහෙම අවස්ථා බොහෝ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන දේ මම පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත්, මම මේකේ සම්පූර්ණත්වය සඳහා -for completeness- මොකද, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කියන්නේ independent, ඔබතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ ඉතාමත් වගකීමක් ඇති, බර වැඩි වාර්තාවක්. දේශපාලන වුවමනාවක් සඳහා සාක්ෂිය එක පැත්තකට ගියා නම්, දැන් එහෙම දේශපාලන වුවමනාවක් නැහැ නේ. එහෙම නැතිව අපි මේ කථාවේ සිද්ධ වුණු සාක්ෂිත්, කරුණාකරලා ඒවා පිළිබඳවත් යම් කිසි අවධානයක් යොමු කරලා, යම් කිසි සංශෝධනයක් - revision එකක් - කළොත් හොඳයි කියලා මම හිතන්නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා, ගිය වර කමිටුව ඒ සාක්ෂිකරුවන්ට දේශපාලන බලපෑමක් කරලා ලබා ගන්නා ලද සාක්ෂි කියලා ඒකෙන් අදහස් කරනවාද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙතුමා හිතනවා, සාක්ෂි විමසීමේදී ගෙන යන ලද path එක කොටු කර ගැනීම සඳහාම කියලා. ඒක නේ මේ කියන්නේ. තර්කය ඒක නේ. ඒ සඳහා වූ path එකම තමයි යන්නේ කියලා හිතනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක මෙහෙමයි, අපි දෙවැනි වතාවට ඒ ගොල්ලෝ මෙතැනට කැඳවුවා නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: එහෙම පරස්පරයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතැනදී එහෙම නම් තද පරස්පරතාවක් දැනෙන්න ඕනෑ. Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva කියන එකත් පිළිගන්න පුළුවන්, අපි කැඳවූ දෙවැනි අවස්ථාවේ ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දුන් සාක්ෂිවලින් බරපතළ විකෘති දේවල් කිව්වා කියලා අපට දැනෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපිට ඇත්තටම එහෙම දැනුණේ නැහැ නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් එකම එක්කෙනයි “do with” කියන එක හෝ එකතු කළේ. වෙන කවුරුවත් එකතු කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ගොඩනැගෙන්නේ ඒක මතයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මම එදා හිටියේ නැහැ, එදා සාකච්ඡාව වෙලාවේ මම ලංකාවෙන් බැහැරව හිටියේ. නමුත්, ඒක මත තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය එන්නේ. කාරක සභාවට කිව්වා නම් බයට සාක්ෂි වෙනස් කළා කියලා- විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගෙන් මම අහන්නේ කරන්න කියලා නොවෙයි, පොඩ්ඩක් මම කියන දේ -

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: මට නම් ඔය කියන කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිම issue එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකට ඔබතුමා කියනවා නම් කිසිම විධියකට වෙනස් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලා, ඒක පිළිගන්න මම සුදානම්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මෙහෙමනේ, දැන් එතුමා වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා වාගේම, ඊට පෙර සාක්ෂි විමසීමේදී එතුමාගේ නියෝජිතයෙක් හිටියා. ඒ වාගේම මේ අවස්ථාවෙත් එතුමා මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ හිටියා නේ. එතකොට එතුමාට කියන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා මා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද වාර්තාව තවදුරටත් ශක්තිමත් වුණා හැරුණු කොට ඒකට වෙනස් කිරීම සඳහා මට සාධක නැහැ කියලා. **ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** එහෙම කියන්න. එතකොට අපට-

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැනදී අපට මෙහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. අපේ මේ වාර්තාව අපිත් හදනවා වාගේම මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරද්දී විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතයකුත් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්; නිර්දේශයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතුමාගේ පරණ මතය පිළිබඳ මතයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කරමු අපි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට මේ සාක්ෂිවලින් ඔබතුමා එදා ඉදිරිපත් කළ මතයේ යම් කිසි සංශෝධනයක් කළ යුතුයි කියලා හිතෙනවා නම්, මම හිතන්නේ ඒක නිකම් going back නොවෙයි නේ. මම කියන්නේ අලුත් සාක්ෂි සමඟ-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අලුත් සාක්ෂි සමඟ එතුමාට ඕනෑ නම් එතුමාගේ තර්කය තවත් ශක්තිමත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැත්නම් යම් අවිනිශ්චිත මතයක් ගොඩනැඟුණා කියලා මතයක් ගෙනෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි එහෙම කරමු. එතකොට හරි පැහැදිලියි. අපි දැන් මේ ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාව

හදනවා. ඒක තවදුරටත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමක්, ඔහුගේ මතය සම්බන්ධයෙන් එකතු කිරීමක් අපි කරමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට මේක ශක්තිමත් වෙනවා නේ. එතකොට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව සියලු සාක්ෂි සමඟ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක විශේෂ case එකක් නිසා කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපිට බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් කෙටුම්පතක් නේ ලබා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. අපි පසු ගිය COPE වාර්තාවන් දෙස බලන කොට මේක අවසානය නොවෙයි, නමුත් මෙතැන වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාව මම පරිශීලනය කරපු ටිකට මට තේරෙන්නේ, අපේ පසු ගිය පරීක්ෂණය පිළිබඳව sequence එක තමයි මේකේ summary එකක් විධියට තිබෙන්නේ. දැන් අපේ වාර්තාව අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. අපි කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ. මේක හොඳයි අද පළමුවැනි දවසට. නමුත්, අපි වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡාවක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි වෙනදා COPE වාර්තාව කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට සම්පිණ්ඩනය කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ආකෘතියක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ ආකෘතියට මේ වාර්තාවත් ඉදිරිපත් කළා නම් හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම හිතන්නේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒ වාගේ මේ වාර්තාව පිටු 10 වාගේ කෙටියෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ ඇයි?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකෙදී අපි සියලු කාරණා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කිරීම තමයි වඩා ගැලපෙන්නේ. **ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** මේක annex එකක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ පිළිබඳව මම පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. දැන් මම මේ ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන කෙටුම්පත ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවා නම්, ඒක Report එක විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සුදුසුයි. එතකොට මේක තමයි Report එක වෙන්නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒ සඳහා නිර්දේශ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ නේ සභාපතිතුමා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක Report එකකට වඩා මේක summary එකක් නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මේකේ කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. දැන් මේ වාර්තාවේ අපි එකිනෙකාගෙන් අහපු දේවල් තිබෙනවා, එකිනෙකා කියපු දේවල් සියල්ලම තිබෙනවා නේ. හැබැයි, ඒ ඔක්කොම පෙරලා අරගෙන, වාර්තාවක් හදන්න අපට බැරිද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි පිටු 05 -10ක වාර්තාවක් හදමු.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: නිර්දේශ සහිතව වාර්තාවක් හදමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නිර්දේශ සහිතව වාර්තාවක් හදමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි නිර්දේශ යටින් සඳහන් කරනවා, බැඳුම්කරය සිදු වූ ක්‍රියාවලිය තිබෙනවා. මේ සිදුවීම තිබෙනවා. අපි එතැනට යමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා 05 වැනිදා වෙන කොට අපි වෙත ලබා දෙනවා නම් හොඳයි. මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සිද්ධ වුණු ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවා නේ, පෙළගැස්මක් තිබෙනවා. මේ තිබෙන්නේ ගමන් මහනේ. Flow එක නේ ඇත්තටම තිබෙන්නේ. මේ flow එකට අනුව තිබෙන කරුණු ටිකට එකඟ නම්, මේ කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට ඔබතුමා කියනවා වාගේ සංක්ෂිප්ත වාර්තාව හදන්න පුළුවන්. එසේ හදලා, ඒකට අපි අවසානයේ නිගමන ප්‍රමාණය එකතු කරනවා. ඒක නේ කාරණාව.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ chronological order එකක් නේ. මෙදා මෙහෙම වුණා, ඊට පස්සේ දවස මෙහෙම වුණා, කියලා කියන්නෙ නැතිව, අපි මේ ටික අරගෙන introduction එකක් දීපු -

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදය නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් වෙනස් කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් අරගෙන තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒ විධියට මේක අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට මෙතැනදී verbatim කිසිවක් ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් එනවා මේක කොහොමද කරන්නේ කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනුව හරහා, මේ සිද්ධිය හරහා අවාසියක් සිදු වී ඇත.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අවාසියක් සිදු වී ඇත. අර ප්‍රශ්නත් එක්ක අවාසියක්-

දිලංකා/පද්මා - 5.05- **ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා:** ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක ඉදිරිපත් කරන එක.....

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම හිතන්නේ මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කරන එක වඩාත් පහසුයි කියලා. මොකද, බැරිවෙලාවත් වැරදිලා හරි මෙතුමා කියන කාරණා එක්ක බලද්දී මත දෙකක් තිබුණොත් මොකද වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය ගන්නවා. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කරලා තිබෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මතයක් දිලා තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. මෙතෙක් කාලයක් අපි ඒවා ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව නොවෙයි කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නමුත්, අපි හැමදාම වාර්තාවක් හදන විට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ තමයි එයට ඇතුළත් කළේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ නොවෙයි එතුමාගේ නිගමන.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නිගමනයන් තුනක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි ඒ නිගමනයන් ඇතුළත් කළා. නිගමනයන් පසෙක තැබුවේ නැහැ. අපි ලොකු හාස්කමක් කළා නොවෙයි. එතුමා දෙන වාර්තාව සාකච්ඡා කරලා, අපි වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරලා දැම්මා. එච්චරයි කළේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඒ ගැන මෙච්චර කථා කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කථා කරලා බලන්නේ වෙනත් අඩු පාඩු තිබෙනවාද කියලා හොයා ගන්නයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කථා කරලා බලන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙම කියපු එක හරිද, මෙහෙම කියපු එක වැරදිද, කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැනදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ conclusion එකක් තිබුණා "value for money"-

The Hon. Bimal Ratnayake: Value for money for professional due care.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට හරියටම එය මතක නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ transparency එක ලබා ගන්න කොච්චර වැයක් දැරිය යුතුද, ඒ නිසා transparencyම නොවෙයි මෙහි අවසාන- මට හරියට එය මතක නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Transparency කියන එක ඇතුළෙන් වාසි අවාසි සිදු වන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි transparency කියන්නේ.

ගරු අශෝක අබේසිංහ මහතා: Least cost එක තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒකෙන් තමයි එය රැකෙන්නේ. ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ආකාරය, ඒ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ආකාරයේ තිබෙන දුබලතාවන්, ඒ දුබලතාවන් හේතු කොටගෙන ඇති වී තිබෙන පාඩුව, එය නිශ්චිත විය යුතුයි. ඒ වාගේම, ඒ පාඩුව ඇති වීම සඳහා අපි උපකල්පනය කරන කරුණු මොනවාද? මේ ඥාතීත්වය බලපාලා තිබෙනවාද; මේ හදිස්සිය බලපාලා තිබෙනවාද කියන කරුණු සියල්ලම එතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, දැන් ඒවාට කැමැති නැති කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්නවා නම් මොකද කරන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම නම්, අපි යටින් "star" mark එකක් දාලා සඳහන් කරමු "මේ කරුණ සඳහා මේ මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ එකඟතාවක් නැහැ" කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණන රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඒ ගැන කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළේ මතයක්. එතුමාගේ මතයත් පාවිච්චි කරලා, මේ ගරු

මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ නිර්දේශයනුත් එකතු කරලා, මේ දීලා තිබෙන සැකැස්මට අනුව අවසාන වාර්තාවක් හදන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ අවසාන වාර්තාවට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය පමණක් නොවෙයි, මේ කාරක සභාවේ මතයත් වැඳගත් වනවා. මේ කාරක සභාවේ මතයට ගැලපෙන විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලා නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් නම්, එක් එක් කෙනා පුද්ගලිකව ඔය කියන දේවල් ටික 05 වෙනි දාට ලිඛිතව අපිට දෙන්න, අපට ඒකෙන් වාර්තාවක් හදන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ සිදු වෙච්ච සාකච්ඡා අනුව නිර්දේශ කියන්නේ වෙන එකක්. නමුත්, මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පැහැදිලිව ඕනෑ. ඒක ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ආකාරය, ගනුදෙනුවේ තිබෙන දුබලතාවන්, එම දුබලතාවන් හේතුවෙන් ඇති වූ පාඩු, එම දුබලතාවන් ඇති වීම සඳහා බලපාන ලද කරුණු, ඊට පස්සේ නිගමනයන්. "නිගමනයන්" කියලා අදහස් කරන්නේ, "මේක CID යවන්න ඕනෑද, FCID යවන්න ඕනෑද, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඉක්මනින් Immigration and Emigration Department එක දැනුවත් කරලා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ passport එක අත් හිටුවන්න කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑද" කියන ඒවා. මේකට තිබෙන දඬුවම කියන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමියට වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම ගැන අදහසක් කියන්න තිබෙනවා. අපි එයට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙමු.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: වෙනත් subjects වාගේ නොවෙයි, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර කියන්නේ අපට අලුත් දෙයක්. අපිත් තවම මේ ගැන අධ්‍යයනය කරමින් තමයි ඉන්නේ. ඒ නිසා 05 වෙනි දාට කාරක සභාව විධියට අපි සියලු දෙනාම එකතු වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කළොත් හොඳයි කියන එකයි මගේ අදහස.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමියලා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එක මත පදනම් වෙලා අපිට වාර්තාවක් හදලා දෙන්න. මෙතුමා පැහැදිලිව ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ආකාරය පැහැදිලි කරනවා. ඒ ගනුදෙනුවේ තිබුණු දුබලතාවන් පැහැදිලි කරනවා. ඒ දුබලතාවන් හේතුවෙන් ඇති වූ පාඩු පැහැදිලි කරනවා. ඒ පාඩු ඇති වීමට හේතු වූ සාධක පැහැදිලි කරනවා. ඊට පස්සේ මොකක්ද කියන එක අපි නිර්දේශ කරමු. ඒකට නේ අපේ සාකච්ඡාව ගියේ. නැත්නම් ආයෙත් ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය හොයනවා කියන්නේ මේ සාකච්ඡාවම නැවත කරනවා කියන එක තමයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: පසු ගිය COPE වාර්තාවලදී සියලු දෙනා මේවාට එකඟ වුණා. ඒක නිසා තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනවලට එකඟතාවක් ආවේ. නමුත්, මම නම් හිතන්නේ නැහැ මෙතැනදී එහෙම සියයට 100ක එකඟතාවක් එයි කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන අපහැදිලිතාවක් කාටවත් නැහැ නේ. මෙන්න මේ දිනයේ බිලියන එකක් නිකුත් කරන්න කටයුතු කළා. එය බිලියන 10 දක්වා වැඩි කළා. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පළමුවෙන්ම බිලියන 20ක් ඉල්ලන්න කියලා කිව්වා. බිලියන 20ක් කියන එක අනතුරුදායකයි කිව්වා. ඊට පස්සේ එය බිලියන 10 දක්වා අඩු කළා. බිලියන 10 දක්වා අඩු කරන එකට කණ්ඩායමක් විරුද්ධයි කියලා කිව්වා. නමුත් සභාපතිවරයා ඒකට එකඟතාව පළ කළා. ඒක නේ ක්‍රියාවලිය. ඊට පස්සේ සිදු වූ පාඩුව, මේ නිසා පොලී අනුපාතය මේ ප්‍රමාණයට ඉහළ ගියා, මෙපමණ මුදලක් ඒ සඳහා දුන්නා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතැනදී අපි කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්නවා නේ පාඩුවක් වුණේ නැහැ කියන තැන.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි ඒකට අවාසි කියලා දමමු. ඊට පස්සේ අපි "star"mark එකක් දමලා "තවත් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් කණ්ඩායමක්" කියලා, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නමත් දාලා "මෙන්න ෙමක ඒ ගොල්ලන් තීරණය කළේ මේ විධියටයි" කියලා සටහන් කරමු. නැත්නම් මේ ලොකු වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දැම්මාම වෙන්නෙත් අපි කරන දෙයම තමයි. "මෙයා කියලා තියෙන්නේ මේක, මෙයා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මේක" කියලා ආයෙත් තර්ක කරනවා. එහෙම නොවෙයි. "මෙන්න මේ තිබෙන්නේ කරුණු" කියලා අපි report එකක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂණන රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම නැත්නම් අපි සියලු දෙනාටම එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් කරුණු ටික අපි ඉස්සර වෙලා ගොනු කරමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි මේකේ පෙළගැස්ම හැදුවාට පස්සේ තමයි යම් කරුණක් පිළිබඳ විරෝධයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒක සටහන් කරන්න අපිට පුළුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපි දැනට ඒක දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අපි දැන් තියෙන තර්ක අනුව පෙළගැස්ම හදනවා. ඒක හැදුවාට පස්සේ, අපිට එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ පරිච්ඡේද එකතු කරන්නත්, ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ පරිච්ඡේද ඉවත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. එහෙම බැරි විවාදයක් තිබෙන ඒවාට "මෙන්න මේ අය මේකට එකඟයි, මේකට විරුද්ධයි" කියලා සටහන් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුනි, මේක හොඳ තත්ත්වයක්. දැන් මම ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් මෙහෙම අහන්නම්. අපි දැන් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු අනු පිළිවෙළක් තිබෙනවා. වාර්තාවක් විධියට එන කොට මේ අනු පිළිවෙළ වෙනස් වෙන්න වෙයි. මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් මේ ගැන කාරණා ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය හැදින්වීම. එහිදී, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සහ අනුගමනය කළ ක්‍රමවේදයන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව ගැනද? නැත්නම් පොදු කථාවද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ේම ගනුදෙනුවට අදාළ පොදු කථාව ඉස්සර වෙලා කියන්න ඕනෑ නේ. මේ වාර්තාව කියෙව්වාම ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්. මුලින්ම තිබෙන්නේ පොදු කථාව. පොලී අනුපාත, ඊළඟට, ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ සිදු කර තිබුණු භාණ්ඩාගර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවෙන් උපුටා ගත් කරුණු තිබෙනවා. කලින් සඳහන් කළ පොදු ක්‍රියාවලියට අමතරව. එහි නැවතත් මේ ගනුදෙනුවට අනුගමනය කළ ක්‍රියා මාර්ගය, ක්‍රියා පිළිවෙළ තිබෙනවා. අදාළ කාලය තුළ රටේ මූල්‍ය තත්ත්වය. 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව ප්‍රායෝගිකව සිදු වුණු ආකාරය. අපිට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ කාරණය ඒකයි. එයත් මෙහි පැහැදිලි කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහිදී අපි සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එකේ කරුණු - ඒක නේ මූලික වුණේ. මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වුණු අවස්ථාව, එහි විකල්ප ක්‍රියා මාර්ග, ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව කරපු නිර්දේශය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළා නම් ඇති වෙන තත්ත්වය, Perpetual Treasuries නම්, ඒකට ලංසු තැබීමේ ස්වභාවය. මේ සියල්ලම තිබෙනවා. එතකොට ඒක මත තමයි-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙය බැලුවාම සාක්ෂි එහෙමත් තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒවා ඇමුණුම්. මේ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව පිටු අංක 57න් අවසන් වනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: වාර්තාවට ඇමුණුම් ටික කොහොමත් අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඇමුණුම් ටික නොවෙයි, වාර්තාවේ පළමු පිටු 57, අපි වාද විවාද කරපුවා තිබෙනවා. ඒවා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වැඩක් නැහැ. "කාරක සභාව මෙහෙම කිව්වා. අධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙම කිව්වා" කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ විවාදය personalize වෙනවා. එහෙම නැතුව, පිටු ප්‍රමාණය 10ක්ද, 20ක්ද කියන එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අපි එක කථාවක් කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නිශ්චිත විය යුතුයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි 05 වෙනි දාට එකතු වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙහි පිටු අංක 53 ගත්තොත්, "...සියලුම මුදල් ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස තමන් ප්‍රකාශ කළ බව සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය සඳහන් කළාය." කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේ දේවල් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ආකාරයට "මෙන්න මේවා අයින් කරන්න, මෙන්න මේවා එකතු කරන්න" කියලා, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ අවශ්‍ය ටික ලබා දුන්නා නම් පහසුයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: කෝප් කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශය උඩ

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: COPE එකේ නිර්දේශය උඩ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද නිගමන මත නම් COPE එක ලොකු සාකච්ඡාවට ගණනක් ගියා. සාක්ෂි ගත්තා. මේ තිබෙන පදනම මත, මට හිතෙන්නේ ඒ නිර්දේශ බිඳ වැටී තිබෙනවාද? බිඳ වැටෙන සාක්ෂි මතු වී තිබෙනවාද නැද්ද යන්න කියන එක ටිකක් පුළුල් කරන්න බැරිද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ, අපි තනිකර විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව මත නොවෙයිනේ පදනම් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීම් වගයක් කළා. දැන් නම් හොඳයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: අපි වෙනම report එකක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මේ මතුවන ලද සාක්ෂිවලින් මුලික කරුණ සනාථ වීම හෝ අනාථ වීම පිළිබඳ යම් සංක්ෂිප්තයක් හදා ගන්න පුළුවන් නම් හොඳයි. ඒ මත පදනම් වෙලා නිර්දේශ දෙන්න. හදන්න පුළුවන් නම් හොඳයි. බැරි නම් අපි වෙන වෙනම නිර්දේශ දෙමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා වෙන වෙනම නිර්දේශ දෙන්න. අපි ඒ ටික එකතු කරලා ඒවායේ පොදු කරුණු එකතු කරලා දාන්නම්. නැත්නම් පෞද්ගලිකව තිබෙන ඒවාත් දෙකම එකතු කරන්නම්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේකට අපි එකඟයි නම් නිර්දේශයක් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. අපි මේ පිටු 57 ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාට එකඟයි කියලා අපි ඉන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පිටු 57 තිබෙන්නේ කරුණු නේ. ඒ මත ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නිර්දේශයන් අවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ පිටු 57 හරියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ පිටු 57 තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මෙහෙම කිව්වා. කාරක සභාව මෙහෙම කිව්වා. ඒවා වැඩක් නැහැ. ඒවා මත එකතු කරලා අපි සංක්ෂිප්ත අදහසක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. කාරක සභාවේ කිව්වොත් ඇත්තටම අදහස දීලා තිබෙන්නේ එක්කෙනයි. අපි කාරක සභාව යන වචනය යෙදුවාට එක්කෙනයි කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. කෙනෙක්ට කියන්න පුළුවන් ඕක කිව්වේ අරයා කියලා. ඒ කථා මොනවත් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේක සම්පූර්ණ වාර්තාවක් විධියට සංක්ෂිප්තයක් කියන්නේ. අමතර දැන ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය නම් මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර ගැන කවුරුත් දන්නේ නැති නිසා ඇමුණුමක් විධියට පිටුවක දෙකක දාන්න මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර කියන්නේ මොනවාද ඒවා මෙහෙම තමයි කළේ කියලා. පිටුවක දෙකක වාගේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ගනුදෙනුව පිළිබඳ පොදු හැඳින්වීම.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි දන්නේ නැති නිසා ඕනෑ නම් පිටුවක් දෙකක් දාන්න බැඳුම්කර කියන්නේ මොනවාද කියලා. නැත්නම් පිටු 10ක 15ක අදහසක් ක්‍රියාවලිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පරිච්ඡේද වශයෙන් දාන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: හැම දෙනාටම බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.)

ඇමුණුම 15

ඇමුණුම 15
இகணைப்பு 15
Annexure 15

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව
2016 ඔක්තෝබර් මස 05 වැනි බදාදා

පැමිණ සිටි :
ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපති)
ගරු වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා
ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු ඥානමුත්තු ශ්‍රීනේසන් මහතා
ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි :
ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී.වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති;
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි කාරක සභාව ආරම්භ කරමු. අපි පසු ගිය 23 වැනි දින කාරක සභාව රැස් වෙලා ලේකම් කාර්යාලය විසින් සකස් කළ දළ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. එම වාර්තාව සහ අනෙකුත් සියලු ලිපිලේඛන අධ්‍යයනය කරලා නිර්දේශ සකස් කර ගන්නයි අද දින සහ හෙට දින අපි යොදා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. නිර්දේශ සකස් කලාට පසුව වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාට Minutes ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ Minutesවලත් තිබෙනවා. අපි පසු ගිය කාරක සභාවේදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට කිව්වා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළ දින සිට මේ දක්වා නැවත මහ බැංකුව කැඳවලා කරපු විමර්ශනවල තත්ත්වය යටතේ එතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ අලුත් කිරීමක් හෝ එකතු කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා එය කරලා දෙන්න කියලා. ඒ අනුව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ලේඛණ දෙකක් හැටියට යාවත්කාලීන කරපු වාර්තාවකුත්, එම වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කිරීම සඳහා වන කරුණුවල ඡේදයන්ගේ නිරවද්‍යතාව පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේ උප ලේඛනයකුත් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ලේඛනයේ විශේෂ වෙනස්කම් සිදු කරලා නැහැ. මම දැකපු ආකාරයට 14 වැනි පිටුවේ සහ 17 වැනි පිටුවේ රතු පැනෙන් අලුත් වගන්ති දෙකක් ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙනවා පමණයි. මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නිර්දේශ ටික ලබා ගන්නයි අද අපට තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට පසුව අපට පුළුවන් අවසාන වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්නයි තිබෙන්නේ. අද දවසෙන් අවසන් කරන්න පුළුවන් නම් වඩාත් හොඳයි. ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ප්‍රමාණයක් දැන් භාර දුන්නා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි අද තව දුරටත් මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ නැහැ. හෙට දින මගේ නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන්නම්.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: හෙට මගේ නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන්නම්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: හෙට සාකච්ඡාවේදී නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙනවා. තව දුරටත් මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ වන විට හොඳටම සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. එම නිසා නිර්දේශ ටික හෙට ලබා දෙන්නම්.

ගරු වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ මහතා: මගේ නිර්දේශ මම හෙට ලබා දෙන්නම්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එක එක්කෙනාගේ නිර්දේශ Report එකට ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ වෙන වෙනමද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව නිර්දේශ ආවාට පසුව සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. 7.1 වගන්තියයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ලේඛනය සහ නිගමනයන් තිබෙනවා. අපට එම නිගමන සහ නිර්දේශ ටික කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඊට අමතරව ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන නිර්දේශවල පොදුවේ දකින්න ලැබෙන නිර්දේශ තිබෙනවා නම් අපි පොදුවේ එම නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපේ කාරක සභාවේ දකින තත්ත්වය තමයි COPE එක විධියට අපි Report එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම. මම කියන්නේ COPE එක විධියට Report එක හදන්න. කාට හරි ඒ Report එකට එකඟ නැති කරුණු තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ එකඟ නැති කරුණු ටික දෙන්න. එහෙම නැතුව Report එකක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මෙතෙක් පැවති සම්ප්‍රදාය අනුව COPE එකට Report එකක් හදන්න. ඒ Report එකේ එකඟ නොවන කරුණු තිබෙනවා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා වෙනම සටහන් කරලා දෙන්න. මම එකඟ නැති ඒවා තිබෙනවා නම් මම සටහන් කරලා දෙන්නම්. ඒවා සටහනක් හැටියට දමමු. එකිනෙකාගේ වාක්‍ය රටා වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, එකම අදහස වුණත් ලියැවෙන ආකාරය වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, බර තැබීම් වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට වෙන්නේ එක එක මන්ත්‍රීවරයාගේ නිර්දේශ කියලා වෙනම ලියවිල්ලක් එන එකයි. ඒක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අනෙක් එක සම්ප්‍රදායත් වෙනස් වෙනවා නේ, සභාපතිතුමා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Report එක හදමු. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ Report එක මත පදනම්ව, මෙතෙක් සිදුවූ සාකච්ඡා මත පදනම්ව COPE එකේ වාර්තාව හදනවා. ඒ වාර්තාවට එකඟ වීම නොවීම එම වාර්තාවේ තමන් පිළිගන්න නොපිළිගන්න කරුණු පිළිබඳව කාට හරි කරුණු තිබෙනවා නම් ඇමුණුමක් විධියට ඒ ටික දමමි.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: කෙටුම්පත විධියට අවසාන Report එකක් හදලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Report එක හදලා සාකච්ඡා කරන කොට එකඟ නැති ඒවා තිබෙනවා නම් දමමු. නැත්නම් මොකද දන්නවාද වෙන්නේ? අරක ලෙහෙසි වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ටත් අවස්ථාව ලබා දුන්නා. ඒකට ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා. දැනට නිර්දේශ කිහිපයක් ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාත් නිර්දේශ වගයක් දීලා තිබෙනවා. මම සිතන විධියට අපට ඒ නිර්දේශත් අහක දමන්න පුළුවන් කමක් නැහැ. ඒ අනුව කාරක සභාව විධියට වාර්තාව හදලා ඒකට අනුමැතිය ගන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හෙට ලැබෙන නිර්දේශත් බලලා-

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: So much the better.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ඒවාත් අපට ලිඛිතව දෙනවා නම් ලෙහෙසි නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශවලට විරුද්ධව ලියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඉස්සෙල්ලා Report එක හදලා පසුව දෙනවාද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි නිර්දේශ දෙන්නත් සුදානම්. ඒ අයට Report එක හදන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නිර්දේශත්, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවත් පදනම් කර ගෙන Report එක හදනවා. නමුත් එම Report එකට එකඟ වීම, නොවීම පිළිබඳව -

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපට මෙහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඇත්තෙන්ම හෙට රැස්වෙන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. හෙට කැඳවන්න අවශ්‍යත් නැහැ. හෙට මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට යෝජනා දෙන්න කියලා කියන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලාට හෙට Report එක දමන්න පුළුවන් නම් හෙට කැඳවමු. හෙට හදන්න බැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හෙට හදන්න බැහැ. අපට one week දෙන්න.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: අපි ලබා දෙන නිර්දේශ එහෙමම දමන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශ පදනම් කර ගෙන Report එක හැදීම නේ කරන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි ලබා දෙන නිර්දේශ මත පදනම්ව Report එකක් හදන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි ඒ Report එකේ හැම මන්ත්‍රීවරයාම දෙන හැම නිර්දේශයක්ම ඇතුළත් නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම ඇතුළත් කරලා හදන්න බැහැ නේ. නමුත් ඒ පිළිබඳ පොදු එකකට ඇවිත් ඒ පොදු එක පිළිබඳ එකඟ නොවී ඉන්න පුළුවන්. මේ පිළිබඳ අදහසකට එමු. පාර්ලිමේන්තු රැස්වීම් 24 වැනි දිනෙන් පටන් ගන්න සතියේ නේ තිබෙන්නේ. මේ මාසයේ 4 වැනි සතියේයි රැස්වීම් පැවැත්වෙන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: 3 වැනි සතියේ නැහැ කියලා කිව්වා repair එක නිසා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 24 වැනි දිනෙන් පටන් ගන්න පාර්ලිමේන්තු සතිය තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි ඒ සතිය ඉලක්ක කරලා 24 වැනි දිනයට කලින් පාර්ලිමේන්තු රැස්වීම් නොපැවැත්වෙන දිනයක හරි රැස් වෙන්න පුළුවන් නම් -

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: පුළුවන් නම් නොවෙයි. එකතු වෙන්න වෙනවා. නැත්නම් 24 වැනි දින පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා. එම නිසා ඊට කලින් දවසක් දමන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට 24, 25, 26, 27 දවස් 4ම තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඇති නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ හතරෙන් එකක දමන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඊට කලින් දිනයක දමා ගන්න පුළුවන් නම් ඒ වෙනුවෙන්ම අපි එමු. අපි ඔක්කොටොම ගැටලු තිබෙනවා. ඒත් මේක විය යුතුයි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මෙහෙම කරමුද? 24 වැනි දිනෙන් පටන් ගන්න පාර්ලිමේන්තු රැස්වීම් සතියේ - දිනය එන්නේ 25. අඟහරුවාදා පටන් ගත්තොත්. ඒ සතියේ අඟහරුවාදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන බලාපොරොත්තුවෙන් අපි 19 වැනි දින රැස් වෙමු. 19 වැනි දින රැස් වෙන කොට ඔබතුමන්ලාට වාර්තාව - හෙට ඔබතුමන්ලා තව නිර්දේශ දෙනවා නම් ඒ ටිකත් අරගෙන අපට 14 වැන දින වන විට වාර්තාව ලැබෙන්න සලස්වන්න පුළුවන්. 19 වැනි දින රැස්වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කරන්න එපායැ එකඟ වෙන එකඟ නොවන දේවල් තිබෙනවා නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පාර්ලිමේන්තු Sitting day එකක් නොවෙයි. නමුත් දැන් සාකච්ඡා කර වේලාව තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායකක මහතා: ඔක්තෝබර් 19 වැනි බදාදා සවස 2.00ට රැස්වෙමු. **සභාපතිතුමා**: 14 වැනි දා වන විට අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පුද්ගලික ලිපිනයන්ටම ඒවා ලැබෙන්න සලස්වන්නම්. 19 වැනි දා සවස 2.00ට රැස්වෙමු.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: 24 කියන එක confirmed.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි 24 වැනි දා කියලා ඉලක්ක කරනවා. නමුත් 24 වැනි දා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැරි වුණොත්, ඒ සතියේ දින 04න් එකක ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: පාර්ලිමේන්තුව රැස් වෙන්නේ 25 වැනි දා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මේ වාර්තාව 25 වැනි දා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට බලාපොරොත්තුවෙන් කටයුතු කරමු. අපි හෙට දිනයේ රැස් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ යෝජනා ලේකම්තුමියට භාර දීමට කටයුතු කරන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධව, මේ ගනුදෙනුව ශක්තිමත් කරන තවත් තොරතුරු ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගම අත්පත් කර ගෙන තිබෙන ලාභය. ඒක declare කරලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට COPE එක හැටියට අපිට, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් මේ ගනුදෙනුවට අදාළ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ වාර්තාවක් කැඳවන්න බැරිද? ඒ වාගේම Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගම ලබා ගත් ලාභය කියලා, මේ ගනුදෙනුවේම තවත් සවිස්තරාත්මක ප්‍රතිඵලයක් එළියට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ලාභය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ වෙන මොනවත් business හරහා නොවෙයි, බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම හරහා සිදු වූ business එකේ ලාභයෙන් පමණයි. ඒ නිසා අපි COPE එක හැටියට කරන්න ඕනෑ, මෙතැන මොකක්ද වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් වාර්තාවක් ඉල්ලා ගැනීම නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, Perpetual Treasuries Limitedවල net profit එක Rs. 5.2 billion කියලා ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙනවා නේ. ඔබතුමා මේ Rs. 1.6 billion හැදුවේ කොහොමද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ අය report එකක් හදලා තිබෙනවා. අපිට ඒක දෙන්නේ නැති එකයි ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ Rs. 1.6 billion එද්දි අනෙක් එක Rs. 5.2 billion කියන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා මෙතුමා ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා. ඒක තමයි මම මුල සිටම විග්‍රහ කළේ. විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ සටහන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ exactly හඳුනා ගන්න පුළුවන් එදින ලාභය පමණයි. ඒ කියන්නේ, මේ තීරණය ගැනීම නිසා එක particular point එකක සිදු වූ අලාභය පමණයි කියන එකයි. අවුරුද්ද පුරා තිබුණු ලාභයන් එකතු කරලා ගත්තාම ලැබුණු ලාභය තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එහෙම නම් පහටත් වැඩි වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. අපි select කර ගත් ඒවා පමණයි point කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකෙන් ලාභය ලැබුණු ආකාරය ගැන, මහ බැංකුවෙන් කළ පරීක්ෂණයක් තිබෙනවා. අපිට ඒක ලිඛිතව ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්. Rs. 5.2 billion දක්වා එන එක ගැන තමයි ඒ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: COPE එකට එහෙම report එකක් එව්වාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එවැනි report එකක් අපි ඉල්ලමු.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක officially ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: අපිත් officially ඉල්ලුවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලන්න ඕනෑ. අපිත් ඉල්ලුවා, තවම දුන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලාභය පිළිබඳ report එකක් මාධ්‍යවල පළවෙලා තිබුණා.

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ තවත් අදහස් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒවා හෙට දිනයේ ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙනවා කියලා එකඟ වුණා. ඒ නිසා අද දිනයේ විශේෂ කටයුත්තක් නැහැ. එම නිර්දේශයන් ලබා ගැනීමෙන් පසුව, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා වාර්තාවක් සකස් කර, ඒ වාර්තාවත් සමඟ 19 වැනි දා රැස්වෙන්න අපි තීරණය කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ දේවල්වල හරි-වැරැද්ද, මේ පිළිබඳ කමිටුවේ මතය මොකක්ද කියලා බලන්න ක්‍රමයක් නැද්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කර දළ කෙටුම්පතක් සකස් කළා. ඒ කෙටුම්පත සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර, නිරීක්ෂණයන් තමයි සකස් කර ගන්න තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශයන්වලට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ යෝජනා ලිඛිතව ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසුව කාරක සභාව හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලා අනුමත කරන හෝ නොකරන වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට ඒ කාරණය පැහැදිලි නැහැ. ටිකක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැවතත් මුල සිට පැහැදිලි කරන්න ගියොත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ ප්‍රමාදය ගැන සමාවෙන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: "තම තමන්ට තිබෙන අදහස් ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙන්න. ඒ සියලුම කරුණු මත පදනම්ව COPE එක විසින් වාර්තාවක් හදන්න. ඒ සඳහා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවත් පදනම් කර ගන්න. ඒ වාර්තාවට එකඟවීම හෝ එකඟ නොවීම්, මේ මස 19 වැනි දා ප්‍රකාශ කරමු" කියලා තමයි කිව්වේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකුවේ Department of Supervision of Non-Bank Financial Institutions එකෙන් report එකක් සකස් කර තිබෙනවා. DG අත්සන් නොකර, ඒ report එක තබා ගෙන සිටින නිසා ගෙන්වා ගන්න විධියක් නැහැ. ඊට කලින් අපි ඒක ගෙන්වා ගත්තා නම් හොඳයි. මොකද, එහි සියලුම විස්තර පැහැදිලිව තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? අපි මේ පරීක්ෂණය අවසන් කළා නේ. පරීක්ෂණ අවසන් කළාට පසුව තවත් සාක්ෂි ගෙන්වා ගන්නවා කියලාද කියන්නේ? **ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා**: අපේ නිර්දේශයන් අද දෙන්න කිව්වා නේ. ඒ අනුව ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතාගේ නිර්දේශය දීලා තිබෙනවා. අපේ නිර්දේශයන් 14 වැනි දාට පෙර දෙන්න කියලා කිව්වා. ඉන් පසුව final report එක හදන්න පුළුවන්. අපි 19 වැනි දා ඒ report එක

පිළිබඳ - අඩුපාඩු, කැමතිද, නැද්ද- සාකච්ඡා කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: බහුතරයකගේ තීරණයක් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම නම් තනි පුද්ගලයෙකුටත් මතයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. බහුතර මත පමණක් තිබෙනවා නම් බහුතරයටම ලෝකේ දුවනවා නේ. මට තේරෙන විධියට කාලය ගත වන එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අපි කොහොමත් time frame එකක් හදාගෙනයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ වාර්තාව දෙන දවස පැහැදිලියි, අද සාකච්ඡා කළා, හෙට සාකච්ඡා කළා, තව එක දවසක් තිබෙනවා, එතැනින් පස්සෙ වැඩේ ඉවරයි, ඊට වඩා කාලයක් යන්න බැහැ. නමුත් specific ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. මේ කමිටුව විසින් හරි-වැරැද්ද, හොඳ-නරක වශයෙන් නිගමනවලට එළඹිය යුතු කාරණා තිබෙනවා. අපි කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ නිශ්චිතව ප්‍රශ්න හඳුනා ගෙන, ඒ ප්‍රශ්න පිළිබඳ එකිනෙකාගේ මතය කුමක්ද කියලා වාද-විවාද කරන්න, සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබුණොත් හොඳයි කියලායි මම හිතෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: අපි එහෙම කළා නේ. මීට කලින් මහ බැංකුව ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළ අවස්ථාවේ ඔබතුමා සිටියේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ කමිටුවේ එහෙම කළේ නැහැ නේ. මට එක දිනයයි පහු වුණේ.

ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මහතා: මීට කලින් සතියේ සාකච්ඡා කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා සිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ දිනයේ ඒක වුණාද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එදින සවස් වන තෙක් සාකච්ඡා කළා. නමුත් වේලාව අවසන් වූ නිසා තමයි අදට සහ හෙටට යොදා ගත්තේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට මේ කටුමැත ලැබුණා නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ලැබුණා. නමුත් මෙහි නිගමන නැහැ නේ. ඔය කියන දේ නේ තියෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කියන දේ තමයි වාර්තා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. කියන දේ නැතිව වෙන දෙයක් වාර්තා කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එක, දෙක සහ තුන කියලා නිගමන නැද්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: හරි පැහැදිලියි. මෙතෙක් සාකච්ඡා වූ කාරණාවල පෙළගැස්ම තමයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ තිබෙන දේ සහ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ඇතුළු සියලුම කාරණා පදනම් කර ගෙන, නිගමන සහ නිර්දේශ සහිතව කෝප් කමිටුව විසින් වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ සඳහා නැවතත් අද සහ හෙට දවස් දෙක යොදා ගත්තේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා නිර්දේශ කරන ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නිගමන හෝ නිර්දේශ හෝ යෝජනා හෝ විවේචන ඕනෑම දෙයක් මේ සාකච්ඡාවට සම්බන්ධ වූ සියලු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගෙන් පුද්ගලිකවම ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා ලිඛිතව ලබා දීමට. 6වැනිදා සහ 7වැනිදා. -අද සහ හෙට-. ඒක අවශ්‍ය නම් මෙතැන ඇවිල්ලා recording සඳහා ඔබතුමන්ලාට කථා කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. අද සහ හෙට සාකච්ඡා කරලා, සාකච්ඡා කරන කරුණු මත ලිඛිතව සෑම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුටම මම අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදීම කිව්වා, ඔබතුමන්ලාට SMS එකකුත් එවලා තිබෙනවා කියලා ලේකම්තුමිය කිව්වා, ලිඛිතව ඒ දේවල් යෝජනා හැටියට ලබා දෙන්න කියලා. මම කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාට අවබෝධයක් නැතිව අනෙක් අය ලිඛිතව ලබා දුන්නේ මොකද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙනවා. හැම දෙනාටම අවබෝධයක් තිබිය යුතුයි. අපේ Minutesවලත් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නිර්දේශ සහ යෝජනා ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙන්න කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට අපි Minutes යැව්වා. ඒ ටික ආවාට පසු, මෙතැන ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට ප්‍රශ්නය ආවේ මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී වෙච්ච ක්‍රියාවලිය, සාකච්ඡා වූ කරුණු ඇතුල් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ මත අවසාන නිර්දේශ නිගමන හදනකොට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් හා යෝජනාත් පුද්ගලිකවම සලකන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ සැලකිල්ලට තමයි ලිඛිතවම ලබා දෙන්න කිව්වේ. ලිඛිතව ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබා දෙන දේවලින් පොදු කරුණු, පොදුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලා දකින පොදු කරුණු එකතු කරලා පොදු නිර්දේශ හැටියටත්, විශේෂත්වයන් වෙනස්කම් තිබෙනවා නම් වෙනස්කම් හැටියටත් අපට වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. 19වැනිදාට යොදා ගත් පරිදි ඒ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළාම ඒකෙත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට එකඟ වන කාරණාවලට එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එකඟ නොවන කාරණාවලට එකඟ නොවන්න

පුළුවන්. සාකච්ඡා කරලා 24වැනිදාට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අද සහ හෙට දින දෙක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ ලිඛිතව කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අවශ්‍ය නම් වාචිකව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. ලිඛිතව කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම වාචිකව කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න සූදානම් වෙලා ආවේ. මගේ නොදැනුවත්කම ගැන සමාවෙන්න. මොකද එක් දිනක් මට පැමිණීමට නොහැකිවීම නිසා ඇති වූ ප්‍රමාදයක්. මා ඒ ගැන කනගාටුව පල කරනවා. වාචිකව කියන්න අවසර නැති බවයි පෙනී යන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එකඟතාවයට පටහැනිව ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. අපි අපට හැඟෙන දේ ලියලා දෙන්නම්. අපට හැඟෙන දේ එහෙම විනිශ්චය කරන්න දක්ෂතාවක් මේ කමිටුවට තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට ඒක කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒක public document එකක් නම් කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මට හැඟෙන විධියට නම් සමහර කාරණා පිළිබඳ මෙහෙම කථා බහ කරලා අපි එක්කෙනාට තිබෙන දැනුම සහ අවබෝධයන් හා එකඟතාවන් වාර්තා කිරීම සුදුසුයි කියන එකයි මට හැඟෙන දේ. වෙනත් හැඟීමක් කමිටුවට තිබෙනවා නම් කමක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා එසේ එකඟ වෙනවා නම් ඒ ගැන මට ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මම මේ ඉදිරිපත් කළේ මේ කාරක සභාවම මීට කලින් එකඟ වූ කාරණාව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කනගාටුවට පත් වෙනවා මම ඒ දිනයේ නොසිටීම ගැන. මම නැති දවසේ එකඟ වූ දේට මට විරුද්ධ වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. හිතෙන දේ මම කිව්වා. මම එතැනින් නතර වුණා. මට දැන් තිබෙන්නේ වඩාත් මහන්සි වෙලා විස්තර ලියන්න නේ. මම ලියලා දෙන්නම්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, අද දිනය යොදා ගත්තේ අදයි හෙටයි සාකච්ඡා කරන්න. සාකච්ඡා කරන්න දා ගත්ත එක තමයි දිගින් දිගටම යන්නේ. අර කෙටුම්පතමනේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඊයේ තවත් ලියකියවිලි හම්බ වුණානේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔව්. ඊට පස්සේ හම්බ වූ එකනේ. මේක කථා කරලා එන කොට අද නොවෙයි හෙට තමයි සාකච්ඡා කරන්න වෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම නැවතත් පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම කෝප් එක සභ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ කමිටු, මේ වාගේ කරන පළමුවෙනි වැඩේ නොවෙයිනේ මේක. අනන්තවත් මේ වාගේ දේවල් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කරලා තිබෙන විධිය තමයි මුලින් රැස්වීම් තියනවා නිලධාරීන් ගෙන්වලා සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. මෙතැනදී ඔබතුමන් සියලුම සාමාජිකයින්ට අවස්ථාව දුන්නා, පෞද්ගලිකවත් සිය අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. මේ සියලුම අදහස් ඔබතුමා ලබා ගෙන, ලේකම් කාර්යාලය විසින් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවත් සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන අපිට document එකක් දෙන්න මෙන්න මේක තමයි කෙටුම්පත කියන එක. එතකොට ඒකටම අනුමත කරනවා නම් අපි අනුමත කරනවා. ඒකේ වෙනස් කම් කරනවා නම් වෙනස්කම් කරනවා. මේක අනුමත කරන්නේ නැහැ මෙන්න මේ කරුණු නිසා වැරදියි කියලා කියනවා නම් ඒ කරුණුත් දාමු. දාලා මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු 26 දෙනාගෙන් මොකක්ද අනුමත කරන්නේ කියන එක සඳහන් කරලා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරමු. අපට වාර්තා 26ක් හදන්න විධියක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒ ක්‍රමයත් වැඩියි. ඔව්වර යන්න දෙයකුත් නැහැ සම්ප්‍රදායෙන් එහාට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ ආධුනිකකමට සමාවෙන්න. ඒ පළපුරුදු මහත්වරුන් කියන විධියට කරමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්න නේ ආවේ. නමුත් අපි ඇත්තටම සාකච්ඡා කරලා, පාඩම් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම නම් ආවේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්න. මට දැන් අවස්ථාව නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මට දැනුනේ පොඩි කණ්ඩායමක් වාගේ හෙක්ටර් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා, එතුමාලාගේ නිර්දේශ හෙට දෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මොකක්ද කණ්ඩායමක් කියන්නේ. එහෙම කණ්ඩායමක් නැහැ මෙතැන.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: කණ්ඩායමක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මට දැනුන දේ මම කිව්වේ. අපි කියලා කිව්වේ. මම කිව්වා කියමුකෝ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: හෙක්ටර් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා එයාගේ නිර්දේශය හෙට දෙන්නම් කියලා . මෙයත් කිව්වා අපි හෙට දෙන්නම් කියලා. තව කෙනෙක් කිව්වා එයාගේ එකත් හෙට දෙන්නම් කියලා. ඒක මටත් දැනෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි මෙතැන බෙදීමක් හදා ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ, ආණ්ඩු පක්ෂය සහ විපක්ෂය කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම එකඟතාවක් නැහැ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. මට මගේ මතයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි එහෙම නම් සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එකඟතාව කියන කථාව කියන්නේ එදින හිටපු අයගෙන්. ඔබතුමන් එදින එතැන සිටියේ නැහැ නේ. හිටපු අය කියපු විධියට තමයි ඒක කිව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි එකඟ වන කාරණාවල් එකඟවීම් වෙනස් වෙනවා නම් ඒත් එකඟකාවයෙන් අපි ඒ දේවල් කරමු. ඒකනේ වඩා හොඳම ක්‍රමය. හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මතු කරපු කාරණාව නිසා මම මේක නැවත අවධාරණය කරන්නේ. මොකක්ද තවත් report එකක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා කිව්ව නිසා. මීට කලින් වතාවේදී අපි මේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලය විසින් සකස් කරපු දල කෙටුම්පත කියන එක ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒක කෙටි කාලයක් අතුළත මහන්සි වෙලා කරන්න සිද්ද වුණා. දෙමළ පරිවර්තනය එදිනට කලින් දවසේ සවස ලැබුණේ. එදා සාකච්ඡා කරන වෙලාවේදී මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කිහිප දෙනෙක් කිව්වා, අපට මේක වැඩිපුර අධ්‍යනය කරලා බලලා එන්න වෙලාවක් වුණේ නැහැ කියලා. මට මතකයි හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා එහෙම විශේෂයෙන් කිව්වා, අපට මේ සඳහා අවස්ථාව ඕනෑ අධ්‍යනය සාකච්ඡා කරන්න කරලා කියලා. එතකොට අපි timeline එකක් යොදා ගෙන නේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ අනුව එදා අපි තීරණය කළා, එහෙම නම් මේ කෙටුම්පත සාකච්ඡා කරන්න, 5වැනිදා සහ 6 වැනිදා, අද සහ හෙට දින දෙකේ අපි යොදා ගනිමු. ඒ දින දෙකේදී අපි අපේ නිර්දේශත් දීලා අවසන් කරමු. එදාම අපි එකඟතාවකට ආවා ඒ නිර්දේශත්, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පුද්ගලික අදහස් හා යෝජනා ලිඛිතවම ලබා දෙන්න කියලා. මොකද මේ කාරණාව සංකීර්ණ කාරණාවක් නිසා, එක එක්කෙනාට වෙන වෙන අදහස් තිබුණා. මට මතකයි බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා එවලේම මෙහි යම් යම් සංශෝධන කියලා එතුමා දකින දේවල් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. මම කිව්වා ඒවා ලිඛිතව දෙන්න කියලා . ඒක තමයි සිදු වුණේ. ඊට පසුව හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාම කිව්වා, මෙච්චර කාලයක් සාකච්ඡා කෙරුණේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාටත් සඳහන් කරන්න ඇති එතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට මොකක් හරි අලුත් අදහස් යෝජනා සහ ඇති වූ වෙනස්කම් පිළිබඳ එතුමාගේ නිගමනවලට අදාළව. ඒ දේවල් තිබෙනවා නම් ඔබතුමාත් ලිඛිතව දෙන්න කියලා. ඔබතුමා එහෙම කිව්වා නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි මේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම දැක්කා. මට බලන්න වුණේ නැහැ. වෙනස් පාටවලින් දීලා තිබුණානේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊයේ වෙන කොට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දීලා තිබුණේ ඒක තමයි. ඒක පැහැදිලිව තිබෙනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මුලින්ම සඳහන් කරන ලද කොටසේ " 2016 ජූනි 29 වැනි දින විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තා නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් අනතුරුව 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 23 දක්වා කාලය තුළ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් සහ විගණකාධිපති විසින් අනාවරණය කර ගත් තොරතුරු අනුව එම වාර්තාවට කරන ලද යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම් ඇතුළත් වාර්තාව. එතකොට මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම් පමණයි. ඊළඟට තිබෙනවා ඒකට එතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන යොමු ලේඛන ටික. එහි ලොකු වෙනස්කම් නැහැ. 14 සහ 17වැනි පිටුවල තමයි මම දැක්කේ එතුමාගේ තව පොඩි වෙනස්කම් තිබෙන්නේ. 5(1)9 සහ 5(1)11 ඡේදවල.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මොනවද තිබෙන වෙනස්කම් කියන්න?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 3 වන පිටුවේ 5(1)9 සහ 5(1)11 ඡෙදවල තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවේ කියන එකද?

සභාපතිතුමා: කොලයේ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ගිය වර කමිටුවේ Minutes.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ පොත් දෙකෙන් පොඩි එකද? ලොකු එකද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී.වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පොඩි එකේ තමයි වාර්තා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තව කරුණක් තිබෙනවා ජේ.වී.පී website එකේ ඊයේ report එකක් publish කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක අද උදේ වෙනත් websites කිහිපයකම publish කරලා තිබෙනවා. Central Bank එකෙන් leak කරපු document එකක් කියලා.

3.00/ කුමාරි (Internal onsite report එකක් කියලා)

)ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය) සම්බන්ධිතයි (.

Internal On-site Report එකක් කියලා ඒක . ඔබතුමන්ලා දැක්කාද කියලාමම දන්නේ නැහැ . ඒකේ තිබෙන්නේ මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුවෙන් කළinvestigation එක.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා :JVP එකේ website එක කිව්වේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය) Lankatruth website එක.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා :අපේ JVP website එක මොකක්ද ,Party website එකද?

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය) Sorry. Lankatruth කියන website එක? website එක කුමක් වුණත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ ඒක ,මම කියන්නේ . ,සත්‍යදඅසත්‍යද කියලා සොයන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි ඒ වාර්තාව ගැන මෙතැනදී , ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකු .ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ලිඛිතව විස්තර ලබා ගන්න ඒ ගැන මෙතැන .බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා .සාකච්ඡා වුණා

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ වාගේ එකක් මෙතැන නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම වුණොත් , විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ඒක ගැනත් වාර්තාවක් වාර්තා සෑදීම හැර මේක .හදන්න වෙනවා .අවසානයක් කරන්න වෙන්නේ නැහැ

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . ඒක ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ ඇයි?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ පොදු දැනගැනීමට ඉල්ලන එකක් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . මේ පරීක්ෂණයට අදාළ එකක් නොවෙයි?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේ පරීක්ෂණයට නොවෙයි.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne: That is for our reference only. If we can get some other-

ගරු සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මෙහෙම කරමු අපි දැනට . ඒක අනුව .කළ පරීක්ෂණ ටිකක් තිබෙනවා නේ .වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරමු

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ඒ පරීක්ෂණ හොඳටම ප්‍රමාණවත්.

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . මට තිබෙන්නේ සරල ප්‍රශ්නයක් මගේ වැරදි අවබෝධය මත මම . ,මෙතැනට පැමිණියේ වාචිකව කථාබහක් සාකච්ඡාවක් කරනවා කියලා සිතාගෙනයි ඒ . අදහස වැරදි නිසා මම ඒ ගැන බලවත් කනගාටුව අවසානයට මේ සියල්ල ලිඛිතව .ප්‍රකාශ කරනවා .දෙන්න වෙනවා නේ

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය)දැනට කවුරු හෝ නිර්දේශ ලිඛිතව දීලා තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න ගරු රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාත් බිමල් රත්නායක ගරු , .මන්ත්‍රීතුමාත් ලබා දී තිබෙනවා

ගරු අජිත් පී :පෙරේරා මහතා .අපට ඒවායේ පිටපත් දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද ?

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඒක public document එකක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒ , .විධියට දෙන්න

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා දෙන කරුණුවලින් පොදු කරුණු එකතු කරලා අපි ලේඛනය හදන්නම් ඊට පසුව අවශ්‍ය ,ඕනෑ නම් . .ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ ,අයට ඒවා ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන්

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . ඒ විධියේ honest discussion එකක් ඕනෑ නම් කථාබහ කරලා හරි , ,වැරැද්ද ගැන එකඟ වෙලාparty lines අමතක කරලා සිද්ධාන්ත ගැන එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය)ඒක වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කළ ඒවා පෙන්වන්න බැහැ කියලා කියනවා නම් ඒක .ඒක එක ක්‍රමයක් , හරි වැරැද ,දේශපාලනය ද නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : "පෙන්වන්න බැහැ." කියලා කියනවා නොවෙයි , ඒ .ගරු සභාපතිතුමා අපෙන් නිර්දේශ ඉල්ලා සිටියා ඔබතුමා .නිසා මගේ නිර්දේශ මම ලබා දුන්නා ඔබතුමා දුන් ,නිර්දේශයක් ලබා දුන්නා නම් නිර්දේශය බලන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මම ඉල්ලන්නේ .නැහැ නේ

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . ඒක ඉල්ලන , මගේ .නොඉල්ලන එක ඔබතුමාගේ වැඩක් නේ -,ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑ සියලු දෙනාගේම නිර්දේශ බලන්න නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . මට ඒ සියල්ල අහන්නත් ඕනෑ ඒක මගේ .බලන්නත් ඕනෑ , .අයිතියක්

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අජිත් පී පෙරේරා . ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාට ඒ ප්‍රකාශය කරන්න නමුත් අසාධාරණ විධියට .අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා කමිටුවවත් ,අපිවත්හෙළාදකින්න ඕනෑ නැහැ . ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේ වාර්තාව අපට දුන්නාට පසු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ ,පෞද්ගලිකව මමත් තවත් මන්ත ,ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාත් රීවරු කිහිප දෙනෙකුත් අපට තිබුණු වේලාව ඇතුළත ඒ ගැන පුළුවන් තරම් අධ්‍යයනය කරලා අපේ කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කළා ඒ නිසා අපි මේක කල් දමන්න හෝ . .නොසැලකිලිමත් ලෙස හෝ කටයුතු කර නැහැ අපේ නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙන්නේ party linesවලින් නොවෙයි අපි සියලු දෙනාම .inclusive approach එකක් නේ යන්නේ එදා පැයක් කථා . හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය (ආචාර්ය) .කළා නේ ,ඇමතිතුමා තර්කයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා නේ"Auditor-General Report එක දැම්මාට පසුව තමයි officersලා සාක්ෂි දුන්නේඒ සාක්ෂි , consider කරන්න." කියලා අපි ,මම හිතන්නේ . කණ්ඩායමක් විධියට මේක අවසන් කළොත් හොඳයි කියන මතයේ අපි ඉන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි . ඒකexploit කර ගන්නේ නැතිව අපි ඉදිරියට යමු . අපි සෑහෙන තරම්flexible වෙලා තිබෙනවා අදත් . මේ කරන්නේalready decided එකක් නේ අපි . ,නමුත් අපි දන්නවා .යන්න නැඟිටලා හිටියේ අජිත් පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාටමේ ගැන තියුණු .ගැඹුරු අදහසක් තිබෙනවා කියලා , අපි නැඟිටලා යන්න නේ සූදානම් වෙලා ,නැත්නම් .හිටියේ

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය) මටත් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අදහස් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි ඒකට respect කරනවා ඒකෙන් අපි ,හැබැයි .suppress වෙන්නත් හොඳ නැහැ.

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය)ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි ,අපි සියලු දෙනාම හෙට මේ ගැන ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලිඛිතව දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා නියමයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . අපි මෙතැන වාද කරන එක තේරුමක් නැහැ ,මෙතුමා කියන්නේ . වාද විවාද ,හෙටයි දවස් දෙක තිබෙනවා ,අදයි සියලු දෙනාම ,කරලා කථා කරන්න නොවෙයි ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ දුන්නාම ඒ සියල්ල එකතු කරලා කාර්යාලයෙන් නිගමන සහිත වාර්තාවක් සකස් නැද්ද ,ඒ නිගමනයට එකඟද .කරනවා කියලායි කියලා අපට කියන්න පුළුවන්?ඒක නේ කියන්නේ .

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය)ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබුණු දවස් දෙක ස්ව කැමැත්තෙන් අපි අත්හැර ගන්නවා.ඒක නේ වෙන්නේ .

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය)නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා :අවශ්‍ය නම් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. දින දෙක වෙන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මට , .ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි .සමාවෙන්න මේ ගැන කියනවාට , ඒක මගේ ,මම එක් දිනයක් සහභාගි වුණේ නැහැ .එදා මම ලංකාවේ සිටියේ නැහැ ,මොකද .ප්‍රශ්නයක් නමුත් එදා ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟවෙලා තිබෙනවා , .ලිඛිත වාර්තා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා කියලාIt is very good. කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නමුත් ඥාය පත්‍රයේ . හෙටයි යොදාගෙන තිබෙන්නේ ,හැටියට අදයි හෙටයි සාකච්ඡා ,අදයි .සාකච්ඡා කරන්න නේ කරනවා කියනevent එක අත්හැරීම් සුදුසුයි කියලා අද අපිම එකඟ වෙමු.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි නේ වුණේ අපි ඇත්ත කථා කරන්න , .ඕනෑ නේ

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවශ්‍ය නම් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක සාධාරණ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එක් දිනයක් නොවෙයි.ඕනෑ නම් තවත් දිනයක් යොදා ගනිමු ,

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා :මේක සාධාරණීකරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ අපි ඇත්ත . .කථා කරමු

සභාපතිතුමා: සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන් ඒකට , .එකඟ වෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාම නේ

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ කරන වැඩවලින් මේ වාර්තාවේ වටිනාකමත් නැති වෙනවා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මෙතැන වුණු දේ ගැන ඉස්සෙල්ලාම කථා කරමු කෝ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙතැන මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින් නැහැ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා , ඒ නිසා .සහ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා පමණයි සිටින්නේ ,අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ මොනවාද ,මම අහන්නේ ?කවුරුන් සමඟද කියලයි

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ අපි සමඟයි අපි ,ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි . සියලු දෙනාම යම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් පිළිබඳ නිගමනයක් මම හිතන විධියට .කිරීමට එළඹුණු කණ්ඩායමක් 15 ,10ක් විසඳිය යුතු කාරණාක් මෙතැන තිබෙනවා නේ එක් කාරණා පිළිබඳව වාද විවාද කරලා ,ඒ එක් . එකඟ වීමට හැකි කාරණා සහ එකඟ වියනොහැකි කාරණා මොනවාද එකඟ වෙන්න නොහැකි වුණේ , ඒ කාරණාවලට එකඟ ,කුමන කාරණාවලටද ,නොවුණේ කවුද කියලා වාර්තා කිරීමත් අවසානයේදී ඒ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් මම මේ .කිරීමත් නේ අපේ රාජකාරිය වෙන්නේ මගේ ,සම්ප්‍රදාය ගැන නොදන්නා නිසායි අහන්නේ තර්කානුකූල ඥානයට මට වැටහෙන දේ තමයි , එවැනි නිගමනයකට එළැඹීමට අපට තිබෙන දැනුම සහ සාක්ෂි අනුව ඒ කාරණා පිළිබඳ වාද විවාදවලට .එළැඹිය යුතුයි කියලා

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවෙන් අවසන් කෙටුම්පතක් සකස් කරනවා නේ අපි ඒක ගැන උදෑසන සිට රාත්‍රී . වෙනකම් සාකච්ඡා කරමු එතකොට ඉවත් . ඒවා ඉවත් ,කරන්න ඕනෑ දේවල් තිබෙනවා නම් ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ දේවල් ,කරන්නත් ඒවා ඇතුළත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන් ,තිබෙනවා නම් .නේ

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔව් එක් , අපට දින දෙකක් ඕනෑ නම් දින ,දිනයක් නොවෙයි .දෙකක් යොදා ගනිමු

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා :ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ සභාපතිතුමායි දින ,ඔබතුමායි , .දින තුනක් කථා කරන්න ,දෙකක් නොවෙයි

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: දවස පුරාම කථා කරමු.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: දින දෙකක් හෝ උදෑසන සිටම කථා කරමු ප්‍රශ්නයක් , .නැහැ

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ලබන සතියේ අඟහරුවාදා සහ බදාදා දින දෙක යොදා ගනිමු . අපට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ කරුණු තිබෙනවා .ඒවා සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ ,නම්

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා :අජිත් පී . අද දින ,පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි) ,ඔබතුමාත්ආචාර්ය ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු (නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමත් මෙතැනට පැමිණියේ ප්‍රමාද වෙලා නේ ඊට ප්‍රථම හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි ගරු . ඒ වේලාවේ සිටි ,මන්ත්‍රීතුමා යෝජනාවක් කළා එතුමා .සියලු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඒකට එකඟ වුණා ,කිව්වේ"අපි මෙපමණ කාලයක් මේක ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළා.දැන් සාකච්ඡා කළා ඇති ," කියලායි .

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනිමේ ,තුමා කිව්වේ වැරදි අදහසක්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: අපි සියලු දෙනා එකඟතාවකට ආවා සාකච්ඡා ,මමත් කිව්වා . .කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලා

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: නැහැ ඒක වැරදි , ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න ගරු රාජ්‍ය .අදහසක් ඇමතිතුමා මෙතැනට පැමිණි ගමන්ම ගරු ඒ වාර්තාව .සභාපතිතුමාට ලිඛිත වාර්තාවක් දුන්නා ,දුන්නාම තමයි අපි කිව්වේ"අපේ නිර්දේශ හෙට දෙන්නම්." කියලා සාකච්ඡා කරන්න එපා ,නැතිව . අපි කිව්වේ නිර්ද ,කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැේශ දෙන්නම් කියලා ,ඒ වේලාවේ මෙතුමා කිව්වා . "නිර්දේශ දෙනවා නම් අද කථා කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ.අපි අවසන් කරමු ," කියලා. "මම හෙට නිර්දේශ දෙනවා." කියලා මම යන්න තමයි හැදුවේ මට වෙනත් රාජකාරියක් තිබෙන නිසා මම . .ඒක මගේ වැඩක් .හැදුවේ ඒකට යන්නයි

ගරු අජිත් පීපෙරේ .රා මහතා: අපේ නිර්දේශ නොවෙයි?ඔබතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ ,

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔව් මගේ , .නිර්දේශ

ගරු අජිත් පී :පෙරේරා මහතා .ඔබතුමා සහ මම අතර මේකට එකඟතාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මෙතුමා අද නිර්දේශ ලබා දුන්නා ,මම කිව්වා .''මම නිර්දේශ දෙන්නේ හෙටම .ම කථා කරන්න එන්නේ හෙට . .මට වෙනත් වැඩක් තිබෙන නිසා මම යනවා'' කියලා නැඟිටලා යන්න ගියේ එතකොට තමයි . .ඔබතුමන්ලා පැමිණියේ

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා එන්න කලින් නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන අය හෙට දින ඒවා ලබා දෙන්න කියලා අපි සියලු දෙනාම එකඟතාවකට ආවා. ඊට පසුව වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: හෙට නොවෙයි, වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ 14වැනි දා නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ අපි කිව්වා, 14වැනි දා වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා, එයින් පැන නගින කරුණු අනුව අවසාන තීන්දුව ගනිමු කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: 18වැනි දා හා 19වැනි දා සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තවත් වැඩිදුර මේ සාකච්ඡාව ගෙනියන්නේ නැහැ කියලා, අපි එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දැන් අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්න දින නියම කර ගත්තේ 19වැනි දා නේ. අපි 18වැනි දාත් ඒ සඳහා යොදා ගනිමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි යොදා ගත් දිනවලට අමතරව තමයි 19වැනි දා යොදා ගත්තේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි draft එකක් හදලා, ඒක discuss කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 19වැනි දා පාර්ලිමේන්තු දිනයක් නොවෙයි. පාර්ලිමේන්තු දිනය වන්නේ 25වැනි දා. අපි 19වැනි දා විශේෂ දිනයක් ලෙස සාකච්ඡාව සඳහා යොදා ගත්තා. ඔබතුමන්ලා ලබා දෙන අදහස් සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන COPE එකෙන් වාර්තාවක් හදලා දෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳ තමයි අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. දැන් නිකම් පොත් පෙරළ ගෙන කථා කරලා වැඩක් නැහැ නේ. නමුත්, draft එකක් හදලා දුන්නාම ඒ මත පදනම් වෙලා, ඇතුළත් කළ යුතු කරුණු, වෙනස් විය යුතු කරුණු, එකඟ වන කරුණු හා එකඟ නොවන කරුණු පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, 19වැනි දා මදි නම්, 18වැනි දාත් යොදා ගනිමු කියලායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 18වැනි දා බැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: 17වැනි දාත් යොදා ගන්න. 16වැනි දාත් යොදා ගන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි අමතර දිනයක් වශයෙන් නේ 19වැනි දා යොදා ගත්තේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ සාකච්ඡාව වන විට 24වැනි දා යොදා ගත්තාත්, 24වැනි දා බැරි වුණොත් ඒ සතිය ඇතුළත හෝ කියලා අදහසක් ආවා. ඒ අදහස ආවේ 19වැනි දා ප්‍රමාණවත් නොවුණොත් කියන හැඟීම සමඟයි. අපි එහෙම දෙයක් සාකච්ඡා කළා නේ. 25වැනි දා වන විට අවසන් කර ගන්න බැරි වුණොත්, ඒ සතිය ඇතුළත ඉදිරිපත් කරමු කියන අදහසකට ආවේ ඒකයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි 19වැනි දා සාකච්ඡා කරලා, මදි වුණොත් 24වැනි දාත් සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා තවත් සැලකිලිමත් විය යුතු කාරණා තිබෙනවා. 19වැනි දා අපි රැස් වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. එදින ප්‍රමාණවත් නැතිනම් අපි 24වැනි දාත් රැස් වෙනවා. 24වැනි දාත් ප්‍රමාණවත් නැතිනම් 25වැනි දාත් රැස් වෙනවා. එහෙම ඒ සතියේම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව භාෂා තුනටම පරිවර්තනය කරන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, භාෂා තුනෙන්ම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම ගැටලුවකුත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ලබන සතියේ සිකුරාදා වන විට අවසන් කරමු. 19,20 සහ 21 කියන දින තුනම තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Maximum, 21 දක්වා යමු.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කලින් COPE කමිටු වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හිටපු දිනය පිළිබඳව අපට අත් දැකීමක් තිබෙනවා. මේ විධියටම කඹ ඇදලා, අන්තිමට වෙන හේතුවක් නිසා ප්‍රමාද වුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක දැන් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මෙතැන තියෙන්නේ එහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අවසන් සතියකට යොදා ගන්න. මුල් දවසේ බැරි වුණොත් ඒ සතිය ඇතුළත අවසන් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: අවසාන වශයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා අතර එකඟතාවක් තිබෙනවා නේ. මම නැවත කියන්නම්. ඒ එකඟතාව මේ විධියට තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා අද සහ හෙට දින දෙක තුළ පෞද්ගලිකව ඉදිරිපත් කරන යෝජනා හා අදහස් තුළින් අවසන් දළ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව, නිර්දේශ හා නිගමනය සහිතව හදලා 14වැනි දා ලබා දෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ 19වැනි දා දවස ඇතුළත සාකච්ඡා කරලා, අවසන් එකඟතාවකට පැමිණීම තමයි අපේ බලාපොරොත්තුව වන්නේ. එසේ එකඟතාවකට පැමිණීමට නොහැකි වුණොත් තවත් එක් දිනයක් අපි යොදා ගන්නවා. ඒ තමයි 20වැනි දා. ඊළඟට අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ 25වැනි දා වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නයි.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.)

ඇමුණුම 16

ඇමුණුම 16
இகணைப்பு 16
Annexure 16

2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදුකර තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් සකස් කරන ලද කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව

මෙය , මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති විසින් පිළියෙල කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ ඇතුළත් වූ කරුණු ද ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවා ලබා ගත් වාචික සාක්ෂි මගින් අනාවරණය වූ කරුණුද සම්පින්ඩනය කොට පාර්ලිමේන්තු කාරක සභා ලේකම් කාර්යාලය මගින් පිළියෙල කරන ලද ලියවිල්ලකි. මෙහි නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් නොවන අතර මෙම ලියවිල්ල අධ්‍යයනය කොට සුදුසු පරිදි ඇතුළත් කළ යුතු නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුත්තේ කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විසිනි. එසේම මෙම ලියවිල්ල හුදෙක් කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ ලියවිල්ලක් වන අතර, එහි ඇතුළත් කරුණු, විගණකාධිපති විසින් විගණනය කොට සොයා ගත් කරුණු හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් වාචික සාක්ෂිවලින් හෙළි කළ කරුණුවලින් පමණක් සමන්විත වන අතර ලේකම් කාර්යාලයේ කිසිදු අදහසක් හෝ යෝජනාවක් ඇතුළත් නොවන බව අවධාරණය කළ යුතුය.

තවද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කරුණු විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් පත්කරන ලද ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටු වාර්තාවේ අඩංගු ප්‍රධාන නිර්දේශයන්ද මේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණු දැක්වීම සඳහා උපයෝගි කරගන්නා ලද අතර එකී සියළු වාර්තා ඇමුණුම් වශයෙන් මෙම වාර්තාව සමග ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇත.

1) **ඇමුණුම 1** - 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුල ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කර තිබුණු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපති විසින් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර කාරක සභාව වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබන විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව.

2) **ඇමුණුම 2** - මහ බැංකුව විසින් 2015 වසර සඳහා නිකුත් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් පත් කරන ලද ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටු වාර්තාව.

3) **ඇමුණුම 3** - ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහා බැංකුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි සිට 2016 මාර්තු දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති විසින් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවට 2016 .07. 05 වන දින ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම -

4) **ඇමුණුම 4** - 2016.07.07 දින මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද අවස්ථාවේදී ලබාදෙන ලද වාචික සාක්ෂි

5) **ඇමුණුම 5** - 2016.08.12 දින මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද අවස්ථාවේදී ලබාදෙන ලද වාචික සාක්ෂි

6) **ඇමුණුම 6** - 2016.09.08 දින මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද අවස්ථාවේදී ලබාදෙන ලද වාචික සාක්ෂි

7) **ඇමුණුම 7** - 2008.10.07 දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාව සහ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල කාර්ය සටහන්

8) **ඇමුණුම 8** - මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙන් උපුටා ගන්නා ලද කොටස්.

9) **ඇමුණුම 9** - 2015- 2016 වසර වල මහ බැංකු නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ යෝජිත ඉදිරි වැඩ පිළිවෙල.

10) ඇමුණුම **10** - 2015 පෙබරවාරි සිට 2016 මැයි දක්වා කාලය තුල ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති විශේෂ වාර්තාව සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද පිළිතුරට විගණකාධිපතිගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම.

2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කර තිබුනු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් කරනු ලැබූ විමර්ෂණයන් පිළිබඳ වැදගත් තොරතුරු සැකෙවින්

- මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා වන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ අනු කාරක සභාව පත් කළ දිනය- 2015.05.20 වන දින

අනු කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරු

ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා (සභාපති)
ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) රාජිත සේනාරත්න මහතා
ගරු රෝසි සේනානායක මහත්මිය
ගරු ඉරාන් වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු අර්ජුන රණතුංහ මහතා
ගරු ඒ ඩී සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා
ගරු එම් ටී හසන් අලි මහතා
ගරු (මහාචාර්ය) රජීව විජේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ඊ සරවනපවන් මහතා

වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් ලබාගන්නා ලද දින

26.05.2015	05.06.2015	17.06.2015
29.05.2015	09.06.2015	17.06.2015
03.06.2015	10.06.2015	18.06.2015
04.06.2015	11.06.2015	23.06.2015

වාචික සාක්ෂි ලබා දීම සඳහා අනු කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද නිලධාරීන්

කැඳවූ දිනය	නම, තනතුර සහ ආයතනය
26.05.2015	
	ආචාර්ය ආර්.එච්.එස්. සමරතුංග, භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්
	ආචාර්ය එම්.එස්.ඩී. රණසිරි, අධ්‍යක්ෂ ජෙනරාල් - භාණ්ඩාගාර දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
29.05.2015	
	රොනල්ඩ් සී. පෙරේරා මයා, ජනාධිපති නීතිඥ, සභාපති, ලංකා බැංකුව
	ජේ.ඩී.කේ. ධර්මපාල මයා, ප්‍රධාන ගනුදෙණුකරු, ලංකා බැංකුව
	යූ. එල්. මුතුගල මිය, වැඩ බලන අධිකාරී, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
	ආචාර්ය එම්. ඉසෙඩ්. එම්. අසීම්, අතිරේකඅධිකාරී, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

03.06.2015

එච්. ඒ. කරුණාරත්න මයා, ලේකම් - මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සහ සහකාර අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

ආර්. ඒ. ජයතිස්ස මයා, මුදල් මණ්ඩල සාමාජික, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

මනෝහාරී රාමනාතන් මිය, මුදල් මණ්ඩල සාමාජික, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

ඩී. එම්. ගුණසේකර මයා, සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී, ලංකා බැංකුව

ඒ. ඩී. බී. තල්වත්ත මයා, ප්‍රධාන හවුල්කරු, අර්නස්ට් ඇන්ඩ් යංග් සමාගම

එච්. එම්. ඒ. ජයසිංහ මයා, හවුල්කරු, අර්නස්ට් ඇන්ඩ් යංග් සමාගම

වයි. ඒ. ද සිල්වා මිය, හවුල්කරු, අර්නස්ට් ඇන්ඩ් යංග් සමාගම

ඩබ්ලිව්. ඩබ්ලිව්. ඩී. ප්‍රදීප් එල්. පෙරේරා මයා, ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ කළමණාකරු, අර්නස්ට් ඇන්ඩ් යංග් සමාගම

පී. ජී. තිසේරා මයා, හිටපු සහකාර සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී, ලංකා බැංකුව

04.06.2015

අස්වින් ද සිල්වා මයා, සභාපති, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව

එස්. ඩී. එන්. පෙරේරා මයා, ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරි / සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව

පී. ඒ. ලයනල් මයා, භාණ්ඩාගාර ප්‍රධානී, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව

ඩී. එල්. පී. අබේසිංහ මයා, ගනුදෙනුකරු , ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව

බී. පී. ජේ. ගුණසේකර මයා, නියෝජ්‍ය සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී /ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරි, ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීමේ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය කළමනාකරණ සමාගම

නිහාල් ජයමාන්න මයා, ජනාධිපති නීතිඥ, සභාපති, සෙලාන් බැංකුව

සෝමදාස පලිහවඩන මයා, ප්‍රධාන ගනුදෙනුකරු, සෙලාන් බැංකුව

එන්. වසන්ත කුමාර් මයා, සාමාන්‍යාධිකාරී, මහජන බැංකුව

ක්ලයිව් ෆොන්සේකා මයා, භාණ්ඩාගාර ප්‍රධානී, මහජනබැංකුව

ආර්. ඒ. ඒ. ජයලත් මයා, අධිකාරී, සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල

එම්. එස්. කේ. ධර්මවර්ධන මයා, අතිරේක අධිකාරී, සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල

ජේ. ඩී. එස්. ජේ. නානායක්කාර මයා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිකාරී, සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල

එස්. පතුමානපන් මයා, සහකාර අධිකාරී, සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල

කසුන් පලිසේන මයා, ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිළධාරී, සී/ස පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම

හරීන් නිශාන්ත මයා, වෙළඳ කළමණාකරු, සී/ස පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම

05.06.2015

බී. ඩී. ඩබ්ලිව්. ඒ. සිල්වා මයා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

පී. සමරසිරි මයා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

09.06.2015

සී. එම්. ඩී. එන්. කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මිය, අධිකාරී, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

ආචාර්ය එම්. ඉසෙඩ්. එම්. අසීම්, අතිරේක අධිකාරී, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

10.06.2015

ඩී. එල්. පී. අබේසිංහ මයා, විධායක නිළධාරී, රජයේ සුරැකුම්පත් ගනුදෙනු, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව

ඩබ්ලිව්. එම්. ආර්. බී. වීරකෝන් මයා, ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ කළමණාකරු (ගනුදෙනු), ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය කළමනාකරණ සමාගම

කාවින්ද මෙවන් ගුණවර්ධන මයා, ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ වෙළඳඅගයන්, හොංකොං ඇන්ඩ් ෂැන්හයි බෑංකින් කෝර්පරේෂන්

ඩී. එන්. ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මයා, සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර්

11.06.2015

අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්රාල් මයා, හිටපු අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

17.06.2015

ජේ. කේ. ඩී. ධර්මපාල මයා, හිටපු ප්‍රධාන ගනුදෙණුකරු, ලංකා බැංකුව

එන්. ඩබ්ලිව්. ජී. ආර්. ඩී. නානායක්කාර මයා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, මූල්‍ය අංශ පර්යේෂණ, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

එල්. එස්. ෆර්නැන්ඩු මිය, කළමණාකරු, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

ආචාර්ය පී. එන්. වීරසිංහ මයා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

ඩී. එන්. ආර්. සිරිවර්ධන මයා, සමාගම් රෙජිස්ට්‍රාර්

අර්ජුන් ජෝසප් ඇලෝෂියස් මයා, අධ්‍යක්ෂ, සී/ස ෆ්‍රි ලංකා වෙළඳ සමාගම

18.06.2015

අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මයා, අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

එම්. එස්. එම්. පී. ෆර්නැන්ඩු, ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ කළමණාකරු, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

23.06.2015

අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මයා, අධිපති, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව

25.06.2015

කාරක සභාවේ සභික මන්ත්‍රීන් පමණක් රැස් විය.

26.06.2015

කාරක සභාවේ සභික මන්ත්‍රීන් පමණක් රැස්විය.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව මගින් පත් කරන ලද අනු කමිටුවක් මගින් 2015 මාර්තු මස මහ බැංකුවේ සිදු කරන ලද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් විමර්ශනය කොට වාර්තාවක් සකස් කළද එම වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව අනු කමිටුවේ හා කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් අතර එකඟතාවක් ඇති නොවුනු අතර 2015.026 දින 7 වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසුරුවා හරින ලද හෙයින් එම වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට අවකාශ නොලැබුණි.

පසුව 2015.08.17 දින මහ මැතිවරණය පවත්වන ලද අතර 2015.09.01 දින 8 වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ වැඩ කටයුතු ආරම්භ කරන ලදී. 2015.11.26 දින ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා, පා.ම. 8 වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ සභාපති වශයෙන් ඒකඡන්දයෙන් තේරී පත් විය.

8 වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව -

1. ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
2. ගරු රවුෆ් හකීම් මහතා
3. ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා
4. ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා
5. ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා
6. ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා
7. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා (2016.07.07 දින පත් කරන ලදී)
8. ගරු වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ මහතා
9. ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
10. ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
11. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
12. ගරු රන්ජන් රාමනායක මහතා

13. ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා
14. ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා
15. ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
16. ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අළුත්ගමගේ මහතා (2016.05.17 දින පත් කරන ලදී)
17. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
18. ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
19. ගරු මාවෙ සෝ. සේනාධිරාජා මහතා
20. ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා (2016.04.07 දින පත් කරන ලදී)
21. ගරු එස්. ශ්‍රීතරන් මහතා
22. ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා
23. ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
24. ගරු වේලු කුමාර් මහතා (2016.07.05 දින ඉල්ලා අස්වන ලදී)
25. ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා
26. ගරු ප්‍රසන්න රණතුංග මහතා (2016.04.07 දින පත් කරන ලදී - 2016.05.17 දින ඉල්ලා අස්වන ලදී)
27. ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
28. ගරු ඥානමුත්තු ශ්‍රීනේසන් මහතා

ඒ අනුව 2016.01.26 දින සිට කාරක සභාව ආයතන විමර්ශනය කිරීම ආරම්භ කරන ලද අතර 2016.02.25 දින විගණකාධිපති වාර්තා අනුව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ කටයුතු විමර්ශනය කරන ලදී.

2016. 05 06. දින කාරක සභාව විසින් 2015 සහ 2016 වසර තුල ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් සති දෙකක් ඇතුළත වාර්තාවක් සකසන ලෙස විගණකාධිපති වෙත නියෝග කරන ලදි.

ඒ අනුව 2015 සහ 2016 වසරවල බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති වෙත තොරතුරු ලබා දීම පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා 2016 .06.08. දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලදි.

2015 -2016 වසර තුල ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් රහසිගත තොරතුරු ඇතුළත් වූ විගණකාධිපතිගේ වාර්තාව 2016.06.29 දින ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත භාර දෙන ලද අතර රහසිගත තොරතුරු ඉවත් කොට සකසන ලද එකී වාර්තාව එදිනම කාරක සභාවේ සභික මන්ත්‍රීන් වෙත භාර දෙන ලදි.

2015 -2016 වසර තුල ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමන් විසින් සකසන ලද වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති විසින් 2016.07.05 දින කාරක සභාවට කරුණු දැක්වීමක් (Presentation) සිදු කරන ලදී.

පසුව, නව මහ බැංකු අධිපති සහ ඔහුගේ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලය 2015 -2016 වසර තුල ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කිරීම් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා 2016.07.07, 2016.08.12 හා 2016.09.08 දිනයන්හි කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලදී.

ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය රනිල් වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතා විසින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව ගැන විමර්ශනය කිරීමට පත් කරන ලද ත්‍රිපුද්ගල කමිටුව වාර්තාව (ඇමුණුම - 2)

ත්‍රිපුද්ගල කමිටුව

ගාමිණී පිටිපන මහතා, නීතිඥ (සභාපති)
මහේෂ් කළුම්පිටිය මහතා, නීතිඥ, කමිටු සාමාජික
චන්දිමාල් මෙන්ඩිස් මහතා, නීතිඥ, කමිටු සාමාජික

ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන, ආර්ථික කටයුතු සහ ළමා හා තරුණ කටයුතු සහ සංස්කෘතික අමාත්‍ය ධුර දරන ලද ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහබැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් රු. බිලියන 01 ක

බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා නිවේදනය නිකුත් කිරීමට හේතු වූ කරුණු හා එම කෘතව්‍යයට අදාල සිදුවීම් මාලාව හා සංඛ්‍යා ලේඛන පරීක්ෂණය කොට වාර්තා කිරීමට හා 2012 ජනවාරි මස 01 දා සිට එම පරීක්ෂණය සිදු කරන ලද දින දක්වා රටේ මූල්‍ය ඉල්ලුම, බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම, වෙන්දේසි කිරීම ආදී කටයුතු අධීක්ෂණය කොට විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා නීතීඥ ගාමිණී පිටිපන මහතාගේ සභාපතිත්වයෙන් හා නීතීඥ මහේෂ් කළුගම්පිටිය, නීතීඥ චන්දිමාල් මෙන්ඩිස් යන මහත්වරුන්ගේ සාමාජිකත්වයෙන් යුතුව ත්‍රිපුද්ගල කමිටුවක් පත් කරන ලදී. එම ත්‍රිපුද්ගල කමිටුව මගින් සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් කිරිඇල්ල මහතා විසින් 2015.05.19 දින පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ සභාගත කරන ලදී.

ඉහත කී ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටුව මගින් කරන ලද විමර්ශනය මගින් පහත සඳහන් කරුණු විශේෂයෙන් අවධාරණය කරන ලදී.

- එක්තරා සමාගමක ලංසු තැබීමේ රටාව අනුව මෙම අවස්ථාවේ අනුමත ලංසුවලින් 50% ක් මිලටගැනීම අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් බැවින් ඒ පිළිබඳ නිසි රාජ්‍ය අධිකාරියක් මගින් සම්පූර්ණ විගණනයක් සිදු කළ යුතු බව.

- ලංකා බැංකුවේ ගනුදෙනු කාමරයේ(Dealer Room) සිදුවන කටයුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් ව්‍යවහාරික විගණනයක් (Forensic Audit) සිදු කිරීමට ලංකා බැංකුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය කටයුතු කළ යුතු බව.

- ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහබැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ කාර්යයන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් හා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතර සිදුකරන කාර්යයන් පාලනය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් නිසි අධීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කිරීමේ විධිමත් යාන්ත්‍රණයක් නොපමාව ක්‍රියාත්මක විය යුතු බව

- ප්‍රාථමික ගණුදෙනුකරුවන් බොහෝ දෙනෙකු දැක්වූ අදහස් පරිදි මහබැංකුවේ සංවේදී තොරතුරු සම්බන්ධ ලියකියවිලි ප්‍රසිද්ධියට පත්ව ඇති බව තම කමිටුවට නිරීක්ෂණය වී ඇති බව හා එසේ රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු පිටවී ඇත යන ප්‍රකාශයේ සත්‍යාසත්‍යතාවය සොයා බැලීමටද මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ කටයුතු සොයා බැලීම සඳහා ද නිසි අධිකාරියක් මගින් පූර්ණ විභාගයක් කළ යුතු බව.

ඉහත කී ක්‍රියාදාමය නිසා රටට යම් පාඩුවක් සිදු වීද යන්න සොයා බැලීමට රජයට හෝ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට හෝ මහජන උන්නතිය තකා වෙනත් සංවිධානයකට අවශ්‍ය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග ගැනීමට කිසිදු බාධාවක් නැති බව නීතීඥ ගාමිණී පිටිපන මහතාගේ සභාපතිත්වයෙන් යුතු ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටුව තම වාර්තාව මගින් දැනුම් දෙන ලද අතර රටේ මුදල් පාලනයේ වගකීම හා පාරිශුද්ධභාවය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ජනතාව විසින් තබා ඇති අපේක්ෂා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඒ අයුරින්ම ඉටු කර ඇත්ද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ සංඛ්‍යාංක හා පා සටහන් (Digital Foot Prints) පිළිබඳව ද නිරීක්ෂණය කිරීම යෝග්‍ය වන බව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

ඉහත කරුණු පදනම් කරගෙන ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් නිසි රාජ්‍ය අධිකාරියක් මගින් පූර්ණ අධීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කළ යුතු බව ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය හා ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් පත් කරන ලද ඉහත කී ත්‍රි පුද්ගල කමිටුව විසින් නිගමනය කොට දැනුම් දෙන ලදී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය හැඳින්වීම.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ආර්ථික හා මිල ස්ථායීතාවය පවත්වාගෙන යාමද මූලික අරමුණු ලෙස සලකා ස්ථාපිත කර ඇති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව, පස් දෙනෙකුගෙන් සමන්විත මහ බැංකු මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ ප්‍රධානියාද වන මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙහෙය වනු ලැබේ. (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම VII බලන්න, පිටුව 47) තවද මුදල් නීති පනතේ 19 (1) වගන්තිය පරිදි මහ බැංකු අධිපති ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ප්‍රධාන විධායක නිලධාරියාද වේ. මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ දැනුම් දීම මත

රජයේ ඉදිරි මාසික මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව මුදල් සපුරාලීම සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් (Treasury Securities) එනම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් (Treasury Bills) හා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර (Treasury Bonds) නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ වගකීම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් දරණු ලබයි. (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම ix - පිටුව 50 බලන්න) වර්ෂයකට වඩා අඩු කාලයකින් කල් පිරෙන (Maturity) අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කරනු ලබන අතර වර්ෂයකට වැඩි දිගු කාලයකින් කල් පිරෙන අයුරින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරයි. මෙම බැඳුම්කරයක මුහුණත වටිනාකම (Face Value) රුපියල් 100 ක අගයක් ගනී. මෙහිදී මහ බැංකුව විසින් රජය වෙනුවෙන් මුදල් සපයා දීම සිදු කරනු ලබන අතර මුදල් නීති පනතේ 106 (1) වගන්තියට (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම X බලන්න, පිටුව 51) අනුව ලංකා මහ බැංකුව රජයේ නියෝජිතයකු ලෙස කටයුතු කරන බව දක්වා ඇත. මෙම සුරැකුම් පත් මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා සුදුසුකම්ලත් ආයතන 16 ක් 2015 වර්ෂය අවසාන විට ලියාපදිංචි කර තිබූ අතර 2016 වර්ෂයේදී ඉන් එක් ආයතනයක් ඉවත්ව ඇත. (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම VI - බලන්න, පිටුව 46)

එම ආයතන අතර රාජ්‍ය මෙන්ම පෞද්ගලික ආයතන ද වේ. මෙම ආයතන ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් /වෙළඳුන් (Primary Dealers) ලෙස හඳුන්වනු ලැබේ. තවද සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට ද ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදී ගැනීමට අවසර ලබාදී තිබේ.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා අනුගමනය කරනු ලබන ක්‍රමවේදයන් 2 -

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින දක්වා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදයන් 2 ක් අනුගමනය කර තිබුණි.

1. පළමු ක්‍රමය

භාණ්ඩගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන දැන්වීමක් අනුව ඉහතින් සඳහන් ලද ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන්ගෙන් මිලගණන් කැඳවා ඒ අනුව ඉහතින් සඳහන් ලද ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන්ගෙන් මිල ගනන් කැඳවා ඒ අනුව බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි (auction) මගින් අවශ්‍ය මුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමයි.

2. දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය

සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්හට සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම හෙවත් පෞද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයයි. මෙම දෙවන ක්‍රමයේදී සිදුවූයේ මහ බැංකුවේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන ලද බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඉපයුම්/ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් (weighted Average Yield Rate) මත ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා අවස්ථාව ලබාදීම වේ.

මෙහිදී මෙම බර තැබූ ඉපයීම් අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීම ක්‍රම 2 ක් අනුව සිදු කරනු ලැබේ. එක් ක්‍රමයක් වන්නේ ආසන්නතම පෙර කාල සීමාව තුල සිදුකළ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේදී සමාන කල් පිරීමේ කාලයක් (Maturity Period) සහිත බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් මත ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම් සඳහා අවස්ථාව ලබාදීම වේ. මෙහිදී මෙම බරතැබූ ඉපයීම් අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීම ක්‍රම 2 ක් අනුව සිදු කරනු ලැබේ. එක් ක්‍රමයක් වන්නේ ආසන්නතම පෙර කාල සීමාව තුල සිදු කළ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේදී සමාන කල් පිරීමේ කාලයක් (Maturity Period) සහිත බැඳුම්කර ඵලදා අනුපාත පදනම් කරගෙන නැවත ඵලදා අනුපාතය ගණනය කිරීමයි. අනෙක් ක්‍රමය වන්නේ ද්විතියක වෙළඳපලේ (Secondary Market) පවතින සමාන පරිණත කාලයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර ඵලදා අනුපාත පදනම් කරගෙන නැවත ඵලදා අනුපාත ගණනය කිරීමයි.

සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වෙන්දේසි දින හැර අනෙකුත් සෑම වැඩ කරන දිනයකම විවෘතව පවතින අතර බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට කැමති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව පෙර තීරණය කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන් යටතේ අලෙවියට ඇති බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට අයදුම් කළ හැකිය. භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවකදී අනුගමනය කරනු ලබන ක්‍රියාවලිය රාජ්‍ය ණය

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි (Operations Manual of Public Debt Department) දක්වා තිබේ.

පොළී අනුපාතය

භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර පොළී අනුපාතයකට (Coupon Rate / Interest Rate) විවිධ පරිණත කාලසීමාවන් සඳහා නිකුත් කරනු ලබයි. එලෙස නිකුත් කරනු ලබන බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකමට අනුව පොළී අනුපාතය මත අර්ධ වාර්ෂිකව රජය විසින් පොළී ගෙවීම් කරනු ලබයි. (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම XI බලන්න - පිටුව 52) බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියන් හිදී ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින්, මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන පොළී අනුපාතයක් මත පදනම්ව විවිධ මිල ගණන් යටතේ ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. එම ලංසු අධි මිලකට (Premium) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වැඩි මිලකට, සම මිලට (at par) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට සමාන වූ මිලකට සහ අව මිලට (Discount) එනම් මුහුණත වටිනාකමට වඩා අඩු වූ මිලකටද ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි. මෙහිදී ඔවුන් විසින් අධි මිලට ඉල්ලුම් කළහොත් පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක්ද ගනු ලබයි. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට ඉහළින් ඇති ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයක් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට වඩා අවම මිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත් පොළී අනුපාතය හා ඵලදා අනුපාතය සමාන වන විට බැඳුම්කර මුහුණත අගයට නිකුත් වන බවත් පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා පහලින් පවතින අවස්ථාවලදී මුහුණත අගයට ඉහල වූ අධි මිලකට නිකුත් වන බවත් දැක්විය හැක. ඒ අනුව පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් අධිමිලක් ලැබෙන අතර එයින් රජයට අමතර මූල්‍ය වාසියක් ලැබේ. එමෙන්ම පොළී අනුපාතයට වඩා වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට එනම් වට්ටම් අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් රජයට මූල්‍ය අවාසියක්ද සිදුවේ. පොළී අනුපාතයට සමාන ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හොත් රජයට අමතර වාසියක් හෝ අවාසියක් සිදු නොවේ.

3 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුල සිදු කර තිබුණු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපති විසින් සකස් කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවෙන් විශේෂයෙන් අවධාරණය කරන ලද කරුණු

2016 මැයි 06 දින පැය 1430 ට පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා රැස්වීමේදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහබැංකුව විසින් සිදු කර තිබුණු පසුගිය හා වත්මන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් පිළිබඳව වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලෙස විගණකාධිපති වෙත ලබාදුන් උපදේශය පරිදි විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් සියළු රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ඇතුලත් කොට සකස් කරන ලද මෙම විශේෂ වර්තාව 2016.06.29 දින පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකවරයාට භාර දෙන ලදී.

තවද එකී විශේෂිත රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ඉවත් කොට සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව විගණකාධිපති විසින් එදිනම පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජිකයන් වෙත ලබා දෙන ලදී. (ඇමුණුම -1)

එම වාර්තාවේ දැක්වෙන කරුණු අනුව කාරක සභාව මගින් පහත සඳහන් කරුණු විශේෂයෙන් අවධානයට ලක් කරන ලදී.

2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින සිදු කරන ලද භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව

එතෙක් අනුගමනය කරන ලද ක්‍රියා මාර්ගය -

මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/05/18/97 ට අනුව 1997 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මගින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණු බවද වෙළඳපලේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවකදී හෝ පොළී අනුපාතය අසීමිතව ඉහල යන අවස්ථාවකදී වෙන්දේසි මගින් සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වන අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල යොදාගත යුතු බවද එම පත්‍රිකාවෙහි දක්වා ඇති බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

ඒ අනුව ප්‍රශ්ණගත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය හඳුන්වාදෙන තෙක් පොලී ප්‍රතිශතය පාලනය කිරීමේ යාන්ත්‍රණයක් ලෙස සෘජු ක්‍රමය මත අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම මහ බැංකුව විසින් අනුගමනය කරන ලද බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව තවදුරටත් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

තවද මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/1/26/2008 මගින් ද 2008 වසරේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණු බවත් පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/25/20/2008 මගින්ද මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් දවීතියක වෙළඳපලේ පවතින පොලී අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05 ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොළී අනුපාතයන් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් වෙළඳපල ද්‍රවශීලතාව ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙයි.

අදාල කාලය සඳහා රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව

මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ගණනය කිරීම් අනුව 2015 මාර්තු මාසයට අදාල රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව රු.බිලියන 172 ක් වූ බවත් 2015 මාර්තු 02 දින සඳහා පමණක් වූ රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව රු. බිලියන 13.550 ක් වූ බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙයි.

රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශය -

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නියෝජිතයෙක්ද ඇතුළුව සාමාජිකයන් 4 දෙනෙකුගෙන් යුතු මෙම කමිටුවේ වගකීම වනුයේ දේශීය ණය ගැනුම්, වියදම හා අවදානම අවම වන අයුරින් පවත්වා ගැනීමයි.

2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින පැවති රැස්වීමේදී මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමණාකරන කමිටුව මගින් රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව වූ රු.බිලියන 13.550න් රු.බිලියන 1 ක් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන්ද ඉතිරි රු. බිලියන 12.550 සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින්ද සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීමට තීරණය කර ඇති බවත් ඒ සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ද අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන ඇති බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙයි.

තවද 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කර සපුරාගත යුතු රජයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රු.බි. 264.683ක් වූ බවත් ඉන් රු. බී. 89,683 භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් මගින්ද රු.බි.172ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මගින්ද ලබා ගැනීමටත් එම රු.බි. 172න් රු.බි. 1 ක් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන්ද ඉතිරිය සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින්ද සපයා ගැනීමට 2015. පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවති රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව මගින් තීරණය කොට නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව තවදුරටත් පෙන්වා දෙයි.

2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව ප්‍රායෝගිකව සිදුවී ඇති අයුරු -

නමුත් මාර්තු මාසය තුල මහ බැංකු මගින් රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සඳහා සපුරා ගන්නා ලද රු.බි. 185.802 න් රු.බි. 14.143 ක් පමණක් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් සපුරා ගෙන ඇත.

(ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම 4.3 හි දැක්වෙන වගුව බලන්න)

මෙදින නිකුත් කිරීමට සැලසුම් කර තිබුනේ වසර 30 කින් කල් පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර වන බවත් එවැනි දීර්ඝ කාලීන බැඳුම්කර සඳහා සාමාන්‍ය ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත් වීමක් අපේක්ෂා කර නොතිබූ බවත් විදේශ ආයෝජකයන්ගේ ඉදිරිපත්වීමක් අපේක්ෂා කළ ද එවන් ඉදිරිපත්වීමක් සිදුව නොතිබූ බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි. (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම xvii බලන්න - පිටුව 57)

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සිදුවූ ආසන්න කාලය තුල වෙළඳපල හැසිරීම -

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු දිනට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතීයක වෙළඳ පල තුල වසර 30 බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 9.48 % ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවතිය. (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම xx බලන්න - පිටුව 63)

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවද එම අනුපාතයට ආසන්න අනුපාතයකින් සිදුවේ යැයි අපේක්ෂාවක් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සතුව පැවති බවද එමගින් රජයට වැඩි මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට අවකාශ පැවතුන බවත් රාජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 25 හා 26 දින පිළිවලින් අන්තර්ජාලයේ හා ප්‍රසිද්ධ පුවත්පත්වල ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලද දැන්වීම් වලට අනුව ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 16 දෙනා වෙත වසර 30 ක කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන රු.බි. 1ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර 12.5 % ක් වන පොළී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබුණි. මේ පිළිබඳ ලංසුතැබීමේ තොරතුරු වාර්තාව (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම xxiii බලන්න,)

සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල හා ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් 16 දෙනෙකු විසින් රු.බි.20,708 ක එකතු වටිනාකමක් දක්වා මිලගණන් ඉදිරිපත්කර තිබුණි. එම මුදලින් 75 %ක්පමණ (රු.බි. 15, 531 ක්) එක් පෞද්ගලික ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් සහ ඔහු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වන ලංකා බැංකුව මගින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණු බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙයි.

දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් රු.බි. 1 ක බැඳුම්කර පමණක් මිලට ගැනීමට නිර්දේශ කර තිබියදී එම ප්‍රමාණය මෙන් දස ගුණයකටත් වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් එනම් රු.බි 10,058 දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට 2015.02. 27 දින පැවැත්වුණු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම xxiv බලන්න- පිටුව 67) විසින් තීරණය කර තිබුණු බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි. එදින පැවති වෙන්දේසියේදී 9.3510 සිට 11.7270 දක්වා වූ බරතැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට මිල ගනන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් 14 දෙනෙකුට වසර 30 කින් කල් පිරෙන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම XXV බලන්න - පිටුව 68) රු.බි. 10.058 ක් උපයා ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළද වටිටම් අනුපාතයකට (අවම්ලට) නිකුත් කිරීම නිසා රු.බි. 9.658 ක් පමණක් උපයා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබුණි. මෙහිදී අනාවරණය වූ තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක් ලෙස ඉහත පරිදි සපුරාගත නොහැකි වූ රු.බි 0.371 (රු.බි.10.058 - රු.බි. 9.687) ක මුදල වෙනත් කෙටි කාලීන ප්‍රභවයකින් සපුරා ගැනීමට සිදුව තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපතිව වාර්තාව තවදුරටත් පෙන්වා දෙයි.

ඉහත ඡේදයේ සඳහන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු තීරණය මහබැංකු අධිපති විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත දෙන ලද උපදෙස් ප්‍රකාරව ගන්නා ලද්දක් බව රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී විසින් ලංසු සාරාංශ වාර්තාව (Bid Summary Report) මත අත් අකුරින් සටහන් කර තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව සඳහන් කරයි (ඇමුණුම - 1 හි ඇමුණුම xxvi බලන්න, පිටුව 69) එම සටහන තමන් විසින්ම තබන ලද සටහනක් බවට (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම XXVii, පිටුව 70) එම අධිකාරිය විසින් වාචික සාක්ෂියක් මගින් තහවුරු කර තිබූ අතර ඉහත සඳහන් සටහනට අමතරව එකී බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය මගින්ම මෙම රු.බි. 10,058 ප්‍රමාණය සපයා ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනත් කිසිදු ලිඛිත සාක්ෂියක් විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව අනාවරණය කරනු ලබයි.

බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සිදු කළ හැකිව තිබූ විකල්ප අවස්ථා -

තවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ මිල ගණන්, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි සඳහන් ක්‍රමවේදයට අනුව විවිධ වූ විශ්ලේෂණයන්ට ලක් කිරීමෙන් පසු සකසන ලද විවිධ විකල්ප 07 ක් අතුරින් 05 වන විකල්ප අවස්ථාව අනුගමනය කිරීම උචිත බවත් ඒ අනුව රු.බි. 2,608 ක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් උපයා ගන්නා ලෙසත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව තවදුරටත් අනාවරණය කරනු ලබයි.

කෙසේවුවද 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින 1110 පැයට පවත්වන ලද වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ විස්තරද ඇතුලත් වූ 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන එදිනම පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම XVI බලන්න - පිටුව 69) දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශකර තිබුන බවත් අනුපාතිකයන් ස්ථාවර කිරීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමනාකරණ සමාගම සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රක්ෂණ සමාගම වෙත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට විමසන ලෙස

වැනි අදහසක් දැක්වෙන සටහනක් සහ වර්ෂ 20,30, 50 ලෙස එක් වර්ගයකින් රු.බි. 10 ක් බැගින් නිකුත් කර බැඳුම්කර රු.බි.40 ක් රැස් කර ගන්නා ලෙස සටහනක්ද තබමින් (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම් XVI බලන්න - පිටුව 57) 2015 මාර්තු මස සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන එදිනම පැය 1300 ට පැවැත්වූ (ඇමුණුම 1 බලන්න) දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ බවත් විගණකාධිපති වර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙයි.

සෘජු ක්‍රමය යටතේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කිරීම

පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් ස්ථාවර කිරීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල, ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීම් බැංකු අරමුදල් සමාගම සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රක්ෂණ සමාගම වෙත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට විමසන ලෙස වැනි අදහසක් දැක්වෙන සටහනක් සහ වර්ෂ 20,30, 50 ලෙස එක් වර්ගයකින් රු.බි. 10 බැගින් නිකුත් කර බැඳුම්කර රු. බි. 40 ක් රැස් කර ගන්නා ලෙස සටහනක්ද තබමින් 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා ණය ගැනුම් වැඩසටහන තුළ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් 2015 මාර්තු මස 02 දින අනුමැතිය දී තිබූ බවත් එහිදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිවක් එම අනුමැතියෙහි සඳහන් කර නොතිබූ බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව සඳහන් කරයි.

එම සටහන් දෙක (අ) සහ (ආ) ලෙස පහත දැක්වේ

(අ) Raise Rs. 40 bn through issue of 20,30,50 years of T-bonds, 10bn each"

(ආ) EPF/NSB/SLIC to be asked to stabilize rates)

කෙසේවුවද මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් වර්ෂ 50 කින් කල් පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලෙසට ඉහත (අ) ලෙස දක්වා ඇති සටහනේ තිබුණද ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිහිටු වීමෙන් අනතුරුව කිසිදු අවස්ථාවක වර්ෂ 30 ඉක්මවා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර නොතිබුණු බවත් එහි දක්වා ඇති සංයුතියේ එකතුව රු.බි. 40 ක් නොවන බවත් බව මෙම නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධ පරීක්ෂණයේදී විගණකාධිපති විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇත.

2015 මාර්තු මස 06 දින දක්වා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම අනුමත කර නොතිබූ බවත් මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත කරන ලද දැනුවත් කිරීම පරිදි එය එදිනම අපර අනුමැතියට (ratification) ලක් කර ඇත. (ඇමුණුම 1 XViii- බලන්න , පිටුව 59)

දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් ලබා දෙන ලද නිර්දේශය ක්‍රියාත්මක කලේ නම් ඇති වන තත්ත්වය -

දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් පෙර අනුමත කර තිබූ පරිදි බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය රු.බි.1 කට සීමා කරනු ලැබුවේ නම් එම වෙන්දේසියේදී ලැබුණු මිල ගණන් අඩුම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයේ සිට ඉහළම බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය දක්වා වර්ගීකරණය කිරීමෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් 7 දෙනෙකුගෙන් බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 10.4652 ට රු.බි. 01 ක මුදල සපුරා ගැනීමට පමණක් නොව රජයට රු.බි. 1403 ක් දක්වා මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබාගත හැකිව තිබූ බවත් එසේ සීමා කලේ නම් බර තැබූ ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 11.7270 දක්වා වැඩි නොවනු ඇති බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙයි.

එක්තරා සමාගමක් විසින් මෙදින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා ලංසු තැබීම -

ලංසු කැඳවීමේ තොරතුරු පත්‍රිකාවට (Bid Accepance information sheet) අනුව සකසන ලද වගුව -

අනු අංකය	ගණුදෙනුකරු (Dealer)	බැඳුම්කර වල මුහුණත වටිනාකම	වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලද මුදල රු.	බර තැබූ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය (WAYR)
1	B ආයතනය	8,000,000	9,546,736	9,3510
2	A ආයතනය	50,000,000	56,005,000	9,9063
3	F ආයතනය	100,000,000	110,954,800	10,0278
4	B ආයතනය	500,000,000	546,966,000	10,1970
5	E ආයතනය	50,000,000	52,253,650	10,2339
6	H ආයතනය	100,000,000	104,507,300	10,2959
7	EPF	500,000,000	522,536,500	10,4652
	එකතුව	1,308,000,000	1,402,769,986	

තවද ඉහතින් දැක්වූ පරිදි ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසිය රු.බි. 1කට සීමා කලේ නම් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් 7 දෙනා හැරුණු විට එදිනට ලැබී තිබූ එකතුව රු.බි. 20708 ක් වූ සියළුම මිල ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම් වලින් සියයට 75 ක ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ඉහත කී සමාගම ඇතුළු වෙනත් ගනුදෙනු කරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගැනීමට අවස්ථාවක් නොතිබූ බව ඉහත වගුවෙන් පැහැදිලි වේ. එදින වෙන්දේසිය මගින් නිකුත් කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු.බි. 1 ක මුදල රු.බි. 10.058 දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට තීරණය කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 07 දෙනා අතරද නොසිටි ඉහත කී සමාගම එදින නිකුත් කරන ලද මුළු බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකමින් 50 % ක් එනම් රු.බි. 5 ක් ලබා ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව උදා වී තිබීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලක්ෂණයක් වූ බවත් (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම XXV බලන්න - පිටුව 68) මෙහිදී එම රු.බි.5 කින් රු.බි. 2ක් සෘජුවමත් රු.බි. 3 ක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවෙකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා වක්‍රාකාරයෙනුත් ලබා ගැනීමට එම ආයතනය කටයුතු කර තිබූ බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට සිදුවූ මූල්‍යමය අවාසිය

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවේ තවත් විශේෂිත කරුණක් වන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණයට යටත් වන සහ ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් ඇති ආයතනයක් ලෙස සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයන් සහිත ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් සාපේක්ෂව අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබාගෙන තිබූ අතර අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතිකයක් සහිතව දවීතියක වෙළඳපලෙන් මිලදී ගැනීම හේතුවෙන් ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ මූල්‍ය වාසිය අහිමි කරගෙන තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සපුරා ගැනීම

2015 මාර්තු මස 02 දිනට රාජ්‍ය ණය වාරික පියවීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයද නිශ්චිතව දක්වමින් 2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 20 දින ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව වෙත ලැබී තිබූ හෙයින් සුදුසු ක්‍රමෝපායන් භාවිතයෙන් එම මුදල ජනනය කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් මහ බැංකුවට තිබූ බව විගණනකාධිපති විසින් කරන ලද පරීක්ෂණයේදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ බව සඳහන් කරයි.

විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව තවදුරටත් සඳහන් කරනු ලබන්නේ අනවශ්‍ය ලෙස වට්ටම් ලබා දීමකින් තොරව සහ වෙළඳපල පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් ඉහල යාමට ඉඩ ප්‍රස්ථා විවර නොකරමින් අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා විකල්ප අවස්ථා ද පැවති බව හා එවන් අවස්ථා කීපයක් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් සවිස්තර ව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

මෙම ගනුදෙනුව සැක සහිත වීමට හේතු -

විගණකාධිපතිට අනුව මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධ ගනුදෙනු පහත සඳහන් හේතු මත සැකයට භාජනය වේ.

- වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් කිරීමට ඉතා ආසන්න කාලයක් තුල එනම් අවසන් මිනිත්තු 08 තුල මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු.බි. 20708 කින් රු.බි. 13.60 ක ලංසු තැබීම
- ඉහත සඳහන් රු.බි. 13.60 ක වටිනාකම තුල රු.බි. 13.00 ක් එක්තරා සමාගමක් වෙනුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම
- රු.බි. 01 ක්වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී රු.බි. 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම
- එක්තරා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් වෙනුවෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව රු.බි. 13 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ පළමු වතාව වීම
- රු.බි. 01 ක් සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී එකී සමාගම විසින් රු.බි. 2 ක් සෘජුවත් රු.බි. 13 ක් ලංකා බැංකුව හරහාත් වශයෙන් එකතුව රු.බි. 15 ක් සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ලංසු කැඳවා තිබූ වටිනාකම මෙන් 15 ගුණයක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් වීම..

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ක්‍රියා කලාපය -

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පැවති වෙන්දේසියේදී මිලට ගැනීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු.බි. 01 ක බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකමට එරෙහිව එකතුව රු.බි 10.058 ක ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට ගත් තීරණය සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ ක්‍රියා කලාපය ප්‍රබල ලෙස බලපා ඇති බව රාජ්‍ය ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ අනු කමිටුව විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ සිදු කරන ලද විමර්ශනයේදී අදාල නිලධාරීන් විසින් ලබා දී ඇති වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හි ඇති පහත කරුණු මත නිරීක්ෂණය වන බව විගණකාධිපති පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

- වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා අවසන් වූ පසුවද මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙම වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් වූ මුළු මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු.බි 20 ක්ම නොගන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මියගෙන් විමසා තිබීම.
- එලෙස රු.බි. 20 ක් දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළහොත් එය ඉතා ඉහල පොළී අනුපාතිකයක් වන හෙයින් එය නුසුදුසු බව රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය සහ අතිරේක ණය අධිකාරී ආචාර්ය එම්. ඉසඩ්.එම් අසීම් මහතා විසින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට අවධාරණය කර තිබීම.
- ඉන්පසු මහබැංකු අධිපති විසින් රු.බි. 10 කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි රාජ්‍ය ණය අධිකාරීගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ කර තිබීම (why don't you go for 10bn) හා ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී පවා රු.බි. 10 කට යාම නිසා ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් බව අනාවරණය කර තිබීම.

ඉහල පොළී අනුපාතයක් තීරණය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පහත කරුණු පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් තීරණය කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපල සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 9.48 ක් විය. එලෙස තිබියදී අදාල වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා 12.5 % ක ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කර තිබුණි. තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපල සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසි සඳහා ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතය ලෙස සියයට 12.5 තීරණය කළ ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවිය. එසේම ඉහල පොළී අනුපාතිකයන් යටතේ වර්ෂ 30 ක් වැනි අමතර පිරිවැයද රජයට සිදුවන අවාසියක් ලෙස සැලකිය යුතු බවද නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ. මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ වර්ෂ 30 ක වැනි දිගු කාලීන බැඳුම්කරයක පොළී අනුපාතයේ සිදුවන ඉතා කුඩා වැඩි වීමකින් වුවද රජයට විශාල මූල්‍ය අවාසියක් සිදුවිය හැකි වීමය.

- 2016 මාර්තු 10 හා මාර්තු 24 දිනවල පැවති බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි 2 කම අපේක්ෂා කරන ලද ඵලදා අනුපාතයන්ට වඩා වැඩි අනුපාතයන් දක්වමින් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් වීම නිසා ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි

2016 මාර්තු 29 දින සිදුකළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම

2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රු.බි. 10 බැගින් වූ විවිධ පරිනත කාලයන් සහිත කල් පිරෙන බැඳුම්කර 04 ක් එනම් රු.බි. 40 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

මෙම ගනුදෙනුවේදී එක්තරා සමාගමක හැසිරීම සහ එම සමාගම මගින් 35% සිට 44 % දක්වා බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පහත සඳහන් කරුණු පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

මෙහිදී රු. බි . 40 ක සීමාවකට කැඳවනු ලැබ ඇති අතර එම මිල ගණන් මත තවත් අමතර රු.බි. 37.732 (මුහුණත අගය) එනම් රු.බි. 77.732 ක් මුහුණත අගය දක්වා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර ඇත. එලෙස මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ වටිනාකම ඉක්මවා නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කර වලින් 60%ක් එකී සමාගම හිමිකර ගෙන ඇත. එම ආයතනය විසින් විවිධ පොලී අනුපාතයන් යටතේ ඉහත සඳහන් වගුව අනුව අනාවරණය වන්නේ අඩුම ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේ පළමු බැඳුම්කරයෙන් 0.5 % පමණක් හිමි කර ගන්නා එකී ඉහළ ඵලදා අනුපාතය යටතේ නිකුත් කර ඇති අනෙක් බැඳුම්කර 3න් 35 % සිට 44 % දක්වා ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීමට සමත් වී ඇති බවයි. එනම් වට්ටම් ප්‍රමාණය වැඩි වන විට වැඩි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබාගෙන තිබීමයි.

මෙම බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියට පෙර පැවති වෙන්දේසි දෙකම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කර තිබූ පදනම වූ ඵලදා අනුපාත වැඩිවීම මෙම වෙන්දේසියේද නිරීක්ෂණය වුවද 14.0742 වැනි ඉහළ මිලකට මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබුණි. ඉහත අවස්ථා 2 හිදීම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන ලද අනුපාත ඉක්මවා මෙවර අනුපාත පිළිගැනීමය.

මෙහිදී බැඳුම්කර 4ක් මගින් රු.බි. 77.73 ක මුහුණත අගයක් ලැබෙන පරිදි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණද වෙන්දේසියෙන් උපයාගෙන ඇත්තේ රු.බි. 59.325 පමණක් වන අතර රු.බි.18.407 වෙනත් කෙටි කාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයකින් සපුරා ගැනීමට සිදුව තිබුණි.

2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දිනැති බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ රු.බි. 1 ක ප්‍රමාණය ඉක්මවා රු.බි. 10.058 දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගෙන තිබීම හා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රු.බි. 40 ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගනන් කැඳවා රු.බි. 77.73 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම හැරුණු විට එවැනි විශාල ලෙස අපේක්ෂිත සීමාවන් අභිඹවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් එම එකිනෙක සීමාව ඉක්ම වූ කොටස හිමිකර ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව බහුලව එකී සමාගමට හිමිව ඇති බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඒවා අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සහ අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ ටෙන්ඩර් අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සංසන්දනය කිරීමේදී එකී සමාගමේ ලංසු ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වීම සාපේක්ෂව පහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීම නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

මෙම ගනුදෙනුව තුල සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලෙහි හැසිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පහත සඳහන් කරුණු අනාවරණය කරනු ලබයි.

ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගතහැකි ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල විසින් 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින තුලදී නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කරයන්ගෙන් ඵලදා අනුපාතය 12.20 % සිට 12.5% ක් දක්වා පරාසයක් තුල රු.බි.9.7366 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර ද්විතීයක වෙළඳ පලෙන් ලබාගෙන තිබූ බවයි. සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල මෙම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 2016 මාර්තු මස 29 දිනට ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුනේ පහත පරිදි ඉතා අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයකට බව පැහැදිලි වේ. එම සියළු ඉල්ලීම් සාර්ථක වී තිබූ ඔවුනට අවශ්‍ය ඉතිරි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය සෘජුවම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් මිලදී ගෙන තිබීම ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී වේ. මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ භාරකාරීත්වයේ පවතින ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙලෙස කටයුතු කිරීම පිළිබඳ මහ බංකුව විසින් අවධානය යොමු නොකිරීමද ප්‍රශ්ණකාරී තත්වයකි.

මෙම ගනුදෙනුව හේතුවෙන් සිදුවී ඇති විගණකාධිපති විසින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබන රු. 784,898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසිය

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් අපේක්ෂිත නාමික වටිනාකම වූ රු.බි. 40 ක් වෙනුවට රු.බි.77.732 ක් දක්වා පිළිගෙන තිබුණි. එහෙත් එසේ නොකර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව මුහුණත වටිනාකම වූ රු.බි. 40 කට සීමා කලේ නම් පහත වගුවේ ගණනය කර දක්වා ඇති රු.784, 898,755 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වා ගත හැකිව තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි. (ඇමුණුම 1 හි වගුව 12 බලන්න - පිටුව - 23)

විගණකාධිපතිට අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින සෘජු ක්‍රමයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමෙන් පසුව එම සිදු වීමට අදාලව ඇතිවූ අවාසිදායක තත්වයන් -

2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින සෘජු ක්‍රමයට තාවකාලිකව නැවැත්වූ පසුව 2015 අප්‍රේල් මස සිට මේ වන තෙක් නිකුත් කර ඇති සෑම බැඳුම්කරයක්ම ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය යටතේ නිකුත් කර තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති විසින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

- ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම නිසා ඵලදායිතා අනුපාතය පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහල අගයක් ගැනීම නිසා රජයට අමතර පිරිවැයක් දැරීමට සිදුවන බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් සවිස්තරව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි. වට්ටම් කළ අගයකට බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන්ට අලෙවි කළද ඒවායේ ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපල මිල ඉහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියක වෙළඳපල තුල විකිණීම මගින් වැඩි ලාභ ආන්තිකයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් ලැබෙන බවත් එම තත්වය තුල රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසිදායක තත්වයක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් වෙත විතැන් වෙන බව විගනකාධිපති වාර්තාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි.
- 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සිදුවූ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනස්කම් සමගම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වූ සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමනාකරන සමාගම මහජන බැංකුව, ලංකා බැංකුව වැනි රාජ්‍ය ආයතන බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි වලින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වල වී තිබුණු බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.
- ඉහල පොළී අනුපාත සමග මිලගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම වෙන්දේසි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වූ අවස්ථා 5 ක් 2015-2016 මැයි දක්වා කාලය තුල වාර්තා වී තිබූ බවත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් මහ බැංකුව අපේක්ෂා කරන මිල ගණන්වලට වඩා ඉතා

ඉහල මිල ගණන්වලටද මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් ඇතිවූ තිබූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

මීට අමතරව 2015 පෙබරවාරි සිට 2016 මැයි දක්වා කාලය තුල මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදුකරන ලද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් පහත කරුණු කෙරෙහි විශේෂයෙන් අවධාරණය කරනු ලබයි.

- ✓ සෘජු ක්‍රමය යටතේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමෙන් බැහැරව ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන්වීම සඳහා තීරණය කිරීමෙන් රටේ ආර්ථිකයට සිදුවිය හැකි මූල්‍යමය බලපෑම පිළිබඳව පූර්ව විශ්ලේෂණයක් සිදු කර තිබූ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවූ බව.
- ✓ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගෙන ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපලෙහි විකිණීම තුලින් පොලී අනුපාතිකය පදනම් විරහිතව උච්චාවචනය වීමක් සිදු වූ බවත් එහිදී පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කිරීම සඳහා වන මහ බැංකුවේ වගකීම ඒ අයුරින් ඉටුවීද යන්න විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව විමසා සිටී.
- ✓ මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපලේ හැසිරීම් රටාවන් පිළිබඳ වැදගත් සියළු දත්ත තමන් සතු කරගත හැකි ක්‍රමවේදයක් මහ බැංකුව පවත්වා ගතයුතු වූ අතර කෙසේවුවද මෙකී ප්‍රශ්ණගත බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී, බැඳුම්කර හඳුන්වා දීම සඳහා ඒවායේ කල් පිරෙන දිනය පදනම්කරගෙන සකස් කරනු ලබන ජාත්‍යයන්තර සුරැකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ අංකයක් (International Security Identification Number) භාවිතා කරනු ලබන බවත් මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී එකම දිනකදී බැඳුම්කර කීපයක් වරින්වර නිකුත් කිරීමේදීඑම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා එකම ජාත්‍යයන්තර සුරැකුම්පත් හඳුනාගැනීමේ යන්ත්‍රයක් භාවිතා කිරීම නිසා දවිතීයක ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේදී එම බැඳුම්කරය කුමන දිනයකදී නිකුත් කළ එකක්ද යන්න හඳුනා ගත නොහැකි වන බව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.
- ✓ ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනු සටහන් කිරීමේදී මහබැංකුව ලබාගනු ලබන්නේ ජාත්‍යන්තර සුරැකුම්පත් හඳුනා ගැනීමේ අංකය, බැඳුම්කරවල මුහුණත වටිනාකම හා ගනුදෙනුව සිදුවූ දින යන කරුණු පමණක් බව තමන්ට කරුණු අනාවරණය වූ බවත් ඒ අනුව සුරැකුම්පත් දවිතීයක වෙළඳපලෙහි අලෙවි වූ වටිනාකම හා ඵලදායිතා අනුපාතය පිළිබඳ දත්ත මහබැංකුව සතුව නොමැති බවට තමන්ට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් වූ බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.
- ✓ සෘජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණද මහ බැංකුවේ කටයුතු සිදු කිරීම සඳහා වන මාර්ගෝපදේශය (operational manual) මගින් හෝ වෙනත් ලිඛිත නීතියක් මගින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිට මෙවැනි අතිශය වැදගත් සංකීරණ තීරණයක් ගැනීමට තම අභිමතය පරිදි සිදුකළ හැකිද යන්න විමසනු ලබයි
- ✓ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් ප්‍රාථමික ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීමට ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය තුලින් මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපලට සිදු වී ඇති බලපෑම පිළිබඳව පසු විපරමක් කිරීමට කටයුතු කොට මෙම ක්‍රමය තවදුරටත් පවත්වාගෙන යා යුතුද යන්න පිළිබඳ කාරණා කෙරෙහි අවධානය නොකිරීම
- ✓ රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් මෙමගින් සාර්ථකත්වයක් නොලබන අතර පෞද්ගලික අංශය මෙමගින් සාර්ථකත්වය ලැබීමට හේතු සොයා බලා රජයට අවම පිරිවැයක් යටතේ අරමුදල් රැස්කර දීමේ මහ බැංකු වගකීම ඉටුවන පරිදි අවශ්‍ය කටයුතු සිදු කලේද යන්න
- ✓ බැඳුම්කර මිලදීගත් පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ගනුදෙනුවන් හෝ ආයතන අඩු පොලී අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර මිලදි ගෙන තිබේද එමගින් රජයට සිදුවන මූල්‍ය අවාසිය හෝ ආර්ථිකයට සිදුවන බලපෑම පිළිබඳ අවම කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය නියාමනය මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කලේද යන්න
- ✓ පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ ගණුදෙනුකරුවන්විසින් තමන් වෙනුවෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් යෙදවීම තුල රාජ්‍ය අංශයට හෝ පෞද්ගලික අංශයට සිදුවන වාසි අවාසි සලකා එමගින් සමස්ථ ආර්ථිකයට වන බලපෑම නියාමනය කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය කටයුතු සිදු කලේ ද යන්න

- ✓ මෙම කාල පරාසය තුල පොළී අනුපාතය ක්‍රමිකව ඉහල යාම සඳහා 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව වෙනුවෙන් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලැබූ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය සෘජුව හෝ වක්‍රව හේතුවූ බවට සොයා බැලීම සඳහා විශ්ලේෂණයක් කළ බවට තොරතුරු අනාවරණය නොවුනු බව.

විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් මහ බැංකුවේ 2015- 2016 වසරවල බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පහත සඳහන් නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි.

(i). ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණවලදී මෙන්ම පවතින ක්‍රමවේදයන් වෙනස්කම්වලට භාජනය කිරීමේදී සහ නව ක්‍රමවේදයන් හඳුන්වාදීමේ දී එමඟින් රටේ ආර්ථිකයට සිදුවන ධන හෝ ඍණ බලපෑම් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අරමුණුවලට ඉන් සිදුවන බලපෑම දිගුකාලීන හා කෙටි කාලීන වශයෙන් සලකා බලා අදාළ තීරණවලට එළඹිය යුතු වන අතර එලෙස කටයුතු කල බවට පිළිගත හැකි සාක්ෂි අවශ්‍ය අවස්ථාවන් හි දී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට හැකිවන පරිදි පවත්වාගෙන යාම.

(ii). ද්විතියක වෙළඳපලද නියාමනය කිරීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු නොවන තත්ත්වයක් තුල මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල හැසිරවීමේ හා නියාමනය කිරීමේ කාර්යය වඩාත් ඵලදායීව ඉටුකිරීම අඩපන වීම වලක්වනු වස් අවශ්‍ය සියලු දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව පවත්වා ගැනීම.

(iii). මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිකුත් කල බැඳුම්කරයන් කල්පිරී මුදල් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා තමන් වෙත ඉදිරිපත් වන අවස්ථාව දක්වා එම බැඳුම්කරයේ හිමිකාරීත්වය හා ගණුදෙනු වන ආකාරය පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වා ගැනීම.

(iv). රටක මහ බැංකුව කෙරෙහි පවතින විශ්වාසය එහි නිලධාරීන් විසින් ගන්නාවූ තීන්දු තීරණවල අවංකභාවය මතද රඳාපවතින හෙයින් හා එම විශ්වාසය දේශීයව මෙන්ම අන්තර්ජාතික වශයෙන්ද නොකැල්ලව පවත්වාගත යුතු හෙයින් එම නිලධාරීන් ගන්නා වූ තීන්දු තීරණයන්ගේ අවංකභාවය කාල පමාවකින් තොරව ඒත්තු ගැන්විය හැකි පරිදි යම් යම් සීමාවන්ට යටත්ව හෝ විනිවිද භාවයකින් යුතුව කටයුතු කිරීම.

(v). නෛතික තත්ත්වයන් ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේඛයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද ඒවාටම සීමා නොවී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ කළමනාකරණ තීරණයන්ට බලපෑම් කළ හැකි මට්ටමේ නිලධාරීන් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට සම්බන්ධිත ආයතන අතර යම් බැදියාවන්හි ගැටීම් පවතින්නේ නම් සද්භාවය පෙරදැරි කරගෙන සුදුසු අනාවරණයක්ද සහිතව සිය කාර්යයන් ඉටු කිරීමට මහ බැංකුවේ ඉහළ කළමණාකාරීත්වය කටයුතු කිරීම.

(vi). ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන බොහෝ තීරණ සමස්ථ ආර්ථිකයට දිගුකාලීනව බලපෑම් ඇති කරවන අතර එවැනි අතිශය වැදගත්, සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයන් ගැනීමේදී නිවැරදි පදනමකින් එම තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේද යන්න ස්වාධීන පාර්ශ්වයකගේ පාරීක්ෂාවන්ට සහ අධීක්ෂණයකට ලක්වීම ඉතා වැදගත් වනුයේ එකී තීරණයන්ගෙන් ජනිතවන යහපත් මෙන්ම අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵලවලටද සමස්ථ ජනතාවට මුහුණ දීමට සිදුවන හෙයිනි. ඒ අනුව එවැනි සංකීර්ණ තීරණ විධිමත් ඇගයීමකින් තොරව ඉතාමත් සරලව හා ක්ෂණිකව ගෙන එමඟින් යම් අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵල ඇති වී තිබේද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ඒ සඳහා බලවරමක් ඇති ආයතනයන්ට ලබා දීමට බාධා සිදුවන පරිදි මුදල් නීති පනතේ 45 වගන්තියේ සටහන් රහස්‍යතාවය සුරැකීමේ ප්‍රතිපාදන යොදා ගත නොහැකි වන පරිදි එම වගන්තිය සුදුසු පරිදි සංශෝධනයට ලක් කල යුතුය.

(vii). මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරුතුරු නිවැරදිව හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර (ඇමුණුම 1 - හි ඇමුණුම xxxiv බලන්න) එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරු (ඇමුණුම 1

- හි ඇමුණුම iii බලන්න) අනුව ලබා දී ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබේ. එහෙයින් රාජ්‍ය විගණනය විසින් එවැනි තොරතුරුවලින් හඳුනාගනු ලැබූ තොරතුරු මෙම වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුළත් නොකර එම තොරතුරු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ලබා දෙන බවත් සඳහන් කළ යුතුව ඇත.

(viii). ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් අතර බැඳුම්කරවලට අදාළව සිදුවන අන්තර් ගනුදෙනු නියාමනය කිරීම සඳහා නිසි ක්‍රමවේදයක් මාර්ගෝපදේශ මඟින් හඳුන්වා දිය යුතුය.

(ix). බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියට අදාළව ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන වෙන්දේසිවල අවසාන දිනය හා වේලාව යම් යම් අවස්ථාවලදී දීර්ඝ කිරීම අනුමත කර තිබූ අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කිරීම් නොවැලැක්විය හැකි සාධාරණීකරණය කළ හැකි කරුණුවලට සීමා කළ යුතුය.

(x). සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු නොවුවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු මෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ලබා දී ඇත. එසේ වුවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපලෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට විකල්පයන් ලෙස වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් ද්විතියක වෙළඳපළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් දක්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. මේ වන විට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ පවතින අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල එම අධීක්ෂණයෙන් බැහැරව ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කළ හැකි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බවට පත් කිරීම.

(xi). මේ වන විට ඉදිරි මාසයේ අවශ්‍යතාව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය වෙතින් ලබා ගන්නා අතර අවම වශයෙන් එය ඉදිරි මාස තුනක කාලයක් දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම.

(xii). ඉහත පරිදි මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය ලබා ගන්නා ලද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරය කල් ඇතිව තීරණය කිරීම.

(xiii). ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම. එනම් පසුගිය කාලය තුළ එක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බුන්වත්භාවයට පත්වීම හේතුවෙන් රජයද ඇතුළුව එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු සමග ගනුදෙනු කළ ආයෝජකයන් අසිරුතාවයට පත්ව ඇත. එවැනි තත්ත්වයන් වැලකෙන පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඔවුන් මුල්‍ය ශක්තීන් ඇතුළු අදාල චර්යාවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම.

(xiv). ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විගණකාධිපති වෙත ඉදිරිපිත් කර ඇති තොරතුරු අතර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකිය යුතු ලේඛන හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්ගෙන් විමසන ලදී. ඒ සඳහා පිළිතුරු ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර නියෝජිත ලේකම්වරයකු දන්වා තිබුණේ, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අදාලව මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යයන් වර්ෂයේ විසර්ජන පනතින් අනුමත සීමාවන් තුළ රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාවය මාසික පදනමින් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ මහ බැංකුව වෙත දැනුම් දීමට සීමා වන බවයි. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණ කටයුතු භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාන්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යභාරය පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණ කටයුතු භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යභාරය ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති සරල කාර්යයකට සීමා වන බවට විගණනයේදී එකඟ විය නොහැකි බව.

විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පහත සඳහන් මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පහත සඳහන් නිගමනයන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි.

(i). විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවෙන් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලැබූ වලක්වාගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.889,358,050 ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය සහ එහි 5.2.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වලක්වා ගත හැකිව තිබූ රු.784,898,755ත ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසිය ලෙස 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින පැවති භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි දෙකේදී වලක්වා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබූ එකතුව රු.1,674,256,805ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වලක්වා ගැනීමට කටයුතු නොකිරීම පිළිබඳව බලධාරීන් වගකිවයුතු බව නිගමනය කරනු ලබයි.

(ii). තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමයට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට තීරණය ගත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා සිදුකර ඇති බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම්වලට අදාලව ද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි හෝ අවාසි ගණනය කළහොත් ඉහතින් දක්වන ලද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසය තවදුරටත් ඉහළයාමේ හැකියාවක් පැවැතීමද බැහැර කළ නොහැකි බව නිගමනය කරනු ලබයි.

(iii). මෙම වාර්තාව සැකසීමේ දී විගණකාධිපති වෙත අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු සහ ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේද වලින් අවධාරණය කර ඇති කරුණු අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ස්වකීය කාර්යය මෙහෙයවීමේ දී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයෙකුගෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරනු ලබන මට්ටමේ වෘත්තීමය විවක්ෂණභාවයකින් (Professional Due Care) යුතුව කටයුතු කර ඇති බව තහවුරු නොවූ බව නිගමනය කරනු ලබයි.

(iv). මෙම වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේදී විගණකාධිපති වෙත හිමි බලතල හා විෂය සීමාව තුල කටයුතු කර ඇති බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ. ඉන් ඔබ්බට සාපරාධී හෝ විගණකාධිපතිට නිගමනය කල නොහැකි මට්ටමේ නීති විරෝධී කටයුතු සිදු වී ඇත්දැයි යන්න මෙහිදී පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් නොවුනු හෙයින් එවන් පරීක්ෂාවක් අවශ්‍යය යැයි හැඟී යන්නේ නම් ඒ සඳහා විශේෂිත වූ ආයතනයන්හි සහය ලබා ගැනීම සුදුසු බව නිගමනය කරනු ලබයි.

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ නිලධාරීන්ද සමග නව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ඇතුළු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් 2015- 2016 කාලය තුල සිදුකරන ලද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් නිකුත් කරන ලද විශේෂ වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද අතර ඔවුන් එහිදී දැරූ අදහස්.

2016. 07.07 දින ප.ව 2.30ට පවත්වන ලද කාරක සභා රැස්වීමේදී සාකච්ඡාවට භාජනය කරන ලද ප්‍රධාන කරුණු

(1) **රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීම සඳහා මහබැංකුව විසින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී, ලංකාව වැනි රටකට වඩා උචිත / වාසිදායක වන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කිරීමද (Auction) නැතහොත් පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය(Private Placements) අනුගමනය කිරීමද යන්න-**

නව මහබැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය-

මෙරට මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල කුඩා මට්ටමින් ව්‍යාප්තව ක්‍රියාත්මක වන වෙළඳපලක් බවත් එවන් මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපලක් තුල බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී ඒ සඳහා වඩාත් යෝග්‍ය වන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද, පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයද නැතහොත් එම ක්‍රම දෙක සම්මිශ්‍රිත වූ ක්‍රමයක්ද (hybrid system) යන්න පිළිබඳවපසුගිය කාලයේ මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අනුගමනය කරන ලද ක්‍රමවේදයන්ද යලි සමාලෝචනය කරමින් මහ බැංකුවේ විශේෂඥ නිලධාරීන් විසින් මේ වන විට අධ්‍යනය කරමින් සිටින බවත්, එහිදී 2015 – 2016 කාලය තුල බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් සකස් කරන ලද විශේෂ වාර්තාවේ අඩංගු නිගමනයන්ද තම නිලධාරීන්ගේ සැලකිල්ලට භාජනය කරනු ලබන බවත් මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කෙසේ වෙතත් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා වඩාත් යෝග්‍ය වන්නේ කුමන ක්‍රමය ද යන්න අදාල කාලය තුල මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල හැසිරෙන ආකාරය හා මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල ස්වභාවය අධ්‍යනය කොට ඒ අනුව ගතයුතු තීරණයක් බව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා තවදුරටත් පෙන්වා දුන්නේය. අදාල කාලය තුල රටේ ආර්ථික ස්ථාවරත්වයට හානියක් නොවන පරිදි පොලී අනුපාතයේ උච්චාවචනයන්ද සලකා බලා අවම පිරිවැයක් යටතේ රජයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව සපුරා දීම සඳහා සුදුසු ක්‍රමයක් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී යොදාගත යුතු බව තම අදහස යැයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(2) **මහ බැංකුව මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම කෙසේ, කුමන ආකාරයකින් සිදු කළ යුතුද යන්න පිළිබඳ අවසන් තීරණය ගැනීම සඳහා නීතිමය බලය රැඳී ඇත්තේ කුමන පාර්ශවයක් මතද යන්න-**

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ මතය-

බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම කෙසේ, කවර ආකාරයකින්, කුමන ප්‍රමාණයකින් කෙසේ සිදු කරන්නේද යන්න සඳහා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය ලබා ගතයුතු බවත් පවත්නා රජය මගින් හෝ අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා මගින් හෝ මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් නිර්දේශයක් සිදු කළද බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවසාන තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහා නීතිමය වශයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය අත්‍යාවශ්‍ය වන බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. එසේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයක් වෙනස් කිරීමේ බලයද ඇත්තේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයටම වන බවද තවදුරටත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(3) **මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මහබැංකුව විසින් අනුගමනය කළයුත්තේ පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයද වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද නැතහොත් එම ක්‍රම දෙක මිශ්‍ර කිරීමෙන් සැකසෙන ක්‍රමයකටද යන්න සඳහා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගන්නා ලද ලේඛනගත අනුමැතිය සහිත තීරණයක් පවතීද යන්න**

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස -

ඒ සඳහා 2008.01.07 හා 2008.10.07 යන දිනයන්හි මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ගනුලැබූ මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා දෙකක් පවතින බව මහබැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද අතර එකී පත්‍රිකා දෙක සතියක් තුල කාරක සභාවට ලබාදෙන බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. (එසේ කාරක සභාවට ලබාදෙන ලද මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා 2 - ඇමුණුම - 7)

(4) **මෙරට බැඳුම්කර වෙළඳපලෙහි ආයෝජනය කිරීම සඳහා විදේශිකයන්ට පැමිණිය හැකිද යන්න සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව විමසන ලදී-**

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ මතය -

මෙම කාලය තුල 12.5% පමණ ප්‍රමාණයකට බැඳුම්කර වෙළඳපලට ඇතුලත් වීමේ අවකාශයන්ට සලසා දී තිබුණද මෙරට ආයෝජනය පිළිබඳ විදේශිකයන්ගේ උනන්දුව අඩු වී තිබූ බවත් ඔවුන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් නොවූ බව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලැබිණි.

(5) **වසර 30ක කාලයක් සඳහා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මින් පෙරසිදු වී තිබේද? ඒසඳහා මුදල් මණ්ඩල අනුමැතියක් තිබේද යන්න-**

මහ බැංකුනිලධාරීන්ගේ පිළිතුර -

මින් පෙරද වසර 30 කාලයක් සඳහා මහ බැංකුව මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සිදුවී තිබෙන බවත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දිනට පෙර පැවති මුදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී මෙවර වසර 30 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන තිබූ බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

(6) **2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම් කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත්වීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව කරුණු විමසන ලදී -**

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

මෙදින රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව වන රු. බිලියන 13.5 ක මුදල සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා සම්පූර්ණ වශයෙන් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය භාවිතා කරන ලෙස හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ණය අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මියට උපදෙස් දෙන ලද බව

ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. පසුව එම නියෝගය මහ බැංකුවේ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යොමු කරන ලද බව ද සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය ප්‍රකාශ කළාය.

කෙසේවුවද මෙදින මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල ස්වභාවය අනුව රු.බිලියන 13.5ක් වන රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද විකල්ප නිර්දේශ අතුරින්, රු.බිලියන 2.6 ක් පමණක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් සපුරා ගත යුතුය යන්න රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද වඩාත් සුදුසු විකල්ප යෝජනාව වූ බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. කෙසේවුවද හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රු. බිලියන 20 ක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගතයුතු බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද බවත් ඒ සඳහා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් විරුද්ධත්වය වාචිකව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද බවත් කාරක සභාව කළ විමසීම් වලදී තවදුරටත් දැනුම් දෙන ලදී.

කෙසේවුවද අවසානයේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ උපදේශය මත රු.බිලියන 10 ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තුමේන්තුව මගින් වාර්තාවක් සකස් කොට එම යෝජනාව ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහා ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට යොමු කිරීමට සිදු වූ බව රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව නියොජනය කරමින් පැමිණි නිලධාරීන් කාරක සභාවට දැනුම් දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාව විමසූ කරුණු -

එහිදී මහ බැංකු ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව මගින් රු.බිලියන 01 ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා කලින් පුවත්පත් නිවේදන නිකුත් කොට තිබියදී එම ප්‍රමාණය රු. බිලියන 10 ක් දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට උපදෙස් ලබා දීමට හේතු වූ කරුණු පිළිබඳව අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් විමසා සිටියේදැයි කාරක සභාව නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් විමසා සිටින ලදි -

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ කරුණු දැක්වීම -

ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විමසීමක් කරන ලද බවත් ඒ අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා විසින් ඒ සඳහා හේතු 2 ක් පෙන්වා දුන් බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

1) රජයට විශාල මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක අවශ්‍යතාවක් පවතින බව
2) මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී නැවත නිකුත් කරනු ලැබුවේ 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මස නිකුත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කරයක් බවත් ඉදිරි සතියේ ඒ වන විට 5% මට්ටමේ පැවති පොලී අනුපාත ඉහල දැමීමට අදහස් කරන බවත් එහදී පොලී අනුපාතය 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මස තිබූ මට්ටමට (11.75%) පත් වනු ඇති බවට තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් නිවැරදි හේතුවක් ගෙන හැර දක්වන ලද බව සඳහන් කරන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවෙහි අදහස් දැක්වීම -

කෙසේවුවද පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සිදුවීමට පෙර පෙබරවාරි 23 වන දින රැස්වන ලද මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මගින් පොලී අනුපාතය, මීලඟ මාසයේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය රැස්වන තෙක් පොලී අනුපාත පැවති මට්ටමේම නොවෙනස්ව පවත්වා ගනු ලබන බවට තීරණයක් ගෙන ඇති බව 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 23 දින මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවෙහි දෙවන අයිතමය උපුටා දක්වමින් කාරක සභාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

-Item No.02 of the Board Paper dated 23 February 2015 –

“Given the rising trend of the market interest rates and rising growth of private sector credit and decided to maintain the policy interest rates at current level until the next month’s monetary policy review”

මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය එවන් තීරණයක් ගෙන තිබියදී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කිරීම සඳහා තීරණය කරනු ලබන්නේ කෙසේදැයි කාරක සභාව විමසා සිටින ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය විසින් පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් නොකරන බවට තීරණයක් ගෙන තිබියදී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කිරීමට ක්‍රියා කර ඇතැයි කාරක සභාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද කාරණය නිවැරදි බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා මැදිහත්වීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් තවදුරටත් අදහස් දක්වමින්, මහබැංකුවේ පොලී අනුපාත විනිමය අනුපාත ආදිය පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා කොට තීරණ ගනු ලබන වෙළඳපල මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුව (Market Operation Committee) ට 27 දා උදය කාලයේ හදිසියේ පැමිණි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් නොවෙනස්ව පවත්වා ගතයුතු බවට තීරණය කරන ලද 5% පොලී අනුපාතය එදින සිට 6.5% දක්වා වැඩි කරන ලෙස දැනුම් දුන් බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා වෙළඳපල මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුවෙහි(Market Operation Committee) නිත්‍ය සාමාජිකයකු නොවන බව ද මෙහිදී ප්‍රකාශ විය. එපරිද්දෙන් ඉහළ දමන ලද පොලී අනුපාතය චක්‍රලේඛයක් මගින් වෙළඳ පලට දැනුම් දීමට වෙළඳපල මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුව (Market Operation Committee) විසින්කටයුතු කරන ලද බවත් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනම ඒ සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා දුන් බවත් ඒ අනුව 5% කට පැවති පොලී අනුපාතය මාර්තු මස 02 දින සිට ඉවත් කර ගන්නා බවටචක්‍රලේඛයක් මගින් මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපලට දැනුම් දුන් බවත් මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් සඳහන් කරන ලදී. .

පසුව, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගේ උපදේශය මත එලෙස පොලී අනුපාතය වෙනස් කිරීමට ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය පසුව රැස්වූ මුදල් මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී අපර අනුමැතියට (ratification) ලක් කරන ලද බව නිලධාරීන් විසින් අනාවරණය කරන ලදී.

ඉහත කී තීරණය මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ගනු ලැබූතීරණයක් මිස මහ බැංකුවේ අනෙකුත් නිලධාරින්ගේ තීරණයක් නොවන බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නට යෙදුනි.

රු.බිලියන 10 ක් ලබා ගැනීමට ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයක් බවත් වෙන කිසිදු අයෙකු එම තීරණය දැනගෙන නොසිටි බවත් එසේ අලුතින් වෙනස් කරන ලද මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් පවතින බව මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල දැන සිටියේ නම් මීට වඩා විනිවිදභාවයකින් යුතුව මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සිදු කිරීමට අවස්ථාව තිබූ බවත් නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

තවදුරටත් කරුණු දක්වමින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පැවතුනේ සිකුරාදා දිනයක බවත් ඒ වන විට පුද්ගලික නිකුතු කිරීම් නතර කර තිබූ බවත් රජයට සඳුදා දිනය වන විට මුදල් ලබා දිය යුතුව තිබූ බවත් අධිපතිවරයාට දුරකතනයෙන් ඇමතූ විට රු.බිලියන 10 ම ගැනීමට උපදෙස් ලද බවත් එම අවස්ථාවේ රජයට මුදල් දීමට වෙනත් ක්‍රමයක් නොතිබූ නිසා රු.බිලියන 10 ට තමන් ඇතුළු නිලධාරීන්ට එකඟ වීමට සිදුවූ බවත් දැනුම් දෙන ලදී.

(7) **බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත (Operational Manual) භාවිතය සම්බන්ධයෙන් දක්වන ලද අදහස්-**

මහබැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම -

මහ බැංකුවේ විවිධ දෙපාර්තමේන්තු 24ක් පමණ පවතින බවත් එමදෙපාර්තමේන්තු ඒවාට අදාල මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණ, අණපනත්, විධිවිධාන, කොන්දේසි, නීතිරීති මතපදනම්ව ක්‍රියාත්මක වන බවත් ඒවාට අදාල වෙමින් මහබැංකුව විසින් වරින්වර ගනුලැබූ තීරණ ඇතුලත්කොට එකී දෙපාර්තුමේන්තු මගින් තම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවලට අදාල මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත් සකස් කරන බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. මහ බැංකුවේ අභ්‍යන්තර විගණන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් එකී මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි පවත්නා මාර්ගෝපදේශයන් අදාල දෙපාර්තමේන්තු මගින් අනුගමනය කරන්නේද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කරන බවත් අනුගමනය කරන ලද ක්‍රමවේදයෙහි යම් වෙනසක් ඇති වුවහොත් එම වෙනස්කම් කිරීමට අභ්‍යන්තර විගණන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරන බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලද අතර ඒ අනුව මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතට අදාල සංශෝධන සිදු කරන බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. ඊට අමතරව මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය විසින්

ගන්නා ලද අයෝජන තීරණ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඇතුලත් විය යුතු බව ද පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ තීරණය -

මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් භාවිතා කරනු ලබන මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි පිටපත් කාරක සභා සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අධ්‍යනය සඳහා ලබාදීම වෙනුවෙන් කාරක සභාවට ලබා දෙන ලෙස නව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාට උපදෙස් ලබා දෙන ලදී.

(8) **මෙරටට අවශ්‍ය මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනයන් සාක්ෂාත් කර ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය, මහ බැංකුව සමග සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේද යන්න පිළිබඳව කාරක සභාවෙන් විමසීමක් කරන ලදී-**

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරයාගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ කමිටුව (Cash Flow Committee)

මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ කමිටුව භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්වරයාගේ සභාපතිත්වයෙන් රැස්වෙන සියළු නියෝජ්‍ය ලේකම්වරු, භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ සියළු දෙපාර්තමේන්තු ප්‍රධානීන් භාණ්ඩාගාර මෙහෙයුම් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන් කීප දෙනෙක් සහ මෙම විෂය පිළිබඳ දැනුම තිබෙන මහ බැංකුව සමග ගනුදෙනු කරන කීප දෙනෙක්මෙම කමිටුවට සහභාගී වන බවත් දැනුම් දෙන ලදී. මෙම කමිටුවෙහිදී, මාසයක් තුල රජයට ලැබෙන ආදායමත් - වියදමත් පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා කරන බවත් ආදායම - වියදම් අතර පවතින හිඟ මුදල, තිබෙන ණය සීමාවන්ට යටත්ව, මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා ගැනීමට සැලසුම් කරන බවද මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් තවදුරටත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(9) **එම ණය මුදල් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබාගන්නා ආකාරය පිළිබඳ පසුවිපරමක් කරන්නේද යන්න කාරක සභාව විමසන ලදී -**

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමාගේ අදහස -

මේ දක්වා එවන් පසුවිපරමක් සිදු කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවයක් මතු නොවූ බවත් එලෙස පසු විපරමක් කිරීමට සිදුවන්නේ නම් එය කළ හැක්කේ මහ බැංකුවේ අදාල බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලියට සම්බන්ධ වන මූල්‍ය නීතිපනත (Monetary Law Act) යටතේ පවත්නා පනතේ විධි විධානයන්ට යටත්ව බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද අතර මහ බැංකුවේ මෙම ප්‍රශ්ණගත බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් ලබාදෙන ලද වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශ මත ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පසුවිපරමක් සිදු කිරීම කෙරෙහි අවධානය මේ වන විට යොමු වී ඇති බව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරයා විසින් කාරක සභාවට දැනුම් දෙන ලදී.

a. ඉදිරියේදී මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරීම සඳහා තමන් කුමන ක්‍රමයන් අනුගමනය කිරීම සඳහා අදහස් කරන්නේද යන්න නව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් විමසන ලදී-

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ අදහස -

තම විශේෂඥ දැනුමැති නිලධාරීන් විසින් දැනට ඒ සඳහා වඩා සුදුසු ක්‍රමයක් සකස් කරමින් පවතින බවත් තමාගේ අවබෝධයට අනුව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය සම්මිශ්‍රිත ක්‍රමයක් (Hybrid system) බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරීමේදී අනුගමනය කිරීම වර්තමානයේදී වඩාත් සුදුසු වන බවත් සඳහන් කළ අධිපතිවරයා එම නව ක්‍රමවේදය මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතිය සඳහා ඉදිරියේදී යොමු කරනු ලබන බවට සහතික විය.

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා තවදුරටත් කරුණු දක්වමින්,පූර්ණ වශයෙන් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය භාවිතයෙන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම වඩාත් විනිවිධභාවයෙන් යුතු වුවත් මෙරට මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල ස්වභාවය අනුව, බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කිරම සඳහා පූර්ණ වශයෙන් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් සිදු කිරීමට තරම් මෙරට මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල දැනට දියුණු මට්ටමකට පැමිණ නොමැති බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් අදහස් දක්වමින් නව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ප්‍රකාශ කලේ, මින් පෙර ලෝක බැංකුවෙන් හා ආසියානු සංවර්ධන බැංකුවෙන් දිගු කාලීන ණය ලබා ගැනීමට අවකාශ තිබුණද මේ වනවිට ලංකාව පහල මධ්‍යම අදායම් ලබන රටක් (Lower Middle Income Country) බවට පත්වී ඇති බැවින් එකී මූලාශ්‍රයන්ගෙන් දීර්ඝ කාලීන ණය ලබා ගැනීමට ලංකාව සුදුසුකම් නොලබන බවයි. එබැවින් දීර්ඝ කාලීන ණය වෙළඳපල වැඩි දියුණු කළහොත් එය රටේ සුබසිද්ධිය වෙනුවෙන් ඉවහල් වන බව නව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය විය. කෙසේ වුවද දීර්ඝ කාලීන මූල්‍ය ආයෝජනයන් සඳහා ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් යොමු වන්නේ රක්ෂණ ක්ෂේත්‍රයේ සිටින ආයෝජකයන් බවත් අපේ රටේ රක්ෂණ ක්ෂේත්‍රය තවමත් එතරම් දියුණු මට්ටමක නොපවතින බවට කරුණු දක්වන අතර ඒ සඳහා මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල තවදුරටත් දියුණු කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා තවදුරටත් ප්‍රකාශ කර සිටියේ මෙම සිද්ධියේදී 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නාර්ථ මතු වුවද, තමන් ඇතුළු වත්මන් මහ බැංකු නිලධාරී මණ්ඩලය දීර්ඝ කාලීන ණය වෙළඳ පල වැඩි දියුණු කිරීම කෙරෙහි ඉදිරියේදී අවධානය යොමු කරන බවයි. කෙසේ වුවද එම කටයුතු විනිවිධභාවයෙන් හා විශ්වාසනීයත්වය තහවුරු වන අයුරින් සිදු කළ යුතුය යන්න නව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා අවධාරණය කලේය.

මහ බැංකුවේ කටයුතු තම නිලධාරීන්ද සමග සංවරණ හා තුලනයන් සිදුකරමින් වඩා විධිමත් ලෙස ඉදිරියේදීසිදු කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය කටයුතු සිදු කරන බව සඳහන් කළ අධිපතිවරයා 2015 -2016 මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් සකස් කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ අඩංගු කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමන් ඇතුළු නිලධාරීන් විශේෂයෙන් අවධානය යොමු කර මේ දිනවල කටයුතු කරන බවත් නව ක්‍රියාවලියක් සකස් කොට එය මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ අනුමැතියට යොමු කරනු ලබන බවත් ඉදිරියට මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල දියුණු වන මට්ටමට අනුගත වෙමින් මහබැංකු කටයුතු අවශ්‍ය තැන්හි සංශෝධන හා වැඩිදියුණු කිරීම් සිදු කිරීමට කටයුතු කරන බවත් දැනුම් දෙන ලදී.

2016.08.12 දින කාරක සභාව සාකච්ඡා කළ කරුණු -

(1) මූල්‍ය නීති පනතෙහි (Monetary Law Act) හි 8.1 වගන්තියට අනුව මහබැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට සුරකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වන බලතල සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහබැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ලබාගන්නා ලදී. -

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ මතය -

බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් බලය පැවරී තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට වන බවත් කෙසේවුවද මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය ක්‍රියා කරනු ලබන්නේ පවත්නා රජය හා මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයා (අදාල අමාත්‍යවරයා) මගින් යෝජනා කරනු ලබන රජයේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය මත පිහිටා වන බවද පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

රජය මගින් රටතුල අනුගමනය කරනු ලබන මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය දැනුම් දුන් පසු ඒ අනුව කටයුතු කර රජයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවන් සපුරා ලීමට මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය ක්‍රියා කරන බව දැනුම් දෙන ලදී. මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය ලිඛිතව හෝ වාචිකව මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට සන්නිවේදනය විය හැකි බව කාරක සභාව විසින් දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් කරන ලද විමසීම්වලදි නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ මතය -

මුදල් මණ්ඩල පනතෙහි 8.1 වගන්තිය අනුව රටේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට සන්නිවේදනය කරනු ලබන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ සමාජිකයකුද වන මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්වරයා මාර්ගයෙන් වුවද ප්‍රශ්නගත බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධියට අදාල කාලය තුල මහ බැංකුව පැවතියේ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ නොව ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා යටතේ පැවතිප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදන, ආර්ථික කටයුතු, ළමා හා තරුණ කටයුතු සහ සංස්කෘතික අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේ වූ බැවින් මෙම බැඳුම්කර

සිද්ධියට අදාල රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට සන්නිවේදනය වූ අකාරයෙහි **නීත්‍යානුකූලභාවය** පිළිබඳවකාරක සභාව දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කරන ලදී. එවකට විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයාට තම නියෝජිතයකු මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ නොසිටි බැවින් බැඳුම්කර සිදිධියට අදාල රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය සන්නිවේදනය වූ ආකාරයපිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් කරුණු විමර්ශනය කරන ලදී.

කෙසේවෙතත් අදාල හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා තමාට අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් උපදෙස් ලබා දුන් බව කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ සාක්ෂි ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා කැඳවන ලද අවස්ථාවේදී අනාවරණය කරන්නට යෙදුන බව කාරක සභාව විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්වරයා මගින් හෝ අදාල විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා මගින් හෝ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට සන්නිවේදනය වූ පසු අවසානයේදී එම ප්‍රතිපත්තිය මත පිහිටමින් වඩාත් නිවැරදි සුදුසුම ක්‍රමය අනුගමනට කරමින් රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව සපුරා ගැනීමේ වගකීම මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල පනත මගින් මහ බැංකු මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය වෙත පවරා ඇති බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(2) මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත භාවිතා කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව කරුණු විමසන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සකස් කරනු ලබන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව බවත් එය අවසන් වරට යාවත්කාලීන කරන ලද්දේ 2013 ජූලි 31 දින බවත් නිලධාරීන් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මගින් අනුමත කරනු ලබන මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරකම්වලට අදාල ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයන් රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැනුම් දීමෙන් පසු රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සංශෝධනය කිරීම හෝ යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම් සිදු කරනු ලබන බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් දැනුම් දෙන ලදී. (ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම් අසිම් - පි.14 -15)

(3) **මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 8 වන පිටුවෙහි B (i) හි සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ආකාරය පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විමසිම් කරන ලදී.**

“Front office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the government as indicated in the approved borrowing Programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs.”

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස -

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ට අනුව මෙහි “as much as possible through auctions” යන්න වෙන්දේසිය හරහා කුමන ප්‍රමාණයක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් නිකුත් කළ යුතුද යන්න තීරණය කරන බවත් “as much as possible” යන්න පිරිවැය, අවදානම යන කරුණු මත තීරණය වන බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. ඒ පිළිබඳ තවදුරටත් කරුණු දක්වමින් මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් සඳහන් කලේ,මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ණය ලබා ගැනීමේ වැඩ සටහනෙහි මධ්‍ය කාලීන ණය කළමනාකරන ක්‍රමෝපායෙහි (Medium Term Debt Management Strategy) සඳහන් කරන උපදේශය පරිදි පිරිවැය හා අවදානම කෙසේ වේද යන්න නිර්ණය කරනු ලබන බවයි. 20-80 අනුපාතයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සිදු කළ යුතු බවට මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි කිසිදු සඳහන් කිරීමක් නොමැති බවද කාරක සභාව කළ විමසීමකදී නිලධාරීන් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාව පෙන්වා දුන් කරුණු -

මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 3 පිටුවේ ද මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය සම්බන්ධයෙන් “raising funds by implementation of the borrowing programme” යනුවෙන් සඳහන් කොට “funds are raised through :

A. Auctions
B. Private Placements
C. Rupee Loans යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වන බවත් ඒ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ලබා දෙන ලෙසත් නිලධාරීන්ට උපදෙස් දෙන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම -

මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි උක්ත ඡේදයෙහි A, B, C යනුවෙන් සඳහන් කළද පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද දෙවනුව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයද තෙවනුව රුපියල් ණය වශයෙන් අනුගමනය කළ යුතු බවට අනුපිළිවෙලක් නොමැති බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස -

පසුගිය කාරක සභාවේදී මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පිළිගත් ක්‍රමය බව පෙන්වා දුන් බවත් පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වූයේ 2008.07.10 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවෙන් වන බවත් ප්‍රකාශ කළ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම -

බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හඳුන්වා දෙනු ලැබුවේ 1997 බවත් ආරම්භයේදී පූර්ණ වශයෙන් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය භාවිතා කිරීමට කටයුතු කළ බවත් කිසියම් හේතුවක් මත 2008 වර්ෂයේදී පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය හඳුන්වා දෙන ලද අතර පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කළ යුතු අනුපාතයක් සඳහන් නොකළ අතර ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව හා සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල වැනි ආයතන කීපයකට විශේෂ පොලී අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලෙස දැන්වූ බව සඳහන් කරන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස-

මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ක්‍රමවේදය හා මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් හැකිතාක් මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය සිදුකළ යුතු බවත් ඉතිරිය පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය මගින් සපුරා ගතයුතු බවට සඳහන් වුවද විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වන ආකාරයට නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය ලෙස සලකා ඇත්තේ පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වන බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය පිළිගත් නියමය වශයෙන් ගෙන කරුණු දක්වා ඇති බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස -

විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ එසේ සඳහන් වන්නේ නම් එම කරුණ වෙනම සාකච්ඡා කළයුතු බව කාරක සභාවේ සභාපති විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස -

ඇමරිකාව, එංගලන්තය, ජර්මනිය දඇතුළුව සියයට 90 ක් පමණ වන ලෝකයේ බොහෝ රටවල භාවිතා කරන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය බවත් ඒ බවට පසුගිය කාරක සභා රැස්වීම්වලදී මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ද එකඟ වූ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(4) **2008.07.10 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාව අනුව මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සංශෝධනය විය යුතු බව කාරක සභාව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී**

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම-

2008.07.10 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාව අනුව මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත මෙතෙක් සංශෝධනය වී නැති බව නිලධාරීන් පිළිගන්නා ලදී

(5) මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත භාවිතය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම-

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම -

රටේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තියේ ඇති වන වෙනසක් මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය මගින් බල ගැන්වෙන බවත් මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය විසින් ගනු ලබන තීරණ / සංශෝධනයන් මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත මගින් පිළිඹිබු වන බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. එකී තීරණ / සංශෝධනය කිරීම් යලිදු මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය විසින් වෙනසකට භාජනය කරන තුරු එය නියමයක් (rule) බවට පත්වන බව ද මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

(6) බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදි වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් ඉවත්ව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කිරීමට තීරණය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් සිදු කලේ කුමන වකවානුවක ද යන්න කාරක සභාව විමසා සිටින ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ කරුණු දැක්වීම -

මෙහිදී පී. සමරසිරි මහතා, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති, ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සභාපති විසින් 1997 වසරේ බැඳුම්කර හඳුන්වා දුන් අවදියේ සිට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් භාවිතා කරනු ලැබුවේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය වන බවත් එම ක්‍රමයෙන් ඉවත්ව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය භාවිතා කිරීමට කටයුතු කරනු ලබුවේ 2008.10.07 දින මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය මගින් ගන්නා ලද තීරණය ප්‍රකාරව වන බව පෙර දින කාරක සභා රැස්වීමේදී ප්‍රකාශ කළ බව කාරක සභාව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කෙසේ වුවද මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා පැවසුවේ තම අදහසේ හැටියට වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය යන ක්‍රමයන් 2ම ඇතුලත් මිශ්‍ර ක්‍රමයක් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී භාවිතා කරන ලද බවයි.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

1997 බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව ඇරඹූ පසු පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කිරීමෙන් ගැටළු මතු වූ බවත් 1998 වසරේදී පොලී අනුපාත ස්ථාවර කිරීමේ අරමුණ මත පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය ආරම්භ කිරීමට අවසර ලබාදුන් බවත් නැවතත් පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් වීමේ තත්ත්වයන් මත 2008 වසරේදී ලංකා බැංකුව, ජාතික ඉතිරිකිරීමේ බැංකුව, රක්ෂණ සමාගම් වැනි විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතනවලට බර තබන ලද සාමාන්‍ය පොලී අනුපාතයකට (Weighted Average Rate) පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය යටතේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා තීරණය කරන ලද බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. එම අවස්ථාවේදී 2008.10.07 දිනැති මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරණය අනුව “Other Captive Sources” යනුවෙන් අදහස් කරන ලද්දේ විශාල වශයෙන් අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන වන බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

තවදුරටත් කරුණු දක්වමින් මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා විද්‍යුත් ක්‍රමය (Electronic System) මගින් සිදු කිරීමට කටයුතු ආරම්භ කිරීමෙන් පසු සෘජු ක්‍රමය යටතේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට මහබැංකු ගනුදෙනු වලට සහභාගී වීමට ඇති අපහසුතාව නිසා 2004 සිට 2008 කාලය තුලද වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(7) 2008 වසරෙන් පසු පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කිරීමට තීරණය කිරීමෙන් පසු එම තීරණය මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි විශේෂයෙන් ඇතුලත් නොවන්නේ මන්ද යන්න කාරකසභාව දීර්ඝ ලෙස ප්‍රශ්ණ කරන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 8 B (1) හි සඳහන් "as much as possible through auction" යන්න පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා සඳහන් කලේ තම අදහසට අනුව ඉන් හැහෙන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් අවම පිරිවැයක් යටතේ රජයට උපරිම මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් සම්පාදනය කර දිය යුතුවන බවයි.

මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් 2008.10.07 දින ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි අඩංගු කරුණු මගින් පිළිඹුබු වන බව තමන් විශ්වාස කරන බවද අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත නියමයන් අඩංගු අත්පොතක් (rule book) නොව එය රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් කළ යුතු කර්යයන් ඇතුලත් මාර්ගෝපදේශයන් (guidelines) ඇතුලත් පුස්තකයක් වන බවද ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

2008.10.07 ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය එදින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළයුතු ආකාරය සඳහන් වන විශේෂිත උපදෙස් ඇතුලත් පත්‍රිකාවක් බවත්, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 8 B (1) ඇතුලත් වන්නේ පුළුල් අර්ථයක් සහිත ප්‍රකාශනයක් බවත් එය මාර්ගෝපදේශයක් මිස නියමයක් නොවන බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවෙහි අදහස -

මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතට අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් හා පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය මගින් සපුරා ගතයුතු මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය කොපමණද යන්න ප්‍රතිශතයක් වශයෙන් දක්වා නොමැති බවත් කෙසේවුවද"as much as possible through auctions" යන්නෙන් හැහෙන්නේ බහුතර බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් සපුරා ගතයුතු අතර ණය ලබා ගැනීමේ වැඩසටනෙහි (borrowing programme) දක්වා ඇතිඉතිරි මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය මගින් සපුරා ගතයුතු බව දැයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් නගන ලද ප්‍රශ්ණයකට පිළිතුරු ලෙස කාරක සභාවේ එම ප්‍රකාශය නිවැරදි බව සනාත කරන ලද අතර 2008.10.07 මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මගින් ගන්නා ලද තීරණයෙහිද ඊට ප්‍රතිවිරුද්ධ අදහසක් ඇතුලත් නොවන බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

කාරකසභාවේ කරුණු දැක්වීම -

කාරක සභාව තවදුරටත් කරුණු දක්වමින් මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි පළමු පිටුව ගෙන හැර දක්වමින් රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව අවම පිරිවැයක් යටතේ සම්පාදනය කර ගත යුතු බව දක්වා ඇති බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. (The front office of the PDD is mainly responsible for mobilizing required funds for the government at the lowest possible cost with a reasonable degree of risk through implementation of domestic borrowing programme approved by the Monetary Board) එහිදී රජයට හා මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලියට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව සම්පාදනය කර ගතයුතු බව දක්වා ඇති බව ද පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. (ඇමුණුම - 9)

(8) මෙම ප්‍රශ්ණගත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ කාල සීමාව තුල පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපලේ පැවති ඉල්ලුම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව විමසීමක් කරන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

මෙම ප්‍රශ්ණගත බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සිදු කළ කාල සීමාව තුල පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපලේ පැවති ඉල්ලුම කෙසේ වී දැයි පැහැදිලි කරමින් එකී කාල සීමාව

තුල පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය මගින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය තරම් ඉල්ලුමක් පැවති බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

මෙහිදී නානායක්කාර මහතා විසින් තමා රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ණය අධිකාරී වශයෙන් සේවය කරන ලද කාලය තුල (2012 ජනවාරි 01 සිට 2015 පෙබරවාරි 09 දක්වා) 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරයක් 8.75% ක පොලී අනුපාතයකට පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීමට හැකිවූ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය යටතේ රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීමට රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරීන්ට අවශ්‍ය අවකාශය සලස්වන බවත් එසේ නොමැතිව රටේ සියළු මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් සපුරා ගනු ලැබුවහොත් අනවශ්‍ය ලෙස පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහල යන බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. මෙම කාල වකවානුව තුල පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය හරහා අවම පිරිවැයක් යටතේරවේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව සම්පාදනය කිරීමට හැකි වූ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

තර්කය එසේ වි නම් මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත නිවැරදි නොවන බවත් එහි සඳහන් වන්නේ හැකි තාක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය භාවිතා කළ යුතු බව වන බව කාරක සභාව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කෙසේවුවද 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේදී පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය හරහා 11.75% ක පොලී අනුපාතයකට රු. බිලියන 02 ක මුදලක් ලබාගෙන ඇති බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස -

ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් නානායක්කාර මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කලේ 8.75% ක අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරනු ලැබුයේ 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේදී බවත් 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසය වන විට මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල තත්ත්වය වෙනස් වී තිබෙන බැවින් පොලී අනුපාතය 11.75% ක ප්‍රමාණයකට පැවත ඇති බවයි.

(9) සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලේ (Employment Provident Fund) මුදල් භාවිතා කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වන 2008.10.07 දිනැති මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරණය විශේෂයෙන් අවශ්‍ය වූයේ ඇයිද යන්න-

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම-

2008 වසරේදී යුධ කටයුතු සඳහා විශාල වශයෙන් ණය ගැනීම සිදුවූ අතර මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපලෙහි පොලී අනුපාතය විශාල වශයෙන් ඉහල යන ලද බව හා පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කිරීම අසීරු කරුණක් වූ බවත් ඒ හේතුවෙන් පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කිරීමේ අරමුණෙන් රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව සපුරා ලීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල් භාවිතා කිරීමට 2008.10.07 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණය ගනු ලැබූ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. මෙහිදී මහ බැංකුව විසින් තීරණය කරන ලද පොලී අනුපාතයකට රජයට මුදල් සපයා දුන් බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(10) 2008.10.07 මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණයට Other Captive Sources යන අදහස ඇතුලත් වූයේ කෙසේද යන්න සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව විමසන ලදී. -

මෙහි දීරවේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය සහිත 2008.10.07 දිනැති අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට යොමු කිරීමෙන් පසු පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කරමින් අඩුපිරිවැයක් යටතේ එකී රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව සපුරා ගැනීමේ ප්‍රශ්ණය මතු වූ බවත් එහිදී සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල් පමණක් නොව මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවන් සපුරා ගතහැකි අනෙකුත් මූලාශ්‍ර ද (Other Captive Sources)සැලකිල්ලට ගත යුතු බව තීරණය වූ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස -

එවිට මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 8 (01) වගන්තියෙහි ඇතුලත්"as much as through auctions"යන කොන්දේසිය හා ඉතිරි මුදල රජය මගින් තීරණය කරනු ලබන ක්‍රමවේදයකට සපුරාගත යුතුය යන කොන්දේසිය ඉන් පිළඹිබු වන්නේද යන තර්කය කාරක සභාව විසින් මතු කරන ලදී.

(11) **2015 පෙබරවාරිමස 27 බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව මගින් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව කරුණු විමසා සිටින ලදී -**

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ කරුණු දැක්වීම -

එදින ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව නියෝජනය කළ සාමාජිකයින් - ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සභාපති, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පී. සමරසිරි, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරී එස්.එස්.අධිකාරී මහතා, ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිපති සී.පී.ඒ කරුණාතිලක මහතා, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ.සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය, ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ ගුණරත්න මහත්මිය සහ තවත් අතිරේක සුපරින්ටෙන්ඩන්ට්වරු දෙදෙනෙක් සිටි බව අනාවරණය කරන ලදී. මහ බැංකු අධිපති ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයකු නොවන බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

මෙහිදී රු. බිලියන 01 සිට රු.බිලියන 10 දක්වා මුදලක් සපයා ගැනීමට ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය ඉහත සඳහන් නිලධාරීන් විසින් වෘත්තීයමය විනිශ්චය අනුව කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයක් බව තමන් පිළිගන්නා බව කාරක සභාව නැගූ ප්‍රශ්නයකට පිළිතුරු වශයෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු සභාපති පී. සමරසිරි මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

(12) 80 -20 අනුපාතය අනුගමනය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව කරුණු විමසන ලදී

මෙහිදී බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී අනුගමනය කරනු ලබන වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය 80:20 අනුපාතයට සිදු කිරීම සඳහා යම් මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණයක් හෝ නියමයක් හෝ ඇත්ද යන්න හා එසේ නොමැති නම් පළපුරුද්ද මත එම් අනුපාතය අනුගමනය කර ඇති බවට කරුණු දක්වා ඇත්තේ ද යන්න කාරක සභාව විමසන ලදී.

විගණකාධිපතිගේ අදහස -

පසුගිය කාලයේ දිගින් දිගටම අනුගමනය කර ඇති ක්‍රමවේදය සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ 4:3 පරිච්ඡේදයෙහි ඒ පිළිබඳ විස්තර කර ඇති බවත් බොහෝවිට සිදුවී ඇත්තේ එම අනුපාතය අනුගමනය කිරීමක් වන බවත් විගණකාධිපති විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස -

රජයට මුදල් සම්පාදනය කිරීමේදී මහබැංකුව විසින් අඩු පිරිවැය හා අඩු අවදානම යන මූලධර්මය මත පදනම්ව කටයුතු කරන බවත් පොලී අනුපාතය ස්ථාවරව පවත්වා ගැනීමටද අවධානය යොමු කරන බවත් ඒ අනුව කටයුතු කර ඇති පසුගිය දත්ත රැස් කර විමර්ශනය කොට ලබා ගන්නා ලද ප්‍රතිඵලයක් වශයෙන් එම අනුපාතය ලබා ගන්නට ඇති බවත් එසේ නොමැතිව 80:20 අනුපාතය අනුගමනය කළයුතු බවට නිර්ණායකයක් නොමැති බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

රු. බිලියන 10 ක් මෙදින වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත්වීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව කරුණු විමසා සිටින ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ කරුණු දැක්වීම -

මෙහිදී රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා පැමිණි අවස්ථාවේදී මුලින් රු.බිලියන 20 ක් ලබා ගැනීමට තමන්ට උපදෙස් දෙන ලද බව රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රධානී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය ප්‍රකාශ කළ අතර ඒ පිළිබඳව තමන් නොදැන සිටි බව ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සභාපති පී.සමරසිරි මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

මෙහිදී සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය තවදුරටත් කාරක සභාවට විශේෂ ප්‍රකාශයක් කරමින් සඳහන් කරන ලද්දේ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් තමාට මෙම තීරණය සිදු කිරීමට මතයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා නොව “Do it” යනුවෙන් නියෝග කරන ලද බව තමන් අද දින ප්‍රකාශ කරනු ලබන බවයි.

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස ප්‍රකාශ කිරීම -

මෙහිදී කාරක සභාව විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද්දේ සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය විසින් මින් පෙර කිසිම අවස්ථාවකදී කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් තමන්ට "DO IT" යනුවෙන් නියෝග කළ බව සඳහන් නොකළ බව හා ''why don't you go for ten '' යනුවෙන් අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කළ බව පමණක් ප්‍රකාශ කළ බවයි. විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවෙන්ද මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මියගෙන් බිලියන 10 කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි ("why don't you go for ten") යන්න ඇසූ බව හැර වෙනත් කිසිම සාක්ෂියක් ඉදිරිපත් කර නැති බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

මෙහිදී සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය කලින් කාරක සභාවලදී ඒ බව ප්‍රකාශ කිරීමට නොහැකි වීම පිළිබඳ සමාව භජනය කරන බව ප්‍රකාශ කර සිටියාය.

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් සමහර නිලධාරීන් විසින් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද අවස්ථාවන්හිදීදක්වන අදහස්වල පරස්පර විරෝධිතාවයක් නිරීක්ෂණය වූ බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. මෙහිදී හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉදිරියේදී සාක්ෂි ලබා දීමේදී යම් බියක් හා චකිතයක් ඇති වීම සාධාරණ බවද පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. අද දින කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට නව අධිපතිවරයකු සමග පැමිණ සාක්ෂි දීම සිදු කරන බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

එදින ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සිටි සාමාජිකයන් 8 දෙනාම ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය මගින් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය අනුමත කරන්නේද යන්න ප්‍රශ්න කරන ලදී. ප්‍රශ්නගත බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධියට අදාල ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ සිටි සාමාජිකයන් 8 දෙනා අතුරින් 6 දෙනෙකු අද දින කාරක සභාවට පැමිණ සිටින බව නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් ප්‍රකාශ කළ කරුණු

මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන ලද දින උදෑසන 10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් පැමිණ ඇත්ද කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් පැවතියේද යනාදී කරුණු විමසූ බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. ඉන්පසුව රැස්වීමකදී මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් රටේ වෙනත් මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයක් පවතින බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද බව දැනුම් දෙන ලද බවත් ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද අතර කෙසේවුවද තමන් ඇතුළු පිරිස එහිදි සාකච්ඡා කරන ලද්දේ මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයෙන් එවන ලද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවයට අනුව මුදල් සම්පාදනය කර ගන්නා අකාරය වන බවද ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

හිටපු අධිපතිතුමා පිටව ගොස් එදින පස්වරු 12.30 පමණ නැවත ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ හා ආනන්ද සිල්වා යන නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනා සමග පැමිණ වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ මුදල් පැමිණ තිබෙදැයි විමසූ බවත් රු.බිලියන 20 ක් පැමිණ ඇති බවත් ඉන් තමන්ට ලබාගත හැකි වැඩිම මුදල රු.බිලයන 2.6 ක් බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලද බවද ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. කෙසේ වුවද රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව සඳහා එම සියළු මුදල් (රු.බිලියන 20) ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස තමන්ට ප්‍රකාශ කළ බව සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය සඳහන් කළාය.

එහිදී රු.බිලියන 20 ම ලබා ගතහොත් මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල තුල ඇතිවිය හැකි අහිතකර තත්ත්වයන් පිළිබඳ කීප විටක්ම පෙන්වා දුන් බව නිලධාරීන් විසින් අවධාරණය කරන ලදී.

එවිට හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මස 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කරන ලද්දේ කුමන අනුපාතයකටදැයි විමසන ලද අතර එම අනුපාතය 11.75% ක් බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද බවත් එවිට එම අනුපාතයට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් විමසූ බව ද ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

එහිදී හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් විසින් ලංසු තබන ලද ප්‍රමාණයන්, ඔවුන්ගේ නාම ලේඛනයන් ආදී විස්තර කියවා බලා රු.බිලයන 20 ම නොගන්නේ මන්දැයි විමසන ලද බවත් රු.බිලියන 20 ප්‍රමාණය වැඩි බව යෝජනා කරද්දී අදාල ලේඛනයේ රු.බිලියන 10 තිබෙන ස්ථානය පෙන්වා රු.බිලියන 10 ක මුදලලබා ගන්නා ලෙස දැනුම් දුන් බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

(13) මෙහිදී හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ලබා ගතයුතු මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය පිළිබඳ නිලධාරීන්ට උපදෙස් දුන්නාද නැතහොත් නියෝගයක් වශයෙන් සඳහන් කළාද යන්න කාරක සභාව මගින් විමසා සිටින ලදී.

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම

එහිදී හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා තමන් ඇතුළු නිලධාරීන්ට රු.බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස පැහැදිලිව තරයේ කියා සිටි බව කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

තවද මෙම බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය යටතේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම නතර කළ හැකි බව ("with this auction we can stop going for direct placements")මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් කළ බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

(14) නිලධාරීන් විසින් රු.බිලියන 2.6 ට වඩා ලබා ගත නොහැකි බවට සටහනක් තැබුවේදැයි කාරක සභාව මගින් විමසන ලදී -

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම

එම අවස්ථාවේදී රු.බිලියන 2.6 ගැනීමට සකස් කර තිබූ වාර්තාව වෙනුවට රු.බිලියන 10 ක් ලබා ගැනීමට වාර්තාවක් සකසන ලෙසත් ඒ සඳහා "Governor instructed to place price upto Rs. 10 million taking into consideration of additional sundry requirements of the government" යනුවෙන් සටහනක් තැබූ බව සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ සෙනවිරත්න මහත්මිය ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

මෙහිදී ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය මගින් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය නිවැරදි බවද ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේද එසේ නැතහොත් එය යම් බලපෑමක් මත ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයක්දැයි කාරක සභාව විමසන ලද අතර එම තීරණය ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ගැනීමට සිද්ධ වූ තීරණයක් බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී.

කාරක සභාවේ මතය

- නිලධාරීන්ගේ පරස්පර විරෝධී අදහස් දැක්වීම් පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව සාකච්ඡා කරන ලද අතර දිවුරුම් දීම මත වෙන වෙනම නිලධාරීන් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවා ප්‍රශ්න කළයුතු බවට අදහස් දක්වා සිටින ලදී.
- තවදුරටත් නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් කරන්නේද නැතහොත් මෙතෙක් ගනුලැබූ සාක්ෂි මත නිගමනයකට පැමිණෙන්නේද යන්න පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව තීන්දුවකට පැමිණිය යුතු බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.
- නැවත අගෝස්තු මස 23 දින රැස්වී කාරක සභාව මගින් කරනු ලබන මෙම විමර්ශනය අවසන් කරනු ලබනු ක්‍රමවේදයක් හා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ අවසන් නිගමනයකට පැමිණිය යුතු බව කාරක සභාව තීරණය කරන ලදී.
- මෙම කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් වන විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීන් අතර එකඟ නොවන කරුණු පවතින්නේ නම් ඒ පිළිබඳ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කළ යුතු බව

2016.09.08 දිනැති කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කළ කරුණු -

(1) දිවුරුමක් ලබා ගැනීමෙන් පසුව නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කිරීම -

කාරක සභාවේ අදහස

2016.08. 12 දින කාරක සභාවේදී, දිවුරුමක් මත මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් කරුණු විමසිය යුතුය යන යෝජනාව අද දින කාරක සභාවේදී ඉල්ලා අස්කර ගන්නා ලදී. ඒ අනුව දිවුරුමක්

ලබා ගැනීමෙන් තොරව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් කරුණු විමසිය යුතු බවට කාරක සභාව එකඟත්වය පල කරන ලදී.

(2) යම් නිශ්චිත කාල පරිච්ඡේදයක් තුල රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීම සඳහා රජය මගින් නිකුත් කළ යුත්තේ කුමන ආකාරයක ණය උපකරණ ද යන්න පිළිබඳ තීරණය කිරීම සඳහා යොදා ගනු ලබන නිර්ණායක මොනවාද යන්න පිළිබඳ විමසන ලදී. –

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ අදහස් දැක්වීම -

වසර ආරම්භයේදී ණය කළමණාකරන මූලෝපාය (Debt Management Strategy)ට අනුව මේ සඳහා අනුගමනය කිරීමට අදහස් කරන මූලික සටහන සකස් කෙරෙන බවත්, එහිදී විසර්ජන පනත ප්‍රකාරව සැකසෙන රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාව අනුව,කුමන වර්ගයේ ණය පියවීම සඳහා මෙම ණය උපකරණ නිකුත් කරනු ලබන්නේ ද යන්න මත කුමන වර්ගයේ ණය උපකරණ නිකුත් කරන්නේද ඒ කුමන කාලයක් සඳහාද යන්න තීරණ කරනු ලබන බවත්පෙන්වා දෙන ලදි. අධිපතිවරයා තවදුරටත් කරුණු දක්වමින්,ඒ අනුව ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව පිළිබඳ විශේෂඥ දැනුමක් ඇති නිලධාරී මණ්ඩලයක් මගින් අදාල කාලය තුල වෙළඳපළ වර්ධනයන්, ද්‍රවශීලතා මට්ටම, වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනු කරුවන් තුල ණය උපකරණ සඳහා ඇති ඉල්ලුම ආදී කරුණු සලකා බලා වෙළඳපල සමීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කිරීම මගින් කුමන වර්ගයේ රජයේ ණය උපකරණ නිකුත් කරන්නේද යන්න පිළිබඳ තීරණය කරනු ලබන බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(3) මූල්‍ය වෙළඳ පල තුල කෙටි කාලීන හා දිගු කාලීන වශයෙන් සුරැකුම්පත් සඳහා ඉල්ලුමක් ඇති වන්නේ කුමන හේතු පදනම් කරගෙන ද යන්න විමසන ලදී. -

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය -

එය ඉදිරියේදී වෙළඳපල හැසිරෙන ආකාරය පිළිබඳ කෙරෙන පූර්වකතනයන් මත තීරණය වන බවත්, නිදසුනක් ලෙස රජය ඉදිරියේදි වැඩි වශයෙන් ණය ලබා ගැනීමට තීරණය කරන බවට අනුමාන කරන්නේ නම්, එවන් තත්ත්වයක් තුල පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහල යන බවත්, එවිට ආයෝජනය කරනු ලබන මුදල් වැඩි පොලී අනුපාතයකට විකුණා ගත හැකි බවට අනුමාන කරමින් වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් කෙටි කාලීන සුරැකුම් පත් සඳහා වැඩි ඉල්ලුමක් ඇති කරන බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(4) වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතර ඉදිරියේදී වෙළඳපල තුල ඇතිවිය හැකි සංචලනයන් පිළිබඳ වෙනස් වූ මතයන් පැවතිය හැකිද යන්න පිළිබඳ විමසන ලදී.

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය -

මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල තුල ඇතිවිය කෙටි කාලීන වශයෙන් (සතියක් වැනි කාලයක් තුල) ඇතිවිය හැකි සංචලන සම්බන්ධයෙන් වුවද වෙළඳපල ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් / ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයන් අතර විවිධාකාර අදහස් උදහස් සැබැවින්ම ඇතිවිය හැකි බවත් මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති කමිටුවේදීද ඉදිරියට ඇතිවිය හැකි වෙළඳපල සංචලන සම්බන්ධයෙන් ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයන් අතර විවිධ මත පළවන බව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(5) **සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කරන්නන් විසින් හෝ සුරැකුම්පත් මිලදී ගන්නන් විසින් සුරැකුම්පත් නිකුත් කිරීම හෝ මිලදී ගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමන් පුරෝකතන මතකලින් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණ මගින් අවාසිදායක ප්‍රතිඵල / අලාභයන් විඳින්නට සිදු වූ අවස්ථා මින් පෙර උදාවී ඇත්ද යන්න පිළිබඳ විමසන ලදී. -**

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය -

එවන් අවස්ථා කලින් පැවත ඇති බවත් මුල්‍ය වෙළඳපල මූලධර්ම හා මතවාද ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම් මත ක්‍රියාත්මක වන දෙයක් බවත් නිරන්තරයෙන් වෙනස් වන එවන් විචල්‍යයන් මත මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල තත්ත්වයන් පුරෝකතනය කිරීම අසීරු කටයුත්තක් බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.

(6) **ණය උපකරණයක් නිකුත් කළ යුතු කාල පරාසය හා ඵලදායිතා අනුපාතය නීර්ණය කිරීම සඳහා නිශ්චිත ක්‍රමයක් පවතීද යන්න විමසන ලදි. -**

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය -

පවතින වෙළඳපල තත්ත්වයන් අධ්‍යනය කර ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීරණ ගනු ලබන බව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් පෙන්වාදෙන ලදි.

(7) **ඉහත කී කාරණා අනුව මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල තුල තීරණ ගැනීමේදී අතපසුවීම් සිදු විය හැකි බව දීර්ඝ කාලීන පළපුරුද්දක සහිත ආර්ථික විද්‍යාඥයෙක් ලෙස තමන් අදහස් කරන්නේදැයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් විමසන ලදී. -**

මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය -

ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව යනු නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් ප්‍රතිඵල පෙන්වා දිය හැකි විද්‍යාවක් නොවන අතර මූල්‍ය වෙළඳපල තුල ගනු ලබන තීරණ මත සැබවින්ම අතපසු වීම් සිදු විය හැකි බව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදි.

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The Financial Statement of M/s Perpetual Treasuries Limited which appeared in The Sunday Observer Newspaper of 25 September 2016

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Annexure 17

"Sunday Observer"
25 September 2016

Perpetual Treasuries Limited
Perfect your future investments
Central Bank Appointed Primary Dealer

PERPETUAL TREASURIES LIMITED
Central Bank appointed Primary Dealer in Government Securities
Audited Financial Statements for the Year ended 31st March 2016

STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION AS AT	31/03/2016 Rs.	31/03/2015 Rs.
ASSETS		
Cash in hand and at bank	5,498,640	2,043,989
Financial assets held for trading	495,165,572	7,856,448,794
Government securities purchased under resale agreements	11,303,744,131	976,953
Property, plant & equipment	10,057,092	13,021,022
Intangible assets	5,632,935	7,113,508
Other assets	26,373,671	1,115,843
Total assets	11,846,472,041	7,880,720,109
EQUITY & LIABILITIES		
Capital and Reserves		
Stated capital	310,300,000	310,300,000
Special risk reserve	869,357,782	239,882,355
Retained earnings	4,984,969,488	515,683,791
Total equity	6,164,627,270	1,065,866,146
LIABILITIES		
Government securities sold under repurchase agreements	5,567,004,241	6,723,509,008
Retirement benefit obligations	513,335	398,556
Other liabilities	113,914,222	90,946,399
Bank overdraft	412,973	-
Total liabilities	5,681,844,771	6,814,853,863
Total equity and liabilities	11,846,472,041	7,880,720,109
Net assets per share	86.83	15.01

STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN EQUITY
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st MARCH 2016

	Stated Capital Rs.	Retained Earnings Rs.	Special Risk Reserve Rs.	Total Rs.
As at 01st April 2014	310,300,000	(3,743,273)	-	306,556,727
Net profit for the period	-	959,550,807	-	959,550,807
Transfer to Special Risk Reserve	-	(239,882,355)	239,882,355	-
Other Comprehensive Income	-	(21,388)	-	(21,388)
Dividend paid	-	(200,220,000)	-	(200,220,000)
Balance as at 31st March 2015	310,300,000	515,683,791	239,882,355	1,065,866,146
As at 01st April 2015	310,300,000	515,683,791	239,882,355	1,065,866,146
Net Profit for the period	-	5,124,196,321	-	5,124,196,321
Transfer to special risk reserve	-	(629,475,427)	629,475,427	-
Other comprehensive income	-	124,803	-	124,803
Dividend paid	-	(25,560,000)	-	(25,560,000)
Balance as at 31st March 2016	310,300,000	4,984,969,488	869,357,782	6,164,627,270

Published as per direction Ref DB/ 24/ 002/ 005/ 01 issued by Superintendent of Public Debt Department of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka

STATEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st MARCH

	Audited 2016 Rs.	Audited 2015 Rs.
Interest income on government securities	942,821,872	358,989,909
Interest expense	(589,176,741)	(252,913,953)
Net interest income	353,645,131	106,075,956
Net Capital gain from trading financial assets	5,230,929,386	767,154,108
Brokerage fee	(9,793,385)	(15,467,700)
Income from trading activities	5,574,781,132	857,762,364
Other income	-	3,953,157
Sales and promotion costs	(13,054,050)	(2,169,266)
Administration costs	(183,987,761)	(146,992,448)
Net profit before (Loss) / profit from revaluation of trading securities	5,377,739,321	712,553,807
Profit / (Loss) from revaluation of trading securities	(253,543,000)	246,997,000
Profit before tax	5,124,196,321	959,550,807
Tax	-	-
Net profit for the period	5,124,196,321	959,550,807
Other comprehensive income	124,803	(21,388)
Total comprehensive income for the period	5,124,321,124	959,529,419
Earnings Per Share	72.17	13.51

I certify that these financial statements have been prepared in compliance with the requirement of the companies Act, No 07 of 2007

Sgd.
N N D Jayasekara
Manager - Finance

Sgd
P A D K O Palisena
Chief Executive Officer

The Board of Directors are responsible for the preparation and presentation of these Financial Statements.

Approved and signed for and on behalf of the Board.

Sgd.
G J Aloysius
Chairman

Sgd.
C R Hulugalle
Director

Colombo Sri Lanka
23rd September 2016

Perpetual Treasuries Limited
Company Registration number : PB 88550
Registered Address: Level 03, Prince Alfred Tower, No. 10 Alfred House Gardens, Colombo 03, Sri Lanka.
Tel: +94 11 220 61 23 | Fax: +94 11 220 61 10 | www.perpetualtreasuries.com

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Bank of Ceylon

The Agreed Upon Procedures Engagement on the Primary Dealer Unit of Bank of Ceylon

01 January 2015 to 31 March 2015

EY
Building a better working world

Building a better working world

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AdeS/HMAJ/VS/AD

Mr. Ranel T. Wijesinha
Chairman
Audit Committee
Bank of Ceylon
No. 01 Bank of Ceylon Mawatha
Colombo 01.

10 April 2015

Report on Agreed Upon Procedure Engagement - Primary Dealer Unit of Bank of Ceylon

Dear Mr. Wijesinha

We write with reference to the request made by you and the subsequent discussion our Partner Mr. Manil Jayesinghe had with you on 16 March 2015 and our subsequent proposal dated 16 March 2015 to perform an Agreed Upon Procedure Engagement on the Primary Dealer Unit of Bank of Ceylon.

We commenced our field work on 24 March 2015 and had two interim presentations to you on 2 April 2015 and 8 April 2015. Our field work was completed on the 9 April 2015 and our draft report was submitted to you on 10 April 2015.

Attached herewith is our final report dated 10 April 2015 for submission to the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors of Bank of Ceylon.

Our report is solely for the information of the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors of Bank of Ceylon and is not to be used for any other purpose or to be distributed to any other parties. We do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone other than the Board of Directors of Bank of Ceylon, for our work or for this report we have issued. This report should not to be used, circulated, quoted or otherwise referred to for any other purpose. This report relates only to the items specified in our proposal dated 16 March 2015 and does not extend to any financial statements of the Bank of Ceylon Primary Dealer Unit, taken as a whole.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you require any further information or clarification with regard to this report.

Yours faithfully

Partners: A D B Talwatte FCA FCMA M P D Cooray FCA FCMA R N de Saram ACA FCMA Ms. N A De Silva FCA Ms. Y A De Silva FCA W R H Fernando FCA FCMA
W K B S P Fernando FCA FCMA Ms. L K H L Fonseka FCA A P A Gunasekera FCA FCMA A Herath FCA D K Hulangamuwa FCA FCMA LLB (Lond) H M A Jayesinghe FCA FCMA
Ms. A A Ludowyke FCA FCMA Ms. G G S Manatunga FCA N M Sulaiman ACA ACMA B F Wijesuriya ACA ACMA

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III Bid History of BOC-PDU Treasury Bills for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31 March 2015

IV Details of External Customers - Treasury Bonds purchased for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31 March 2015

V Details of External Customers - Treasury Bills purchased for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31 March 2015

VI Details of Customer Requisitions

Documents provided to us for further verification by the Chairman of the Audit Committee of Bank of Ceylon

VII Explanation handed over by the General Manager Mr. D.M. Gunasekera to the Chairman ,Bank of Ceylon.

VIII Explanation provided by the Chief Risk Officer Mr. Lalith Fernando at the request of the Chairman of the Audit Committee.

Other Documents obtained from BOC

IX BOC Treasury Operation Manual - Primary Dealer Unit

X E-mail copy of Customer Requisition - Perpetual Treasuries Ltd

ERNST & YOUNG Chartered Accountants COLOMBO

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AdeS/HMAJ/VS/AD

Mr. Ranel T. Wijesinha
Chairman
Audit Committee
Bank of Ceylon
No.01 Bank of Ceylon Mawatha
Colombo 01.

10 April 2015

Agreed Upon Procedure Engagement on the Primary Dealer Unit (PDU) of Bank of Ceylon (BOC)

Dear Mr. Wijesinha

We have performed the procedures agreed with you and enumerated below with respect to the procedures of the Primary Dealer Unit of Bank of Ceylon ("PDU"), for the three months ended 31 March 2015. Our engagement was undertaken in accordance with the Sri Lanka Auditing Standard 4400 Engagements to Perform Agreed - Upon Procedures Regarding Financial Information. (International Standards on Auditing 4400 - Engagements to Perform Agreed - Upon Procedures Regarding Financial Information). The procedures were performed solely to assist the Audit Committee in obtaining comfort on procedures related to PDU and are summarized as follows;

1. Review the compliance of the procedures adopted by BOC PDU with the regulations laid down by Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) and those specified by the Board of Directors of Bank of Ceylon (BOC).

2. Check compliance of the activities carried out by BOC PDU with the policies and procedures adopted by the Bank.

3. Perform a GAP analysis with regard to the design of the processes to address the risks in the PDU business in comparison with best practices.

We report our findings below:

I. **Review the compliance of the procedures adopted by BOC PDU with the regulations laid down by CBSL and those specified by the BOD of BOC.**

A Primary Dealer is a specialized intermediary in the government securities market, appointed by the CBSL under the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance No. 8 of 1923 and the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance No.7 of 1937. The main purposes of the Primary Dealer system include strengthening the primary market by;

Partners: A D B Talwatte FCA FCMA M P D Cooray FCA FCMA R N de Saram ACA FCMA Ms. N A De Silva FCA Ms. Y A De Silva FCA W R H Fernando FCA FCMA W K B S P Fernando FCA FCMA Ms. L K H L Fonseka FCA A P A Gunasekera FCA FCMA A Herath FCA D K Hulangamuwa FCA FCMA LLB (Lond) H M A Jayesinghe FCA FCMA Ms. A A Ludowyke FCA FCMA Ms. G G S Manatunga FCA N M Sulaiman ACA ACMA B E Wijesuriya ACA ACMA

a) Helping to build stable, dependable source of demand for securities by effectively participating in the primary auctions conducted by Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
b) Providing liquidity in the secondary market,
c) Building distribution channels (to act as intermediaries) and,
d) Providing market information, including price, volumes and spreads between bids and offers.

At present there are 16 approved Primary Dealers in Sri Lanka.

1.1 Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) Direction on Minimum Subscription Levels – Treasury Bills and Bond Auction- (CBSL Directive dated 15 August 2003)

In terms of the Direction each Primary Dealer is hereby required to subscribe a minimum 10% of the amount offered for each maturity at each Treasury Bond Auction and Treasury Bill Auctions in order to ensure that the auctions are fully subscribed. There is no specific limit for a maximum bid.

Bid History of BOC PDU- Treasury Bonds- for the period 1 January 2015- 31 March 2015

- During this period CBSL has conducted 7 Primary auctions of Treasury Bonds. As a Primary Dealer BOC has Bid in all 7 auctions. (Annexure 11).

We report our observations as follows

- Out of the 7 auctions bids placed at 6 auctions were within the range of 10% - 13.15% of the auction value advertised by CBSL. At the Auction Held on the 27 February 2015, BOC placed bids for 1,350 times higher than the CBSL advertised Auction Value.

- BOC had bid the minimum requirement (i.e 10%) at 4 out of the 7 auctions. These bids were placed only on behalf of BOC. None of the bids were accepted by CBSL.

- There were 3 Auctions where BOC placed bids as follows:

  - At the auction held on 2/27/2015, BOC did not place any bids on behalf of the Bank and placed bids on account of another Primary Dealer, Perpetual Securities Limited for Rs. 13 Bn. and other customers for Rs. 508 Mn. without considering the Bank's exposure to credit, market and liquidity risks. (Annexure IV)

  - 3/10/2015 – 13% for BOC and 0.15% for a Trust. The value accepted was Rs. 3,000 mn. amounting to 10% of the Auction Value.

  - 3/17/2015 – 10% for BOC 0.1% for an Individual Customer. Total Bid Rejected.

- At present regulations, there is no prohibition for a Primary Dealer to place a Bid on behalf of another Primary Dealer.

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Bid History of BOC PDU - Treasury Bills- for the period 1 January 2015- 31 March 2015

During this period CBSL has conducted 14 Primary auctions of Treasury Bills. As a primary dealer BOC has Bid in all 14 auctions. (Annexure III).

We report our observations as follows

- Out of the 14 auctions, BOC has placed bid for the Bank and other customers for 5 Auctions. Bids have been placed only for the Bank at the other 9 Auctions.

- The % of bidding at the 5 Auctions where BOC placed bids for the Bank and the customers are as follows. (Annexure III).

    - 1/21/2015- 11% for BOC and 4% for Customers
    - 1/28/2015- 15% for BOC and 12% for Customers
    - 2/25/2015- 13% for BOC and 7% for Customers
    - 3/11/2015- 10% for BOC and 5% for Customers
    - 3/18/2015 – 25% for BOC and 6% for Customers

- At the other 9 Auctions, BOC bid % range from 10% to 33%

- The success rate at the T/Bills auctions range from100% to 20%.

1.2 Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka- Issued by CBSL- (CBSL Directive dated 7 November 2013)

1.2.1 Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka - Section 11 - Knowing the Customer and Suitability

- *Sec. 11.1- A Primary Dealer must gather and record sufficient information from the customer prior to offering, recommending arranging or providing a product/ service appropriate to that customer. The level of information gathered should be appropriate to the nature and complexity of the product/service being sought by the customer, but must be to a level that allows the primary dealer to provide a professional service.*

- *Sec 11.3- When assessing the suitability of a product/service for a Customer, the Primary Dealer must, at minimum, consider and document whether, on the basis of the information gathered under Provision 11.1:*

    a) *The product/service meets Customer's needs and objectives*
    b) *The customer;*
        - *Is likely to be able to meet the financial commitment associated with the product/service on an ongoing basis.*
        - *Is financially able to bear any risks attaching to the product/service and*
        - *The product/service is consistent with Customer's attitude to risk.*

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The following Procedures were carried out by us:

I. Inquired the procedures followed in order to comply with the KYC guidelines.
II. Requested the KYC forms of customer to ensure the compliance with the KYC guidelines.

We give below our findings:

- Know Your Customer (KYC) procedure followed by the Primary Dealer Unit (PDU) of the Bank does not cover all types of customers of the Bank.

- As per the discussion held with Chief Dealer on 31 March 2015, we were informed that Know Your Customer (KYC) for corporates are not taken by the PDU before entering into Primary Dealer transactions and reliance is placed on the Bank KYC process.

- On verification of the KYC forms, we observed lapses in the following KYC forms made available to us.

    - Perpetual Treasuries Limited- Seal of BOC has not been placed on the signature on the Bank Officer authorizing the KYC form.

    - Ceylinco Life PLC - The Authorized Signature of the Bank Officer and the BOC seal authorizing the KYC form was missing.

- During our review we noted that Primary Dealer Unit does not have a documented credit evaluation process. As per the explanation received from Chief Dealer, the unit does not carry out credit evaluation on Banks and other Primary Dealers. The unit only examines the movement of current accounts for other existing customers. The unit only accepts bids from existing Bank customers. However there is no documentary evidence to prove this practice.

- The service line also does not have a requirement for identifying credit limits for customers.

1.2.2 CBSL Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka- Section 7.1- Conflicts of Interest

A Primary Dealer must have in place and operate in accordance with a written conflicts of interest policy appropriate to the nature, scale and complexity of the Primary Dealer activities carried out by the Primary Dealer. The conflicts of interest policy must:

a) Identify, with references to the Primary Dealer activities carried out by or on behalf of the Primary Dealer, the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a risk of damage to the interest of its Customers; and

b) Specify procedures to be followed, and measures to be adopted, in order to manage such conflicts.

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The following Procedures were performed by us:

- Reviewed the BOC (PDU) Procedure Manual to identify the documented policy with regard to the conflict of interest.

Our Findings are as follows

- The Procedure Manual of BOC (PDU) does not have a documented policy with regard to the conflict of interest.
- There is also no documented evidence of any review carried out by the PDU to establish any conflicts of interest during the period reviewed by us.

1.2.3 CBSL Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka - Conflicts of Interest Sections 7.5- 7.6

A Primary Dealer must ensure that there are effective fire walls in place between the different business areas of the Primary Dealer, and between the Primary Dealer and its connected parties, in relation to information which could potentially give rise to a conflict of interest or be open to abuse.

A Primary Dealer must ensure that it has written procedures in place relating to the maintainance of fire walls, and the cosequences of breaches of the fire walls. These procedures must be notified to all relevant officers and employees of the Primary Dealer.

The following Procedures were performed by us:

- Reviewed the BOC (PDU) Procedure Manual to identify the documented policy with regard to the conflict of interest.

Our Findings are as follows

- The Procedure Manual of BOC (PDU) does not have a documented policy with regard to the conflict of interest.
- There is also no documented evidence of any review carried out by the PDU to establish any conflicts of interest during the period reviewed by us.

1.2.4 CBSL Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka- Section 10 -Provision of Information (Sections 10.9-10.10)

The terms of business must set out the basis on which the Primary Dealer provides its Primary Dealer activities and must include at least the following;

a) *the legal name, trading name(s), address, and contact details of the Primary Dealer;*
b) *if the Primary Dealer is part of a group, the name of the group to which the Primary Dealer belongs to;*
c) *confirmation that the Primary Dealer is authorised , licensed or registered and the name of the competent authority that has authorised, licensed or registered it:*

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d) a statement that it is subject to this Customer Charter which offeres protection to Customers and that the Charter can be found in Sinhala, Tamil and English languages on the CBSL's website
e) a description of the Primary Dealer activities that the Primary Dealer providers
f) a general statement of the changes imposed directly by the Primary Dealer
g) a summary of the Primary Dealer's policy in relation to how it will use a Customer's personal data
h) a summary of the Primary Dealer's policy in relation to the conflicts of interest
i) an outline of the action remedies which the Primary Dealer may take in the event of default by the Customer

A Primary Dealer must provide its terms of business to a Customer as a stand-alone document.

The following Procedures were performed by us:

- Requested a stand-alone document which specify the terms of business to a customer.

Our Findings are as follows

- BOC PDU does not issue any printed stand- alone terms of business to customers.

1.2.5 CBSL Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka- Section 13 -Error Resolution (Section 13.1)

A Primary Dealer must have written procedures in place for the effective handling of errors which affect customers. At a minimum, these procedures must provide for the following:

a) The identification of the cause of the error
b) The identification of all affected customers
c) The appropriate analysis of the patterns of the errors, including investigation as to whether or not it was an isolated error
d) Proper control of the correction process and
e) Escalation of errors to compliance/risk functions and senior management

The following Procedures were performed by us:

- Reviewed the BOC (PDU) Procedure Manual to identify the documented policy with regard to the Error Resolution.

Our Findings are as follows

- The Procedure Manual of BOC (PDU) does not have a documented policy with regard to Error Resolution.

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1.2.6 CBSL Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka- Section 14 -Complaints Resolution (Section 14.3 - 14.4)

A Primary Dealer must have in place a written procedure for the proper handling of complaints. This procedure need not apply where the complaint has been resolved to the complainant's satisfaction within five working days, provided however that a record of this fact is maintained. At a minimum this procedure must provide that:

a) *The Primary Dealer must acknowledge each complaint in writing within five business days of the complaint being received.*
b) *The Primary Dealer must provide the complainant with the name of one or more individuals appointed by the Primary Dealer to be the complainant's point of contact in relation to the complaint until the complaint is resolved or cannot be progressed any further*
c) *The Primary Dealer must provide the complainant with a regular update, in writing, on the progress of the investigation of the complaint at intervals of not greater than 20 business days, starting from the date on which the complaint was made*
d) *The Primary Dealer must attempt to investigate and resolve a complaint within 40 business days of having received the complaint; where the 40 business days have elapsed and the complaint is not resolved, the Primary Dealer must inform the complainant of the anticipated timeframe within which the Primary Dealer intends to resolve the complaint and must inform the customer that they can refer the matter to the Financial Ombudsman, and must provide the customer with the contact details of such Ombudsman and*

Within five business days of the completion of the investigation, the Primary Dealer must advise the customer in writing, of:

I. *The outcome of the investigation*
II. *Where applicable, the terms of any offer or settlement being made*
III. *That the customer can refer the matter to the Financial Ombudsman,*
IV. *and The contact details of Financial Ombudsman*

The Primary Dealer must maintain an up-to-date log of all complaints from customers subject to the complaints procedure.

The following Procedures were performed by us:

- Reviewed the BOC (PDU) Procedure Manual to identify the documented policy and procedures with regard to the Complaints Resolution.

- Requested from the PDU unit the customer complaints log.

Our Findings are as follows

- The Procedure Manual of BOC (PDU) does not have a documented policy and procedures with regard to the Complaints Resolution.

- The PDU does not maintain a Customer Complaints log.

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1.2.7 CBSL Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka- Section 15 – Records and Compliance (Section 15.1 – 15.3)

A Primary Dealer must ensure that all instructions from or on behalf of customers, including the date of both receipt and transaction of the instructions are recorded.

A primary dealer must ensure that any decision in the exercise of its discretion on behalf of a customer with respect to a product /Service is recorded.

A Primary Dealer must maintain up to date records containing at least the followings.

a. *A copy of all document required for customer identification and profile.*
b. *The customers contact details.*
c. *All information and documents prepared in compliance with this charter.*
d. *Details of product /Service provided to the customer.*
e. *All correspondence with the customer and the details of any other information provided to the customer in relation to the product /Service*
f. *All documents or applications completed or signed by the customer.*
g. *Copies of all original documents submitted by the customer in support of an application for the provision of a product /Service; and .*
h. *All other relevant information and documentation concerning the customer.*

The following Procedures were performed by us:

- Reviewed the BOC Primary Dealer Procedure Manual to identify the documented policy and procedures with regard to the Record Keeping and Compliance process.

Our Findings are as follows

- The Procedure Manual of BOC Primary Dealer does not have a documented policy and procedures with regard to the Record Keeping and Compliance process.

2. Check compliance of the activities carried out by BOC PDU with the policies and procedures adopted by the Bank.

2.1 BOC Procedure Manual -Section 6- Primary Dealer Unit. (Page 65)

Primary dealer unit should not process application without verification of funds, signatures and the other vital data's. They also should adhere to the K.Y.C guidelines especially in the cash transactions.

The following Procedures were carried out by us:

I. *Inquired the procedures followed in order to comply with the KYC guidelines.*
II. *Requested the KYC forms of customer to ensure the compliance with the KYC guidelines.*
III. *Inquired about procedures followed to verify the funds.*

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IV. Inquired the procedures followed to obtain customers consent for the method of communicating with the Bank and the names, designations and signatures of the authorized officials of the customer.

V. Requested the procedures followed to verify the signatures in the customer requisitions.

We give below our findings: (Annexure VI)

- As per the discussion held with Chief Dealer on 31 March 2015, we were informed that Know Your Customer (KYC) for corporates are not taken by the PDU before entering into Primary Dealer transactions and reliance is placed on the Bank KYC process.

- On verification of the KYC forms, we observed lapses in the following KYC forms made available to us.

    - Perpetual Treasuries Limited- Seal of BOC has not been placed on the signature on the Bank Officer authorizing the KYC form.

    - Ceylinco Life PLC - The Authorized Signature of the Bank Officer and the BOC Seal authorizing the KYC form was missing.

- During our review we noted that Primary Dealer unit does not have a documented credit evaluation process. As per the explanation received from Chief Dealer, the unit does not carry out credit evaluation on Banks, other Primary Dealers. The unit only examines the movement of current accounts for other existing customers. The unit only accepts bids from existing Bank customers. However there is no documentary evidence to prove this practice.

- The service line also does not have a requirement for identifying credit limits for customers.

- Generally the Bank obtains the instruction from the customers via e-mail and fax. Bank has not obtained customer consent with regard to the method of communication.

- Customer signatures have not been verified in the Customer Requisition by an authorized officer.

- We observed that when the Bank obtained the customer requisition via Fax, Names of the authorized signatories and seal of the company are not available on the customer requisition.

- The Bank also does not have a secure email channel to obtain email requests from customers.

- Bank has also not obtained customer indemnity for fax and email correspondences.

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- The Bank also does not request subsequent confirmation of the transactions for Primary Market Transactions. This is obtained for Secondary Market Transactions.

2.2 BOC Procedure Manual -Section 6.3.15- Function of Audit and Internal Control Officer (ICO). (Page 87)

- *ICO should check all relevant aspects with due care to achieve the objective of existing internal control of the Bank.*
- *ICO should concentrate on following aspects.*
  - *Authority*
  - *Accuracy*
  - *Completeness*
- *Also ICO should get some reports daily from Report Menu of Integrated Treasury Management System (ITMS) under PDU.*

The following procedures were carried out by us

- Discussed with the ICO to understand the process followed by him.
- Requested for documentary evidence of the verifications done by the ICO.

We give below our findings

- We observed that the ICO did not get print outs independently.
- There is no evidence to prove that the ICO reviewed the reports specified in the manual.

3. Perform a GAP analysis with regard to the design of the processes to address the risks in the PDU business in comparison with best practices.

We give below other observations in addition to the matters noted above for consideration by the management.

3.1 Delegated level of authority in respect of accepting bids from customers

- All customer requests related to primary market transactions are approved by the chief dealer.
- We did not come across any Board Approved delegated limited under which Primary Market Transactions are carried out by the PDU. However there are delegated limits for Secondary Market Transactions. Therefore the Primary Market Transactions would require approval by persons who have delegated authority. By conducting Primary Market Transactions without clear delegated authority, and specific approval for transactions, the Bank would be exposed to credit, liquidity and market risks.

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3.2 Bidding Process

- Treasury Bond Auction Sheets are signed by the Dealer, Chief Dealer, Senior Manager-PDU and Assistant General Manager (Treasury) with the following certification:

  "Committee for investment in government Securities decided to submit the Bid after having discussed the bank's requirement for investment, liquidity position and possibility of maximum allocation of available stocks to customer requirement."

- However we requested the Minutes from Chief Dealer and he confirmed that there is no such a minutes and that this is regular wording used by the Bank on the Auction Sheet.

- We recommend the Bank to maintain minutes of the Investment Committee Meetings to ensure transparency of the decisions made.

- We also noted that with regard to the auction held on 2/27/2105, BOC has not placed a bid which as per discussions with the Chief Dealer was due to excess liquidity whereas the reason given for the re-purchase on the settlement date of 3/2/2015 was excess liquidity of the Bank. No documentary evidence was made available to us to support this evaluation.

3.3 Settlement of Bids by third Parties

- In instances where the bids placed on behalf of other parties have been successful, cash has been received in full from the customers other than in one instance noted below.

  - With regard to the settlement of Rs. 3 Bn by Perpetual Securities Ltd, on 3/2/2015 we noted a sale and purchase by BOC amounting to Rs. 2.3 bn of the bid placed on behalf of the Primary Dealer as stated below.

Perpetual -Settlement of Bid		BOC - Outright Purchase from Perpetual	
15.26 p.m.	Rs 1 Bn	15.25 p.m.	Rs. 300,000,000
15.27.25p.m	Rs. 1 Bn	15.27.25 p.m.	Rs 1 Bn
15.34 p.m	Rs. 1 Bn	15.27 p.m	Rs 1 Bn

  - In certain instances, the sale proceeds appear to have been released before the settlement of the full bid liability by Perpetual Securities Ltd.
  - There was not specific approval requested or granted for this transaction.

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- As per the deal ticket this is an outright purchase. However, as per the dealer confirmation from Perpetual Securities, the bank has entered into a transaction to purchase at an agreed yield of 12.50% and re-sell the same security to perpetual on 6 March 2015 on an agreed yield of 12.495%. From this transaction BOC has earned Rs.3.9Mn profit.

- We also noted that BOC does not obtain bid settlements from the Primary Market Customers prior to settlement of the Bid Liability to CBSL.

3.4 Secondary Market Transaction of Treasury Bonds

- On 6 March 2015 Bank has sold the bond purchased from Perpetual Securities Ltd. As per the deal ticket this is an outright sale to the same customer.

- At the time of sale, Bank did not use the market rate prevailing at selling date.

- Generally Bank practice is to use the market rate for Secondary Market transactions.

- If the Bank made this transaction at the market rate based on the average secondary market yield (11.775%) BOC would have made a gain of Rs.136.14 Mn. (Secondary Market Yield is extracted from weekly economic indicators published by Central Bank of Sri Lanka on 06 March 2015).

3.5 Accounting treatment on primary auction transaction

- Bank policy is to recognize all financial assets and liabilities on the Settlement date. The settlement date is the date on which a financial transaction is settled and monies from the transaction is received in the recipient's account. Companies that use settlement date accounting principles do not officially record a transaction until the deal is closed and cash is received.

- Since Bank has committed to purchase, Bank has to record the allocated T.Bonds or T.Bills as a commitment.

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4. Improvement to BOC Procedure Manual- Primary Dealer Unit

4.1 Section 6.0- Primary Dealer Unit

"Primary Dealer Unit of the Treasury Division will process the Treasury Bill/ Treasury Bond tender results, customer applications, discount of Treasury Bills/ Bonds for customers and corporates and deals concluded by Front Office staff."

However, customer applications are filled only by individual clients and small scale corporate clients. Large scale Corporate clients, Banks and Primary Dealers do not practice filling of customer applications. The said discrepancy should be addressed to ensure that different procedures in place for different customers are specifically stated in the Manual of Procedures.

4.2 Section 6.1 Policy – Primary Dealer Unit

"Swift messages will be verified by a "B" class officer other than the messages generated from the ITMS System."

Section 6.3.7 Messages

"'B' class officer at PDU will generate Swift messages, reinvestment sales, cancellation and discount process, and after checking for accuracy, Swift messages will be sent to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka before 4:00 p.m. every working day."

The above processes contradict each other. Further, it signifies the fact that the process lacks control over segregation of duties as generation and verification of SWIFT messages are the responsibilities of a single officer ("B" class officer). However, as per the practice of the Bank, 'Data Entry Operator' is responsible for generating SWIFT messages and verification of the same is the duty of a "B" class officer.

4.3 Section '6.3.3- Maturity Process of Treasury Bills',

'A' class officer at PDU authorizes all changes in the maturity list."
As per the practice of the bank, an "A" class officer in PDU does not authorize changes in the maturity list in the maturity list itself. However, Senior Manager - PDU (an "A" class officer) authorizes the final bid sheet prepared by Dealer where all such changes to maturity list are incorporated.

However, any amendment to the changes done in the maturity list that gets highlighted by Senior Manager – PDU will ensure that the entire bid sheet has to be amended, re-printed and submitted for approval which emphasizes duplication of work. Therefore, the Manual of Procedures should be specific as to when an "A" class officer in PDU should be authorizing all changes done to the maturity list. Ideally, it should be prior to submission of the same to Dealer.

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4.4 Section 6.3.4 Re-investment of Treasury Bills

"In the re-investment process, customers may have to select one of the following two options -

(a) Continuation of same face value and interest is credited to their account
(b) Full amount will be re-invested up to the nearest rupee"

The section is limited to the above two scenarios and does not address further possibilities. Further possibilities include,

1. Customer requesting to increase/decrease the re-investment amount
2. Customer requesting to re-invest for a different tenor

As per the practice of the Bank, above mentioned possibilities are addressed by means of obtaining written instructions to continue the request. The same should be included in the Manual of Procedures to ensure a comprehensive control mechanism is in practice for the re-investment process.

4.5 Section 6.3.7 Messages

"SWIFT message will include -

(i) Customer Code
(ii) ISIN
(iii) Face Value"

SWIFT messages as per the practice of the bank contain the following elements;

1. *Report Generation Date*
2. *Report Generation Time*
3. *Movement Details*
    a. *Transaction Reference*
    b. *Matching Transaction Reference*
    c. *RTGS Settlement Request Reference*
    d. *Transaction type*
    e. *Face value (Quantity)*
    f. *Settlement value*
    g. *Trade date*
    h. *Settlement date*
4. *Security Details*
    a. *ISIN*
    b. *Security Name*
5. *Party Details*
    a. *Submitter Code*
    b. *Debit Participant Code*
    c. *Debit Account*
    d. *Credit Participant Code*

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6. *Status Change Time*
    a. *Entry time*
    b. *Matched time*
    c. *Settlement time*

The Manual of Procedures does not state elements that should be included in SWIFT messages in detailed form. Therefore, it should be amended to ensure that all essential elements are incorporated to the Manual of Procedures.

4.6 Section '6.3.10 Treasury Bond transactions

"The PDU will adopt the following procedure for the sale of Treasury Bonds to customers/banks -

Customers desirous of investing in Treasury Bonds will submit an application form or a letter of request to purchase Treasury Bonds in the secondary market. The customer will specify the following details -

- *Name, address and telephone number*
- *Face value*
- *Period*
- *Yield*

'B' class and 'A' class officers attached to the PDU will verify and authorize sale deal ticket. The authorized deal ticket will be kept at the PDU.

Staff at the PDU will enter a message to Wide Area Network (WAN) provided by the CBSL which will be entered, verified and authorized by 'B' and 'A' class officers in order to re-position the security.

Repositioning message fields specify the following -

- *Reference number*
- *Face value*
- *ISIN*
- *Customer Code number*
- *Date"*

As per the practice of the Bank, the above mentioned procedures are followed for sales transactions with individual and small scale customers. Therefore, the Manual of Procedures should be amended to ensure that customer types are specifically mentioned to ensure that reader understands different procedures in place for different customer groups.

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Further, responsibility to generate SWIFT messages should be allocated to a specific officer since the phrase "staff at the PDU" is subjective since it includes officers of all categories ('A' class, 'B' class, Date Entry and Internal Control). Further it could hinder the control strength in segregation of duties. However, as per the current practice of the bank, SWIFT message generation is the responsibility of 'Data Entry Officer' at the PDU.

Elements that are included in Repositioning messages are less detailed as per the section quoted above. The relevant section of the Manual of Procedures should be modified and include below mentioned elements.

1. Report Generation Date
2. Report Generation Time
3. Movement Details
    a. Transaction Reference
    b. Matching Transaction Reference
    c. RTGS Settlement Request Reference
    d. Transaction type
    e. Face value (Quantity)
    f. Settlement value
    g. Trade date
    h. Settlement date
4. Security Details
    a. ISIN
    b. Security Name
5. Party Details
    a. Submitter Code
    b. Debit Participant Code
    c. Debit Account
    d. Credit Participant Code
6. Status Change Time
    a. Entry time
    b. Matched time
    c. Settlement time

4.7 Section 6.3.12- Deal Confirmation

'B' class officer who verifies the respective transaction is responsible for checking deal confirmations from banks and brokers. He/she should send deal conformations on the same day and attach the soft copy in the Deal Ticket. He/she should also check the counterparty confirmations. If confirmations are not received or if there is any discrepancy, a 'B' class officer at the PDU should inform the counterparty and make sure to obtain deal confirmation in time."

The section does not state that a copy of the authorized counterparty confirmation should be maintained by the PDU for audit trail. Further, a 'soft copy' of the deal conformation is not possible to be attached to the deal ticket. Therefore, necessary amendments to the relevant section of the Manual of Procedures should be made.

4.8 Section 6.3.15 Functions of Audit and Internal Control Officer

"ICO should concentrate on following aspects.

- *Authority*
- *Accuracy*
- *Completeness"*

However, the relevant section of the Manual of Procedures does not state that Internal Control Officer has to certify upon verification of authority, accuracy and completeness. The said deficiency should be corrected to ensure that the duties of the Internal Control Officer are supported with evidence.

Because the above procedures do not constitute either an audit or a review made in accordance with Sri Lanka Auditing Standards or Sri Lanka Standards on Review Engagements, we do not express any assurance.

Had we performed additional procedures or had we performed an audit or review of the financial statements in accordance with Sri Lanka Auditing Standards or Sri Lanka Standards on Review Engagements, other matters might have come to our attention that would have been reported to you.

Our report is solely for the purpose set forth in the first paragraph of this report and for your information and is not to be used for any other purpose or to be distributed to any other parties. We do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone other than the addressee, for our work or for this report we have issued. This report should not to be used, circulated, quoted or otherwise referred to for any other purpose. This report relates only to the items specified above and does not extend to any financial statements of the PDU, taken as a whole.

10 April 2015
Colombo

Annexure I

Executive Summary issued to The Board of Directors on The Agreed Upon Procedure Engagement on The Primary Dealer Unit of Bank Of Ceylon for the period 1 January 2015 to 31 March 2015

With reference to our Agreed Upon Procedures Report Dated 10 April 2015, we give below a summary of the Key Findings based on the procedures conducted by us as elaborated in our report.

- During the period 1/1/2015- 3/31/2015 BOC has participated in 6 Treasury Bond Auctions where the total bid value placed by BOC was approximately Rs 13.2 Bn out of which Rs.23.1 Mn was placed on behalf of customers. At the auction held on 2/27/2015, BOC did not place any bids on behalf of the Bank and placed bids on account of another Primary Dealer, Perpetual Securities Limited for Rs. 13 Bn. and other customers for Rs. 508 Mn. without considering the Bank's exposure to credit, market and liquidity risks.

- Know Your Customer (KYC) procedure followed by the Primary Dealer Unit (PDU) of the Bank does not cover all types of customers of the Bank.

- We did not come across any Board Approved delegated limited under which Primary Market transactions are carried out by the PDU. However there are delegated limits for secondary market transactions. Therefore the Primary Market transactions would require approval by persons who have delegated authority. By conducting Primary Market transactions without clear delegated authority, and specific approval for transactions, the Bank would be exposed to credit, liquidity and market risks.

- There are also many areas where written policies in compliance with Customer Charter for the Primary Dealer Industry in Sri Lanka - Issued by CBSL- (CBSL Directive dated 7 November 2013) has not been adopted by the PDU as further detailed in our report.

- We have also identified Gaps in the process followed by the PDU in compliance with the PDU Policy manual as further detailed in our report.

- In relation to the Primary Market Auction held on 2/27/2015 we noted the following.

    - BOC had no investment requirement on 2/27/2015 as per the Investment Committee. However BOC has purchased Rs. 2.3 Bn worth of Bonds on the settlement date of this auction from a customer.
    - In instances where the bids placed on behalf of other parties have been successful, cash has been received in full from the customers other than in one instance noted below.
    - With regard to the settlement on the Rs 3 Bn by Perpetual Securities Ltd, on 3/2/2015 we noted a sale and purchase by BOC amounting to Rs. 2.3 bn of the bid placed on behalf of the Primary Dealer as stated below.

Perpetual -Settlement of Bid		BOC - Outright Purchase from Perpetual	
15.26 p.m.	Rs 1 Bn	15.25 p.m.	Rs. 300,000,000
15.27.25p.m	Rs. 1 Bn	15.27.25 p.m.	Rs 1 Bn
15.34 p.m	Rs. 1 Bn	15.27 p.m	Rs 1 Bn

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- In certain instances, the sale proceeds appear to have been released before the settlement of the full bid liability by Perpetual Securities Ltd.
- There was no specific approval requested or granted for this transaction.

- On 3/6/ 2015 Bank has sold the bond purchased from Perpetual Securities to the same customer as an outright sale.
  - As per the deal ticket this is an outright sale.
  - At the time of sale bank did not use the market rate prevailing on the selling date.
  - Generally bank practice is to use the market rate for secondary market transactions.
  - If the Bank made this transaction at the market rate based on the average secondary market yield (11.775%) BOC would have made a gain of Rs. 136.14 Mn. (Secondary Market Yield is extracted from weekly economic indicators published by Central Bank of Sri Lanka on 6 March 2015)

This Executive Summary should be read in conjunction with our agreed upon procedure report dated 10 April 2015.

Our report is solely for the information of the Board of Directors of BOC and is not to be used for any other purpose or to be distributed to any other parties. We do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone other than the Board of Directors of Bank of Ceylon, for our work or for this report we have issued. This report should not to be used, circulated, quoted or otherwise referred to for any other purpose. This report relates only to the items specified above and does not extend to any financial statements of the BOC PDU, taken as a whole.

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Annexure II -Bid History of BOC-PDU Treasury Bond for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31March 2015

Date of Auction	Date of Settlement	Auction Value Rs Mn	Details of Bids						Total Bid Value Rs Mn	% of Bid	Status
			On behalf of The bank Rs Mn	% of Bid	On behalf of Other Customers						
					For Other Primary Dealers Rs Mn	% of Bid	For Other Customers Rs Mn	% of Bid			
12/30/2014	1/1/2015	3,000	300	10%	Nil	0 %	Nil	0 %	300	10%	Total rejected
2/27/2015	3/2/2015	1,000	Nil	0	13,000	1,300 Times	508	50.8%	13,508	1350 Times	Rs 3,508 Mn Accepted
3/10/2015	3/16/2015	30,000	4,000	13%	Nil	0 %	6.1	0.15%	4006.1	13.15 %	Rs 3,000 Mn Accepted
3/12/2015	3/16/2015	20,000	2,000	10%	Nil	0 %	Nil	0 %	2,000	10%	Total rejected
3/17/2015	3/20/2015	14,000	1,400	10%	Nil	0 %	17	0.1.%	1,417	10.1%	Total rejected
3/30/2015	4/2/2015	25,000	2,500	10%	Nil	0 %	Nil	0 %	2,500	10%	Total rejected
3/26/2015	4/1/2015	30,000	3,000	10%	Nil	0 %	Nil	0 %	3,000	10%	Total rejected

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For the period 01 January 2015 to 31 March 2015

Annexure III -Bid History of BOC-PDU Treasury Bills for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31March 2015

Date of Auction	Date of Settlement	Auction Value Rs Mn	Details of Bids						Total Bid Value Rs Mn	% of Bid	Status
			On behalf of The bank Rs Mn	% of Bid	On behalf of Other Customers						
					For Other Primary Dealers Rs Mn	% of Bid	For Other Customers Rs Mn	% of Bid			
12/31/2014	1/2/2015	12,000	4,000	33%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	4,000	33%	3,500 only Accepted
1/7/2015	1/9/2015	12,000	2,035	17%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	2,035	17%	Total Accepted
1/13/2015	1/16/2015	15,000	5,000	33%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	5,000	33%	Total Accepted
1/21/2015	1/23/2015	10,000	1,050	11%	Nil	Nil	400	4%	1,450	14%	750 of Own and 300 of Customer only Accepted
1/28/2015	1/30/2015	10,000	1,500	15%	Nil	Nil	1,200	12%	2,700	27%	1,100 of Own and 350 of Customer only Accepted

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Annexure III-Bid History of BOC-PDU Treasury Bills for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31March 2015 Cont...

Date of Auction	Date of Settlement	Auction Value Rs Mn	Details of Bids						Total Bid Value Rs Mn	% of Bid	Status
			On behalf of The bank Rs Mn	% of Bid	On behalf of Other Customers						
					For Other Primary Dealers Rs Mn	% of Bid	For Other Customers Rs Mn	% of Bid			
2/2/2015	2/6/2015	12,000	1,700	14%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1,700	14%	1,494 only Accepted
2/11/2015	2/13/2015	12,000	1,300	11%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1,300	11%	Total Accepted
2/18/2015	2/20/2015	10,000	1,000	10%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1,000	10%	200 only Accepted
2/25/2015	2/27/2015	12,000	1,600	13%	Nil	Nil	840	7%	2,440	20%	1,400 of Own and 740 of Customer only Accepted
3/3/2015	3/6/2015	15,000	3,450	23%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	3,450	23%	1,800 only Accepted
3/11/2015	3/13/2015	20,000	2,000	10%	Nil	Nil	1,000	5%	3,000	15%	750 of Own and 100 of Customer only Accepted
3/18/2015	3/20/2015	16,000	4,000	25%	Nil	Nil	1,000	6%	5,000	31%	Total Accepted

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Annexure III-Bid History of BOC-PDU Treasury Bills for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31March 2015 Cont...

Date of Auction	Date of Settlement	Auction Value	Details of Bids						Total Bid Value	% of Bid	Status
			On behalf of The bank	% of Bid	On behalf of Other Customers						
					For Other Primary Dealers	% of Bid	For Other Customers	% of Bid			
		Rs Mn	Rs Mn		Rs Mn		Rs Mn		Rs Mn		
3/25/2015	3/27/2015	16,000	4,375	27%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	4,375	27%	Total Accepted
3/31/2015	4/2/2015	19,000	2,000	11%	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	2,000	11%	Total Accepted

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Annexure IV- Details of External Customers - Treasury Bonds purchased for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31March 2015

Auction Date	Customer Name	Requested Amount (Mn)	Accepted amount (Mn)	Requested Time by Customer (a.m)	CBSL Bid Time by BOC (a.m)	Settlement Date	Settlement time by BOC to CBSL (a.m)	Settlement time by Customers to BOC (p.m)
2/27/2015	Kaluthara Bodhi Trust	7.5	7.5	10.45	10.58	2/03/2015	9.22	13:27:34
2/27/2015	Ceylinco Insurance PLC	500	500	Not Clear	10.58	2/03/2015	9.22	13:55:53
2/27/2015	Perpetual Treasuries Limited	13,000	3,000	10.45	10.58	2/03/2015	9.22	15:26:58
	Perpetual Treasuries Limited					2/03/2015	9.22	15:27:25
	Perpetual Treasuries Limited					2/03/2015	9.22	15:34:37

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Annexure V- Details of External Customers - Treasury Bills purchased for the period of 01 January 2015 to 31March 2015

Auction Date	Customer Name	Requested Amount (Mn)	Accepted amount (Mn)	Requested Time by Customer (a.m.)	CBSL Bid Time by BOC (a.m.)
21/01/2015	Ceylinco Life	400	300	9.38	10.35.05
28/01/2015	Ceylinco Life	1100	250	10.09	10.35.05
28/01/2015	MBSL	100	100	10.24	10.35.05
25/02/2015	Ceylinco Life	600	500	10.40	10.31.53
25/02/2015	MBSL	100	100	10.27	10.21.43
25/02/2015	Lankaputhra	140	140	10.01	10.21.43
11/03/2015	Deutsche Bank	1000	100	10.01	10.47.05

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Annexure VI- Details of Customers Requisitions

	Date of Auction	Customer Name	Official Customer consent on Method of Communication	Method of Communication	Signatures verification by an authorized BOC Officer	Names of the authorized signatories and seal of the company
T Bond	03/17/2015	Anura Indragith Siriwardena	Not Available	Letter	Not Available	N/A (Individual Customer)
T Bond	03/10/2015	Kalutara Bodhi Trust	Not Available	Fax	Not Available	Not Available
T Bond	02/27/2015	Kalutara Bodhi Trust	Not Available	Fax	Not Available	Not Available
T Bond	02/27/2015	Ceylinco Insurance PLC	Not Available	Fax	Not Available	Not Available
T Bond	02/27/2015	Perpetual Treasuries Limited	Not Available	E-mail	Not Available	Not Available
T Bill	02/25/2015	Lankaputhra	Not Available	Fax	Not Available	Not Available
T Bill	02/25/2015	MBSL	Not Available	E-mail	Not Available	Not Available
T Bill	02/25/2015	Ceylinco Insurance PLC	Not Available	Fax	Not Available	Not Available
T Bill	01/28/2015	MBSL	Not Available	E-mail	Not Available	Not Available
T Bill	01/28/2015	Ceylinco Insurance PLC	Not Available	Fax	Not Available	Not Available
T Bill	01/21/2015	Ceylinco Insurance PLC	Not Available	Fax	Not Available	Not Available

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Annexure VII – Explanation handed over by the General Manager Mr. D.M. Gunasekara to the Chairman, Bank of Ceylon

30 year Treasury Bond issue by Central Bank of Sri Lanka on 27th February 2015

1) Bank of Ceylon is a Primary Dealer appointed by Central Bank of Sri Lanka to deal in Government Securities in the Primary Market. Here the Government Securities refers to the Treasury Bills (for 91/182/364 days tenor) and Treasury Bonds (from 2 years to 30 years at present) issued by Central Bank on behalf of Government of Sri Lanka. "Primary Dealer refers to a Company appointed by Central Bank who has access to Central Bank Government Securities Auction. BOC, under its role as a Primary Dealer submits its own bids as well as bids on behalf of individuals and corporates. Submission of bids by one Primary Dealer on behalf of another Primary Dealer is not restricted by Central Bank. When there is a business opportunity, BOC submits the bids of other Primary Dealers and the other Banks to the Primary Auction.

2) How does the bank accept the bids from customers, Corporates, banks and other Primary Dealers?

Customers (Individuals and Corporates)

Since the KYC (Know Your Customer) procedure has been properly followed by the branch concerned, Treasury does not separately check the KYC.

Treasury checks the history of previous bidding by the customer in order to ensure the funding arrangement. It is the customer's responsibility to arrange funds in his account to settle the transactions. If the customer failed to provide the funds for their successful bids (bank never encountered such an experience), bank has the right to sell the security in the market. Therefore, no credit risk involved. However, the bill or bond is subject to market risk in the event of adverse movements in market rates. Primary Dealers are expected to take market risk in dealing in Government Securities in the process of profit making.

Bank and Other Primary Dealers

BOC does not check KYC for these categories since all of them are appointed to engage In commercial banking and/or Primary Dealer activities. BOC do not inquire in to more details of their bids since it is not ethical to go in detail about their customer names who are back by such bids. However, we inquire whether the bids are on their behalf or customer behalf. Since these institutions abide by their respective codes of conduct and regulated by Central Bank it is presumed they do not submit the bids of any fraudulent nature. Primary Dealers are appointed by the Central Bank to engage in government security transactions. All these investments in government securities have to go through the primary dealers. Further they are given the privilege of maintaining accounts with Central Bank. They are the only people who can maintain accounts with Central Bank other than the Commercial Banks.

3) As questioned in the article BOC has not arranged any credit line for the concerned Primary Dealer Company. Also BOC has not approved credit lines to other Stand Alone Primary Dealer Companies. Therefore, it is not necessary for BOC to check the names and owners of the Primary Dealer Company in question. Since the BOC never approved credit lines to any Primary Dealer there has been no need to check their asset value.

There is no need to have the credit line for Primary Dealers because there is no credit risk involved in these transactions. All government security transactions are settled on the basis of DvP (Delivery verses Payment) and RvP (Receive verses Payment). Here the DvP refers to the settlement of transaction simultaneously by delivering the security against payment by the other party. RvP refers to the settlement of transaction simultaneously by receiving the security against making the payment to the other party.

4) On 27th February 2015 Central Bank held an auction for issuance of Rs. 01 Billion (face value) worth of 30 year Treasury bond for value 2nd March 2015 at 12.50% coupon rate. BOC bided as below.

	Customer	Rate	Face Value (Rs. Million)
1	Kaluthara Bodhi Trust	9.35%	8
2	Ceylinco Insurance Life	10.25%	500
3	Perpetual Treasuries	12.50%	3000
4	Perpetual Treasuries	12.75%	5000
5	Perpetual Treasuries	13.00%	5000

The first three bids were successful. We informed the parties accordingly. The transaction under the above (3) was fully settled on the value date (02nd March 2015 as below through our accounts with Central Bank of Sri Lanka via **SSSS** system. (Scrip less Securities Settlement System) **This Auction transaction was agreed on 27th February 2015.**

BOC paid cash and received securities from Central Bank.

(Face value Rs.3 Bln) (Rs.3, 000,756,000)

BOC Received cash and delivered security to Perpetual

(Face value Rs.3 Bln) Rs.3, 000,990,000

Transaction gain **Rs.234,000**

Our transaction with Perpetual Treasuries was fully settled through the Central Bank. Accordingly Central Bank credited Rs 3,000,999,000 to our account with them concluding the transaction.

5) After completion of this auction transaction BOC agreed the following transaction since there is a very good business opportunity for the bank to employ its excess liquidity at 12.50% for 4 days. (BOC's best alternative available for investing this excess money for 4 days was Central Bank standing deposit facility at 6.50%) Details of the transaction are as below. **This Out Right Buy/Sell transaction was agreed on 2nd March 2015.**

BOC bought Rs.2.3 bln face value of the security at 12.50%

and paid money to Perpetual **(Value 02nd March)** (Rs.2,300,759,000)

BOC sold Rs.2.3 bln face value of the security and received

money from Perpetual at 12.4950% **(Value 6th March)** Rs.2,304,687,400

Profit on the transaction **Rs 3,928,400**

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Dealers of the BOC do not exercise any credit authority other than money market lending done within the already board approved limits. Government Securities buying and selling transactions are not credit transactions since these transactions are settled DvP and RvP basis.

J.K.D.Dharmapala

Chief Dealer

Bank of Ceylon

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VIII Explanation provided by the Chief Risk Officer Mr. Lalith Fernando at the request of the Chairman of the Audit Committee.

Bidding Process in recent bond transaction on behalf of Perpetual Securities

CBSL announced a Treasury bond auction to issue a 30 year bond on 27th February 2015 for the value of Rs. 1 Billion. Bank of Ceylon as a PDU has submitted bids on behalf of its customers including Perpetual Securities which is also a CBSL appointed PDU and this is their first transaction with BOC.

Generally when bank receives bids from external parties, they are submitted to the CBSL with the concurrence of Chief Dealer and AGM Treasury. CBSL decides and select the bids submitted by PDUs depending on the rates and will be informed to the PDUs. On the settlement date PDUs are required to pay the settlement proceeds of the accepted bids to CBSL.

Accepted bids are then settled by the customers on the same settlement date of the bond issue. There is no upper limit for amount of the bids as well as for rates. Further, one PDU can accept bids on behalf of another PDU.

Details of the bids received form Perpetual Securities

Received 3 Bids

@ 12.50 – Rs. 3 Billion

@ 12.75 – Rs. 5 Billion

@ 13.00 – Rs. 5 Billion

CBSL accepted bids up to Rs. 10 Billion exceeding the pre-announced amount of Rs. 1 Billion at the cut off rate around 12.5%. As a result Perpetual Securities was successful of getting Rs. 3 Billion @ 12.50%. They settled the transaction in full. However they entered a repo transaction with BOC for Rs. 2.3 Billion for 4 days. Even this transaction is settled now. Bank was able to earn a spread around 6% for this period.

Conclusion

These Government securities transactions are done on DVP (Delivery vs. payment) basis and both the settlement and delivery take place simultaneously, as a result there is no settlement risk for the bank. This is one of the routine transactions of the bank.

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6.0 - Primary Dealer Unit

Primary Dealer unit of the Treasury Division will process the Treasury Bill / Treasury Bond tender results, Customer applications , Discount of Treasury Bills/ Bonds for customers and corporates , Deals concluded by the Front Office staff re investments and Primary Dealer Unit will be responsible for accounting, preparing and settlements of the deals. The Primary Dealer unit staff should act with due diligence and care, as it is the Back Office of Fixed income securities operations that will detect any errors or frauds.

Primary Dealer unit will receive the Customer applications, letters and Deal Tickets from the Dealers to verify and authorize for the accuracy of the deals against the Source Document i.e. Reuter / Bloomberg Deal Conversation print-out, fax confirmation, brokers confirmation etc.

The deals should be verified by "B" Class Officer and authorized by an "A" Class Officer. The officers verifying and authorizing deals should place their signatures and also confirm the sending of payment, receiving and confirmation messages of the deals, in the space provided in the deal ticket

Once the Primary Dealer unit Officers are satisfied that the input data are correct, they will verify and authorize ("B" Class Officer & "A" Class Officer) the deals as per the deal ticket and the source document. In case there is a discrepancy it should be escalated to the Management and verified independently.

The absence of a source document means that an insufficient recording of a deal has been made and should be attended to immediately. With the approval of the Chief Manager and Assistant General Manager - Treasury, settlement could be made in the absence of an inward confirmation or source document to avoid payment of back valuation charges, however all efforts must be made to verify and satisfy regarding the details of the deal before settlement.

Primary Dealer unit staff should obtain the daily maturity list and attend to the settlement so that bank will not incur any late payment charges. Back Office staff should forward all deal blotters to the Chief Manager and Assistant General Manager – Treasury for their approval.

Primary Dealer unit staff should maintain all Standard Settlement Instructions (SSI). A party independent of the dealing functions must review the audit trial of the new deals, amendments and cancellation.

Primary Dealer unit should not process applications without verification of funds, signatures and the other vital data's. They also should adhere to the K.Y.C guidelines especially in the Cash transactions.

6.1 Policy - Primary Dealer Unit

Primary Dealer Unit staff should handle transactions belongs to retails customer and should not engage with any of Front office functions such as conclude Deals with counterparties or agree/quote Interest rates to the Corporates, Counterparties and Banks etc.

Primary Dealer Unit staff should not verify or authorize any Deals without Dealer's signature

Primary Dealer Unit staff should not Verify or authorize any Deal without Source document unless obtaining permission from either AGM Treasury or AGM Treasury Back office

Primary Dealer Unit staff should always compare the details of source document against the Deal ticket and if found any discrepancy Back office should return the deal with appropriate reason to the Front office for corrections.

The deals will be verified by a "B" class officer

The deals will be authorized by an "A" class officer

Swift messages will be verified by a "B" class officer other than the messages generated from the ITMS System

Swift messages will be authorized by an "A" class officer

All Journal vouchers should input by Staff Assistance and Verify by "B" class officer.

All "B" class officers should make sure to check and verify counterparty confirmation **on or before the following working day.**

6.2 - Business process of Treasury Primary Dealer Unit

a) Processing of Tender Results

b) Sale of T-Bills to Corporates, Individuals, Govt. Institutions and Societies

c) Maturity Process of Treasury Bills

d) T bill/Bond applications

e) Re- Investments of Treasury Bills

f) Cancellation of Treasury Bill transaction

g) Reports

h) Messages

i) Revaluation of Treasury Bill Portfolio

j) Reverse Repo Transactions

k) Treasury Bond transactions

l) Verification and Authorization of Fixed Income security deals and Tender results.

m) Revaluation of Treasury Bond Portfolio

n) Deal Confirmations

o) Preparation of Brokerage Payments

p) Batch processing in ICBS

q) Batch Posting to ITMS

r) Functions of Audit & Internal Control officer

6.3 - Procedures

6.3.1 - Processing of Tender Results

PDU will receive the Tender Result sheet signed by the Chief Dealer and Dealer those who are assigned to handle/ Bid CBSL weekly tender.

PDU will enter the details of results to the Treasury Bills System and ' A' class officer will have to authorize the Tender Results.

Treasury Bill System will generate following reports in respect of the Tender

- List of Tenders entered
- List of Tenders Authorized
- List of G/L entries

PDU has to make settlement of the Tender and the additional purchases if any to CBSL on the value date i.e. last working day of the week by Electronic Media authorized by "A" and "B" Class Officer.

After settlement, CBSL assigns ISIN wise securities to Primary Dealer Unit

In case of Tender got rejected or not received entire amount as per our bid ,PDU will normally allocate T bills from banks existing portfolio as a Sale.

In such occasions Dealers will try to purchase the balance or full amount from the Secondary market to fulfill our customer requirements.

6.3.2 - Sale of T-Bills to Corporate Customers, Societies, NGOs, Government Institutions and individuals etc

The PDU at BOC trades Government Securities to Corporate Customers, Societies, NGOs, Government Institutions and individuals etc.PDU will adopt following procedure in such transactions.

The customer's need of investing in Treasury Bills will apply on an application form for purchase of Treasury Bills. The application form is pre-printed and it requires the customer to specify -

- Name with initials
- NIC Number
- Full Name
- Address
- T/p Numbers / Fax Numbers / E-mail
- Resident
- Face Value
- Investment Value
- Period
- From Date
- Yield
- Source of funds
- Maturity instructions
- Method of payment
- Operating instructions
- Date
- Signature

The application will be signed by customer and in case of companies / societies it is signed by their authorized signatories.

- Data Entry Operator at PDU will record the customer information to Treasury Bill System as well as Central Bank System.

- "A" Class officer will authorize Customer Information File in the Treasury Bill System.

Staff at PDU will record customer's application in the Treasury Bills System, period wise i.e. 91, 182, 364 days. After recording, the system will generate a Sales Transaction Report from Bank Portfolio. This report will specify –

- Period
- Date
- Bid Price / Bid Rate
- Sales Price / Sale Rate
- TXN Amount F/V
- Investment Value
- Purchase Date
- ISIN
- Interest
- Re-investment mode
- Maturity Date
- Capital Gains
- Bank BEP
- Method of Payment

The "B" Class officer will check Sales Details Report with the source document (application). After verification of accuracy "B" Class officer will process the sale transaction.
In this process the system will generate reports as follows -

i. Sales Cash at bankers
ii. Sales Suspense Account Creditors
iii. Non BoC List
iv. Error Report
v. Sales G/L
vi. Sales Processed List
vii. EIM Report
viii. Batch Report
ix. G/L Voucher Report

"B" Class Officer will process the customer batches. In this process the customer account will be debited online.

After processing sales transaction, staff at PDU will generate customer advice. This advice will be signed by "B" and "A" Class Officers.

6.3.3 - Maturity process of Treasury Bills

❖ The Primary Dealer Unit follow the under mentioned procedures Treasury Bills -

PDU generate "Maturity List before processing" on Monday eve report will specify -

- Treasury Bill Reference Number
- Customer Code Number
- Period
- Name
- Face Value
- Re-investment mode
- Payment Account Number and Branch Code
- Hold
- Period wise reinvestment total
- Period wise Non re-investment total

"B" Class Officer at PDU makes necessary adjustments in accordance requests which specify -

- Increase / decrease Face value
- Add on Rates
- Period changes
- Re-investment or non re-investment
- Mode of Payments

"A" Class Officer at PDU authorizes all changes in the maturity list.

After authorization of Auction Results "B" Class Officer process the maturity on the last working day of the week, mostly on Friday.

Treasury Bill System will automatically generate accounting entries batches and also various print-outs.

Customer accounts will be credited immediately after processing custome

Treasury Bill System will update the customer data and matured Trea saved in customer past records.

"B" Class Officer at PDU processes the re-investment and the system wil Bills to customers under their codes by period / ISIN wise.

6.3.4 - Re - Investment of Treasury Bills

In this re-investment process, customers may have to select one of the following two options -

(a) Continuation of same face value and interest is credited to their account

(b) Full amount will be re-invested up to the nearest rupee.

Re-investment Process will generates customer batches and accounting entries.

After processing batches, customer account will be credited with interest.

Once the Bills are fully allocated to customers "B" class officer at PDU will transfer the balance Treasury Bills to the Bank portfolios

Primary Dealer Unit will reconcile Bank and Customer investments of Treasury Bills with ICBS G/L and also the Bank and Customer Treasury Bills against the Central Bank Lanka Secure System.

6.3.3 - Maturity process of Treasury Bills

❖ The Primary Dealer Unit follow the under mentioned procedures on maturity of Treasury Bills -

PDU generate "Maturity List before processing" on Monday every week. The report will specify -

- Treasury Bill Reference Number
- Customer Code Number
- Period
- Name
- Face Value
- Re-investment mode
- Payment Account Number and Branch Code
- Hold
- Period wise reinvestment total
- Period wise Non re-investment total

"B" Class Officer at PDU makes necessary adjustments in accordance with customer requests which specify -

- Increase / decrease Face value
- Add on Rates
- Period changes
- Re-investment or non re-investment
- Mode of Payments

"A" Class Officer at PDU authorizes all changes in the maturity list.

After authorization of Auction Results "B" Class Officer process the Treasury Bills maturity on the last working day of the week, mostly on Friday.

Treasury Bill System will automatically generate accounting entries and customer batches and also various print-outs.

Customer accounts will be credited immediately after processing customer batches.

Treasury Bill System will update the customer data and matured Treasury Bills are saved in customer past records.

"B" Class Officer at PDU processes the re-investment and the system will allocate new Bills to customers under their codes by period / ISIN wise.

6.3.6 - Reports

(a) Report of Provisions for Interest Receivable

The 'Provision for Interest Receivable' Report will be printed by the "B" Class Officer at PDU from Treasury Bills System. The cost of investments as described in the above report will be compared and balanced by "B" Class Officer with G/L Account balance. This will be reviewed by PDU Manager / "A" class Officer.

Any discrepancies if any, between the balances as per G/L Balance and Treasury Bill System investment costs will be rectified by "B" Class and "A" Class Officers at PDU.

Reports will specify -

ii. Face Value

iii. Investment Value

iv. Period

v. Interest on maturity

vi. Interest as at date

vii. Rate / Price

Officer at PDU will generate Bank and Customer Portfolio ISIN wise Reports.. Reports will specify ISIN wise Bank total and customer total.

PDU Officer will generate Report from Central Bank System which includes same details. These two reports will be compared and balanced by officer at PDU with Investment Manager / "A" Class Officer.

Discrepancies, if any between the BOC system and CBSL System will be rectified immediately. Balancing process is done every fortnight.

On the last working day of the month "B" Class Officer at PDU will generate Provision on Interest Receivable Report through the Treasury Bill System. This report contains -

i. Total Investment Cost

ii. Total Face Value

iii. Interest on maturity

iv. Interest as at date

v. Bank yield

vi. Days to mature etc

The Report referred to under item No. iv provides interest received as at date for Bank Investments. Manual entries will be passed as follows –

Dr	Adjusting A/C Amount Receivable	-	11310039
Cr.	Interest Received Treasury Bills	-	51301029

The following reports can be generated by the officers and other staff at PDU from the Treasury Bills System based on authorization provided to the concerned staff to generate and print the reports. The reports have been categorized into Daily, Weekly and Monthly Reports.

Daily Reports

New Individual Customers Entered

New Individual Customers Authorized

New Joint Customers Entered

New Joint Customers Authorized

Changes Authorized - Ind / Joint

Customer Advice [Purchases]

Customer Advice - Sales

Customer Advices - Discounts

On request Advices - Sales / Reinv.

Customer / Bank Portfolio Summary

Customer Past Operations

Customer Portfolio - Individual

Customer Portfolio

Transaction Detail - Purchase

Transaction Detail - Discount

Sale TXN.s from Bank Portfolio

List of Tenders Entered

List of Tenders Authorized

List of Holds with Details

List of Holds Renewed

List of Maturity T/bills Held

Maturity List Before Processing

Provision on Interest Receivable

Primary Market Tender Advice

List of ADD Rates

T/bill Changes on same day – Entered

Total Holdings for an ISIN

Asset Evaluation – Creation

Asset Evaluation – Update

CBSL Transaction List

History of a T/Bill

Customer Advices – Reinvestment

List of all customer holdings

Monthly Reports

Provision on Interest Receivable

List of Holds

Weekly Reports

T/bill Changes on same day

Changes Entered In Reinvesting

Changes Authorized in Reinvesting

6.3.7 - Messages

"B" Class Officer at PDU will generate SWIFT messages, Reinvestment Sales, Cancellation and Discount process, and after checking for accuracy, SWIFT messages will be sent to the Central Bank before 4.00 p.m. every working day.

SWIFT message will include -

ii. Customer Code

iii. ISIN

iv. Face Value

Lanka Secure (Central Bank of Sri Lanka) will update the system under BOC Primary Dealer participant Code (Participants Code same as BOC TB Code). Also Lanka Secure at CBSL will send customer Advice confirming Treasury Bill transaction.

PDU will generate SWIFT messages after every transaction (i.e. Sales to Customer, purchasing from customer) and this will be sent to the Central Bank (Lanka Secure). Central Bank will update records in accordance with the message in the following manner -

- Sales - Bank to Customer
- Purchases / Discounts - Customer to Bank

Primary Dealer Unit will pass entries for interest receivable on Treasury Bill Investment at the end of each month and the following procedure will apply –

These entries will be verified and authorized by "B" and "A" Class officers.

On the first working day of the following month reversal entries will be passed.

At the end of the month, PDU will generate trading portfolio of Treasury Bills to evaluate the market value of Treasury Bills.

6.3.8 - Revaluation of Treasury Bill Portfolio

CBSL will provide market value of ISIN wise Treasury Bills to enable the PDU officers to evaluate Treasury Bill Portfolio. PDU will have to prepare the following entries.

Dr/Cr - Revaluation of T/Bills 91D HFT	A/C No.	10611032
Dr/Cr - Revaluation of T/Bills 91D HFT	A/C No.	52402058

These entries to be verify and authorize by the officers at Primary Dealer Unit.

Authorized Revaluation entries will be posted to G/L Accounts at the end of each month and will be reversed on the first working day of the following month.

6.3.9 - Reverse Repo Transactions

PDU will receive Reverse repo transactions Deal ticket from front office along with the source document. Both verifying and authorizing officers will have to undependably compare the details in the source document and the Deal ticket. If they found any discrepancy, they will have to contact counterparty / Broker or concern dealer at Front office and any higher officer to rectify the error. PDU officers should always get the confirmation from the counterparty when the deal is done through a Broker.

Since the Reverse repo transactions are backed by the collaterals, PDU officers will have to get the ISIN number of the security from the counter party to check at the CBSL browser .PDU officers should not release the funds until they are satisfied and make sure of the collateral and its value.

As per the type of the Deal system operator at PDU have to prepare message type (DVP,RVP or CVF/RVF) to exchange security and funds in respect of the Reverse Repo Transaction.

They (PDU) also will have to check the CBSL browser to make sure about the movement of funds and Securities of the Bank.

Once the transaction is fully authorized system (ITMS) will generate entries and customers accounts and GL will get updated through at the Batch processing procedure.

6.3.10 - Treasury Bond transactions.

Treasury Bonds are issued by the CBSL on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka. As per the Bank and Customers requirements, Treasury Front Office forward the bids for such bonds when CBSL published tender amount, coupon rate, tenor etc. in the newspapers and the electronic media. PDU handles processing and settlement part of the bond tender.

- After announcing Treasury Bond Results CBSL will send Net Settlement details on value date. PDU will settle through RTGS (Real Time Gross Settlement).

- CBSL assigns the purchased Securities in scripless format to Bank's own Portfolio in the Central Depository System (Lanka Secure) which is fully automated.

- "B" Class and "A" Class officers attached to PDU will verify and authorize Security Deal Ticket and PDU will hold the Treasury Bond Deal Ticket in their custody.

- After the verification and authorization of "B" and "A" Class, the ITMS system will update G/L Accounts automatically and at the end of the day, account entries will be transferred to ICBS (main G/L system in the bank).

- During Secondary Market purchases, the Deal Ticket should be authorized by "B" Class and "A" Class Officers at PDU.

The settlement process for Treasury Bond purchases from other Primary Dealers/ Banks, are also handled by Back Office through the RTGS. The Messages should be entered with the Purchasing Bank and will indicate ISIN, FV and Settlement Amount. On the other side, Selling Bank will also enter the message delivering scripless securities through the same system. These messages specify –

Purchasing Bank - RVP message (Receiver Verses Payment)

Selling Bank - DVP message (Delivery Verses Payment)

After matching / Settling the messages, securities will be recorded in the bank portfolio by CBSL Central Depository System

The PDU will adopt the following procedure for sale of Treasury Bonds to customers / banks -

Customers desirous of investing in Treasury Bonds will submit an application form or a letter of request to purchase Treasury Bonds in the secondary market. The customer will specify the following details -

- Name, Address and Telephone Number
- Face Value

- Period
- Yield

"B" Class and "A" Class Officers attached to PDU will verify and authorize Sale Deal Ticket. The authorized Deal Ticket will be kept at the PDU.

Staff at PDU will enter a message to Wide Area Network (WAN) provided by CBSL which will be verified and authorized by "B" and "A" class officer in order to re-position the security.

Repositioning message fields specify the following -

- Reference Number
- Face Value
- ISIN
- Customer Code Number
- Date

If the bank sells the Treasury Bonds to another Primary Dealer / Bank, the relevant message type would be as follows -

Selling Bank will enter Delivery Verses Payment (DVP)

Purchasing Bank will enter Receive Verses Payment (RVP)

The above messages should match and settle. The Selling Bank's CBSL Account will be credited. In addition Security will be transferred to the purchasing bank.

The Primary Dealer Unit will adopt the following procedure for Collection of Interest Coupons from CBSL.

- CBSL, on the coupon due date will credit our account with them. The amount could be verified from the CBSL Browser (Online WAN provided by CBSL).
- The ITMS will credit own holdings (Bank Portfolio) Coupon Payments which will be authorized by "B" Class and "A" Class officers at PDU. After authorization, system will automatically credit relevant G/L Accounts.
- For coupon payments due to customers, manual entries will be passed by staff at PDU. These vouchers will be authorized by "B" and "A" Class Officers at PDU.

- The authorized vouchers are required to be posted to the G/L Account manually. This will be authorized by "B" and "A" Class officers at PDU subsequently.

PDU will adopt the following procedure for collection of maturity of Treasury Bonds.

- The Maturity proceeds will be credited by CBSL to the Bank of Ceylon Account maintained with CBSL.
- On maturity date of Treasury Bonds, CBSL Browser at BOC will display maturity amount of Treasury Bonds.
- On maturity date of Treasury Bonds, the ITMS will automatically generate maturity settlements. After verification and authorization of "B" Class and "A" Class Officers at PDU, the relevant G/L Account will be credited automatically.
- Accounting Vouchers will be prepared by PDU on account of customer's Treasury Bond Maturity proceeds. Vouchers should be verified and authorized by "B" and "A" Class Officer at PDU.
- Authorized vouchers are required to be posted to G/L Account manually. G/L Account will be updated after verified and authorized by "B" Class and "A" Class Officers at PDU.

The Primary Dealer Unit will be responsible for balancing of Treasury Bond Investments between the closing stock of BOC holdings which could be obtained from ITMS and Manual Records of customer's portfolio with Central Bank Browser figures.

CBSL Browser will also make available ISIN wise reports of the Treasury Bonds Portfolio.

Our own holdings (Bank holdings) detailed reports indicate ISIN wise which will be printed through ITMS. This will be reconciled with CBSL ISIN wise reports.

Customer holdings which are maintained manually will be entered in Excel Sheet and should tally with CBSL ISIN wise Reports.

Discrepancies, if any, between balances as per the two sets i.e. CBSL Reports and BoC Reports will be reconciled, rectified and recorded immediately.

Rectification and balancing of records will be verified and authorized by "B" Class and "A" Class Officers at PDU. Also the reconciliation process will be monitored by the Senior Manager, PDU.

PDU will also conduct annual verification of Treasury Bonds at the end of each year with the available records. This process is carried out by independent "A" Class and "B" Class Officers attached to International Division.

6.3.11 - Revaluation of Treasury Bond Portfolio

CBSL will provide market value of every bond series. At the End of each month PDU applies these rates to mark to market the Held for Trading (H.F.T) and Available For Sale (A.F.S) Portfolios.

PDU revalue the HFT portfolio at the end of each month and revalue AFS category only at the end of each year.

The following entries have to pass at the PDU in respect of the Treasury Bond revaluations.

DR. Revaluation Profit - GOSL Bond HFT / AFS
CR. Revaluation of GOSL Bond HFT / AFS

All these entries to be verified and authorized by two officers at the PDU.

At the end of the month, Security dealers will generate trading portfolio of Treasury Bonds to evaluate the market value of bonds

CBSL will provide market value of ISIN wise Treasury Bills to enable the PDU officers to evaluate Treasury Bill Portfolio. PDU will have to prepare the following entries.

Verified and Authorized Revaluation Entries will be posted to G/L Accounts by PDU at the end of each month and year end. These entries will be reversed on the first working day of the following month.

6.3.12 - Deal Confirmation

"B" Class Officer who verifies the respective transaction is responsible for checking deal confirmations from banks and brokers. He/She should send deal confirmations on the same day and attach the soft copy in the Deal Ticket. He/She should also check the counterparty confirmations. If confirmations are not received or if there is any discrepancy, a "B" Class Officer at PDU should inform the counterparty and make sure to obtain deal confirmation in time.

6.3.13 - Preparation of Brokerage Payments

PDU officers will have to reconcile and pay the Brokerage payments in respect of the Fixed Income securities and Reverse Repo transactions with the Brokers statement and the System generated Brokerage schedule.

Once the reconciliation process is completed, PDU will issue a Pay order and prepare following entries.

For Treasury Bonds

DR. Brokerage Payable Sec	A/C 22310293
DR. Charges account VAT	A/C 62701002
CR. BOC Primary Dealer Unit	A/C 70702261

For Reverse Repo

DR. Brokerage Payable MM	A/C 22310293
DR. Charges account VAT	A/C 62701002
CR. BOC Primary Dealer Unit	A/C 70702261

For Treasury Bills

DR. Charges account Brokerage	A/C 62303044
DR. Charges account VAT	A/C 62701002
CR. BOC Primary Dealer Unit	A/C 70702261

In addition to the above PDU gets discount from the Brokers as per the Brokerage Volumes. This Discount amount is decided by the Sri Lanka Brokers Association. Brokers are usually indicating the Discount amount in their Invoice/ Bill and following entries to be passed.

Dr Brokerage Payable SEC or MM	A/C 22310293 or 22310291
Cr.BOC Primary Dealer Unit	A/C 70702261
Cr.Volume Discount in Brokerage	A/C 52403007

All above entries to be verified and authorized by two officers at the PDU .

6.3.14 - Batch processing at ITMS & ICBS

PDU use both ITMS and ICBS systems to process T/Bill, T/bond and Reverse Repo transactions.

At present ICBS handles only customer portion of T/Bill transactions (credit /debit of clients accounts) and the GL accounts entries in respect of the T/Bill transactions will be routed via ITMS batch transfer to the ICBS.

Once the transactions are verified and authorized at the ICBS system, staff assistant at PDU should generate reports in respect of the T/Bill transaction. As per the ICBS report staff assistant has to input GL entries belongs to T/Bill transactions to the ITMS system and referred to the verifying and authorizing officers for them to verify and authorize.

GL accounts will get updated to the ICBS system during the process of the day end procedure handles by the System Administrator and the IT Division of the Bank..

Apart from T-bill transactions, T-Bond and Reverse Repo transactions are maintained at the ITMS. PDU will follow the similar procedure of verifying, authorizing and input messages to the system as per the T-bill transactions.

Updating of customer and GL accounts will be done during the batch transfer procedure at PDU.

6.3.15 - Functions of Audit & Internal Control Officer

ICO should check all relevant aspects with due care to achieve the objectives of existing internal controls of the bank.

ICO should concentrate on following aspects.

- Authority
- Accuracy
- Completeness

ICO will get following reports daily from Report Menu of ITMS under PDU

Deal Register for previous day

Accounting entries for previous day

Tender Document

Reinvestment instructions

Sales, Purchases and Discount transactions

Reservation/ Cancellation of facilities granted against T- Bills and T-Bonds

Manually posted vouchers/ batches to ICBS Via ABT

Staff and other sundry payments , charges accounts

Outstanding of General Ledger accounts

Check the accuracy of bank security portfolio and its balances

ICBS trail balance

Treasury Bill on line account

Deal ticket, Deal Blotter

Audit Trail

Make sure to check ITMS and ICBS trail balances during mid and end of each month

Make sure to check the balances of below accounts and if there is any balance remaining, he should investigate and rectify the error immediately.

iv) Unmapped A/c Real Time - 11310418

v) Intraday Suspense A/c - ITMS - 11310417

vi) Unmapped A/c Nominal - ITMS - 52403009

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ıexure - X E-mail copy of Customer Requisition - Perpetual Treasuries Ltd

m: "kasun" <kasun@perpetualtreasuries.com>
<chiefdealer@boc.lk>
<nuwan@perpetualtreasuries.com>, "kaushitha"
<kaushitha@perpetualfundmanagement.com>

e: Friday, February 27, 2015 10:48 AM
ject: Perpetual Treasuries Ltd

r Sir,

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llion @ 12.50%

llion @ 12.75%

lion @ 13.00%

you for choosing Perpetual for your astute investments.

regards

ın Palisena

Head of Group Treasury

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

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ඇමුණුම 19
இகணைப்பு 19
Annexure 19

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව
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එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාම මම පිළිගන්නවා. අපි අද දවසේ විශේෂයෙන් රැස්වෙන්නේ, මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධියට අදාළ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා, ඔබතුමන්ලා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර අනුමත කර ගැනීමටයි. අපි ඊයේ දවස තුළ මුණ ගැසීමට තමයි කලින් දින තීරණය තිබුණේ. නමුත් අද දින පාර්ලිමේන්තු දිනයක් හැටියට වාර්තා වූ බැවින්, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ පහසුව සඳහා අපි අද දිනයේ රැස්වෙන්න තීරණය කළා. ඊයේ දහවල් වනතුරුත් මෙහි පරිවර්තන ගැටලු තිබූ නිසා මෙම වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලා අතට පත් කරන්න නොහැකි වුණා. නමුත් අද දිනයේ හැමෝටම භාෂා පරිවර්තන සහිතව වාර්තාව ලබා දෙන්න පුළුවන් කම තිබෙනවා. එම වාර්තාව අනුමත කර ගන්නා ආකාරය පිළිබඳව අපි මුලින් පැහැදිලි කර ගනිමු. ඒ නිසා මෙම වාර්තාව කියවා එය අනුමත කර ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමයක් යෝජනා කරන ලෙස මම ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: ඔබතුමා කියන එක ලේසියි. ඒ වාගේම අපිට ඒක හොඳයි. අපිට මේ වාර්තාවේ ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදය සලකා බලන්නත් පුළුවන්. නැතිනම් විවාදයට තුඩු දී ඇති කාරණා ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්නත් පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම හිතන්නේ පිටුවෙන් පිටුව කියවා ගෙන යන්න පුළුවන් නම් ඒක වඩාත් හොඳයි කියලායි. මොකද, විවිදාත්මක දේවල් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ පිටුවේදීම ලකුණු කර ගන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපිට පළමුවෙන්ම මේ වාර්තාව කියවා ගන්න විනාඩි 20ක් පමණ දෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වඩා හොඳයි.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: අපිට කියවා ගැනීමට විනාඩි 20ක් දුන්නාම වඩාත් හොඳයි.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අදාළ වාර්තාව කියවා බැලීම සඳහා කාරක සභාව සුළු වේලාවකට කල් තබන ලදී)

(කාරක සභාව නැවත රැස්විය)

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාම මේ වාර්තාව කියවපු නිසා, මම නැවතත් කියවන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. ඒ නිසා අපි පිටුවෙන් පිටුවට යමු. ඒ පිටුවෙන් පිටුවේ තිබෙන කාරණාවල සංශෝධන

තිබෙනවා නම්, අපි ඒවා සංශෝධන කර ගනිමු. පළමු වැනි පිටුවේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැද්ද? හැමෝම එකඟද?

සභාපතිතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශයෙන් පසුව අංක හැටියට පළමු වන පිටුව තිබෙනවා නේ. මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන දිනය හැටියට තමයි 25 වැනි දා කියලා දිනය සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: ඒක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊළඟ පිටුවේ නම් ටික සහ සභාපතිතුමාගේ සටහන කියන එක. ඊළඟට පළමු වැනි පිටුව.

ගරු **හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා**: මෙහි printing mistake එකක් කිව්වාට කමක් නැද්ද?

"ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව" කියන එකට "ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බංකුව" කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. ඒක version එකේ ප්‍රශ්නක්. ඒක හදන කොට correct වෙනවා කියලා කියනවා.

ඊළඟට දෙවැනි පිටුව, තුන් වැනි පිටුව, හතර වැනි පිටුව, පස් වැනි පිටුව, හය වැනි පිටුව. හය වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වන කරක සභා රැස්වීම් දිනවලටම, 2016.10.20 වශයෙන් අද දිනය "වාර්තා කොටුම්පත අනුමත කිරීමට රැස්වුණා" කියලා ඇතුළත් වෙනවා.

හත් වැනි පිටුවේ වරහන් තුළ සඳහන් වන පිටුවේ සිට පිටුව දක්වා කියන එක, වාර්තාව ඇමුණුම් සමඟ සකස් වන විට එය සකස් වෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අපි ඇමුණුම් පරීක්ෂා කළේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: තිබෙන ඇමුණුම් ටිකම තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. අට වැනි පිටුව, නව වැනි පිටුව.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහි "විගණිත වාර්තාව" කියන එක "විගණන වාර්තාව" ලෙස සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: ඒක අපි දැක්කේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අත්‍යාවශ්‍යයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හත් වැනි පිටුවේ, අංක 18 වශයෙන් සඳහන් වන "විගණිත වාර්තාව කියන එක විගණන වාර්තාව ලෙස නිවැරදි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ Report එක අපේ අවධානයට යොමු වුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: ඒක සම්බන්ධයෙන් එහි සඳහනක් නැහැ. ඒ තීන්දුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් කමිටුව තීන්දු කරන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා තියෙන්න එපායෑ.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: අපිට දීපු වාර්තාවේ අමුණා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: නැහැ. මේ අස්වාභාවිකයි කියලා තියෙන එකට -Ernst and Young Company- ත්‍රිපුද්ගල කමිටුවකින් කිව්වා විගණන වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න කියලා. අපි ඒක දැකලා නම් නැහැ. But, nobody has given me a thought to that. එහි නිරීක්ෂණ මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, ඒක වැදගත් නිරීක්ෂණයක් නේ. ඒ ත්‍රිපුද්ගල කමිටුවෙන් කියනවා සියයට 50ක් ලැබීම අස්වාභාවිකයි කියලා. Then, the Ernst and Young will have a full investigation on that. Then, we will have something to start it.

ගරු **අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා:** ලංකා බැංකුවේ Chairman, එයාට ඒක පිළිගන්න බැහැ කියලා, Audit කරන්න දෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා, සභාපතිතුමා කියනවා. ඒක ඉතා වැදගත්.

සභාපතිතුමා: කළින් සාකච්ඡා කළ වෙලාවේදී ලංකා බැංකුවේ සභාපතිතුමා තමයි Earnest and Young එකෙන් මේ ආකාරයේ වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරනවා කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කළේ. එය කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් වුණා. කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් වුණු සියලුම ලේඛන ඇමුණුම් විධියට ඉදිරිපත් වන නිසාත්, අපිට ඇමුණුම් ලේඛනයක් විධියට එය වැදගත් වන නිසාත් තමයි මෙහි සඳහන් කර ඇත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒ ගැන සඳහනක් කරනවා. ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා ෙමේ ඉල්ලීම ප්‍රශ්න සහගතයි කියන එක. එයට අදාළව තමයි මෙය ඉතා වැදගත් වන්නේ. ප්‍රශ්න සහගත නම්, ඒ විගණන වාර්තාව අපිට වඩාත් අත්‍යාවශ්‍ය වනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේක independent source එකක්. එය සාමාන්‍ය company එකක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි කවුරුවත් එය දැකලා නැහැ. අපිට දැන් එය දෙන්න. එය අපිට දැන් බලන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: තිබෙනවා. සියලු දෙනාටම ලබා දෙන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොකද, එයත් කරුණක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපිට අද දිනය ඇතුළත එය ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: 22 වෙනි පිටුව නිවැරදි කළ යුතුයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා එය එතැනදී mark කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැන ඇමුණුමේ අංකය වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, එය සකස් කළ හැකියි. 08 වැනි පිටුව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහි ත්‍රී පුද්ගල කමිටුව මගින් කරන විමර්ශනය ගැන සඳහන්ව තිබෙන ස්ථානයේ අංක 02ට, "forensic audit" කියලා, සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. අපේ මේ සමස්ත ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ කුමක් හෝ ආයතනයක් විසින්, COPE එක විසින් හෝ Auditor-General's Department එක විසින් හෝ forensic audit එකක් කළාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Forensic audit එකක් කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Forensic audit is a scientific audit.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: අපි කරන මූල්‍ය විගණනයෙන් එහා ගිය වංචාවක් සිදු වෙලා තිබෙවා නම්, එය නීත්‍යානුකූලව උසාවිය සමඟ කටයුතු කරන ආකාරයට, ඊට එහා ගිය-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: උසාවි යන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. මෙහි ඇතුළට කිදා බැහැලා මේ ගැන සොයන එක. අපි කොතැනකදීවත් forensic audit එකක් කළේ නැද්ද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුවේ forensic audit එකක් කරන්න කියලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අගමැතිතුමා පත් කරපු ත්‍රී පුද්ගල කමිටුවේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණුවල සාරාංශයක් මේ දමලා තිබෙන්නේ. සම්පූර්ණ වාර්තාව ඇමුණුමක් විධියට තිබෙනවා. "...ලංකා බැංකුවේ ගනුදෙනු කාමරයේ (Dealer Room) සිදු වන කටයුතු සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෝහාරික විගණනයක් (Forensic audit) සිදු කිරීමට ලංකා බැංකුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය කටයුතු කළ යුතු බව." කියලා, ඒ සාරාංශයේ එක් කාරණයක් විධියට, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ නිර්දේශයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: COPE එක හෝ මහ බැංකුව හෝ විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් හෝ forensic audit එකක් කරලා නැහැ නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. ඇත්තටම එය අපි කරන දෙයකට වඩා ආයතනගත ව්‍යුහයකින් කළ යුතු දෙයක්.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒක අපේ වැඩක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එය අපට කරන්න බැහැ නේ. මොනවා හරි තාක්ෂණික ක්‍රම පාවිච්චි කරලා-,

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපිට කරන්න බැරි වුණාට වෙන කෙනෙක් ලවා කරවා ගන්න අපිට පුළුවන් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට එය නිර්දේශ කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපිට මුල සිටම insider information යනවා කියන එකෙනි සහ පොඩි market එකේ විචලනයන් වෙනවා කියන එකෙනි විශාල ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. Private Placementsවල ඉඳලා අපි දිගටම කථා කළ දෙයක්. එහෙම තිබෙනවාද? එහෙම තිබෙනවා නම් ඉතා හොඳයි. අපි යෝජනා කරනවා ඉදිරියේදී අනිවාර්යෙන් 1997 ඉඳලා forensic audit එකක් කරනවා නම් හොඳයි කියන එකයි මගේ අදහස.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි එහෙමනම් එය නිර්දේශවලට ගනිමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා: කලින් කමිටුවෙත් සිටිය නිසා, දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කොතැන හෝ තැනකදී ෙම් ගැන සඳහන් කළා මට මතකයි. Forensic audit එකක් කළා නම්, මෙහි සම්බන්ධතාව නිශ්චිත පුද්ගලයන් ආයතන අතර තිබෙන money transfer ආදී සියල්ල ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා කියන්නේ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනුවත් එක්ක උපයපු ආදායම හෝ ඒ මුදල වෙන වෙන තැන්වලට, වෙනත් ගිණුම්වලට ගියේ කොහොමද? ඒවා අතර ඇති සම්බන්ධය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ විතරක් නොවෙයි, ලංකා බැංකුවේ telephone calls යන ආකාරය ආදිය. Insider information වෙන්නේ කොහොමද ඒ සියලු දේවල් සම්බන්ධයෙන්.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මේ තිබෙන්නේ අපිට දීපු එකක් නොවෙයි. බැංකුවට දීපු එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ත්‍රී පුද්ගල කමිටුවෙන් අපිට නිර්දේශ දෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත්, එහි ගතයුතු දෙයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, අපි එය ගත යුතුයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Wikipedia එකෙනි සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන දෙයක් කියන්නම්,

"Forensic science is the application of science to criminal and civil laws."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It covers both criminal and civil.

සභාපතිතුමා: කෙටුම්පතෙහි 09 වෙනි පිටුව. එහි ගැටලුවක් නැහැ නේද?

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: එම පිටුවේ අග printing mistake එකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: බාධා කරනවාට සමාවන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපේ අවසාන නිර්දේශවලට forensic audit එකක අවශ්‍යතාව පිළිබඳව කාරණය - ඒ කියන්නේ අපි මෙයට එකඟ වනවා කියන එක නොවෙයි.- එය ඇතුළත් කරනවාද? ඔබතුමා අහලා ඉන්න එකඟ වෙනවාද කියලා නැත්නම් මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් එනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි නිර්දේශ කථා කරන අවස්ථාවේදී ලකුණු කරමු. දැනට, "නිර්දේශවලට forensic audit එකක් ගැන නිර්දේශ කරනවා." කියලා, එකඟතාවක් තියා ගමු. ඔබතුමා 09 වෙනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා කිව්ව දෝෂය computer system එකේ එකක්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, forensic audit එකක අවශ්‍යතාව අපිට නිර්දේශ කරන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට, අපි කරපු audit එක සහ Report එක එයට යටත් වනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, එය අපේ නිර්දේශයක් විතරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මූලික කුමක්ද කියලා අපට තීරණය කරන්න බැහැ. Forensic audit එක අවසන් වුණාට පසුව එහි තිබෙන කරුණු අනුව එය තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: කෙටුම්පතේ 10 වෙනි පිටුව. එහි නිවැරදි කිරීම් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නිවැරදි කිරීමක් වශයෙන් නොවෙයි, කරුණක් වශයෙන් දෙයක් සඳහන් කළ යුතුයි. මේ වාර්තාවෙත් සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා, "..ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඒ අයුරින්ම ඉටු කර ඇත්ද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ සංඛ්‍යාංක හා පා සටහන් (Digital Foot Prints) පිළිබඳව ද නිරීක්ෂණය කිරීම යෝග්‍ය වන බව පෙන්වා දී තිබුණි." කියලා. සමාවෙන්න, මම කලින් කමිටුවේ සිටියේ නැති නිසා මට සමහර කරුණු ගැන පැහැදිලි නැහැ. මේ කියන්නේ කුමක්ද කියලා justify කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "Digital footprint" කියලා තිබෙනවා, What is that කියලා තමයි අහන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා නේ මෙය ලියන්න ඇත්තේ. ඔබතුමා මෙයින් අදහස් කළේ කුමක්ද කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අදාළ Report එකේ තමයි ඒ කාරණය තිබෙන්නේ. ගරු අගමැතිතුමා විසින් පත් කරපු නීතීඥ ගාමිණි පිටිපන මහතාගේ සභාපතීත්වයෙන් පැවති ත්‍රී පුද්ගල කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශයක් හැටියට, "...ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඒ අයුරින්ම ඉටුකර ඇත්ද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ සංඛ්‍යාංක හා පා සටහන්(Digital Foot Prints) පිළිබඳව ද නිරීක්ෂණය කිරීම යෝග්‍ය වන බව පෙන්වා දී තිබුණි." කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි අහන්නේ ඒ මොකක්ද කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔතැන කියන්නෙත් forensic audit එකම තමයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙය අපේ අදහසක් නොවෙයි. ඒ Report එකේ නිර්දේශයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපිත් එය ඇතුළත් කරනවා නම්, එහි තේරුම දැන ගන්න එක අවශ්‍යයි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: වචනයේ තේරුම දැන ගන්න එක අවශ්‍යයි නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒකේ තිබෙන ඔක්කොගේම අපි එල්ලෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඒක ඒ අයගේ නිගමන.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රිපෝට් එකේ දානකොට අපි දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ මොකක්ද දාන්නේ කියලා. නිගමනය දාන්නේ ඒ තැන. නැත්නම් මුළු නිගමනයම අමුණනවානේ මේකට.

ගරු **චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා**: ඒක හරි.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** රිපෝට් නිකමට දාන්න බැහැ.

ගරු **වීර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා:** මට මතකයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේත් තිබුණා, ඒ අයගේත් තිබුණා, මින් එහා ගිය පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතුයි කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පි. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇත කියන එක විතරක් ලිව්වා නම් හරි.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: දැන් ඒකේ දාන කොට එසේ යෝජනා වී ඇත. තවමත් එය සිදු වී නැත කියලා එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා**: " සිදු වී නැත" කියන එක කරන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒක අපට කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: නැහැ අපි කරනවා නොවෙයි.

ගරු **මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා**: එක් එක් ආයතන විසින් දෙන ලද නිර්දේශ වුණා නැහැ කියලා දාන්න ගියොත් ඒක ප්‍රායෝගික නැහැ. ඒක අදාළ දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මොකද එය "සිදු වී නැත" කියලා කිව්වොත් අපගෙන් එහා වග කීමකට යනවා. කවුද වග කියන්නේ කියන ප්‍රශ්නය ඇපසු ආවාම අපි කරපු එකෙන් වැඩක් නැතිව යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වැදගත් කරුණු quote කරන්නේ. මොකද වැදගත් කරුණු quote කරන්නේ මේකට දාන්න ඕනෑ නිසා.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමනි, මම දකින්නේ මෙහෙමයි. පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තමයි මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවසාන බලධාරියා. පාර්ලිමේන්තුව අපිට මේ වග කීම පැවරුවාට පසුව අපි කිව්වොත් මෙහි තවත් ඒවා කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා, අපි දෙන තීන්දුව වැඩක් නැතිව යනවා.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි මේකේ අන්තිම නිර්දේශවල යෝජනා කරන්න ඕනෑ, මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඉදිරියේදී මෙම ඩෙන්ටර් කටයුතුවලදී අනුගමනය කරන්න ඕනෑ කරන sales conditions එක එක parameters ගැන. මට තේරෙන විධියට digital foot prints කියන්නේ, කවුද කළේ කියලා, වෙක් නම් අපි අත්සන් කරනවා නේ.

E-mail වාගේ ඒවාගේ, transactional computers වලින් කරන ඒවායේ කවුද user කියලා අසු වන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද common computers පාවිච්චි කරද්දි. මට තේරෙන විධියට ඒ වාගේ දෙයක් තමයි ඇත්තේ කියලා. Digital foot prints කියන්නේ mainly කවුද user කියන එක හැම transaction එකෙන් transaction එකම record වෙන ක්‍රමයක් විය යුතුයි. මොකද common computers පාවිච්චි කරන නිසා. අතිරේක පුළුවන්. මම කියන්නේ ඔබතුමන් අගට නිර්දේශ වගයක් දාලා තිබෙනවා නේ මහ බැංකුව ඇතුලේ modify වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. එතැනට අපි මේක යෝජනා කරමු. දැන් කරලා තිබෙනවාද නැද්ද කියලා අපට අදාළ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට මෙහෙම යෝජනාවක් නිර්දේශවලට දාන්න පුළුවන්. අපේ නිර්දේශවලදී, මීට කලින් පත් කරන ලද ස්ත්‍රී පුද්ගල කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශයන් මේ වන විට ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙලා නැහැ. ඒවා ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සුදුසු පියවර ගත යුතුයි කියලා.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: අපි මේ COPE කමිටුවේ report එක හදන්නේ වගකීම ඇතුව. මේ අදහස් දක්වන විට අපි අවශ්‍ය අදහසක් තිබෙනවා නම් දැක්විය යුතුයි. ගිය වර ඇසුව වැදගත්ම කරුණ තමයි, මහ බැංකුවෙන් යන දුරකථන පණිවිඩ සම්බන්ධයෙන් trace එකක් නැහැ. අපි ගිය වතාවේ කිව්වා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අනිවාර්යෙන් පරීක්ෂණයක් පවත්වන්න ඕනෑ කියලා . ඒක වැදගත් දෙයක්. Inside trading වෙන්නේ trace නැති විට ඇතුළෙන් telephone calls යන විට. ඉතින් මේ දෙකම ඉතාම වැදගත්. Forensic එකයි මේකයි. හැම තැනින්ම callsයන එක කිසිම නිරීක්ෂණයක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ Central Bank එකෙන්. ඕනෑ විධියට inside information දෙන්න පුළුවන්. කාගේවත් lines වෙක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. Calls වෙක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ record වෙන්නේ නැහැ. පිට රට හැම Central Bank එකකම හැම එකකම digitalized record වෙනවා.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ට්‍රෙෂරිය කරන කාලයේ ටෙලිෆෝන් ලයින් තිබෙනවා, ඒවා dedicated lines. ඒ කියන්නේ නොම්මර කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ මහ බැංකුවට ගන්න. Primary dealer කෙනෙක් නොම්මරයක් කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ. Pick up කළාම කෙලින්ම මහ බැංකුවට සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ. Red phone කියලා අපි ඉස්සර කාලයේ කියන්නේ. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ dealing rooms වල තිබෙනවා එක එක ටෙලිෆෝන්. ඒ එක එක ටෙලිෆෝන් යන්නේ එක එක primary dealers ලාට. monitor කරන එක මහ ලොකු අමාරු දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක වැදගත් කාරණාවක් නිසා මෙතැන සටහන් කරනවා වාගේම නිර්දේශයකට ගනිමු. ඊළඟට 10 වන පිටුව ගනිමු.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: 09 වන පිටුවේ හිස්තැන් වගයක් තිබෙනවා ඒ මොකද?

සභාපතිතුමා**:** ඒක computer printingවල ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඒක එකතු වෙලා වවන ටික හැදෙනවා. 10 වන පිටුව හරිනේද? 11 වන පිටුවේ බලන්න?

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 11 වන පිටුවේ තමයි මූලික ප්‍රශ්නය පැන නගින්නේ. මම මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් වූ පළමුවෙනි දවසේ සිට මගේ තර්කය ඉදිරිපත් වුණේ රජයට කොහොමද මේ මූල්‍ය අලාභය කියලා තිබුණේ ඉස්සර. ඒක අවාසිය හැටියට අපි දැන්

වචනය වෙනස් කළා. මට මේ පළමුවෙනි paragraph එකේ අවසාන ප්‍රශ්නය-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩි බාධා කිරීමක් කරනවා. කලින් පිටුවට එන්න පුළුවන්ද? නැත්නම් ඔබතුමා අවසන් කරලාම ඉන්නවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක අවසන් කරලා ඉමු. පටන් ගත්තා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 10 වෙනි එක අවසන් කරමුද? පිටුවෙන් පිටුව අවසන් කර ගෙන ගියාම ලෙහෙසියි. ඔබතුමාට අදාළ වෙන දෙයක් මේකේ තිබෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, 2 වන ඡේදය, 2 වන ක්‍රමය. සෘජු ක්‍රමය, පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය, මම දැන ගන්න අහන්නේ, මේකේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. "බරතැබූ ප්‍රමාණය ප් ප්‍රාථමික ගනු දෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා අවස්ථාව ලබා දීම" මේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනු දෙනුකරුවන් කියලා මට ලැබී ඇති ලිපි ලේඛන අනුව සඳහන් වෙන්නේ, EPF, ETF -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ප්‍රාථමික කියන්නේ primary dealersලා සහ EPF.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : Any private dealer also.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: All primary dealers. 16 primary dealers plus one දැන් අපි යමු, මූලික content එකේ ගැටලුවට. පළමුවෙනි ඡේදයේ අවසාන වාක්‍යයට. " එමෙන්ම පොලි අනුපාතයට වඩා වැඩි ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට එනම්, වට්ටම් අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් රජයට මූල්‍ය අවාසියක්ද සිදු වේ" එම වාක්‍යය ගැටලු සහගතයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එම කොටසද? එම කොටසින් එහා තිබෙන අනෙක් ටිකත් එක්කමද? " පොලී අනුපාතයට සමාන ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළහොත් රජයට අමතර වාසියක් හෝ අවාසියක් සිදු නොවෙයි කියන එකත් එකක්මද? නැත්නම් මේ කොටස විතරද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔක්කොම එකට කියවන්න ඕනෑ. ඊට කලින් වාක්‍යයත් එකටම කියවන්න ඕනෑ. රජයට වාසියක්ද? අවාසියක්ද? දැන් මෙතැන තේ මූලික ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. රජයට අලාභයක් හෝ අවාසියක් වුණාද? වෙන කවුරු හෝ ලාභයක් හෝ වාසියක් ලබා ගත්තාද? ඒ ප්‍රමාණය කුමක්ද කියන එක. දැන් මෙතැන කියන්නේ රුපියල් සියයේ bond එක තිබෙනවා . රුපියල් සියයේ bond එකට සමහර අවස්ථාවලදී පොලී අනුපාතයකුත් එහෙමත් නැත්නම් කූපන් එකක් එකතු කරනවා. සමහර අවස්ථාවලදී කූපන් එකක් එකතු කරන්නේ නැහැ. රුපියල් සියය විතරයි. මාස හයෙන් හයට පොලිය ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ සමහර ඒවායේ මාස හයෙන් හයට පොලිය ලැබෙනවා .

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මාස හයෙන් හයට ලැබෙන්නේ නැත්නම් කොහොමද පොලිය ලැබෙන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අවසානයේදී face value එක ලැබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එපමණයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මගදි කිසිම interest එකක් ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපි එහෙම නම් එතැනින් පටන් ගනිමු.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Only a storage facility.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම එකක් පටන් ගනිමු. රජය විසින් නොයෙකුත් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්, බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරනවා. අපි ඒ බැඳුම්කර බිල්පත් කියන ඒවා වෙනස් කර ගන්නේ කාලය අනුව. අවුරුද්දකට අඩු නම් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් කියලා අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සඳහන් කරනවා. අවුරුද්දකට වැඩි නම් අපි භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර කියලා සඳහන් කරනවා. එතකොට භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වල කූපන් එකක්, එහෙමත් නැත්නම් පොලිය අනුපාතයක් නැහැ. එතකොට අපිට මේ බැඳුම්කරය. කිසිම දවසක රුපියල් සියයට විකුණන්න බැහැ. පොලියක් නැත්නම් ඇයි ගන්නේ? දැන් රුපියල් සියයට ගන්නේ නැහැ නේ. එක්කෝ අනූවට, එක්කෝ රුපියල් අසූපහට, එහෙම නැත්නම් රුපියල් අසූවට. රුපියල් හැත්තෑපහට, රුපියල් අනූපහට ආදී වශයෙන් නොයෙකුත් ගණන්වලට ගන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගන්නේ අර වාසිය අත් කර ගන්න. අසූවට ගත්තාම සියයට දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම අද අනූවට ගත්තා කියලා හිතමු. අවුරුද්දකින් පසුව මට රුපියල් සියයක් ලැබෙනවා. එතකොට මට රුපියල් දහයක් ලැබෙනවා. එතකොට සියයට දහයක් වාගේ ගණනක් තමයි අපට yield එකක් හැටියට ලැබෙන්නේ. නමුත් එහි කූපන් එකක් නැහැ. එතකොට රජයට කිසි දවසක මේක face value එකට විකුණන්න බැහැ. එහෙම විකුණන්න පුළුවන් අවස්ථා ලෝකයේ ඉතාම දුර්ලභයි. ඒ වෙන්නේ අද ජපානය වාගේ රටවල සෘන පොලියක් තිබෙනවා. සෘන පොලියක් තිබුණ අවස්ථාවකදි පමණයි, මෙවැනි බැඳුම්කරයක් හෝ බිල්පතක් සියයට හෝ

සියයට වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයකට විකුණන්න ලැබෙන්නේ. එතකොට මගේ මූලික ප්‍රශ්නය වෙන්නේ සභාපතිතුමා, අපි මේ ලාභය හෝ අලාභය එහෙම නැත්නම් වාසිය හෝ අවාසිය තීරණය කරන්නේ රුපියල් සියයට වඩා අඩුවෙන් ලැබුණා නම් ඒ **gap** එක නම්, එතකොට මූලික ආර්ථික විද්‍යාත්මක ගැටලුවක් මෙහි පැන නගිනවා. අපි මෙතැනින් එහාට යන්න කලින් මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට අපි විසඳුමක් සොයා ගන්න වෙනවා. මොකද මම සෘජුවම එදා සිට අදත් කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමන් දන්නවා මේක අද ගෙනෙන ගැටලුවක් නොවෙයි නේ. අපි දිගින් දිගටම මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ තමයි එක වර්ගයක බැඳුම්කරයක්.

කිසිම දිනයක රුපියල් **100**ට විකුණන්න බැහැ. ඒක රුපියල් **90**කට විකුණුවොත් රජයට පාඩුවක් වෙනවාද? අපි කියන විධියට ඒක පාඩුවක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් තිබෙන **Report** එක අනුව පාඩුවක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි එතැනට පළමුවෙන්ම අවතීර්ණ වෙන්නේ **11**වැනි පිටුවෙන් නේ. ඒ නිසා ඒක පාඩුවක් කියලා සඳහන් කරන්න වෙනවා. ඒ පළමුවැනි කාරණය. දෙවැනි කාරණයට යන්න කලින් පළමුවැනි කාරණය ගැන දැන් සාකච්ඡා කරනවාද, නැත්නම් පසුව සාකච්ඡා කරනවාද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: දැන් සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාටත් කියන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවා නම් කියන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, නැත්නම් මම මගේ කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, මම ඒක **explain** කරන්නම්. මම හිතන විධියට, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ ඔය කියන කාරණය ගැන පැහැදිලිව සම්පූර්ණයෙන් විස්තර කර තිබෙනවා. ඒක දෙවරක්, තුන්වරක් **read** කළොත් තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්. අනෙක් කාරණය තමයි, **bills** ගැන වාර්තාවේ කිසිම තැනෙක කථා කරලා නැහැ, ඕක ඔතැනින් **out** වෙනවා. මොකද, අපි කථා කරන්නේ, **bonds** ගැන පමණයි. ඒක මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා කියන එක නිවැරදියි, වෙනත් පිටස්තර කාර්යක් කිරීමේදී. නමුත් මේ කාරණයට **bill** එක සම්බන්ධ නැහැ. **Bond** එක ගැන කථා කිරීමේදී "අවාසිය" කියන වචනය භාවිත කළාට "අලාභය" කියන වචනය භාවිත කරන්න මම කැමැතියි. වාර්තාවේ "අලාභය" කියන එක හඳුනා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ පැහැදිලිව ඔය කියන කරුණ පදනම් කරගෙන නොවෙයි. පැහැදිලිම අපට සැලැස්මක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා **uy;d:** එහෙම නොවෙයි නම්, අපි ඒක ඉවත් කරමු.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉවත් කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එතුමාට පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ කාරණය නිවැරදියි, කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මේකේ කථා කරන්නේ **bills** ගැන නොවෙයි, **bonds** ගැන නේ. **Bonds**වලදී අපි කථා කරන්නේ, **specific issue** එකක් ගැස මිසක් **general problem** එකක් ගැන නොවෙයි. **Specific issue** එකේදී ඔය කියන කාරණය ඊට වඩා වෙනස් තත්ත්වයක තිබෙන්නේ. මේකද, මේ කාරණයේදී **Bonds issue** කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් **policy** එකක් තිබුණා. **Bonds issue** කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මීට වඩා **legal base** එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ **legal base** එක යටතේ, ගන්න ඕනෑ ප්‍රමාණය **Monetary Board** එක අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ප්‍රමාණය ගිහිල්ලා **"as much as possible"** කියන එක අපි **explain** කළා. මේක **"minimum loss"** කියන තැනට ගිහිල්ලා තමයි කරන්න වුණේ. මොකද, **market** එකේ පොලී **rate** එක ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සඳහා යා යුතු උපරිම එක මේකයි. එහෙම නැතිව, **auction** එකේ එන **region** එක නොවෙයි කියන එක මේ වෙන කොට සියයට **100**ක්ම පැහැදිලි වෙලා අවසානයි කියලා මම හිතනවා. **Auction** එකට යන මුළු වටිනාකම කියන කාරණයේදී, අපි මේ **case** එකම ගත්තොත්, **Rs 1 billion** කියන කාරණය,-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැනට එන්න නොවෙයි, මම උත්සාහ කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා හදන්නේ වැරදි නිවැරදි කරන්නයි. මෙතුමා අහන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා දීලා තිබෙන වාර්තාව අනුව ඉතා සාධාරණ, සරල ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: වාර්තාව ගැන තමයි මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා හදපු වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමා හදපු වාර්තාවක් නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් හදපු, අපේ **investigation** එක පදනම් කරගත් වාර්තාව නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමා **explain** කරන්නේ සම්පූර්ණ **bond issue** එක ගැන. (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා අහන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි, එතුමා අහන්නේ, වාර්තාවේ **3.2**හි සඳහන් මාතෘකාව බලන්න. "බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හා මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ පොලී අනුපාතයෙහි බලපෑම." මේක අහගන්න. එකපාරක්, දෙපාරක් ඇහුවාම අපි කියන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා පැහැදිලි වෙයි. ඒ බලපෑම බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඇති වෙන ආකාරය කාරක සභාවෙන් විස්තර කරන්නේ, රුපියල් **100**ට අඩු මුදලක් තිබුණාම අවාසියකුත්, ඊට වැඩි මුදලක් තිබුණොත් වාසියකුත් වෙනවා කියන පදනම ගැනයි. ඒ කාරණය ගැන පමණයි අහන්නේ. ඒක එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ කියලා, ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා උදාරණයක් විධියට කිව්වේ, බිල්පත් සම්බන්ධයෙන්. බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තත්, පොලී අනුපාතයයි,-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම තවම එතැනට ආවේ නැහැ. ඒක ගැනත් මම කියන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කාරණයත් අවසන් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, බිල්පතක් නිසා ඒක අදාළ නැහැ කියලා නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් කථා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊට කලින් මේ කොටස ඇතුළත් කිරීමේ අදහස ගැන මම කියන්නම්. එතෙකාට ඒක පැහැදිලි වෙනවා නේ. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකුවෙන්ම ඉදිරිපත් කළ ලේඛන, ඒ අයම දීපු සාක්ෂි සටහන් සහ ඒ අයගේම තොරතුරු මත පදනම් කරගෙන කවුරු හෝ මේ වාර්තාව පරිශීලනය කරන කොට "බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?" කියන එක තේරුම් ගැනීමට පොදු අදහසක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒක දැන ගැනීම සඳහා තමයි **3**වැනි පරිච්ඡේදයේ "භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය" ගැන හැඳින්වීමක් කරන්නේ. නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සහ ඒ නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රමවේද ගැන තිබෙනවා. ඒ ක්‍රමවේදවලින් පළමුවැනි එක තමයි, බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හා මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ පොලී අනුපාතය බලපෑම. මොකද, අපි මේකේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ ඒවා ගැන නේ. ඒ පොදු දේ තමයි මෙතැන සඳහන් වෙන්නේ. ඊට පසුව **4**වැනි පරිච්ඡේදයේ තිබෙන්නේ, ඒකට අදාළ නීතිමය පසුබිම ගැනයි. ඒ ටික හරි නේ. ඒක තමයි මේකෙන් පැහැදිලි කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව අනුව බැලුවාම මේ කාරණය වැරදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම පිළිගන්නවා, මේකේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පතක් ගැන නොවෙයි, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරයක් ගැනයි කියලා. මෙතැනදී අපි බිල්පත සහ බැඳුම්කරය වෙන් කර හඳුනා ගන්නේ කොහොමද? අවුරුද්දට වැඩි නිසාද නැත්නම්, **coupon** එකක් තිබෙන නිසාද? මොකද, **coupon** නැති බැඳුම්කරත් තිබෙනවා. **Discount bonds** තිබෙනවා අවුරුදු **30**ට. ඒවා ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ඉදිරිපත් කරලා නැති වුණාට, ඇමෙරිකාව, ජපානය, ඉන්දියාව වැනි විදේශ රටවල අවුරුදු **30**ට යනකම් **deep discount bonds** තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මෙතැනදී අපි තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ, රුපියල් **100**ට වඩා **face value** එකට අඩු නම් රජයට අවාසියක් වෙන්නේ ඇයි කියලා. ඒ මූලික පදනම මත නේ, මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්නේ. ඒ අනුව තමයි මේක පාඩුවක් කියන තර්කය අපි ගොඩනහන්නේ. මෙතැනදී අපට තීරණය කරන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා, මේ බැඳුම්කරය බිල්පතකින් වෙනස් වෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා. **Coupon** එකක් පොලියක් දෙන නිසාද කියලා තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. **You have to justify that.** එහෙම කළා කියමු කෝ. මම පිළිගන්නවා, එතැනට එමු කෝ. අපි මේවාට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කියන්නේ, **Government Paper** කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ, බිල්පත් වෙන්න පුළුවන්; බැඳුම්කර වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අවුරුද්දට අඩු නම්, **Treasury bills** අවුරුද්දට වැඩි නම් **Treasury bonds.** අපි **bond** එකක් ගනිමු. මේ **bond** එක කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අවුරුද්දට අඩු නම් කියන්නේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පතක් කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අවුරුද්දට අඩු නම්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්. අවුරුද්දට වැඩි නම්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්වලට පොලී අනුපාතයක් ලැබෙනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ලැබෙනවා, නමුත් **coupon** එකක් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා කවදාවත් රුපියල් **100**කට **bill** එකක් විකුණන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, **interest rate** එකක් නැහැ. නමුත් ඒක උච්චාවචණය වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: **interest rate** එකක් කියන්නේ, මම අද මේක රුපියල් **80**ට ගත්තා කියමු කෝ. ඒක අවුරුද්ද අවසාන වෙනකම් තියාගෙන ඉඳලා මහ බැංකුවට දුන්නාම මට ඒකට රුපියල් **100**ක් දෙනවා. එතකොට රුපියල් සියයට **20**ක පොලියක් මට ලැබෙනවා. මෙතැන නේනේ එක වෙනසක් පමණයි. අපි දන්නවා, මේ බැඳුම්කරයට **coupon** එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. **Coupon** එකක් කියන්නේ මොකක්ද, ඒකට පොලී අනුපාතයක් තිබෙනවා. අපි හිතමු, මේ බැඳුම්කරයේ තිබෙන **coupon** එක සියයට **10**යි කියලා. සියයට **10**ක **coupon** එකක් තිබෙන මේ **bond** එක මහ බැංකුවෙන් අද විකුණනවා. එතකොට අපි සියලු දෙනාම මේකට ලංසු තියනවා. අපි හිතමු මේකේ කාලපරිච්ඡේදය අවුරුදු දෙකයි කියලා. අපි එහෙම උපකල්පනය කරමු කෝ. සියයට **10**ක පොලියට මේ බැඳුම්කරය දෙනවා. නමුත් කලින් නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තව අවුරුදු දෙකක් ඉතිරි වුණු තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අවුරුදු **4**ක් වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අවුරුදු **4**ක බැඳුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කළා කියමු කෝ. ඒකෙන් අවුරුදු දෙකක් ගෙවිලා තිබෙනවා, තවත් අවුරුදු දෙකක් ඉතිරි වෙලා තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒවා සලකන්නේ අවුරුදු දෙකේ බැඳුම්කර විධියටයි. ඒවාට ලැබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය සියයට **15** නම්, අපිට කිසිම දවසක මේක රුපියල් **100**ට විකුණන්න බැහැ. රුපියල් **100**ට විකුණන්න බැරි ඇයි?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අතන රුපියල් **5**ක් වැඩියෙන් ලැබෙන නිසා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අතන රුපියල් **5**ක් වැඩිපුර ලැබෙනවා. **Market** එකේ ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට පුළුවන් මෙතැනින් ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ එතැනින් ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා ඉන්න. ඒකට තමයි අපි කියන්නේ, **"arbitrage"** කියලා. වෙළෙඳ පොළක් හරියට ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා නම්, එහෙම වෙනසක් තිබෙන්න බැහැ. උදාහරණයක් හැටියට මම **simplify** කළොත්, එකම දේ නේ මේ විකුණන්නේ. එකම පොල් ගෙඩි වර්ගය ගත්තාම, එක කඩයක පොල් ගෙඩියක මිල රුපියල් **10**යි. තවත් කඩයක පොල් ගෙඩියක මිල රුපියල් **15**යි. වෙළෙඳ පොළේ එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ. රුපියල් **10** ඉහළට යන්න ඕනෑ. රුපියල් **15** පහළට එන්න ඕනෑ. රුපියල් **12.50**ට මේක සමස්ත **equilibrium** එකක් විධියට එන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා, එතකොට මට තිබෙන මූලිකම ගැටලුව තමයි අපට ඍජුව මේ වාක්‍ය මෙතැන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැරිවීම.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් දැන ගන්නයි අහන්නේ. මුලින්ම **Rs. 1 billion** ගන්න නේ දැන්වීම දැම්මේ. ඒක හරිද විගණකාධිපතිතුමා?

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: හරි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එතකොට අදාළ සමාගම බිලියන කීයක්ද ගත්තේ? **Perpetual Treasuries Limited** එක ගත්ත **bond** ගණන කීයද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: **5**යි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔක්කොම **10**යි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගත්ත පොලී අනුපාතය කීයද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: **11.73**යි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, බිලියන **10**ක මුදල **11.73**ක පොලී අනුපාතයට නේ ගත්තේ. මේ මුදල සියයට **11** පොලියට ගත්තා නම් ආණ්ඩුවට ලාභද, පාඩුද? සියයට **11.73**ට ගත්ත එක සියයට **11** පොලී අනුපාතයට ගත්තා කියලා කියමුකෝ. එතකොට මොකක්ද වෙන්නේ?

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඇත්ත වශයෙන් එතැන **issue** එක ඒක නොවෙයි. මේක **market** වෙලා අපට කීයක් ලැබෙනවාද කියන **issue** එකයි තිබෙන්නේ. **Market** එකේ තිබෙන **interest rate** එක පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි ඒක තීරණය වෙන්නේ. මේකේ තිබුණ **issue** එක මේ අවස්ථාවේ ඊට වඩා අඩු **interest rate** එකක් තිබුණේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ. මම එතැනට තමයි එන්න හදන්නේ. මේකේ **secondary market** එක සම්බන්ධ කරුණු සේරම හරි. නමුත් ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ සිද්ධිය සිදු වුණු අවස්ථාවේ සිදු වුණු පාඩුව නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ මේ වාර්තාවේ **14** වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා - මම **14** වැනි පිටුවට යනවා නොවෙයි. වෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසායි මම අහන්නේ. කෙටුම්පතේ එතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ කොටසක් තිබෙන්නේ. **2014** වසරේ සිට සිදු වුණු ක්‍රියාවලිය තමයි- වෙන්දේසියට ගියා නේ. වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් සියයට **14**ක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඍජු ක්‍රමයෙන් සියයට **86**ක්

අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් සියයට **4, 96, 14, 4** ගියේ පවතින පොලි අනුපාතය ගැන අවබෝධයක් ගන්න. පැහැදලි නේ. මේ දක්වා සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ ගන්න සම්පූර්ණ ප්‍රමාණයෙන් සියයට **5**ක් හෝ සියයට දෙකක්, තුනක් කලින් **auction** එකට දමනවා. දමලා බලනවා යන **range** එක මොකක්ද කියලා. ඊට පසුව තමයි **fix** ක්‍රමයට ගන්නේ. ඒක නේ සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් මාර්තු මාසයෙන් පසුව සියයට සියයම වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට තමයි ගියේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි තවම එතැනට ඇවිත් නැහැ, ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සියයට **11.73** ට නේ ගත්තේ. එතුමා අහන්නේ සියයට **11** පොලි අනුපාතයට ගත්තා නම් රජයට පාඩුද, වාසිද කියලායි. වැඩිය විස්තර කරන්නේ නැතිව ඒකට පිළිතුරක් දෙන්නකෝ. පිළිතුර දුන්නාට පසුව මෙතුමාට ඊළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ඇමතිතුමා **secondary market** එක පිළිබඳව ආර්ථික විද්‍යානුකූලව කථා කළා. අපි නිශ්චිත කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් එවලේ පාඩුව නේ බලන්නේ. විශේෂයෙන්ම පොලි අනුපාතය සම්බන්ධයෙන්. ඒ කියන්නේ මේකට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු අය බිලියන එකක් ගන්න හිතාගෙන තමයි ඉදිරිපත් වන්නේ. නමුත් සමාගම් දෙකක් විතරක් වැඩි ගණනක් දැම්මා. සිද්ධ වුණු ක්‍රියාවලිය ඒක නේ. සමාගම් කිහිපයක් වැඩිය දැම්මා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. මට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්නකෝ. අපි කවුරුත් දන්නවා අපි කරන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා. අපි කවුරුත් මේ කරන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව හරහා සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුවට අදාළ වාර්තාවක් සකස් කිරීම නේ. එහෙම නැතිව බැඳුම්කර පිළිබඳව ලංකාවේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ආර්ථික විද්‍යාත්මක විග්‍රහයකට අර්ථකථනයක් දෙන එක නොවෙයි නේ. එතකොට මේ ගනුදෙනුව අදාළ කර ගෙන මහ බැංකුව දැනට ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය කොහොමද සිදු වන්නේ කියන එක ගැන තමයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් මෙතැනට ඇවිත් පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා **market** එකේ තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණය ගැන අදහසක් ගන්න අපි මුලින් අගයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඒ ඉදිරිපත් කරන අගයට එන ඉල්ලුම මත මහ බැංකුවට, අපට නොවෙයි. හිතලුවකට නොවෙයි. මහ බැංකුවට තිබෙන වාසි අවාසි බලලා තමයි අපි තීරණය ගන්නේ කියලා. වාසි අවාසි කියලා එන්නේ එතැනට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මමත් ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න ඇමතිතුමා සිතන විධියට හිතන්න කැමැතියි. මම ආර්ථික විද්‍යාඥයෙකුත් නොවෙයි. මට ගොඩක් සංකීර්ණ දේවල් තේරෙන්නේත් නැහැ. හැබැයි ඔබතුමා ඇහුවේ **common sense** පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. අපේ සාමාන්‍ය කථාව මොකක්ද? මේක **11.73**කට යන්නේ නැතිව **10**කට, **9.5**කට, **10.5**කට ගියා නම් **okay** ද කියලා නේ අහන්නේ. **That is to have a common sense.** එහෙම වුණා නම් හරිද? **12**කට කිට්ටු වෙන්න ගිය නිසාද මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇති වුණේ? ඒක තමයි **common sense** ප්‍රශ්නය. ඒකට පිළිතුරක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි **specific** ප්‍රශ්නය. මම ගරු සභාපතිතුමා සමඟ එකතු වෙන්නේ නැහැ මෙන්න මේ හේතුව නිසා. ඔබතුමාම මේ **report** එකේ තිබෙන විස්තර බැලුවොත්, **2014** වසරේ අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ සම්පූර්ණ **direct placements; 2014** ජූනි මාසයේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් **direct placements; 2014** අගොස්තු මාසයේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන් **direct placements;** ඔක්තෝබර්, නොවැම්බර්, **2015** ජනවාරි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් **direct placements. Central Bank** එකේ මහත්වරු ඔය තර්කය කිව්වා තමයි. ඔබතුමා හරි. කිව්වාට ඒ අය කියන එක නිවැරදි නැහැ. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. **Central Bank** එක කියන දේ වාර්තා කරන්න අපි අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. අපටත් මොකක් හරි දෙයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි විනිශ්චයක් දෙන්න නේ මේ කමිටුවට ඇවිත් ඉන්නේ. ඒක එහෙම නොවෙයි. මෙතැන ඔය කියන **ratio** එකක් **maintain** කිරීමක් හරි, ඒ කියන්නේ **auction** එකට පොඩ්ඩක් දමලා ගණන අරගෙන ඒකට **private placements match** කිරීම හැමදාම වෙලා නැහැ. එහෙම කරපු දවස් ඇති. මම නැහැ කියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ විතරක් නොවෙයි, අපි **specific** පෙබරවාරි මාර්තු ගත්තත් ඇත්තටම **100 per cent auction** නැහැ නේ. බලන්නකෝ මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන හැටි. අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ **2015** වසරේ පෙබරවාරි **27** වැනි දින **auction** එක ගැන. ඒ **auction** එකට කලින් රුපියල් බිලියන **23**ක් **private placements**වලින් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඔතැන **tricky** ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. **Mr. Wijesinghe,** ඒක හරිම **important** ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඕක නේ කියන කථාව. ඒ කියන්නේ විශාල මුදල් හිඟයක් තිබුණා. පසුව තිබෙන ඒවාට මම මේ යමක් කියන්නේ. විශාල මුදල් හිඟයක් තිබුණා; **desperate** හිඟයක් තිබුණා. ප්‍රතිපත්ති

මොකුත් නැහැ. **Direct placements** දමලා පුළුවන් තරම් ගන්න බැලුවා. අන්තිම දවසක් නිසා මම මේ කියන්නේ. බිලියන **23.524** සම්පූර්ණයෙන් **private placements** දමලා **market** එක ශුද්ධ කරලා ගත්ත ගණනක්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ. වෙන්දේසියෙන් **10** අරගෙන **23** ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. බිලියන තුනයි ලැබුණේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ යථාර්ථයේ සිද්ධ වුණු දේ සහ දැන් තිබෙන දේ. එච්චරයි මට තිබෙන්නේ. මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය මේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමා හරි මම හරි පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රමවේදය. වෙනස්කමක් තිබෙනවා නම් වෙනස්කම සටහන් කරමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේකේ පාඩුවක් හෝ අලාභයක් හෝ වුණේ නැහැ කියලා කියනවා නම් මෙතැන ගැටලුවක් නැහැ නේ. පාඩුවක් හෝ ලාභයක් වුණ නිසා නේ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේකේ තිබෙන පාඩුව හෝ අවාසිය ඉවත් කළාම කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මට අවස්ථාව දෙන්නකෝ. මෙතුමා කියන විධියට ගියොත් ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට කරන්න පුළුවන් දෙයක්. ඒ කියන්නේ ලාභ පාඩු කථාවක් නැහැ නේ. මෙතැන ලාභ පාඩු කථාවක් නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ වාසි, අවාසිත් නැහැ. අපි මේ වාර්තාවෙන් බලන්නේ වෙච්ච දෙයක් ගැන. එතකොට අපි මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ - ලංකාවේ මහ බැංකුව බැඳුම්කර සහ බිල්පත් නිකුත් කිරීමේදී ඒ අය තමයි බෙදා ගෙන ඉන්නේ අවුරුද්දද, අවුරුද්දට වැඩිද කියන එක. ඒ අය තමයි දන්නේ ඒවායේ ලාභ පාඩු ගණනය කරන විධිය. ඒ අය තමයි ඒවාට ලාභද පාඩුද කියලා ගණනය කරන්නේ.

නැත්නම් ඕනෑම නිලධාරියෙකුට වංචා කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි, ආසන්න සතිවල තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතික මත පදනම් වෙලා, රජයට අත්‍යවශ්‍ය මුදල් ප්‍රමාණය, අඩුම **risk** එකක් සහිතව කළ යුතුයි කියලා නිර්ණායක පනවා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා පසු ගිය සතියේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතිකය කියන එකත් මේකට අදාළයි. මේ සඳහා ලෝකයේ සුවිශේෂී අවස්ථා තියෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව ඉගෙන ගන්නා අවස්ථාවකදී වැදගත් වෙයි. අපටත් ඒක වෙනත් අවස්ථාවකදී වැදගත් වෙයි. මෙතැනට අදාළව ගත්තොත්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ඊට කලින් සතියේ සියයට **9.48**ට තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතිකය සියයට **11.73**ට ගිහින් තියෙන විට, ඒක සියයට **9.48**ටම ගන්න තිබුණා නම් ශ්‍රී ලංකාණ්ඩුවට වාසි නැද්ද? කියලා ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන්නේ. ඒක සියයට **10**ට ගත්තා නම් වාසි නැද්ද; සියයට **11**ට ගත්තා නම් වාසි නැද්ද? මොකද, ගිය සතියේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතිකය තිබෙනවා. ලෝකයේ ඉස්සෙල්ලාම **market** එකක් හදේ පටන් ගෙන කරනවා නොවෙයි නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන්නේ, ලංකාවේ මහ බැංකුව භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී ලාභ පාඩු ගණනය කිරීම සඳහා හදා ගෙන තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදයයි. සියයට වැඩි නම් ලාභයි කියලා කියනවා; සියයට අඩු නම් අලාභයි කියලා කියනවා. ඒක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ ක්‍රමවේදය.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපට කැමැති විධියට අර්ථකථනය කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම නොවුණොත් කිසිම ආකාරයකින් මෙහෙම ගණන හදන්න බැහැ. ඒක ලාභද පාඩුද කියලා බලන එකම විධිය තමයි, ඒ ආසන්න සතියේ හෝ ඒ ආසන්න මාසයේ තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතිකයට සාපේක්ෂව කොච්චර ඉහළට ගියාද, පහළට ගියාද කියලා බලන එකයි. සුනාමියක් ආවොත්, අපට ඒකත් සැලකිල්ලට ගන්න වෙනවා. එහෙම නැතිව මෙයින් ලාභ හෝ පාඩුයි කියලා **hypothetically** අපට කියන්න බැහැ. මෙය ණය උපකරණයක්. මේ ණය උපකරණය පාවිච්චි කිරීමේදී අනිවාර්යෙන් වාසි හා අවාසි දෙකම වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම ගත්තොත් අපට කියන්න බැහැ කිසිම අවස්ථාවක වාසියි හෝ අවාසියි කියලා. මේ හැම ණය උපකරණයක්ම නිශ්චිත අවස්ථාවකදී යොදා ගන්නවා. අපි අලාභ නම් කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා අර ගෙන නැත්තේ. අර ගෙන නැති දෙකක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතුමා කියන කාරණාවට මා එකඟයි. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී තිබුණු වෙළෙඳ පොළ අනුපාතිය ගැන නේ මේ කියන්නේ. ඒ එදා හෝ ඊට කලින් සතියේ හෝ ඊට කලින් මාසයේ හෝ තිබුණු **market** එක තමයි. වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තියෙන්නේ ද්විතීයික පොලියක්. ප්‍රාථමික පොලියක් වෙළෙඳ පොළේ නැහැ නේ. ප්‍රාථමික පොලියක් තියෙන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් නිකුත් කරන අවස්ථාවේදී පමණයි. ඊට පස්සේ තියෙන්නේ ද්විතීයික පොලියක්. මේ බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කළේ ඒ ද්විතීයික පොලියට සාපේක්ෂව යන පොලී අනුපාතයකට නම්, එතැන ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. මම එතුමා එක්ක සියයට සියයක් එකඟයි. මෙතැනදී වට්ටම්

අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කළොත්, රජයට මුල්‍ය අවාසියක් වෙනවා කියලා **broad statement** එකක් කියනවා. මම විරුද්ධ වෙන්නේ ඒකටයි. මම ගෙන ආවේ ආර්ථික විද්‍යාත්මක තර්කයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: හැම මොහොතේම ඒක වෙනවා කියලා කියන්න බැහැ, කියලා ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මේ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී ඒක වුණා නම් ඔබතුමා මොකද කියන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්ව විධියට, ලාභ අලාභ තීන්දු කරන්න සාපේක්ෂව බලන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු කාරණාවත් නිවැරැදියි. අපට තියෙන්නේ සාමාන්‍ය දැනුම නේ. ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇහුවේ, සියයට **11.73**ට දුන්න එක සියයට **11**ට ගත්තා නම්, ආණ්ඩුවට වාසියක් වෙන්නේ නැද්ද? කියලා. අපට තේරෙන විධියට වාසියි කියලා කිව්වේ. ඒක සියයට **8**ට ගත්තා නම් ආණ්ඩුවට කොච්චර වාසිද? නියමයි! නේ. මට දැනෙන දේ ඒකයි. මම කෙටි ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම්. ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තියෙන ගණනටම ඔය බැඳුම්කර **issue** කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වෙනම දෙයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම පුළුවන් නම්, -ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තියෙන ගණනටම රුපියල් මිලියන **10**ට **12**ට හැම අවස්ථාවකදීම ගන්න පුළුවන් නම්-"ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තියෙන **interest rate** එකට සියලු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් විය යුතුයි." කියලා, මේ **manuals**වල සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවට අනුව එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. මෙහි ඔබතුමා සඳහන් කරලා තියෙන පළමු වැනි **paragraph** එකම වැරැදියි. මමත් ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව අනුව ටිකක් අධ්‍යයනය කළා. ඒ අනුව තමයි වැරැදියි කියන්නේ. ගණන **100** නේ. සියයට **90**ක් කියලා දෙනවා නම්, **interest rate** එක සියයට **10**යි. **80** කියලා දෙනවා නම්, සියයට **20** වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ආණ්ඩුව රුපියල් **100**යි, **interest rate** එකයි පාලනය කරන්නේ ඒකෙන් තමයි. එකසිය දහයට දුන්නොත් **interest rate** එක අඩු වෙනවා. එතකොට ආණ්ඩුවට අවශ්‍යතාව අනුව ඒක **110** කරන්න; **80** කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන ගණන අනුව. ඒ නිසා මේ **paragraph** එක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වැරැදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි වැරැදියි කියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. අපි මෙහෙම කියමු. මේක **generalized statement** එකක් නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, රුපියල් සියයට අඩුවෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර වෙළෙඳ පොළේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරයක් විකුණුවොත් ඒක රජයට අලාභයක් කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. මොකද, හැම අවස්ථාවේදීම ඒක වෙන්නේ නැහැ. සමහර අවස්ථාවලදි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, සමස්තයක් හැටියට අපට ඒක කියන්න බැහැ. මම මේ කියන්නේ දේශපාලන කථාවක් හෝ පක්ෂග්‍රාහී කථාවක් නොවෙයි. මම කියන්නේ, මෙහෙම එකක් දැම්මොත් මට මේ චාර්තාව අත්සන් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට එකසිය පහට ගියොත් රජයට වාසියක් කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ නොවනවා නම්, ඒ එකඟ නොවන වාක්‍ය මොකක්ද කියලා අපට කියන්න. මෙයින් කියැවෙන්නේ, සියයයේ එක **70**ට දුන්නොත් හැම වෙලාවේම වෙන්නේ මේකයි; සියයේ එක **100**ට දුන්නොත් හැම වෙලාවේම වෙන්නේ මේකයි; සියයේ එක **110**ට දුන්නොත් හැම වෙලාවේම වෙන්නේ මේකයි කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සියයේ එක එකසිය දහයට දෙන්නේ පොලී අනුපාතය **balance** කර ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොලී අනුපාතයයි දෙකම **balance** කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පොලී අනුපාතය අඩු කළාම රජයට වාසි වෙනවා. එතකොට ගෙවන්න වෙන්නේ අඩු පොලියක්. එතකොට තමයි වැඩි මුදලක් ගෙවන්නේ. අඩු මුදලක් ගෙවන්නේ වැඩි පොලියක් ගෙවනවා නම්. ඒක ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේ **supply and demand mechanism** එකක්. අපි අවුරුදු **100**කට ණයක් ගත්තොත්, පොලී අනුපාතය අඩුයි. අපි දවස් දෙකකට ගත්තොත් පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩියි. මෙයින් රජයට වාසියක් හෝ අවාසියක් වෙනවා කියලා කාටවත් කියන්න බැහැ. මේක ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව. එතකොට සියයේ එක එකසිය දහයට වාගේ වැඩි ගණනට දෙන විට රජය පොලිය අඩු කරනවා. එතැනදී රජයට වාසියක් ලැබෙනවා;

මුදලින් අවාසියක් ලැබෙනවා. ඒ දෙක balance වෙනවා. ඒක තමයි ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කියන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයිද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා indicators දෙකක් තියා ගෙන, දෙකෙන් එකක් වෙනස් කරලා, එතකොට මේක apply වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කියනවා. එහෙම නොවෙයි. පොලියයි සියයයි දෙකක්. එතකොට පොලිය නිශ්චිත නම්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සෘජුව සම්බන්ධයි. What are you talking about?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේ වාර්තාවට පදනම් වුණේ, එකක්, පොලිය නිශ්චිත වෙලාවට අගය මොකක්ද? කියලා. නැත්නම් අගය නිශ්චිත වෙලාවට පොලිය මොකක්ද? කියලා. ඔබතුමාගේ තර්කයේ වාසියට මේ දෙකම කළවම් කරනවා. එහෙම වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Indicators දෙකක් තිබුණාට, හැම වෙලාවේම දෙකෙන් එකයි apply වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොලී මට්ටම එක නම්, ගරු බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන එක නිවැරැදියි. රටේ පොලී අනුපාතය වෙනස් නොවී එකම මට්ටමක පවතිනවා නම් ඔබතුමා මේ ඇතුළු කර තිබෙන paragraph එක නිවැරැදියි. මේ සියයේ මුදල ඉහළ සහ පහළ යන විට පොලී අනුපාතය වෙනස් වෙනවා. ඒක ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව අනුව අනිවාර්යෙන්ම වෙනවා. ඒකයි bond එකේ පොලී අනුපාතයක් එන්නේ.

එතකොට පොලී අනුපාතයක් නැතුව ගන්න බැහැ. පොලී අනුපාතයක් ගණනය නොකරන්නේ නම්, ඔබතුමා කියන මේ සංඛ්‍යාව හරි. පොලී අනුපාතිකය ඇතුළත් වෙනවා නම් මෙය තනිකරම වැරදි ආර්ථික විද්‍යාත්මක වාක්‍යයක්.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා**: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මුල සිටම ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ. පළමු වැනි එක, 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ මහ බැංකුවෙන් නිකුත් වූ බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන් රටේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් පැන නැගුනා. එතකොට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළව අගමැතිතුමා විශේෂ කමිටුවත් පත් කර වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒ වාගේම විපක්ෂයත් මේ පිළිබඳ කරුණු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඔබතුමා ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහි ප්‍රධානම ප්‍රශ්නය වුණේ රජයට අලාභයක් වුණාද කියන එකයි. රජයට අලාභයක් වුණා කියන ප්‍රශ්නය රටේ ජනමාධ්‍යයෙන් මේ හැම තැනම ප්‍රසිද්ධ වුණාට පසුව තමයි පාර්ලිමේන්තුව අපට ඒ වගකීම පැවරුවේ. ඊට පස්සෙ මේක සොයා ගෙන යන විට මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගැටලු විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් මහ බැංකු වාර්තා පරීක්ෂා කිරීමෙන් අපිට පෙනුණා. මෙයින් රජයට අලාභයක් වුණා කියන කාරණය වාර්තා වුණා. ඉන්පසුව ක්‍රමවේදය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රශ්න පරීක්ෂා කරන විට අපිට හසු වුණා. ඉන්පසුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා සම්බන්ධයෙන්, අධිපතිවරයාගේ ඥාතීත්වයක් ඇති සමාගමගමකට වැඩි බැඳුම්කම ප්‍රමාණයක් නිකුත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් පැන නැගුනා. එවැනි ගැටලුකාරී දේවල් සිදු වුණා කියන එක, සියලුම පරීක්ෂණවලින් සනාථ වෙලා තිබෙන. ඒ නිසා ඒ සමාගම මේ වන විට ලංකාවේ වැඩිම වාර්තා ගත ආදායමක් උපද්දවපු සමාගම බවට පත්වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මෙහි දූෂණයක් සිදු වුණාද කියන සැකය සමාජයටත් රටටත් තිබුණ නිසා ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා. ඊළඟට ඒ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් සොයා බැලීම සඳහා පාර්ලිමේන්තුව අපිට පැවරුවා. දැන් තිබෙන්නේ ඒක වුණාද කියන එකයි. ඒක වුණාද කියන්න, අපි බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේ ලාභ පාඩුවලට වඩා මේ ක්‍රමවේද බිඳ වැටිලා තිබෙනවා නම්, නීති රාමුව බිඳ වටිටගෙන තිබෙනවා නම් එවැනි ගැටලුත් මේක ඇතුළේ තිබිය යුතුයි. තමන්ගේ වගකීමෙන් පරිබාහිරව කටයුතු සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ හැම එකක්ම පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් කිරීම තමයි මෙතැනින් සිදු වන්නේ. නැතිනම් මෙතැන මූල්‍ය අගය පමණක් පරීක්ෂා කළොත් මෙය පරීක්ෂණයක් නොවෙයි. මූල්‍ය අගය පමණක් බලනවා නම් විශේෂඥයන් මඟින් වෙනම බලන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් විගණනයට හසුවෙද්දී එහි ක්‍රමවේද බිඳ වැටිලා, ඉන් එහාට ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. ඒක නිසා තමයි ඒ පාඩුවයි, මේ කරුණුයි සනාථ වෙන්නේ. නිසි ක්‍රමවේදයකට ගිහිල්ල ඒක සිද්ධ වුනා නම් සමහර විට මේක එහෙම නොවෙන්න තිබුණා. නමුත් මේ ඔක්කොමත් එකතු කරලා බැලුවම තමයි, මෙහි යම් අක්‍රමිකතාවක් සිදු වුණා කියන තර්කය පැන නගින්නේ. අපි මුදලේ අගය එහෙට මෙහෙට වූ එකක් ගැන පමණක් බලලා මේක ගොනු කර ගන්න බැහැ. ඒක ඇතුළේ ක්‍රමවේද විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් බිඳ වටිටලා ආපු එකක් පරීක්ෂාවට ලක්වීමෙන් තමයි මේ තීන්දුවට එන්න වෙන්නේ කියන එකයි මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අවසාන වාර්තාවේ නිගමන තුන දෙස බැලුවාම ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් පෙනෙන්නේ. නමුත් එහෙම තත්ත්ත්වයක් තුළ නොවෙයි නම් මේක සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ, ඔය කියන තර්ක අදාළ වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නොවී මේ සිද්ධියට අදාළව තිබෙන ලැදියාවන්, බැඳීම් ආදී සියල්ලම බැලුවම තමයි යම් ක්‍රමවේදයකින් වංචනිකව හෝ දූෂිත ක්‍රියාදාමකින් කියන නිගමනයට එන්නේ. එහෙම නැතුව මුදලේ

අගය මත පමණක් තීරණය වන කරුණක්ම නොවෙයි. එහෙම නොවුණා නම් සමහර විට ඔය කියන තර්ක සත්‍ය වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා මට හිතෙනවා.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන එක හරි. මට තිබෙන්නේ එක ප්‍රශ්නයයි. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මේ ගනුදෙනුවේදී එක වෙනුවට දහය ගැනීම නිසා යම් කිසි අලාභයක් රජයට වුණාද, නැද්ද කියන තැනට අපි තවම ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ. එතැනට මගේ අදහස මම ඉදිරිපත් කරලා නැහැ. ඔබතුමා දන්නවා මගේ අදහස මොකක්ද කියලා. යම් කිසි අලාභයක් - අවාසියක්- වූ බව මම කලින් සිටම පිළිගත්තා. නමුත් ඒ අවාසිය කොපමණද කියන එක පිළිබඳව පසුව කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම කියන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි. මම කියන්නේ, හැම අවස්ථාවේදීම සියයට වඩා අඩුවෙන් අපි bond එකක් නිකුත් කළොත්, ඒක රජයට පාඩුවක් කියලා මෙතැන ලියන්න හැකියාවක් නැහැ. ඒක වැරදියි. අපිට කියන්න පුළුවන් මේ අවස්ථාවේදී පාඩුවක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්, ඒක වුණා කියලා. අපි පසුව එතැනට එමු. නමුත් ආර්ථික විද්‍යාත්මකව ඒක කරන්න බැහැ. අපි ඔක්කොම බලමු ඇමුණුම 30හි 121 වැනි පිටුව. මගේ මේ තර්කය පොඩ්ඩක් වැඩි දියුණු කරන්නයි මම එතනැට යන්නේ.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: ගරු හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මෙතැන 100ක් කියලා නැහැ නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: වට්ටම් මිලට කියන්නේ ඒක නේ. සියයට අඩුනම් තමයි වට්ටම් මිලට කියන්නේ.

ගරු **(වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා**: දැන් මෙහි තිබෙන බැඳුම්කර බිල්පතේ නිර්වචනයට ඔබතුමා එකඟද?

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: බැඳුම්කරයක් සහ බිල්පතක් වෙනස් වෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා, අපිට ඕනෑ නම් තවදුරටත් හඳුන්වන්න පුළුවන්. දැන් මෙතැන අපි නිර්වචනය කරලා නැහැ නේ.

ගරු **නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා**: සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමයක් නේ මේ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් හඳුන්වන විධිය නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: අවුරුද්දට අඩුනම් කියලා නැහැ නේ. මම මේක තවදුරටත් පැහැදිලි කරන්නම් කෝ. අපේ වාර්තාවේ පිටු අංක 121ට අපි යමු. එතැන තමයි මේකෙ පාඩුව හදන්නේ. දැන් පළමු වැනි පාඩුව එන්නේ 8 වෙනි sequence number එකෙන් "E" කියන පුද්ගලයා. රුපියල් හයලක්ෂ අනූපන්දහස් හත්සියපනහක estimated loss එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇමුණුම් xxx. පිටුව 121.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: ගරු බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමා බලන්න. අපි මෙහෙම නේ පොලිය හදන්නේ. මම මේක ගොඩාක් study කළා. මම මේ නිකං කියන කථාවක් නෙමෙයි. දැන් බලන්න, 08 වැනි එකෙන් තමයි පළමුවෙනි loss එක එන්නේ හයලක්ෂ අනූපන්දාස් හත්සිය පනහක් කියලා. ඒක පිළිගන්නවා නේ. එතකොට "E" කියන පුද්ගලයා රුපියල් 103.1158ට තමයි ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. හැබැයි ඒක loss එකක් හැටියට පෙන්වනවා. දැන් ඔබතුමා කලින් කියනවා 100ට වඩා වැඩිනම් රජයට වාසියක් කියලා. 100ට වඩා අඩු නම් රජයට අවාසියක් කියලා. එහෙම නම් 100ට වඩා වැඩි වෙනකොට loss එකක් වුණේ කොහොමද?

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: නැහැ. ඒක එන්නේ අරකට සාපේක්ෂව.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: හරි. මම කියන එක ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: ඒක එන්නේ 104ට සාපේක්ෂව. ඒකේ තිබෙන්නේ වැඩි ලාභය අඩුවීමක් නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කියනවා නම් 100 කියන් බැහැ. මේ දෙකම වෙන්න බැහැ. **ගාමිණී ජයසිංහ මහතා**: මේ වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් කථා කරනවා නම්, මම ඒකට උත්තර දෙන්නම්. අපි මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, "Monetary Board එක විසින් අනුමත කළ ප්‍රමාණය ඉක්මවා ගැනීම නිසා ඇති වූ අලාභය" නිසා නේ. නමුත් ඔය කියන කාරණයට වඩා එහා ගිය දෙයක් තමයි මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ. මේ 108.4 කියන කාරණයෙන් නතර කළා නම් Monetary Board එක, approve කරපු ආකාරයට මෙන්න මේකයි ලැබෙන ප්‍රමාණය. එතකොට ඒ ප්‍රමාණය කරන්නේ නැතුව, වෙනත් බලපෑම් මත Monetary Board එක කියපු ප්‍රමාණය exceed කරලා ගැනීම නිසා යම් දෙයක් වුණා නම් ඒක තමයි මේ calculate කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: මම ඒ ඉලක්කම් පිළිගන්නේ නැති වුණත් ඒ තර්කය පිළිගන්නවා. ඒ තර්කය මොකක්ද? යම් කිසි ප්‍රමාණයකට එතැනදී අපිට cut-off කරන්න තිබුණා. එතැනදී cut-off කළේ නැහැ. ඊට වඩා ගත්තා. ඒ නිසා පාඩුවක්, අලාභයක් සිද්ධ අවාසියක් සිද්ධ වුණා. මම ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් සියයට සියයක් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සමඟ එකඟයි. හැබැයි ඔබතුමා

කියන general line එකට මේක පරස්පර වෙනවා. පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා අධිමිලක් ලැබෙන අතර, රජයට මූල්‍ය වාසියක් ලැබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, 100ට වඩා අපි වික්කොත් රජයට මූල්‍ය වාසියකුත්, 100ට වඩා අඩුවෙන් වට්ටමකට වික්කොත් මූල්‍ය අවාසියකුත් සිදු වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා අපිට මේ දෙකම මේ වාර්තාවේ තියන්න බැහැ. දෙකෙන් එකයි තියන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ. දැන් මෙතැනදී අපි 104ට වික්කේ. දැන් 104ට වික්කා නම්, මේ අනුව අලාභයක් වෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: මේකට අනුව අවාසියක්.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: මේකට අනුව පාඩුවක්. ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න.

ගැමිණී ජයසිංහ මහතා: ඒකත් calculate කරලා දෙන්න පුළුවන් කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ, වාසියක්. මොකද, එතැනින් උඩ ප්‍රමාණය වාසි ගැන කථා කරලා නැහැ. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන තැන ගැන පමණයි කථා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: 100ට උඩින් කීය ආවත් වාසියක් නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: 100ට උඩින් ආවොත් වාසියක්ද? අවාසියක්ද?

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: 100ට උඩින් අවොත් වාසියි නේ. 103ට ආවොත් වැඩියෙන්ම වාසියි.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: ඒක තමයි මේ general statement එකෙන් කියන්නේ.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: ඔබතුමා කියනේ estimated loss කියන මේ column එකේ loss එක ගැනද?

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: ඒකෙන් නේ මේ අවාසිය හදන්නේ. ඒක එකතු කරලා නේ මේ 884 හදන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ loss වෙන්නේ අර තීරණය මත.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ 104ට සාපේක්ෂව.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 104ට සාපේක්ෂව loss එකක් නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි දෙන්නාම හරි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 100ට උඩින් තියෙන ඔක්කොම වාසියි. 104 වැඩියෙන් වාසියි.

(ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා සම්බන්ධිතයි)

104ට ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තියෙද්දි නේ මේ 103ට ගන්නේ. ඒ නිසා අවාසියක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතකොට, සියයට උඩින් තිබෙනවා නම් වාසියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම නම්, සියයට උඩින් තිබෙන ඒවා අවාසියි කියලා කියන්නේ කොහොමද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේක වෙනත් කාරණයක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි 104ට සාපේක්ෂව හදන නිසයි අවාසිය.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ දෙකම හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නිසා හැම වෙලාවේම සියය කියලා කියන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මේ කියන්නේ "සියය" කියන සාධකය මත මහ බැංකුව ගණනය කරන ක්‍රමය. ඒක එකක්. ඒක වැරදි නැහැ. අපේ වාර්තාවට අපි ඇතුළත් කරලා තිබෙන කාරණය සිද්ධාන්ත වශයෙන් ගත්තොත්, බැඳුම්කරයක මුහුණත අගය සහ මුහුණත අගයට අඩුවට සහ වැඩියට මිල තීරණය වීම කියන කාරණා නිවැරදියි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙතැන මේ කියන්නේ, බැඳුම්කරයේ මිලදී ගැනීම පිළිබඳව මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය පදනම් කරගෙන. ඒ තීරණය ඉක්මවා ගිහින් සිදු වුණු අවාසි. ඒ තීරණය ඉක්මවා යාම නිසා සිදු වූ අවාසියත් මෙහි නිවැරදියි. ඒ කාරණය සහ මේ කාරණය කියන කාරණා දෙක එකට ගළපන්න බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම හිතන විධියට, අපි එකම දෙය ආකාර දෙකකට කියනවා නේද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, යම්කිසි මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් පිරිසක් එයට එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැත්නම්, "එතුමන්ලා එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ." කියලා ඒ බව සටහන් කරන්න. නැත්නම් ඔය මාතෘකාවේම පැය ගණනාවක් ඉන්න වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට දැන් තීරණය පැහැදිළියි. මේ වාර්තාවේ කෙටුම්පතට "බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හා මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ පොලී අනුපාතයෙහි බලපෑම." සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු විග්‍රහය ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම වැරදි නැහැ. එය නිවැරදියි. ඒ නිවැරදි තීරණය මේ කෙටුම්පතේ 10 පිටුවේ 3.2 යටතේ ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එය නිවැරදියි. එය ක්‍රියාවලියේදී මහ බැංකුව විසින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රතිපත්ති ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ ක්‍රමවේදය නිසා වෙච්ච අවාසිය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ගණනය කිරීම වෙනත් කාරණයක්. මෙතැන මේ ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන කාරණය නිවැරදියි. ඒ කාරණය වැරදියි කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරු හරි කියනවා නම්, ඒ

ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන කාරණය ලිඛිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. එය අපි වෙනම කාරණයක් විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්. මම විශ්වාස කරන විධියට මෙය වෙනස් කරන්න හේතුවක් නැහැ. එය සඳහන් කරලා footnote එකක් විධියට දමමු. මෙය වෙනස් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි මේකට විරුද්ධයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහි වෙනස් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම මගේ කාරණය කියුවාට පස්සේ ඒ ගැන සඳහන් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ එය වෙනස් කරන්න කියලාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඉස්සර වෙලා මම කියන දේ අහන්න. සමස්තයක් හැටියට වට්ටම් මිලකට බැඳුම්කරයක් නිකුත් කිරීම හරහා රජයට අවාසියක්, අලාභයක් වෙනවා කියලා මෙතැන කියලා තිබෙන ප්‍රකාශය -statement එක- පිළිගන්න බැහැ. ඒකට හේතුව, අවුරුද්දකට අඩු බැඳුම්කරයකට අපි බිල්පතක් කියලා කියනවා. භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පතක් කිසි දවසක මුහුණත අගයට විකුණන්න බැහැ. එය එක් කාරණයක්. අපි අවුරුද්දට එහා ගිය බැඳුම්කරයක් ගත්තොත්, ඒ බැඳුම්කරයට පොලියක්, එහෙම නැත්නම් කූපන් එකක් අමුණලා තිබෙනවා නම්, එය රුපියල් සියයේ මුහුණත අගයට විකිණිය හැකි වන්නේ එකම අවස්ථාවකදී පමණයි. ඒ අවස්ථාව වන්නේ, බැඳුම්කර හරහා ලැබෙන කූපන් එක, වෙළෙඳ පොලේ එම කාල පරාසයටම එක්කෝ නිකුත් කරලා තිබෙන, එහෙම නැත්නම් එම කාල පරාසයේ ඉතිරි වෙලා තිබෙන බැඳුම්කරයකට ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් ලැබෙන පොලිය හා සමාන නම් පමණයි. ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොලේ මෙම බැඳුම්කරයටම සමාන බැඳුම්කර ඇත්නම්, එහෙම නැත්නම් කලින් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු බැඳුම්කරයක මේ කාල පරාසය ඉතිරි වෙලා තිබෙන බැඳුම්කර තිබේ නම්, ඒ බැඳුම්කරවලට ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ලැබෙන ඵලදා අනුපාතය මේ බැඳුම්කරයේ පොලියට වඩා වැඩි නම්, එහෙම නම් ඒ අවස්ථාවලදී බැඳුම්කරය විකිණිය හැකි වන්නේ වට්ටමකට පමණයි. මුහුණත අගය සියයද, මුහුණත අගය සියයට අඩුද කියන එක තීරණය වන්නේ, මේ බැඳුම්කරයට අදාළ වන කූපන් එක සහ වෙළෙඳ පොලේ ඒ හා සමාන බැඳුම්කරවලට තිබෙන ඵලදා අනුපාතය මතයි. ඒ නිසා සියලුම අවස්ථාවලදී සියයට වඩා අඩුවෙන් නිකුත් කළ පමණින් එය රජයට අලාභයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 3.2 ලෙස කෙටුම්පතේ සඳහන් කොටස පිළිබඳව මම එකඟ නොවෙමි. එසේ එකඟ නොවන්නේ, එම පරිච්ඡේදයේ ඇති නිගමනය ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේ ඇති මූල ධර්මයන්ට පටහැනි වන බැවිනි. එම සාවද්‍ය සිද්ධාන්තය මෙම කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ මින්පසු ඇති ගණනය කිරීම්වලටද අදාළ කරගෙන ඇති බව පෙනෙන්නට ඇත. ඒ අනුව මෙය බැරෑරුම් කරුණකි. මෙම කරුණ පිළිබඳ මාගේ වෙනස් වූ මතය, වාර්තාවේ වෙනස් වූ මතයක් ලෙස සටහන් කරන ලෙස ඉල්ලා සිටිමි.

ගරු **අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා**: මමත් 3.2 කියන මෙම විස්තරයට අනුගත වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අජිත් පි.පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු කරුණත් එක්කම මමත් ඒකට අනුගත වෙනවා.

ගරු **ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා**: 3.2 සම්බන්ධව මුලින්ම අපි තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ, මේ අදාළ බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි මේ පරීක්ෂණ පවත්වා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට දැන් අද කථා කරන්නෙයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා පරීක්ෂා කළෙයි, අගමැතිතුමාගේ කමිටුවෙන් බැලුවෙයි, මෙම අදාළ බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පමණයි. මේ පිළිබඳ න්‍යායවන්වත් මොනවත් හෝ සමස්තය නොවෙයි. මේක නිවැරදියි කියන එකයි මතය. ඒ වාගේම මෙහිදී අපේ අනු කාරක සභාවේත් හිටියා. මෙතැන ප්‍රධානතම ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, මුලින්ම Rs. 1 billion ඉල්ලුවා. එතකොට මේකේ ක්‍රියාවලියක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙනුයි, Technical Evaluation Committee එකයි තමයි ගතයුතු ගණන තීරණය කරන්නේ. Technical Evaluation Committee එක දැන්වීම් දැම්මාට පසුව, ගත යුතු ප්‍රමාණය ඒ අය යෝජනා කළා. නමුත් අධිපතිවරයා යෝජනා කළා බිලියන 20ක් ගත යුතුයි කියලා. මේකේ වවන තිබෙනවා. ඒක සටහන් කර ගන්න. මේ ගැනීම සිද්ධ වුණේ අධිපතිවරයාගේ නියෝගය මත කියන එක තිබෙනවා. එවැනි තීන්දුවක් තීරණයක් නිසා තමයි මේ පාඩුව සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා බොහොම පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒවා අපි ඉදිරියේ දී බලමු. මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මේ 3.2 කොටස සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනත් අදහස් තිබෙනවා නම් සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: 3.2 සම්බන්ධයෙන් සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන ප්‍රකාශයට මාගේ සම්පූර්ණ විරුද්ධත්වය ප්‍රකාශ කරනවා. ඊට හේතුව තමයි මේ කෝප් කමිටුව විසින් මේ සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව විශේෂයෙන්ම ලාභ, අලාභ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් නිගමනයක් ගන්නේ මෙම ප්‍රකාශය තුළින්. මෙම

ප්‍රකාශය ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව අනුව සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම වැරදියි. හර්ෂ ඇමතිතුමාත්, අජිත් ඇමතිතුමාත් කිව්ව කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් එකඟ වෙනවා. ඒ අනුව සියයක මුහුණත අගය ඉහළ, පහළ යාම පොලී අනුපාතයට සාපේක්ෂව සිදු වන කරුණක්. ලෝකයේ හැම රටකම ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ එහෙමයි. ඒ අනුව මෙවැනි ප්‍රකාශයක් කිරීම ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේ සියලුම දත්තවලට විරුද්ධ ප්‍රකාශයක් බවට මාගේ හැඟීමයි. මෙම ප්‍රකාශය පිළිගෙන මෙම වාර්තාව යම්කිසි ආකාරයෙන් අවසන් වුවහොත් මේ වාර්තාවේ නිරවද්‍ය භාවය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මෙම ප්‍රකාශය විශාල වශයෙන් බලපාන බව තමයි මගේ හැඟීම.

ගරු **හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමනි, මමත් ඒකට විරුද්ධ වෙනවා. විශේෂයෙන්ම හර්ෂ ඇමතිතුමා පැහැදිලි කරපු ආකාරයට මේ දෝශ සහිත 3.2 ප්‍රකාශය නිසා මේ වාර්තාවට වැරදි සහගතව ලොකු බලපෑමක් සිදු වන බවයි විශ්වාස කරන්නේ. එමනිසා මමත් මේ සඳහා විරුද්ධ වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ සහ අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශ දෙක සටහන් කරලා, ඒ දෙකට අනෙත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ නම් ටික එකතු කළොත් හරිද? වෙන වෙනම දාන්නද? හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගෙයි, සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගෙයි, අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගෙයි ප්‍රකාශ තුන දානවා. ඒ දෙකට අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීවරු දෙදෙනාත් එකඟයි කියලා දානවා.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා**: එහෙම නම් ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්න වෙයි අනෙත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු එකඟයි කියලා.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: නමුත් මීට වඩා වෙනස් මතයක් මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු ප්‍රකාශ කළා.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: කොහොමත් තිබෙන එකට එකඟයි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 11 වන පිටුවේ අනෙත් කාරණය හරි නේද? අපි එතැනින් එහාට ගොස් දිවා ආහාරයට නතර කරලා පටන් ගනිමුද?

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමා, බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියනවා ඉතිරි අය ඉතිරි ටිකට එකඟයි කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කොටසට එකඟයි නේ. වෙනත් අදහස් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: මට පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා ඒක එහෙමද කියලා. ඔබතුමන් විමසන්න කියලා මම කියන්නේ. යම් වෙලාවක අපිට compromise කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා, මේ සාකච්ඡාව විනාඩි පහෙන් අවසන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මේක තවත් දුරට යනවා නේ. යම් වෙලාවක සමහර දේවල් ගැන compromise කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: ඔබතුමා අංක ගණිතය කථාවක් කිව්වා. මම ඒකටයි මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: මම කිව්වේ නැහැ එහෙම. මම කිව්වේ "as it is" කියලා. මම අංක ගණිතය කථාවක් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: මොකක්ද "as it is" කියන්නේ?

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: මම කිව්වේ මේ සඳහා වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවේ විරුද්ධ වෙන මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් විශේෂයෙන් සටහන් වෙනවා. මොනවත් විශේෂයෙන් කියන්නේ නැති අය කියන්නේ මේක එකඟයි කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ ඒ ක්‍රමයට යමු.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: ක්‍රමය අහන්න ඕනෑ ඔබතුමා එකඟද නැද්ද කියලා?

සභාපතිතුමා: තව කවුරු හරි එකඟ නැති අය ඉන්නවා නම් කියන්න ඒක. දාන්න ඕනෑ. අහන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. අවබෝධයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: Record කරන්නේ නැත්නම් ඒකට එකඟයි කියලා කියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු **වසන්ත අළුවිහාරේ මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමා, හර්ෂ ඇමතිතුමා කිව්ව විධියටම, අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කිව්ව විධියට ඒකේ ගැටළු සහගත කරුණු තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මමත් ඒකට විරුද්ධයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: 3.2 කියන කොටසට එකඟ නැති වෙනස් අදහස් තිබෙන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අදහස් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා**: මේක ඕනෑවට වඩා දුරදිග ගෙනියන්න ඕනෑ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. මෙතැන අපි තර්ක කළේ සමස්තයක් වශයෙන් මුහුණත අගයට අඩු නම් අවාසියක් කියන්න බැහැ කියන එක පිළිබඳ පමණයි. නමුත් මේ බැඳුම්කරය ගැන නොවෙයි මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කළේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 10 වන පිටුවේ 3.2 කොටසට අදාළව තිබෙන වෙනස්කම් කියන්න කියලා කියන්නේ?

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:** ඔයාගෙන් intention අනුව ඔබ floodgates open කරනවා වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් floodgates open කළාට

පසුව ඒවා ගිහින් බැමී කැඩෙනවාද කියන දේවල් අපට පාලනය කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක එක එක මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ අයිතිය. අපි බලමු පුළුවන් තරම් compromise යන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම අහන්නේ සම්පූර්ණ Report එක ගැන නොවෙයි නේ. මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා, අපි ක්‍රමවේදයක් හදාගනිමු. ඔබතුමන්ලා පිටුවෙන් පිටුව මම අහන එකෙන් කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා මුලින්ම සියල්ලම කියෙව්වා. මුළු Report එක ගැනම ඔබතුමන්ලාට අදහසක් තිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව පිටුවෙන් පිටුව ඡේද හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලාට එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් කරුණු තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. නොවෙන්න පුළුවන් කරුණු තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ වෙනස්කම් සටහන් කරන්න. අවසානයේදී ඒ මත පදනම් වෙලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට මුළු Report එක ගැනම අදහසක් කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා**: මේකේ ප්‍රශ්නය එන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. නිශ්චිත කරුණක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මන්ත්‍රීවරු එකඟ නොවන කරුණු එකඟ නොවෙනවා කියලා කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කළාම, ඒක විතරක් වාර්තාවේ සටහන් වුණොත්, වාර්තාව බලන අයෙකුට පෙනෙන්න පුළුවන්, ඕනෑ නම් සියලු දෙනාම විරුද්ධ වුණාද කියලා . ඉතිරි ටික ගැන මතයක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කෝප් කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව නේ මේ දාන්නේ.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා**: ඒ නිසා අනෙක් අයගේ මතය ලෙසත් ඒ තැනකදී එහෙම නම් එන්න වෙනවා. කණ්ඩායමක් ලෙස නේ කිහිප දෙනෙක් විරුද්ධ වුණාම.

සභාපතිතුමා: කෝප් කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව මේ දාන්නේ.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා:** ඒ වාර්තාව ගියාම හිස් තැනක් තිබුණොත් එහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙනවා.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: කවුරුත් එකඟයි නම් සියලු දෙනාම එම පිටුවට එකඟයි. එකඟ නැත්නම් ගිය විධියට යමු. එකඟ නැති කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා නම් කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි 11 වන පිටුවේ 4 වන කාරණයට යන්නේ නැතිව දිවා ආහාරය සඳහා පැය භාගයකට නතර කරමු. අපි සවස 2ට පටන් ගනිමු.

කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණ.

දිවා භෝජන සංග්‍රහයෙන් පසුව කාරක සභාව නැවත ආරම්භ කරන ලදි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි කලින් මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කර තිබෙන නිසා පිටුවෙන් පිටුව සාකච්ඡා කරමු මේ ගැන මීට පෙර විශාල වශයෙන් වාද . යෝජනා කිරීමට සහ ,විවාද කරලා තිබෙන නිසා වෙනස්කම් කිරීමට යමක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒවා 11වැනි පිටුවේ වාර්තාවේ .පමණක් ඇතුළත් කරමු -,ගත්තාම 4.1

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . ඒ කාරණය ගත්තාම ඒකේ ,technical කරුණු ගැන කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ අවසානයේදී මේ වාර්තාව . 225දෙනාම අධ්‍යයනය පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රීවරු මීට වඩා තේරුම් ගත ,කරන නිසා මම හිතනවා හැකි ආකාරයෙන් මෙහි තිබෙන පසුබිම මීට වඩා මම මේ කියන් .විස්තර කළ යුතුයි කියලානේ 4.1 , සහ ඒවා විස්තර .කාරණා දෙකක් එක්කමයි 4.2 .කර තිබෙන ඒවා ප්‍රමාණවත් නැහැ

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් පී පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය . අපි මේකට ඇමුණුම් ඇතුළත් කර ,ඇමතිතුමනි තිබෙන නිසා වාර්තාව හැකි තරම් සංක්ෂිප්ත විය ඒ නිසා .යුතුයි

ඒ .ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණාව ගොඩක් සංකීර්ණයි විධියට බැලුවොත් මහ බැංකුවෙන් දීපු ලේඛන , ඒවා .සියල්ල මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ .ඇමුණුම් විධියට තිබෙනවා සියල්ල මේ වාර්තාවේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු .මහ බැංකුවෙන් දීපු වාර්තා තිබෙනවා ,තිබෙනවා ඒ සියල්ලම එකම වාර්තාවක් විධියට එනකොට ඒක බලන කෙනෙකුට අවබෝධ කරගන්න පුළුවන් .මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ සංක්ෂිප්ත කිරීමක් . බරපතළ ,ඒවා මීට වඩා විස්තීර්ණ කරන්න ගියොත් දැනටත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති .ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙනවා ඔබතුමන්ලා කරන වෙනස්කම් .වෙලා තිබෙනවා සහිතව භාෂා පරිවර්තන අංශයෙන් මේවා නැවත ඒකට ගරු .පරිවර්තනය කරන්න ඕනෑ කථානායකතුමාගෙන් විශේෂ අවසරයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඇමුණුම් ටික නම් පරිවර්තනය කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ ඒවා ඇමුණුම් විධියටම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න , මේ .ඒකයි මෙතැන තිබෙන ගැටලුව .පුළුවන් කරුණුවල හරයට හානියක් නොවන විධියට තවත් ,කාරණා එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම් ඒවා එකත ,ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒවා කියනවා නම් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී 11වැනි පිටුවේ **:පෙරේරා මහතා .** 4.1හි තිබෙන එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් .නැහැ

සභාපතිතුමා: අලුතෙන් යමක් එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ කුමන ස්ථානයටද කියලා කිව්වොත් අපට ඒක එතැනට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි , මම මේ ගැන ටිකක් විස්තර කරන්නම් මට . තේරෙන විධියට මේ කාරණාව ප්‍රකාශ කර විශේෂයෙන්ම .තිබෙන්නේ වැරදි විධියටයි Operational Manual එකයි, Board Paper එකයි අනුව තමයි මම මේක විස්තර කරන්නේ මේකේ . වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය වෙළෙඳ ,සඳහන් වෙනවා පොළේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවකදී පොලී අනුපාතය-,

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ?11වැනි පිටුවේ නොවෙයි නේ

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා 11වැනි පිටුවේ **:** .එතැනින් නේ පටන් ගන්නේ .8වැනි කරුණ "වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය වෙළෙඳ පොළේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවකදී පොලී අනුපාතය තිබෙන අවස්ථාවක වෙන්දේසිය මඟින් සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වන අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල යොදා ගත යුතු බව" කියලා.

ගරු :හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා (ආචාර්ය) ඒක පොතේ කොතැනද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා.11වැනි පිටුවේ **:**

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ ඇමුණුම් අංක .1හි ඒක සඳහන් වෙනවා

ගරු අජිත් පී:පෙරේරා මහතා . විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ විශේෂ වාර්තාවේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.දෙවැනි වාර්තාවේ ,

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඒකේ Board Paper එක කියවන්නම්3 .වැනි පිටුව 97"In order to ensure that the market behavior is an orderly manner, the Superintendent, Employees Provident Fund (EPF) will also be permitted to bid at these auctions. This will, in addition, help to ensure that the issue will be fully subscribed". මේක තමයි EPF එක auctionsවලට සම්බන්ධ කර ගත් තීන්දුව ඒ අදහස නොවෙයි . මෙතැන ප්‍රකාශයෙන් පැහැදිලි වෙන්නේ ඒ . සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට ලැබිලා තිබෙන තොරතුරු ඒ ගැන ගරු .විධියට තිබෙන්නේ එපමණයි .සභාපතිතුමගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරනවා ,එතකොට පැවති ක්‍රමය තමයිOperational Manual එක අනුව අපි කලින් විස්තරාත්මකව සාකච්ඡා කළ ආකාරයට ,"FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs." මීට කලින් මහ බැංකුවේ සියලුම නිලධාරීන් දිවුරුම් පිට දුන් සාක්ෂිය තමයිමේ , Operational Manual එක අනුව ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා කටයුතු , ,වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් ,කරනවා කියන එකත් 85ක් වාගේ සියයට ,80ක් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සියයට ප්‍රමාණයක්auctions ඉතිරි කොටස .private placements කියලා කිව්වා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් . විශේෂයෙන්ම ,අවධානය යොමු නො වුණේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේක තීන්දු කරද්දී මේ , Board Papers තුන ඉතාම වැදගත් වෙනවා 2008 . වර්ෂයේ තමයි මේ Board Paper එක ගෙනෙන්නේ ක්‍රමවේදය පොඩ්ඩක් වෙනස් . කරන්නBoard Paper එකක් ගෙනෙනවා ඒ . අවස්ථාවේදී රටේ තිබුණු හදිසි තත්ත්වය අනුව පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කරන්න සීමිත ක්‍රමවේදයක් හැටියට තමයි මේක ගෙනෙන්නේ . ඒකBoard Paper එකේත් සඳහන් වෙනවා . 07.01.2008 ,ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානය යොමු කරනවා දිනැති, අංක MB/PD/1/26/2008 "Proposed yield structure for Treasury Bonds to be mobilized through direct placements in 2008." නමැති Board Paper එකටමේකෙන් . තමයි ,direct placementsවලට යම් කිසි අලුත් අර්ථයක් එකතු කරන්නේ ,ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානය යොමු කරනවා . එහි(i) යටතේ කියා තිබෙන ," Inform the Monetary Board of the plan of direct placements on Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans in 2008 to be arranged through the captive type investors." කියන එකට ."Captive type investors" ඒක ඉතා පැහැදිලියි. Introduction යටතේ සඳහන් වෙනවා ,According to the Government cash flow for 2008, Government expects to raise Rs. 355 billion from domestic rupee sources by issuing Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans. The main investor group operating in the long term debt market is State owned and State managed captive type sources." captive sources කියන්නේ රජයට , ඒක .අයිති රජයෙන් පාලනය වන කියන එකයි .මේකේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් වෙනවා

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ම (ආචාර්ය)හතා: පිටු අංකය ?92ද

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේ ඇමුණුම්වල අංක xiii.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ තිබෙනවා ," The main investor group operating in the long term debt market is State owned and State managed captive type sources. Major captive investors are EPF, NSB and ETF. ඉතා පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් කරනවා ,captive sources කවුද කියන්නේ කියලා. EPF, NSB and ETF. "Resource

availability with these captive sources in 2008 is estimated at Rs. 300 billion. මෙන්න මේ හේතුව නිසා තමයි මේක bond market එකට පාවිච්චි කරන්නේ. "EPF - Rs. 183 billion, NSB - Rs. 83 billion and ETF - Rs. 33 billion."

ඊළඟ ඡේදයේ තිබෙනවා ,"Based on the above estimates, Rs. 120 billion has to be collected from non-captive sources mainly from Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans through auction process to meet the borrowing requirement."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe contd.

"Based on the above estimates, Rs. 120 billion has to be collected from non captive sources mainly from Treasury bonds and rupee loans through auction process to meet the borrowing requirements" - අනෙක් මාර්ග දෙකෙන් ඒ මුදල් සෙවිය යුතුයි කියලා. ඒකේ අන්තිම පිටුවේ විජයවර්ධන කියලා කෙනෙක් අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒකේ අන්තිම ඡේදයට ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානය යොමු කරනවා. "Considering the above issues it is suggested to issue long term bonds with 6,8,10 and 15 tears tenure for direct placement. The proposed rates for these bonds net of taxes are 13.90 percent, 12.15 per cent, 11.80 per cent, and 11.55 per cent respectively"

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කොතැනද? Board Paper එක තිබෙනවා, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ 91 පිටුව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඔබතුමාට photocopy එකක් දෙන්නද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කියන එක Board Paper එකේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා කියන Board Paper එක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Board Paper එක කියන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senansinghe : MBPB 1/26/2008.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකේ කොළ කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senansinghe : Take the last two papers, ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ කොටස නැහැ. Board Members ලා sign කරපු-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ අවසානයට තමයි sign වෙන්නේ. Decision එක එන්නේ ඕකෙන්. මට කලින් COPE එකෙන් ලැබුණ documents ටික මේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Possible implications කියන තැනින් ඒක අවසන් වෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senansinghe : Yes. So this is a complete paper.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ 92, 93 පිටු අතර තව කොළයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකේ තමයි අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි වැදගත්. මම පෙන්වන්නම් කොපමණ බරපතළ commission එකක්ද කියලා. මේ ක්‍රමවේදයේ commission එක මම පෙන්වන්නම්. ඇත්තටම Central Bank must be taken legal action against that.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකේ කෙළින්ම කියනවා නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : This is totally fraudulent for giving for public - private companies. They specifically say only for EPF, ETF and NSB, and only for three months.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මේකේ නැහැ නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : So that is what I am saying.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා දැක්කාද? මේක කියවන්නකෝ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : In 1997, you had that auction system. That is the first time that you came into the auction system and started training bonds.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Private placement එක දමපු වේලාව.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : No. 1997 auction system and then they mentioned about EPF also can bid for auctions. EPF also can bid. Then, in 2008, Mr. Cabraal and the gang, they have a Board Paper without amending the manual, because of volatility of the market, I understand because of the war the interest rates were going sky rocketing, so they want to control it. So they bring the captive sources to be used. EPF, ETF and NSB to be used to balance for three months. After three months, it is over. You must renew the process and get

back to the system again. This is for specific reasons not completely, not every day. For specific reasons you must use it. But then there is a Board Paper which says, for ETF, EPF all that must be compensated. You cannot use EPF, ETF and NSB to float the interest rate as a mechanism because these money belongs to someone else. If we use it, so private placement then you are arbitrarily using that interest rate.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඊට පසුව තිබෙනවා 2008 වසරේ අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ review කරන්න කියලා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : You have to stop it. You have to review and then stop it. This is a temporary position for one or two or three maximum. So, after that they make it a method of the central Bank without any process.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට පසුව තව ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා, සභාපතිතුමා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : I will continue. So, in this report what you find as a correct system is a wrong system. You go on the wrong system. Somebody starts going on the wrong direction after about seven years you say that is a correct direction which is totally wrong.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇයි අපි මේක කලින් දැක්කේ නැත්තේ? දැන් නේ මේක දැක්කේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : This is I had.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමාට කොහොමද ලැබුණේ?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : These are the papers I had from the earlier COPE.

සභාපතිතුමා: කලින් කමිටුවේ ඒවාත් ඔක්කොම අපි ළඟ තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔය ලේඛනය මට ආව විධිය නොවෙයි. ඕක part එකක්ද කියලා බලන්නකෝ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මේකෙන් මේ සිද්ධියට ඇති වන වෙනස මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: I will explain. 2008වල ගෙනෙනවා specific reason එකකට to stabilize the interest rates - direct placement - only for captive sources. That is why they lied. The Central Bank officers came and lied. They said that captive sources is an open area - big captive sources or any captive sources, which is totally wrong. And it says, Government control such as EPF, ETF and NSB.

සභාපතිතුමා: සමාවෙන්න, තිබෙනවා. Scan කරන කොට වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක අපේ ඇමුණුම්වල තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasighe : This is the most fundamental thing. You cannot move beyond this.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ පිටුව විතරද ඔබතුමන්ලාට අඩු?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, 92 පිටුවේ කවුරු හරි අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවාද? "Possible implications" කියන එක යටින් අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. Table I තිබෙනවා, Table II තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක යටින් තිබෙනවාද "possible implications" කියලා?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඊට යටින් අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඊළඟ පිටුව තමයි අඩු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊළඟ පිටුව අඩුයි. ඒක මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මෙහෙමයි සභාපතිතුමා. අපි දන්නේ නැහැ ඕකට පසුව Board Papers අරගෙන තිබෙනවාද කියලා. අපි නිශ්චිත කරන Central Bank එකේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන කථා කරන කොට මහදි වෙනස් කරලා නැත්නම් මේකේ ගැටලුවක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් අපි නිශ්චිතව කතා කරන bond issue එකට මේකේ බලපෑමක් නැහැ. අපි ඇත්තටම තව බැලුවොත් මහ බැංකුව ඇතුළේ පරිපාලනමය වශයෙන් සුවිශාල ගැටලු ඇති නේ. අපි දන්නවා, කලින් සිටි අධිපතිවරයාගේ පාලනය ගැනත් අපට යම් යම් අදහස් තිබෙනවා. පොදුවේ ඕනෑම ආයතනයක දුර්වලතා තිබෙනවා නේ. එම නිසා 2008 වසරේ මේ Board Decision එකට කලිනුත්, ඊට පසුවත් ගත්ත, ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකරපු තීන්දු ඕනෑ තරම් ඇති. ඒ වැරදි සොයනවා නම් ඒක වෙනම වැඩක් විධියට කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක අපේ වගකීමක් කියලා ගන්නවා නම් ඒක පසුව කරන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැත්නම් රජයේ -

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ- කවුරු හරි කල්පනා කරලා කරන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක්. අපි මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා කරන්නේ එතෙක් පැවතුණු නිශ්චිතව ඒකට අදාළ Board Papers තිබෙනවා නේ. 2008 වසරේ මේ Board Paper එකේ other captive sources කියන එක නිශ්චිත කරලා මාස තුනකට define කරලා තිබියදී, ඊට පසුව ඒ අය අනුගමනය කරපු ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි අපි ඊළඟ transactions සේරටම අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේත් Board Paper එකකින්. අපට නැවත Board Paper එකක් තිබෙනවා, Monetary Board decision එකක් තිබෙනවා මේ විධියට යන්න කියලා. ඒක තමයි අවසාන මෙහොතේ වෙනස් වෙන්නේ. අපට ඒකට සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ විශේෂ මැදිහත් වීම. Personal මැදිහත් වීමක් තිබෙනවා. එම නිසා මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ තව කරුණු හෙව්වොත් මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකරපු විවිධාකාරයේ පරිපාලන දුර්වලතා ඕනෑ තරම් ඇති. මෙන්න මෙහෙම හිතන්නකෝ. සමහර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවලට සහභාගී විය යුතු නිලධාරීන්ගේ වගකීම්, තනතුරු වගේ ඒවායේත් සමහර විට අඩුපාඩු තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. මම ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු එක ඇතුළත් කරන එක ගැන මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් මේ කාරණය මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් කැඳවපු අවස්ථාවලත් දීර්ඝව සාකච්ඡා කළා. දීර්ඝව සාකච්ඡා කරපු එකේ හරය තමයි - සාරාංශ කාරණය තමයි- මේකට ඇතුල් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව තිබුණ දේ තමයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබුණා පළමු වැනි කොටසේ කියන කාරණාව. අපි ඒ පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ නිලධාරීන් ගෙනැත් කාරක සභාවේදී කථා කළා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් කියාපු අදහස තමයි 4.1.2 යටතේ පැහැදිලිව තිබෙන්නේ.

ඒ කියන්නේ "2008.10.07 මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයට "other captive sources" යන අදහස ඇතුළත් වූයේ කෙසේද යන්න කාරක සභාව විසින් මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් විමසන ලද අතර, සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල් පමණක් නොව, අදාළ කාලයන් තුළ රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවන් සපුරා ගත හැකි අනෙකුත් මූලාශ්‍ර ද (other captive sources) සැලකිල්ලට ගත යුතු බව තීරණය වූ බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී." ඒ කියන්නේ නිලධාරීන් පෙන්වා දුන් කාරණය. මෙහි තියෙන්නේ, ක්‍රමවේදය පිළිබඳව මේ කාරක සභාවෙන් - ඔබතුමන්ලා - ප්‍රශ්න කළාම ඒ නිලධාරීන් දීපු පැහැදිලි කිරීම හා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම අතර සාරාංශය. අනෙකුත් දීර්ඝ පැහැදිලි කිරීම් ඇමුණුවල තිබෙනවා. වාර්තාවක් හැදීමේදී අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල තීරණය කියලා, Board Minutes මෙතැනට දමන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවා නේ.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා:** මේ 4.1 ඡේදයෙන් ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ " සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමය" නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ general practice එක. එහෙම දෙයක් තියෙන්න ඕනෑ. 4.1 ඡේදයේ සිට 4.4 ඡේදය දක්වා දිගටම තියෙන්නේ ඒවා තමයි. General practice එක පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් මෙතැනදී කියපු කාරණය වැරැදියි. මේ ලේඛනයෙන් ඒක පේනවා. මේ ලේඛනය විතරක් නොවෙයි තවත් හේතු තියෙනවා. "Captive sources" කියන්නේ Government sources කියලා මට තේරුම් ගන්න බැරිව හිටියේ. දැන් මට ඒක තේරෙනවා. Captive sources කියන්නේ Government-controlled sources කියලා මේ ලේඛනය දිහා බැලුවාම පේනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සම්පූර්ණ private sources මෙතැනට එනවා කියලා, අපේක්ෂා කළේ නැහැ. මේ කාරණය ගැන ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් විටින් විට කියා තිබෙන කරුණු පරස්පරයි. අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් යමක් කිව්වාම පිළිගන්නවා නේ. හැබැයි, මෙතැනදී අභියෝගයට ලක් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ම නේ. මේ කථා කරන්නේ, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ credibility එකක් ගැන නේ. එක පුද්ගලයෙක් විතරක් නොවෙයි. මුළු system එකම. මේ අය සුදනෝ වගේ " අපි නොවෙයි. අර ගොල්ලන්" කියලා කිව්වාට, කට්ටියම අඩු වැඩි වශයෙන් ඒකේ ඉන්නවා. ඒ system එකම තම තමන්ගේ පෞද්ගලික liabilities ගැන හිතලා උත්තර දෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි පරස්පරතා ඇති වෙන්නේ. නැත්නම් අපට පරස්පරතා පේන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඔය කබ්රාල් මහත්මයාගේ කාලේ තිබුණු ඒවා. මෙහි වැදගත්කම මේකයි. මේ පාඩුව හෝ ලාභය පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ගණන් හැදීමට පදනම් කර ගෙන තිබෙන standards පදනම් වෙන්නේ, ඒ historical dataවලටයි. ඒ historical data standards ඒවා. ඒ කාලයේ තිබුණු practice එක irregular නැත්නම් criminal practice එකක්. ඒ irregular practice එකේ data normalය. -මේක unusual එකක් තමයි. මේක සාමාන්‍යයි කියලා මා කියන්නේ නැහැ.- ඒකට මේක සාපේක්ෂ කරලා ගණන් හදන එක තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය. ඒ වාගේම manual එකේ තිබෙන වැරැදි පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා නේ. ඒ manual එකේ වැරැදි ගැන පැහැදිලි කර තිබෙනවා. එතකොට නිලධාරීන් පාවිච්චි කරන්න

ඕනෑ guideline එක මොකක්ද? Manual එකද? නැත්නම් Monetary Board එකේ decisions හුදකලාව වෙන වෙනම අර ගෙන අනුගමනය කරන්න ඕනෑද? කියන ඒවා ප්‍රශ්න. මෙතැනදී ඔබතුමා Central Bank එකේ නිලධාරින් කියපු දේවල් කියලා සමහර දේවල් කිව්වාට, ඇත්තටම ඒ අය කියපු දේ එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, Central Bank එකේ officialsලාගෙන් කරුණු ලබා ගන්න බැරි, අපි scrutinize කරන්නේ Central Bank එකේ නිලධාරින්ම තමයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි ලබා ගන්න බැරි කියලා, ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ කථාව නිවැරැදියි. ගරු අජිත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු විධියට අපි ප්‍රශ්න කරන්නේ Central Bank එකේ නිලධාරින්ගෙන්ම තමයි. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේ ප්‍රශ්නයේ හරය සම්බන්ධයෙන් කථා කළා. අපි කථා කරන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි. අපි පිටුවෙන් පිටුව, paragraph එකෙන් paragraph එකට කථා කරමු. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එතුමාගේ වාර්තාවෙන් කියනවා, නිවැරැදි ක්‍රමය private placement ක්‍රමය කියලා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම කියන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක COPE වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. මම ඒක පෙන්වන්නම්. මේ Board paper එක අනුව තමයි, Central Bank එකේ officialsලා කටයුතු කළ යුත්තේ. හැබැයි, මේ Board paper එක විතරක් නොවෙයි. මේ Monetary Board එකේ Board paper එක අනුව කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් manual එක අනුව කරන්න ඕනෑ. නිවැරැදි ක්‍රමය ඒක තමයි. Monetary Board එක manual එකට අමතරව decision එකක් ගන්නවා නම්, ඒක manual එකට amend වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මේ විධියට තමයි Central Bank එකේ officialsලා කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. තමන්ට ඕනෑ විධියට අත්තනෝමතිකව කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ. එහෙම නම්, මේ රටේ ක්‍රමවේදය අපට හදන්න බැහැ. ඕනෑම පුද්ගලයකුට "මේක හරි අරක වැරැදියි" කියන්න පුළුවන්. Central Bank එක govern වෙන්නේ මේ manual එක අනුවයි. මේ කරුණු පිළිබඳව සලකා බලන්න ඕනෑ. මේවායේ ගොඩක් implications තියෙනවා. This is a very serious affair. Just listen to me. Let me speak. I have to make a comment on that. Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne, you listen patiently. Let me finish. I do want any comments or I do not want any smiles. I am just putting my debate forward. If somebody is not happy with it, they can express their opinions later.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක තමයි වැදගත් දේ. මම එදත් කිව්වේ මේකයි. Central Bank එකේ අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ක්‍රමවේදය. ප්‍රශ්න දෙකයි තියෙන්නේ. ඒ ප්‍රශ්න දෙකට උත්තර අහන්න මම විනාඩි පහයි ඉල්ලුවේ. අවස්ථාව ලැබුණේ නැහැ. මම අද වේලාව ගත්තේ ඒකයි. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය වෙනස් කරන්න, 2008 වර්ෂයේ Central Bank එකේ manual එක වෙනස් වුණා නම් මට පෙන්වන්න. Manual එක කොහේවත් වෙනස් වෙලා නැහැ. ඒකට මම පළමු වැනි COPE කමිටුවේදී සාක්ෂි පෙන්නුවා. ඒ manual එකට පරිබාහිරව කටයුතු කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා කිසිම කෙනෙකු කියලා නැහැ. අන්තිමට යම් අදහසක් දුන්නේ අලුතින් පත් වූ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමායි. එතුමා vague answer එකක් දුන්නා මේකේ තියෙන අදහස් තියෙනවා නේද කියලා. හැබැයි, එතුමාට මේ Board papers සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවබෝධයක් නැහැ. මේ Board paper එකේ ඉතිරි ටිකත් මම ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරන්නම්. මම පෙන්නුව ලේඛනයේ අන්තිම ඡේදය "Since the domestic debt market is volatile in the recent past-" මෙන්න මේ හේතුව නිසා තමයි, මේ සීමිත අවස්ථාවල මේක ගෙනාවේ. "It is proposed to review this rate structure at end of April 2008."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Temporary දීලා තියෙන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It was given temporary; three months. That is why they did not amend. That is the second page. Now, I come to the third page. MB/PD 25/20/2008. "The Board having considered the paper approved of issuing Treasury Bonds to EPF and other captive sources-" What are the other captive sources?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: The NSB, the ETF

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, you spot on.

"Requesting the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engaging in the secondary market options.: Operations"

එකේ ඊළඟ පිටුව ඔබතුමා ළඟ තියෙනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැන පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තියෙනවා. එතැන තියෙන දේමයි 94 පිටුවේත් තියෙන්නේ. ගරු සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියවන්නේ 95වැනි පිටුව නේ. ඊට පස්සේ 96වැනි පිටුවේ අත්සන් කරපු පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා. 94වැනි පිටුවේ තියෙන්නේත් ඒකමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අත්සන් කරපු තැනට සභාපතිතුමාගේ අවධානය යොමු කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපේ documentsවල තියෙනවා. නමුත්, scan කරලා ගන්න විට ඇවිත් තියෙන්නේ වෙනත් පිටුවකටයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 94වැනි පිටුව නිවැරැදි ද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: 94වැනි පිටුවට මේක එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහි රැස්වීම් අංකය 25/2008.

ඊළඟ පිටුවේ තිබෙන එක තමයි වැදගත්ම වෙන්නේ. "Issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at an interest rate 5 basis points above the rates prevailed in the secondary market through private placements." මෙන්න මෙච්චරයි ගේන්නේ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මේක තමයි වැදගත්ම පේළිය. ඊට පස්සෙ මෙහි පහළින් තිබෙනවා Wijewardena, Coorey, AG(P), S/PD කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඊළඟට හතර වැනි ඡේදයේ තිබෙනවා, "Accordingly, the Monetary Board is invited to approve; (i) to issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at an interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and (ii) to request the EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations." එච්චරයි. අතින් ලියලා තිබෙනවා -I find it very disturbing– "and other captive sources" කියලා. එතැන no signatures have been used.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, ගරු සුජීව ඇමතිතුමා. මම හිතන්නේ ඒක genuine එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: That is what I am saying. Genuineද නැද්ද කියලා අපිට තීන්දු කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. In my little legal knowledge all I am saying is, හර්ෂ ඇමතිතුමා handwritingවලින් වෙනස් කළාම important Board Paper, you put signatures.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** මෙහි මාතෘකාව තිබෙන්නේ "Improvement of Market Liquidity Through Active Participation of Employees' Provident Fund" කියලා විතරයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying. Let me finish it. Your interpretation can be given. I am just saying my interpretation. In a Board Paper if you put a minute in your handwriting, everybody who signed here might have countersigned. So, forget that. Even if it is so - එහෙම වුණා නම් වැඩිම වෙන්නේ EPF එකට ඇරෙන්න ETF සහ NSB එකට captive sourceවලට ගන්න පුළුවන් කියන අදහස.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එච්චරයි එතැනින් එහාට නැහැ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: හැබැයි, වැඩි හරියක් දීලා තිබෙන්නේ private companiesවලටයි. It is totally illegal. Then, the COPE Committee finds that is a correct system in the country. Let me finish.

The Chairman: COPE Committee කියලා කියන්න එපා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I do not know. Now, I have been reading draft from the Auditor-General and the draft from you. එක තැනක නිවැරදි ක්‍රමයක් කියලා, මට විනාඩි දෙක තුනක් දුන්නොත් පෙන්වන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක තිබෙන්නේ අපේ ලේඛනයේ 12, 4.2 නේ. මමත් ඒකක ලකුණු කරගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඉතාමත් වැදගත් කරුණ වන්නේ මේකයි. එහෙමනම් 1997 තිබුණු වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය වෙනස් වෙලා නැහැ. වැරදි සහගත නීති විරෝධී ලෙස මහ බැංකු නිලධාරින් විසින් යමක් අනුගමනය කරලා තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒක මේ රටේ හරි ක්‍රමය නොවෙයි. ඒකට තමයි මේ අණපනත් රෙගුලාසි මේ සියලු දේවල් තිබෙන්නේ ඒ guideline එක කර ගන්න. ඒවා guideline කරන්නේ නැතුව එහෙම නම් ඒ කාරණය තමයි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. බැරිවෙලාවත් මේක නම් ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබුණේ Manual එකේ, direct placement එක නම් ක්‍රමවේදය, 1997 ඇතුළත් වුනේ direct placement එකනම්, එහෙම නම් මේ Monetary Board එක වෙනස් කරපු එකත් හරි. ඒක වැරදිලාවත් හරි ක්‍රමය ලෙස තිබ්බා නම්, එතකොට මේ 2015දී කරපු ක්‍රමවේදයත් හරියටම හරි. Monetary Board එක එක්කත් සාකච්ඡා කර ගත්තා, ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කළා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ කථාව ඉවරයිද?

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: නැහැ, මගේ කථාව ඉවර නැහැ. ඉවරයි නම් ඉවරයි කියලා කියනවා නේ.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: ඉවර කරන්නත් වෙනවා. රෑ වෙනකම් ඉන්න බැහැ නේ. විනාඩි 10ක් හෝ 12ක් හෝ අරගෙන අවසන් කරන්න. මොකද, අපිටත් අවස්ථාව අවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: ඔබතුමාගේ අවස්ථාව ගන්න. ඔබතුමා කථා කරන විට අපි අහගෙන ඉන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: මම හිතන්නේ ඔබතුමාගෙන් පිට කවුරුත් කථා කරන්නෙ නැහැ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: මම කථා කරපු විනාඩි ගණන ඔබතුමා ගණන් කරලා පෙන්වන්න.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: ඔබතුමා තරම් කවුරුවත් කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: වැදගත්ම කරුණක් මෙතැන ඉදිරිපත් කරද්දී මෙතුමා disturb කරනවා. ඔබතුමා මේක නවත්වන්න. ගිය සැරේත් ඕක කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අද අපි රැස්වෙලා ඉන්නේ නැවතත් මුල සිට විවාදය කරන්න නොවෙයි. මේ වාර්තාවට ඔබතුමාගේ වෙනස්කම යෝජනා කරන්න. එච්චරයි මම කියන්නේ. මෙතැන කිසි කෙනෙකුට, තව කෙනෙකුට influence කරලා, බලපෑම් කරලා මතයක් හෝ අදහසක් වෙනස් කරන්න නොවෙයි නේ අපි ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නේ කියන එකයි. පාඩම් කියා දෙන්න නෙමෙයි. අපි මේ ගැන ගොඩාක් අධ්‍යනය කළා, හදාරලා තමයි මේ කාරක සභාවට ඇවිල්ල තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් එකඟ වූ දේ නේ මම මේ කියන්නේ. මගේ මතය ඒක. එය වෙනස් කරනවා නම් වෙනස් කරන්න. අපි කවුරුත් එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා, මේ 25 වැනිදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට මෙහි වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඒ සඳහා කෙටුම්පතක් අපි මුලින් ඔබතුමන්ලාට දුන්නා. ඔය කියන අනු ලේඛන සහ ඇමුණුම් සමඟ මේ කාරක සභාවේ ඒ කෙටුම්පත තිබෙනවා. ඒක අධ්‍යනය කරන්න වේලාව මදියි කියලා, වෙලාවත් ගත්තා. ඊට පස්සෙ ඒ කෙටුම්පත පදනම් කර ගෙන ඒ කෙටුම්පතේ කාරණාවලින් මොකක්ද බලන්න මේක බැහැර කරලා තිබෙන්නේ? ඒ කාරණා මත මේ වාර්තාව හදලා තිබෙනවා. එදා කිව්වා, ඒ කෙටුම්පතේ කාරණාවලට නිර්දේශත් එකතු කරලාම හදලා දෙන්න කියලා. ඊළඟට නිර්දේශත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගෙන් ඉල්ලා ගත්තා. ඒ නිර්දේශ මත අද මේ අවසාන වාර්තාව හදලා තිබෙනවා. ඉතින් මේ වාර්තාවේ පිටුවෙන් පිටුව සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ, කාටවත් ඉගෙන ගන්න හෝ උගන්වන්න නොවෙයි. මෙහි මේ කාරණාවට වෙනස් කමක් තිබෙනවා නම්, වෙනස් අදහසක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ අදහස ලියන්න නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස මට කියන්න, සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට මම ඒක ලියන්නම්.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: ඔබතුමාගේ කථාවෙන් අපට තේරෙන්නේ ඔබතුමා fixed mind එකක ඉන්නවා කියන එකයි. මොකද, "ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන දේ ඕනෑ නම් මම ලියන්නම්" කියලා එහෙම බැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නැතුව කොහොමද? ඔබතුමාල මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්න එපායෑ. ඒක පුදුම අදහසක් නේ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: ඔබතුමා ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න. ඔබතුමා නේ සභාපතිතුමා.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: මම එකක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ වේගය, ආවේගය, ප්‍රශ්න මොනවා වුණත්, වෙලාව කොච්චර ගත්තත් එතුමා අලුත් දෙයක් කියනවා. මෙච්චර කලක් අපි නොදැක්ක document එකක් එතුමා පෙන්නුවා.

සභාපතිතුමා**:** නැහැ, ඒක මේච්චර කල් නොදැක්ක දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒක වැරදියි. එකෙන් වැරදි අදහසක් එනවා නේ. මේ ඇමුණුම්වල ඒක තිබෙනවා.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: තිබුණා අපේ අවධානය ලක් වුණේ නැහැ. අපේ සාකච්ඡාවට

සභාපතිතුමා**:** විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ පිටුවක් මග හැරිලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක අපේ ලේඛනවල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: බොරුවන් නොවෙයි, තියෙනවා. සභාපතිතුමා මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. එතුමා රැස්වීම් ගිහිල්ලා ආවා කියන එක එතුමාගෙ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. හැබැයි රැස්වීමට ආවා, නැතා එතුමා වැදගත් කාරණාවක් පිළිබඳව දීර්ඝව කථා කළා. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, වේලාව ගත්වීම ගැන කියනවා. එතුමා relevant කථා කරනවා නම්, වේලාව ගත වන එක මටත් අදාළයි. මමත් මේ ඉවසන්නේ නැතුව ඉන්නේ, ඔබතුමාගේ වේලාවත් ගන්න නිසයි. නමුත් මොනවා කරනවාද කියලා, මම ඔබතුමාට disturb කළේ නැහැ. අපේ පක්ෂයේ කෙනෙක්ද, නැද්ද කථාවක් නෙමෙයි. ඒ නිසා අපි හැමෝටම අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා මෙතැන තමන්ගේ වෙලාව අරන් කථා කරන්න. තමන්ගේ තර්කය සම්පූර්ණයෙන් කියන්න. ඒ වගේම සභාපතිතුමා සමාවෙන්න මේ කථාව කියනවට. ඔබතුමාගෙ tone එකේ තිබෙනවා fixed ගතියක්. අපි මෙතැන compromise කරලා එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් නම්, ඔබතුමාගේ මේ තිබෙන මේකට විරුද්ධ දේ යටින් ලියන්න නොවෙයි. මේවා අපි නොදනවාත් නොවෙයි නේ. ඔබතුමා යමක් ලියලා තිබෙනවා, ඊට යටින් එක්සත් ජාතික පක්ෂයේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු 05 දෙනා කථාවක් ලියනවා කියලා.

එහෙම ලියන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමාට තේරුම් යනවා නම් ඔබතුමාගේ බුද්ධියට ඔබතුමා සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන් හෝ අපේ මේ සමස්ත අදහස විධියට මේ දැන් ලියලා තිබෙන ටික technically වැරදියි කියලා, ඒ අයින් කරලා එකඟ වෙන මතය ලියන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මම කිව්වෙ ඒක නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමාලාට මම කිව්වේ කාරක සභාව හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කරනවා නම් මම මේ වාර්තාවම නොවෙයි ලියන්න ඕනෑ කියලා ඒක මම ලියන්න එපායෑ. ඒ ගැන ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. නමුත් ඔබතුමාටත් තේරෙනවා උගත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමෙක් හැටියට වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරලා ඒක අවසන් කරන ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක. එය වාර්තාවක් හැටියට සකස් කළාම, ඔබතුමන්ලා පැයක් ඇතුළත ඒක කියෙව්වා. එතකොට දැන් මේ වාර්තාව ගැන යම් පූර්ව අදහසක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අදහසේ ඉඳගෙන ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදය පිටුවෙන් පිටුව සංස්කරය කරලා හදන්න පුළුවන්. මේ කරන ක්‍රමයට විශාල තර්කයක් හෝ විශාල විවාදයක් හදාගත්තාම මම කොහොමද ඒක වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්නෙ? ඔබතුමා ඒක පිළිගන්නවා නේ.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: ඒක summarize කර ගනිමු. මෙතැන කියන සියලුම දේ දාන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වාර්තා ගත කරන්න ක්‍රමයක් මටත් තිබෙන්න ඒපායැ.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: මේ කියන සියල්ලම ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. අපි කථා කරලා එකඟතාවකට එනවා නම් ඒක summarize කරලා සකස් කර ගනිමු.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමා ඉතාම කාරුණික ඉල්ලීමක් කරන්නේ. මම කථා කරනවා වැඩි නම්, මේ මාතෘකාවෙන් පිට යනවා නම් ඔබතුමා එය නවත්වන්න. මට වෙනත් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ බාධා අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ඒ හොඳ සාධකයක් ගැන කථා කරන විට එය මැඩ පවත්වන්න ගිය වරත් ඕකයි වුණේ. ඔබතුමා මට වේලාවක් දෙන්න, ඒ වෙලාව තුළ මම කථා කරන්නම්. මම එතනින් ඉදිරියට කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ. අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්නේ ඔබතුමා ලිව්ව ඕනෑ එකකට "Yes" හරි "No" හරි කියල යන්න නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා මෙහි වැරැද්දක් දකිනවා නම්, ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ යම් වැරදි සහගත තත්ත්වයක් දකිනවා නම්, ඒක වෙනස් කරන එක තමයි ඔබතුමාගේ නිහතමානීකම සහ පක්ෂග්‍රාහී නොවීම කියන්නේ.

මේ වාර්තාව හදිසියේ ඉවරයක් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා, ඕනෑම වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙය මාස 16ක් සාකච්ඡා කළ එකක්. හදිස්සියේ කළ දෙයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කථා කරලා ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමා අදහස් දක්වන්න. ඔබතුමා preconceived mind එකක ඉඳලා, "මේක ඉවර කරන්න ඕනෑ මේ විධියට." කියලා, ඒ තැනට ඔබතුමා එන්න එපා. මම අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නම්, එය වැදගත් නැත්නම්, නීත්‍යානුකූල නොවනවා නම්, ඔබතුමා එතැනින් ඉදිරියට ඒ තීරණය ගන්න. මම මේ සඳහන් කරන්නේ ඉතා වැදගත් කාරණයක්. මේ සාධකයට ඉතා වැදගත් කාරණයක්. මට ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට ලක් කළ යුත්තේ මෙපමණයි. Private placement system එක හරි කියන ක්‍රමවේදය මත නේ අපි මේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකෙන් බැහැර වීමට තීන්දු ගත්තේ කොහොමද? බැහැරවීමට Monetary Board එකේ අවසර ලැබුණාද? ඒ බැහැරවීම හරිද? ඒ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට ආපු වෙලාව හරිද? කියන කරුණු නේ මේ මුළු Report එකෙන්ම සාකච්ඡා වෙන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ඉගෙන ගත්ත මිනිස්සු වශයෙන් දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ, මහ බැංකුවේ මේ ක්‍රමය වෙනස් වෙලා නැත්නම්, තියෙන ක්‍රමෙවේදය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය නම්, Board Paper එක ගෙනැත් තිබෙන්නේ මාස තුනකට volatile situation එකක් නවත්වන්න නම්, එතැනින් එහාට captive sources කියලා මෙහි සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා නම්, එය වෙනස් වෙලා නැත්නම්, එතැනින් ඉස්සරහට නීති විරෝධී ලෙස private සමාගම්වලට private placements දීලා තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒක වැරදියි නේ. එතැනින් අපි ඒක නවත්වන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කාරණය වැරදියි කියලා ලියවෙන්නත් ඕනෑ. මේක මේ එක මාසයක - මාර්තු මාසයේ bond එකක් ගැන ලියවෙන වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි. මහ බැංකුවේ සියලුම ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුවේ ගන්න තීන්දු මොනවාද? මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රමවේද මොනවද? ඔබතුමා නේ සඳහන් කරන්නේ. මේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් කරනවා, පළවෙනි ක්‍රමය - වෙන්දේසිය ක්‍රමය, දෙවැනි ක්‍රමය - private placement ක්‍රමය කියලා. මෙහිදී, රටේ තිබෙන තත්ත්වය private placement කියලා තමයි අපි නිගමනයට එන්නේ. මහ බැංකුවේ කරන ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි private placement. ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න තමයි Monetary Board එකේ approval එකක් නැතිව, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා බලෙන් වෙනස් කළේ. ඒක තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්නය. එතකොට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය ඉවරයි. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය 2008 වසරේදී private placement එකකට හැරවුණේ කොහොමද කියලා ඔබතුමාට, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට උත්තර

දෙන්න පුළුවන් නම්, මම මගේ තර්කය එතැනින් නවත්වනවා. ඒ ගන්න තීන්දුව ගත්තේ කොතැනින්ද, මෙතැනින් පස්සේ රටේ මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන ක්‍රමවේදය මේක. මෙන්න manual එක amend වෙලා තිබෙනවා මේ ආකාරයට. එහෙම පිළිතුරක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද? විගණනය කියන්නේ ඒක නේ. විගණනය කියන්නේ සියලුම කරුණු කාරණා ගැන සැලකිලිමත් වෙලා දකින දකින සාක්ෂිවලින් මොනවත් ලියන එක නොවෙයි. මේවා ඉතා බැරෑරුම් ලෙස අධ්‍යයනය කළ යුතුයි. මේකට පරිබාහිරව නීත්‍යානුකූල තර්කයක් පුළුවන් නම් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. "මෙන්න මේ ක්‍රමය අනුව private placements ලංකාවට ආවා, මහ බැංකුවට 2008දී ආවා." කියලා, පුළුවන් නම් මට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. එතකොට මම මගේ තර්කය අකුලා ගන්නවා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ එක දෙයයි. අපේ ෙම් කමිටුවේ වගකීම මහ බැංකුවේ පරණ දේවල් මේ සිද්ධියට ඇදලා ගැනීම නොවෙයි. පරණ දේවල් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන මතයේ මම ඉන්නවා. ස්ථිර වශයෙන්ම ගන්න ඕනෑ. එහි කිසිම සැකයක් නැහැ. ඒ දේවල් අනිවාර්යෙන්ම ගත යුතුයි. හැබැයි මේ වෙලාවේදී නොවෙයි. මේ වෙලාවේදී අපි කථා කරන්නේ එක දෙයක් පිළිබඳව. එක isolated incident. When I say an isolated incident, Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva, it does not mean before 2000. I agree with you totally. මම ඔබතුමත් එක්ක සියයට දාහක් එකඟ වෙනවා මේක කරන්න ඕනෑ. හැබැයි ඒ මේ වෙලාව නොවෙයි. ඒ සඳහා මේකෙන් පස්සේ දෙවනුව කැඳවමු. නමුත්, අපිට මේ වෙලාවේ කළ යුතු වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා. මාස 16ක් තිස්සේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කළා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අනිත් කාරණය අපි කථා කිරීමේදී අපේ කථා ඔබතුමා සීමා කරන්න. අපි දැන් මාස 16ක් කථා කෙරුවා. මේ මාස 16 අපි වාර්තා හැදුවා. තීන්දුවලට ආවා. ඒ සියල්ලම ඇවිල්ලා අවසාන වාර්තාව අසාකච්ඡා කරන වෙලාව තමයි මේ. අපිට දැන් තිබෙන කාර්ය භාරය වන්නේ, අවසාන වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම. අවසාන වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමේදී අපේ පරස්පර අදහස් තිබෙනවා නම්, එයට ඒවා එකතු කරන්න. ඒක වෙනම කතාවක්. නමුත්, අපි 25 වෙනිදාට මේ අවසන් වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුයි. අපි මේ අවසන් වාර්තාව 25 වෙනිදාට පාර්ලිමේන්තුව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ නැත්නම්, ඕනෑ නැත්නම් කරුණාකරලා අපි අපේ තීන්දුවලට එමු. අපි අපේ තීන්දුවලට ඇවිල්ලා, මේක ඉවරයක් කරමු. "25 වෙනිදාට අපිට අවසන් වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ." කියලා අපේ තීන්දුවට එමු. ඊට පස්සේ අපි ඒක රටේ ජනතාවට භාර දෙමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ අපි ඉදිරියේ තිබෙන - අපිට බලය පැවරී තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය, 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයෙත් මාර්තු මාසයෙත් සිදු වූ ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධව පමණයි. අපිට ඕනෑ දෙයක් කරන්න පුළුවන්. 1997 පටන් ගත්ත දවසේ ඉඳලාම වුණත් මේක කරන්න පුළුවන්. මැයි 31 දක්වා කාලය නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේක පොඩ්ඩක් කියවන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ කියන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ තිබෙන්නේ යාවත්කාලීන කළ වාර්තාව.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොදුවේ තිබෙන්නේ " 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ" කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 2016 මැයි 31 දක්වා කාලය. එය තමයි අපිට තිබෙන mandate එක. එතකොට, මම කියන්නේ මහ බැංකුවේ මීට කලින් සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන වැරදි, මහ බැංකුවේ පොදුවේ සිදු වී තිබෙන පරිපාලන ගැටලු මත පදනම් වෙලා අපි මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනයක යන එක විසින් අපිට මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳ හරි අවධානයක් යොමු කර ගන්න බැරි වෙනවා. උදාහරණයක් ගත්තොත්, උසාවියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන case එකක් හොයන්න ගියාම උසාවියේ තියෙන වැරදි සොයන්න ගියොත්- උසාවියෙත් වැරදි තිබෙනවා නේ. උසාවියේ එක් එක් කෙනා පත් කරපු විධිය ඒ අකාරයට ගත්තොත්, කිසිම ආකාරයක පරිපාලනයක් කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා. මොකද, මම වගකීමෙන් කියනවා 2008 කොළයක් අඩුවෙන් ලැබුණ මේ Board Paper එකට පස්සේ, මහ බැංකුව ඇතුලේ ඒ සම්බන්ධව කුමන තීන්දු තීරණ ගත්තාද කියලා අපි හරියට හොයලා බලලා නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ ඒක අපේ අඩුපාඩුවක් නොවෙයි. අපිට පැවරී තිබෙන විෂය ඉටු කර ගැනීමට ඒක එතරම් අදාළ කාරණයක් නොවෙයි. මේ එකතු කරලා තිබෙන මූලික කරුණු ටිකම ගත්තාම 3, 4 දෙකම ගත්තාම, අපිට උදව් වෙනවා තමයි, අපිට ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන සාමාන්‍ය අදහසක් ගන්න තමයි දමලා තිබෙන්නේ. මහ බැංකුව බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවලදී

අනුගමනය කරන සියලුම කරුණු මෙහි සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම මෙහිදී මතු කරන මූලික කාරණය තමයි, ආයතනයේ තිබෙන අතීත අඩුපාඩුකම් හෝ දැන් ගියත් සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් අඩුපාඩුකම් මත, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට මේ වැරැද්ද සොයා ගැනීමට බාධාවක් කර ගත යුතු නැහැ. මොකද, මේ නිශ්චිත bond issues දෙක ගත්තාම, අපි investigate කරපු ඒවා ගත්තාම, සාක්ෂි කැඳවපු ඒවා ගත්තාම අපිට වෙනමම කරුණු තිබෙනවා. මේ Board Papers මොනවත් අදාළ නැහැ. ගිහිල්ලා පැනෙන් ගහලා 20ක් ගන්න 10ක් ගන්න කියලා කිව්වාම, මොන manual එකක්වත් අදාළ වන්නේ නැහැ. මගේ මූලික තර්කය, ආයතනයේ පොදුවේ තිබෙන්නා වූ අඩුපාඩුකම්, අපි කවුරුවත් මහ බැංකුව දූෂිත ඉවත් කළ යුතු ආයතනයක් වශයෙන් පිළිගනෙන් නැහැ. අවශ්‍ය ආයතනයක් කියලා පිළිගන්නවා නේ. එහි තිබෙන විවිධ අඩුපාඩුකම් අපිට ඉලක්ක ගත වී තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය නිවැරදි හෝ වැරදි කිරීමට යොදා ගත යුතු නැහැ. ඊළඟ කාරණය, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා, manual එක ආදී කරුණු පිළිබඳ අපි සෑහීමට පත් වෙනවාද කියන එක වෙනම කථාවක්. නමුත්, අපි ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් වත්මන් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා වෙනම කැඳෙව්වා. ඊට කළින් කණ්ඩායම සමඟ කැඳවලත් ඉතා පැහැදිලිව මේ ක්‍රමවේද තුන ගැන - විශේෂයෙන් ක්‍රම වේද දෙක ගැන - අපි auction වලින් ගන්නවාද, direct placements වලින් ගන්නවාද කියලා සහ ඒ ක්‍රම දෙක ගැන මහ බැංකුවේ manual සහ Board Papers මගින් ආවරණයක් තිබෙනවාද? දැනට අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රමවේදය පිළිබඳව, දැනට තිබෙන manual එකේ විවිධ අඩුපාඩුකම් මැද හරි ඒක තිබෙනවාද? කියන එක පිළිබඳව නව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙනුත් අපි ප්‍රශ්න කළා. ඒ වාගේම ඔවුන්ගේ ලිපි ලේඛනවලත් මෙය තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මම ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කියන්නේ, මෙතැන direct placements වලට අනුව මේ වාර්තාව සකස් වෙලා නැහැ. Direct placements හරි කියලා, මේ වාර්තාව සකස් වෙලා නැහැ. Auction ක්‍රමය නිවැරදියි කියලා මේ වාර්තාව සකස් වෙලා නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව සකස් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, මේ ක්‍රම දෙකම පාවිච්චි කරලා - මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා කිව්වෙත් ඒකයි.

මේ කුමන ක්‍රමවේදය හෝ පාවිච්චි කරලා, රජයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල්, "…..the lowest possible cost with a reasonable degree of risk." ඒ නිසා මම හිතනවා, ඒක එතුමාත් තහවුරු කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපටත් ඒක තේරෙනවා, මොකක්ද මේකේ intention කියලා. ඒනිසා ඉතාම ඕනෑකමින් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ, අපි අධීක්ෂණය නොකරන ලද Board Papers තව තිබිය හැකියි. 2008 වර්ෂයේ සිට 2015 වර්ෂය දක්වා අධීක්ෂණය කරපු නැති Board Papers ඕනෑ තරම් තිබිය හැකියි. ඒක නිශ්චිත කාරණයට බලපාන්නේ නැහැ. ඊට මඟ පෙන්වන තවත් manuals, Board Papers තව ගණනාවක් ඒ ආසන්නයේ තිබෙන නිසා. ඊට කලින් සිදු වූ practice එක තිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව ලසන්ත ඇමතිතුමා අසන ලද ඉතා සරල ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙනවා. මේ නිශ්චිත transaction එකේ. මොකද අපි කාටත් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ, අපි දෙයක් කරද්දී මඟ පෙන්වීම ඇතුලේ කොහොමද ඒවායින් රටට වාසි අවාසි සිදු වෙන්නේ කියන එක. ඒකට තමයි professional due care එක තිබෙන්නේ. අපි කාටත් ඒකේ responsibility එක තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ නිසා මේකෙන් නිශ්චිතව ලාභයක්, අලාභයක් වුණාද? රටට වාසියක් ,අවාසියක් වුණාද කියන එක නිශ්චිත නිර්ණායකයක් වෙනවා manuals, Board Papers ඔක්කොම එක්ක. ඒක ගැන තමයි මට නිශ්චිතව පැහැදිලි කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. මම ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ අද අපි තව බෙහෝ තර්ක කරන්නේ නැතිව, අපි එකඟ නැති ඒවා එකඟ නම් එහෙම ලියා ගෙන. පුළුවන් තරම් include කර ගන්න බලා ගෙන inclusive approach එකක යමින්, නමුත් මේක ඉවර කරන්නත් ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් අපට හැමදාම ඉතිහාසයට යන්න බැහැ.

ගරු **අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා**: ඉවර නොකිරීමේ අරමුණක් අපටත් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නිශ්චිත කාලයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. දැන් සවස තුනයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අද හරි හෙට හරි අපි කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හෙට හරි කිව්වාට බැහැ. අපි හෙට ඉවර වෙනවා . අපි 25වැනිදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා කියලා කීන්දු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කැමති හෝ අකමැති හෝ මම නම් මෙතැනින් නැගිටලා යනවා, තව ටිකකින්. මේක ඉවරයක් කරන්න බැරි වුණොත් හතරට පසුව කැමති වාර්තාවක් දාන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කියන්න එපා. වගකීමකින් කටයුතු කරමු. මේකේ සමස්තයම කථා කරන්න ඔබතුමන්ලාට අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. මම මොනවා හරි කිව්වොත් ඔබතුමන්ලා කියයි මම අයිතිය නැති කරනවා කියලා. අයිතිය තිබෙනවා ඕනෑ තරම් කථා කරන්න. එළි වෙනතුරු හරි කථා කරන්න. නමුත් ඉලක්කයකුත් තිබිය යුතුයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඉලක්කයට කථා කරලා ගත්ත තීරණ තිබෙනවා. හෙට වෙන කොට මේක ඉවර වෙන්නත් ඕනෑ. 25 වැනිදා වාර්තාව දාන්නත් ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Paragraph එකෙන් paragraph එකට යන්න කියලා කිව්වාට ඔබතුමන්ලා මේකේ මොකක් හෝ වෙනස්කමක් යෝජනා කරනවා නම් ඒක සාරාංශ කරලා කියනවා නම්, මෙන්න මේ වෙනස්කම් මෙතැනට ඇතුල් කරන්න කියලා, ඒක සියලු දෙනාටම පිළි ගන්න පුළුවන් නම්. අපේ හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා 3.2 කොටසට ඉතාම නිවැරදිව කළා නේ. එතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන අදහස ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒක පිළි ගන්න අය ඉන්න පුළුවන් නොපිළිගන්න අය ඉන්න පුළුවන්. ඊට පසුව ඒ විධියට ඇතුළට දාමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේක පිළි ගන්නවා නේ. මම වැරදි කියලා තිබෙනවා නම් මේක පිළි ගන්නේ. ඊට පසුව මට මගේ මතය ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාම විස්තර කරන්න සවිස්තරාත්මකව විස්තර කරන්න. ඔබතුමා සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන් තීන්දුවක් ගන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන්න මම කියපු දේ වැරදියි නම්, ඔබතුමාගේ මේ මතය මේ තිබෙන ප්‍රකාශය එතන එහෙමම තියලා, එතකොට මම මගේ ප්‍රකාශය කරන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: කාටත් පොදුවේ පිළි ගන්න පුළුවන් අදහසක් බවට පත් වෙන්න අවශ්‍යයි නේ. මේක කාටත් පොදුවේ පිළි ගන්න පුළුවන් අදහසක් බවට පත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මගේ පුද්ගලික අදහස නොවෙයිනේ වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. මේ වාර්තාව මම පුද්ගලිකව සකස් කරපු එකක් නොවෙයි නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 2008 මොකක්ද? මම හිටියේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඕක මේ කාරක සභාවේ, සාක්ෂි සටහන් අරගෙන බලන්න. පැය ගණන් දවස් ගණන් කථා කරපු දෙයක්නේ මේ කියන්නේ. අවසානයේ මේ වර්තමානයේ අධිපතිතුමා පිළිගත්ත විධියත් 4.2 කොටසේ තිබෙනවා . අවසානයේදී කියපු දේත් එහි තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සාක්ෂි ඔක්කොම කැඳවලා බලන්න. ඔබතුමා එකක් පෙන්වන්න මේ ක්‍රමය හරි ක්‍රමය කියලා නිර්ණායක පෙන්වන්න?

සභාපතිතුමා: හරි ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ. මට මතකයි ඕක අහපු ගමන්ම වඩා නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය auction ක්‍රමයද නැද්ද කියලා ඇහුවාම අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ, ඒක ඒ මොහොතේ වෙළෙඳ පොළ තත්ත්වයන් යටතේ රජයට අවාසි සහගත නොවන ආකාරයට ගන්න තීරණය කියලා. ඒක තමයිමෙහි සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා අන්තිමට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා කියන දේ සාධකය වශයෙන් ගන්නවා, නිලධාරින් විස්සක් විතර කියපු දේ සියල්ලම අතපසු කරලා. එතුමාගේ word එකද අපේ තීන්දුව. මම ඔබතුමාට පෙන්වන්නේ ලිඛිත සාක්ෂි. ඔබතුමා තීන්දුවක් ගන්න එතුමා හරිද, ලිඛිත සාක්ෂි හරිද කියලා?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සුජීව ඇමතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා අවසන් කළේ, මේ ගනුදෙනුවේ වරදක් වෙලා නැහැ කියලා නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි ගනුදෙනුව ගැන පසුව කථා කරමු. අපි paragraph එකෙන් paragraph එකට නේ යන්නේ. මුළු එකම කථා කරනවා නම් මුළු එකම කථා කරමු.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ යන විධියට - I think, the best thing is, we will put this Report and you can put another Report. සුජීව වෙනම Report එකක් දාන්න.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මේ Report එකට අපි පාවිච්චි කරලා තිබෙන්න auction ක්‍රමය වැරදි කිව්ව නිසා සිදු වුණා කියලා. මේකේ තිබෙනවා, අපි කථා කරපු බොහෝ ඒවාවල තිබෙන්නේ auction ක්‍රමය ගත්ත නිසා තමයි මේ වැරැද්ද සිද්ධ වෙන්න ප්‍රධානම හේතුව කියලා. එතකොට මෙතුමා පෙන්වන්නේ පැහැදිලිව මේ Board Papers වලින් ක්‍රමවේදය කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මම සංශෝධනයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නද? 11 වන පිටුවේ 4.1 දී තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පැණ නැගුනේ? මෙතැන තිබෙනවා " ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම ආරම්භ කර ඇත්තේ 1997. ඒ අනුව 1997 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මගින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණ බවද, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවකදී හෝ පොලී අනුපාතය අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවකදී වෙන්දේසි මගින් සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වන අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල යොදු ගතයුතු බව පත්‍රිකාවේ සඳහන් වේ" අපි මේක සංශෝධනය කරමු. " මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවක් හා පොලී අනුපාතය අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවක් වූ 2008 ජනවාරි මස දී සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වන මුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා මාස හතරක කාලයක් සඳහා සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල යොදා ගතයුතු බව පත්‍රිකාවේ සඳහන් වේ"

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම හරි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම හරි නේද? Then, we all are safe.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊළඟට 4.1.1ට යමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන අපි වැරැද්දක් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මෙතැන

තිබෙන්නේ 4.1.1 මගින්ද, දෙවැනි කොටස ගත්තොත් "මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ පවතින පොලී අනුපාතවලට වඩා 0.5%ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් වෙළෙඳ පොලේ ද්‍රව ශීලතාව ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කර ඇත" කියලා තිබෙවා නේ. නමුත් ඒකේ නිර්දේශ ලැබිලා නැහැ. ඒකේ ඉල්ලලා තිබෙනවා නිර්දේශ දීලා නැහැ. බලන්න දීලා තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා. 95 වන පිටුවේ ඕක ඉල්ලනවා. අපේ ලොකු පොතේ, යාවත්කාලීන කරපු පොතේ 95 වන පිටුව බලන්න. එහි කියනවා, 0.05%ක් අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට වැඩිපුර ගෙවන්න කියලා. සුජීව ඇමතිතුමා, මේක වැදගත් අහගන්න. ඔබතුමාගේ Board Paper එක. සුජීව ඇමතිතුමා ගෙන එන ලද එක හරිම වැදගත්. මමත් දැන් තමයි දැක්කේ. ඒකේ Title එක තිබෙන්නේ අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට "Improvement of market liquidity through active participation of EPF."මොකක්ද මේකෙන් කියන්නේ, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ද්‍රවශීලිතාවය වැඩි කර ගැනීම සඳහා අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල භාවිතා කිරීම. කලින් Board Paper එකේ තිබුණා, අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට කියලා තිබෙනවා, ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළට සහභාගි වෙන්න එපා කියලා. අපි කථා කරපු එකේ ඒක තිබෙනවා. මේකේ තිබෙනවා, "…captive holders would keep these securities in their investment portfolio in order to avoid mark-to-market losses."

ඒක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේකේ තිබෙනවා, ඒ නිසා Board Paper එකේ 4වැනි අංකය අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට සියයට 0.05ක් වැඩිපුර ගෙවන්න කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව කියලා තිබෙනවා, අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලය ද්‍රවශීලතාව වැඩි කර ගැනීම සඳහා ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ගනු දෙනු කරන්න කියලා. ඔය දෙක නේ ඉල්ලන්නේ. "Accordingly, the Monetary Board is invited to approve;" 1. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට සියයට 0.05ක් ගෙවන්න. "(i) to issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at a interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements;..." ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තිබෙන rate එකට වඩා සියයට 0.05ක් අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට ගෙවන්න. ඒක privately අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලක් එක්ක place කරන්න. 2. අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට කියන්න, කරුණාකරලා ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ද්‍රවශීලතාව වැඩි කිරීම සඳහා ගනුදෙනු කරන්න. ඔය දෙක තමයි ඉල්ලන්නේ. හැබැයි, ඒක දෙන්නේ නැහැ. දෙන්නේ මොකක්ද, "The Board taking into consideration the views expressed by the members, approved;

(a) to allow the EPF to invest in longer term Government papers based on long term inflationary expectations plus 4 percent real rate of return and 2 percent risk premium to cover the errors in inflation projections;

(b) ETF also to be offered investment opportunities in Government paper on the same basis;" සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ captive source එකට අනෙක් ඒවා එකතු කරනවා කියලා නේ. එහෙම එකතු කළාට EPF එකට දෙන්නේ එක ක්‍රමයක්, ETF එකට කියනවා EPF ක්‍රමයම දෙන්න කියලා. NSB එකට කියනවා, " (c) for Superintendent of Public Debt to negotiate with NSB for investments in Government Paper, based on yield rates proposed in the Paper; and (d) for the Monetary Board to review the rates after April, 2008." මේක ඉතාමත්ම පැහැදිලියි. අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට පාඩුවක් ලැබෙනවාට මේගොල්ලන් කැමැති වුණේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා සියයට 0.05 නොවෙයි, අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන දීර්ඝ කාලීන උද්ධමනයට වඩා සියයට 6ක් වැඩියි. මේගොල්ලන් ඉල්ලන්නේ සියයට 0.05ක්.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** 0.6ක්?

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** නැහැ, ඉල්ලන්නේ 0.05ක් වැඩිපුර දෙන්න කියලා. නමුත් market එකේ කියනවා, සියයට 0.05ක් නොවෙයි, සියයට 6.0ක් දෙන්න කියලා. Inflationary expectation එකට වඩා සියයට 6.0ක් දෙන්න කියලා ඉල්ලනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, අර වාගේ එකසියවිසි ගුණයක වැඩි කිරීමක් මෙතැනින් කියනවා.

ගරු **ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා:** මොකක්ද අංකය?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 4.1 ඡේදය යටතේ තිබෙන එක.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:** ඔය Board Paper එකේ තිබෙන එකේ තිබෙන අදහස තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි කියන එකක් නොවෙයි, Board Paper එකේ තිබෙන විධියට, "other captive sources" යනුවෙන් අදහස් කරන්නේ, NSB, EPF and EPF කියන එක සහ ඒ අවසරය මේ Board Paper එකටම ලබා දී ඇත්තේ නිශ්චිත කාලයකට පමණි. අපට ඕනෑ නම් කාලයක් දමන්න පුළුවන් නේ. January to February කියලා ඇතුළත් කළොත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැද්ද?

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. හැබැයි, මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ, සියයට 0.05 ඉල්ලුවාට දීලා නැහැ. උද්ධමනය සියයට 6යි කියන කථාව තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:** ඒ තරම් details ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. මේ 4.1.2ට එකතු කළොත් එහෙම "other captive sources" යනුවෙන් -

සභාපතිතුමා: බිමල් රත්නායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම හිතන විධියට, මෙතැන ලොකු පටලැවිල්ලක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක නිරවුල් කරගෙන තමයි අපට ඉතිරි ඒවා සාකච්ඡා කරන්න වෙන්නේ. හේතුව මොකද දන්නවාද, රැස්වීම් අංක 25/2008 කියන එකේ decision එක තිබෙන්නේ, ඒක නොවෙයි. 667, 668 කියලා අනෙක් පැත්තේ තිබෙන්නේ. 97 පිටුවේ තිබෙන එක.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක වෙන්න බැහැ. ඒක තිබෙන්නේ මේකේ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි පිටුව මාරුවෙලා වැදිලා තිබෙන එක.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** එතකොට මේක වැරදියි නේ.සභාපතිතුමා: මේ තිබෙන්නේ, රැස්වීම් අංක 25/2008. Board Paper කියන එක. It states, "Improvement of Market Liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund (EPF). The Board having considered the paper approved of:..." කියලා මෙන්න මේ approvals දෙක තමයි දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** ඒ ගැන තමයි මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කළේ. මේ තිබෙන්නේ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි,-

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒ කියන්නේ, 94ත් වැරදියි, 96ත් වැරදියි.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** ඔව්, ඔතැන තිබෙන විධිය වැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: පිටු දෙක මාරුවෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට මම ඒක පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්නම්. 93වැනි පිටුවේ පසුව 94වැනි පිටුව තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ 94වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන දේම තමයි 96වැනි පිටුවේත් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක තමයි මම කලින් ඇහුවේ. එතකොට කිව්වා නේ, වැරදි 94වැනි පිටුව විතරයි කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, 94වැනි පිටුවම තමයි 96වැනි පිටුවේත් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ Board Paper එකේ decision එක එන්නේ මේක.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංමහ මහතා:** ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒකේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ, " (a) Issuing Treasury Bonds to EPF and other captive sources at an interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and

(b)Requesting the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engaging in secondary market operations."

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** එහෙම නම්, මේ ඡේදයේ වැරැද්ද තිබෙන්නේ කාල පරිච්ඡේදය ඇතුළත් කරන එක පමණයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 96වැනි පිටුව පොතේ තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 96වැනි පිටුව තමයි photocopy වෙලා නැතිව පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලාට දුන්නේ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** ඒ කලින් එක.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒ 94වැනි පිටුව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ 21/2008 අන්තිම පිටුව.

සභාපතිතුමා: පිටුවක් මාරුවීමක් මේ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතුමා සඳහන් කරන්නේ, 21/2008 පිටුවක් ගැන.

සභාපතිතුමා: 94වැනි පිටුව ඉවත් කළා නම් හරි. ඔය කියන්නේ 21/2008 අන්තිම කොළය.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** 21/2008 අන්තිම කොළය තමයි අපට photocopy කරලා දුන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි 94වැනි පිටුවට එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක හරි. එතකොට 96වැනි පිටුවත් වැරදිද?

සභාපතිතුමා: 96වැනි පිටුව කියන එක එතැනට අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** 96වැනි පිටුව කපලා, කුරුටු ගාලා ඉවත් කරන්නද?

සභාපතිතුමා: 96වැනි පිටුව අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** එහෙම නම්, අපි 96වැනි පිටුව කපා දමනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැනට එන්නේ 97වැනි පිටුව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අර ගත්ත එකම තමයි ඔය ආපහු තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, ඒක නොවෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 94වැනි පිටුව සහ 96වැනි පිටුව කියන එකයි දෙකම එකයි. එකක් duplicate.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට 94වැනි පිටුවත් වැරදි නම්,-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: වැරදියි කියන්නේ, අමුණලා තිබෙන විධිය වැරදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 96වැනි පිටුව ඇමිණෙන්න ඕනෑ කොතැනටද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, අපි මේකේ originals ටිකම අරගෙන බලමුද? එතකොට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ. මහ බැංකුවෙන් ගෙන්වා ගත්ත ලේඛන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** ඔබතුමිය බලන්න මේක හරිද කියලා. 07.01.2008 දිනය. රැස්වීම් අංක 1/2008. ඒක පටන් ගන්නේ, "Proposed yield structure for Treasury Bonds to be mobilized ....." ඊළඟ පිටුව: "The Board taking into consideration the views expressed by the members, approved;

(a) to allow the EPF to invest in longer term Government papers based on long term inflationary expectations plus 4 percent real rate of return and 2 percent risk....." එනවා. Next page විධියට minutes තිබෙනවා. ඊට උඩින් තිබෙනවා, Copy no. 13. ඒක තමයි ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ, -

සභාපතිතුමා: විෂය අංක 26 කියන එක.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** මෙතැන වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා දන්නවාද, මේක 94 නොවෙයි, 92 (a) වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** මම කියන පිළිවෙළට තමයි මට කලින් ලැබුණු Board Papers. ඒවා පිළිවෙළට තිබෙනවා. Meeting No. 1/2008 states, "Proposed yield structure for Treasury Bonds to be mobilized through Direct Placements in 2008.

The purpose of this Board Paper is to;....." ඊළඟට තිබෙනවා, "suitable rate structure for long term maturities based on the medium term inflation targets ...." Chart එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකේ තමයි විස්තර කරන්නේ "Inflation Targets as per....."

සභාපතිතුමා: Chart එක තිබෙන්නේ ඒකේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ rates ටික තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** එහෙම නම්, ඒක එන්න ඕනෑ, 95 (a).

ගරු **සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** I will not go into detail. මුලින්ම පිටු ටික සාදාගන්න. ඊට පස්සේ තිබෙනවා, "Captive holders could not trade or sale these bonds without capital losses in due rate structure continues." ඒක එතැනින් අවසන්. There is one more page. ඊළඟට chart එකක් එනවා.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Those are the proposed yield rates. **ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** Yes, you are correct. දෙවැනි Board Paper එක Meeting No: 25/2008. The heading is "Improvement of Market Liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) " ඒක 7.10.2008.

එකම මාසයේ කියලා හිතෙයි. නැහැ. 10 වැනි මාසයේ. Board Paper එක 25/2008 .

සභාපතිතුමා: විෂය අංකය 20.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. ඒකේ heading එක 'Improvement of Market Liquidity Through Active Participation of Employees' Provident Fund'කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනෙක් පැත්තේ Minute එක තිබෙනවා, "Improvement of Market Liquidity through active participation of Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) "කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි approved එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ තමයි එක එන්නේ. ඒක තමයි මම කිව්වේ අතින් ලියලා තිබෙනවා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 96 duplicate වෙලා වැදුණ එක. ඒක ඉවත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. පොතේ එක පිටුවක්

වැඩිපුර වැදිලා. පොතේ පිටුවක් වැඩිපුර වැදිලා, අර පිටුව අඩුවෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒකයි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. Photocopy කරන කෙනා අතින් එක පිටුවක් හැලිලා ඒ වෙනුවට වෙන එකක් වැදිලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට කියන්න 91 වැනි පිටුවට පසුව මොකක්ද එන්නේ කියලා.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: 91ට පසුව "Proposed Yield Structure for-"

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 35/2008 කිව්වොත් මම කියන්නම්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 7.1.2008 තිබෙනවා, "-The purpose of this Board Paper is to;"

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. "Proposed Yield Structure For Treasury-" කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: Yes. එකේ second page එක-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: "The Board taking into consideration the views expressed by the members, approved:

(a) to allow the EPF to invest in longer term Government papers"

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම නම් 94 තමයි 92 වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊට පසුව, "Proposed Yield Structure for Treasury Bonds to be Mobilized Through Direct Placements in 2008 -"

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. 91 වැනි පිටුවට පසුව එන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 91 පිටුපේ අන්තිමට "-this paper has proposed-" කියලා නේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Page 94 එකට තමයි page 97 එක එන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කොහොම හරි ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියාපු එක හරි. Table එක අන්තිමට එන්න ඕනෑ. අනෙක් Board Papers ටික එකට එන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකම තිබෙනවා මේකේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. මහ බැංකුවෙන් අපට එවපු ලේඛනවල Board Papers ටික ලේකම් කාර්යාලයේ අනුපිළිවෙළට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Photocopy කරන කොට එහාට මෙහාට වෙලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට ඒක සකස් කරන එකේ තමයි පිටුවක් වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 92 බී හරි. 93 හරි. 93 පිටුවට පසුව.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේ වාර්තාවට මෙන්න මෙහෙම එකතු කළොත් හොඳද කියලායි මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ. 4.1.1ට පොලි අනුපාතවලට සාපේක්ෂව ඉහළ පොලි අනුපාතයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් වෙළඳ පොළ ද්‍රවශීලතා ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒකට අමතරව 25.8 2008 කියන එකෙන් approval එක secondary market එකට මැදිහත් වෙන්න කියන එක. ඒක දමන්න අවශ්‍යද කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තේරුණේ නැහැ. නැවතත් කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: 4.1.1 ට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මඟින් ද්විතියික වෙළඳ පොළේ පවතින පොලි අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොලි අනුපාතයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් වෙළඳ පොළ ද්‍රවශීලතාව ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කර ඇති කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒකේදී 0.05ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොලි අනුපාතයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම සහ තව එකතු කිරීමක් කරනවා මේ Board Paper එකේ තිබෙන decision එක. ද්විතියික වෙළඳ පොළ කටයුතුවලට මැදිහත් වීම සඳහා "at a interest rate five basis point above the secondary market rates" කියන එකයි, මේ කොන්දේසියි නේ approve කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ දෙක මේකට එකතු කරනවාද කියලා අහන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ දෙක එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඊට වඩා වැදගත් දේ තමයි, මේක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ temporarily.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. ඒක දමමු. තාවකාලිකව දී තිබෙන අතර මේ කාරණාවත් ඇතුළත් කරනවා කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Board Papers දෙකේ තිබෙන main content එක දැම්මා නම් හරි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඇතුළත් කරමු කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Other captive sources කිව්වාම introduction ඒකේ තිබෙනවා major captive sources කියලා. Duplicate වෙනවාද දන්නේ නැහැ. Other කිව්වාම අර තුන විතරක් නොවෙයි. Major state-owned enterprises ඔක්කොම අයිතියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක 4.1.2 තිබෙනවා නේ. 4.1.2 අපි කියලා තිබෙනවා. නිලධාරිනුත් ඒක කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරිද, වැරදිද නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Board Papers එකේ සම්පූර්ණ සාරාංශයක් ඇතුළත් -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම හදද්දි other captive sources කියලා කියන්නේ -

සභාපතිතුමා: නිශ්චිතව මේ කාරණා 4 කියන එක නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Other captive sources කියලා කියන්නේ ස්ථිරසාරවම රජයට control එක තිබෙන sources.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: නැහැ. I will read out the relevant part. "- Monetary Board approved or sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placement of treasury bonds rupee loans in respect of captive sources". So, investors such as EPF, NSB, ETF- "

It is specifically stated.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:ගරු සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමාම බලාපු එක බලන්න. I have no issue with that. But, this paper states,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පටන් ගන් හැටි කියන්න. Heading එක කියන්න.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: Proposed yield structure for treasury bonds. එහි සඳහන් වෙනවා "According to the Government cash flow for 2008, government expects to raise Rs. 355 bn from domestic rupee sources by issuing Treasury bonds and Rupee loans. The main investor group operating in the long term debt market is state owned and state managed captive type sources"

Then comes the major captive investors. The other captive sources are not only EPF, NSB and ETF. They are major.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, no. Those are specifically at last stage.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: That is true. That is there. But, here they have mentioned that the major captive investor is EPF.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහෙම දමමු. ප්‍රධාන මූලාශ්‍රය ලෙස සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල සහ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: No, no. ඒක මේකේ දීලා තිබෙනවා. අපට එකේ යන්න බැහැ. මේ ඔක්කොම එනවා. අර ටික ඔක්කොම සාකච්ඡා කරලා last page එකේ එනවා "The Monetary Board approval is sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placements of treasury bonds and rupee loans in respect of captive investors such as EPF, NSB and ETF during –"

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Such as කියාපු ගමන්ම there can be more.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි. පොල් සංවර්ධන මණ්ඩලය තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Other meaning is, such as කියන්නේ you give the examples for these three.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: That means there can be more.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Yes, but government-owned.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Government-managed කියන්නේ රජයේ.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: State-owned and state-managed යන දෙක දෙකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: රජයේ හිමිකාරිත්වයව සහ කළමනාකරණය සහිත.

සභාපතිතුමා: රජයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය සහ කළමනාකරණය සහිත.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: රජයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය සහ රජයේ කළමනාකාරිත්වය සහිත sources වලට පමණයි, invest කරන්න පුළුවන් සහ මෙයින් ආවරණය වෙන්නේ. Draft එකේ තියෙන විධියට ඒක ආවරණය වෙන්නේ නැහැ. Draft එකේ තියෙන විධියට open private - hundred percent වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා තියෙන්නේ. ඒක amend කරන්න අපි එකඟ වෙමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක ඒ විධියටම approve වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ දෙකේම තියෙන්නේ approval එක ඉල්ලනවා කියලා. But, I do not see any approval.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ අය **yield curve structure** එකක් දීලා, inflation expectation කියලා methods දෙකක් දීලා තියෙනවා. ඒ අය දෙකෙන් එකකට දීලා තියෙන්නේ. 93වැනි පිටුවේ 'A proposed yield structure' කියලා තියෙනවා. Proposed yield structure කියලා methods දෙකක් දීලා තියෙනවා. දෙවැනි method එක දාලා නැහැ. Method one කියලා තියෙනවා, "Nominal interest rate which would equate net percent value at given real rate of return" කියලා. අවුරුදු දෙකේ සිට පහළොවට maturity එක දීලා තියෙනවා.- without market risk premium -කියලා, Market risk premium add කරලා දීලා තියෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: is it the approval?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි, Method – I. Typo එකක් තියෙනවා. Method II ඒක තමයි Inflation expectation forecast එක. ඒ අය දීලා තියෙන්නේ, Inflation expectation forecast එකට අනුවයි. ඒ අය කියන්නේ, - "Allow EPF to invest in long-term Government paper based on long-term inflation expectation plus four plus two percent, cover the error in inflation …" ඒ කියන්නේ, මේ Inflation expectation එකක් දීලා තියෙනවා නේ. 2007 වර්ෂයේ මෙපමණයි; 2008 වර්ෂයේ මෙපමණයි; 2009 වර්ෂයේ මෙපමණයි; 2010 වර්ෂයේ මෙපමණයි; 2011 වර්ෂයේ මෙපමණයි කියලා. මම උදාහරණයක් හැටියට කියන්නම්. approval එක දීලා තියෙන්නේ මේ විධියටයි. ඒ අය කියනවා, අවුරුදු දෙකක Bond එකක් issue කළොත්-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The Board proposed it but it was not approved.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ approve කරලා තියෙන්නේ වෙනත් ක්‍රමයකටයි. මම ඒ approve කරපු ක්‍රමය කියන්නම්. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම පසුබිම මතක් කළොත්, 2008 වර්ෂයේ ජූලි මාසයේ උද්ධමනය සියයට 29.9ට ඉහළ ගියා. එතකොට උද්ධමන මාපකය වෙනස් කළා. උද්ධමන මාපකය වෙනස් කරලා, "උද්ධමනය අඩුයි." කියලා කිව්වා. නමුත්, ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඉතා ඉහළ උද්ධමනයක් තිබුණා. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව ඉදිරිපත් කළ method එක - ක්‍රමය - අනුව, EPF එකෙන්-

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපි මේ විධියට තවත් කරුණු කිහිපයක් එකතු කළොත් හොඳයි ද? ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාත් අවධානය යොමු කරන්න. මෙහි 4.1 සහ 4.2හි තියෙන්නේ එකම කාරණාවක් ගැන නිසා, "රජයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය සහ කළමනාකාරිත්වය සහිත මූලාශ්‍ර ලෙස මූලික වශයෙන් සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල සහ අනෙකුත් මූලාශ්‍ර ලෙස සේවා නියුක්තයන්ගේ භාර අරමුදල සහ ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව යොදා ගත හැකි බව දක්වා ඇති අතර, එය 2008 ජනවාරි මස සිට අප්‍රේල් මස දක්වා වන කාලය සඳහා ඉල්ලුම් කර ඇත."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සීමිත කාලය සඳහා ඉල්ලුම් කර ඇත.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට එහි පැහැදිලි නැහැ, ඉල්ලුම් කළාට අනුමැතිය-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අනුමැතිය තියෙනවා. "ඉල්ලන කාලයට අදාළ අපේක්ෂිත උද්ධමනයට සියයට 4ක මූර්ථ පොලියක් සහ සියයට දෙකක -risk - අවදානම් පොලියක් සහිතව සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කරන්න." කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි, compensate කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ Fund එකේ ආරක්ෂාවට ඒක කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Fund එකේ ආරක්ෂාවට ඒක හදිසි අවස්ථාවකදී ගත්තේ. But you must compensate it. එතකොට EPF, ETF යොදවන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 4.1.1හි අවසාන ඡේදයට "Board paper මඟින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ පවතින පොලී අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතයන් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් සහ රජයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය සහ කළමනාකාරිත්වය සහිත....." කියන කොටස එතැනට තමයි එකතු වෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වැරැදියි. මෙය සිද්ධ වෙලා තියෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. ජනවාරි මාසයේ Board එකට ගිහින් කියනවා, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ - market එකේ- මිල හරිම ඉහළයි. ඒකට හේතුව උද්ධමනය ඉහළ ගිහින් තියෙනවා. උද්ධමනය සියයට 25ට වඩා ඉහළ ගිහින් තියෙනවා. උද්ධමනය සියයට 25ට වඩා ඉහළ ගිහින් තියෙද්දි, පොලී අනුපාතය සියයට 30ට වඩා වැඩි වෙනවා. අපේ රටේ යුද්ධයක් තිබුණා නේ. මේ යුද්ධයේ උච්චතම අවස්ථාවයි. මෙය control කර ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒ නිසා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට Board Paper එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා කිව්වා, "අපි සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැර වෙමු. 1997 වර්ෂයට කලින් තිබුණු ක්‍රමයට යමු." ඒ කියන්නේ auction එක කරන්නේ නැතිව, direct placementsවලට

යන එක. Direct placements වලට ගිහින් ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට, ETF එකට සහ NSB එකට මේවා දෙමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ එකට අමතරව.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයට කලින්, මේ ජනවාරි මාසයේ එක. ඊට පස්සේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කියනවා, "මෙන්න මේ පොලී අනුපාත ගෙවමු." කියලා. අවුරුදු දෙක නම් සියයට 16යි; අවුරුදු තුන නම් සියයට 19යි; කියලා පොලී අනුපාත දෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ Board එක මෙහෙම තීරණය කරනවා. "ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන ප්‍රශ්නය අපට තේරෙනවා. අපි ඒ නිසා මාස හතරකට පමණක් direct placementsවලට යන්න දෙනවා. එහෙම කරන්න දෙන්නේ කලින් සඳහන් කළ ආයතන තුනට සහ රජයට අයත් අනෙකුත් captive sources වලට පමණයි. නමුත්, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉල්ලන පොලී අනුපාතයට අප එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපි එකඟ වෙන්නේ, අපේක්ෂිත උද්ධමනයට සියයට 4ක් සහ සියයට 2ක් එකතු කරලා, සියයට 6ක් එකතු කරපු පොලී අනුපාතයක් ගෙවන්නයි." ඊට පස්සේ මෙය මේ විධියට සිද්ධ වුණාද, කියලා අපි බලන්න ඕනෑ. It is important. ඒ සඳහා අපි ආපස්සට බලන්න ඕනෑ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම 2008 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට උද්ධමනයට සියයට 6ක් එකතු කරපු පොලී අනුපාතයක් ලැබුණාද කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ උද්ධමනය පහළ යනවා. උද්ධමනය පහළ යන විට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව කියනවා, "අපට මෙපමණ පොලියක් ගෙවන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයේ අලුත් Board Paper එකක් ගෙනැල්ලා කියනවා, සියයට 0.05ක් විතර ගෙව්වාම ඇති." කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කියන්නේ අර කලින් කිව්ව කාරණාව උඩට එන්න ඕනෑ. 2008.10.07 Board Paper එකට කලින් මෙතුමා කියන කාරණාව එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ compensation එක ගෙවලා නැහැ. ඒ සියලුම දේවල් සලකා බලද්දි මේ Board Paper එක මෙහෙම දාලා, ETF, EPF අතහරිනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගෙවලා නැහැ කියලා කොහොමද දන්නේ?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I checked all these things.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට මෙතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ, 2008.01.07 ඇමුණුම. ඒක හරි. ඊ ළඟට එන්න ඕනෑ, ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කියන කාරණා ටික.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 12වෙනි පිටුවද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. 12වෙනි පිටුවේ මුලට. ඒ කියන්නේ 4:1:1ට දමන්න ඕනෑ, ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා කියන කාරණාව.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 2008 Board Paper එක නේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒකට අපි compromise වෙනවා නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක එකතු කරලා දමන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මෙතැනින් ලොකු case එකක් එනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 4:1:1 අලුත් Board Paper එකට decision එක එන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක හරි. ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා කිව්ව කාරණාව එනවා, 4:1:1ට, මේකට උඩින්. ඒ වෙනම කාරණාවක් හැටියට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. සියයට 0.05 කථාවට කලින්?

සභාපතිතුමා: සියයට 0.05ට කලින්. ඔක්තෝබර්වලටත් කලින්. ඒ කියන්නේ සියයට 0.05 එන්නේ ඊට පස්සේ. ඒක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට පමණක් සීමා කරනවා, ඊට පස්සේ. ඊට කලින් මේ ටික එනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මේ දෙක ඉවත් වන්න ඕනෑ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "2008 වසරේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණු බවත් පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/25/20/2008 (2008.10.07) (ඇමුණුම - 7) මඟින්ද මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ..." ඒකත් වෙනස් වන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තිබෙන්නේ open- මේ ටික ඉවත් වන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කොයි ටිකද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ 4:1:1. මේක තිබුණොත්, අපේ idea එක එන්නේ නැහැ. " 2008 වසරේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණු බවත්.." ඒක නොවෙයි නේ අපි කියන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායන මහතා: ඒක කලින් පිටුවත් එක්ක සම්බන්ධ වනවා. කලින් පිටුවේ auctions තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ auctions නේ? මේ කියන්නේ direct placements.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායන මහතා: පළමු එකේ වෙන්දේසි මඟින් ලබා ගන්නා ක්‍රමය පිළිබඳව තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ fully auctions. ඊට පස්සේ තමයි direct placements එන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Direct placements එන්නේ සීමිත වුවමනාවකට. ඒක මේකට වැටෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක වෙනස් නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කරුණ පහළට එන්න ඕනෑ, අර කරුණ ඉහළට එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ කරුණ පහළට එන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි. මේ කරුණ පහළට එන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: "... පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා (ඇමුණුම 7) මඟින් 2008 වසරේ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් මුදල් අවශ්‍යතා මාස හතරක කාලයකට සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණු බවත්,..."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "2008 වසරේ සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් මුදල් අවශ්‍යතා මාස හතරක කාලයකට සපුරා ගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණු බවත්, පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා 25 මඟින් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ පවතින පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා සියයට බින්දුවක පමණ පොලී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා නිර්දේශ කර ඇත."

සභාපතිතුමා: අර ටික එන්න ඕනෑ උඩට. ඒක මම ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ verbatim එකේ- මාස හතරකට නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මාස තුනකට. ජනවාරි මැද වෙන් කරන්නේ. ජනවාරි, පෙබරවාරි, මාර්තු, අප්‍රේල්. For three months.

ඊ ළඟ එකත් වෙනස් වනවා, 4:1:2. "... මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණයට other captive sources යන අදහස ඇතුළත් වූයේ කෙසේද යන්න කාරක සභාව විසින් මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් විමසන ලද අතර, .."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. එතැනට යන්න කලින් අපි අර කරුණ add කළා නේ, මාස තුන කියා දමා. ඊට පස්සේ සියයට 0.5 කථාව එනවා නේ. ඊට කලින් add වන්න ඕනෑ, direct placementsවලින් මාස තුනකට දෙන්න කිව්වා. ඒ direct placementsවලින් මාස තුනකට දෙන්න කිව්වේ අද පවතින අපේක්ෂිත උද්ධමනයට වඩා සියයට 6ක-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මේ විධියට ලිව්වා නේ? "මෙම කාල සීමාවට අදාළ උද්ධමනය මූර්ත පොලිය සියයට 4ක් සහ සියයට 2ක අවදානම් පොලියක් සහිතව" කියලා. ඒක නේ එන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මෙතැනදී මටත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වනවා. මට මතක විධියට ඔය නිලධාරි පැමිණි වෙලාවේ කිව්වේ, වෙන්දේසියකට යාමෙන් අධික පොලී අනුපාතයකට යනවා නම්, පාලනය කිරීම සඳහා පාවිච්චි කරනවා කියන එක නේද, direct placementsවල ආවේ. ඒකට නිශ්චිත කාල රාමුවක් තිබුණාද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: යම් යම් තැන්වල decisions විධියට අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. නමුත්, ඒක continuously-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නොසලකා හැර තිබෙනවාය කියලා කවුරුත් කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කවුරුත් කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තුන් දෙනෙක් පමණ කිව්වා. ඒක මට මතකයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ක්‍රමවේදයක් විධියට නොවෙයි, පුරුද්දක් විධියට අරගෙන ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන එකක්. ඒක එහෙමයි ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. පොලී අනුපාතය පාලනය කරන්න නේ. ඒක එහෙම ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි issue එක.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ මේක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑකම තිබෙන්නේ මේ ගොල්ලන් පුරුද්දක් විධියට අරගෙන ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන නිසායි. නැත්නම් මාස හතරට කියලා දැම්මොත්, එතැනින් පස්සේ සිදු වුණු ඒවා ඔක්කෝම සාධාරණ වනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි වැරදියි කියන්නේ. මේක පුරුද්දක් විධියට කරන්න බැහැ. ඒකට තමයි Board papers ගේන්නේ. පුරුද්දක් විධියට කරනවා නම්, Board papers ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: Page 91 තිබෙන්නේ ඔබතුමාගේ යෝජනාවම තමයි - proposed yield structure for treasury bonds. ඒකේ last paragraph එක බලන්න.

"In 2008, the Government's borrowing requirement from the domestic market through treasury bonds and rupee loans is excessive and not be able to raise through the normal auction process at a reasonable yield rates. Therefore, it would be advisable to raise funds available with captive type investors through direct placements."

ඒ ගොල්ලන් මාස ගණන් දමා නැහැ.

"Further considering the bunching problem in the domestic debt, it is suggested to-" මෙතැන ඒ නිසා මාස තුනම කියන එක සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මාස තුන කියන එක කියන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මාස තුන ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ decisions එකේදි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මාස තුන තිබෙන්නේ captive sourcesවලට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකේ explain කරනවා, why it is volatile.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම තේරුම් ගෙන තිබෙන විධිය හරිද බලන්න. මම කියන්නේ direct placements open. Captive sourcesවලට තමයි මාස තුන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. You read the whole paper.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, දෙකම එකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්තිම එක බලන්න. Look at this. It states, 'considering above issues.' Considering above issues කියන්නේ ඔක්කෝම issues ටික consider කරලා අවසන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා open කිව්වාට එතැන close වන හැටි බලන්න. ඊට පස්සේ අපට photocopy කරපු කොළයක් දුන්නා නේ. ඒකෙන් නේ ඉල්ලන්නේ.

The Chairman: 'The Monetary Board approval is sought-'

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි. අන්තිම paragraph එක බලන්න.

'The Monetary Board approval is sought for direct-'

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. They explain why it should be done. Do you understand Hon. Bimal Rathnayake?

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: 'In respect of captive investments-**'**

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasingeh: That is the thing.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: That is what I am saying.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasighe: That is the end result. After considering all that

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: As a tool, ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඒ වෙලාවේ introduce කරනවා.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Direct placements for captive sources only. ඒ දෙකම එකයි. දෙකම එකට දෙන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasighe: They are explaining in the middle like this. Start එක බලන්න කෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Direct placements එක එන්නේ නිශ්චිත කාරණාවලට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, "Inform the Monetary Board of the plan of direct placements on treasury bonds and rupee loans avail for captive type of investors." යනුවෙන් ඉහළින් සඳහන් වනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපි එකතු කරමු.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: No, we can put as it is. මේක දමමු.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඒ විධියටම දමමු. 4:1:1ට අපට ඒ කාරණා ඇතුළු කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: 4:1:2 ට අපි ගත්තේ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Other captive sources කියන එක ඉවත් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: 4:1:2 ඉවත් කරමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක included නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: 4:1:2 ඉවත් කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ ගොල්ලන් කිව්වා, ලොකු funds තිබෙන අයට පුළුවන් කියලා. රජය කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකයි, කාරණය. එතැන ඒ අය වැරැදිම නැහැ. ඒ මොකද දන්නවාද? කාලයක් Insurance corporation එක රජයට අයිති වෙලා තිබුණා. පසුව privatize කළාම නැති වුණා. යළිත් රජයට අයිතිය තිබෙනවා නම් එය captive source එකක් තමයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අප ඒ කාරණය හදලා, 4.1 සංශෝධනය වන විධිය ඔබතුමන්ලාට යළිත් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

ඊළඟට අපට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ 4.2හි සඳහන් කාරණයයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන Operational manual එක ගැන ගරු විගණකාධිපතිතුමා නිකුත් කර තිබෙන පොඩි පොතේ 5වැනි පිටුවේ මෙසේ කියා තිබෙනවා.

"3.1විෂයගත ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළව මහ බැංකුව යම් මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතක දැක්වෙන පිළිවෙත් අනුව කටයුතු කළ බව සඳහන් කර තිබුණද, එය එහි මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් හෝ යම් අධිකාරි බලයක් සහිත ආයතනයක් විසින් අනුමත කළ සමස්ථ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතක් නොවන බව මා වෙත වාර්තා වී තිබීම."

"විෂය පථය සීමාවීම" යන මාතෘකාව යටතේ 3.1 ඡේදයේ තමයි එය සඳහන් වන්නේ.

මෙහි අර්ථය අප කලින් සිටම කියන එකක්. මේක මෙහෙම භාර ගත්තොත්, Operational Manual එකට වටිනාකමක් නැති වෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මා හිතනවා ඔබතුමා ලිව්වේ එහෙමයි කියා. හැබැයි, ඔබතුමා honestly refer කරලාත් තිබෙනවා, ඒ කියන්නේ, ඇමුණුම iv සහ vට. ඒක ඔබතුමා යවලා තමයි ගෙන්වා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ, මේ ගැන තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද කියා. ඇමුණුම ivහි මෙහෙම කියා තිබෙනවා:

"With regard to the queries raised in your letter dated 17th June, 2016 on the above subject, our responses are as follows:

1. PDDs Operational Manual has not been approved.

2. This manual is relevant to the period of February, 2015."

The relevance is there but the thing is, it has not been approved. ඒ "not been approved" කියන එක මත තමයි මේ Operational Manual එක හරි ක්‍රමයට ඇවිත් නැහැ කියා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ. හැබැයි, ඉන් පසුව එතුමා එය query කර තිබෙනවා. මා හිතන විධියට ඒ උත්තරය එතුමාටත් ගැටලුවක් වෙන්න ඇති. එතුමාට නැවත උත්තර දෙනවා 2016.06.27වැනි දා, "Operational Manual of the Public Debt Department" යන මැයෙන් යුතුව.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියවන කොටස ඇතුළත් වන පිටු අංකය කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙන පොඩි පොතේ 64වැනි පිටුවේ තමයි මෙය සඳහන් වන්නේ.

එහි එක් තැනක මෙසේ සඳහන් වෙනවා:

"…there is no specific requirement imposed by Monetary Board to obtain approval of the Monetary Board for Operational Manuals of the Departments of the Central Bank."

එහෙම අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. මේකේ Operational Manual එක Monetary Board එක approve කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

The last line of that letter states, "Therefore, the issue of legal validity of decisions taken in terms of Public Debt Department Manual does not arise." මොකක්ද මේ කියන්නේ? Decisions අනුව Operational Manual එක හදනවා. Operational Manual එක නැවත approve කරනවා කියා දෙයක් නැහැ. ඉන් පසුව clarify කරනවා, decisionsවලට අනුකූලව හදා තිබෙන මේ Operational Manual එක තමයි අප පිළිගන්නේ කියලා. ඒක අමුතුවෙන් සම්මත කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. Evidenceනුත් එකයි. මේකත් එකයි. එම නිසා Auditor-Generalගේ 3.1 ඡේදය ඒ අර්ථයෙන් හරි නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "ඒ අර්ථයෙන් හරි නැහැ" කියා ඔබතුමා අදහස් කරන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ අර්ථයෙන් හරි නැහැ කියන්නේ, ඒකේ validity එක challenge කරන එක වැරැදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත්, ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. ඒකට උත්තරය එවන්නේ අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහත්මයාම නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුරු එව්වත් එහෙම තමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් උත්තර එව්වත්, නැතත් මේ කමිටුව ඉදිරියේ දුන් සාක්ෂිවල position එක මේකමයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මේ උත්තර දෙන්න හේතු වුණේ මේකයි. අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් ආවා නේ, එයා මේ වැඩේ කළේ කොහොමද කියා. එතකොට අප අහපු ප්‍රශ්නවලට තමයි මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සම්බන්ධයෙන්, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා පටලවා ගන්න එපා. අප මේ ඒ ගැන නොවෙයි කථා කරන්නේ. වෙන එකක් ගැන. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ point එක ගන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමාටත් මේක මතක ඇති. මට නම් හොඳට මතකයි. මම මේ inquiry එකට පැමිණි පළමු දවසේම තමයි Operational Manual එක කෝ කියා ඇහුවේ. මම outsider කෙනෙක් නේ. මෙතුමන්ලා Operational Manual එකක් ගැන කථා කරනවා. මේක Operational Manual එකට විරුද්ධයි කියනවා. ඉතින් මම ඇහුවා Operational Manual එක කෝ කියා. ඊට පසුව තමයි පහුවෙනි දා අපට Operational Manual එක දුන්නේ. මේක රහසක් කියා තියාගෙන හිටියා. මේ Operational Manual එකේ validity එක challenge කරන එක වැරැදියි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිගේ පැත්තෙන් ගත්තාම යම්කිසි නිලධාරියෙක් වැරැද්දක් කර තිබෙනවා නම්, මේක valid නැත්නම් කොහොමද එයා මේ error එක fix කරන්නේ. එතැනයි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ angle එකෙන් ගත්තාම විගණකාධිපතිට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා, කවුරු හෝ වැරැදි decision එකක් ගත්තොත් මොකක් මතද එයාට charge කරන්නේ? Original Operational Manual එක කොහේ හෝ approve කරනවා. අප දැන් recommendation එකක් දුන්නේ ඒකයි, මේකේ Operational Manual එකක් මොකක් හෝ කවුරු හෝ approve කරන්න, නැත්නම් මේ decisions ගත්ත ඒවා හරිද, වැරැදිද කියා බලන්නේ කොහොමද? Decision එකක් වැරදුණොත් **වැරැදි කෙනෙක්ම** fix කරන්න විධියක් නැහැ, ඒ නිලධාරියාට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම ඔබතුමාට දොසක් කියන්නේ නැහැ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: කොහොමත් මට දොස් කියන්න බැහැ. මේකේ හදලා තිබෙන්නේ, limitations දමලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒකයි. ඉස්සරහට අප propose කරනවා, මේ නිසා කුමක් හෝ legal validity එකක් මේකට දෙන්න. නැත්නම් මේ decisionsවලට කාටවත් challenge කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේ proposal එකෙත් ඒක තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ point එක වෙන එකක්. ඔබතුමා කියපු කාරණයත් හොඳයි. ඒ ගැනත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

නමුත්, as at today, procedure එක තිබෙන්නේ Operational Manual එකේ. "නැහැ, Operational Manual එක ගණන් ගන්න එපා" කියා කවුරු හෝ මෙතැනදී කියනවා නම් මේ පදනම මත යන්න බැහැ. මොකද, ඒ මත තමයි අප වැඩ කළේ. අප ඒකට එකඟද? ඒ කියන්නේ, Operational Manual එකේ තමයි procedure එක තිබෙන්නේ කියන එකට එකඟද? එව්වරයි. ඒක මත කෙනෙකුට විනයානුකූලව කටයුතු කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එක විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, valid question එකක්.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: But, as at today, මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරියෙක් බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධව කටයුතු කළයුතු වන්නේ Operational Manual එක අනුව නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasighe: Exactly. Everybody agreed on that.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම නිසා ඒ කාරණය අප මීට වඩා strong විධියට කියන්න ඕනෑ, Operational Manual එක අනුව තමයි වැඩ කරන්න ඕනෑ කියා. ඒකෙන් එළියට යන්න බැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ Operational Manual එක අනුව වැඩ කරන්න ඕනෑ, විගණකාධිපතිවරයා, Operational Manual එක අනුව කටයුතු කරලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඒ කියන කාරණාව හොඳයි. මොකද, ඒ කියන කාරණාවට අදාළව මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශයකුත් තිබුණා, Operational Manual එක update වෙන්න ඕනෑ, ඒ වාගේම Operational Manual එක යම් නීත්‍යානුකූලභාවයකින් පිළිගැනීමට ලක් වෙන්න ඕනෑය කියා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හොඳ එකේදි directions හම්බ වෙනවා නේ, Monetary Board එකෙන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ සාක්ෂි දුන් සියලුදෙනාම කිව්වේ, වෙනස්කමක් ඇති කරනවා නම් Monetary Board එකෙන් decision එකක් ගන්නවා නම් ඒක amend වෙන්න ඕනෑය කියායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේ 4.2 කොටසෙහි තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අප සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, the Operational Manual is the guideline.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, මම එම කාරණය පොඩ්ඩක් කියවන්නම්. කෙටුම්පතෙහි 4.2හි අප සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ ඒ කාරණයයි.

"ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහා පරිශීලනය කරනු ලබන බවත්....

එහි ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ගන්නේ කෙළින්ම පරිශීලනයෙන්.

...එය අවසන් වරට යාවත්කාලීන කරන ලද්දේ 2013 ජූලි 31 දින බවත්, මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් අනුමත කරනු ලබන මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරකම්වලට අදාළ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයන් දේශීය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැනුම් දීමෙන් පසු එම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සංශෝධනය කිරීම හෝ යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම සිදු කරනු ලබන බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් තවදුරටත් දැනුම් දෙන ලදී....

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ටික හරි නේ.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී අනුගමනය කළ යුත්තේ ඍජු ක්‍රමයද, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද යන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් උපයෝගි කරගන්නා ලද ලබන ඉහත කී මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි අදාළ කරගත් කොටස් මෙම වාර්තාවෙහි ඇමුණුම් 8 වශයෙන් දක්වා ඇත. ..

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Correct.

සභාපතිතුමා: ...කෙසේ වුවද, 2008 ඔක්තෝබර් 07 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාව අනුව මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත මෙතෙක් සංශෝධනය වී නැති බව කාරක සභාව විසින් කරන ලද විමසීමකදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පිළිගන්නා ලදී. කෙසේවුවද එකී මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණය මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි අදාළ වගන්ති මගින් ආවරණය වන බව තම අදහස යැයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් - වර්තමාන අධිපතිවරයා විසින් - කාරක සභාව විසින් කරන ලද විමසීම්වලදී ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී...

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම පොඩි බාධා කිරීමක් කරනවා. එතැන තමයි වැරැදි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපේ අදහස නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. මේක ගේන්නේ මාස තුනකටයි. එතකොට Operational Manual එක amend වන්නේ නැහැ. මාස තුනකට -තාවකාලික සිදුවීමකට ගේන කොට එය අදාළ නැහැ. Monetary Board එකේ approval එකෙන් හදිසි තීන්දු ගේන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගෙන හැම එකෙන්ම Operational Manual එක amend වන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. ඒක නොවෙයි මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ. මාස තුනකට ගෙනාපු එකට මේ amendment එක ඇතුළත් විය යුතු නැහැ. එය amendment එකක් නොවෙයි. ඒක තාවකාලිකයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ස්ථිර දෙයක් නම් තමයි Operational Manual එක amend විය යුත්තේ. එමනිසා මෙතැන එන්නේ වෙන අදහසක්.

...කෙසේ වුවද එකී මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණය මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි අදාළ වගන්ති මගින්.... කියා එහි සඳහන් කරනවා.

මේ වගන්තියම වැරැදියි.

...ආවරණය වන බව තම අදහස යැයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් කාරක සභාව කරනලද විමසීම්වලදී ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී...

ඒ, "ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී" කියන එක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අප පිළිගන්නවාද, නැද්ද කියන එක නොවෙයි එතැන කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: අප පිළිගන්නවා කියා නොවෙයි මම කිව්වේ. අධිපතිතුමා කියපු දේයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 8වන පිටුවෙහි -ඒක නේ අප ගොඩක් විවාද කළේ. - B. i. හි සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී ඍජු ක්‍රමය හා වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ආකාරය පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් විමසීම කරන ලද අතර මහ

බැංකු නිලධාරින්ට අනුව එහි "as much as possible through auctions" යන්න වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හරහා කුමන ප්‍රමාණයක බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් නිකුත් කළ යුතුද යන්න තීරණය කරන බවත්, එය පිරිවැය, අවදානම සහ කරුණු මත තීරණය කරන බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. ඒ පිළිබඳ තවදුරටත් කරුණු දක්වමින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරින් සඳහන් කළේ, මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ණය ලබාගැනීමේ වැඩ සටහනෙහි මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ ක්‍රමෝපායෙහි සඳහන් කරන උපදේශය පරිදි පිරිවැය හා අවදානම කෙසේ වේද යන්න තීරණය කරනු ලබන බවයි.

එතකොට ඒ ක්‍රමවේද ටික තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 4වැනි කාරණයේ 1වැනි ඡේදයට එකඟයි, 2වැනි ඡේදයට එකඟයි, තුන්වැනි ඡේදය මේ වෙලාවට අනුකූල නැහැ. එතැන් සිට තිබෙන ටිකෙන් -මේ තර්කය ගොඩනඟන එක්කෙනා කවුරු හෝ- උත්සාහයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා ඒ කියන්නේ, private placementsවලට යන එක justify කරන්න line එකක් **දමන්න**. එය හිතා මතා කරන දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒක කුමක් හෝ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. එහෙම නොවෙයි, අප කළ යුත්තේ. උපුටා දැක්විය යුතුයි. මේක පිටස්තර මිනිස්සු නේ, බලන්නේ අන්තිමට. මේ Operational Manual එකේ තිබෙන B. i. එක. එහි මොකක්ද කියන්නේ? "FO has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා හා සම්බන්ධිතයි.

ඊළඟට "The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved borrowing programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs" එතකොට ඔතන කාරණා දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. පළමුවැනි rule එක තමයි auction එක, ඒ කියන්නේ balance එක ඕනෑ නම් තමයි private placement එකකට යන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම යන්නත් ඕනෑ, approved borrowing prgogramme එක ඇතුළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමාට මම පොඩි සහයෝගයක් දෙන්නම්. ඒක තමයි 2008 දී ව්‍යතිරේකය ගෙනාවේ. EPF, ETF සහ NSB ඇතුළු captive sourcesවලින් ඒ හදිසි අවස්ථාව පමණක් සපුරාගත යුතුයි කියලා කාලසීමාවකට ආවේ ඒ නිසයි. එතකොට, පිළිගත්ත ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය. මෙතැනදී අපි දිගටම ඔප්පු කරන්න යන්නේ private companiesවලට private placement දෙන එක හරියි කියන එකයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : Private placement, private companiesවලට නොවෙයි, private placement රජයේ මුදල් හෝ පාවිච්චි කරලා "මූල්‍ය තත්ත්වය පාලනය කිරීම සඳහා" කියන එක තමයි මට මතක තිබෙන්නේ දිගටම මේ නිලධාරින්,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක හරි. ඒ වුණාට මේක දෙන්නේ private companies වලට.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : එහෙම නොගැනීම තමයි මේකේ තිබෙන වරද.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2008න් පස්සේ නීති විරෝධී ලෙස private companiesවලට private placement දෙනවා. ඒක තමයි දිගටම ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ. ඒක තමයි අපි මෙතැනින් justify කරන්න හදන්නේ. which is wrong. එයයි මෙතැන සඳහන් වෙන්නේ, "As much as possible" කියලා. ඒක තමයි ක්‍රමවේදය. ඒකෙන් පරිබාහිර වෙන්න බැහැ. ඒක පුළුවන් එකම අවස්ථාව, 2008 Board Paper එකේ දාලා තිබෙන, EPF, ETF, NSB කියන හදිසි අවස්ථාවේදී පමණයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි මේ පිළිබඳව ඇතිවෙන්න කථා කළා. මහ බැංකුවේ නව අධිපතිතුමාගෙනුත් මේ පිළිබඳව ඇහුවා. එතුමා හරි පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා, මේක ආවරණය වෙනවා කියලා. මොකද, "as much as possible" කියන්නේ, "හැකි තරම්" කියන එක. හැබැයි, ඒකට මුලින්ම තිබෙනවා, - මේකේ යටින් quote කරලා තිබෙනවා - "The Front Office of the PDD is mainly responsible for mobilizing required funds for the Government at the lowest possible cost with reasonable degree of risk." කියලා. ඒවා මූලධර්ම. මේ පොතේ පිළිවෙළ ගත්තාම, මේ කොටස තිබෙන්නේ මුළින්; තුන්වැනි පිටුවේ. 8වැනි පරිච්ඡේදයේ පළමුවැනි කොටස තමයි ඔය කියන "as much as possible" කොටස තිබෙන්නේ. අනිත් එක තමයි, "as much as possible through auction" කියන එකේ whole idea එක ගන්නේ නැතුව අපි ඒක කෑලි කඩන්නේ ඇයි? "As much as possible through auctions" කියලා තිබෙන කොට, ඒකේ balance කියලා කථාවකුත් තිබෙනවා. මේක broad, මේක business එකක්නේ. මේ සල්ලිනේ, වෙළෙඳාමක්නේ මේ කරන්නේ. මේකේ මුලදී මහපෙන්වීමක් තිබෙනවා, මොන business එක කළත්, මොන කටයුත්ත කළත්, lowest possible cost with the reasonable degree. මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. මහ බැංකුවේ තිබුණේ එකම එක ක්‍රමයයි. ඔකනේ සරලව කියන්න හදන්නේ. මහ බැංකුවේ

අනුමත වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ එකම ක්‍රමයයි. ඒ, auction ක්‍රමය විතරයි. ඕකනේ කියන්න හදන්නේ. මම කියන්නේ ඒක වැරදියි. එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. Direct placement ක්‍රමයයි, ඒ ක්‍රමයයි දෙකම තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒක මට හොඳට මතකයි. ඕනෑ නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාට verbatim බලන්න පුළුවන්. Auction, private placement, rupee loans කියන ඒවා 1, 2, 3 විධියට පලිවෙළට තිබෙන කොට, මෙතැනදී ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඇහුවා,-

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා : මම ඇහුවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මෙතැනදී ඇහුවා, මුලින්ම තිබෙන්නේ auction එකද කියලා. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාම කිව්වා, ඒක සටහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ අනුපිළිවෙළට නොවෙයි කියලා. ඒක තමයි මේකේ සඳහන් කළේ. " .... යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වුවද, මෙමඟින් පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද, දෙවනුව පෞද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයද, තෙවනුව රුපියල් ණය වශයෙන්ද අනුගමනය කළ යුතු බවට අනුපිළිවෙළක් නොමැති බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී" කියලා සටහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, ඊට කලින් තිබෙන සාක්ෂි බලන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මට පොඩි වෙලාවක් දෙන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේකේ private placement, බැඳුම්කර, ඔය ආදී වශයෙන් ක්‍රම දෙක තුනක් තිබෙනවා. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මෙතැනට ආවේ වංචාවක් වෙලා තිබෙන නිසානේ. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ආවේ මෙහෙම එකක් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා සොයන්න. එතකොට මේක "වෙන්දේසිය" කියන පාරිශුද්ධ ක්‍රමවේදයට මුවාවෙලා සිදු වුණු හොරකමක්. ඕක තමයි වචනය. එතකොට "වෙන්දේසිය" කියන එක තමයි එකම නීතිගත ක්‍රමය කියලා අපි කිව්වොත්, එතකොට මෙතැන හොරකමක් නැහැ. අපි තහවුරු කරන්න හදන්නේ "වෙන්දේසිය" පාරිශුද්ධ වුණු හොඳම ක්‍රමය කියලා නම්, මෙතැන හොරකමක් නැහැ, අපට මේ ගැන සොයන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත තත්ත්වය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හරියට හරි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මේක මුලින්ම abort කරන්නනේ අපි කටයුතු කරන්නේ. මුලින්ම theory එක abort කරන්නනේ හදන්නේ. එතකොට අපට issue එකක් ගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2008 වෙනකල් තිබුණේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය විතරයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියන්නේ ව්‍යාපාර කටයුතුවලදී cost analysis කියන එක සළකන්නේ නැත්නම්, මොකක්ද එතැන කරන්න පුළුවන් ගනු දෙනුව? ඒක මේකේ සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකුවට මුදල් සොයා ගැනීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය, direct placement ක්‍රමය තිබෙනවානේ. එතකොට මේ ක්‍රම දෙක ගැන අපි තර්ක කළාට manual එක පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒක දිගින් දිගටම කථා කළා. Manual එක පිළිබඳව ගැටලුකාරී තත්ත්වයන් තිබෙනවා. ඒක කවුද අනුගමනය කරන්නේ, කොහොමද, කින්ද මන්ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව ගැටලු තිබෙනවා. අපි මේ සිද්ධිය අරගෙන බලමු. මේ සිද්ධිය Monitoring Board එකට දැම්මා කියලා කියනවා. මෙතැන කොහේවත් කියැවිලා නැහැ, ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කළ වෙලාවේ Monitoring Board එකේ හිටියේ කවුද කියලා. Monitoring Board එකේ සිටිය යුතු මුළු ගණන කීයද, මේ සිද්ධිය ඉදිරිපත් කළ වෙලාවේ Monitoring Board එකේ කවුද හිටියේ, කී දෙනෙක්ද හිටියේ, ඒ අය කවුද පත් කළේ? මෙතැන ඒ මොකුත් කියැවෙන්නේ නැහැනේ. ඒකනේ ඇත්ත කථාව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. Monitoring Board එකේ 7දෙනෙක්ද ඉන්න ඕනෑ, නමුත්, ඒ වෙලාවේ 3දෙනයි හිටියේ. ඒකෙන් එක්කෙනෙන් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා. ඔහු සමඟ තවත් දෙදෙනයි සිටියේ. තුන්දෙනයි සිටියේ. ඒ නිසා මේ වෙලාවේ අපි manual එක තුළින් private placement ද හරි, වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා වගේ direct placement ද හරි කියන එක නීතිගත කිරීමට වඩා, මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සහ සිතුම් පැතුම් දිහායි අපි බලන්නේ. මේ chart එක දිහා බලන්නකෝ. ඉතිහාසයේත් private placement ගත්තත්, ඒ අය යම් කිසි ආකාරයකට සියයට 4ක්, 5ක් auction එකට ගියා. එහෙම කළේ පොලිය බලාගන්න. ඒ වෙලාවේ market එකේ තිබුණු පොලිය කීයද කියලා බලලා, ඒ ගණනට තමයි private placement කළේ. හැම අවස්ථාවක්ම නොවෙයි. නමුත් කලින් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : කලින් කරලා තිබෙන එක වැරදියි කියලා තමයි අපි කියන්නේ. Private companiesවලට private placement දෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : නමුත්, අපි කියන්නේ සංසන්දනාත්මක බැලීමේදී. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සංසන්දනාත්මකව බැලීමේදී මෙතැනත් අඩු පාඩුවක් සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරියට සිද්ධ වුණා නම්, auction ක්‍රමය තමයි හරිම ක්‍රමය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : නමුත්, මෙතැනදී ඒක හරියට සිද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ. ඒකයි ඇත්ත කථාව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක පරීක්ෂා කරන්න ඕනෑ. You are right. I agree with the Hon. Lassantha Alagiyawanna.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මමත් සියයට සියයක් එකඟයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : නමුත්, අපි auction එකටත් ගියානේ. සියයට 4ක්, 5ක් auction එකටත් ගියා. ඒ rate එකේදී ආපු interest එක තිබෙනවා. ඒ interest rate එකට තමයි private placement කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Auction එක හරි හෝ වැරදි වෙන්නේ මොකක් හෝ particular economy එකකට අනුවනේ. එදා අපි Central Bank Governor කිව්වා, - එතුමාගෙන් අපි categorically පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවානේ - auction හරිගියත්, අපේ වගේ පොඩි market එකකට sustain වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. ඔහු කිව්වා, US වත්, - What he said is -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අන්තිම මාස තුනේ තමයි auction එකක් කරන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. එතුමා කරන එක නෙමෙයි කිව්වේ. අපේ වගේ පොඩි market එකකට auction විතරක් හරියන්නේ නැහැ කියලා එතුමා කිව්වා. ඔහු කිව්වා, "අපි යන්න ඕනෑ එතැනට බව ඇත්ත, හැබැයි අපට දැන් ඒක කරන්න බැහැ" කියලා. The Hon (Dr.) Harsha de Silva, economics ඉගෙනගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්, එතුමා කිව්වා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : එතුමා කිව්වා. ඒ නිසා end of the day අපි බලන්න ඕනෑ, ඔබතුමා Chicago economist ද, ඔබතුමා Bangkok economist ද නොවෙයිනේ, End of the day ලංකාවට ලැබෙන වාසිය මොකක්ද කියන එකයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : That is correct.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : හරි පැහැදිලි arithmetic එකක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සභාපතිතුමනි, Governor එහෙම කියලා අන්තිම මාස තුනේම කරන්නේ auction වැඩ.

සභාපතිතුමා : අපි කොහොමද ඒක විභාග කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ. එතුමා කියන දේ හරියි කියලා ඔබතුමා කියනවා නම්,-

සභාපතිතුමා : එතුමා කියන දේ හරිද, වැරදිද කියන එක නෙමෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය. මේකට ඇතුළු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතේ තිබෙන එක සහ නිලධාරීන් මෙතැනට ඇවිල්ලා කිපයු කරුණු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : එක Governor කෙනෙක් එකක් විශ්වාස කරනවා, තව Governor කෙනෙක් තව එකක් විශ්වාස කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Auction system එක අනුගමනය කරනවා කියලා තමයි සියලුම නිලධාරීන් කිව්වේ. 2008 වෙනකල්ම auction system එක තමයි අනුගමනය කළේ. මේ Board Paper එකෙන් තමයි ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය වෙනස් කළේ. ඒ වෙනස් කරපු ක්‍රමවේදය නිවැරදි නැත්නම් private placementවලට private companies දෙන එක අපි කොහොමද හරියි කියලා කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් පිළිගත්ත දේ නොවෙයි නම් මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න. මට ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මොකද, මේවාත් එක්ක ඇමුණුම් ඇතුළු කළාට පස්සේ verbatimවල තිබෙන සාක්ෂි සටහන් මට වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම සාක්ෂිවලින් කියන්නම්. මම මේ කුඩා වාර්තාවෙන් කියවන්නේ. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා, "ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට 2004 වසර් සිට 2008 වෙනකල් auction ක්‍රමය තමයි අනුගමනය කළේ?" එතකොට එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා කියනවා, "ඔව්, ඉන් බැහැර වෙන්න බැහැනේ." 2016 අගෝස්තු 12වැනිදා වාචික සාක්ෂි, පිටුව 23. ඒ කියන්නේ, auction ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැර වෙන්න බැහැයි කියන එක එතුමා පිළිගත්තා. එතකොට ප්‍රශ්නය වෙන්නේ මේකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සියලුම සාක්ෂිකරුවෝ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එතකොට, auction ක්‍රමය තමයි principle එක. ඒක තමයි principle එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා කියපු විධියට එයින් බැහැර වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, වෙට්ටුවක් දාලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පරණ නිලධාරින් එක්කෙනෙකු හෝ ඉන්නවා නම් පෙන්වන්න, "ඒක නොවෙයි" කියා කියන.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා, මට තර්කය හදාගන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. ඇත්තටම auction තමයි principle එක. මතක තබාගන්න මේ inquiry එකේදි Central Bank එකේ නිලධාරින් - විශේෂයෙන් දෙවැනියා වන වීරසිංහ මහත්මයා- මුල් දවසේ සාක්ෂි දෙමින් කිව්වා, සියයට සියයක් auction යන්න නම් Monetary Board approval එකක් ඕනෑ, ඒ approval එක ගත්තේ නැහැ කියා. මාව shock වුණා. එතකොට අපේ නැහැ manual එක. මා ඉතිහාසයයි මේ කියන්නේ. එතකොට අපේ අතේ නැහැ, manual එක. අතේ manual එක නැතිව එතුමා කිව්වේ මොකක්ද? ඒ කියන්නේ, පරණ ක්‍රමය- ඔබතුමාගේ original වාර්තාවේ තිබුණු එක -ඒ කියන්නේ, auction සියයට 20ක් ගිහිල්ලා private placements සියයට 80ක් යනවා කියන ratio එකක්- ඒක තමයි healthy කියා ඔබතුමා කියා තිබුණා. ඒකට කමක් නැහැ. එහෙම තමයි වෙන්න ඕනෑ, ඒක තමයි කරගෙන ආවේ, ඒක වෙනස් කරලා auction යනවා නම්, ඒකට Monetary Board approval එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ, ඒකවත් ගන්නේ නැතිව තමයි මේ වැඩේ කළේ කියා කිව්වා. "අම්මෝ, මේක මාර වැඩක් නේ! එහෙම වෙන්නේ කොහොමද!" කියා මටත් හිතුණා. මම කිව්වා, "එහෙම නම් manual එක දෙන්න." කියා. එදා ඔබතුමන්ලා ළඟ manual එක තිබුණේ නැහැ. පසුව මම manual එක ගෙන්වා ගත්තා. එතකොට තමයි මේ කාරණය තේරුණේ. Rule එක auction. Exception එක තමයි private placements.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ exception එක ගෙනෙන කොට 2008 Board එකට ගෙනෙන්න ඕනෑ. නිකම්ම ගෙනෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Auction එක වැරැදියට කළාද නැද්ද කියන එක ගැන අපට ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒක ගැන වෙනම කථා කරමු.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හැබැයි මේ principle එක, පිළිගත් කරුණක් හැටියට කියන්න බැහැ. Mr. Rathnayake සඳහන් කළ දේයි මා උපුටා දක්වන්නේ. මෙහි කෙළින්ම කියනවා, "අපි කළේ auction. තවත් witnessesලා ඉන්නවා." කියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔක්කෝම witnessලා කියන්නේ ඒකයි. එක witness කෙනෙකු හෝ පෙන්වන්න, "ඒක එහෙම නොවෙයි" කියා ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරපු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නමුත් මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පෙන්වන්න හැදූ චිත්‍රය මොකක්ද? Monetary Board එකේ approval එකක් නැතිව Governor තනි හිතුවක්කාරකමට විෂයය භාර ඇමතිවරයා, රටේ අගමැතිවරයාගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි මේක කළා කියා නේ evidence දුන්නේ. රටේ අගමැතිවරයා උපදෙසක් දුන්නා නම් ඒ උපදෙස දුන්නේ මේ manual එකේ තිබෙන guideline එක අනුවයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි ක්‍රමවේදයට කරන්න කියායි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. හරි ක්‍රමවේදයට කරන්න කියායි. ඒ නිසා ඒකට අමුතුවෙන් approval ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඒකයි මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: එහෙම නම් අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන්ව ආයෙත් request කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක වෙනම කතාවක්. අර්ජුන බැරි නම් ඕනෑ කෙනෙක්.

ගරු (අවාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කාරණය මේකයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමා. අපි මේක බෙදා ගන්න ඕනෑ. 27වන දා වූ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් වැරැද්දක් වුණේ නැති එක පිළිබඳව නොවෙයි මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා වන්නේ. මේ සාකච්ඡා වන්නේ, ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය හරිද නැද්ද කියන එක ගැන පමණයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct

ගරු (අවාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Auction එක හරහා හොරකම් කළාද කියන එක පිළිබඳව දැඩි මතයක් මටත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 10ක් ගියේ ඇයි-

ගරු (අවාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. 10ක් ගියේ ඇයි, කොහොමද ඔහු එය ගත්තේ කියන ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "පහක් ආවේ කොහොමද?" ආදි ප්‍රශ්න.

ගරු (අචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, එයාට පහක් ආවේ කොහොමද ආදි ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. ඊට වඩා හපන්, 29වන දා එක. මාර්තු මාසයේ 29වන දා එක පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 27වන දා එකට වඩා හපන්. නමුත් ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපි දැනගන්න ඕනෑ ඒක බෙදා ගන්න. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මේ ඔක්කෝම එක්ක බැලුවාම මට පෙනෙන විධියට මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ මාස තුනකට ගත් licence එකක්. මාස තුනකට ගත් එකක් දීර්ඝ කාලීනව කරගෙන ආවා නම් එතැන ලොකු වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Private ඒවාටත් දෙනවා.

ගරු (අචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Private ඒවාට කොහොමද දුන්නේ? අප දකින විධියට මෙහි නැහැ- අප නොදන්නා දෙයක් තිබෙනවාද කියා දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපට එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, අපි Governorගේ කාරණාවේ එල්ලිලා කලින් දුන් සෑම evidence එකක්ම නොසලකා හරිනවා. Auction ක්‍රමය කියා කලින් දුන් ඒවා පහකට වඩා මම හෙට ගෙනෙන්නම්. ඒවා එකක්වත් අල්ලන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මොකක්ද ගරු රාජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "Auction ක්‍රමය තමයි system එක" කියායි සියලු නිලධාරීන් කිව්වේ. මම හිටියා කලින් COPE එකේ. මා ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය ඇහුවේත් ඒ හින්දායි. අන්තිමට Governor ඇවිල්ලා- loose ball අත් හැරලා අන්තිමට ආ කෙනා- එතුමාත් ඇවිල්ලා ඒකත් correct කරනවා, "එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ. එය හරියටම කියන්න අපට බැහැ" කියා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මා හෙට ගෙනැවිත් පෙන්වන්නම්- මේ auction ක්‍රමය තමයි රටේ පවතින ක්‍රමය. ඒක කවුරුවත් කියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. Manual එකේත් තිබෙනවා; 1997 Board paper එකේත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. කාරණය මොකක්ද කියා දන්නවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Private company එකකට දෙන්න කියා approval එකක් තිබෙන්නේ කොහේද කියා කියන්න. Private licence holder කෙනෙකුට Perpetual Treasuries හෝ Entrust Securities හෝ තවත් කවුරු හෝ කාට හෝ දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියා මෙහි සඳහන්ව තිබෙන්නේ කොහේද? එවැන්නක් තිබෙනවා නම් කියන්න.

ගරු (අචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක බොහොම වැදගත් ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ? එහෙම තිබෙන තැනක් අපට පෙන්වන්න. Auditor-Generalගෙනුයි අප අහන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඒක හරිම clear. 2013 අවසානයට අනුමත වූ manual එකේ තිබෙනවා- July 31න් පසුව renew කරලා නැහැ නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, 2013ට කලින් ඉඳලාම මෙය තිබෙනවා. මේ auctions, private placements කියා දමන්නේ මොකටද? ඒ, private placements තිබෙන නිසා නේ. Private placements කියා එකක් තිබුණේ නැත්නම් manual එකට දමන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරැදියි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මා කියන්නේ, හරිද වැරැදිද කියන එක නොවෙයි. ඒක manual එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Board paper.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Board paper විතරක් නොවෙයි, අපි බලන්න ඕනෑ. Manual එකේත් තිබෙනවා, Board papersවලත් තිබෙනවා. අනෙක් එක, Best Practices. ඔය තුනෙන් නේ මිනිසුන් guide වෙන්නේ. Manual, Board papers and Best Practices. එහෙම නම්, මේ manual එකේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව තිබෙනවා private placements කියා. ඉතින් අප කොහොමද කියන්නේ, "එහෙම නැහැ" කියා?

සභාපතිතුමා: "Funds are raised to auctions, private placements and rupee loans." කියා සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා. Manual එකේ මුලින් පැහැදිලි කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක manual එකේත් තිබෙනවා. 2013 ජූලි 31ට කලින් ඉඳලාම තිබෙනවා. ඉතින් කොහොමද "නැහැ" කියලා කියන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න පැහැදිලි කරන කල්. 2008 අර private placement එක ගෙනෙන්න තමයි අර Board paper එක ගෙනෙන්නේ. ඒ option එක තිබෙනවා. ඒ option එක තිබෙන්නේ ව්‍යතිරේකයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ option එක ගෙනෙන්න Board paper එකක් ගෙනැල්ලා- ETF, EPF ආදි captive sourcesවලට විතරක් ඒ option එක ගෙනෙනවා. එතැනින් එහාට -ඔබ්බට- යන්නේ

නැහැ. මට ඔබතුමා පෙන්වන්න, private licence holder කෙනෙකුට direct placement එකක් දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියා තිබෙන තැනක්.

ගරු (අචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙහි තිබෙනවා. දැන් මා කියවන්නම් manual එක. ඒක simple. අපට ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳාගන්න පුළුවන්. මෙහි සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා, "Private placements: Front Office has to make arrangements to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved borrowing programme may be arranged through private placements with primary dealers" කියා. එසේ සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නම්, primary dealersලා කියන්නේ, private entities. EPF නොවෙයි, NSB නොවෙයි. මෙහි manual එකේ තිබෙනවා, "as much as possible" auction එකෙන් අරගෙන ඉතිරි ටික primary dealersලා හරහා private placements ගන්න පුළුවන් කියා. ඒක අවුලක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහි අවුලක් නැහැ. මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඒක නොවෙයි. මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. අපේ Report එකේ අපි ලියන්න ඕනෑ B (i) කියන එක, සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ලියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තමයි පළමුවැනි එක. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඔය full stop එකත් එක්කමයි. එහෙම කියවන්නේ නැතිව, මෙය තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, "as much as possible" කියා එකක් ඕනෑ නැහැ, තිබෙන්නේ auction විතරයි නම්. ඔබතුමා lawyer කෙනකු වන නිසා තේරෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම නම්, කෙලින්ම ලියන්න ඕනෑ only auction කියායි. So, why we have to say "as much as possible"?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, අපි එකඟයි. පුළුවන් තරම් auction; ඉතිරි ටික private placements.

ගරු (අචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මට මෙහි ඊට වඩා ලොකු කුමන්ත්‍රණයක් තිබෙනවා වාගේ පෙනෙනවා. මෙය approve කරලා තිබෙන්නේත් 2013 වර්ෂයේදී යි. වැරැදි විධියට එය කරපු අයම තමයි මෙයත් කර තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ අයට ඕනෑ විධියට මෙය ලියාගන්නත් පුළුවන්. 2013 වන කොට private placements දීපු එක standard වාගේ වෙලා. අපි ඔකට කියනවා නේ "grandfathered" කියා. නීතියක් තිබුණේ නැති වුණත් කලින් වූ නිසා කරනවා නම් අප කියනවා නේ, It is grandfathered law කියා. "කලින් වූ නිසා අපි කරනවා." කියන එකයි. by practice.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කලින් වෙච්ච දේ නිසා කරනවා වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. එහිම අනෙක් පැත්තට හිතන්නත් පුළුවන්, 'දැන් වූ දේට අපි තර්ක කරනවා' කියාත්. ඒක එහෙම වුණොත්?

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ මතය හැටියට ක්‍රම කීයක් තිබුණාද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ ක්‍රම තුන තමයි. Direct placements, auctions and rupee loans.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට තවත් එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නහන්න තිබෙනවා. "Medium-term debt management strategy" කියා සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා. අවුරුදු 30 කියන එක medium-term ද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, manual එකේ B (i) කියන එක දාන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක හරිම ලේසියි නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේක මගේ එකක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Central Bank එකෙන් කියපු දේයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි ඒක දමන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. අපට තේරෙන දේ නේ මෙහි දමන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

04.30/චාන්දනී/**ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:** ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක්

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා. මේක ඉතාමත් පොඩි කාරණයක්. දැන් auctionද, direct placementsද, අනෙක් ක්‍රමයද කියලා කාටවත් තේරෙන්නේ නැත්නම්, කොයි ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළත් කමක් නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ කියන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : වාර්තාවේ vague නම්, ඇත්ත කථාව ඒක නේ. මම දන්න විධියට සාක්ෂි දුන්න කට්ටිය ඔක්කෝම කිව්වේ, "වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් auction ක්‍රමයේ යන්න ඕනෑ. ඊළඟ ටික තමයි, direct placements ක්‍රමයේ යන්න ඕනෑ" කියලා. එහෙමත් නැහැ කියලා හිතනවා නම්, හිතන්න කෝ auction and direct placements

කියා තිබෙනවා කියලා. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවට ඕනෑ ක්‍රමයකට ගන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා auction ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කළත්, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා direct placements ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කළත් දෙකම එකයි. එතකොට ක්‍රම දෙකේම වරදක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : වරදක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මොකක්ද තිබෙන වරද?

සභාපතිතුමා : Low-cost strategy කියන එක.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Who are we to decide the cost?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : සාක්ෂි සටහන් බලන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ කියන්නේ "Auction system එකට එන්න approval එකක් ගත්තේ නැහැ" කියලා. අපි හරියට කරුණු කාරණා කථා කරමු කෝ. ඔබතුමන්ලා දවස් ගණනක් අධ්‍යයනය කරලා අන්තිමට කියන්නේ, "හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා auction system එක ගෙනෙන්න Monetary Board එකෙන් approval එක ගත්තේ නැහැ" කියලා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒකත් එක කාරණයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි වැදගත්ම කාරණය. Manual එකේ තිබෙනවා නම් "auction system" කියලා, ඒ ක්‍රමය ගෙනෙන්න නැවත අලුතෙන් Monetary Board එකේ approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : නැත්නම්. ඒ වෙලාවේ ගන්න තීරණය Monetary Board එකෙන් අනුමත වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හැම දාම ගන්න තීන්දුව මේකේ එන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : එහෙම එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Manual එක අනුවයි වෙන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : එහෙම නම් Monetary Board එකක් ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා උත්තරයක් දෙන්න. හැම දාම ගන්න තීන්දුව Monetary Board එක-

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලා එහෙම තීරණය කරනවා නම් මට ප්‍රශ්නයකුත් නැහැ. මේක මගේ පෞද්ගලික තීරණයක් නොවෙයි. ඒ කියන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වෙලාවේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන කොටම, "මේ තීරණය Monetary Board එකට නොදන්වා ගත්ත තීරණයක්. පස්සේ ඒක තොරතුරක් හැටියට මාර්තු 2වැනි දා දැනුම් දීමක් පමණයි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ" කියන එක මේ කාරක සභාව පදනමක් හැටියට සලකනවා කියලා මම විශ්වාස කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක ඕනෑ නැත්නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. දැන් දිගටම කර ගෙන ආපු ක්‍රමය තිබෙනවා නේ. මේක වෙනස් වූ ක්‍රමයක්. මේ ක්‍රම දෙකෙන් හරි හෝ වැරදි ක්‍රමය ගැන කථා කරනවා නොවෙයි. දිගටම private placements ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කර ගෙන ඇවිල්ලා auction ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවා. ඒ තීන්දුව ගත්තේ කවුද? ඉබේටමද, නැත්නම් කවුරු හෝ නිලධාරියෙක් කියලාද ගත්තේ? Monetary Board එකෙන්ද ගත්තේ? කවුද ඒ තීන්දුව ගත්තේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මම උත්තරයක් දෙන්නම්. ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, කලිනුත් auction ක්‍රමයට ගියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : මේ තීන්දුව ගත්තේ කවුද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : Manual එක දිහා බලලා ගත්තේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : කලින් කර ගෙන ආපු ක්‍රමය-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මට තත්පරයක් දෙන්න. ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා, manual එක අනුව කාගෙන්වත් අහන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ auction යන්න; කාගෙන්වත් අහන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ private placements යන්න. කලින් පාලනය කරපු අය, වැඩියෙන් private placements ගියා; අඩුවෙන් auction ගියා. අලුත් පරිපාලනය ආවාම, වැඩියෙන් auction ගියා; අඩුවෙන් private placements ගියා. අඩු ගණනේ පළමුවැනි මාස දෙකේ, -අපේ serious ප්‍රශ්න සහගත මාස දෙකේ- සියයට සියයක් auction ගියේ නැහැ නේ. ඒක මාරු කළා. ඇත්තම කිව්වොත් මම දන්නවා ඒකේ තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. මේ කථාව කියන්න මම ඒ තරම් dishonest වෙන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත්, ඒ වෙලා තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නයට යටත්ව මම කියන්නේ, ඒ වෙච්ච සිද්ධිය -පෙබරවාරි, මාර්තු

වෙච්ච සිද්ධි- B. i. එකට හරියටම එකඟයි. ඒ සඳහා නැවත Monetary Board එකට යන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවාද කියා මා දන්නේ නැහැ. මට මතක තිබුණේ, ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා කියපු කථාව. මොකද, මට මතක? එදා එහෙම කිව්වාම, මාව shock වුණා. මොන තරම් කතන්දර කිව්වත් එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. මේක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම වෙනස් ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් නම් මේකට අවසර ගත යුතුයි. එහෙම නම් අවසර නොගැනීමට හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, මේ කාරණය ගැන Prime Minister පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී කිව්වා. එතුමා කිව්වා, "මමයි කිව්වේ auction යන්න" කියලා. හරිද?

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : හැබැයි, එතුමා කිව්වේ නැහැ "හොරකම් කරන්න" කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : අපි යන්නේ එතැනටයි.

සභාපතිතුමා : කාගෙන්වත් අනුමැතිය ලැබුණේ නැත්නම් අගමැතිතුමා කිව්වා කියලා කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. ඒක නොවෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය. එතුමා විෂය භාර ඇමති.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : එතුමා කියන කොටම මේක කරලා ඉවරයි.

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා : විෂය භාර ඇමතිවරයාගෙනුත් අහන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අගමැතිතුමාව මේකට සම්බන්ධ කරන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නිවැරදි ක්‍රමවේදය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න ගිහින් වැරදි ක්‍රමවේදයක් ක්‍රියාත්මක වනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : Minister-in-charge of the subject තමන් යටතේ තිබෙන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවක ප්‍රධානියාත් එක්ක communicate කරන කොට- ආණ්ඩුවට desperate situation එකක් එනවා. ආණ්ඩුවට සල්ලි අවශ්‍යයි. ඒක තමයි මේක assess කරලා නැත්තේ Auctionවලට යන්න. මොකද, මෙතුමන්ලා මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ අවුරුදු ගණනක් කිව්වා auction යන්න, auction යන්න කියලා. ඒක අලුත් දෙයක් නොවෙයි. අපේ ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තියට මම defend කරනවා. ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අවශ්‍යතාව අනුව හෝ long-term thinking අනුව හෝ manual එකට හෝ හරි නම්, කවුරු කිව්වත් නැතත් මේ සඳහා නැවත Monetary Board එකේ approval එකක් ඕනෑ නැහැ. මේ fundamental error එක ගැන ඔබතුමා අවංකව ඒ කථාව කිව්වා. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමා විශ්වාස කළා "ඒක අවශ්‍යව ඇත" කියලා. B. i. එකේ scope එකට වැටෙනවා නම් Monetary Board එකේ approval එකක් ඕනෑ වෙන්නේ නැහැ ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. ඒ policy එක within the rules. Rule එක කඩලා නැහැ. Practice එකේ දහයක් ගන්න තිබුණාද, විස්සක් ගන්න තිබුණාද, දෙකෙන් නතර කරන්න තිබුණාද කියන point එක අපි appreciate කරනවා. ඒ නිසා rule එක කඩලා නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවාද auction and direct placements දිගටම තිබුණා කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මේකට අනුව.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : පිළිගන්නවා නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔව්, පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත්, -

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : එච්චරයි. ඒක පිළිගන්නවා නේ. ඒක පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ කියලා නේ මුලින් තිබුණේ. දැන් පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මෙහෙමයි. මම කියන්නම්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අපි එක එක බෙරා ගනිමු. දැන් පිළිගන්නවා නේ auction and direct placements දෙකම තිබුණා කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හරිෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Direct placements සියයට 90ක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : එහෙම එකක් කොහේවත් නැහැ. Intellectually corrupt කරන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා හරි. Detailsවලට යන්නේ නැතුව-

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කමිටුව හෙටට කල් දමනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා යෝජනා කළා, B. i. කියන එක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒක විතරද? නැත්නම් තව ඇතුළු කරනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු විධියට "as much as possible through auctions and others through direct placements." මේ ක්‍රම දෙකම අනුගමනය කරන්න පුළුවන්. මෙතුමා කියපු එක හරි. Manual එකෙන් අදහස් කරන්නේ, වැඩි

හරියක් auction එකට ගිහිල්ලා ඉතිරිය direct placementsවලින් යන්න කියන එකයි. ඒක first එකටම ඇතුළත් කරමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අපි කියන්නේ, ඒ interpretation එක දෙන්නේ නැතුව අපි B. i. paragraph එක as it is දමමු.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක තමයි මම යෝජනා කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ අදහස හරි නේ. සිංහලෙන් it is very -

සභාපතිතුමා : අපට තිබෙන්නේ වාර්තාවේ, "මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොතේ 8වන පිටුවේ B. i'හි සඳහන් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ආකාරය" කියන එකට "එහි ක්‍රමවේදය මෙසේය" කියලා ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ ටික ඇතුළු වුණාම ඇති. අනෙක් ඔක්කෝම අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් මට සවන් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : "ක්‍රමවේදය මෙසේය" කියලා දමමු. සාකච්ඡා කරපු ටික ඊට පහළින් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මම තව ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : හෙට අපි කීයටද රැස් වෙන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මේක ඉවර කරමු. හෙට උදේ 9ට පටන් ගනිමු. නැත්නම් අපට ඉවර කරන්න අමාරුයි නේ. හෙට උදේ 9ට පටන් ගන්නවා. අවසන් කරන වේලාවක් කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට අවසාන කරන වෙලාව කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අවසන් කරන වෙලාව නොවෙයි, පටන් ගන්න වෙලාව කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Timeframe එකත් කාරණයක් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඕනෑ තරම් වෙලාවක් අරගෙන අපි අවසන් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා : හෙට අවසන් කරමු. හෙට උදේ 9.00ට පටන් ගනිමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හෙට උදේ 7.00ට හෝ කීයට හෝ පටන් ගෙන අවසන් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා : හෙට උදේ 9.00ට පටන් ගනිමු. හෙට දිනය තුළ අවසන් කරන අධිෂ්ඨානයෙන් කටයුතු කරලා අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : රෑ වන කල් ඉඳලා හෝ කමක් නැහැ අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. සභාපතිතුමනි, මා මේ කථාව බේරුම් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. කමිටුවේ නායකයා හැටියට ඔබතුමා තීරණයක් ගත්තා. සභාපති වශයෙන් ඔබතුමා පත් කිරීමේදී පවා අපි යම්කිසි මූල ධර්මයක සිටියා නේ. ඒක මතක තබා ගන්නකෝ. මමයි ඔබතුමාගේ නම යෝජනා කළේත්. ඒ මූල ධර්මය තමයි, කමිටුවක් විධියට අපි වැඩ කරනවාය කියන එක. මෙයට අපි හැමදෙනාගේම එකතු කිරීම් ඇතිව හෝ නැතිව, එකඟ වෙලා හෝ එකඟ වන්නේ නැතිව අපි හැමදෙනාගේම අත්සන් මේ වාර්තාවට ඕනෑ නම් අපි මේ පුළුල් සාකච්ඡාව සම්පූර්ණයෙන් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක හොඳයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඊයේ දවස අහිමි වුණේ අපේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසා නොවෙයි, ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රායෝගික ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසායි.

සභාපතිතුමා : මගේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : "හෙට සවස 2.00ට වැඩ අවසන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් වෙලාව ඉවරයි. කැමැති නම් තව මොකක් හෝ ලියා ගෙන එන්න "යි කියලා fix කරන්න හදන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා : නැහැ, එහෙම නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒකට අපි කැමැති නැහැ. එහෙම නැත්නම් අපි මෙච්චර මහන්සි වෙලා මේවා කරන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, මේ සාකච්ඡාව තුළ අපි කියන දේත් සමහර විට වැරැදි බව අපට තේරෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ඉවර කරන වෙලාව ගැන fix කරන්න හදන්න එපා. ඕනෑ නම් රෑ වන කල් වැඩ කරමු. ඕනෑ නම් සෙනසුරාදාත් කරමු, ඕනෑ නම් ඉරිදාත් කරමු. අපට එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මේ කටයුතු ඉවර වන කල් කරමු.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : සෙනසුරාදාට එන්න බැහැ, සභාපතිතුමනි. හෙට තමයි අවසාන දවස. එහෙම නම් අපි වෙනත් වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : තමුන්නාන්සේලාගේ හෝ අපේ කියලා නැහැ. අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරන්නයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Translation issue එකකුත් තිබෙනවා. අපට මේක ඉවර කරන්නත් ඕනෑ. අපි අද සම්පූර්ණ දවසත් කරලා, හෙට සම්පූර්ණ දවසත් කරලා හෙට රෑ 8.00ට හෝ 9.00ට අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : උදේ වන කල් හෝ ඉවර වන කල් කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඉවර වන කල් කරමු. 11.00 දක්වා හෝ කරලා ඉවර කරමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : හෙට දවසේ රෑ 11.00 දක්වා හෝ කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමා බාධා කරන්නේ නැත්නම් හෙට ඉවර කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මට දැන ගන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. දැන් "Medium-term Debt Management Strategy" කියන එක සොයා ගත්තේ කොහෙන්ද? කොහේද ඒක තිබෙන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක verbatimවල තමයි තිබුණේ. ඒ වෙලාවේ ඉදිරිපත් කරපු අදහස නේ මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය, ඒක මෙතැනට relevant ද කියන එකයි. මොකද, අවුරුදු 30ක් කියන්නේ medium-term ද? මා ඒකයි අහන්නේ. මේ specific transaction එක medium-term කියා දමා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් මට හිතෙන්නේ medium-term නොවෙයි කියලායි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, it is not. It is a long-term.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මොකද හේතුව, මේ පහළ තිබෙන වචන ටික එහෙම දෙයක් කියන්න උත්සාහ කරනවා. මොකක්ද? "A. Auctions: B. Private Placements: C. Rupee Loans යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වුවද, එමඟින් පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද, දෙවනුව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයද, තෙවනුව රුපියල් ණය වශයෙන් අනුගමනය කළ යුතු බවට අනුපිළිවෙළක් නොමැති බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී." ඒක කියන්නේ වෙන හේතුවක් උඩයි. ඒ වචන ගලපා තිබෙන්නේ වෙන line එකකට නේ. ඒක ගලපා තිබෙන්නේ B. i. හි තිබෙන පළමුව auction, balance එක private placements කියන ප්‍රතිපත්තිය පිළිගනිමින් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක නේ එතැන පැහැදිලි වුණේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ නිසා එක්කෝ මේ කොටස අයින් කරන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නැත්නම් මේක relevant විධියට -

සභාපතිතුමා : මේක තමයි පැහැදිලි වුණේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is very important.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. ඒක අයින් කරනවා. මට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let me say this.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මා මේ තර්කයටම තමයි එන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : විභාග කෙරිල්ලක් වුණේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සභාපතිතුමනි, මේකට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමා කියන දේ කරනවා නම් ඇත්තටම නිලධාරීන් ගෙන්වා සාක්ෂි විමසීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑම නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් කියපු දේයි මෙහි සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ ගොල්ලන් අන්තිමට කිව්වා. ඔබතුමා කලින් ටික ගන්නේ නැහැ; එකක්වත් අරගෙන නැහැ. මා පෙන්වන්නම් සාක්ෂි සහිතව. මෙන්න මේ කාරණය බලන්න. සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා direct placement එක නිවැරැදියි කියලා අදහසක් දෙන්න හදනවා. එහෙම දෙනවා නම්, 2008 අප්‍රේල් මාසයෙන් පස්සේ private placements සඳහා captive sources ලෙස EPF, ETF යොදා ගන්නේ කොහොමද? ඔබතුමා මට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න. ඔක්කොම manual එක අනුවයි කියනවා නේ. ඔබතුමායි මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ විධියේ ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමා මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන කොට ඔබතුමාට මේ ගැන දැනුමක් තිබෙනවා නේ. මා අහන්නේ, 2008 අප්‍රේල් මාසයෙන්, captive sources ලෙස EPF, ETF private placementsවලට යොදා ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියලායි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : සභාපතිතුමනි, මට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Interest rate එක balance කරන්න තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : කිහිපදෙනකුට වුවමනා වාර්තාවක් හදන්න නම් අර පරීක්ෂණ අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ පරීක්ෂණ වුවමනා

වන්නේ ඒ පරීක්ෂණවලට අදාළ වාර්තාවක් හදන්නයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සභාපතිතුමනි, මා ඉතා වැදගත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මා ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ, 2008 අප්‍රේල් මාසයෙන් පස්සේ කොහොමද EPF, ETF captive sourcesවලට direct placements යොදා ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියලායි. ඒකට මට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : සභාපතිතුමනි, මට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න. දැන් අපි ඉස්සෙල්ලා පිළිගත්තා නේ, මෙතැනට B. i. එක දමන්න. B. i. එකේ මොකක්ද තිබෙන්නේ? ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගත්තාට පස්සේ දැන් reverse කරන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගත්තා, auction and direct placements කියන ක්‍රමවේද දෙක තිබුණාය කියලා. දැන් කියනවා ඒක තිබෙන්න බැහැයි කියලා. එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ නේ. එහෙම නම් මොකක්ද? අපි intellectual debate එකක් කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ. Corrupt debate එකක් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මට ඉඩ දෙන්නකෝ. මම නේ මේ point එක ගත්තේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒ කාරණය අවසන් කරන්න මගේ අවස්ථාව මට දෙන්න. මා කියන්නේ, මේ manual එකේත් තිබෙනවා, අපි විවාදයෙන් තොරව එකඟ වුණා, B. i. කියන එක දමන්න. B. i. කියන එක දමන්න එකඟ වුණේ ඇයි?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : B. i. කොටස as it is දමන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒකේ තිබෙනවා, auction and direct placements කියන දෙකම. ඒක පිළිගත්තාට පස්සේ, මේ විධියට direct placements තිබෙන්න බැහැ, ඒක කොහෙන්ද ආවේ, ඒක 2007න්ද ආවේ, 2008න්ද ආවේ කියලා නැවත තර්ක කරනවා නම්, අපේ agreement එකේ තේරුමක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මා ඒකට උත්තරය කියන්නම්. උත්තරය හරි simple.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මා කියන්නේ උත්තර නොවෙයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔබතුමන්ලා අතර තිබෙන්නේ පොඩි misunderstanding එකක්. Please! මට කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මගේ ඊළඟ කාරණය මෙයයි. මෙහි තර්කයක් මතු වුණා නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට දිගින් දිගටම තිබුණු ප්‍රධාන තර්කයක් තමයි, -the Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silvaගේ නම් මූලික තර්කයක් තමයි- auction විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ, අවසර තිබෙන්නේ ඒකට විතරයි කියන එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. "As much as possible through auctions"

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒක පස්සේ නේ ආවේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. ඒක මුල ඉඳලාම තිබුණා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අපට ඒක දැනුණේ නැහැ. මට බොරු කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. අවසානයේ auction ක්‍රමය පමණයි තිබුණේ. Direct placements මාස තුනකට කියලා තමයි තර්කය මතු වුණේ. මා වැරැදි නම් පස්සේ නිවැරැදි කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ, 2008ට කලින්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මා කථා කරන්නේ, 2008න් පස්සේ සිද්ධියක් ගැනයි. 2008න් පස්සේ මේ ක්‍රම දෙකම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක හරි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒක පිළිගන්නවා නම්, ඒක 2008 තිබුණාද, නැද්ද කියලා ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් අපට නැහැ.

දෙවන කාරණය මෙයයි. Auction විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ කියන එක මතයක් වශයෙන් ආපු නිසා තමයි ලොකුම ප්‍රශ්නය මතු වුණේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි "as much as possible" කියන එක ගොඩක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න සිද්ධ වුණේ. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ කරුණු මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ කරුණු තිබිය යුතුමයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : මොකක්වත් නැතුව වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මේක manual එකේ -

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ විධියට වාර්තාවක් ලියන්න. ඒක මට කියන්න එපා. මෙතැන සිදු වුණු දේයි මා ලියා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අර පැත්ත ඔබතුමාට පෙනෙන්නේම නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : සිදු වුණු දේයි මා ලියා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Manual එකේ තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලාට වෙනම වාර්තාවක් ලියා ගන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒක ලියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මැද්දෙන් යන්නේ නැත්තේ ඇයි?

සභාපතිතුමා : මැද්ද කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? එකින් එක මැද්ද කියන්න කෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මුල ඉඳලාම මා ඔබතුමාට මැද්ද කිව්වා නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Manual එකේ තිබෙන එක දමන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මා මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ලිහා දෙන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා : මෙතැන තිබුණු දේ දමන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලා verbatim අරගෙන බලන්නකෝ. දැන් මෙහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාම මෙතැන කියපු ඒවාටත්, ඔබතුමන්ලා නිලධාරින්ගෙන් අහපු ප්‍රශ්නවලටත්, ඒවාට නිලධාරින් දීපු උත්තරවලටත් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් පරස්පර වන විධියට ඇමුණුම් එක්ක වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට සභාගත කරන්න බැහැ. එහෙම කළොත් ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් සමාජයේදී උත්තර දෙන්න එපා යැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මා මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ලිහා දෙන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එහෙම කවුද කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : මෙහි තිබෙන දෙය නේ මා මෙහි සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමා එක් කෙනෙක් කියන එක දමනවා. අනික් එක් කෙනා කියන එක දමන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : අනික් එක් කෙනා කියන්නේ කවුද කියා කියන්න?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : පළමුවන සාක්ෂියේදී නිලධාරින් ඕනෑ තරම් කිව්වා, වැඩියෙන් කරන්නේ -සියයට 80ක්- auction system එක කියලා. මා හෙට ගෙනැවිත් පෙන්වන්නම්. ඔබතුමාට ඒක miss වුණේ කොහොමද කියා කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ ටිකත් පෙන්වන්න. ඊට පස්සේ Governorගෙන් අහන අදහස නේ, ආයතනයේ අදහස නේ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑ එක අහලා ඔබතුමා ඒ උත්තරය -

සභාපතිතුමා : මා ඇහුවේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා අහපුවා තමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක විතරයි නේ ඔබතුමා දමන්නේ. හැම එකෙන්ම අපි එකින් එකට ඔබතුමාට පෙන්වා දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා අනික් එක දමන්නේ නැහැ. එක පැත්ත් දමා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මෙතැන ප්‍රධාන තර්කයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. මෙතැන ප්‍රධාන ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා, මෙතැන තිබුණේ auction ක්‍රමය විතරයි කියලා. ඒකට තමයි සභාපතිතුමාත්, අපේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් සියලුදෙනාමත් දැහලුවේ. එතකොට තමයි මතු වුණේ, මේක සොයා ගත්තේ නැහැ, auction ක්‍රමය මූලික වෙන්න පුළුවන්, ඒක තමයි "as much as possible" කියා තිබෙන්නේ. හැබැයි මේකේ අනික් ක්‍රමයත් තිබුණාය කියලා. ඒ ගැන අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම සාක්ෂි සටහන් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මුලින් auction ක්‍රමය ගැන ලියලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට අමතරව ඒකට විරුද්ධව මතු වුණු තර්කයත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ. එහෙම නැතුව ලේකම් කාර්යාලය හෝ සභාපතිතුමා හෝ අපි හෝ කවුරු හෝ -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩි තුනක් දෙන්න. බිමල් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, පොඩ්ඩක් මම කියන දෙය දැන් අහන්න. අපි දැන් එකඟ වුණා, B ((i) "as it is-" කියලා. එකඟයි නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ වාගේම ඒ පදනමින්, ඒ කියන්නේ රීතිය- auction, ව්‍යතිරේකය-private placement කියන කාරණය ගැන මම පෞද්ගලිකව ඇහුවා. ඒකට තැන් කීපයකදීම ප්‍රධාන කීප දෙනෙකුගෙන්ම positive උත්තර ලැබිලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට වෙනස් දෙයක් ආවේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊට පොඩ්ඩක් වෙනස් අදහසක් ආවා, මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමාගෙන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, කියන කල්. ඒ තමයි සිද්ධියට සම්බන්ධ වුණු අයගෙන් ආපු දේ. මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඇහුවාම එතුමා යම් දියාරු උත්තරයකට ගියා. නමුත් එතුමා අර කාරණා ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළේ නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ ඔබතුමාත් ඒක විශ්වාස කරලා නැහැ, මහබැංකු අධිපතිතුමා එහෙම කිව්වා කියලා කියනවා නම්. නමුත් මාගේ ප්‍රශ්නය වෙන එකක්. මේ දෙවන කොටසේ තිබෙන, medium term debt management strategy කියන කොටසේ, එතැනට දමන relevancy එක එන්නේ, ඔබතුමා කලින්

කිව්වා වාගේ වෙන විධියකට. ඒක මෙතැනට relevant නැහැ කියලායි මම කියන්නේ.

එකක්, මේ 30-year එක medium term නොවෙයි. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කවුරු හෝ දන්නා කෙනෙක් කියන්න මට. එය මම භාර ගන්නම්. මම economics දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක එච්චර ලොකු point එකක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියනවා නම් ඒ කොටස ඉවත් කරන්න කියලා, ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නම් මම ඉවත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ ඒක ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒක ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන්නේ මෙන්න මේ හේතුව නිසා. ඒකේ තර්කය බලන්න. ඒකෙන් justify කරන්න හදලා තිබෙන්නේ rule එකට, ඒ කියන්නේ අපි එකඟ වුණු දෙය, මේ තිබෙන manual එකේ තිබෙන ප්‍රමුඛතාව auctionsවලට දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියන එකට එරෙහි දේ තමයි එහි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක odd. ඒකයි කියන්නේ. ඊට හේතුව ඔබතුමා කලින් කිව්ව කාරණය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් odd නේද? අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්න ඇත්තේ මොකද දන්නවාද? 13 වන පිටුවේ පළමුවන ඡේදයේ තිබෙන්නේ, "as much as possible through auctions" කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ, auctions, private placements කියන කොටස තිබෙනවා නේ. ඊට පස්සේ කොටස බලන්න. ඊට පස්සේ මූලධර්මය, auctions ද, private placements ද මොන ක්‍රමයට හෝ කටයුතු කළ යුත්තේ කොහොමද කියලා දැක්වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. සභාපතිතුමා බලන්න,-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: කරුණු කියලා ඉවර කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම හිතුවේ ඔබතුමා කරුණු කියලා ඉවරයි කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ, මම කියලා ඉවර නැහැ.

අපි මුලින් ලියා තිබෙනවා, මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කරන මූලික ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන, ණය කළමනාකරණ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත භාවිතය ගැන. අපි එතැනට, "කෙසේවුවද එකී මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණය..." කියන තැනට, - 12 පිටුව අගට- එකතු කරනවා, manual **එකේ තිබෙන (b) (i) . b(i) එක** දැමීමෙන් මොකක්ද වෙන්නේ? අපි විසින් පිළිගනු ලබනවා, යෝජනා කර තිබුණු ප්‍රධාන ක්‍රමය, auctions කියලා. "as much as possible through auctions" කිය එක අපි පිළිගන්නවා නේ. ඊළඟට අපි දාලා තිබෙනවා, direct placement කියන එකත් අපි tool එකක් වශයෙන් අනුගමනය කරනවා කියලා තමයි කෙටුම්පතේ 13වන පිටුවේ පළමුවන ඡේදයේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඊළඟට අපි ලියනවා, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ manual එකේ තිබෙන විධියට, tools තුනක් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට තිබෙනවා, - Rupee loans කියන එක මෙතැන විස්තර කරලා නැහැ. - මේ tools තුනම තිබුණත්, අපි අනුගමනය කරන ප්‍රතිපත්තිය - ඕනෑනම් ඒ කොටස bold කරලා හෝ, අකුරු ලොකු කරලා හෝ නැත්නම් තරු ලකුණක් - * සලකුණක්- දාලා හෝ කිව්වාට කමක් නැහැ. - අපි කියනවා, "The front office of the PDD is mainly responsible for …. lowest possible cost with a reasonable degree of risk…." කියලා. එතකොට අපි මොකක්ද කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. මොකක්ද අපේ මාතෘකාව? මාතෘකාව තමයි, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත භාවිතය. එතකොට එයට අපට ඕනෑ දේවල් ඇතුළු කරන්නයි, ඕනෑ නැති දේවල් එයින් අයින් කරන්නයි අපට බැහැ නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් පාවිච්චි කරන tools සියල්ලම අපි ඇතුළු කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම අපි ඇතුළු කරන්න ඕනෑ, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ මූලික fundamentals මොනවාද කියලාත්. Basic tools දෙකයි, ඒ දෙකට සම්බන්ධ ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිත් අපි ලියනවා, auctions and placements කියලා. හැබැයි මේ දෙකම cover කරන fundamental එක අපි මුලින් ලියනවා.

ඕනෑ නම් සභාපතිතුමාට මෙහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. කෙටුම්පතේ දහතුන්වන පිටුවේ " The front office…." කියලා 13 වන පිටුවේ ඉංග්‍රීසියෙන් තිබෙන කොටස මුලට දමන්නෙ. මම හිතන්නේ ඒක වඩාත් හොඳයි කියලා. අපි කුමන transaction එකක් කළත්, මොන tool එක පාවිච්චි කළත් මහ බැංකුව ණය ගන්නේ lowest cost with a reasonable degree of risk. එක් තමයි අපේ guideline එක. ඊළඟට අපි දමනවා, b(i) and this paragraph.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: I agreed.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, "as much as possible through auctions" කියන එක-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ යෝජනාව, කෙටුම්පතේ 13 වන පිටුවේ පළමු ඡේදයේ සඳහන් මෙන්න මේ කොටස අයින් කරන්න කියලායි. එච්චරයි කියන්නේ. "... ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් සඳහන් කළේ, මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ණය ලබා ගැනීමේ වැඩසටහනෙහි මධ්‍ය කාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ ක්‍රමෝපායෙහි (Medium Term Debt Management Strategy) සඳහන් කරන උපදේශය පරිදි පිරිවැය හා අවදානම කෙසේ වේද යන්න නිර්ණය කරනු ලබන බවයි.

තවද, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 3 පිටුවෙහි මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේද ලෙස, ..."

ඔන්න එතැන තිබෙන කාරණයෙහි මට තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ කාරණය තමයි, මේක apply වෙනවාද කියලා මේ specific දේවලට. මේ ගැන කවුරු හෝ මට positive උත්තරයක් දෙනවා නම් මම ඒක අයින් කර ගන්නම්. ඒ කියන්නේ Medium Term Debt Management Strategy කියන එක අදාළ වෙනවාද, 30-year bond එකකට?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නම් මේ කොටස අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ, මේකට.

ගරු නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: 30- year bond එකකට නොවෙයි, මේක පොදුවේ කෙරෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් අපි මේ කොටස අයින් කරමු. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: මේ medium term කියලා කියන්නේ කියලා කියන්නේ 30-year කියන එක නොවෙයි. මේ strategy එක, මේ උපාය මාර්ගය, කොහොමද ආර්ථිකයට බලපාන්නේ කියලා මේක දිගුකාලීනව සලකා බැලෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ අවුරුදු තිහ කියන එක නොවෙයි මේකෙන් අදහස් වෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා බලන්නකෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම Verbatim Report එකේ බලලා, හෙට ඔබතුමන්ලාට දැනුම් දෙන්නම්. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මට ඒ සියල්ල මතක නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ යන මාර්ගයේ angle එක කෙළින් කර ගන්නයි අපි මේ හදන්නේ. යන්නේ එක පැත්තකට. ඒක හරි නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ දක්වා ගිය ක්‍රමය හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා දැන් කිව්වා, මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියලා ඒකේ හරියට ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැහැ. ඒකේ කියපු එක කියවෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. එතුමා විතරයි එහෙම දෙයක් කිව්වේ. හැබැයි කලින් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මුල සිටම කියලා තිබෙනවා, නිගමනයකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා, "ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී පවත්වාගෙන යන සෘජු ක්‍රමය....." එතුමාගේ report එකේ එතුමා තීන්දු කරනවා, එය ක්‍රමය කියලා. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ report එක ආපසු එනවා, "ඉහත වගුව අනුව 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය..." කියලා.

තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට තීරණයක් ගන්නේ කොහොමද, ඒ ක්‍රම දෙකම පාවිච්චි වෙනවා නම්. "....මුළුමනින්ම ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා වූ මාස 15ක කාලය තුළ, සෘජු ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත් මාසයන්ද, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් සඳහා යොදා ගත් මාසයන්ද, ..." කියලා දැක්වෙනවා.

." අපි pre-conceived idea එකකට එනවා, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තමයි පාවිච්චි කළ ක්‍රමය කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: කොතැනද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: උඩින් එන idea එක අවසන් කරන්නේ එතැනින්. ඒකයි ප්‍රශ්නය.

සභාපතිතුමා: පිටුව 13හි කොතැනද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කෙටුම්පතේ 14 සහ 15 වන පිටුවල තිබෙන වගුව පෙන්වලා කියන්නේ. "2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය..." කොහොමද මේ වාගේ නිගමනයකට එන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහි එය පෙනෙනවානේ ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. මේ වගුවේ තිබෙන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය '0' කියලා. සෘජු ක්‍රමය සියයට 100යි කියන එකයි මෙහි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරිද වැරදිද කියලා කියන එක නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ක්‍රම දෙකම හරි නම් -

සභාපතිතුමා: ක්‍රම දෙකම හරි නම් නොවෙයි. ඒ ක්‍රම දෙකම තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා වචනාර්ථයෙන් මේක ගත්තොත් කොහොමවත් තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. මෙහි සඳහන් වන්නේ, " ඉහත වගුව අනුව 2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය මුළුමනින්ම ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා වූ මාස 15ක කාලය තුළ සෘජු ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත්

මාසයන්ද, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත් මාසයන්ද ....”

එහෙම නම් “වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක්...” කියන එකත් වැරදියි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක සාධාරණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක සාධාරණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: සමහර මාස තිබෙනවා ක්‍රම දෙකම යොදා ගත්. ඒවා නොවෙයි නම් මොකක්ද දමන්න තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. ඊට පස්සේ මේ වාර්තාවෙන් මොකක්ද නිගමනය වන්නේ? වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ගෙනෙන්න තීන්දුව කොහෙන්ද ආවේ? වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයක් ගෙනෙන්න තීන්දුවක් අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ක්‍රම දෙකම තිබෙනවා නම් මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා නොකර ඉන්න ඕනෑ වාර්තාවේ. ක්‍රම දෙකම practice කරන්න පුළුවන්, මහ බැංකුවට. That is the fundamental basic truth about this. එක පැත්තකට කියනවා, -

සභාපතිතුමා: ක්‍රම දෙකම භාවිත කළ හැකියි කියලා නිර්දේශයක් හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලාට දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: COPE එකෙන් ඒ නිර්දේශය එන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා ගේ නිර්දේශය එන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකයි හරි දේ.

හර්ෂණ රාජකාරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන 13 වන පිටුවේ “Auctions, Private Placements; Rupee loans “ යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වුවද,...”කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඔහොම ඉන්න. අපි උඩ ටික බේරාගෙන යමු. මම 13 වන

පිටුව සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ඉවර කර ගෙන යන්නම්.

5.00 උදාරා/ මම පොඩි වාක්‍යයක්...

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම පොඩි වාක්‍යයක් කියවන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: 13 වන පිටුවේ ඉංග්‍රීසියෙන් තිබෙන කොටස මුලට අර ගෙන, ඊට පස්සේ මේ B (i) කියන කොටස සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ඇතුළත් කරලා, Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy කියන කොටස -ගරු අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන “...ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් සඳහන් කලේ...” කියන කොටස- ඉවත් කරලා, ඒක සංශෝධනය කළාම හරි නේ. එතකොට අපට 14 වන පිටුවට යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක විතරක් නොවෙයි. මෙතැන ඒ, බී, සී යටතේ, “...යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වෙන වුවද....පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී.” දක්වා -

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒක තිබෙන්නේ මගේවත් ඔබතුමාගේවත් පෞද්ගලික කැමැත්තට නොවෙයි. මේ Manual එක ගැන තිබුණු ලොකු විවාදයක verbatim එකක් තිබෙනවා, එහෙම පිටින්ම; අධිපතිතුමා ගෙන්වලා. එහිදී අධිපතිතුමා ඇතුළු පිරිස මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත භාවිතා කරන එක ගැන කියපු අදහස් ටික තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතැනදී එහෙම අදහසක් මතු වුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නැත්නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලා verbatim ඔක්කෝම බලලා හරි අදහස කියන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Dr. Azim කිව්වා, Mrs. Seneviratne කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ, ඉතා පැහැදිලිව තිබුණු දෙය.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතැනදී ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඉතා පැහැදිලිව පිළිගත්තා, “as much as possible” කියලා ලියලා තිබෙන්නේ, වැඩිපුර auctions කරන්න කියන එක කියලා. නැත්නම් “as much as possible” කියන වචනයේ තේරුම මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන අපි හෙට උදේට කථා කරමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක bulldoze කරන්න හදන්න එපා. B (i) එකේ තිබෙනවා, auction එකයි, direct placement එකයි දෙකම. හැබැයි direct placement එක ගැන ටිකක් පැහැදිලි කරලා තිබෙන එක ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉවත් කරන්න කියලා කියනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක නේ මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක විතරයි පැහැදිලි කරනේ. Auction එක ගැන පැහැදිලි කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: B (i) එක මේකේ තිබෙනවා නේ. B (i) එක මෙතැනට ආවාම ඒක හරි යනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මහ බැංකුවට යවපු ප්‍රශ්නාවලියට දීපු උත්තරත් එක්ක මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොත ගැන සාකච්ඡාවක් ඇති වුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් evidence ගන්න කෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අන්න එදා තමයි මේක පූර්ව වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, මහ බැංකුවේ කට්ටියගෙන් තොරතුරු ගන්න බැහැ, bias කියලා. එතකොට සමහර ඒවා ගන්නවා, සමහර ඒවා ගන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතැනට ගෙනැල්ලායි කථා කළේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් ඉදිරිපිට.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මොනවා වුණත් මෙන්න මේ වචන තුන ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට පොඩ්ඩක් ඉඩ දෙන්න. "මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 3 පිටුවෙහි මෙසේ සඳහන් වේ" කියලා, auctions, private placements, rupee loans කියලා ලියන්න පුළුවන්. It is okay. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඊට පස්සේ තිබෙන වාක්‍යයේයි. "...යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වුවද..." කියලා ලියලා තිබෙනවා, "...එමඟින් පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද, දෙවනුව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයද, තෙවනුව රුපියල් ණය වශයෙන් අනුගමනය කළ යුතු බවට අනුපිළිවෙළක් නොමැති බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී." කියලා. නිලධාරීන් අතර එහෙම එකඟතාවක්වත් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට හෙට verbatim recordsවලින්ම ගෙනැල්ලා පෙන්වන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපිත් පෙන්වන්නම්, අනෙක් පැත්ත.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට දෙකම දමමු. ඒකේ කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔය මොනවා පෙන්වුවත් වැඩක් නැහැ, ඒකේ basics cover කරලා තිබෙනවා, සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ වෙනම පොඩි idea එකක් දෙනවා, ඒක නොවෙයි ක්‍රමය කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ "……lowest possible cost with a reasonable degree of risk….." කිව්වාම, ඔය එක, දෙක, තුන වැඩියෙන් තිබුණත්, අඩුවෙන් තිබුණත් අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් broad theory එකකින් ඒක cover කරලා තිබෙනවා. Verbatim ගෙනැල්ලා බලන්න, දෙගොල්ලන්ම.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේකේ philosophy එක ගන්නකෝ. හෙට දවසට පදනමක් විධියටයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. රෑට ගිහිල්ලා පාඩම් කරනවා නම් මේවා ඔළුවේ තියා ගන්න. මේකේ හරි ලොකු වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. කලින් inquiry එකේ මේ නිලධාරීන් දීපු සාක්ෂි සහ මෙතැනට ඇවිල්ලා පරණ Governor නැතුව දීපු සාක්ෂි අතර ලොකු වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වෙනසට හේතුව මොකක්ද කියලා අපි දන්නවා නේ. මෙතැන සාක්ෂි දෙන්න පටන් ගත්ත පළමුවන දවසේ, "auction යවනවා නම් මේක යන්න ඕනෑ Monetary Board එකට, එහෙම decision එකක් නැහැ" කියන එක තමයි වීරසිංහ කිව්වේ. ඒ කියන්නේ දෙවැනියා. ඒ line එකේ තමයි ඊට පස්සේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම develop වුණේ. එතකොට first inquiry එකේ ඔය නිලධාරීන්ගේම සාක්ෂි සහ මේ සාක්ෂි අතර ලොකු contrast එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ඔය දෙගොල්ලන්ම as it is භාර ගන්න එපා. අපිට එකඟ විය හැකි විනිශ්චය අපි ලියමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගන්නේ ඔක්කෝම අර අන්තිම ටික. අර කලින් verbatim එකේ මොනවත් අර ගෙන නැහැ. මම ඒක ඔබතුමාට කරුණු සහිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්. වීරසිංහ, රත්නායක ඇතුළු ඔක්කෝම අය කියපු ටික.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔය කෙටුම්පතේ අගට තිබෙනවා එක් කෙනෙකුගේ නමක්. ඔය ඔක්කෝම විත්තිකාරයෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හොඳම උදාහරණය තමයි සභාපතිතුමනි, අර lady "do it" කියපු එක. පිටු භයක් මම ඇහුවා, ඒක මට අහන්න දෙන්නේ නැතුව. අන්තිමට ඒක ඇතුළත් කළා, සත්‍ය තත්ත්වය - ඉස්සර වෙලා "direction" එකක් කියලා කියනවා. ඊට පස්සේ "why do you not take it" කියලා කියනවා. ඒ පරස්පර ඔක්කෝම අමතක කරලා, මේ මතයට පක්ෂග්‍රාහී "you do it" කියන එක ඇතුළත් කරනවා, report එකේ. It is very unfair. අපි ඒවා correct කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක කලින් කථාවක් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් කථාවක් නොවෙයි. Because it is very difficult for us to මේ ඔක්කෝම correct කර කර, correct කර කර - report එකක් එන්න ඕනෑ, -

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම කිව්වොත් එහෙම පසුගිය කාලයේ අල්ලපු නැති හොරු දැන් අල්ලන්නේ. බුද්ධි අංශ නිලධාරීන් අල්ලන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පළමුවන සාක්ෂිය ඕනෑ තැනක පවතිනවා. සාක්ෂි වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ඔක්කෝම ටික මේකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ''do it' කියන එක දමලා, එතුමියට සඳහන් කරන්න - කියන කියන එක ඇතුළත් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගිය පාර අපි සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඒකෙන් මතු වුණු කරුණු තමයි මේ අවසන් වාර්තාවට දැම්මේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක දමන්නවත් වටින්නේ නැහැ, වාර්තාවට.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කොහොම වුණත් සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ කමිටුවට එන්නේ කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශ නේ. සාක්ෂි ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට බලන්න පුළුවන් නේ. මොනවා හරි එකක් තිබෙනවා නම්, තව මතයක් දමලා හරි නිර්දේශ දෙන්න ඕනෑ, අවසානයේදී.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ යෝජනාව මේකයි. මේ වාර්තාව unbalanced කියලා පෙනෙන්නේ, ඔය B (i) කියන එක දාලා නැති නිසයි. B (i) එක දමලා දැන් මේ තිබෙන විධියට තිබ්බාම - ඒක හෙට බලන්න. B (i) එක දමලා මේක තිබෙන කොට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: B (i) එක දමලා නවත්වන්න කියලායි කියන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ. ඒ විධියට එන්න එපා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Manual එකේ No. 03ත් දමන්න පුළුවන්. 'A', 'B', 'C' කියලා තිබෙන එකත් දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතැනින් එහාට explain කරලා angle එක වෙනස් කරන එක -

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ නිලධරින් කිව්වාය කියන කොටස නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එක නිලධාරියෙක් එකක් කියනවා, තවත් නිලධාරියෙක් තවත් එකක් කියනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නිලධාරින් කිව්වා කියලා තමයි මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ. අපේ අදහස් හැටියට නොවෙයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මේක කියවන කෙනෙකුට -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 'X' කියන කෙනා එකක් කියනවා, 'Y' කියන කෙනා එකක් කියනවා. අපි 'Y' ගේ මතය -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව එහෙම එකක් වෙන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ theory එක ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ වාර්තාව කියපු ඒවා දමන එකක් නොවෙයි. අපි නිගමනයකට ඇවිල්ලා, ඔබතුමන්ලා නිගමනයකට ඇවිල්ලා, හරි දේ වාර්තා කළ යුතුයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන විධියට මහ බැංකු නිලධාරින් පෙන්වා දුන්නා කියලා මේකේ මොකුත් දමන්න බැරි වෙනවා.

සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පෙන්වා දීමෙන් මෙවැනි නිගමනයකට එනවා කියලා දමන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම මේක වෙන විධියකට පෙන්වන්නම්. දැන් මේකේ තිබෙනවා, ''auctions, private placements and rupee loans යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වුවද එමඟින් පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද, දෙවනුව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයද, තෙවනුව රුපියල් ණය වශයෙන් අනුගමනය කළ යුතු බවට...'' යනුවෙන්. දැන් මම අහන ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා දකින්න ඇති, මේ ගොල්ලන් issue කරලා තිබෙන rupee loans ප්‍රමාණය. එකක්වත් issue කරලා නැහැ නේ. මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ rupee loan එකක්වත් issue කරලා තිබෙනවා කියලා, ගිය අවුරුදු දහයටම. නමුත් මොකක්ද මේ කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ අහන්නේ, Manual එකේ තිබෙන එක ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලා අහපු ප්‍රශ්නවලට දීපු පැහැදිලිකිරීම් ගැනයි. Manual එකේ දීපු එක ක්‍රියාත්මක කළාද කියන එක නොවෙයි. Manual එකේ තිබුණු එක ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන අනුපිළිවෙළක් තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඇහුවා. එතකොටයි කිව්වේ, අනුපිළිවෙළක් නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වැදගත් වෙන්නේ නැත්තේ මොකද දන්නවාද? ඒක වැදගත් වෙන්නේ නැත්තේ මේ rupee loans කියන ඒවා අනුපිළිවෙළක් නැහැ කියලා කිව්වාවට, එක rupee loan එකක්වත් නිකුත් කරලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. දීලා නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. හතරවන ක්‍රමයක් තිබුණා නම්

ක්‍රියාත්මක නොවීම තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය මතු කළ වෙලාවේ ආපු උත්තරය -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එක නිලධාරියෙක් හෝ දෙදෙනෙක් එහෙම කිව්වත් ගරු කටයුතු සභාවක් විධියට අපි ඒක පිළිගන්නා සත්‍යයක් හැටියට වාර්තා කිරීම ගැළපෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, මේක ඇත්තටම ප්‍රශ්නය පොඩ්ඩක් ඇත නේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකයි අපි කියන්නේ.

ඊළඟට තව එක දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. මම හෙට දවසට ඕනෑ නිසයි කියන්නේ, නැත්නම් හෙට දවසට වෙලා යන නිසා. ඒ තමයි දැන් අලාභ ගණනය කිරීමේදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමා යම් පදනමක් හදලා තිබෙනවා.

ඒ පදනම මත ඔබතුමා එය කෙටුම්පතට ඇතුළත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට ඒ සඳහා පදනම් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ historical dataයි. ඒ කියන්නේ ඉතිහාසයේ මේ දේ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එහි යම් රටාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ රටාවට වඩා මෙය වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනුව ඒ වෙනසත් එක්ක ඇති වන පාඩුව හෝ අලාභය වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපට ඒ ගණන් හදා ගැනීම සඳහා historical data අවශ්‍යයි. Historical data කියලා කියන්නේ අඩු ගණනේ පසු ගිය අවුරුදු පහකවත් bonds සම්බන්ධව තිබෙන විස්තර ටික අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙනවා. දැනට තිබෙන විධියට ඌනතාව කියවන්න බැහැ. විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ 2014 වර්ෂයේ මුල වාගේ ඉඳලා නේද තිබෙන්නේ? සාමාන්‍යයෙන් 2012, 2013 වශයෙන් අඩු ගණනේ අවුරුදු පහකවත් තොරතුරු නැති බවයි මට පෙනෙන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට බැරිද, ඒ තොරතුරු ටික හෙට දිනයේ සොයා ගන්න? ඔය quantum of loss කියන එක පිළිබඳ මගේ හිතේ ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් මම ඒකට එකඟ නැහැ. මගේ ගණන් හැදීමේ ක්‍රමයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ මගේ ගණන් ක්‍රමයට එය වැටෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ක්‍රමයට වැටෙන්නේ නැති වුණත්, ගණන් හදා ගැනීමේදී මටත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, කලින් rates අදාළ කර නොගෙන මම හදන ක්‍රමය හරිද කියා බලන්න බැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ කොච්චර නිකුත් කළාද, කොච්චර ගත්තාද කියා පොඩි trend එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපි යම් දෙයක් හුදකලාව සීමිත කාලයකට සාපේක්ෂව මේ කාරණයට සන්සන්දනය කිරීමට වඩා අවුරුදු දෙකක්, තුනක් හතරක් compare කරන එක තමයි වඩා හොඳ වන්නේ. ඒ කාලය odd නම් ඒ කාලයට සාපේක්ෂව මේක සන්සන්දනය කිරීම ගැලපෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා ගරු සභාපතිතුමා අපට බැරිද, ඒ data ටික සොයා ගන්න?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මහ ලොකු දෙයක් නොවෙයි. Printout එකක් ඉල්ලුවොත් දෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක Central Bank එකෙන් හෙට උදේට ගෙන්වා ගනිමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි 2008ට පෙර සිට බලන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි, මම හිතන විධියට එය පොතක සඳහන්වෙලා ඇති.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා ළඟ තිබෙනවාද? ඉල්ලුවා නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන් එවයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එය විනාඩි 10ක වැඩක්.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට පොඩි අවසරයක් දෙන්න. මොකද, මම හෙට එන්නේ නැහැ. මගේ මතයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ පිළිබඳ දැනුවත් කිරීමට මට අවසර දෙන්න.

ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කෙටුම්පතේ 17 වන පිටුවේ මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව හා එහි කාර්ය භාරය යනුවෙන් කොටසක් තිබෙනවා. මේ රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව තීන්දු කරන්නේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිර්දේශ මත. කෙටුම්පතේ 5.1.2 යටතේ සඳහන් වනවා "2015 මාර්තු මාසය සඳහා භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්කර සපුරාගත යුතු රජයේ සමස්ථ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව රුපියල් බිලියන 261.683ක් වූ බවත්, ඉන් රුපියල් බිලියන 89.683 භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් මඟින්ද, ඉතිරිය භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර මඟින්ද ලබා ගන්න කියා" තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම ඊට පහළින් සඳහන් වෙනවා, "ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 25 හා 26 දින පිළිවෙළින් අන්තර්ජාලයේ හා ප්‍රසිද්ධ පුවත්පත්වල ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලද දැන්වීම්වලට අනුව ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳුන් 16 දෙනා වෙත වසර 30ක කාලයකින් කල්පිරෙන රුපියල් බිලියන 01ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සියයට 12.5ක් වන පොලී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ තීන්දුවක් අරගෙන නිකුත් කළා" කියලා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ රුපියල් බිලියන එකක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සියයට 12.5ක පොලී අනුපාතයක් යටතේ නිකුත් කිරීමට තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලෝ තීන්දු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ වාගේම 18 වන පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා, "DO IT" යනුවෙන් නියෝග කළ බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. නමුත් මින් පෙර කරන ලද සාක්ෂි දැක්වීමකදී "why don't you go for 10" කියලත් කියා තිබෙනවා." ඒ කාරණය වෙනම කථාවක්. ඊට පස්සේ කොහොම හරි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා බිලියන 10කට යන්න කියද්දී, එතුමා කියා තිබෙනවා "එවිට හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින්

2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මස නිකුත් කරන ලද 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරයෙහි බර තැබූ අනුපාතය පිළිබඳ විමසන ලද බව.” එතකොටම කියනවා, “ එම අනුපාතය 11.75ක් බව නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද බව.,” එතකොට සියයට 12.75ක පොලී අනුපාතයකට තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 01ක භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ඉල්ලලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරය ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ සියයට 11.75කට. ඊටපසුව එහෙම තිබෙද්දී, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිතුමිය විසින් සටහනක් යොදා තිබෙනවා, “Governor instructed to place price up to Rs. 10 billion taking into consideration of additional fund requirements of the Government”. එතකොට මේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10දී මේ පිළිබඳ අවධානය යොමු කරන්න කියා එතුමා කියා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මීට පෙර 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ සියයට 11.75කට අරගෙනත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම “මේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ලබා ගැනීමට උපදෙස් දීමට හේතුව කුමක්දැයි ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු සභාපති විසින් හිටපු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් දුරකතනයෙන් විමසන ලද බව -

ඒ සඳහා හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් හේතු 2ක් ඉදිරිපත් කළ බව-

1. ආණ්ඩුවට විශාල මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් අවශ්‍ය බව.” යනුවෙන් එතුමා ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තිබෙනවා. මම මේ කියන්න යන්නේ ඒ ඔක්කෝම තිබෙද්දී, මෙහි අවසානයේ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ සහ කාරක සභාවේ පොදු නිර්දේශ යනුවෙන් තිබෙනවා. පොදු නිර්දේශ ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අපි ඒකට එකඟයි. කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශවල අන්තිම එකට ඉහළින් තිබෙනවා “2015-2016 බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සඳහා අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා සෘජුවම වගකිව යුතු අතර., ඒ paragraph එකට මම විරුද්ධයි. ඒකට මම යෝජනා කරනවා “2015-2016 බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සඳහා සම්බන්ධ සියලු නිලධාරීන්ට එරෙහිව අදාළ නීතිමය ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගැනීම තුළින් අලාභය ඔවුන්ගෙන් අය කර ගැනීම යනුවෙන් ආවොත් හොඳයි.” කියලා. එය මගේ නිර්දේශය. මොකද, එහි නමක් දක්වන්නේ නැතුව. අලාභයක් තිබුණොත් එයට සම්බන්ධ සියලු නිලධාරීන්ට එරෙහි නීතිමය කටයුතුවලින් පසුව විය යුතුයි. මොකද, නමක් සඳහන් කිරීම සුදුසු නැහැ කියා මා හිතනවා. ඒ නිසා එය ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අලාභයක් සිදුවෙලා තිබෙනවා නම් කියන්නේ නිර්දේශයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: අලාභයක් සිදුවී තිබෙනවා නම් නීතිමය ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අලාභයක් තිබෙනවා නම් මොකද කරන්නේ කියන එක නිර්දේශයක් නොවෙයි. ඒක නිකම් බිත්තියකට ගැහුවාම කඩන් වැටෙනවා වාගේ.,

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඒක එතුමාගේ අදහස. කරුණාකර එතුමාගේ අදහසට ඉඩ දෙන්න. ගරු බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා බාධා කරන්න එපා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා:අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා මේකට සම්බන්ධ නැහැ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මම මේ කාරණා ටික කියෙව්වේ මට තේරුම් යනවා, 2014 වර්ෂයේ සියයට 11.75කට බැඳුම්කර ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට 12.75කට ගන්න කියලාත් කියා තිබෙනවා. මේ 12.75 තීන්දු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා නොවෙයි. Head of Department. එහි අධිපතිවරයා නැහැ. එතකොට අවසානයේ අපි එහෙම නිගමනයක යෙදෙන්න හොඳ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන්වම ඕනෑ. ඔළුවමයි හොයන්නේ. සාක්ෂියක් ඇතත් නැතත්, අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන්වමයි ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මගේ නිර්දේශය තමයි photocopying කරපු කෙනායි.,

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා, ඒක වැරදියි. ඔබතුමා අද කියන ප්‍රකාශය වැරදියි. විශේෂ නිර්දේශයන් ටික දුන්නේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගෙන් ආපු කාරණාවල සාරාංශය හැටියටයි. ඒවායේ photocopies තිබෙනවා. ඕනෑ නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාට බලන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි එහෙම එකක් කියලා නෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ගැන මේ කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා තීරණ ගන්න පුළුවන්. හැම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුටම නිර්දේශ දෙන්න කියලා කිව්වා. ඒ ආපු ටිකෙන් නිර්දේශ ටික හදලා තිබෙනවා. ඒවා ටික සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඔබතුමාලාට පුළුවන් තීරණ ගන්න. කාරක සභා වාර්තාව අවසාන වෙන්නේ පොදු නිර්දේශ හැටියට නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් දාන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරලා තීරණය කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇත්තටම කිව්වොත් මම ඔබතුමාට හිතෙන් බැණ බැණ

හිටියේ. මම හිතුවා ඔබතුමා තමයි ඔය ටික ලිව්වේ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. නැහැ. ඒක වැරදියි. මම ඒ ගැන කියන්නයි හිටියේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා:එහෙම නම් කරුණාකර මෙහෙම ලියන්න. අජිත් පෙරේරා මහතා මෙසේ කියයි; තිලකරත්න මහතා මෙසේ කියයි; ගුණවර්ධන මහතා මෙසේ කියයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම දාන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා:මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ.,

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා අපි ඔක්කෝගෙම නිර්දේශ වාගේ නේ දාන්නේ. මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේ විධියට නිර්දේශ කළා; මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේ විධියට නිර්දේශ කළා කියලා දාන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා අන්තවාදී නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා:ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අද ගරු සභාපතිතුමා මේ කාරක සභාව පටන් ගනිද්දී කිව්වා.,

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, කියනකම් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මන්ත්‍රීවරු කී දෙනෙක්ද නිර්දේශ දීලා තිබෙන්නේ? මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනයි නිර්දේශ දීලා තිබුණේ. අද උදේ තමයි ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා එතුමාගේ නිර්දේශය දුන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මගෙත් නිර්දේශ තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: කොයි වෙලාවෙද දුන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මා ළඟ තිබෙනවා. මම හිතුවේ දෙන්න බැහැ කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක දෙන්න බැරි කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ලබා දෙන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: තුන්දෙනයි නිර්දේශ දීලා තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම දැන් ලබා දෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අදාළ දින දෙකේදී විතරක් නොවෙයි. මම ලේකම්තුමියට කිව්වා අන්තිම මොහොත වෙනකම් තියන්න කියලා. තුන්දෙනෙකුගේ නම් විතරක් දාලා මේ නිර්දේශ ටික ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් මුළු කාරක සභාවම හැල්ලු වෙනවා. 26 දෙනෙකුගෙන් යුත් කාරක සභාවෙන් තුන්දෙනෙක් විතරක් නිර්දේශ දීලා තිබෙනවා කියන එක කාරක සභාව හැල්ලු වෙන කාරණාවක්. කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒ නිර්දේශවල සාරාංශයයි. ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට මට copies දෙන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා එදා ඒ යෝජනාවත් කළ නිසා. දැන් වුණත් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඊළඟට පොදු නිර්දේශය සකස් කළේ ඒ විශේෂ නිර්දේශයත් මේ සියලු ලේඛන බලා මගේ වගකීමෙන්. මේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ සියල්ලම නිර්දේශ ලබා දුන් මන්ත්‍රීවරු තිදෙනාගේ නිර්දේශවල සාරාංශයයි මෙතැන අනික් කවුරුත් නිර්දේශ දීලා නැති නිසා තමයි එහෙම කළේ.ඔබතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ ටික නිර්දේශ සකස් කරනකොට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හෙට උදේ දුන්නාට කමක් නැද්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ ටිකත් මේ නිර්දේශවල අන්තර්ගතයට හානියක් නැත්නම් ඔබතුමා තියාගන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 25වැනිදා උදේටත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු නිර්දේශ බෑග් එකක් ගෙනැල්ලා දුන්නොත් මම මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: හැබැයි, කියන දවසට නිර්දේශ ලබා දුන්නේ මෙච්චරයි කියලා ඔබතුමා සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි හිතුවේ සියලු දේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කළාය කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Verbatimවල තිබෙනවා; Guidelinesවල තිබෙනවා; හොඳ මහ පෙන්වීමක් තිබුණා. හැම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුටම පෞද්ගලිකව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන්න කියලා කිව්වා. ඒ ලබා දෙන නිර්දේශ දින දෙකකට සීමා නොකර අන්තිම දවස වනතුරු තියා ගන්න කියලා මම ලේකම්තුමියට කිව්වා. ඊයේ උදේ තමයි මේ නිර්දේශ ටිකත් ලේකම්තුමියත්, මමත් සාකච්ඡා කරලා සකස් කළේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට දැන් කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්නකෝ. ලේකම්තුමිය මේ වාර්තාවේ ලියලා තිබෙන්නේ අපේ නිර්දේශ කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වා. ඔබතුමා ඒ වෙලාවේ එහෙම කිව්වා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I was not aware of it.

සභාපතිතුමා: නිර්දේශ නොවේ නම් වෙන මොනවාද? ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේ විධියට පොදු

නිර්දේශය සහ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා දෙකක් ලියන්න වුණේමත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු සුළු පිරිසකගේ නිර්දේශ නිසයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමා. ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන එක හොඳයි, වාචිකව මෙතැන කථා කරන එක නරකයි කියලා ඔබතුමා හිතන්න එපා. මම දිගටම මේ philosophy එකේ හිටියා. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. රණ්ඩු කරගෙන හෝ බැණගෙන හෝ එකඟතාවක් මත ගෞරවයක් තියාගෙන මේ කමිටුව තනි වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න ඕනෑය කියලායි මම නම් විශ්වාස කරන්නේ. එච්චරයි මම කියන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

The Hon. Mahindananda Aluthgamage : "That is correct" කියලා කියන්න එපා. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ නිසාම තමයි මේ විධියට වාර්තාව හැදුවෙත්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම මේ කාරණය කියන තුරු පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. "ලජ්ජා වනවා. ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන කට්ටිය ෂෝක්. වාචිකව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන කට්ටිය දුර්වලයි" කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වා. එහෙම නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපිත් philosophy එකක් අනුව වැඩ කරන්නේ. ඔබතුමා එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැ. නමුත් ඒ වාගේ අර්ථයක් ලබා දුන්නානේ. නිර්දේශ ලබා දුන්නේ තුන් දෙනෙක් නිසා මට ලජ්ජා හිතුණාය කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වානේ. දැන් කමක් නැහැ. මම ඇත්තටම හිතුවේ ඔබතුමාට නිර්දේශ කට්ටල දෙකක් තිබෙනවාය කියලායි. කමක් නැහැ. දැන් මට වැඩේ පැහැදිලියි. හොඳ වෙලාවට ඔබතුමා මේ ගැන කිව්වේ. නැත්නම් මම ඔබතුමාට තවමත් බණිනවා.

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඔය තීන්දුව කලින් ගන්න තිබුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට බැන්නාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මට කොහොමත් බණිනවානේ.

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන්න ඕනෑය කියලා අපි සාකච්ඡා කරපු වෙලාවේ, -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කිව්වේ නැහැනේ ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙනවාය කියලා. මම කවදාවත් ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන්න කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ. ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන එකත් හොඳයි. ලිඛිතව දුන්නාය කියලා වරදක් නැහැ. ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙනවාය කියන එකේ වරදක් නැහැ, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ ලබා නොදුන්නු කට්ටිය නරක නැහැ කියලායි මම කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හෙට උදේ 9.00ට රැස් වෙමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මමත් නිර්දේශ ලබා දීලා තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, එහෙම නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙනවාට වඩා හොඳයි, අපි මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා විසඳා ගන්න එක.

සාක්ෂිකරුවෝ නික්ම ගියහ,

කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණ.

ඇමුණුම 20

ඇමුණුම 20
இகணப்பு 20
Annexure 20

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව
2016 ඔක්තෝබර් මස 21වැනි සිකුරාදා

පැමිණ සිටි:

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපති)
ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව.
ඩබ්ලිව්. පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති,
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්.රෝහිත මහතා. සහකාර විගණකාධිපති,
එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය. විගණන අධිකාරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: සාකච්ඡා කරන ලද කරුණුවල සංශෝධන දෙකක් ඔබතුමන්ලා යෝජනා කර තිබෙනවා. එම සංශෝධන දෙකෙන් 12 වන පිටුවේ 4.1.1 සංශෝධනය ලේකම්තුමිය සකස් කර තිබෙනවා. මෙහෙම " පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක එම්බී/පීඩී/1 26/2008, 2008.01.07 මගින් 2008 වසරේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින් අරමුදලේ අවශ්‍යතාව සපුරා ගැනීමට මාස තුනක කාලයකට තීරණය කර තිබුණ බවත් එහි කියලා පරිවර්ථනය කර දාන්න ඕනෑ.

"The Monetary Board approval is sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placement of Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans in respect of captive investor, such as EPF, NSB and ETF during January April 2008." කියන ටික එකතු වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි ඉල්ලා තිබුණේ authorized කරපු එකත් දාන්න නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නේ approved වුණේ. පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD 2520/2008. 2008.10.07. ඒකත් ඇමුණුම 7ටම තිබෙනවා. "මගින්ද මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ පවතින පොලී අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතයක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් වෙළෙඳ පොළ ද්‍රවශීලතාව ඇති කිරීම සඳහා වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කර ඇත" කියලා සම්පූර්ණ කරනවා. 4.1.1 ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා ඒක ඉවත් කරන්න කියලා. උඩ එකෙන් ඒකම කියැවෙන නිසා. මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් සහ එම තීරණය දීර්ඝ කිරීම මගින්, -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මාස තුනකට කියලා ඊට පසුව දීර්ඝ කරලා තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නේ ඔක්තෝබර් මාසයට දීර්ඝ කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකම නොවෙයි දීර්ඝ කර තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Continuity එකක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ continuity එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Continuity එකක් තමයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is for three months but you cannot continue it for ten months.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ 'continue' කියන වචනය පිළිබඳ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරමු. නමුත් මෙහි spirit එක තමයි EPF and captive sourcesලාට පමණයි. මේකේ Primary Dealersලා මෙහි නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: But, continue කියලා දාන්න එපා. Because when you go for April, you cannot continue it from October.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය)හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Violation එකක් තිබෙනවා, April to October.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, you are justifying the continuation upto April- අවසරය ගන්නේ සභාපතිතුමා. තව අවුරුදු දහයකට පසුව continue කරන්න බැහැ. එහෙම නම් එය සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ගත්තු තීන්දුව අනුව-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගත්තු තීන්දුව වෙනස් වෙලා නැහැ. 10.07 තීරණයේ තිබෙන්නේත් ඒ sources වලින්ම 0.05කට secondary marketඑකට යන්න පුළුවන් කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වැදගත් වන්නේ ඕක ගේන්නේ EPF එකට පාඩුවක් නොවෙන්න පළමුවෙනි එකෙන් conditionsදාලා නේ. ඒ conditions මෙතැන නැහැ. Second Paper එක ගේන්නේ හොර වැඩකට. සභාපතිතුමා පළමුවෙනි එක EPF අයිතිකරුවන්ට අලාභ නොවන ලෙස ඉතා හොඳට හිතලා බලලා percentage දාලා උද්ධමනය දාලා ගේන්නේ. අපිට EPF පාවිච්චි කරන්න බැහැ මේ රටේ අවශ්‍යතාවලට ණය ගෙවා ගන්න ඕනෑ ගණන්වලට interest rates වලට.

සභාපතිතුමා: පැහැදිලි කිරීම් නොවෙයි. දාන විධිය කියන්නකෝ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මට තිබෙනවා පොඩි අදහසක් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න මෙතැනින් එහාට යන්න පෙර.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ අන්තිම එකේ approvalඑකක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කොහේද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: Board Paper අපට ගෙන්වා ගන්න පුළුවන් නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තිබෙනවාද Board Paper එකක්?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: 2008.10. 07 එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Approved එක තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හොඳට කියවන්න. 'Accordingly, the Monetary Board is invited to approve;'

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: That is not the approval.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying. මේවා වැඳගත්ම තීන්දු මේ රටේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම ඇහුවේ Board paper එකේ approval එකයි දාන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying. First one was approved. That was for three months. I will give it to you. After that nothing was approved. අර ඉතිරි ටිකත් දාන්න. මම ඒකයි කිව්වේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Approval එක තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නේද 10.07.2008 විෂය අංක 20 යටතේ, The Board is having considered the Paper approved of - කොටස් දෙකකට තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 97 කියන පොතේ සඳහන් වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ පොත ගන්න. ඒක බැලුවා නම් ලෙහෙසියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමාටත් මම එකින් එක පෙන්නුවා ලස්සනට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 96 වන පිටුව බලන්න. මේක තිබෙන්නේ. දිනය 07.10.2008 එදාම තිබෙනවා. විෂය අංක 20. The Board is having considered the Paper approved of -

(a) **Issuing** Treasury Bonds to Employees' Provident Fund and other captive sources at a interest rates 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placement; and

(b) **Requesting** the EPF and other captive sources to create liquidity in the secondary

market by actively engage in the secondary market operations.

So, ඒ දෙකටම approval එක දීලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඒක මෙතැනට ඇතුල් කරමු. අර විධියටම ඇතුල් කළා නම් හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සුජීව ඇමතිතුමා කියන එකත් දාගන්න. මෙතැන ලොකු වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. ජනවාරි මාසයේ ඉල්ලුවේ අපේක්ෂිත උද්ධමනයට වඩා සියයට හයක් අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදලට ගෙවන්න කියලා. එසේ ගෙවලා ඒක review කරන්න කියලා කිව්වා අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ. ඒක එහෙම වුණේ නැහැ. එසේ නොවී violateවෙලා ඔක්තෝබර් මාසය වන තුරු කල් ගියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ review කරලා නැද්ද ඒක?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. ඒකත් දාන්න සභාපතිතුමා. That is what I am saying. අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ review කරන්න තිබුණ එක reviewකරලා නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: කොහොමද එහෙම කියන්නේ,

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට තිබෙන කරුණු අනුව.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගෙන් වැඩක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙනම් ඔබතුමා පෙන්වන්නකෝ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඔබතුමා මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් විතරයි. හොඳ ද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට වචනයක් කථා කරන්න දෙන්න

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඔබතුමා කාටත් කථා කරන්න දැන ගන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : Same thing for you.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඔබතුමා මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් විතරයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You are raising your voice and I am also raising my voice. ඔබතුමාත් මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් විතරයි. ඔබතුමා ඔය part එක දාන්න එපා හැමදාම. කෑ ගහලා මෙතැන-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Tone upset කරන්නේ ඔබතුමායි මෙතැන. අපි කියන්නේ මේකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : කිසිම upset එකක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමා තමයි හැමදාම මෙතැන tone එක පටන් ගන්නේ. Your tone is the same and you want us to be the same.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි කියන්නේ මේකයි. පරීක්ෂණයක් කරලා නැති දේවල්වලට, අපි බලපු නැති Board Paper ගන්නේ නැතිව අපට නිකම් කියන්න බැහැ. අපි ඊයේත් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මතු කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ -

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් අහගෙන ඉන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එච්චරයි ද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මම කථා කරන්නේ සභාපතිතුමාටයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හෙමින් කථා කරන්න. මොකද, කෑ ගහන්නේ? **සභාපතිතුමා** : කවුරුත් සාමකාමීව වැඩ කටයුතු කරගෙන යමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : සද්දේ දාලා දිනන්න බැහැ. මෙතුමා ඔක්කෝටම වඩා සභාපතිතුමාට කථා කරන්න දන්නේ නැහැනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සභාපතිතුමාට කථා කරන්න දන්නේ නැහැ කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? සභාපතිතුමා මට කථා කරන්න දැන ගන්න එපායැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒක හරි. ඒක අපි දන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මොනවාද දන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මට කථා කරන්නකෝ. මේක ඔබතුමන්ලා දෙදෙනා අතර ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. කථා කරන කෙනෙක් මට කථා කරන්න. එතකොට මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඉවරයි.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට මිනිත්තුවක් දෙන්නකෝ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : Argument එකකට යන්න එපා.

The Hon. Sujeewas Senansinghe : Why are you telling me? Be fair. If you are telling me you tell him also.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ඔබතුමා කථා කරන්න පටන් ගත්ත වෙලාවේ ඉඳලා ඔබතුමා කථා කරන විලාශය අනුව, -ඒක වරදක් නොවෙයි. ඒක **ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ** රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාගේ හැටි- හැබැයි, -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : So this is correct.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : හැබැයි, **ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ** රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මේක personal ගන්නේ නැතිව MPs විධියට කථා කරන්න දෙන්නකෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මට personal එකක් නැහැ. How many times you have corrected me?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ ගැටුම ඕනෑ නැහැ. මේක ඉවර කරලා-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senansinghe : Why do not you tell him the same thing?

සභාපතිතුමා : හැමෝම මට කථා කළා නම් හරි. ඕනෑ දෙයක් මට කියන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට එක අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න කියලා බොහොම කාරුණිකව ඉල්ලනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : **ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ** රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, අපි මේක ඉවර කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මට මේ කාරණය මතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක නවත්වන්න. අද උදේ රේඩියෝ එකේ පත්තරවල විස්තර කියන කොට සඳහන් කළේ මොකක්ද? "අජිත් පී. පෙරේරායි, සුජීව සේනසිංහයි පිටුවෙන් පිටුවට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ආරක්ෂා කරයි" කියලයි සඳහන් කළේ. අද හැම පත්තරේම තිබෙනවා. ගිය වතාවේත් ඔබතුමා මට කිව්වා, සංයමයෙන් කථා කරන්න කියලා. මා ඉතාමත් හොඳ භාෂාවෙනුයි කථා කළේ. It is very unfair. ඊට පස්සේ පත්තරේ මට විරුද්ධව පළ කර තිබෙන දේ මා ඔබතුමාට පෙන්වන්නම්. ඔබතුමා මට ඔහොම කථා කරන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා : මා කිසි කෙනෙකුට කථා කරලා නැහැ. මා කථා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙතැන විතරයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවා. Verbatim තිබෙනවා ඒකට. පත්තරවලට කියපුවා මට කියන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමා මේක බලන්න. ඔබතුමා කමිටුවේ සභාපති. ඔබතුමා ගිය වතාවේත් මට කිව්වා, සංයමයෙන් කථා කරන්න කියලා. මා ඉතාමත් හොඳින් කථා කළා. කිසිම ලෙසකින් භාෂාව-

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක හරි. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : භාෂාව ඉතාම අශුද්ධ ලෙස භාවිත කළ අයට ඔබතුමා සංයමයක් ගැන කතා කළේ නැහැ. එතකොට පත්තරේ සඳහන් වෙලා එනවා, " Senasinghe draws flack for his conduct at COPE" කියලා. ඔබතුමා සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන්-

සභාපතිතුමා : මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මගේ නමත් සඳහන් කරලා අද පත්තරවල දාලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : " Senasinghe draws flack for his conduct at COPE" කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා. ඔබතුමා කියන මේ වචන පත්තරේට දෙන්නේ මේ විධියටයි. ඔබතුමාගේ වගකීම තමයි මේ කෝප් කමිටුව ඇතුළත කථා වන දේවල් -

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක ගැන කවුරු හරි කෙනෙක් මට complain කළා නම් මට පුළුවන් පත්තරවලට කියන්න. ඒක පත්තරේ ගියා නම් ඒක ගැන මට මෙතැනදී complain කරන එකයි ඔබතුමාට කරන්න තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමා පත්තරේ දකින්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා මේ කමිටුවේ සභාපති.

සභාපතිතුමා : මට හැම පත්තරයම බලන්න විධියක් නැහැනේ. මම ඊයේ ඇත්තටම-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සමා වෙන්න මෙහෙම කියනවාට. ඔබතුමා නියෝජනය කරන පක්ෂයේ හේරත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඊයේ හිරු TV එකේදී සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම මේක ඇතුළේ conduct එක ගැන කථා කළා. ගරු විජිත හේරත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. එකක් කියන්නම්. පරම සත්‍ය කියලා නැහැ. ඇත්ත තිබෙනවා, බොරු තිබෙනවා, වංචාව තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම හැම දේටම ලෝකයේ පිළිගන්නවා, ජනප්‍රියයි කියලා ජනප්‍රිය දේවල්වලට එකඟ වෙන්න බැහැ. එහෙම ජනප්‍රිය දේවල්වලට එකඟ වෙනවා නම් අපි මෙතැන ඉන්නේ නැහැනේ. ඒ නිසා මේවායේ හරි වැරැද්ද අපට තේරෙන පමණට, අපේ නැණ පමණට අපිත් විනිශ්චය කරන්න ඕනෑ. පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මේකේ දේශපාලනයක් තිබෙනවානේ. ඒ දේශපාලනය තුළ ඔබතුමාගේ පක්ෂය නියෝජනය කරන අපේ මිත්‍ර ගරු විජිත හේරත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඊයේ හිරු TV එකේදී මේ කමිටුව ඇතුළත වුණු දේවල් ගැන එතුමාගේ අර්ථ නිරූපණ ඉදිරිපත් කළා. මේ වුණු දේවල් ගැන එතුමාගේ අර්ථ නිරූපණ සහිතව ඊයේ විවේචනාත්මකව කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා, අපි හොරු ආරක්ෂා කරන්න කථා කරනවායි කියලා. එතකොට ඒ හොරුන් ආරක්ෂා කරන්නේ කවුද, කොහොමද, මොන ප්‍රමාණයටද කියන එක අපි නොදන්නවා නොවෙයි. අපි බබ්බු නොවෙයිනේ, සභාපතිතුමා. අපිත් ජීවිතේ මේ දුරක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ මොනවා හෝ අත්දැකීමක් එක්කනේ. ඒ නිසා හොරුන් ආරක්ෂා

කරනවා ද, නැද්ද, කවුද හොරු ආරක්ෂා කරන්නේ, කවුද හොරුන් එක්ක deal දාන්නේ, කවුද හොරු, පෞද්ගලික හොරු කවුද, කවුද මිනීමරුවෝ, කවුද දූෂකයෝ කියලා අපි දන්නවා. අපටත් ඒවා ගැන මිම්මක් තිබෙනවා. **ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ** රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාගෙන් මා ගෞරවයෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා, අනෙක් අය ඔබතුමාව ප්‍රකෝප කරවන්න හැදුවත් ඔබතුමා ප්‍රකෝප වෙන්න එපායි කියලා. නමුත්, මා ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට එක දෙයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. මා බලාගෙනයි හිටියේ. ඔබතුමාගේ මුලින් කිව්වේ "ගන්න පොත" කියලා. එහෙම කියන්න ඔබතුමා කවුද? ඔය වැඩේ පටන් ගන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මා පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. මෙතැන විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තා තිබෙනවා. Verbatim reports තිබෙනවා. ඒ reports ඔක්කෝම ඔබතුමන්ලාට දීලා තිබෙනවා. මෙතුමාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා, වෙනම ලේඛනයක් අරගෙන කථා කරන්න. නමුත්, කාටත් පහසුයි මගේ ළඟ තිබෙන වාර්තාවම, ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා ළඟ තිබෙන වාර්තාවම අරගෙන බලනවා නම්. ඒකනේ ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාත් ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කිව්වේ 97 වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒක පෙන්වන එකයි මම කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට සද්දේ දැම්මාට තිබුණේ නැති පිටු ටික මම පෙන්නුවේ.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne : I want to say a few words. Before you I started.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන්නකෝ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම බොහොම කාරුණිකව ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා මගේ අදහස. මේවා පක්ෂයේ අදහස් නොවෙයි, මගේ අදහස්. අපි ඔක්කෝම මෙතැන ඉන්නේ කම්ටුවේ සාමාජිකයින් හැටියටයි. පක්ෂ හැටියට නොවෙයි. මා විශ්වාස කරනවා, ඒකයි අපේ වගකීම කියලා. දෙවැනි එක, මගේ මිත්‍ර **ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ** රාජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමාට මා කාරණයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. තරහා වෙන්න එපා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, ඔබතුමා කාටවත් කියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. එක එක් කෙනාට කියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne : You do not try to bulldoze anybody.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මට කියන්නකෝ. වෙනත් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් සඳහන් නොකර කථා කරන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන කිහිප වතාවකදීම අපි දැක්කා, මෑත කාලයේ පැමිණි සාමාජික මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් නිලධාරි මහත්වරුන්ව bulldoze කරන්න හදපු හැටි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : රවනවා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : I can look after myself, please. ඊයෙත් මා දැක්කා, නිලධාරි මහත්වරුන්ව bulldoze කරන්න හදන හැටි. දැනුත් මා දැක්කා සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට ඔබතුමාව bulldoze කරන්න හදපු හැටි. අපේ පෞද්ගලික මත භේද තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. පළමු වැනි දේ, මේකට කිසි සේත්ම අපි එකඟ නැහැ. ඒක පළමුවැනි එක. දෙවැනි එක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, -

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : මොකක්ද ඇහුවේ? නොදන්න game එක ද? මට ද කිව්වේ? දත් මිටි කාලා මට-

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස කමිටුවට කියන්නකෝ. ඒ ඇති.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : මෙතැන දත් මිටි කාලා, රවලා-

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne : Mr. Ajith Perera, I am speaking.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා-

සභාපතිතුමා : අපි මේ වාර්තාව ගැන කථා කරමුකෝ.

The Hon. Lakshman Senewiratne : Let me speak will you?

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් පැහැදිලි කිරීම පැත්තක තියලා අපි මේ වාර්තාවේ කාරණාවලට යමු. එච්චරයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණුවලට එන්න. එක එක් කෙනාගේ ආවේග නොවෙයි. වාර්තාවේ කරුණුවලට එන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : මම ඉවර නැහැනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, අපි ආයෙත් මුලට යන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් මම කථා කරමින් සිටියේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට ප්‍රකාශයක් කරන්න තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආයෙත් මුලට යන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. කියනකම් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට -

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මට මගේ කථාව ඉවර කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්නකෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාත් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. මෙතැනදී අපි-ඔබතුමන්ලා හැමෝම ආවේගවලට යන්නේ නැතුව, එක එක පෞද්ගලික ප්‍රශ්න මතු කර ගන්නේ නැතුව වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු ගැන විතරක් කථා කරමු.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කථා කරමින් සිටියේ -

සභාපතිතුමා: වාර්තාවේ කරුණු ගැන කථා කරන්න. 4.1.1ට අදාළව සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරන විධිය ගැන කථා කරලා ඉවර කරන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අපි මේ වාර්තාව මාස 18ක් තිස්සේ හැදුවා. සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට සිටින ඔබතුමා ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණ පක්ෂයේ කෙනෙක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මෙතැනදී ඔබතුමා ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණේ සභාපතිවරයෙකු නොවෙයි, අපට. හරිද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අදාළ නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: තව කෙනෙක් ඔබතුමා පත් කරන්න යෝජනා කරන්න ඇති; මම එකඟ වෙන්නත් ඇති. ඒක එතැනින් අවසානයි. ඔබතුමා සභාපති. මාස 18ක් තිස්සේ අපි සියලු දෙනාම එකඟ වෙලා මේ වාර්තාව -අවසාන වාර්තාවත්- හැදුවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හදලා නැහැ. කෙටුම්පතක් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: හරි. කෙටුම්පත හැදුවා. මටත් කරුණු කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවට අමතරව, ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්නගේ අදහසක් හැටියට එම කරුණු ඇතුළත් කිරීමයි කළ යුත්තේ. ඒ හැර, ඒවා කමිටුවේ අදහසක් නොවෙයි. අපි දැන් මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. බොහොම මහන්සියෙන් -

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් පිරිසක්: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕක තමයි වැරැද්ද.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මම මේ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ මගේ අදහස. I am talking. මට කථා කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කථාව කරගෙන යන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ තිබෙන්නේ, හඳුන්නෙත්තිගේ අදහස්. ඒ නිසා අපි මේකට එකඟ වෙලා - නිකම් විහිළු කරන්න එපා. බොරු කථානේ, ඔය කියන්නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මම කථා කරලා ඉවර නැහැනේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එක්කෙනෙකුට කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙමුකෝ. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමා කථා කරන්නකෝ. අපි එක එක්කෙනා ගනිමුකෝ. එක එක්කෙනා ගන්නකෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මමත් කථා කරන්න වේලාවක් ඉල්ලුවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කරලා අවසන් කරන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එක එක්කෙනාගේ අදහස් ගනිමුකෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මටත් කථා කරන්න වේලාවක් දෙන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු අජිත් මැතිතුමනි, එක එක්කෙනාගේ අදහස් විමසමුකෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මමත් කථා කරන්න වේලාවක් ඉල්ලුවානේ. නමුත් මට වේලාවක් දුන්නේ නැහැනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස ඉදිරිපත් කර අවසන් කරන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ඔක්කෝටම අදහස් තිබෙනවා. අපේ අදහස් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, කරුණාකර පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම මගේ අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නම්. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමා කථා කරන්න. මේ මගේ අදහස. මේ වාර්තාවට එහායින් අපේ අදහස් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ අදහස් - අපි උදාහරණයක් ගනිමු. 17 වැනි පිටුවේ මගේ අදහසක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක මගේ අදහස.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. I am not finished. මම කථා කරලා ඉවර නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව මාස 18ක් තිස්සේ හැදුවේ තනියම නොවෙයි.

ඊළඟට, මේක "සභාපතිගේ වාර්තාව" කියා කවුරුන් හෝ කියනවා නම් ඒක අපට නින්දා කිරීමක්. ඒක අපට කරන නින්දාවක්. මෙය සභාපතිගේ වාර්තාවක් කියා කියනවා නම් ඒක බොහොම වැරදියි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවටත් හොඳ නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. එහෙම නම් කෝප් කමිටුවක් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා සිටියාම ඇති. එහෙම නම් තනියම කරගෙන යන්නකෝ. ඒක සම්පූර්ණ වැරදියි. අපි මාස 18ක් තිස්සේ මේක කරගෙන ආවා. මම එක දෙයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහත්මයාගේ වාර්තාවත් ගන්න එපාය කිව්වා නම් - දැන් මේ කරුණු කාරණා අනුව ආපසු ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහත්මයාගේ වාර්තාව ගන්නය කියා තව කට්ටියක් කියයි. එතකොට මේක කරන්න බැහැ. අපි මාස 18ක් තිස්සේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා යම් කිසි තීන්දුවකට පැමිණියා. මේ වාර්තාවෙන් පරිබාහිරව අපටත් ප්‍රශ්න තිබෙනවා. නැත්තේ නැහැ. හැබැයි, ඒක ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්නගේ අදහස කියා වෙනම කරුණක් හැටියට ඇතුළත් කරන්න. එහෙම දමන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, අපි මෙම වාර්තාවේ වෙනස් කරන්නේ මගේ අදහස හෝ මෙතුමාගේ අදහස විතරයි. එහෙම නැත්නම් මෙතුමාගේ අදහස විතරයි. එහෙම නැතුව කමිටුවේ අදහස නොවෙයි. කරුණාකරලා අපි එතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමනි, ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමා කියපු කාරණයත් සැලකිල්ලට ගනිමින් මම කාරණා කිහිපයක් පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. ඔබතුමන්ලා මුලින්ම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා නම් විතරක් අපි මේ වාර්තාව ගැන කථා කරමු. හේතුව මේකයි. අට වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මම පත් වුණාට පසුව අපි තීරණයක් කළා, කලින් සියලුම සාක්ෂි සටහන් පාවිච්චි කරලා, තවත් ලේඛන පාවිච්චි කරලා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳව තිබෙන විගණන අංශයේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ වාර්තා සියල්ලත් අරගෙන මේ පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරමුය කියා. ඒක කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කර ගත් තීරණයක්. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ ගැන දන්නවා. ඒ තීරණය අනුව තමයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා වාර්තාවක් සකස් කළේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් ඒක පිළිගත්තා.

විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ එම වාර්තාව පදනම් කරගෙන -ඒක පිළිඅරගෙන නොවෙයි, එය පදනමක් හැටියට සලකා ගෙන- අපි වාර අටක් නිලධාරීන් කැඳවා සාක්ෂි සටහන් ගත්තා. එතකොට, ඒ වේලාවේ මෙතැනදී ගරු හර්ෂ මැතිතුමාත් මතු කළ තර්කයක් තමයි, කලින් සාක්ෂි සටහන් යම් පදනමක් යටතේ ලැබුණු ඒවා. ඒ නිසා ඒවා පාවිච්චි කරන එක ගැටලුවක් කියන එක. හැබැයි, ඒක පදනම් කරගත් අවසාන ලේඛනයක් තිබුණු නිසා අපි එම ලේඛනය පදනම් කරගෙන නැවත සාක්ෂි කැඳෙව්වා. මෙම කාරක සභාවේ සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් 26 දෙනාටම එම විමර්ශනයට සහභාගි වෙන්න ඉඩ තිබුණා. එම සාක්ෂි සියල්ල එකතු කරලා, මෙම ලේඛන සියල්ල පදනම් කරගෙන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශයේ නිලධාරීන් තමයි මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කළේ. මේක මම පෞද්ගලිකව හදපු ලේඛනයක් නොවෙයි. එම වාර්තාවේ කෙටුම්පතක් - ලේකම්තුමිය, එම කෙටුම්පත ඉදිරිපත් කළ දිනය මට කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මීට කලින් තව කෙටුම්පතක් -

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මට අවසර දෙන්න. මම කථා කරලා ඉවර වුණාම ඔබතුමන්ලා කථා කරන්න. මොකද, ඔබතුමන්ලා මට බරපතළ චෝදනාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. මේකේ කෙටුම්පත් අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාට දුන්නා. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා එම කෙටුම්පත -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සමාවෙන්න. එය පළමුවැනි කෙටුම්පත.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. පළමුවැනි කෙටුම්පත.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: There is a second Draft.

සභාපතිතුමා: නවවැනි මාසයේ 23 වැනිදා කෙටුම්පතක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නූලෙන් ගැට ගහපු එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. ඔය තිබෙන්නේ ඒක. ලොකු file එකක දමා ඔබතුමන්ලාට ලබා දුන්නේ එම කෙටුම්පතයි. එම කෙටුම්පත සම්බන්ධව සාකච්ඡා කරලා මේකේ අවසාන වාර්තාවක් හදන්නය කියා ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා. එම කෙටුම්පත පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශය විසින් සකස් කළේ. එතකොට එම කෙටුම්පත මත නිර්දේශත් සහිතව අවසාන වාර්තාව හදන්නය කියා ඔබතුමන්ලා

කිව්වා. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශයට නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් කරන්න බැරි නිසා නිර්දේශ ලබා දෙන්නය කියා අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් පෞද්ගලිකවම ඉල්ලා සිටියා. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් තුන්දෙනෙකු තමන්ගේ නිර්දේශ ලිඛිතව ලබා දීලා තිබුණා. එම නිර්දේශත් ලබා ගෙන, පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශය තමයි මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කළේ.

මම දවස් තුනක් උදේ 8.30ට ඇවිල්ලා මෙම කාරක සභා කාමරයේදී පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශයේ නිලධාරීන් සමඟ එම වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධව සාකච්ඡා කළා. එසේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා තමයි - කාරක සභාවේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් තුන්දෙනෙකු විතරක් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු නිර්දේශ නිසා ඒවා විශේෂ නිර්දේශ හැටියට ඇතුළත් කරන්නය කියා කිව්වා. ඒවා file එකක තිබෙනවා. ඊට අමතරව පොදු නිර්දේශත් සකස් කළා. එම පොදු නිර්දේශ සකස් කිරීමේ වගකීම මම කාරක සභාව වෙනුවෙන් භාර ගන්නවා. මෙම ලේඛනයේ සියලු වචනවලට පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශය වෙනුවෙන් මම පෙනී සිටිනවා. එසේ පෙනී සිටින්නේ, මම මෙම වාර්තාව හදලා නොවෙයි. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශය විසින් සාක්ෂි සටහන්, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තා කියන එකී ලිපි ලේඛන මත පදනම්වයි මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඊයේත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා, medium-term debt management strategy කියන එක ගත්තේ කොතැනින්ද කියන එක ගැන. එතකොට මම පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශයට කිව්වා, ඔබතුමන්ලා verbatim reportsවලින් ඒ ටික අරගන්නය කියා. ඇත්තටම අට වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ බලතල අනුව මට තිබෙන්නේ, මේ කැඳවූ වාර අටේ දීපු සටහන්වලින් මේ වාර්තාව හදන්නයි. හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා වාර දෙකක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. අනෙක් අධිපතිතුමා වාර තුනක්ද කොහේද ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ අය දීපු සාක්ෂි සටහන්වලින් මට මෙම වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිවරයෙක් වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන වෙන ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද කියා ඔබතුමන්ලා මට කියන්න. සභාපතිවරයෙක් තමයි, වාර්තාවක් හදලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. ඊට පසුව තමයි කාරක සභාවේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ඒ සම්බන්ධව අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. මම නොවෙයි, මෙම කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජික මන්ත්‍රී 26 දෙනාගෙන් කවුරුන් මෙම සභාපති පුටුවේ හිටියත්, මේක තමයි ක්‍රමය කියා මා හිතනවා. වෙන ක්‍රමයක් නැහැ. එහෙම නැත්නම් මම කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජිකයෙක් හැටියට වාඩි වෙන්නම්. ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් කැමැති කෙනෙකු ඇවිල්ලා මෙම වාර්තාව හදලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන වෙනත් ක්‍රමයක් ගැන මට කියන්න. මට කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා පිළිතුරු දුන්නේ මම කියපු දෙයටයි. මම ඒකට උත්තරයක් දෙන්නම්. ඔබතුමා ඔය කියපු ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. හැබැයි, අපේ ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමා කිව්වේ ඕක නොවෙයි. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශය හදපු කෙටුම්පත තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි කෙටුම්පත. මම මේ කියන්නේ ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ අදහසයි. අපිට මොනවා හරි අදහසක් තිබෙනවා නම් එය මෙම වාර්තාවේ අගට එල්ලන්න පුළුවන් කියා එතුමා සඳහන් කළා.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඔව්. එතුමා කිව්වේ එහෙමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම හරි යන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම ඒ ගැන මොනවත් කියන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම හරි යන්නේ නැහැ. ඔය පත්තර, රේඩියෝ මොනවත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මතක තබා ගන්න, හෘදය සාක්ෂිය කියන එක මේ හැමෝටමත් තිබෙනවා; කරුණු කියන ඒවා හැමෝමත් දන්නවා. තිබෙන අනෙක් ඒවාත් අපි නොදැන ඉන්නවා නොවෙයි. හොඳද? ඒ නිසා මෙම කාර්යයේදී අපි පුළුවන් තරම් තිබෙන තොරතුරු සොයාගෙන, අවංකව කරුණු සොයාගෙන, වාර්තාවල ප්‍රශ්න සොයාගෙන කටයුතු කරමු. මේ ගේම් එක හරි නැහැ. මොකද, ඊයේ රාත්‍රියේ තමුන්නාන්සේලාගේ හිතවත් අපේ මිත්‍ර මන්ත්‍රීතුමා -

සභාපතිතුමා: මම ඒකට පිළිතුරක් ලබා දෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපි දන්නවා, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු සභානායකතුමාත් කථා කළා. මෙම කාරක සභාවෙන් පිට ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් කරන අදහස් දැක්වීම්වලට මට වග කියන්න බැහැ. මෙම කාරක සභාවෙන් එළියට ගිහිල්ලා කවුරු කථා කරනවාද කියා මම දන්නේ නැහැ. මට ඒකට කොහෙත්ම වග කියන්න බැහැ. මෙම කාරක සභාවේ සිටින ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් එළියට ගිහිල්ලා කරන ප්‍රකාශවලට මට වග කියන්න බැහැ. ඒක එම ගරු

මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ වගකීමක්. මගේ පක්ෂයේද, වෙන පක්ෂයකද කියන එක මට අදාළ නැහැ, ගරු මැතිතුමනි.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:** කවුරුන් හොරු රකිනවාද කියන එක සම්බන්ධව අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අපි දෙපැත්තේම හොරුන්ට විරුද්ධව සටන් කරන පක්ෂයක සාමාජිකයන්. ඒ ගැන කිසි බයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කෑ ගහන්නේ නැතුව ඉන්න කියන්න.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:** අපි දන්නවා, කවුද හොරු රකින්නේ කියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මෙම කාරණයට අදාළව විතරක් කථා කරන්න.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:** අපි දකිනවා -

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම කාරණය ගැන විතරක් කථා කරන්න. මෙම කාරණය ගැන විතරක් කථා කරන්න කියායි, මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා හරි, අපි වැරදියි කියන එකද ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ? එහෙම එකක් නැහැ, ගරු බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ ඒකයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පෞද්ගලික මත නොවෙයි, මම මේ වාර්තාව හදපු විධියේ වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා නම් කරුණාකරලා ඒ ගැන කියන්නය කියා මම නැවතත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියනවා. මට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ එපමණයි. මම මේ වාර්තාව හදපු ක්‍රමවේදයේ වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා නම් කියන්න. මෙම වාර්තාවේ අඩංගු ඒවායේ වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒවා නිවැරදි කරන්න. එපමණයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම වාර්තාව හදපු ක්‍රමවේදයේ වැරැද්දක් නොවෙයි තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත්, අපේ ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමා කිව්වා, ''මේක තමයි වාර්තාව, මේකට එකඟ වුණා නම් ඒ කරුණුත්, එකඟ නොවන අයගේ කරුණු පහළිනුත් සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියා'' එකට අපි එකඟ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමාගේ ඒ අදහස ගත්තේ නැහැ නේ, ගරු ඇමතිතුමා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඉතින්, ඒක ඔබතුමා දැන්නේ කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔහොම ඉන්න කියනකම්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමාගේ මතය. ඒක පහළින් සඳහන් කරනවා නම්,-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රකාශයක් ආවේ නැති නිසා-

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු හර්ෂණ මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමා එහෙම කිව්වා. එය එතුමාගේ පුද්ගලික මතය. ඔබතුමා දන්නවා, ඊයේ අපි මේ වාර්තාව ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරද්දී, 3:2 වගන්තියේ සඳහන් කොටසක් වෙනස් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තිබුණා. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ නැති එම කොටසෙහි සංශෝධනයක් කළ යුතුයි කියලා. ඒක ඒ ඡේදයේ කෙළවරටම දාන්නේ. එකක්වත් පහළින් සහ ඉහළින් සඳහන් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න ඕනෑ ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට. ඔබතුමා-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒක වැරදියි කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කථා කළේම නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : මම ඊයේ දවසෙත් කථා කළේ නැහැ. ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් නොවෙයි, මේක හරිම අසාධාරණයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : නැහැ. නැහැ. මම කථා කළේ- ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, හරිම අසාධාරණයි. ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මැතිතුමනි, ප්‍රශ්නයක් ආව අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය නිරවුල් කරලායි ඉදිරියට යන්න ඕනෑ. දැන්, හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මැතිතුමා මතු කරන්නේ, මේ වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධව සාකච්ඡා කරන ක්‍රමවේදය පිළිබඳවයි. ඒකට ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිතුමා පුද්ගලික අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. මම මෙම කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට ලේකම් කාර්යාංශය සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කරලා වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මගේ පුද්ගලික අදහස වන්නේ, ඒ වාර්තාවේ වෙනස්කම් කරනවා නම්, අපි කාටත් එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් වෙනස්කමක් තිබෙනවා නම්, එය පොදුවේ වෙනස්කමක් විධියට යොදමු. එහෙම නැත්නම්, ඒ කරුණුවලට එකඟ වෙන්න බැරි නම්, ඒ ඡේදය කෙළවරේම; ඒ ස්ථානයේම එම

වෙනස්කම වෙනස් විධියකට යොදමු. එපමණයි. ඉතින්, ඒ ක්‍රමයට මෙය කරගෙන යමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම බොහෝ වෙලාවක ඉඳන් විනාඩි දෙකක කාලයක් ලබා දෙන්න කියලා ඉල්ලුවා. අද, "The Island" පත්තරේ මුල පිටුවේ, ලොකුවට පාට කරපු පෙට්ටියක සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාගේත්, අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමාගේත්, මගේත් නම් තුන දාලා අපිව සමච්චල් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එහි සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, "අපි හොරු රකින්න ගියා. පැය 7ක් තිස්සේ ගහ ගත්තා. හැබැයි, අපට කිසි වෙනසක් කරන්න බැරි වුණා, කෝප් වාර්තාව ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම ඉදිරියට ගෙන ගියා" කියලා එම පත්තරේ මුල් පිටුවේ අපේ නම් තුන සඳහන් කර දාලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක හොඳ නැහැ නේ? ඒක වැරැදියි නේ? කොහොමද, මේක වෙන්නේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : හොඳයි. ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා එකඟයි ද මෙම කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිතුමා පක්ෂග්‍රාහීව කටයුතු කරනවා කියලා, මෙම කාරක සභාවේ සභිකයෙක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු සභාවේදී කියනවාට. ඒක වැරැදියි නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම මේ කියන්නේ, අද සිදු වුණු දෙයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : එම නිසා අපට control කරන්න බැරි දේවල් තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒ දේවල් කොහොමත් කියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක හොඳ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා කියන දේ මම පිළිගන්නවා. මේවැනි දෙයක් සිදු වුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා : ඒක පළමු කාරණය. දෙවැනි කාරණය තමයි, අපි මෙය සංශෝධනය කරන විට, හැම කාරණාවකටම එකඟවෙලා සංශෝධනය කරමු. මම කියන්නේ, නැවතත් කල්පනා කරන්න කියලායි, අපි මුලින්ම කථා කරපු රුපියල් 100 ප්‍රශ්නය ගැන. මම හිතන්නේ, අපි ඔක්කෝම එකඟ වෙලා සංශෝධනය කර ගත්තොත් හොඳයි කියලායි. තුන් වැනි කාරණාව තමයි අපි ඉදිරි වැඩ කොටස ආරම්භ කරන්න කලින් මහ බැංකුවට call එකක් දීලා හෝ ෆැක්ස් එකක් යවලා හෝ කියන්න 2008 ජනවාරි ඉඳලා 2008 නොවැම්බර් වෙනකම් සියලුම Monetary Board Papers ෆැක්ස් එක මාර්ගයෙන් අපට ලබා දෙන්න කියලා. එමඟින්, අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ මෙය review කළාද, නැද්ද කියලා බලා ගන්න අපට පුළුවන් වනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක ඔබතුමා දැන්මම කරන්න. මොකද, තව පැය භාගයක්, පැයක් යනකොට අපට ඒ ටික ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමා දැන්ම ඒකට ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණොත්නේ අපට දැන්මම මෙම ප්‍රශ්නය නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. නැත්නම් නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අදම මේක අවසන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔය තේරෙන කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති වාර්තාවේ 248 වෙනි පිටුවේ ඉන්ද්‍රජීත් කුමාරස්වාමී මහතාගේ ප්‍රකාශය බලන්න.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Let the Chairman to take the decision on that.

සභාපතිතුමා : මොන පොතෙන්ද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති වාර්තාවේ, 2008 Board Paper එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉන්ද්‍රජීත් කුමාරස්වාමී මහතාගේ ප්‍රකාශයක් 248වෙනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වනවා. ඒ වාගේම ඔබතුමාගේ- ඒ දෙකම කියවන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එම කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් නිලධාරීන් කැඳවලා පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කළා. මෙතුමන්ලා කියන විධියට, Board එක අනුමත කළාට මේ වචනය නැහැ කියන ප්‍රශ්නය මත නේ මේ ගැටුමකට යන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියන්නේ මේක පරීක්ෂණයක්-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මැතිතුමනි, මට සුළු කාලයක් ලබා දෙන්න. මම ඒකේ copy එක දෙනකම්. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ වාර්තාව අනුමත කරන ක්‍රමය කිව්වා නේ. ඒකට මගේ විරෝධතාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා මුලදී කිව්වා, මෙය සාකච්ඡා කරනවා කියලා. දැන් ඔබතුමා මෙතෙක් කල් කෝප් කමිටුවේ කරපු සම්ප්‍රදායක් තිබෙනවා. මේකේ මහ බැංකුවේ සිද්ධියට පමණක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ සම්ප්‍රදාය, කෝප් කමිටුවේ සම්ප්‍රදාය සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. එදා සිටම,-විජයදාස රාජපක්ෂ මහත්තයාගේ කාලේ සිටම- ඔබතුමාගේ සිටම කෝප් කමිටුවට පත් කරපු සභාපතිවරුන්ගේ ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. මේකට විතරක් priority දෙන්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා, මම කරුණාකරලා ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ, මේ කමිටුව හදපු මතයයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, කෝප් කමිටුවේ සභාපතිතුමා අපි ඔක්කෝම එකතු වෙලා හදපු මතය. මේක තමයි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් හැමදාම සිදු වන්නේ. මේකට පරිබාහිරව යම් පුද්ගලයෙක් යනවා නම්, එතැන අපේ මත දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ අපි මේක නිවැරදියි කියා කියන කොට,

තව අය නැහැ කියනවා. එහෙම නැහැ කියන අයගේ කරුණුත් පහළින් ඇතුළත් කරන්නම් කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වා නේ. ඔබතුමා ඒ අයගේ කරුණු ඇතුළත් කරන්න. හැබැයි, ඒ ප්‍රකාශයන් කරන පුද්ගලයාගේ නමත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න. මොකද, එතකොට හොරායි-පොලීසියයි දෙකම තිබෙනවානේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම තමයි දාන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට ඔබතුමාගෙන් එක ඉල්ලීමක් කරන්න තිබෙනවා. මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්න ඇති වෙන කොට මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් අවසර අරගෙන කථා කළේ. මම එතකොට කිව්වා, ''ඕක බලන්න, ඕක බලන්න'' කියලා. මම ඊයේ පැය තුනක පමණ කාලයක් තිස්සේ ඉඳන් ඔබතුමා ළඟ නැති බොහෝ කරුණු පෙන්වා සිටියා. ඒ කිසිම අවස්ථාවක ''ඕක බලන්න, ඕක බලන්න'' කියලා, මම ඔබතුමාට කිව්වේ නැහැ. ''මේකේ අවසරය ලැබිලා නැහැ'' කියලා මම කිව්වාට පසුව, බිමල් රත්නායක මැතිතුමා මගේ ඇඟට කඩා පැන්නා. ''කොහොමද, අවසර නැහැ කියන්නේ. මෙයා විතරක් නොවෙයි මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඉන්නේ'' කියලා මට කිව්වා. මම කෑ ගැහුවේ නැහැ. ඊට පසුව මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් දෙදෙනෙක්ම මගේ නම කියලා කියනවා, '' ඔබතුමා ආවේගශීලීව කථා කළා'' කියලා. තව කවුරු හරි මට ආවේගශීලීව කථා කළොත්, මමත් කථා කරනවා. මම බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට කලින් ආවේගශීලීව කථා කළේ නැහැ. මම මුල ඉඳන්ම ඉතාම සාධාරණව, අපක්ෂපාතී ලෙස කටයුතු කරනවා. මට ප්‍රශ්නයක්වත් අහන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ. මම මේ කමිටුවට ''අලුතෙන් ආපු පුද්ගලයා'' කියලා මොනවා හරි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. අලුතෙන්-පරණ කියලා නැහැ. මම කෝප් කමිටුවේ කලිනුත් සාමාජිකත්වය දැරුවා. කොප් කමිටුව මට හොඳට පුරුදුයි. නඩු කිව්වා, පොත් ලිව්වා ඒ නිසා කලින් කරපු දේවල් ගැන අපි හොඳින් දන්නවා. සත්‍යයට විතරයි. මම වැරදි දෙයක් කරන්න කියලා කිව්ව තැනක් කොහේ හරි තිබෙනවා නම්, එයින් එක තැනක් කියන්න. මම ඊයේ අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදීම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මේ කමිටුවේ වාර්තාවේ කොයි තරම් වැරදි පෙන්නුවාද? එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලාත් එක්ක මම තරහා වුණේ නැහැ. මම, ''බලනවකෝ ඕක'' කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ. මට දවස් දෙකකට ඇවිල්ලා කෝප් කමිටුවෙන් හදන වාර්තාවේ වැරදි පෙන්වන්න පුළුවන් නම්, ඉතින් මට එක් කරුණක් miss වුණාම ඔබතුමා '' බලන්න ඕක'' කියලා මට සැර වෙනවා. මම ''ඒකේ අවසරය නැහැ'' කියලා කිව්වාම, අවසරය නැත්නම් බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන්න ඕනෑ වන්නේ, '' අවසර තිබෙනවා'' කියලායි. මේක සාකච්ඡා කරලා විසඳා ගන්න ඕනෑ එකක් නේ. ඔබතුමා ඊයේ කිව්වා, මේ නිර්දේශ දාලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. එතකොට මේ අවසාන වාර්තාව නොවෙයි නේ. මෙය එක එක්කෙනොගේ නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් කරලා, අපට යම් කිසි එකඟතාවකට එන්න පුළුවන් විධියේ යම් මූලාශ්‍රයක් -draft එකක් -. ඒ මූලාශ්‍රය අගට අපි විවිධ අදහස් දැක්වුවාම ඔබතුමා සහ කමිටුව ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් කිසි අදහසකට එනවා. එකඟ වෙන්න බැරි නම් විකල්ප අදහස් ඇතුළත් කරනවා. එච්චරයි. මොකද, මම කොයි වෙලාවකවත් කෑ ගහන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මට කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න. මට කථා කරන්න එපා නම්, ඔබතුමා මගේ කථාව නවත්වන්න. ඒක ඔබතුමා හසුරුවන්න. මොකද, වෙන කාටවත් කියන්න බැහැ, '' ඔබතුමා මෙහෙමයි, මෙහෙමයි'' කියලා. මම කථා කරනවා වැඩි නම්, '' සුජීව, ඔබතුමාට කථා කරන්න ලැබුණු කාලය අවසානයි'' කියලා ඔබතුමා කියන්න. ඒක ඔබතුමාට භාරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමාට, ''මම පොත බලන්න'' කියලා කිව්ව එකෙන් යම් අපහසුතාවක් ඇති වුණා නම්, මම ඒ ගැන කනගාටු වෙනවා. අපි මෙම කාරණාව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මට එක් කරුණයි miss වුණේ, ඔබතුමා ඇඟට කඩන් පැන්නා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට නම් පෙනෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. මේ අවුරුදු එකහමාරක් තිස්සේ ඉඳන් මමත්, ඔබතුමාත් කෝප් කමිටුවේ හිටියා. මෙම වාර්තාවට ඒවාත් පදනම් කරගන්න පුළුවන් වුණා. මම මෙම වාර්තාව ඊයේ බැලුවා. මේ වාර්තාවේ අපි මෙතෙක් කරපු පරීක්ෂණවලට අදාළව ඒ පරීක්ෂණයේ නැති කිසිම දෙයක් නැහැ. තිබෙන දේවල්වල අඩුවක් හෝ වෙනත් මොනවා හරි දෙයක් තිබෙනවාය කියන එක දැනෙන්නේ නැහැ. එක එක කරුණු තිබෙනවා. මෙම කරුණු ප්‍රමාණවත්ය කියලා මට හිතෙනවා. එතකොට අපි මෙහිදී බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ, එක පුද්ගලයෙක් විසින් තනතුරක් දරලා ඒ පුද්ගලයා මේ රටේ මහජන මුදල් තමන්ට ඕනෑ පරිදි පාවිච්චි කළාද කියන එකයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන්, පොල් ගෙඩියක් හොරකම් කළාමත් -ඉස්කෝලේ ළමයින් වුණත්- පොලීසියෙන් ගෙනියලා, උසාවි දාලා නඩු ඇහුවා. මට මතකයි එවැනි සිදුවීමකට මීට කලින් හිටපු ආණ්ඩුව මැදිහත් වුණා. ඒක නිසා මේ වාර්තාවේ අඩුවක් නැහැ.

ඒක ඵලදායී වුණා. මම හිතන්නේ ඊයේ බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු සමහර කරුණුවලින් වාර්තාව තව පෝෂණය වුණා. ඒ

වාගේ අවස්ථා තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. එවැනි කරුණු එකතු කර ගන්න, එහෙම නැත්නම් මේකට අලුතෙන්ම තව මොනවා හරි ඡේදයක් එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම්, එකතු කරන්න. නැත්නම් වෙන්නේ මොකක්ද? මේකේ සමහර ඒවා සංශෝධනය කරන්න ගියොත් මට පෙනෙනවා, හොරකම කිලෝ දහසක් නම් - මේකේ වාර්තාවේ කිලෝ දහසක බර තිබෙනවා නම්, සමහර කරුණුවලින් ග්‍රෑම් පනහ, සියය අඩු වුණොත්, මේ වාර්තාවේ weight එක පහළ බහිනවා. දැන් අපට ඒක තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපි හැමෝම කලබලයෙන් ඉන්නේ. අපි හැමෝටම හැම වාර්තාවම මතක හිටින්නේ නැහැ. ඒක නිසා weight එක පහළ බහිනවා. නමුත් බැලු බැල්මට අපි දැක්කා මේ පරීක්ෂණයේදී, වංචාවක් සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන බව, අක්‍රමිකතාවක් සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන බව, ඒකට වෙච්ච මැදිහත්වීමක් තිබෙන බව. බැලු බැල්මට ඒ කරුණු මේ වාර්තාවෙන් සහතික වෙනවා. ඒ සහතික වීම තමයි අපට දෙන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙන්නේ. ඉතින් අද මේ රටේ තොරතුරු දැන ගැනීමේ අයිතියත් තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙන නිසා ඕනෑ නම් රටේ මිනිසුන්ට බලන්න මුළු වාර්තාවත් තිබෙනවා. ඉතින් ඒක නිසා ඒ සංක්ෂිප්ත වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අපි එච්චරටම මෙතැන ගැටුම් ඇති කර ගත යුතු නැහැ. ඒ අවශ්‍ය කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මේකෙන් මම හිතන්නේ නැහැ, - අපි මෙහෙම උපකල්පනය කළොත්, කාට හරි මේ වාර්තාව අර ගෙන අධිකරණයකට යාමේදී මොනවා හරි ඒකේ බරක් අඩු කර ගන්න අපේ වචන දෙක තුනක් - නීතිය කියනෙන් වචන නේ. වචන දෙක තුනක් එහා මෙහා වුණොත් සමහර ඒවා යන්න පුළුවන්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු අපි පිළිගත්තා. ඒ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු අධ්‍යයනය කළාම මේකට අදාළව ඒකේ ගැටුමක් නැහැ. මෙතෙක් කරපු පරීක්ෂණවල කරුණු අපි පිළිගත්තා. ඒ පරීක්ෂණවලට අදාළවත් මේකේ ගැටුමක් නැහැ. තාක්ෂණිකව අපි මේකේ අසාධාරණයක් වෙනවා කියලා හැම වෙලාවේම තර්ක කරන්නේ, අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන්ට අසාධාරණයක් වෙනවාද කියන එක ගැනද, එහෙම නැත්නම් ආණ්ඩුවට - රජයට - අසාධාරණයක් වෙනවාද කියන එක ගැනද? අපි හැම වෙලාවේම ඉන්නේ රජය පැත්තේ. රජයට අසාධාරණයක් වුණාද කියන පැත්ත විතරයි අපට බලන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙන්නේ. තනි පුද්ගලයෙකුට අසාධාරණයක් වුණාද කියන එක ගැන බලන්න අපට වැඩක් නැහැ. එතකොට අපි අසාධාරණයක් වුණාද කියලා හැම වෙලාවේම මේ පරීක්ෂණයේදී බලන්නේ, රජයට. ඒ කියන්නේ මහජන මුදල්වලට අසාධාරණයක් වුණාද කියලායි. මහජන මුදල්වලට අසාධාරණයක් වුණාද කියන අර්ථයෙන් බලනවා නම් මේ වාර්තාවේ හානියක් මට පෙනෙන්නේ නැහැ. විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ කිසි ගැටලුවක් නැහැ, මහජන මුදල්වලට, රජයට හානියක් වුණාද කියන පැත්තෙන් බලනවා නම්. හැබැයි පුද්ගලයාට හානියක් වුණාද කියන පැත්තෙන් බලනවා නම් මේ වාර්තා ඔක්කෝම බොරු. ඕක තමයි මගේ තර්කය.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි අනෙක් කරුණුවලට යමුද? ඔබතුමන්ලාට තවත් මොනවා හරි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවාද? එතකොට දැන් 4.1.1.ට අදාළ සංශෝධනය මම ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම පොඩි යෝජනාවක් කරනවා. දැන් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය එන්නේ review එක කළාද කියලා නේ. ඒ review එක කළේ නැත්නම් එතැනින් ඉදිරියට මේක කර ගෙන යන්න බැහැ. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා වැදගත්ම දේ තමයි review එක කළාද කියන එක. Review නොකර යන්න බැහැ නේ. මේක මේ ඉතාම අත්‍යවශ්‍ය කටයුත්තකට ගත්ත තීන්දුවක්. එතකොට review එක ගත්තාද කියලා බලන්න කියලා හරි දමන්න. Review එක කළාද, -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක වැදගත්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඉතා වැදගත්.

සභාපතිතුමා: වඩා හොඳ දෙය තමයි හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා මතු කරපු ආකාරයට මහ බැංකුවට අපි fax message එකක් යවමු, 2008.01.07 –

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මම ඒකට එකඟ නැහැ. මොකද, දැන් අපි පරීක්ෂණයක් - අපි මේ අවසන් වාර්තාව හැදුවේ දින ගණනක් සියලු කරුණු සැලකිල්ලට අර ගෙන, ඒ මතු වුණු සියලු වාචික සාක්ෂිත් පදනම් කර ගෙනයි. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම යම් පැහැර හැරීමක් තිබුණා නම්, ඒ කමිටුව ඒ වෙලාවේ ඒ ලේඛන මතු කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට දැන් නැවත වරක් මේ ලේඛන ගෙනැල්ලා - ඒක නැවත කැඳවීමක්. ඒ ලේඛන ගෙනෙන එක අපට අදාළ දෙයක් නොවෙයි. දැන් මේක ඉදිරිපත් කරලා යම් කිසි විවාදයකදී, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඊට පස්සේ ඇති වන අධිකරණ ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයකදී, පැහැර හැරීම් තිබුණා නම් ඒවා ගෙනැල්ලා සනාථ කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. දැන් අපිම කථා කරලා, අපිම අවසන් කරලා, අපිම සාක්ෂි සම්පින්ඩනය කරපු වාර්තාවක් තුළ නැවත ඒ ලේඛන ගෙනැල්ලා ඒ ලේඛනවල නිරවද්‍යතාව ගැන අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්න යනවා නම්, එතැන අලුත් තත්ත්වයක් මතු වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මම ඒකට එකඟ නැහැ. මේ තිබෙන කරුණු මත

යමු. පැහැර හැරීම් තිබෙනවා නම් එතුමන්ලාට සඳහන් කරන්න කියන්න. එතුමන්ලාට සඳහන් කරන්න පුළුවන්, මෙහෙම පැහැර හැරීමක් තිබෙනවා, ඒ නිසා මේ කාරණාවට අපි එකඟ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමාගේ කථාවේ සත්‍යයක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට වෙන්නේ review එකක් කළේ නැහැ කියන නිගමනයට අපට එන්න වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් අපි ඒක ඔබතුමාගේ සටහනක් විධියට ඇතුළත් කරමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට වචනයක් කථා කරන්න දෙන්න. ඒක මම අගය කරනවා. නමුත් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට මම මෙතැනදී පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ, මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පැන නඟින්නේ අපට මේ Auditor-General ලබා දීපු වාර්තාවේ පිටුවක් නැති වුණු නිසා බව. වැදගත්ම පිටුවක් මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඒක අපේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලයේ filesවල තිබුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ වුණාට අපේ ළඟ නැහැ නේ. අපට ලැබුණු Auditor-Generalගේ වාර්තාවේ වැදගත්ම පිටුව නැහැ. මොකක්ද, වැදගත්ම පිටුව? පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ primary dealersලාට private placement කරන්න පුළුවන්ය කියන අවස්ථාව දීලා තිබෙන්නේ මාස තුනකට පමණයි කියන Monetary Board එකේ Report එක මේ පොතේ නැහැ. ඒක හම්බ වුණේ ඊයේ. ඊයේ නේ හම්බ වුණේ. ඒක ඉතාම වැදගත් දෙයක්. ඊයේ නේ අපට මේක හමුබ වුණේ.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: That is shocking.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක එච්චර වැදගත් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වැදගත්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මොකද දන්නවාද? අපේ මූලික තර්ක පදනම් වුණේ මුලින්ම, - අපේ intension එක මොකක්ද? මට ඒක කියන්න. අපි මුලින්ම තර්ක කළා, ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව pure science එකක් නොවෙයි, ඒ නිසා ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවෙන් ගන්න තීන්දු වරදින්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ ඒක abort වුණා. ඒක ඔප්පු කර ගන්න බැරි වුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇයි?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ තර්කයම පාවිච්චි කරලා තමයි ග්‍රීක බැඳුම්කර නඩුවේදී අදාළ වූදිතයන් නිදහස් වෙලා තිබුණේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මේකට අදාළ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම කියන්නම්. මට කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න කෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කලින් එක abort වුණු කථාවක් කියන්න බැහැ. එහෙම එකක් වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම එකක් මෙතැන විවාද වුණා. ඊළඟ කාරණය මේකයි. දැන් මේ අපි නිශ්චිතම කාරණයට ආවොත්, මේක මේ direct placement සහ auction කියන ක්‍රමය මේ මහ බැංකු වාර්තාවේ manual එකේ තිබෙනවා. ඒක 2013 ජූලි 31 වන විට අනුමත වෙලා තිබුණු බැංකු වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා. අපි මේ කථා කරන බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ 2015 සහ 2016 වර්ෂවල. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ මේ ඔබතුමන්ලා කථා කරන Board Paper එක 2008 වසරට අදාළ එකක්. මහ බැංකුවේ පෙර වැරදි ගැන සොයන අවස්ථාවකදී ඒක ඉතා වැදගත් එකක්. නමුත් අපට අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ මහ බැංකුව auction සහ direct placement කියන tools දෙකම පාවිච්චි කළාද, නැද්ද කියන එක ඔප්පු කර ගන්න නම්, ඒකට ඉතාම ප්‍රමාණවත්, manual එකේ තිබෙන එක. මම තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් Board Paper එක ඉල්ලනවාට එකඟයි. හැබැයි ඔබතුමා හිතනවා, ඒක 2008 ඔක්තෝබර් දක්වා ඇති කියලා. තව කෙනෙක් හිතුවොත් 2011 Board Papers ටිකත් ඕනෑ කියලා, තව කෙනෙක් හිතුවොත් - එතකොට වෙන දේ තමයි, මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය නැවත අපි අමුතුම පරීක්ෂණයකට යෑම. අපට Board Papers 200ක් අධ්‍යයනය කරන්න බැහැ නේ. Board Papers 100ක්වත් ඇති නේ අඩු ගණනේ, අවුරුදු අටකට. ඒ නිසා මම කියන්නේ - පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශය සහ සභාපතිතුමා වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා කාලය නාස්ති කරන්නේ නැතුව, - පුළුවන් තරම් include කර ගෙන යන්න අපි අවුරුද්දක්-මාස අටක් විතර උත්සාහ කරලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් මම ඉතා වගකීමෙන් කියනවා, අපට එකඟ වෙන්න බැරි දේවල්වලින් -නිකම් අරකටත් නැති, මේකටත් නැති දේවල්වලින්- මේ වාර්තාව දියාරු මොකක් හරි එකක් කරනවා වෙනුවට, වාර්තා දෙකක් දෙන්න කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දෙකක් ඇයි? එහෙම නම් හතරක්-පහක් දෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. හතරක් හරි පහක් හරි දෙන්න. ඒකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මොකද දන්නවාද? මම උදාහරණයක් කියන්නම්.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එක්සත් ජාතික පක්ෂයට ඕනෑ විධියට වාර්තා හදන්න බැහැ. රටේ ජනතාවට ඕනෑ විධියටයි වාර්තා හදන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට එතුමාගේ අදහස ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න දෙන්න. ඒක අදහසක්. ඒක අදහසක්. ඒකට එකඟ නොවුණාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: දැන් අපි නැවත Board Papers කැඳවන්න ගියාම ඒක ඉවර වෙන්නේ නැහැ. තව වාර්තාවක් කැඳවන්න හිතෙන්න පුළුවන්. මට හිතුනොත් වෙන එකක්ම ගන්න. මම කිව්වොත් 2011 වසරේ -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක විශේෂ දෙයක් නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාට විශේෂ එක මට විශේෂ වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක තිබුණේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක අදාළ නැහැ. ඒක අදාළ වෙන්නේ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට එතුමාගේ අදහස ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න දෙන්න. එච්චරයි. සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාට මම ඊට පසුව අවස්ථාව දෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: දිගට කථා කරන කවුරුත් හිතා ගත්තා නම් හොඳයි, අන්න ඒ අමාරුව අනෙක් අයටත් තිබෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා සම්බන්ධිතයි.

ඒ අමාරුව අනික් අයටත් දැනෙන බව කවුරුත් හිතා ගත්තොත් හොඳයි.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියන්නේ ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමාගේ intention එක මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ එය නිශ්චිත කර ගැනීම වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. හැබැයි, ඒ කාරණය විසින් අනිවාර්යයෙන් මේ කටයුත්ත දිග් ගස්සනවා. Board Papers 100ක් අධ්‍යයනය කරන්න බැහැ. තව වාර්තා ගෙනෙන්න කියලා කියයි. 2011 වර්ෂයේ විගණකාධිපතිගේ වාර්තාව ගෙනෙන්න කියයි; 2009 විගණකාධිපතිගේ වාර්තාව ගෙනෙන්න කියයි. මට හිතුණොත් එහෙම පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි. එහෙම නම් ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අපි ඒක නැත්නම්.,

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: කරුණාකරලා මම කියන්නේ COPE කාරක සභාවට_මේ පරීක්ෂණය විතරක් නොවෙයි, තව පරීක්ෂණ කරන්න තිබෙනවා. සභාපතිවරයා ලේකම් කාර්යාලය සමඟ එක්ව සකස් කරපු වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාවේ තවත් පිටු 30ක් පමණ අපට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනුව අපට එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් කාරණාවලට එකඟ වෙමින්, ඔක්කෝම අයට එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් කාරණා සම්පූර්ණ වශයෙන් amend කරමින්, එකඟ වෙන්න බැරි කාරණාවලට කලින් සඳහන් කළ පරිදි එතැනම සටහන් යොදමින් මේ කටයුත්ත අවසන් කරමු කියන යෝජනාව තමයි මම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. එසේ නැතිව හොරාගේ වාර්තාවයි, පොලීසියේ වාර්තාවයි දෙකම එකක් කරන්නට මම කිසිසේත් එකඟ නැහැ. ඒක කරන්න බැහැ. මම ඉතාමත් වුවමනාවෙන් කියනවා, මෙතැන හොරු ආරක්ෂා කිරීමක් තිබෙන බව. ඒ කාරණය මම පැහැදිලිව දකිනවා. හොරෙක් රකින්න හදනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:ගරු සභාපතිතුමා.,

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හොරු ටික. හොරා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි එක එක්කෙනා කථා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට පළමුව අවස්ථාව දෙමු. ඊට පසු අවස්ථාව ඔබතුමාට දෙන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, අපට ඇත්තටම COPE වාර්තාව කියන්නේ මොකක්ද, කියන එක ගැන කාගේවත් හරි අදහසක් නැහැ. මොකක්ද, දැන් මේ වාර්තාවෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ? මොනවා හරි ලියලා දෙන්නද? ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කළ යුතු ක්‍රියා පිළිවෙත එනම් නීති අනුව, රෙගුලාසි අනුව , Manuals අනුව කියන වැදගත්ම කාරණා අමතක කරලා අපට ඕනෑ විධියට මේ වාර්තාව.,

මේ COPE කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව කියන්නේ රචනාවක් නොවෙයි. මේ කරුණු හරියට දැනගෙන වාර්තාව ලියනවාද? මොකද, පොඩි කරුණු ගෙනෙන්නේ. Board Papers දෙකක Manual එක අනුව නේ සිදුවෙන්නේ. Manual එකට පිටින් යනවා නම් තාවකාලිකව කරනවා නම් Board Paper එකක් ගෙනෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මීට අදාළව මේ Board Paper එක ගෙනැල්ලා තිබෙනවාද, මේ Board Paper එකේ review එක කරලා තිබෙනවාද, ඊළඟට, ගෙන එන ලද Board Paper එක හරිද කියන කාරණා ටික අමතක කරලා

අපට COPE වාර්තාව ලියන්න පුළුවන් නම්, සියලු කාරණා අපි සැලකිල්ලට නොගෙන මේ වාර්තාව හදනවා කියා එහෙම නම් ලියන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නැතුව අපි COPE කමිටු වාර්තාව වගකීමක් සහිතව ලියනවා නම් මේ කියන ලද කරුණු කාරණා ගැන අපට සැලකිලිමත් වෙන්නට වෙනවා. ඒ දෙක අනුව කොහොමද ලියන්නේ කියන එක ඔබතුමා තීන්දු කරන්න. ඔබතුමා "සියලු කරුණු මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි සලකා බලා නොමැත; අපට ලැබුණු කරුණු අනුව COPE වාර්තාව සකසමි." කියලා ලියනවා නම් මේ කියන කථාව හරි. ඒකට එකඟ වෙලා ඒ වාර්තාවට අපිත් සූදානම්. මොකද, කාටවත් තෙරෙන්නේ නැහැ COPE වාර්තාව කියන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා. මෙහි නිර්දේශ දමනවාද, නැත්නම් ඔබතුමා හදන වාර්තාව අවසන් වාර්තාවක්ද, එය කෙටුම්පතක්ද, මේක model එකක්ද කියන කාරණය ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කාටවත් තවම තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා, මේ වාර්තාව මොකක්ද කියන එක තේරුම් කරලා දුන්නොත් හොඳයි. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, සමහර කට්ටියගේ නිර්දේශ මෙහි ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙනවා ඒවා ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස් නොවෙයි කියලා. මන්ත්‍රීවරු නිර්දේශ ලබා දුන්නා. මෙන්න මේ නිර්දේශය කරන්න කියා දුන්නාම ඒකත් ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා ඔබතුමා කිව්වා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක ඉතා වැදගත්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ කථාව ඉවරයිද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉවර නම් මම ඉවර කරනවා නේ. ඒක වැදගත් වන්නේ ඔබතුමා කියනවා, සමහර ඒවා මන්ත්‍රීවරු දුන්න නිර්දේශ බව. එතකොට සමහර මන්ත්‍රීවරු හිතාගෙන ඉන්නවා මේ වාර්තාව සියලු දේ සලකා බලා දෙන වාර්තාවක් කියලා. එතකොට මේ නිර්දේශය හරිද වැරදිද කියා බලලා මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කිරීමට ඔබතුමා තීරණයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, දෙන ලද නිර්දේශය ඇතුළත් කළා නම් මේක වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි. එතකොට කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වැදගත්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැදගත්. ඒ ගැන අවබෝධ කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. තර්ක කරලා හරි යන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා කියන්න ඕනෑ අපි කොතැනද ඉන්නේ කියන එක.

සභාපතිතුමා:ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මතු කළ කාරණාවේදී ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වුණා මේ වාර්තාවේ අපි ඉන්නා ස්ථාවරය කොතැනද කියන එක ගැන. ඒ ගැන මම නැවත පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ. මම කලිනුත් පැහැදිලි කළා; කලිනුත් දීර්ඝව පැහැදිලි කළා. මම නැවතත් පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. මොකද, තේරෙන්නේ නැත්නම් නැවත පැහැදිලි කරන්න වෙනවා නේ.

මේ කෙටුම්පතේ ඒ සාරාංශය ඇතුළත් වනවා. අට වන පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මේ කාරක සභාවට අපි පත්වුණාට පසුව විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට බාරදුන්නා අපට උදව්වක් හැටියට පරණ ලේඛන සියල්ල පාවිච්චි කරලා - නැවත සාක්ෂි කැඳවන්න අවශ්‍ය නැති නිසා- ඒ සියලු සාක්ෂි සටහන් පදනම් කරගෙන අපට වාර්තාවක් ලබා දෙන්න කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් දන්නවා, ඒ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ බව; ගරු කථානායකතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කළ බව සහ මේ කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ බව. ඉදිරි විමර්ශනයේදී එය පදනම් ලේඛනයක් හැටියට අපි සලකනවා කියා තීරණය කළා. ඒ අනුව අපි වාර අටක් මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් කැඳෙව්වා. ඒ අවස්ථා 8 ගැනම මේකේ සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. 2016.06.08 වෙනිදා සිට අපි දිගට කැඳවීම් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කැඳවූ සාක්ෂි verbatim හැටියට තිබෙනවා. එහිදී දීපු උපදෙස්, උත්තර පත්තර හැටියට තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවට මහ බැංකුවෙන් එවන ලද පිළිතුරු තිබෙනවා. ඒ පිළිතුරුවලට විගණකාධිපතිවරයා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද නිරීක්ෂණ තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැනත් අපි මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඊළඟට අපි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට යවන ලද ප්‍රශ්නාවලියක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නවලියට මහ බැංකුවෙන් දෙන ලද පිළිතුරු තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට අපි යවන ලද ප්‍රශ්නාවලියක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නාවලියට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් දෙන ලද පිළිතුරුත් තිබෙනවා. ඒවා ඇමුණුම් වශයෙන් ඇමුණුම් 18ක තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාව කියන්නේ වාර්තාව විතරක් නොවෙයි. මේ සියලු ලේඛන, ඇමුණුම් සහිත වාර්තාව. ඒ සියල්ලත් එක්ක ඔබතුමන්ලා අපට ඉදිරිපත් කළා මේකට කෙටුම්පතක් සකස් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒ කෙටුම්පත සකස් කරලා සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට අපි ලබා දුන්නා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පළමුවෙනි කෙටුම්පත.

සභාපතිතුමා: පළමුවෙනි එක. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමට කලින් තිබූ පළමුවෙනි කෙටුම්පත. 2016. 09. 23 වන දින. එහි තිබෙනවා, කාරක සභාව පමණක් රැස්විය. "පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් සකසනු ලබන තොරුතුරු වාර්තාව ගැන සාකච්ඡා කිරීම." ඒ කියන්නේ තොරතුරු වාර්තාවක් හැටියට. මේකේ flow එක. මේකේ ගමන ගැන. එය පදනම් කරගෙන ඔබතුමන්ලා එදින යෝජනා කළා මෙහි අවසාන වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරලා කාරක සභාව හමුවට

දෙන්න කියලා. එතකොට ප්‍රශ්නයක් ආවා, වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් එහි නිර්දේශයන්, නිගමනයන් ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට දෙන්න බැහැ කියලා. එතකොට අපි ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට දුන් උපදේශය අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වා නිර්දේශ ලිඛිතව දෙන්න කියලා. ඒ නිර්දේශත් ඇතුළුව තමයි ඇත්තටම මේ වාර්තාව හැදුවේ. මේක කෙටුම්පතක් විධියට සලකන්න ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නිර්දේශ විතරක් නොවෙයි. අදහස් දෙන්න කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අදහස් දෙන්න කියලා. ඊට පසුව මන්ත්‍රීවරු තිදෙනෙක් ලිඛිතව අදහස් දීලා තිබුණා. අපි බොහෝ වේලාවට විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ නිර්දේශ සහ නිගමනයන් මත තමයි පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තා සකස් කරන්නේ. ඇත්තටම සාමාන්‍ය විධියට හදන පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා වාර්තාවක් නම් මේ හදන්නේ ඒ ටික පමණක් ඇතුළත් කරලා වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මේ කෙටුම්පතේ ඔබතුමන්ලා බලන්න ඉතා පැහැදිලිව විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ නිර්දේශයන් සහ නිගමනයන් වෙනම තිබෙනවා. මන්ත්‍රීවරු දුන් ලිඛිත අදහස් විශේෂ නිර්දේශ හැටියට තිබෙනවා. ඒවා මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නමින් දැම්මේ නැත්තේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු තිදෙනෙක් පමණක් දීපු නිසායි. ඊයේ ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා යෝජනා කළ ආකාරයට මම මගේ සංශෝධනයක් හැටියට ලියාගෙන ආවා කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ හැටියට මේක ඉදිරිපත් කරමු කියලා. නම් හැටියට නොවෙයි, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ හැටියට. ඒ කාරණාවත් එක්ක මේ කාරක සභාවට අවශ්‍ය වටිනාකමක් ඇති කරන්න තමයි පොදු නිර්දේශයක් ඔබතුමන්ලාට දුන්නේ. එහි වගකීම මම බාරගන්නවා. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයත් සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඒ පොදු නිර්දේශය මම ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ නම් මේ ලේඛනයේ තිබෙන පොදු නිර්දේශයත් වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්; මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නිර්දේශයත් වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්; තව නිර්දේශ එකතු කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒවායේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එතකොට තිබෙන්නේ මෙය කෙටුම්පතක් විධියට දැන් සලකා කටයුතු කිරීමයි. කාරක සභාවට වාඩිවෙන සභාපතිවරයෙක් ඒ කියන්නේ මම නොවෙයි ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට කරන්න වෙන්නේ මේ ආකාරයට තමයි කියලායි මම හිතන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියූ කාරණා පොඩ්ඩක් නිවැරදි විය යුතුයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මෙය වාර්තාව හැටියට සලකනවා නම් මේ කෙටුම්පත සම්පූර්ණ වශයෙන් අනුමත කරන්න පුළුවන්. කවුරු හරි මෙය වාර්තාව නොවෙයි කියා විශ්වාස කරනවා නම් මේකට වෙනස් වාර්තාවක් දෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. කාරණා මේවා නොවෙයි කියා විශ්වාස කරනවා නම් මෙයට සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. එච්චරයි කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. මම කියන්නේ මම නොවෙයි, වෙන කවුරු හරි සභාපති වුණත් ඕක තමයි කරන්න වෙන්නේ. ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා කියන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට පොඩ්ඩක් කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් අවසාන කරන්න. නැත්නම් මොකද වෙන්නේ හඳුන්නෙත්තිගේ වාර්තාවක් COPE කමිටුවෙන් යන්න බැහැ. ඒක ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා:ගරු සභාපතිතුමා මට විනාඩි 5ක් කථා කරන්න දෙන්න. කාරක සභාව අද රැස්වෙලා තිබෙන්නෙත්, අගමැතිතුමා දිගින් දිගටම කමිටු පත් කළෙත්, මේ ඔක්කෝම දේවල් කළේ මහ බැංකුවේ ඇති වුණ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධවයි.

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙන්න පුළුවන්, රජයේ ගිණුම් පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව වෙන්න පුළුවන්, විශේෂ කාරක සභා වෙන්න පුළුවන් වාර්තා දෙක තුන ඉදිරිපත් කරපු අවස්ථා පාර්ලිමේන්තු ඉතිහාසයේ අනන්තවත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනුව වාර්තා දෙක තුනක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ හැකියාව අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම තිබෙනවා. ඒ කාරණය මා හිතන්නේ ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලි කරාවි. ස්ථාවර නියෝග අනුව එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. මේ කාරක සභාවේ සිටින සාමාජිකයෙකු වශයෙන් මා ඔබතුමා කියපු කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් මේ වාර්තාව සංශෝධනය කරන්න පුළුවන්. සාමාජිකයින්ට ඕනෑ නම් සංශෝධන නොකර ඉන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒ කාරණයත් පැහැදිලි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඕනෑ නම් සංශෝධන නොකර ඉන්නත් පුළුවන්. මේ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව මම අනුමත කරනවා. අනිකුත් සාමාජිකයනුත් ඒ ගැන කියාවි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ සම්බන්ධව ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාවත් අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම අපි අනුමත කරනවා. ඒ අනුව මේ වාර්තා දෙකම අපි අනුමත කරනවා. අපි කලිනුත් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ හිටියා. මේ හැම දෙයක් සම්බන්ධවම අපිට යම්කිසි ආකාරයක මතකයක් තිබෙනවා. සුජීව සේනසිංහ ඇමතිතුමාත් කලින් කාරක සභාවේ හිටියා; අපිත් හිටියා; ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාත් හිටියා; වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මැතිතුමාත් හිටියා. විශේෂයෙන්ම මේ

සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයෙන් අනුමැතියක් ගත යුතුද නැද්ද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳව තමයි ඊයේ දිගින් දිගටම සාකච්ඡා කළේ. ඒකට හේතු වුණේ මේකයි. 2008 අවුරුද්දේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය තිබිලා, බහු ක්‍රමයට යෑම සම්බන්ධව මාස තුනකට අනුමැතියක් අරගෙන තිබුණා. මාස තුනෙන් පසුව අනුමැතියක් නැහැ කියන එක තමයි අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම තර්කයක් විධියට තිබුණේ. මම ඒ විස්තර තව පැයකින් විතර හොයලා දෙන්නම්. 2008 ජූලි මාසයේදී මාස තුනක් කියන එක අයින් කරලා මහ බැංකුව "මේක තමයි වඩාත් වාසිදායක ක්‍රමය" කියන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුව අරගෙන තිබෙනවා.

තව පැයක් ඇතුළත ඒ Board Minute එක ඇතුළු සියලුම විස්තර මම ලබා දෙන්නම්. අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඒ විස්තර තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු අනුව යම් හෙයකින් මෙහෙම දෙයක් සිදු වුණේ නැහැ කියලා අපි හිතමුකෝ. විශේෂයෙන්ම මෙතැනදී යම්කිසි ආකාරයක වංචාවක් වැනි දෙයක් සිදු වුණු බවයි අපි කියන්නේ. මේ ප්‍රශ්න කිරීම්වලදී අනාවරණය වුණු කරුණ තමයි, දැන් Board අනුමැතිය ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියන එක. 2008 ජූලි ඉඳලා පෙරබරවාරි 27වැනිදා දක්වාම මොකක්ද සිදු වුණු ක්‍රමය? අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම බහු ක්‍රමය තමයි දිගින් දිගටම සිදු වුණු ක්‍රමය වුණේ. මේ දවසින් පස්සේ තමයි සියයට සියයක්ම වෙන්දේසිය ගියේ. ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීන්දුව ගත්තේ කවුද? නමුත් අපට අනාවරණය වුණු කරුණු අනුව වාගේම නිලධාරීන්ම කියපු කටඋත්තරය අනුව සිදු වුණේ මේකයි. Rs. 1 billion auction එක advertise කළා. එතකොට තිබෙන ප්‍රධානතම ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි Rs. 1 billion auction එක advertise කළාම primary dealersලා දන්නේ නැතිකම. ඒ අය දන්නේ සේරම මේ ක්‍රම දෙකටම ගන්නවාය කියලායි. Advertise කළාට පස්සේ කවුරුවත් දන්නේ නැහැනේ. කවුරුවත් දන්නේ නැහැ, advertisement එක දැම්මා. 2008 ඉඳලාම දිගටම සියයට දෙක තුනක් auction එක ගියා. Direct placements ගත්තා. මේ advertisement එක දැකලා ආපු primary dealersලා 16දෙනාම දන්නේ නැහැ, ගන්න ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද කියලා. ඒක ප්‍රධානතම ප්‍රශ්නයක් බවට කමිටුවේදී අනාවරණය වුණා. මේ auction එක අවසන් වුණාට පස්සේ Rs. 1 billion එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු අනිකුත් සියලුම ආයතන බිලියන දෙකයි තුනයි දාලා තිබුණේ.

එක සමාගමක් විතරක් බිලියන 16ක් දාලා තිබුණා. Board එකට ගියේත් නැහැ. ඒක තමයි කලින් තිබුණු ක්‍රමය. දැම්මේ Rs. 1 billion. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ බෑණාගේ සමාගම බිලියන 16ක් දැම්මා. බිලියන 16ක් දැම්මාට පස්සේ Technical Evaluation Committee එකට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයා ගියා. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ගිහිල්ලා කිව්වා, "රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනුව මේකට රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ගන්න" කියලා. මේ Technical Evaluation Committee එක මොකක්ද කිව්වේ? Technical Evaluation Committee එක කිව්වා, "මේක ගන්න බැහැ. මේ පොලියට ගැනීම රටට පාඩුයි" කියලා. මේ සිද්ධිය වුණු දවසේ දවල් 12.00ට තමයි තීන්දුව ගන්නේ අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම සියයට සියයක් auction එකට යනවාය කියලා. මේක තමයි සිදු වුණේ. මම ඊයේ මේ තොරතුරු සියල්ලම කියෙව්වා. දවල් 12.00ට බිලියන එකක් advertise කරලා, primary dealersලා 16 දෙනෙක්ම මොකුත් දන්නේ නැතිව, බෑණාගේ සමාගමට විතරක් බිලියන 16ක් දාලා, බිලියන 20ක් ගන්න කියලා කිව්වාම මේකේ තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද? ඊට පස්සේ මොකද වෙන්නේ? ඊට පස්සේ එන Monetary Board එකේ සාමාජිකයෝ හත් දෙනෙක් ඉන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත් සාමාජිකයින් දෙන්නයි හිටියේ. මෙහෙම කටයුත්තක් සිදු වුණා කියලා නිකම් inform කරනවා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විශේෂයෙන්ම අද තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය දේශපාලනයක්වත් මොකක්වත් නොවෙයි. අපි මේ පිළිබඳව පිටින් ඉඳගෙන කථා කරනවා නොවෙයි. නමුත් මේක ප්‍රධාන ප්‍රශ්නයක් බවට පත්වෙලා තිබෙනවා. පසු ගිය සුමාන දෙක තුනේම මහ බැංකුව auction ගියා. කවුරුවත් එන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද කරන්නේ? සල්ලි අච්චු ගහලා දෙනවා. අද Treasury Billsවල බිලියන 800ක් ගෙවන්න තිබෙනවා. මේ වාගේ ණය බිලියන 900ක් තිබෙනවා. පොලිය වැඩි වීම නිසා මේ බිලියන 1,700ට විතරක් ආණ්ඩුවට බිලියන 80ක් ගෙවන්න සිදු වුණා. මේවා තමයි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්න. ඒ නිසා අපි බොහොම පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් කරනවා, මේක පෞද්ගලික ප්‍රශ්නයක්වත් මොකක්වත් නොවන බව. මේ කරුණු කාරණා අනුව අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මෙතැන හිතා මතාම වංචාවක් සිදු වුණා. ඒ නිසා මේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් කරුණු අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම අපි අනුමත කරනවා. ඒක තමයි අපේ තීරණය.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perara: As it is අමුවෙන්ම අනුමත කරනවාද නැත්නම් මෙහි තිබෙන අඩුපාඩු හදාගෙන ඉස්සරහට යන්න ඕනෑ නැද්ද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව අපි අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම අනුමත කරනවා.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perara: As it is?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒකටත් අපි සූදානම්. As it is අපි අනුමත කරනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒක අපේ අයිතිය.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක අපේ අයිතියක්. අපේ අයිතියට, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගෙන් මම පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම්. එතකොට මේ වෙනස් කරපුවා ඇහේ අමාරුවටද අපි වෙනස් කළේ. ඊයේ ඡේද දෙකක්ම වෙනස් කළා. ඔළුවේ අමාරුවටද අපි ඡේද දෙකම වෙනස් කළේ. ඔළුව පාවිච්චි කරලා කරුණු කාරණා සාකච්ඡා කරලා සියලු නිලධාරීන්ගේ, - අපි අහන්නේ ඒකයි. මේක සත්‍ය නම් වෙනස් වෙන්න බැහැනේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නමුත් බොහොම පැහැදිලිව කියන්න ඕනෑ, මේකට අපට ඕනෑ තරම් සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන් බව. වෙන කවුරුන් හෝ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ටිකක් මෙතැනට ගෙනැල්ලා වාඩි කළොත් එතුමන්ලාට අපටත් පෙනෙන්නේ නැති කරුණු පෙනේවි.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: We can enrich this.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මේකේ අඩුපාඩුකම් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ප්‍රධාන කරුණ හැටියට මෙතැන වංචාවක් සිදු වුණා. එවැනි දෙයක් සිදු වුණේ නැහැ කියලා මෙතැන කිසිවක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේ කාරක සභාවට තිබෙන අරමුණ මොකක්ද? මේ කාරක සභාවට තිබෙන්නේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් දෙයක් සිදු වුණාද කියන එක සෙවීමයි. එහෙම දෙයක් සිදු වුණා. ඒ සිද්ධියට අදාළ සාධාරණ කරුණු අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මේකේ තිබෙනවා. ඕනෑ නම් කරුණු අලුතින් එක්කහු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ වාගේම අපිට රණ්ඩු වෙන්න අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේත් නැහැ. කාරක සභාවේ මේ තීන්දුව රටට යෑමක් විතරයි සිදු වෙන්නේ. මේ තීන්දුව රටට ගියාය කියලා නීතිමය වශයෙන් කටයුතු කරන්න වෙන්නේ නැහැනේ. ඒ නිසා මේකට සේරම එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. 26 දෙනෙක් ඉදිරිපත්වෙලා මට විතරක් මේක අනුමත කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඉතුරු 25 දෙනාටම වෙන එකක් දාන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ අයිතිය තිබෙනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒකේ වරදක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ අයිතිය අපි පාවිච්චි කරමු. ඒ අයිතිය පාවිච්චි කරලා කටයුතු කරමු. එච්චරයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගෙන් පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කර ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කථා කළේ නැහැ. ඔක්කොටම මම කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්නම්. හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා දැන් කථා කරන්න.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විශේෂයෙන්ම මෙතුමා කරපු ප්‍රකාශයේ වැදගත් දෙයක් මම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වනවා. මෙතුමා කිව්වා, "බිලියන 20ක් ගන්න කියපු එක ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළා"ය කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ Tender Board එකයි, ණය මණ්ඩලයයි - ඒ දෙක - තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා, "බිලියන 20 ගන්න එපා"ය කියලා. එහෙම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළේ බිලියන 20 ගත්තොත් Interest rate එක වැඩි වන නිසා ප්‍රශ්නයක් වනවාය කියලායි. නමුත් ඒ Tender Board එක සහ ණය මණ්ඩලය නිලධාරීන් වශයෙන් ගත් තීන්දු තීරණ සහ ඒගොල්ලන්ගේ වගකීම පැහැදිලිව මේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන්වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක මේකට දාන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඇයි, දාන්න බැරි? දාන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට 20 ගන්න ඒගොල්ලන් බැහැ කිව්වා නම්, 10 ගන්නත් බැහැ කියන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නම්, 10 ගන්නත් බැහැ කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් එකඟවෙලා වාචිකව ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තිබෙනවා, 10 ගන්න ඒගොල්ලයි තීන්දු කළේ කියලා. මේ Tender Board එකයි ඒක තීන්දු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. එහෙම නම්, ඒ බව මේකේ සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. සභාපතිතුමනි, Tender Board එක පැහැදිලිව වාචිකව පිළිතුරු දීලා තිබෙනවා, මේ ගත්ත තීන්දුව නිවැරදියි කියලා. එතකොට මම නැවත ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා, "මේ තීන්දුව නිවැරදියි කියලා කියන්නේ ඔබතුමා තනිව ගත්ත තීන්දුවක්ද?" කියලා. එතුමා කියනවා, නැහැ, අපි සාමූහිකව, කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගත්ත තීන්දුවක් කියලා. එහෙම නම්, ඒ Tender Board එකේ හිටපු කණ්ඩායමයි, ඒ තීන්දුව අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. එහෙම නම්, ඒ Tender Board එක 20 ගන්න බැහැ කියලා කිව්වා නම්, 10 ගන්නත් බැහැ කියන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නම්, ඒ පාඩුව සිද්ධ කරන්න මූලික වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒ Tender Board එකයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Tender Board එක වගකියන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ සංශෝධනයට අපි එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා. ඕනෑ නම් නැවත ඇතුළත් කරමු.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා:සභාපතිතුමා, කරුණාකරලා මට කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: සියලු දෙනාම නිශ්ශබ්ද වෙන්න.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ Tender Board එක එතැනදී වැරැද්දක් කරලා තිබෙනවා නම්, මම සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම විරුද්ධයි මේ "කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියන එකට. එහෙම විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා එකක් එන්න බැහැ මේකට. එහෙම එනවා නම්, මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනෙක් දීපු නිර්දේශ නම්, කරුණාකරලා ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනා දීපු නිර්දේශ කියලා මෙතැන දාන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එහෙම දාන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ. අපි ඒකට එකඟ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙනම් මේ නිර්දේශ ඔබතුමාට දෙන්න තිබුණා නේ. ඇයි දෙන්නේ නැතිව හිටියේ?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම දෙන්නේ නැතිව හිටියේ මෙවැනි ආකාරයෙන් දාන්න මට අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැති නිසායි. මට ඕනෑ වුණේ මේ කාරක සභාවේ අපි හරි විධියට සාකච්ඡා කරලා සත්‍ය දේ මේකට දමන්නයි. මේක මාධ්‍ය කියන දේ බලාගෙන, එහෙම නැත්නම් දේශපාලන වශයෙන් එළියේ ගිහිල්ලා එක එක කතාන්දර කියන්න, එහෙම නැත්නම් කාටවත් මඩ ගහන්න අපිට මේ කාරක සභාවේ වැඩසටහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැති නිසා තමයි, මම පෞද්ගලිකව ඒ මතය ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැත්තේ. ඒ නිසා මේ මතය සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම කාට හරි මඩ ගහන්න දේශපාලන වශයෙන් ගත්ත නිර්දේශ හැටියටයි මම දකින්නේ. මේකට සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම මම විරුද්ධයි. මොකද හේතුව, අර 20 ගන්න බැහැ කියලා කියනවා නම්, ඒ 10ත් ගන්න බැහැ. ඒක පදනම් කරගෙන මේ නිර්දේශය මෙතැනට එන්න බැහැ කියන එක තමයි මගේ යෝජනාව.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මැතිතුමා කියපු කාරණාව පිළිබඳව පොඩි නිවැරදි කිරීමක් කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි. එතුමා කිව්වා, one Billion ගන්න එක මොන ක්‍රමවේදයටද ගන්නේ කියලා ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන් දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. සභාපතිතුමනි, Advertisement එකේ ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදය තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා පැහැදිලිවම එතැනදී ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන්ව දැනුවත් කරනවා, auction කරනවාද, private placement කරනවාද කියලා. නැත්නම් දෙයියනේ! කොහොමද කෙරෙන්නේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා:ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා දැනගෙන කථා කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දැනගෙන තමයි කථා කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා:ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ අදහස් කියන්න කෝ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා:ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම හිතන්නේ ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කියපු කරුණට තමයි මූලික වශයෙන් මේ ලියැවිල්ල,- මොකද, මට හැඟී යන කරුණු සියල්ල එක්කයි, අපේ තිබෙන අරමුණු එක්කයි බලන කොට අපි මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විශේෂඥයන් නොවෙයි. අපි දේශපාලනඥයන්. අපිට යුක්තිය සහ සාධාරණත්වය ගැන තිබෙන්නේ සාපේක්ෂ අදහස්. නමුත් හොඳ-නරක මොකක්ද කියලා කාටත් තේරෙනවා. ලාභ-අලාභ කාටත් තේරෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මම යෝජනා කරනවා, ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා යෝජනා කරපු විධියට මේ ලියැවිල්ල අනිවාර්ය වශයෙන්ම තවත් ඉහළට සකස් කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒ ගැන කිසිම විවාදයක් නැහැ. **Encyclopedia Britannicas** පවා අලුතින් ලියන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගැන කිසිම විවාදයක් නැහැ. නමුත්, අපිට පරීක්ෂණයට භාජනය වෙච්ච කරුණට අදාළව සාක්ෂි සටහන් අනුව බැලුවාම,- මේ ලියැවිල්ලේ තිබෙන ගැටලු සහගත තැන් විසඳන්න අපි ඊයේ උත්සාහ දැරුවා. අපි යම්කිසි ශක්තිමත් කිරීමකුත් කළා. තවත් ශක්තිමත් කළ හැකි බවටත් විශ්වාසයක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත්, ප්‍රස්තුත කරුණට අදාළව මේ ලියැවිල්ල මට ප්‍රමාණවත්. මේකේ තිබෙන නිර්දේශවලට අමතරවත් මට තව නිර්දේශ තිබෙනවා. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන් අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන්ගේ passport එකත් පොලීසියෙන් අත් අඩංගුවට ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මගේ නිර්දේශයක් තිබෙනවා. එවැනි කරුණු එකතු කරන්න අවස්ථාව ලැබුණොත්, මම ඒවා එකතු කරනවා. ඒ නිසා මගේ යෝජනාව තිබෙන්නේ,- අපිට එකිනෙකාගේ ස්ථාවරයන් සමඟි කරන්න බැරි තරම් වෙනස්. ඒ නිසා මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ, අපේ කාලය නාස්ති කරන්නේ නැතිව අනවශ්‍ය ප්‍රයාමයකට යන්නේ නැතිව මේක අනුමත කරන්න කියලායි. මේකට එකඟ නොවෙන අයට විවේචනාත්මකව පුළුවන් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ දේවල් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. නමුත්, මම මේකට එකඟයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා:ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩි පහක කාලයක් දෙන්න. කාර්යාලයෙන් අපිට දුන්නා, සැප්තැම්බර් 23වැනිදා නුලෙන් ගැටගසා ඇති වාර්තාවේ පළමු කෙටුම්පත. එම කෙටුම්පත මත තමයි, අවශ්‍ය නම් ලිඛිත කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කිව්වේ. මම මේ වාර්තාව පරිශීලනය කළා. එම වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන බොහෝ

කරුණුවලට මගේ එකඟතාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ පුළුල් එකඟතාවක් ඇති කරගත හැකිව තිබූ නිසා හුඟාක් ප්‍රතිවිරුද්ධ කාරණා ලිඛිතව කියන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ, මම හිතුවා අපිට බේරුම් කරගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. මම මේ දෙවැනි කෙටුම්පතේ නැති,- ඔබතුමන්ලා ළඟ පළමුවැනි කෙටුම්පත නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මේ ගැන අහගෙන ඉන්න. දෙවැනි කෙටුම්පතේ නැති, පළමුවැනි කෙටුම්පතේ ඇති කාරණා කීපයක් අවධානයට යොමු කරන්න ඕනෑ, හරියටම අපි මේ කථා කරන ඡේදයට අදාළව. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපිට මෙතැනදී compromise එකක් ගන්න පුළුවන්. බලාපොරොත්තු අත් හැරගන්න එපා කවුරුවත්. මොකද, අවසානයේදී මේ ප්‍රශ්නය නොවෙයි, COPE කමිටුවේත්, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේත් ගෞරවය ආරක්ෂා කරගන්න අපිට අවශ්‍යයි. ඇත්තටම මේකේ 42 සහ 43 වැනි පිටු තමයි, 4හි (1) සහ (2)ට අනුකූල කරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් එහි ඇති "කාරක සභාවේ අදහස" කියන එක තමයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම කාරක සභාවේ නිගමනය. අදහසයි, නිගමනයයි අතර ලොකු වෙනසක් නැහැ. කාරක සභාවේ අදහස යනුවෙන් එහි උපුටා දක්වා ඇත්තේ මෙයයි. "මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ක්‍රමවේදය හා මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොත අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මඟින් හැකිතාක් මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය කළ යුතු බවත්, ඉතිරිය පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය මඟින් සපුරා ගත යුතු බව සඳහන් වුවද, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වන ආකාරයට නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය ලෙස සලකා ඇත්තේ පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වන බවත්, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මඟින් පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය පිළිගත් නියමය වශයෙන් ගෙන කරුණු දක්වා ඇති බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී." කියලා ඔබතුමා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම එයට මම එකඟයි. මම ඔබතුමාට යෝජනා කරනවා, එම කොටස මෙම දෙවැනි කෙටුම්පතට එකතු කරන්න කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා:ගරු මැතිතුමනි, ඒකේ අනෙක් පිටුවේ තවත් කරුණක් තිබෙනවා. "කාරක සභාවේ අදහස" ඉතිරි ටික අනෙක් පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා. "කාරක සභාවේ අදහස" කියන එකේ ඉතිරි කොටසෙහි සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා, "විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ එසේ සඳහන් වන්නේ නම්, එම කාරණා වෙනම සාකච්ඡා කළ යුතු බව කාරක සභාවේ සභාපති විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී." කියලා. "කාරක සභාවේ අදහස" හැටියට ඒකටම අදාළව තිබෙනවා,- කාරක සභාවේ එවෙලේ, එවෙලේ මතු වෙච්ච අදහස් තමයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ. මේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ඇමරිකාව, එංගලන්තය, ජර්මනිය ඇතුළු සියයට 90ක් පමණ ලෝකයේ බොහෝ රටවල භාවිතා කරන වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය බවත්, ඒ බවට පසු ගිය කාරක සභාවේදී මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් සඳහන් කර සිටියා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා:ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට මේ presentation එක කරන්න දෙන්නකෝ. ඒක කියලා, ඊට පස්සේ තවත් කාරක සභා අදහස් කීපයක් කියලා තිබෙනවා. අපි ඊයේ පිළිගත්තා නේ අත් පොතේ B (I), as it is. අපේ අර්ථ නිරූපණ නැතිව එලෙසම දක්වන්න අපි එකඟ වුණා නේ. මම හිතන්නේ, ඊට වඩා අපිට අනුගමනය කරන්න ක්‍රමයක් නැහැ කියලායි. ඒක තමයි නීතිය. එහෙම නම්, "කාරක සභාවේ අදහස" හැටියට සඳහන් මේ කොටස අපි එකතු කළ යුතුයි. ඒ කාරක සභාවේ අදහස වශයෙන් දක්වා ඇති 44 පිටුවේ ඇති ඉතිරි කොටසෙහි සඳහන් වෙනවා, "විගණකාධිපති එසේ සඳහන් වන්නේ නම්, එම කරුණ වෙනම සාකච්ඡා කළ යුතු බව කාරක සභාවේ සභාපති විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී." කියලා. ඔබතුමා ඒක අපිට පෙන්වා දී තිබෙනවා.

මම යෝජනා කරනවා, එය මේ අවස්ථාවේ සාකච්ඡා කළ යුතුයි කියලා. මොකද, මීට අවශ්‍ය කරන කරුණු තිබෙනවා. ඇත්තටම අපි ඊයේ සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ අනුව බොහොම පැහැදිලියි, විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් එතුමාගේ ගණනය කිරීම සඳහා පදනම් කරගත් මුල් ප්‍රතිපත්තිය - මම මේක හදිසියේ ඉදිරිපත් කරන එකක් නොවෙයි. මගේ වෙන කථාවක් නැහැ. එදා ඉඳලාම මේ ස්ථාවරයේ සිටියේ - අනුව ඔබතුමාගේ draft එකෙන් කියන කොටස as it is මේකට ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ඒත් එක්කම මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්න කැමැතියි, මේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා,- ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඔබතුමා මුල් කෙටුම්පතේ විස්තරාත්මකව යම් යම් කරුණු සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, මේ නිශ්චිත ප්‍රශ්නයට අදාළව. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්ව කරුණ ඔබතුමා මුල් කෙටුම්පතේ 50වන පිටුවේ අංක 11 ඡේදය වශයෙන් දක්වා තිබෙනවා. ඒකේ පිටපත් නැති මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ දැන ගැනීම සඳහා මම ඒක කියවන්න කැමැතියි.

"2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 බැදුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව මඟින් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව විමසිල්ල යොමු කරන ලදී."

මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ කරුණු දැක්වීම. එදින ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු නියෝජනය කළ සාමාජිකයන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු සභාපති, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති පී. සමරසිරි, රාජ්‍ය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරි එස්.එස්. අධිකාරි, ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරි සී.පී.ඒ. කරුණාතිලක මහතා, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.

සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය, ආර්ථික පර්යේෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ ගුණරත්න මහත්මිය සහ තවත් අතිරේක සුපිරින්ටන්ඩ්වරු දෙදෙන් සිටි බව අනාවරණය කරන ලදී. මහ බැංකු අධිපති ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු සාමාජිකයෙකු නොවන බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. මෙහිදී රුපියල් බිලියන 1 සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා මුදලක් සපයා ගැනීමට ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය ඉහත සඳහන් නිලධාරීන් විසින් වෘත්තීමය විනිශ්චය අනුව කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයක් බව තමන් පිළිගන්නා බව කාරක සභාව නැඟූ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු වශයෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු සභාපති පී. සමරසිරි මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මේ ඔබතුමාගේ මුල් කෙටුම්පත. ඇත්තටම මට මේක දැක්කාට පස්සේ නැවත ලියන්න දෙයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මගේ view එකත්, ඔබතුමාගේ හෝ අදාළ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයේ නිලධාරීන් අරගෙන තිබෙන හරයම තමයි. මම යෝජනා කරනවා, ඒ කරුණ මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න කියලා. එහෙම කළාට පස්සේ මේ තිබෙන හරයාත්මක ප්‍රශ්න අපට විසඳාගන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමාට මම පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. පළමුවැනි කෙටුම්පත කියලා ඔබතුමා කියන මුළු කෙටුම්පතම මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් වෙනවා. ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට මුළු කෙටුම්පතම එනවා. කරුණු හැටියට ගත්තත්, ඔය සියල්ලම මේකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට නොවෙයි ඇතුළත් විය යුත්තේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඇමුණුමක් හැටියටත් තිබෙනවා, කරුණු හැටියටත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, මම පෙන්වන්නම්. කරුණු හැටියට ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙන බව මම පෙන්වන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : සභාපතිතුමා, මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අවසන් කරන්න මට පොඩි වෙලාවක් දෙන්න. අවසානයේ මිනිස්සු, රටේ පුරවැසියෝ, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු කියවන්නේ වාර්තාව. ඇමුණුමුවලට ඇතිවන අවධානය අඩුයි. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉතාම ගෞරවයෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ මෙයයි. අපි අවසානයේ අත්සන් නොකර නොපිළිගත් කෙටුම්පතක් අවසන් වාර්තාව විධියට එළියට අරගෙන, ඒ අවසන් වාර්තාවට මේ නිගමනයන් දෙක ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එතකොට අපට ඉදිරියට යන්න පුළුවන්, අපේ අත්සනත් අපට තියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ඒ නිගමනයන් විස්තරාත්මකව මේකට ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ විස්තරය මදි.

සභාපතිතුමා : මේ වාර්තාවේ ඊළඟ පිටුවලට යන කොට ඒ විස්තර තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. තව විස්තර ඇතුළු කරන්න ඕනෑ නම්, අපි ඇතුළු කරමු. නමුත්, ඊළඟ පිටුවලට යනකොට ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණාව ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, සභාපතිතුමා. ඒ විස්තර ඇතුළු වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපි ඒ විස්තර ඇතුළු කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඕකනේ වැදගත්ම කාරණය. ඒ නිසා අපි ඔය කාරණාව ඇතුළත් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා : අපි ඒක ඇතුළු කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔය කාරණාව ඇතුළු කළාට පස්සේ වෙනත් කාරණාවක් නැහැ. ඕක contradict කරලා නැත්නම්, ඔය කාරණාව තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්නයේ හරය වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. හර්ෂණ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා දැන් advertisement එක පෙන්නුවා. Auctions දාලා තිබෙනවා කියලා එතුමා පෙන්නුවා. ඒක හරියටම හරි. 2008 ඉඳලාම ඕක තමයි වුණේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒක නෙමෙයිනේ ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ කියනකල්. 2008 ඉඳලාම auction ප්‍රමාණයෙන් ගන්න ටිකට auction කියලා තමයි දාන්නේ. Auction එක දැම්මත්, ඒකෙන් සියල්ලම ගන්නේ නැහැනේ. Interest rate එක බලාගන්න තමයි auction එක දාන්නේ. 2008 ඉඳලා දිගටම ඔය විධියට තමයි advertisement එක තිබෙන්නේ. Interest rate එක බලාගන්න auction එක දානවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාකරුණා මහතා : කවුද කියන්නේ එහෙම?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : දිගටම කළේ ඒ විධියට තමයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාකරුණා මහතා : ඔබතුමා කියලා ඉවර කරන්නකෝ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : Advertisement එක දානකොට 2008 ඉඳලාම මේ advertisement එක තමයි දාන්නේ. මේ advertisement එක දාලා auction එකට යනවා. එතකොට මුළු රටේම අවශ්‍යතාවෙන් සියයට තුන හතරක් තමයි ඒකෙන් ගන්නේ. ඒ ප්‍රමාණය අරගෙන interest rate එක දැනගෙන, ඊට පස්සේ placement කරනවා. ඒක හරි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාකරුණා මහතා : නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, Rs. 1 billion කියලා දාලා auction එකේදී ඊට වඩා වැඩියෙන් ගත්ත අවස්ථා ඕනෑ තරම් තිබෙනවා. නමුත්, මෙතුමා කිව්ව කාරණය ඒක නෙමෙයි. "මොන ක්‍රමවේදයටද ගන්නේ කියන එක ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවෝ දන්නේ නැහැ" කියන එකයි මෙතුමා කිව්වේ. මොන ක්‍රමවේදයටද ගන්නේ කියන එක ඉතා පැහැදිලිව advertisement එකේ තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නම් advertisement එක කියවගන්න බැරි වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මෙහෙමයි. මම නිවැරදි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Misunderstanding එකක් තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමා අදහස් කළේ මෙක නේද? තැරැව්කරුවන් දන්නේ නැහැ මෙක සියයට 100ක්ම deviate වුණු බව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හරියට හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ කියන්නේ සියයට 100ක්ම වෙනස්වීමක් වන බව. ඒක දන්නේ නැහැනේ. සියයට 100ක්ම deviate වුණු බව දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : සියයට 100ක්ම auction යන බව දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමා ඉස්සෙල්ලා ඒක කිව්වේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මෙතෙක් යන ක්‍රමවේදය සියයට 100ක්ම වෙනස් වුණු බව දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක අතුරු කාරණාවක්නේ. අපි එකින් එක කරුණු අරගෙන කථා කරමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : එතකොට, ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්ව කාරණාව අපි අනුමත කරනවා. Tender Board එක වග කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Tender Board එක විතරයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඊයේ සහ අද අවසන් සාකච්ඡාව යන වෙලාවේ මේ කාරණයත් කියන්න ඕනෑ. මේ වාර්තාවේ යම් කාරණා කිහිපයක් පෙන්වලා, ඒ කාරණාවලට විරුද්ධයි කියලා අශෝක් අබේසිංහ නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා අද එන්නේ නැහැ කියලා ඊයේ කියලා ගියා. හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා දැන් කථා කරමින් කියනවා, මෙකේ නිර්දේශවලට සම්පූර්ණයෙන් විරුද්ධයි කියලා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : සම්පූර්ණයෙන්? නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ඒ විධියට ඇතුළත් කරන්න බැහැ කියලා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. වැරදි ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න එපා. ඔබතුමාගේ කථාව අවසානයේ මම ඒක කියන්නම්.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : හරි, හරි, මම ඒක ඉල්ලා අස්කර ගන්නම්. මම ඒ කථාව ඉල්ලා අස්කරගෙන කථා කරන්නම්කෝ. සභාපතිතුමා මේ වාර්තාවෙන් දීලා තිබෙන නිර්දේශ පිළිබඳව එබතුමාට යම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා කිව්වා. මේ වෙනකොට කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජිකයෝ දෙන්නෙක් මේ වාර්තාවට විරුද්ධ බව ප්‍රකාශ කරලා තිබෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ වාගේම තවත් සාමාජිකයෝ පිරිසක් මේ වාර්තාවටත්, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවටත් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් පක්ෂයි කියලා කියනවා. මේ, මට දැනෙන දේ. මම වැරදි නම් කවුරු හෝ කෙනෙකුට පසුව නිවැරදි කරන්න පුළුවන්. අපට පෙනෙනවා, තව සමහරු පිරිසක් මේකට කෙළින්ම විරුද්ධ නොවී මේ වාර්තාවේ බර අඩු කරගන්න උත්සාහ කරනවා. ඒ සඳහා විවිධ විධියට උත්සාහ කරමින් යනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, හැබැයි මම දන්න විධියට මම සහ වැඩි බහුතරයක් ඉන්න ස්ථාවරය තමයි මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ උත්තරීතරභාවය, COPE කමිටුවේ උත්තරීතරභාවය, ඒ සියල්ල ආරක්ෂා කරගනිමින් ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙන වාර්තාව - ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, මේක උබතුමාගේ පෞද්ගලික දෙයක් නෙමෙයි, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ COPE කමිටුව විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙන වාර්තාව - අපි අනුමත කරනවා.

ඒ වාගේම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාවක් අභියෝගයට ලක් කරන්න බැහැ. හැබැයි, ඒ පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡාවකට යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඇයි, බැරි?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : මම කිව්වා, මගේ මතය වැරදි නම් එය සංශෝධනය

කිරීමට යටත්ව කියලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ, දෙවියෙක් නෙවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : බුදු හාමුදුරුවෝ

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : බුදු හාමුරුවොත් නොවෙයි; දෙවියොත් නොවෙයි. එතුමා විගණකාධිපති. හැබැයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට අභියෝග කරමින් එතුමාව මේ විධියට විවේචනය කරන කොට මේ කාරණය වෙනුවෙන් සමහර කට්ටිය මොන තරම් පෙනී සිටින්න උත්සාහ කරනවාද කියලා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මම කියන්නේ,-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : මට කියන්න දෙන්න කෝ. අපට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න කෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා :ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට කථා කරන්න දෙන්න. එතුමාගේ අදහස් නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා අහගෙන ඉන්න. ඉන් පස්සේ කථා කරන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : මම කියන්නේ, මේ රටේ ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවෙන් විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට පැවරිලා තිබෙන බලය ගැන. එහෙම නම් රටට විගණකාධිපති කෙනෙක් වැඩක් නැහැ. මේ ආණ්ඩුව අලුතෙන් කුමක් හෝ යෝජනාවක් ගෙනැල්ලා විගණකාධිපති තනතුර අහෝසි කරන්න. දැන් මෙතුමන්ලාට වැඩ කරන්නත් බැහැ නේ. අපට තේරෙනවා ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ දේ තමයි කර ගන්න හදන්නේ කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අවසාන වශයෙන් මා කියන්නේ දැන් මේ වාර්තාව ගැන අපි අද රෑ 12 වන තෙක් කථා කළත් අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම වෙන දේ තමයි, මත දෙකක්. ඒ නිසා මේ පිළිබඳව දිගින් දිගට කථා නොකර ඉඳිමු.

මම දන්න හැටියට නම් පාර්ලිමේන්තු ඉතිහාසයේ COPE එකේ සභාපතිවරයා විසින් වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. සභාපතිවරයා වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළාට පස්සේ ඒකට වෙනස් මත දරන වාර්තා සාමාජිකයන් විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේ පළමුවැනි වතාව නොවෙයි. 1985ත් මට මතකයි සාමාජිකයන් විසින් මත ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක යන හැටි අපට හොඳටම තේරෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවට පක්ෂ පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ වාගේම විරුද්ධ පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ නිසා කාලය නාස්ති කරන්නේ නැතුව මේ දෙක අහලා ඔබතුමා සකස් කළ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. විරුද්ධ අයට පුළුවන් ඒ අයගේ වාර්තාවක් හදලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මම හිතන්නේ අවසානයේ වෙන්නේ ඒක තමයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැනටම සාමාජිකයන් දෙදෙනෙක් විරෝධය ප්‍රකාශ කරලා ඉවරයි. අපේ මතය නම් ඒකයි.

සභාපතිතුමා :ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා අමාත්‍යතුමාගේ අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. එතකොට කවුරුත් කථා කළා වෙනවා. මෙතැන දැනට කථා නොකරපු කෙනෙකු හැටියට ඉන්නේ ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා අමාත්‍යතුමා. එතුමාගේ අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මමත් COPE එකේ සභාපතිවරයෙක් හැටියට මීට පෙර කටයුතු කර තිබෙන නිසා මගේ අත් දැකීමත් කියන්නම්. මගේ මතය මේකයි. අපි වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට සියලුදෙනාම ඒකමතිකව ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම තමයි සාමාන්‍ය ස්වරූපය. නමුත්, එහි ප්‍රධානම වගකීම පැවරිලා තිබෙන්නේ සභාපතිතුමාට සහ ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයට. ඒ වාර්තාව තමයි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් මෙතෙක් කල් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. මම මේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණුවලට යන්නේ නැහැ. කරුණුවල යම් වැරැද්දක් තිබෙනවා නම් කථා කරලා හදා ගන්න එක සාධාරණයි. මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත්, COPE වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධව ඕනෑ තරම් නිදර්ශන තිබෙනවා, සභාපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවට විරුද්ධවත්වය ප්‍රකාශ කළොත් ඊට අතුරු වාර්තා හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු. ඒ හැරුණාම වෙනත් ක්‍රමයක් මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සාකච්ඡා කරලා-

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා : සාකච්ඡා කරලා අඩු පාඩු හදා ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකේ කිසි වරදක් නැහැ. නමුත්, වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අයිතිය සභාපතිවරයාට තිබෙනවා. කවුරු හෝ සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම මුළු වාර්තාවටම විරුද්ධ වනවා නම්, පැහැදිලි ලෙසම වෙනත් වාර්තාවක් හරහා තමන්ගේම වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මමත් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා එවැනි වාර්තා. ඒ කියන්නේ, "මේ අය විරුද්ධයි" කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩි දෙකක් දෙන්න. අපි COPE වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හදනවා. දැන් ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, අපි තවම දන්නේ නැහැ 97 ඉඳලා අවේ auction system එකද, -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා : ඒක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අවශ්‍ය නැත්තේ මොකද? අවශ්‍ය නැත්තේ තමන් වෙන මතයක ඉන්න නිසායි. දේශපාලන මතයක ඉන්නේ. කිසිම දෙයක් ඉගෙන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මට නම් මෙතැන දේශපාලනයක් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේකේ ඇත්ත, නැත්ත මොකක්ද? මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද? ඒක තවම COPE

කමිටුවට හොයා ගන්න බැහැ. දැන් අපි සාකච්ඡා කරනවා, ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය private placementද, auction systemද, කියලා. තවම ඒ ගැන නිගමනයකට එන්න බැරිව අපි කොහොමද වාර්තා හදන්නේ? 1997 ඉඳලා 2008 දක්වා ආවේ මොන ක්‍රමයද? Auction system එකද? ඒ auction systemද එක වෙනස් වුණාද? ඒක වෙනස් වුණේ කොහොමද? ඒක නීත්‍යානුකූලද? Manual එක amend වුණාද?

දැන් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, බලන්න කොච්චර පරස්පර විරෝධීද කියලා මේ අදහස් දක්වන පිරිසම. සමහර කට්ටිය කියනවා, "as much as possible" -

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : වාර්තාව අනුව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. Do not disturb. ඔබතුමා කථා කරන කොට අපි අහගෙන හිටියා නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළාට පස්සේ ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාව බලන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා :ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමෙන් පස්සේ මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම පිළිබඳව ලේකම්තුමාගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක කියන තෙක් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ලේකම්තුමාගේ අවධානයට මා මෙය යොමු කරවනවා. මෙතැන අපි තීන්දු කරලා තිබෙනවාද 2008දී Direct placement system එකට කොහොමද මාරු වුණේ කියලා? ඒ මාරු වුණු ක්‍රමය හරිද? අපි මේ Board Papers ගැන තවම ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : අපි දැන් නැගිටලා යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතකොට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ auction systemද එකද, අන්තිම වන කොට තිබුණු නීත්‍යානුකූල ක්‍රමය වන private placement කියන එකද? ඒකවත් අපි තීන්දුවකට ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය වැරදියි. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමාම සහභාගි වුණු COPE රැස්වීමේ verbatim reportsවල තිබෙනවා, මහ බැංකුවේ එස්.එස්. රත්නායක මහතා පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ උපලේඛනයේ 238වන පිටුවේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව මෙසේ සඳහන් වනවා:

"මම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරී, රත්නායක. 1997 වසරේදී තමයි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම ආරම්භ කළේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම, ඒ අවස්ථාවේ auction ක්‍රමයට තමයි ගියේ. නමුත්, auction ක්‍රමය තුළින් දිගින් දිගටම ප්‍රශ්න මතු වුණා. Interest rate එක විශාල වශයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන අරමුදල් තිබෙනවා, ඒ අරමුදල්වලට auction ක්‍රමය හරහා එන්නේ නැතිව direct placementවලින් එන්න පුළුවන් කියන weighted average rate එකට 1998 වසරේදී මුදල් මණ්ඩලය අවසරයක් දුන්නා. Weighted average rate එක මත direct placement යනවා කියන එක ආරම්භ වුණේ 2008 වසරේදී නොවෙයි. Treasury bond කියන එක 1997 වසරේ ආරම්භ කරලා, මාස කිහිපයක් ගිහිල්ලා 1998 වසරේදී direct placement ආරම්භ කළා." එතකොට direct placement ආරම්භ කළ අවුරුද්ද-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, ප්‍රධාන ක්‍රමවේදය.

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. තව තිබෙනවා. "එය බාහිර පාර්ශ්වවලට විවෘත වුණේ නැහැ. මහ බැංකුව විසින් පාලනය කරන විශාල අරමුදල්වලට auction හරහා එන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. 1998 වසරේදී, පොලී අනුපාත ස්ථාවර කිරීමේ අරමුණත් ඇතිව direct placement ආරම්භ කළා....." ඒ පැහැදිලි කිරීම දිගටම තිබෙනවා. ඊළඟට තිබෙනවා, " 2008 වසර ආසන්න කාලය වන විට මෙය මහ බැංකුව තුළ සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී auction ක්‍රමය විතරක් නොවෙයි තවත් ක්‍රම තිබෙනවා කියලා මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණයක් ගත්තා. උදාහරණයක් වශයෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව, ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකුව, රක්ෂණ සමාගම් ඒ වාගේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන පද්ධතියක් අපේ රට තුළ තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතනවලට - weighted average rate- ඒ කියන්නේ බර තබන ලද සාමාන්‍ය පොලී අනුපාතය මත direct placememt කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක 2008 වසරේදී ආරම්භ වුණේ. නමුත්, ඒක තිබෙන captive sources කියන define කරලා නැහැ. Define කරන්නේ නැති හේතුව වන්නේ, captive sources කියලා අදහස් කරන්නේ විශාල අරමුදල් තිබෙන ආයතන. ඒවා primary dealers හරහා එන විට සමහර වලාවට විශාල වශයෙන් commission ගෙවන්න සිදු වෙනවා. ඒක නිසා රජයේ අරමුදල් පිරිවැය අඩුකර ගැනීම සඳහාත්, රටේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමයෙහි පොලී අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කර ගැනීම සඳහාත් යෙදූ ක්‍රමවේදයක් තමයි ඒක. ඒ සඳහා වැරදි interpretation දීම සුදුසු නැහැ." ඒ ටික පැහැදිලිව තිබෙනවා. ඊට අමතරව තව තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Captive sources කියන එක ETF, EPF කියලා සඳහන් කළේ රජයෙන්. ඔහු කියන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි. පෞද්ගලික ආයතන-

සභාපතිතුමා : ඊළඟට ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්න කරලාත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමා ඒක පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හරිෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියවපු විස්තරය ඉතාමත් වැදගත්. ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තරය එතැනම තිබෙනවා. ඒ අන්තිම වාක්‍ය නැවත කියවන්න. "Primary dealersලා හරහා එන විට commission ගෙවන්න වන නිසා ඒගොල්ලන්ට කෙළින්ම එන්න දුන්නා" කියලා තිබුණා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : තිබෙනවා. මෙසේ සඳහන් වනවා. " ඒක නිසා රජයේ අරමුදල් පිරිවැය අඩු කර ගැනීම සඳහාත්, රටේ මූල්‍ය ක්‍රමයෙහි පොලි අනුපාතය ස්ථාවර කර ගැනීම සඳහාත් යෙදූ ක්‍රමවේදයක් තමයි ඒක. එහි තිබුණු යහපත් අරමුණු තමයි, ..." ඒ ආදී වශයෙන් තිබෙනවා. නැවත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ මා ළඟ තිබෙන්නේ වාර්තා දෙකක්. COPE එකේ සභාපතිතුමාට අමතරව සාමාජිකයෝ ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තා දෙකක්. එහෙම වාර්තා ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මෙතුමන්ලාටත් කියන්න, එහෙම වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : අපි මෙතැන මතවාදීව ගැටෙන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව මම අනුමත කරනවා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : අපිත් අනුමත කරනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : හැබැයි, මෙතුමන්ලාට අයිතිය තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපට වඩා මෙතුමන්ලාට දැනුම තිබෙනවා; මෙතුමන්ලා වෘත්තිකයෝ. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලා වෘත්තීය මට්ටමින් වාර්තාවක් හදලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Very good!

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟතාවක් තිබෙන අය "එකඟයි" කියලා අපට සටහනකට ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එතකොට amendments?

සභාපතිතුමා : ඊයේ වන තෙක් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු amendments කාරක සභාව පිළිගත්තා නේ. ඊයේ වන තෙක් පිළිගත්ත amendments අපි ඇතුළත් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : Intellectually corrupt වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ, අපි ඊයේ වන තෙක් කරපු ටිකක් තිබෙනවා නේද, ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒකත් ඕනෑ නැත්නම්, ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. As it is -

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, තව කාරණයක්. මම කිව්වේ, "විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියන කතන්දරය.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහෙම කරන්න, -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විශේෂ නිර්දේශ ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: විශේෂ නිර්දේශ ඔබතුමන්ලා දාපු ඒවා නොවෙයි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මන්ත්‍රීවරු දාපු ඒවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එහෙම නම් මේ සියලු දෙනාටම කොහොමද කියන්නේ? විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියන්නේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනෙක් දාපු දෙයක්. මේ කමිටුව හදපු වාර්තාව නොවෙයි ඒ. ඒක අයින් කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක අයින් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එහෙම කොහොමද කරන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපේ නිර්දේශ එකතු කරන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, වාර්තාව, ඒ කියන්නේ පළමුවන පිටුවේ සිට අන්තිම පිටුව දක්වා ඒ සියල්ල අපි අනුමත කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අත්සන් කරලා යන්න, වාර්තාවට එකඟ අය. අනෙක් අය වාර්තාවක් ලබා දෙන්න. මට පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න තිබෙනවා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් අපි මේ වන විට පූර්ණ පරීක්ෂණයක් කරලා ඉවරයි. දැන් ඔබතුමා සංක්ෂිප්ත වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළා. දැන් මේ පිටු 288කින් තිබෙන්නේ, ප්‍රශ්න අහලා සාක්ෂි දුන්න වාර්තාවේ සම්පිණ්ඩනයක්. හැබැයි මේකට එකිනෙක්කෙනාගේ අභිමතය පරිදි

කන්කොන් එල්ලන්න ගියොත් මේක පිටු 388ක විතර වාර්තාවක් වෙයි. ඒ නිසා ඒකට මම එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාවට සමහරු කැමැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්, සමහරු අකැමැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ මූලික පරීක්ෂණවල, මූලික නිරීක්ෂණවල කරුණු අන්තර්ගත නිසා මේ වාර්තාවට මම එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාවට වෙනස් වාර්තාවක් කවුරු හෝ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම් ඒ වාර්තාවයි, මේ වාර්තාවයි දෙක එකට තමයි මට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක නිසා ලේකම්තුමා දැන් මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අවසාන කරන්න බැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා ඔබතුමා කොමිටිය කර ගෙන යන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: යන කෙනෙකුට ගියහැකියි. අපේ එකඟතාවක් තිබෙනවා, අද රෑ 12.00 වන තෙක් මෙය සාකච්ඡා කරනවා කියලා. මම හිතනවා, ඒ වැදගත්කම ඔබතුමාට තිබෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව වෙනස්කරනවාට අපි විරුද්ධයි. එළි වෙන තෙක් හෝ කමිටුව පවත්වාගෙන යන්න, මේ වාර්තාව වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැතුව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තමාගේ අයිතිය නැති කර ගෙන-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේක අපේ වාර්තාවක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමාට පැහැදිලි කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න.

ජගත් ගජවීරආරච්චිගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියකට අවසර දෙන්න. මම දේශපාලන කරුණක් හෝ factual -ප්‍රස්තුත- කරුණක් නොවෙයි පැහැදිලි කරන්නේ. මම කියන්නේ වාර්තාව ගැන. අපි කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාවක් පිළියෙල කරන කොට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මුල් බැස ගත් සිද්ධාන්තය - underlined principle කියන එක- අනුව තමයි කටයුතු කරන්නේ. පුළුවන්තරම් දුරට ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලුදෙනාගේම එකඟත්වයෙන් ඒකමතික වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි underlined principle කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලුදෙනාම එකතු වෙලා එක වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම තමයි 'පාර්ලිමේන්තුව' කියන එකෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ. නමුත් යම්කිසි අවස්ථාවක ඔබතුමන්ලා අතරේ පූර්ණ එකඟත්වයක් ඇති වන්නේ නැත්නම් ඒ හැම විටම කාරක සභාවේ වැඩිපුර එකඟත්වය ඇති වන වාර්තාවට, ඉදිරිපත් වන අනෙකුත් මතවාද සියල්ලම අමුණලා එක වාර්තාවක් හැටියට තමයි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක පස්සේ ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා, මේක ඉස්සෙල්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා කියලා එහෙම කිරීම සුදුසු නැහැ. මේ සියලු කරුණු එක මොහොතේ එකවර පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: ඒක තමයි හැමදාම වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි, ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ මූලධර්ම පුළුවන්තරම් inclusive වෙන්න ඕනෑ. මේ සාකච්ඡාව දැන් on going සාකච්ඡාවක්. අපි ඊයේ හවස දක්වාම inclusive විධියට වැඩ කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැනුත් කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ වාගේම දැනුත් අපි ආරම්භ කළා. Inclusive වෙන විධියටත් මම මහ පෙන්නුවා, ඔබතුමාගේම first draft එකට අනුව. අපි ළඟ දැන් drafts දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ first draft එකේ තිබුණු presentation එක වඩා හොඳයි කියලා මම ඔබතුමාට කිව්වා. මත භේදයට තුඩු දුන් කාරණා දෙකක් තිබුණා. ඒවාගේ දේවල් ඇතුළත් කරමින්, compromise කරමින් යන්න පුළුවන්. මේ සාකච්ඡාව තුළ ඉන්න නිසා තමයි මම තවමත් කියන්නේ, තවත් opportunity ටිකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා අවසන් inclusive approach එකට. අපි එතැනට යා යුතුයි; ඒක උත්සාහ කළ යුතුයි. ඒක තමයි අපේ එකඟතාව. අපට ඒකට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න. කවුරු හෝ මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් සාකච්ඡාවට සහභාගි වෙන්නේ නැත්නම් එසේ කරන්න.

මේ COPE කමිටුවේ සම්පූර්ණ සාමාජික සංඛ්‍යාව කීයද?

සභාපතිතුමා: 26යි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව විසිහයදෙනාගේම වාර්තාවක්. එතකොට ඒ විසිහයදෙනාගේ බහුතර මතය, සුළුතර මතය කියලා දැන්ම හොයන්න පුළුවන්කමක් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා විවිධ මත තියෙන්න පුළුවන්. උදාහරණයක් විධියට කියනවා නම් මම දරන්නේ වෙනස්ම මතයක්. සමහර කාරණා ගැන සමහරවිට පොදු මත තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. විශේෂයෙන්ම දූෂණය සහ අවස්ථානුකූල කාරණා ගැන මට යම් ආකාරයක විශේෂ මතයක් තිබෙනවා. මම උත්සාහ කරන්නේ මගේ මතයට කමිටුවම නම්මා ගන්න. ඒකයි මගේ උත්සාහය. ඒකට මම තර්ක කරලා, කරුණු පෙන්නලා inclusive approach එකෙන් මම උත්සාහ කරනවා, මේ කමිටුව මගේ මතයට නම්මා

ගන්න. මගේ මතයට නම්මා ගන්න බැරි වුණොත් තමයි මට කියන්න වෙන්නේ මේ specific කාරණය ගැන,"මේ පොදු කාරණා ගැන මම එකඟයි, specific කාරණය ගැන මට එකඟ වෙන්න බැහැ" යි කියලා. ඒක සාමාන්‍ය මතය, common sense කියන දෙය. ඒ අනුව ක්‍රියා කරමු කියලා මම කියන්නේ. සමහර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් යනවා නම් මට කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සමාවන්න. මේක රටේ දැඩි අවධානයට යොමු වුණු කාරණයක්. අවසාන දින දෙක පිළිබඳව කමිටුවේ හැම සාමාජිකයෙක්ම දැනුවත් කර තිබෙනවා, ඊයේයි, අදයි මේ කාරක සභාවට එන්න කියලා. ආවේ නැත්නම් ගෙදර ගිහින් අත්සන් කරවා ගන්න බැහැ. අද රැස්වීම රටේ තීරණාත්මක රැස්වීමක් නම් මේක තමයි බහුතරය. මේ කමිටු සාමාජිකයන් සියලු දෙනාටම ලිඛිතව දැනුම් දීලා, SMS යවලා දැනුම් දීලා තිබෙනවා. ඊට වඩා ගෙවල්වලට ගිහින් අත්සන් කර ගන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. මේ බහුතරයේ තමයි තීන්දුව.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, record කෙරෙන්න ඕනෑ නිසා කියන්නේ-

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මට ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් උපදේශයක් අවශ්‍යයි. මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

ගරු ලේකම්තුමාගේත් උපදෙස් අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පොඩි යෝජනාවක් තිබෙනවා, මෙය අවසන් කිරීම සඳහා. මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් කියනවා, මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. තව මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් කියනවා, මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව සංශෝධන සහිතව, එනම් සංශෝධනය කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. ඒ කියන්නේ වෙනස්කම් සහිතව. එහෙම නේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකයි අදහස් දෙක. මෙහිදී කරන්න පුළුවන් ක්‍රමවේදයක් ලේකම්තුමා යෝජනා කරනවා. අපි පරිච්ඡේදයෙන් පරිච්ඡේදය ගියෝතින් ඒ පරිච්ඡේදයේදී ඒ පරිච්ඡේදයටම එකඟ අය මෙතැන ඉන්නවා නම් ඒ අය කී දෙනෙක්ද කියා දමනවා. ඒ පරිච්ඡේදයට වෙනස් අදහසක් තිබෙන අය ඉන්නවා නම් එයත් එහි සඳහන් කරනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා:ලේකම්තුමා දන්නේ නැහැ, ඊයේ සිට අපි ඒකනේ කළේ. ඒකට යන්න බැරි නිසා නේ මෙහෙම වෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතැනදී නිර්දේශවල පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නිර්දේශ දාලා තිබෙන්නේ කමිටුවේ විධියට නොවෙයි නේ. පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් තුන්දෙනෙකුගේ නිර්දේශ නේ දමන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුගමගේ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නැත්තේ මොකද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුගමගේ මහතා: නැහැ. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, -

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: විශේෂිත නිර්දේශ දාලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මම සභාපතිතුමාට කථා කරන්නේ. මට සභාපතිතුමාත් එක්ක කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නිර්දේශ දීලා තිබෙන්නේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනෙක් වාචිකව දුන්නා කියලා. එතකොට මේ සියලු දෙනාගේ මතය-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: කොයි වෙලාවේද වාචිකව දුන්නේ? වාචිකව කොයි වේලාවේවත් දුන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, -

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මෙතුමා දන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: වාචිකව දුන්නේ පෞද්ගලිකවද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මෙහාට වාචිකව දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න හර්ෂණ මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: වාචිකව දුන්නාද, නිර්දේශ මොනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: වාචික අදහස් සියල්ලම බලලා නේ මේ පොදු නීතිය නේ හදලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතුමා කියන්නේ වාචිකව දුන්නා කියලා. එහෙම දුන්නේ නැහැ නේ?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔබතුමා සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා පක්ෂයක් නියෝජනය කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මෙතැන මේ වාර්තාව හදද්දී විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා සඳහන් කර තිබෙන්නේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනා දුන්නු වාර්තා විතරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. මම නැවත අවධාරණය කරනවා, -

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා,-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මගේ යෝජනාව. මෙතැන මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනායි කියලා නම් තුන දමලා අනෙක් අයට එකඟ වෙන්න කියන්න. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, හැම දාම කියනවා, දැනුත් කියනවා, මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනෙක් තමයි ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක මුළු කාරක සභාවේම මතය බවට පත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නිසා තමයි මෙහෙම දාලා තිබෙන්නේ. හැබැයි කාට හෝ මේක වෙනම නමින් දමන්න ඕනෑ නම් කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නමින් දමමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම නමින් දමන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මේක තුන් දෙනාගේ නමින් දාලා මේ අයට කැමැති නම් ඒකට එකඟ වෙන්න කියන්න, ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ කාරණයට මෙච්චරම මේ ගොල්ලෝ උනන්දු නම් - ඔබතුමා පැහැදිලිව සියලු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට කිව්වා, අහවල් දවසට කලින් නිර්දේශ දෙන්න කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ කාරණයට මේවචර කෑ ගහනවා වාගේම මේ කාරණයට මෙච්චර උනන්දු නම් ඒ දිනයට නිර්දේශ දෙන්න තිබුණා නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශ දුන්නේ නැතුව මෙතැන බයිලා ගහලා වැඩක් නැහැ නේ. ඒ නිසා දීපු නිර්දේශ එක්ක කරන්න. එච්චරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: Minutes ගන්න බලන්න. මෙතැන නිර්දේශ දෙන්නේ නැතුව ඇඟ බේරා ගන්න හදනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියන්නේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, සඳහන් කරන්න, තුන්දෙනායි නිර්දේශ දීලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. අනෙක් අය නිර්දේශ දුන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වාද, නිර්දේශ දෙන්න. ඒ දෙන ටික විතරයි වාර්තාවට දාන්නේ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නිර්දේශ දෙන්න කිව්වාට පසුව කරන දේ අපි කොහොමද දන්නේ?

ගරු **මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා**: ඒක කමිටුවේ වග කීමක්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මෙතුමා කිව්වා වාචික නිර්දේශ දුන්නා කියලා, එහෙම දුන්නාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා පුද්ගලිකව කාරක සභා රැස්වීම් දෙකට සහභාගි නොවූ නිසා ඔබතුමා එසේ කියන එක මම පිළි ගන්නවා. ඉතා පැහැදිලිව මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ හෘදය සාක්ෂියට අනුව දන්නවා, කිව්වේ මොකක්ද? කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශ නැහැ. ඒකේ අදහසක් ගන්න බැහැ. ඒක නිසා අපි ලිඛිතව නිර්දේශ දෙන්නම්. දවස් දෙකක් ඒකට දා ගත්තා. ඒ දවස් දෙකේ සියලුම නිර්දේශය මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරලා, වාර්තාව දෙන්න කියලා තමයි කාරක සභාව කිව්වේ. එතකොට නිර්දේශ දෙන්නේ මට ගෙදර ගෙනයන්න නොවෙයි. නිර්දේශ දෙන්නේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු **මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා**: මේ අය නිර්දේශ දෙන්නේ නැතිව බෙල්ල කැපිලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකෙන් බේරෙන්න හදන්නේ.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: දැන් තිබෙන්නේ අපි එකි නෙකා විවිධ මතවල ඉඳලා වාර්තා දෙකක් හෝ දෙකක් හෝ තුනක් හැදෙනවා නම්, ඒ තුන ඔබතුමන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. අපි කියන්නේ මේක කලවම් කරන්න එපා. ලේකම්තුමාට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ මේකේ gravity එක. ලේකම්තුමා ඊයේ පෙරේදා හිටියේ නැහැ. මම සභාපතිතුමාට කථා කරන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි එකඟ වුණා.

ගරු **මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා**: ඒ එකඟතාව යන්නේ නැති නිසා නේ අපි යන්න හදන්නේ.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමා, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ පෞද්ගලික නිර්දේශ කියන එක අමතර කථාවක් විතරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Final draft එක මේ.

ගරු **ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමා, ඔය වාර්තාව, කෙටුම්පත අපට ඊයේ දීලා විනාඩි 20ක් කියවන්න දුන්නා. අපි කියෙව්වා. මේ වාර්තාව ඇතුලේ තිබෙන කරුණු ලිඛිතව දීපුව තිබෙනවා, අපි සාකච්ඡා වුණ ඒවා තිබෙනවා, වාචිකව දීපු ඒවා තිබෙනවා. ඒ සියල්ලම දාලා තමයි වාර්තාව හදලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකට තමයි අපි අනුමැතිය දෙන්නේ.

මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණුවලට කියන්න පුළුවන් මේක වැරදියි. මේක මන්ත්‍රීවරු තුන්දෙනෙක්ගේ විතරයි අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. පක්ෂග්‍රාහීව කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා කියලා ඒ සියලුම වැරදි දාලා මෙයාට එකක් දෙන්න කියන්න.

ගරු **මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා**: සභාපතිතුමා, සුජීව මහත්මයා සභාපති කරලා ඒ කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව භදලා දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාව, වාර්තාවක් හැටියට කෙටුම්පතක් ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙනවා . ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට අධ්‍යනය කරන්න පුළුවන්, හදාරන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මේ වාර්තාවට අදාල වෙනස් ලේඛන, වෙනස් අදහස් ඕනෑ දෙයක් තිබෙනවා නම් සඳුදා වෙන විට ලිඛිතව දෙන්න. පුද්ගලිකව නොවෙයි. මේක අවසන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ලිඛිතව දෙන සියලු කාරණා සමඟ මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට සභාගත කරන්නම්.

ගරු **බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා**: මම ගැන මම කථා කරන්නේ. මේ ඉදිරිපත් වූ හැම පොතක්ම මම කියෙව්වා. මම ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව දන්න කෙනෙක් නොවෙයි. උපරිම උත්සාහ කළා, මේක කමිටුවකට අදාළ කරුණු දැන ගෙන, මම නම් බැඳුම්කර දැන ගත්තෙත් මේ සිද්ධියෙන්මයි. උපරිම වශයෙන් මේකේ කරුණු කාරණා දැනගෙන මේකට අදාළ කමිටුවක් විධියට, කොයි තරම් අප්‍රසන්න අත්දැකීම් හම්බ වුණත් කමිටුවක් විධියට ඒකට දායක වෙන්න. මම මෙතැන පාඩම් කරලා තමයි කථා කළේ හැමදාම. පුද්ගලිකව මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් වශයෙන් මගේ පැත්තෙන් මේ කාරක සභාවට සිදු විය හැකි මහන්සිය මම වුණා කියලා. ඒක ඇතුලේ උත්සාහ කරන්නේ, කරුණු සහිතව, බුද්ධිමය තර්කයක් ඇතුලේ වංචාවක් දූෂණයක් වුණාද කියලා සොයා බලන්න. ඒ අරමුණට අනුව කටයුතු කර ගෙන ඇවිත් තිබියදි, විවිධ ලේඛන, වාර්තා සියල්ල පරිහරණය කර තිබියදී, හෘදය සාක්ෂියට ඒ conviction එක තිබියදී ඒ spirit එකෙන් අදාළ අදහස ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ. ඒ අදහස අපි අවංකව මේ දූෂණයට විරුද්ධව, රාජ්‍ය මුදල් වංචාවට විරුද්ධව අපි කරන කටයුත්තට විරුද්ධව කඩා කප්පල් කරන අරමුණින් මැදිහත් වෙනවා කියලා දැන දැන තිබෙන කොට, තවදුරටත් ඒකාබද්ධ වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරන්න වුවමනාවක් ඇති වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද? ඒ ඒකාබද්ධ වාර්තාව කියලා එන්න ඕනෑ අපි කාගෙත් අදහස් එකතු වෙච්ච fruits salad එකක් නොවෙයි. එන්න ඕන සාක්ෂි සටහන් වාර්තා, විගණන වාර්තා සියල්ලම පදනම් වූ ඒ මත එන තර්කානුකූල නිගමනයක්. මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමා පළමුවන වතාවට දැක්කේ මේ කමිටුවේදී. ඒවා මත තමයි දිගටම කෝප් කාරක සභා ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තා හොඳ වෙන නරක වෙන තත්ත්වයන් පවා මෙහි ඇති වුණා නේ. ඒ නිසා inclusive approach එකක තමයි බොහෝ මන්ත්‍රීවරු ආවේ. ඒක අනවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණයට හෑල්ලු වෙමින්, ඒක බලහත්කාරී ලෙස යටපත් කරන්න උත්සාහ කරනවා නම් "inclusive" නාමයෙන්, අත් අල්ලාගෙන ගහේ පනින්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. එතකොට දෙගොල්ලන්ටම පීනන්න බැරි වෙනවා නේ. අත් අල්ලන් ගහේ පැන්නොත් පීනන්න පුළුවන් අයටත් පීනන්න බැරි වෙනවා. ගහේ පනින කොට අත් අත්හැරලා පනින්න ඕනෑ. ඒ නිසා ඉතාම පැහැදිලියි, ඊයේ අධික උත්සාහයක් ගත්තා එකඟතාවකට යන්න. නැහැ. එකම කරුණ ඉතාම නරක ආකාරයට මේ කරුණට සෘජුව, මේ වංචාව තේරුම් ගැනීමට අදාළ නොවන විධියට මැදිහත් වන නිසා තමයි කල්පනා කළේ, මේ දැන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙන වාර්තාවත්, ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවත් ඕනෑම දෙයක් තවත් enrich කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් වශයෙන් හිතනවා, කාරක සභාවේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලයයි සභාපතිතුමයි පැවැත්වූ වාර්තාව, ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා තිබෙන වාර්තාවයි හොඳටම ප්‍රමාණවත්. මම එකඟයි ඊයේ වූ සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාට. ඒක ගැටලුවක් නම් ඔබතුමන් මුලින්ම ඉදිරිපත් කරපු විධියට ඒ නිර්දේශ සහිතව ඉදරිපත් කරනවාට එකඟයි. මෙහෙම ලියන්න බැහැ වාර්තා. මොකක් හරි තර්කානුකූලකමක් තිබිය යුතුයි. එක වාර්තාවක උඩ කොටසේ තිබෙනවා. දූෂණය වුණා, නැත්නම් auction තිබුණා. වාර්තාවේ දෙවන කොටසේ තිබෙනවා, නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ නිගමන වල තිබෙනවා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා දූෂණය කළා, නිගමන තිබෙනවා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා දූෂණ කළේ නැහැ කියලා. එහෙම බැහැ නේ. එක වාර්තාවක් දාන්න එක conviction එකකට. අනෙක් වාර්තාව අනෙක් දත්ත මත දාන්න. තුනක් තිබෙනවා නම් තුනක් දාන්න. ඒක තමයි මගේ ඉල්ලීම.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, පළමුවෙනි දෙය තමයි අපි මේ කාරක සභාවේ ඉස්සරහට යන්න ඕනෑ, එකඟ වූ දේවල් මත. මොකක්ද අපි එකඟ වුණේ? සාක්ෂි විභාගය කරන ආකාරය ගැන එකඟ වුණා. ඊට පසු අපි තවත් පුළුල් එකඟතාවකට ආවා. මේක ඕනෑවට වඩා අදින්න දෙන්න බැහැ, මේකේ time frame එකක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. අපි ඒකට ගරු කළා. හෘදය සාක්ෂියේ ප්‍රශ්නයකුත් තිබෙනවා. එළියේ දේශපාලනය කථා කරන එක වෙනම එකක්. ඒකට අවශ්‍ය පහසුකම් අපි හැම දෙනාම ලබා දුන්නා. අපි හැම දෙනාම දින වෙන් කර ගත්තා. මේ සාකච්ඡාව පටන් ගන්න

තිබුණේ පෙරේදා. පෙරේදා පරිවර්ථන ගැටලු නිසා එළඹෙන්න නොහැකි වුණා. අපි ඊයේ එකඟ වුණා. අපි ඊයේ නැවත එකඟකාවක් ඇති කර ගත්තා අද දවසේ රාත්‍රී 12 වෙනකම් හෝ මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරලා සියලු දෙනාම එකඟ වූ වාර්තාවකට යනවා කියලා . ඊයේ දවස අපි සාර්ථක අවසන් කළා. අපට හුරු පුරුදු නැති කමත්, එකඟතාවකට එළඹීමට තිබෙන මාර්ගය ගැන අවබෝධයක් නැති කමත්, යම් පෞද්ගලික වූ ආවේණික ප්‍රශ්න නිසාත් අපට යම් යම් වෙලාවන් ගත වෙන්න ඇති. නමුත් සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ මොහොත දක්වාම අලට ඒකෙන් බැහැර වෙන්න කාරණයක් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ, මේ කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන්න, එකඟ වූ දෙයින් බැහැර වෙන්න ඔබතුමාට නොහැකියි. මම කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෙක් හැටියට පක්ෂ, පාට කඳවුරු නැතිව, මට ආවේණික මතයක් තිබෙනවා.

ඒ මතයට කැමැති අය ඉන්න පුළුවන්, අකැමැති අය ඉන්න පුළුවන්. සමස්ත මතයේ කොටස් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන් එකඟ නොවෙන. ඒ නිසා අපේ තර්ක අද දවසේ ඉදිරිපත් කරලා ඒ කාරණා මේ කමිටුවේ නිල සටහනට ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. ඒත් එක්කම අද දවසේ සාකච්ඡා කළා, අපට බොහොම ලේසියෙන් මේකෙන් එළියට යන්න ක්‍රමයක් තිබුණා. ඔබතුමාගේ කාරක සභාවේම පළමු කෙටුම්පත තමයි අපට මුලින් දීලා තිබුණේ. ඊයේ තමයි දෙවන කෙටුම්පත දැක්කේ. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ මුල් කෙටුම්පතේ තිබෙන නිරීක්ෂණ සහ සමහර කාරණා ඇතුළත් කරමින් මේ දැන් අපි හිර වෙලා ඉන්න ප්‍රශ්නයෙනුත් එළියට යන්න මහක් මා කිව්වා. ඒවා කරන්න පුළුවන්. දැන් මේ "හොරු ආරක්ෂා කිරීම, මම හොඳයි, ඔයා නරකයි, කමිටුව තුළ අරයාගේ හැසිරීම නරකයි, එයා හොඳයි" කියලා එළියට ගිහින් කියන්න පුළුවන්. ඊයේ රාත්‍රියෙත් ඒක වුණා. ඒකට කමක් නැහැ. අපි දේශපාලනඥයන් වශයෙන් ඒ හැම අභියෝගයටම මුහුණ දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා මා ඔබතුමාගෙන් ගෞරවයෙන් ඉල්ලන්නේ ඔබතුමා මේ කෝප් කමිටුව කියන වැදගත් කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට අපි ඇති වුණු එකඟතාව මත ඉස්සරහට යමු කියන එකයි. අපට සවන් දෙන්න. ඔබතුමා සහ මේ කමිටුවේ බහුතරය එකඟ නොවෙනවා නම් මට ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. කරුණාකර, මට සවන් දෙන්න. මගේ කථාව මට ඉවර වෙනතුරු කියන්න දෙන්න. මා කියන කථාව ගෙදර ගිහිල්ලා ලියා ගෙන එන එකක් නොවෙයි. මේ නිල වාර්තාවේ කවදා හරි දවසක මේ රටේ මිනිස්සු කියවන කොට ඒක කියවන්න පුළුවන් තැනක මේක ලියා ගන්න දෙන්න. Game, ඒකේ තිබෙන ගැඹුර, මේ හැම තැනම වාඩි වෙලා ඉන්න පුද්ගලයින්ගේ සම්බන්ධතා, අණ ලැබෙන්නේ කොතැනටද කියන එක අපි නොදැන ඉන්නවා නොවෙයි. ඒ නිසා බොරුවට අමුතු ප්‍රතිරූපයක් හදලා මේ කමිටුවේත් ගෞරවය නැති කරලා, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේත් ගෞරවය නැති කරලා මේ කරන්න හදන gameවලට ඉඩ දෙන්න එපා. එකඟතාව මත වැඩ කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලාට අදහස් දක්වන්න තිබෙන අයිතිය මා මොනම වෙලාවකවත් බැහැර කරලා නැහැ. එහෙම බැහැර කරලා සභාපතිවරයෙක් හැටියට කටයුතු කරන්න තිබුණා නම් මට මීට වඩා පහසුයි. ඇත්තටම එහෙම නම් මට තිබුණේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා වාර්තාවක් දුන්නාට පස්සේ ඒ වාර්තාව මත පදනම් වෙලා මම වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා එතැනින් ඒක ඉවර කරන එකයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ඔබතුමා හොඳ වැඩි වුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක නොකරපු නිසා තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇති වුණේ. මෙතුමා කියාපු කාරණාව මට අදාළ වෙනවා නම් විතරයි මා මේක කියන්නේ. සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මට කිසි කෙනෙකුගෙන් අණ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ,-

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමා කථා කළානේ. මට කිසි කෙනෙකුගෙන් අණ නැහැ. මා ඒක විවෘතවත් කියලා තිබෙනවා. හැම තැනමත් කියලා තිබෙනවා. මේ මොහොත වනතුරු මේ කාරක සභාවේ සියලු පක්ෂ නියෝජනය කරන මන්ත්‍රීවරු මට සහයෝගය දීලා තිබෙනවා. මා දැනුත් බලාපොරොත්තු වනවා. සහයෝගය දීලා තිබෙනවා කියන එක මා ප්‍රසිද්ධියේත් කියලා තිබෙනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට සමහර මන්ත්‍රීවරු පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තුළත් මාධ්‍ය තුළත් වෙනස් මත කියද්දී, මා ඒ මතවලට උත්තර දීලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒක එහෙම නොවෙයි කියලයි. මා සම්බන්ධයෙන් වුණත් එහෙමයි. මා එහෙම කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේකෙදිත් මා උපරිම උත්සාහ කරන්නේ අදටත්, දැනටත්, මේ මොහොතෙත් මේක එක වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නයි. එක වාර්තාවක් හැටියට මේ වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලා අනුමත කරන්නේ නැත්නම් අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කරන්න පුළුවන් දේ තමයි මේකට තිබෙන සංශෝධන ලබා දෙන එක. ඒ සංශෝධනත් එක්කම මා වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට සභාගත කරන්නම්. ඒක තමයි මට කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. එහිදී ඔබතුමන්ලාට අදහස් දක්වන්න තිබෙන අයිතියට මා කොහෙත්ම බාධා කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් හෝ මගෙන් ඒ සංශෝධන විකෘති වේවි කියා සැකයක් තිබෙන නිසා -දැන් එහෙම ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා නේ- ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්නේ මේ වාර්තාවට තිබෙන සංශෝධන ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදයට වෙන්න පුළුවන්, වාක්‍යයෙන් වාක්‍යයට වෙන්න පුළුවන් ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙන්න කියලයි. ඒ ලිඛිතව දෙන සංශෝධනත් එකතු කරලා මා වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි දැක්කා ඔබතුමා පසු ගිය මාස 18ම බොහොම සාධාරණව වැඩ කටයුතු කරගෙන ගියා. අපි කිසි කෙනකුට බැහැ, ඔබතුමාට චෝදනා කරන්න. ඒක මා පැහැදිලිව කියනවා. මගේ මතය ඒක. අපි දැක්කා, ඔබතුමා බොහොම සර්ව සාධාරණව කටයුතු කළ ආකාරය. නමුත්, මගේ පෞද්ගලික අදහස අනුව, කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෙක් හැටියට මා ඔබතුමාට දොසක් නඟනවා. ඒ, මාස 18ක් මේක ප්‍රමාද කිරීම සම්බන්ධවයි. ඔබතුමාගේ පැත්තෙන් ඔබතුමා සාධාරණව ඒක කරගෙන ගියා. ඒක හරි. හැබැයි, මේක මෙච්චර කාලයක් ප්‍රමාද කිරීම පිළිබඳව මට තිබෙනවා ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඊළඟට ඔබතුමා කාගේවත් පැත්තක් ගත්තේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා බොහොම සාධාරණව ඔබතුමාගේ වැඩ කටයුතු කළා කියන එක අපි ප්‍රකාශ කරනවා. ඊළඟට කාගෙන්වත් අණක් අනුව මා හිතන්නේ නැහැ, කවුරුත් වැඩ කරනවා ඇති කියලා. මා මෙතැනදී එක දෙයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. අපේ ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියාපු කාරණාව. අපි ඉන්නේ රජය ආරක්ෂා කරන්නයි. අපි ඉන්නේ රජය පැත්තේ. අපි ඉන්නේ රජයේ මහජනතාවගේ මුදල් ආරක්ෂා කරන්නයි. කමිටුවේ අපි ඔක්කෝටම තිබෙන එකම මතය මොකක්ද? අපට ඕනෑ රජය ආරක්ෂා කරන්නයි. මේ කාරක සභාවේ අපි සියලුම ආයතන ගෙන්වා මොකක්ද මේ කරන්නේ? රජය ආරක්ෂා කිරීමයි. රජය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම කරනවා මිසක් හොරාව ආරක්ෂා කිරීම නොවෙයි කරන්නේ. අපි ඔක්කෝම ඉන්නේ එතැනයි. ඒ නිසා තමුනාන්සේගෙන් අපි ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ තීන්දුව මේකයි, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ තවත් අදහස් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක මීට අමතරව - තමුන්නාන්සේ දැන් ඒ තීන්දුව දුන්නා. අපි ඒ පිළිබඳව එකඟතාව පළ කරනවා. අපි මෙතැනින් නික්ම යනවා. ගිය මාස 18ක කාලය තුළ අපි බොහොම සහෝදරත්වයෙන් වැඩ කළා. සියලු දෙනාටම බොහොම ස්තුතියි. ඉදිරියේදීත් අපට තව වැඩ කරන්න තිබෙනවා. මේ තමයි අවසාන වාර්තාව-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අවසාන වශයෙන් ඔබතුමා කරපු ප්‍රකාශයේ මා එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැති කොටසක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, කාගේවත් බලපෑම්වලට යට වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. හැබැයි, ඔබතුමාගේ හෘද සාක්ෂිය දන්නවා, ඔබතුමාට කොච්චර බලපෑම් තිබුණාද කියලා. මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා පළමුවැනි වතාවට මේ කෝප් කමිටුවට කැඳවන්න කියන කොට ඔබතුමාට මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ කී දෙනෙකු කිව්වාද, ගෙන්වන්න එපා කියන එක පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමාගේ හෘද සාක්ෂිය දන්නවා. ඔබතුමාට බලපෑම් කළා අධිපතිවරයා මේ කෝප් කමිටුවට ගෙන්වන්න එපායි කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඇත්තද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ඇමතිතුමා මේ කමිටුවේ ඉන්න විට එක් කෙනෙකු එළියට ගිහිල්ලා, ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ඇමතිතුමාට දුරකථනයෙන් ඉහළ පෙළේ ප්‍රබලයෙක් කථා කරලා කිව්වා, මේක මෙහෙමයි මේ විධියට කටයුතු කරන්න කියලා. ඒ ඔක්කෝම අපි එළියට දමන්නම්. එහෙම නම් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සියලු තොරතුරුත් එක්ක අපි කථා කරමු මේක පිළිබඳව, මේකට ආපු බලපෑම් පිළබඳව. ඔබතුමා ඔය ගත්ත තීන්දුව වෙනස් කරන්න එපා. මා ඔබතුමාගෙන් අවසාන වශයෙන් එක කාරණයක් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, මේ වාර්තාව මෙහෙමයි, ඉතිරි ටික සඳුදා දෙන්නේ කියලා. හැබැයි, ඔයින් එහාට තීන්දු ඔබතුමාට ගන්න බැහැ. දැන් අද මෙතැනින් එළියට ගියාම ඔබතුමාට ලොකු බලපෑමක් එනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා යනවා නම් යන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා :ඔබතුමා කවුද, මට යන්න කියන්න. ඔබතුමා කොහොමද මට යන්න කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට අයිතියක් නැහැ, මට යන්න කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑ නම් යන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : ඔබතුමා කවුද මට යන්න කියන්න. ඔබතුමාට අයිතියක් නැහැ, මට යන්න කියලා කියන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මේ ගත්ත තීන්දුවෙන් එහා, ඔය කරපු ප්‍රකාශයෙන් එහාට යන්න එපා. ඔබතුමා ඔය තීන්දුවේම ඉන්න. වෙනස් කරන්න එපා. ආපසු ඉහළින් දුරකථන ඇමතුම් ටික ඒවි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : මෙතුමාට බලපෑම් කෙරුවා කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : අහන්න, අහන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : මට කාගෙන්වත් බලපෑම් නැහැ. මට ඒක කියලා තිබෙනවා. මට බලපෑම් කරන්න පුළුවන් මට විතරයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : මම පාවා දෙන්න කැමැති නැහැ. ඕනෑ නම් කියාපු කෙනා එක්ක කියන්නම්. මම ඒක වෙලාවට කියන්නම්. දැන් කියන්නේ නැහැ. Call එක ආපු නොම්මර ඔක්කෝම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : දේශපාලන කථා නවත්වලා වැඩ කරගෙන යමු.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, භෘද සාක්ෂියට එකඟවයි මමත් මේකට එකඟ වුණේ. කාගේවත් මෙහෙය වීමක් මට නම් තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒක මා පැහැදිලිව කියන්න ඕනෑ. මා අවසාන වශයෙන් ඔබතුමාට මතක් කරන්න කැමැතියි, මේ ලේඛනයේ අවසාන එක නොවෙයි, ඊළඟ එක "2015- 2016 බැඳුම්කර ගනු දෙනුව සඳහා අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා සෘජුවම" කියන එකට මහ බැංකු අධිපති කියන එක එකතු වුණොත් හොඳයි. නැත්නම් මේක වැරදි-

සභාපතිතුමා : මේ වාර්තාව මත පදනම් වෙලා දෙන සංශෝධන ටික දෙන්න. නිරීක්ෂණ ටික දෙන්න. මා ඒවා ඇතුළත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : මේක technical error එකක් වෙන්න ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් කාරුණිකව ඉල්ලනවා ඒ සංශෝධන ලිඛිතව දෙන්න කියලා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : වෙනත් සංශෝධන නැහැ. ඒක විතරක් දෙන්නම්. අනෙක් කාරණාවලට එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක සටහන් කර ගන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ 2015 – 2016 බැඳුම්කර ගනු දෙනුව සඳහා අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් කියන නම වෙනුවට ඔබතුමා යෝජනා කර සිටින්නේ, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති-

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් කියන නම තිබුණාට කමක් නැහැ. මහබැංකු අධිපති කියන එක තියෙන්න එපායැ. ඒ කාර්ය භාරය-

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මා ඒක ගැන පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක මගේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලයේ අදහසක් නොවෙයි. ඒ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරු ලියා දුන්නු නිරීක්ෂණවල තිබුණු අදහස තමයි මේ දැම්මේ. ඒකට ඔබතුමා ඒකට එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැති නිසා ඒක සංශෝධනය වෙන්න ඕනෑ ආකාරය ඔබතුමා යෝජනා කරනවා, "හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා .." යනුවෙන් සඳහන් විය යුතුයි කියලා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ඔව්. ඒක COPE එකට හොඳයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට අවසර දෙන්න කලින් කියාපු කාරණයක් ස්ථිර කර ගන්න. මා ඔබතුමාට කාරණා දෙකක් කලින් කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මට පොඩි අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න? දැන් මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තා සහ අදාළ සියලු ලේඛන, මේ ඇමුණුම් 18ට අදාළ සියලු ලේඛන ඔබතුමන්ලා ළඟ තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මා ඔබතුමන්ලාට යෝජනා කරනවා, -අපට පහසුයි ඒක- ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සංශෝධන, මේ වාර්තාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන සංශෝධන ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙන්න කියලා. ඒ ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙන සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මට කාරණා කිහිපයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ඉක්මනට යන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒක වෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඔබතුමාට යන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒක වෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක්. මොකද, අපට ඔබතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා මේ කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක හරි. මට යන්න ඕනෑ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හැඟීම මොකක්ද කියා මට තේරෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා පොත් ලැහැස්ති කරගෙන යන්න ලැහැස්ති වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොත් ලැහැස්ති කරන නිසායි මම එහෙම කිව්වේ. විජේසිංහ මහත්මයාට එහෙම යන්න ඕනෑ නම් යන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අදාළ නැහැ. මේකේ quorum එක තිබෙනවා නම් කාරක සභාව පවත්වා ගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මට එහෙම හදිසියක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, මෙම කාරක සභාවේ quorum එක තිබෙනවා නම් අපට මෙම කාරක සභාව පවත්වා ගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්. හරිද? මෙම කටයුතු අවසන් කිරීමට අපි ක්‍රමවේදයක් හදා ගනිමු. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කරුණාකර මට මේ ගැන කියන්න. අපි කලින් ක්‍රමවේදයක් හදා ගත්තා. අපි ඊයේ ඒක

continue කළා. අපිට එම ක්‍රමවේදය වෙනස් කරන්න තරම් කාරණයක් උපවය වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇත්ත.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඒකට එකඟද? එහෙම නම් මට ඉඩ දෙන්න, to continue the agreed system.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි. එතැනදී මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට යෝජනා කරන්නේ, හොඳම දෙය තමයි -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සමාවෙන්න. ඔබතුමාගේ මතය -

සභාපතිතුමා: මොකද, මේ වාර්තාවම පිළිගන්නවා කියා පිරිසක් කියද්දී, මේ වාර්තාවම පිළිගන්නවාය කියා පිරිසක් අදහස් දක්වද්දී, මේකම නැවත සංශෝධනය කරන්නය කියා ඔබතුමන්ලා නැවත කියනවා නම්, කරුණෙන් කරුණට අදාළව හෝ ඔබතුමන්ලා නැවත සංශෝධන ටික ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බොහොම ස්තුතියි, එම යෝජනාවට. එම යෝජනාව ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරනවා. කරගෙන පැමිණි ක්‍රමවේදයටම අපි කරගෙන යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: තව ක්‍රමවේදයක් හදන්න බැහැනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. කලින් තිබුණු ක්‍රමවේදයට කරගෙන යමු. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට මේ කාරණය කියන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දමලා ගියපු මිනිසුන් කියපු දෙයට අපි එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපි continue කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැනට පැමිණියේ නැති තව කී දෙනෙකු ඉන්නවාද? එහෙම නම් ඒ අයගෙනුත් telephone එකෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ, කරන්නේ මොකක්ද කියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහෙමයි -

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමනි, හොඳම දෙය ලිඛිතව දෙන එකනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙන්න මෙතැන තමයි අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා ඒක කරන්න එපා. කට්ටියකට ඕනෑ විධියට ඒක කරන්න එපා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට කථා කරන්න හම්බ වුණේම නැහැනේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ලේකම්තුමනි, මේ අහන්න. අපිට කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න. මම පැයක් බලා ගෙන සිටියා, වචනයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට ඕනෑ නම් තව වාර්තාවක් දමන්න කියන්න. මේක අපේ වාර්තාව.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. මේක අපේ වාර්තාව.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට තීරණයක් ගන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුනි, මෙහෙමයි. දැනට තිබෙන ක්‍රමය තමයි, එක්කෝ දැන් adjourn කරන්න පුළුවන්. Adjourn කරලා ඉවර වෙලා - මට කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. දැන් adjourn කරලා ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු මේ වාර්තාවේ සංශෝධනය වෙන්න ඕනෑ දේවල් තිබෙනවා නම්, එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ දේවල් තිබෙනවා නම් - ඇත්තටම තිබෙන්නේ සංශෝධනය විය යුතු දේවල් නොවෙයි, එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ දේවල්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සංශෝධනත් තිබෙනවා නේද, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි?

සභාපතිතුමා: සංශෝධන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ - මම කියනකම් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මෙම වාර්තාවම ඇතුළත් කරන්නය කියා පිරිසක් කියනකොට, එම වාර්තාවම සංශෝධනය කරන්න ඕනෑය කියා ඔබතුමන්ලා කියනවා. එතකොට මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ මොකක්ද? ඒ නිසා හොඳම දෙය තමයි -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ පිරිස වැඩක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කියන්න බැහැනේ. එතකොට මට සිද්ධ වෙනවා - මම කියනකම් ඉන්න. මම ක්‍රමයක් හදා දෙනකම් ඉන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට මේක කියන්න. දැන් මේ ඔබතුමා ඉස්සරහා තිබෙන්නේ COPE සභාව නොවෙයිද?

සභාපතිතුමා: COPE සභාව තමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තවම තිබෙන්නේ COPE සභාව. කවුරු හරි ගියා කියලා -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. ඒ ගියපු අයගේ අදහසක් තිබෙනවා. එම නිසා එම අදහස බැහැර කරලා මට ඉදිරියට යන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ගියාය කියා ඔබතුමා COPE කමිටුව නවත්වන්නේ නැහැ නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුරුවත් ගියාය කියා අපට COPE කමිටුව නවත්වන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: බැහැ, බැහැ. එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. Quorum එක තිබෙනවා නම් අපි කටයුතු කරගෙන යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: - අපි එම ක්‍රමවේදය දිගටම අරගෙන යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: එම ක්‍රමවේදය ගෙනියන්න තමයි, මම යෝජනා කරන්නේ. එම ක්‍රමවේදය ඉදිරියට ගෙන යනකොට, ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධනය කරන යෝජනාවක් -යම් කාරණයක්- තිබෙනවා නම්, එසේ සංශෝධනය කරන කරුණ අදාළ වාර්තාවේම ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. මම මේවා කියන්නේ ලේකම්තුමාගේත් උපදෙස් අනුවයි. එසේ අදාළ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරනකොට, මේ තිබෙන එක අයින් කරලා ඇතුළත් කරනවා නොවෙයි. තිබෙන එකත් එක්ක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්: එතකොට ඒක වෙනම එකක් විධියට දමමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම දැක්කා, ලේකම්තුමා කියනවා. ඕකම සංශෝධනය කරන්නත් පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකම තමයි. මෙතැනම තමයි.

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: එතකොට ඒ මත දෙකම අපි ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මත දෙකම ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නැතුව බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඊයේ කාරක සභාවේ සිටියේ නැහැනේ. වැරදි දේවල් අයින් කරලා නිවැරදි මතය, අපි එකඟ වෙන මතය-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ඔක්කෝම එකඟ වුණු එක. එකඟ නොවෙනවා නම් එකඟ නොවන මතය -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් 26 දෙනෙකු සිටිනවා. අද දවසේ මොනවා වුණත් අවසානයේ ඔබතුමා මේ වාගේ පිටපතක් හදලා, 1,2,3,4,5 කියා 26 වෙනකම් දමා මේ සියලු දෙනාටම අත්සන් කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න ඕනෑනේ. එහෙම අවස්ථාවක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑනේ. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මැතිතුමනි, එහෙම එකක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ අවස්ථාව වෙනකොට final කඩදාසි ගොන්නක් තිබෙනවා. තවම ඒ අවස්ථාව උදා වෙලා නැහැ. ඇත්තටම කථා කළොත්, මෙම කාරක සභාවෙන් නැඟිටලා ගියපු මහත්වරුන් "අතරමැද්දේ මේ තිබෙන ඕනෑම දෙයකට අපි එකඟයි" කියා ගියාට, ඔබතුමා තවම දන්නවා, ඊයේ අපි එකඟ වුණු නිසා යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට - ඊයේ කමිටුව එකඟ වුණු නිසා. පුද්ගලයෝ නොවෙයි. ඇත්තටම 'as it is" කියා draft එකක් නැහැනේ. ඔබතුමාට එහෙම එකක් තිබෙනවාද? ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමාට ඇත්තටම තිබෙන්නේ මෙම කමිටුවේ කටයුතු ඉස්සරහට අරගෙන යන්නයි. ඊට පසුව අත්සන්වලට ඉඩ තබා හැමෝටම දැනුම් දෙන්න, අත්සන් කිරීම සඳහා මෙතැනට පැමිණෙන්නය කියා. එපමණයි. එහෙම නැතුව සභාව මැද්දෙන් නැඟිටලා ගියපු කෙනෙක් කියන්නේ කොහොමද, "වෙනස් කරනවා නොවෙයි. ඔන්න අපි යනවා." කියා? "අපි යනවා යන්න" කියා කියන්නේ කොහොමද?

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ. ඒක වැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වැරදියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකනේ කිව්වේ. ඒක තමයි කිව්වේ. ඔබතුමාට දැන් දණ්ඩනයක් නියම කරලා ගියා. සමාවෙන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, උදාහරණයක් විධියට මම දැන් ඔබතුමාට printing mistake එකක් පෙන්වා දුන්නාය කියමු. ඔබතුමා ඒක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැද්ද? එහෙම වෙනස් නොකරන එක ඔබතුමාගේ සභාපතිකමටත් ගැළපෙනවාද -

සභාපතිතුමා: මොකක්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි හිතමු printing mistake එකක් තිබෙනවා කියා. අකුරක හෝ ඉරක printing mistake එකක් මම ඔබතුමාට පෙන්වා දෙනවා කියා හිතමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක පහළින් දමනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතකොට ඔබතුමා ඒක වෙනස් කරනවානේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: That is common sense. ඒක සභාපති විධියට ඔබතුමාට තිබෙන බලයනේ. ඒකනේ ඔබතුමා draft එකක් - ඒ කියන්නේ මූලිකයා. ඔබතුමා අපේ first among equals. අපි හැමෝම සමානයි. හැබැයි, සභාපතිතුමා නිසා ඔබතුමා පළමුවැනියා. එතකොට

අපිට එම opportunity එක දෙන්න. ඒ නිසා මේ කවුරු ගියත් අමුතු ක්‍රමවේද හදන්න බැහැ. සදාචාරයට, එකඟ වුණු දෙයට, සම්ප්‍රදායට මේ කියන හැම දේටම ගැළපෙන්නේ - අපි ඊයේ එකඟ වුණා. අද රෑ දොළහ වෙනකම් අපි මේ කාර්යය කරනවා. හරිද? ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගියා කියලා සභාපතිවරයාට බල කරලා යන්න හැකියාවක් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට නැහැ. Quorum එක තිබෙනවා. අපි එකඟ වුණා, paragraph එකෙන් paragraph එකට යන්න. අපි paragraph එකෙන් paragraph එකට යමු. ඊට පසුව අපි එකඟ වෙන report එක අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරමු, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Exactly. අපි මේක විසඳා ගන්නා ක්‍රමයක් කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එපමණයි. ඒ අය ගියා කියලා, අපට මේක නවත්වන්න කියලා ඒ අය බල කරන්න බැහැ. ඒ අය ඒක කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අයින් කරන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැත්නම් අපි කලින් ඒවාත් තියලා පහළින් දාන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී හබ කරන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් නැති වුණත්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ස්වාධීන පුද්ගලයෙක් වශයෙන් ඔබතුමා මෙතැන ඉන්නවා. ඒකට බොහොම ස්තුතියි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉන්නවා. ලේකම්තුමා ඉන්නවා. ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ නිලධාරියෙක් ආපු එක වඩාත් හොඳයි. එතුමාගේ සහායත්, අනෙකුත් කාර්ය මණ්ඩලවල සහායත් ඔබතුමාට ලැබෙනවා. කරුණු පිළිබඳව එතුමිය හොඳට දන්නවා. ඔබතුමා, අපි කියනවාට එකඟ වෙන්න එපා. එකඟ විය හැකි නම් එකඟ වෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ එහෙම නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කාරණාවන් ගැන ඇසීමේදී මම යෝජනා කළේ, මට පහසු ක්‍රමය සහ ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයට පහසු ක්‍රමයයි. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කරුණු ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදයට ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙනවා නම් වඩාත් පහසුයි කියලායි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ. අපි ඒ ක්‍රමය පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම වැදගත් කාරණයක් කියන්නද?

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, මම පැහැදිලි කරනකම්. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කරුණු ලිඛිතව ලබා දෙනවා නම් අපට පහසුයි. එතකොට, එම වෙනස්කම් ටික මෙම වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න අපට ලෙහෙසියි. එම කරුණු ලබා දිය හැකි දිනයක් අපට දන්වා එම දිනයට ඔබතුමන්ලා දකින වෙනස්කම් ටික ලියලා, -පෞද්ගලිකව හෝ තනි-තනිව හෝ පොදුවේ හෝ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ- අපට ලබා දෙන්න. අපි හිතමු, මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ඉන්න ඔබතුමන්ලා හය දෙනා හෝ තම තමන් දකින වෙනස්කම් ලියලා මෙන්න මේවා තමයි වෙනස්කම් කියලා කියනවා නම් ඒකත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ ආකාරයට හර්ෂණ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා යනාදී වශයෙන් තනි තනිව කරුණු ලබා දෙනවා නම් මෙම වාර්තාවට ඒවා ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ සභාපතිත්වය ඇතිව නිවැරදි COPE වාර්තාවක් ලබා දෙන්න අපි දවසක් හෝ මෙතැන ගත කරන්න කැමැතියි.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, දැන් මෙහි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවානේ, නිවැරදි එකක් කියලා නැහැනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ඔබතුමා ඉදිරියේදීම මූලික කාරණා සියල්ල amend කළා. සියලුම කාරණා -නම් ටික හැර- පටන් ගත්තාට පසුව සාධක ඇතුළුව සියලුම කාරණා අපි amend කළා, පළමුවෙනි ඡේදය හැර.

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන ඒවා record වෙනවානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ. නැහැ. Record වුණාට කමක් නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කරුණු කියන්න දෙන්නකෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා : කරුණු දෙකක් සංශෝධනය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. කරුණු දෙක සංශෝධනය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, සියලුම කාරණා පිළිඅරගෙනයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මට අවසන් කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියන කරුණුත් record වෙනවා. ඔබතුමා කියන කරුණුත් record වෙනවා. මටත් කරුණු කියන්න අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා නේ. පළමුවෙනි එකේ "මුහුණත අගය" කියන එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් පමණක් හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා අදහසක් ප්‍රකාශ කළා. මමත් අදහසක් ප්‍රකාශ කළා. එයට අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමාත් තවත් කිහිප දෙනෙකුත් අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කළා. එම නිසා, අපි සියලුම කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් එහි නිවැරදි තත්ත්වය අවබෝධ

කර ගෙන, සියලු දෙනාම සාකච්ඡා කරලා -හිතූ මතේට නොවෙයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ලේකම්තුමා, කාර්ය මණ්ඩලය අපි ඔක්කෝම කථා කරලා- අපි එම වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කළේ නිවැරදි කරුණු නේ. වැරදි දේ නොවෙයි නේ. නමුත්, දැන් මේ තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ වැරදි ගොඩාක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වැරදි නැත්නම්, අපට මෙතරම් වෙලාවක් ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. ඒ වාගේම, එම නිවැරදි නොවන කරුණු අයින් විය යුතුයි කියලා අපි එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ සභාපතිත්වයෙන් යුතුව පවතින COPE කමිටුවේ මෙම වාර්තාවට තිබෙන කරුණු මොනවා හරි දාලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නට ඔබතුමා කැමැතිද? අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ ඒකද? පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට මොනවා හරි දීලා දාන්නද? අපි පොඩ්ඩක් මහන්සි වෙලා මෙම වාර්තාව සැකසිය යුතුයි. කවුරුවත් ආරක්ෂා කරන්න කියලා, මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ, නීත්‍යානුකූල කරුණු. ඒ කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කරලා, සාධාරණ මනුස්සයෙක්ට ඔළුවට දැනෙන වෙනස්කම් ටික මේකට ඇතුළත් කර ගන්න පුළුවන් නම් හොඳයි. ලේකම්තුමනි, කලින් සිදු වුණේත් එහෙමයි. ඊයේ දවසේදීත් සිදු වුණේ එහෙමයි. ඒක සාර්ථකව සිදු වුණා. අද හිටපු පිරිස අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ නේ. ලේකම්තුමනි, ඔවුන් දේශපාලන අදහස් නේ දුන්නේ. මෙතැනට අවශ්‍ය වන එක technical point එකක් දුන්නාද? මුල ඉඳන්ම කිව්වේ, දේශපාලන කථාවක් නේ. මේක වැරදිද, හරිද කියලා. අපටත් දේශපාලන කථාවක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක නොවෙයි, අපි කියන්නේ. අපි කියන්නේ, paragraph එකෙන් paragraph එකට කවුද හරි කවුද වැරදි කියන එක නොවෙයි. හිටපු Governor කියනවා නම්, " මමයි දෙන්න කිව්වේ, මම අණ කළා මගේ නියෝගය පිළිගත්තා" කියලා. That is it. ඒක අපි පිළිගන්නවා. Perpetual Treasuriesවලින් කොහේ හරි තිබෙනවා නම් හොරකම් කළා insider information ගියා කියලා අපි පිළිගන්නවා. අපට කවුරුත් ආරක්ෂා කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. හැබැයි, දේශපාලන ව්‍යූහයෙන් යුතු වාර්තා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න දෙන්න බැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඔබතුමාට මුල ඉඳලාම පෙන්වන්නම්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ private placements ගැන කියනවා. ඒ එක තැනකවත් කියනවාද විනිවිදභාවය කියලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා බලන්න ඕනෑ විනිවිදභාවය. ඉලක්කම්, ගණිතය නොවෙයි.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: That may be the procedure.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ. මම මේ උදාහරණයක් දෙන්නේ. එහෙම විනිවිදභාවය නැතිකොට මේ වාර්තාවේ private placement එකෙයි auction එකයි ගැන අපි සාකච්ඡා වෙන්නේ නැත්නම්, අපි මේ වාර්තාව සැකසීමේදී fundamental වැරැද්දක් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එම නිසා, අපි කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන කෙටුම්පතේ වැරදි තිබෙනවා කියලායි. එම නිසා අපි හැන්දෑ වනතුරුම සාකච්ඡා කරලා, එහි වැරදි ටික හදා ගෙන, මෙන්න මේ කාරණා සත්‍ය කාරණා ලෙස ගෙන අපට එකඟ වන්න පුළුවන් කරුණු ටිකට අපි එකඟ වෙමු. ඊට පසුව ඒවා අපට මෙම වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. අනෙක් කාරණා ටික අපට පහළින් අමුණන්න පුළුවන්. සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කිව්ව විධියට මෙම වාර්තාවේ typographicaly error එකක් හෝ එවැනි මොනවා හරි දෙයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, පහළින් දානවාද "ඉහත සඳහන් paragraph එක වැරදියි" කියලා. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට එතකොට මේකම වැටෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මෙම වාර්තාවේ ඡේදයක් වැරදිලා තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක හරිගස්සන්නේ නැහැ. පහළින් කෑල්ලක් අමුණනවා, "ඉහත ඡේදය වැරදී ඇත. එය නිවැරදි විය යුත්තේ මෙසේ ය" කියලා. එහෙම drafts කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ ලේකම්තුමනි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, තවත් වෙලාව ගන්නේ නැතිව අපි එකින් එක යමු.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මෙම කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කෙටුම්පත මමත් ඇතුළුව, කෝප් කමිටුවේ පිරිසක් අනුමත කළා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම එවැනි අනුමත කිරීමකින් පසුව, මෙතැනින් ඒ අය ඉවත් වුණා. නමුත්, ඔබතුමාට අනුමැතියක් දීලායි තිබෙන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කෙටුම්පතට එකඟත්වය පළ කරලා, ඔබතුමාගේ කෙටුම්පතට අපි අනුමැතියක් දුන්නාට පසුව මේ අවස්ථාවේදී අලුත් සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඔබතුමාට පුළුවන්කමක් තිබෙනවාද? ඒ වාගේම, මෙය ඉදිරියට ගෙන යනවාද, නැද්ද කියන එක තීන්දු කිරීමට කෝප් කමිටුවේ සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන් ඔබතුමාට පූර්ණ බලයක් තිබෙනවා. එහෙම වුණොත් මට හිතෙන්නේ, මෙය සමඟර විය යුතුයි කියලායි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි කලින් ඉඳන් එකඟ වුණේ- ඊයේ දිනයේත්, අද දිනයේත් අපි එකතු වෙලා මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. අපටත් වෙන රාජකාරීන් තිබෙනවා. මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු සියලු දෙනාමත්,

ඔබතුමාත් ඒවා නතර කරලා ආවේ මේ වාර්තාව සැකසීම ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්නයි. එක එක පිරිස්වලට හදිසි වෙන වෙන කාරණා තිබෙනවා කියලා, ''මේකට අපි එකඟයි'' කියලා ගියාට, ඒක අපට අදාළ වන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක සත්‍යයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්. අපට අදාළ වන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන කරුණු-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාට මාගේ අදහස ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න මට තප්පරයක කාලයක් ලබා දෙන්න. අපි මේ සාකච්ඡාව නවත්තපු තැන ඉඳන් එකින් එකට paragraph to paragraph සාකච්ඡා කරමු. එහෙම සාකච්ඡා කරලා අද දවස ඇතුළත කරන්න පුළුවන් තරම් අපි මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරමු. ඒ කරුණු ගැන එතුමන්ලාගේ යම් යම් අදහස් හා යෝජනා විරුද්ධව තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ කරුණුත් මෙම වාර්තාවටම අමුණන්න. ඒක අපට ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මේක තමයි කමිටුව. ඒ කමිටුවේ විධියට යන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මැතිතුමනි, මම ඒ සඳහා පිළිතුරක් ලබා දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ කමිටුව තවම on-going committee එකක්. තවම මෙහි අවසාන තීරණයක් නැහැ. අවසාන තීරණය මේ කෙටුම්පතේ final draft එක අද ඊ 12 වෙනකම් සාකච්ඡා කරලා අවසන් වෙනවා කියලා හිතන්න. අන්න එතකොට draft එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔවුන් ''නොදැකපු ගැහැණියෙක්ව කසාද බඳිනවා වාගේ'' වැඩක් නේ මේ කරලා ගියේ. දැන් මෙන්න මෙහෙම කියනවා, ''අපි ඒකට එකඟයි, වෙනස් කරනවා එහෙම නොවෙයි'' කියලා. මොකක්ද, tone එක. එකඟ වුණු ක්‍රමයකට යන්න අපට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න. සෑහීමකට පත්වෙනවා. ගජදීර මැතිතුමා ඉන්නවා නම් මම සන්තෝෂ වනවා. මොකද, එතුමා සාධාරණ, ප්‍රතිපත්ති ගරුක මන්ත්‍රී කෙනෙක් කියලා මම දන්නවා. එතුමාට යන්න වෙනත් හේතු තිබෙන්න ඇති. අපට සතුටුයි. හැබැයි, මේක එකඟ වුණු පරිදි ඉදිරියට යන්න ඕනෑ. මේ කමිටුවේ කටයුතු තවම අවසන් නැහැ. එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ අද ඊ 12 වෙනතුරු හරි මෙය සාකච්ඡා කරන්නයි. එපමණයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම පොදු එකඟත්වය අද බිඳුණා. ඒකට හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා. මම ඒ ගැන පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. ඒ අය ගියේ ලේකම්තුමා පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කළා-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එකඟ වුණු දේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම කථා කරලා අවසන් වෙනකම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමා කියන-

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : අයියෝ! ඉන්නකෝ මොකක්ද ඔච්චර හදිස්සි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : Draft එක හැදුවේ මෙතුමන්ලා වාගේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ගරු ලේකම්තුමා කරුණු දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතුමන්ලාද මේ draft එක හැදුවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : නැහැ, නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ඔබතුමන්ලා මම කථා කළාට පසුව කථා කරන්න. කථා කරන්න දෙන්න. ඉස්සර වෙලා ශීලාචාර වෙන්න. මම ඔයාලාට බාධා කළේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : හොඳයි, ඔබතුමා කථා කරන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මත දෙකක් ආවා. එකක් තමයි, අවශ්‍ය නම් තව කෙනෙකුට අතුරු වාර්තාවක් දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. අතුරු වාර්තා දෙකක් නොවෙයි, ඕනෑ නම් තුනක් දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලාත් එකඟ වුණා. එහෙම කියනකොට කවුරුත් එකඟ වුණා, ''නැහැ එහෙම ඕනෑ නැහැ, අපි එක වාර්තාවක් පමණක් දෙමු'' කියලා. මේ අද දවසේදීයි. ඊට පසුව, ලේකම්තුමා එයට විකල්පයක් හැටියට කිව්වා '' දැන් එවැනි අලුත් යෝජනා තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒක ඇමුණුම් හැටියට මෙයට ඇතුළත් කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරමු'' කියලා. ඉන් පසුවයි එතුමන්ලා පිටව ගියේ. ඉතින්, අපි දැන් වෙනස් තීරණයකට එන්නෙ කොහොමද? ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, COPE කමිටුවේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට ඔබතුමාට බලය තිබෙනවා, මේක ඉදිරියට ගෙනියනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා තීන්දු කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සමහර විට කෑමට යන්න ඇති.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒ අයගේ පෞද්ගලික තීරණවලට ගියා කියලා අපට කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා තීන්දුවක් ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන දේ මට පැහැදිලියි. අපි ඊයේ කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු අවසන් කරද්දී, අද

කාරක සභාව රැස්වෙලා මේ සාකච්ඡාව අවසන් කරමු කියලා පොදු එකඟත්වයකට ආවා.

සභාපතිතුමා සම්බන්ධිතයි.

හැබැයි, අද කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු ආරම්භ කරගෙන යන කොට, ''අපි කවුරුත් එකතු වෙලා මේක සාකච්ඡා කරලා අවසන් කරමු'' කියන පොදු එකඟතාවයේ බිඳ වැටීමක් වුණා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. ඒ අය නැඟිටලා ගියා.

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම කියන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : දැන්, මම ගියොත් එහෙම?

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ පොදු එකඟත්වය බිඳ වැටුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි,-

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔහොම ඉන්න, මම කියන කල්. ඔබතුමා මගේ කථාව කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්නේ නැත්නම් මෙතැනට ඇවිල්ලා කියන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම් මට මේ දේ කියන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. පොදු එකඟත්වය බිඳ වැටුණේ මේ කාරණය නිසායි. සාකච්ඡාවකින් තොරව මේකට එකඟයි කියලා පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ වාගේම මේක සංශෝධනය කරන්න ඕනෑය කියලා තවත් පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා. ඒ අය මෙතැන දැන් ඉන්නවාද, නැද්ද කියන එක නොවෙයි අදහස. ඔක්කෝම එකට එකතු වෙලා මේ සංශෝධනයන් කරලා අවසාන වාර්තාවක් බවට පත් කරනවා වෙනුවට, පිරිසක් ''නැහැ, මේකම වාර්තාව හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ'' කියන අදහසක ඉන්නවා. තවත් පිරිසක්, ''මේකට සංශෝධනය ඇතුළත් කළ යුතුයි'' කියන අදහසක ඉන්නවා. මේක සංශෝධනය කරනවා කියන එකෙන් අදහස් වෙන්නේ මොකක්ද? මේක සංශෝධනය කරන එකෙන් අදහස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මා අදහස් කරන්නේ, මේ වාර්තාව වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැතුව මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළු වෙන්න ඕනෑ දේවල් එකතුවක් හැටියට ඇතුළු කරන එකයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ සංශෝධනයන් දෙන්න. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මට තත්පරයක් දෙන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විශේෂ නිර්දේශ තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : හැම දෙනාගේම විශේෂ නිර්දේශ දෙන්න කියලායි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එහෙම නොවෙයි නේ. විශේෂ නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒවා, මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අදහස්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කෝ. තත්පරයක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමා හිතන්න එපා, මේ සංශෝධන අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම කරන්න ඕනෑය කියලා. අපේ තර්ක තිබෙනවා. අපේ කරුණු තිබෙනවා. මගේ තර්ක තිබෙනවා. ඒ කරුණු අපි ඉදිරිපත් කළාම, ඔබතුමා ඒවාට ඇහුම්කන් දීලා මම කියන කරුණ වැරැදියි කියලා අපට තේරුම් කරලා දෙනවා නම්, අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුනුත් අපේ සාකච්ඡාවට එකඟ වුණොත් මම ඒවා අයින් කර ගන්නම්. එතකොට ඒක as it is තියන්නත් පුළුවන්. මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ, මේ සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන්න කියන එකයි. අපට ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න. ඔබතුමා අපට ඇහුම්කන් දෙනවාද, නැද්ද කියලා තීරණය කරන්න. එච්චරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා : මට ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න බැරි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඇහුම්කන් දෙන එක නොවෙයි, මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මොකක්ද ප්‍රශ්නය?

සභාපතිතුමා : දවස පුරාම වුණත් ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපට ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඇහුම්කන් දෙන එක මේ වාර්තාවට අදාළ කර ගන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා :ලේකම්තුමා මම ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපට ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න. ඔබතුමා කෙටුම්පත සකස් කිරීමට මූලික වුණු කෙනෙක් හින්දා, සාමාජිකයෙක් වන මම අසන දේවල්වලට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න ඔබතුමාට යුතුකමක් තිබෙනවා. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඇහුවොත්, ''ඇයි, මේවා දැම්මේ? මට නම් මේ දේවල් හම්බ වුණේ නැහැ. මේකට අපි එකඟ නැහැ. මොකක්ද, මේ ප්‍රශ්නය?'' කියලා, ඒක පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඔබතුමාට යුතුකමක් තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ ස්ථානයේ ඉන්න නිසා සමහර කාරණා ගැන පැහැදිලි කරන්න එතුමාට යුතුකමක් තිබෙනවා. එතුමාට අපි ආරාධනා කළා. එතුමා මේ කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෙක් නොවෙයි නේ. අපි එතුමාට ආරාධනා කරන්නේ, එතුමාගේ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයේ ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ සියලුදෙනාට ආරාධනා කරන්නේ ඒ

පැහැදිලි කිරීම ලබා ගන්න. අපි එතුමා කියන දේ එලෙසින්ම භාර ගන්නවා නම්, පරීක්ෂණයක් ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ; මේ කමිටු ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. COPE, PAC කමිටු එකේදී අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ එතුමාගේ වාර්තා මත පදනම් වෙලායි. ඒ නිසා ඒ සාකච්ඡාවට ඉඩ දෙන්න. මේ සාකච්ඡාව අතරමැද නැඟිට ගිය පිරිසකගේ චේතනාවන් ගැන හිතලා කමිටුවේ කටයුතු අඩාල වෙන්න බැහැ. එතුමන්ලාට මතයක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. එතුමන්ලා හිතන්න පුළුවන්, අපි දැන් කියපු කරුණු ඉවරයි කියලා. It is okay. හැබැයි, අපට ඉඩ දෙන්න. මට ඉඩ දෙන්න. මගේ කථාව මේ උත්තරීතර පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ලියන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. මගේ කථාව ඔබතුමා තවම අහලා නැහැ. බොහොම සුළු කොටසයි අහලා තිබෙන්නේ. මගේ කථාව මේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා අහලා නැහැ. අපේ කරුණු ලියන්න ඕනෑ නැද්ද? මම බොහොම හැඟීම්බරවයි ඔබතුමාට මේ කථාව කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමා මොහොතකට කලින් indicate කරපු දේ මොකක්ද? මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුව ශක්තිමත් කරනවා, මේ කමිටු ශක්තිමත් කරනවා කියන්නේ මුළු ක්‍රියාදාමයම කඩාගෙන වැටෙන එකද? ඒක අමතක කරන්න එපා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි මොන තරම් වාද කළත් ඊයේ හවස හිනාවෙලා එකඟ වුණේ, "අපි හෙට උදේ හම්බ වෙමු" කියලා නේ ගියේ. අද දවසේ ඕක වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. නැඟිටලා යන කණ්ඩායමකට dictate කරන්න දෙන්න බැහැ නේ. ඉන්න පිරිසකගේ මතය ජයග්‍රහණය කරන එක වෙනම කාරණයක්. අනෙක් එක ඡන්ද විමසීම් කරන ක්‍රමයකුත් මේවායේ නැහැ නේ. ඒකට ඉඩ දෙන්න. මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ COPE කමිටුව ශක්තිමත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒකට ඉඩ දෙන්න. දුර්වල කරන්න ඕනෑ නම් සවන් නොදී නතර කරන්න. නැඟිටලා ගිය මහත්වරු ගියේ, "ඔය ගොල්ලන් ඕනෑ දෙයක් කර ගන්න" කියලා. එතුමන්ලා කිව්වේ නැහැ, "මේ කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු නතර කරමු" කියලා. එතුමන්ලාට කියන්න අයිතියක් නැහැ, "මේ කාරක සභාවේ ඉදිරියේ ඇතිවන ක්‍රියාදාමය මෙලෙස විය යුතුයි" කියලා. කාරක සභාවේ ආපු නැති අයටත්, නැඟිටලා ගිය අයටත් කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, "මේ කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු මෙහෙම වෙන්න ඕනෑ" කියලා. ඔබතුමා බය වෙන්න එපා. සභාපතිවරයා වන ඔබතුමාගේ ගෞරවය, ඔබතුමාගේ රාජකාරී ආරක්ෂා කරන්න අපි බැඳිලා ඉන්නවා. කමිටු සාමාජිකයන් විධියට අපි ඒක ආරක්ෂා කරනවා. ඔබතුමා අපි හැමෝගේම සභාපති. නැඟිටලා ගිය අයගේයි, නැඟිටලා නොගිය අයගේයි, ආපු නැති අයගේයි, 'සභාපති' වන්නේ ඔබතුමා. ඔබතුමා අපි 26දෙනාගේම සභාපති. ඒ 26දෙනාගේම අත්සන් ඔබතුමා මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළු කරන්න ඕනෑ. මේ කමිටුවේ නැඟිටලා ගිය පිරිසගේ අත්සන් විතරක් නොවෙයි, සියලුදෙනාගේම අත්සන් ඒ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළු කළ යුතුයි. බහුතරය කියලා දෙයකුත් නැහැ. මම නතර කළ තැන සිටයි කියන්න යන්නේ. මම ඔබතුමාට බොහොම වැදගත් කාරණා කිහිපයක් කිව්වේ. අපි කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමාගේ මුල් කෙටුම්පතෙහි තිබෙන කාරණා දෙකක් මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න කියලා. ඒ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමා මොකද කියන්නේ?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ඇමතිතුමනි, සමාවෙන්න. පරස්පර කාරණයක් නොවෙයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, -

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : අපි නතර කළේ කොතැනින්ද?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම නතර කළ තැනින් තමයි පටන් ගන්න හදන්නේ. සභාපතිතුමා කිව්වා, මේ පිළිබඳ පැහැදිලි කිරීම් තිබෙනවා නම් සඳුදා ගෙනැල්ල දෙන්න කියලා. මුළු කමිටුවටමයි ඒක කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එතුමාට අදහස් දක්වන්න බැහැ. එතුමා අත්සන් කරලා ඉවරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම කියන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අත්සන් කරලා ඉවරයි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම කියන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අත්සන් කළා නම් ඔබතුමාට ඉන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමාට එහෙම කියන්න අයිතියක් නැහැ නේ. එතුමා මේකට අත්සන් කළා කියලා එතුමාට දැන් යන්න කියලාද කියන්නේ?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : එහෙම ඉන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අත්සන් කළාට පස්සේ මොනවාද කථා කරන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම කියන්න එපා. කාරක සභාවේ සෑම සාමාජිකයෙකුට කාරක සභාවේ ඉන්නත් පුළුවන්; අදහස් දක්වන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : මොකක්ද කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්න. දැන් මටත් එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : මට දැන් කරන්න බැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඔබතුමාට ඉන්න පුළුවන්. ආරාධනා කරලා-

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ආරාධනාවට නොවෙයි මම ඇවිල්ලා ඉන්නේ. මම කිව්වේ, සභාපතිතුමා මෙහෙම තීන්දුවක් ගත්තා. සභාපතිතුමා දැනුත් කිව්වා, සඳුදා දිනයේ තිබෙන සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒ ප්‍රකාශය මත සමහරු නැඟිටලා ගියා නේ. ඇයි, එක පාර්ශ්වයකට එක විධියකටත්, තව පාර්ශ්වයකට තව විධියකටත් සලකන්නේ? මම අහන්නේ ඒකයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමා තීන්දුවක් ගන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක කාලයක් දෙන්න. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, සඳුදාට කොළයක ලියලා දෙන්න කියන කාරණයට මම එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැත්තේ ඇයි කියලා දන්නවාද? අපට පුළුවන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ, සාකච්ඡා කරලා මේකේ වෙනස් කරන්න තිබෙන දේවල් එකඟත්වයෙන් වෙනස් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : දැන් එහෙම බැරි තත්ත්වයක් නේ ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඇයි බැරි?

සභාපතිතුමා : මෙතැන පිරිසක් කියද්දී මුළු වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා,-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා ඒකට බයයිද?

සභාපතිතුමා : නැහැ, මම ඒකට බය නැහැ. බය නිසා නොවෙයි මම ඒ කාරණය කියන්නේ. ඒ කාරණයත් මේ කාරක සභාවේදී මට නොසලකා හරින්න පුළුවන්ද? මම මේ කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අපි ඒකට එකඟ වුණාද? ඒක ඉදිරියට අරගෙන යමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැඟිටලා ගිය මිනිස්සු, ආපු නැති මිනිස්සු ගැන බලන්න නොවෙයි ඔබතුමා ඉන්නේ. මේ කමිටුවේ කාලය ගත කරන්න කැමති-

සභාපතිතුමා : නැහැ, නැහැ. එහෙම කියන්න එපා. මම මේ වාර්තාව හැදුවේ සියලු ලේඛන සහිතව ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයත් එක්කයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා පක්ෂපාතීව එහෙම කරන්න කෝ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : එහෙම කරන්න එපා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා : "එහෙම කරන්න" කියලා ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? ඒ වාර්තාවට සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඔබතුමන්ලාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඊයේ අපි එකඟ වුණා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මේ වාර්තාව සම්පූර්ණයෙන් පැත්තකට දාලා වෙන වාර්තාවක් හදනවා නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒකටත්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : මම දන්නේ නැහැ, මේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා බය වෙලායි ඉන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : මොකක්ද ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා බය වෙලායි ඉන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : මම මොකටද බය වෙන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා බය වෙලායි ඉන්නේ. අද රෑ 12 වෙන කල් වුණත් කටයුතු කරන්න මේ කමිටුවේ ගණ පූරණය තිබෙනවා; මුල් එකඟතාව තිබෙනවා. එහෙම තිබෙද්දී ඔබතුමා කටයුතු කරන්න ඕනෑ මේ සභාවේ මතය අනුවයි. එහෙම නැතුව ඔබතුමාට තනි මතයක් අරගෙන, "මම දැන් මේක නතර කරනවා" කියලා යන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : සභාපතිතුමාට බලයක් තිබෙනවා, ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව-

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ ඕනෑ විධියට මට කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මම එක ප්‍රශ්නයයි අහන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මේ කාරක සභාව හැටියට අපි කෙටුම්පත හැදුවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අපි ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ කෙටුම්පත සාකච්ඡා කරන්න හදන්නේ නැතුව මේ සාකච්ඡාව අවසන් කරන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ කෙටුම්පතම, වාර්තාව හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා පිරිසක් කියනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එහෙම ක්‍රමයක් මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒකට සංශෝධන එකතු කරනවා නම්, සංශෝධන එකතු කරන්න. කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් අහන්න -

සභාපතිතුමා: "කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව" කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව කියන්නේ, මෙතැන සභාපතිවරයාට හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලා මා විශ්වාස කරලා මටත්, ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයටත් භාර දීපු වාර්තාව. එතකොට ඒක අනුමත කිරීම, නොකිරීම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වැඩක්. ඒකට නේ දැන් සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. මම මේක මේ මගේ දැනුමෙන් හදපු එකක් නොවෙයි නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ලේඛන, මෙතෙක් කරපු පරීක්ෂණ, මෙතෙක් ලබා ගත් සාක්ෂි සටහන් සියල්ල එකතු කරලා හදපු දෙයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන ඔක්කොම හරි. සභාපතිතුමනි, මම අහන්නේ එක ප්‍රශ්නයයි. දැන් ඔබතුමා එකඟ වුණා නේ ඊයේ -

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමා අර විධියට කියද්දී -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක මේ විධියට යන කොට අපේ හිත රිදෙනවා. පොඩ්ඩක් අහන්නකෝ. අපට අසාධාරණයක් වෙනවා. ඔබතුමා පක්ෂග්‍රාහියි කියලා අපට දැනෙනවා. ඒකයි අපි කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමා ඊයේ යම් දෙයක් සඳහා එකඟ වුණා. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, ඊයේ දවසම හරි අද දවසම හරි කථා කරලා මේක ඉවර කරනවා කියලා. එහෙම වුණාට පස්සේ මම නැගිටලා ගියා නම්, ඔබතුමා මට මෙච්චර ආදරය කරලා කියනවාද, සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා නැගිටලා ගියා, එතුමා එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ, මේක මෙතැනින් නවත්වන්න ඕනෑය කියලා?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සමහරු කියලා ගියා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සමහරු නොවෙයි. එකද, දෙකද, තුනද කියලා වැඩක් නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා එහෙම කරනවාද? ඔබතුමා කොහොමවත් කරන්නේ නැහැ. ගිය කට්ටියට යන්න කියනවා. දැන් ආවේ නැති කට්ටිය ඉන්නවා. ආවේ නැති කට්ටියගේ අදහස ඔබතුමා කොහොමද දන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒවා අපට අදාළ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ මෙතැන ඉන්න කට්ටිය කියන දෙයයි. කෝප් එකට මම ආවේ නැත්නම් - මම දවස් දෙකක් ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ. එන්නේ නැති කොට මට කියන්න බැහැ, මම දවස් දෙකක් ආවේ නැහැ, මගේ අදහස මම ඔබතුමාට call කරලා කියන්නම්, මෙහෙම කරන්න කියලා. දැන් ගිය කට්ටිය ගියා. ඒ කට්ටියගේ අදහස් තිබුණා. අපි එකඟ වුණා එක දෙයකට. ඒ දෙය නොකරන්න ඔබතුමාට ඇති හේතුව මොකක්ද? ඒ දෙය දිගට කර ගෙන යන්න ඔබතුමාට තිබෙන අපහසුතාව මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: බාධාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් කර ගෙන යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: බාධාවක් නැති එක පහසු කරන්න තමයි මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ, ඒ සංශෝධන ලිඛිතව දෙන්න, එතකොට ලෙහෙසියි කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඔච්චර හිතුවක්කාර ඇයි?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ එකඟත්වය පළ කරලා ගියේ සභාපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාවට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට තේරෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා කණ්ඩායමක් plan කර ගෙන ඇවිල්ලා මේක කරන්න, මෙහෙම කළාම මේක නවත්වමු කියලා, ඒ නැවැත්වූවාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමා දැන් ඒ කාර්යයට උදව් කරන බවක් තමයි අපට තේරෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට ඇයි දන්නේ නැහැ මෙච්චර අමාරු, මේක ඉස්සරහාට කර ගෙන යන්න. ඒකයි. අපට තේරෙනවා නේ ඒක. Plan කර ගෙන එනවා, මෙහෙම අපි නැගිටලා යන්නම්, මේක ඉවර කරමු කියලා. එහෙම නැත්නම් කර ගෙන යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක පුදුම කථාවක් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පුදුම කථාවක් නොවෙයි, සභාපතිතුමනි. ඒක හරි අසාධාරණයි. තුන් දෙනෙක් නැගිටලා ගියා කියලා ඔබතුමාට කමිටුව නවත්වන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ කෙටුම්පතට - මම දැන් මෙතැන ඉන්නවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් පටන් ගන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මේ පටන් අර ගෙනයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට අපි එකඟත්වය පළ කළා. කොටසක් එකඟත්වය පළ කරලා ගියා. සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද කරන්න හදන්නේ කියන එක මට කියන්න. සංශෝධනය කරනවාද, ඇමුණුම් හැටියට දමනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. හොඳ මොහොතක් ඕනෑ, මේක පටන් ගන්න. ඊයේ අපි

එකඟ වුණා, දහතුන්වන පිටුවේ තිබෙන කාරණා කිහිපයක් සංශෝධනය කරන්න. ඒ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමාගේ යෝජනා මොනවාද? ඒ සංශෝධනය පිළිබඳව.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ සංශෝධනය දැන් සකස් කළා නේ. දහතුන්වන පිටුවේ තිබෙන කරුණු උදේම සංශෝධනය කළා. ඒක උදේම කිව්වා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපට ඒක ඉවර කර ගන්න බැරි වුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ ඒ නිසා දැන් මේකේ - දැන් ආපසු කියන කොට ඔබතුමන්ලා -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක කර ගෙන යන්න ඔබතුමා කැමතිම නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, මම කැමැතියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කැමැතියි. අපට කියන්න, ඊයේ වෙච්ච එකඟතාව මත ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, අද ඒ කොටස හදා ගෙන එන්නම් කියලා. ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ, මේ කමිටුව. දැන් ඊයේ ඒ එකඟතාව මත තිබෙන draft එක මොකක්ද? නිශාන්ති මහත්මිය, ඔබතුමිය ඒ කොටස කියවන්න.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: "සෘජු මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/1/26/2008 (2008.01.07) (ඇමුණුම - 7) මඟින් 2008 වසරේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට මාස තුනක කාලයකට තීරණය කර තිබුණු තවත් - මාස තුනක කාලයකට කියන එක වැඩිපුර දැම්මා- එහි පසුව මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක MB/PD/25/20/2008 (2008.10.07) (ඇමුණුම - 7) මඟින්ද මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපළේ පවතින පොලී අනුපාතවලට වඩා සියයට 0.05ක් පමණ ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතයන් සහිත බැඳුම්කර සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට නිකුත් කිරීම මඟින් සහ එම තීරණයම දීර්ඝ කිරීමෙන් - එතැන තමයි නැවතුණේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Captive sources කියන එක, EPF, ETF and NSB සහ review කියන එක එතැනට ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කරලා, review එක ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ සංශෝධනය වෙනම ඇතුළත් කරන්න. මේ වාර්තාවේ මෙතැනම ඒ සංශෝධනය ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි එක දමන්න. නැත්නම් confuse වෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරි එක කියන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එකඟ වෙන එක ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන -

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: එහෙම දමන්න බැහැ, දැන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. කෙටුම්පතක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කෙටුම්පතට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සංශෝධනය ඇතුළත් කරන්න. ඒකයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: වෙනම.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ ඒවා ඉවත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වැරදි අදහසක් නේ එතකොට එන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ කොහොමද?

සභාපතිතුමා: වැරදි අදහසක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. එතකොට වැරදි නම් වැරදි එක කාටහරි පෙනෙනවා. එහෙම කරන්න එපා. ඒක වැරදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් අපට මෙතැන අතපසුවීමක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අතපසු වීම කියන එක වෙනම එකක්. ඒක පොදු එකඟතාවකින් කරන්න පුළුවන් නම් හොඳයි. හරිද? "මාස තුනකට" කියන කාරණාව අපි සකච්ඡා කරලා එකඟ වුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක දමන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊට පස්සේ අවසාන කාරණාවේදී "දීර්ඝ කිරීම" කියන ප්‍රශ්නය ආවාට පස්සේ ඒක දීර්ඝ කළාද, නැද්ද කියලා සොයා ගන්න බැහැ කියලා තමයි තීරණය වුණේ. පැහැදිලියිද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් ඒක ලියන්න ඕනෑ, දීර්ඝ කළාද, නැද්ද කියලා අනාවරණය කර ගත නොහැක කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි. හැබැයි අතපසුවීම කියන එක - මාස තුනේ කථාව එන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මම උදේම කිව්වා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට මෙහෙමයි මේ සංශෝධනය තිබෙන්නේ කියලා කිව්වා. ඒක තමයි මේ කාරක සභාව එකඟ වුණු සංශෝධනය. මෙතැනින් එහාට යන සංශෝධන තිබෙනවා නම්, මේ කාරණාවෙන්

එහාට යන සංශෝධන තිබෙන ඒවා මේ වාර්තාවේ ඇත්තටම ඒ ඡේදය ළඟින් සටහන් කරන්න. සටහන් කරලා -

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දැන් කියන එකට තමයි එකඟ වෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි කරන්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් ඔබතුමා කෙටුම්පතක් හැදුවා. මේ කෙටුම්පතේ ඇස් බැල්මට වැරදියි කියලා කරුණක් අපි සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන් ඔබතුමාට දැන් පෙන්වා දෙනවා නම්, කෙටුම්පතේ කතෘතුමා විධියට ඔබතුමා convince වෙනවා නම්, ඒක factually -මතය නොවෙයි. මතය ගැන අත තියන්න එපා. මතය ගැන අත තියන්න එපා- Factually වැරදියි කියලා, සාක්ෂි අනුව හෝ ඔබතුමාගේ available කරුණු වැරදියි කියලා පෙනෙනවා නම්, ඒ වෙනස විය යුතුයි. ඒ වාගේම ඔබතුමා කියන ක්‍රමයට දැනට ඇති සාවද්‍ය -කරුණු අනුව වැරදි- අතපසුවීමකින් එකතු වුණු කොටස් උඩිනුත්, විකල්පය යටිනුත් දැම්මාම, අර වැරදි මතයට ප්‍රමුඛතාවක් ලැබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාව සමාජයට නේ අපි දෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රමුඛතාවක් දෙන ආකාරයට නොවෙයි, මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. එතැනම තමයි දමන්න ඕනෑ. ප්‍රමුඛතාවක් දෙනවා කියලා foot note එකක් දමනවා කියන එක නොවෙයි මේ කියන්නේ. මේ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාවේ ඒ paragraph එකේම සංශෝධනය දමන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් මේක අව්‍යාරුවක් වෙනවා නේ. ඒක නේ මෙතැන මෙච්චර වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කළේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : I will clear this.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක වෙනස් කරන්න තිබෙන අවස්ථාව අපට ලබා දෙන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඇතුළු අපි හැමෝගේම එකඟතාව -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අවස්ථාව අපි ලබා දෙනවා, මෙන්න මෙහෙම.

අපි දැන් මේ වාර්තාව හදලා තිබෙනවා. මේක draft report එකක් තමයි. මේක final report වශයෙන් මේ කාරක සභාව අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ. හැබැයි, අපි කිව්වා මේක final draft report එක කියලා. ඒක නේ කෙටුම්පත කියලා මෙහි සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Draft report. ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉතින් මේ කෙටුම්පත වෙනස් කරනකොට, මේ වෙනස් කිරීම් කරන කරුණු ටික වෙනම සටහන් කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම නොවෙයි නේ වෙනස් කරනවා කියන්නේ. ඒක නෙවෙයි වෙනස් කිරීම කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පිරිසක් මේ කෙටුම්පත එහෙමම පිළිඅරගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ගියාට අපි මොනව කරන්නද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් සභිකයන් 26 දෙනාම නැවත කැඳවලා කථා කරමු. නැත්නම් බැහැ. පිරිසක් මෙතැන පිළිගත් එකක් ඔය ගොල්ලන් වෙනස් කරනවා නම් ඒක කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඇයි, එහෙම බැරි? ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ගියාට කමිටුව යන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ වැඩක් නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ එළියට යන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව පිළිඅරගෙන නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා පස්දෙනෙක් නැවත මේක වෙනස් කරනවා නම් ඒක මට කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි පස්දෙනාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසා නොවෙයි නේ ගියේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නිසා නොවෙයි ගියේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙමනම් 26 දෙනාම කැඳවන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නැහැ. නැවත කැඳවන්න නොවෙයි. අපට ඕනෑ කරගෙන යන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි වාර්තාවක් හැදුවා. පිරිසක් මුළු වාර්තාවම පිළිගන්නවා. ඊටපසුව ඔබතුමන්ලා වාක්‍යයෙන් වාක්‍ය වෙනස් කරනවා නම් එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. මම කියන්නේ වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන් එකඟ වෙච්ච කාරණා ටික සම්බන්ධයෙන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් උපදෙස් අරගෙන එකඟතාවයෙන් කරගෙන යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් 26 දෙනාම කැඳවමු. එහෙම කැඳවලා වෙනස් කිරීම් කරමු. එහෙම කළාම තව කෙනෙකුට කියන්න බැහැ අපි නැති වෙලාවේ වෙනස් කළා කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම නම් ආපු නැති අය ඉන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, මට බැහැ එක් කෙනෙක් හරි කියනවා නම් මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නවා කියලා, ඒ පුද්ගලයා මෙතැන මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නා බව සඳහන් කරලා යනවා නම්.,

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක එතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට ඒ වාර්තාව නැවත වෙනස් කරනකොට.,

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා කාරක සභාව ඉවර වෙන්න කලින් නැගිටලා යන්නේ කොහොමද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හරි නම් හරි. හරි දෙකක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ මේ වාර්තාවේ හරය වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ නේ. මේ වාර්තාව එහෙම වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි ඊයේ කළේ. අපි ඒකට නේ අද ආවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොදුවේ එකඟ වෙලා නේ ඒ කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුද, පොදු කියන්නේ? කවුද පොදු කියන්නේ? හතරක්ද, පහක්ද,හයක්ද, දහයක්ද, පහළොවක්ද, විස්සක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට මට වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්න කවුද පොදු?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ එක තමයි ඔබතුමාට හරි. ඒ හතර දෙනාගේ එක තමයි ඔබතුමා හරි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා ඔබතුමා දැන් ඉස්සරහට යන්න බැරිව එතැන දැන් හිරවෙලා නේ. එකඟ වෙලා ආවා මෙතැනින් නවත්වන්න. දැන් ඉස්සරහට යන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධන සඳුදාට දෙන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මේක වාර්තා කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධන ලිඛිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මම ඒක වාර්තාවට ඇමුණුවා කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්. මම කාරක සභාවේ බහුතරයම කැඳවලා කථා කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාට බැරි නම්, අපි සභාපතිවරයෙක් පත් කරගෙන කරුණු හොයනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මොකද, මේ කාරක සභාව අද රැස්වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා

පක්ෂග්‍රාහී වෙන්න එපා. මේ කාරක සභාව අද රෑ 12.00 වෙනතුරු වැඩ කරන්න එකඟ වුණා. මේ කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් ඔබතුමාට අපට ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න බැරි නම් ඔබතුමාට එකඟ වෙච්ච ක්‍රියාපටිපාටි අනුගමනය කරන්න බැරි නම්, ඔබතුමාත් යන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි කරගෙන යනවා. ඒක හරි වැරදියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාත් නැඟිටලා යන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ හතර පස්දෙනාගේ මතයට එකඟ වෙනවා. එතකොට අපි මේ කමිටුවේ ඉඳගෙන ඉන්නවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා සභාපති වුණාට ඔබතුමාගේ හිත ඇතුළේ තිබෙන්නේ වෙන කාරණයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපේ ඒවා මම්මා. අනික් ඒවා සුම්මා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒ අදහස වැරැදියි. ඒ අයගේ මතයක් නොවෙයි. මේ සභාපතිතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කෙටුම්පතට දැක්වූ එකඟතාව. ඒ අයගේ පුද්ගලික ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. කෙටුම්පතට සංශෝධන නැත්නම් අපි එකඟ නම් ඒක එකක්. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒක තේරෙනවා නම් තව එකක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Draft report එක අත්සන් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඇයි, අපි කියන ඒවා වෙනස් කරන්න බැරි? පුදුම කථාවක් නේ. ඊයේ වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්. අද වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒක එතැන වෙනස් කරන්න යන්න එපා. සංශෝධන වෙනම ලියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, නැවත ඒකාධිපති ක්‍රමයක් ඕනෑද? පාර්ලිමේන්තුව ශක්තිමත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැද්ද?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා ඕක වෙනම ගේන්න කෝ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැඟිටලා ගිය මිනිස්සුන්ට මතයක් නැහැ නේ. කාරක සභාවට සහභාගි වෙන්නේ නැතුව නැඟිටලා ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මතයක් ඇතුවයි නැඟිටලා ගියේ. කෙටුම්පත පිළිගෙන ගියේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මෙතුමා මේ කෝප් කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන දේ මම පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත් ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ පිරිසක්

මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගෙන නැඟිටලා ගියාට පසුව ඒ වාර්තාවේ ඡේදයක් ඔබතුමන්ලා සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වෙනස් කරනවා නම් ඒ වෙනස් කිරීම කොහොමද මම ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ. එතකොට කරන්න වෙන්නේ තිබෙන වාර්තාවට එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. සම්පූර්ණයෙන් තිබෙන එක ඉවත් කරලා ඇතුළත් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

අපට මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ කෙටුම්පතක් නේ. අපි දැන් මේ කෙටුම්පත සංශෝධනය කරමින් යනවා. මේක draft report එකක් නේ. මේක final report එකක් නොවෙයි. අපි දැන් මේක ගැන කථා කරගෙන, කථා කරගෙන යනවා. කථා කරගෙන කථා කරගෙන යනකොට අපි තීරණයකට එළැඹුනා, paragraph එකෙන් paragraph එකට සංශෝධනය කරන්න පුළුවන් ඒවා සංශෝධනය කරමු; බැරි ඒවාට තමන්ගේ නම දාලා ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට එකතු කරමු කියලා. ඒක නේ අපේ තිබූ agreement එක. මේක කරගෙන, කරගෙන යනකොට කට්ටියක් කියනවා අපට මෙතැනින් ඉස්සරහට කරන්න බැහැ කියලා. ඒ මොකක් හරි හේතුවක් නිසා. අපට මේක කරන්න බැහැ ඒ නිසා අපි නැඟිටලා යනවා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. ඒ විතරක් නොවෙයි. ඒ අය මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගෙන යනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නවා. නැඟිටලා යනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඒකට ඇමුණුමක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා කියනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කියනවා අපි මේ වාර්තාව මීට පස්සේ සංශෝධනය කරන්න සූදානම් නැහැ. අපි මේ වාර්තාව මේ විධියටම පිළිගන්නවා. අපි නැඟිටලා යනවා කියලා කියනවා. එතකොට ඒ කට්ටියත් එක්කත් සාකච්ඡා කරලා මෙහි යම්කිසි දෝෂ තිබෙනවා නම් හරි ගස්සන්න අපට අවස්ථාවක් නැහැ. දැන් අපට අවස්ථාව නැහැ නේ. නමුත් ඊයේ ඒ අවස්ථාව තිබිච්ච නිසා ඔක්කෝම එකතු වෙලා මේ කෙටුම්පතේ තිබුණු වැරැදි නිවැරදි කරන්න අපට පුළුවන් වුණ බව අපි දැක්කා. දැන් මේ අවස්ථාවේදී ඒ අවස්ථාව නැහැ. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා මේ point එකෙන් එහාට අපට ඒ අවස්ථාව ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම ලැබෙන්නේ නැති නිසා මේක final report වෙන්න බැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට final report වෙන්නේ පිටු 01 සිට 12 දක්වා විතරයි. එතැනින් එහාට final report එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊළඟට තිබෙන්නේ කෙටුම්පතක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඊළඟට තිබෙන්නේ draft report එකක්. Final draft report එකක් තමයි. Report එකක් නැහැ. පිටු 12 වෙනකම් report.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔව්. අද ඉවර වුණාට පසුව තමයි final report වෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සාකච්ඡා නොකර මේක කරන්න බැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට බැහැ නේ අපේ මතයට උඩින් යන්න. ඒ ගොල්ලොත් සමානයි නේ. අපි වාගේම නේ ඒ ගොල්ලත්. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට සභාපතිතුමාට අණ කරන්න බැහැ report කරන්න කියලා. එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. එතකොට පිටු 11ක report එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතැනින් එහාට කෙටුම්පතක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, පළමු පිටු 11ට report එකක් වශයෙන් අපි එකඟයි. එතැනින් එහාට කෙටුම්පතක් වශයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අපි එකඟයි. ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ නීතිය. ඔබතුමායි මමයි කෝප් කමිටුවේ වැඩ කරලා තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි එකඟ වෙලා ගත්ත තීන්දුවක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: කෙසේ හෝ අවසාන වාර්තාව වෙන්නේ මුළු කාරක සභාවම එකඟ වෙන වාර්තාව.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අනිත් අය නැඟිටලා ගියා කියලා අපට කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් මුළු කාරක සභාව කියන්නේ අපි. ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා මට නිර්වචනය කරන්න දැන් ඔබතුමා ඉදිරියේ තිබෙන මුළු කාරක සභාව කවුද?

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: දැන් මේ ඉන්න කාරක සභාව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් මේ මුළු කාරක සභාව අපි කරගෙන යමු. මම දන්නේ නැහැ, ඔබතුමාට ඇයි, මේ අපහසුවක් තිබෙන්නේ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මුළු කාරක සභාව දැන් මෙතැන ඉන්න කාරක සභාව තමයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් කරගෙන යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රායෝගිකව තේරුම් ගන්න. යථාර්ථය, ඇත්ත දේ තේරුම් ගන්න කෝ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇත්ත මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් කෙටුම්පතක් හැටියට මේ කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව නම්, මේ වාර්තාවම වෙනස් නොකර, මේ වාර්තාවම පිළිගන්නා පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා. මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාට වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්. එහි කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ වෙනස් කිරීම මේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණුවලට එකතු කිරීමක් හැටියට කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, එහෙම කරන එක හරි අසාධාරණයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් කෙටුම්පතට සාමාජිකයන් දෙන්නෙක් කියනවා මේකට අපි එකඟයි කියලා. එතකොට නැවත එතැනින් එහාට යන්නේ නැද්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් එහෙම වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අහන්න ඕනෑ කෝප් කමිටුවේ ලේකම්තුමාගෙන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න එපා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: කෙටුම්පත සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ වෙලාවේ මේ කෝප් කමිටුවේ හිටපු පිරිසක් එකඟත්වය පළ කරලා තමයි ගියේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් ඉදිරිපත් කළ පළමුවෙනි කෙටුම්පතට දෙන්නෙක් කියනවා, මම මේකට සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟයි; මෙතැනින් එහාට මට වැඩක් නැහැ කියලා. එතකොට ඒක report.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔබතුමා ජ්‍යෝෂ්ඨයෙක් නේ. පැහැදිලිව කියන්නකෝ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරගෙන එද්දී කට්ටියක් ගියා. එගොල්ලන් කියනවා එකඟයි කියලා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: එකඟ වෙලා ගියේ. නැඟිටලා ගියේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මේ කාරක සභාව පටන් ගත් දිනයේ දෙන්නෙක් කියනවා මේ කරපු ටිකට මම එකඟයි කියලා. මෙතැනින් එහාට මට වැඩක් නැහැ කියලා. එතකොට ඔබතුමා එතැනින් මේ කටයුත්ත නවත්වලා ඉවර කරනවාද? කලින් කෙටුම්පතට ඔබතුමා අහපුවාම දෙන්නෙක් කියනවා "මම මේකට සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟයි" කියලා ඒ දෙන්නා නැඟිටලා යනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත් එහෙම ගත්තොත් මේ වාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයකුත් තිබෙනවානේ, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. එකඟයි කියන පිරිස අත් හරිමුකෝ. ඒකත් අපි පැත්තකින් තියමු. ඔබතුමන්ලා හය දෙනා ඉන්නවානේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා හය දෙනාට මේ වාර්තාව සම්පූර්ණ වාර්තාවක් බවට පත් කරන්න බැහැනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පුළුවන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඇයි බැරි? පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි කෝප් එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි 26 දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ඒක පස්සේ. අත්සන් කරන එක එන්නේ පස්සේ. අපි මේක ඉවර කළාට පස්සේ ඒ කට්ටියට පුළුවන් අත්සන් කරන්න හෝ අත්සන් නොකරන්න. කෝප් එක හැටියට ඔබතුමා ඒ කාරණය පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න. මේ කෝප් එක තමයි ඔබතුමා ඉදිරියේ තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඊයේ තීන්දුවකට ආවා, මේ කෙටුම්පතේ පරිච්ඡේදයෙන් පරිච්ඡේදය ගන්න. ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද අපිට කිව්වේ? විනාඩි 20ක් දෙන්නම් කියලා ඔබතුමා පැයක් විතර දුන්නා. ඊට පස්සේ කිව්වා, "අපි පරිච්ඡේදයෙන් පරිච්ඡේදය ගනිමු" කියලා. දැන් එකින් එක අරගෙන කථා කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. දැන් පරිච්ඡේදයෙන් පරිච්ඡේදය කථා කරගෙන යනවා. ඒ අතරතුර ඔබතුමන්ලාට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. සාකච්ඡා කරන්න කිසිම බාධාවක් නැහැනේ. හැබැයි, එහෙම සාකච්ඡා කරද්දි, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ක්‍රමවේදය වෙනස් කරන්න එපා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම වෙන ක්‍රමයක් කියන්නද? ක්‍රමවේදය වෙනස් නොකර ඔබතුමාගේ draft එක ඒ විධියටම පිළිගන්න කණ්ඩායමක් හිටියානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වැඩේ හරි, වැඩේ හරි. Plan එක හරි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දැන් දෙනවානේ. එතකොට පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කරන්න එපා. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ විධියට කථා කරන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා මේ වැඩේ කරන්න එපා. මේකේ සීමාවක් තියා ගන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ ගිය කට්ටියට පුළුවන්, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක විහිළුවට ගන්න එපා. බබ්බු වාගේ හැසිරෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔබතුමා අපි කියන දේ කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතකොට ගිය කට්ටිය ආවාට පස්සේ වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔය අදහස වැරැදියි. මම පිරිසකට උදවු කරනවාය කියන කථාවනේ ඔය කියන්න යන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ගැන තවමත් විශ්වාසයි. අපිට නරක දේවල් හිතෙනවා. ඔබතුමා හොඳට ඉන්නකොට අපි අදහස් වෙනස් කර ගන්නවා. සමාවෙන්න, මම නරක දේවල් හිතුවාට. දැන් හොඳ දේ ගැන හිතන්න. එම "as it is" draft එකට එකඟ පිරිස ඉන්නවානේ. එතුමන්ලා නැඟිටලා ගියා. මේ විධියටම ඒ අයට ඔබතුමා draft එකක් print කරලා තියන්න, ඒගොල්ලන්ටත් අත්සන් කරන්න. අපි විවෘත මනසින් මේ කමිටුවේ ඉන්නේ. මම අවංකවම කියනවා, සුජීව සේනසිංහ ඇමතිතුමා හිටියොත් හොඳ බව. මම එතුමා එක්ක සමඟර කාරණාවලට එකඟ නැහැ. මම දන්නවා, එතුමා කියන්න යන්නේ මොනවාද කියලා. මම ඒවාට එකඟ නැහැ. ඒකයි මම මෙච්චර fight කරන්නේ. විශේෂයෙන්ම හුඟක් වෙලාවට අවසාන නිගමනයකට මම එතුමාත් එක්ක එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපිට ඕනෑ මේක compromise කරන්නයි. අපිට ඕනෑ inclusive approach. එතුමන්ලාටත් draft එකක් type කරලා print කරලා හදලා තියන්න. මේකට කිසි වෙනසක් නැතිව එකඟයි කියපු පිරිසගේ නම් ටික ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට අමුණන්න. ඒ වාගේම චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට නමක් එකතු කරන්න කිව්වානේ. එතුමාට දෙකින් ඕනෑම එකකට අත්සන් කරන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය ඉවරයි. නැඟිටලා ගිය පිරිසගේ අදහසට ගැළපෙන print-out එක අරගෙන තියන්න. නමුත් අපි තමයි මේ කමිටුව. ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා නැවතත් පැමිණියා. එතුමා නැඟිටලා ගිය කෙනෙක්. තව ටිකක් හවස් වනකොට තවත් අය එන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම ආවේ මගේ නිර්දේශ ටික දීලා යන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හොඳයි. එහෙත් අපි එතුමා ආදරයෙන් පිළිගන්නවා. එතුමා පැමිණි බව වාර්තා කරන්න. "ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේ අවස්ථාවේ සභාවට පැමිණ සිටී."

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ, සමිතිවලට ඇවිල්ලා වාඩි වුණාම. "වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා පැමිණ සිටී". ඔබතුමා නැවත සාදරයෙන් පිළිගන්නවා. සුබ සන්ධ්‍යාවක් වේවා! ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. ඔබතුමා පැමිණීම ඉතා වටිනවා. ඔබතුමා පැමිණීම අපට ලොකු ධෛර්යයක්. මගේ point එක ගන්නකෝ. -as it is- ඕනෑය කියන පිරිසට දෙන්න. නැත්නම් අවුල්නේ. අපි තමයි මේ කමිටුව. තව මන්ත්‍රීවරු හවස් වනකොට ඒවි. අපි මේ පණිවුඩය කියලා තිබෙන්නේ. අද කමිටුව හවස් වනතුරු පැවැත්වේවි. රෑ 12.00 වනතුරු පැවැත්වෙන එකක් නැහැ. නමුත් හවස් වනතුරු ඇදිලා යනවා. ඒ නිසා පුළුවන් වෙලාවට එන්න කියලා තමයි පණිවුඩය ලබා දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. අපි තමයි මේ කමිටුව. අපි දවස කැප කරලා මෙතැන ඉන්න මිනිස්සු. අපිට සවන් දීලා ඔබතුමා සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සහ ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයත් එක්ක එකඟවෙලා, සාක්ෂි සටහන්වලට, නීතියට සහ වාර්තාවට අනුව ඔබතුමාගේ විනිශ්චයට ගැළපෙන දේවල් එක්ක අපි ඉස්සරහට යමු. එතකොට සඳුදාට ඔබතුමා ඉස්සරහ යම් ලේඛනයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි මේ -as it is-. අර පිරිසට අත්සන් කරන්න. අනික තමයි අද මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී එකඟ වන කරුණු ඇතුළත් වුණු, එහෙම එකඟ වීමක් ඇති නොවුණොත් මොනවත්ම වෙනසක් ඇති නොවුණු ලේඛනය. දැනටමත් වෙනස්වෙලා තිබෙන බව අපි දන්නවානේ. එතකොට කාටවත් අසාධාරණයක් සිදු වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා 26 දෙනාටම ඇවිල්ලා අත්සන් කරන්න කියලා ඔබතුමා දැනුම් දුන්නාම ඒ සියලු දෙනාටම ඇවිල්ලා තමන් අත්සන් කරන ලේඛනය මොකක්ද කියලා තීරණය කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. අපි එතැනට යමුද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හරි අසාධාරණයි. අපිට මේක කරගෙන යන්න බැරි නැහැ. ඒගොල්ලන් ගියා කියලා, -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කිව්ව දේ හොඳයි නේද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස හොඳයි. ඒ අදහස වැදගත්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අසාධාරණයක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා නම් ඒගොල්ලන්ට -as it is- එකට අත්සන් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: News reportවල මෙසේ සඳහන්වෙලා තිබෙනවා. "මේ මාසයේ 25 වැනි දින පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට නියමිත මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර වංචාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් වූ කමිටු වාර්තාවේ අවසන් වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම ඊයේ මධ්‍ය රාත්‍රිය අවසන් වනතෙක් සිදු වූ අතර එහිදී මහත් කාල ගෝට්ටියක් ඇතිව තිබේ. බැඳුම්කර මගඩියක් සිදුව නැතැයි එක්සත් ජාතික පක්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් කියද්දි විපක්ෂය සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා නිදහස් පක්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ඊට විරුද්ධ වීම නිසා අවසන් වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම උණුසුම් මුහුණුවරක් ගත්තේය. හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාට පක්ෂපාතීව එජාප මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් දිගින් දිගටම අදහස් පළ කළ අතර අනික් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ඊට විරුද්ධව අදහස් පළ කළහ. ඒ අනුව 25වැනිදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට නියමිත වාර්තාව බෙදුණු වාර්තාවක් වන බව වාර්තා වන අතර එක්සත් ජාතික පක්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු අධිපතිට පක්ෂවත්, සෙසු අය විරුද්ධවත් ලෙස අවසන් වාර්තාව සකසා ඇත."

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒවායින් අපිට වැඩක් නැහැ. අපි මේ වැඩේ කරමු. මේ වැඩේ කර ගන්න අපට අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකේ තිබෙන විධියට වාර්තාව දෙකට බෙදිලා. මම දන්නේ නැහැ මෙතැනින් ගිය කවුරු හෝ, -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ. මේකනේ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමනි. ඒ ගිය කණ්ඩායමට ඕනෑ කරන්නේ මේ දෙකට බෙදීම තහවුරු කරන්නයි. එච්චරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන කාරණය ඔබතුමන්ලාට සාපේක්ෂව සාධාරණයි කියලා මට තේරෙනවා. නමුත් මේ වාර්තාව මාස 16ක් තිස්සේ සාකච්ඡා කරපු වාර්තාවක්. කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු ගොඩාක් දෙනෙක් මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ වාගේම මෙය රටේ තිබෙන සංවේදී ප්‍රශ්නයක්. නම් වශයෙන් බැලුවොත් එහෙම දැන් අට දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. අට දෙනෙක් මේ වාර්තාවම පිළි අරගෙන ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මන්ත්‍රීතුමාත් ඒ වාර්තාව පිළිඅරගෙන තිබෙනවා, සම්පූර්ණයෙන් පිළිගත් වාර්තාවක් හැටියට. ඔබතුමන්ලා පස් දෙනෙක් දැන් කියනවා, "මේක නැවත සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ"ය කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගණ පූරණයෙන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගණ පූරණය අනුව. ඒකත් පැහැදිලියි. සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මට හිතෙනවා, මේ ඇති වෙච්ච තත්ත්වය ඒ අට දෙනාටවත්, ඔබතුමන්ලා පස් දෙනාටවත් අදාළව නොව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මේ කාරක සභාවේ 26 දෙනාම කැඳවලා අපි සාකච්ඡා කරමු කියලා. එතකොට මේක 25 වැනිදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දානවාය කියන එක තීරණය කරන්න බැහැ. පොරොන්දු වෙච්ච ආකාරයට එහෙම කරන්න බැරි වන එක ගැන මම කනගාටු වනවා. 26 දෙනාටම ලිඛිතව දැනුම් දීලා, 26 දෙනාම කැඳවලා අපි ලබන අඟහරුවාදාට පාර්ලිමේන්තු දිනයේදී රැස් වෙමු. රැස්වෙලා තීරණය කරමු මේ ලේඛනය පිළිගන්නවාද නැත්නම් වෙන ලේඛනයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ලිඛිතව අද අපිට ආරාධනා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒගොල්ලන් ආවේ නැහැ කියන එක සාධාරණ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආවේ නැහැ කියන එක සාධාරණත් නැහැ. මේ සංවේදී ප්‍රශ්න නිසා, -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, සභාපතිතුමා. ඔබතුමා තීරණයක් අරගෙන මේක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දාන්න පුළුවන්. ඉවරයිනේ. අට දෙනෙක් මේ වාර්තාව පිළි අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. පස් දෙනෙකුගේ අදහස් අර ගන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තත්පරයක් මට දෙන්නකෝ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක හරි අසාධාරණයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගණ පූරණයක් තිබේ නම්, දවසත් හරි නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨ සහභාගිත්වයත් තිබෙනවා නම් දැන් මොකක්ද තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. නමුත් මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. කාරක සභාව හැටියට මේ වාර්තාව සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා හය දෙනෙක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඉතින් මොකද? අපි පොඩ්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩි නොවෙයි. ගණ පූරණය තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඇත්ත. නමුත් මේ වාර්තාව මීට වඩා පුළුල් විධියට සාකච්ඡා කරලා අවසන් කරන්න වාර්තාවක් තිබිය යුතු බව පිළිගන්නවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපිට ඕක තේරෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කාරණය තේරෙනවා වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒගොල්ලන්ට අවස්ථාව ලබා දුන්නා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපිට මේ කාරණය තේරෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒ කාරණය තේරෙන බවත් පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු අට දෙනෙක්ම මේ වාර්තාවම පිළිගන්නකොට ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා මේ වාර්තාවට නැවත සංශෝධන - වෙනස්කම් - ඇතුළු කරන්න. හැබැයි, ඒ කටයුතු කරන්නේ මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු වෙනස් කරලා නොවෙයිනේ; මේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණු වෙනස් කරලා නොවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Draft එකනේ මේ තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Draft එක බව ඇත්ත. හැබැයි, මේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණු වෙනස් කරලා නොවෙයි ඒ කටයුතු කරන්නේ. මේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණු වෙනස් කරනවා නම් අපි 26 දෙනාම කැඳවලා වෙනස් කරමු.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කමක් නැහැ. මට ඒ අයිතිය තිබෙනවානේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, හරි. 26දෙනාගෙන් කෙනෙක් ආවේ නැත්නම්, ඒ අයට නැවත අවස්ථාවක් දෙනවාද?

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: You cannot do that.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි ඉවත් වුණේ පදනමක් ඇතුව. අපි කිව්වා, මේ වාර්තාව අපි පිළිගන්නවා. මේ වාර්තාව 25 වෙනිදාට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. තව අමතර කරුණු තිබෙනවා නම්, එකතු කරන්න කියන පදනමින් තමයි අපි ගියේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි 26 වෙනිදාට සියලු දෙනා කැඳවමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අඟහරුවාදා ආවේ නැත්නම්?

සභාපතිතුමා: ආවේ නැත්නම් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දැන් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. ඇයි, දැන් කරන්න දෙයක් නැත්තේ? දැන් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ, එදාට කරන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. මේක පුදුම කථාවක් නේ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක අද අවසාන කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔය ගණන් වැරදියි නේ? ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කිව්ව අට දෙනාගෙන් දෙදෙනෙක් දැනටමත් මේ සභාවේ ඉන්නවා. ඔබතුමාට ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගැන විනිශ්චය කරන්න බැහැ. දැන් වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මැතිතුමා එතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ලියමින්, අත්සන් කරමින් ඉන්නේ. එතුමා වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරද්දි මුල් වාර්තාවට ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම එකඟ වන්න බැහැ නේ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නිර්දේශ වෙනම එකතු කරනවා නේ. ඒකට තමයි මේ වාර්තාව දෙන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: කැමති වුණු අය තව එනවා. මේක කෝළමක්.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක උසාවිය නොවෙයි නේ?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟ වෙලා ගියා නම්, තව වාර්තාවක් දෙන්නේ මොකටද?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක උසාවිය නොවෙයි. මට තිබෙන අයිතිය සීමා කරන්න කාටවත් බැහැ. මට තිබෙන අයිතිය මම මොකටද අනුන්ට දෙන්නේ? මේක මගේ අයිතිය. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ වාර්තාව දෙන්නම්, ඒක වෙනම අමුණන්න. කමිටුව හදපු වාර්තාව මම අනුමත කරනවා වාගේම, මම වෙනම එකක් දෙනවා. මම හෙමින් කථා කළාම හිතන්න එපා, මට භයියෙන් කථා කරන්න බැහැයි කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨත්වය සලකා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමාගේ වචනය අසා තමයි අනික් අය ගියේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මමත් යන්න ලෑස්ති වුණා. සභාපතිතුමාට මම කිව්වා, මේ කෙටුම්පතට පක්ෂපාතයි කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ සභාපතිතුමා කිව්වා, වෙනත් ඒවා තිබෙනවා නම් සඳුදාට ගෙනැල්ලා දෙන්න කියලා. අනික් අය ගියාට පස්සේ සභාපතිතුමා වෙන තීන්දුවකට එනවා නම් ඒක වැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කාරක සභාවට මන්ත්‍රීවරු එන යන එක මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. ඒක මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවධාරණය කරනවා. ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව පිළිගෙන අත්සන් කළාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමාට නැවත නිර්දේශ දෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි නැහිටලා ගියෝතින් විරුද්ධයි කියලා ඒකත්-

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කෙටුමපත් වාර්තාව පිළිගත්තා කියලා කිව්වාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමාට නැවතත් සංශෝධන දෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපේ එක වෙනස් කරන්නත් එපා, අපි වෙනස් කරන්නේත් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට නැවත මේක වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. පැහැදිලිද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ප්‍රකාශයක් කරලා යනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ වාර්තාව ''පොදු වාර්තාව'' කියලා පිළිගත්තාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට නැවත මේ වාර්තාවට සංශෝධන දමන්න බැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව පිළිනොගත් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට තමයි සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ. ඒකයි මම මෙපමණ වෙලා කථා කරන්නේ. ඕනෑම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුට මේ සභාවට එන්න පුළුවන්, යන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක වෙනම කථාවක්. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ කෙටුම්පත පිළිගෙන ගියාට පස්සේ නැවත මේ කාරක සභාවේ සිටින මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඒක ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදය සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වෙනස් කරන එකට මම එකඟ නැහැ. ඒ වෙනස් කිරීම මේකට ඇතුළු කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම යද්දි හරියට Minute කරලා ගියා. අපි එකඟ වුණු වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Plan එක දුන්නා, ගිහිල්ලා බලමු, මේක හරි ගියේ නැත්නම් නැවත එන්න කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: Plan නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු දෙවෙනි කෙටුම්පත තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒකට අපි එකඟතාව පළ කරලා, ඒක as it is පිළිඅරගෙන තමයි ගියේ. ඒකට අපට සංශෝධන නැහැ කියලා තමයි ගියේ.

දෙවෙනි එක, ඒක ඔබතුමා වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඊට අමතරව මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට හෝ වෙන මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට ඔය වාර්තාවට සංශෝධන ඇතුව හෝ නැතුව හෝ තවත් අලුත්ම දෙයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඔබතුමා ඒක වෙනම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. අපි මෙතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන එකට සංශෝධන ගේන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ නේ? අපට වාර්තා දෙකකට කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ නේ? අපි එකකට කැමැතියි කියලා, අනික් එකට විරුද්ධව කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ නේ?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේකේ නිර්දේශවලට අපි එකඟ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඉදිරිපත් වුණු වාර්තාව අපි අනුමත කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කාටත් සාධාරණයක් විය යුතුයි. අපි කෑම කාලා එන්නම්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අනික් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කෑම කාලා ආවා නේ? අපිත් ගිහිල්ලා එන්නම්. සභාපතිතුමා ඉන්න. අපි ගිහිල්ලා එන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මමත් කන්න එපායැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කිසිම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුට තව මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුගේ අයිතියක් නැති කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන බොරු කරන්න එපා. මේක අවසන් කරන්න ගිහිල්ලා අවසන් වුණේ නැති වුණාම ආයෙත් ආවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අවසන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මොනවාද අවසන්?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඕක නොවෙයි කාරණාව. තවම මේක අවසාන වාර්තාව බවට පත් වෙලා නැහැ. මේකේ දහතුන්වෙනි පිටුව දක්වා තමයි සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරමින් මේ කෙටුම්පත සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. එහෙම තියෙද්දි තව මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී මේ මුළු කෙටුම්පතම වාර්තාව හැටියට පිළිගෙන ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම ගිහිල්ලා තියෙද්දි quorum එක හැටියට මේ කාරක සභාව තියනවා නම්, මේක තව දුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම බාධාවකුත් නැහැ. ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට බාධාවකුත් නැහැ. ඒක තමයි මෙතෙක් සාකච්ඡා කළේ. බාධාවක් නැහැ වාගේම, මට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මේක මුළු වාර්තාව හැටියට මන්ත්‍රීවරු ප්‍රමාණයක් පිළිගෙන තිබෙන නිසා ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ කියන එක. අනික් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, ඒ සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරද්දි වාර්තාවට සාධාරණය ඉෂ්ට වන්නත්, මුළු ක්‍රියාවලියට සාධාරණයක් ඉෂ්ට වන්නත්, ඒ සංශෝධන ඒ ඡේදයට වෙනම ඇතුළු වන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකයි අපි සාකච්ඡා කළේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔය වාර්තාවට ඡන්ද විමසීමක් කරලා සභාවේ කටයුතු අවසන් කරන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඡන්ද නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතුතමනි, ඔබතුමා ඉස්සෙල්ලා කිව්වේ ඕක නොවෙයි නේ. අපි නැඟිටලා ගියේ ඕකට නොවෙයි

නේ. ඔබතුමා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා. ඔබතුමා ප්‍රකාශයක් කරලා කිව්වා, මේ වාර්තාවට අමතරව මෙතුමන්ලා වෙනත් එකක් දමනවා නම්, ලබන සඳුදා වෙනකොට ගෙනැල්ලා දෙන්න, ඒක ඇතුළත් කර ගන්නම් කියලා. මේ කරුණු එකින් එකට සාකච්ඡා කරනවා කියලා එහෙම කථාවක් කිව්වේ නැහැ. අපි නැඟිටලා ගියේ; අනුමත කළේ ඒ පදනම මත. ඒක නැවත වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා කාටවත් යන්න කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා එකඟ වුණාද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා ඉතා පැහැදිලිව මෙක කියන්න. මම ඒක හරියට Minute කරලා ගියා. ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ දෙවෙනි කෙටුම්පතට ඒ ලෙස අපි එකඟයි. ඒක තමයි 9 හරි, 8 හරි අත්සන් කරපු වාර්තාව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කොහේද අත්සන් කළේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි අත්සන් කළා.

2, ඊ ළඟට දැන් තවත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු කණ්ඩායමකට අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා, සභාපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව සංශෝධන සහිතව වෙනස් කරන්න. එතකොට ඒක දෙවෙනි වාර්තාව. මොකක්ද 1, මොකක්ද 2 කියලා අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අරක එක කෙටුම්පතක්. මේක තව කෙටුම්පතක්. අපේ එක අපි අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන නිසා ඒක සම්මතයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක කෙටුම්පතක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි, කෙටුම්පතක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව එකක්. මේක තව එකක්. අපේ කෙටුම්පත අප අත්සන් කර තිබෙන නිසා දැන් එය සම්මතයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සම්මත කළා කියා ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම තමයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කෙටුම්පතත් එහෙමයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක draft එකක්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: Draft එක අප සම්මත කළා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතකොට අපේ කෙටුම්පත?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කෙටුම්පත ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමන්ලා අපේ කෙටුම්පතට විරුද්ධයි නේ. ඒකයි අප එය සම්මත කළේ. අප එකඟ වුණු එක අප සම්මත කළා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක වාර්තාව නොවෙයි, කෙටුම්පත.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයක් මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ඇතිවුණු පළමුවැනි වතාව මෙය නොවෙයි නේ. කාරක සභාවලදී ඉතිහාසයේ කණ්ඩායම් දෙකක් මෙවැනි මතවාද ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒක ආදර්ශයට ගෙන ඔබතුමා වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මේක කෙටුම්පතක්, වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදී වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ වාර්තාවේ සැර බාල කරන්න එපා. ඔබතුමා මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ඉතිහාසයටම කැලලක් ඇතිකරන්නයි යන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවක් වෙනම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාට එහෙම කරන්න අයිතියක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදී විධියට වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. අපේ තීන්දු වෙනස් කරන්න කියා ඔබතුමා කොහොමද කියන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. අප මේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ, -

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: **Dr. Neville Gunaratne**ගේ එකේදිත් වෙනම වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණ විනිසුරු සමරකෝන් මහත්මයාගේ එකේදිත් වෙනම වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒ මත දෙකක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාට මේ කෙටුම්පත වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳන මාර්ගයක් ගැනයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් අහගෙන ඉන්නකෝ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම කියන්නේ කෙටියෙන් වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියායි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේක වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: වාර්තා දෙකයි. වෙන කථා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ කෙටුම්පත පිළිබඳව කරන සාකච්ඡාව අවසන් නැත. ඒ සාකච්ඡාව ආරම්භ කරන ලෙස මම ගෞරවයෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිමි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම මෙහෙම කරන්නම්. 25වැනි දාට මේ පිළිබඳව ගරු කථානායකතුමා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කරලා, අවශ්‍ය නිර්දේශ අරගෙන, වාර්තා දෙකක් ලෙස හෝ මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ කෙසේද කියා මම බලන්නම්. මේ ඇති වුණු තත්ත්වය සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වාර්තා කරලා, මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට දැනුම් දෙන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. අපේ විරුද්ධත්වය වාර්තා කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මගේ විරුද්ධත්වය වාර්තා කරන්න, දැන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මේක කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙම කෙටුම්පත පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡාව අද රාත්‍රී 12 තෙක් හෝ ගෙන ගොස් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් අවසන් කිරීමට ඊයේ දිනයේ අප එකඟ වුණා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ එකඟතාව මත අද දින මෙම සභාවේ මෙම කෙටුම්පත පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරන ලෙස අප ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. මෙම කෙටුම්පතේ අප දැනට සාකච්ඡා කොට ඇත්තේ පිටු අංක 13 තෙක් පමණයි. අංක 13 සිට ඉදිරියට මේ කෙටුම්පත සාකච්ඡා කරන කොට සියලුදෙනාගේම මතය ඇතුළත් - inclusive - වාර්තාවක් සකස් කිරීම මේ සභාවේ ගරුත්වයට හේතු වන බව මා කියා සිටිනවා. පාර්ලිමේන්තු සම්ප්‍රදායද එයයි. සාකච්ඡාව අවසන් වූ පසු ඕනෑම ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුටහෝ කිහිපදෙනෙකුට -අවශ්‍ය නම්- එම වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කිරීම පිණිස තමන්ගේ විකල්ප මත ප්‍රකාශ කළ හැකියි. නමුත්, ඊට පෙර සාකච්ඡාව අවසන් විය යුතුයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඉතාම ගෞරවයෙන් ඔබතුමාට කියා සිටින්නේ අද දින, මේ මොහොතේ මෙම සාකච්ඡාව අවසන් කිරීමට කිසිම සාධාරණ හේතුවක් නැති බවයි. "අපට මේ සාකච්ඡාව අවශ්‍යයි, දැන් ප්‍රමාණවත්" යයි කියූ අයට එසේ කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: එතුමා හරි. එතුමාගේ වාර්තාව වෙනම ගන්න. ඒකයි, මුලදි ගත්ත තීන්දුව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සභාවෙන් නැඟිට යනවා නම් එතුමන්ලාට එසේ යන්නත් අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. ඕනෑ නම් අද මෙම කාරක සභාවට එන්නේ නැතිව ඉන්නත් පුළුවන්. නමුත්, අද මෙම කාරක සභාවට පැමිණ සිටින මන්ත්‍රී සංඛ්‍යාව සහ මේ සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යාමට සූදානමින් සිටින මන්ත්‍රී සංඛ්‍යාව ඔබතුමා දන්නවා. ඒ අනුව අප කළ ඉල්ලීම සලකා බලා, එකඟ වූ පරිදි මේ සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන ලෙසත්, පිටු අංක 13 සිට ඉදිරියට සාකච්ඡා කරන ලෙසත් මා ඔබතුමාගෙන් ගෞරවයෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. එසේ නොකරන්න තරම් කිසිම සාධාරණ හේතුවක් උපවය වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අප ඊයේ සාකච්ඡා කර, අද රාත්‍රී 12 වනතුරු හෝ මේ කෙටුම්පත ගැන සාකච්ඡා කිරීමේ බලාපොරොත්තුවෙන් තමයි ආවේ. අපට දැන් මේ සභාවෙන් නැඟිටලා යන්න කිසිම අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. හැබැයි, ඊයේත්, අදත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු දෙපළක් මේ වාර්තාවේ බොහෝ කරුණුවලට විරුද්ධයි කියා කිව්වා. ඒ වාගේම මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරගෙන යන කොට අපට තේරුණා අප, මත දෙකක සිටින බව. අපටත් රාත්‍රී 12 වනතුරු ඉන්න පුළුවන්. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අප ආවේ අද මෙම කෙටුම්පත ගැන සාකච්ඡා කර අවසන් කරන්නයි. හැබැයි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට දැනෙනවා, ඔබතුමාටත් තේරෙනවා ඇති, මෙතැන මත දෙකක් තිබෙන බව. ඒ නිසා අප දිගින් දිගටම මොනවා කථා කළත්, අප ඉන්නේ මත දෙකකයි. ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ වාර්තාව හරියි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව හරියි කියන මතයේ අප ඉන්නවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා බුදු හාමුදුරුවන් නොවෙයි; දෙවියෙක් නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන තැන ඉන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියනවා නම් මොකක්ද තත්ත්වය? රටේ තිබෙන රාජ්‍ය ආයතනයක විගණන කටයුතු පිළිබඳව බලලා වාර්තාවක් දෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා නේ. ඒ පිළිබඳව අපට අදහස් දක්වන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, එතුමාගේ මතය තනිකරම bulldoze කරලා, එතුමාට තර්ජනය කරලා අප මෙහෙම තීන්දු කරන එක හරිම වැරැදියි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. ඒ නිසා මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ මේකයි. බොහොම ගෞරවයෙන් තමයි අප මේ සභාවෙන් නැගිටිටේ. සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට ඔබතුමා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ ඒ ප්‍රකාශය තමයි, "මේ වාර්තාව

කට්ටියක් අනුමත කළා, අනික් අයට පුළුවන් අහවල් දවස වන විට අනික් අදහස් ටික දෙන්න, ඉන් පසුව එයත් වෙනම වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා" කියන එක. එතකොට මම ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් ඇහුවා, "ඉතිහාසයේත් මෙහෙම වුණාද?" කියා. එවිට එතුමා **නෙව්ල් ප්‍රනාන්දු** මැතිතුමාගේත්, සමරකෝන් මහෙස්ත්‍රාත්තුමාගේත් කමිටු වාර්තා දෙකක් පුස්තකාලයෙන් අරගෙන ගෙනැත් දුන්නා. අපේ අතීත අත්දැකීම් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මේ කටයුත්ත එක කට්ටියකට ඕනෑ විධියටම නොවෙයි විය යුත්තේ.

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මෙම කමිටුවේ සභාපති ධුරය දරන කාලය තුළ මේ සම්පූර්ණ සම්ප්‍රදාය වෙනස් කරන්න එපා. මේ කටයුත්ත ගැන උනන්දුව දක්වන හැමදෙනාටම අද මේ රැස්වීමට එන්න තිබුණා නේ. මුළු රටම දන්නවා අද මෙම කාරක සභාවේ මේ කාරණය කථා කරන බව. මන්ත්‍රීවරුත් දන්නවා. අද එන්න පුළුවන් උපරිම ගණන විධියට නේ, මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා14දෙනා ආවේ. ඒ 14දෙනාගෙන් වැඩි බහුතරයක් අත්සන් කරලා එකඟතාව පළ කළා, ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාව අප අනුමත කරනවා කියා. ඊට පසුව තමයි මේ කටයුත්තත් කරනවා කියා ඔබතුමා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළේ. මෙම කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට ඊට හාත්පසින්ම වෙනස් දෙයක් ඔබතුමාටකියන්න බැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන් ඔබතුමාට ඒ ප්‍රකාශය වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. ආයේ කථානායකතුමාගෙන් අහලා එහෙම වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමා මෙම කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයායි. තව කථා කරන්න ගියොත් මට ගොඩක් දේවල් එළියට දමන්න වෙනවා. මම එහෙම කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා එක එක්කෙනාගේ දේවල් අහන්න එපා. කමිටුව සහ සභාපතිවරයා ලෙස මැද ඉඳගෙන මේකේ හරි තීන්දුව ඔබතුමා ගන්න. එක එක්කෙනාගෙන් අහන්න ගියොත් ඔබතුමාට මේ කාර්යය කරන්නම දෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමා මධ්‍යස්ථව, හරි දෙය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. එය වැරැදියි නම් එතුමන්ලාට වෙනත් වාර්තාවක් දමන්න කියන්න. ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27වැනි දා වූ සිද්ධියක් ගැනයි අප මේ කථා කරන්නේ. අද 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 21වැනි දායි. මෙවැනිම අමිහිරි අත්දැකීමකට අප පළමුවෙනි පාර්ලිමේන්තු අනුකාරක සභාවේදීත් මුහුණ දුන්නා. සද්භාවයෙන් මේ පිළිබඳව කථා කරන්න ගිහින්, අන්තිමට පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසුරවලා අපට එය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැරි වුණා. මේ සිද්ධිය ගැන මුළු රටම බලාගෙන ඉන්නවා. අප දෙකෝටියක මහ ජනතාවක් නියෝජනය කරන්න මෙතැනට ඇවිත් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා අප මේ ගැන රටට කියන්න ඕනෑ. මේ කෙටුම්පත ඔබතුමා හදා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කෙටුම්පත අප ඊයේ කියෙව්වා. කලිනුත් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මේ කාරක සභාවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ මෙහෙම තමයි. කෙටුම්පතද, වාර්තාවද කියන එක නොවෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා හදපු කෙටුම්පත අප අනුමත කළා. අනුමත කළාට පසුව ඒක වාර්තාවයි. එයට සියලුදෙනාම එකඟ වන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. එහෙම එකඟවන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. අප කියන දේ හරිය කියන්නම ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. අදහස් වෙනස්; වෙන පරමාර්ථ අරමුණු තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවත් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා, එතුමන්ලාගේ කරුණුත් මේකට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. කලින්, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවා. අප කියන්නේ එහෙම කරන්න කියායි. එහෙම නොවුණොත්, මේක බලාගෙන ඉන්න පුළුවන්කමක් නැහැ. මේක මේ රටට කරන අපරාධයක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා නිකම් හුරතලයට ඔහොම කිව්වාට, එහෙම නොවෙයි නේ, කරන්නේ. මම මේ බොහොම ගෞරවයෙන් ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ. අද දවස අවසන් වනතුරු හෝ සාකච්ඡා කරලා අවසන් කරන්න අප එකඟ වුණු මේ සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යාමට බාධා කරන්නේ අලගියවන්න නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා ප්‍රමුඛ මේ කණ්ඩායම නේ. ඔබතුමාට මේ සභාවෙන් නැඟිටලා යන්න අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. අපට මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරන්න එපා කියන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒකට නේ අප එකඟ වුණේ. දේශපාලන න්‍යාය පත්‍ර මත කටයුතු කරන, -ඒක නේ ආපසු ආවේ. නැඟිටලා ගිහින් ආපසු ආවේ තීරණයේ අඩුපාඩුවක් තිබෙන නිසා නේ. බොහොම ස්තුතියි. අප ආදරයෙන් පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම කරගෙන යන්න දෙන්න බැහැ. අපට ඕනෑ නිසා ආවා.

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අප ඊයේ මේ කාරක සභාවේ වාඩි වුණා නොවෙයි නේ. අප කාලයක් තිස්සේ මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය දැක්කා. ඒ නිසා අපත් උපරිමව උත්සාහ කළේ එක වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තමයි.

අද උදේ වන කොට අපිත් මේ කෙටුම්පත අනුමත කර තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නම්, මේ, එක වාර්තාවක්. මෙතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්, එක්කෝ වෙනස්ම වාර්තාවක් ලියන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම්, මේකට විවිධ කැලි මූට්ටු කරලා ලියන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි ඒක වෙනත් වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ඒක වෙනම වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින් ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඒක වෙනත් වාර්තාවක්. මේකට කැලි එකතු කළොත්, වෙනස්ව ලිව්වොත්, ඒක වෙනත් වාර්තාවක්. ඒ නිසා ඒ වාර්තා දෙක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි තවම සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. එහෙම නම් අප ඊයේ වෙනස්කම් කළේ කොහොමද?

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින් ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මෙය 25වන දාට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම නම්, ඊයේ මෙය වෙනස් කළේ කොහොමද?

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින් ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: මෙතැනින් ඉදිරියට යන්න බැහැ නේ. යන්න බැරි නිසා තමයි එහෙම කියන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: 13වන පිටුව වන කල් එකඟ වෙමින් ආවා. එතැනින් එහාට යන්න බැහැ. වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන් ඒවා වෙනස් කළා. ඉතිරි ඒවා කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 14න් ඉවරයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට වුවමනාවක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ හොරු රකින්නයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 14න් ඉවරයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අනෙක් ඒවා කථා කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මේ ප්‍රශ්නයේදී ගරු කථානායකතුමාට-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, සභාපතිතුමා කිව්වා, නිර්දේශ භාර දෙන්න පුළුවන්, ඊයේ සහ අද කියා. එහෙම නම්, ඒ ටිකත් ඇතුළත් වෙලා මෙය සංශෝධනය වන්න ඕනෑ. සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, අද වන කල් අපට අවස්ථාව දී තිබෙනවා කියා. මෙය නවත්වන දිනයක් ඔබතුමා දීලා නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාවට නිර්දේශ ඊයේත්, අදත් දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියා ඔබතුමා කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ටිකත් ඔක්කෝම ඇතුළත් කරලා ඔබතුමා කෙටුම්පතක් -final එකක්- භදන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙය අනිවාර්යයෙන් 25වන දාට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා කියලායි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක කරන්නත් බැහැ කියා කිව්වා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක final document එක කරගෙන අරවා-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙය 25වන දා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා කිව්වා.

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒක වැරැදියි. ඔබතුමන්ලා නිර්දේශ නොදීම-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අද වන කල් පුළුවන්. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා කිව්වා අද වන කල් නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන් කියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පුළුවන් නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ. තවම අද දවස ඉවර නැහැ. තවම අපි භාර දෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගත් පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අවසන් වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මා අහන්නේ, "මේ හදපු කෙටුම්පත අපි අනුමත කරනවා." කියලා කියන්න අපට තිබෙන බැරිකම මොකක්ද කියායි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මොකක්ද බැරිකම?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට ඒ ගැන කියන්න. අපි මෙය අනුමත කරනවා. මේක හරි කියා කියන්න වාගේම මෙය වැරැදියි කියලා කියන්නත් අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අයිතිය පාවිච්චි කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි දැන් අපේ නිර්දේශ භාර දෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි හැම කෙනෙකුටම ආත්ම ගරුත්වයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි හැම දාම උත්සාහ කරනවා එක මතවාදයකට යන්න, එකට යන්න. එහිත් සීමාවක්- යන්නේ කොහේටද, මොකක්ද කියා-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා තමයි මෙය කඩාකප්පල් කරන නායකයා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කමක් නැහැ. එහි වගකීම මා භාරගන්නම්. මට අයිතිය තිබෙනවා නේ ඒකට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. එහෙත් ඒ, කඩාකප්පල් කරන්න නොව, විකල්ප මතය කියන්නයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කඩාකප්පල් කරනවා කියන එක ඔබතුමාගේ මතයයි. ''කඩාකප්පල් කරනවා'' කියා දකින්නේ ඔබතුමායි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, හෘදය සාක්ෂියට කථා කරලා අහන්න කෝ, මොකක්ද මේ කරන්නේ කියා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: හෘදය සාක්ෂියට කථා කළොත් කාරණය හොඳින් තේරෙනවා නේ. ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා, ඔබතුමා කථා කරගෙන යන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හෘදය සාක්ෂියට කථා කරනවා නම් ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ කරපු ඒවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මොනවාද? තාත්තා කරපු ඒවාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, අපි බොහොම පැහැදිලිව මේ වාර්තාව අනුමත කරනවා. එච්චර තමයි අප කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මා හිතන විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලාට කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ ක්‍රම දෙකයි. මගේ අදහසයි මා මේ කියන්නේ. එකක් තමයි, මේ වාර්තාව සම්පූර්ණයෙන් පිළිගන්නා අය මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නා එක. එනෙක, මේ වාර්තාවට සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරන අය මේ වාර්තාවට සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරන එක.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: සංශෝධන නොවෙයි. ඒක වෙනම වාර්තාවක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කියන කල්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සාකච්ඡා කිරීමේ අවස්ථාවක් අපට දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සංශෝධන ගෙනාවාම ඒක වෙනම වාර්තාවක්. පටලාගන්න එපා. මේකට සංශෝධන නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න මා කියන කල්. වාර්තා දෙකක් වන්නේ මෙය අවසාන වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කරලා අවසන් වුණාමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාර්තා දෙකක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. වාර්තා හතරක් වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව තවම හදා අවසන් කරලා නැහැ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාව තවම හදා අවසන් කරලා නැහැ. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, හොඳින් තේරුම් ගන්න එය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මාත් කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාව තවම final වාර්තාවක් වෙලා නැහැ. කොහොමද, මේ වාර්තාව හදා අවසන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේක හදා ඉවර නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාව තවම final වාර්තාවක් වෙලා නැහැ. Final වාර්තාවක් වෙන්න නම් කාරක සභාවේ හැම දෙනාම මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟ වන්න ඕනෑ. එකඟ නොවන පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා නම් ඒ අයට පුළුවන්, සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ''සංශෝධන'' කියන වචනය වැරැදියි. වෙනම වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක වෙනම වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, අපේ සාකච්ඡාව පටන්ගන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක වෙනම වාර්තාවක්; අරක වෙනම වාර්තාවක්. එච්චරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි කෑම කාලා එමුද? මෙතුමන්ලා නම් කෑම කාලායි ඉන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා මුලින් සිටි ස්ථාවරයේම ඉන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, ස්ථාවරය වෙනස් කරන්න එපා. ඔබතුමා ප්‍රකාශයක් කළා. එය මේ කමිටු රැස්වීම් වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා එතැන ඉන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාට බඩගිනි නැද්ද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ කියන එක එක දේවල් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක ඔබතුමාගේ ස්ථාවරය.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒක මගේ ස්ථාවරය නොව, ගරු සභාපතිතුමාගේ ස්ථාවරයයි. අපි ඒක බලාගනිමු. ඔබතුමා ඉන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, බඩගිනි නැද්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා පොඩ්ඩක් උදවු කරන්න. මේ වාර්තාවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: නැත්තේ මොකද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමා ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒ ගැන පැහැදිලි කරාවි.

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: මේ වාර්තාවේ අංක 12 වන කල් ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලුදෙනා එකඟයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වාර්තාවේ නොවෙයි.

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: මේ කෙටුම්පතේ 12 පිටුව දක්වා ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලුදෙනා එකඟයි. 12න් ඉදිරියට තිබෙන කොටසට මත දෙකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දෙකක් නොවෙයි. දෙකක් වන්නේ කොහොමද? ගොඩක් තිබෙනවා.

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: සමා වන්න! විරුද්ධ මත තිබෙනවා. එවිට මේ වාර්තාව final වාර්තාවක් වන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, මෙය සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව වන නිසා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

ජේ.ආර්. ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: මේ වාර්තාව අවසන් වාර්තාව වන්නේ නැහැ. මෙතැන තිබෙන අවසාන තීරක සාධකය, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සංඛ්‍යාත්මක අගයයි. මා මෙය මීට කලින් කිව්වේ නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව තිබෙන හැටියටම එකඟයි කියා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා අටදෙනෙක් කියා තිබෙනවා. කාරක සභාවේ සාමාජිකයෝ 26දෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: අද සිටින ගණනින්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම ගන්න බැහැ, COPE එකේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට, ගෙවල්වලට ගිහිල්ලා අත්සන් කරවාගෙන එනවාද? මොකක්ද ඒ නීතිය ලේකම්තුමා? ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ, ආවේ නැති අයගේ ගෙවල්වලට ගිහින් අත්සන් කරගෙන එන්න කියලාද? මාර නීතියක් නේ ඕක. ගෙවල්වලට ගිහින් අත්සන් කරන්නද? අනෙක් සාමාජිකයන් ආවේ නැත්නම් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. ආවේ නැත්නම් මොනවා කරන්නද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ආවේ නැති එකට මොකක්ද කරන්නේ?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මාර කතාවක් නේ ලේකම්තුමා කියන්නේ. සභාවට පස්දෙනෙකු ආවා නම්, එච්චරයි.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මට පොඩි වෙලාවක් දෙන්න. මම ලේකම්තුමාට දොස් කියනවා නොවෙයි. මෙච්චර දවස් අපි වැඩ කළා නේ. මේ ලේකම් ආවේ අද නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සිටින අයගෙන් -අද සහභාගි වූ අයගෙන්- තමයි කරන්න වෙන්නේ. එහෙම නේද, ලේකම්තුමා?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, 26දෙනාම ඇවිල්ලා හදපු වාර්තාව මොකක්ද කියා මට කියන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: කරුණාකර මා මේ කියන දෙයත් ලියාගන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සාමාජිකයන් 26දෙනාම අත්සන් කරපු වාර්තාව මොකක්ද කියා කියන්න. ලේකම්තුමා කියන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, ඔබතුමා කියන්න, සාමාජිකයන් 26දෙනාම ඇවිල්ලා සම්මත කරපු වාර්තාව මොකක්ද කියා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මීට කලින් එහෙම කළාද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: COPE එකේ සාමාජිකයන් 26දෙනාම අත්සන් කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව පෙන්වන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මොකක්ද ඒ කමිටුව? කියන්න එය.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: නිකම් බොරු උපදෙස් දෙන්න එපා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට. තමුන්නාන්සේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමා නොමඟ යවනවා නේ. ලේකම්වරයා-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එවැන්නක් තිබෙනවා නම් කියන්න. එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම නම්, සාමාජිකයන් 26දෙනා අත්සන් නොකරපු ඔක්කෝම අහෝසි වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා: ලේකම්කෙනෙක්!

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතුමා කියා අවසන් කළේ නැහැ. කියන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මොනවා කියන්නද එතුමා? ඔබතුමන්ලා සභාපතිතුමා නොමඟ යවන්න එපා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි කියන්නේ. සාමාජිකයන් 26දෙනාට අත්සන් කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න ඕනෑ. සාමාජිකයන් 26දෙනාම එකඟ වන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. සාමාජිකයන් 26දෙනාට ඒ එක් එක් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කැමැති නම් අත්සන් කරන්න අවසාන ලියවිල්ලක් -යම් ලේඛනයක් හෝ ලේඛන කීපයක්- තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. අත්සන් කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඕනෑ නම් අත්සන් කරන්න පුළුවන්; අත්සන් නොකර ඉන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නමුත්, මේ සභාවේ බහුතරය කියන්නේ, සාමාජිකයන් 26දෙනාගෙන් බහුතරයයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. අද පැමිණ සිටින අයගෙන් බහුතරය. අදින් අවසානයි.

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැත්තේ මොකද්? එහෙම නැත්නම්, වෙනත් මොකක්ද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ අය වැය සම්මත කරන කොට මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා 225දෙනාම ඉන්නවාද? එහෙම නැහැ. සිටින අයගෙනුයි සම්මත වන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අද සාකච්ඡාව රාත්‍රී 12.00 වන කල් යෑමට නියමිතයි. එහෙම නම්, රෑ 12.00ට ඡන්දයක් ගන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මෙහි තිබෙන්නේ සම්මත වීම ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ගිය පාර COPE වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට භාර දුන්නේ නැහැ. අවසානයේදී පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසුරුවා හැරියා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා,

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ජනාධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා, අගමැතිතුමා බේරන්න තමයි එය කළේ කියා. ජනාධිපතිතුමා ජාතිය අමතා කිව්වා, අගමැතිතුමා බේරාගන්නයි එය කළේ කියා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, අනුකාරක සභාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට සහභාගි වූ අයගෙන් තමයි ඡන්දය ගත්තේ. එවේලේ අපට බහුතරය තිබුණේ නැහැ. නමුත් එළියේ අය සිටියා. එවේලේ සියලුදෙනා සිටියේ නැහැ. සිටි අයගෙනුයි ඡන්දය ගත්තේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙය 26දෙනාගේම අත් සනට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඒ සඳහා අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. 26දෙනාගේම අත් සන් ගත්තාට කමක් නැහැ. මෙතැන තිබෙන කාරණය ඉතා පැහැදිලියි. අපි පිටු 12ක් හෝ පිටු 15ක් හෝ පිටු 25ක් හෝ ගැන කථා කළා වෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපි නවදෙනෙක් විශ්වාස කරනවා මේ වාර්තාව නිවැරැදියි කියා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු මේ කෙටුම්පතට අපි නව දෙනෙක්, as it is කැමැතියි. එතකොට ඒක එක වාර්තාවක්. අපි කැමැති නැහැ ඒ වාර්තාව තවත් මන්ත්‍රී කණ්ඩායමකගේ කරුණුවලින් අලුත් වනවාට. හැබැයි, ඒ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා වෙනම වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. එතකොට පළමුවැනි එක මොකක්ද, දෙවැනි එක මොකක්ද කියලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. වාර්තා දෙකටම සමාන වැදගත්කමක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට හැම මන්ත්‍රීවරයකුගේම අයිතිය රැකිලා. ඒ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් තවදුරටත් ඔබතුමා එක්ක අද රෑ වන තෙක් සාකච්ඡා කරලා එතුමන්ලාගේ යෝජනා සහ අදහස් ඔක්කෝම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. එතකොට වාර්තා දෙකක්. ඒ වාර්තා දෙකම COPE එකෙන් තමයි හදන්නේ. ඒ වාර්තා දෙකම ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයෙන් තමයි type කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාර්තා දෙකම කැමැති නම් සභාපතිතුමා තමයි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි මා කියන්නේ. නැතුව, මෙන්න මෙහෙම බැහැ. අපි නවදෙනා එකතු වෙච්ච වාර්තාවට- මට lawyersලා ඕනෑ නැහැ. මම කියන්නම්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ඒක අපි කිව්වා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම ඒක කියලායි ගියේ. මම දැන් repeatedly කියන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට අද දවසම ඉන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මහා ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදයේ බාප්පලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : බාප්පලා- අපි ලොකු තාත්තලා නොවෙයි. ඒ නිසා ඉතාම පැහැදිලිව කියන්නම්. වාර්තාව-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නායකයාගෙන් අහන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මගේ නායකයා, මම.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : බොරුවට කෑ ගහන්න එපා. රෑ 12ට තව පැය කීයද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි මන්ත්‍රීවරු- පොඩ්ඩක් කෑ නොගහ ඉන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මට කියන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : එතුමා කෑ ගහන කොට ඔබතුමා පාලනය කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. අපි නවදෙනෙක් මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟයි. අපට තව සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා ඒක එක වාර්තාවක්. ඒ නිසා තමයි, අපි නැගිටලා ගියේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගියා නම්, යන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. නැවත හෙටත් මහ බැංකුවට අමතරව තවත් ආයතන ගැන කථා කරන්න අපට COPE එකට එන්න වනවා නේ. අපට එකතු වෙලා fight කරන්න සිදු වන ඒවාත් ඉදිරියේදී එයි. ඒ නිසා දැන් අපි මරාගෙන මැරෙන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාවට අපි නවදෙනෙක් as it is එකඟයි. තව මන්ත්‍රීවරු ටික දෙනෙක් වෙනස් වාර්තාවකට එකඟයි. ඒක අද තවදුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරන්න. සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඔබතුමා වාර්තා දෙකක් COPE එකෙන්ම හදලා, ලේකම්තුමියටම කියලා type කරලා, කැමැති නම් ඔබතුමාම වාර්තා දෙකම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. නැතුව, අපේ එකට එක එක ඒවා දාන්නවත්, අපේ ඒවා අරන් මෙතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්නවත් එපා. ඒකට ඔබතුමාට අයිතියක් නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මටත් පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, දැන් ඔබතුමා "අපේ" කිව්වේ මේ කෙටුම්පතද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඔව්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : අපි අත්සන් කරපු වාර්තාව.

සභාපතිතුමා : මෙතුමන්ලා අනුමත කළ වාර්තාව.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ඒකට අපි එකඟ වෙන්නම්. හැබැයි, ලේකම්තුමා එක දෙයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ තමයි, "එතුමන්ලාගේ කෙටුම්පත" කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔව්. එහෙම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අපි අනුමත කළ වාර්තාව.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා අනුමත කළාට පස්සේ, අපේ කෙටුම්පත.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ඒක "මෙතුමන්ලාගේ කෙටුම්පත" කියලා වාර්තා කර ගන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක ඔබතුමාට තේරෙනවා නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා : හරි, ඒක පැහැදිලියි. මම මගේ තීරණයත් දෙන්නම්.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : මා ඊට පෙර වචනයක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි මෙතැනින් නැගිටලා ගියා. ඇත්ත. අපි ගියේ, ඔබතුමාගේ වචනයකට ගරු කරලා එක තීරණයක් අරගෙන. ඒ මොකක්ද? ඒ යෝජනාව අපි අනුමත කළා. ඒකට එකඟ නැති මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ යෝජනාව දිගටම සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. දැන් ලේකම්තුමා එතුමාගේ කථාවේදී මොනවා කිව්වාද කියලා මා දන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක තමයි අපේ තීන්දුව. ඒක තමයි මීට ඉස්සෙල්ලා පැවැති සම්ප්‍රදායත්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඊට පස්සේ ඕනෑ නම් ඒ වාර්තා දෙකම ඔබතුමා 25වැනි දා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මෙතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවක් අලුතෙන් හදන්න. ඒක අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. හැබැයි, අපි අත්සන් කරපු වාර්තාව වෙනම වාර්තාවක් විය යුතුයි. ඒකට "සංශෝධන" කියන වචනය ගෙනෙන්න එපා. ඒකට "සංශෝධන" කියන වචනය වැරදියි. ඒක වෙනම වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගියා නම් ඇයි ආවේ.

ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහතා : අපි එන්න ඕනෑ නේ. නැත්නම් තමුන්නාන්සේලා සභාපතිතුමාවයි, අනෙක් කට්ටියවයි bulldoze කරන්න යනවා නේ. තමුන්නාන්සේලාට අපව bulldoze කරන්න බැහැ නේ. තමුන්නාන්සේලාට පුළුවන් මේ අහිංසක නිලධාරි මහත්වරුන්ව bulldoze කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා :ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. දැන් මෙහෙමයි. මම සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නවා නම්, දැන් මේ අත්සන් කරපු ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරු සහ තවත් අත්සන් කරන්න ඉන්නවා නම් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඒක අත්සන් සහිතව ලේකම්තුමියට භාර දෙන්න. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා අත්සන් කරපු "මෙන්න මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නවා" කියලා. ඒ වාගේම මේ වාර්තාවට සංශෝධ ඇතුළුව මේ වාර්තාවේ කොටස්ද සහිතව වුණත් තවත් වාර්තාවක් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුත් අත්සන් සහිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරු වෙනුවෙනුත් මේ

කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු හැටියට සමානව වැදගත්කමකින් මම වාර්තා දෙකම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : සාකච්ඡා කරන්න අවස්ථාව?

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලා රෑස් වෙනවා නම් ඒ සාකච්ඡාවට මම එන්නම් ඕනෑ වෙලාවක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : කොහේද? ඒ කියන්නේ, COPE එකට නොවෙයිද?

සභාපතිතුමා : COPE එකේම තමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙනම් COPE එකේ වාර්තා දෙකක්. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ COPE වාර්තා දෙකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා : අත්සන් කරන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් සඳහන් කරනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා :ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, දෙවැනි වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අත්සනින්. ඒකේ සභාපතිතුමාගේ නම ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කරුණාකරලා ඔබතුමා අපට COPE එක හැටියට මේ කමිටුව නතර කළ තැන සිට, 13වන පිටුවේ සිට මේ සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන්න අවසර දෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවසර දෙනවා කියන කාරණාව මම පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. දැන් මෙතැන පිරිසක් සම්පූර්ණ වාර්තාව පිළිගෙන තිබෙන නිසා අනෙක් පිරිසට පුළුවන්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපි පොඩි ඇති?

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩි නොවෙයි, මම කියන්නේ. ‘‘සමාන වැදගත්කමක්’’ කියලා මම කිව්වේ ඒකයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමා අපට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේකේ ඇතුළේ තිබෙන කරුණු-

සභාපතිතුමා :ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මම කියනතෙක් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එහෙම නම් මමයි නැගිටලා යන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : සියලු ලේඛන සහිතව-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : තමුන්නාන්සේ එහෙම කියන්න එපා. නැහැ, එහෙම නොවෙයි. මේ කමිටුව එකඟ වුණු සාකච්ඡාව හදුන්නෙත්ති සභාපතිතුමාට දෙන්න බැරි නම්, ඔබතුමා එකඟතාව කඩනවා;. සම්ප්‍රදාය කඩනවා. අපට අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න තිබෙන අයිතියට ඉඩ දෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපට අපේ මතය ගැන කියන්න මේ සභාවේ සාධාරණ අවස්ථාවක් ඕනෑ. එකඟතාවෙන් පිට යන්න එපා. හරිද? එහෙම නම්-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : මේක නිකම් පංචිකාවත්ත වාගේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා තීන්දුව අරගෙන ඉවරයි. සභාව අවසන් කරන්න. මේ මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලාට සියලුම ඇමුණුම් සහිතව කමිටුව පරිශීලනය කළ ලේඛන සියල්ල දීලා තිබෙනවා. මේකට සංශෝධන-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : වාර්තාවේ කරුණු ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්න අවස්ථාව දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : අපි මෙතෙක් වේලා උත්සාහ කළා මේක හොඳින් අවසන් කරන්න. අද රෑ 12වන තෙක් ඉන්න අපි අවේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා හදවතට කථා කරලා අහන්න. මොකක්ද එකඟ වුණේ? අද රෑ 12 දක්වා හෝ මේ සාකච්ඡාව ගෙන යනවා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා : දැන් ඒක කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඇයි, බැරි?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මේ සද්දෙට භය වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් කථා කරන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා බැහැ කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : කිව්වා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමා එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමාට තරහා ගිහින්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මොකද කිව්වේ නැත්තේ? ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදය වෙනුවෙන් පෙනී ඉන්නවා ලු. බම්බුව!

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්, පරක්කු වෙලා එන ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ටත් පුළුවන්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපි ජනතාවට කියනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා ඒක හොඳයි. අපි දෙගොල්ලෝ ගිහින් ජනතාවට කියමු. Press conference එකක් තියලා අපි දෙගොල්ලෝම කථා කරමු. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි,

මෙතුමන්ලාට මෙහෙම සද්දෙ දාලා භය කරලා මේවා කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමා දෙනවාද, නැද්ද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මොකක්ද ඒ නීතිය? මේ බලන්න කෝ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට-

සභාපතිතුමා : මගේ කථාවට අවධානය යොමු කරන්න. සංශෝධන සහිතව දෙන අය සංශෝධන සහිතව වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරලා ලේකම්තුමාට භාර දෙන්න. ඒ සංශෝධන අපි භාර ගනිමු. ඒ වාර්තා දෙකම එකවර සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. පැහැදිලියි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එතැනට යන්න එපා ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

සභාපතිතුමා : කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, පෙනෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තර්ජනය කරපු පළමුවැනි COPE එක. තර්ජනය කරලා, භය කරලා මේ කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ. අපට සිද්ධ වනවා එළියට බැහැලා මේක කියන්න. අපි සම්ප්‍රදාය අනුගමනය කරනවා. අපි මේක එළියට බැහැලා කියනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : 25වැනි දා වාර්තාව-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම යෝජනා කරන්නේ මේ මන්ත්‍රී කණ්ඩායමට කථා කරන්න දෙන්න. ඒක ඒගොල්ලන්ගේ අයිතියක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : දැන් "බැහැ" කියලා නේ කිව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මොකක්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : "බැහැ"යි කියලා කිව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : "බැහැ" කියන එක නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා තමයි වලිගෙ පාගාගෙන දහලන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කථා කරන්න දෙන්නේ නැත්නම්, මේ වන කොට මම මෙතැනින් නැගිටලා ගිහින්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අපි පැහැදිලිව කියන්නේ, මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාටයි, ප්‍රමාද වී එන මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාටයි අද හවස එන මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාටයි, අද රෑ 12 වන තෙක් සාකච්ඡා කරනවා නම් එතුමන්ලාට අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අයිතිය තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : මෙතුමා පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා,-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කෝ. අපි කිව්වේ,-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මම ඒ යෝජනාව කළා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඔබතුමන්ලා හිතන්න ඇති අපේ කෙටුම්පත වෙනස් කරන්න.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ඔබතුමා ඇහුම් කන් දෙන්නේ නැහැ. පොඩ්ඩක් අහ ගන්න. මෙතුමා කිව්වා, තමුන්නාන්සේලා මේ කෙටුම්පතට කැමැති නම් තමුන්නාන්සේලා අත්සන් කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. අපි සාකච්ඡා කරලා සකස් කරන වාර්තාව අප ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම් කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම නම් කියන්නේ අපි COPE වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න දවස් දෙක දා ගත්තා නේ. ඊයේ මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් හිතුවා, එතුමා කථා කළා ඇති කියලා. එතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ දීලා ගියා. අපි දහදෙනෙක් විතර හිතනවා, දැන් අපට ඇති කියලා. අපි නිශ්චිතව කියනවා, සභාපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවට එකඟයි කියලා. ඒ වාර්තාව ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. හැබැයි, දැන් මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට අද දවසේ එතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් හා සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අයිතිය තිබෙනවා.

එතකොට ඒක දෙවැනි වාර්තාව. ඒක "ඒ" හෝ "බී" හෝ "සී" හෝ දෙවැනි වාර්තාව.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ඒක අතුරු වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : අතුරු වාර්තාවක් නෙමෙයි. ඒකත් COPE කමිටුවේ ඊළඟ වාර්තාව.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : සභාපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව වෙන්නේ එක වාර්තාවයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා : බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා දකින්නේ එතුමාගේ ඇස්වලින්නේ. එතුමා දන්නේ එකයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : මම එකඟ නැහැ ඒකට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : "සභාපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව" කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : සභාපතිතුමා විසින් මේ කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : කෝ, වාර්තාව?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ඒක වාර්තාවක් වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : මේ කියන කථාව තේරුම් ගන්නකෝ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ඔළුවල තිබෙන පෞද්ගලික අභිලාසයන්වලට මට වාර්තා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, කථාව සරලයිනේ. ඔබතුමා වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම කරන්න බැහැනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම කරන්න බැරිනම්, ඔබතුමා මෙතැනට ඇවිල්ලා මේක කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අපි එන්නම්. ඔබතුමාට බැරිනම් යන්න, අපි එන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා : මොකක්ද මේ කියන කථාව? ඔබතුමා කොයි වෙලාවෙත් ඕකමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : කියන්න හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා පක්ෂග්‍රාහී විධියටයි කටයුතු කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමා ඒක කථානායකතුමාට දැනුම් දෙන්න. මම පක්ෂග්‍රාහී නම්, ඔබතුමා ඒක ගරු කථානායකතුමාට දැනුම් දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මෙහෙම වැඩ කරන්න බැහැනේ. ඕක තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය.

සභාපතිතුමා : මම පක්ෂග්‍රාහී නම්, ඔබතුමා ඒක කථානායකතුමාට වාර්තා කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මම වාර්තා කළා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මෙතුමා කිව්වානේ. මෙතුමා කිව්වා. මෙතුමාට කොහොමවත් විශ්වාසයක් නැහැ. මෙතුමා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී publicly කිව්වානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක මගේ අයිතිය.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : මේක මගේ අයිතිය. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, වාර්තා 2ක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න, දැන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට කථා කරන්න දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහසේ හැටියට මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු ගැනනේ කථා කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : කෙටුම්පත.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒකේ තිබෙන කාරණා ගැන අද ඔබතුමන්ලාට කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔව්, ඔබතුමා ඒකට කැමැතියි කියලා ඊයේ කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස කියන්නකෝ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔබතුමාගේ එකඟතාව තිබුණු නිසා තමයි අපි මේ කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට වෙන අදහසක් යෝජනා කළොත්, එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්න පුළුවන්, ''නැහැ, ඔබතුමා අනිත් එකට තමයි එකඟ වුණේ'' කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මුලින් පැමිණි එකඟතාව අනුව කටයුතු කරන්න කියන එකයි අපි ඔබතුමාගෙන් කරුණාවෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ. අද රාත්‍රී 12 වෙනකල් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඊයේ අපි එකඟ වුණානේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා : ඊයේ එකඟ වුණු ඒවා අදට අයිති නැහැනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එහෙම කියන්න එපා. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ මෙතැනට ආපු අදහසයි, මෙතැනින් ගිය අදහසයි පැහැදිලියිනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමාට ඒ අයට ඉන්න දෙන්න තිබුණා. ඉන්න දුන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඔබතුමා ඉඩ දුන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඒ වෙනකල් මේ කටයුතු ඇදගෙන ගියානේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : අන්න ඒකනේ වැරැද්ද. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඔක්කෝම ඉන්න නිසයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. මේක වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඒ අය එකඟ වෙලා මෙතැනින් එළියට ගියා. ඒක ඒ අයගේ අයිතිය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක සම්ප්‍රදායක් නෙමෙයිනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු වෙනස් කරලා වෙන වාර්තාවක් හදන්න කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන කොට, මට ඒකට එකඟ වෙන්න බැහැ. ඒකයි මම කිව්වේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : වාර්තාව නෙමෙයි, කෙටුම්පත. ඒක තවමත් කෙටුම්පතක්.

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම නම්, ඒක දෙවැනි වාර්තාවක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක කාලයක් දෙන්නකෝ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට එන්න, කථා කරන්න, එකඟ වෙන්න, නැඟිටලා යන්න අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. ඒ අයිතිය අපි පිළිගන්නවා. නැවත එන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒ අයිතියත් අපි පිළිගන්නවා. අපේ අයිතිය මොකක්ද? අපේ අයිතිය තමයි, මේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබෙන අයිතිය. අපේ අයිතිය තමයි, මේ

ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව එකඟ වුණු අයිතිය. දැනටමත් කරුණු කථා නොකර මේක ගෙනයන ආකාරය පිළිබඳව කථා කරමින් වටිනා පැය කිහිපයක් නාස්ති කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේ වෙලාව අපට බඩගිනි වෙලාව. ඒ නිසා අපට දිවා ආහාරය සඳහා ඉඩ සලසලා, දිවා ආහාරයෙන් පස්සේ - එතකොට ටිකක් සන්සුන් වෙලා එයි - අපි මේ වාර්තාවේ 13වැනි පිටුවේ ඉඳලා ඉදිරියට සාකච්ඡා කරමු. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු අවසන් නැහැ. වාර්තා 1ක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද, 2ක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද, 3ක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද, 5ක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද, 26ක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද කියලා තීරණය වෙන්නේ මෙම සාකච්ඡාව අවසානයේදීයි. අවසානයේදී අපට සමහර කාරණා ගැන compromise කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් එහෙම දේවල් වෙනවා. කාරණා පිළිබඳව කථා කරලා, සුළු සුළු අඩු පාඩුකම් මඟ හැරලා, පොදු එකඟතාවකට පැමිණිලා,- අපි එහෙම කළානේ. දහනමවැනි ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථා සංශෝධනය ගෙනාපු වෙලාවේ අපි දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් වාද කරලා, රණ්ඩු කරලා, ඔක්කෝම දේවල් කරලා, අවසානයේදී අපි සමහර දේවල් අත හැරියා, සමහර ඒවාට එකඟ වුණා. මොකද, අපි ලෝකයට, රටට පෙන්වන්න ඕනෑ, අපි සියලු දෙනාම අනුකූල වුණු - inclusive වුණු - ක්‍රියාදාමයකට යනවා කියලා. එහෙම කළොත් තමයි මේ COPE එකේ අනාගතය, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ස්වාධීනත්වය, අනාගතය රඳා පවතින්නේ. මේ අතර මැද්දේ එක් කණ්ඩායමක් නැඟිටලා ගිහිල්ලා, ඒ හරහා මේ ක්‍රියාදාමය අඩාල කිරීමට හෝ මේ ක්‍රියාදාමයේ අපි එකඟ වුණු ක්‍රමය වෙනස් කිරීමට හෝ උත්සාහ කළත් ඒ සඳහා ඉඩ දෙන්න එපා. මට තවමත් ඔබතුමා කෙරෙහි විශ්වාසය තිබෙනවා. අපි අතින් විවිධ දේවල් කියවෙන්නට ඇති. අපි කවුරුත් මිනිස්සු. අපි අතිනුත් අඩු පාඩුකම් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, මේ සාකච්ඡාවට ඉඩ දෙන්න. ඔබතුමා මේ සාකච්ඡාවට ඉඩ දෙන්නේ නැත්නම්, අපට මේ ක්‍රියාවලියට සම්බන්ධ වෙලා වැඩක් නැහැ. වාර්තා එකද, දෙකද නෙමෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය. එහෙම සාකච්ඡාවකට ඉඩ දෙන්නේ නැත්නම්, මට පෞද්ගලිකව ගිහින් කියන්න කෙනෙක් නැහැ. මම කථා කරන්නේ මම ගැන. මම කාටද කියන්නේ? මේ කමිටුවේ සාමාජික මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් හැටියට, මුල ඉඳලාම මතභේදයට තුඩු දුන් සමහර කාරණා ගැන මගේ මතයත් පළමුවැනි දවසේ ඉඳලාම ඒ විධියටම තිබෙනවා. ඒ කාරණා ගැන හඬ කරන්න, වාද කරන්න, මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු අතර බෙදාගන්න මට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්නේ නැත්නනම්, මේ මන්ත්‍රීකම මොකටද සභාපතිතුමා? කාටද කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: මට තිබෙන්නේ මෙන්න මේ කාරණය පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ එකඟතාව පැහැදිලි කරගන්න විතරයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඊයේ ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා මෙම කරුණුවලට විරුද්ධ වෙලා මේ සභාවේ පිටවෙලා ගියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂණ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන කාරණාවට අනුව ඉස්සරහට යන්න මෙන්න මේ විධියට මට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ එකඟතාව දෙන්න. දැන් මන්ත්‍රීවරු 8දෙනෙක් සංශෝධන රහිතව මේ වාර්තාවට පූර්ණ වශයෙන් එකඟතාව පළ කරලා තිබෙනවා. පැහැදිළියිද? ඒ කියන්නේ දැනට 12වැනි පිටුව දක්වා වුණු සංශෝධනත් පිළිගනිමින්, ඉන් ඉදිරියට තිබෙන කාරණා ටික පොදුවේ පිළිඅරගෙන වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම මේක තව දුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා. එසේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා කළ යුතු යම් යම් සංශෝධන තිබෙනවා නම් - ඒ අයත් මේක වාර්තාවක් හැටියට පිළිගන්නවා නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ - ඒ සංශෝධන ඇතුළු කරන වාර්තාව, කළින් මන්ත්‍රීවරු 8දෙනෙක් එකඟ වුණු වාර්තාවද, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒ සංශෝධනය වෙනම සටහන් කරලා මේ වාර්තාවේම සංශෝධනය සහ වාර්තාව සහිත වාර්තාවක්ද? මට ඒක කියන්න. ඒ කාරණය විසඳලා දුන්නොත් මම එකඟයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ COPE කමිටුවේ මීට පෙර අත් දැකීම් ගත්න. එවැනි මත දෙකක් ආවාම වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන බව අපට ලේකම්තුමාම කිව්වා. ඒ නිසා වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නැතුව මෙන්න මෙහෙම වෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ. මම ඉන්න ස්ථාවරය ඒකයි. දෙවැනි වාර්තාව, - දෙවැනි වාර්තාව කිව්වාට පළමු එකට සමානම වාර්තාවක් තමයි - නමුත්, පූර්ණ වශයෙන් කවුරුත් අනුමත කරපු වාර්තාව නොවෙයි, සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබෙන වාර්තාව සාකච්ඡා කරලා, 3.2 ඡේදය වෙනස් කරලා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහසට අනුව මම ඒ වාර්තාවත් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඒක එකක්, ප්‍රධාන වාර්තාව තව එකක් වුණොත් මම වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන එක විකෘතියක් වෙනවානේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඔබතුමාට වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සංශෝධනයක් කරනවා නම්, ඒ සංශෝධනය වෙනම පේන්න ඕනෑ. මම කියන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. අපි මෙහෙම හිතමුකෝ. අපි උදාහරණයක් අරගෙන කථා කරමුකෝ. 4වැනි මාතෘකාව අරගෙන බලමු. "භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධව මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කරන ලද ප්‍රතිපත්ති, ක්‍රියාමාර්ග හා නීතිමය පසුබිම". 4.1.1 සහ 4.1.2ත් ඇතුළුව මේ කාරණා තුනට දැන් එක කණ්ඩායමක් සම්පූර්ණ වශයෙන් පිළිඅරගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා හිතන්නකෝ. අනිත් අය මේක සාකච්ඡා කරන කොට 4.1.1 සඳහා සංශෝධනයක් තිබෙනවා කියලාත් හිතන්නකෝ. එතකොට ඒ අයගේ සංශෝධනය මේකට ඇතුළු කරනවා. ඇතුළු කරලා මේකේ තිබෙන අදහස වෙනස් කරලා 4.1.1 ඡේදය වෙනුවට වෙනත් ඡේදයක් දාන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කියනවා. එහෙම නැත්නම් 4.1.2 ඉවත් කරන්න කියලා කියනවා. එතකොට මම කියන්නේ "4.1.1 ඒ විධියටම තිබියදී, වාක්‍යයක් හැටියට 4.1.2ට අපි එකඟ නැහැ, ඒ නිසා ඒක ඉවත් කළ යුතුයි" කියලා නේද සටහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නැත්නම් සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම වෙනස් කරලා ඒ වාර්තාව හදන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමනි, ඉතා සරලයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නැත්නම් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වෙනස් කරලා ඒ වාර්තාව හදන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එපමණ සංකීර්ණතාවක් නැහැ. 9දෙනා අත්සන් කරපු වාර්තාව ඔබතුමා "ඒ" කියා නම් කළා. අලුතින් හැදෙන්න යන වාර්තාව "ඒඒ" කියා නම් කරන්න. එපමණයි. ඒ වාර්තාවේ, අර 9දෙනා අත්සන් කරපු වාර්තාවේ තිබුණු ඒවාම තිබෙන්නත් පුළුවන්, වෙනස් ඒවා තිබෙන්නත් පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඒක වෙනස් වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු **මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා:** වාර්තා දෙකක් විය යුතුයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: වාර්තා දෙකක්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : මේ වාර්තාව සංශෝධනය කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. මෙය කෙටුම්පතක් නේ. මෙය කෙටුම්පතක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ, ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාව කෙටුම්පතක් තමයි. නමුත් එක පිරිසක් මේ වාර්තාව සම්පූර්ණයෙන් පිළිගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු **හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා** : අවසාන කරන්නේ කවුද? මෙතුමන්ලාට අවසාන කරන්න ඕනෑය කියලා අවසන් කරනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමන්ලා පිළිගෙන තිබෙනවා. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අනික් අය එකතු වෙලා මේ වාර්තාව සංශෝධනය කරනවා නම් ඒ සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරලා වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න මට පුළුවන්.

ගරු **වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා:** සභාපතිතුමනි, මට කථා කරන්න අවසර දෙන්න. පළමුවන ප්‍රශ්නය මෙයයි. මේ කාරක සභාව අවුරුදු එකහමාරක් පමණ රැස්වෙලා පරීක්ෂණය කළා. අපි සියලුදෙනාටම වාර්තාවක් හදන්න බැරි නිසා ඔබතුමා ඇතුළු ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයට භාර දුන්නා, වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඒ වාර්තාව තමයි අපට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. සභාපතිතුමා ඇතුළු ලේකම් මණ්ඩලය හදපු වාර්තාව ඉස්සෙල්ලාම ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවා නේ. කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවක් හදලා අපට ඉදිරිපත් කළා නේ. අද කමිටුවට සහභාගි වුණු සාමාජිකයන්ගෙන් බහුතරයක් පිළිගන්නවා, ඒ වාර්තාව නිවැරැදියි කියලා. අද තමයි, මෙය අවසාන කරන්න නියම කර ගත් දිනය. 25වන දා මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කමිටුවේ අපි තීරණයක් ගත්තා. අපි වග කියන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, මේ රට ඒ වාර්තාව දිහා බලා ගෙන ඉන්නවා. මේ සකස් කර තිබෙන වාර්තාව මේ කාරක සභාවේ සිටින බහුතරයක් පිළිගන්නවා. එතකොට කිහිපදෙනෙක් වෙනුවෙන් අපි සියලුදෙනාම ඉන්නේ ඇයි? මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නේ නැති කවුරුන් හෝ ඉන්නවා නම් "මේක අපි පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ"යි කියන්න. එපමණයි, සරලයි.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** අපි මේකේ hypothesis එක ගනිමු. මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ "කාරක සභාවේ පොදු නිර්දේශ" සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. ඊළඟට, "කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන විධියට 9දෙනෙක් අත්සන් කරලා මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගත්තාය කියමු. එතකොට එය කාරක සභාවේ පොදු නිර්දේශ වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ වෙන්නත් බැහැ. එතකොට ඒක කාරක සභාව නොවෙයි. එහෙම නම් පොදු නිර්දේශ මොකක්වත් නැහැ. ඒ අනුව මේ වාර්තාව මේ තිබෙන විධියට පිළිගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා : ඒ 9දෙනාගේ පොදු නිර්දේශයන් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට දීපු මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ මුල් පිටුවේ මෙසේ සඳහන් වනවා:

"පාර්ලිමේන්තු ප්‍රකාශන මාලා අංක ..... ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ අට වැනි පාර්ලිමේන්තුව (පළමු සැසිවාරය) 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදුකර තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව විසින් සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව"

අපි මේ වාර්තාවට තමයි අනුමැතිය දෙන්නේ. සාකච්ඡා කරලා, අධීක්ෂණය කරලා, ඒ කටයුතු සියල්ලම කරලා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙන එක තමයි අපට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : සංශෝධනය කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ, කියන කල්. කෙටුම්පත තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරි. මේ කෙටුම්පතේ සඳහන් කරුණු වෙනස් කරන්න කාරක සභාවට පුළුවන්කමක් නැහැ. අකුරු, ව්‍යාකරණ -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මොකද, බැරි?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : මා කථා කරලා ඉවර නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, සීමාවක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : කථා කරන එකේ සීමාවක් තිබෙන්න එපා යැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මොකක්ද මේ පිස්සු කෙළින්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා : එතුමාට පිස්සු කෙළින්න දෙන්නකෝ. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා උත්තර දෙන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : දෙවියනේ, ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මේක අහගන්නකෝ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන එකම තමයි මමත් කියන්නේ. මා මේ පැත්තට ඇඟිල්ල දික් කළා. මා කාරක සභාව කියන එකෙන් අදහස් කළේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලයටයි. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට පුළුවන්, මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන ව්‍යාකරණ, අකුරු වෙනස් කරන්න. මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණු අනුමත කරන්න අයිතියකුත් තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණුවලට විරුද්ධ වන්නත් අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන කරුණුවලට -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මේ වාර්තාව final එකක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : Final එකක් නොවෙයි තමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම නම් මේ වාර්තාව වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්. වෙනස් නොකර ඉන්නත් පුළුවන් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක නේ මා හදා දෙන්න යන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ වෙනස් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැයි කියලාද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. එහෙම කියන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අපි මේ වාර්තාව අනුමත කරන්නේ නැහැ. මේ කාර්යය කර ගෙන යන්න ඉඩ දෙන්නකෝ. ඔබතුමන්ලා අනුමත කරලා ගියා නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඒ අනුව, සකස් කරන ලද මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ 12වන පිටුව දක්වා කරපු සංශෝධනත් ඇතුළත් කරලා, දැන් මෙතුමා කිව්ව විධියට, කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ වශයෙන් සඳහන් නොකර මේ 9දෙනාගේ නිර්දේශ කියා සඳහන් කරලා මේ වාර්තාව හදන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : අත්සන් කරන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නිර්දේශ කියා සඳහන් කරමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා : ඒක හොඳයි. ඊළඟට, පාර්ලිමේන්තු ඉතිහාසයේ මෙවැනි වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ආදර්ශයක් අරගෙන, මේ සංශෝධන කොහේටද ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ, ඒ සඳහා ක්‍රමවේදය මොකක්ද යන කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් මෙයට ආදේශ කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක next step එක. වාර්තා දෙකක් තවම ඉදිරිපත් වුණේ නැහැ. මේක premature step එකක් යන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : එතකොට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එක වාර්තාවයි නේ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. එහෙම එකඟතාවක් නැති නිසා නේ වාර්තා දෙකක් ගැන කථා කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපි තවම සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ 13වන පිටුව ගැනයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මේ කෙටුම්පත ඕනෑ වෙලාවක වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මේ වාර්තාවෙන් පස්සේ අපි සියලුදෙනාම එකඟ වෙලා යම් වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නේ. අන්න ඒක තමයි වාර්තාව. ඒ වාර්තාවටත් එකඟ නොවන්න පුළුවන්. අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒ වාර්තාවට විරුද්ධව තව වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. මේ වාර්තාව අවසාන වාර්තාව නොවෙයි. Let me finish.

සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක COPE එකටවත්, COPE කාර්යාලයටවත් වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන් දේවල් නොවෙයි. මේක COPE එකේ සම්ප්‍රදායක්. සියලුම කරුණු සම්පිණ්ඩනය කරලා අවසාන කෙටුම්පත ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කළේ මේ වාර්තාව තුළින් යම් තීන්දුවක් ගන්නයි. අපි ඊයේ තීන්දු කළා, වෙනස්කම් තිබෙනවා නම් වෙනස්කම් එකතු කරලා, සියලුදෙනාගේම අදහස් ලබා ගෙන, නීත්‍යානුකූලව ඒවා නිවැරැදි නම් ඒ වෙනස්කම් ටික ඇතුළත් කරන්න. අතර මහදී එය වෙනස් වුණා. ඒක වෙනස් වෙලා, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් පිරිසක් කිව්වා, අපි මේ මුළු කෙටුම්පතටම එකඟයි කියලා. ඕනෑ නම් ඊට කලින් කෙටුම්පතටත් එකඟයි කියන්න මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට අයිතිය තිබුණා. ඒක ප්‍රකාශ කරලා මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් ගියා. එතුමන්ලා ගියාට පස්සේත් COPE එකේ කාර්ය භාරය ඉදිරියට කර ගෙන ගියා. සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා එකඟ වුණු පරිදි, අපි සියලුදෙනා එකඟ වුණු පරිදි මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන අඩුපාඩු හදා ගෙන යම්කිසි තැනකට එනවා. එතැනදී තමයි වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පළවෙනි ස්ථානයකට එන්නේ. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ අනුව වාර්තාවක් හදනවා, හෙටද, අනිද්දාද කියා මා දන්නේ නැහැ. කවදා හෝ වාර්තාවක් හදනවා. ඒ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළාට පස්සේ ඒ වාර්තාවටත් විරුද්ධ වෙන්න කමිටු සාමාජිකයන්ට පුළුවන්. ඒකට ප්‍රතිවිරුද්ධ වාර්තාවක් හදන්නත් පුළුවන්, ඕනෑම සාමාජිකයකුට. එතකොට තමයි කලින් සඳහන් කළ වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන අවස්ථාව මතු වන්නේ. එතකොට වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ කාරණය පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න. COPE එක රැස්වන දවසේ සභාගි වන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් සංඛ්‍යාව එකතු කරලා ඡන්ද පවත්වන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා කලින් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව කමිටු සාමාජිකයන් 27දෙනාටම ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා, ඒ වාර්තාවට එකඟද, නැද්ද කියලා එතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් ලබා ගන්න. එතකොට එතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්, එකඟද, නැද්ද කියා අත්සන් කරන්න. ඒ අනුව තමයි, ඔබතුමාට ඒ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හැකියාව ලැබෙන්නේ. එතැන තමයි දැන් අපි ඉන්නේ. මෙතුමන්ලා හිතන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව තමයි අන්තිම වාර්තාව කියලායි. ඒක වැරැදියි. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් පැහැදිලි කර දෙන්න. මෙතුමන්ලාට එකඟත්වයක් ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න පුළුවන්. එතැනින් එහාට වෙනස් වන එකට මෙතුමන්ලාට බලපෑම් කරන්න බැහැ. මෙතුමන්ලා කෙටුම්පතටයි එකඟ වන්නේ, වාර්තාවට නොවෙයි. අපි මෙතැන කෑ ගහන එකත් ඇහට අමාරුයි. සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කාරුණිකව මේ තීන්දුව ගන්න. මේ සාකච්ඡාව අපි අවසන් කරමු. අපි දිගින් දිගටම බහින් බස් වෙලා වැඩක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමා තීන්දුවක් ගත්තාම, එයට මොකක් හෝ අමතර එකතු කිරීමක් කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම් අපි එකතු කරන්නම්. එක් එක් කෙනාට විනාඩි දෙකක් හෝ විනාඩි තුනක් දීලා අවසන් කරමු. එහෙම නැත්නම් අපි අනවශ්‍ය ලෙස දිගින් දිගටම කෑ ගහනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට බොහොම ස්තුතියි, මේ කාරණය පහසු කළාට. දැන් මම කියන්නෙත් ඒකම තමයි. මේ අයට නැවත සංශෝධනයන් මේ වාර්තාවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැති නිසා තමයි ඒ අය මේ කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් හැටියට පිළිගත්තේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අන්න හරි. කෙටුම්පත, වාර්තාවක් හැටියට අපි පිළිගත්තා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉන්න අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් හැටියට පිළිගන්න බැරි නිසා, සංශෝධන තිබෙන නිසා තමයි මේ සාකච්ඡාව පවතින්නේ. පැහැදිලිද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් මම යෝජනා කරන්නේ, කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් හැටියට පිළිගත් අයගේ වාර්තාව, වාර්තාවක් හැටියටම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම් කියන එක.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හොඳයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට බාධාවක් නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ සංශෝධන කිසිවක් නැහැ. අලුත් තත්ත්වයක් නිර්මාණය වුණු එක හොඳයි. ඒ කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් හැටියට පිළිගන්නා

මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් ටික ඇතුළත් කර ඒ අය ඒ නිර්දේශ පිළිගන්නවා කියලා ඒ නිර්දේශ ඒඅයගේ හැටියට ඇතුළත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට කරුණු හැටියට මෙහි සාකච්ඡා කරන්න දේවල් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ කරුණු සංශෝධන හැටියට - ඒ ගැන මෙතැන විවාදයක් නැහැ නේ. මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ඉන්න පස් දෙනා හෝ දහ දෙනාට හෝ කී දෙනාට හෝ තිබෙන සංශෝධන ටික - දෙන්න. ඒ සංශෝධන ටික ලිඛිතවම දෙන්න. ඒ ලිඛිත සංශෝධන ටික ඇතුළත් කරලා ඒක වාර්තාවක් බවට පත් කරලා ඒ වාර්තාවත් අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇයි සාකච්ඡා කෙරෙන්නේ නැත්තේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: සාකච්ඡාව කෙරෙන්නේ නැත්තේ-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇයි නැත්තේ? සමහර වැදගත් කාරණා ගැන අපි දෙන්නා - මමයි, සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතායි.- එකඟ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා අතරත් වෙනස්කම් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න අවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ලිඛිතවත් අරගෙන වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: නිශ්චිතව අපේ එකඟතාව තිබෙන්නේ නවදෙනාගේ - නව දෙනාහෝ ඒ වාර්තාව තව කවුරු හෝ මන්ත්‍රීවරු අත්සන් කරනවා නම් ඒ අයත් සමඟ - වාර්තාව, වාර්තාවක් විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමටයි. ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්. පැහැදිලිද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: COPE කමිටුවේ සාකච්ඡා කර එකඟතාවකට ඇවිල්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කළ වාර්තාව එකක්. මහදී නවත්වා ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාව අමතර එකක්. ඒක අමතර එකක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, පිස්සු නටන්න එපා. මන්ත්‍රීවරු වශයෙන් අපට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා නේ,-

සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මම පැහැදිලි කරන්නම්. මම උදවු කරන්නම්. මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට සහයෝගයක් දෙන්නේ. මේ කෙටුම්පතට අපි එකඟ වුණේ නැහැයි කියලා හිතමු.

මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට පුළුවන් නේ ඕනෑම වේලාවක-සඳුදා වුණත්,- මේ කෙටුම්පත අරගෙන ''මේක අපේ වාර්තාව ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න'' කියලා කියන්න. ඒකම තමයි ඔබතුමා කරන එකෙනුත් වෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ නවදෙනාට ඕනෑ නම් පුළුවන් නේ, ඔය කෙටුම්පත අරගෙන ''මේක තමයි අපේ වාර්තාව'' කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. බැරි නැහැ නේ. ඕනෑ නම් සඳුදා වුණත් මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්, ''මේක තමයි අපේ වාර්තාව'' කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඕනෑ එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත් ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි. ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න වෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවත් එක්ක, වාර්තා දෙකක් හැටියට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක තමයි. අපට ඕනෑ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සාකච්ඡා කොට එකඟ වූ වාර්තාව එකක්. මහදි නවත්වපු එක එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇයි නැත්තේ?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: සාකච්ඡා කොට ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාව තමයි,-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම එකක් නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අන්තිමටත් ඕක වෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා,-

ගරු නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: සාකච්ඡා කොට-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නලින්ද මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපි සාකච්ඡා කර ඉවර කරමු. එකඟ වෙන ඒවාට එකඟ වෙමු, අනෙක් කරුණුවලට එකඟ නොවී ඉදිමු. යන්න එපා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: විනාඩියක් දෙන්න ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නලින්ද මන්ත්‍රීතුමා යන්න එපා, ඉන්න. ඊයේ සාකච්ඡා කළා වගේ සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: දෙවෙනි වාර්තාව මේ ගොල්ලන්ට ඕනෑ විධියට හදන්න කියමු.

ගරු නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: මහ නැවැත්තුවද, කින්ද මන්ද කියන්නේ නැතුව, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ වාර්තාව මේක, මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන්

මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ වාර්තාව මේක කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කරමු. එතකොට වැඩේ ඉවරයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 12වෙනි පිටුවෙන් පස්සේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, අද දවස අවසන් වුණාට පස්සේ **මෙහෙම කරන්න** පුළුවන්. Issue එකක් එන්න ඇත්තේ මොකද දන්නවාද? මෙතැන වාර්තා දෙකක් එනවා, මන්ත්‍රී කණ්ඩායම් දෙකේ නම්වලින්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුද කිව්වේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා තමයි කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: වාර්තා දෙකක් කියන්නේ, මේ වාර්තාව 13 වන පිටුව දක්වා පොදුවේ සංශෝධනය කළ, පසුව පොදු වාර්තාවක් හැටියට මේ කෙටුම්පත පිළිගත්ත මන්ත්‍රීවරු නව දෙනෙක්ගේ වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. මම නව දෙනා කියලා කිව්වේ, අද ඉන්නා අයගේ. ඕනෑ නම් විසිහය දෙනා අතරින් තව අයට ඒකට එකතු වෙන්න පුළුවන්; අත්සන් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ වාර්තාව වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඒ වාගේම තමයි, ඒක තවදුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා - 13 වන පිටුවේ සිට තවදුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කරලා වෙනස්කම් කළ යුතුයි කියලා- පිළිගන්න මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා. ඕකනේ මේකේ ඇත්ත කාරණය. ඒ අයට ඒ වෙනස්කම් සකස් කරලා ඒ අයගේ නම්වලින්, ඒ අයගේ නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් වාර්තාවක් භදන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒවා මෙතැන කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉතින් කථා කරන්න. මට කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා සභාපති. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ, කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ. අවස්ථාව දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉතින් කථා කරන්න. ඒක හරි. ඒ කථා කරලා භදන වාර්තාව ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අත්සන්වලින්, ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම්වලින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාර්තා කීපයක් වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක තමයි අපි කිව්වේ, වේලාසන ඉඳලා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: හැබැයි මේ සියල්ලම හදලා 25 වෙනිදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා?

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම තීරණය කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එහෙම තීන්දුවක් කලින් ගත්තා නේ සභාපතිතුමා. එදා ඔබතුමා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්න බලපෑම. ඒවා තමයි බලපෑම් කියන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, එදා timeframe එකක් හැදුවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. සකස් කරලා මේ වාර්තා දෙකම පරිවර්තනය කරන්න ඕනෑ, ඉංග්‍රීසි සහ දෙමළ බසින්. එක දෙයක් කරන්න පුළුවන්. වාර්තා දෙකම සකස් කර අවසන් වුණාට පසුව, එක දවසේ එක වේලාවටම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 25 වෙනිදාට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැරි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් 25 වෙනිදායින් පටන් ගන්නා පාර්ලිමේන්තු සතියේත් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ කියලා ඔබතුමාට කියන්න බැහැ නේ. අපි timeline එකට එකඟ වුණා නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එතුමා බැහැ කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ලබන අවුරුද්දේ තමයි,-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, එතැනට යන්න එපා. මේ මාසය පහු වුණොත් අය වැය. එතකොට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න වෙන්නේ ලබන අවුරුද්දේ. එතැනට යන්න එපා, ඔබතුමා. ඒ ලණුවලට අහුවෙන්න එපා. ඒ නිලධාරීන් දෙන ලණුවලට අහුවෙන්න එපා.

ගරු නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: ඔයිට කලින් ඒවායේ රෑ නිදි මරාගෙන පාර්ලිමේන්තුව වැඩ කළේ. වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බලපෑම් කරන්න එපා, මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මැතිතුමනි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒක බලපෑමක් නොවෙයි. සුජීව සේනසිංහ නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා මරණ තර්ජනය කළා, එහෙම කරන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 2.30ට නැවත කාරක සභාව රැස් වෙනවා. මම අවධාරණය කරන්නට ඕනෑ, මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් වීම තීරණය වන්නේ ඇත්තටම භාෂා පරිවර්තන පහසුකම් අපට ලැබෙන ප්‍රමාණයට අනුවයි කියන එක. භාෂා පරිවර්තන පහසුකම් ලැබෙන ප්‍රමාණයට අනුව පුළුවන් තරම් ඉක්මනින් මේ වාර්තා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සමාවෙලා තත්පරයක් ලබා දෙන්න. ඒ ප්‍රායෝගික අමාරුව අපි පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපිට timeline එකක් තිබුණා, ඒක වෙනස් වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් මේ කමිටුවේ රැස්වීම හදලා සියලු දෙනාගේ කැමැත්ත මත timeframe එකක් හැදුවා. සභාපතිතුමනි, 25 වෙනි දිනට වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නට හේතුව, නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ අය වැය එන නිසායි. නොවැම්බර් මාසයේ අයවැය විවාදය ගත්තාම මේ වාර්තාව ගෙනෙන්න වෙන්නේ ලබන අවුරුද්දේයි. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමා එකඟ වුණු පරිදි, 25 වෙනි දා හෝ ඒ සතියේ පාර්ලිමේන්තු දිනයක මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ සතියේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නට උපරිම උත්සාහ කරමු.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: "උපරිම" කියන වචනය දමන්න එපා. අපි එකඟතාවකට ආවා. ඒ අනුව කටයුතු කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි නොවෙයි නේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා පරිවර්තන කටයුතු කරන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: දවල්-රෑ දාලා ඒ කටයුත්ත කරමු. අපි හෝ සල්ලි දෙන්නම්, වැඩේ කරන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපිට එහෙම දවසක් නැත්නම්, අද දිනට අපි ඇයි මේ කමිටුව යොදා ගත්තේ? ඇයි, අපි ඊයේට මේ කමිටුව යොදා ගත්තේ? ඔබතුමාට ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. එක දවසයි වෙනස් වුණේ timeline එක.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කල් දැමීමේ වගකීම නම් ගන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමා වග කියන්න ඕනෑ, කල් දැම්මොත්. 25 දිනයෙන් පටන් ගන්නා සතියට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා කියලා ඔබතුමා එකඟ වුණා. ඔබතුමායි ඒ දිනය කිව්වේ. දැන් මේ ලැහැස්ති වෙන්නේ වෙන කොන්ත්‍රාත් එකක් කරන්න. ඒක කරන්න එපා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි විරුද්ධයි, සභාපතිතුමාට තර්ජනය කරන එකට.

සභාපතිතුමා: තර්ජන නැහැ. කථා කරන්න පුළුවන් ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට.

මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු ප.ව. 2.30 දක්වා අත්හිටුවනවා.

[කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු ප.ව. 2.30 දක්වා අත්හිටුවයි.]

(ප.ව. 2.30ට කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු නැවතත් ආරම්භ කරන ලදී.)

සභාපතිතුමා : අපි කථා කරමින් හිටියේ වාර්තාවේ 12වැනි පිටුව සහ 13වැනි පිටුව සම්බන්ධයෙනුයි. ඒකේ 4.1.1ට සංශෝධනයක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත්, ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන විධියට ඒ සංශෝධනයට තව මොනවා හෝ එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑද? කොහොමද වෙන්න ඕනෑ. 4.1.2 ඉවත් කරන්න කියලා තීරණය කළා. ඒක හරි. ඊට කලින් සාකච්ඡා කරපු ටිකමයි-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අර captive sources කියන එක පොඩ්ඩක් විස්තර කරලා ඒ ටික දැම්මා නම් හොඳයි කියන එකයි මගේ අදහස. ඒ Paper එක ඒක ඇතුළත් වෙලා අන්තිමට ඉවර වෙන්නේ - "Captive sources such as NSB **government control or government owned."** කියලයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒකට අපි ඊයේ එකඟ වුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක අත්‍යවශ්‍යයි නේ. නැත්නම් අපට ඒ අදහස එන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : කොතැනට ද ඒක ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : 4.1.1 දී "..සෘජු ක්‍රමය මඟින් අරමුදල් අවශ්‍යතා සපුරා ගැනීමට...." කියලා අපි ඒක ඉවර කළානේ. ඒ Board Paper එක මාස තුනකට කියලත් කිව්වානේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක Board paper එකේ තිබෙන විධියටම දමනවා. ඒ විධියට දැම්මා නම් ඒ ඔක්කෝම ටික එනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මේ ටිකයි වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. අපි ඒකම quote කරලා - as it is -

සභාපතිතුමා : මම verbatimsවලටත් කිව්වා. ඒක මෙහෙමයි එන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ තිබෙන්නේ අන්තිම ටික. ඒ ටිකයි වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. අනෙක් ඒවා ඕනෑ නැහැ.

The Chairman: "The Monetary Board approval is sought for the proposed structure to be used for direct placements of the Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans in respect of captive investors such as EPF, NSB and ETF during the January, April 2008."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : That is correct. මේකත් වැදගත් වෙනවා. "Since the domestic dead market is volatile in the recent past, it is

proposed to review this rate such as April 2008. ” ඒ ටික දැම්මා නම් හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා : හරි. එහෙම නම් 4.1.2 ඉවත් කරනවා. 4.2 සඳහා ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්ව විධියටම සංශෝධනය හදලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ටික මුලට අරගෙන-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ ගොඩක් ඒවාට මා එකඟයි. මෙන්න මේක ඔබතුමාගේ සහ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සාක්ෂිවල තිබෙනවා amend වුණොත් අත්පොත amend වෙන්න ඕනෑයි කියලා. දීර්ඝ කාලීනව වෙනසක් වෙනවා නම් අනිවාර්යෙන්ම manual එක amend වෙන්න ඕනෑයි කියන එක හැම සාක්ෂියේම තිබෙනවා. අන්න ඒ අදහස ආවොත් හරි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක කියැවෙනවා නේද-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : පැහැදිලි නැහැ. ඒක මෙතැන නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක කියැවෙනවා. නිර්දේශය එද්දිත් අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඒක තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ, **“..** අත්පොත සංශෝධනය කිරීම හෝ යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම් සිදු කරනු ලබන බව ද ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් තවදුරටත් දැනුම් දෙන ලදි.”කියලයි. ඒක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා : එතැනට එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ, -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක තිබෙන්නේ First Draft Report එකේයි**.**

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Permanent වෙනසක් වෙනවා නම් අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඒ අත් පොත සංශෝධනය විය යුතුයි කියන එක සියලුම නිලධාරීන් පිළිගන්නවා. ඒක පිළි නොගත් එක් කෙනෙකු හිටියා. ඒක පිළි නොගත්තේ අන්තිමට ආපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා විතරයි. ඒකත් ඔබතුමාට මතක් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එතුමා එහෙම කිව්වේ නැහැ. එතුමා කිව්වේ සංශෝධනය කිරීම අත්‍යාවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ඇතුළත-

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : Board Paper එකක් ආවොත් එදා ඉඳලා ඒ Board paper එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වනවා එතැනට සම්බන්ධ වෙලා. Manual එක එතැනදි change කරන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත්, Manual එකට link වෙනවා අර Board Paper එක. එහෙමයි කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. ඒක නොවෙයි. සාක්ෂි ටික ඔක්කෝම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක නොවෙයි කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම Manual එක amend වෙන්න ඕනෑයි කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් කිව්වා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : Amend කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි වැරැද්ද. Amend වුණේ නැත්නම් ඒකට දිගු කාලීනව වෙනස් වීමක් සිදු වෙන්නේ නැහැ. තාවකාලිකව කරන එකකට amend වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඒකනේ මාස තුනකට ගෙනෙන්නේ. සාක්ෂි ඔක්කෝම අරගෙන බලන්න. ඒ හැම කෙනාම කිව්වේ ඒක. එහෙම නැත්නම් Manual එකක් වැඩක් නැහැනේ. එහෙම නම් Manual එක amend වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මේක පටලවා ගන්න එපා. ඇත්තටම අපට වෙනස් අදහසක් -

සභාපතිතුමා : අපේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. “ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් අනුමත කරනු ලබන මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරකම්වලට සහ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයන් දේශීය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දැනුම් දීමෙන් පසු එම දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් මෙම මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත සංශෝධනය කිරීම හෝ යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම සිදු කරනු ලබන බවද, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් තවදුරටත් දැනුම් දෙන ලදී” කියලයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම සිදු වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. “සිදු කරනු ලබන බවට” කියලා කිව්වාට ඒකේ අදහස එන්නේ නැහැ. “ සිදු විය යුතුයි” කියලා-

සභාපතිතුමා : අපි සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ, “නමුත්, ඒ ආකාරයට කාලානුරූපව යාවත්කාලීන වී නොමැති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.” කියලා. හරි නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා : එතකොට 13වැනි පිටුවේ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන එකත් මේකේ තිබෙනවා. “කෙසේ වුවද, 2008 ඔක්තෝබර් 07 දිනැති මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාව අනුව මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත මෙතෙක් සංශෝධනය වී නැති බව කාරක සභාව විසින් කරන ලද විමසීමකදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පිළිගන්නා ලදී.” කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : හරි නේද? “..කෙසේ වුවද එකී මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණය මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි අදාළ වගන්ති මඟින් ආවරණය වන බව තම අදහස යැයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් කාරක සභාව...” කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා. ඊළඟ කාරණාව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "..කෙසේ වුවද එකී මුදල් මණ්ඩල තීරණය මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොතෙහි අදාළ වගන්ති මඟින් ආවරණය වන බව තම අදහස යැයි මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් කාරක සභාව කරන ලද විමසීම්වලදී ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී" කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා. ඒක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ ටික හරිනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඊළඟට මේකේ B. i. කියන කොටසට සම්පූර්ණ කොටස ඇතුළත් කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපි ඒකේ කොටසක් අයින් කළා නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක එතැනට අදාළ නැහැ නේද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒක අයින් කළානේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වානේ, පහළ ඉංග්‍රීසියෙන් තිබෙන කොටස මුලට ගන්න කියලා. " The front office of the ....." කියන එක. ඒක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එන විධිය මා කියන්නම්. 12 වැනි පිටුව බලන්නකෝ. 4.2 පටන් ගැන්ම එන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. මුලටම එනවා ඒ ඉංග්‍රීසි ටික. "..මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොතෙහි පළමු පිටුවේ සඳහන් -

"The front Office (FO) of the PDD is mainly responsible for mobilizing required fund for the Government at the lowest possible cost with reasonable degree of the risk through the implementation of domestic borrowing programmes approved by the Monetary Board"

යන්න ගෙන හැර දක්වමින් මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් -මුලට එන කොට කියන්න වෙනවානේ, කවුද කියලා- රජයේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව අවම පිරිවැයක් යටතේ සම්පාදනය කර ගත යුතු බව දක්වා ඇති බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී. එහිදී රජයට සහ මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලියට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව සම්පාදනය කර ගත යුතු බව දක්වා ඇති බවද පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී."

ඊළඟට B. i. කියන එක එතැනටම, ඒ අනු පිළිවෙළටම එකතු කළා.

"දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතෙහි 08වන පිටුවෙහි B. i. හි මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය සපයා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදයන් අනුගමනය කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පහත සඳහන් පරිදි, කරුණු දක්වා ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇත.

"B. i. FO has to make arrangement to meet financing needs as much as possible through auctions. The balance fund requirements of the Government as indicated in the approved Borrowing Programme may be arranged through private placements with PDs. "

කියලා, ඊට පස්සේයි පටන් ගන්න කොටස තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 3 වන පිටුවේ, "මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේද ලෙස auction private placements rupee placement කියලා" තිබෙනවා නේ. එතැනින් නතර කරන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, මුලින් තිබෙන එක as much as possible කියන එක contradict වෙනවා මේ කථාවට.

සභාපතිතුමා : හරි, ඒක එතැනින් නවත්වන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මෙතැන "මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය කිරීමේ ක්‍රමවේද ලෙස සඳහන් වේ" කියලා දමන්නම්. ඉතිරි ටික අයින් කරනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : අන්න හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන, ඊළඟට ඉවත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ කොටස මෙන්න මේකයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ...යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වුවද,... කියන paragraph එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: "...එමඟින් පළමුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයද, දෙවනුව පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමයද, තෙවනුව රුපියල් ණය වශයෙන් අනුගමනය කළ යුතු බවට අනුපිළිවෙළක් නොමැති බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී...."

එම කොටස අයින් කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තනිකරම වැරැදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ටික එහෙම එනවා.

ඊළඟට, ඔබතුමන්ලා කලින් මෙන්න මේ කොටස ඉවත් කරන්න යෝජනා කළා. ඒ 13වන පිටුවේ දෙවන ඡේදයේ අග කොටසයි. මම එය කියවන්නම්.

"....ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් සඳහන් කළේ, මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ණය ලබාගැනීමේ වැඩසටහනෙහි මධ්‍යකාලීන ණය කළමනාකරණ ක්‍රමෝපායෙහි medium term debt management strategy සඳහන් කරන උපදේශය පරිදි පිරිවැය හා අවදානම කෙසේ වේද යන්න නිර්ණය කරනු ලබන බවයි."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කොටස අදාළ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අදාළ නැහැ නේ. එම නිසා ඒ කොටස ඉවත් කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 4.3 ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතැන අයින් වන්නේ කොතැනට යනතුරුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: "...ඒ පිළිබඳ තවදුරටත් කරුණු දක්වමින්.." කියන තැන සිට " ... නිර්ණය කරනු ලබයි...." කියන කොටසට අයින් වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "...තවද, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතේ 3වන පිටුවේ මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනයේ ක්‍රමවේද ලෙස (a) auctions (b) private placements (c) rupee loans යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වේ..."

සභාපතිතුමා: එච්චරයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට පසුව ඒ ගැන තිබෙන amendment එක අයින් වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන පොඩි content issue එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ මේකයි.

"..... යන්න ගෙන හැර දක්වමින් රජයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව අවම පිරිවැය යටතේ සම්පාදනය කරගත යුතු බව දක්වා ඇති බව එම නිලධාරීන් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී...."

මේ ගැන ගොඩක් attention දෙන්න.

"...එහිදී රජයට හා මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලියට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයට මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාව සම්පාදනය කරගත යුතු බව දක්වා ඇති බවද පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී..."

දැන් අප දිගටම කථා කරන්නේ රජයට අවාසියක් නොවන ආකාරයටයි. හැබැයි, මේකේ එකතු කර තිබෙනවා "රජයට" හා "මහ බැංකුවට" කියා දෙකක්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එය දෙකක් වන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. දෙකක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඇයි, මහ බැංකුව කියන එක දමලා තිබෙන්නේ? මහ බැංකුවට තිබෙන්නේ loss. මහ බැංකුව අවුරුදු තුනක්ම losses නේ. ගිය අවුරුද්දේ බිලියන 15ක් විතර loss. ඊට කලින් අවුරුද්දේ බිලියන 30ක් විතර loss. ඊට කලින් අවුරුද්දේ බිලියන විසි ගණනක් loss. අප බලන්න ඕනෑ, ඇයි මේක දමලා තිබෙන්නේ කියා. මහ බැංකුවට loss එකක් කියන්නේ, රජයට loss එකක් කියන්නේ, loss ජාති දෙකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇත්තටම ඒ දෙකම එකක්, loss එක නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මේ කාරණයයි. මහ බැංකුවට loss එකක් එන්නේ foreign loansවල රුපියලේ depreciation එක guarantee කරලා තිබෙනවා නම්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, manual එකේ එහෙම කථාවක් නැහැ. Manual එකේ තිබෙන්නේ මේක විතරයි. මේක නිර්වචනයක් විධියට වාගේ යන එකක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන කවුරු හෝ කියා ඇති නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක තමයි. කියලා ඇති. නමුත් ඒක manual එකේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඒක ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක ඕනෑ. ඒක වැදගත්. එහි වැදගත්ම කාරණය මම කියන්නද? මහ බැංකුව එක එක රටවල දමා තිබෙන investments තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ investmentවලින් ලැබෙන foreign exchange loss එක එක පැත්තකින්, අනික් පැත්තෙන් මහ බැංකුව නොයෙකුත් foreign loans guarantee කරනවා, නේ. ඒ අයට කියනවා, "මම මේ exchange loss එක ගන්නම්" කියා. එතකොට මහ බැංකුවේ ගොඩක් දුරට මේ තිබෙන්නේ exchange loss. එහෙම නැත්නම් goldවල devalue එකේ mark to market losses මේ තිබෙන්නේ. හරි නේද? මේ mark to market loss එක නැති කරගන්න එක ක්‍රමයක් තමයි, මේ foreign loans ගන්නවා වෙනුවට domestic market එකෙන් loan ගන්න එක. අපි foreign dollar loans ගන්නවා; rupee loansනුත් ගන්නවා. Dollar loans ගත්තාම, වෙන කවුරු හෝ ගත්තත් මහ බැංකුවට ඒකේ loss එකක් දරාගන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා, සමහර විට hedge නොකර, foreign exchange loss එක ගන්න නිසා mark to market loss එකක්. Rupee loansවලින් ගත්තොත්, මහ බංකුවේ එහෙම loss එකක් ඇති වන්නේ නැහැ. රුපියල්වලින් ගත්තොත් mark to market loss එකක් එන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අප බලන්න ඕනෑ මෙතැන සඳහන් වන්නේ ඒකද කියලා. මගේ point එක මේකයි. ඒක නම්, මහ බැංකුවට කියන්න පුළුවන් අපට වැඩිපුර domestic market එකෙන් loan ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි කියා. එතකොට ඔය justification එක එක පැත්තකට එතැනට ගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්, "අප බිලියන 10ක් domestic market එකෙන් ගත්තා, එහෙම නැත්නම් බිලියන 20ක්; නැත්නම් බිලියන 50ක්" කියා. Domestic market එකෙන් වැඩිපුර ගන්නේ රජයේ loss එක

නොවෙයි, එක පැත්තකින්. මහ බංකුවට එන mark to market loss එක අවම කරගන්නයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, අප ඒ ගැන බලන්න ඕනෑ, එහෙම අදහසක්ද මෙතැනින් ආවේ කියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අසීම් එහෙම කියනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කියනවාද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ bond issue එකේදි ඒක බලපාන්නේ නැහැ, ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. මොකද,Central Bank එක කරන්නේ ඒජන්සි business එකක් විතරයි. ගන්නේ මොකක්ද, ඒක මාරු කරනවා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය. Loansවල මේ වාගේ loss සම්බන්ධයෙන් කටයුතු Central Bank එකට අදාළ නැහැ. මොකද, හම්බ වෙන ගණන මාරු කරලා, ඒ loss එක දරා ගන්නේ රජයයි. මහ බැංකුව කියන කෑල්ල ඒකට අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම අහන්නේ, "මහ බැංකුව" කියා දැම්මේ ඇයි කියායි. මහ බැංකුව කියා දමන්න හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා නම් අර කලින් සඳහන් කළ කාරණය තමයි හේතුව වන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ අය කියන්නේ, විදේශ ණය අඩු කරගන්න,-

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: අප මේ කථා කරන්නේ bond ගැන විතරයි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විදේශ ණය අඩු කර ගත්තාම bond නේ, ගන්න වන්නේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් මහ බැංකුවට වෙනම විදේශ ණය ගන්න පුළුවන්.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකුව විදේශ ණය ගන්නවා. Bond ගන්නේ මහ බැංකුව නොවෙයි. Bondවලදී මහ බැංකුව ඒජන්සි business එකක් විතරමයි කරන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒජන්සි business එකක් කරන එක මම පිළිගන්නවා. හැබැයි, මහ බැංකුව ඒජන්සි business එකක් කරන අතරේ domestic loans වලට, foreign loansවල exchange loss එක ගන්න අවස්ථා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මහ බැංකුව පැත්තෙන් බැලුවොත්, foreign loan එකක් අරගෙන ඒකට exchange loss එක ගන්න කොට මහ බැංකුවට loss එකක් එනවා. අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම loss එකක් එනවා. මහ බැංකුව දිගටම loss නම් -බිලියන 20,30 loss නම්- ඒ loss එක අඩු කර ගන්න පුළුවන් එක ක්‍රමයක් තමයි domestic loans ගන්න කියා ආණ්ඩුවට කියන එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි කිව්වේ. අසීම් කියා තිබෙන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කොහේදීද කිව්වේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අසීම්ගේ පිටු 20ක් විතර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක technical point එකක් හැටියටයි මම ගේන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඒක verbatim එකකින් නේ, හොයාගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. Verbatim එකේ තිබෙන්නේ. අසීම් කියපු කොටසේ තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: Verbatim එකේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඒ කාරණය පසුව බලමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊළඟට 4.3හි සඳහන් වන කාරණය බලමු, Chart එකත් එක්ක තිබෙන කොටස.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට කලින් අවුරුදුවල, ඒ කියන්නේ 2012, 2013 වර්ෂවල විස්තර අප ළඟ නැද්ද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: 2009 සිට තවත් report එකක් කැඳවලා තිබෙන්නේ. මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා ඉල්ලුවා, මුදල් පනත යටතේ එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. මේ වෙනකොට 2009 සිට ඔක්කෝම schedules හදලා තිබෙන්නේ. දැනට ඒ කටයුතු වෙමින් පවතිනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ point එක මේකයි. ඉතිහාසයේ වෙච්ච දේවල් දිහා බලනකොට අපට මේ අවස්ථාවේ සලකා බැලීමට ඒ අවුරුදුවල තොරතුරු තිබුණා නම් මේ රටාව දිහා බලන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ තොරතුරු නැති බවද කියන්නේ, මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා ලිපියකින් ඉල්ලා තිබුණාද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ගිය මාසයේ මුදල් ඇමතිතුමාම report එකක් හදලා ඉල්ලුවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන්?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ නිසා ඒ report එකට response එකක් හැටියට අපි දැන් Central Bank එකෙන් 2009 ඉඳලා සියලුම වාර්තා ඉල්ලලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තවම ලැබිලා නැහැ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔක්කෝම schedules, tables හදලාම අපි ඉල්ලුවා. මෙන්න මේ tables වලට හදලා certify කරලා දෙන්න කියලා. ඒ කටයුත්ත මේ වෙලාවේ වෙමින් පවතිනවා.

සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා සාක්ෂිවල 206 වන පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා Private Placementsවල ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතය 11.23 සඳහන් කරපු ඒවා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට ඒවා එක්ක ගත්තා නම් පිටිපස්සට යම්කිසි දත්තයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, ගණනය කරන්නේ කලින් ඒවාට සාපේක්ෂව නේ. ක්‍රමවේදය බලලා කොහොමද වෙන්නේ කියලා බලන්න මෙතැන ඉඳන් විධියක් නැහැ. මෙහි තව අවුරුදු තුනක විතර දත්ත ඇතුළත් වුණා නම් හොඳයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, එහි පොඩි point එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඇත්තටම 2014ත් unusual අවුරුද්දක්. මොකද election එකක්-

2015 වසරේ මුදල් වියදම් කිරීම දිහා බලන්නකෝ. 2015 මුදල් වියදම් කිරීම පිළිබඳ කාරණා බැලුවොත් එහෙම ඇත්තටම සාමාන්‍යයෙන් අපට පිළිගත හැකි ආර්ථික මූලෝපායයන්වලින් එහා ගිහිල්ලා මැතිවරණයක් ඉලක්ක කරගෙන කරපු කියපු දේවල් අපට පෙනෙන්න තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒ කාරණය අවංකවම පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේ 2014 අවුරුද්දත් ජනාධිපතිවරණයක් ඉලක්ක කරගෙන රජයක් කටයුතු කරපු අවුරුද්දක්. මට හිතෙනවා ඒ අවුරුද්දේ තොරතුරු unusual කියලා. ඒක සාමාන්‍ය නෙමෙයි කියලා. ඒකයි මගේ තර්කය. Average එක හරි අවුරුදු තුනක රටාවක් බැලුවා නම් මීට වඩා-

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2014 ජනවාරි සිට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2014 අවුරුද්දේ මුල සිට තිබෙනවා. 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ තමයි Presidential Election එක declare කරන්නේ. ඇත්තටම ඒ අවුරුද්ද election year එකක්. මොකද, ඒ ආණ්ඩුව හැටියට. ඒ ආණ්ඩුව ඒ මුදල් සංසරණය කළේ election එකක් පිළිබඳ තත්ත්වය නිසා. ඒ වාගේම 2015 ගත්තාම ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත තත්ත්වය. ඒ වෙලාවේ economy එක කළමනාකරණය කරන විධිය normal beahaviour එක නොවෙයි කියලා මම කියන්නේ. කලින් තොරතුරු තිබුණා නම් අපට average එකක් බලන්න තිබුණා. එච්චරයි මම කියන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියනවා නම් මුදල් ඇමතිතුමා කියූ පරිදි ඒ තොරතුරු තවම ලැබිලා නැහැයි කියලා මේ වෙලාවේ අපට press කරන්න-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනික් එක මේ interest rate එකත් වැදගත් නේද? අපි බලන්නේ ඒක නේද? මේකෙත් සඳහන් වන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් කොච්චරද, සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් කොච්චරද කියන එක විතරයි නේද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. මේ එක කාරණයක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Pattern එක අනුව 2014 ඉඳලා ගියේ කොහොමද කියන්න තමයි මේ table එක දාලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි හරි එහෙම නම් මේක ඇති.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ argument එක මම කිව්වේ. පොඩ්ඩක් හිත පිරිසිදු වෙන්න මම ඒක කිව්වේ. මුල ඉඳලාම ඒක මට හිතෙනවා. තව එක දෙයක් පැහැදිලි කර ගත්තා නම් හොඳයි. අපි මේ inquiry එකේ ප්‍රශ්න අහනකොට ඇත්තටම අපේ හැඟීමක් තිබුණා 2015.02.27 නේ මේ controversial ප්‍රශ්නය. එදා සියයට සියයක auctions වලට ගියා කියලා. ඇත්තටම ඒ මාසය බැලුවොත් auctions තිබෙන්නේ සියයට 30යි. 2015 වසරේ මාසය බැලුවොත් තිබෙන්නේ සියයට 30යි. සෘජු ක්‍රමය තිබෙන්නේ සියයට 70යි. ඒක මම හිතන්නේ අපට miss වෙච්ච point එකක්. අපි මුල ඉඳලාම ඒ සංසිද්ධිය ගැන කථා කළේ නැහැ. ඒක වෙන point එකක්. ඊළඟට ආපසු බැලුවොත් මාර්තු මාසයේ නේ ලොකුම ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. 40ක් ඉල්ලලා 77ක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. කරුණාරත්න මහතා: නැහැ ඒ 2016.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2015 මාර්තුවලට යන්න. 2015 මාර්තුවලට ගියොත් එහෙම එතැන නැවත වතාවක් 171ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් 14ක් Direct Placements. එතකොට එතැනත් සියයට සියයක් auctions කියන එක නැහැ. මම වැරැදි නම් නිවැරදි කරන්න. අපට යම් වෙලාවක තිබ්බ අදහසක් තමයි 2015.02.27 වෙනිදායින් පස්සේ හෝ 2015 පෙබරවාරි වෙනකොට සියයට සියයක්ම auctionsවලට ගියා කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ක්‍රමානුකූලව auction එකට ආවේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇත්තටම එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ. ඊළඟ මාසයේ තව direct placements කරලා තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒක අපි ලියන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැද්ද? Contradiction එකකුත් තිබෙනවා. Governor කියන්නේ මට policy instruction එකක්

හම්බවුණා කියලා නේ. Governor හරි මේ ඉන්න නිලධාරින් කියන්නේ. ඒත් ඒ policy instruction එකට මේක ගැලපෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කියන්නේ, "Gradually they entered this." කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: It is okay. එහෙම නේ විය යුත්තේ. Gradually වෙන්න නේ ඕනෑ. නමුත් මෙතැන පොඩි පරස්පරයක් නැද්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට තේරෙන්නේ gradually වුණා කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකෙන් තේරෙනවා gradually වුණා කියලා. අනික් අතට අපි තියාගෙන හිටපු presumption එකත් වැරැදියි නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් පවතින්නෙත් 100 per cent auctions නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ අද වෙනතුරු 100 per cent auctions.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is important.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ ඒක significant නැද්ද? මෙතැන අපි ඉදිරියේ දීපු සාක්ෂිත් එක්ක ඒක පරස්පර නැද්ද? Policy directive එකක් ආවා කියලා නේ කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපි මේ chart එකේ සටහනක් හැටියට කෙහේද, යොදන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්න් ඒ ගැන අවධානය යොමු කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි. ඒ කියන්නේ එතැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා මෙතුමා අහන්නේ policy decision එකක් ආවා නම් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වෙනස් කරනවාද, නැත්නම් ක්‍රමානුකූලව වෙනස් කරනවාද කියන එක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මුළු තර්කයම තමයි ad hoc විධියට තීරණයක් ගත්තා. ඒක එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. මේ figures වලින් indicate කරනවා නේද අඩු ගණනේ ඒ මාස දෙකේ 100 per cent auction වලට ගියේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ නම් තිබෙන්නේ මුල ටික.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතකොට March එක reflect කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: March එක සියයට 8ක් විතර එන්න විධියක් නැහැ නේ. එතකොට සියයට සියයක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මාර්තු එකක් ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා කියන්නේ පෙබරවාරි තීන්දුව ගත්තාට පස්සේ , it must be continued with only auctions. එහෙම නැතුව-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නැතුව පරස්පර වෙනවා. මට පෙන්වන්න ඕනෑ කාරණය මෙයයි. මම මේ කියන්න හදන්නේ මගෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරන popular දේ නොවෙයි. මම මේ කියන්න හදන්නේ ඇත්තටම මේ policy directives ගැන ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට මතයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මට හිතෙනවා සාධාරණයක් වෙනවා කියලා ඒක. මොකද, අපි මේ inquiry එකේදීම ඔය කාරණය දැක්කේ නැහැ. මම මේ summary එකයි පළමු එකයි කියවනකොට තමයි ඒක දැක්කේ. ඒක සාධාරණ observation එකක් කියලා මම හිතනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: සටහනක් හැටියට යොදනවා නම් ඒක කොහොමද යොදන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Evidence එක්ක සම්බන්ධ කරගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Policy decision වලට සිංහලෙන් කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ලැබුණ බවට සඳහන් කළද එම ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම ක්‍රියාවට නැඟීම -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එම ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම ක්‍රියාවට නැඟී නොමැති බව පෙනී යයි. පෙබරවාරි සහ මාර්තු මාසයේ-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Original policy පිළිබඳ ඇත්තම හිතුවොත් oral testimonials පැත්තක දාලා මේ සංඛ්‍යා දිහා බැලුවොත් පෙනෙනවා කලින් ආණ්ඩුව අරගෙන ගිය ප්‍රතිපත්ති, කලින් Governor අරගෙන ගිය ප්‍රතිපත්ති අඩු ගණනේ March වෙනකම්ම continue කරලා තිබෙන බව. ඒක තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ක්‍රමානුකූලව පෙබරවාරි සහ මාර්තු මාසයේ එය වෙනස් වී හරියටම policy decision එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට මෙච්චරයි කියන්න ඕනෑ. අපි බැලුවොත් -

සභාපතිතුමා: ලියන්න ඕනෑ විධියටම කිව්වා නම් හරි.

ඒ වගුව ගැන පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා නේ ඊළඟ ඡේදයේ, ඒ ඡේදයේ මුලට හෝ අගට එකතු කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Draft Report එකේ "2014 ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය, මුලුමනින්ම ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා මාස පහක කාලය තුළ සෘජු ක්‍රමය-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි නේ. 2014 ජනවාරි විය යුතුයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ තිබෙන data අනුව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ජනවාරි මාසයේ සිට විය යුතුයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මාසයේ සිට සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට ගත් තීරණය මුළුමනින්ම ක්‍රියාත්මක වූ 2015 අප්‍රේල් මාසය දක්වා වූ මාස 15ක කාලය තුළ සෘජු ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත් මාසයන්ද, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පමණක් යොදා ගත් මාසයන්ද, මෙම ක්‍රම දෙකම යොදා ගත් මාසයන්ද නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. කෙසේ වෙතත් එම මාස 15 තුළ නිකුත් කළ සමස්ත බැඳුම්කරවලින් සියයට අසූවකට වඩා සෘජු ක්‍රමය යොදා ගෙන ඇති බව පැහැදිලි වේ. මම යෝජනා කරන්නේ, evidence ගැන කිව්වොත් ඒ අය කිව්වා, අපට ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ආවා කියලා -

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඇමතිතුමා, මම ටිකක් මේකට එකතු කරනවා, මේ Central Bank එකේ Monetary Board එකේ minute paper එකක් තිබෙනවා, එවකට හිටපු අධිපතිතුමා 2015.03.06 වන දින Monetary Board එකට දැනුම් දෙනවා, මේ auction එක temporary suspend කළා කියලා. මම කියවන්නම් ඔබතුමාට. 2015.03.06 වෙනිදා

"The Chairman informed the Board that the Central Bank temporary suspend the method of Direct Placement of Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds used to raise funds for the Government with a view to move towards a greater market mechanism based on standard auction system followed alternative at present. Accordingly, the Central Bank at the 30-year Treasury Bond auction held on 27th February, 2015, decided to accept Rs. 10 billion out of Rs. 20 billion worth bonds received for Rs. 1 billion announced to the market for bid in order to meet the Government funding requirement only from the open market bids."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Monetary Board එකට දාලා report එක ratify කර ගන්න එක.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී.වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Ratify කිරීමක් නොවෙයි, just to inform the Board.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කවුද ඕක දාලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: "The Chairman informed.."කියලා කියන්නේ, The Governor has informed through the Board.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක හරි. සාක්ෂිවලිනුත් ඒක ආවා. ඒක වුණේ මෙහෙමයි. ඔතන point එකක් තිබුණා, මේ inquiry එකේ මුලදී අදහසක් තිබුණා, auction යාම වැරදියි කියලා. Auction ගියා. Auction ගිය නිසයි මේ කරදරය වුණේ. එහෙම යන්න Monetary Board approval එකක් තිබුණේ නැහැ කියන එක තමයි popular view එක තිබුණේ. අපට ඒ වෙලාවේ available තොරතුරු අනුව. දැන් අපට පෙනෙනවා auction යා හැකිව තිබුණා. සුදුසු අනුපාතය රටට හොඳද? මොකක්ද කියන එක ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය ප්‍රශ්නයක්. Auction යා හැකිව තිබුණා. යා හැකි සීමාව තුළ යන්න ගියා. ඔතන ප්‍රශ්නය ආවේ inquiry එකේ evidence තිබෙනවා අවසර ගත යුතුද කියලා. ඕක ratification එකක්ද කියලා. ඇත්තටම ratification එකක් නොවෙයි, just to inform. එතකොට ratification එකක් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මොකද within the rules, cover වෙන්න ඕනෑ. Auctionවලට Rs. 10 billion ගිය එක existing rulesවලින් cover වෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senashinghe: There is nothing wrong.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: There is nothing illegal. "Nothing wrong" කියන එක නොවෙයි, "nothing illegal."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No. According to the manual, there is nothing wrong.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Okay. There is nothing against the procedure.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, wrongද illegalද rightද කියන්නේ මේක මම එදත් කිව්වේ මෙතැන judgment call එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට right or wrong වෙන්නේ ආණ්ඩුවට වෙන cost එක. අපි හිතනවා නම් මේක දහයට ගිය නිසා interest rate structure එක උඩට ගිය නිසා cost එක වැඩි වුණා

කියලා ඒ judgement call එකක්. මෙතැන අයුතු දෙයක් කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියන එක තවත් දෙයක්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, Hon. Minister, there is one more thing. If there is a policy decision, it does not matter what it is.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි මෙහෙම කිව්වා නම් නිවැරදියි. තිබෙන එක වැරදි නැහැ. තිබෙන එක හරි. 'නිරීක්ෂණය වේ" කියන එකට පසුව තිබෙනවා. 2015.02.27 දින රුපියල් බිලියන 10058ක මුදලක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් ලබා ගැනීම එවකට පැවති අත්පොතේ බී(1) වගන්තියේ දැක්වෙන ප්‍රතිපත්තියට අනුකූල වන අතර, එය පිළිබඳ 2015.03.06 වන දින මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය වෙත දැනුම් දීමක් ද කර ඇති බව පෙනේ. අපි එතැනින් එහාට කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 15 වන පිටුවේ 4.4

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. එම ඡේදයට මම තව එක උදාහරණයක් එකතු කරන්නද? විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට මේකේදී අපි කියනවා. 2 වන ඡේළිය. "නිකුත් කිරීම සඳහා තීරණ ගැනීම සඳහා පැවරී තිබෙන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය වන අතර, ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ රජය හා මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් යෝජනා කරනු ලබන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය මත පිහිටා වන බව මුදල් අමාත්‍ය ලේකම් සහ මහ බැංකු නිලධාරියා විසින් කාරක සභාව විසින් කරන ලද විමසීම්වලින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී" ඒක හරි. ඉතිරි ටිකත් හරි. මේ දෙකෙන් අපි කොයි එකද ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ? තව එක අදහසක් කියන විධියටම හරි. " එසේ වුවද රජය විසින් ඉදිරිපත් වූ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්බන්ධයෙන් අවසාන අනුමැතිය ලබා දීම සඳහා පැවරී ඇත්තේ, මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී" මේකේ idea එක ඒ තරම් පැහැදිලි නැහැ. ඒ තීන්දුව අනුව නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුත්තේ, ඒ තීන්දුවම ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනවාද? නැත්නම් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට පුළුවන්ද? ඊට පරිභාහිරව තීන්දුවක් ගන්න කියන එක මේ ඡේදයෙන් පැහැදිලි වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: සාකච්ඡා වුණේ එහෙමයි. රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය වාචිකව හෝ ලිඛිතව දැනුම් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. සන්නිවේදනය වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ සන්නිවේදනය වෙන එක අවසාන වශයෙන් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණය ගැනීමේ බලය තිබෙන්න් මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේදී එක පිරිසක් කිව්වා එහෙම ආවානම් එම තීන්දුව තමයි මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්නේ කියලා. තව පිරිසක් කිව්වා, ඒ අවසාන තීන්දුව පවතින්නේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට කියලා. මම දන්න විධියට රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනිවාර්යෙන්ම මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුතුයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකට එකඟතාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් මෙහෙම තිබ්බා නම් හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙහෙම තියන්න. අපි සාධාරණ විය යුතුයි. අනෙක් අයත් නැති නිසා, අපි එකඟ විය හැකි ප්‍රමාණයකට එකඟ වෙමු. අනවශ්‍ය තැන්වලට යන්න එපා. ඒක කොහොමටත් පැහැදිලියි නේ. රීතියට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 16 වන පිටුව, 4.5 මේ ටිකේ ඔක්කොම තිබෙන්නේ, 4 වන කාරණාවේ ඔක්කොම තිබෙන්නේ, මූලික හරයේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකත් හරි නේද? " අදාළ රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට සන්නිවේදන වාර්තා කිරීම කාරක සභාව දීර්ඝ ලෙස සාකච්ඡා කරන ලදී" හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: 4.6. 1 හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 4.6.2ත් හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: 5 වන කාරණය 5.1.1 හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අන්න එතැන, මම සුදුසු තැනකට, මේ හරියේ තමයි ඒක කියන්න ඕනෑ.

පුද්ගලික නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි මේ report එකේ යම් තැනක නැවත කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ නේද? ඒ කියන්නේ private placementsවල යෝග්‍යතාව හෝ අයෝග්‍යතාව පිළිබඳව මෙම වාර්තාවේ 17 වන පිටුවෙන් පසුව කථා කරනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ නේද? මටත් ඒකට දෙයක් එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දැන් මෙන්න මේ කාරණය බලන්න. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මම පොඩ්ඩක් ඔබතුමාගේ මතයකට අභියෝග කරනවා. මම නොවෙයි, අභියෝග කරන්නේ. මම මේ කියවන්නේ මුලින් දීපු draft එකෙන්. මෙන්න මේ කාරණය මෙම report එකට ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය සඳහන් වෙන්නේ මොන පිටුවේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මුල් කෙටුම්පත. කාරක සභාවේ අදහස - 43 වන පිටුව.

"මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ක්‍රමවේදය හා මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින් හැකිතාක් මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය සිදු කළ යුතු බවත්, *ඉතුරුව* පුද්ගලික නිකුතුව මගින් සපුරා ගත යුතු බවත් සඳහන් වුවද, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වන ආකාරයට නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය ලෙස සලකා ඇත්තේ, පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වන බවත්, විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය "පිළිගත් නියමය" වශයෙන් ගෙන කරුණු දක්වා ඇති බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී."

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකේ inverted commas නැහැ නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම එය යෙදුවේ, පැහැදිලි කිරීමටයි.

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: අපි කොහේවත් එහෙම කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා නොවෙයි. සමාවෙන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අදහස අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ අපි draft එකේ reject කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියපු අදහස මේ ගොල්ලන් කියන්නේ.

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම අදහසක් අපට නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙමවත් කියා නැහැ.

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙමවත් කොහේවත් කියා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශයෙන් හදපු draft එකේ, ඒ අදහස ගත්තේ කොතැනින්ද කියන එකයි පැහැදිලි කර ගත යුත්තේ.

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: අපි ඒක reject කළා. ඒ නිසා තමයි, second එකට ඇවිල්ලා ඇත්තේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම හිතන්නේ -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඔබතුමා කියපු අදහසක් හැටියට තමයිලු අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ නේද? එහෙම නැතුව අපි නම් ඇතුළත් කළේ නැහැනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඇත්තටම මගේ line of questions තිබුණේත් ඔතැනයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: Verbatim එකේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස්වල සාරාංශය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහෙමයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතයක් වෙනම තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් කාරක සභාවේ -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ නිසාම තමයි මම එහිදී සඳහන් කළේ, මේක විවාදාත්මකයි; එහෙම නම් ඒ ගැන තවදුරටත් පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමට සාකච්ඡා කළ යුතුයි කියා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තමයි අපි මේ කරන්නේ. ඇත්තටම අපි - නොවී සිටියා නම් මේක බෙරුම් කර ගන්න තිබුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මෙම නිරීක්ෂණය -

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම නිරීක්ෂණයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කාරක සභාවේ -

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: ඔය draft එකක්නේ. අපි කිව්වා ඔය draft එකෙන් දමපු එක වැරදියි -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Draft එකේ තිබුණු අදහස, ඇත්තටම මගේ අදහස.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක කාරක සභාවේ අදහස. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අදහස නොවෙයි.

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අදහස කියන එක වැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක කාරක සභාවේ අදහස යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ. උඩින් එක තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අදහස.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා නැහැ කියා **සඳහන් කරන්නේ, 5.1.2හි මුල් ඡේදයද?**

ගාමිණී වියේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ළඟ මේක නැහැනේ. කෙටුම්පත් දෙකක් හැදුවානේ. දැනට සති දෙකකට පමණ කලින් අපිට කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශයෙන් මුල් කෙටුම්පත දුන්නා. ඒකට තමයි අපි ගැට ගහපු කෙටුම්පත කියා කිව්වේ. එම කෙටුම්පත තව polish කළා. ඒකේ වැරැද්දක් නැහැ. එහෙම polish කරලා තමයි මේකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් මම කියන්නේ මේ specific ප්‍රශ්නය. මම මේකෙන් ගන්නේ අපි හැමෝටම එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි කියා හිතාගෙනයි. ***මේකේදී කාර්ය මණ්ඩලය ගැනත් හිතා තිබෙනවා.*** විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතයට පටහැනි බවට සටහන් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒක මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. නමුත් මම හිතන්නේ

කොහේ හරි තැනක මගේ පෞද්ගලික මතය වශයෙන් - අනෙක් අය එකඟ නම් -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම ගැටලුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ පෞද්ගලික මතයත් මෙයමයි. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, අපි 4.2හි සංශෝධන ටිකක් කළානේ. Private placementsද, direct placementsද, rupee loansද system එක කියා. අන්න එතැනට ඔය කරුණ ඇතුළත් කර ගත්තා නම් හරි කියා මට හිතෙනවා. මෙම draft එකේ ඒක සාකච්ඡා වුණු තැන හැටියට තිබෙන්නේ එතැනයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කොතැනද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි 13 පිටුවේ ඒ ගැන කථා කළානේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, එතැනට ඇතුළත් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙය එතැනට ගන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට ගැළපීමක් තිබෙනවා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතැනට ගන්න බැහැ. විගණකාධිපති -

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය හැටියට නොවෙයි, මෙතුමාගේ අදහසක් හැටියට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම මේ අදහස ගත්තේ මෙන්න මේකෙන්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ note එකේ හැම තැනම තිබෙන්නේ, "එහිදී ඍජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිවක් එම අනුමැතියෙහි සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි.." කියලායි. ඒක එක ඡේදයක සඳහන් වෙනවා. මම කියන දෙය පොඩ්ඩක් අහගන්න. දිගින් දිගටම සඳහන් කරනවා, ඍජු ක්‍රමය තමයි පවත්නා ක්‍රමය කියා. 5.1.11 – "....ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් ඍජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීම අනුමත කර නොතිබුණි...." යනුවෙන් සඳහන් වෙනවා. "....ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී භාවිතා කරන ඍජු ක්‍රමය..." යනුවෙන් ඊට පහළින් සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා සඳහන් කරන්නේ මොකක් ගැනද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ report එක. පළමුවැනි එක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩි පොතද, ලොකු පොතද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 2016.06.29. First report එක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පිටුව කීයද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: **11** වැනි පිටුව. මේ මුළු report එකම base වෙන්නේ, ඍජු ක්‍රමය තමයි පවත්නා ක්‍රමය කියායි. ඒක තමයි මම ඒ අදහස දැරුවේ. පළමුවැනි ඡේදය බලන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කොතැනද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: **11වැනි** පිටුවේ 3 වැනි ඡේදය.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Statisticsවලින් තිබෙන ක්‍රමය තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. Statisticsවලින් හෝ කොහෙන් හෝ එන අදහස තමයි ඔතැන සඳහන් වුණේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන කියනවානේ, "විගණකාධිපතිගේ මතය" කියා. ඒකයි මම කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අදහස -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම අදහසකුත් නැහැ. ඍජු ක්‍රමය. Statisticsවලින් prove වෙන විධිය -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Statistics වලින් හෝ මොකෙන් හෝ මේ අදහසනේ, එන්නේ. මේකේ කියන්නේ නැහැ, statistics අනුව කියා. මේකේ එන්නේ මතයක්. එම මතයේ මෙහෙම සඳහන් වෙනවා. 1 වැනි ඡේදය-last line, "එහිදී ඍජු ක්‍රමය අත්හිටුවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිවක් එම අනුමැතියෙහි සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි." ඒක එක නිගමනයක්.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක නිගමනයක් නොවෙයි. Dataවලින් තිබෙන කථාව කියා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: නිගමනයක් කරලා නැහැ. Dataවලින් තිබෙන කථාවයි මේ කියන්නේ. එම දත්ත මගින් තිබෙන කථාව මේ කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Dataවලින් reflect වෙන දෙය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක report එකක්නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඕක නිගමනයක් නොවෙයි. ඔය report එකේ තිබෙන විස්තරය ඔය කියා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන කථාව නිවැරදියි. මේක නොවෙයි, කථාව. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, හැබැයි, ඔබතුමාගේ report එකේ තිබෙන philosophy එක

තමයි ඇත්තටම private placements ගියා නම් මේ කරදරය වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක. ඒක තමයි ඔබතුමා අපට අර පළමුවැනි දවසේ පැහැදිලි කිරීමේදීත් කිව්වේ. ඒ පැහැදිලි කළේ, ඒක තමයි. Private placements ගියා නම් පරණ විධියට මේ විපැත්තිය වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Data base කරගෙන ගිය සියයට අසූවක්, විස්සක් වාගේ -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකනේ, කිව්වේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඉස්සරහට තිබෙන දෙය කියා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. තිබෙන දෙය කියන්නේ, දෙපැත්තක් සඳහන් කළා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔය වචනය පාවිච්චි කරන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමන කිව්වායින් පසුව -"conclusions"- වෙනත් අදහසක්නේ, එන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නිගමන නොවෙයි, philosophy එක.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔය කියන කථාවටයි මම විරුද්ධ. අනෙක් ඒවා ගැන -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල එක දෙයක් විතරනේ, සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. පවත්නා ක්‍රමය තමයි ඍජු ක්‍රමය. මේකේ කොහේවත් සඳහන් වෙලා නැහැ - අපි සාකච්ඡා කළා; සාක්ෂිවල ඇසුවා. Auction system එක තමයි, තිබෙන system එක. මම ඇසුවේ, ප්‍රශ්නය. එම system එකෙන් බැහැර වුණේ කොහොමද කියන එක ගැන කාටවත් -

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ ඒක තමයි. ඒක එහෙම නම් මෙතැන auctions, private placements කියන අදහස තිබෙන කොටසේ -4.2- ඔබතුමන්ලාට සටහනක් හැටියට යොදන්න පුළුවන්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ **වාර්තාවේ** මෙහෙම වුණාට, ඒක එහෙමම නොවෙයි කියා යොදන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම මොකක් හරි යොදන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුරුවත් කියන එකක් ඕනෑ නැහැ. අපි තේරුම් ගන්නා දෙය ගනිමුකෝ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඉස්සෙල්ලා හදපු එකනේ, මේ report එක. ඊට පසුව ඕවා සාකච්ඡා කළාම -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඕනෑ නම් ඒක එතැනට ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැනදී වැදගත් වෙන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කිව්වේ මොකක්ද කියන එක නොවෙයි. ඒක නොවෙයි, වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. දැන් අපි understanding එකකට එන්න ඕනෑ. පවත්නා ක්‍රමය - 1997 සිට 2008 වෙනකම් පැවැතුණේ, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයනේ. මම හිතන්නේ ප්‍රායෝගිකව පැවතුණේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය. 2008 වෙනකම් සියයට සියයක්ම වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය පැවතුණේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සියයට සියයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ සියයට සියයක් වාගේ - මේක අමතක කරන්නකෝ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. අපි බැලුවොත් මෙතුමාගේ එම report එක-

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: 1997දී auctions පටන් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. 98 මුල ඉඳලා direct placements පටන් ගෙන තිබෙනවා, Central Bank එක ඇතුළේ තිබෙන sourcesවලට අනුව. ඊට පසුව ඒක 2004දී ආයෙත් නතර කරලා -

සභාපතිතුමා: සාක්ෂි දෙනවිට සාක්ෂි සටහනක කියනවා, 2004 computer system එකකට යන නිසා හැම තැරැව්කරුවෙකුම computer ජාලයට සම්බන්ධ නැති නිසා නැවත නතර කරන්න වුණා කියා.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** මෙතුමිය සඳහන් කළේ, වැදගත් දෙයක්. ඉස්සෙල්ලාම primary dealer කෙනෙකුට direct placement එකක් දුන්නේ කවදාද කියා ඔබතුමිය දන්නවාද? මට පොඩ්ඩක් ඒ ගැන කියන්න. අපේ මුළු සාකච්ඡාවේම තිබෙන්නේ captive sources සඳහා direct placements කරන්න කියලානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්න ඒක තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඔව්. අන්න ඒකයි ප්‍රශ්නය. ඒක දන්නවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඒක තමයි වැදගත්ම කාරණය වෙන්නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Primary dealersලාට direct placements දෙනවා කියලා එකක් නැහැ. Primary dealersලා auction එකෙන් ඒක අර ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 2008 සිට 2015 වෙනකම් දීලා තිබෙන්නේ primary dealersලාට. ඒක තමයි වැදගත්ම. ඒ විධියට දුන්නොත් තමයි

auction එකට දෙන්නේ නැතුව primary dealersලාට දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔය ගණන් ගන්න පුළුවන්. Primary dealersලා ගන්නේ නැත්නම්, කාට දෙන්නද? අපිට EPF එකට, ETF එකට ඔක්කෝම ටික දෙන්න බැහැනේ. හදිසි අවස්ථාවල විතරයි, ඒ ගෙනාවේ. විශේෂ කාරණා නොගෙනාවේ.

ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, අපි හඳන ගණන වැරදි වෙන්නේ මේ නිසායි. EPF එකට ETF එකට NSB එකට කිසිදු ප්‍රශ්නයක් හෝ අසාධාරණයක් ඇති නොවෙනවා නම්, ඔය කියන ක්‍රමවේදය නිවැරදියි. මෙහෙයුම් වාර්තාවේ private dealersලාට දෙන්න පුළුවන් මොනවා හරි දෙයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, මෙතුමාගේ ගණනය කිරීම් නිවැරදියි. ඒ විධියට private dealersලාට private placements දෙන්න බැරි නම්- ඒ captive sourcesවලත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් එනවා මාස 3න් එහාට ගිහිල්ලා කොහොමද ඒක දීර්ඝ වෙන්නේ කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ දීර්ඝ වුණා කියලා හිතන්න. එතකොට අපට කියන්න බැහැ direct placementsවලට යන්න කියලා. අපට රටක් වශයෙන් EPF, ETF, NSBවලට ණය බර කරන්න බැහැ. It is totally wrong. private dealersලාට Private placements දෙන්න බැරි නම්, - තේරුණාද මම කියන එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මම හිතන්නේ ඒක ඉතාමත් වැදගත්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි. That is the most important thing.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක ඉතාමත් වැදගත්.

සභාපතිතුමා : මට හිතෙන අදහස මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්නම්. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලාට තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්. අපි ඒක එහාට ගිහිල්ලා දානවාට වැඩිය- ඒ කියන්නේ, මුදල් නීති කියලා එහාට දානවාට වැඩිය මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත භාවිතා කිරීමයි ඒකත් එක්කම මෙය use කරලා තිබෙන විධියයි එක්ක මෙතැනට යොදන්න පුළුවන් කියලා මට හිතෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක හරි. මට තේරෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : 4.2 වාගේ තැනකට ඒක ගත්තොත් හොඳයිද? එතකොට ඒක related. ඒකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එය යොදන තැන මම සඳහන් කරන්නම්.

2008 Board papers දෙක අනුව හදිසි අවස්ථාවකදී මාස තුනක කාලයකට private-direct placementsවලට අවසර ලබා දී ඇත. පළමුවෙනි Board paper එක අවසර ලබා දී ඇත්තේ EPF, ETF සහ NSBවල හිමිකරුවන්ගේ අයිතීන් ආරක්ෂා වන පරිදි උද්ධමනය සැලකිල්ලට ගනිමින්ය. එහිදී, විශේෂයෙන්ම සඳහන් කර ඇති කාරණය වන්නේ, එම සෘජු නිකුත් කර - captive sources -රජයේ හෝ රජය විසින් පාලනය කරනු ලබන ආයතන වන EPF, ETF හෝ NSB වැනි ආයතනවලට ලබා දීමටයි. එම සෘජු නිකුත් කර පෞද්ගලික ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන්ට ලබා දීමට අවසරයක් ලබා දී ඇත් ද යන්න කිසිම ලියවිල්ලකින් පැහැදිලිව සඳහන් කර නොමැත. අපැහැදිලියි.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක හරි නේද? කොහේවත් document එකක් නැහැ නේද ඒ අයට දෙන්න කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ අනුව, 2008 සිට 2015 දක්වා පෞද්ගලික ගැණුම්කරුවන්ට ලබා දී ඇත් ද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කළ යුතුය. ඒක direct placement එක කියන තැනට හරි වෙනත් කොතැනකට හරි ඇතුළත් කළාම ඇති. අපට ඕනෑ අදහස මතු වෙන්න පමණයි. අපට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ, මේ system එක ආවේ කොහොමද කියලායි. System එක තිබුණා. නමුත්, මේ system එක ආපු හැටි හොයා ගන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා : හොඳයි. අපි තව ඉදිරියට යමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමා එකඟ නම්, මේ ඇති වන හරය- විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එකඟ නම් ඒක පැහැදිලියි. ඒ කියන්නේ, මුල් draft එකේ තිබුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීමට අදාළ කොටස මම බැලුවා. එහි කියලා තිබෙන්නේ, private placements තුළ තමයි මේක manageකරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක තමයි හරි ක්‍රමය. ඒක තමයි පිළිගත් ක්‍රමය. එතකොට ඒක එපමණකට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේද? පොදු අදහස නොවෙයි නම්, මගේ පෞද්ගලික අදහස කියලා මම කියනවා. ඒක පොදු අදහස නේද? මට ලොකුවට දෙයක් සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මම මේ draft එකෙන්ම ගන්නේ ඒ කාරණය නිසා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මමත් අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමාගේ අදහසට එකඟ වනවා. මම හිතන්නේ පොදු අදහසකට අපි ඔක්කෝම හිතන්න හේතු වුණේ, 2008 දියත් කළ එක යම් කාල පරිච්ඡේදයකට සීමා වුණු වැඩසටහනක් කියලා අපි දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ. අපි කවුරුත් දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නෙත් නැහැ, අපි දන්නෙත් නැහැ මේ COPE කමිටුවේ අය දන්නෙත් නැහැ. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා අපි statistics බැලුවාමත් ජේන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ, සියයට 80ක් පමණ ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ

සෘජු ක්‍රමයට. ඒ ක්‍රමයට අනුව අපි සම්ප්‍රදානුකූලව බැලුවාම මේ auction එක out of order. එහෙම නේ වුණේ? ඒක ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට පේනවා. අපි ගිය අවුරුද්දේ බැලුවා ඊට කලින් අවුරුද්දේ බැලුවා ඒක out of order. නමුත්, 2008 ඉඳලා 2014 අග සිට 2015 ආරම්භය වෙනතෙක් කරගෙන ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණේ approval එකක් නැති දෙයක් කියලා අපි දැන ගත්තේ පසුවයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි කාටවත් වැරැද්දක් පටවන එකක් ගැන නොවෙයි මේ කියන්නේ. අපි කියන්නේ සමහර විට අපි mislead වුණා වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා : මෙහෙමයි. මට අදහසක් තිබෙනවා, කාරක සභාවට මෙවැනි අදහසක් යොමු කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට එතුමාගේ මතය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ස්වාධීන අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ නිරීක්ෂණ අනුව සෘජු ක්‍රමය, පොදු ක්‍රමය හැටියට දකින අතර එය කාරක සභාවේ මතය අනුව වෙනස් වේ වාගේ එකක් යොදන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: It is okay.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එතකොට සාධාරණයක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මම කියන්නේ-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එහෙම තමයි සාධාරණ විධිය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එතුමාට මේ කරුණු තිබුණේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මතයක් නොවෙයි. කරුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව; කරුණු පෙන්වා දීම අනුව; කරුණු පෙන්වා දීමේ රටාව අනුව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම යොදන්න

සභාපතිතුමා : කරුණු පෙන්වා දීම අනුව යනාදී වශයෙන් යොදන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා දැක්කේ නැති documents තිබෙනවා නේ. මෙතැන ඔබතුමාට තනිවම මේ තීරණ ගන්න බැහැ නේ. Documents 10ක් පමණ දාලා

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ රටාව අනුව- අපේ කාරක සභාවේ සිටින ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මතය අනුව එය හදා ගන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එම අවස්ථාවේ දුන් තොරතුරු අනුව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම කියන්න එපා. ඒක ඕනෙත් නැහැ. පසුව ලැබුණු තොරතුරු අනුව-

සභාපතිතුමා : මම දන්නේ නැහැ. මට කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ මේකයි. මෙතුමාගේ මතය ස්ථාවරව කියන්න අයිතිය තියලා අපේ අදහස සඳහන් කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමනි, මට ඒක කියන්න අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: කොතැනද කියලා තැන කිව්වා නම් හරි නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අපි කලින් කියලා යෙදූ තැනටම යෙදුවා නම් හරි. හැබැයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතයක් තමයි කිව්වේ කියලා සඳහන් කරනවා නම්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමනි, මම මේ කියන්න හදන්නේ සාධාරණ හොඳම ක්‍රමයක් ගැනයි. ඔබතුමා අහගෙන ඉන්න කෝ. සභාපතිතුමාගේ concern එක තමයි මම බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා එකඟ නැත්නම් කියන්න. "මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ ක්‍රමවේදය හා මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොත අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මඟින් හැකිතාක් මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය සිදු කළ යුතු බවත්, ඉතිරිය පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය මඟින් සපුරා ගත යුතු බවත් සඳහන් වුවද, එම අවස්ථාවේ තිබූ කරුණු අනුව විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වන ආකාරයට නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය ලෙස සලකා ඇත්තේ පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය වන බවත්, මෙම පරීක්ෂණයට විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කොට ඇති වාර්තාව මඟින් පුද්ගලික නිකුතු ක්‍රමය පිළිගත් ක්‍රමය" වශයෙන් ගෙනහැර කරුණු දක්වා ඇති බවත්, පෙනී යන ලදී. අපි ඊට වඩා comment නොකර එතැනින් නතර කරමු. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊළඟට, 5.1.1හි තිබෙනවා, "මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව හා එහි කාර්ය භාරය." පිළිබඳව. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක කොහොමද එන්නේ? ඒ මූලාශ්‍රය කොහෙන්ද ගත්තේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: Manual එකේ තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ "ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව හා එහි කාර්ය භාරය" කියන එකේ තිබෙනවා. ඒක මම තමයි යෝජනා කළේ. මොකද, ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව කියලා හැම තිස්සේම පාවිච්චි වුණාට, ඒකේ කාර්ය භාරය මොකක්ද කියලා පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් අවශ්‍යයි නේ. ඒකට තමයි manual එකෙන් අරගෙන දැම්මේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක හොඳ අදහසක්. ඒත් එක්කම Tender Board එකේ කාර්ය භාරය මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වෙනම තිබෙනවා. මම කිව්ව නේ ඒක දාන්න කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Tender Board එකේ කාර්ය භාරය manual එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතුමා සුදුසු දෙයක් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඇත්තටම මේක කියවන්නේ සාමාන්‍ය මිනිස්සු නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව හා එහි කාර්ය භාරය." කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ වාගේ මේ Tender Board එක සහ එහි කාර්ය භාරයත් specifically මේ 5.1.1 කියන තැනට දමන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ගත්තේ මෙහෙමයි, ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. අර ගනුදෙනුවට අදාළ කොටසේදී ලංකා බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරීත්වය,-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔය කියන්නේ මේකේ background එක නේ. පස්සේ අපි discuss කරනවා, Tender Board එක තමන්ගේ යුතුකම ඉෂ්ට කළාද, නැත්නම් Tender Board එකට බලපෑම් කළාද කියලා. ඒකනේ තිබෙන issue එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් අපි ඒක ගනිමු, "මුදල් මණ්ඩලය සහ මහ බැංකුවේ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව." කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලයේ ටික මම කියන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක පස්සේ බලමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: 4.6ට අලුතින් එකක් හැටියට එකතු කරමු. 4.6ට ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය කියලා එකක් දමන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හැබැයි, "මහ බැංකුවේ දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව හා එහි කාර්ය භාරය" තිබෙන්නේ 5.1.1 යටතේයි. එතැනින් පල්ලෙහාට ඇතුළත් වුණා නම් හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එකේ ඒවා තුනක් දමමු. 5.1.1.1 සහ 5.1.1.2 කියලා දමමු. කියන්න බලන්න, Tender Board එකේ රාජකාරි මොනවද කියලා?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මම DDMC එක කියවන්නද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, කියවන්න.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: "The Domestic Debt Management Committee (DDMC) is the Committee responsible for taking……"

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔය Domestic Debt Management Committee එක. Tender Board නොවෙයි, ණය කළමණාකරණ කමිටුව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Its okay. ඒකත් කියන්න කෝ.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: "…… decisions on raising funds from domestic market with a view to minimizing the cost and the risk of the Government/ public debt."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දැන් translation එක හරි. ඒක 5.1.1 කියන එක නේ. ඒක 5.1.1.1 කියලා දමන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: 5.1.1.1 දැම්මා නම් ලෙහෙසියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 5.1.1.1 යි, 5.1.1.2 කියලා දමන්න. මහ බැංකුවේ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව ද මේ කියන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ තීරණය ගත්ත ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව රැස් වුණා නේ. මොකක්ද ඒකේ responsibility එක?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒකේ මෙන්න මෙහෙම කියවෙනවා. "After closing of each Treasury Bills and Treasury Bonds auction, the Front Office prepares following documents to be submitted to the Treasury Bond/Bill Tender Board Committee which takes decisions on the amount to be accepted that gives the lowest and optimal cost and risk combination. The TOR and the Treasury Bill/Treasury Bond is attaching …." එතකොට දැන් මෙතැනින් කියැවෙන්නෙත් "lowest possible" -

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Perfect! ඇත්තටම ප්‍රශ්නෙත් ඒක නේ. අපි අවසානයේදී කියන්නේ, මේ වාගේ issue එකක් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ බලපෑමක් පිට ඒ තීරණය ගත්තාද, එහෙම නැත්නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේම own decision එකක්ද? ප්‍රශ්නය එච්චරයි නේ. එහෙම නම් බලන්න ඕනෑ, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ duties මොනවද කියලා. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ duties- මොකක්ද ඒකට කියන නම්? මහ බැංකුවේ,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Treasury Bills and Treasury Bondsවලට ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කරවලට සම්බන්ධ ටෙන්ඩර් කැඳවීම."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කවුද දැන් ඒක ලියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: නිලධාරි මහත්මියක් ඒක සටහන් කරගන්නවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "මහ බැංකුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ වගකීම සහ කාර්ය භාරය. " කියලා ලියා ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කාර්ය භාරය වෙනුවෙන් භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සහ භාණ්ඩාගාර,-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: "මහ බැංකුවේ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ කාර්ය භාරය" කියලයි සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි උඩ එකට දාලා තිබෙන්නේ, "දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව හා එහි කාර්ය භාරය." කියලා නේ. මේකට දාමු, "මහ බැංකුවේ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ කාර්ය භාරය." කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙහි රාජකාරි පිළිබඳව සිංහලෙන් කියන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: රාජකාරිය තමයි, භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත්, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර auction -වෙන්දේසි- වලට කැඳවා,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පතුත් වෙන්දේසිවලට කැඳවනවා ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි translate කරලා ඇතුළත් කරන විධියටම හදා ගනිමුද? Manual එකේ පිටුව කියන්න කෝ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පිටු අංක 5.

සභාපතිතුමා: 5වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Tender Board එකේ තිබෙන කාර්ය භාරය translate කරලා දාන්න. 5.1.1 සහ 5.1.2 හරි නේද? ඒක සියලු දෙනාම පිළිගන්නවා නේද? ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ඇමතිතුමනි, 5.1.1 සහ 5.1.2හි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27වැනිදා තීරණය කළා, Rs. 1 billion ගන්න කියලා කියන එක නේ මේ කියන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දා පැවැති රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව මඟින් තීරණය කොට නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ බව 2015-2016 මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති විසින් සකස් කර ඇති වාර්තා මඟින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි". 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින පැවති රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව මඟින් තීරණය කොට නිර්දේශ කර තිබූ රුපියල් මිලියන එකක් ගන්න තීන්දු කළා.

ඊළඟට 5.2, "2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සිදු වූ ආසන්න කාලය තුළ වෙළඳ පොළ හැසිරීම". "මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු දිනට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතීයක වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ වසර 30 බඳුම්කර සඳහා සියයට 9.48ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවතිය". ඒකත් හරි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, වාර්තාවේ කොතැනට හෝ මේ සාකච්ඡාව එන්න ඕනෑ. අපේ report එකේ නැති ඉතාම වැදගත් දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ තමයි 27 වැනි දා උදේ Market Operations, නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතාගේ committee එකට Governor පැමිණ තීරණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා, ඒ committeeයේදී three-day rule එක ඉවත් කරන්න. ඒක ඉතාම වැදගත් සාධකයි. Three-day rule එක ඉවත් කළාම, market එකේ interest rate එක සියයට පහේ සිට සියයට එකහමාරකින් එකපාරට වැඩි වෙනවා. පෙ.ව. 8.00ට හෝ පෙ.ව 9.00ට හෝ bond market එක bid කරන්න කලින් තමයි මෙය සිදු වන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මේ වාර්තාවේ 20 වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වන්නේ, "පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දා උදය කාලයේ වෙළඳ පොළ මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුවට - Market Operations Committee- හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා පැමිණ සියයට 5ක පැවැති පොලී අනුපාතය Special Standing Deposit Facility Rate සියයට 6.5ක් දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට උපදෙස් දුන් බව හා අධිපතිවරයා එම කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෙකු නොවන බව" කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඉන්නේ ඒ context එකේ නේ. දැන් අපි කියනවා නේ, "මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු දිනට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතීක වෙළඳ පොළ තුළ වසර 30ක බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 9.48ක සාමාන්‍ය- අනුපාතයක් පැවතිය" කියලා. අපි ඒ කාරණය එතැන කියන්නේ, මෙයට background එකක් හැටියට නේ. එතකොට ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී අපිට කියන්න වෙනවා, ගිය සතිය සහ 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා අතර හදිසි තත්ත්වයක් හටගත්තා කියලා. ඒ හදිසි වෙනස තමයි, interest rates structure එක ඇතුළෙන් වෙනස් වුණා කියන එක. ඒ අය තීරණයක් අරගෙන interest rates structure වෙනස් කළා, bond auction එක පටන් ගන්න කලින්.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඒ කොටස ළඟටම මේ කොටසත් ගෙනිච්චා නම් හරි නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ කොටසින් පස්සේ, මෙදින මහ බැංකුව විසින් three-day rule එක - ඒක පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගැන ලොකු explanation එකක් ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා කරලා තිබෙනවා.

මේ වාර්තාවේ 139 පිටුවේ දෙවැනි line එකේ සඳහන් වෙනවා, ''යම්කිසි බැංකුවක් පැමිණ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් තැන්පත් කළොත්, ඒ සඳහා ලබා දෙන්නේ සියයට 6.5ක පොළී අනුපාතයයි. යම්කිසි මාසයක තුන්වරකට වඩා මුදල් ගෙනැවිත් තැන්පත් කළොත් සියයට 6.5ක පොළියක් දෙන්නේ නැහැ. සියයට 05යි දෙන්නේ. නමුත් එදා උදේ ඒ සියයට 05ට දෙන්න තිබුණු ප්‍රතිපත්තිය වෙනස් කර, සියයට 6.5ට වැඩි කළා.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: 2015 මාර්තු මස 27 වැනි දා උදේ අධිපතිතුමා කොමිටි එකට පැමිණ ප්‍රකාශ කර තිබෙනවා, සියයට 05 සිට සියයට 6.5 දක්වා වැඩි කරනවා කියලා. එදා හවසම ඒ committee එකෙන් circular එකක් issue කරලා තිබෙනවා, 03 වැනිදා සිට තමයි ඒ rates වෙනස් වීම වෙන්නේ කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකයි මෙතැන තිබෙන game එක. දැන් මම ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා, මේක දැනගෙන සිටියේ කවුද, කී දෙනෙක් මෙක දැනගෙන සිටියාද කියලා. අපි පෙ.ව 9.00ට තීරණයක් ගන්නවා, bond එක open කරනවා පෙ.ව 10.00ට. නමුත් මෙය ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ ඊළඟ දවසේ. මෙය දැනගෙන හිටපු කට්ටියක් සිටියා. අපි ගොඩක් වේලාවට හිතන්නේ rate එක සංසන්දනය කරන්නේ මෙකක් එක්කද කියලා නේ. අපි මේක 11.30ට ගත්තා නම් ඒ rate එක වැඩි, ගිය සතියේ 9.30ට තිබුණු නිසා නේ. මේ 27 වැනි දා උදේ ගත්ත තීරණයත් එක්ක 9.30 කියලා එකක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. 9.30ක් තිබෙන්න බැහැ. මොකද, interest rates structure එකම ඉහළ ගිය නිසා. ඒක වැදගත් සාධකයක් නිසා අපිට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න වෙනවා. මම දන්නෙ නැහැ, මේක මගේ මතය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකෙන් කොහොමද මේ specific transaction එකට තිබෙන impact මෙකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Market එකේ තිබෙන්නේ 9.30 නම් 11.30 කියන එක හරි වැඩියි. Market එකේ තිබෙන්නේ rate එක 11.00 නම් 11.30 කියන එක වැඩි නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්න හරි. 1.30 උඩට යනවා කියන්නේ, මෙතැන තිබෙනවා නේ 9.5ක් කියලා. එතකොට ඒ change එකේදී 11ක් වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 11ක්ම වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. සියයට 1.30 කින් වැඩි වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඒත් මම කියන්නේ ඒ ගත් තීරණය නිසා interest rate එකේ යම්කිසි ඉහළ යාමක් සිද්ධ වුණා කියන එකයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එදා දවසේ ඉඳලා නොවෙයි ඉදිරියට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එදා දවසේ ඉඳලා වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තීන්දුව ගත්තාට තීන්දුව ක්‍රියාත්මක කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. තීන්දුව ක්‍රියාත්මක කරලා තිබුණෙ නැති වුණත්, 9.00ට දමපු අය හිතනවා ''අපි හරි මෝඩයි 9.00ට දැම්මෙ ඇයි'' කියලා. 9.30ට දාල වැඩක් නැහැ. අපි බලාපොරොත්තු වුණේ 9.30, 10.00 නම් 9.30ට, 10.00ට bonds ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ. Bonds ලැබෙන්න නම්, මෙය 11 වෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට මේක දැනගත්ත යම්කිසි පුද්ගලයන් කණ්ඩායමක් බැංකුව ඇතුළේ සිටියා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කවුද ඒ කණ්ඩායම.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අපිට මෙතැන සොයන්න බැහැ නේ. ''දවස් තුනේ රීතිය අයින් කරන්න, එදා උදේ තීන්දු කළා'' කියන එක පමණක් අපි ඇතුළත් කරමු. අපිට උපකල්පනය කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි සමාවෙන්න, මම මේ නොදන්න දෙයක් අහනේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට දෙන සාක්ෂි අනුව මේක හරිද?

ගාමිණී ජයසිංහ මහතා: මේ සඳහා circular එකක් ඒ අය issue කළා කියලා කියනවා. ඒ වාගේම verbatimවල ඒ ඔක්කොම තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට මේ verbatimවල තිබෙන තැන සොයා ගන්න බැරි ප්‍රශ්නය නේ තිබෙන්නේ. නතිනම් හැම එකේම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 20 වැනි පිටුවේ ඒක තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 20 වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන එකම මෙතැන්ට ගන්න ඕනෑද කියන එක ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතනැට ආවා නම් හරි. ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ සුමානයේ අන්තිම එක තමයි මේ වෙනස් වීම.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමය සාමාන්‍ය කෙනෙකුට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකට "සියයට 5ක පැවති පොලී අනුපාතය ලබන සතියේදී ඉවත් කරන බවට හා" එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක නිශ්චිතව ලියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කරුණක් වශයෙන් මේක නිවැරදියි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කරුණ නිවැරදියි කියලා 20වැනි පිටුවේත් සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තේරුම් ගත හැකි ආකාරයට ලියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමය අනුව සාමාන්‍ය කෙනෙක් මේක බැලුවොත් තේරුම් ගන්න අපහසුයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, මෙහි සඳහන් වෙන්නේ, "5%කට පැවති පොලී අනුපාතය ලබන සතියේදී ඉවත් කරන බව හා පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යන බව (2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මස බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවේදී පැවති තත්ත්වයට පොලී අනුපාත මට්ටම පත් වන බව) පෙන්වා දෙන ලද බව" කියලායි. ඒක එහෙම නොවෙයි විය යුත්තේ. එතැනට 27වැනි දින උදෑසන කියලා ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගැන සම්පූර්ණ description එකක් දෙකෙහි තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඒ විධියටම තියන්න, ඉවත් කරන්න එපා. මම කියන්නේ "ආසන්නයේ වෙච්ච සිද්ධිය" කියලා නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, ආසන්නයේ වෙච්ච සිද්ධිය කිව්වාම, ඕනෑ නම්, 5.3හි පළමුවැනි point එක විධියට ඔය කථාව දමන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒක පෙරවරු 10.45ට කලින් වුණු දෙයක් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 5.3.1 විධියට මේක දැම්මොත් මේ points බොරු වෙනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වැරදි නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක 5.3.1ට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුඵන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්, එතැනට ඇතුළත් කළොත් ගැලපෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, එතැනට ඇතුළත් කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ, පෙරවරු 10.45, පෙරවරු 11.00 සහ පෙරවරු 11.20 කියලා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක 5.3හි පළමුවැනි point එක විධියට ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ, "කරන ලද බව" කියලා නේ. නමුත් අතනදී එන්නේ, "කර තිබෙන බව" කියලා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයක් නේ. Verbatim reportsවල තිබෙන සියලු දේ මෙතැන ලියන්න බැරි නිසා තමයි, ඒ දවසේ සිදු වුණු ක්‍රියාවලිය සංක්ෂිප්ත කරලා ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා ආරම්භයක් හැටියට මේ කාරණය ඇතුළත් කිරීම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Business එක දන්නා කෙනෙකුට මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ, මොකක්ද කියලා තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් නේ. මේක අනාගතයේදී interest එක ඉහළ යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඒ කරුණ මෙතැනට ඇතුළත් කළොත් තමයි නිවැරදි වෙන්නේ. අපි කියන්නේ, අවසාන සතියේ පොලී අනුපාතය ගැන නේ. ඒ නිසා මේක අවසානයට ඇතුළත් කළා නම් හරියටම හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මමත් ඒ විධියට තමයි මුලින් හිතාගෙන හිටියේ. නමුත් ඊට වඩා හොඳයි, එදා දිනයේදී සිදු වුණු දෙයක් හැටියට මේක ඇතුළත් කරන එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හොඳයි. That is correct.

සභාපතිතුමා: 2015 වර්ෂයේ පෙබරවාරි මස 27වැනි දින බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සිදු වූ ආකාරය ගැන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකේ පළමුවැනි කරුණ විධියට තමයි මේක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කියන්නේ, හරි -√- ලකුණුවල පළමුවැනි හරි -√- ලකුණ විධියට ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක පළමුවැනි හරි -√- ලකුණ විධියට ඇතුළත් කරන්න. අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඊට පසුව තවත් වැදගත් දෙයක් add කරන්න තිබෙනවා, පෙරවරු 9.48ට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මුලින් මේක add කරන්න?

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක add කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක add වෙන්න ඕනෑ විධිය කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක add ඕනෑ විධිය කිව්වා. ඒක හරි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මෙතැන දවස් තුනෙහි කථාව නැහැ නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** දවස් තුනෙහි කථාව තිබෙන්නේ, 20වැනි පිටුවේ උඩ කොටසේ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ සඳහන් කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** 20වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා නේ, "පෙබරවාරි මස 27වැනි දින උදය කාලයේ වෙළඳපළ මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුවට හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා පැමිණ 5% පැවති පොලී අනුපාතය 6.5% දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට උපදෙස් දුන් බව සාමාජිකයෙක් කීය." කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි, සාමාජිකයෙක් කියන එක වෙන එකක් නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක policy එකක් හැටියට මෙතැනට ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක ලියන්න ඕනෑ විධිය හදලා දෙන්න කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** 5.3හි පළමුවැනි හරි -√- ලකුණ විධියට ලියන්න ඕනෑ, "27වැනි දින උදේ කාලයේ -අපිට වේලාව සොයාගන්න පුළුවන්. වේලාව සොයා ගනිමු.- වෙළෙඳ පොළ මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුව මඟින් එතෙක් පැවති දින තුනෙහි රීතිය එනම්, දින 3කට වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් යම් බැංකුවක් මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් තැන්පත් කළ හොත්, ලැබිය යුතු පොලී අනුපාතය සියයට 6.5 සිට සියයට 5 දක්වා අඩු කර තිබිණි. මෙම තීරණය මඟින් එම අඩු කිරීම ඉවත් කරන ලදි." කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එම දින තුනෙහි රීතිය ඉවත් කර,-

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: දින තුනෙහි රීතිය වෙනස් කළේ නැහැ, interest rate එක විතරයි වැඩි කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දින තුනෙහි රීතිය ඉවත් කළා. දින තුනෙහි රීතිය ආවොත් තමයි සියයට 5ක් වෙන්නේ. Three-day rule එක ඉවත් කළාම තමයි සියයට 5 නැති වෙන්නේ. Three-day rule කියන්නේ, three daysවලට වඩා තැන්පත් කළොත් සියයට 5යි. ඊට අඩුවෙන් තැන්පත් කළොත් සියයට 6.5යි. ඒ කළේ, දින තුනෙහි rule එක ඉවත් කළා. දින තුනෙහි rule එක ඉවත් කරන කොට interest rate එකට ඒ කියන්නේ, normal rate එකට එනවා.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** Normal rate එකට ආවා, ඒකයි වුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැවත සාමාන්‍ය අගය වන සියයට,-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකේ impact එක ලියන්නේ නැද්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒකේ impact එක දැන් ලියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට ඇතුළත් කරන්න තවත් interesting දෙයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැවත සාමාන්‍ය අගය වන සියයට 6.5ට පැමිණෙන ලදි.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක ගලපලා ලියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ හැන්දෑවේ කියලාත් ලියන්න.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** ඒක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. 18වැනි පිටුවේ මුලම සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා, "වසර 30 බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 9.48%ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවතිය." කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කුමන පිටුවේද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** 18වැනි පිටුවේ පළමුවැනි sentence එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** 18වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා, "මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු දිනට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතීයක වෙළඳ පළ තුළ වසර 30 බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 9.48%ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවතිය." කියලා. මම කියන්න හදන්නේ මේකයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සියයට 9.48 කියන එක තීරණය වෙන්නේ, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ auctions හරහා ගිහිල්ලා එන ඒ කියන්නේ, වැඩිපුරම සියයට 80ක්, සියයට 90ක් Direct Placements හරහා එන පොලියක්. මේ පොලිය වෙළෙඳ පොළේ සාමාන්‍ය විධියට නිර්මාණය වෙන පොලිය නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Natural interest rate එකක් නොවෙයි, artificial interest rate එකක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක අපි කියන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කියන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඇමුණුම්වල තිබෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක 30-year bondsවල secondary market deal වෙනවා කියන එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Thirty-year bondsවල secondary market deal වෙනවා කියන්නේ, market එකක් නොවෙයි, මේ tap එකේ එකක් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Secondary market එකක් තීරණය වෙන්නේ, primary market එක අනුව නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, secondary market එක කියන්නේ, ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට tap එකෙන් bonds ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Tap එක කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Tap එක කියලා කියන්නේ, ඕනෑ වේලාවක මහ බැංකුවට ඇවිල්ලා අවුරුදු 2, අවුරුදු 5, අවුරුදු 10 trade වෙන ඕනෑම bond එකක් market එකෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ කියන්නේ, market එකෙන් ගන්නත් පුළුවන්; මහ බැංකුවෙන් ගන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒවා තමයි Private Placements කියලා දුන්නේ. ඕනෑම වේලාවක tap එක ඇරලා ගන්න පුළුවන් නිසා තමයි tap කියලා කිව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සියයට 9.48යි කියන ගණන අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ, Central Bank

Report එකෙන්මයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගණන නිවැරදියි, වැරදියි කියලා කියන්නේ නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ, ඔක නිදහස් වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තීරණය වෙන පොලියක් නොවෙයි කියලායි. ඒක නේ මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. මේ තීරණය Private Placements හරහා වෙච්ච තීරණයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කියන්නේ, manipulate කිරීමකින් මේක වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සියයට 6 ගණනේ Private Placement එකකින් ගත්තා නම්, පොලී අනුපාතය සියයට 6.5 නොවෙයි. දිගටම EPF, ETF පාවිච්චි කරලා ගත්තා නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන මේකේ කොටසක් ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක add කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒක කොහොමද ලියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැන ලියන්න ඕනෑ, "මෙම පොලී අනුපාතය නිදහස් වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තීරණය වූ පොලී අනුපාතයක් නොව, Private Placements හරහා මහ බැංකුව සම්බන්ධ වීම හරහා තීරණය වුණු පොලී අනුපාතයක්." කියලා නේ. ඒක නේ කියන්න හදන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කෙටියෙන් කිව්වා නම්, "මෙම පොලී අනුපාතය මහ බැංකුවේ සෘජු නිකුත් කිරීමේ දිගු කාලීනව තීරණය වූ පොලී අනුපාතයක් බව නිගමනය වේ."

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම පොලී අනුපාතය,-

මෙම 9.4ක පොලී අනුපාතය, මහ බැංකුව විසින් දිගු කාලයක් තිස්සේ ක්‍රියාත්මක කරපු සෘජු නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රමය හරහා ලැබෙන්නා වූ පොලී අනුපාතයක් බවට නිගමනය වේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට තවත් පොඩි දෙයක් එයට එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවා. Time frame එකේ හරි වැදගත් දෙයක් තිබෙනවා._Perpetual Treasuries Limited ආයතනයට ලංකා බැංකුවෙන්-,

සභාපතිතුමා: 5.3 තිබෙන කරුණු හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 5.3 කරුණු ගැන තමයි කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 5.3 මොන කරුණුද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉස්සර වෙලා තිබුණු කාරණාවලට එකඟ වෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: 5.3 කරුණුවලට එකඟද? මොන කාරණයටද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 5.3 , 10.48ට

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට කලින් ඒවා ටික.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: කලින් ඒවාට එකඟ ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පළවෙනි එකට. "...හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා එදින පෙ.ව. 10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇත්ද ආදී විස්තර විමසූ බව."

සභාපතිතුමා: පළවෙනි එක ඔබතුමා දැන් එකතු කළ එක. අනෙක් කාරණය තමයි මෙය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "...හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා එදින පෙ.ව. 10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇත්ද ආදී විස්තර විමසූ බව." හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එය factually හරිද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට මතක විධියට නිවැරදියි. එහෙම නේද විගණකාධිපතිතුමා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒවා වාචික සාක්ෂිවල ඇමුණුම් 04, 05 හි සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. උපුටාගෙන තිබෙන්නේ එයින්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වෙලාව නම් අපට නිශ්චිත නැහැ. නමුත් දෙවතාවක් ආවා කියන එක හරි. "...මෙදින බැදුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය පෙ.ව. 11.00ට අවසන් විය යුතුව තිබුණද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකුගේ ඉල්ලීම මත වෙන්දේසිය පෙ.ව. 11.05 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කරන ලද බව." එයත් නිවැරදියි නේ. එය සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමවේදයක් කියලා සියලුම සාක්ෂිකරුවන් සඳහන් කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පෙ.ව. 11.00ට තිබුණු එක පෙ.ව. 11.05 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කරනු ලැබීම.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට මතක විධියට නම්, එය සාමාන්‍ය කාරණයක් නොවෙයි කියලා තමයි කිව්වේ. එය තමයි අසාමාන්‍ය කාරණය. තාක්ෂණික ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා නම් විතරක් - අපි හිතමු, computer system එක out වෙලා, current ගිහිල්ලා නතර වුණු අවස්ථාවක විතරයි එහෙම ඉල්ලුම් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක සාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් නොවෙයි කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා කියනවා නම්, එහෙම එකතු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා නිවැරදි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මට මතක විධියට, මමත් ඔබතුමා සමඟමයි හිටියේ. මේක අහනකොට කිව්වේ, "this is a normal practice" කියලා වාගේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: Verbatimවල ඇති. තාක්ෂණික තත්ත්වයක් යටතේ විතරයි එවැනි අවස්ථාවක් එන්නේ කියන එක හරිම පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා, පෙ.ව. 10.45 කියන වෙලාව හරිද? මේක හරි important. මම ඊළඟට කියන්න යන්නේ 10.48ට PTL එකෙන් fax එකක් එනවා, බිලියන මෙච්චරක් 12.05ටත්, බිලියන මෙච්චරක් 12.75ටත්, බිලියන මෙච්චරක් 13ටත් ගන්න කියලා. මේ ලේඛනයේ මට එය හරියට පෙනෙන්නේ නැහැ. එයින් නේ 05 එන්නේ. එතකොට, මෙය දමන්න කලින් මට දෙයක් අහන්න තිබෙනවා, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා මෙතැනට ආවේ එදින පෙරවරු 10.45ට පමණ කියලා කියනවා නේ. "පමණ" කියලා කියන්නේ, ආපු එක ගැන doubt එකක් නැහැ. ආපු බව පිළිගත්තා. මම අහන්නේ timing ගැනයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සාක්ෂිවලින්ම තමයි බැලුවේ වෙන බලන්න ක්‍රමයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "පමණ" කිව්වාම මෙය එහාට මෙහාට වෙනවා නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 10.45 කියලා කවුරු හරි කියලා ඇති.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊළඟට වෙලාව sure නැහැ කියලා සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවාද දන්නේ නැහැ. මෙය පසුවද ඉස්සර වෙලාද, වෙලාව sure නැද්ද කියන එක හරි වැදගත්. නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාට තේරෙනවාද මම කියන කථාව. පෙ.ව. 10.48ට තමයි බිලියන 13ක්ද කොහේද Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා offers තුනක් ආවේ. ඒ offers තුන ආවේ අපි ඊයේ Ernst and Young එකෙන් ගත්තේ. Ernst and Young එකේ අන්තිමට ටික මගේ අතේ තිබෙන්නේ. එහි මුල වවන ටික පැහැදිළි නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මෙහි තිබෙන්නේ එතුමා පෙ.ව. 10.45ට පමණ ආවා කියලා තමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Page එක මොකක්ද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: Page eka 90.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 89 වෙනි පිටුවේත් කියනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: "පළමුවරට පෙ.ව. 10.45ට පමණ තමයි ආවේ." කියලා, සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය තමයි කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "...පළමුවරට 10.45ට තමයි ආවේ."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 5.3 ඉන්නේ. 5.3 event එකක් තිබෙනවා, 27 වෙනිදා 10.48ට තමයි bids තුන එන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන ප්‍රශ්නයක්, "එතුමා පෙ.ව. 10.45ට පමණ ආවා. දෙවැනි වතාවටත් ආවාද?" කියලා අහනවා.

සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය පිළිතුරු වශයෙන් "ඔව්." කියලාත් කියනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට මතකයි තවත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් කියනවා පෙ.ව. 11.05 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම නොකිරීම ගැන නිගමනයක් කරනු නොලැබේ. මෙහි තවම evidence නැහැ කියලා ඔබතුමාගේ මුල් වාර්තාවේ කොතැන හරි තැනක එහෙම තිබෙනවා නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහි 11.45 a.m. කියලා තිබෙනවා. අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහත්මයා කියලා තිබෙනවා පෙ.ව. 10.45ට පමණ කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහත්මයා සාක්ෂි දීලා මොකද කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එයා කියනවා, "I would have gone about 10.45 a.m. At that point, I wanted to convey it to the department officials. Because of the Monetary Board met on 23rd, as I told you and we had decided to go for an auction and that was the auction that was happening that day. The view that we should accept as much as possible from the auction because the private placement method was not working. We had not been able to raise enough money. For this, Rs. 13.5 million we only waste Rs. 3.5 million so far for the first day of the week. Secondly, that the private placement method is not something that is desirable. Hon. Prime Minister has already pointed this out to me. He was getting complains from the public and myself. This is not premier desirable way because it is not transparent and secondly it is not working. We are not getting enough money for the Government. "

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "පමණ" is okay.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is okay.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ report එකේ පෙ.ව. 11.05 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කළ එක ගැන doubt එකක් තිබුණා නේද? "අපි investigate කළේ නැහැ" "evidence මදි කියලා" ඒ වාගේ දෙයක් තිබෙනවා නේද? ඔය වෙලාවේ තමයි issuable ඒවා එන්නේ. Close කරන්න තිබුණු වෙලාව පෙ.ව. 11.00 නේද? Close කරන වෙලාව විනාඩි 05ක් පහු වුණා නම්, ඒ විනාඩි 05 ඇතුළත කොපමණ bids ආවද?

සභාපතිතුමා: විනාඩි 05 ඇතුළත ආවා කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ආවා.

එල්.එස්. අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: HSBC එකෙන් ආවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ෙම් තිබෙන draft එක අනුව පෙනෙන්න තිබෙන්නේ, ප්‍රශ්නගත Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක තමයි වෙලාව අරගෙන දැම්මේ කියලා. ඇත්තටම ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

මම කියන්නේ පරක්කු වෙලා ආපු bids ඔක්කොම තිබෙනවා නේ. මම Governor ගිය ආපු වේලාව බලන්නේත් ඒකට. ඔක්කොම bids ආපු වේලාව අපි මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරමු. ගොඩක් නැහැ නේ ලියන්න. එතකොට පිටස්තර කෙනෙකුට වුණත් මේක anyaliseකරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. මම කියන්නේ හැම bid එකක්ම ආපු වේලාව දමන්න කියලායි.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: Sheet එකම attachment එකක් විධියට දැම්මා නම් ඉවරයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒකෙන් presume වෙන්නේ 11.5 වෙනකම් ගියේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක එක ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ඒ additional විනාඩි 5 ගත්තේ -

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මෙහෙම කරමු. මෙහිදී ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ පොළ ගැණුම්කරුවන් ලංසු තැබූ විස්තර ඇතුළත් ලැයිස්තුව හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් රැගෙන පරීක්ෂා කළ බව කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ. එතැනට දමමු ලැයිස්තුව කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එයා 10.45ට නම් ආවේ 11.05ට සිදු වුණු දේ දන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එයා ලැයිස්තුව බලලා තිබෙන්නේ ඊට පසුව නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දෙවැනි අවස්ථාව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ අරමුණ මම කියන්නද? මගේ අරමුණ, මෙතැන තමයි issue එක. මෙතැන තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. මේ වේලාවේ තමයි play කළේ. කවුරු හරි advantage එකක් ගත්තා නම් අන්තිම මොහොතේ, මුල ඉඳලාම පට පට ගාලා එව්වා නම් -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 11.00-11.05 දක්වා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කරපු -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේවා දිහා බලන අයට පහසුවෙන් තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. මෙතැන නේ issue එක තිබෙන්නේ. මෙතැන තමයි වංචාව තිබෙන්නේ. මෙතැන එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. අපි මේ අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් floor එකට ආවා; ප්‍රශ්න කළා; delay කළා කියමින්

n unprofessional විධියට යන්නේ. නමුත් මේ වෙච්ච sequence එක මොකක්ද? වංචාව කරන මිනිහා මුලින් දමන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අනෙක් අය දැන ගන්නවා නේ bids එනවා කියලා. තමන්ට රහසිගත තොරතුරක් - insider information - තිබෙන කෙනා 55,58 තමයි දමන්නේ. එතකොට අනෙක් අයට chance එකක් නැහැ. අන්තිම විනාඩි 5 advantage එක- මම අනන්ත අහලා තිබෙනවා අන්තිම විනාඩි 5 තමයි මේ බිලියන 5 ආවේ කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 2015.02.27 වැනි දින 11.00න් පසුව තිබෙන්නේ 11.04.26ට. තිබෙන්නේ, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Rs. 100 million.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වැඩි කිරීමේ advantage එක ලැබුණේ ඒකට.

සභාපතිතුමා: හැබැයි මෙහෙම දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. අවසාන මිනිත්තු 5දී නොවෙයි. ඒක අවසන් වුණු කාලයත් එක්ක අවසාන 8දී තමයි ලොකුම ප්‍රමාණය ඇවිත් තිබෙනනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් එවපු රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒක කීයටද ආවේ?

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: 10.57.21ට, 10.57.41ට, 10.57.57ට.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ bid sheet එක මෙතැනට ගනිමු නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Insider information තිබෙන කෙනා ඒක කලින් play කරන්නේ නැහැ. එයා අන්තිම මොහොත වෙනකම් ඉඳලා වෙන කාටවත් ඒ information යන්න නොදී දමනවා. ඒක තමයි කථාව.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Auctionsවලදී, everybody plays in the last five minutes so that the others do not get the chance.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ බිලියන 13 දමන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එක නේ. Bank of Ceylon දමන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක වෙනුවෙන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකේ annexure එකක් තමයි - කරුණාකරලා කියවන්න පුළුවන් annexure එකක් එකතු කරන්න.

ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: පුළුවන්. Sheet එකම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ sheet එක වෙනම දමන්න. ඊට අමතරව interesting දෙයක් තමයි Earnest and Young එකේ Report එකේ කෙළවරේ තිබෙන මෙන්න මේ කොළය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Fax එකද? මේකෙන් කියන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකෙන් යවනවා Bank of Ceylon එකේ Group Treasury එකට මෙන්න මේ bids තුන දමන්න කියලා. මේ copy එකේ මුල කොටස කැපිලා. සියයට 12.5ට, 12.75ට සහ 13ට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සියයට 12.5ට බිලියන කීයක් ආවාද? වාසිය, පාඩුව කාට ආවත් මේ වේලාවේ රටේ මිනිස්සුන්ට හරියටම කියන්න ඕනෑ වෙලා තිබෙන දේ මොකක්ද කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 10.48ට Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් මුදල් ඉල්ලුවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Bank of Ceylon එක PTL එකට approval එක ආපු වේලාවද, නැත්නම් PTL එක Central Bank එකට එවපු fax එකද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ නේ. Bank of Ceylon එකට PTL එක යවාපු fax එක.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඉල්ලන්න කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකේ මුල කොටස කැපිලා. It states, "Dear Sir, enter the following bids for today's 2045 Bond auction."

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: -on behalf of the PTL. එහෙම කියලා නැහැ. Anyway, it is understood.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Kasun Palisena, Head of Group Treasury අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකේ වේලාව 10.46.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 10.48යි. 10.48ට මුදල් ඉල්ලනවා Bank of Ceylon එකෙන්. Bank of Ceylon එක bid එක දමනවා 10.58ට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේකේ තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මේ timing ගත්තාම ඒ කියන්නේ 10.45ට ඇවිත් මේ තොරතුරු floor එකෙන් ගත්තා නම්, විනාඩි 3කින් deal එකම create කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට තේරුණේ නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: He was there probably from 10.45 a.m. to 10.55 a.m.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Who?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The Governor. So, the suspicion is that the information has gone from there කියන එක නේ.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: It is a very important point. ඒ කියන්නේ Governor පහළට ගියේ 10.45ටද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පමණ. 47 වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්, 48 වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්, ඊට පසුව වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 10.48ට තමයි PTL එකෙන් request එක ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එකට.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මෙයා ගාව කලින් information තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කාගේ ළඟද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: PTL ගාව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. That is what he is saying.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මමත් කියන්නේ. PTL එකට කොහෙන් හරි information ලැබුණා නේ. PTL එක ගාව information තිබුණා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, PTL said that.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකක්ද කිව්වේ?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: In the evidence, they said that they were given a call and asked, "We are going to go for Rs. 10 billion-

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Who said that?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The Central Bank.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: What?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Otherwise, who? That is why I could not trap them. When I asked the question, they said, "We got a call." Not only them but also an officer from the Central Bank- හරි නේද? Calls ගිහින් officer කෙනෙක් ලක්ෂ 7 ½ ක් දැම්මා කියලා කිව්වා නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැනින් එහාට මොකටද සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. That is what I am saying.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අපි නිකම් මරා ගත්ත එක විතර නේ වුණේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is a very vital evidence.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක vital තාම.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: PTL එක -primary dealersලා 4 දෙනෙක්- කියනවා calls ආවා කියලා. එතකොට අපි අහනවා Central Bank **එකෙන්** කොහොමද මේ calls යන්නේ monitoring system එකක් නැතුව කියලා. එතකොට ඒ අය කියනවා ඒ අය දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. Callsවලින් අහනවා Rs. 10 billionවලට යනවා, ගන්න කැමතිද කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පුදුම කථාවක් නේ ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ. කොහේද ඒක තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Proceedingsවල. හතර දෙනෙක් විතර අහනවා. That is why we could not trap PTL. එතකොට මම අහද්දි, they said, "අපි දැන ගත්ත the Government was in a vulnerable situation." කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම කියන දේ අවසන් කරන තෙක් ඉන්නකෝ. I was there in the last COPE Subcommittee. ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති සභාපතිතුමාට මතක ඇති. අපට Central Bank එක ඇතුළෙන් දුරකථන පණිවිඩ ආවා කියලා ආයතන 4ක් විතර ඇවිත් කියනවා. ඇතුළෙන් calls දීලා අහනවා අපි බිලියන 10ක් විතර දමනවා කියලා. එතකොට අපි ඇහුවා Central Bank එකෙන් ඇයි එහෙම calls ගියේ කියලා. "අපි market එකේ තිබෙන ඉල්ලුම බලනවා. එහෙම අපි calls දමලා බලනවා." Central Bank එකේ officer කෙනෙක් ඇවිත් ලක්ෂ 7 ½ක bid එකක් දමලා තිබුණා. අපි telephone conversation එකෙන් tap කළා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.**පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා:** රුපියල් ලක්ෂ හත හමාරකට එකක් දමන්න, ඔහු dealing room එකට ඇවිත් කථා කරලා, මෙහෙම ආරංචියක් තිබෙනවා කියලා කිව්වාම, එහෙම දමන්න බැහැ. Minimum Rs. 5 million දමන්න ඕනෑ කියනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: That is right. ඒ එක්කෙනෙක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ information එක leak වුණා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. ඕනෑ තරම් evidences තියෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මිනිස්සු කියන්නේ, "මාමා බෑණට information දුන්නා. බෑණා අර ගත්තා. එයින් බෑණා රුපියල් කෝටි ගණනක් සෙව්වා." කියලා නේ. "ඔව්. බෑණා රුපියල් කෝටි ගණක් සෙව්වා තමයි." හැබැයි, බෑණට information ලැබුණේ මාමාගෙන්ද? කියන ප්‍රශ්නයට question mark එකක් එනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:. Central Bank එකෙන් PTL එකට call එකක් ආවා කියලා කියනවා නේ. තිබුණු evidences එක්ක ඒ කරුණ කවුරුත් හබ කළේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපි verbatim වලින් ගත්තා නම් හරි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඉතාම අත්‍යවශ්‍යයි. ඒ කොටස හොයලා ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අපි ඇතුළු කරන්නේ කොතැනටද? Bid sheets ටික දැම්මාට පස්සේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඇතුළු කරන තැන තීරණය කරන්න. මම ඇතුළු කළ යුතු කොටස කියන්නම්. "මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් මෙම ප්‍රශ්නගත වෙන්දේසිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඊට කලින් දිනයකදී -primary dealers- ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට දුරකථනයෙන් කථා කර, රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් පමණ ඉදිරිපත් කළොත් මිලදී ගැනීමට කැමැත්ත හෝ අකමැත්ත විමසන ලද බව සාක්ෂිවල සඳහන් වේ."

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතැන වාචික සාක්ෂිවලට නොවෙයි ඒක දමන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාචික සාක්ෂිය මොකක්ද කියලා දමන්න ඕනෑ. කවුරු හෝ refer කළොත් එහෙම.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හතර දෙනෙකුට විතර කියනවා. මට හොයලා කියන්න පුළුවන්.ඊළඟට "Perpetual Treasuries Limited - PTL- සමාගමේ නියෝජිතයාටද එවැනි දුරකථන පණිවුඩයක් ලැබුණු බව ප්‍රකාශ කරයි. තවද මහ බැංකුවෙන්..."

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ, මහ බැංකුවෙන් කියලා නේ. එතකොට නිල වශයෙන් පුද්ගලයෙක් නැහැ නේ. ඒක කියන්න ඕනෑ, මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් කාගෙන් හෝ ලැබුණා කියලා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් විසින්." කියලා දමන්න. එහෙම call දෙනවා කියලා, නිලධාරීන් පිළිගත්තා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක සාමාන්‍ය procedure එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සාමාන්‍ය procedure එක කියලා, ඒ අය පිළිගත්තා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: Private Placements හැරෙන්න auction එකෙනුත් අර ගෙන තියෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Auction එකට කලින් මෙහෙම කරලා තියෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගිය සාකච්ඡා වාරයේ proceedingsවල Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකෙන් ආපු නිලධාරියාගේ සාක්ෂි ගත්තා නම්, ඒක අපට හරියටම බලන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ තොරතුරු නිශ්චිතවම ගත්තේ කොහොමද කියලා ඔහු කිව්වා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔහු කිව්වා. තව private dealer කෙනෙක් කිව්වා. Verbatim ගත්තා නම්, ඒ දුරකථන පණිවුඩ ආවේ කාගෙන්ද කියලා හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ normal procedure එක. ඒක වැරැදි ද නිවැරැදි ද කියන එක වෙනම දෙයක්. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ටත් ගැනුම්කරුවන් ඉන්නවාද කියලා බලන්න-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Normal procedure එක නොවෙයි. Market එක mature වෙච්ච වෙලාවක rate එක වැඩි කළාම වෙන දේ මේ කියන්නේ. System එක credible නැහැ. Insider information ආරක්ෂා කර ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක මිනිසුන් දන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ වගේ situation එකක් තුළ auctions කොච්චර prudentද කියන එක තමයි මෙයින් පේන්නේ. Auction is legal but Prudentද කියන ප්‍රශ්න තමයි, අපි කථා කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වෙලාවේ සිදු වූ සිදුවීම. They were not used to auction.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි timing ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳ ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මුල ඉඳලා times ටික ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට දැම්මා නම් ඉදිරියට යන්න ලේසියි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇමුණුමක් නොවෙයි. අපි ඒක එතැනටම add කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අවසානයේ මිනිස්සු කියවන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව විතරයි. අපි කොච්චර මහන්සි වුණත්, මිනිස්සුන්ට මේක තේරෙන්නේ නැත්නම්, මිනිසුන් misinterpret කරනවා නම් වැඩක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ කොටස කිව්වා නම් හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Close කරන්නේ 11.00ට නම්, data system එකේ තියෙන bid offers කෙනෙකුට 11.00ට කලින් බලන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නම් මේ පළමු වැනි වාක්‍ය vague වැඩියි නේ. "හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා එදින පෙ.ව 10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇත් දැයි ආදී විස්තර විමසූ බව ....." කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම විමසුවා කියලා පිළිගත්තා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Computersවලින් bids එනවා. එතකොට secure line එකකින් bids එනවා. එන එන bid එක ඒ එන වෙලාවට computer screen එකෙන් පෙන්නුම් කරනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කවුද කියලා නම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මට මතක හැටියට කවුරු හෝ නිලධාරියෙක් කිව්වා, amount එක දැන ගන්න පුළුවන්. Interest rate එක හෝ කවුද ඉල්ලන්නේ කියලා දැන ගන්න බැහැ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ප.ව 12.45ට වත් ගන්න බැහැ. ප.ව 12.45ට interest rate එක හා ගණන ගන්න පුළුවන්. කවුද කියලා දැන ගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම ඒක පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. මෙතැන කියනවා, " හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා එදින පෙ.ව 10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇත් දැයි ආදී විස්තර විමසුවා." කියලා. මම මෙච්චර වෙලා හිතා ගෙන හිටියේ, මේක secure තැනක්. ඇතුළට ගියොත් ඔළුව දාලා බලා ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා Governor ගිහින් බලලා, එවැනි දෙයක් කිව්වා කියලා තමයි මට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් තිබුණු චිත්‍රය. නමුත්, මේ කියන විධියට ඇත්තටම පිටස්තර කෙනෙකුට පෙ.ව 10.45ට ඇවිත් දැන ගන්න පුළුවන් available තොරතුරු මොනවාද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Price and the quantity තමයි දැන ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ. කවුද කියන එක දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහි සඳහන් වෙන්නේ Price and the quantity කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නැත්නම් මේක විහිළුවක් නේ. නැත්නම් auction වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඒකත් direct placements වාගේ නේ. හැබැයි, මිනිස්සුන්ගේ ඇත්තටම මතය තියෙන්නේ ඒක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ලෝකයේ මතය එක්ක නොවෙයි, අපි කමිටුවක් විධියට evidences මත පදනම් වෙලා - "හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා එදින පෙ.ව 10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇත් දැයි ආදී විස්තර විමසු බව ...." කියලා තියෙනවා. ඒ වචනය අවසානයේ ඔබතුමාගේ draft එකේ අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහත්මයාට වගකීමක් පවරා තියෙනවා නේ. ඒකයි මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් මෙහෙම අහන්නේ. එතුමාට ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම වගකීමක් පැවරෙනවා නම්, පැවරෙන තැන තමයි මෙතැන.

සභාපතිතුමා: වගකීම පැවරෙන එක තැනක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වැදගත්ම තැනක් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කියන්නේ, නිලධාරීන් සාක්ෂි දෙමින් කිව්වා, මීට කලින් කවදාවත් Front Office එකට අධිපතිවරයෙකු ඇවිත් මේ වාගේ තොරතුරු විමසලා, පූර්වාදර්ශයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ කියලා. මොකද, අධිපතිවරයා ඉන්නේ 16වැනි තට්ටුවේ. තට්ටු හැටියට අර ගෙන ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය පැහැදිලි කර කිව්වා. එතැනට ගිහින් තමයි ඔහු දැන ගන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ එතුමා එතැනට ආවාම ලබාගත හැකි available තොරතුරු මොනවාද කියන එකයි. ඒ available තොරතුරුවලින් එතුමාට කාරණා 02ක් වැදගත් වෙනවා. ඒ තමයි available තොරතුරු මොනවාද, timing කොහොමද කියන එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමාගෙන් ඇහුවාම එතුමා කිව්වේ "මම සාමාන්‍ය විධියට වටේ ඇවිදින විට ඒ අය හමු වුණාම ඇහුවා කියලා තමයි මට කිව්වේ" කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතකොට available තොරතුරු මොනව ද? Timing මොනවාද? කියන එක තමයි වැදගත් වන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඇතුළත් කළා නම් හරි නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ ටික ලියාගන්න. කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇත්ද ආදී- ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, කොහොමද ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කියන්න කෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කාරණාව කිව්වා නම් හරි. කරුණු හැටියට සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල තිබුණේ, ''කොච්චර තිබෙනවාද කියලා විමසුවා'' කියලා නේ. Bids ආපු ප්‍රමාණය නේ අහන්නේ. තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් ඒ අයට ගන්න පුළුවන් කොහොමද කියලා විස්තර මම දන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ අය කිව්වේ මොනවාද කියලාත් මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මටත් මතකයි කිව්වා. නමුත් කිව්වේ කොතැනද කියලා verbatimවල තමයි බලන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 12.45 වන විටත් නම් ආවේ නැහැ කියලා තමයි මේ verbatim එකේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ අය කිව්වේ ''නම්'' සොයා ගන්න බැහැ. **Close** කළාට පස්සේ තමයි Front Office එකට බලන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒත් ''නම්'' එන්නේ නැහැ. Governor කියනවා 12.30 වන විටත් there is only the - ගණනයි interest rate එකයි විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒක තිබෙනවා නම් මේ කථාව ඉවරයි නේ. Perpetual Treasuries Company කියලා තියනවා නම්, නම තිබෙනවා නම්, මේක ගන්න කිව්වාම එකෙන් හොර අහුවෙනවා නේ. ඒක තමයි එතුමා කියන්නේ Rs. 20 millionවලට පස්සේ මෙන්න මේ ගණන තිබුණා කියලා. නමුත් නම් නැහැ. කොතැන හෝ නමක් තිබුණා නම් මට පෙන්වන්න. නම තිබුණා නම් මම අහනවා, ''ඔබතුමා නම් දැක්කා නේ, ඒ නිසා නේ එතැනින් පහළ ගන්න කිව්වේ'' කියලා. Guarantees එනේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නම් අපි මෙතැන සඳහන් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතුමා, ඒක rate කළාට පසුව තමයි නම් සොයා ගත්තේ. Interest rate එකයි, මුදලයි විතරයි එන්නේ. නැතිනම් auction එකක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. එහෙනම් නම් බලලා ගන්නවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ''තොරතුරු විමසුවා'' කියන එක ටිකක් බලලා කියන්න.

ගරු **හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා**: 10.45ට ආවා කියලා කියනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කවුද කියන්නේ?

ගරු **හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා**: සී.එම්.ඩී. එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Governor admit කරනවා මම ආවා කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ Governor ගේ ප්‍රකාශය නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Governor කියනවා නම්, ''මම ආවා'' කියලා- Governor කියන්නේ නැද්ද මොනවාද ඇහුවේ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාවේ මෙහෙම තිබෙනවා, ''10.45ට පමණ ආවා'', ''දෙවැනි වතාවටත් ආවාද'' කියලා ඇහුවාම, සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කියනවා ''ඔව්'' කියලා. දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහනවා, ''එතුමා පළමු වැනි වරට පැමිණ කළ කථාව මොකක්ද'' කියලා. එතකොට සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කියනවා, එහිදී auction එකෙන් කොපමණ ගත්ත ද, කොපමණ claim කරලා තිබෙනවාද, කොපමණ offer කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඇහුවා. ඉන්පසු Meeting එකක් තිබුණා. එහිදී අධිපතිතුමා, අගමැතිතුමාට ප්‍රකාශ කළා රටේ වෙනත් මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. නමුත් ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ කර ගත්තේ නැහැ. මොකද, අපේ අවශ්‍යතාවය වෙනත් එකක් නේ. මහා භාණ්ඩාරගයට යවපු **subsidiary** requirement එක තමයි funds raise කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ 12.30ට ආපු ඒක නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතුමා පළමු වැනි වතාවට කළ කථාව මොකක්ද කියලා නොවෙයි මෙතැන අහන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකෙන් close කරපු ඒවා එහෙම අහන්න බැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අධිපතිතුමා දෙවැනි වතාවට පැමිණ මොකක්ද කිව්වේ කියලා නැවතත් අහනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ ප්‍රකාශය වැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: දෙවැනි වතාවට පැමිණ අහන අවස්ථාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කියනවා, '' Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ මුදල් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා ඇහුවා. අපි කිව්වා රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඊට පස්සෙ රුපියල් බිලියන 20 කෝ කියලා තරයේ ඇහුවා-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔහොම කථා කරනවා නම්, අනිවාර්යෙන්ම close කළාට පස්සේ වෙන්න එපායෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ ලේඛනයේ, ඒ අවස්ථා දෙක තිබෙන්නේ එහෙමයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Explanation එක වැරදියි. දෙවැනි අවස්ථාවේදී තමයි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. පළමුවෙනි අවස්ථාවේ කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 325 පිටුවේ proceedingsවල ඒක තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සල්ලි දෙන්නේ කවුද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල මහතා.

මේ තමයි විනාඩි 10ක කථාව. "අනිවාර්යෙන් මම මෙයට ඉස්සර වෙලා මේ වාගේ දේවල් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේ වගේ technically විනාඩි දහයක් අවශ්‍ය නම් අපි ඒක ඉල්ලනවා"..... නැහැ, මට එහෙම හැඟීමක් ආවේ නැහැ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිතුමනි. මොකද ඒක 10.30ත් 11.00ත් අතර ගන්නට ඕනෑ decision එකක්. ඒ වන විට ඒවා ගොඩක් analyze කරලා. ඒ දාන bid එක දා ගන්නවා හැරුනු කොට මේක වදින්නේ නැහැ කියලා මගේ හිතේ විශ්වාසයක් තිබෙනවා නම් සහ මට මේ project කරන්නට හැකියාවකුත් නැත්නම්, "නැහැ, නැහැ ඕක අපිට දාන්න බැහැ" කියලා කියනවාට වඩා, මට ඒ සම්බන්නධව.....

ජේ.කේ.ඩී. ධර්මපාල කියන්නේ කවුද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Chief Dealer, BOC.

සභාපතිතුමා: 10.45ට පැමිණ අහපු විස්තරේ තමයි මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය මහත්මිය කියනවා 10.45ට ආවා කියලා. නමුත් එතුමිය කියන්නේ 12.30ට අදාළ විස්තරය නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 12.30ට දෙවැනි වතාවට ආවා කියලා නැවතත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු **හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා**: දෙවැනි පාර ආපු වේලාවේ, මේ විස්තරය ගත්තා කියලා තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. මේ පළමු වැනි එක මෙතැන වැරදියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "මේ වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇත්දැයි ආදී විස්තර විමසූ බව" කියන එක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි. ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි. මෙතැන කියනවා 11 වන තෙක් තීන්දුවක් ගන්නත් බැහැ, දන්නෙත් නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ නේ, ගරු සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. එහෙම කරපු ගමන්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පස්වරු 12.30 කියන එක හරි. ඒ විස්තර ටික ඒකට තමයි අයත් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතුමා එන්න ඇති. එතුමාම පිළිගන්නවා නේ. පෙරවරු 10.45ට ආවා කියලා. නමුත් පෙරවරු 10.45ට ඇවිල්ලා වෙන්දේසියෙක් කොපමණ මුදලක් ලැබුණාද කියලා අහලා නැහැ. අපේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙනවා නේ පස්වරු 12.30 කියලා. ඒ වේලාවේ තමයි තොරතුරු විමසා තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කියන්නේ, අර වේලාවේ ඇවිල්ලා, "Auction එකෙන් කොපමණ ගත්තාද, කොපමණ claim කරලා තිබෙනවාද, කොපමණ offer කරලා තිබෙනවාද?" කියලා අහලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි. මොකද දන්නවාද, ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා කියනවා, " In fact, the meeting went from 12.30 p.m. to 1.10 p.m. on that particular day. Those details are also there. The Minutes sheet is also there and it says the time; from which hour to which hour."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතැන තිබෙන පෙරවරු 10.45 කියන එක පස්වරු 12.30ට කියලා දමන්න මම කැමතියි. "10.45ට පමණ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇද්දැයි ආදී විමසූ බව කියන එකට evidence.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Yes, that is wrong. ඒ වේලාවේ ඇවිල්ලා ගියා කියලා තමයි ඒ ගොල්ලන් කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කිසිම තොරතුරක් නැහැ. පැමිණියාට පසුව පළමුවැනි එක වෙන්න ඇති නේ මේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, Governor කියනවා, ඇවිල්ලා පහළට ගියා කියලා. කිසිවක් ඇහුවා කියලා කියන්නේ නැහැ. That is correct. Very good, Hon. Ajith P. Perera, that is spot-on.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කොහොමද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පැමිණි බවට පමණයි evidence එකක් තිබෙන්නේ. තවත් evidence තිබෙනවා නම් කියන්න, මට සොයා

ගන්න අපහසුයි. අපට agree වෙන්න පුළුවන්, පස්වරු 12.30ට පැමිණියා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ විධියට ඇතුළත් කරමු නේද? රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණි බව,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තවත් වැදගත් දෙයක් සඳහන් වෙනවා,

යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මියගේ සාක්ෂිවලදී ගරු සුනිල් සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඒ කියන්නේ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි ඔබතුමා ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහනවා, "Bank of Ceylon තමයි එතකොට පේන්නේ. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමියලාගේ Tender Board එක decision එක ගන්නේ Bank of Ceylon දැකලා නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, අදාළ ආයතනයේ නම දැකලා නේ එතකොට දැන් තමයි දන්නේ Bank of Ceylon මේ purchasing එක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ on behalf of Perpetual Treasuries කියලා. ඒක ඒ වේලාවේ දන්නේ නැහැ නේ?" කියලා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය පිළිතුරු දෙනවා, "ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම කියනවා නම්, අපි Department එකේදී data analyze කරන කොට වුණත් party එක කවුද කියන එක immaterial. ඇත්තටම ඒක අපි බලන්නේම නැහැ. අපට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ quantity එකයි, rate එකයි." කියලා. නැවතත් ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා, "බලන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ, ඒක දන්නේම නැද්ද?" කියලා. එවිට යූ.එල්. මුතුගල මහත්මිය පිළිතුරු දෙනවා, "නැහැ. නැහැ..." කියලා. So, they do not get the names. , "...නම් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් ඇත්තටම නම් තිබුණාට ඒක අපට වැදගත් නැහැ. කවුද, කොච්චරද එතැනදි දාලා තිබෙන්නේ,- මොකද ඒ වේලාවේ party එක අපට වැදගත් නැහැ. අපට අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් ටික සපයා ගන්න එක විතරයි. එතැනදී quantity එකටයි, rate එකටයි තමයි අපේ ඇහැ යන්නේ." කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඒක කිව්වා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැනට ඇතුළත් කරන්න වෙන්නේ, "පැමිණි බව" කියලා නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා පෙරවරු 10.45ට පමණ පැමිණි බව" කියලා තමයි අපට ඇතුළත් කරන්න වෙන්නේ. ඒ වාගේම මම යෝජනවා කරනවා, මේ evidence එක specifically ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. මම ඒ ගැන කලිනුත් කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තොරතුරුවල දමන්න ඕනෑ කොහොමද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, timing ඉතා වැදගත් කියලායි. කුමක් හෝ doubt එකක් තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ කියන්නේ පෙරවරු 10.45ට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා පැමිණියාට පෙරවරු 10.45ට ඔය කියන specific data available නැහැ. (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මේ document එක කුමක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ document එක තමයි, කසුන් පලිසේන e-mail copy of the customer requisition. මේ customer requisition එකක් නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, Bank of Ceylon එකේ document එකක්. Bank of Ceylon එකේ customer කෙනෙක් නොවෙයි Perpetual Treasuries Limited. නමුත් customer requisition එකකින් තමයි මේක එනෙන්. Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක පෙරවරු 10.48ට ඉල්ලනවා, ඒ ගොල්ලන් වෙනුවෙන් මෙන්න මේ Treasury Bonds එක දමන්න කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන විධියට මෙහෙමයි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක Bank of Ceylon එකෙන් පෙරවරු 10.48ට ඉල්ලනවා- පළමුවැනි එකේ තිබෙන ගණන කීයද? අපට දීලා තිබෙන chart එකේ හරියට ඒක පෙනෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පළමුවැනි Rs. 3 Billion bid එක එන්නේ, පෙරවරු 10.57.22ට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක කින්නේ, සියයට 12.5ට ආව එකද? Rate එකත් වැදගත් වෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ 3ක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, time log එකේ rate එකක් පෙන්නුම් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊළඟ එක කියන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඊළඟට Rs. 5 billion ඉල්ලනවා, පෙරවරු 10.57.41ට. නැවතත් Rs. 5 billion ඉල්ලනවා, පෙරවරු 10.57.57ට. ඒ තුනම ඉල්ලන්නේ Bank of Ceylon. ඊට පසුව HSBC එක Rs. 100 million ඉල්ලනවා, පෙරවරු 11.04.26ට.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අර තුන ඉල්ලන්නේ, Bank of Ceylon on behalf of-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, HSBC නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අන්තිම එක ඉල්ලන්නේ HSBC එක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, මේ කාරණාවත් ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ කොතැනටද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි ඒක ඇතුළත් කරමු, පෙරවරු 10.45ට පසුව. Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක රුපියල් බිලියන 3ක් සියයට 12.5කටද, රුපියල් බිලියන 5ක් සියයට 12.75කටද, රුපියල් බිලියන 5ක් සියයට 13කටද ආයෝජනයද, 2,045ක් බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේ ලංසු තබන ලෙසට ලංකා බැංකුවට 2015.02.27වැනි දින පෙරවරු 10.48ට e-mail පණිවුඩයක් මඟින් උපදෙස් දී ඇත. එම ලංසු ලංකා බැංකුව විසින් පිළිවෙළින් පෙරවරු 10.57.22, පෙරවරු 10.57.41 සහ පෙරවරු 10.57.57 යන වේලාවලදී මහ බැංකුව වෙත ලැබී ඇත. ඒ බව ලංසු වේලාව දැක්වෙන ලේඛනයෙන් සනාථ වේ. ඊට පසුව සඳහන් වෙනවා, ''මෙදින බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය පෙරවරු 11.00ට අවසන් විය යුතුව තිබුණද, ප්‍රාථමික ගනු දෙනුකරුවකුගේ ඉල්ලීම මත වෙන්දේසිය පෙරවරු 11.05 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කරන ලද බව'' කියලා. එතැන බව කියන වචනයට පසුව මේ විධියට ලියන්න.

එලෙස, පෙරවරු 11.00ට පසුව ලංසු තබා ඇත්තේ එක් ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු පමණක් වන අතර, ඒ රුපියල් මිලියන 100ක් වෙනුවෙන් පෙරවරු 11.04.26ට ලංසු තබා ඇති HSBC බැංකුව බව ලංසු සටහන් අනුව පෙනෙන්නට ඇත.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ අයට ඒක ලැබිලාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: HSBC ලැබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: හම්බවෙලා නැත්නම් ඒකත් සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි ප්‍රශ්නය ඇත්තේ, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ interest rate එක ඊටත් වඩා වැඩි ඇති.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒකට ඕනෑ නම් addition එකක් දමන්න පුළුවන්. Perpetual Treasuriesලා අන්තිම Rs. 13 billion ඉල්ලන්නේ 10.57න් පටන් ගත්ත වෙලාවක නේ. හැබැයි මීට ගොඩක් කලින් Perpetual Treasuriesලාම ඉල්ලනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ එතැන එයා Rs. 2 billion ඉල්ලනවා කොටස් හතරකින්. එතැන පළවෙනි එක පටන් ගන්නේම 10.32ට. එතකොට, පොඩි indication එකක් තිබෙනවා නේද 10.32 වෙනකොට තිබෙන intention එක තිබුණේ Rs. 2 billion වලට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් market කරන්නේ, එක එක වෙලාවට check කර කර auction ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. හැම කෙනාම බැලුවොත් එකට auction එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ නැහැ. අන්තිම වෙනකම් තියාගෙන ඉඳලා අත හරිනවා සියලුම ටික. ඕනෑම auction එකක් බලන්න, හතර පස් වතාවක් auction වලට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඔය එක් කෙනෙක්වත් එක සැරයකින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඕක ඒ ගොල්ලන් එහා මෙහා කරමින් market value එක බල බල තමයි auction එකට දමන්නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මෙහි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ අන්තිම සියල්ලම ඉල්ලන්නේ Bank of Ceylon එක හරහා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේක unusual behavior එකක්. ආයේ කථාවක් නැහැ. Rs. 01 billion වලට auction එකක් දාලා Rs. billion 2, 3දමන එක රටාවට ගැළපෙනවා. 20ක් දමනවා කියන එක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් කියන කොට contradict වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මමත් එදා කොතැනින් හරි අල්ලා ගන්න හැදුවේ. Evidence හොඳට check කරලා බලන්න. එයා කියනවා "...මට call ආවට පස්සේ තවත් තුන් හතර දෙනෙක්ට calls ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන කොට බිලියන 10කට යනවා කියලා Government was desperate - මේ කාලේ අනිවාර්යෙන්ම Government එකට ගොඩක් සල්ලි ඕනෑ. ඒ desperation එක අපි දැක්කා. ඒ නිසා මම risk එකක් අරගෙන, we were very aggresive in our dealings and we went for that bid. අපි දැම්මේ ඒකයි. අපි ඇහුවා grill කලා, ඔහුට හැම එකකටම උත්තරයක් තිබුණා. කොහොමද ඒ information එක ආවේ.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva : You might be wrong there.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : Tell me why.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva : I just read in the verbatim.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : Whose verbatim?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva : Aloysius's verbatim.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : Not his. He did not know any of this. CEO of the Perpetual Treasuries is the main guy.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතුමා කිව්වේ නැද්ද call ආවා කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතුමත් කියනවා call ආවා කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: But he did not give any expert evidence on that. අපි ඇහුවේ Perpetual Treasuries එකේ Mr. Kasun -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතුමා කියන්නේ call ආවා කියලා ඉස්සර කාලයේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. ඔය සම්බන්ධයෙන්. ඔය සම්බන්ධයෙන් එයාට call එක ආවා

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අර්ජුන් ඇලෝෂියස් කියන මහත්මයාට කථා කළාට පසුද කසුන් කියන මහත්මයාට කථා කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කලින් මම හිතන්නේ. Proceedings වල. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට calls ආවා. Then they got to know- time කර කර ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ bids ටික දැම්මා කියලා. Risk එකක් අරන් දැම්මා, වැඩ කළා කියලා කියන්නේ. ඒකට අපි contradict කරලා නැහැ. අපි දැන් සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට කරගෙන යමුද? Shall we move forward?

සභාපතිතුමා: 5.11 නේ අපි ඉන්නේ. එහි ඉතිරි කාරණා ටිකට යනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "...එම වෙන්දේසියේදී බැඳුම්කර සඳහා පැවති ඉල්ලුම සලකා බැලීමෙන් පසුව රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ඉදිරි කාර්යාලය විසින් සකස් කරන ලද විකල්ප ක්‍රම 07ක් ඇතුළත් වාර්තාවේ තිබූ රු.බිලියන 2.6ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ යුතු බවට වූ නිර්දේශය ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා වාර්තාවක් සකසන ලද බව." එය හරි. "..මෙහිදී ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළ ගැනුම්කරුවන් ලංසු තැබූ විස්තර ඇතුළත් ලැයිස්තුව හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් රැගෙන පරීක්ෂා කළ බව." එයත් හරි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: සිදු වෙච්ච දේවල් ෙන් මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "...හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා එම ලැයිස්තුවේ රු.බිලියන 20 සඳහන් ස්ථානයට අතර දිගුකොට රු.බිලියන 20ම නොගන්නේ මන්දැයි විමසූ බව." එයත් හරි නේ. රු.බිලියන 20ක් දක්වා ඉල්ලුමක් ලැබී ඇති බව නිලධාරීන් විසින් දැනුම් දෙන ලද විට එම රු.බිලියන 20ම ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් නිලධාරීන්ට යෝජනා කරන ලද බව." මෙහි නම් නැහැ කියලා කිව්වේ ඒක නේ. නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මම නම් නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ මෙතැන. ගණනයි, interest rate එකයි තිබෙන්නේ. "..බිලියන 20 ලබා ගන්නා නිලධාරීන්ට යෝජනාකරන ලද බව." හරිනේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ඊයෙත් කථා කළ 2016.08.12 "Do it" කියලා දැම්මේ, ඒක නිශ්චිත කළේ එදා ඒක ගොඩක් සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වෙච්ච නිසා. ඕනෑ නම් අයින් කරලා දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, එය වැදගත්. සාකච්ඡාවට ලක් වුණේ නැහැ. "සමාවෙන්න" කියනවා නේ. කලින් එහෙම කිව්වෙත් නැහැ කියලා කියනවා නේ. Under oath ඒ සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේ නිලධාරීන්ට සාක්ෂි වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. මෙතුමිය ඒ කථාව හතර වතාවක් වෙනස් කරනවා. එතුමිය කියන දේ වීරසිංහ මහතාත් අනුමත කරන්නේ නැහැ. වීරසිංහ මහතාත් කියනවා එහෙම එකක් කිව්වේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නම්, මෙතුමාගේ මුල් draft එකේ ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම මේ ආකාරයට තිබෙනවා. "..මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ කරුණු දැක්වීම." පිටු අංක 51. "..මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා පැමිණී අවස්ථාවේදී මුලින් රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ලබා ගැනීමට තමාට උපදෙස් දෙන බව රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රධානි සි.එම්.ඩී.එන්.ෙක්. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය ප්‍රකාශ කළ අතර ඒ පිළිබඳව තමන් නොදැන සිටි බව ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු සභාපති පී.සමරසිරි මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. මෙහිදී සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය තවදුරටත් කාරක සභාවට විශේෂ ප්‍රකාශයක් කරමින්, මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා මෙතැනට "විශේෂ" කියලා ආවේ කොහොමද කියන එක ගැන. "...විශේෂ ප්‍රකාශයක් කරමින් සඳහන් කරන ලද්දේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් තමන්ට මෙම තීරණය සිදු කිරීමට මතයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා නොව "Do it" යනුවෙන් නියෝග කරන ලද බව තමන් අද දින ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද බවයි. කාරක සභාවේ අදහස, මෙහිදි කාරක සභාව විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද්දේ සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය විසින් මින් පෙර කිසිම අවස්ථාවකදී කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් තමන්ට "Do it" යනුවෙන් නියෝග කළ බව සඳහන් නොකළ බව හා "Why

do not you go for ten?" යනුවෙන් අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කළ බව පමණක් ප්‍රකාශ කළ බවයි.

විගණකාධිපතිවාර්තාවෙන්ද මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මයගෙන් බිලියන 10කට නොයන්නේ මන්දැයි "Why do not you go for ten?"යන්න ඇසූ බව හැර වෙන කිසිම සාක්ෂියක් ඉදිරිපත් කර නැතිව බව පෙන්වා දෙන ලදි. මෙහිදී සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය කලින් කාරක සභාවලදී ඒ බව ප්‍රකාශ කිරීමට නොහැකි වීම පිළිබඳ සමාව හජනය කර සිටියාය." Verbatim අනුව මෙතැන උපුටා දක්වා තිබෙන ටික අපට මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. Mrs. Seneviratne හැර අනිත් හැමෝම එක ස්ථාවරයක ඉන්නවා. Mrs. Senevirtne තමයි එතුමියගේ ස්ථාවරය inquiries දෙකේදි වෙනස් කරන්නේ. Mrs. Seneviratneට නියෝග කරන්න, එතුමිය නේ note එක දමන්නේ, "Governor directed me to go for ten" කියලා. අපි සමහර වෙලාවට සාක්ෂිකරුවෙකුගේ තිබෙන විශ්වසනීයභාවය බලන්නත් වෙනවා නේ. ඒ එක්කම 50 වෙනි පිටුවේ ඒ specific කාරණය සම්බන්ධව මේ ආකාරයට තිබෙනවා, "...2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වන බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව ගනු ලැබූ තීරණ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව විමසා සිටින ලදී. මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන්ගේ කරුණු දැක්වීම, ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව නියෝජනය කළ සාමාජිකයන්, සභාපති, පී. සමරසිරි මහතා, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සහකාර අධිකාරි, අධිකාරි මහතා, ආර්ථික පරීක්ෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිපති, කරුණාතිලක මහතා, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාරත්මේන්තුවේ අධිකාරි සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය, ආර්ථික පරීක්ෂණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ ගුණරත්න මහත්මිය සහ තවත් අතිරේක superitendents දෙනෙක් සිටිය බව සඳහන් කරන ලදි. මහ බැංකු අධිපති ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෙක් නොවන බවද ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී." මේක තමයි වැදගත් කොටස, "..මෙහිදි බිලියන 01 සිට බිලියන 10 දක්වා මුදලක් සපයා ගැනීමට ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය ඉහත සඳහන් නිලධාරීන් විසින් වෘත්තීමය විනිශ්චය අනුව කණ්ඩායමක් වශයෙන් ගනු ලැබූ තීරණයක් බව තමන් පිළිගන්නා බව කාරක සභාව නැගූ ප්‍රශ්නයකට පිළිතුරු වශයෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සභාපති, පී. සමරසිරි මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී."

ඇත්තටම ඒක තමයි තිබෙන තත්ත්වය. ඕකට ඒක contradiction එකයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාගේ දෙවැනි නිරීක්ෂණය. Inquiries දෙකෙදී අදහස් වෙනස් වුණු හැටි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕකටම එකතු කරන්නම්. මේක තමයි වැදගත්ම කාරණය. අපි මේවාට අවධානය යොමු කරලා නැහැ. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය යොමු කරන්නේ ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතාට,

"My question is, did the Governor alter the decision of your recommendation or he went along with your recommendations in this situation?

Dr. A.Z.M. Azim: It is basically the Tender Board's Decision. The Tender Board communicated that to the Governor."

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඊට පසුව අපි සාකච්ඡා කරපු verbatim report එකේ තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට බලන්න පුළුවන්. මෙතුමා කියන වෘත්තීය විනිශ්චයභාවයක් යටතේ ඒක ගත්තා කියලා සමරසිංහ මහත්මයා කිව්වාට පසුව එදා සිටි ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ අය නැගිටලා කිව්වා ඒක අපි කමිටුවක් හැටියට ගත්ත තීරණයක් නොවෙයි, සභාපතිතුමා අපට කිව්වා අධිපතිතුමා මේක දන්නවා කියලා වෙන සාකච්ඡාවක් -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඔය කවුරුවත් කලින් සාක්ෂිවල එහෙම කියලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. අවසාන ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට තමයි එම වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕක plan කරලා සියල්ල වෙනස් කළා. ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහත්මයාත් කිව්වා අපේ තීන්දුවක් නොවෙයි කියලා. ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහත්මයාගේ සාක්ෂිය මම මේ කියවන්නේ. මේ ඔක්කොම contradictory කියලා මම කිව්වේ. එදා ආපු කට්ටිය නොවෙයි, ඊට කලින් සිටියේ. එදා ඔක්කොම plan කරලා ආවේ. මේ under oath. මේවා under oath නොවෙයි. අපි නිකම් විමසුමක් කළේ. මේ under oath දුන්න සාක්ෂි. පළමු වැනි කරුණ තමයි සාක්ෂිය පරස්පර නම් සාක්ෂිය පිළිගන්න බැහැ. මේකේ ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහත්මයා කියනවා " it is basically the Tender Board's decision. The Tender Board communicated that to the Governor." කවුරුවත් දිවුරුමක් මත සාක්ෂියක් දීලා නැහැ.

මම තව කාරණයක් එකතු කරන්නම්. සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මැතිණිය පළමුව කියන්නේ "insisted" කියලා. ඉන් පසුව එම සාක්ෂිවල කියනවා "නැහැ මට වැරදුණා, directed " කියලා. ඊට පසුව නැවතත් එනවා, "Why do you not take it?" කියලා. අන්තිමට versions 4ක් මේ සාක්ෂිකාරියගෙන් එනවා. "Do it" කියලා කිව්වා කියලා. මෙතුමාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයකට පිළිතුරු දෙන්න

කියලා එන්නේ. ඒ අවස්ථාවේ මෙතුමා අහපු යෝජනාවක් නේද කියලා. කිසිම තැනක කවුරුවත් - ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහත්මයා ඉන්නවා, Deputy Governorsලා දෙදෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. Governorගෙන් අහනවා ඔබතුමා direction එකක් දුන්නාද කියලා. "නැහැ, if I were you, I will take it" කියලා තමයි එතුමා කිව්වේ. "Why do you not take it?" කියන අදහස තමයි ආවේ කියන එක තමයි සියලු දෙනාම පිළිගන්නේ. එතකොට මේක ඉතාමත් වැදගත්, සභාපතිතුමා. ඒකයි මම එදා ඔය ප්‍රශ්නය ඇසුවේ. මෙතුමිය වෙනම line එකක පරස්පර විරෝධී සාක්ෂි හතරක් දීලා තිබෙනවා. එතුමිය හැර වෙන කවුරුවත් direction එකක් දුන්නා කියලා under oath සාක්ෂියක් දීලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැනදී අපට එක දෙයක් කියන්න පුළුවන්. Under oath දීලා තිබෙන evidence අපට විශ්වාස කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඊළඟට දෙවැනි වාතවට ඇවිත් contradictory දෙයක් කිව්වා කියන එකත් ලියන එක සාධාරණයි. පී. සමරසිරි මහත්මයා දිගටම ඒ ස්ථාවරයේ හිටියා. නමුත් සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය contradictory දෙයක් කිව්වා. මෙතැන 50 වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන නිරීක්ෂණය ලියලා ආපහු 52 පිටුවේ තිබෙන කාරක සභාවේ අදහස කියන තැන ඇත්තටම ඔබතුමා contradictory කියලා ලියලා තිබෙනවා. පරස්පර කියලා නැතුව මීට කලින් අවස්ථාවේදී සමාව බජනය කළා කියලා - අපේ මතය වශයෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන්, සභාවේ මතය වශයෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන්. සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ සාක්ෂියේ පරස්පරතාවක් තිබුණත් ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා කියලා තිබෙනවා නම් - එයාගේ හැසිරීම අනුව එයා හිටපු Governorට හිතවත්ව සාක්ෂි දෙන කෙනෙක් වශයෙන් අපට තේරුම් ගන්න බැහැ නේ. එයා ඇත්ත කියනවා වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එයාගේ කිසිම ගැටලුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Basically මට පෙනෙන්නේ professional කෙනෙක් විධියට. එයාගේ සාක්ෂියයි, පී. සමරසිරි මහත්මයා අඛණ්ඩව කියන - එයා නේ කමිටුවේ සභාපති. මෙතැන පරස්පරය තිබෙන්නේ සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය මුලින් දිවුරුම් සාක්ෂි දීලා, ඉන් පසුව දිවුරුම් නැතිව contradictory view එකක් ගැනීමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය දිවුරුම් පිට දෙකක් කියනවා. "Insisted" කියන එකයි, "direct" කියන එකයි. ඊට පසුව "Why do you not take it?" කියන එකත් කියනවා. ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ සටහනේ සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකත් එක්ක වෙන දෙයක් match වෙනවා. ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහත්මයාගේ ප්‍රශ්නයට පිළිතුරු දීලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් එනවා නේ. ඒ අය කියනවා නේ මේක අපේ කමිටුවේ වගකීම, අපි තමයි මේ තීරණ ගත්තේ කියලා. එහෙම නම් එතැනට යන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නානායක්කාර මහත්මයාත් කියනවා. කලින් එකේ නානායක්කාර මහත්මයාත් කියනවා ඒ තීන්දුව ගන්නේ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ එතුමන්ලා එතුමන්ලාට කෙරෙන කරුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීමෙන් පසුව කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි දැන් කොහොමද මේක සකස් කරන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාට මේක නැහැ නේ. මම කියන්නම්. මම සුදානම් කරන්න හදන්නේ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙන්න මෙතැනට දමන්න -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට ඔබතුමා සමාවෙන්න. මම කියන්නම් කරන දේ. කෙළින්ම cut and paste කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතැනින් එහාට මම කොටසක් එකතු කරන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ කොටස එකතු කරන්න පසුව කියන්නම්. මෙතැන ලියලා තිබෙනවා නේ "ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ පොළ ගැණුම්කරුවන් ලංසු තැබූ විස්තර ඇතුළත් ලැයිස්තුව අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ගෙන පරීක්ෂා කළ බව" කියලා. ඉන් පසුව මුල් කෙටුම්පතේ අංක 11 වශයෙන් තිබෙන කොටස ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම ඇතුළත් කරන්න. ඒ කියන්නේ සමරසිරි මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී කියන කාරණය.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැනට ඇතුළත් කරන්නම්. ඒ කියන්නේ පරීක්ෂා කළ බව කියන තැනට ඇතුළත් කරනවා මේකේ පිටු අංක 50, අංක 11.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 50 පිටුවේ අංක 11 සම්පූර්ණයෙන්. එතැනටම පොඩි ඡේදයක් විධියට එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ, සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ vary වීම. "කෙසේ වෙතත් ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරී සී.එම්.ඩී.එන්.කේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ සාක්ෂිය පිළිබඳව විශේෂයෙන් සලකා බැලිය යුතුව ඇත" කියලා 52 වන පිටුවේ කාරක සභාවේ අදහස ප්‍රකාශ කිරීම යටතේ තිබෙන සම්පූර්ණ කොටස -

මම පහසු කරන්නම්, තිබෙන විධියටම ගත්තාම ඔබතුමාට හිතේ ගැටුමක් නැහැ නේ. කාරක සභාවේ අදහස ප්‍රකාශ කිරීම කියන කොටස, ඒ සම්පූර්ණ ඡේදයම, ඒ කියන්නේ "මෙහිදි" කියන වචනයේ සිට "සිටියාය" කියන තැන දක්වා කොටස ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊට පසුව "කාරක සභාවේ අදහස" කියලා තව කොටසක් තිබෙනවා. එම කොටස ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ නැද්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකක් දමන්න පුළුවන්. මෙම බැඳුම්කර සිදුවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් සමහර නිලධාරීන් විසින් කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියට කැඳවන ලද අවස්ථාවේදී දක්වන ලද අදහස්වල පරස්පර විරෝධිතාවක් නිරීක්ෂණය වූ බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. ඒක නේ සාක්ෂි විශ්ලේෂණය. මේ නිගමන නොවෙයි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතැනින් අවසන් කරන්න. සමරසිරි මහත්මයා කියනවා ඒක ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ සම්පූර්ණ තීරණය කියලා, අපේ තීන්දුව කියලා. ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහත්මයාත් කියනවා. ඒ දෙක ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තවද අතිරේකණය අධිකාරි ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහතා ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද්දේද අදාළ තීරණය ටෙන්ටර් කමිටුවේ තීරණයක් බවය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ආචාර්ය එම්.ඉසෙඩ්.එම්. අසීම් මහත්මයා කියාපු එක මම පැහැදිලි කරන්නද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ඒකේ දිනය හරි, මොකක් හරි කිව්වා නම් හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Proceedingsවල පහළ අංකය 839, උඩ අංකය 66. එහෙම දැම්මාම හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

මෙහි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් කියනවා, "Who led the Tender Board? How the Tender Board decision was taken? It was our decision. Then, he communicated to the Governor." 66වැනි පිටුවේ පහළින් අංක 839හි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ".....ඉන්පසු එකී තීරණය මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා වෙත ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව විසින් දැනුම් දෙන ලද බවද, සාක්ෂි මඟින් හෙළිදරව් විය." ඊළඟට 18වැනි පිටුවේ පහළ සිට 1වන පේළියේ සිට 8වැනි පේළිය දක්වා ඉවත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මොකද, කලින් කිව්ව කාරණයෙන් ඒක cover වෙනවා, "Do it" and "Why don't you go for 10?"

සභාපතිතුමා: කොතැන සිට පහළටද ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා, ඔබතුමන්ලා කිව්වා නම් හොඳයි. වාක්‍ය උඩ සිට කියෙව්වා නම් හොඳයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "මෙහිදී ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ලංසු තැබූ විස්තර ඇතුළත් ලැයිස්තුව හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් රැගෙන පරීක්ෂා කළ බව..." කියලා තිබෙනවා. එහි "හිටපු" යන වචනයේ සිට "why don't"දක්වා වන වචන ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තිබුණාට කමක් නැහැ. ඇත්ත කථාව ඒක නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කලින් කිව්ව කාරණාවේ ඒ සියල්ල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "Why don't you go for 20? Why don't you go for 10?" ඔක්කොම එහි තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තියෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කොටස, අලුතින් එකතු කරන කොටසේ තිබෙන නිසා ඉවත් කරන්න කියලා කියන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Okay. It is understood.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊළඟට 19වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන පළමු වැනි පේළි දෙක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. නමුත්, මෙතැනදී අඩුවක් තිබෙනවා. මෙන්න මේ කොටස, කලින් උපුටා දැක් වූ සාක්ෂිවලින් කියැවෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමාගේ draft report එකේ 53වැනි පිටුවේ ඉහළ සිට 6වැනි පේළිය මම කියවන්නේ. "හිටපු අධිපතිතුමා පිටව ගොස් එදින පස්වරු 12.30ට පමණ නැවත ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ සහ ආනන්ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනා සමඟ පැමිණ වෙන්දේසියෙන් කොපමණ මුදල් පැමිණ තිබේ දැයි විමසූ බවත්, රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් පැමිණ ඇති බවත්, ඉන් තමන්ට ලබා ගත හැකි වැඩිම මුදල රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6ක් බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදුව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. කෙසේ වුවත්, රටේ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව සඳහා එම සියලු මුදල්, රුපියල් බිලියන 20ම ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස තමන්ට ප්‍රකාශ කළ බව සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය ප්‍රකාශ කරයි. එහිදී රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ලබා ගතහොත් මුල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ ඇති විය හැකි අහිතකර තත්ත්වය පිළිබඳව කිහිප විටක් පෙන්වා දුන් බව නිලධාරීන් විසින් අවධාරණය කරන ලදී. එවිට හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මස, තිස් අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කරන ලද්දේ කුමන අනුපාතයකට දැයි විමසන ලද අතර, එම අනුපාතය සියයට 11.75ක් බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද බවත්, එවිට එම අනුපාතය නොවන්නේ මන් දැයි

මහ බැංකු අධිපති විමසූ බවද ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී. එහිදී හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් ලංසු තබන ලද ප්‍රමාණයන්, ඔවුන්ගේ නාම ලේඛනයන් ආදී විස්තර බලා, රුපියල් බිලියන 20ටම නොයන්නේ මන් දැයි විමසන ලද බවත්, රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ප්‍රමාණය වැඩි බවට යෝජනා කරද්දි, අදාළ ලේඛනයේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10 තිබෙන ස්ථානය පෙන්වා රුපියල් බිලියන 10 මුදල ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස දැනුම් දුන් බවත් ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලදී." දැන් අපි රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ප්‍රශ්නය හඳුනා ගත්තා නේ. "Do it." and "Why don't you go for 10?" කියන එක. ඒ මුල් කොටසම නිවැරැදියි. එතැන "ඇඟිල්ල තබා පෙන්වා දෙන ලදී." කියන තැනට, "Why don't you go for 10?" කියන කොටස එන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට verbatimවලට match වෙනවා. ඒක අපි ඒ විධියට දමමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණාවල සාරාංශය මෙහි තියෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම දමන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: "රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස ඉහත කී ලැයිස්තුවේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ඇති ස්ථානය අතින් පෙන්වමින් හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් නිලධාරීන්ට උපදෙස් දෙන ලද බව ....." කියලා තියෙන්නේ. ඒක වෙනස් කරනවාද? එහෙම නැතිනම් මේ කොටස එහෙමම ගන්නවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැනදී වැදගත් කාරණා කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි, මේ කටයුත්තට ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ සහ ආනන්ද සිල්වා යන දෙදෙනා පැමිණි බව. සමහර විට මම කියන ඒවාට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ හිත රිදෙනවා ඇති. නමුත්, මට හිතෙන දේ මම කියනවා. එතකොට මොකක් හෝ challenge කරලා බේරුම් කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. Professionalsලා වැඩ කරන්නේ එහෙමයි නේ. එහෙම නැතුව මොකක් හෝ හේතුවක් නිසා ඒ අවස්ථාවේදී ඔළුව වනලා, ඊට පස්සේ දැන් "මම නම් නොවෙයි. මෙයා" කියලා කියන එකේ අප්සට් එකක් තියෙනවා. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මෙතැන හිටපු මිනිස්සු කවුද කියලා දැන ගන්න ඒ අයගේ නම් තියෙන්න ඕනෑ. Inquiry දෙකේ versions දෙකේ කථාව සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වෙනස් වෙනවා. හැබැයි, මේක more comprehensive සහ readable. 12.30ට නැවත මේ දෙදෙනා සමඟ ආවා කියලා තේරෙනවා. ඔබතුමාත් කවුරු හෝ සමඟ ආවා කියලා තිබෙනවා. ඇත්තටම 12.30ට ආවා කියලා ඔබතුමාගේ මේ draft report එකේ නැහැ. එහි තියෙන්නේ, 12.30ට නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනෙකු සමඟ පැමිණියා කියලා. ඒ නම් දෙක ඉතා වැදගත්. අපි මෙහෙම දමමු. 5:3 ඡේදයේ "හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා යළි පෙ.ව 12.30ට පමණ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් දෙදෙනෙකු වන ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ සහ ආනන්ද සිල්වා යන දෙදෙනා සමඟ රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පැමිණ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය සම්බන්ධ කරුණු විමසූ බව..." ඊළඟට "රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ලබා ගතහොත් මුල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ඇති වන අහිතකර තත්ත්වය පිළිබඳව නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද බවත්, එවිට හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මස නිකුත් කරන ලද තිස් අවුරුද්ද බැඳුම්කරය බර තැබූ අනුපාතය විමසන ලද බවත්, එම අනුපාතය 11.75ක් බව නිලධාරීන් විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද බව හා එවිට හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් එම මුල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ අනුපාත පැවැති මට්ටම අනුව කටයුතු නොකරන්නේ මන් දැයි විමසන ලද බව, පසුව රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගන්නා ලෙස ඉහත කී ලැයිස්තුවේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10 සඳහන් ස්ථානය පෙන්වා දෙමින් හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් උපදෙස් දෙන ලද බව ....." ප්‍රශ්නය තියෙන්නේ එතැන නේ. ඒක හරිද?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is correct.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "....ඒ අනුව හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ උපදෙස් පරිදි රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා වෙනම ම වාර්තාවක් ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව සකස් කරන ලද බව ..." එහෙම evidence එකක් නැහැ නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, ".....උපදෙස් පරිදි රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා වෙනම වාර්තාවක් ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් සකස් කරන ලද බව..." කියලා තියෙනවාද? එහෙම evidence තියෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට තේරෙන විධියට නම්, Tender Board රැස් වෙලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10යි කියලා කථා කරලා ගියා. ඔය අතරමැද ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් වාර්තා සකස් කිරීමක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්ද? එහෙම වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. එතකොට මුළු ප්‍රශ්නයම Tender Board එකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, Front Office එකෙන් හදනවා. මෙහි සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මියගේ සාක්ෂිය අනුව, " ඒ ටික ගත්තා. ඊට පසුව අපි යෝජනා කරන රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 auction එකක් සහිතව රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක auction එකක් දමලා, Tender Board එකට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. Tender Board එකට ඒක ඉදිරිපත්

කරලා, අපි පුද්ගලිකව කිව්වා Governor ඇවිල්ලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කිව්වා කියලා. නැත්නම් අපේ යෝජනාව තිබුණේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට පමණයි කියලා."

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එයා තමයි රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 එක රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට යන්න කියලා උපදෙස් දීලා තියෙන්නේ. සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය තමයි උපදෙස් දීලා තියෙන්නේ, රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6 එක අයින් කරලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ට යන්න කියලා. රුපියල් බිලියන 10කට එක වාර්තාවක් හදන්න කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Tender Board එකේ Head, සෙනෙවිරත්න මහත්මිය නොවෙයි නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හිටපු නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: උපදෙස ලැබුණා. තීන්දුව ගැනීම Tender Board එක සතුයි. සාක්ෂි දෙකකින් කියනවා, කවුරු මොනවා යෝජනා කළත් තීන්දුව ගන්නේ Tender Board එක කියලා. ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට උපදෙස් දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ඒ අනුව Tender Board එක- ආසිම් කියෙන්නෙත් ඒකයි. ඒක හරි නේද? එතකොට ඒක ඇතුළත් වුණා නම් හරි.

"The Hon. (Mrs.) Rosy Senanayake: Who heads the Tender Board?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Deputy Governor overseeing-

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: When that decision is made in that meeting, within half an hour or forty five minutes or whatever-"

Governor order එකක් දුන්නා නම් decision එකක් ගන්න forty five minutes යන්නෙ නැහැනේ. Governor යෝජනා කළාට පස්සේ මේ decision එක ගන්න forty five minutes deliberate කරලා තිබෙනවා.

"-then that decision is conveyed to the operations people immediately?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: No. When the decision is made, we inform that to the Governor. When the Governor signs-"

ඊට පස්සෙ කියනවා:

"Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Once that is signed only we will make the so-called press release/announcement.

The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne: My question is, did the Governor alter the decision of your recommendation or he went along with your recommendation in this situation?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is basically the Tender Board's decision. The Tender Board communicated that to the Governor."

එතකොට Governor's decision නොවෙයි, "Tender Board's decision communicated to the Governor" ඒක ආව නම්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වාර්තාවක් සකස් කළා කියන එක සාක්ෂි වශයෙන් හරිද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙනම් අපි ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මඟින් සකස් කරන ලද බව කියන එකට පසුව තිබෙන අර "හිටපු" කියන වචනය- මේ වාක්‍ය හරිද බලන්න. "හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ උපදෙස් මත රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගැනීම, රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරිතුමිය විසින් සටහනක් තබා, ඉදිරි කාර්යාලය වෙත දැනුම් දුන් බව" The Governor instructed to place price up to Rs. 10 billion taking into consideration of additional fund requirement of the Government කියන එක සිංහලට පරිවර්තනය වෙන්න ඕනෑ වෙන විධියකටයි. "වැඩිමනක් අරමුදල්වල අවශ්‍යතාවය සලකා, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ උපදෙස් මත- මම ඒ පරිවර්තනය තමයි නිවැරදි කරන්නේ- එම රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක නිර්දේශය ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවට රැගෙන ගිය බව හා හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගැනීමට උපදෙස් දුන් බව ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු නිලධාරින් ණය අධිකාරිතුමියට ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද බව." ඊළඟට තිබෙනවා, මහ බැංකුවේ ටෙන්ඩර් මණ්ඩලය කියන කොටස අපි දැන් වෙනත් තැනක දී- ඒක තිබුණාවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනික් එක තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, පී. සමරසිරි මහත්මයා කියනවා, එහෙම උපදෙසක් ආවනේ, ඊට පස්සේ එතුමා call කරලා අහනවා මේ උපදෙස් දෙන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊළඟට, රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගැනීමට උපදෙස් දීමට හේතුව කුමක්දැයි ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටු සභාපති විසින් හිටපු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් දුරකථනයෙන් විමසන ලද බව. ඒක prudent නේ. ඇයි මෙහෙම හදිසි දෙයක් කියන්නේ කියලා. ඒ සඳහා හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් හේතු දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කළ බවත්, ආණ්ඩුවට විශාල මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක් අවශ්‍ය බව, දෙවැනි කරුණ සියයට 5කට පැවති පොලී අනුපාතය - Special

Standing Deposit Facility Rate - ලබන සතියේ දී ඉවත් කරන බව හා- එතැන ඇත්තටම ඉවත් කරන ලද බව නෙමෙයි, ඒ වන විටත් එයා තීරණය කරලා තිබුණා ඒක නිවැරදි වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. එතකොට ලබන සතියේදී ඉවත් කරන බව නෙමෙයි, ඒ වන විටත්-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒක සටහන් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මෙහි සඳහන්ව තිබෙන්නේ, මගේ එකඟතාවය නෙමෙයි. මේ කාරක සභාවේ දී මේක සඳහන් කරල තිබෙන හේතුව කියන්න එපායැ. ඒ විමසන විට අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කිව්වේ සමරසිංහ මහත්මයාගෙ සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල එතුමා කියන්නේ, 'අධිපතිවරයා මෙන්න මෙහෙම කිව්ව' කියලා. එතකොට ඒ කිව්ව කියන එකෙන් කියන්නේ, 'අද උදේ අපි තීරණය කරලා තිබෙනවා' කියලා නෙමෙයි. ඒ කිව්වයි කියලා කියන්නේ, ලබන සතියේ අපි ඉවත් කරනවා කියන එක තමයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ. කාරණා දෙකක් එයා කිව්වා කියලා වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල තිබෙන කාරණය මම කියන්නේ. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි නේ. සමරසිංහ මහත්මයා එසේ කිව්වද එම තීන්දුව ඒ වනවිට රැගෙන තිබෙන ලදී හෝ මොකක් හෝ දාන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක නේ සත්‍ය කථාව. That is correct.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතකොට ලබන සතියේ දී ඉවත් කරන බව හා එවිට පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යන බව, වරහන් ඇතුළේ සටහන් කර තිබෙනවා, 2014 සැප්තැම්බර් මස බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවේදී පැවති පොලී අනුපාත මට්ටමට පත්වන බව. ඒක හරි නේද? පෙන්වා දෙන ලද බව. එතකොට දැන් එතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ, වරහන් ඇතුළේ කෙසේ වෙතත් එදින එනම් පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින උදේ වරුවේ එකී තීන්දුව ලබා ගෙන තිබූ අතර, එය ක්‍රියාත්මක වූයේ එදින සවස් වරුවේ 3.00 ඉඳලා හරි මොකක් හරි එහෙම එකක් කිව්ව නේද? 3 වැනිදා කියලා ඒ කථාව හරි නේද? සතියක වගේ කාලයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ එක ආපසු ලියන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. As it is ඒක හරි. වෙනස් කරන්න එපා. මේක හරි. ඉස්සරහට යමු. කෙසේ වුවද, පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර නිකුවට පෙර, එනම් පෙබරවාරි 23 දින රැස්වෙන ලද මහ බැංකු මුදල් මණ්ඩලය මගින් පොලී අනුපාතය මීළඟ මාසයේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය රැස්වනතෙක් පොලී අනුපාත පැවති මට්ටමේම නොවෙනස්ව තබා ගනු ලබන බවට තීරණයක් ගෙන ඇති බව 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 23 වැනි දින මුදල් මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවේ දෙවන අයිතමය උපුටා දක්වමින් සඳහන් කර ඇත. මෙන්න මේක හරිද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැනට අවශ්‍යද කියලා මම දන්නෙ නැහැ. කථාව හරි. Facts are correct.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊළඟ එක, පෙබරවාරි 27 වන දින උදේ කාලයේ වෙළෙඳපොළ මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුව - Market Operation Committee - හිටපු අධිපතිවරයා පැමිණ, සියයට 5ක්ව පැවති පොලී අනුපාතය - Special Standing Deposit Facility Rate - 6.5ක් දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට උපදෙස් දුන් බව හා එම අධිපතිවරයා එම කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෙක් නොවන බව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වීරසිංහ මහත්මයා තමයි මේ යෝජනාව කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කමිටුවේ සභාපති කවුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: වීරසිංහ මහතා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වීරසිංහ මහතා තමයි මේක අධිපතිතුමාට යෝජනා කළේ කියලා evidenceවල තිබෙනවා. ඒකට අධිපතිතුමාගේ nod එක ලැබුණා කියලා තමයි එයා කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම යෝජනාව එම කමිටුවේ සභාපති, නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපති ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද බවද පෙනී යන ලදී.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක කොතනටද එන්න ඕනෑ ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක එන්න ඕනෑ කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයෙක් නොවන බව කියන තැනට. Governorගේ වැඩක් නෙමෙයිනේ මේක. වෙන තැනක තිබෙන තොරතුරක් නේ. එදිනම වෙළෙඳපොළ මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුව මඟින් චක්‍රලේඛයක් නිකුත් කර, එම පොලී අනුපාතය පිළිබඳව මුදල් වෙළඳපොළ දැනුවත් කළ බව. එදිනම කියන එක අපි හිතමු-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට එදිනම දැනුවත් කළා නම්, people will get to know. ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා කිව්ව එක හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හැබැයි ඒක වෙන්නේ, just after the auction. එතකොට වැඩේ පස්සේ- සාමාන්‍ය ජනතාව දන්නේ පස්සේ. විශේෂ ජනතාව කලින් දන්නවා. හිටපු මහ බැංකු

අධිපතිවරයා විසින් පෙබරවාරි මස 27 වන දිනම ඒ සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා දුන් බව, එම පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් කිරීමට ගනු ලබන තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක වූයේ මාර්තු 03 වැනිදා සිට බව, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ගනු ලබන තීන්දුව- එතකොට ඒක හරිද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි හරි ඔක්කොම හරි. Ratification හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ගනු ලබන තීන්දුව- ඇත්තටම හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් මොකක් ගැන ගනු ලැබූ තීරණය ද ratify කරන්නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ interest rate එක වැඩි කරන්න ගත්ත තීරණයද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ තීරණය ගන්න එතුමාට ද අයිතිය තිබෙන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව් ඒක තමයි. නැහැ ඒක මුදල් මණ්ඩලයට දැනුම් දෙනවා අධිපතිවරයා විසින්. ඊට පස්සේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒක අනුමත කරනවා - ratify - කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇත්තටම මේක ලියන්න ඕනෑ, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ratify කළේ ඇත්තටම ඒක මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙ තීරණයක් නෙවෙයි නේ. ඒක නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතාගේ කමිටුවෙන් දුන්න තීරණයක් නේ. එතකොට හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ගනු ලැබූ එම තීන්දුව කියන වචනය වැරදියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ එතකොට ඒකට දාන්න නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතා විසින් යෝජනා කරන ලද-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ කමිටුවෙ නම දාන්න. Market Operation Committee.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපේ Minute එකේ තිබෙන විධියටම දැම්මා නම් හොඳයි නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කමිටුවේ නම, Market Operations Committee.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Board Paper එකේ කුමක් හෝ තිබෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, Board Paper එකක් තිබුණා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Board Paper තිබෙනවා නම්, නිවැරදි විධියට ඇතුළත් කරන්න. මොකද, අපි කලින් කියන්නේ, ඒ තීන්දුව මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ තීන්දුවක් කියලා නොවෙයි, "Market Operations Committee headed by Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe" කියලා නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතා: අපි අනෙක් කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කරමු, Board Paper එක සොයා ගන්නකම්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට වැදගත් කාරණයක් කියන්න තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ කාරණය අවසන් කරමු.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Board Meeting No. 5/2015. Date එක 06.03.2015. Heading එක, "3. Ratification of the Withdrawal of the 5 per cent Special Standing Deposit Facility Rate".

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Decision එක ඉක්මනට කියන්න.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒකේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ එපමණයි. ඊට පසුව 3 කියන item එක යටතේ, 3.1., 3.2., ...දමලා තිබෙනවා. 3.3. කියන item එක යටතේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙන කොටස මම කියවන්නම්. "The Chairman informed the Board that the Central Bank temporarily suspended the method …"

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, අනෙක් එක නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක පැහැදිලියි. මෙතැන හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා විසින් ගනු ලැබූ තීන්දුව කියලා නොවෙයි, ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතා,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කිසිවක් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. සියයට 5 කියන එක සියයට 6.30 කර ගැනීමට ගත් තීන්දුව මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය ratify කරන ලදි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ විධියට ලියන්න. "හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා" කියන එක වෙනුවට "ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ මහතාගේ සභාපතිත්වයෙන් යුතු වෙළෙඳ පොළ මෙහෙයුම් කමිටුව විසින් ගනු ලැබූ එම තීන්දුව මාර්තු 06වැනි දින පැවති මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේදී අපර අනුමැතියට යටත් කරන ලද බව" කියලා. (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ වැදගත් කාරණාව කියන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම පසුව කියන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 5.4 එක නිවැරදියි නේ. "දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින්

ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 1ක බැඳුම්කර පමණක් මිලට ගැනීමට නිර්දේශ කර තිබියදී, එම ප්‍රමාණය මෙන් දස ගුණයකටත් වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් එනම්, රුපියල් බිලියන 10.058ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට 2015.02.27 දින පැවැත්වුණු භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව විසින් තීරණය කර තිබුණු බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මඟින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.” ඒක නිවැරදියි. “එදින පැවති වෙන්දේසියේදී...” ඒ කියන සියල්ල නිවැරදියි නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි කවුරුවත් නොදුටු කාරණයක් තිබෙනවා. එය සඳහන් විය යුතුයි. අපි 18වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් සියයට 9.48 කියන එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් කථා කළා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, “මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතු දිනට පෙර සතියේ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ වසර 30 බැඳුම්කර සඳහා 9.48%ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් පැවතිය.” යන එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Mrs. Jayaratne, අපි කිව්වා නේ, සියයට 9.48ක සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් තිබුණා. ඒ පොලිය සෘජු ක්‍රමයට දීලා market එකේ නොතිබුණු කෘතිම පොලියක් කියලා. මම verbatim එක කියවන කොට අපට miss වුණු ඉතාම වැදගත් දෙයක් දුටුවා. අපි mark-to-market එකක් ගැන කථා කළා නේ. ඕනෑම primary dealer කෙනකුගේ portfolio එක සෑම දිනයකටම mark-to-market කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒ නිසා දවසින් දවස mark-to-market කරන්න මහ බැංකුවෙන් පොලියක් දෙනවාලු. මහ බැංකුවෙන් කියනවාලු ඒ පොලිය තමයි පාවිච්චි කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. කසුන් පලිසේන කියන පුද්ගලයාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න කරද්දී ඔහු කියනවා, “ඔව්, සියයට 9.48ට rate එක තිබුණාට mark-to-market rate එක තිබුණේ සියයට 10.16ට කියලා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඊට පසුව ඔහු කියනවා, “It is uniformed and the rate is applicable for everyone.” So, the mark-to-market rate is 10.16. There is no point of going me bidding lower than that rate.” ඒ අවස්ථාවේ Hon. Eran Wickramaratne අහනවා, “Is the rate of 10.16 published by the Bank of Ceylon?” He replied, “Yes. Then he went on to ask , “They publish it mark-to-market once a month or daily?” මොහු කියන්නේ, සියයට 9.48 තිබුණාට සියයට 10.16ක් තමයි mark-to-market rate එක බැංකුවෙන් දීලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. ඔහු තවදුරටත් කියනවා, එදිනට කලින් දිනයේ Central Bank එකෙන් ඔහුට call කළා. Call කරලා ඇහුවා, සියයට 9.35 පමණ ගණනේ bid කරන්න කැමතිද කියලා. සියයට 9.35 පමණ ගණනේ bid කරන්න කැමතිද කියලා ඇහුවාම, private placements එකක් දමන්න offer එකක් කියලා ඔහු හිතුවා කියලා. මොකද, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් private placements දමන්න මහ බැංකුවෙන් call කරලා මෙන්න මේ ගණනට දමමුද කියලා අහන නිසා. අපි මේ ගැන ටිකක් හිතන්න ඕනෑ. අපි සියයට 9.45යි, සියයට 9.50 කියලා කිව්වාට, mark-to-market rate එක සියයට 10.01 නම්, එතැන discrepancy එකක් තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒකට කරන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ finding එක වැරදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: වැරදියි කියන්නේ, ගොඩක් indications තිබෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සියයට 9.35 rate එකට හේතු 3ක් මම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්. වෙනත් තැනෙක පසුව ලිව්වත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මම දන්නේ නැහැ මේක දමන්න ඕනෑ කොතැනටද කියලා. එක් කරුණක් තමයි, සියයට 9.35 කියන්නේ, manipulated rate එකක්. ඒක market rate එකක් නොවෙයි, primary dealersලා හරහා,-

සභාපතිතුමා: සියයට 9.35 නොවෙයි, සියයට 9.48.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කලින් සතියේ තිබුණේ සියයට 9.48 නේ. ඒ සියයට 9.48 කියන්නේ, manipulated rate එක. ඒක market එකේ rate එකක් නොවෙයි, tap එක හරහා හෝ ඒ වාගේ call කරලා සියයට 9.35ට ගන්නවාද කියලා අහනවා. ඒක පළමුවැනි එක. දෙවැනි කාරණය තමයි, සියයට 5.00 සිට සියයට 6.50ට මේක වැඩි කළ නිසා. තුන්වැනි කාරණය Central Bank එකෙන් එදා publish කරලා තිබෙන mark-to-market rate එක සියයට 10.16 නිසා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒකට කලින් සංශෝධන එකතු කළා නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, ඒකට එකතු කිරීමක් කළා සාමාන්‍ය පොලී ඵලදා අනුපාතය කියන එක 9.48 කියලා කියන්නේ documentsවල තිබෙන එකක් නේ. ඒක සෑදුණු ආකාරය ගැන තමයි මෙතුමාගේ interpretation එකක් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සියයට 10.16 කියන එක කොහේවත් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලා කලින් දැම්මා, "මෙම පොලී අනුපාතය නිදහස් වෙළෙඳ පොළේ තීරණය වූ පොලී අනුපාතයක් නොව, සෘජු මිලදී ගැනීම් හරහා මහ බැංකුව මැදිහත් වීම හරහා තීරණය විය." කියලා. ඕනෑ නම් තවත් දෙයක් එතැනට add කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි. එතැනට මේකත් add කරන්න. Mrs. Wickramaratne, අපි මේකත් add කරමුද? "එදින මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශ කරන ලද mark-to-market rate එක සියයට 10.16ක් විය." එපමණයි. Mark-to-market කියන්නේ,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් වෙළෙඳ පොළට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, mark-to-market කියන්නේ, ඒ පොලියට discount කරලා අපේ portfolio එකේ value එක බලන්න ඕනෑ. Mark-to-market rate එක අනුව profit එකක් තිබෙනවා නම්, notional profit එකක් තිබෙනවා. loss එකක් තිබෙනවා නම්, notional loss එකක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට අනෙක් කාරණාවලට යන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "5.5 පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් (perpetual Treasuries) සමාගම විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සඳහා ලංසු තැබීම." එහි දැක්වෙනවා, "ඉහතින් දැක් වූ පරිදි ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසිය රු.බි. 1කට සීමා කළේ නම්, ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්...,-"

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඒ කාරණාව ගැන කථා කරන්න කලින් තවත් දෙයක් ඇතුළත් කරන්න තිබෙනවා. ඒ කාරණාවට පසුවට අදාළ කරුණක්, නමුත් මෙතැනට ගෙනෙනවා නම්, වඩා හොඳයි කියලා මම අදහස් කරනවා. මේක ඉතාමත් වැදගත් කාරණයක්. අපි කෙස් පැලෙන තර්ක ගෙනෙනවා, පෙරවරු 10.47ට මොකක්ද වුණේ, පෙරවරු 10.48ට මොකක්ද වුණේ, Governor මෙතැනට ගියාද, තව දෙදෙනකු අතනට ගියාද, මේක බැලුවාද කියලා. ඒ විධියට අපි බොහෝම ඕනෑකමින් මේක දිහා බලනවා.

මොකද හේතුව, එකක් ගන්නවා වෙනුවට දහයක් ගත්ත නිසා. දැන් බලන්න, ඊළඟ අවුරුද්දේ මාර්තු මාසයේ 40ක් ගන්නවා වෙනුවට 77ක් ගත්තා. එතකොට වැඩිවුණේ 09ක් නොවෙයි 37ක්. එයින් බහුතරයක් ගත්තේ ඇලෝසියස් කියන පුද්ගලයා. එයින් හම්බකරපු ගණන මෙයින් හම්බකරපු ගණනට වඩා අතිවිශාල වුණා. හැබැයි, එතැනදී Governor පැත්ත පළාතකවත් හිටියේ නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකට evidence නැද්ද? 2016 මාර්තු 29 වෙනිදා එකට ඉඳලා නැද්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ එයා කිසිම විධියකට මෙයට සම්බන්ධ වෙලා නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ ඒක මෙතැනදීම ගෙනෙන්න අවශ්‍යයි. අපේ සාමාන්‍ය ජනතාව විශ්වාස කරන්නේ "Govenor මාමා- බෑනාට දුන්නා, ඒ නිසා මූ ගැහුවා, ගහලා කෝටි ගණන් හෙව්වා" කියලායි. අපි හිතනවා, insider informationවලින් තමයි මොහු මෙය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. එතකොට මේ insider information ආවේ Governorගෙන් කියන මතය තමයි මහ ජනතාව ගොඩ නහන්න හදන්නේ. ඒ සඳහා තිබෙන evidence මොනවාද? ඒ වෙනුවට මෙතැන අපට පෙනෙනවා, Governor කිසිම විධියකට සම්බන්ධ නොවී, 2016 මාර්තු 29 වෙනිදා ඊටත් වඩා විශාල මුදලක බැඳුම්කර මොහු ගත්තා කියන එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අනෙක් කාරණය නම් නව මහ බැංකු Governor ඉන්න විටදිත් auctionsවලින් වැඩි හරියක්ම Perpetual Treasuries එකෙන් අරගෙන තිබීමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම අහන්නේ මේ විධියට වෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියලායි. මෙතැන සාධාරණ සැකයක් තිබෙනවා. මම දකින විධියට සැකයක් නැතිව අපිට කියන්න බැහැ, මෙතැන මාමාගෙයි බෑනාගෙයි තිබෙන සම්බන්ධතාව නිසා තමයි බෑනාට මේක ගන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ කියලා. මොකද පළවෙනි අවස්ථාවේ රුපියල් බිලියන 09ක් වැඩි වීම ගැන අපි කෙතරම් හෙව්වාද? නමුත් ඊළඟ අවස්ථාවේදී Governor පැත්තකවත් ඉඳලා නැහැ. ඔහු නොවෙයි තීරණය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ 40ක් ඉල්ලලා, 77ක් දෙන්න තීරණය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ Tender Board Committee එක. මම හිතන්නේ ඒ පරස්පරය ඉදිරියටම ගේන්න වෙනවා. ඒක මුලටම ගේන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries පටන් ගන්නේ මෙතැනින්. මේ විස්තරය ඉදිරිපත් කරලා ඊට පස්සේ එය ඇතුළත් කළා නම් හරි. Then, there is a meaning to it.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි මේ කථා කරන්නේ 27 වෙනිදා බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව ගැනයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, ඒකට පස්සේ , "2016 මාර්තු මාසයේ මේ වාගේ බැඳුම්කරයක් ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා ඒක මෙහෙමයි" කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහෙම දෙයක් තිබෙවා. මෙහි තිබෙන්නේ " 2016 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව නිකුත් කර තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර **සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු-"** නමුත්, මෙතැන සියයට 99 ක් focus එක තිබෙන්නේ පෙබරවාරි ගනුදෙනුව ගැන. අපි in detail ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ පෙබරවාරි ගනුදෙනුව ගැනයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පෙබරවාරි ගනුදෙනුවට වඩා මාර්තු ගනුදෙනුව ලොකුයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක වෙනම කථාවක්. අපි ඒක සම්බන්ධයෙන් in detail ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි ඒ නැත්තේ කියලා තමයි අපි අහන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක කරන්න ඕනෑ. නමුත්, මෙතුමන්ලා එක්ක බැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නෙත්. මේ මාතෘකාව දමන එකේ තේරුම මොකක්ද කියලා මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. මැයි මාසයේ ඒවා අපි බලලාවත් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි මේක මුලම පටන් ගන්නවා නේ. ඉතා වැදගත් එකක් හැටියට මෙහි මුලටම දමන්න ඕනෑ, පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ ගනුදෙනුවේදී Governorගේ යම්කිසි විධියකට සම්බන්ධයක් ඇතැයි **සැකයක්** පහළ වුණා. නමුත් 2016 මාර්තු ගනුදෙනුවේදී ඔහුගේ සම්බන්ධයක්-,

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2015 මාර්තු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 2016 මාර්තු. ඒකෙන් නේ වැඩියෙන් ගහලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ තර්කයට මම ගරු කරනවා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම, ඔය තර්කය apply වෙනවානේ, 2015 මාර්තු-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. 2016 මාර්තු-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 transaction එක ගැන හුඟක් investigate කළා. බිලියන 171ක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම එකක් අරගෙන නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මාර්තු එක කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2015 මාර්තු මාසයේ රුපියල් බිලියන 171ක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒ මාසයටම නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: බිලියන 171ක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා, auctionsවලින්. බිලියන 14ක් තිබෙනවා, private placementsවලින්; 92 per cent from auctions and 8 per cent from private placements. ඔබතුමා කියන තර්කය අදාළයි එහෙම බැලුවොත් එතැන ඉඳලා තිබෙන huge- අපි මේ කථා කරන්නේ Rs. 10 billion වලින් Rs. 5 billion doubt එක ගැන නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකට හේතුව අර දෙකේ තමයි Perpetual Treasuries Limitedලාට වැඩියෙන් ආවේ. මේවාට ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන එකේ වැදගත්කමක් තිබෙනවා. අපි කථා කරන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක ගැනයි, එවකට හිටපු Governor ගැනයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපේ මාතෘකාව මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මාතෘකාව මොකක් වුණත් අපි යථාර්ථය ගැන කථා කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: යථාර්ථය ඒක නොවෙයි. මට ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න. **"**2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිකුත් කර තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධයෙන්" ඒක නේ අපේ focus එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම නම් මෙය වැරැදියි. අපි බලලා තිබෙන්නේ දෙකයි නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What is your point? Tell us in short මේකේ auction එකෙන් වැඩියෙන් -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is not the issue. Auctionsවලට දුන්නාද කියන එක නොවෙයි නේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, auction ක්‍රමය වැරැදි නම්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Auction ක්‍රමය වැරැදියි කියන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Direct Placement ක්‍රමය වඩා prudent තෝරා ගැනීම විය යුතුව තිබියදී එක දිගට, 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 යම් ක්‍රියාවලියක් පටන් අරගෙන 2015 මාර්තු මාසයේ auctions වලින් රුපියල් **බිලියන** 171 collect කරලා, ඊට පස්සේ බිලියන 44, 35, 82, 99, 100, 57, 55, 20, 29, 61, 37, 135, 30, 114 continuously අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. එතකොට, අපි දැනට deeply investigate කරලා තිබෙන්නේ පෙබරවාරි 27 ප්‍රශ්නය ගැන විතරයි. හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා සියල්ලම මහහැරලා, -වුවමනාවෙන් නොවෙයි කියලා මම දන්නවා - 2016 මාර්තු මාසයේ බිලියන 135 total ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා - එහි තිබෙන මාර්තු 29 transaction එක ගැන විතරක් කථා කරනවා. අපේ Report එකෙත් ඒක තිබෙනවා. මම අහන ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. අපේ mandate එක වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ මේ සියලුම auctions ගැන සොයන්නයි. ඒක තමයි අපේ mandate එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට මම පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්, සොයන්න බාධාවක් හෝ පරීක්ෂණවලට බාධාවක් නොවෙයි. අපේ මාතෘකාව එහෙම තිබුණා වුණාට, - විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවල එහෙම දිගටම මාතෘකාව පාවිච්චි කරලා තිබෙන නිසා- හැඳින්වීමේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට බලන්න පුළුවන්, මේකේ නිශ්චිත කරලා තිබෙනවා මේ විධියට:

අපේ මාතෘකාව තිබෙන්නේ එහෙම වුණාට, එම මාතෘකාව දිගටම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ හැම වාර්තාවකම පාවිච්චි කරලා තිබෙන නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලාට හැඳින්වීමේ බලන්න පුළුවන්. මේකේ නිශ්චිත කරලා තිබෙනවා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව මඟින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 වැනි දින සිදු කරන ලද 30 අවුරුදු බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවේදී අක්‍රමිකතාවන් සිදුවී ඇති බවත්, එම නිසා මූල්‍යමය පාඩුවක් රජයට හා රටට සිදුවී ඇති බවත් පවසමින් 2015 බෙපරවාරි මාසයේදී එවකට පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රී මහාචාර්ය ජී.එල්. පීරිස් මහතා ඇතුළු මන්ත්‍රීවරු ගණනාවක් අත්සන් කරන ලද න්‍යාය පුස්තකයට ඇතුළත් කරපු යෝජනාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ යෝජනාව අනුව ඒ පිළිබඳ සොයා බලා වාර්තා කිරීමට තමයි 2015 මැයි මාසයේදී ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් නීතිඥ ගාමිණි පිටිපන මහතා ඇතුළු පිරිසක් නම් කර කමිටුවක් පත් කළේ. ඒ කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව තමයි 2015 මැයි මාසයේ 19 වැනි දින ගරු ලක්ෂ්මන් කිරිඇල්ල මහතා විසින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ සභාගත කළේ. ඒක න්‍යාය පුස්තකයට ඇතුළත් කරලා ඒ යෝජනාව පිළිබඳව තමයි පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ අනුකාරක සභාවක් මඟින් පූර්ණ විමර්ශනයක් සිදු කිරීම වඩා යෝග්‍ය යැයි ගරු කථානායකතුමා 2015 මැයි 20 දින පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී ප්‍රකාශ කළේ. ඒ අනුව තමයි අපට මේ පරීක්ෂණය එන්නේ. එතකොට ආරම්භය ගත්තොත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 වසරේ මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ සිදුවූ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධව වාර්තාවක් සකස් කිරීම නොවෙයි ඇත්තටම තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක අපි වාර්තාවේ නමට යොදා ගත්තාට බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව ගැන නිශ්චිත කාරණාවක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට පසුව second mandate එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකේ මාතෘකාව වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම වෙනස් වෙන්න බැහැ. නව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පටන් ගනිද්දි අපට කවුද mandate එක දුන්නේ? හරි නම් අවසන් වූ කරුණු අවසන් වෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් ඉවරයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නමුත් කාලය ඉතිරි කරන ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නිසා අපි කලින් evidence ගන්න එකඟ වුණා. මේ අලුත් පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තේරී පත් වුණාම අපේ COPE එකට නැවත වරක් mandate එකක් යම් තැනකින් ලැබුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: කාරක සභාව නේ ඊට පසුව තීරණය කළේ. මේ කාරක සභාව විසින් තමයි තීරණය කළේ. මහ බැංකුව කැදෙව්වාට පසුව කාරක සභාව එකඟතාවකට ආවා බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් වාර්තාවක් සකස් කළ යුතුයි කියලා. එතකොට වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම කියලා අදහස් වුණේම මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ගැන තමයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමා වෙන්න. මම මේ කියන්න යන්නේ ඉතිරි ටික දැන් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා නොවෙයි. ඒක නොවෙයි කියන්න යන්නේ. ඉතිරි ඒවා හොයන්න කියලා නොවෙයි මම කියන්න යන්නේ. දැන් මේක දිගටම සිදු වෙනවා. අපේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන්නේ සිද්ධි දෙකක් ගැන විතරයි. මගේ තර්කය මොකක්ද දන්නවාද? ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා තර්කයක් මතු කළා නේ "2016 මාර්තු මාසයේ 29 වැනි දින මහේන්ද්‍රන් කෙනෙක් නැත; එහෙම floor එකකට ඇවිල්ලත් නැත: ඒත් වැඩේ වෙලාය" කියලා. එක සිද්ධියක මහේන්ද්‍රන් ඉන්නවා, අනෙක් සිද්ධියේ මහේන්ද්‍රන් නැහැ. අතර මැද තිබෙන සිද්ධි, තොරතුරු අපි ළඟ තිබෙනවා. Trend එකකුත්

තිබෙනවා. එතකොට අපි හොයලා බලලා තිබෙනවාද අඩු ගණනේ ඔය කියන PTL සමාගමට ඔය කාලය තුළ බිලියන එකසිය ගණන් යද්දි, auction වෙද්දි ඒකෙන් කොපමණ ප්‍රමාණයක් මේ PTL සමාගමට ගිහින් තිබෙනවාද කියලා. එච්චරයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන එකේ වැදගත්කමක් තිබෙනවා. PTL එක ලාභ ගත්ත එක ගැන හැම තැනම කථා කරනවා නේ. එහෙම ලාභ අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ මේ සිද්ධියෙන් විතරක් නොවෙයි නේ. අර ඔක්කොම එක්ක නේ. මේ සිද්ධියෙන් ලාභ ගත්ත විධියට නේ වේදිකාවලයි, හැම තැනම කථා කරන්නේ. නමුත් ලාභ අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ අවුරුද්දේම කරපු අනෙක් සියලු දෙයින්ම නේ. අපි හදන වාර්තාවේ අවසානයේ මේ point එක දමමු.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී. සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එක එක bond එකේදී වෙන වෙනම percentage එක තිබෙනවා. Bond-wise තිබෙනවා එක එක ආයතනයට ගිය percentage එක -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Bonds වැඩියෙන් ගත්ත අය කොහේද ඉන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හැම එකක් ගැනම තිබෙනවා කියලා කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහෙම තේරුම් ගත්තොත් හරි. අපි මේ කාරක සභාවට මහ බැංකු නිලධාරින් කැඳවපු අවස්ථාවේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ප්‍රශ්න කළේ, සාකච්ඡා කළේ නිශ්චිතව පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ මාර්තු මාසයේ සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනු දෙක ගැන තමයි. නමුත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ සියලුම බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳ සවිස්තර වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපට evidence තිබෙනවා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Secret නිසා නම දැම්මේ නැහැ. කේ.එච්.ඒ. එහෙම කියලා දමලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි දැන් එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ ඇත්ත නම් දමන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි දැන් කොහොමත් එහෙම නේ තීරණය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මේක ඉතාම වැදගත්. මොකද, රටේ කථාව යන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක මෙච්චර මුදලක් උපයලා තිබෙනවා, ඔක්කොම හොරකමින් උපයලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා නේ. එතකොට අපි සොයලා දෙන්න ඕනෑ මොකක්ද ඒ සොරකම කියලා. Auction එකෙන් කොහොමද සොරකම් කරන්නේ කියලා අපි ක්‍රමවේදයක් සොයලා දෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපි දැන් පළමු වැනි එකෙන් සොයා ගන්න උත්සාහ කරනවා. ඊට පසුව හැම auction එකෙන්ම කොහොමද මේ හොරේ වෙන්නේ කියලා අපි නිගමනයක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අවසානයට කියන්න තිබෙන දේ මම දැන්මම කියන්නම්. ඇත්ත කථාව මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ අධික අසීමිත, ලාභයට හේතුව ඒ අයට කාරණා දෙකකින් advantage එකක් තිබීමයි. එකක් තමයි මාමා අධිපති වුණත්, නැතත් insider information ඒ අයට continuously ලැබෙනවා. දෙවැනි එක තමයි capital market එකේ මේ අය ලොකුවට play කරන නිසා අනෙක් ඔක්කොටොම වඩා capital advantage එකක් තිබෙනවා. අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bonds අවලංගු කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ. බැංකුව හරි, කවුරු හරි, මොනවා හරි මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය නීතියේ frame එකට ඇතුල් වෙනවා. අපේ කෙටුම්පතේ තිබෙන අවසාන නිගමනය - අපි transactions දෙකක් ගැන විතරක් කිව්වත්, මුල් එකේ මහේන්ද්‍රන් කෙනෙක් ඉන්නවා. දෙවැනි එකේ මහේන්ද්‍රන්ගේ personal involvement එකක් නැහැ. Still the same thing happens. එතකොට ඉතුරු ඒවායේ අපට එහෙම evidence එකක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන කාරණය හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතයට එකඟ වෙන්න වෙනවා. මම අවසානයේ කියන්න යන එක දැන් කියන්නම්. නැත්නම් ඇයි මම මේක කියන්නේ කියලා හිතයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතයට එකඟ වෙන්න අපට යම් හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා. Mature වෙච්ච නැති market එකක free auctionsවලට යන්න යන තීරණයේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ හැම ගනුදෙනුවක්ම එකින් එක එකින් එක investigation කළේ නැහැ. අපි මේ ගනුදෙනුවලදී අනාවරණය කර ගත් කරුණු ප්‍රමාණයක් මත තමයි මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්නේ. මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. එම නිසාම අපේ නිර්දේශයේ තිබෙනවා "මේ ප්‍රශ්නගත බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවට සම්බන්ධ පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ් ආයතනය ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලෙස ඉතා කෙටි කාලයක් තුළ අධික ලාභයක් උපයා ඇති අතර එසේ ලාභ ඉපයීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ පූර්ණ බලැති යාන්ත්‍රණයක් මඟින් පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු අතර - අපි එහෙම පරීක්ෂණය කළා නම් එහෙම දෙයක් දමන්නේ නැහැ නේ- එමඟින් ඔවුන්ගේ කටයුතු හරහා මහ බැංකුවට හා රජයට මූල්‍යමය පාඩුවක් සිදුවී ඇත්දැයි ඉතා ඉතා කඩිනමින් අනාවරණය කර ගැනීම මහ

බැංකුවේ වගකීමක් ලෙස කාරක සභාව තරයේ විශ්වාස කරයි" කියලා

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම නිගමනයට මගේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකෙන් අදහස් කරන්නේ අපි මේ කාරක සභාවේදී පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ් ආයතනය ගැන සම්පූර්ණ පරීක්ෂණයක් කළේ නැහැ කියන එක නේ. එම නිසා එවැනි පරීක්ෂණයක අවශ්‍යතාව තමයි එම නිර්දේශයෙන් අනාවරණය වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ report එකේ මතු පිට කියවෙන්න ඕනෑ, annexure එකක් විධියට නොවෙයි. මම timing ගැන කිව්වා වගේ, මේ report එකේ මතු පිට කියවෙන්න ඕනෑ - නිගමනවල මේ ආයතනය ගැන විශේෂයෙන් කියනවා නේ. එහෙම නම් අපි ඔය දවසේ ඉඳලා 2016 වසරේ මැයි මාසය දක්වා තිබුණ auctionsවලදී සහ direct placementsවලදී මේ සමාගම කොපමණ bonds ප්‍රමාණයක් මිලදී ගත්තාද කියන එක සහ මොන rate එකටද ගත්තේ කියන එක අපේ වාර්තාවේ ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. අමුතුවෙන් සාක්ෂි අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. අපට දැනට තිබෙන evidence අනුව. ඒකට අපි එකඟ වෙමුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒක පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ් ආයතනය ගැන තිබෙන කොටසට ඇතුළත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙනම පරිච්ඡේදයක් විධියට ඇතුළත් කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. Attachmentsවල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Recommend කරන්න අපට හරියටම හේතුවක් තිබෙන්න එපායැ. මේ specific සිද්ධියට තිබෙන සම්බන්ධයට අමතරව අවරුදු 1 ½ක් මේ unhealthy සංසිද්ධිය සිදු වෙනවා.

ඒක වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා specifically මේ transaction හැම එකකම PTL සමාගමේ පංගුව - ප්‍රමාණය- ප්‍රතිශතයක් විධියට දාලා ඔබතුමා කියපු recommendation එකට match කරන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන කොටස ඇතුළු කරන්නේ කොතැනටද? ඒ ඇතුළු කරන ආකාරයත් සමහම කිව්වොත් ලේසියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: " පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් (Perpetual Treasuries) සමාගම විසින් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සඳහා ලංසු තැබීම - ඉහතින් දැක්වූ පරිදි ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසිය රු.බි.1කට සීමා කළේ නම් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් 7දෙනා හැරුණු විට එදිනට ලැබී තිබූ එකතුව රු. බිලියන 20,708ක් වූ සියලුම මිල ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම් වලින් සියයට 75ක ප්‍රමාණයක් සඳහා මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම ඇතුළු වෙනත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට අවස්ථාවක් නොතිබූ බව ඉහත වගුවෙන් පැහැදිලි වේ...." කියලා තිබෙනවා. " වෙනත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට අවස්ථාවක් නොතිබූ බව..." කියලා අපට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? Auction එකක් කියන්නේ ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට ඕනෑම ගණනක් දමන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තියෙන්නේ, මේ අනු පිළිවෙළට ඇවිත් රුපියල් බිලියනයකට සීමා වුණා නම්, ඒ රුපියල් බිලියනයට එන අය තමයි ඉහළ සිට තියෙන්නේ. රුපියල් බිලියනයට එන අය අතරේ Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ. ඒක නිශ්චිතයි නේ. ඒක වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා කියන්න බැහැ නේ. Bank of Ceylon ගණනට ඉල්ලුවා නම් වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "එදින වෙන්දේසිය මඟින් නිකුත් කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කළ රු.බි 1ක මුදල රු.බිලියන 10.058 දක්වා වැඩි කිරීමට තීරණය කිරීම හේතුවෙන් ඉහත සඳහන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳුන් 07දෙනා අතරද නොසිටි Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම එදින නිකුත් කරන ලද මුළු බැඳුම්කර වටිනාකමින් 50%ක් එනම් රු.බිලියන 5ක් ලබා ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව උදා වී තිබීම කැපී පෙනෙන ලක්ෂයක් වූ බවත් (ඇමුණුම 1 හි ඇමුණුම xxv බලන්න - පිටුව 114) මෙහිදී එම රු.බිලියන 5කින් රු.බිලියන 2ක් සෘජුවමත් රු.බිලියන 3ක් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු වූ ලංකා බැංකුව හරහා වක්‍රාකාරයෙනුත් ලබා ගැනීමට එම සමාගම කටයුතු කර තිබූ බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි."

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහි perception එක තමයි, Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම bid කළාද, නැද්ද, ඒ නම් වැටෙනවාද? කියලා මෙතැනදී පේනවා වාගේ. එතැනදී ඇත්තටම bid කරලා තියෙන්නේ කවුද?, නැත්තේ කවුද? කියලා දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි pre නිගමනයට ඇවිත් මේ ටික ලියන්නේ. මම එහෙම ලියනවාට විරුද්ධ නැහැ. අපට හොරා ඔහොමයි කියලා ලියන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒක කැමැති විධියට සඳහන් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 1ක් හම්බ වුණා නම් හම්බ වෙන්නේ නැහැ; රුපියල් බිලියන 2ක් ලැබුණොත් මෙහෙමයි; රුපියල්

බිලියන 5ක් ලැබුණොත් මෙහෙමයි කියලා අපි මෙතැනදී නිගමනයකට එනවා නේ. ඔය විධියට එක ගනුදෙනුවක් ගත්තොත් ඕනෑ විධියට හැම වෙන්දේසියක්ම එකින්එක විග්‍රහ කරන්න පුළුවන්. දහයක් ඇතුළත මෙන්න මේ ගණන සමාගමට ලැබුණා කියන එක හරි. පළමු වැනි බිලියනය තීන්දු කළේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පමණක් නම්, වෙන කවුරුවත් නොවෙයි නම්, ඒත් මේ කාරණය නිවැරැදියි. අපට ලැබුණු ඔක්කොම සාධක අනුව තියෙන්නේ, ඒ තීන්දුව ගත්තේ එතුමා නොවෙයි කියලා. අපි මෙතැනදී වෙනම නැවත හඳුන්වනවා. බිලියනයක් හම්බ වුණා නම් ඔහුට කීයක්වත් හම්බ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. 1.7ක් හම්බ වුණා නම් හම්බ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. 2.5ක් හම්බ වුණා නම්-

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපේ පරීක්ෂණය ඒක නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් 2.5ක් වුණා නම් කියලාත් දමන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකත් ඊට පස්සේ තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තියෙන්නේ කොහේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැන නොවෙයි. ඊළඟ තැන්වල තියෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ තියෙන්නේ loss calculation එකේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ loss calculation එකේ. ඒක එන්න ඕනෑ මෙතැනට නේ. මෙතැනදී අපි හොරා මෙහෙමයි, සිද්ධිය මේකයි කියලා. එහෙම නම් මේකත් දමන්න ඕනෑ. 1.3ක් ගත්තා නම් මේ ගණන හම්බ වෙනවා. 2.5ක් ගත්තා නම් මේ ගණන ලැබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ටික ඇතුළු කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක අයින් කළා කියලා ගැටලුවක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මෙච්චර හම්බ වුණාම මෙච්චරයි කියලා, ඒක වෙනම වගුවක් හැටියට දැම්මාම හරි. හැබැයි, එහි තේරුමක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට කොහොමද වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමන්ලා කරන්න ඕනෑ විධිය කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 2010 වර්ෂයේ Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමට සියයට 5ක් ලැබුණා කියන එක හරි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක ගැලෙව්වොත් වෙන්නේ, කලින් Report එකේ තියෙනවා. මේ Report එකේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි අයින් කරන්නේ අනවශ්‍ය ඒවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි මේ තියෙන ඒවා පුළුවන් තරම් තියා ගන්න බලමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ ටික තියන්න. රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දුන්නොත් කිසි දෙයක් ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක වටිනවා නම් දමන්න. රුපියල් බිලියන 10න් සියයට 50ක් - රුපියල් බිලියන 5ක්- හම්බ වුණා කියන එක තමයි, මා දකින විධියට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. දෙකයි දශම ගණනකට තීන්දු කළා නේ. එතකොට කීයක් ලැබෙනවාද? එහෙම එකින්එකට එකින්එකට ගන්න බැහැ නේ. එකක් ඉල්ලුවා නම් මෙහෙමයි; 1.7ක් තීන්දු කළේ කවුද? 2.5ක් වුණා නම් කීයද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 2.6ටත් නැහැ නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එකක් බිලියනයේ bid කරපු එක, අනෙක් එක බිලියන 10ට ගත්ත එක. Justify වෙන figures දෙකයි තියෙන්නේ. එකක් auction එක අනෙක් එක ගත්ත එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක එහෙමම තියමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහෙමත් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. 20ම ගත්තා නම්, Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමට යන ගණනත් දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක මේ වාර්තාවේ තියෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වෙනම තියෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "2005 පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේදී මුල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ ලංකා බැංකුවේ හැසිරීම - මෙදින බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේදී පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම මඟින් කරන ලද ඉල්ලීමකට අනුව එම සමාගම වෙනුවෙන් ....." ලංකා බැංකුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් audit එකක් කරලා තියෙන නිසා, මේක අපට අවශ්‍යද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: කමක් නැහැ. ඒක තිබුණා කියලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේදී ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වය - දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් නිකුත් කිරීමට නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණේ රු.බිලියන 1 බැඳුම්කර පමණි. එසේ වුවද එම ප්‍රමාණය මෙන් දස ගුණයකටත් වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් එනම්, රු.බිලියන 10.058ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීමට 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වන දින වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන් ද අනතුරුව පැය 12.30 සිට පැය 13.10, දක්වා පැවැත්වුනු අංක 2/2015 දරන භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර ටෙන්ඩර්

කමිටුව (Treasury Bond Tender Committee) විසින් තීරණය කර තිබුණි (ඇමුණුව xxiv). මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ ඉහත තීරණය ගෙන ඇත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන්ද අනතුරුව බවය..." වෙන්දේසියෙන් අනතුරු නේ තීන්දුව ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ ඒක අනවශ්‍යයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අනවශ්‍යයි. ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව තීන්දුව ගන්නේ වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව නොවෙයි ද? ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව තීන්දුව ගන්නේ වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව නේ. මෙහිදී ඒක වැදගත් කරුණක් නොවෙයි. ඊට කලින් තීන්දුව ගත්තා නම් තමයි වැදගත් කරුණක් වෙන්නේ. වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් වෙන්න කලින් ගත්තා නම් තමයි, වැදගත් කරුණක් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එයින් කියන්න අදහස් කළේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහි තියෙනවා. " මෙය ඉහත 5.1.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් කර ඇති දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් රු.බිලියන 12.550ක් ඍජු ක්‍රමයෙන් සපුරා ගැනීමට කර තිබූ තීරණයෙන් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් බැහැර වීමකි." කියලා. ඒක කියන්න තමයි ඉහළින් සඳහන් කළ කරුණ කියන්නේ. ඒක වැරැදියි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මෙතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ Tender Committee එක නොවෙයි. DDMC එකේ monthly cash flow එක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන එහෙම එකක් දාලා නැහැ නේ.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: එතැන "ඉහත තීරණය" කියන්නේ පළමුවෙන්ම තියෙන එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. පළමුවෙන් රුපියල් බිලියනයක් ගන්න තීන්දු කළා. ඊළඟට " ....ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව (Treasury Bond Tender Committee) විසින් තීරණය කර තිබුණි." කියන තැනින් අවසන් නේ. වෙන වැදගත් කරුණක් නැහැ.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: -DDMC එකෙන්- ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවෙන් මුළු මාසයටම අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණය ඊට කලින් මාසයේ තීරණය කරනවා. ඒක මාසය පටන් ගන්න කලින් ඒ ගොල්ලන් approve කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේක ගන්නේ මොන ක්‍රමයටද; වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයටද කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කියන්නේ මේ decision එක ගත්තේ වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව කියලා. ඒක understood නේ. රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දාලා බිලියන 10ක් ගත්තාම ඒක වෙන්දේසියෙන් පස්සේ වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මාසයටම තියෙන requirement එක identify කරනවා නේ. ඒ සම්පූර්ණ schedule එක මාසය පටන් ගන්න කලින් අනුමත වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. මේ ටෙන්ඩර් එක මාර්තු මාසයට අදාළව නේ ගන්නේ. හැබැයි, ඒ ටෙන්ඩර් එක අනුමත කරන්නේ මේ තීරණය ගත්තාට පස්සේ. ඒ කියන්නේ DDMC එක රැස් වෙන්නේ මේ තීරණ ගත්තාට පසුවයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ ඉහත තීරණය ගෙන ඇත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවැත්වීමෙන්ද අනතුරුව නොවෙයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මෙහි වැදගත් කරුණ වන්නේ Tender Board එක තීන්දුව ගත්තාට, ණය මණ්ඩලය ගන්න ඕනෑ තීන්දුව, Tender Board එකේ තීන්දුව අර ගෙන වැඩේ කළාට පස්සේ ගත්තා කියන එකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක මෙහෙම වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. "මෙම නිරීක්ෂණයේ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10.058 ගැනීම සඳහා තීරණය ගෙන ඇත්තේ මේ දිනට පසුවය." කියන එක එන්න ඕනෑ. දිනයක් දාලා කියන්න ඕනෑ, ඒ දිනට පසුවය කියලා.

වෙනත් කාරණා කියන්නේ නැතුව, දිනයක් දාලා කියන්න ඕනෑ ඒ දිනට පසුවය කියලා. මේකේ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ, බිලියන 10.058 ගැනීමට තීරණය ගෙන ඇත්තේ මෙන්න මේ දිනෙන් පසුවය කියලා, දිනය දැම්මා නම් හරි. "තීන්දුව ගත්තේ වෙන්දේසිය පැවතීමෙන් අනතුරුව බව" කියලා තිබෙනවා.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය : බිලියන 10.058ට කියන්නේ Tender Committee එකේ decision එක නේ. DMC එක කියන්නේ බිලියන එකයි, බිලියන 172 කියන ගණන නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක කලිනුයි කියන්නේ.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය : ඒක මාසයක programme එක නේ. ඒ මාසයේ programme එක අනුමත වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම නම් මෙහෙම දාන්න ඕනෑ. "Debt Department එකේ තීන්දුව වූයේ, මේ බිලියන එකත්, බිලියන 170ත්

ගැනීමය. නමුත්, මෙහිදී විශේෂ කරුණ වූයේ බිලියන එකකට දාලා බිලියන දහයයි දශම ගණනක් එදිනම වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගැනීමයි.'' කියලා.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය : වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව ලබා ගැනීමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව නොවෙයි. වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගැනීමයි. ''වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව'' කියලා කිව්වොත් වෙන තේරුමක් එන්නේ. ''වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගැනීමයි'' කියලා එන්න ඕනෑ. ''වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව ලබා ගැනීමයි'' කියලා කිව්වොත්, ඒකෙන් අහස් වෙන්නේ හොරයක් කරනවා වාගේ දෙයකුයි. වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුව නේ තීන්දුව ගන්නේ, දහයයි දශම ගණන ගන්න. වෙන්දේසිය ඉවර වුණාම තමයි තීන්දු කරන්නේ 10.058 ගන්න. ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව ගත්තු තීන්දුව වුණේ, බිලියන එකයි, බිලියන 170යි ගන්න එක. නමුත් මෙහි විශේෂ කරුණ වන්නේ, බිලියන එකක් වෙන්දේසියට දාලා, එදිනම වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් වූ පසු බිලියන 10.058ක් ගැනීමට තීන්දු කිරීමයි.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය : ඒ ටෙන්ඩර් කොමිටි එකෙන්. ඒ වුණාට DDMC එක, එදා හවස තීරණය කරනවා, බිලියන එකයි ගන්නේ කියලා. එදා උදේ බිලියන එකයි කියලා බිලියන 10.058කට ගියා නේ. එතකොට ටෙන්ඩර් කොමිටිය decide කරලා ඉවරයි. එදා full auction ගියා. මේ ගොල්ලන් හවස ආපහු තීරණය කරනවා, මේ මුළු මාසයටම direct placement යන්නේ එක බිලියනයයි. අනෙක් 170ම ගන්නේ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Direct placements නොවෙයි, auction.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය : එක බිලියනයක් auction යනවා. අනෙක් ඔක්කෝම යන්නේ direct placements කියලා programme එක අනුමත කරනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ කොයි කාලයේදිද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : ඒක කරන්නේ මේ ටෙන්ඩර් එක ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක මම දන්නවා.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: It is a ratification.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramarathne: That is the whole programme for the month.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මෙහෙම දැම්මොත් හරි. මම මේ කියන ටික ලියා ගන්න. මෙහෙම ආවොත් හරිද කියලා බලන්න. ''මෙදින ණය කමිටුවේ තීන්දුව වනුයේ, බිලියන එකක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබාගෙන ඉතුරු බිලියන 170 මෙන්න මේ කාලය තුළ ලබා ගැනීමයි'' කියලා. ඒ කාලය ඔබතුමාන්ලා දා ගන්න. මාසයක් තුළ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක පුදුම වැඩක් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : භාෂාව දාලා ඊට පස්සේ කථා කරමු. මේ ටික ඇතුළත් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ''දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් නිකුත් කිරීමට නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණේ'' කියන තැනට මේ කෑල්ලම දාන්න පුළුවන්. ''මෙහිදී නිරීක්ෂණය වූ වැදගත්ම කරුණ වන්නේ, බිලියන එකක් වෙන්දේසියේ කැඳවා වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් වීමෙන් පසුව බිලියන 10.058ක් ගැනීමට ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව තීරණය කිරීමයි. තවද, අනෙකුත් වැදගත් කරුණ වන්නේ එදිනම කියලා වෙලාව දාලා මෙම බිලියන 10.058 ගැනීමේ තීන්දුවෙන් පසුව ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව රැස්වී බිලියන එකක් වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගැනීමටත්, ඉතිරි මුදල direct placements එකේ-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක ටිකක් confuse වෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මේ තිබෙන එක නේ. I have to say that.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඇයි, අපි ඒක දන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Why is there a confusion? ඔබතුමන්ලා අහන්නේ ඒක නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : අපට අදහස විධියට ගන්න වෙන්නේ මේකයි. දේශීය ණය කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව තමයි මොන ක්‍රමයටද යන්නේ කියන එක තීරණය කරලා ඉදිරි මාසය සඳහා ණය programme එක අනුමත කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම plan කළාම, ඒ අනුව කරන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම plan කළාම ඒ guideline එක අනුව කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : එහෙම තමයි කරන්නේ. මේ කියන programme එක මාර්තු මාසයටයි අනුමත කරන්නේ. ඒ මාසයට අදාළ ටෙන්ඩර් එක තියලා ටෙන්ඩර් එක ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ ආපහු DDMC එක රැස් වෙලා තමයි මේක අනුමත කරන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එතකොට මේ ගොල්ලන් අනුමත කරන්න ඕනෑ, බිලියන 10ක් ගත්තා කියලා නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : ඒක තමයි. ඒ programme එකේ තිබෙන්නේ Rs. 1 billion එකට

auction යන්නත්, ඉතුරු ප්‍රමාණය direct placement යන්නත්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක footnote එකක් හැටියට දැම්මා නම් හොඳයි. නැත්නම් මේක පැටලෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. Rs. 1 billion එකට auction යන්න ඉතුරු ප්‍රමාණය direct placements ගන්න කියලා DDMC එකේ හදපු report එක ඒ විධියටම ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඊට පස්සේ අනුමත කරනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක පුදුම වැඩක් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : හැබැයි, ක්‍රියාවලිය සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ වෙන විධියකට. ක්‍රියාවලිය සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ, Rs. 1 billion වෙනුවට Rs. 10 billion අරගෙන. ඒක නොවෙයි ආපසු නැවත ඒ ගොල්ලන් තහවුරු කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒකට වෙනම heading එකක් දාලා ඒක මෙතැන සිදු විය නොහැකි දෙයක් හරි සිදුවීමක් හැටියට හරි දාන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ. නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහෙම දැම්මා නම් හරි. මෙතැනට වෙන කල් ඉවර කර තීරණය ගෙන තිබුණි. වරහන් ඇතුළේ දාන්න මේ කාරණය. වැදගත් කරුණක් වන්නේ මේ අනුමත කරපු රුපියල් බිලියන 10.058-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : වරහන් ඇතුළේ දාන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "රුපියල් බිලියන 10.058 ගැනීමෙන් පසුව එදින සවස ණය මණ්ඩලය විසින් නැවත කලින් ගත්තු තීන්දුව අනුමත කිරීම" කියලා වාක්‍ය ගළපලා දාන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : "සිදු කර තිබීමයි." කියලා දාන්න. ඒ කියන්නේ, ණය මණ්ඩලය මුලින් ගත්තු තීරණයම නැවත-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : රුපියල් බිලියන 10.058ට ගත්තාට පස්සේත් ආපසු ගන්නවා. ඒකට document එකක් තිබෙනවාද? මට ඒක confusing. මම ඒක කලින් දැක්කේ නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : Minute එකක් ගහනවා, monthly programme එකේම-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් බලන්න, කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඊළඟ කාරණයට යමු.

6. "2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හැකිව තිබූ විකල්ප ක්‍රම තුනක් සහ ඒවායේ ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි - අවාසි පිළිබඳ විශ්ලේෂණයක් 2015 – 2016 මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව මඟින් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි.

6.1. බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව රුපියල් බිලියන 1කට සීමා කළේ නම් ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය"

මේක නේ වැදගත් කාරණය. මේකෙන් ගොඩක් දුරට ඉවර වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අපි මේ අවාසිය කියලා එකක් හදනවා. ඒ අවාසිය හදන්නේ කොහොමද? විගණකාධිපතිතුමා තීරණය කරනවා, බිලියන එකට වඩා ගත්තු නිසා difference එක Rs. 1.4 billion. Rs. 1.4 billion කියන එකේ ලංසු මිල රුපියල් 104.5073. හරි නේද? එතකොට රුපියල් 104.5073 cut-off එකක් හැටියට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ගන්නවා. ඒ තමයි ETF එකෙන් එන හත්වැනි bid එක. ඊට පස්සේ අටවැනි bid එක එන්නේ 103.1158කට. එතකොට ඒ දෙක අතර තිබෙන වෙනස බලනවා. රුපියල් 104.5073 සහ රුපියල් 103.1158 කියන එකේ ශත ගණනක වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. රුපියල් සියයට මේ ශත ගණනේ වෙනස නම්, bid එකේ amount එකෙන් ඒක වැඩි කරනවා. මේ අවස්ථාවේ bid එක රුපියල් මිලියන 50යි. ඒක loss එක හැටියට අපි සඳහන් කරනවා. මේ විධියට තමයි ඊළඟ එකට යන්නේ. ඊළඟට, "ජේ" කියන bid එක ගත්තොත් රුපියල් 102.20 රුපියල් 104න් අඩු කරනවා. ඒ වෙනස ගන්නවා. දාලා තිබෙන bid එක මිලියන 100යි. ඒකෙන් වැඩි කරලා loss එක හදනවා. අවසාන bid එක තමයි රුපියල් 90ට තිබෙන්නේ. එතැන රුපියල් 14.33ක වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. රුපියල් 100ට රුපියල් 14 නම්, රුපියල් බිලියන තුනට රුපියල් මිලියන 430යි කියලා loss එක හදනවා. අපි තේරුම් ගනිමු, මේ විධියට තමයි මේ loss එක හදලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එතකොට, ඒක හරිද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ විධියට තමයි මේ loss එක calculate කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. මෙහි තිබෙන පරස්පරය මෙයයි. මේ Report එකේ මුලින්ම කියනවා, "සියයට වැඩි නම් ආණ්ඩුවට පාඩුවක් වෙන්න බැහැ." කියලා. "100ට අඩු නම් තමයි පාඩුව තිබෙන්නේ. සියයට වැඩි නම් ආණ්ඩුවට ලාභයකුයි තිබෙන්නේ" කියලා තිබෙනවා.

එතකොට මූලික ගැටලුව එනවා, 104 එහෙම නම් කොහොමද පාඩුවක් වෙනෙන් කියලා. 103 පාඩු වෙන්නේ කොහොමද, 102 - ඔහොම ගිහිල්ලා G වෙනි bid එක වෙනකල් - කවුද දන්නේ නැහැ, G

කියන පුද්ගලයා මිලියන 50ක bid එකක් දමලා තිබෙනවා, රුපියල් සියයට; 99.9990ට. ඒ bid එක වෙනකල් පාඩුවක් වෙන්න බැහැ, අපේ Auditor Generalගේ report එකේ තිබෙන තර්කයට අනුව. එතකොට මූලික තර්කය - ඉස්සර වෙලා මම ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්. ඉස්සර වෙලා ඒක කියන්න, පිළිතුර කොහොමද කියලා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: සියයේ කථාව ඇත්තටම මෙතැනට සම්බන්ධ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, අපි දැන් මේ ගනුදෙනුවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි කථා කරන්නේ. එතකොට මේකෙදී ක්‍රමවේදයක් අනුගමනය කරනවා. ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව තමයි අපි auction එකේ ඔය Rs. 1 billion කථාව තිබෙන්නේ, ඉල්ලපු ප්‍රමාණය. එතකොට ඒ Rs. 1 billion ගැනීම සඳහා යම් ක්‍රමවේදයක් යනවා. එතකොට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදය අනුගමනය කළා නම් ඇති වන තත්ත්වය ගැන තමයි මේ කථා කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ ක්‍රමවේදයේ ඔය 104 කියන කාරණය තිබෙන්නේ ඒකයි. එතැන එතකොට ධන පැත්තට යනවා නම් අධි මිලක් යටතේ යන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට අධි මිලට ඉල්ලුම් තිබෙනවා. මීට පිටි පස්සේ තවත් තිබෙනවා, මීටත් වැඩි මිලට. එතැනට අපි අර ගෙන ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ. මෙතැනින් පස්සේ ටික විතරයි. මෙතැනින් තව උඩට ගිහිල්ලා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මේ amount එක තමයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන amount එක. එතකොට calculation එක එතැනින් පටන් අර ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ ඒ විධියට තමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට දැන් මෙතැන තිබෙන - අපි මේක සාකච්ඡා කරමුකෝ. දැන් එතකොට අරකයි මේකයි දෙකම වෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද, අරකයි මේකයි කියන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට දැන් අපි කියනවා නම් සමස්තයක් හැටියට රුපියල් සියයෙන් පහළට විතරයි නම් රජයට පාඩු වෙන්නේ, රුපියල් සියයට ඉහළ නම් පාඩු වෙන්න බැහැ. එතකොට අපි මේ දෙකෙන් එකක් ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. එක්කෝ අපි ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ මූලිකව කියපු දේ, රුපියල් සියයට අඩු නම් විතරයි පාඩු කියන එක. එහෙම කළොත් මේ ඔබතුමා කියන එකට එන්න පුළුවන්. මමත් ඔබතුමා කියන මූලික තර්කයේ ඉන්නවා. මම පිළිගන්නවා. 105ද, 100ද, 80ද කියන එක අපට වෙනම සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මම කියන්නේ සියය කියන එක අපට ගන්න බැහැ, එතැනින් පහළ නම් විතරයි පාඩු, එතැනින් ඉහළ නම් පාඩු නැහැ කියන එක පාවිච්චි කරන්න බැහැ කියලා. ඒක පාවිච්චි කරනවා නම්, සියයෙන් පහළ විතරයි පාඩු කියලා, අපට මේ 104 පාඩුයි කියලා කියන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ මේකයි. ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, දැන් මෙතැන කියන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියනයකට සීමා නොකර රුපියල් බිලියන 10ට ගියපු නිසා - එතකොට අරකේ සියයද, එකසිය තුනද, එකසිය දෙකද කියන එක අදාළ නැහැ. රුපියල් බිලියන 10ට ගියපු නිසා - දැන් ගිහිල්ලා නේ. ඇත්තටම වෙච්ච දෙය ඒක නේ. එක අවස්ථාවකදී බිලියනයක් ගන්න කියලා, බිලියන 10ට ගියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ තර්කය මම පිළිගන්න සූදානම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ බිලියන 10ට ගියපු නිසා, බිලියනයකට සීමා නොකළ නිසා වෙච්ච පාඩුව -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ තර්කය මම පිළිගන්න සූදානම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක එකක්. අවාසිය කියන්නේ ඒක නේ. බිලියනයෙන් නතර වුණා නම් මීට ඉහළ කට්ටිය නේ අහු වෙන්නේ. අන්න ඒකයි මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම ඒකෙන් එන දෙය පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් ඒ තර්කය ගොඩ නඟලා තිබෙන ක්‍රමය පිළිගන්න සූදානම්.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ "සියය" කියන එක ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. එච්චරයි මම කියන්නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතැන "සියය" කියන කථාව -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ report එකේ තිබෙනවා, - මොකද, මෙතැනින් එහාට යන්න බැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දැන් 100ට වැඩි වුණත් අපි cut-off එක දමලා තිබෙන්නේ Rs. 1 billion කියන එකට නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාගේ තර්කය පිළිගන්නා ගමන් ඔබතුමාගේ මූලධර්මය -concept- එක ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයකුත් නැහැ. නමුත් වෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. දැන් Rs. 1 billionවලට auction එකට

ගිහිල්ලා Rs. 1 billionම ගත යුතුයි කියලා නියමයක් නැහැ. නිලධාරීන්ගේ සාක්ෂිවලින් ආවා -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. 11වන පිටුවයි, 23 වන පිටුවයි පරස්පරයි. ඒක වෙන්න බැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ 23න් පටන් අර ගෙන 25න් අවසන් වන වගුවේ calculation එක අනුව 889,358,050.00ක loss එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ loss එක මම මේ ඉන්න ගමන් එකින් එක හැදුවා. මම මේ කියන්නේ කාගෙන්වත් සොයා ගෙන ආපු දේවල් නොවෙයි. මම මෙතැන ඉන්න ගමන් මේක හැදුවා. සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ තිබෙන්නේ ඒක. ඕනෑනම් මේ දෙකත් දමා ගන්න. ටෙලිෆෝන් එකේ මේ නොම්මරය ගහලා එකින් එක හැදුවා. එතකොට ඒක තිබෙනවා, ඇමුණුම 30 කියන එකේ 121 වන පිටුවේ; හදපු විධිය. ඒක තමයි මම ඉස්සර වෙලා විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරිතුමියත් එක්ක sort out කර ගත්තේ, ඒ විධියට තමයි හැදුවේ කියලා. එතකොට අපි දෙදෙනාම ඉන්නේ එකම පිටුවේ. නමුත් 11 වන පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා නම්, 100න් ඉහළ රජයට වාසියි කියලා, 104 කියන එක පාඩු වෙන්න බැහැ. එව්වරයි. එතකොට එහෙම නම් අරක ඉවත් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. 11 වන පිටුවේ - ඒක ඉවත් කර ගන්නේ නැතුව අපට 23 වන පිටුවට එන්න බැහැ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන එහෙම වුණොත් කොටස් දෙකකට කැඩෙනවා. මොකද, මෙතැන ඵලදායී අනුපාතයත් එක්ක නේ මේ 11 වන පිටුවේ කථා කරන්නේ. Interest rate එකයි, ඵලදාවයි. එතකොට ඒ gap එකත් මේක ඇතුළට ඇත්තටම එනවා. ඒ නිසා තමයි -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මම ඔබතුමා කියන එක පිළිගන්නවා, අපි yield එකත් එක්ක තමයි consider කරන්නේ, face value එක. Coupon එකත් එක්ක නොවෙයි. Yield එකත් එක්ක face value එක - ඒ කියන්නේ ඵලදායී අනුපාතයයි, මුහුණත වටිනාකමයි තමයි compare කරන්නේ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම අපට මෙතැන ලොකුවට argue කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. මෙතැන අපි මේක ගැන නොවෙයි කථා කරන්නේ. හැබැයි අපි position එකක් ගන්නවා නම් 11 වන පිටුවේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 100න් ඉහළ ලංසුවක් ආවොත් ඒක රජයට ලාභයි, සියයට පහළින් ලංසුවක් ආවොතත් ඒක රජයට පාඩුයි කියලා, එහෙම නම් අපට ඒ position එකේ ඉඳ ගෙන 104 පාඩුයි කියන්න හැකියාවක් නැහැ. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: 11 වන පිටුවේ ඇත්තටම Central Bank එකේ තිබෙන manual එකේ තිබෙන විස්තර වගයක් තමයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඇතුළත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැන ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: "රජයට අමතර මූල්‍ය වාසියක් ලැබේ" කියන කොටස ඉවත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක අපේ සාමූහික එකඟවීමක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. අර ගොල්ලන් case දමන්න බැහැ. මේක මේ අපි දමන addition එකක් නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ එකඟත්වය මත මේක ඉවත් කළා කියලා කියන්න.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේකෙන් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ කටයුතුවලට, ගණනය කිරීම්වලට problem එකක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. Principlesවලට විතරයි-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි. මම පිළිගන්නවා. ගණනය කිරීම්වලට ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් අපට ඒක ඉවත් කරන්නේ නැතුව 23 වන පිටුවට එන්න බැහැ. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ.

එතැනදී එහෙම නම් අපි මෙහෙම කරමු. අපි මේකට agree වෙනවා නම් - මම ඊයේ මේ ගැන ලොකු paragraph එකක් ලිව්වා නේ. එතකොට ඒ paragraph එක මම කියපු එකක් හැටියට නොවෙයි, එහෙම නම් ඒ paragraph එක අපි සියලුම දෙනා එකඟ වුණු paragraph එකක් හැටියට එන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් මම කියපු එකක් ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නේ නැති එකක් වෙනවා නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒකට එකඟ වුණා නේද, සභාපතිතුමනි?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මෙහෙමයි ආවේ. 11 වන පිටුවේ ඒකම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සමහර අය ඒක පිළිගත්තේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කිහිප දෙනෙක් ඒකට එකඟ නැහැ කියන එක තමයි කියැවුණේ. ඒක ඒ විධියටමයි දමන්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් technical agreement එක පිළිගත්තේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඒ විධියටමයි දමන්න වෙන්නේ. මොකද, ඒකම තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවේ 4.2 ත් තිබෙන්නේ. විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ 4.2 න් තමයි අපි ඒක අර ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි ඊයේ මේ තර්කය ගත්තා. අවාසනාවකට අපි එක් එක්කෙනා අතර සියයට සියයක් එකඟතාවක් තිබුණේ නැති නිසාත්, එය හැමෝම එකඟ වුණු වාර්තාවක් නොවන නිසාත් අපි අද සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඉල්ලුවා. දැන් අපට පෙනෙනවා ඒක inherent ප්‍රශ්නයක් බව. සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට ඔබතුමා මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට සාධාරණ විසඳුමක් ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි මෙහෙම කරමු. අපි ඔක්කොම එකඟ වුණු බවට ප්‍රකාශ කරමු. ඒගොල්ලන්ට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ, ඒගොල්ලන් පිස්සෝ වාගේ කෑ ගහනවා. ඒගොල්ලන් බොරුවට topic එක තේරුම් ගන්නේ නැතිව දේශපාලනය ගැන කථා කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මෙහෙම කරමු. 6වැනි ඡේදයට එකතු කිරීමක් කරමු. 11වැනි ඡේදයේ තිබෙන වාක්‍යය මේ විධියට වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑද නැත්නම් 11වැනි ඡේදයටද මේ එකතු කිරීම කරන්න ඕනෑ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 11වැනි පිටුවේ මොකක්ද අපි වෙනස් කරනවානේ. ඒක මගේ යෝජනාවක් හැටියට නැතිව, මම ඉදිරිපත් කරලා ඔක්කොම අය පිළි ගත් එකක් හැටියට දමන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම දමමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම දමමු. එතකොට ඉවරයිනේ. ඒ ඡේදය වෙනස් කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 11 වැනි පිටුවේ වෙනස් කිරීමක් කර ගන්නවානේ. කොහොමද වෙනස් කරන්නේ කියලා කියන්නකෝ? අන්තිම වාක්‍යය ඉවත් කරන්න නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: රජයට මූල්‍ය වාසියක් හෝ අවාසියක් කියන කථාව නැතිව ඉතුරු ටික තිබුණා නම් හරිනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "ඒ අනුව පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම මගින් අධිමිලක් ලැබෙන අතර එයින් රජයට අමතර වාසියක් ලැබේ" කියන ටික අයින් කරන්න ඕනෑ නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපිට අයින් කරන්න බැහැනේ. මොකද, අයින් කළොත් ඒගොල්ලන් කෑ ගහනවානේ. අපි කිසි දෙයක් අයින් කරන්නේ නැහැනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක තිබියදී අපි එතැනට තව ටිකක් එකතු කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. එකතු කරන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එකතු කරමු, අර වාක්‍යය අයින් කරන්න අපි ඔක්කොම එකඟ වුණාය කියලා. නැත්නම් ඊට පස්සේ කියාවි,-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි. මේක මෙහෙමම තිබියදී, -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එකඟ වුණා කියලා දාන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එකඟ වුණා කියලා දමමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැත්නම් අපි මෙහෙම කරමුද? හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මම මෙහෙම යෝජනාවක් කරනවා. 13වැනි පිටුව දක්වා එකඟවෙලා ඉවත්වෙලා ගිය පිරිසක් ඉන්නවානේ. ඒ නිසා අපි එතැන touch කරන්නේ නැතිව මේ schedule එක ළඟ, 11වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන view එක අපිට, - අපි මොනවා හෝ ලිව්වාට වරදක් නැහැනේ. අද කමිටුවේ වෙච්ච දේ ලියවිලා තිබෙනවානේ. ඒ නිසා 23වැනි පිටුවට ගලපලා ලියන්න, "11වැනි පිටුවේ මෙසේ සඳහන් වී තිබුණද, එහි ඇති මූලධර්මය දෝෂ සහගත බවත්, නිවැරැදි මූලධර්මය මෙය විය යුතු බවත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එකඟ විය" කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඒ කාරණය ඇතුළත් කරන්නකෝ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක 11ටම ගියා නම් හරි. මොකද, මෙතැනට issue එකක් කර ගත්තොත්, -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි එකඟ වෙලා ඉවරයිනේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන මොකක් හෝ report එකකට තමයි ඇත්තටම ඔය කාරණය එන්න ඕනෑ. Auditor-Generalගේ Report එකට වෙනස්කමක් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න එපා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ මේකේ මොකක් හෝ, -

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මෙහෙම කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. සභාපතිතුමාටත් වන අනතුර අවම කරන්න තමයි මම මෙය යෝජනා කරන්නේ. අපිට jurisdiction එකක් තිබෙනවානේ 13වැනි පිටුවේ ඉඳලා ඉස්සරහට යන්න. අපිට ඒ බලය තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ සහභාගීත්වය තිබෙනවා; ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඉන්නවා; අපි ඉන්නවා. ඒ නිසා අපි 23වැනි පිටුවේ මෙහෙම සඳහන් කරමු.

"ඊයේ දින 11 වැනි ඡේදයට පසුව ඇතුළත් කරපු, නමුත් ඒ අවස්ථාවේ සියලු දෙනාගේම එකඟතාව ගැනීමට නොහැකි වූ කරුණු පිළිබඳව 2016.10.21 දිනට අනුව 11වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් කර තිබූ එම මූලධර්මය දෝෂ සහගත වන බවට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එකඟ විය. එම එකඟතාව මෙසේ සටහන් කර සිටිමි."

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි දාන්න ඕනෑ මේ ගණනය කිරීමත් එක්කයි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. ගණනය කිරීමට අදාළත්වයක් නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ගණනය කිරීම වෙන පදනමක්. Contradict වෙනවා කියන එක, -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගණනය කිරීමේදීත් එනවා. මොකද, ගණනය කිරීමේදී, -

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මොකද, කමිටුව ස්වාධීනයිනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට ඒක ඇතුළු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා තීරණයක් ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මොකද, මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමේ වගකීම තිබෙන්නේ මටනේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: චුට්ටක් ඉන්න. ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්නකෝ. ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්න හේතුව මම කියන්නම්. ඔයගොල්ලන්ගේ calculation එකට මම ආපසු recalculate කළා. එතැනට ගියොත් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Rs. 889 million තිබෙනවානේ. ඒක Rs. 525 million වුණා. එතකොට මිලියන 350ක වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: According to you?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: No. no. That is what we have agreed. අපි සියය කියන එකෙන් වෙනස් වුණොත් 889යි කියන loss එක 550ට අඩු වෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: According to your theory that is wrong.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මගේ theory එක ඒක නොවෙයි. මම theory එකක් ගැන කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ. තවම එතැනට ආවේ නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ මේකට වෙන වෙනස පිළිබඳවයි. මෙතැන වෙනස මිලියන 350යි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ප්‍රතිපත්ති කථා නොකළාට මෙතැන අංක ගණිතමය දෝෂයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක අපි correct කරන්න ඕනෑ. පාඩුවක් පෙනෙනවා. පාඩුවේ quantum එක වෙනස් වෙනවා. ඒකෙන් ප්‍රශ්න දෙකක් පෙනෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම මේක සභාගත කරන්නම්. ඔබතුමන්ලා එය ඇතුළත් කර ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔය කාරණය මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළු කරනවාද නැත්නම් මේ කාරණය ඇතුළු කරලා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ calculation එක යනවාද? ඒ calculation එක යන්න වෙනවානේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඇතුළු කරනවාද නැද්ද කියලා අපි පසුව බලමු. ඒක settleනේ. ඒක ඉවරයි. හරි. Calculation එකට අනුව පිළිගත් ක්‍රමවේදය පරිදි මමත් පිළිගන්නවා, මේ විධියට තමයි loss එක හදන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. සුජීව සේනසිංහ ඇමතිතුමනි, මා මේ කියන්න යන කාරණය ගොඩක් වැදගත්. දැන් සභාපතිතුමා මේ loss එක calculate කරන්නේ බිලියනයක් පමණක් auction එකෙන් ගන්න අදහස් කරලා තිබියදී බිලියන 10ක් ගත්ත නිසාත්, අර බිලියන 9 auction එකෙන් ගැනීම නිසාත්, - **ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ** ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා යන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා අදහස් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒක නම් නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වචනයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක වැදගත් කියලා හිතෙන නිසයි මම කියන්නේ. "සීමා කළේ නම්". සීමා නොකළා නම් එතකොට වෙනත් අදහසක් එන්නේ. සීමා නොකරපු නිසා තමයි මේ පාඩුව වුණාය කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සීමා කළේ නම් මේ අවාසිය වෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක හරි නේ. දැන් අපි යන්න ඕනෑ මෙච්චරවෙලා කරපු argument එකට. ඒ තමයි, to the beginning. "As much as possible by auction the less by private placement." බිලියන 10ක් කියන තීරණය ඇතුළේ කොච්චර auction එකෙන් ගත යුතුද? මෙතැන අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ සියයට සියයක්ම auction එකෙන්. මොකද, බිලියන 13ක් ඕනෑ කියලා තිබුණා. බිලියන 13න් බිලියන 3ක් private placement එකෙන් අරගෙන තිබුණාය කියලා කිව්වා. බිලියන 10ක් ඉතුරුවෙලා තිබුණාය කියලා කිව්වා. අපි සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමයට ගියා නම් මොකක්ද වෙන්නේ? බිලියන එකක් අපි auction එකෙන් ගන්නවා. ඉතුරු බිලියන 9 ඒ weighted average එකට අපි placement කරලා ගන්නවා. ඒකනේ වෙන්නේ. මෙතැන වුණේ එහෙම නොකර බිලියන 10ම auction එකෙන් ගත්තා. එතකොට judgment call එකක් එනවා කොච්චර අපි auction එක හරහා ගත යුතුව තිබුණාද ඉතුරු ටික private placement

එකෙන් ගන්න කියලා. ඒ judgment call එක කරන්නේ කවුද? ඒ judgment call එක බිලියනයයි කියලා අපිට තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? මෙහෙමනේ. ඒක Judgment call එකක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Advertise කිරීම තුළම, ඒක limit කරනවානේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකක්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපි Rs. 1 million ගන්නවාය කියන, -

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි market sentiment එක බලන්න ඕනෑ. හරිද? අපි Rs. 10 billion ගන්නවා කිව්වොත් එතකොට primary dealersලා දන්නවා, මෙච්චර අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවාය කියලා. එතකොට ඒගොල්ලන් ලොකු interest එකකට දෙන්නේ. එය නීතියට කරන්න පුළුවන් ගනුදෙනුවක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නීතිය තමයි. ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට පොඩ්ඩක් වැරදුණා. මෙතැන සමහර අවස්ථාවල Rs. 1 billion දාලා Rs. 5 billion ගන්නවා. Rs. 1 billion දාලා Rs. 2 billion ගන්නවා. මෙහිදී නොයෙකුත් ක්‍රම අනුගමනය කරනවා. අපි එහෙනම් කියන්න ඕනෑ, මීට කලින් Rs. 1 billion දාලා ගත් ඒවා ඔක්කෝම වැරදියි කියලා. ඒවාට loss එකක් මේ වාගේ calculate කරන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා ඒකට එකඟයි නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපට මෙතැනදි විතරක් Rs. 1 billion දාලා Rs. 1 billionට වැඩියෙන් ගත් නිසා ඒක අවාසියක් කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ argument එක ඔබතුමා හොඳට අහගන්න. Rs. 1 billion දාලා Rs. 2 billion ගත් අවස්ථාවලදී එහෙම නම්, Rs. 2 billion එක අවාසියක් වනවා. ඒක investigate කරන්න ඕනෑ. Rs. 1 billion දාලා Rs. 5 billion ගත් අවස්ථාවලදී ඉතිරි Rs. 4 billion අවාසියක් වන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒක investigate කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒවා ඔක්කෝම හරි නම්, මේක වැරදි වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

සභාපතිතුමා: වැරදියි කියලා නොවෙයි නේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන අවාසියක් වුණාය කියලා නේ කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක මට තේරෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කරුණු පැහැදිලි කරයි. අපට මේ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුව ගැන කථා කරද්දි මේ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුවේ options 3ක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. කවුද කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: එකක් තිබෙනවා, මේ දැන්වීමට අනුව බිලියනය ගත්තා නම්, තව එකක් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ තීරණය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළා නම්, ඒ වාගේ හතරක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ loss එක කියන එක එන්නේ අර තීරණයත් එක්ක නේ. මොන තීරණයද? සියයට සියයම auction එකෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑය කියන තීරණයත් එක්ක තමයි මේ ඔක්කෝම හැදෙන්නේ. Auction එකෙන් රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දාලා බිලියන දහයක්-

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Replacement එකෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ loss එක හැදෙන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දාලා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගත් නිසා නේ? රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දාලා බිලියන 10ක් ගත් තීරණය වැරදියි කියන එක කියන්න එපායැ, මේ loss එක හදන්න. රුපියල් බිලියනයක් දාලා බිලියන 10ක් ගත් තීරණය නිසා නේ loss එක එන්නේ. එහෙනම් loss එක එන්නේ ඇයි? Loss එක එන්නේ, රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගත් නිසා. ඒ තීරණය වරදින්න ඕනෑ, මේ loss එක හැදෙන්න. ඒ තීරණය වැරදි නම්, මේ loss එක හරි. ඒ තීරණය වැරදියි කියන්නේ කොහොමද? ඒ තීරණය හරිද, වැරදිද කියන එක පිළිබඳව තීරණය කරන්න අපි දවස් දෙකක් තිස්සේ සාකච්ඡා කළා. එතැනදි අපි කිව්වා, කලින් තිබුණේ auction එක, temporary තමයි placements කළේ, නැවතත් auction එකට ගියා යනාදී වශයෙන්.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ හැම එකේම cut-off point එක අනුව ඔබතුමා කියන කථාව හරි. නමුත්, සම්පූර්ණයෙන් මේ දේ සිද්ධ වෙලායි තිබෙන්නේ. මොකද, judgment කියන issue එක එන්නේ Tender Board එක තමයි judgment එක ගන්නේ. Tender Board එක 1ද, 2ද, 3ද කියන එක තීරණය කරනවා. ඒ තීරණය කරන්නේ market එකේ sensitivity එකයි, market එකේ interest rate එකයි ඔක්කෝම පදනම් කර ගෙන. මේ සිද්ධියේදීත් Board එක තීරණය කරලා තිබෙනවා, point එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 2.6 කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් තීරණය කළා. එතැන logic එකක් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට තිබෙනවා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අනුව තමයි මේ calculation එක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ logic එක ගන්නවා නම්, ඒ Tender Board එක නොදීපු නමුත්, දෙන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වුණු decision එකට අනුව මේ loss එක එනවා. එතකොට මේක නොවෙයි එන්නේ. අර 668 කියන loss එක එන්නේ. 668 කියන loss එක දැම්මාම ගැටලුවක් එනවා. මොකද, 668 කියන loss එක හදන්න රුපියල් 102න් කැපෙන්න ඕනෑ. 102න් කැපෙන්න විධියකුත් නැහැ. අපි ඒක වෙනස් කළා නේ. ඒ නිසා ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. 102න් හැදුවොත් 660 ගණනක loss එකක් එනවා. හැබැයි, 2.6 කියන එක ඒ ගොල්ලන් දුන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ අදහසක් පමණයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අදහසක් පමණයි තිබුණේ. 2.6 ගන්න කියන එක ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. මෙතැන තමයි වැදගත්ම දේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2.6ක් ගැනීම කියන එක පිළිබඳව තිබෙන්නේ අදහසක් පමණයි. නමුත්, ඒ වෙලාවේ-

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Best option එක හැටියට දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: දුන්නේ නැහැ කිව්වා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දුන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: දෙන්න ලෑස්ති වුණා. දුන්නේ නැහැ කිව්වා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක ඇති වෙන්න හේතුව තමයි, අර "Governor instructed." කියලා මොකක් හරි minute එකක් එවීම.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: "Why do you not go for 20" කිව්වා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට කවුරුවත් රකින්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ සිදු වූ දේ මොකක්ද කියලායි. 2.6ට දෙන්න ඕනෑය කියලා ඒ ගොල්ලන් internally තීරණය කළා. හැබැයි, ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ ගොල්ලන් තීරණය කළා, Governor කිව්ව නිසා 10ක් ගන්න. අපි 2.6 කියලා loss එකක් calculate කරනවා නම්, අපි ඒක කියන්න ඕනෑ කලින්. ඒ කියන්නේ 2.6ක් ගන්න ඕනෑය කියලා කලින් හිතුවාට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. ඒක නොවෙයි කළේ. 2.6ක් ගන්න කියන එක Governorට ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැහැ. Governorට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කලින් ඒ ගොල්ලන් 10ක් ගන්න තීරණය කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 2.6 කියන එක මේ discussion එකේ තිබුණු එක stage එකක්. ඊට පස්සේ twenty කථා කළා, ඊට පස්සේ කිව්වා, එහෙනම් ten කියලා. ඒ ten කියන option එක Tender Board එක discuss කරන කොට ඒ original 2.6 option එක Tender Board එක අත් හැරියා. එතකොට අපි ඒ Tender Board එකේ තීරණය තුළ තිබෙන ඒ කාරණය මත ඉඳලා 2.6ට වඩා නොයා යුතුව තිබුණාය කියලා නිගමනය කරන එක සහ ඒ මත ගමන් කරන එක-

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමන නොවෙයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දකින options කීපයක් නේ මේ තිබෙන්නේ. විකල්ප අවස්ථා කීපයක් නේ මේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු **(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:** නැහැ. පත්තර වල ගියේ loss එක Rs. 1.6 billion කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පත්තරවල ගිය එක නොවෙයි නේ මේකට අදාළ වන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ එකක් ගන්න පුළුවන්. මේ වාර්තාවට ගන්න වෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන විකල්ප අවස්ථා කිහිපයක්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ අවස්ථා ටික ඔක්කෝම සිද්ධ වුණාය කියලා කියන්නේ නැහැ. අවස්ථා කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා, මේ අවාසිය ඇති වන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඒ මට තේරෙන විධියට. අපි ගන්නේ ඒක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එහෙම නම් ප්‍රතිඵලය හිතලාම ගණන් හදන්න පුළුවන්. හැම ගනුදෙනුවක්ම ඒ විධියට හදන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි. හැම ගනුදෙනුවක්ම හදන්නත් පුළුවන්. හැම දාම සිදුවන ඒවාත් හදන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, අපට ප්‍රස්තුත කාරණය තිබෙන්නේ මේ ගනුදෙනුව නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතැන තමයි වැඩය. එහෙම නම්, මේ ගනුදෙනුව හා සමානව සියලුම ගනුදෙනු-

සභාපතිතුමා: මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයාගේ මැදිහත්වීම මත තිබෙන ගනුදෙනුව නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ මැදිහත්වීම නිසා අපි මේ ගනුදෙනුව සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. මැදිහත්වීම නැත්නම් කොහොමද මේක බලපාන්නේ? එහෙම නම්, මාර්තු මාසයේ තිබෙන එක. එහෙම නම්, 2008 වර්ෂයේ තිබුණු එක. 1997 වර්ෂයේ තිබුණු එක. එහෙම නම්, කවුරුත් දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මෙතුමා

අධිපති වුණොත් එහෙම මෙතුමාත් කරන්න එපායැ, තව ක්‍රමයක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: **ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ** මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මෙතැන වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ specific transactions දෙකක් විතරක් අරගෙන අපි පෙන්වන්න හදනවා,-

සභාපතිතුමා: විකල්ප ක්‍රම තුනක් කියන එක මේකේ පැහැදිලි කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකෙන් පේන්නේ මේ loss කියන එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: Loss නොවෙයි, මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි හා අවාසි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එදා කිව්වා නේ "පාඩුව" කියන වචනය දමනවා නම් කැමැතියි කියලා. "පාඩුව" කියන වචනය එන්නේ යම් කිසි ගණනයක් ඇතුව.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි වැරදි අර්ථ කථනයක් ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැයි කියලායි මට හිතෙන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ, මෙන්න මේ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුව සිදුවන මොහොත අනුවයි. ඊට වඩා එහාට උපකල්පන හදන්න බැහැ. මොකද, වෙළෙඳ පොළේ පොලී අනුපාත වෙනස් වන්න පුළුවන්. අවුරුදු 30ටම උපකල්පන කරන්න බැහැ. නමුත්, මේ ගනුදෙනුව නිශ්චිතව සිදුවන පොලී අනුපාතයට අදාළව විකල්ප අවස්ථා කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා.

ඒ විකල්ප අවස්ථාවල වාසි, අවාසි තමයි මෙතුමා ගණනය කර තිබෙන්නේ. අවාසිම වුණා කියන එක නොවෙයි; වාසිම වුණා කියන එකත් නොවෙයි. එයයි පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: පොඩි අඩු පාඩුවක්ව තිබෙන්නේ, මමත් -විගණකාධිපතිත්- මෙහි party එකක් කරගෙන කථා කරන එකයි. මොකද, COPE එකට assist කරන්න තමයි මා මෙය හදා තිබෙන්නේ. වෙනත් එකක් සඳහා නොවෙයි. මට මෙතැන වෙනත් job එකක් නැහැ. මෙය ඕනෑ විධියකට- Opinion එකක් විතරයි. ඒ තමයි, විගණකාධිපතිගේ opinion එක. විගණකාධිපතිට opinion 26ක් දෙන්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා විගණකාධිපතිගේ මතය දීලා තිබෙනවා, මේ options ද සමඟ. ඕනෑම decision එකක් ගැනීම පිළිබඳව කිසිම ගැටලුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ option එක ආවා නම් Central Bank එකේ සියලු officersලා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ආර්ථික විද්‍යාව සම්බන්ධයෙන්-

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: සියලු සාකච්ඡා කරලායි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම්, ඔබතුමා කියා තිබුණේ, සාකච්ඡා කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් ලැබෙන්නේ නැහැ, Central Bank එක bias කියලා?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒවා ඔක්කෝම තිබෙනවා නම් එපායැ. මොකද, මෙය pure එකක් නොවෙයි නේ. කොතරම් සාකච්ඡා වට ගණනක් පවත්වාගෙන ගියාද? බීජය විතරයි මේ දාලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ Report එකේ තිබෙනවා, කරුණු ගන්න අවස්ථාවක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ-

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. මේ බීජයක් විතරයි. මෙය, න්‍යෂ්ටියයි. මෙය ඕනෑ දෙයක් කරලා හදාගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: න්‍යෂ්ටිය හරියට වැටෙන්න එපායැ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: න්‍යෂ්ටිය හරියට වැටිලායි තිබෙන්නේ. මගේ දැනුම අනුව න්‍යෂ්ටිය දාලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ දැනුම අනුව ඕනෑම විධියකට වෙනස් කරගන්න. අපේ කිසි ගැටලුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙය සාකච්ඡා කරන එක ඇත්තටම හොඳයි. විෂයය දැනුමටත් හොඳයි. දැනුම අලුත් වෙනවා නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මගේ judgment එක අනුව තමයි මම මෙය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විෂයානුබද්ධ විශේෂඥයකු විධියට ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමාත් යම් කරුණක් කිව්වා. ඒ කරුණුත් එක්ක කල්පනා කළාම ඒ approach එකේ අඩු පාඩුවක් තිබෙනවා කියා ඔබතුමාට තේරෙනවා නේද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. අඩු පාඩුවක් නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා තිබෙන එක වෙනස් කරන්න. එහි ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. වෙනස් කරලා හදා ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙය තේරුම් ගන්න. අපි ඊට පසුව මහ බැංකුවටත් මෙය දැනුම් දුන්නා. මේ වාර්තාව මහ බැංකුවටත් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. මහ බැංකුවෙන් මෙයට ආ උත්තරයත් තිබෙනවා. මහ බැංකුවෙන් ආ උත්තරයේත් ඊට පස්සේ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකුවෙන් ආ උත්තරය මොකක්ද කියා මට කියන්න. මට ඕනෑ ඒ උත්තරය. ඇත්තටම එය තමයි වැදගත් වන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එය ඔබතුමා ළඟ තිබෙනවා. මහ බැංකුවෙන් ආ උත්තර ටික තිබෙනවා ලොකු පොතේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, එය වැදගත් වන්නේ මොකද දන්නවාද? මහ බැංකුව අදටත් කරන්නේ ඔය auction ක්‍රමයමයි. මහ බැංකුව ඕක පිළිගන්නවා නම් නැවත මේ auction ක්‍රමය කළ යුතු නැහැ. එහෙම ගත්තොත් ඔය auction ක්‍රමය කරන හැම එකකටම අදාළව ගණන් හදන්න අපට පුළුවන්, එක එක විකල්ප අවස්ථාවලට අනුව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ තිබෙන තත්ත්වය තුළ මේ auction ක්‍රමය immediately නතර කළ යුතු තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවාද කියා අපට යම් විධියකට හිතන්න පුළුවන්. මා දන්නේ නැහැ- අපට හිතෙනවා නම්- අනෙක් කාරණය තමයි, මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් සියලුදෙනා මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ වගකීමට, විමර්ශනයට ලක් වූ පුද්ගලයන් වීම. පළමුවැනි inquiry එකේ ඉඳලා දෙවන inquiry එක දක්වා ඒ අයගේ උත්තරවල තිබෙන වෙනස්වීම් එක්ක -ඒ පරිපාලනය වෙනස් වීමත් සමඟ සහ කාලය ගත වීමත් සමඟ- ඒ අය මත ඇතිවන වගකීමෙන් මිදීම සඳහා යම් විධියක උත්සාහයක් තිබෙනවා කියා අපි දැක්කා. මහ බැංකුව මේ කාරණය පිළිබඳව කියන දේවල්, ඒ අය චූදිතයාම වන නිසා ඒ අය කියන දේවල් වැදගත් නමුත් ඒ මතයන් කෙරේ අපට විශ්වාසය තබන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මටත් පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න තිබෙනවා, සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට. මෙයට මේ කාරණාවට ඇතුළු කිරීමේදී බලපෑ ප්‍රධාන හේතුව මා කියන්නම්. මෙතුමන්ලා මහ බැංකුවට එය යොමු කරලා-

මෙතුමන්ලාගේ, "....යාවත්කාලීන කිරීම් ඇතුලත් වාර්තාව" බලන්න. එහි 23වන පිටුවේ ඉඳලා 24, 25, 26 දක්වා. එහි 26වන පිටුවෙහි සඳහන් වනවා, "තවද ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසි එම දිනට ක්ෂණිකව ඇතිවූ/ඇති විය හැකි තත්ත්වය පමණක් වන අතර එමගින් දීර්ඝකාලීනව ඇතිවන බලපෑමද සළකා බැලුවහොත් එම විකල්ප අවාසි තවත් ඉහළ යාමට ඇති ඉඩකඩද බැහැර කළ නොහැක." කියා. නමුත් එය ගණන් හදා නැහැ.

ඊට පහළින් වරහන් තුළ සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා, (ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර හා විගණන ඡේදය සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරන බැවින් සහ වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන් හා අනෙකුත් කරුණු අනුව ඉහත ඡේදය තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින් ඡේදය එලෙසම යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඇතුලත් කර ඇත.)" කියා.

"...යාවත් කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවේ ඇතුළත් එකිනෙක ඡේදයන්හි නිරවද්‍යතාවය පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේ උපලේඛණය" හෙවත් ලොකු පොත බලන්න. එහි පිටු අංක 135 ඉඳලා 138 වනතුරු තිබෙනවා එයට අදාළ කරන, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම්. 136වන පිටුවේ මෙසේ සඳහන් වනවා: "විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි විය.

2015.02.27 වැනි දින රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව වෙත 100% ක් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා අනුගත විය යුතු බවට වාචිකව දැනුම් දීමත්, පසුව එම තීරණය 2015.03.06 දින පැවති මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමට වාර්තා කිරීමත් නිසා එකී විකල්පයන් වෙත අවධානය යොමු නොකළෙහිය"

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක තමයි ඒ අය කියා තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහි ඊට පසුව සඳහන් කරනවා, "ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපති ඉහත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම් පහත පරිදි වේ"

එකී පැහැදිලි කිරීමත් එහිම තිබෙනවා. එය මෙසේයි:

"පිළිතුර පිළිගත හැක. වාචික උපදෙස් මත වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය 100% ක් අනුගමනය කලද මෙම වෙන්දේසියෙන් රැස්කර ගන්නා මුදල සීමා කර අප විසින් නිරීක්ෂණය කර ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසි වලකා ගත හැකිව තිබුණි. තවද ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දී ඇති පිලිතුර විගණන නිරීක්ෂණ සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරයි."

ඊට පසුව සඳහන් වනවා, "ඉහත කරුණුවලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් විසින් කරන ලද ඇතැම් ප්‍රශ්ණ කිරීම් හා අදාල නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් ලද පිළිතුරු පහත දැක්වේ." කියා. ඉන් අනතුරුව, ඊට අදාළ කාරණා තිබෙනවා. එහි සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා, ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා, ගරු රංජන් රාමනායක මහතා අසන ලද ප්‍රශ්න සහ ආචාර්ය පී.එන්. වීරසිංහ මහතා, ආචාර්ය ඉන්ද්‍රජීත් කුමාරස්වාමී මහතා ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරු.

ඊට පසුව 5:1:18 ඡේදය සම්බන්ධයෙන් -එනම් රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා ලංසු තීරණය කිරීමට ගත් ක්‍රියාමාර්ග- මෙසේ සඳහන් වනවා:

"විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් ඉහත ඡේදය පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකු අධිපති ගේ ලිඛිත පැහැදිලි කිරීම්.

නිරීක්ෂණයට විරෝධතා නොමැත."

එහෙමයි මෙහි සඳහන්ව තිබෙන්නේ. ඉහත කරුණු වලට අදාලව කමිටු සාමාජිකවරුන් හා නිලධාරින් කළ සාකච්ඡාවට අදාළ verbatims තිබෙනවා. මෙහි පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව තිබෙන්නේ-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහි වැදගත්ම එක තමයි, මහ බැංකුව ඉස්සර වෙලාම කියන කථාව. 0 සිට 100 දක්වා- ඒ කියන්නේ, සියයට සියයක් ගන්න වූ නිසා -

සභාපතිතුමා: "....වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය හා අනුගත විය යුතු බවට වාචිකව දැනුම් දීමත්, පසුව එම තීරණය 2015.03.06 දින පැවති මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමට වාර්තා කිරීමත් නිසා"... කියා සඳහන් වනවා. සියයට සියයක් ගත් නිසා මේ විකල්පය අවශ්‍ය වුණේ නැහැ කියලායි කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මාත් කියන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is exiting….

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඒක හරි නේ

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Policy එක ආවාට පසුව අපි කොහොමද- If there are other polices, how can we decide that?

සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත් ප්‍රශ්නය වී තිබෙන්නේ මෙයයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ නිරීක්ෂණය ඉදිරිපත් කළාට පසුව -විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙම ඇස්තමේන්තු නිරීක්ෂණය ඉදිරිපත් කළාට පසුව- තමයි මෙය ඒ අයගේ උත්තරය බවට පත් වන්නේ. අප එය පිළිගන්නවාද නැද්ද කියන එක තීරණය කරන්න පුළුවන් අපේ කමිටුවට. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතයට මෙමහින් බලපෑමක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මට කාරණයක් miss වුණා. මගේ එකම ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. මෙහි කියන්නේ බිලියන 1ක් විතරක් ගත්තොත් මේ පාඩුව සිදු වන්නේ නැහැ කියන එක නේ. එහෙම නම් අප උපකල්පනය කරන්නේ direct placementsවලින් ඉතිරි ටික ගන්නවා කියන එක නේද? ඒක හරි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මහ බැංකුව දෙන උත්තරය තමයි අප hundred percent, auctionsවලට ගිය නිසා ඒ අවස්ථාව අවශ්‍ය වුණේ නැහැ කියන එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරියට හරි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මා කියන්නේ මෙතැන ඊට වඩා වෙනස් තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා කියායි. මේ කරුණු සියල්ල සලකා බලද්දී අපට ගොඩක් කරුණු අනාවරණය වුණා නේ. Direct placements යන්න පුළුවන්ද, direct placement එකේ Primary Dealersලාට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද? Direct placement එකේ EPF, ETF, captive sourcesවලට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද? 2008 ගෙනාවේ මොන directions මතද? සියයට හයක compensation එකක් ගෙවන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ ඔක්කෝම -ඒ කිසි දෙයක්- මේකට අදාළ නැහැ නේ. අපි blindly කියනවා, direct placement එකේ EPF එකටයි, ETF එකටයි මේ සියලුදෙනාගේ මුදල් මේ ගණනට ගහලා ගත්තොත් අපට වාසි වෙනවා කියා. එහෙම ගහන්න බැහැ. EPF, ETF එකට, NSB එකට මුදල් යොදවනවා නම් පහළ පොලී අනුපාතවලට, ඒ ඔක්කෝම -සියලු පාඩුව- compensate කරන්න ඕනෑ, සියයට 6ක. ඒවා අමතක කරලා-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වැදගත්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින් 2008දී මේ තීන්දු ගන්නේ නිකම්ම නොවෙයි. යුද්ධය පැවැති අවස්ථාවක ගත් තීන්දුවක්. අප හිතුමතේ එහෙම තීන්දු ගන්න ගියොත්- NSB එකටයි captive sources ටිකට දීලා අපට රටේ interest rates පාලනය කරන්න පුළුවන් කියා තීන්දුවක් ගන්නවා නම්, that is correct. නමුත් ආණ්ඩුවක් තීරණයක් ගෙන තිබෙනවා නම්, කෘත්‍රිම පොලී අනුපාතය නොවෙයි, රටේ අනාගතයට බලපාන්නේ පාවෙන පොලී අනුපාතයයි කියා, ඊට විරුද්ධව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තීන්දුවක් දෙන්නේ කොහොමද? Policy එක ඇතුළේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට බලතල තිබෙනවා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විග්‍රහයක් කරන්න. Policy එකට විරුද්ධව කොහොමද- දැන් මෙතැනදී සඳහන් වුණා- අනුගත වූ මේ කරුණුවල direct placements- විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මුළු-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට comment එකක් දෙන්න ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Comment එකක් නොවෙයි. මා කියන්නේ comment එක ගැන නොවෙයි. මුළු Report එකම base වන්නේ- Direct placements system is the prevailing system in the country. That is totally wrong. Direct placements system එක මේ රටේ තිබෙන තත්ත්වයයි කියා අපට පැහැදිලි කර දෙන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක පැහැදිලි කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් අපට පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙනවා නම්, රෙගුලාසි සියල්ල අනුව රටේ තිබෙන

නීත්‍යානුකූල තත්ත්වය මේකයි කියලා අන්න එතකොට මේ ගණනය කිරීම්වල යම්කිසි සාධාරණත්වයක් එනවා. එහෙම නැතුව වැරදි ක්‍රමයකට ගණන් හදලා අපි කොහොමද කියන්නේ, ඒ ක්‍රමයට ගත්තොත් මෙහෙම අඩු පාඩු තිබෙනවා කියලා. රටේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් තිබෙනවා. ආණ්ඩුවේ ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් තිබෙනවා. ආණ්ඩුව අරගෙන තිබෙන හරි හෝ වැරදි ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය තමයි, "විනිවිදභාවයෙන් යුතුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට යන්න ඕනෑ." කියලා. මේකේ කිසිම විනිවිදභාවයක් ගැන කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ. Auctions ක්‍රමයට යෑමේ තනිකර හේතුව විනිවිදභාවය නේ. Direct placement ක්‍රමයට ගිය ගමන් හොරකම් සිදු වෙන්න තිබෙන අවස්ථාව වැඩියි. මම පෙන්වන්නම් direct placementsවලින් විනිවිදභාවය නැති වෙන්න මෙතැන තිබෙන සාක්ෂි. සාක්ෂි හයකට වැඩිය තිබෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මා ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානය ඒ සඳහා යොමු කරවනවා. මම ඒවා පෙන්වන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා : දැන් මෙහෙමයි. ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන තර්කය අනුව, ඔබතුමා මුල ඉඳලාම ඉන්න තර්කය අනුව ඒක හරි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ, direct placement ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කරලා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒකනේ හොයන්න ඕනෑ. "ඒ ක්‍රමය නිවැරදියි" කියලා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මුලින් ඔප්පු කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා : Direct placement අනුගමනය කරලා එක පාරටම auction ක්‍රමයට සියයට සියයක් මාරු වන කොට auction ක්‍රමයට මාරු වීමේ තීරණය කමිටුව හැටියට ගන්නේ නැතුව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි,-

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ තීරණය ගන්න ඕනෑද, නැද්ද කියලා දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට විවාද කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : විවාද නොවෙයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ -

සභාපතිතුමා : "ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ නැත්තේ" කියන තත්ත්වය මත තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ ඇස්තමේන්තුවෙන් බලන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට තේරෙන විධිය මේකයි. ඔබතුමා මට පෙන්වන්න direct placement ක්‍රමය කොහෙන්ද ආවේ කියලා. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා -

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එච්චරයි තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : නමුත්, ක්‍රමවේදයක් හැටියට ඒ ක්‍රමය තමයි දිගටම අනුගමනය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : වැරදි ක්‍රමයක් නිවැරදියි කියන්න බැහැ නේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. ඔබතුමා මෙතැනට එක මිනිසුන්ට හැම දාම ගහනවා නම් ඒක හරිද? ඔබතුමා මෙතැනට එන හැම කෙනාටම කනට එකක් ගහනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මම උදාහරණයක් කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : තීරණ අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඒ තීරණ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙලා තිබෙනවා. 2008 ඉඳලා ඒ තීරණයම ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙලා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඕනෑම අධිකරණයකින් අහන්න. නීතියේ තිබෙනවා, රෙගුලාසිවලට සහ චක්‍රලේඛනවලට **පටහැනි** නම්, එය වැරදි දෙයක් නම්, ඒක දිගටම ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණා කියලා ඒක නිවැරදි වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක රජයේ සේවකයෝ දන්නවා. අපි ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලන්නේ, සාධාරණය. මමත් lawyer කෙනෙක්. මම උසාවියේ practise කරනවා. කොහේවත් කියලා නැහැ, "මේ මිනිහා දිගටම වැරදි කරලා තිබෙනවා, මිනී මරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මේ මිනිහාට මිනී මරන්න පුළුවන්" කියලා. රටේ නීතියක් තිබෙනවා. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් basic එකක් අහන්නේ. රටේ වැදගත්ම කරුණක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට හිතූ මතේට ලියන්න බැහැ. මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ, කොහේ හරි තිබෙනවා නම් අපට පෙන්වන්න direct placement ක්‍රමය තමයි මේ රටේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය කියලා. ඒකේ captive sourcesවලට ගන්න පුළුවන් අයිතිය මොකක්ද? ඒකේ 2008 compensate කරන්න ගෙනාවේ සියයට දශම 6යි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : සියයට 6ක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔව්, සියයට 6ක්. උද්ධමනය අනුව. ඒ සියයට 6 direct placementsවල කොහේද ඇතුළත් වෙන්නේ? වැරදි ක්‍රමවේදයක් නම් ඒක හඳුනා ගෙන කියන එක නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වගකීම. කොහේ හෝ අනුගමනය කරපු වැරදි ක්‍රමවේදයක් පෙන්වලා, මේ ක්‍රමවේදයට කළා නම් හරි කියන එක නොවෙයි නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්නේ. ඇත්තටම මෙතුමාගේ වචනය රටේ ප්‍රධාන වචනයක් බවට පත් වෙනවා. මෙතුමා සාමාන්‍ය පුද්ගලයෙක් නොවෙයි නේ. COPE එකේදී අපට උපදෙස් දෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා. මෙතුමාගෙන් එහෙම වචනයක් එන කොට, මේ

මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඔක්කෝම කිව්වේ ඒකයි. ඔබතුමාගෙන් වචනයක් ආවාම අපට ඒ ඇති. ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ කරුණුවල කෝක හබ කළත් අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ පෞද්ගලිකව කියන මතයක් නොවෙයි.

Direct placement ක්‍රමයට ආපු විධිය අපි දන්නේ නැත්නම්, direct placement system එක හරි කියලා Operational Manual එකේ නැත්නම්, අපි කොහොමද කියන්නේ ඒක නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය කියලා? අනෙක් එක direct placement ක්‍රමය කොහොමද එන්නේ? අපට මේ ප්‍රශ්නයට උත්තර දෙන්න. එතකොට අපි පිළිගන්නවා. Direct placement ක්‍රමය නීත්‍යානුකූල ක්‍රමයක්, ඒක නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය, ඒක captive sourcesවලට ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා කොහේ හරි සඳහන් වනවාද? මේ compensation එක මාස තුන අවසන් වන කොට නිරීක්ෂණය කරලා නැත්නම් ඒ ගත්ත තාවකාලික තීන්දුව එතැනින් ඉවරයි නේ. EPF සහ ETF එකට පොලිය වශයෙන් සියයට 6ක් compensate කරන්න කියලා තිබෙනවා නම්, මේක නඩු දාන්න පුළුවන් කාරණයක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු රාජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා කියන කථාව සියයට සියයක් නිවැරදියි. ඒක වැරදි නැහැ නේ. වැරදි දෙයක් කරපු පළියට ඒක නිවැරදි වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : වැරදියි කියන කාරණය නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. ඒ ක්‍රම දෙකම භාවිතයෙන් ප්‍රායෝගිකව ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මේ ක්‍රම දෙකම හරි හෝ වැරදි කියන එක නොවෙයි. ඒ ක්‍රම දෙකම Operational Manual එකේ තිබෙනවා. 2008 ඉඳලා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා :ගරු සභාපතිතුමා,-

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කෝ. මට ඔබතුමන්ලා එක්ක argument එකක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ දෙයක් වාර්තාවට ඇතුළු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ක්‍රම දෙකම මේකේ තිබෙද්දි-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඕනෑ දෙයක් ඇතුළු කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා : නැහැ, පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ. එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඊට අමතරව.

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රායෝගික කරුණු එකඟතාවයෙන් ඇතුළු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එක හරි. මම ඕකට තව point එකක් ගෙනෙන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ ක්‍රම දෙකම Operational Manual එකේ තිබෙද්දි, ඒ ක්‍රම දෙකම අනුගමනය කරලාත් තිබෙද්දි, practice එකක් හැටියට සම්පූර්ණම direct placementsවලට ඒගොල්ලෝ ගිහින් තිබෙද්දි එකවර සියයට සියයක් auctionsවලට යන එකත් එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා අපි තර්ක කරනවා නේ direct placementsම ගියපු එක තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා; නිශ්චිත කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. එහෙම නම් auction ක්‍රමයට ගිය එකත් නිශ්චිත කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : රටේ රීතිය නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක තමයි. Operational Manual එක නොවෙයි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැත්නම්?

සභාපතිතුමා : මහ බැංකුව 97දී ඒ තීරණය ගන්න කොට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒ තීරණය ගන්න ඕනෑ නේ. දැන් ඒ ක්‍රමයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වෙනසක් වෙනවා නම්, ඒ කියන්නේ auction ක්‍රමයට යනවා නම් auctions හෝ direct placement ක්‍රමයට යනවා නම් direct placements හෝ ඒක සියයට සියයක් වෙනස් වීම මුදල් මණ්ඩලය තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. මුදල් මණ්ඩලය ඒ තීරණය අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ පස්සේ නේ. මේකේ හරි විධිය තේරෙනවා. අපි ඇත්තට-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මට තත්පර 10ක් දෙන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේකට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න. Direct placement ක්‍රමයත් හරි නම්, auction ක්‍රමයත් හරි නම් -ක්‍රම දෙකම හරි නම්- තමන්ට ඕනෑ විධියට යොදා ගන්න පුළුවන් නම් මහ බැංකුවේ ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා වාගේ හොඳ දැනුමක් තිබෙන කට්ටිය ඇතුළත් කරනවා, "බැදුම්කර direct placement හෝ auction ක්‍රමයෙන් ලබා ගත හැකියි" කියලා. ඔළුවෙ අමාරුවට නොවෙයි නේ ඒවා ලියලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා දන්නවා උසාවියේ ඔක්කෝම ලියවිලි "as much as possible" කියලා දාලා තිබෙන්නේ හේතුවකට. එහෙමත් නැහැ කියලා හිතන්න කෝ. එහෙම නම් ඔතැනට එන්නේ, "බැදුම්කර වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට හෝ direct placement ක්‍රමයට ලබා ගත හැකියි" කියලා. ඔව්වර නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන එක ඔව්වර සැහැල්ලු නම්, ඕනෑ විධියකට ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා-

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මට මේක ඉවර කරන්න දෙන්න. එතකොට මොකටද 2008 Board

Paper එකක් අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ මේක වෙනස් කරන්න? ඔබතුමන්ලා අපට මේකට උත්තරයක් දෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. වටේ කැරකෙනවා. Direct placement ක්‍රමයත් පුළුවන්, auction ක්‍රමයත් පුළුවන් නම්-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කියන එක පැහැදිලියි. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කෝ මේක කියන තෙක්. ඔබතුමන්ලා කියනවා නේ 2008 මේක වෙනස් කළා කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වෙනස් කළේ මාස තුනකට.

සභාපතිතුමා: මාස තුනකට වෙනස් කළ එක නැවත වෙනස් කරලා නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මාස තුනක කාලයකට වෙනස් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතැනින් එහාට-

සභාපතිතුමා : මාස තුනකට වෙනස් කරපු එක නැවත වෙනස් කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එතකොට එතැනින් ඉවරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා : එතකොට දිගටම ඒ ක්‍රියවලිය යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ. මාස තුනෙන් ඉවරයි. මාස තුනකට වෙනස් කරනවා කියන්නේ -

සභාපතිතුමා : නමුත් ඇත්ත කාරණය තමයි, ප්‍රායෝගිකව ඒක දිගටම ක්‍රියාත්මක වන එක නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා :සභාපතිතුමා ඒක වැරදි දේ නේ. ඔබතුමාට තේරෙන්නේ නැත්නම් මම දන්නේ නැහැ. මම උදාහරණයක් කියන්නම්. ඔබතුමා කියනවා, COPE එකේ තව පැය භාගයක් කෑ ගහන්න දෙනවා කියලා. පැය භාගයකට පස්සේ ඒක ඉවරයි නේ. අපට කියන්න බැහැ පැය දෙකකට පස්සේ, ''ඔබතුමා පැය භාගයකින් නැවැත්තුවේ නැහැ නේ'' කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: කෑ ගහන්න එපා කියලා තීරණයක් අර ගන්නෙත් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දිගටම කෑ ගහනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා රටේ නීතිය දන්නවා නම් මාස තුනකට ගන්න අවසරය-

සභාපතිතුමා: නීතිය අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, එහෙම නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ යෝජනාව ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එහෙම කියන්න එපා. නිකම් arbitrary වෙන්න එපා. අපි අහන්නේ මේකයි. එහෙම අත හෝදා ගෙන පැත්තකට වෙන්න එපා. මේකට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ. අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් අහන්නේ, direct placement ක්‍රමයක් මේ රටේ පැවතුණා කියලා කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ? Captive sourcesවලට කොහොමද ගන්නේ? තේරෙනවා නම් අපට විස්තර කරලා දෙන්න කෝ, captive sourcesවලට කොහොමද ගන්න ඕනෑ, compensation කොහොමද ගෙවන්න ඕනෑ, PDDවලට කොහොමද දෙන්න ඕනෑ, කවදාද ඒ තීන්දුව ආවේ කියලා. මෙතුමා එහෙම නම් ලියන්න ඕනෑ, ''මස තුනකට ගත්ත ඒ තීන්දුව ක්‍රියාත්මක වනවා. මේක දිගටම රටේ නීතිය බවට පත් වනවා. මහ බැංකුවේ රෙගුලාසි බවට පත් වනවා'' කියලා. මෙතුමා එහෙම නම් අපට උපදෙසක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඊට විරුද්ධව අපට අධිකරණයට වුණත් යන්න පුළුවන්. අපට ව්‍යංග්‍යයෙන් කියලා හරි යන්නේ නැහැ. එකේ review කරලා තිබෙනවා නම්, එතැනින් එහාට නැත්නම්- මාස තුනකට ගත්තේ. ඒක මාස තුනෙන් ඉවරයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ලියවිලි ටික ගෙනෙන තෙක් වෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක් මම අහන්නම්. මම මේ ප්‍රශ්නය වෙන විධියකට දකිනවා. දැන් ඇත්තටම අපි උපකල්පනය කරමු auction සහ direct placement ක්‍රම දිගටම ආවා කියලා. එහෙම දෙකම තිබෙන එක නිවැරදියි කියන එක සහ වැඩි බරක් direct placementsවලට තැබීම තමයි proper විධිය කියලා. මොකද, මම මෙතුමාගේ තර්කයට වඩා වෙනස් angle එකකින් ඒ දිහා බලන්නේ. එහෙම නම් ඒ කථාව එන්නේ single transaction එකකට නොවෙයි නේ. යම් කාලයක ආණ්ඩුවට අවශ්‍ය කරන funds ලබා ගැනීමටයි ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය තිබෙන්නේ. එහෙම බැලුවාම 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ -අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල් මහතාගේ කාලයේ- ක්‍රියාත්මක කර ගෙන ආපු ප්‍රතිපත්තිය maintain කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඇයි, auctionsවලින් අරන් තිබෙන්නේ 10යි; direct placementsවලින් 23යි.

30 ට 70 maintain කරලා තිබෙනවා. මේකේ තර්කය තමයි, direct placementවලින් ගන්න පුළුවන් ප්‍රමාණය සැලකිය යුතු ප්‍රමාණයක් ඒ ගොල්ලෝ අරන් තිබුණා. මේ, මාසයේ අන්තිමනේ. ඒ අනුව market එකේ යම් සල්ලි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබුණා. එතකොට මම දැන් සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ තර්කය වෙනම තියලා, මම බතුමාගෙන් ඇහුවොත් ''ඇත්තටම, 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයට අදාළව

කලින් අරන් ආපු ක්‍රමවේදයම අරන් ඇවිල්ලා නේද?" කියලා. සියයට 30යි auction, සියයට 70යි direct. අපි මේ policy එකෙන් කථා කරන්නේ එක transaction එකක් ගැන නොවෙයිනේ සභාපතිතුමා. Policy එකෙන් කථා කරන්නේ නිශ්චිත කාලයකට අදාළ fund requirements ගැනයි. එහෙම බැලුවාම ඇත්තටම මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ desperate දෙයක් නෙමෙයි. අපි කියනවානේ desperate කමක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. Market එකේ තිබුණු සල්ලි එකතු කරලා, එකතු කරලා ඒ desperate situation එකට තමයි මේක ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. එහෙම බැලුවාම ඒ තිබෙන ක්‍රමය නිවැරදියි කියලා කිව්වත්, still මම ඉන්නේ වෙන තැනක. නමුත්, මේක හරි. මම මේ කියන තර්කය ගැන විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මොකද කියන්නේ?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔය කථා කරන තර්කවල යම් යම් කාරණා තිබෙන්නට පුළුවන්. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම තිබෙනවා. ඒක හොඳයි. මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමේදී ප්‍රධාන කාරණා කිහිපයක් පමණයි සැලකිල්ලට ගත්තේ. ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන්ම මේ කථා කරන manual එක හරහා minimum cost එකට සහ risk එකට මේ මිලදී ගැනීම කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන කාරණය සැලකිල්ලට ගත්තා. එතැනදී systematically Tender Board එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් සහ Monetary Board එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒ ගොල්ලෝ අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රමවේද පදනම් කරගෙන ගලාගිය ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබුණා. ඒ ගලාගිය ක්‍රමවේදය පදනම් කරගෙන අඩුම පිරිවැය යටතේ ගැනීම සඳහා මේ Tender Board එක අනුමත කරන ක්‍රමවේදය පදනම් කරගත්තා නම් සිදු වන කාරණය තමයි විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ highlight කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකට එහා ගිය කාරණා තිබෙනවා නම්, එම කාරණාත් මේකට එකතු කළා කියලා කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒකයි මම කිව්වේ, මේකේ හරාත්මක කරුණ තමයි කථා කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. ඒ හරාත්මක කරණුවලට

අමතරව Central Bank එකෙයි, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙයි ක්‍රමවේදවල තව දහසකුත් එවැනි දුර්වලකම් කථා කරගන්න තිබෙනවා කියලා මම හැම වෙලාවේම කියනවානේ. එතකොට Central Bank එකෙත් මේක තමයි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. අපි මේ වගේ secrecy එකකට මුවාවෙලා කරන හුහක් අඩුපාඩු දිගින් දිගටම, දිගින් දිගටම තිබුණා. අපි පරණ වාර්තා වුණත් ඕනෑවට වඩා check කරන්න ගියේ නැහැ. යන්න බැහැ. මොකද, secrecy ප්‍රශ්නය නිසා මේ ටික ගන්න ගිය අමාරුව ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවානේ. එම කාරණාව මේ වාර්තාව හදන වෙලාවේදී තිබෙන තත්ත්වයත් එක්ක කථා කරන එක එච්චර සාධාරණ නැහැ කියලා තමයි මම නම් හිතන්නේ. මොකද හේතුව, මේ minute එක ගන්න අපි මහන්සි වුණු මහන්සිය දන්නේ අපි විතරයි. එහෙම තමයි මේ වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලා වෙනුවෙන් සකස් කළේ. මම වෙනුවෙන් නොවෙයිනේ. ඒ පදනම හරියට තේරුම් ගන්න. ඒ පදනම මත විගණකාධිපතිට පැවරිලා තිබෙන බලතල අනුව රජයේ මුදල් ආරක්ෂා කිරීම කියන කාරණයේදී රජයේ මුදල් ගැනීම සහ minimum cost එකකට ගැනීම කියන කාරණා දෙක තමයි මෙතැනදී වැදගත් point එකක් හැටියට විගණාධිපති විසින් සලකලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ අනුව තමයි අවම මිල මොකක්ද,- අවම මිලට නොගැනීමේ යම් යම් ක්‍රමවේද, ඒ කියන්නේ ක්‍රමානුකූලව තිබුණු ක්‍රමවේද අභිභවා යෑම නිසා සිදු වුණු අලාභ තමයි මේ ගණනය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකට කැමති නම් එහෙමයි, ඒකට අකමැති නම්, ඒවාට අවශ්‍ය options හදලා ඕනෑ දෙයක් සඳහන් කිරීමේ කිසිම අවුළක් නැහැ. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ වාර්තාව වෙනස් කරන්න,- මොකද, මේක කෝප් කමිටුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළා මිසක්, ඉන් එහාට ගිය එකක් නෙමෙයිනේ. කමිටුව මේ ඔක්කෝම ටික develop කරගන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, කමිටුවට තමයි ඊට පස්සේ බලය තිබෙන්නේ. මට තිබෙන බලතල අනුව මාස ගණනක් දහලලා, fight කරලා තමයි මේ information අරගත්තේ. නැත්නම් මේ information ගන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලාම පැහැදිලිව පිළිගන්නවා, Central Bank එකේ කට්ටියගේ bias මේවා ගන්න බැහැ කියනවා කියලා. ඉතින් මම මොකද කරන්නේ? එතකොට details ඉල්ලුවාම, details දෙන්න බැහැ, secrecy කියලා මාර යුද්ධයක් කළා. ඒ හරහා දහලලා, කෝප් කමිටුවට ගෙනැල්ලා තමයි ඒ decisions ටික අරගත්තේ. විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මේ වගේ fight කරපු case එකක් නැති තරම් මේ වගේ වාර්තාවක් මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයකට ගේන්න. එහෙම කරලා තමයි මේක හරිගස්වලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේකේ ඕනෑ තරම් ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන අඩු පාඩු ඇති. ඒ අඩු පාඩු හදලා මේකට add කරගන්න. ඒකේ කිසිම අවුලක් නැහැ. මොකද, විගණකාධිපති දීලා තිබෙන්නේ මතයක්. විගණකාධිපති මත දෙකක් දෙන්නේ නැහැ. ලබා දුන්නොත් දෙන්නේ එක මතයයි. ඒ මතයට එකතු කරගැනීම්, අඩු කරගැනීම් ඕනෑ දෙයක් කෝප් කමිටුවට කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ දේ කරන කොට අපි නිකම් ගහමරාගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. සාකච්ඡා කරලා, තර්ක කරලා ඒ දේ කරන්න. මටත් තර්ක කරන්න පුළුවන්, මාත් එක්ක තර්ක කරගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේකේ මෙන්න මේ ටික develop කරමු කියලා, ඒ ටික develop කරගන්න. කිසිම issue එකක් නැහැ.

නමුත් යම් කාරණයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිට එක මතයයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ මතය ඔහු කරපු කාර්යයන් අනුව, ඔහු සොයාගත් තොරතුරු අනුව සකස් කරලා තිබනෙවා. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ limitations ඔක්කෝම පෙන්වලා තිබෙන්නේ. හමුබ වුණු සියල්ලම පෙන්වලා තිබෙනවා. ඒවාට අවස්ථා ටික තිබෙනවා. ඒවා estimation කියලා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. "මෙන්න මේ අනුව මෙහෙම වුණොත් මෙහෙමයි" කියලා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඉතින් ඔය කියන දේවල් එකතු කරලා ඔය වාර්තාව හදන්න පුළුවන්. කිසිම ගැටලුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමාගේ ප්‍රකාශය මම අගය කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : Manual එක පිළිබඳවත්, මේකේ තිබෙන policy එක පිළිබඳවත් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉන්න ස්ථාවරය අනුව, ඔබතුමන්ලා දකින දෘෂ්ටිය අනුව, ඔබතුමන්ලා විග්‍රහ කරගන්නා ආකාරය අනුව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ඇස්තමේන්තු ක්‍රියාවලිය හරිද වැරදිද, නැත්නම් එකඟද, නැද්ද කියලා බලලා මේකට යම් කාරණා ඇතුළු කරන්න හෝ ඉවත් කරන්න ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ කාරණය මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. මේක ඉතාම හොඳ කාරණාවක්. ඔබතුමා කිව්ව එක අපි පිළිගන්නවා. ඔබතුමාට Finance Ministry එකෙන් letter එකක් දීලා තිබෙනවා private placement ගැන විස්තර දෙන්න කියලා. ඔබතුමා නිවැරදිව මේ විස්තරය දුන්නොත්, ඔබතුමාගේ ඔය නිගමනයත් එක්ක හරියට එකතු කරන්න පුළුවන්. අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම එතකොට තමයි අංග සම්පූර්ණ උත්තරයක් එන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට Finance Ministry එකෙන් මේක එවලා තිබෙනවා.

Hon. Mr. Ravi Karunanayake

Minister of Finance.

<u>Audit to be concluded in terms of Section 43(3) of the Monetary Law Act</u>

This refers to your letters FM/W/M/65/16 dated 04 August 2016 (Hand delivered to my office on 17 October 2016) and FM/WM/17/16 dated 19 August 2016 on the above subject.

Once the receipt of the aforesaid letter dated 19 August 2016, on the same date I directed the officers concerned to gather the necessary particulars to compile the said report called by you under 10 subjects for a period of 09 years with the intention of submitting the same within three months.

Two letters relating to this matter dated 19 August 2016 and 07 September 2016 were addressed to the Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

The Senior Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka informed me by letter dated 05 October, 2016 that they require time till the end of October 2016 to submit the particulars I requested.

I assure you that I will try my best to compile the said report and submit the same on or before the 01 November, 2016 as requested by your letter dated 04 October 2016, provided that particulars requested from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka are received at least one week ahead in time for me to prepare the report before 01 November, 2016.

එහිදී සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මේකයි. It is very important.

Then we will agree with you, what you have done is correct.

I refer to the Section 43(2) of the Monetary Law Act and request you to examine accounts of the Public Debt Department of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka relating to direct/private placements in government securities since 2008 on a per year basis and report findings on the following subjects.

i) Whether such placements were carried on with due approval of the Monetary Board.

ii) Whether adequate internal controls and decision-making process were in place to avoid any irregularities that could have arisen from non transparency of fund raising.

iii) Whether placements that have been initially approved by the Monetary Board in 2008 for state owned funds have been extended to all captive sources with appropriate studies and approvals (Please provide a fist of such captive sources along with information on placements)

iv) Whether public auctions were adequately conducted to promote government

securities market in the medium to long run in line with global best practices.

v) Whether placements were open only for securities offered for particular auction or other securities at the choice of investors.

vi) Whether yield rates offered on placements were fir and supported with evidence on market yield rates.

vii) Whether yield rates on private placements have been lower than market yield rates.

viii) Whether government securities market development has been suppressed by such placements.

(x) Whether placements have helped reduce the funding cost to the government on Treasury Bills and Bonds compared to market interest rates.

(xi) Whether the Central Depository on government securities operates with standards IT controls to prevent any unauthorized transfers of ownership of securities.

I shall be thankful if you will submit the report on the examination within three months.

Minister of Finance."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : කවුද මේ ලිපිය එවා තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Finance Minister මේක සකස් කර තිබෙනවා නම්, ඔබතුමාගේ නිගමනය ගැන අපට හරියටම උත්තරයක් ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි මා කිව්වේ. පිටු ගණනක tables හදලා මේ දවස්වල Central Bank එක ready වෙනවා. පසු ගිය සුමානෙත් කථා කළා. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ තව time ඉල්ලනවා. නමුත් මා ගිය සුමානේ මේ ලිපිය refer කරලා නැවතත් ලිපියක් යැව්වා, "ඇමතිතුමා first වලට ඉල්ලනවා. ඒ නිසා මේක තව expedite කරලා දෙන්න"යි කියලා. සෑම දෙයක්ම submit කරන්න ඒ ගොල්ලෝ මාස 2ක් time ඉල්ලුවා. ඒවා submit කළාම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

අනික් පැත්තෙන්, ඒවාත් නැවතත් හදන්නේ Central Bank එකෙන් නේ. මට ගිහිල්ලා තවදුරටත් ඒවා සොයන්න බැහැ. මට files 1,500ක් handle කරන්න තිබෙනවා. ඊළඟට, Central Bank එකේ millions of transactions තිබෙනවා. අපට සිටින staff එකේ ප්‍රමාණයට අනුව එක් කෙනකු හෝ දෙදෙනකු යොදා ගෙන බොහොම අමාරුවෙන් තමයි මේ වැඩ කටයුතු කරන්නේ. ඒ අනුව අපට ගන්න පුළුවන් information අරගෙන, ඒවා recheck කරලා ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙනුත් report එකක් හදලා දෙන්නම්. මොකද, අවුරුද්දකට රුපියල් මිලියන ගණනක transactions තිබෙන ආයතනයක අපට ඒවා පිළිබඳව එකින් එකට යන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒ නිසා උපරිම වශයෙන් කරන්න පුළුවන් දේවල් තමයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම කෙරෙන්නේ. මේවායේ ඇතුළේ තිබෙන secret issue එක නිසා ලොකු plunders වෙලා තිබෙනවාය කියන එක හොඳටම පැහැදිලියි නේ. ඇත්තටම ඔබතුමන්ලා එකතු වෙලා ඒවා තමයි නිවැරැදි කරන්න ඕනෑ. මුලින්ම transparency තුළින් ඒවා හෙළි කර ගන්න, secrecy එකට මුවා වෙලා Central Bank එකෙන් සිදු වන අවාසි නැති කර ගන්න මොකක් හෝ වැඩ පිළිවෙළක් සකස් කරන්න ඕනෑ. වැදගත්ම දේ ඒකයි. එතකොට මේ ප්‍රශ්න සියල්ලම විසඳෙනවා. මටත් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, අපේ කාර්ය භාරය අපි කරනවා. පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්, ඇමතිවරුන් වශයෙන් අපි නිකම් ඉන්නේ නැහැ. අපි විශාල කාර්ය භාරයක් කරනවා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි මා කියන්නේ. වැදගත්ම දේ මේ ප්‍රශ්නවලට උත්තර සොයා දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒවා වැදගත් තමයි. ඒවා වැදගත් වාගේම ඒ කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් opinion දෙන කොටත් අපි ප්‍රවේශම් වන්න ඕනෑ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : මගේ opinion එක මා පැහැදිලිව දීලා තිබෙනවා, limitations සියල්ලම දීලා තිබෙනවා, කාරණා සියල්ලම කියා තිබෙනවා. එතැනින් එහාට මා ගිහින් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මට තත්පර 20ක් දෙන්න. Private placements සම්බන්ධයෙන් මේ ප්‍රශ්න ටිකට හරියාකාරව උත්තරයක් ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන් නම්, ඊට පස්සේ ඒ සාධක අනුව අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඔබතුමාගේ ගණනය ගැන බලන්න පුළුවන්. Private placement සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඒක නිවැරැදි ක්‍රමය කියලා නේ අපි හිතා ගෙන ඉන්නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: අපි අනික් ඒවාත් ඉල්ලා ගෙන බලමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේකත් එක්කම අපි ඒ report එක බලාපොරොත්තු වනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඇත්තටම ඔබතුමාත් එක්ක, ඔබතුමා දැන් කියපු කාරණයත් එක්ක මා එකඟ වනවා. දැන් දැක්කා නේ. අපටත් කෑ ගහන්න සිද්ධ වුණා. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය කාරණය මත සහ රටට අවශ්‍ය විවෘතභාවය පිළිබඳ කාරණය මත ආණ්ඩු පක්ෂයේ ඇමතිවරයකු වශයෙන් මටත් කෑ ගහන්න සිද්ධ වුණා. එහෙම කරලා තමයි අවසානයේ සමහර තොරතුරු අපි ලබා ගත්තේ. එහෙම නොවුණා නම් මේ සාකච්ඡාව මෙපමණ දුරටවත් යන්නේ නැහැ. අපි දැන් දන්නවා, ඒක කොපමණ අමාරුද කියලා. ඒ නිසා මා පළමුවෙන්ම ඔබතුමාට ස්තුතිවන්ත වනවා, දැනට තිබෙන සීමාසහිත තොරතුරු මත යම් නිගමනයකට එළඹීම පිළිබඳව. ඒ වාගේම මා සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාට කියන්න ඕනෑ, සාධාරණයක් වෙන්න - මුල් දවසේ අපිත් කරුණු එතරම් හරියාකාරව දන්නේ නැති නිසා වෙනස් tone එකකින් තමයි කිව්වේ.

විගණකාධිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ "විෂය පථය සීමා වීම" යටතේ මේ ප්‍රශ්න ටික සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඇත්තටම මා එය අගය කරන්න ඕනෑ. එහි මුලින්ම manual එක ගැන, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතේ තිබෙන issues ගැන කියනවා. ඇත්තටම ඒ ලේඛනත් පස්සේ නේ ලැබුණේ. ඔබතුමා ලියා ගෙන්වා ගත්තා නේ manual එකේ validity එක ගැන.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : Transparency කියලා දෙන්න බැහැයි කිව්වා නේ. මේකට කියලා නේ ගෙන්වා ගත්තේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ, "විෂය පථය සීමා වීම" යටතේ 3.1 ඡේදයේ තිබෙන සීමාවන් ඇත්තටම දැන් අදාළ නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ 3.2 ඡේදයේ ඔබතුමා කියනවා, පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වීමේ කාර්යය ඔබතුමා වෙත පැවරුණු දිනය හා අදාළ සිද්ධීන් සිදු වූ දිනයන් අතර කාල පරතරයක් තිබුණු නිසා තොරතුරු නැති වෙලා තිබුණාය කියලා. 3.3 ඡේදයේ කියනවා, "අදාළ විෂයගත කරුණු පිළිබඳ විෂය බද්ධ පෘථුල දැනුමක් සහිත මූල්‍ය හා ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයින්ගේ සහය ලබා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් නොතිබීම හා මෙම වාර්තාවේ පළමු ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය පිළිබඳව ගැටලුසහගත තත්ත්වය නිසා එවැනි සහයක් ලබා ගැනීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වීම." කියලා. ඊළඟට, 3.4 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් වනවා, "ඉහත 3.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් විශේෂඥයින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව සිටියද එම නිලධාරීන්ගේ සහය අපක්ෂපාති ලෙස ලබා ගත හැකිද යන්න ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වීම." කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ 3.5 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් වනවා, " අදාළ විෂයට සම්බන්ධිත ඉතා වැදගත් ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු එම තෙවන පාර්ශ්වයන් වෙතින් සෘජුව ලබා ගැනීමට හෝ තහවුරු කරවා ගැනීමට අධිකාර බලයක් විගණකාධිපති වෙත නොතිබීම." කියලා. එයත් වැදගත් කාරණයක්. මොකද, එහෙම නැත්නම් සංසන්දනය කරන්න බැරි තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, private sector එකත් information දෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා මේ ලේඛන ටික කියවා ගන්න කල් අවසන් නිර්දේශයන්ට පදනම් වීම සඳහායි මා මේ කථාව පටන් ගන්නේ. අවසානයේ නිර්දේශවලට මෙතුමා සීමා දක්වා තිබෙන කාරණා-

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : ඒවා දෙන්නේ නැති එක විතරක් නොවෙයි, මට බලයක් නැහැ නේ, යන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, specific areasවලට private sector එක වුණත් මේවා public funds සම්බන්ධ කාරණා නිසා investor, private වුණත් ඒ information පිළිබඳව audit කරන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : අලුත් විගණන පනත් කෙටුම්පතේ ඒ සියල්ලම ඇතුළත් කරලායි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ පනත් කෙටුම්පත තවම සම්මත වෙලා නැහැ. ඊළඟට තවත් කාරණා සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා. එදා Auditor-Generalට තිබුණු තොරතුරු මත මාස කිහිපයකට කලින් මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කළා. ඉන් පස්සේ අපට අදාළ නීතිය පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ලැබුණා. ඒ වාගේම අනිකුත් දත්ත යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් ලැබී තිබෙනවා. මා බොහොම ගෞරවයෙන් සහ වග කීමෙන් සභාපතිතුමාට කියා සිටින්නේ, ඔබතුමාට ඒ වෙලාවේ තිබුණු තොරතුරු මත ඒ නිගමනය නිවැරැදි වුණාට, අනුකූල වන නීතිය පිළිබඳ අපට දැන් තිබෙන පැහැදිලිකම නිසා මේ මොහොතේ ඇති තොරතුරු මත ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඒ නිගමනය ගැලපෙන්නේ නැහැ කියලායි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා, එතුමාට තිබෙන්නේ එක වාර්තාවයි කියලා. විටින් විට වාර්තා සකස් කිරීමේ සම්ප්‍රදායක් නැහැ. ඒක සුදුසු නැහැයි කියලාත් පිළිගන්නවා. එහෙම නම් සභාපතිතුමනි, මා ඔබතුමාට ආයාචනය කරනවා, - අපි දුෂ්කරතාවක ඉන්නවා. අපි දැන් පොඩි උගුලකට අහු වෙලා නේ ඉන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : එහෙම නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : උගුලකට අහු වෙලාය කියන්නේ, අපිත් එක්ක හිටපු එක කණ්ඩායමක් අතර මැදදී නැඟිටලා ගියාට පස්සේ -

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ වාර්තාවක් ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දෙයි.

ඔබතුමන්ලාට මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එතුමන්ලාත් සිටියා නම් අපට මේ කාරණා ගැන කථා කරන්න තිබුණා. ඒක තමයි මුල ඉඳලාම කිව්වේ. එතුමන්ලා සිටියා නම් convince කරන්නත් තිබුණා. මා ඔබතුමාගෙන් බැගෑපත්ව ඉල්ලන්නේ, මේ තත්ත්වය පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමා ස්වාධීනව සලකා - විෂයානුබද්ධව ස්වාධීනතාව පිළිබඳ කිසිම සැකයක් නැහැ.- අපි වෙනස් නිගමනයකට එමු කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒ කරුණු ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ ඇස්තමේන්තු සම්බන්ධයෙන් හෝ වාසි අවාසි ගණනය කිරීම පිළිබඳව හෝ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන මතය, තර්කය අනුව ඉදිරිපත් කරන කාරණාව වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරලා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මට ඒකට මතයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්. සභාපතිතුමා විධියට ඔබතුමා මේ කෙටුම්පත සකස් කරන්න නේ සහාය වුණේ. මේ කෙටුම්පත පිළිබඳව නේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. සංඛ්‍යාත්මක අලාභයක් ගැන තිබෙන සංකල්පය පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයකයි මා ඉන්නේ. ඒ කාරණය පිළිබඳව විවාදයකින් තොරව මේ තිබෙන සීමාවන් ඇතුළත් කරලා ඒ කරුණු සඳහන් කරන්න බැරිද? ඒ කියන්නේ, "මෙහෙම තිබුණා. නමුත් ඉන් පස්සේ මේ තොරතුරු තිබෙනවා. ඒ තොරතුරු අනුව මෙහෙම ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා"යි කියන කාරණය එකඟතාවෙන් වාර්තාවට අතුළත් කරන්න බැරිද?

සභාපතිතුමා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව මූලික පදනමක් හැටියට සලකා ගෙන තමයි අපි ඉතා පැහැදිලිව සාක්ෂි විමසීම, සාකච්ඡා කිරීම ඇතුළු සියලු දේවල් කළේ. මා නැවතත් කියන්නේ, ඒ පදනම ම සලකා ගෙන තමයි, ලේකම් කාර්යාලය සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කරලා මා මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කර තිබෙන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ඇස්තමේන්තුවල සහ විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ අන්තර්ගතයන් නේ මට ඇතුළත් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට වෙනස්ව ඔබතුමන්ලා දැන් දකින අදහස අනුව මේ කමිටුව වෙනස් අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, කිසි ගැටලුවක් නැහැ, ඒ වෙනස් අදහස වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ඒකනේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මගෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ. මට ස්වාධීනව ඉන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගැන මට ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මම මේ වාර්තාව වෙනුවෙන් පෙනී සිටින්නේ මගේ පුද්ගලික අභිලාෂයක් වෙනුවෙන් නොවෙයි. මේ වාර්තාව වෙනුවෙන් මම පෙනී සිටින්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව මූලික පදනමක් හැටියට සලකලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා මට කියන්න, මේ වාර්තාවේ මම අතින් එකතු කරපු මොනවාවත් තිබෙනවා දකියලා. මේ මූලික වාර්තාවේ එකතු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ සියලුම verbatim වල මට පිළිගන්න පුළුවන්, මට පෙනී ඉන්න පුළුවන් කරුණු. Verbatim වල තිබෙන, නිලධාරීන් ඉදිරිපත් කළ, මේ ලියවිල්ල සකස් කළ මේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලයේ සියලු දෙනා වෙනුවෙන් මට පෙනී ඉන්න පුළුවන්, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව මූලික පදනමක් හැටියට සලකලා මේ පරීක්ෂණය දිගට ගෙන යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මාව පත් වුණු දා ඉඳලා ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගත්ත පදනමේ සිටියි මම කටයුතු කරන්නේ. මට ඊට වඩා වෙනසක් නැහැ. හැබැයි ඊට වඩා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ විෂය පථයට, දැනුමට, බුද්ධියට ප්‍රමාණාත්මක කරුණු අනුව ඔබතුමන්ලා යම් අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම් ඒ අදහස වෙනුවෙන් ඒ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න මට පුළුවන්. ඒක නේ මගේ කාර්ය භාරය. ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙතැන සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මා පිළිගෙන තිබෙන්නේ ඒ නිසා නේ. මේ වාර්තාවට සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟයි කියලා එක පිරිසක් වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නත් ස්වාධීන මනසක් මට තිබෙනවා වාගේම, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන කාරණාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නත් මට ස්වාධීන මනසක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැනට - 13වන පිටුවට- එන තෙක් ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟයි නේ. එතැන සිට ඉදිරියට යමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට මෙන්න මේ කාරණය ගැන විතරක් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ අර කලින් තිබුණු tradition එක ඒ විධියටම continue වුණා කියලා අපට පිළිගන්න පුළුවන් නේද? ඒ කියන්නේ නීතියට එකඟ වුණත්, නැති වුණත් - ඒ ගැන වාදයක් තිබෙනවා. මම ඒ ගැන කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ. – 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයට කලින් තිබුණු ක්‍රමය ඒ කියන්නේ වෙන්දේසි අඩු, direct placement වැඩි ක්‍රමවේදය 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේත් continue වුණා කියන එක පිළිගන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: 2015 වර්ෂයේ අග අන්තිම එක නේ auction එකට ආවේ. ඒ වෙන තෙක් කලින් කීපයක් තිබ්ලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මාසයේ fund requirement එක සැලකුවාම 30 per cent bonds and 70 per cent direct placements.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතකොට අපි ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. ඒ මාසයේ ඒක continue වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම බැලුවාම පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ තිබුණු ක්‍රමය තුළ ගත්ත රුපියල් බිලියන 10, direct placements වලට ගියේ නැහැයි කියන උපකල්පනය මත අවාසියක් විධියට පෙන්නුම් කිරීම දෝෂ සහගතයි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම බැලුවා, Board Papers ටික ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ජනවාරි මාසයේ දුන්න තීන්දුව අප්‍රේල් මාසයෙන් ඉවර වුණාම, මැයි මාසයේ තව Board Paper එකක් දමලා තිබෙනවා. අප්‍රේල් වන තෙක් EPF, NSB, ETF වලින් රුපියල් බිලියන 115ක් අරගත්තා. Monetary Board එකේ approval එක ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා, මැයිවල සිට දෙසැම්බර් වන තෙක් direct placements කරන්න. Treasury Bonds ඒකට yield structure එකක් ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකේ approval එක හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවා, මැයි මාසයේ සිට දෙසැම්බර් මාසය වන තෙක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ මොන අවුරුද්දේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 2008

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතැනින් පස්සේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැනින් පස්සේ අපි ළඟ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඔක්තෝබර්වල එකක් එන්නේ කොහොමද, මැද හරියේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා, දෙසැම්බර් වන තෙක්. මැද හරියේ එක ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙන්නේ, "Improvement of Market Liquidity through Active Participation of Employees' Provident Fund" කියලා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, EPF.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: "Issue Treasury Bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at an interest rate 5 basis points above the rates prevailed in the secondary market through private placements; " එතකොට ඒ කාරණාවයි, මුලින් කාරණාවයි conflict වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි. මුලින් එකේ එන්නේ 6 per cent නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මුල් එකේ 6 per cent එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, පළමුවන එකේ එනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය)හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පළමුවන එකේ 6 per cent එකක් එනවා. එක් වෙනස් කරනවා, මැයි වල. May to December up to 15 years නේ මේගොල්ලෝ rates දෙන්නේ. ඒ සියයට 18-12.6 වන තෙක්. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ ඒක determine කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරය කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හරය තමයි, අපි මාස තුනකට නේ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි, assessment එක නැහැ නේ. ඒක නේ අපි ඇහුවේ. මේකේ අහනවා නේ, "It is proposed to review this rate structure at the end of April 2008" කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක review කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Review කරන්නේ May මාසයේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. අප්‍රේල්වලින් ඉවරයි නේ. මැයි මාසයේ review කරලා දෙසැම්බර් වන තෙක් දීර්ඝ කරනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒකෙන් එක දෙයක් පෙනෙනවා. It is a continuing temporary arrangement on specific condition.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තේරෙනවා නේද සභාපතිතුමා? කරනවා නම් හැම වෙලාවේම ඒක extend කරන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, පවතින එකම norm එක තමයි auction system එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැතුව මෙහෙම දෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි අලුතෙන් ගෙනෙනවා නම් ව්‍යතිරේකයක් නේ ගෙනෙන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම්, system එක හරි නම්, ඔය කියන විධියට ක්‍රම දෙකම තිබෙනවා කියලා පිළිගන්නවා නම් මේක ඕනෑ නැහැ. Board Papers මොනවාවත් ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නවා, එතකොට Monetary Board එකේ approval එක වරින් වර ඒ අය අරගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒක අපට පෙනෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 2008 දෙසැම්බර් මාසය වෙන තෙක් approval එක අරගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. වරින් වර අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ direct place කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්, direct place කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Auction කරන්න නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. Direct placement සඳහා නේ අරන් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: System එක auction.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රීතිය සභාපතිතුමනි, auction. ඒකෙන් පිට වෙන්න ඕනෑ නම් ගන්න ඕනෑ, Board approval එකක්. ඒක තමයි මාස තුනෙන් තුනට අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. දෙසැම්බර් වන තෙක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ කෝ? ඊට පස්සේ ගත්තේ නැත්නම් ආපහු රීතියට එනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ තර්කය තිබෙන්නේ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපේ තර්කය නොවෙයි. අපි සියලු දෙනාගේම.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. ඔබතුමන්ලා තර්ක කරන කාරණය තිබෙන්නේ එහෙම අලුතෙන් තීරණයක් ගත්තේ නැත්නම් එතකොට තිබෙන්නේ auction ක්‍රමය කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමය. ඒක තමයි මේ manual එකේ කියන්නේ "as much as possible" කියලා. නැත්නම් එහෙම දමන්නේ නැහැ නේ. පුළුවන් තරම් යන්න කියලායි කියන්නේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක යන්නේ විනිවිදභාවයට. වෙන මොනවාවත් නොවෙයි. විනිවිදභාවය ඉතා වැදගත්. මම දන්නේ නැහැ, market rates බලලා උච්චාවචනයට යන්න, direct placement හෝ non- solicited proposals හෝ දෙන්න කියලා රජයේ ආයතනයක් කියනවාද කියලා. Dollars 450 million ප්‍රමාණයක LED bulbs එනවා, ලංකාවට ආයතන ආරම්භ කරන්න. එතකොට වැඩිම වාසිය ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන්, ඒකට දෙනවා නම්. ඒක තමයි ගිය වර ආණ්ඩුව කළේ. Non- solicited proposals ලෝකයේ කොහේවත් රජයේ ආයතනයක් අනුමත කරන්නේ නැහැ. Auction system එකේ තිබෙන විනිවිදභාවය නැතුව, ඒක කරන්න කියනවා නම් අපට අනෙක් ආයතනවලටත් ඒ ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය කරන්න පුළුවන්. රජයේ සියලුම ආයතන COPE කමිටුවට ඊළඟට ගන්න කොට මම ඒක අනුගමනය කරනවා. Non- solicited proposals ක්‍රමයට අඩු ගණනට ගන්න පුළුවන්. මේ ලෝකයේ auction system එක තිබෙන්නේ විනිවිදභාවයට; වෙන දෙයකට නොවෙයි. විනිවිදභාවය ලෝකයේ හැම දියුණු රටක්ම අගය කරන දෙයක්. රජයේ ආයතන, විශේෂයෙන්ම Auditor General's Department එක බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ මෙම ආයතනවල විනිවිදභාවය. ඒක අපි advocate කරන්නේ නැතුව විනිවිදභාවයෙන් අඩු ක්‍රමවේදයක් අනුගමනය කරන්නට කියනවා නම්, ඒ වාගේම EPF, ETF එකට කිසිම compensation එකක් නොගෙවා ඒක පාවිච්චි කරන්න කියලා කියනවා නම් මම දන්නේ නැහැ, ඒක කොච්චර නිවැරදිද කියලා. රීතිය තිබෙන්නේ auction system එක, "as much as possible" කියන එක. ඒක ඉතා පැහැදිලියි. ව්‍යතිරේකය තමයි Board approval එක ගන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක. ඒක හැම එකකටම අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. දෙසැම්බර් මාසයේ ගත්ත ඒවා තව පෙන්වන්න ඕනෑ, මේ ක්‍රමය දිගටම කර ගෙන ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා නම්. දිගු කාලයකට ගත්තා නම්, බැරි වෙලාවත් 2009 ඉඳලා 2015 වෙන තෙක් ගත්තා නම් අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම manual එක amend වෙන්න ඕනෑ. කෙටි කාලයෙන් කෙටි කාලයට ගෙනෙන්න තමයි මේ Board Papers ගෙනෙන්නේ. මම දන්නේ නැහැ, එතැනින් එහාට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් කොහොමද කියන්නේ කියලා, ආපු ක්‍රමවේදයට මේක කර ගෙන යන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් විතරයි අහන්නේ. වැරදි සහගත දෙයක් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන්න කියලා කිසිම ආයතනයකට අපි මීට කලින් කියලා නැහැ නේ. මේ COPE එකට නැත්නම් PAC එකට වෙන ආයතන ආපුවාම අපි අහන්නේ Board decision එකක් ගත්තා නම් එය ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකළේ ඇයි කියලායි, "ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Board decision එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ අනුව ක්‍රියාත්මක නොකළේ ඇයි?" කියලායි වෙනත් ආයතන ආපුවාම නිලධාරීන්ගෙන් අපි අහන්නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ කිව්වොත්, "නැහැ මේක නොවෙයි අපි අනුගමනය කරපු ක්‍රියා මාර්ගය, ඊට පස්සේ අපි දිගටම වෙන ක්‍රමවේදයක් අනුගමනය කළා" කියලා අපි ඔළුව වනලා නිකම් ඉන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම කොහොමද ඔබතුමන්ලා කළේ කියලා අපි ප්‍රශ්න කරනවා. මේකේදී එහෙම ප්‍රශ්න නොකරන එක අපට ප්‍රහේළිකාවක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඇහුවේ, කවදා ඉඳලාද private placements දුන්නේ non-captive කට්ටියට කියලා. Direct placement දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියන්නේ captive කට්ටියට

විතරයි නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි. මේ තුනෙන් permission අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ EPF, ETF සහ NSB.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හැබැයි මෙහි දාලා තිබෙනවා "…captive sources such as…" කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. එතකොට PTL එක, Entrust Securities PLC එක, First Capital එක කියන ඒවාටත් බැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙනම් HSBC, Seylan Bank PLC කියන ඒවාටත් බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: බැහැ. Acuity Securities Limited, DFCC Vardhana Bank PLC කිසි එකකට දෙන්න බැහැ. මේක අනුව නම් දෙන්න බැහැ. හැබැයි දැන් ඒක 2013 අත්පොත ඇතුළට එනවා. 2013 අත්පොතේදී කියනවා private placements කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. "…as much as…" possible…" සහ primary dealersලාට private placements කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. හැබැයි ඒකට Monetary Board එකේ approval එකත් තියෙනවද නැද්ද කියල අපි දන්නෙ නැහැ. හැබැයි ඉතින් දිගටම තිබෙන්නේ "…auction as much as possible…"කියන එක. අපේ තර්කය කොහොමද මේක justify කරන්නේ, මේක කොතැනින්ද කැපෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් තව ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම්. අපි ගණන හදන විට assume කරන්නේ private placement කරලා ඉතිරි රුපියල් බිලියන 09 ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා නේ. දැන් රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න ඕනෑ නම් අපි auction එකෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් නම් ගන්නේ, ඉතුරු රුපියල් බිලියන 09 private placement කරල ගන්න පුළුවන් කියලා නේ. එතනදී ගැටලු දෙකක් මතු වෙනවා. එකක් තමයි ඊට කලින් සතියේ උත්සාහ කරල අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 03යි. ඊළඟට ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වෙනවා දැන් Rs. 1 billionවලට කපනවා නම් අපිට ගෙවන්න වෙන්නේ interest rate එක සියයට 10.4 යි. සියයට 10.4ට පුද්ගලයෝ දෙන්න ලැහැස්තිද කියන එක අපට ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න සිද්ධ වෙනවා. මොකද, අර interest rate එකත් වැඩි වුණා නේ. එදාම උදේ සියයට 1.5කින් වැඩි වුණා. මේ තත්ත්වය තුළ අපේ assumption එක correctද කියන එකත් ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මගේ අවබෝධය සඳහා මට පොඩි කාරණාවක් දැන ගන්න අවශ්‍යයි. දැන් ඔබතුන්ලාම පිළිගන්නා ආකාරයට, දිගින් දිගට auction ක්‍රමය තිබුණා. නමුත් දිගින් දිගටම Board papers දමලා මේ අය direct placementsවලට ඇවිල්ල තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Board papers දෙකක් දමලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අනික් ඒවත් එක්ක 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015 තෙක් ආවා කියමු කෝ. 2015 ජනවාරි විතර වෙනකම් එනවා කියමු. හැබැයි මේ කාරණාව වන වේලාවේදී අධිපතිතුමාට, අගමැතිතුමා කිව්ව නිසා හරි, නැත්නම් වෙන උවමනාවක් නිසා හරි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් auctionsවලට යන තීරණය තිබෙනවා. ඒ තීරණය හැබැයි අනෙක් තැරැව්කරුවෝ දන්නේ නැත්නම්, ප්‍රාථමික dealersලා දන්නේ නැතිනම් ඒ තීරණය නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් දැනුම් දීමක් නැතිනම් ඒ අයට තිබෙන පූර්ව අදහස තමයි මේ bid එක කරන්නෙත්, මේ ඉල්ලුම කරන්නෙත් මේ පරණ ක්‍රමයටමයි කියලා. මොකද, ඊට පස්සේ අපි සම්පූර්ණ auction එකට යනවයි කියලා තීරණය ගන්නේ සියයට සියයක් මින් ඉදිරියට තිබෙන්නේ auction කියලා, පස්සේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙච්ච ක්‍රමය තීරණය ගන්නේ මාර්තු 6 වැනිදා දැනුම් දීමකින්. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන තර්කය අනුව හරි වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් ඒ තීරණය ගන්නා විට මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණාව ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ auction ක්‍රමයටම වුණාට ඒ auction ක්‍රමයට යන එක තැරැව්කරුවන්, ඒ කියන්නේ ප්‍රාථමික dealersලා මූලික වශයෙන් අවබෝධයක් ගන්නේ කොතැනින්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නොගන්න එක තමයි හේතුව.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගන්නෙ කොතනින්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ඒක තමයි mislead කරලා තිබෙන point එක. මේකෙ කියන්නේ **අසිමිලාගේ ඔක්කොමලාගේ experts ලාගේ ....බලන්න, ඒ බිලියන 10 පෙන්වන්නේ නැත්තේ වැඩි interest rate එකක් පෙන්වන නිත්දා.** එතකොට **ඒ කට්ටිය** දැන ගන්නවා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් Government එක desperate කියලා. ඒක තමයි ඒ හැම එකේම තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට මම පෙන්වන්නම්. එකින් එකට මම මෙතැන ලකුණු කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපි රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් පෙන්වන්නේ, නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ගිය සැරේ එනකොට ඒක නේ දුන්න සාක්ෂිය. රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් පෙන්වන්නේ අනික් කට්ටිය දැන ගනී කියලා අපි desperate කියලා වැඩි interest rate එකක්. දැන් රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ඉල්ලනවා නම් ඔක්කොම ගැණුම්කරුවේ ඉන්නවා 12.5, 13,-

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. ගන්න ගණන නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. ගන්න ගණන බිලියන 10ද 20ද කියන එක නෙමෙයි මම අහන්නේ. ඒ ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදය. ඒ අයට ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදය ගැන පූර්ව අවබෝධයක් තිබෙන්නේ, by practice දිගටම direct placementsවලින් තමයි ගන්න ප්‍රමාණය කියලා. හැබැයි ඒක ඒ අයට සංනිවේදනයක් වෙන්නෙ නැතිනම්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක මහ බැංකුවේ technique එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක technique එකක් කියලා බැහැර කරන්න බැහැ නේ. දැන් අපි හිතමු එහෙම නැතුව අපි යන්නේ auction එකට කියලා. Monetary Board එක තීරණයක් අරගෙන හරි ඒ නිශ්චිත දැනුම් දීම, අපි මීට පස්සේ auction එකට යන්නෙ කියලා කිව්වාට පස්සේ සමහර විට මීට වඩා පොළී අනුපාත වෙනස් වෙලා මීට වඩා මේ ගනුදෙනුවේ වෙච්ච අවාසිය සිද්ධ නොවෙන්න තිබුණ නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දැන් උපකල්පනයක් නේ. එතකොට අපි ගන්නව කිව්වොත් හැම වෙලේම වැඩි auction එකෙන් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න එපායෑ. රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් දැම්මොත් සියයට 12ට 13ට වාගේ අනුපාතයට එන්නේ මිනිස්සු දැනගත්තාම. එක තමයි කියන්නේ ඕනෑම auction එකක්-

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට තමයි අපිට ප්‍රශ්නය එන්නේ. මේ තොරතුර නිශ්චිත එක්කෙනෙක් දෙන්නෙක් දැන ගත්තොත්, දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා කියපු ආකාරයට මහ බැංකුවෙන් ඒ තොරතුරු දැනුම් දීලා නම් එක පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා සෘජු ක්‍රමය යටතේ මිලදී ගැනීමට බලාපොරොත්තුවෙන්- හැබැයි එක නිශ්චිත පුද්ගලයෙකුට දෙන්නෙකුට Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකට කියලා හිතුවොත් ඒ අයට යනවා නැහැ මේක අපි auction ක්‍රමයට තමයි යන්නේ කියලා පූර්ව තොරතුර. රුපියල් බිලියන 10ම ගන්නවා හරි නොගන්නව වුණත් අපි යන්නේ auction ක්‍රමයට කියලා- වෙනස් වෙනවා කියන අදහස එක්කෙනෙකුට පමණක් ගියොත්, එතකොට එයාට එතන අමතර වාසියක් ගන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා හරි. ඒක තමයි හිටපු Governor කියන්නේ කොහොමද මේ information ගියේ කියලා. Central Bank එක ඇතුළෙන් ගියපු calls ටික නීත්‍යානුකූල නැහැ. ඒකට පරීක්ෂා කරන්න කියලා අපි එතුමාට අණ දුන්නා. ඊට පස්සේ අනික් එක තමයි ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට, එහෙනම් මොකද auctionsවල රුපියල් බිලියනක් දාලා තුන්ගුණයක් හරි දෙගුණයක් හරි ගන්නේ මොකද කියලා හැම වෙලේම කියන්න පුළුවන්නේ අපි ගන්නේ මේ ගණන කියලා.

අපි සාධාරණය කරනවා නම්, එහෙම නම් තැරැව්කාරයින්ට හරි ගාන දැන ගත යුතු නම් එහෙම නම් හැම auction එකේම ගන්න ගණන කියන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම කියන්න බැහැ. එහෙම බැංකු කරණය වෙන්න නැහැ. බැංකු කරණය දෙන්නෙ ඒ surprised element එක තියාගන්නවා. interest rate එක පල්ලෙහා තියා ගන්නවා. රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් දානවා අඩු ගණනට ආවොත්. රුපියල් බිලියන 100ක් හරි ගන්නවා. කලින් පාර එකොලොස් ගුණයක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඒක තීරණය කරන්නේ බැංකුව.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපිට තිබෙන්නේ මේකයි. ඒ තීරණය ගන්න තරැව්කරුවන් 16 දෙනාම එක තීරණය දන්නවා නම්, තැරැව්කරුවන් 16 දෙනා අතරම තරගය සිද්ධ වෙන්නේ එක ක්‍රියාවලියක් හැටියට. හැබැයි මෙතැනදී මේ පරීක්ෂණයේ ම තිබෙන්නේ තැරැව්කරුවන් අතරේයි. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ සාකච්ඡාවේ වෙච්ච කරුණු අනුවත් තේරෙනවා, මහ බැංකුවෙන්ම තොරතුරු- මම කියන්නේ නැහැ ඒක කාගෙන්ද ගියේ කියලා. කාගෙන් ගියා වුණත් තොරතුරු ගිහිල්ලා, එක පිරිසකට වෙනස් තීරණයක් මෙතෙක් ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙච්ච තීරණයෙන් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් deviate වෙනවා කියන අදහස තව පිරිසකට ගියොත් එයි අසමානතාවයක් නිර්මාණය වීම විය හැකි නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. මේක පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දා ගනුදෙනුවට ඒ කියන්නේ, 1 billionවලට ගිය වෙන්දේසිය එක නිශ්චිත බැඳුම්කරයක් පමණයි. ඔය කියන "අපි මින් පස්සේ auction විතරයි යන්නේ" කියන කථාව, ඒ වන විට මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් අනුමත කර නොතිබූ, නමුත් තිබෙන අත්පොත අනුව කළ හැකි ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මොකද හේතුව, එදා ඒ auction එක කරන්න නීතියෙන් අයිතිය තිබුණා. අපි මින් පස්සෙ private placement නැහැයි කියන policy එක එදාට අදාළ නැහැ. එදා දවස auction දවස. ඒ කියන්නේ, අපි private placement කරන්නේ එක දවසක. Auction කරන්නේ එක දවස හෝ දවස් කිහිපයක. ඔය කියන පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා වන විට private placements කරලා කරලා රුපියල් බිලියන 23.524ක් market එකෙන් එකතු කර ගෙන,

ඉන් පස්සේ, රුපියල් බිලියන එකක auction එකකට ගියා. එහෙම යන්න පුළුවන් නේ. ඇත්තටම ඔය කියන broader policy එක ඔය දවසේ implement කළෙත් නැහැ, කරන්න හේතුවකුත්

නැහැ. ඒ දවසේ සිදු වුණු ගැටලුව තමයි, එකක් ඉල්ලලා, 2.6ක් කියන ගණන අභිබවා, 20ට නොගිහින්, 10න් නතර කරපු එකේ තිබෙන අවාසිය හෝ සුදුසුකම් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නය. නමුත්, ඔබතුමා කියන, මින්පසු අනාගතයේදී direct placement නැහැ කියන policy එක, ඒ දවසේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ නැහැ එදා auction දවස. ඊළඟ මාසයේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණෙත් නැහැ. ඇත්තටම කිව්වොත් direct placement විතරයි කියන policy එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණයෙන් පස්සේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපට අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවා, මෙතැන නිලධාරීන්ගේ සාක්ෂිවලින්ම කියවුණා, A, ද , B ද කියලා වැදගත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. මේ තීරණය ගන්න කොට, අගමැතිතුමා කිව්ව නිසා හරි නැත්නම් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා ඒ අයට කිව්වා කියලා "අපි මීට පස්සේ මේකත් එක්ක auction වලට යන්නේ" කියන එක. ඒක වාචිකව ඒ අයට කියලා තිබුණා. වාචික අවබෝධයක් ඒ අයට තිබුණා. නමුත්, ඒක Monetary Board එකට inform වෙලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. Monetary Board එකට inform වෙන්නේ මාර්තු 06.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Monetary Board එකට inform වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක Monetary Board එකට යන්න ඕනෑද, නැද්ද කියන එක දැන් argument එක. නමුත්, පළමුවෙන් දැන ගත් ස්ථාවරය අනුව Monetary Board එකට යා යුතු නැහැ. මොකද, Monetary Board එකේ මුල ඉඳලාම තිබෙන තීරණය නිසා. ඒක නේ මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි. There is a small point. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට, auctionsවලට full යනවා කියන එක තීන්දු කළේ එදා නොවෙයි. එදා තීන්දු කළේ, බිලියන එකක් ඉල්ලුවා, 11.75ට වඩා අඩුවෙන් 10ක් ආවා. ඒ 10 ගත්තා. එතැන ඒ වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් ගත්ත එක හරිද, නැද්ද කියන ප්‍රශ්නයයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකෙන් full auction system එකට ගියා කියලා නොවෙයි මෙහි කියන්නේ. මේ Dr. M.Z.M. Azim කියන්නේ, Monday වෙන කොට Rs. 10 billion ඕනෑ. Dr. M.Z.M. Azim අහනවා, "ඉතිරි Rs. 10 billion හොයන්නේ කොහෙන්ද?" කියලා. Direct placement කරලා ගන්න පුළුවන්. "Tomorrow and the day after tomorrow are not working days. So, how do you find this money on Monday? So, we went on the basis that in September, we have given at 11.7…" මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම්, ඔබතුමා කියනවා අනිත් අයට අසාධාරණයක් වෙනවා කියලා. එතකොට, මම direct placement එකෙන් ඔබතුමාට බිලියන 3ක් දෙනවා, මට interest ගණනට ඕනෑ. එතකොට අනිත් 15ටම වෙන අසාධාරණය?

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ, අසාධාරණ වෙනවා කියලා නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම කියන්නේ ඒක දැන්වූවා නම් direct placement එකේ මට ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑ ගණන කියලා, ගන්න පුළුවන් interest rate එක කියලා. මම උදාහරණයක් දෙන්නේ. Direct placement එකේ මම බිලියන 03ක් එක පුද්ගලයෙක්ට දෙනවා. මෙතැන තිබෙනවා direct placement 13ට දුන්න ඒවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ 11.75ට බිලියන 2ක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වුණ පාඩුවත් ගණන් හදන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතැනින් ඉදිරියට යන විධියක් කියන්න. මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඉවර කරන විධියක් කියන්න. මට තේරෙන දේ මම අහන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලාට මේ පිටු තුනටම තිබෙන්නේ ඔය කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් නේ. මෙය තියනවාද, නැත්නම් අයින් කරනවාද, එහෙම නැත්නම් මෙයට වෙන යෝජනාවක් දෙනවාද කියන තීරණයට ආවා නම් අපිට මේ සාකච්ඡාව ඉදිරියට කරගෙන යන්න පුළුවන්. අපි මේ වාර්තාව 25 වෙනිදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න අදහසක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට, මේ වාර්තාව translate කරන්න ඕනෑ. අඩුම තරමේ පාර්ලිමේන්තු සභියේ වත් මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුයි. එහෙම නැත්නම්, "දෙයක් පටන් අරගෙන අවසන් කළේ නැහැ." කියලා, අපි සියලු දෙනාටම ලොකු විවේචනයකට මුහුණ දෙන්න වෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ කාරණා තුන ගැන ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ තිබෙන අදහස මට කියන්න. 6.1, 6.2, 6.3. ඔබතුමන්ලා අවාසිය ගණනය කිරීම පිළිබඳව ස්ථාවරයක් කිව්වා නේ. ඒ ස්ථාවරය මෙහි ලකුණු කරනවා නම්-, කලින් එහෙම අදහසක ඉන්න එපැයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපිට deadline එකක් දෙන්න අපහසුයි. අපි මහන්සි වුණානේ. අපි block කරන්න හැදුවේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි පැය 11ක් වාඩි වෙලා සිටියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා දැන් මේ කථා කරපු කාරණය අවසන් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ ගණනය කිරීමට මම විරුද්ධයි. මම එයට මගේ පිළිතුර දෙන්නම්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මෙතැන ගණනය කිරීම අපට හරි යන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔය ගණනය කිරීම කියන එක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් බැඳිලා තිබෙන්නේ auction වල system එක අනුව. මම මෙතුමාට වරදක් කියනවා නොවෙයි. මෙතැන හරි වැරැද්දක් නැහැ. මේ ගැටලුව hypothetical.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly!

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Auction ගිය එකයි මිලියන 10ට ගත්ත එකයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ ලාභයත් එක්ක ලඝු කරන්න එපා. Perpetual Treasuries Limited ලාභය ලබා ගන්නේ primary market එකෙන් නොවෙයි. Perpetual Treasuries Limited ලාභ ලබා ගන්නේ secondary market එකෙන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙමද, මම දන්නේ නැහැ ඒක.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඉදිරියේදී තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අඩු ගණනට අරගෙන වැඩි ගණනට විකුණුවාම ලාභය තිබෙන්නේ secondary market එකේ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට, Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක විකුණුවේ EPF එකට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එය නේ ජාත්‍යන්තර ප්‍රශ්නය. ඒකනේ මෙතුමා අවුරුදු හතරක්ම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ කිව්වේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට, ඔය Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක Stock Market එකෙත් එයම කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: EPF එක ගැන මෙතැනත්, හැම තැනම කථා කළෙත් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය නේ. It is still continuing. හොරකම continue වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන EPF එකයි මෙතැනයි අතර ලොකු සම්බන්ධයක් තිබෙනවා. EPF එකට මේ ගොල්ලන් මේක pump කරලා එතැනින් dump කළා. මේක Stock Market එකේ කළා. ගිරිය යටින් කෑ ගැහුවා. හැබැයි, එදා අද වාගේ පාලනයක් තිබුණේ නැති නිසා, කිසිම දවසක කථා කරන්න බැරි වුණා. මේ ආණ්ඩුවේ මේ ක්‍රමවේදය නිසා තමයි අපිට මෙච්චර දෙයක් හරි කර ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ ගැන අපි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම සන්තෝෂ වෙන්න ඕනෑ. එදා කථා කරන්නවත් chance එකක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ. එතකොට මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ hypothetical loss එකක් නේ. Auditor-General, මේක උපකල්පනය කරන ලද loss එකක්. හැබැයි, Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ profit එක ඇත්ත. මෙන්න අතේ ඩොලර්. ඒක hypothetical නොවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක already madeද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක made. මේක නොවෙයි ඒ වෙන එකක්. ඒවා හම්බ කළේ secondary market එකේ EPF එක හරහා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා, EPF එකට primary dealer කෙනෙක් විධියට එන්න පුළුවන්කම තියෙද්දි, EPF එක nominal ගණන් දමලා, ඊට පස්සේ immediately secondary market එකෙන් ගන්නවා නේ. මෙතැන අපේ observations වල strongly තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ ඒ ගැන.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Governorගේ office එකේ Public Debt Superintendent එවලා තිබුණ ලිපියේ තිබෙනවා, මම දැන් දැක්කේ, "Except for EPF, all other captive sources need to come to the auction through a primary dealer. Therefore, the year 2008 could be considered as the year where primary dealers were first allowed to participate in private placements." ඒ කියන්නේ, primary dealer කෙනෙක් bid එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ private placement එකක EPF එකට හෝ captive source එකට විතරයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Fax එක ආවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහි තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙම ලිපියේ තිබෙනවා, EPF එකට හැරුණු විට අනෙක් captive sourcesවලට private placements ගන්න බැහැ. ඒ අය auction එකට එන්න ඕනෑ, primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා. ඒක නේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කවදාද දන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 2008 වර්ෂයේ සිට.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දැන් නේ fax message එක ආවේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ETF එකට ගන්න බැහැ. ETF එක primary dealership එකක් නොවෙයි එයාට තිබෙන්නේ. special right එකක් එයාට දීලා තිබෙනවා. Monetary Law එකේ ඒක තිබෙනවා provision එකක් දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. අපිත් යෝජනා කරන්නේ ඒක තමයි. ETF එක ඒ position ගන්න කවදාවත් ඉල්ලලා නැහැ. ETF එකට එහෙම දෙන්න Central Bank එක කටයුතු කරලාත් නැහැ. ඊට වඩා ලොකු දෙයක් තිබෙනවා, Insurance Fund එක. Insurance Fund එකටත් එහෙම provision එකක් නැහැ. එයත් ආපසු එන්න ඕනෑ primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා. ETF එකයි Insurance Board එකයි funds දෙකේම primary dealersලා හරහා තමයි කවුරු හරි එන්න ඕනෑ. එයාට directly දෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Private placements කරලා තිබෙනවා නේ private අය.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Primary dealersලාට විතරයි. Primary dealersලා කරලා තිබෙනවා. පුළුවන්ද බැරිද කියන එක නොවෙයි. කරලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් secondary market එකේදී නේ මේ සියලුම manipulations ටික කරන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Secondary market නේ අතහරින්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ නිසා අපට ඒවා ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Primary market එකෙන් යම් advantage එකක් ගන්නවා. ඒ Insider information හරහා. මේක ලොකුවට වෙන්න පුළුවන් direct placements නිසා නේ. අඩුම ගණනේ මෙතැන මොකක් හරි මැජික් වැඩක් තිබෙනවා. auction එකේ මොනවා හරි screws තිබෙනවා. Private placements එහෙම නොවෙයිනේ. ''මවං කීයද'' කියලා නේ අහන්නේ. එතකොට ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක්. ලොකු ලාභය ලබන්නේ දෙවනුව.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම නැවතත් ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්නේ, නැවත සාකච්ඡාවකට ගිහින් නැවත පටන් ගන්න කොට තිබෙන අමාරුකම ගැන නොවෙයි කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට සාකච්ඡාව නැවත මුල සිට පටන් ගන්න වෙනවා නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා සාකච්ඡා කරන ලද මේ ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි, අවාසි කියන කාරණය සාකච්ඡා කරලා අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, දිගටම යනවාද? තවත් පිටු සෑහෙන ගණනාවක් තිබෙනවා. ගණනය විතරක් අවසන් කරලා, අපි නැවත එක දවසකින් අවසන් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කරන්න.

ගරු **හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා**: අහඹරුවාදා පාර්ලිමේන්තු දවසේ කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පාර්ලිමේන්තු දවසේ නොවෙයි සඳුදා කරමු. අගහරුවාදා වන විට අවසානයි නේ. එතකොට සාකච්ඡා සියල්ලම එනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි මේකට මොකක් හරි collective decision එකක් ගනිමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි කථා කරන ලද point එක අවසන් කරලා ඊට පසුව වාර්තා කරමු එතැනින් එහාට. මම මේ ගණනය කිරීමට -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔහොම අමුවෙන් කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අමුවෙන් නොවෙයි. මම කියන්නේ මගේ observations එක්ක.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මොකක් හරි ශීලාචාරකමකින් කියමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්න. මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ ශීලාචාරකම. භාගයට ගණනය කරපු එක හරි කියනවාද? කොහොමද කියන්නේ? ඔබතුමන් ශීලාචාරකමට ඉක්මනින් විනාඩි දෙකකින් විතර කියන්නකෝ.

ගරු **හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා**: අපි ගොඩාක් වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කළා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ reason එක මම කියන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ශීලාචාර කමෙන් ඔක්කොටම ගන්න පුළුවන් විධියට ඔබතුමන් කියන්න?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම ඉන්නේ වෙන point එකක. මම ඔයගොල්ලන් ඉන්න line එකේ නොවෙයි ඉන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් මගේ pointඑකට ඔබ විරුද්ධ වුණේ ඇයි?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න. අමුවෙන් කියපු එකට මම විරුද්ධ වුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම chapter close කරන්න ගියේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔබතුමන් අපි සැම දෙනා වෙනුවෙන්ම කියන්න කෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ හදලා තිබෙන්නේ hypothetical loss එකක්. උපකල්පිත පාඩුවක්. අපි එකෙන් නතර කරලා හෝ 2.6න් නතර කරලා, විස්ස අපි අයින් කරලා දමමු. අපි විස්සට ගියේ නැහැ නේ. දහයට විතරයි ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. 1න් හෝ 2.6න් හදලා තිබෙන ලාභය උපකල්පනය කරන ලද අවාසියක්. ඒකට හේතුව තමයි අපි අපේ assumption තිබෙන්නේ අපිට cut-off rate එකට තිබෙන interest එකට සියයට 10.4% මම දන්නේ නැහැ, එම ගණනට ඉතිරි රුපියල් බිලියන 9ම විකුණන්න පුළුවන් කියන එක. ඒක තමයි උපකල්පනය.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපේ ලේකම් කාර්යාලය අපහසුතාවයට පත් නොවන විධියට, ලියන්න ඕනෑ විධියට කිව්වා නම් හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමිය කියවන්න ඊට පසුව අපි නැවත හදමු. අපි කිව්වේ, රුපියල් බිලියනයට සීමා කළේ නම් හෝ බිලියන 2.6ට සීමා කළේ නම් කියන රජයට වූ අවාසිය ඒ කියන්නේ, ඇත්තටම මුදල්වලින් ගිය අවාසියක් නොවෙයි. එය උපකල්පනය කරන ලද අවාසියක්. It is a hypothetical loss. ඒ උපකල්පනය කරපු අවාසිය හදන්න අපි assumptions කියන්නේ මොනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Hypothetical කියන්නේ මන:කල්පිත. Assumption කියන්නේ උපකල්පනය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පළමුවෙනි එක hypothetical දෙවැනි එක තමයි අපි මේකට assumptions වගයක් අරන් තිබෙනවා. Assumptions තමයි 1. අපට මේ බිලියන 9, cut-off rate එකට සියයට දහයයි දශම හතරක් වාගේ තිබෙන ගණන. එම ගණනට ලබා ගත හැකියි. නමුත්, private placements හරහා ඒ සතිය තුළ ලබා ගත හැකි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ බිලියන 3යි. ඒ කියන්න අවශ්‍යයි නේ නේද? අපි ලබා ගත හැකි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ බිලියන තුනයි නමුත් අපි උපකල්පනය කරනවා මේ සියලුම බිලියන 9ම දහයයි දශම ගණනකට ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි කියලා . එතැනදී මතු වන ගැටලුව තමයි, 27 වැනිදා උදේ දින තුනේ රීතිය වෙනස් කිරීම නිසා සමස්ත වෙළෙඳ පොළ පොලී අනුපාතය සියයට එකහමාරකින් වැඩි වුණා. 5 සිට 6.5ට වැඩි වුණා. ඉහළ ගොස් තිබෙනවා . ඒ සිද්ධිය අපි මේ උපකල්පනයට අතුළත් කරලා නැහැ. ඇත්තවශයෙන්ම අපට ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ private placements හරහා මේ මුදල් ලබා ගැනීමට ගෙවිය යුතු පොලිය කීයද කියලා අපි කාටවත් කියන්න හැකියාවක් නැහැ. හරි නේද ඒක?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි ඒක නොදන්නා කරුණක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නොදන්නා කරුණක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ අනුව නොදන්නා කරුණක් පදනම් කරගෙන අවාසියක් ගණනය කිරීම කළ නොහැකිය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අවාසිය ගණනය කිරීම පිළිබඳව අපට technically sound argument එකක් නැහැ කියන එකයි කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, අවාසියක් ගණනය කිරීම පිළිබඳව තාක්ෂණිකව පිළිගත හැකි තර්කයක් ගොඩනැඟිය නොහැකිය. මම හිතන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ නම් මේකට තවත් දෙයක් එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. "කෙසේ වෙතත් මේ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වූ ස්වභාවය පිළිබඳ.." අපට කුමක් හෝ reservation එකක් තිබෙනවා නේද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒවා අවසානයට දමමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කොටස ඉවත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ කොතැනටද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මුලින් එකතු කරන්න. මම කියන්නේ හිස් එක ඉවත් කරමු කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මුලින් එකතු කරනවා කියන්නේ කොතැනටද, අපි කථා කරන්නේ 6වැනි කාරණය ගැන නේ. 6.1 (i) කියන වගුව ඉවත් කරලා එතැනට ඇතුළත් කරනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හිස් එක අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම අහන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි, වගුව තිබියදීමද නැත්නම්, වගුව නැතිවද ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ කියලායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ විධියට ලිව්වොත් මේ වගුව දමන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔය කියපු කාරණාව අනුව නම්, මේක දමන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: 23වැනි පිටුවෙන් පටන් ගන්නා chart එක නැතිව මේක මුලට එකතු කරනවාද

නැත්නම්, මේ වගුවත් එක්කම ඒක ඇතුළත් කරනවාද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: වගුව නැතිව ලියනවා නම්, වෙනම අදහසකින් ලියන්න වෙනවා. ඔය විධියට ලිව්වොත් වගුව දමන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේකේ වෙනත් වටිනාකමක් තිබෙනවා. අවාසිය කියන Column එක ඉවත් කරලා, ඉතිරි columns ටික තියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ, "අවාසිය" කියන column එක ඉවත් කරලා, එදා දවසේ සිදු වුණේ මේකයි කියලා තත්ත්වය පෙන්නුම් කරන්න "ගනු දෙනුකරුවන්, ලංසු මිල, බැඳුම්කරයේ මුහුණත වටිනාකම, ගෙවිය යුතු සමුච්චිත වටිනාකම" කියන ඒවා තියන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මේ තර්කය මතු වෙන්නේ අවාසිය පිළිබඳව නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මේ තිබෙන්නේ, actual එක නොවෙයි නේ, එදා දවසේ වූණු දේ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේකේ තර්කය තිබෙන්නේ, රුපියල් බිලියන එකක සීමාව, ඊළඟ තර්කය තිබෙන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 2.6කට සීමාව, ඊළඟ එක තිබෙන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 20 සීමාව.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 20 අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ, රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් දීලා නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 20 කෙසේවත් අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 20 අදාළ නැත්නම්, අපේ තර්කය අනුව මේකත් අදාළ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියපු වාක්‍යයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන කොට ලියන්නේ කොහොමද? මේ කාරණය නිවැරදියි. ඔබතුමන්ලා ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වය කියන එක සංශෝධනය කර ලියලා තිබෙනවා. කෙටුම්පතෙහි අංක 6 යටතේ තිබෙනවා, " 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හැකිව තිබූ විකල්ප ක්‍රම තුනක් සහ ඒවායේ ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත වාසි - අවාසි පිළිබඳ විශ්ලේෂණයක් 2015 – 2016 මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව මඟින් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි." කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා යෝජනාවක් කළ නිසා මම අහන්නේ, එතැන සිට තිබෙන කොටස් ටිකට මොකක්ද කරන්නේ කියලායි. අහන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ tables අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මොකද, අපි කියනවා නේ, රුපියල් 889,358,050ක loss එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. මේක තවත් detail එකක් පමණයි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි." කියන කොටසත් තිබියදී ඒකටම මේකත් ඇතුළත් කරන්නද කියන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි." කියලා කියන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ විධියට කියන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා නේ. අපට ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. 6වැනි යටතේ තිබෙන්නේ, රු. 889,358,050ක අවාසියක් තිබුණු බව Auditor-General කියනවා කියලායි. ඒ නිසා අපට ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. ඒක report එකේ තිබෙන එකක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Okay. "එසේ නමුත්" කියලා,-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: "එසේ නමුත්" කියන්න කලින් 6.2. තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද බලන්න. ඒකත් හදන්න ඕනෑ "එසේ නමුත්" කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Tables දෙක ඉවත් කරමු.

ගරු **හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා:** 6.2.වැනි අංකය යටෙත්ත් තිබෙනවා, "රුපියල් 688,538,600ක ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසියක්" කියලා. එතැනත් "එසේ නමුත්" කියලා නැවතත් ඒකම repeat කරන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ දෙකම එකකට දමමු. 6.1. (i)හි table එක ඉවත් කරලා ඒ දෙකම එකකට දමලා "කෙසේ වෙතත්" කියලා හදන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක හරියට flow වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: flow වෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මේ ගැන ටිකක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 6.1හි (i) තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒකේ වගුව ඉවත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත් "අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි." කියන කොටස දක්වා ඒ විධියටම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: "අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි." කියන එක තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද මහතා: මම ඒ ගැන කියන්නම්, ටිකක් ඉන්න. මම වචන ටික එන්න ඕනෑ විධිය කියන්නම්. 6.2 තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒකෙත් වගුව ඉවත් කරන්න. ඊට පසුව ඉතිරි වෙන්නේ 6යි, 6.1යි, 6.2යි පමණයි. එතැන ලියන්න ඕනෑ මේ විධියටයි, ''විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවට අනුව බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව රුපියල් බිලියන 1කට සීමා කළේ නම්,-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තිබෙනවා නේ, ප්‍රධාන මාතෘකාව විධියට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නැවතත් ලියන්න.

'' විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවට අනුව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත්ව රුපියල් බිලියන 1කට සීමා කළේ නම් ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසිය.'' කියලා ඇතුළත් කරන්න. එතකොට වඩාත් පැහැදිලියි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඒක 6.1හි ප්‍රධාන මාතෘකාව විධියට තිබෙනවා නේ, ''විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව මඟින් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබයි.'' කියලා. මම කියන්නේ, ඒක ඒ විධියට තිබියදී 6.1 (i) කියන එකට මේක දැම්මාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මොකද, ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නැවතත් දමන්න, ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මෙතැන heading එක වෙනස් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ක්‍රම 3ක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, ක්‍රම දෙකයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ නිසා ඒක වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ''2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ හැකිව තිබූ විකල්ප ක්‍රම සහ ඒවායේ ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත වාසි - අවාසි පිළිබඳ විශ්ලේෂණයක් 2015 – 2016'' කියලා දමමු. එතැන ''ක්‍රම'' කියලා දැම්මා හරි, ''ක්‍රම තුනක්'' කියලා දමන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කැමති දෙයක් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැනදී කියන්න ඕනෑ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේක කියලා තිබෙනවා, නමුත් අපි විකල්පයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා කියලා නේ. ඒක පැහැදිලි වෙන විධියට ලියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට යෝජනා කරනවා, ඒක මේ විධියට කළා නම් හොඳයි කියලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ මේ විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙනවා, ඒකේ 6.1 යටතේ තිබෙනවා, ''අවාසියක් සිදුව තිබුණි.'' කියලා. එතැනට වෙනකම් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව බලන කෙනෙකුට තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් නේ. ඒ නිසා ඒවා තිබියදී, '' විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ එසේ සඳහන් වුවද'' කියලා ලියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ opinion එක ඊට යටින් ලියන්න. ඊට පසුව 6.2වැනි කාරණයටත් ඒ විධියට තියන්න පුළුවන් නැත්නම්, 6.1 සහ 6.2 කාරණා දෙක එකක් විධියට දමලා තුන්වැනි ඡේදය හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ opinion එක දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 6.1 දමන්න, 6.2ත් දමන්න. ඒ දෙකටම අදාළ වෙන විධියට opinion එක දමන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්, එතකොට පැහැදිලියි නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක හොඳයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන එකක්වත් ඉවත් කරන්න හොඳ නැහැ. එතකොට අපට චෝදනාවක් එනවා, ඒවා ඉවත් කළා කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අනිවාර්යෙන්ම.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 11වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් දේ කෙතැනටද ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 11වැනි පිටුවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ මොකක්ද?

ගරු (අචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 11 වැනි පිටුවේ generalized එක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක නැතිව කරන්න බැහැ.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: 6.1 (i)ට පසුව ඒක දැම්මා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 6.1 (i) දැම්මා නම්, 6.2 (ii)ත් දමනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 6.2 (ii)ටත් පසුව ඒක දමන්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි නැවත රැස්වෙන්නේ කවදාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ටිකක් ඉන්න, 6.3 යටෙත් සඳහන් වෙනවා, ''රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගේ යෝජනාව ක්‍රියාත්මක කළේ නම්, ඇති විය හැකිව තිබූ ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසිය.'' කියලා. ඒක ඉවත් කරනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, 6.3 කියන කාරණාව රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක කථාව අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේද?

ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 6වැනි කාරණාව අවසානයේදී සඳහන් වෙනවා, " ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසි එම දිනට ක්ෂණිකව ඇති වූ ඇති විය හැකි තත්ත්වය පමණක් වන අතර, එමඟින් දීර්ඝ කාලීනව ඇති වන බලපෑමද සලකා බැලුවහොත් එම විකල්ප අවාසි තවත් ඉහළ යාමට ඇති ඉඩකඩද බැහැර කළ නොහැකි වන බව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව මඟින් තවදුරටත් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි." කියලා. ඒ කොටස ඔබතුමන්ලා අදාළ කරගන්නේ නැහැ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. මොකද, අපි දන්නේ නැහැ නේ, ඒක මොන විධියට වෙනවාද කියලා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ කොටසම ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊට පසුව 7වැනි මාතෘකාව විධියට තිබෙනවා,-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 7වැනි මාතෘකාව ගැන අද කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 7වැනි මාතෘකාව ගැන අද කථා කරන්නේ නැද්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අද කථා කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා තීරණය කරන්න, ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: පාර්ලිමේන්තුව රැස්වෙන අහඹරුවාදා නේ. එදිනද රැස්වෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: සඳුදා දින රැස් වෙමු. අහඹරුවාදා වන විට දවසක් නිකම්ම යනවා නේ. මම මුහුණ දෙන අපහසුතාව ගැනත් ඔබතුමන්ලා හිතන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි road map එකක් නේ කරන්නේ. දවසක් එහාට මෙහාට වුණාට කමක් නැහැ. අපි හැමෝටම මේ බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවට වඩා වෙන වැඩත් තිබෙනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම දන්නවා. නමුත් ඔය විග්‍රහයේ නොවෙයි නේ අපි දැන් ඉන්නේ. මේකේ තිබෙන සංවේදීකමයි, සංකීර්ණත්වයයි, අවශ්‍යතාවයි ඔක්කොම එක්ක මම කියන්නේ. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලාම කිව්වා රාත්‍රී 12 වෙනකම් හරි ඉඳලා මේක අවසන් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. එතැන නේ අපි හිටපු ස්ථාවරය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පැය 11 ½ක් කළා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පැහැදිලියි. මට තේරෙනවා. මටත් ගොඩක් අපහසුයි. ඒකත් මම පිළිගන්නවා. නමුත් ඔබතුමන්ලා තේරුම් ගන්න අපි දැන් 8.20ට මේක නවත්වනවා. නවත්වලා අපි නැවත අහඹරුවාදාට නම් දමන්නේ - එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා පස් දෙනා විතරක් නොවෙයි නේ කාරක සභාව. අනෙක් අයගෙනුත් අදහස් එන්න පුළුවන්. මෙතැන රාත්‍රී 12.00 වෙනකම් හරි ඉඳලා අවසන් කරනවා කියලා කියාපු අයට මම දෙන පිළිතුර මොකක්ද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හෙට උදේ බැරිද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. එහෙම නම් සඳුදා රැස් වෙමු. අහඹරුවාදා විවාදය තිබෙනවා. COPE කමිටුවේ අතුරු වාර්තාව ගැන විවාදය අහඹරුවාදා තිබෙනවා. අහඹරුවාදා මම Chamber එකේ ඉන්න එපායැ. අපි සඳුදා ප.ව. 2.00ට රැස්වෙමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: බැහැ. ප.ව. 4.00ට අගමැතිතුමාගේ meeting එකක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. ප.ව. 2.00ට රැස්වෙමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: උදේ බැරිද?

සභාපතිතුමා: උදේ බැරි වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සඳුදා Morning රැස්වෙමු. පැය තුන හතරක් යයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: සඳුදා උදේ 9.30ට රැස්වෙමු.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.)

ඇමුණුම 21

ඇමුණුම 21
இகணப்பு 21
Annexure 21

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව
2016 ඔක්තෝබර් මස 24 වැනි සඳුදා

පැමිණ සිටි:

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපතිතුමා)
ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ මහතා
ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා

සහායට පැමිණ සිටි:

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති;
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.අයි.එස්. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවට පැමිණ සිටින සියලු දෙනා පිළිගනු ලබනවා. අපි කටයුතු ආරම්භ කරමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කළ කෙටුම්පතෙහි අවසානයේදී "කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියලා කොටසක් තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා සමඟ කළ සාකච්ඡාවේදී මම තේරුම් ගත් ආකාරයට "කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියන ඒවා ඇතුළත් කළේ, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ යෝජනා හැටියටයි. ඒක ඔබතුමා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාවටත් ඇතුළත් වෙනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඒ ගැන මට කියන්න දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක "Colombo Telegraph" එකේ දමලා තිබෙනවා මේක අපේ report එක කියලා. ඒක අපේ report එකක් නොවෙයි, මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා හෝ බිමල් රත්නායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා හෝ කවුරු හෝ දීපු වාර්තාවක් වෙන්න ඇති.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක COPE එකේ report එක වෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ලොකු වැරැද්දක් කළා, විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා කොටසක් ඇතුළත් කරලා. ඒ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ නොවෙයි, කවුද man කෙනෙක් දුන් නිර්දේශයක්. කවුද man කෙනෙක් දුන් නිර්දේශයක් අපේ නිර්දේශයක් වෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතැන පොඩි clarification එකක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා ඒක කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, එදා කිව්වා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නමුත් යන්නේ ඒ විධියට නොවෙයි, කෙටුම්පතේ තිබෙන්නේ "විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියලායි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක කෙටුම්පතෙහි විශේෂ නිර්දේශ විධියට ඇතුළත් වෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම හිතනවා, ඔබතුමා press note එකක් යැව්වොත් හොඳයි කියලා. ඒක මගේ අදහසක්. "පත්තරවල

නොයෙකුත් දේවල් පළ වෙනවා, ඒ වාගේම විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා එකක් ගැනත් පළ වෙනවා, නමුත් ඒ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා පළ වෙන්නේ, COPE එකෙන් දුන් නිර්දේශ නොවෙයි." කියලා press note එකක් යැව්වොත් හොඳයි. මම මේ වෙනකම් කිසිම television channel එකකට කථා කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම කථා කළේත් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: e gollo එකෙන් ඇවිල්ලා ඇහුවාම අපි කිසිම දෙයක් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා: Statement එකක් දෙන්න කියලා කිව්වාම, ඔබතුමා එක්ක කථා කරන්නේ නැතිව දෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ සභාපති හැටියට ලේකම් මණ්ඩලය සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කරලා, සියලු කරුණු මත පදනම් වෙලා හදපු කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා නේ. ඒ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ "කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කළේ, මට කිසිම මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් විශේෂ නැහැ. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු 26දෙනාටම පුද්ගලිකව ලිඛිතව තමන්ගේ නිර්දේශ දෙන්න කියලා නිශ්චිත කාලයක් ලබා දීලා දැනුම් දුන්නා. මම මේ ගැන සෑම අවස්ථාවකදීම කිව්වා. ඊට පසුව ඔවුන් ලබා දුන් නිර්දේශවලින් තමයි මේ "විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියන කොටස ඇතුළත් කළේ. සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මම ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාවේත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නම් වශයෙන් ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට මතකයි, අශෝක් අබේසිංහ ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා යන වේලාවේදීත් අවසානයට කියලා ගියා ඒකේ සංශෝධනයක් කරන්න කියලා. ඒ අනුව ඒ වාර්තාවේ අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් කියන නම වෙනුවට විශේෂ නිර්දේශවල 2015 - 2016 බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සඳහා මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු අධිපති ලෙස ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තීරණය කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක කිව්වේ, චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්, ඒක ඒ විධියට වෙනස් කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාව මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගෙන් යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් අනුමත කර තිබෙනවා නේ. මම හිතනවා, ඒ අනුමත කර ගත් වාර්තාව ගැන මෙතැනදී සාකච්ඡා කිරීම අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක අනුමත කළේ එක් කොන්දේසියක් යටතේයි. ඒක වෙනස් කරමු කියලා කිව්වේ ඒ නිර්දේශ දමපු අයගේ නම් ඇතුළත් කරලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමිය කිව්වේත්, ඒ අදාළ කෙනාගේ නම් දමලා සංශෝධනය කරනවා කියලා නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එදින තීරණය කළේ මාතෘකාව වෙනස් කරනවා කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මාතෘකාව වෙනස් කළා. ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මාතෘකාව විධියට "කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියලා දමමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් දමන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එක්, එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයා මෙන්න මේ ආකාරයට කිව්වා කියලා නම් දමන්න ඕනෑ. හැබැයි, සියලු දෙනාම නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මෙතැනට ගන්න එකේ තේරුමක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා හදන වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලා හදන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතකොට මේ වාර්තාවලින් සභාපතිතුමා ඉන්නේ කුමන වාර්තාවේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මගේ තීරණයක් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එදා පොරොන්දු වුණා, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් දමලා ඒ නිර්දේශ දමනවා කියලා. දැන් තිබෙන තත්ත්වය අනුව මේවා ඔබතුමාගේ සහ අපේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් මේ හදන වාර්තාවට විශේෂ නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, අරක වැරදියි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක දැන් වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වැරදි එක නිවැරදි කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක එදා අපි කථා කළ දේට වඩා වෙනස් දෙයක් දැන් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එදා කථා කළේ නිර්දේශවල මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් දමනවා කියලා නේ. ඒක ලේකම්තුමියගෙන් අහන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එදා කිව්වා, නම් දමනවා කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නම් දමනවා කියලා එදා කිව්වාට දැන් දමන්නේ නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇයි නැත්තේ, නම් ටික දමනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන දේට එකඟ වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නම් ටික දමන්න, එපමණයි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි අනෙක් වාර්තාව ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරමු. අනෙක් වාර්තාව ගැන කථා කරන එකේ තේරුමක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාවයි, මේ වාර්තාවයි නොවෙයි. ඒ වාර්තාවේ අපහැදිලි තැන් තිබෙනවා. අපට ඒවා දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාවයි, මේ වාර්තාවයි කියලා වාර්තා දෙකක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එක වාර්තාවයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක මම දකින විධිය කියන්නම්. වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවේ පළමුවැනි පිටු 11හි 4.1.1 වෙනකම් සියලු දෙනා agree වුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 4.1.1 වෙනකම් සෑම දෙනාම එකඟ වූ ආකාරයට සංශෝධන සහිතව තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: වාර්තාවේ සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වූ කොටස මේකයි, ඉතිරි ඒවා, උදාරහණයක් විධියට, සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා මමත් එක්ක එකඟ වෙලා නොමැති අනෙක් අය එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා ඒවා මෙන්න මේවායි කියලා වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාවේ නොයෙකුත් පුද්ගලයන්ගේ නොයෙකුත් positions -අදහස්- අඩංගු වෙනවා. එතකොට පිටු අංක 01 සිට 11 දක්වා වාර්තා දෙකක් නැහැ නේ. පිටු අංක 01 සිට 11 දක්වා තිබෙන්නේ එක් වාර්තාවයි. එක document එකක් ඇතුළේ කොටස් තිබෙනවා නැතිව, වාර්තා තුනක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වාර්තා එකයි, ඒකේ අදහස් කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔය කථාව නොවෙයි, සභාපතිතුමා එදා කිව්වේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔය කථාව නොවෙයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: COPE කමිටුවට වාර්තා කිහිපයක් දෙන්න බැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පුළුවන්. ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කෝප් කමිටුවේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් 26දෙනෙකු ඉන්නවා නම්, ඒ 26දෙනාම වාර්තා 26ක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒවා වාර්තා නොවෙයි. Dissenting views දෙන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම දෙන්න බැහැ. මොනවා හරි ලිව්වොත්, "ඔබතුමා හොරෙක්, පල් හොරෙක්, සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහත්මයා මිනී මරුවෙක්." කියලා ලිව්වොත් ඒකත් දෙනවාද? දෙන්න පුළුවන් එක වාර්තාවයි. ඒ වාර්තාවට Dissenting views දෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපිට වාර්තා දෙන්න පුළුවන් නම්, ඔබතුමා ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමා ඉන්නේ, මේ සියලු දෙනා සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කර පැහැදිලි තීන්දුවකට එන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම් 27දෙනාටම ඕනෑ විධියට වාර්තා හදා ගෙන එන්න කියනවා. ඒ වාර්තා 27ම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි අතර පරස්පරයක් නැහැ. අපි කියන කථාව කියන විධියේ ගැටලුව තියෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා මාධ්‍යයට කිව්ව දේ මා අහගෙන හිටියා. මමත් ඒ ගැන යම් අදහසක් කිව්වා. වාර්තා 1, වාර්තා 2, වාර්තා 26 කියලා වාර්තා 26ක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ඇමුණුම් ඇතුළු සියලු දේ සමඟ තනි වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. Complication එකක් තියෙන නිසා, එක කොටසකට කිහිපදෙනෙකු එකඟයි; තව කොටසකට තව කොටසක් එකඟයි; සහභාගී නොවූ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් මොන තීරණයක් ගනිවි ද කියලාත් දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඒ අයටත් අනෙක් කණ්ඩායම සමඟ එකතු වෙන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම නැතිනම් තමන්ට තව එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ මොන මතය ඉදිරිපත් කළත්, අසභ්‍ය දෙයක් හැරෙන්න, එය කියවා බලා අපේ විෂය පථයට අදාළ නම්, ඒ තනි මන්ත්‍රීවරයාගේ මතය වුණත් කියන්න ඔබතුමා බැඳී ඉන්නවා. කණ්ඩායමක් නම් කණ්ඩායමකගේ මතය. එහෙම නැතිනම් නැහැ. මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් සහ අද පැමිණි සහ නොපැමිණි සියලු දෙනාගෙන්ම ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ, COPE කමිටුවේ පාර්ශ්ව දෙකක්, තුනක් හෝ හතරක් නැහැ. මුළු COPE කමිටුවම එකයි. ඔබතුමා අද මෙතැන සිටින සහ නොසිටින හැමෝගේම සභාපතිතුමා. ඒ වාගේම සභාපතිතුමා මොන වාර්තාවේද ඉන්නේ කියලා අහන එක සුදුසු නැහැ. මොකද, තවම ඔබතුමා වාර්තාව හදලා නැහැ නේ. අද දවස අවසන් වන විට මේ තිබෙන කරුණු සලකා බලා ඔබතුමාට සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට කැමැති මතයක් සමඟ කටයුතු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා, ඔබතුමා ඉන්නේ මොන මතයේද කියලා අහන එකේ තේරුමක් නැහැ. මට technical

ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඔබතුමාගෙන් දැන ගන්න තියෙනවා. පළමු වැනි කෙටුම්පත සහ දෙවැනි කෙටුම්පත කියලා කෙටුම්පත් දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. එයින් දෙවැනි කෙටුම්පතේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා දෙයක් තියෙනවා නේ. ඒ දෙවැනි කෙටුම්පතේ පළමු වැනි නිර්දේශ set එක ඔබතුමා අපේ නායකයා හැටියට ලේකම් කාර්යාලය සමඟ එකතු වෙලා හදපු කෙටුම්පත. ඒක අපේ සාකච්ඡාවේ පදනමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දෙවැනි කාණ්ඩයේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ. මට පෙනෙන ආකාරයට ඒ දෙවැනි කාණ්ඩයේ තිබෙන නිර්දේශ, අඩුම ගණනේ ඒවා ඉදිරිපත් කළ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් හෝ මේ කමිටුව ඉදිරියේ ඒවා justify කළේ නැහැ. නමුත්, එහෙම justify නොකර කියන්න අයිතිය තියෙනවා. මොකක් හෝ ලිඛිත දුන්නත් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒ දෙවැනි නිර්දේශවලට " විශේෂ" කියලා title එකක් තියෙනවා. ඒ title එක අර්ථය නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා කමිටුව හැටියට බහුතරය හෝ ලේකම් කාර්යාලය හෝ කමිටුවේ නිර්දේශ හැටියට හදලා තියෙන නිර්දේශ තමයි නිර්දේශ කියන්නේ. ඊට අමතරව එක් එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට තම තමන්ගේ නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිර්දේශ හඳුන්වා තිබෙන නාම පදයෙන් මේ කමිටුවේ ක්‍රියාවලියේ තිබෙන මූක්‍ය යෝජනා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ යෝජනා යටපත් වෙනවා කියලා මා හිතනවා. ඒ මා කියන්නේ literature ගැන. සාමාන්‍ය පුරවැසියෙක් බාහිරින් බලන විට මුළු වාර්තාවම කියවන්නේ නැහැ නේ. එතකොට ප්‍රමුඛතාව යන්නේ අග තිබෙන individual Membersලාගේ අදහස්වලට. මම ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට ගෞරව සහිතව මේ කියන්නේ. ඒ සමහර අදහස් තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් වැරැදියි කියලා මා හොඳාකාරවම දන්නවා. අවසානයකට ඒ සාකච්ඡාව කර ගෙන යන්න බැරි වුණා. ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් හිටියා නම් අපට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න තිබුණා. ඒ නිසා මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ, එදා එකඟ වූ දේවල් වාර්තාවේ තියන්න. ඒ එකඟතාවෙන් පිට යන්න එපා. නමුත්, ඒවාට දෙන title එක හෝ ඒවා තබන තැන කොතැනද කියන එක ගැන බලන්න. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම කියනවා නම්, ඔබතුමාගේ මුල් කෙටුම්පතේ තිබෙන නිර්දේශ ගැන මට නම් ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. අපට එහෙම පුළුල් එකඟතාවක් ඇති කර ගන්න පුළුවන්කම තියෙද්දි, විශේෂ නිර්දේශවලට වාර්තාවෙන් වැඩි වටිනාකමක් දෙන්න ගිහින් වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන නියම වෘත්තීමය භාවය වෙනස් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ගැන ඔබතුමා හිතලා බලන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, නඩුවක නම් special recommendations කියන්නේ - ඒක තමයි තීන්දුව. කාගේවත් නිර්දේශ කියලා කවුරුත් දන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඒක ඔබතුමාගේ නිර්දේශවලටත් පසුව එන විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කිව්වාම, මිනිස්සු හිතන්නේ අර ඔක්කොම සලකා බලා දුන්න තීන්දුව කියලා. ඒ නිසා ඒ ගැන ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරන්න. මම මේ record වෙන්න කියන්නේ. අපි මේ COPE කමිටුවේ ගෞරවය ආරක්ෂා කර ගන්නේ නැතිනම්, මේ COPE කමිටුවට සහභාගීවීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මට ගැටලුවක් පැන නඟිනවා. 2016 අගෝස්තු 13වැනි දා Island පත්තරයට මා ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරනවා. එහි කියනවා, " Senasinghe draws flak for his conduct at COPE." මෙය මා ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරනවා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අනිවාර්යෙන්ම COPE කමිටුව මේ කර්තෘවරයා කැඳවිය යුතුයි. එහෙම කැඳවා මේ ලියවිල්ල ලිවීමට හේතු සාධක වූ කරුණු හා එය මොන පදනමක් මත වාර්තා කළාද යන්න සම්බන්ධයෙනුත් ප්‍රශ්න කළ යුතුයි කියන එක තමයි මගේ යෝජනාව වන්නේ. ඊට පස්සේ 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 21 දිනැති පත්තරේ තියෙනවා, COPE - UNP MPs try their best to take Mahendra off the hook. එයත් මම ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරනවා. " UNP MPs demanded certain amendments report argument." "Sujeewa Senasinghe, (Dr.) Harsha De Silva, Ajith P. Perera" මේ පත්තර වාර්තාවත් ඔබතුමාට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඊට පස්සේ අපි තවත් හෑල්ලුවට ලක් වුණා. ඊට පස්සේ කියනවා, " Treasury bond scams - COPE report holds Mahendran responsible. 'Good Governance' MPs in last ditch-battle to defend their man. ඒ ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා, ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ, ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා සහ තවත් ඉතිරි මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්. කලින් නම දාලා තියෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ කියලා, Good Governance MPs කියලා. UNP to present alternative report disputing damning report. ඒක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වැරැදියි. අපිව මෙහෙම හෑල්ලුවට ලක් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? The Island draws fire for reporting committee proceedings. Committee Proceedings වාර්තා කරන්නේ කොහොමද? මෙහි Committee Proceedings වාර්තා කළා කියලා Island Newspaper එක පිළිගන්නවා. මෙය විශාල වරදක් ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මෙහෙම කටයුතු නොකරන ලෙස අපේ ස්වාධීනත්වය බලපෑම් කරනවා නම්, අපට COPE කමිටුවේ වැඩ කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා.

මේවාට පෙනී සිටින එපා කියලා බලපෑමක් නේ කරන්නේ. මුළු රටටම පේන්න පත්තරේ මෙහෙම ලියනවා නම්, ඔබතුමා අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම COPE කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් මේ කර්තෘවරුන්ට summon කළ යුතුයි. මම මේ COPE කමිටුවේ හිටපු senior මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් හැමෝගෙන්ම ඇහුවා. තව පත්තර දෙක තුනක මෙහෙම ලියලා තියෙනවා. එහෙම නොකළොත් අපට ඉදිරියේදී කෝප් කමිටුවේ වැඩ කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මගේ යෝජනාව වන්නේ, ඔබතුමා මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයක් ගත්තේ නැත්නම්, අපට COPE කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් වශයෙන් ඉදිරි අනාගතයේදී ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා. කිසිම දෙයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට කථා කරන්න බැරි වෙනවා. පත්තරවල ලියලා අපට බලපෑම් එල්ල කරන්න පටන් ගන්නවා. බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඒ කරුණටම තව එක් දෙයක් එකතු කරන්නම්. ඔය දැනට තිබෙන නීතිමය තත්ත්වය අනුව නේ. පත්තරකරුවන් ඔය විධියට අපට පහර ගහන්න හැකියාවක් නැහැ කියලා, මා විශ්වාස කරනවා. අපිව සමච්චල් කරලා; පාච්චල් කරලා; අපි කියන දේවල්වලට වඩා වෙනස් දේවල් කියලා; අපි හොරු රකින්න හදනවා කියලා කියනවා. අපි technical arguments දමන එක වෙනම දෙයක්. නමුත්, අපේ හෘද සාක්ෂියේ තියෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා, පත්තරකරුවන්ට ඕනෑ විධියට ලියන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට අර්ථකථනය කරන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒ නිසා මමත් ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන එක second කරනවා. මට මතකයි, ගිය වර PAC එකේදී EPF ගැන කථා කරන විට Central Bank එක පැත්ත පළාතක ආවේ නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ මම මෙතැනදී මොකක්ද කිව්වා කියලා, ගරු කථානායකතුමා, මාව suspend කරන්න ගියා. අන්තිමට මම ගිහින් suspend කරන්න එපා කියලා වැඳලා බේරුණේ. ඒ මම කියලා නොවෙයි. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ම පත්තරෙන් ගෙනැල්ලා, televisionsවල දාලා මහ ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා සම්බන්ධිතයි:

ඉතින් මම හිතන්නේ, ඒ පත්තර කර්තෘවරුන් ගෙන්නලා, අදාළ ප්‍රශ්න කිරීම් කළ යුතුයි කියලායි. හැබැයි ඒකට යමක් තව එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක කරන ගමන් අපේ recommendationsවල දමන්න ඕනෑ, මේ COPE එක මාධ්‍යයට විවෘත කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: COPE එක මාධ්‍යයට විවෘත කරන්න ඕනෑ. අපි කෝප් එක පමණක් හංගල in camera කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. අපේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුව මාධ්‍යයට විවෘත නම්, COPE එක මාධ්‍යයට විවෘත කරන්න බැරි ඇයි?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඇත්තටම මෙතැන කාරණා දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. මේ කොච්චර මේක නරකට ගියාද කිව්වොත් එකක් තමයි, මේ තීන්දුව දීලා ඉවරයි කියන එක. ඒක තමයි මේකෙ තිබෙන කාරණය. ඒක ඉතාම නරක තත්ත්වයක් නේ. සාමාජික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ මතවාදයන් පිළිබඳව නොදන්නා කාරණා වාර්තා කිරීම වරදක් වගේම අවසන් නොවූ කාරක සභාවක් අවසන් වූවයි කියලා වාර්තා කිරීමත් ඇස්බැල්මටම වැරදියි. දෙවැනි තර්කය තමයි, ගරු හර්ෂ ඇමතිතුමා සමඟ මම එකඟ වෙනවා කියන එක. කරුණාකර, අපිට මේ COPE කමිටුව ඊළඟ සැසිවාරයේ ඉඳලා සියයට සියයක විවෘතභාවයක් ලබා දෙන්න කියන එක. දැන් අපිත් දෙවිධියකට හිතුවා. අන්තිමට වෙන්නේ, තාක්ෂණික කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් තර්ක කරන අපි නරකයි. දේශපාලනය කථා කරන මිනිස්සු හොඳයි. එතකොට ඔය මාධ්‍යවේදීන් මේ සභා ගර්භයේ ඉන්නවා නම් හෝ ඒ අයට වෙන කාමරයක ඉඳලා මෙහි තිබෙන කාරණා රූපවාහිනියෙන් බලාගන්න පුළුවන් නම්, ඒ අයට judgment එකක් ගන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට අපිට ප්‍රශ්න කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. ඒ අය ඇත්ත ඕක්කොම දකිනවා නම්, මාධ්‍ය වේදියෙකුට හිතෙන දේ මොකක්ද කියලා අපිට judge කරන්න බැහැ නේ. එම නිසා මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් වශයෙන් කරනවා, COPE කමිටුවේ සියයට සියයක පාරදෘෂ්‍යභාවයක් අවශ්‍යයි කියලා. අර්ධ පාරදෘෂ්‍යභාවය සහ මේ කටයුතු නිසා අන්තිමට මේ මුළු ක්‍රියාවලියම කඩාකප්පල් වෙන බව ප්‍රකාශ කරනවා. මම මේ වෙලාවේ මේ ගැන මතක් කරන්නේ, අපිට පසුව වේලාවක් නැතිවෙයි කියලායි. නමුත් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳ තීරණයක් අපේක්ෂා කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් අනිවාර්යෙන්ම නීතිමය ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගන්නවා. ඒ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරනවා. ඒ විධියට කළොත් COPE කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් පවා කැඳවන්න සිදු වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා අනිවාර්යයෙන් මම මෙයට නීති ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගන්න එක ගන්නවා. ඊළඟට සිදු වන එකවත් නවත්වා ගැනීම ඔබතුමාගේ කාර්යභාරයක්

වෙනවා. කවදාවත් COPE කමිටුවේ වාර්තා පත්තරවල ගියේ නැහැ. දැන් මේක COPE කමිටුවක් නොවෙයි, "අඹ ගහ යට නඩු අහනවා වගේ" හැම තැනම පත්තරවල තම තමන්ට ඕනෑ ඒවා ලියනවා. ඒ නිසා COPE කමිටුවේ ගෞරවය ආරක්ෂා කරන ලෙස ඉතාමත් කරුණාවෙන් ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් අපේ හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ඇමතිතුමා කිව්වා, අපි 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟ වුණා කියලා. 11 වැනි පිටුවේ අපි first paragraph එක ගැන අපි එදා කථා කළා නේද. ඒ 11 වැනි පිටුවේ, පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා අඩු ඵලදා අනුපාතයක් බැඳුම්කර- ඒ paragraph එක ගැන එදා තීන්දුවක් ගත්තාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා, පසුව ඒ සඳහා පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් දෙන්නම්. මම දන්නවා, මෙම කාරණාව රටේ සංවේදී කාරණාවක් සහ දිගින් දිගටම මාධ්‍යවල සාකච්ඡා වෙච්චා වූ කාරණාවක් නිසා අවධානය වැඩියි කියලා. ඒ වාගේම නිසා මාධ්‍යවලත් වාර්තා ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා මමත් දැක්කා. හැබැයි අද පත්තරවල යන දේවල්, රූපවාහිනී වැනි විද්‍යුත් මාධ්‍යවල යන දේවල්, ගුවන්විදුලි මාධ්‍යවල යන දේවල් සහ websitesවල යන දේවල් ඔක්කෝම නිරීක්ෂණ කරලා, ඒ ඔක්කොම මගහැරෙන්නේ නැති වෙන්න සොයා බලලා, එකින් එකට අදාළව මට ඒ ආයතන කැඳවන්න මට බැහැ. ඒක ප්‍රායෝගිකවත් බැහැ, මට සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට කරන්න පුළුවන් දෙයකුත් නොවෙයි. එම නිසා සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් 26 දෙනාගේම වගකීම තමයි, මේ කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු හැටියට අපේ මාධ්‍යවලට අදහස් ඵලකිරීමේදී වගකීම් සහගතව කටයුතු කරන ඕනෑ කියන එක. මොකද, ඒ වගකීම කියා දිදී, පුරුදු පුහුණු කරන්න මට බැහැ නේ. මේ කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු හැටියට තමන්ගේ වගකීම් සහිතව කටයුතු කිරීම හැම කෙනාගේම වගකීමක්. මාධ්‍යවල පලවෙනවා නම්, ඒවාට වඩා වෙනස් තත්ත්වයන් ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී මතු කරන්න. ඒක තවකෙනෙකුට වරප්‍රසාද ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. තමන්ට පුද්ගලිකව බලපාන කාරණාවක් නම්, ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ මතු කරලා පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තුළින් ඒකට අදාළ ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ගරු සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ මාධ්‍යවල පල වූ දේවල් සම්බන්ධයෙන් කාරක සභාව හමුවට කැඳවන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව මම කථානායකතුමාගේ උපදෙස් ලබා ගන්නම්. ඒ කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් මට පොදුවේ කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ, ඒ එකින් එක පත්තර බල බලා ඒවට උත්තර දෙන්න මට හැකියාවක් නැහැ කියන එකයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒ වගේම මාධ්‍යයට කමිටුවක් විවෘත කරන එකත් ඔබතුමාට තීන්දු කරන්න බැහැ. ඒකත් කථානායකතුමාගේ අනුමැතියක් ඇතිව තමයි කරන්න ඕනෑ. සභාපතිතුමා මට අවසර දෙන්න එදා එක ඉදිරියට යනවා නම් මම මෙතැන අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. මට message එකක් තිබුණ නිසයි ආවේ.

ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් දැන් ඔබතුමා කියපු කාරණයේ, ඔබතුමා COPE සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මාධ්‍ය මෙතැනට කැඳවීමට අපහසු නම් ඔබතුමාට එක දෙයක් කළ හැකියි. COPE කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් වන අපට සාධාරණයක් වන පරිදි, ඔබතුමා මාධ්‍යයෙන් ප්‍රසිද්ධියේ ඉල්ලීමක් කරන්න, මේ කරුණ ගැන සාකච්ඡා වෙමින් පවතිනවා, නමුත් වගකීමෙන් තොරව දැන්වීම් ඵල කරන එක නතර කරන්න කියලා. මොකද, නැතිනම් අපිට damage එකක් වුණාට පස්සෙ ඒක ගැන කථා කරන්න කවුරුත් නැතිව යනවා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ප්‍රකාශයක් කරන්නම්.

ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා: මොකද, COPE සාමාජිකයෙක් හැටියට අපිට damage එකක් වෙලා ඉවරයි. මේක ඔබතුමා කිව්වා වගේ රටේ සංවේදී කරුණක්. මේ ගැන බොහෝ දෙනා කථා කරනවා. බොහෝ දේවල් ගැන සමහරු තීන්දු දීලත් අවසන්. එම නිසා මේ ගැන පොදුවේ කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේ වාර්තාව ගැන ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කරුණු ගැන මට දෙයක් කියන්න තිබෙනවා. සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවක් මම කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කෙටුම්පත් දෙකක් දුන්නා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. කෙටුම්පත් දෙකක් දුන්නා. ඒ දෙකෙන් දැන් අවසාන කෙටුම්පතක් නේ අපි මේ දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. කෙටුම්පත් දෙකක් දුන්නා, අයෙත් මුල් කෙටුම්පත සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒක ඔබතුමාල බලල තමයි මේ කාරක සභාව මට පැවරුවේ, මේක සාරාංශ ගත කරලා නිර්දේශයන් සහිතව වාර්තා කෙටුම්පතක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. ඒ කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාව හැටියට පිළිඅරගෙන -සංශෝධන සහිතව 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා- අත්සන් කරපු මන්ත්‍රීවරු ප්‍රමාණයක් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සහ අර නිර්දේශවලත් එදා එකඟ වුණා-

සභාපතිතුමා: මට පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න කෝ. එතකොට සංශෝධන සහිතව කෙටුම්පතක් වාර්තාව හැටියට පිළිගත්ත මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් ඉන්නවා. ඊටපසු තවත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලා, ඒ වාර්තාව පදනම් කරගෙන සාකච්ඡාවක් ආරම්භ කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඔක්කොම ඒ සාකච්ඡාව ආරම්භ කළා. අතරමගදී ඒ අය නැගිටලා ගියා, අපි දිගටම සාකච්ඡා කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: සාකච්ඡාවක් ආරම්භ කරලා ඔබතුමාල වාර්තාවක් හදන්න ඔබතුමාල දැන් වාර්තාවක් හදන්න සාකච්ඡා කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගෙන් මම ඉතා කරුණාවෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා කෙටුම්පත කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කරන්න කියලා වාර්තාවක් නැහැ තාම.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට පොඩි දෙයක් කියන්න දෙන්න. එතකොට ඒකට දැන් පහසුකම් සැපයීම සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මගේ වගකීම. තව මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් ඇවිල්ල මට කියනවා නම් නැහැ මේ වාර්තාව නෙමෙයි අපට තව දෙයක් කථා කරන්න තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒකටත් පහසුකම් සැපයීම මගේ වගකීමක්. ඒක නිසා තමයි මම මෙතන ඉන්නේ. ඔබතුමාල මෙහෙම තැනකට එනව නම් ඒක වැරදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා දිගින් දිගටම පොඩි වැරැද්දක් කරනවා මම ඒක පෙන්වල දෙන්න ඕන. ඔබතුමා දිගින් දිගටම කියනවා වාර්තාව කියලා. මේ වාර්තාව නෙමෙයි මේක කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවයි කෙටුම්පතයි අතර වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට වාර්තාව සම්මත කළා කියලා කට්ටියක් පත්තරේට දානව. වාර්තාවක් නිකුත් කරලා නැහැ. 6 දෙනෙක් අත්සන් කරලා ගිහිල්ලා කෙටුම්පතට. නමුත් ඒක වාර්තාව නෙමෙයි. අපි තවම 30 ගණන්වල පිටුවෙ ඉන්නේ කෙටුම්පතේ

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා තේරුම් ගන්න ඕන සභාපතිතුමා එදා COPE කමිටුවේ ලේකම්තුමා කිව්වා මේක කෙටුම්පතක් පමණයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මගේ ස්ථාවරය කියන්න ඕන මෙහිදී මොකද කෙටුම්පතක් මේ සියලු දේවල් අධ්‍යයනය කරලා හදාපු අවසාන ලියවිල්ල ඒක. ඒක දැම්මෙ කෙටුම්පතක් හැටියට දැම්මේ ඒකෙ යම් යම් කාරණා තිබෙනවා නම් සම්පූර්ණ කරන්න බලන්න. නමුත් අපි 9 දෙනෙක් එදා ඒ වාර්තාව පිළිගත්තා

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වාර්තාවක් ලෙස පිළිගත්තා ඒ සංශෝධිත කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් ලෙස ඒ පිරිස පිළිගත්තා. සිංහල හරියට තේරුම් ගන්නකො එතකොට ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් නෙමෙයි. ඒක කෙටුම්පතක් අවසාන කෙටුම්පත සිංහල භාෂාවෙන්. අවසාන කෙටුම්පත කියල කියන්නේ වාර්තාවක් නෙමෙයි. නඩුවක වුනත් අවසාන කෙටුම්පතක් කියල කියන්නේ gist එක ඒක වාර්තාවක් වෙන්නෙ නැහැ. ඒ වාර්තාව තමයි අපි පළියෙළ කරමින් පැවතුනේ.

11 වෙනි පිටුවට පස්සේ, පිරිසක් කිව්වා මෙතැනට එනකම් අපි එකඟයි, 11ට එනකම් මේ සංශෝධන ඇතිව, කෙටුම්පතේ තිබෙන ඉතිරි ටික දමලා අපේ වාර්තාව කියලා අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා කියලා. මම කියන දේ වැරදි නම් ඔබතුමා මාව නිවැරදි කරන්න. ඔබතුමා එයට එකඟ වුණා. ඒ පිරිස මඟදී නැගිටලා ගියා. අපි මුලින්ම ඔබතුමත් එක්ක එකඟ වෙලා පටන් ගත්තා වැඩක් මේ කෙටුම්පත සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඔබතුමා එක්ක සහ විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව එක්කත් technical pointsමත අපි මේකේ නිවැරදි ස්ථාවරය පැහැදිලි කරගෙන යන ගමන තමයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑ විධියට COPE කමිටුවේ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයට මෙහි මොනවාද පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ, මොනවාද පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ නැත්තේ කියලා අවසන් තීන්දුවකට එන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, අපි සියලු දෙනා යම්කිසි පදනමක් මත මෙම කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් බවට පත් කරමින් පවතිනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒ අවසාන වාර්තාවටත් ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට තමන්ගේ නිර්දේශ දෙන්න පුළුවන්. එයත් වාර්තාවේ කොටසක් බවට පත් වෙනවා. එය තවත් වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි. දැන් මම මෙයට පරිබාහිරව පිටු 40ක පමණ කෙටුම්පතක් වෙනම දුන්නොත් එය වෙනත් වාර්තාවක් බවට පත් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම වුණොත් COPE කමිටුව විහිළුවක් බවට පත් වෙනවා. එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමාට කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ සියලු දෙනාටම කියනවා තමන්ගේ වාර්තාව හදාගෙන එන්න කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ ඒ සියල්ලම එකතු කරලා මෙන්න COPE කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව කියලා දෙනවා. එහෙම නොවෙයි නේ COPE කමිටුව කරන්නේ. මෙතැන අපි සාක්ෂි කැඳවන්නේ මේ විද්වතුන් ගෙන්වලා ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නේ පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඇමතිවරු වශයෙන් ඔළුව පාවිච්චි කරලා අපිට යම්කිසි නිගමනයකට එන්න. නැත්නම්, COPE කමිටුව කරන්නේ කරුණු වාර්තා කිරීමක් නොවෙයි.

කරුණු වාර්තා කරනවා නම්, ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය හරි. එක් එක් කෙනාට ඕනෑ කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කළාට පස්සේ, සාක්ෂි කැඳෙව්වාට පස්සේ, ප්‍රශ්න ඇසුවාට පස්සේ අපිට ඕනෑ මතයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට ඒක නියම අච්චාරුවක් බවට පත් වෙනවා. ඒක නොවෙයි අපි කරන්නේ. අවසාන වශයෙන් ඔබතුමා වගකියනවා මේ අන්තිමට දෙන report එකට. මේ report එකට ඕනෑම පුද්ගලයෙක්ට තමන්ගේ අදහස් දැක්වීමේ නිදහස තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි ඒ හැම අදහසක්ම COPE කමිටු වාර්තාවක් බවට පත් වන්නේ නැහැ. අපිට මේ ගැන හැමදාම උදේ සිට සවස් වනතුරු කථා කර කර ඉන්න බැහැ. මේ පදනම හරි නම් එය ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙනත් පදනමක් තිබෙනවා නම් අපිට ඒ පදනම කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන දෙයත් නිවැරදිව තේරුම් ගත්තොත් ප්‍රශ්නය නිරාකරණය වෙයි කියලා මම හිතන්නේ. දැන් ඒ අය මම ඉදිරිපත් කළ කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් ලෙස පිළිඅරගෙන, 11 වෙනි පිටුවෙන් පස්සේ තිබෙන දේවල්වලට තවත් සංශෝධන අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ කියලා ඒ ටික පිළිඅරගෙන කලින් සාකච්ඡා කරද්දි මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ ''පොදු විශේෂ නිර්දේශ'' කියන එක ''මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ'' කියලා නමින් ඇතුළත් කරන්න කියලා නම් ටික දමන්නත් එකඟ වුණා. එහෙම එකඟ වෙලා ඒ අය පිටව ගියා කියන්නේ, මෙතැන ඒ අයට තවත් සංශෝධන නැති නිසා නේ. ඒ අයට තවත් සංශෝධන නැති නිසා ඒ අය පිටව ගියා. ඒ අය පිටව යද්දි ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කියපු දෙයක් තිබෙනවා, ඒ කෙටුම්පත ඒ අය වාර්තාව විධියට පිළිගන්නවා. ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. හොඳම උදාහරණය තමයි ඊට පස්සේ වීරකුමාර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇවිල්ලා එයට තවත් නිර්දේශ ප්‍රමාණයක් එකතු කරන්න ආවාට පසු, අපේ ලේකම් මණ්ඩලය උපදෙස් දුන්නේ, තව දුරටත් ඒ නිර්දේශ ඇතුළත් කරන්න බැහැ. මොකද, ඒ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඒ කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාව හැටියට පිළිඅරගෙන අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන නිසා. මන්ත්‍රීවරු 09 දෙනෙක් එය වාර්තාවක් විධියට පිළිගත්තාට පස්සේ ඒක වාර්තාවක්. එතකොට මම සභාපතිවරයා විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කෙටුම්පතම ඔබතුමන්ලා තවදුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා සාකච්ඡා කරලා, සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරලා, වාර්තාවක් බවට පත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලන් සකස් කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව, කෙටුම්පත පිළිඅරගෙන සකස් කළ වාර්තාව මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාව කෙටුම්පත, ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධන කරන ප්‍රමාණයන් එක්ක මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාර්තා දෙකක්. එකක් වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. සාමාන්‍ය සිහි බුද්ධියෙන් තේරෙනවා, මේ කෙටුම්පතට සංශෝධනය කරන දේවල් ඒ වාර්තාවේ නැහැ. ඒක නැහැ නේ. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා උදාහරණයක් කියන්නම්, 15 වෙනි පිටුවේ ඔබතුමන්ලා 4.3 කොටස සංශෝධනය කළා. හැබැයි, ඒක අනිත් වාර්තාවේ නැහැ ඒක වෙන වාර්තාවක්. ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධනය කරපු කෙටුම්පත තව වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එක ප්‍රශ්නයයි අහන්නේ මේ තිබෙන්නේ මගේ වාර්තාව. ඔබතුමා මේක පිළිඅරගෙන මාගේ වාර්තාවක් ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: COPE වාර්තාව විධියට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මගේ COPE වාර්තාව මේක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ වාර්තාව විධියට නොවෙයි COPE වාර්තාව විධියට.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මේ කෙටුම්පතට වෙනස් වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, මම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහි අන්තර්ගතය ඔබතුමාට වැඩක් නැහැ. මේ කාරණාවට අදාළව මේ මගේ වාර්තාව. එතකොට, මම ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා මේක මගේ වාර්තාව විධියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම බොහොම ගෞරවයෙන් සභාපතිවරයා විධියට එය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. COPE කමිටුවෙන් ඔබතුමා දෙන වාර්තාව විධියට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම කියලා නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ නමින් තමයි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. අනිත් වාර්තාවත් ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරු නමින් තමයි ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපිට ඕනෑ ඕනෑ ඒවා COPE කමිටුවට දෙන්න බැහැ. දැන් මෙහි දේශපාලන කථාවක් ලියලා තිබුණොත්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මේ කෙටුම්පතට පරිබාහිරව මේ කෙටුම්පත වෙනුවට වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, එය ඔබතුමාගේ නමින් මට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වාර්තා නොවෙයි, වාර්තාවට අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක අපි රේල් පාරක් වගේ

දෙපැත්තක යන්නේ නැතිව, සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඔය document එක එතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, එතකොට එය සුජීව සේනසිංහ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා විසින් COPE කමිටුව හරහා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු ඔහුගේ අදහස් වනවා. හරි නේ. ඊට පස්සේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් 09 දෙනෙක් මේකට අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් 09 දෙනා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු එකක් වෙනවා ඒක. එතකොට COPE වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන එකත් COPE වාර්තාවක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි ඔබතුමත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරලා COPE කමිටුවෙන් කරන එක ඒකනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: උදාහරණයක් විධියට කලින් වාර්තාවක් මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට පෙන්වන්නම්, "...පාර්ලිමේන්තු ප්‍රකාශන මාලා අංක 71. විශේෂ කාරක සභාවක වාර්තාව. ඒ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන්නෙත් එහෙමයි. ඒ කියන්නේ, "...18. පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රී සහ විරුද්ධ පක්ෂයේ නායක අනුර බණ්ඩාරනායක, පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රී දිනේෂ ගුණවර්ධන හා සරත් මුත්තෙට්ටුගම යන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් ඉහත සඳහන් නිරීක්ෂණ සඳහා එකඟ නොවූයෙන් ඔවුහු වෙනම වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට එකඟ වූහ. ඉහත සඳහන් සාමාජිකයන් තිදෙනා විසින් වෙන් වෙන්ව ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද වාර්තා මෙම වාර්තාවේ X-1 පරිශිෂ්ඨය ලෙසින් යා කොට ඇත."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ වෙන වාර්තාවක් නේ එහෙම බැහැ. මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ COPE කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් විසින් සාකච්ඡා කොට ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තා තිබෙන්නේ මේක විතරයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකද නැත්තේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක කියලා අදහස් කරන්නේ කෙටුම්පත.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ සාකච්ඡා කරමින් පවතින එක. අනිත් එක COPE කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් විසින් 11 වෙනි පිටුව දක්වා පමණක් සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු එකක්. මේ තියෙන්නේ COPE කමිටුව සහ අපේ තාක්ෂණික උපදෙස් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ කාර්යාලයත් සමඟ ඔවුන් ඔවුන්ගේ presence එකත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරපු වාර්තාවකට තිබෙන්නේ එකයි. COPE සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් සමඟ කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කර ඉදිරිපත් කරපු එක තමයි ෙම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට අනිත් එක?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ 11 වෙනි පිටුව දක්වා සාකච්ඡා කරපු එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: 11 වෙනි පිටුව දක්වා සාකච්ඡා කරලා අනිත් කාරණා සඳහා ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියලා, ඒ අය එකඟ වෙච්ච වාර්තාව. ඒක verbatim වල තිබෙනවා. ඒ කෙටුම්පත ඒ අය වාර්තාවක් විධියට පිළිගත්තා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එයට ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ, මුළු කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයම එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ. කොහොමද එහෙම නම් 11 වෙනකම් සාකච්ඡා කළේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා එහෙම කියන්න එපා. ඔබතුමන්ලාෙග් අවශ්‍යතාවට කියන දෙයක් කියලා මට තේරෙනවා. අපි විනාඩි 20කින් කියවන්න කියලා අරගෙන ඔබතුමන්ලා පැයක් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් කියෙව්වා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ විශේෂ තත්ත්වය; මේ එකඟ නොවීම නැත්නම් අපි එකඟ වෙන ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද? ඔබතුමන්ලාට මම ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරලා, තිබෙන සියලු ලේඛන පරිශීලනය කරලා, සභාපතිවරයා විධියට දීපු වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලා පළවෙනි පිටුවේ ඉඳලා අවසාන පිටුව වෙනකම් කියෙව්වාට පස්සේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු 26 දෙනාම එයට එකඟ වුණා නම්, ඒක නේ වාර්තාව. ඒ කෙටුම්පතට මන්ත්‍රීවරු 26 දෙනාම එකඟ වුණා නම් ඒක වාර්තාව. ඒක පැහැදිලි නේද? ඒ කෙටුම්පත කියවා බලා ඒ අවස්ථාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු 9 දෙනෙක් එයට එකඟ වුණාම ඒක ඒ අය ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොටස. ඒ අයගේ වාර්තාව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කියවා බලා දිනක් සාකච්ඡා කිරීමෙන් පසු.

සභාපතිතුමා: අනිත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු විධියට ඔබතුමන්ලා එයට තවත් සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරලා ඔබතුමන්ලා වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව. මම සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලාට පහසුකම් සැපයීමයි කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා පහසුකම් සපයන්නෙක් නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා සභාපතිවරයා. ඩිවි ගුණසේකර මහත්මයා සියලුම තීරණ ගත්තේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: කථානායකතුමා සභාව කැඳවූවාට පසුව කථානායකතුමාට තව මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් අය ඉන්නවා. එකඟ නොවෙන අය ඉන්නවා. එතකොට එකඟ වන

අයගේ අදහසට ගරු කරනවා වාගේම එම වාර්තාවට එකඟ නොවූ අයට ඔබතුමන්ලාට, ඔබතුමන්ලාට කැමති විධියට ඒක සකස් කර ගන්න මම ඉඩ දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක මම කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවත් මම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඔය කිසිදු වාර්තාවක් පිළිබඳ, ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද වාර්තාවේ, මේ සියලු දෙනාටම එකින් එකට සංශෝධනයන් නැත්නම්, අනෙක් අය ගෙන එනතුරු වාඩි වෙලා ඉන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. ඒ නිසා අපි කිව්වා, මෙතැනින් පසුව අපට කිසිදු සංශෝධනයක් නැහැ, අපි ඔබතුමන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් ලෙස පිළි ගන්නවා කියලා තමයි අපි ගියේ. මෙතැන අනෙක් අයත් ඔක්කොම ගිහින් එක් කෙනෙක් විතරක් කියනවා, මට සංශෝධන තිබෙනවා කියලා. එතුමාගේ සංශෝධන සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඇතුළත් කිරීමෙන් ඒක වාර්තාවක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්න නිසා නේ ප්‍රශ්නය. ඒ නිසා අපි එදා අවසාන වශයෙන් තීරණයකට ආවේ, එහෙම දේවල් තිබෙනවා නම් ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට හෝ ඊට පසුව මෙතුමන්ලා කිව්වා ඒකත් වෙන වාර්තාවක් ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා. ඒ පදනම මතයි අපි ගියේ. වැරදි විග්‍රහ දෙන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක පැහැදිලියි. ඒ පැහැදිලි භාවය මත තමයි මේ සාකච්ඡාව පටන් ගත්තේ. ගිය සිකුරාදා ප.ව 12.45ට පමණ මේ සාකච්ඡාව පටන් ගත්තේ ඉතාම නිරවුල් විධියට. ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරු සංශෝධන රහිතව 11 වන පිටුවෙන් පසුව ඉතිරි සියලු කාරණාවලට එකඟ වුණාට පසුව තමයි එම වාර්තාව, වාර්තාවක් හැටියට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ. එදා දිනයේ සකස් වූ අවසාන වාර්තාව එදා දිනයට ඒකයි. ඒ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව දැන් සකස් කරන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවශ්‍ය නම් මම නැතුවත් එම වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න පුළුවන්. සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇයි අමතක කරන්නේ? ඔබතුමන්ලාට කිව්වා ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරු කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාව විධියට පිළිගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඒක මට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් ගැටලුවක් නැතිව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලාට මම කිව්වා, ඔබතුමන්ලා සාකච්ඡා කරන දේවල් මේ කෙටුම්පතට සංශෝධන හැටියට දෙන්න. අපිට සඳුදාට ඒ සංශෝධන දුන්නාට පසුව ඒ ටික ඇතුල් කරලා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම් කියලා. එතකොට හර්ෂ සිල්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මතු කළා, මෙතැන ඉන්න අය අතරේ වුණත් වෙනස් අදහස් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා මෙතැන දැන් අපි සාකච්ඡා කරමු. ඇයි කථා කරන්න බැරි. අනෙක් වාර්තාව වාර්තාව හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරමු. මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා අපේ තිබෙන ටික හදමු කියලා. එහෙමයි සාකච්ඡා කළේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඊට පසුව බොහෝ දේවල් කථා කරලා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කළා, ඒකට. ඊට පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලා bulldoze කරන්න හදනවානම් "ඒක නොවෙයි වාර්තාව, මෙච්චර වෙලා කථා කරන නිසා මේකයි වාර්තාව" කියලා ඒකට මම එකඟ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි අදහස් දක්වන එක bulldoze කියලා කියන්න එපා. අපි ඉතාමත් හොඳ භාෂාවෙන් ඔබතුමාත් එක්ක සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. අපි එළියට ගිහින් අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නද? අපි මේ කියන්නේ අනිවාර්යෙන්ම කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා නොවෙයි. අපි අපේ අදහස් දක්වන්නේ. Bulldoze නොවෙයිනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අවසාන වශයෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒත්තු ගන්වන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට දැන් ඔබතුමන්ගේ තර්කය තේරෙනවා. ඔළු තිබෙන මනුස්සයන් වශයෙන් අපි සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඕනෑ. Hard and fast rules ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මගේ අවසාන අදහස මම කියන්නම්. අද මේ සාකච්ඡාව පටන් ගත්තේ, එදා රාත්‍රී 8.30ට අවසන් වුණාට පසුව, එදා රෑ 12.00 වෙනතුරු හරි ගොස් සාකච්ඡා කරමු කියලා ගොස් රාත්‍රී 8.20ට විතර අපි අවසන් කළේ, මේ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයට තිබුණු සියලුම අපහසුතාවයන් සලකා බලා. දැන් අපට කථා කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ ඊළඟ පිටුවේ සිට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මොකක් හෝ සංශෝධනයන් කර ගෙන ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව හදා ගන්න. නැතුව අනෙක් වාර්තාව ගැන සාකච්ඡාවක් නැහැ. ඒ වාර්තාව දැන් වාර්තාවක් විධියට හදලා, මේ කටුම්පත ඒ අය වාර්තාවක් විධියට පිළිගෙන අවසන්. එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා හදන වාර්තාවක් ඔබතුමන්ලා හදා ගන්න ඕනෑ. හදලා ඒ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒ වාර්තා දෙකක් වෙනවා . ඒ වාර්තා දෙකම ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම තමයි මම කරන්න හදන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂණ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මොකක්ද කියන්නේ?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මෙතැන පොඩි සාකච්ඡාවක් නේ අපි කළේ. මේක නීතියක් රීතියක් විධියට කළා නම් එහෙම නම් මෙතුමාත් අත්සන් කළානේ. එහෙම නම් මෙතුමා ඉන්නත් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: අද කාරක සභාවේ දිනය යොදා ගත්තාට පසුව එදා, ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් හැම දෙනාටම message එකක් යවනවා නේ කාරක සභාව රැස් වෙනවා කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට අපේ වැඩක් නම් මේ සංශෝධනය කිරීම මෙතුමාට ඒකේ වැඩක් නැහැ නේ. අපේ වැඩේ කරන්න අපට ඉඩ දෙන්න ඕනෑ. මේ තර්කයෙන් මට ඔබතුමන් කියන කාරණය සාධාරණව තේරෙනවා. ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය හරි. අපිට මෙහි hard and fast rule එකක් නැහැ නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා පෙන්වා සිටියා, වෙන කාරක සභාවක් ගත්ත තින්දුවක්. ඒකෙන් මට පොඩි line එකක් ආවා, ඔබතුමා කියන කථාවේ සාධාරණත්වයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. අපට තේරෙන්නේ නැති නිසා තමයි මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. මෙතැන තිබෙනවා නම් මෙන්න මේකයි COPE වාර්තාව කියන්නේ, මේකයි කෙටුම්පත කියලා කොහේ හරි ලියලා තිබෙනවා නම් හරි. එතකොට අපිට ලේකම්තුමියට කියන්න පුළුවන් නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එහෙම නැති නිසා නේ මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. ඔබතුමා කථානායකතුමාගෙන් අහන්න, අර විධියට දුන්න එකේ වාර්තාවක් ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? තවත් අයට වාර්තා ලෙස තවත් අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා අහලා ඔබතුමන් එතැනින් ඉවර කරන්න. ආයෙත් අපෙන් අහන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට verbatim ගෙනැල්ලා බලන්න පුළුවන් නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. ඔබතුමන් කථානායකතුමාගෙන් අහන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: කථානායකතුමාගෙන් අහන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. මෙතැන ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයේ උපදෙස් ලැබී තිබුණා එදාම. ඒ උපදෙස් අනුව තමයි එම තීරණය ගත්තේ. ඒ තීරණය අරගෙන ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කිව්වා, ඒ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ වාර්තාව, වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ඒ අය අත්සන් කළාට පසුව ඒ අය ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව, වාර්තාවක් හැටියට සකස් කර ගන්න කියලා. ඒක සකස් කර ගැනීමට මම සභාපතිවරයා විධියට, ඇත්තටම ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදී විධියට මට ඒ වෙලාවේ කරන්න තිබුණේ ඒක නොවෙයි. එදා දිනයේ රැස්වූ අයගේ බහුතරයෙන් ඒක සම්මත කරන්න කියලා ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දාන්න නේ. ඒ වෙනුවට ඔබතුමන්ලාට කැමති වාර්තාවක් හදාගන්න අවස්ථාව දුන්නාට පසුව ඇයි මෙහෙම කරන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට කැමති වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි . එහෙම නම් ගෙදර ගිහින් හදා ගන්නවා නේ. ඔබතුමන් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම මගේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කෙටුම්පත. ඒක වාර්තාවක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ලැබුණු තොරතුරු අනුව ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙනවා. අපි දැන් තොරතුරු ඔබතුමන්ට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා, මේ කරුණු වැරදියි කියලා. එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමන් පිටු 11 වන තුරු සංශෝධනය කළේ මොකකටද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ වාර්තාවල ශ්‍රේණිගත ප්‍රමුඛතාවක් තිබෙනවාද? නැත්නම් මේ වාර්තා සියල්ලම එකම මට්ටමේ වාර්තාද?

එන්.එස්. චිත්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය : එහෙම ප්‍රමුඛතාවක් නැහැ. දෙකම එක සමාන වැදගත්කමින් යුක්තයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ලේකම්තුමාලාත් verbatim බලලා හෝ උපදෙස් දෙන්න මේක පවත්වාගෙන යන්න. මේ කාරක සභාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කෙටුම්පත මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් වාර්තාව ලෙස පිළි ගන්නවා, ඒකේ නැවතත් අපට සංශෝධන නැහැ. විරෝධතාව දක්වලා එළියට ගියා නොවෙයි නේ. ඒ සංශෝධන නැති නිසා අපි යනවා. ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මන්ත්‍රීතුමා වාර්තාව හැටියට පිළිගෙන කෙටුම්පතට.අත්සන් කරපු මන්ත්‍රීතුමෙක් හැටියට මෙතුමා අද ආවේ කාරක සභාව හැටියට කැඳවපු නිසා කියලා නේ එතුමා කිව්වේ. එතුමා කියන්නේ මම පිළිගත් වාර්තාව නොවෙයි නම් මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ, කෙටුම්පතේ මගේ එක පිළිගෙන ඉවරයි නේ. එතකොට එතුමාට ඉන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලා නේ. ඒක නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ? ඒක වාර්තාව ලෙස දැනට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තීරණය කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එක වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා සාකච්ඡා කරලා දැන් මේ කෙටුම්පත, ඔබතුමන්ලාට වාර්තාවක් හදා ගැනීමේ අයිතිය තිබෙන නිසා තමයි මම මෙතැන ඉන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තව වාර්තාවක්. ඔබතුමාගේ කෙටුම්පත මත වාර්තාවක්?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාර්තාවත් එතකොට වාර්තාවක් හැටියට. ඔබතුමන්ලා කොළයකට අත්සන් කළාට පසු, කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාවක් හැටියට මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එකට bind කරලා දෙනවාද වෙන වෙනම දෙනවාද කියන එක වෙනම දෙයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක දැන් තීරණය කර ගනිමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාවයි, මේ වාර්තාවයි හැර තවත් වාර්තා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එක වාර්තාවයි තිබෙන්නේ සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා කියන එක වැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් නම් කරන කොට නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිස මේ කෙටුම්පත වාර්තාව විධියට පිළි ගන්නවා කියලා, ඒ නම් කරන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නමින් එම වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ? ඊට පසුව තව මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිරිසක් කියනවා නම් ''මෙන්න මේක තමයි වාර්තාව'' කියලා ඒ අයගේ නමින් මම ඒ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ? එතකොට එතැන වාර්තා දෙකක් නේද?

ජගත් ගජවීර ආරච්චිගේ මහතා: දෙකම අපි එකට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා වැරදියි. එක වාර්තාවයි. එක වාර්තාවේ කොටස් දෙකයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එක වාර්තාවේ කොටස් දෙකක් කිව්වාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොටස මම වෙනම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා, වාර්තාව කියන්නේ සියලු දේ අඩංගු එකක්. ඇමුණුම් ටිකත් එක්ක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට එක විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. ලේකම්තුමා, අපට මෙහෙම කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? එක කෙටුම් පතෙන් වාර්තා දෙකක් හැදෙන තත්ත්වයක් ගැන නේ මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. වාර්තාව ''ඒ'' කියලා ගත්තොත් එහි 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා තිබෙන්නේ කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කර ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබූ කොටස සහ ඉතිරි ටික මුළු කෙටුම්පතම කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කර ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කොටස කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් දෙන්නකෝ. එතකොට සභාපතිතුමාට කථා කරන්න ලෙහෙසියි. දැන් තවත් කෙනෙක් මේ කමිටුවට එනවා. මේ සියල්ලට අමතරව ඔහු වෙනම වාර්තාවක් දෙනවා. ඒක කොහොද ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ කියලා ලේකම්තුමා කියන්න. අර වාර්තාව එක්කම යවනවාද? නැහැ නේ. ඒක වෙනම වාර්තාවක් විධියට යන්න ඕනෑ.

ජගත් ගජවීරආරච්චිගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමාගේ අවසරය ඇතිව කියන්නේ. මේ කාරක සභාවේ පූර්ණ බලය තිබෙන්නේ කාරක සභාවට. මම, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, කාරක සභා කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයේ සියලු දෙනා ඉන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට සහාය වෙන්න. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳ පූර්ණ තීරණ ගැනීමේ බලය තිබෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට. ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ මේ කාරක සභාව. සභාපතිතුමාගේ නායකත්වයෙන් යුතු කාරක සභාව තමයි මේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳ තීරණය ගන්න ඕනෑ. මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කලිනුත් කිව්වේ COPE කමිටුවේ, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පූර්ණ එකඟත්වයෙන් එක වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් වුණොත් තමයි වඩාත් වැදගත්, වඩාත් ලස්සන, වඩා සරු සහ වඩා rich වාර්තාවක් වෙන්නේ. නමුත් යම් කිසි අවස්ථාවකදී ඔබතුමන්ලා එක මතයකට එන්නේ නැත්නම් සභාපතිතුමා මධ්‍යස්ථව ඉඳගෙන මේ වාර්තා දෙකම එක වාර්තාවේ යුගලයක් විධියට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ වගකීම තමයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට තිබෙන්නේ. මගේ අදහස මෙහෙමයි. මම මේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට දෙන්නේ පොඩි guideline එකක්. එතකොට සභාපතිතුමාට කියන්න වෙන්නේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ COPE කමිටුව මේ සැසිවාරයේදී රැස් වෙලා මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනයක් කර වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තීරණය කළා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන කාරක සභාවේ සාක්ෂි සටහන්ද ඇතුළත් කර කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිතුමා සහ ලේකම් මණ්ඩලය විසින් කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවක් පිළියෙල කළා. එම කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඉදිරිපත් කළා. නමුත් මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවට සියලුම ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ පූර්ණ එකඟත්වයක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ. කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව සාකච්ඡා කර ගෙන යන කොට මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කණ්ඩායමක් ඒ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ඇති සැටියෙන්මද හෝ වෙනස්කම් සහිතවද, තවත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා පිරිසක් එම කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවට වෙනස් සංශෝධන සහිතවද වාර්තා දෙකක් සකස් කර තිබෙනවා. කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට මෙම කරුණ පිළිබඳව මධ්‍යස්ථව සිට 1-10 දක්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා විසින් පිළියෙල කරන ලද වාර්තාව ''අ'' වාර්තාව වශයෙනුත්, 1-10 දක්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා විසින් පිළියෙල කරන ලද වාර්තාව ''ආ'' වාර්තාව වශයෙනුත් මේ සමඟ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරමි කියලා තමයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුත්තේ. එතුමාගේ වාර්තාව තනි පිටුවයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා මධ්‍යස්ථව ඉඳගෙන ගහක්, ගලක් වගේ නොසෙල්වී මේ සියලු දේ දරා ගෙන කරන්න ඕනෑ ඒ දේයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: තවත් වාර්තාවක් ආවොත් "ඇ", "ඈ" වශයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: "ඇ" කියන එක තුන් වැනි වගේ කියලා හිතෙනවා නම් අ,ආ, කියලාම යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම යෝජනා කරනවා "අ", "ආ" නැතිව වෙන මොනවා හරි -රවුමක්, හතරැස් කොටුවක් වගේ දෙයක් - දමන්න කියලා. "අ", "ආ" කිව්වාම එකකට ප්‍රමුඛත්වයක්-

ජගත් ගජවීරආරච්චිගේ මහතා: ප්‍රමුඛත්වය නොවෙයි එතැන තිබෙන්නේ. අනුක්‍රමය පමණයි එතැන අදහස් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව, වාර්තාවක් ලෙස පිළිගත් නිසා මට මේ සංශෝධනයන් අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. එම නිසා මට යන්න අවසර දෙන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අවසරයි. බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මට දැනුම් දුන් නිසායි මම අවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 6 වැනි කොටස සම්පූර්ණයෙන් අවසන් කළා. 7 වැනි කොටසේ තිබෙන යෝජනා සාකච්ඡා කරලා එතැනින් ඉදිරියට යමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානය යොමු කරනවා ඔබතුමාගේ Report එකේ 5.1 ඡේදයට. ඒක නිවැරදිද කියලා දැන ගන්න පුළුවන්ද? ඔබතුමාගේ කලින් Report එකේ, 2015.02.27 සිදු කළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම කියන heading එක යටතේ තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ 5.1.1. හි මෙසේ සඳහන් කරනවා ..

"1997 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මඟින් නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. වෙළඳ පොළේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවකදී පොලි අනුපාතය අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවකදී වෙන්දේසිය මඟින් සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වූ මුදල් සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල යොදා ගත යුතු බවද එහිදී නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මේ නිසා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පොලි ප්‍රතිශතය පාලනය කිරීමේ යාන්ත්‍රණය ලෙස ඍජු ක්‍රමය වන මත අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම යොදා ගෙන තිබුණ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. "

මේක කොහේවත් නැහැ, ඍජු ක්‍රමයට නොවෙයි. මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ auction එකට තමයි -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරලා පස්සේ නේ දැන ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම 97 හොයලා බැලුවා. 97 කොහේවත් මට සොයා ගන්න බැරි වුණා. වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට තමයි දෙන්නේ. ඍජු ක්‍රමය මත නොවෙයි. ඒක 97 ආවේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එක වාර්තාවේ කොටස් දෙකක් කිව්වාට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොටස මම වෙනම ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමා, වාර්තාව කියන්නේ සියලු දේ අඩංගු එකක්. ඇමුණුම් ටිකත් එක්ක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට එක විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. ලේකම්තුමා, අපට මෙහෙම කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? එක කෙටුම් පතෙන් වාර්තා දෙකක් හැදෙන තත්ත්වයක් ගැන නේ මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. වාර්තාව "ඒ" කියලා ගත්තොත් එහි 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා තිබෙන්නේ කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කර ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබූ කොටස සහ ඉතිරි ටික මුළු කෙටුම්පතම කාරක සභාවේ සාකච්ඡා කර ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කොටස කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් දෙන්නකෝ. එතකොට සභාපතිතුමාට කථා කරන්න ලෙහෙසියි. දැන් තවත් කෙනෙක් මේ කමිටුවට එනවා. මේ සියල්ලට අමතරව ඔහු වෙනම වාර්තාවක් දෙනවා. ඒක කොහොද ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ කියලා ලේකම්තුමා කියන්න. අර වාර්තාව එක්කම යවනවාද? නැහැ නේ. ඒක වෙනම වාර්තාවක් විධියට යන්න ඕනෑ.

ජගත් ගජවීරආරච්චිගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමාගේ අවසරය ඇතිව කියන්නේ. මේ කාරක සභාවේ පූර්ණ බලය තිබෙන්නේ කාරක සභාවට. මම, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, කාරක සභා කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයේ සියලු දෙනා ඉන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට සහාය වෙන්න. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳ පූර්ණ තීරණ ගැනීමේ බලය තිබෙන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට. ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ මේ කාරක සභාව. සභාපතිතුමාගේ නායකත්වයෙන් යුතු කාරක සභාව තමයි මේ වාර්තාව පිළිබඳ තීරණය ගන්න ඕනෑ. මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කලිනුත් කිව්වේ .... කමිටුවේ, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පූර්ණ එකඟත්වයෙන් එක වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් වුණොත් තමයි වඩාත් වැදගත්, වඩාත් ලස්සන, වඩා සරු සහ වඩා .... වාර්තාවක් වෙන්නේ. නමුත් යම් කිසි අවස්ථාවකදී ඔබතුමන්ලා එක මතයකට එන්නේ නැත්නම් සභාපතිතුමා මධ්‍යස්ථව ඉඳගෙන මේ වාර්තා දෙකම එක වාර්තාවේ යුගලයක් විධියට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ වගකීම තමයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට තිබෙන්නේ. මගේ අදහස මෙහෙමයි. මම මේ ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට දෙන්නේ පොඩි .... එකක්. එතකොට

සභාපතිතුමාට කියන්න වෙන්නේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ... කමිටුව මේ සැසිවාරයේදී රැස් වෙලා මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර සිද්ධිය පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනයක් කර වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තීරණය කළා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන කාරක සභාවේ සාක්ෂි සටහන්ද ඇතුළත් කර කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිතුමා සහ ලේකම් මණ්ඩලය විසින් කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවක් පිළියෙල කළා. එම කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඉදිරිපත් කළා. නමුත් මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවට සියලුම ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ පූර්ණ එකඟත්වයක් ලැබුණේ නැහැ. කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව සාකච්ඡා කර ගෙන යන කොට මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කණ්ඩායමක් ඒ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ඇති සැටියෙන්මද හෝ වෙනස්කම් සහිතවද, තවත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා පිරිසක් එම කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවට වෙනස් සංශෝධන සහිතවද වාර්තා දෙකක් සකස් කර තිබෙනවා. කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට මෙම කරුණ පිළිබඳව මධ්‍යස්ථව සිට 1-10 දක්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා විසින් පිළියෙල කරන ලද වාර්තාව "අ" වාර්තාව වශයෙනුත්, 1-10 දක්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා විසින් පිළියෙල කරන ලද වාර්තාව "ආ" වාර්තාව වශයෙනුත් මේ සමඟ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරමි කියලා තමයි ගරු සභාපතිතුමා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුත්තේ. එතුමාගේ වාර්තාව තනි පිටුවයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා මධ්‍යස්ථව ඉඳගෙන ගහක්, ගලක් වගේ නොසෙල්වී මේ සියලු දේ දරා ගෙන කරන්න ඕනෑ ඒ දේයි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: තවත් වාර්තාවක් ආවොත් "ඇ", "ඈ" වශයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: "ඇ" කියන එක තුන් වැනි වගේ කියලා හිතෙනවා නම් අ,ආ, කියලාම යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම යෝජනා කරනවා "අ", "ආ" නැතිව වෙන මොනවා හරි -රවුමක්, හතරැස් කොටුවක් වගේ දෙයක් - දමන්න කියලා. "අ", "ආ" කිව්වාම එකකට ප්‍රමුඛත්වයක්-

ජගත් ගජවීරආරච්චිගේ මහතා: ප්‍රමුඛත්වය නොවෙයි එතැන තිබෙන්නේ. අනුක්‍රමය පමණයි එතැන අදහස් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව, වාර්තාවක් ලෙස පිළිගත් නිසා මට මේ සංශෝධනයන්අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. එම නිසා මට යන්න අවසර දෙන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අවසරයි. බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මට දැනුම් දුන් නිසායි මම අවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 6 වැනි කොටස සම්පූර්ණයෙන් අවසන් කළා. 7 වැනි කොටසේ තිබෙන යෝජනා සාකච්ඡා කරලා එතැනින් ඉදිරියට යමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාගේ අවධානය යොමු කරනවා ඔබතුමාගේ ... එකේ 5.1 හරිද කියලා දැන ගන්න. ඔබතුමාගේ කලින් ... එකේ, 2015.02.27 සිදු කළ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම කියන .... එක යටතේ තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ 5.1.1. සඳහන් කරනවා 97 මාර්තු මාසයේ සිට භාණ්ඩාගාර වෙන්දේසි මඟින් නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි. වෙළඳ පොළේ අවශ්‍ය තරම් මුදල් නොමැති අවස්ථාවකදී පොලි අනුපාතය අසීමිතව ඉහළ යන අවස්ථාවකදී සපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වූ සපයා ගැනීම සඳහා සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල යොදා ගත යුතු බවද එහිදි නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි. මේ නිසා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පොලි ප්‍රතිශතය පාලනය කිරීමේ යාන්ත්‍රණය ලෙස ඍජු ක්‍රමය වන මත අරමුදල් සපයා ගැනීම යොදා ගෙන තිබුණ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මේක කොහේවත් නැහැ, ඍජු ක්‍රමයට නොවෙයි. මේකේ තිබෙන ... එකට තමයි -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරලා පස්සේ නේ දැන ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම 97 හොයලා බැලුවා. 97 කොහේවත් මට සොයා ගන්න බැරි වුණා. වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට තමයි දෙන්නේ. ඍජු ක්‍රමය මත නොවෙයි. ඒක 97 ආවේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට 28වැනි පිටුවේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැද්ද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මේ 28වැනි පිටුවේ අවලංගු කිරීම ගැන ගැටලුවක් නැහැ නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: 28වැනි පිටුවේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැත්නම් අපට 29වැනි පිටුවට යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. අංක 7 යටතේ කියනවා " 2016 මාර්තු 10 හා මාර්තු 24 දිනවල පැවති බැඳුම්කරු වෙන්දේසි 2 ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම" කියලා. ඒක වැදගත්. ඒ reject කරපු අවස්ථාවේ ආපු පොලී අනුපාතිකයන් මොනවාද කියලා. ඒ ඇමුණුම් 1 අපට තේරෙනවා මදි. 2016 මාර්තු 10 හා 2016 මාර්තු 24 දිනවල බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි දෙකක් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරනවා නේ. අපට වෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක් තියෙනවා. සමහර වෙලාවට යම් විධියකට වුවමනාවෙන් තමන්ට අවශ්‍ය වන පුද්ගලයා හරියට bid කරපු නැති නිසා reject කළාද? ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද

කියලා මට පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ bidsවල ඒ අවස්ථාවේ තිබුණු unusual nature එක මොකක්ද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඇමුණුමේ තියෙනවා. ඒ interest rate- yield rate එක වැඩි නිසා තමයි-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Yield rate කියන්නේ, ප්‍රකාශිත ගණන තිබෙනවා නේ. පළමු වැනි එකේ නම් සියයට 12.5ක් තිබුණා නේ. ඊටත් වඩා උඩට ගියාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මේ පොතේ තිබුණා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඇමුණුම 1හි කියලා කියන්නේ. ඇමුණුම 1හි පිටුව මොකක්ද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: 125 page එකේ තියෙනවා. Reasons ගොඩාක් තියෙනවා.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: Shall I read the recommendations?

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Yes.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramaratne: "The Tender Board made the following observations:" That is there in page 126.

"a. Today's auction was to raise funds for the coupon payment of Treasury Bonds amounting to Rs. 12.77 bn.

b. As per the department recommendation only around Rs. 4.00 bn can be raised with the increases in yield rates by 54 to 264 bps across the maturities. Any other option to raise more funds would further increase the yield rates which may not be prudent.

c. The excessive speculation appears to continue as reflected in bids. The yield rates since the recent monetary policy tightening have increased by nearly 100 to 150 bps and further increase doesn't appear to be appropriate at this stage.

Decision : Accordingly, the Tender Board decided to decline to accept the departmental recommendation and reject consideration of all bids."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඒක නිසා market rates වැඩි වෙයි කියලා බවට- Okay, agreed.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැන ගොඩාක් වැදගත් දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. මම මේ ගරු සභාවට පෙන්වා දෙන්නම්. Yield rate එකේ කූපන් එකේ ගැටලුව අපි තේරුම් ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා පිටු අංක 125ට අවධානය යොමු කරන්න. මෙතැනදී මොකක්ද වුණේ කියලා තීරණය කරද්දි අපට ඒක වැදගත් වෙනවා. අපි මේ re-issue එකක් කරන්නේ. 8.00% 2019 'A', ඊට පස්සේ 11.00% 2021 'A', සහ 11.40% 2024 'A' කියන series තුන තමයි මේ re-issue කරන්නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ මාර්තු මාසයේ 29වැනි දාට කලින් සතියේ reject කරපු එක සහ 29වැනි දා අන්තිමට භාර ගත්ත එක.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: 2016 මාර්තු 10 සහ මාර්තු 24.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපට හැකියාවක් නැහැ කූපන් එක set කරන්න. මම කලින් ගෙන ආ තර්කය තවදුරටත් පැහැදිලි වෙන්නේ එතැනදී තමයි. මේ set කරපු කූපන් එකක් තියෙන්නේ. කූපන් එක සියයට 8යි. එතකොට මේ කූපන් එක වෙනස් කරන්න අපට හැකියාවක් නැහැ. කූපන් එක වෙනස් කරන්න අපට හැකියාවක් නැති නිසා, face value එක මාරු වෙන එක මාරු වෙනවාමයි. මම එදා ගෙන ආ තර්කය තවදුරටත් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නේ. ඔබතුමා එතැනදී මා සමඟ එකඟ වෙනවා ඇති. මේ අට කියන එක fixed. Market එකේ මොනවා තිබුණත් කූපන් අට fixed. Market එකේ තියෙන yield එක අටට වැඩි නම් කොහොමත් face value එක 100ට වඩා අඩු වෙනවා. ඒක ඒ අවස්ථාවේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතය සමඟ සිද්ධ වෙන කාරණාවක්. එය මා නැවත පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කළේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ reject කරපු එක ගැන ලොකු fault එකක් ගැන අපට evidence නැහැ නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇත්තටම මේක reject කරපු එක හොඳයි නේද? මොකද, මෙතැන රුපියල් බිලියන එකසිය ගණන ගත්තා නම් interest rates තවත් ඉහළ යන්න තිබුණා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලෝ reason එක විධියට කියන්නේ ඒක තමයි. ඒක අපට පිළිගන්න වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 29වැනි පිටුවේ අංක 8 සහ 8.1

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 29වැනි පිටුවේ අංක 8හි සඳහන් මේ කාරණය ගැන සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා ද කියන එක අපට බලන්න අවශ්‍යයි. 2016.03.29වැනි දා වන විට මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගේ හෝ ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහගේ හෝ ආචාර්ය ආනන්ද සිල්වාගේ මැදිහත්වීමක් පෙන්නුම් කරනවාද? මේ දවසේ floor එකට ආපු බවක් එහෙම තියෙනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තවම එතැනට ආවේ නැහැ නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ 8.1 ගැන නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්. දැන් 28වැනි පිටුව ගැන කථා කරලා ඉවරයි. ඊළඟට තියෙන්නේ, Item No. 8. එහි තියෙනවා 2016 මාර්තු 29 කියලා. මම මේ පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න අහන්නේ. 2016 මාර්තු මාසයේ 29වැනි දා තිබුණු එකත් අපි ගවේෂණය කරපු එකක් නේ. අපි ගවේෂණය කළේ දෙකයි. මේ දෙවැනි අවස්ථාවේදී අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් හෝ Dr. Weerasinghe හෝ Dr. Ananda Silva යන තුන්දෙනා floor එකට ආපු බවක් හෝ Tender Board එක සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කළා කියලා සාක්ෂියක් තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මම හිතන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාටත් මතක ඇති, අපි ඒ ගැන සාක්ෂි විමසීමේදී හෝ විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ නිරීක්ෂණවල හෝ එවැනි දෙයක් වාර්තා වුණේ නැහැ. මගේ කෙටුම්පතටත් මා එහෙම දෙයක් ඇතුළු කළේ නැත්තේ ඒ නිසායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේක වැදගත් කාරණාවක්. අපේ සැකය මතු වුණේ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 27වැනි දා auction එකේදී Governor එතැනට ගිහින් රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න කිව්වේ ඇයි, ඒ floor එකට ගියේ ඇයි යනාදී ප්‍රශ්න මතු වුණා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Governor විතරක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Governor, Dr. Weerasinghe, Dr. Ananda Silva යන සියලු දෙනාම ගිය නිසා. එතැනදී යම් කිසි මැදහත්වීමක් සිදු වූ බව බැලූ බැල්මට පෙනුණා. එතකොට රුපියල් බිලියන 1 නැතුව රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ගත්තේ ඇයි? කියන ප්‍රශ්නය එතැනදී පැන නැඟුණා. නමුත්, මෙතැනදී රුපියල් බිලියන 40ක් ඉදිරිපත් කරලා රුපියල් බිලියන 77ක් ගන්න අවස්ථාවේදී අර කලින් කිව්ව පුද්ගලයන් ඒ සඳහා මැදහත් වුණා කියලා සඳහනක් නැහැ නේද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක ඇතුළත් වුණොත් හොඳයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපි ඒක අවසානයට ඇතුළත් කළොත් හොඳයි නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. මේක පටන් ගන්න තැන නිසා අපි මෙතැන දාමු. 29වෙනි පිටුවේ පළමුවෙනි ඡේදයේ ‘‘.....පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.’’ යන තැනට මෙසේ එකතු විය යුතුයි. ‘‘මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට අදාළව වෙන්දේසිය පවත්වන අවස්ථාවේදී හෝ ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ තීරණ ගන්නා අවස්ථාවේදී හිටපු මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා හෝ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් වන ආචාර්ය වීරසිංහ මහතා, ආනන්ද සිල්වා මහතා යන අය සහ සමරසිරි මැදිහත් වූ බවක්....’’

සමරසිරි Tender Board එකේ සභාපතිනේ, එතුමා අදාළ නැහැනේ. කොහොමත් එතුමා තීරණය ගන්න ඕනෑනේ. සමරසිරි මහත්මයා ගැන මෙතැන සඳහන් කරන්නට ඕනෑ නැහැනේ, මේක සමරසිරි මහත්මයාගේ job එකනේ. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ උඩින් ආපු මිනිසුන් සමරසිරි මහත්මයාට බලපෑම් කළාද කියන එකනේ.

‘‘.... ආනන්ද සිල්වා මහතා හෝ විමසුම් කළ බවක් හෝ මැදිහත් වූ බවක් පිළිබඳව කිසිදු සාක්ෂියක් මෙම කමිටුව ඉදිරියේ ඉදිරිපත් නොවීය. එය විශේෂයෙන් සැලකිය යුතු නිරීක්ෂණයකි. ‘‘ ඒ කොටස එකතු කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මට තව එකතු කිරීමක් කරන්නට පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මොකක්ද point එක?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : 2015 රුපියල් බිලියන 1ක ප්‍රමාණයක් ඉක්මවා රුපියල් මිලියන 10.5ක් දක්වා මිලදී ගෙන තිබීම-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ආයෙත් කෙටුම්පතේ මුලට යන්න එපා ගරු ඇමතිතුමනි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැනදී වැදගත් කාරණයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ තමයි 8.1 දෙවෙනි paragraph එකෙන් පසුව, දැන් කියනවානේ රුපියල් බිලියන 30ක් දුන්නා, ඉන් පසුව රුපියල් බිලියන 77ක් ගත්තා. 77ක් ගන්න විට වැඩිම interest rate එක දීපු එකෙන්නේ වැඩිපුරම අරන් තිබුණේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ report එකේ ඒ table එක කොතැනද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : Draft එකේ page 31.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, 31 නොවෙයි 32. මම අහන්නේ 29වෙනි දා කීයක් offer කරලා කීයක් ගත්තාද කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ report එකේ කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. කීයක් offer කරලා කීයක් ගත්තාද කියන්නකෝ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : රුපියල් බිලියන 40ක් offer කරලා රුපියල් බිලියන 59.325යි ගත්තේ. ඉතිරි රුපියල් බිලියන 18 කෙටි කාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයන්ගෙන් සපුරා ගැනීමට කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. මම අහන්නේ 29වෙනි දා කීයක්ද offer කළේ, කීයක්ද ගත්තේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ මාර්තු 29ද? offer කළේ අඩු ගණනක් නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Offer කළේ කීයක්ද, ගත්තේ කීයක්ද කියලා තිබෙන්නේ කොහේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Offer කළේ 40යි කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මේ තිබෙන්නේ ගත්ත ගණනනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : රුපියල් බිලියන 59යි ගත්ත ගණන.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ගණනේද හැම එකකටම offer කළේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්. පී.සී වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : රුපියල් බිලියන 10 ගණනේ offer කරලා පළමුවෙනි රුපියල් බිලියන 8 ගත්තේ සියයට කීය ගණනේද? එකේ 4ක් තිබෙනවානේ. අවුරුදු 10න් කල් පිරෙන එක, රුපියල් බිලියන 10.27ක් ගත්තානේ. ඒකේ interest rate එක කීයද, කීයටද ගත්තේ? ඒක වැදගත්නේ, කොහේ හරි ඇති. ඒ කාරණය ඉතාමත්ම වැදගත්. හරි, හරි. ඒක තිබෙනවා 31වෙනි පිටුවේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් මගේ මේ point එක ගැන අවධානය යොමු කරන්න. 10 ගණනේ ඉල්ලලා, රුපියල් බිලියන 10.2ක් අරන් තිබුණා සියයට 12.69 පොලියට. හරිනේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්. පී.සී වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : ඔව්.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මිය : 31වෙනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන්නේ Perpetual Treasuries Limitedවල ගත්ත range එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අපට ඕනෑ ඒක නොවෙයි, ඔක්කොම කොපමණ ආවාද කියලා. 30වෙනි පිටුවේ ඒක තිබෙනවා කොපමණ ආවාද කියලා. 7වෙනි වගුවේ තිබෙන්නේ ලැබුණු ගණනනේ. 30වෙනි පිටුවේ 7වෙනි වගුවේ තිබෙන්නේ ලැබුණු ගණන නේද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, ඒක තිබෙන්නේ 40.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්, 40ට අනුව අපි හිතමු LKB 00520 E 014 කියන පළමුවෙනි series එක තිබෙනවානේ. ඒ series එකෙන් 10ක් අපි offer කළානේ. ඒ 10ට කොපමණ ලංසු ලැබුණාද?

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මිය : 27ක් ලැබුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ලංසු 27ක් ලැබුණානේ. ඒක තමයි මට වැදගත් වෙන්නේ. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි මේ ගැන අවධානය යොමු කරන්න. ඒ විධියට ලංසු 27ක් ලැබුණාට අපි ගත්තේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10.27යි. ඒ ගත්තේ පොලිය සියයට 12.7ට. ඒක හරිනේ?

ඩබ්ලිව්. පී.සී වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අවුරුදු කීයකටද ඒ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ අවුරුදු 8කට. අරක අවුරුදු 10කට, මේක අවුරුදු 8යි මාස 11කට. ඉදිරිපත් කළා රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක්, රුපියල් බිලියන 36.9කට ලංසු ලැබුණා, රුපියල් බිලියන 21ක් ගත්තා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : පොලී අනුපාතය කියද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : පොලී අනුපාතය සියයට 13.8යි. ඊළඟට අවුරුදු 4යි මාස 1ක ඉතිරි කාලයක් තිබෙන බැඳුම්කරයක් තිබුණා. ඒකට රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් offer කළාම රුපියල් බිලියන 32ක ලංසු ලැබුණා. නමුත් ගත්තේ රුපියල් බිලියන 17යි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එතකොට 47ක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : රුපියල් බිලියන 32ක ලංසු ලැබුණා, රුපියල් බිලියන 17ක් ගත්තා සියයට 13.9 පොලියට. හතරවෙනි එක රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් offer කළාම රුපියල් බිලියන 45ක ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අවුරුදු ගණන කොහොමද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අවුරුදු 14කට. රුපියල් බිලියන 40 ගණනක් ඉදිරිපත් කළාම ඒකෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 28.9ක් ගත්තා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : රුපියල් බිලියන 47ට තව 28ක් එකතු වෙන්නට ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10යි offer කළේ, නමුත් රුපියල් බිලියන 28ක් ගත්තා. ඒක ගත්තේ සියයට 14.07ක පොලියට. ඒ අනුව මෙතැන ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මේක විය යුතුව තිබුණේ මෙහෙම නොවෙයි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : මුල ඒවායින් වැඩි පුර ගන්න තිබුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්. මුල ඒවායින් වැඩිපුර ගත යුතුව තිබුණා, නමුත් ගත්තේ යට ඒවායින්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But that is for a longer period. Normally you give at a high interest rate for a longer period

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. මේක බැලූ බැල්මට 4වෙනි එකෙන් ගත යුතුව තිබුණේ නැහැ. නමුත් 4වෙනි එකෙන් තමයි වැඩිපුරම ගත්තේ.

මේක ගන්න තිබුණේ ඔය ක්‍රමයට නොවෙයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, the thing is, can we justify?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Yes, it is clear. I am justifying. ඒ හතර වැනි එකෙන් ගත්ත නිසා තමයි Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකට මෙච්චර ගියේ. අපි හෘද සාක්ෂියට එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: How do you say that?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඇයි? Perpetual Treasuries Limited තමයි වැඩිපුරම දාලා තිබුණේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : අවසාන 3ට දාලා තිබුණේ, Perpetual Treasuries Limited.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අවසාන 3ට තමයි Perpetual Treasuries Limited දාලා තිබුණේ. මේ තීරණය ගත්ත කෙනා ගත්තා. නමුත්, මේ තීරණය වැරදියි. මොකද, අඩු පොලියට ගන්න අවස්ථාව තිබුණා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, it is for a short period.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: It does not matter.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It matters to them, not to us.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: No, it matters to the Government. අපි ගන්න ඕනෑ අඩු පොලියටයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We can scrutinize. We can have a postmortem. But, when they decide -

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: They have the figures in front of them.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What I understand is, – I do not know much about the banks. – when the time period comes down, the interest rate also comes down.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Interest rate also comes down because there is a premium.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It takes long time for them to pay.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. මෙතැන ගන්න තිබුණේ නැහැ අවුරුදු 14ක එක. අවුරුදු 4ක ගන්න තිබුණා. එහෙම නැත්නම් අවුරුදු 8 එක ගන්න තිබුණා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The time period is shorter.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : කමක් නැහැ. අවුරුදු 8 ට ගන්න තිබුණා.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: What the Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe says is also a part of the argument.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly!

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, මෙතැන එහෙම නම්-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is your argument. I have a different argument and the officials of the Bank have another argument. So, what we have to find is, whether a malpractice has happened. We cannot argue -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මෙහෙමයි. මම Treasurer කෙනකු හැටියට වැඩ කර තිබෙන නිසයි මා කියන්නේ. මා මේ රක්ෂාව කරලා තිබෙනවා. මට මේකේ තාක්ෂණික දැනුමත් තිබෙනවා. මට practical දැනුමත් තිබෙනවා. මම ලංකාවේ තිබෙන ලොකුම බැංකුවක භාණ්ඩාගාරික හැටියට වැඩ කර තිබෙනවා. මගේ දැනුමත් එක්කයි මා කියන්නේ. මේක බැලූ බැල්මට නොකළ යුතු දෙයක්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is your argument.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: That is my professional view. එතකොට මේ තීරණය ගත්තේ කවුද? හැබැයි, එතැනදි කියන්න ඕනෑ මේ තීරණය ගන්න අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් හිටියේ නැහැ. මේක අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් ගත්ත තීරණයක් කියලා කොතැනකවත් සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත්, ඒ තීරණය ගත්තා. ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ කවුද කියන එක Minutesවල තිබෙනවා. නමුත්, මා තරයේම කියා සිටින්නේ -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I got your point.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: That is my professional view. ඒක කළා. ඒක වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Whether it was wrong or how it was taken.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. Broader view එකක් ගත්තොත්, මේක මේ තනි පුද්ගලයෙක් මහ බැංකුවේ floor එකට ගියාද, නැද්ද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය විතරක් නොවෙයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ. මේක much broader ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is science.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : Theory ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ point එක මුලින් මතු කර තිබුණා. ඒ කියන්නේ, අපේ system එක matureද, අපේ system එකේ -ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා ඒ තාක්ෂණික වචනය කිව්වා- judgment එක ගන්න මිනිස්සු, එතැන ඉන්න නිලධාරින්ට ඒ තීරණය ගන්න අවශ්‍ය කරන skills තිබෙනවාද, ඒ ගොල්ලනුත් ඇත්තටම truly independent ද කියන ඒවා තමයි ප්‍රශ්න. එතකොට මගේ judgment එක, - දැනට අවුරුදු එකහමාරක් තිස්සේ continue වනවානේ මේ process එක.- මෙය දිගින් දිගට කියවන්න කියවන්න මට තේරෙන දේ තමයි ඇත්තටම මේ මුළු system එක එක්කෝ corrupt නැත්නම් inefficient කියන එක. එහෙම නැත්නම් දෙකම. ඒ නිසා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැත්නම් අපි වැරදියි. We are not always right. We have not asked them.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපි නොවෙයිනේ මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ. අපට -මේ කමිටුවට- භාර දීලා තිබෙන්නේ මේක ගැන පසුවිපරමක් කරන්නනේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We have never questioned anybody on this. That is our biggest fault. We could have asked them. We are deliberating together studying the documentation. We could have asked them as to why they had done that. I do not know why we have not asked questions from them on this.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මම කැමැතියි, මේකට එක කාරණයක් එකතු කරන්න. මේකේ සිංහල පොඩ්ඩක් හරියට හදන්න. මම යෝජනා කරනවා,-

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, කොතැනටද-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : 8.1.2ට පසුව. ".. 14.0742 වැනි ඉහළ ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සිදු කර තිබුණි.." කියන එක. අපේ කමිටුවට පෙනෙන පරිදි, අපට තේරෙන පරිදි, මේ ගත්ත ක්‍රමය -අපි එක එක කොටස්වලට බෙදලා නේ ගත්තේ. පළමුවැනි එකේ යම් කිසි ප්‍රමාණයක්, දෙවැනි එකේ යම් කිසි ප්‍රමාණයක්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මා කියන්නේ මේකයි. මෙතැන තිබෙනවානේ ඔබතුමාගේ schedule එක. ඒ schedule එක මේකේ include කරමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්, schedule එක include කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මොකද, මිනිස්සු කියවන්නේ නැහැ annexes. ඔබතුමා කියන කොටනේ අපටත් මේක technical විධියට තේරෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා මේක එතැනට include කරලා ඉන් පස්සේ ඒක ගැන කියන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ, වගුව 7සහ 9 combine කරලා එකක් හදන්න. 7යි, 9යි combine කරලා එකක් හදලා කියන්න, " මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී බැලූ බැල්මට මෙය කළ යුතුව තිබුණේ, රජයට වැඩි පොලියක් දෙන බැඳුම්කර වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් සහ අඩු පොලියකට ලබා ගත හැකි බැඳුම්කරවලින් අඩු ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබා ගැනීම නොව, එහි විරුද්ධ පැත්තය" කියන එක.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : සැකයක් මතු වේ -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, සැකයක් මොකක්ද? දැකපු ගමන්ම මේක වැරදියි කියලා පෙනෙනවානේ.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: That is your view point.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Yes. If you do not agree, say that you do not agree. Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna, I am a professional. මම කියන්නේ, බැලූ බැල්මට මෙහෙම දෙයක් පෙනෙනවා කියලා කියනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva, I have a little bit of knowledge of this. I have been studying this. If you have given them an opportunity to answer this, they

will have a very good answer. I am just saying. What I gather from what you read is that when the period is shorter, the interest rate is also lower.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අපට මෙහෙම දාන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why does the Government go for long-term bonds? Because that is easy for them.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe, this is where the fraud is. I am telling you.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, that is what you are saying. You must question them.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මම කියන්නේ, මේක අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් කරපු දෙයක් නොවෙයි. මෙතැන අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් හිටියේ නැහැ. Perpetual Treasuries කාරයා ගැහුවේ මෙතැනින්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Anybody, we are saying. It is an auction. This is your point of view. I have my own opinion. I beg to differ with you all with respect, with your knowledge on that.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe, you can differ with me. But, I am telling you, this is the fraud. මෙතැනයි හොරකම සිද්ධ වුණේ. මේක වැරදියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක එක තැනක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මෙතැන තමයි එක තැනක්. අක්‍රමිකතාවක් -හොරකම කියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ- වුණු තැනක් මේක.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I am on a broader point in fairness to the officials of the Central Bank. This is your opinion but I do not want to be a part of this because I have the respect for the Central Bank's officials. Then, you must investigate why.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Exactly! We will put like that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I cannot give a conclusion.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරි, එකඟයි. ඒක ඒ විධියට භදන්න. "බැලූ බැල්මට මෙහෙම පෙනෙනවා. ඒ නිසා පුළුල් පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු බව කාරක සභාවේ හැඟීමයි." කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒකට reasons කිව්වේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා එහෙම කියන්න අවශ්‍ය කරන මොනවා හෝ -දැන් ඔබතුමා කිව්වානේ, හේතු දෙක තුනක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒකත් ලියනවා ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක ලිව්වා. 7යි, 8යි එකතු කරලා අපි අලුත් වගුවක් හැදුවා. ඒකෙන් පෙන්වනවා 10 ගණනේ ඉදිරිපත් කළා-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : කිව්වානේ. ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් කියෙව්වා නම් හරි.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය : මට ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් miss වුණා. "මෙම බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී එය කළ යුතුව තිබුණේ රජයට වැඩි පොලියක් දෙන-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම කියන්නම්. "කළ යුතුව තිබෙන්නේ රජයට වැඩි පොලියක් ගෙවිය යුතු බැඳුම්කර අඩු ප්‍රමාණයකුත්, රජයට අඩු පොලියක් ගෙවිය යුතු බැඳුම්කර වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයකුත් ගත යුතු පිළිවෙතයි...."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එම අවස්ථාව මෙතැන තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "එම අවස්ථාව මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ අවස්ථා හතරේදී අපට පැහැදිලිව දක්නට ඇත..."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙදා දින බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේදී ඒ අවස්ථාව රජයට තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "මෙදින වෙන්දේසියේදී එම අවස්ථාව රජයට තිබුණු බව පෙනී යයි."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එය "මහ බැංකුවට තිබුණු බව පෙනී යයි" යනුවෙන් නිවැරදි විය යුතුයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "....මහ බැංකුවට තිබුණු බව පෙනී යයි..." යනුවෙන් නිවැරදි කරන්න. ඊළඟට, "නමුත් එසේ කළ බවට කරුණු අනාවරණය නොවෙයි. එම නිසා මෙම දිනයේදී බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් සවිස්තරාත්මක පරීක්ෂණයක් අවශ්‍ය බව අප හට පෙනී යයි." යනුවෙන් සඳහන් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු ඉස්සරහට කරගෙන යමුද? 30 වැනි පිටුව නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. 29 වන පිටුවේ ඊළඟ පේළියේ සඳහන් වෙනවා, "මෙහිදී බැඳුම්කර 4ක් මගින් රු.බි. 77.73ක මුහුණත අගයක් ලැබෙන පරිදි බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණද වෙන්දේසියෙන් උපයාගෙන ඇත්තේ රු.බි. 59.325 පමණක් වන අතර රු.බි. 18.407 වෙනත් කෙටි කාලීන ණය ප්‍රභවයන්ගෙන් සපුරා ගැනීමට සිදුව තිබුණි. එසේ සිදුව ඇත්තේ ඉහත තීරණය නිසා වූ අවාසියේ බලපෑම..." කියා. එය "ඉහත තීරණය නිසා විය" කියා සංශෝධනය විය යුතුයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: වෙන්දේසියෙන් 59නේ, අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට කෙටි කාලීනව ගත්ත එක අවාසියක් වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. අපි මේක අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ - 77ක් දැම්මාට, high interest rate එක නිසානේ, අපිට අඩු ගණනක් හම්බවෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතුමා කියන්නේ කෙටි කාලීන ඒවා වැඩියෙන් ගත්තා නම් හොඳයි කියායි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: හරි. දැන් මෙතැනත් 77 ගන්න ගිහිල්ලා අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ, 59නේ. එතකොට 59න් 18ක් කෙටි කාලීනනේ. 59ට අමතරව.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 18 අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ, එළියෙන්. වෙනම.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: නැහැ. 59ට අමතරවනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. එතුමා කියන්නේ මේකයි. ඔය **57** ඇතුළේ තමයි, අර හතරේ එක එක ඒවා තිබෙන්නේ. ප්‍රභවයන්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම ඇහුවේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කෙටි කාලීනයි, මේ කෙටි කාලීනයි දෙකක්, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. මේ කෙටි කාලීන කියන්නේ ඒ ගොල්ලන් market එකට ගිහින් one or two weeks හෝ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ගන්නවා. බැංකුවලින් ගන්නවා; අයිරාවලින් ගන්නවා. එහෙම ගන්නවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: "...ඉහත තීරණය නිසාය..." හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "....අවාසියේ බලපෑම...." කියා තිබෙන එක අයින් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: "අවාසියේ බලපෑම" කියන එක එතැන ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි කෙලින්ම කියනවානේ, මොකක්ද කියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි නේද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "...ඉහත තීරණය නිසාය." ස්ථිරයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27 දිනැති බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ රු.බිලියන 1ක ප්‍රමාණය ඉක්මවා රු.බි. 10.058 දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගෙන තිබීම හා 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින රු.බිලියන 40 ක් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවා රු.බිලියන 77.73 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම වැනි විශාල ලෙස අපේක්ෂිත සීමාවන් අභිභවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම හේතුවෙන් එම එකිනෙක සීමාව ඉක්ම වූ කොටස හිමිකර ගැනීමේ අවස්ථාව බහුලව පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගමට හිමිව ඇති බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි." ඒක හරි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට ඒකට කරුණක් එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හොඳයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඊයේ study කරපු එකේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා පැහැදිලිව - මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් පොඩි උපදෙසක්, පොඩි පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීමක් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා. බිලියන 170ක් ඕනෑ වෙලා තිබුණා එම මාසයේ. එතකොට බිලියන 13.5ක් ඕනෑ වෙලා තිබුණා, 20 වැනිදා විතර වෙනකොට. දෙවැනිදා සම්පූර්ණ කර ගන්න ඕනෑ, බිලියන 13.5. එතකොට bonds දීලා තිබුණා සීමාවක් රහිතව, for any amount of years. Direct placement එකෙන් බිලියන තුනහමාර හම්බ වුණේ, ඕනෑම bond එකකට ඉඩ දීලා. This is very important. බිලියන තුනහමාරයි, බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා වෙනකොට. සිකුරාදා තමයි auction එක දැම්මේ, බිලියන එක ගන්න. එතකොට බිලියන එක සිකුරාදා - auction එක දෙක වෙනකොට ඉවරයි. දෙකේ ඉඳලා හතර වෙනකොට ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය සොයන්න ඕනෑ, ආණ්ඩුව. It has never been defaulted. මහ බැංකුව කවදාවත්

default කරලා නැහැ, අපේ ඉතිහාසයේ. හරිද? එතකොට පැය දෙකක් ඇතුළත බිලියන නවයක් මේ expertsලා, මහේස්ත්‍රාත්ලා ඔක්කෝමලා සෙවිය යුතුයි. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ සාක්ෂියේ ඒ ගොල්ලන් කියනවා, Bank of Ceylon and People's Bank අයිරා ටික අංග සම්පූර්ණයි. You cannot go even for a short-term loan. ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය සොයන ක්‍රමවේදයත් අපි පොඩ්ඩක් එහෙම නම් කියන්න ඕනෑ. පැය දෙකක් ඇතුළත - අනිත් එක, සෙනසුරාදා, ඉරිදා නිවාඩු. සඳුදාට බිලියන නවය දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි ආසීම් සහ සියලු දෙනාම කියන්නේ, ඒ දුන් උපදෙස් අනුව අපට 11.73, ඒ පොලී අනුපාතයට එම මුදල ගන්න සිදු වුණා කියා. අපිට තිබෙනවා නම් අපට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ, එහෙම නොදෙනවා නම් ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය සොයන ක්‍රමවේදයත් - ගරු හර්ෂ මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා expert නම් ඒකත් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා expert කියලා මේක පාඩුයි කියලා නිකම් ඉන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මගෙන්ද මේ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: As an expert, I am asking this question from you also?

විගණකාධිපතිතුමා සහ ඔබතුමා කියන දෙදෙනාම මේ ගැන දන්නා දෙදෙනෙක් විධියට - ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය සොයන විධියක් ගැනවත් කියන්න ඕනෑනේ. බිලියන නවය ගත්තේ ඇයි කියා අපි reports ලියා හරි යන්නේ නැහැනේ. අපිටත් ලියන්න පුළුවන්, බිලියන නවය ගත්තේ මොකටද කියලා. අපි හොයන විධියකුත් කියන්න ඕනෑනේ. එහෙම නම් ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය හොයන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවාද; එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ උත්තරය මොකක්ද - එහෙම නැත්නම් මේ බිලියන නවය ගැනීම සම්බන්ධ අපේ අදහස වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම මේක දකින්නේ මෙන්න මේ විධියටයි. අපි මෙහෙම හිතමු. අර ආසනයේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉන්නවා. මගේ ළඟ තුවක්කුවක් තිබෙනවා. පත්තරවලත් මේවා වාර්තා කරයිද දන්නේ නැහැ, මේ කියන විධියටම. **මේක උදාහරණයක්.** ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමා මගේ ආසනය ළඟ තිබෙන ආසනයේ ඉන්නවා. මම තුවක්කුව පත්තු කරනවා. එසේ පත්තු කළාම එම උණ්ඩය කෙළින්ම යනවා. ගිහිල්ලා ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමාගේ ඇහේ වදිනවා. මම තුවක්කුවේ කොක්ක ඇද්දායින් පසුව නවත්වන්න බැහැ. ඒ විධියට මෙතැනදී අපි අර තීරණය ගත්තායින් පසුව අපට වෙන ක්‍රමයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ, මේ බිලියන නවය ගන්න. That is very important.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I wanted to know. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඒ තීන්දුව ගත්තේ නැහැ කියලා හිතන්න. I am trying to think rationally. එතකොට කොහොමද - direct placement එකේ ඔක්කෝම සීමා රහිතව අවුරුදු 30 ගණනේ bonds දීලා 3.5යි සොයා තිබෙන්නේ by Thursday. ඒක කළේ අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන්වත්, කවුරුවත් නොවෙයිනේ. ඒක කළේ ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව. ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව ඔක්කෝම වැඩ දමා සොයා තිබුණේ, 3.5යි. එතකොට auction එකට යනවා, Rs. 1 billion. ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය නැවත කොහොමද මේච්චර - ඔක්කෝම avenues exhaust කරලා නම් for seven days, you all being experts in the treasury operations, how do you find that out within two hours?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කිව්වේ. මේක ඇද්දායින් පසුව අපට නවත්වන්න විධියක් නැහැ. හැබැයි, ඇද්දේ නැත්නම් -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇද්දේ නැත්නම්?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇද්දේ නැත්නම් පරණ ක්‍රමය තිබුණානේ. පරණ ක්‍රමය මොකක්ද? පරණ ක්‍රමය කියන්නේ මේකයි. අපි කීයක් හෝ auction එකෙන් දෙනවා. ඉතුරු ටික private placements කරනවා, EPF එකත් එක්ක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: EPF එකත් එක්ක හෝ කාත් එක්ක හෝ private placement කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම බැහැනේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇයි, බැරි?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You cannot use the EPF or ETF without compensations.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. අපි තීරණය ගත්තානේ, auction එකට යන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂ මැතිතුමනි, මම අහන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම නම් මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපිට ඕනෑ විධියට අපට decide කරන්න බැහැනේ. There are guidelines. ඔබතුමාට සල්ලි සොයා ගන්න බැරි

වෙනකොට EPF, ETF එකෙන් ගන්න බැහැ, තමන්ට ඕනෑ විධියට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ දෙක විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ, ගරු සුජීව මැතිතුමනි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am asking you. That is wrong.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි තීරණය ගත්තා නම් auction එකට යන්න, අපට අර option එක නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කිව්වේ, තුවක්කුව පත්තු කළාය කියා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That option is still there**.**

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Which option?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Both those options are there. There is no hard and fast rule because you have tried direct placements until Thursday. Answer my question because we also have to think like them.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි, හරි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You went by direct placement until Thursday. The maximum amount you have found is Rs. 3.5 billion. Then, there is an interest rate. By Monday, you have to give Rs. 10 billion to the General Treasury.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Rs. 1 billionවලට එනවා, බිලියන තිස් ගණනක්ද කොහේද ***ඉල්ලුම***. එතකොට හැන්දෑවේ දෙක වෙනකොට බිලියන එකක් ගත්තා කියන්නකෝ. ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය බල කරලා EPF, ETF එකට ගහන්න ඕනෑ, අපට ඕනෑ interest rate එකේ ගණනට. You can decide the interest rate. ඔබතුමා decide කරන්නේ; ඔබතුමා දෙන්නේ. මහ බැංකුවේ තමයි ETF and EPF එක තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම උත්තරය කියන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක දුන්නොත් එහෙම - ඒක 12ට දුන්නොත්, EPF is not making a loss, but it is still our calculation. EPF එක අටට දුන්නා කියන්නකෝ. එතකොට ඔය කියන විධියට calculations ඔක්කෝම හරි. හැබැයි, EPF එක 8 සිට 12ට - අර හතර, ඒ පාඩුව කොහොමද ලබා ගන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ක්‍රමවේද ගොඩාක් තිබෙනවා, ගරු සුජීව මැතිතුමනි. අපිට මෙහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. අපි එක extreme එකක් ගනිමු. එක extreme එකක් තමයි, අපි auction එකෙන් ගන්නේ යම් කිසි කුඩා ප්‍රමාණයයි, ඉතුරුවා private placement කරනවා. ඒක තමයි කලින් කරගෙන සිටියේ. අපි තීරණයක් ගත්තා, එහෙම නොකර සම්පූර්ණ එක auction එකෙන් ගන්න. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, මේ interest rate එක වැඩි වෙන නිසා ඊට වෙනත් විකල්පයක් තිබෙනවාද කියන එකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම තීන්දු කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. එදා තිබුණු තීන්දුව තමයි - auction system එකට fully ඇවිල්ලා තිබුණේ නැහැ, ඒ වෙනකොට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇවිල්ලානේ, තිබුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Fully ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ. Thursday වෙනකම් direct placement.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Thursdayට කලින්ද ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ. Auction එකට කලින්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Auction එක දවසේ එවැනි hard and fast rule එකක් තිබුණේ නැහැ auction එකෙන් ඔක්කොම ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ නැහැ තිබුණේ නැහැ. You read what Dr. M.Z.M. Azim was saying.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මම දන්නේ නැහැ

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Dr. Azim was saying, "We were advised that this is a rational under 11.75 there is Rs. 9 billion. So, why do you not take it?." They thought the best way is - නැත්නම්, ඔබතුමා කියන 2008 තත්ත්වයට යනවා. EPF, ETF පාවිච්චි කරලා මෙම රුපියල් බිලියන 9 යේ ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳා ගන්න හදිසි අවස්ථාවක නැවත Board paper එකක් ගෙනෙන්න ඕනෑ. Dr. M.Z.M. Azim සහ ඒ සියලුම දෙනා කියන්නේ, අපට දුන්න rational එක තමයි- He was saying, "This is a country we have never defaulted in the fast.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හොඳයි, සුජීව සෙනෙසිංහ මැතිතුමනි. එහෙමනම්, මගේ misunderstanding එකක් තිබිලා තිබෙනවා. මම හිතාගෙන හිටියේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම auction එකෙන් මේවා ගන්න කියලා තීරණය අරගෙන තිබුණා කියලායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ එහෙම වුණේ නැහැ නේ. අපි මාර්තු මාසේත් direct placement එකෙන් සියයට 10ක් ගන්නවා නේ. නැහැ, ඒක වෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. They were slowly transforming into auction system. So, they have said, "We should in the future go by auction."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමනි, මම හිතන්නේ මෙතැන important point එකක් තිබෙනවා. Hundred per cent auction යනවා කියලා තීරණයක් අරගෙන තිබුණාට, ඒ තීරණය පෙබරවාරි මාසේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණෙත් නැහැ. අප්‍රේල් මාසයේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණෙත් නැහැ. Hundred per cent auction යනවා කියලා ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ ඊට පසුවයි. දැන් බලන්න මම එදත් මේ ගැන කියන්න උත්සාහ කළා කවුරුවත් මට ඇහුම්කම් දුන්නේ නැහැ. මම හිතන්නේ, දැන් තමයි වෙලාව කියලායි. පෙබරවාරි මාසේ බැලුවොත් රුපියල් බිලියන 10යි. 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 10යි. සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 23යි. මාර්තු මාසයෙත් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් 171යි. සෘජු ක්‍රමයෙන් 14යි. මම මේ කියවන්නේ, මෙම කෙටුම්පතේ 14 වෙනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් කර ඇති දෙයයි. ඇත්තටම Rs. 1 billion auction යන එක manual එකේ තිබුණු නීතියට අනුකූලයි. "As much as possible" කිව්වාම, අනෙකුත් කොන්දේසිවලට යටත්වයි -අසීමිතව යනවා කියලා නොවෙයි-. ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේ අනෙකුත් මූලධර්මවලට යටත්ව උපරිම ප්‍රමාණයකට යා හැකියි. ඒ අනුව ඒකත් නිවැරදියි. හැබැයි, ඒ ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනිවාර්යෙන්ම එලෙසම ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුතුයි කියලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් මාර්තු මාසයේවත් තිබුණේ නැහැ. එය ක්‍රමානුකූලව ඒ සඳහා මාරු වුණා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can I explain you really well from Dr. M.Z.M. Azim's explanation? Dr. M.Z.M. Azim gives a brilliant explanation.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : කියන්න බලන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මෙන්න මේ කාරණාව වඩාත් වැදගත් වෙනවා. This is what we have missed.

Dr. Azim states, "The funding modality in terms of meeting the gross borrowing requirements specified in the Government Appropriation Act is managed through direct issuances as well as auctions and up until the recent 30-year bond issue, we had both avenues available. So, at times we do not raise the total fund requirement by the Treasury. We raised part of the requirement through auctions and the balance requirement was offered through direct placements channel."

So, he agrees at this time. First auction and then direct placements.

He further states, "Recently, of course, there were discussions internally in the Bank also that we should be gradually moving away from direct issuances channel, that we should be looking at more market-based, market-oriented mechanism of financing and the proposal was to go into the full-scale public auctions. So, in this particular instance, this took place on the 27 of February and that was a Friday. Next day was 28th Saturday, 01st is Sunday and the 2nd March is the first business day of the month of March where the Treasury requested Rs. 30.5 billion in their cash flow and this Rs. 30.5 billion by that time, Sir, we have funded about Rs. 3.5 billion as prefunds to the Treasury and the balance requirement was something like Rs. 10 plus billion preciously. Then, on the particular auction announcement day, we published the auction announcement on 25th in Central Bank's website and in international newswires like Bloomberg, Reuters or whatever and the national newspapers carried the press advertisement on 26th where we announced Rs. 1 billion. At that time, the direct placement channel was available for us and that was not suspended or requested to stop. On the day of the auction – of course, on the 26th also we were told possibly we had to make a call on this, but on 27th the auction day – we were told that it would be better if we could seriously look at this arrangement and that we should go through public auctions and raise the funds. Upon realizing that we have received bids up to Rs. 20 plus billion, 20 times oversubscribed, the senior management highlighted the fact that this is an ideal opportunity that we should be

moving into public auction and the requirement was Rs. 10 plus billion – the balance requirement of 2nd of March. We have been asked to consider this as an option and proposed this balance requirement through the 30-year bond that we have offered, and we took that message to the Tender Board. This was the reason why we have gone to the entire amount.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha asked, "From Rs. 1 billion to Rs. 10 billion?"

Dr. M.A.M. Azim replied, "Yes."

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake asked, "That was because you had the opportunity and you thought that you grab the opportunity. Am I clear?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim replied, "Exactly. The other thing, Sir, we also had to factoring that we had no business in between Friday to Monday. So, if we do not accept that, we will not be able to conduct another fresh auction. So, we have factored all these things into consideration and then the management's view also has been factored in and based on that, we suggested to the Tender Board and the Tender Board basically after deliberations – as the usual process in the Tender Board when it comes to issuances of Treasury bonds or Treasury bills – decided, 'Okay, we should be meeting the entire requirement of the Treasury from the auction itself.' "

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: So, that is very clear.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is very clear.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: We can quote it as it is. Date එක කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : දිවුරුම් පිට සාක්ෂි. පිටුවේ පහළින්ම අංක 832 සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා. ඒ අංක 832ට ඉහළින් අංක 59 සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා. "Dr. M.Z.M. Azim, Additional Superintendent, Debt Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka" එතුමා තමයි මෙහි සාක්ෂියට කැඳවලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතුමාගේ සාක්ෂිය ආරම්භ වන පිටුවේ පහළින් 832 යනුවෙනුත්, ඒ 832ට ඉහළින් අංක 59 යනුවෙන් සඳහන්ව තිබෙනවා. මේ අදාළ කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි එතුමා විස්තරයක් කර තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එතකොට ඒ ප්‍රකාශය include කරන්න වෙන්නේ කොතැනද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : 59 වෙනි පිටුවේ වම් පැත්තේ තීරුවේ සඳහන් ඡේදයේ පරිදි සුසිල් ප්‍රේමජයන්ත මැතිතුමා Dr. Azimගෙන් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න පටන් ගෙන තිබෙනවා. එය මේ විධියට සඳහන් වනවා, "I have a question. Now you mentioned about five occasions – from…." එතුමා අහනවා, "රුපියල් බිලියන 1 සිට රුපියල් බිලියන 10 දක්වා යන්න හේතුව කුමක්ද?" කියලා. එතකොට එම ප්‍රශ්නයට Dr. Azim පිළිතුර වශයෙන් ලබා දෙන කරුණු අංක 59 වෙනි පිටුවේ වම් පැත්තේ අවසාන ඡේදයෙන් පටන් ගන්නවා, "The funding modality in terms of meeting ……".

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමනි, මේ අයට edit කර ගන්න තියන්නේ නැතිව හරියටම line දෙක සඳහන් කළා නම් ඇති.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි මම දැන් කිව්වේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එය සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ වන්නේ අපේ report එකේ 23 වෙනි පිටුවේ නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔය කොටස කොහොමත් වැටෙන්න ඕනෑ 23 වෙනි පිටුවට නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : 29 වෙනි පිටුවේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අපේ කෙටුම්පතේ මේ කොටස සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ 23 වෙනි පිටුවේ නේද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : කෙටුම්පතේ මෙතැනත් සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එම කොටස 23 වෙනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වුණා නම් හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එතකොට මේ කථාව මෙතැනින් අවසානයි. 23වෙනි පිටුවේ 6.1ට කලින් දාන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙම ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳව සලකා බැලීමේදී ආචාර්ය අසීම් මහතා විසින් දිවුරුම් පිට දෙන ලද සාක්ෂිය ඉතා වැදගත්ය. එය මෙසේය, කියලා කියමු. අපි ඒක comment කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

මේකට අවුරුද්දක් විතර දුන්නා නම්, කට්ටිය ඔක්කෝම ටික කියවයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ තිබෙන්නේ, 30වැනි පිටුව නේද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: 29වැනි පිටුවේ last paragraph එකට මොකද කරන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි නේ. ගැටලුවක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක එහෙම්ම යනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට මෙතැන මෙන්න මේ වාගේ පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. පළමුවැනි වතාවට අපේ report එකේ තිබෙනවා, Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමට යම් අපේක්ෂිත සීමාවන් අභිභවා බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අවස්ථාවක් ලැබුණා කියලා. මගේ පෞද්ගලික අදහස හැටියට Perpetual Treasuries ගැන යම් නිර්දේශයක් කළ යුතුයි කියලා මම හිතනවා. මොකද, අපේ මුල් කෙටුම්පතේ Perpetual Treasuries ගැන කිසිම නිර්දේශයක් නැහැ. මේ අවස්ථාවේ නැති මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අරමුණු මට තේරුම් ගන්න අමාරුයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ ගැන තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ. විශේෂ නිර්දේශවල කියලා තිබෙන එක් එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරයාගේ යෝජනාවලත් නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ගැන නොවෙයි මේ කියන්නේ. ඒ වාගේම කමිටුවෙන් හදාපු කෙටුම්පතෙත් Perpetual Treasuries සම්බන්ධව adverse comment එකක් නැහැ. එතකොට අපි ළඟ තොරතුරු තිබෙනවාද, 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27වැනිදා වන විට Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ හිටපු අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු කවුද කියලා? ඔවුන්ගේ නම් අපි ළඟ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැන ප්‍රශ්න කරද්දී ගිය වතාවේ ලැබුණා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි අවසානයේදී ඊට අදාළ නිර්දේශය මොකක්ද කියලා වාද කරමු. මෙතැන පළමුවැනි වතාවට company එක ගැන original draft එකෙන්ම mention කරලා තිබෙන නිසා එම දිනය වන විට එහි අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන් වශයෙන් සිටියේ මෙම තැනැත්තන්ය කියන කාරණය පිළිබඳව සඳහනක් කිරීම අවශ්‍යයි කියලා මම හිතනවා. මොකද, ඒක නිර්දේශ කරලා අපිට කියන්න පුළුවන් කරන දේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැදගත්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපිට ඒ නම් ටික ඉක්මනින් කියන්න පුළුවන් ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 29වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන, "2015 පෙබරවාරි මස 27දිනැති බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා මිල ගණන් කැඳවූ රුපියල් බිලියන එකක ප්‍රමාණය ඉක්මවා....." කියන එක එහෙමම තියනවද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කොයි එකද, ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමනි?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 29වැනි පිටුවේ last paragraph හි "එකේ සිට දහය දක්වා යන්න විස්තර කර ඇත." කියන එක ආපහු දක්වනවාද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මොකක්ද page එක?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 29වැනි පිටුවේ last paragraph එක. ඒකේ කියනවා නේ, රුපියල් බිලියන 1 සිට බිලියන 10 දක්වා යන්න හේතුව මොකක්ද කියලා. ඒකේ explanation එකක් තමයි මම දැන් දුන්නේ. ඒකේ සඳහන් කර ඇත කියලා සඳහන් කරනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. Then it becomes too much. If we want -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක දැන් මේ කථාකරන තැනට දාන්න එපා. ඒක එතැන කථා කරන්න. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මේ ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳලා ඉන්න ඕනෑ. මේක වැදගත්ම දෙයක්. කවුද ඒ වන විට හිටපු අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු කියලා මට තොරතුරු ටික දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපේ ළඟ ඒ තොරතුරු නැහැ. මොකද, ගිය සැරේ කමිටුවේදී තමයි,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලොකු වාර්තාවේ ඇති. ඒක බැලුවා නම්, start එකේදීම ඒක අහලා ඇති. Perpetual Treasuries එකේ ලොක්කෙක් ආවා නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එතුමාත් ආවා. ඒ වාගේම company Registrar ගෙනැල්ලා question කරන වෙලාවේත් සඳහන් වෙලා ඇති.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එතුමා ඒක හොයනකම් අපි ඊළඟ එකට යමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි එතකම් ඊළඟ එකට යමු. අපි ඒක දමන්න අනුමත කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 30වැනි පිටුව බලන්න. මේකට තිබෙන evidence මොනවාද? "ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඒවා අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සහ අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ ටෙන්ඩර් අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථා සන්සන්දනය කිරීමේදී Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ ලංසු

ප්‍රතික්ෂේපවීම සාපේක්ෂව පහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීමද නිරීක්ෂණය විය." කියලා තිබෙනවා. මට දැනගන්න ඕනෑ, evidence තිබෙනවාද කියලායි.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ auctionsවලට ගිය ඒවායින් අග කොටස් අරගෙන තමයි ඒ decision එක අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මේක මගේ අදහසක්. වැඩි හරියක් Perpetual Treasuries එකට ලැබුණු බව නිරීක්ෂණය නිවැරදියි. අපිට එතැනින් එහාට යන්න පුළුවන්ද ? ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරනවා නම්, අපිට evidence ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්න.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ නම සඳහන් කළේ නැහැ නේ. නම සඳහන් කළේ නැත්තේ,-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නම කියන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් අපි මෙතැන හැංගි හොරා කරලා වැඩක් නැහැ. ඒ නම් හෙළිදරවු කරන්න අපි එකඟ වුණා නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: COPE වාර්තාව පැත්තෙන් නේ. මේ පැත්තෙන් කථා කරන කොට ගත්තොත් පසු ගිය වාර්තා සන්සන්දනය කරලා දෙන්න පුළුවන් අවශ්‍යතාවක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, අනෙක් ඒවායේත් ඔක්කෝම කාරණා ගන්න ඕනෑ. විශේෂයෙන්ම මේ කාරණා දෙක විතරයි නේ අපි analyze කළේ. ඒක පැහැදිලිව ඊළඟ පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා. අවසාන අවස්ථාවට යන කොට අපි Rs. 1 billion ගත්තොත් මොකද වෙන්නේ; Rs. 10 million ගත්තොත් මොකද වෙන්නේ කියන කාරණා ගත්තාම, ඊළඟට reject වෙච්ච ඒවායේ analysis එක අරගෙන බැලුවාම ඒවාට justification එක කරන්න ගැටලුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ preferred institute එකක් විධියට මේ ගොල්ලන්ව පේනවාද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා කියපු කාරණාවෙන්ම ඒක පේනවා නේ. අන්තිම එකේ අඩු ගණනට තිබෙන එක ගන්නේ නැතිව, වැඩි ගණනට තිබෙන එක ගන්න ගිහිල්ලා තමයි ඒ ටික Perpetual Treasuries එකට ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. අපි දක්වන්න ඕනෑ, ඒක කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. We cannot give a general idea.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: දාන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ඔක්කෝම information මේකේ තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වාගේම වෙනත් ආයතනයකටත් එහෙම හම්බ වෙලා තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒකත් අපි සොයා බලන්න ඕනෑ. අහඹු ලෙස එක ආයතනයකට විතරක් හම්බ වෙලා කියලා අපට එක angle එකක් බලලා නිගමනය කරන්න බැහැ. එහෙම නම්, තව auction ගත්ත කට්ටියගේත් එහෙම අහඹු අවස්ථා ඇති.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ නම් ටික ඔක්කෝම මේකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ analysis එකේ document එක තිබෙනවාද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි මේකට annexure කියමු කෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ ඔක්කෝම තිබුණාට, ඒ ඔක්කෝම ගැන කියන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගොඩක් report එකට දාන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා:අපි special case එකක් ගැන කථා කළා නේ. මේකේ තිබෙන ඒවා analyze කරලා ratio හැටියට දාන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ගැටලුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔය ආයතනය විතරක් නොවෙයි, තවත් auction හම්බ වෙච්ච ආයතන ඇති නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේකේ summary එකක් හදලා දාන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කාටවත් auction වැඩියෙන් හම්බ වෙනවා කියලා අපිට වරදක් පටවන්න බැහැ. අපිට පුළුවන් ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන්න කියන්න. Forensic audit එකක් කරන්න කියන්න පුළුවන්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. අපිට පුළුවන් ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන එකයි. නැත්නම් අපිට හොරු අල්ලන්න බැහැ නේ. ඇක්සස් ආයතනයට හරි ජෝන් කීල්ස් ආයතනයට හරි වැඩියෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් හම්බ වෙනවා. අපිට කියන්න බැහැ නේ, මේ ආයතනයට වැඩියෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් හම්බ වෙනවා, ඒ නිසා මේ ආයතනය වැරදියි කියලා. ටෙන්ඩර් වැඩියෙන් හම්බවීම තුළ සැකයක් පහළ වෙනවා. ඒ අනුව අපිට නිර්දේශයක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්, forensic audit එකක් හරි, මොකක් හරි කරන්න කියලා. Am I right?

පස්වරු 4.43ට ගරු සභාපතිතුමා මූලාසනාරූඪ විය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමාගේ තර්කය නිවැරදියි. ඒ තර්කයේම තමයි දැන් මම ඉන්නෙත්. නමුත් මම අහන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මෙතැනදී කියනවා ටෙන්ඩර් අසාර්ථක වූ අවස්ථාව සන්සන්දනය කිරීමේදී Perpetual Treasuries එකේ ලංසු ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම පහළ මට්ටමක තිබෙනවා කියලා. අන්න ඒකට ඔබතුමන්ලාගෙන් evidence තිබෙන document එකක් තිබෙනවාද? ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒකට specific analysis එකක් කළාද? Annexure එක විතරයි ඕනෑ.

ගාමිණී වික්‍රමසිංහ මහතා: ඒ sheet එක අපි දෙන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම විස්තරය ඇමුණුම,- ඇමුණුම් අංකයක් කියන්න. එම විස්තර ඇමුණුම 'XXXI'ද? ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි දැන් ඉන්නේ 30වැනි පිටුවේ උඩම පේළි තුන තුළයි. මම ඇහුවා, මේකේ කියන කාරණයට සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවාද කියලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියනවා, සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒ සාක්ෂිවල annexure එක මෙතැන ලිව්වා නම් හරි. මේ report එක ලොකු කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මේක ටිකක් complicated එකක් නේ. නමුත් ඒ සාක්ෂි පස්සේ කෙනෙක් analyze කරද්දී බලන්න පුළුවන්. ඇමුණුම කියලා, එතැනට ගැළපෙන අංකයක් දාන්න.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මූලාසනයේ වැඩබලන සභාපතිතුමා හිටපු වෙලාවේ කථා කළ කාරණයක් පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමාට කියන්න තිබෙනවා. අපි එතුමාට කිව්වා, "මේ වාර්තාවේ අගට, ඔය කාලය වන විට Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ හිටපු අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩලය නම් කරන්න." කියලා. Perpetual Treasuries සමාගමේ අයට එරෙහිව දැනට නිර්දේශයක් නැහැ. නමුත් මම යෝජනා කරන්නවා, එහෙම එකක් දාන්න කියලා. මම හිතනවා, එතැනට දාන්න කලින්, 29වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන reasonsවලට ගළපලා දැම්මා නම් හොඳයි කියලා. එතැන තිබෙන්නේ අයුතු වාසියක් ලැබුවා කියලා. ඒ ස්ථානයේ, ඒ අයගේ පෞද්ගලික නම්වලින් සඳහන් කරන්න කියලා මම යෝජනා කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : එතකොට මෙහෙම ප්‍රායෝගික ගැටලුවක් මතු වෙයිද කියන ප්‍රශ්නයයි මම ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කරන්නේ. මම මේ කියන කාරණය ඔබතුමන්ලාට අලුතෙන් කරුණක් හැටියට එකතු කරන්න බාධාවක් නොවෙයි. මේ කෙටුම්පත අපි සකස් කරන කොට පාදක කර ගන්නේ අපට තිබෙන සාක්ෂි, තිබෙන ලේඛන, වාචික සාක්ෂි සටහන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මීට කලින් COPE කමිටුවේ සාක්ෂි අදාළ කර ගත්තා නේ. ඒ කමිටුවේදී ඔය තොරතුරු සොයා ගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා ඔබතුමා නැති වෙලාවේ අපි සොයා ගත්තා. ඔබතුමාගේ දැන ගැනීමටයි මම මේ කාරණය කියන්නේ. සමාගම් Registrar ඇවිල්ලා සාක්ෂි දීලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ පුද්ගලයන්ගේ නම් ටික ගන්න පුළුවන් නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : දාන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා : මොකද කාලයත් එක්කයි ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ නම් ටික තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන එක එකතු කරමු. එහෙම නම් ඒ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන එක ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට ගත්තා නම් හරි නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. ඇමුණුමක් කිව්වාම කියවන මිනිස්සුන්ට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ. අජිත් පෙරේරා, හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා, හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි කියලා විස්තර ඇතුව තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් මේවා ගැන මිනිස්සු හොයලා බලන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ඊළඟට, 30.2වන ඡේදය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මම හිතන්නේ මේක වැදගත් කාරණයක්ය කියලායි. මම Central Bank එකේ Website එකට ගියාමයි මේක හොයා ගත්තේ. මහ බැංකු Website එකෙන් අර්ථකථනය කරනවා, Bond කියන්නේ මොකක්ද, කොහොමද මේ Bond එක නිකුත් කරන්නේ කියලා. ඒක මහජනතාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කාටද මේකට bid කරන්න පුළුවන් වන්නේ, කොයි ජාතියේ කෙනෙක්ද කියන එක ගැන දැනුවත් කරලායි. එහි මෙසේ තිබෙනවා,

Main Features of Treasury Bonds	
Issuer	Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Available Instruments	Conventional bonds and Inflation-linked bonds
Tenor	Conventional bonds: 2 - 20 Years, Inflation-linked bonds: 3 years
Currency	Sri Lanka Rupees (LKR)
Issuance Method	Auction basis
Auction system	Through competitive bidding price

Issuance Method is Auction. මහ බැංකුවේ Website එකෙන් ලෝකය දැනුවත් කරනවා, කොයි ආකාරයටද මේවා දෙන්නේ කියලා. එතකොට මේකේ කියන්නේ, private placements නොවෙයි. Issuance Method is auction. Auction System is through competitive bidding price. මම හිතන්නේ මේක ඉතාමත් වැදගත්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Yes, can I have a copy of that?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අපි මේකේ printout එකක් ගනිමු. මේක තමයි මහ ජනතාව දැනුවත් කිරීම සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන වාර්තාව. මේකේ කියන්නේ auctions නම්, තව මොනවාද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : තව තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is how the Central Bank introduces Bonds.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : තව තිබෙන එක ඇත්ත.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ date එක කවද්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. මේක වෙබ් අඩවියේ හැම දාම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ දවස්වලත් තිබුණාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්. මේ Central Bank Website එකේයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එදා තිබුණාද දන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එදා තිබුණාද කියලා අපට forensic audit කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. මේ අද තිබෙන එක නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂන රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඔය advertisement එකක් ගැනද කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ. මේක generally මොකක්ද, Bond එක කොහොමද, Bonds ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක ගැනයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : The Central Bank introduces as to what Bonds are. ඩෙව්ඩ් බොන්ඩ් කියන්නේ කවුද කියලා ඇහුව්වාම කළු tie එකක් දාන, කළු suit එකක් අඳින, සපත්තු දෙකක් දාගෙන ඉන්න කෙනෙක් කියලා කිව්වාම ඔහු රතු සපත්තු දාගෙන රතු tie එකක් දාන කෙනෙක් කියලා කියන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එහෙම වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. අපි ඊළඟ එකට යමු.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මෙතැනට එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ දේවල් ගැන කිව්වා නම් හරි. ලැයිස්තුව ගැන කථා කරලා නේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔව්. ඒක ගැන කථා කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා : හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : සමාවෙන්න. ඒ අදාළ කාලයේ තිබුණාද කියලා සනාථ කර ගන්නේ නැතුව ඕක ඇතුළත් කරනවාට මම කැමති නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අදාළ කාලයේ තිබුණත්, නැතත් දැන් තිබෙන එක දමමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අදාළ කාලයේ තිබුණා. දැන් තිබෙන එක දාමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒක ඔබතුමා හිතන හැටි නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මම ගෞරවයෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා, ඒක සලකා බලන්න කියලා. මොකද ඒ කාලය policy change එකක් වුණු කාලයක් නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරි. එහෙම නම්, අපි මේක මහ බැංකුවට යවමු. මේක යවලා අහමු එදා තිබුණේ කොහොමද කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එහෙම කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 20 වැනි දා තිබුණු එක ඉල්ලන්න කෝ. සුමානයකට කලින් තිබුණු එක ඉල්ලන්න. " Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් කිරීමට ඉතා ආසන්න කාලය තුළ එනම් අවසාන

විනාඩි 08 තුළ....." කියලා තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, මේක වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේද? ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක එතැනට යන එක හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : 30 පිටුවේ 1 ඡේදයට යන කල් සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 25 දින සන්ඩේ ඔබ්සවර් පුවත්පතේ Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම විසින් පළ කර තිබූ දැන්වීමේ සඳහන් එම සමාගමෙහි විගණිත මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශවලට අනුව (ඇමුණුම - 17) 2014-2015 සහ 2015 – 2016 වර්ෂ සඳහා එම සමාගමේ ප්‍රකාශිත ප්‍රාග්ධනය රුපියල් මිලියන 310.3ක්ව තිබියදී එම වර්ෂ සඳහා වූ බදු පසු ලාභයන් පිළිවෙළින් රුපියල් බිලියන 0.959ක් හා රුපියල් බිලියන 5.124ක් ලෙස විශාල අගයන් ගෙන තිබීම ඉහත සඳහන් විගණන නිරීක්ෂණය මඟින් ඉස්මතු කර ඇති කරුණු හේතුවෙන් ඇතිවූවක්ද යන්න බැහැර කළ නොහැක." මේ ලාභය 2016 මාර්තු වෙන කොටද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : මට පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ නේ. එහෙම කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : මට පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මට මේ කාරණය පැහැදිලි කරලා දෙන්න. මේ ආයතනය මහ බැංකුව එක්ක වැඩ කරන වෙනත් ආයතනයක් නේ. මම මේ අහන්නේ මහ බැංකුව ගැන විතරක් නොවෙයි. අපි COPE එකට වෙනත් ආයතනයක් ගෙනැල්ලා සාකච්ඡා කළත් ඒ ආයතනය ගැන කථා කරන්න අපට පුළුවන්ද, බැරිද කියලායි මම අහන්නේ. මේක බැහැ කියන එකක් නොවෙයි. COPE එකෙන් ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන නීතිමය තත්ත්වය දැන ගන්නයි අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : රජයේ මූල්‍ය කටයුතුවලට මැදිහත් වෙන - භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කටයුතුවලට හරි, බැංකුවක කටයුතුවලට හරි මොකකට හරි මැදිහත් වෙන - බාහිර ඕනෑම පාර්ශ්වයක් ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. මම සරල උදාහරණයක් ඔබතුමාට මතක් කරන්නම්. අපි මහජන බැංකුව කැඳවපු වෙලාවේ Kandy City Centre කියන ආයතනයට දීපු අක්‍රිය ණයක් ගැන අපි කථා කළා. කෙනෙකුට ඕනෑ නම් තර්ක කරන්න පුළුවන්, "Kandy City Centre කියන පෞද්ගලික ආයතනය ගැන විමර්ශනය කරන්න COPE එකට අයිතියක් නැහැ. අපට ඒ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?" කියලා. ඒ වෙලාවේදී අපට Kandy City Centre එක අදාළ වුණේ අක්‍රිය ණය ගැන කථා කරන්න ගිහිල්ලා. අක්‍රිය ණය ගැන කථා කරන කොට Kandy City Centre එක ගැන කථා කරන්න වෙනවා. ඔය තර්කයෙන් හිතුවොත්, අපට කථා කරන්න වෙන්නේ අපි ගෙන්වන ආයතන ටික ගැන විතරමයි. ඒකට අදාළ වෙන-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ප්‍රශ්නයකට නොවෙයි ඇහුවේ. ඒක ඉගෙන ගන්නයි ඇහුවේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : මේ කෙටුම්පතට සම්බන්ධ වුණේම Perpetual Treasuries කියන ආයතනයයි. මේ ප්‍රස්තුත කාරණයේදී බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවෙන් අසාමාන්‍ය ලාභයක් ලබපු ආයතනය මේ ආයතනයයි. ඒ අයගේ මූල්‍ය වාර්තාව ගැනත් මේ කාරක සභාවේ අවසාන අවස්ථාවේදී සාකච්ඡා කළා. සාකච්ඡා කරලා තමයි, කාරණාවක් හැටියට ගත්තේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මේකේ සඳහන් වෙනවා, "විගණන මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශවලට අනුව 2015 – 2016 වර්ෂ සඳහා" කියලා. ඔබතුමාගේ Report එකේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ, "2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා" කියලා. එතැනින් පස්සේ නිගමනවලට අපට යන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා : මේ 2015 – 2016 මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශනයන් එළි දක්වන්නේ පස්සේ කාලයක වෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශනය අපේ ගනුදෙනුවට සම්බන්ධ වෙන කාලයට අදාළ වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හරි, හරි. මම අහන්නේ 2016 වර්ෂයේ අද වෙන කල්ම මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශන මේකට අදාළ කර ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එකයි. I am asking you -

ගරු හර්ෂන රාජකරුණා මහතා : මෙතැන කියලා තිබෙන ලාභ උපයපු කියන කාරණය-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට කථා කරලා ඉවර කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න කෝ. ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි. අපි පරීක්ෂා කරන්නේ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශනයේ 2016 මාර්තු වෙන කල් නේ. අද වෙන කොට මෙන්න තත්ත්වය කියලා අපට *ad-hoc* දාන්න බැහැ. එහෙම නම්, "මේ බිලියන 5.2 මාර්තු වෙන කොටද" කියන කාරණය තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: According to the Financial Year.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශන වර්ෂයට අදාළවයි අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සමහර වෙලාවට අද වෙන කල් මේ ගණනය කරලා ඇති නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂන රාජකරුණා මහතා : මාර්තු 31.

Mr. W.P.C. Wickramarathne: That is 31st March 2016.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : "වර්ෂය" කියන තැන මූල්‍ය වර්ෂය කියලා ලියමු.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : මූල්‍ය වර්ෂය නොවෙයි, ගිණුම් වර්ෂය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක 2016 මාර්තුවලින් අවසන්ද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ඔව්, ඔව්. 2015 - 2016 කියන්නේ ගිණුම් වර්ෂය.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ අවබෝධයටයි මම මේ කාරණය කියන්නේ. මේ කෙටුම්පත පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡාවේදී මේ වාර්තා දෙකටම අදාළවයි කියන්නේ. ලේකම් කාර්යාංශයත් සකස් කරපු වාර්තාවේත්, පොදුවේ සකස් කරන වාර්තා සියල්ලට අදාළවත් මෙන්න මේ කොටස සංශෝධනය වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තිබුණා. අවසානයේ තිබෙනවා, "ඉහත සඳහන් විගණන නිරීක්ෂණ මඟින් මතු කර ඇති කරුණු හේතුවෙන් ඇති වූවක්ද යන්න බැහැර කළ නොහැක." කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට කියන්න ඕනෑ කාරණාව ඒක නොවෙයි. මේක කලින් දවසේ සාකච්ඡා කරන වෙලාවේදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමා පෙන්වා දුන්නා, දෙවන ඡේදයේ අන්තිමට රුපියල් බිලියන 0.59ක් හා රුපියල් බිලියන 5.124ක් ලෙස විශාල අගයක් ගෙන තිබීම අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් නිරීක්ෂණය කෙරේ කියලා එනවා නම් හොඳයි කියලා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමායි කිව්වේ. ඒ කියන්නේ විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයකින් මතු වන කාරණාවක් අවධාරණය කරනවා කියන තැනට - එහෙම කරලා නැති නිසා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. අපිට ඒක සංශෝධනය කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් කලින් සම්මත කරපු අර ගොල්ලන්ගේ එකට ඒක සංශෝධනය කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඒ වෙලාවේ තමයි සාකච්ඡා කළේ. ඒ නිසයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. සංවාදය අතරතුරයි ඒක සාකච්ඡා කළේ. ඒ නිසා මම ඒක ලකුණු කර ගත්තා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකට අපි එකඟ වුණාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්. එකඟ වුණා. වාර්තා දෙකේම ඒක සඳහන් වෙනවා නම් හොඳයි කියලායි මම මේ කියන්නේ. ඒකයි මම මේ කිව්වේ, ඒක මෙතුමන්ලාගේ නිරීක්ෂණය නිසා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ආපු විධිය හොඳයි. ඒ ගැන කිසි ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒක හොඳයි. මම වෙන මොනවත් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නේ නැහැ. මීට කලින් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා කිහිප දෙනෙක් එකඟ වුණු මතයටත් ඒ ගොල්ලන් "අසාමාන්‍යයි" කියලා එතැන දමන්න කියලා ඉල්ලුවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ සාකච්ඡාව වෙලාවේදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමා තමයි මතු කළේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් ඉල්ලුවා නොවෙයි. නැත්නම් මේක මෙහෙමම තියන්න පුළුවන්. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මේක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අදහසක්. ඒක මම නිවැරදි කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක මේ කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ ඉල්ලීමක් නොවෙයි. මේක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ විගණන නිරීක්ෂණවලින් මතු වෙන කරුණක් හැටියට මේ draft එකේ තිබෙන එක පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ අදහසක් ඒක. ඒකයි කිව්වේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහෙමයි. ඔබතුමාට දෝෂයක් එන්න පුළුවන්, ඔබතුමාට දොස් කියන්න පුළුවන්, අර කලින් මන්ත්‍රී කණ්ඩායම අත්සන් කරලා ගිය එකේ අකුරක් හරි වෙනස් කළොත්, අහන්නේ නැතුව. හැබැයි අපි කැමැතියි - මම කැමැතියි - "අසාමාන්‍ය" කියන වචනය - විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණයට සුදුසු වචනය ගැන "අසාමාන්‍ය" කියන වචනය දමන්න මම නම් කැමැතියි, දැන් මේ සකස් කරන වාර්තාවට. කලින් එක වෙනස් කරන්න අපට අයිතියක් නැහැ. ඒක වෙනස් කළොත් ඔබතුමාට දොස් කියාවි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ අය එකඟ නම් අපට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් අහලා දමන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ. එහෙම කරන්නේ කොහොමද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් අපි මේක මෙහෙමම තියමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඔක්කෝම ආපසු දෙන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙහෙමයි. ඊට පස්සේ කියාවි අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරන නිර්දේශ හොඳයි කියලා හිතලා, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් අහලා ඔබතුමා දැම්මොත්, ඔබතුමාට දොස් කියනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම එකක් නොවෙයි. අපි මේක මෙහෙමම තියමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි මෙහෙම කරමු. මම යෝජනා කරනවා මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී, විශාල අගයක් කියන එකට "අසාමාන්‍ය" කියන වචනය එකතු කරන්න කියලා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: මොකද, මේ කෙටුම්පත මෙතැනින් නේ අපටත් ආවේ. මම කිව්වා, -

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි පැහැදිලිව කියන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට අසාධාරණයක් වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ මේකයි. අපි කලින් කිව්වා, මේක අවසාන කෙටුම්පත කියලා. මේකට සීල් තියන්න - එහෙම නම් මේ වාගේ ඒවා වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මේ කෙටුම්පතේ -

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්: මම නම් විරුද්ධයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මේ කෙටුම්පත ''කෙටුම්පතක්'' හැටියට මෙතැනට දීපු වෙලාවේ තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාත් මේක දැක්කේ. එතකොට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඒ වෙලාවේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මට මතු කරලා පෙන්වූවා, මේක විගණන නිරීක්ෂණයකින් මතු වන කරුණක් හැටියට නැතුව, මේක සාකච්ඡා කරද්දී ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලා, අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වයක් නිරීක්ෂණය වෙනවා කියලා. හැබැයි මේ කාරක සභාවේ මේ සාකච්ඡාවේ මේ පිටුව ළඟට ආවේ නැතුව නේ තිබුණේ. ඒ නිසා මේ කාරණාව දැන් තමයි මට මතු කරන්න පුළුවන් අවස්ථාව වුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. ඒ නිසා අපට දැන් අර කලින් කට්ටියගේ එක වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: බැහැ. ඒ නිසා ඒ වාර්තාව ඒ ආකාරයෙන් තිබෙන්න හරින්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට පුළුවන්, එකඟ වෙන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි මේ අද දවසේ වෙනස් කළා නේ. ඒ ක්‍රමයට අපි දැන් මෙතැනදීත් එකඟ වෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතයට ගරු කරමින් විශාල අගයක් යන්නට අසාමාන්‍ය අගයක් බව ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ඊළඟට තිබෙනවා, ''පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගමේ මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ හැසිරීම පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේද පහත සඳහන් ආකාරයට සඳහන් කර ඇත.

(i) පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් කිරීමට ඉතා ආසන්න කාලය තුළ, එනම් අවසන් මිනිත්තු 08 තුළ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය වූ රු.බිලියන 20.708 කින් රු. බිලියන 13.60 ක ලංසු ලැබී තිබීම.

(ii) ඉහත සඳහන් රු. බිලියන 13.60 ක වටිනාකම තුළ රු. බිලියන 13.00 ක් පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය වෙනුවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම.

(iii) රු. බිලියන 01 ක් වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවා තිබියදී රු. බිලියන 10.058 ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම.

(iv) පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය වෙනුවෙන් ලංකා බැංකුව රු. බිලියන 13 ක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හා එලෙස ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු වෙනුවෙන් වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කළ පළමු අවස්ථාව වීම.'' කියලා.

ඒක හරිද? ලංකා ඉතිහාසයේ ඒකද, ඓතිහාසික අවස්ථාව?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. තවත් ඒවා තිබෙනවා කියලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක පළමු අවස්ථාව කියලා අපි ඉදිරිපත් කළේ, ඒක සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල මතු වුණු කරුණක් වුණේ ඒ ආකාරයට නිසයි. ඒ කියන්නේ ඒක අපේ පෞද්ගලික මතයක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල තිබෙනවා, සමහර අවස්ථාවලත් වෙනත් කට්ටිය හරහා -

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් වෙනුවෙන් තවත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් ඉදිරිපත් වුණු පළමුවන අවස්ථාව කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ ඔය auction එකේදී.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: කොහොමත් එහෙම chances නැහැ. මොකද, ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙක් වෙනුවෙන් තවත් කෙනෙක් -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: It can happen. ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකුට වෙන කෙනෙක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැහැ කියලා කොහේ හරි තිබෙනවා නම්, ඔබතුමා මට පෙන්වන්න. ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: බැහැ කියලා නොවෙයි, එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ කියලායි මෙතැන කියැවුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හොයන්නේ නැතුව අපට නිගමනයකට එන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පුළුවන්ද, බැරිද කියන එක තර්ක කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Evidence නැතුව අපි කොහොමද එහෙම කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: කවුරු හරි කෙනෙක් එහෙම කිව්වාට පස්සේ අපට ඒ ඉතිහාසය හොයා ගෙන යන ක්‍රමයක් නොවෙයි තිබුණේ. මේ සාක්ෂි සටහන්වල, අපි සාකච්ඡා කරපු කරුණුවල, අපි

විමර්ශනය කරපු කරුණුවල, මතු වෙච්ච කරුණක් හැටියට තිබුණා. ඒ කරුණට ඔබතුමන්ලාට එකඟ වෙන්න බැරි නම්, ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම මේ නීත්‍යානුකූල දෙයක් කියන්නේ. බැරි වෙලාවත් කවුරු හරි ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබුණා නම් අපේ තත්ත්වය මොකක්ද? අපි කොහොමද - අපිට කියන්න පුළුවන්, සාක්ෂි අනුව -

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි කියන්නේ නැහැ. මේ සාක්ෂි සටහන් ක්‍රියාවලිය ඇතුළේ සාකච්ඡා වුණු කරුණුවල මතු වෙච්ච කරුණක් හැටියට තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි එහෙම කියන්නේ නැහැ නේ. මේකේ කියන්නේ නිගමනය. ඔබතුමන්ලා එහෙම තිබ්බාට කමක් නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. It is legally wrong for us to say that.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "මේක පළමු අවස්ථාවේදී බව සාක්ෂිවලදී අනාවරණය විය." ඒ සාක්ෂි හරිද, වැරදිද කියලා අපට අභියෝග කළාට කමක් නැහැ. ඒක එහෙම දමන්න. කමක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: මේ ඉස්සර වෙලා එකේ තිබෙනවා, "රු. බිලියන 01 ක් වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවලා තිබියදී රු. බිලියන 10.058ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම." කියලා. එතකොට පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගමෙන් රුපියල් බිලියන 10.058ම පිළිගත්තේ නැහැ නේ. පිළිගත්තේ රුපියල් බිලියන පහයි. එතකොට මේකේ headline එක තිබෙන්නේ පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම පිළිබඳව. එහෙම පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මම අහන්න හිටපු ප්‍රශ්නයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි. දහයෙන් පහක් කියලා දමන්න පුළුවන්, නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගෙන් පිළිගත්ත ප්‍රමාණය කීයද කියලා හරියට දමන්න. එච්චරයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ කියන්නේ දෙවන එක. මේ කියන්නේ 2016 මාර්තු එක ගැන.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ. 2015 එක මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: මේකේ අපි පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගමේ වෙළෙඳ පොළ හැසිරීම ගැන කථා කරද්දී, මේ තුන ඇතුළත් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම නොවෙයි නේ, ලංසු පිළිගන්නේ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: සම්පූර්ණ දහයයි දශම ගණනම ඒ ගොල්ලන් ගත්තේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක පොඩි වැරදීමක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඉවත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: අපේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන්නේ පර්පෙවුවල් - මේ ගනුදෙනුවට සම්බන්ධ වුණු ඒවා තමයි කියන්නේ. ගනුදෙනුවට අදාළ කරුණු -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඒ කියන්නේ දැන් මේ කෙටුම්පතේ 30 වන පිටුවේ (iii) යටතේ තිබෙනවා, "රු. බිලියන 01 ක් වටිනා භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර සඳහා ලංසු කැඳවලා තිබියදී රු. බිලියන 10.058ක් දක්වා ලංසු පිළිගැනීම." කියලා. ඒ කාරණය මෙතැනට අදාළ නැහැ නේද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේක හරි, මාතෘකාව වෙනස් වුණොත්.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව කියලා දැම්මා නම් හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන තවත් පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. මේ දෙකම එකට දමන්න බැහැ. දැන් මේ අච්චාරුවක් නේ. මෙතැන 27 වැනිදා ඒවාත් තිබෙනවා. මාර්තු 29 වැනිදා ඒවාත් තිබෙනවා. මම හිතන විධියට පෙබරවාරි 27 සඳහා එක set එකක් සහ මාර්තු 29 තව set එකක් දැම්මොත් වඩාත් හොඳ නැද්ද, Subheadings වාගේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Dates අනුව දැම්මා නම් හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැත්නම් මේ දෙක පැටලෙනවා නේ. එතකොට අපට පුළුවන් - අවසන් මිනිත්තු අටේ ලංසු ආවේ 27 වැනිදා එකේ නේ. එතකොට පළමුවන එක එන්නේ 27 වනදා යටතේ. දෙවන එක එන්නේ 27 වනදා යටතේ.

3 වෙනි එක වෙන්නේ 27 වෙනිදා යටෙක්. මේකත් 27 වෙනිදා යටතේ. 5 වෙනි එක එන්නෙත් 27 වෙනිදා යටෙක්. මාර්තු 29ට මෙහි එකක්වත් අදාළ නැහැ. මාර්තු 29ට අදාළ වෙන්නේ අර කියපු Table එකේ තිබ්බ්ව කථාව. ඒක මෙතැනට ගේන්න මාර්තු 29 කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මාර්තු 29ට අදාළව අපි සාක්ෂි විස්තරාත්මකව අරගෙන නැහැ නේ. ඒක

තමයි ඇත්ත තත්ත්වය. ඒ විතරක් නොවෙයි, තවත් auctions බර ගණනාවක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ලොකු අඩුපාඩුවක් කියලා ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි. මමත් එකඟයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොකද, ඒක නැතුව අපට කණා පොල් කඩන්න බැහැ. එකක් හම්බ වුණා. මේකෙදීත් අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් හිටියා; දෙවෙනි එකේදීත් එතුමා පල්ලෙහාට ආවා වාගේ මොකක් හරි සාධකයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තියෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපි සෘජුවම කියන්න ඕනෑ 29 වෙනිදා එකට පල්ලෙහාට ආවේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: පර්පෙක්චුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම වෙන්දේසිය අවසාන වෙන්න ඉතා ආසන්න කාලයක් තුළ අවසන් මිනිත්තු අට තුළ මුළු ලංසු ප්‍රමාණය රුපියල් බිලියන 20ක්., දක්වා කියන මේ කථාව අනික් ඒවාත් එක්ක compare කරනකොට මට හිතෙනවා සාමාන්‍යයෙන් auction එකකදී අවසාන වෙනකොට නේද, bids වැඩිපුර දමන්නේ?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එතැන one billion ඉල්ලලා තිබෙද්දී ten billion ගියේ කියන අසාමාන්‍ය තත්ත්වය තමයි. ඒක අනික් ඒවාත් එක්ක specific features තියෙන එකක් ඒකයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ auction අනික් ඒවාත් එක්ක බලනකොට එහෙම compare කළාද නැද්ද දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: කළා. Generally, එකක් ඉල්ලුවොත් තුන්ගුණයක් තමයි maximum යනවා කියලා තමයි Central Bank හැම වෙලාවේම කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි නේ මෙතැන අදහස් කරන්නේ? මෙතැන වැඩිපුර prominence දෙන්නේ ‘‘අවසාන මිනිත්තු අටේදී’’ කියන එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අනිත් ඒවාත් ආවේ අවසාන මිනිත්තු අටේදී ද දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමාගේ point එක හරි. මෙහි වැදගත් වන්නේ අපට unusual එකක් තිබෙනවා. Perpetual Treasuries is getting more. හැබැයි, එතකොට අපි අපේ සාධකයෙන් එළියට එනවා. අපි කියන්නේ පෙබරවාරි 27 වෙනිදා අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා තමයි හිටියේ. එතුමා පහළට ගිහිල්ලා බලපෑම් කරලා Perpetual Treasuries එකට බිලියන 5ක් දුන්නා කියන කථාව නේ අපි මේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ argument එක තනිකර අපි බැහැර කරනවා, අපි පිළිගන්නවා නම් බිලියන 5ක් දක්වා Perpetual Treasuries ලබලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඊට පස්සේ කිසිම auction එකකට අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතාගේ සම්බන්ධතාවක් අපි පෙන්නුම් කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කිව්වේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා:ඒක auction එකේ වැරැද්දක්ද, එහෙම නැත්නම් අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතාගේ වැරැද්දක්ද කියන එක අපි තීන්දු කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ කාරණා දෙකම තියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක මෙතැනදී නොවෙයි එන්නේ. ඒක මෙහෙම නැහැ කියලා අපි කලින් කිව්වා. ඒක අපේ නිගමනය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට කියන්නේ. අපි argument එකක් base කරනකොට -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ අපි එහෙම argument එකක් base කරලා නැහැ. විගණකාධිපති කිසිම අවස්ථාවක එතැනට ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සාධාරණයි. අපි ඒ නිගමනයට එමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: That is correct. I wanted to clear it for myself.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Auditor-General, specific point කියලා මම පිළිගන්නවා. අපට වෙනත් arguments තිබෙනවා specific point ….

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කිව්වා කියලා නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. I am thinking aloud.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට මේක වෙනස් කළාද, 15 විතරද, දෙවෙනි para එකේ 29 කියන එක ගැලෙව්වාද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ගැන තීරණයක් ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ තිබෙන කරුණුවලට අමතරව තව කරුණු එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාට යෝජනා කරන්න පුළුවන්. 29 වෙනිදාට අදාළවත් එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම්-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ රෝම ඉලක්කම් i, ii, iii තියෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: රෝම ඉලක්කම් iii ඉවත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. iii වැරැදියි නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එකඟ වුණ පරිදි -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නැත්නම් heading එක වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 30 වන පිටුවේ රෝම ඉලක්කම් iii යටතේ කාරණය වැරැදියි. එතකොට පැහැදිලියි නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා. ඊට පසුව අපි පළමු වෙනි එක දිනය දැම්මා. දෙවෙනි එකට අහවල් දිනය කියලා දැම්මා. තුන දැම්මා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි, තියාගන්න ඕනෑ නම් ඒකට ක්‍රමයකුත් තිබෙනවා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම බිලියන 10.5 එක ඉවත් කරලා ඇත්ත ගණන ඇතුළත් කරලා 27 වෙනිදා කියලා සඳහන් කරලා, ඊළඟ එකෙත් ඇත්ත ගණන ඇතුළත් කරලා මාර්තු 29 කියලා දාන්නත් පුළුවන්. ඒක සත්‍යයක් නේ. අසත්‍යයක් නොවෙයි නේ. එහෙම ඇතුළත් කළා නම් වඩා හොඳයි. එතකොට වඩාත්ම නිවැරදියි. ඒක හරි නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, ඒක කොහොමද, වෙන්න ඕනෑ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 27 වෙනිදා ඒ ගොල්ලෝ දාපු ගණන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එහෙම දානවා නම් ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම 10.58ක් නිකුත් කළාය මෙතුමාට දුන්නේ 5යි කියලා දාන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. 10.58 වැරැදියි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: බිලියන 10.58 ඉවත් කරලා බිලියන5 ක් කියලා දාලා හරි යන්නේ නැහැ. එදා දවසේ 10.58ක් නිකුත් කළා. එකට ගියේ 5යි කියලා දාන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක ලියලාම දුන්නා නම් හරි. මොකද, හේතුව මේ කට්ටියට නැවත homework කරන්න ඕනෑ නේ. තව රාජකාරියක් පැවරෙනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 10.58ක් ගත්තා. ඒකෙන් පර්පෙක්චුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ගත්තේ x කියන ප්‍රමාණයකි. x සහ y කියන අගයන් මම පස්සේ දෙන්නම්. මාර්තු 29 වෙනිදා එකේදී y කියන ප්‍රමාණයක් ගත්තා. එයින් පර්පෙක්චුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ගත්තේ z කියන ප්‍රමාණයකි. x, y, z අගයන් මම දෙන්නම්. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා මෙතැන තව ඉතාමත් වැදගත් technical point එකක් තිබෙනවා. මේ කාරණය වැදගත්. සමහර වෙලාවට මතයක් තිබෙනවා, එක පැත්තකින් ආණ්ඩුවට වෙච්ච පාඩුවක් තිබෙනවා; ඒ පාඩුව පර්පෙක්චුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් එක ලබා ගත්තා. පර්පෙක්චුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් එක බිලියන 5ක ලාභයක් ලබා ගත්තා. ඒක තමයි ආණ්ඩුවට නැති වෙච්ච බිලියන 5. රජයට වෙච්ච පාඩුව තමයි බිලියන 5. ඒක තමයි පර්පෙක්චුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් එකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අයුතු ලාභයක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි, ඒක එහෙම නෙවෙයි. ඒකට හේතුව අපට market දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තිබෙනවා primary market අනික secondary market එක තිබෙනවා. එතකොට අපි දැන් අත්පුඩියක් ගහනවා නම් එක අතකින් අත්පුඩියක් ගහන්න බැහැ. අත් දෙකම ගැහුවොත් තමයි අත්පුඩිය වදින්නේ. මේ අසාමාන්‍ය ලාභය හොයන්න පර්පෙක්චුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් එකට දේවල් දෙකක් සිද්ධ වෙන්න ඕනෑ. එකක් තමයි වැඩි පොලියට, අඩු ගණනට ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළෙන් ලබා ගැනීම සිදුවිය යුතුමයි. එය පළමුවෙනි එක. නමුත් එය සිද්ධ වෙච්ච පළියට මෙයාට ලාභයක් ලබන්න බැහැ. මොකද, විකුණන්න කලින් හෝ තමන්ගේ අතේ තිබෙනකොට වෙළඳපොළේ පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ ගියොත් මේ අතේ තිබෙන එක ලාභයක් නොවෙයි පාඩුවක් වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා වෙළඳපොළේ පොලී අනුපාතය ඉහළ යන්න කලින්, වෙළඳ පොළේ පොලී අනුපාතය පහළට ගියොත් මේක විකුණනන්නත් මිනිහෙක් ඉන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ විකුණන එක ගන්නත් පුද්ගලයෙක් ඉන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය සිද්ධ වන්නේ ද්විතික වෙළඳපොළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විකුණුවේ නැත්නම් පාඩුව මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විකුණුවේ නැත්නම්, එය අතේ තියාගෙන හිටියොත් කිසිම දවසක කිසිම පාඩුවක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අවුරුදු 30ම තියාගෙන හිටියොත් කිසිම පාඩුවක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Exactly.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි fundamental එක bond market එකේ. හැබැයි, bond market එකේ primary dealersලා සල්ලි හම්බ කරන්නේ කොහොමද? අපි කියනවා "riding the wave" කියලා. යම්කිසි විධියකට අපි මොළේ කල්පනා කරන්න ඕනෑ; අපි guess එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ; කොයි විධියටද interest rate එක පහළ යන්නේ කියන එක දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ; අපට පුළුවන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ market එකේ තිබෙන පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා පොලී අනුපාතයක් දෙන bond

එකක් අපේ අතේ තියා ගන්න. එතකොට market එකේ පොලී අනුපාතය පහළට ගියොත් මගේ අතේ තිබෙන bond එකේ premium එක වැඩි වෙනවා. මගේ bond එකේ වටිනාකම වැඩිවෙනවා; අතහරිනවා. එතකොට කොයි වෙලාවෙත් මේකේ cycle එකක් තිබෙනවා. Riding the wave එක හරියට කරන්න පුළුවන් මිනිහා සල්ලි හම්බ කරනවා. එතකොට හැම වෙලාවේම bond market එකේ සල්ලි හම්බ කරන්න බැහැ. සමහර වෙලාවට ලාභයි; සමහර වෙලාවට පාඩුයි. එහෙම නම් මේ ද්විතික වෙළඳපොළේ මෙයාගේ bond ලබා ගත්තේ කවුද? එතැන තමයි මූලික issue එක තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට නේද ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, Central Bank එකේ වගකීම වෙන්නේ ද්විතික වෙළඳපොළේ පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා හැමතිස්සේම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳපොළේ - primary market- පොලී අනුපාතය වැඩියෙන් තියා ගන්න එක. ඒ වැඩියෙන් තියාගත්තොත් තමයි ඔය කියන ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකුට - කාට හරි- ද්විතික වෙළඳපොළෙන් අසාමාන්‍ය ලෙස ලාභයක් උපයන්න බැරි.

මහ බැංකුවේ වගකීම වෙන්නේ හැම තිස්සේම ඒ වෙළෙඳ පොළවල් දෙක තුලනය කිරීමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මහ බැංකුවේ වගකීම කාටවත් ලාභ - අලාභ දෙන එක නොවෙයි. ඒක වැරැදියි. මහ බැංකුවේ වගකීම,-

සභාපතිතුමා: කාටවත් ලාභ - අලාභ දෙන්න නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. අසාමාන්‍ය විධියට වෙළෙඳ පොළ manipulate කරලා ලාභ ගන්න තිබෙන ඉඩකඩ වැළැක්වීමේ උපාය මාර්ගයක් මහ බැංකුවට තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඒක කෙටි කාලීනව කරන්න පුළුවන්. මාස තුනේ Treasury Billsවලින් කරන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, දීර්ඝ කාලීනව එහෙම දෙයක් කරන්න බැහැ. අවුරුදු 30ක් කියන කාල පරාසය තුළ අවුරුදු තිහක Treasury Bond එකක market yield එක manipulate කරන්න මහ බැංකුවට බැහැ. මහ බැංකුවට කෙටි කාලීනව Open market operations මගින් සල්ලි දෙන්න පුළුවන්; සල්ලි ගන්න පුළුවන්; Treasury Bonds දෙන්න පුළුවන්; Treasury Bonds ගන්න පුළුවන්. Technically, interest rate එක කෙටි කාලීනව balance කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් දීර්ඝ කාලීනව බැහැ. අපි market principle එක පිළි ගත්තොත් සභාපතිතුමා කියන ඒ control එක දීර්ඝ කාලීනව තියා ගන්න බැහැ. ඒක තමයි ඒකට තිබෙන උත්තරය. මම හිතන්නේ ඒක මෙතැන 1, 2, 3, 4ට කලින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න වෙනවා. මෙතැනදී අපි සොයා බැලිය යුතු මූලිකම කාරණයක් වෙන්නේ මේ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධයෙනුයි. මොකද, මේ ලාභය ඉපැයුවේ ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ නොවෙයි. මේ ලාභය ඉපැයුවේ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ. එහෙනම් ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ගනුදෙනුව අපි ඉතාමත්ම පුළුල්ව සහ ගැඹුරින් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න ඕනෑ. ලේකම්තුමිය, ඒ කාරණය ලියා ගත්තාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තිබුණේ නැත්නම් ලාභයක් - අලාභයක් නැහැනේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි එතැන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක විකුණන එකෙන් තමයි ඔහුගේ ලාභය ගණනය කරන්නේ. ඔහුගේ ලාභය හැම වෙලාවේම අපේ අලාභය කියලා කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Secondary market එක ගැන තොරතුරු නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැන ඒක සීමාවක් කියලා කියනවානේ, හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක නිර්දේශයක් හැටියට දෙන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මොකද, වික්කේ නැත්නම් ඔහුට ලාභයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලාභයකුත් නැහැ. පාඩුවකුත් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි. අපේ ආණ්ඩුවට තිබෙන පාඩුව hypothetical loss එකක්. හැබැයි, මොහුට තිබෙන්නේ actual රුපියල් ශතවලින් ලැබෙන ලාභයක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමා. බැරි වෙලාවත් interest rate එක ඉහළ ගියා නම් අපි කාටද ඔය වරද දාන්නේ? මිනිහා පාඩුවක් ලැබුවාය කියලා කියනකොට "තමුසේ පාඩුවක් ලැබුවා. තමුසෙට මාර අසාධාරණයක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා"ය කියලා අපි මේ වාගේ පරීක්ෂණයක් කරනවාද? I am talking about the other side.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක හරි. සුජීව සේනසිංහ ඇමතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ තර්කයත් හරි. හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමාගේ තර්කයත් හරි. නමුත් practically මොකක්දවෙලා තිබෙන්නේ? අපි දන්න විධියට මේ manipulation එක කරන්න Government control එකේ තිබෙන fundsනේ පාවිච්චි කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. Evidence නැති වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඕක තමයි ඇත්ත කථාව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතකොට අපිට, -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ETF ද, DFCC ද දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි හොයන්න ඕනෑ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Do you have any evidence?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මොකක්ද තිබෙන්නේ කියලා කියන්නකෝ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: දෙවැනි එකේ තිබෙනවා, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: How much is it? බිලියන පහෙන් EPF එක ගත්ත ගණන කියන්නකෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඔය කාරණය කියන ගමන් අපි එය ලියා ගනිමුද? නැත්නම් අපිට මේ කටයුත්ත කරන්න බැහැනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කියපු කාරණය සටහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ ආකාරයත් එක්ක කිව්වා නම් ලේසියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි කියනවානේ මොහු ලාභ ලැබුවාය කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ තිබෙන්නේ බිලියන 5ක් කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ලාභ ලැබුවේ කොහොමද කියලානේ මේ කියන්නේ. ඒ කාරණය ඔබතුමිය ලියා ගත්තාද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. එතුමිය ලියා ගත්තේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා කියන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ලේකම්තුමියනි, මම කියන කාරණය පොඩ්ඩක් ගලපලා ලියන්න. Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගම මෙම විශාල ලාභය ලබා ගත්තේ මේ බැඳුම්කර ඔවුන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් ලබා ගත් බැඳුම්කර ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ විකිණීම හරහාය. හරි නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ හරහා නොවෙයි. අපි ගත්තේ කොහෙන්ද කියලා කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට මෙවැනි අධික පොලියක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළේදී Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගමෙන් මිලදී ගත්තේ රජයට අයිති සේවක අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල වැනි අරමුදල්ද යන්න සොයා බැලීම සඳහා සහ එවැනි ගනුදෙනුවකට ඔවුන්ට එළැඹීමට හේතු වූ කාරණා සොයා බැලීම සඳහා පුළුල් පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු බවත් කාරක සභාවේ මතයයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නම්. මේ PTL එක කරන්නේ මේක විතරද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: බිලියන 10ක් ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙන මොනවාද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම අහන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි. ඒගොල්ලන් වෙන business එකක් කරනවාද නැද්ද කියලා අපි දන්නවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේගොල්ලන් Stock Market එකේ කලින් ඔය business එක කළා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම කියන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දන්නේ නැති නිසා අහන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: දන්නේ නැති නිසයි අහන්නේ. මේ ලබා ඇති ආදායම මේකෙන්ම ලබලා කියලා අපිට ඔප්පු කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන්නේ මේ ජාතියේ business එකක් පටන් ගන්න try එකක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පටන් ගමු මල්ලි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අහන්නේ මේ ජාතියේ business එකක් පටන් ගන්න පුළුවන්ද කියලායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි Directorsලා වෙලා සභාපතිතුමනි ඔබතුමායි, මමයි, සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමායි, -

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: 5.2.3 ඔය කාරණය අපි පැහැදිලිව කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි මන්ත්‍රීවරු වෙලා කන්න, බොන්න නැතිව මෙතැන දුක් විඳිනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: 5.2.3 කියෙව්වොත්, -

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒකෙන්මද මේ ලාභ ඔක්කොම ලබලා තිබෙන්නේ?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ ඔය ගැන කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එහෙනම් හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කියපු තර්කය වැරැදියිනේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇයි,ඒ?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කියනවා, අධික ලාභය ලැබුවේ මේ secondary market එකේ business එකෙන් කියලා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනුවේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම යෙදිලා ඉන්නේ ඔය කියන කාරණයට සම්බන්ධ අය. භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් හා බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධ ගනුදෙනුවල, -

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මේ Particular transaction එක නොවෙයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එහෙනම් මේ කාරණා දෙකම අපිට කියන්න වෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Page 34 බලන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 5.2.3 හරි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක අපේ වාර්තාවේ කියැවෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කාරණය ගැන කථා කරලා අවසන් නම් අටවැනි කාරණය පටන් ගන්න කලින් අපි කෑම කාලා එමුද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තව වැදගත් කරුණක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කරුණ ලියා ගත්තාද? බිලියන 40න් අන්තිමට බිලියන 9ක්ම Perpetual Treasuries Limited, -

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: නැහැ. අපි කියන්නේ මේකයි. EPF එකට primary market එකෙන් ගන්න හැකියාව තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, ඒගොල්ලන් ගත්තේ නැහැ. හැබැයි, අවසානයේ secondary market එකේදී ඒගොල්ලන් Perpetual Treasuries Limited ගත්ත ඒවා ප්‍රමාණයකුත් secondary market එකේ අරගෙන.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා කියන එක හරි. ඒ කාරණය වෙනම එන්න ඕනෑ. මේක අනාගෙන හරි යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක EPF එකට එන වාසියක්. මේ ඔක්කොම මිශ්‍ර කරන්න බැහැ. EPF එක primary market එකේ ගන්න පුළුවන් අවස්ථාවේදී secondary market එකේ මෙවැනි interest rate එකකට ගැනීමට හේතුව මොකක්ද කියලා එන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, අපි ඕවාට උත්තර දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ලේකම්තුමිය, මම කියපු දේ ඔබතුමිය කියවන්නකෝ.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගම මෙම විශාල ලාභය ලබා ගත්තේ මෙම බැඳුම්කර ඔවුන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් ලබා ගත් බැඳුම්කර ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ විකිණීම හරහායි. මෙවැනි අධික පොලියක් සහිත බැඳුම්කර ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේදී Perpetual Treasuries Limited සමාගම මිල දී ගත්තේ රජයට අයිති අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල වැනි අරමුදල්ද යන්න සොයා බැලීම සඳහා සහ එවැනි ගනුදෙනුවලදී ඔවුන්ට එළැඹීමට හේතු වූ කරුණු සොයා බැලීම සඳහා පුළුල් පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු බව කාරක සභාවේ මතයයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තවද අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ බැඳුම්කර ගැනීමට හැකියාව ඇති බවත්, ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ වැඩි පොලී අනුපාතයකට ලබා ගැනීමට හේතුත් පරීක්ෂා කළ යුතුවේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: We do not know. Let them-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන්න ඕනෑය කියන්නේ-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ඊ ළඟට, 8.1.1 කියලා ලියන්න. ඒකේ මාතෘකාව වශයෙන් ''පරීක්ෂණයේ සාක්ෂි විමසීමේදී මතු වූ සීමාවන්'' යනුවෙන් ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් 2014 ජනවාරි සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි මඟින් මිලදී ගැනීම් 25ක් පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණු අතර, එම වෙන්දේසි 25න්, 23ක් පිළිබඳව මෙම කමිටුව මඟින් කිසිදු සාක්ෂි විමසීමක් කර නැත. තවද, 2016 මාර්තු මස 29 වන දින බැඳුම්කරය පිළිබඳවද විස්තරාත්මක සාක්ෂි විමසීමක් කර නැත. විස්තරාත්මකව සාකච්ඡා කර ඇත්තේ 2015.02.27 දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුව පිළිබඳව පමණකි. ඉතිරි වෙන්දේසි 23 පිළිබඳව කිසිදු සාක්ෂි විමසීමක් නොකිරීම මෙම

පරීක්ෂණයේදී නිවැරදි තීරණයක් ගැනීමට අපහසු තත්ත්වයක් උදා කරන ලදී. එසේ හෙයින්, ඉදිරි පරීක්ෂණයකදී 2008 වසරේ සිට 2016 දක්වා වූ කාලය තුළ සිදු වූ සියලුම බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි සහ private placements සෘජු ලබාදීම් පිළිබඳව විස්තරාත්මක පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතුව ඇත. විශේෂයෙන්ම එම සාක්ෂි විමසීමේදී forensic audit පැවැත්වීමද අත්‍යවශ්‍ය වන බව පෙනේ.

අපි නිර්දේශ වශයෙන් ඒක දමමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ කරුණ අවසන් නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2008 ඉඳලා 2016 දක්වා කාලය තුළ සම්පූර්ණ විනිශ්චයක් කරන්න ඕනෑ, including forensic audit.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට ඊ ළඟ ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්න තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන්. මේ වාර්තාවෙන් පිටු පහක්ම ඉවත් වනවා. 8.2 ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය තිබෙනවා නේ. කලින් අවාසිය calculate කරපු විධියටම තමයි මේකත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත්, අපි කොහොමද මේක කඩා ගත්තේ කියලා මට දැනගන්න ඕනෑ. 40 වෙනුවට 77ක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම නිසා සිදු වූ අවාසිය කියන එක නේ අපි අර්ථ කථනය කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 40 සිට උඩට යන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට 40 අපි 4කට කඩා ගත්තේ කොහොමද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා: 10 ගණනේ 4ක් නේ අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට පළමුවෙනි එක 10 හරි. ඒකේ පාඩුවක් නැහැ. එහෙමද? විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ 131 පිටුව බලන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පළමුවෙනි 40ම අලාභ තිබෙන්න බැහැ. 40ක් දාලා 70ක් ගන්නවා නේ? Am I right?

ඩබ්ලිව්.ජී.ඒ. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: පළමුවෙනි එක අවසන් වන්නේ 33න් වෙනි පිටුවේ මැදින් 256 කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Audit Report එකෙන් කියන එක මට ලේසියි. 33න් වන පිටුවේ මැදින් 258 කියනවා නේ. ඒක පළමුවෙනි එක නොවෙයි, දෙවෙනි එක. ඊට ලේසියි, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ Report එකේ 131 පිටුව බලමු. යාවත්කාලීන එකේ 131 පිටුව. ඒකේ නේ calculation එක තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගණන දැම්මේ කීයද?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Forty.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They were planning to get 40.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Yes.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: They took 70.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Seventy seven.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Fortyවල සිට උඩට යන්න ඕනෑ නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔක්කෝම 40න් ගන්න බැහැ, 10-10 blocks නේ දුන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 40න් කීයක් ගත්තාද කියන එක ඉවත් වන්න ඕනෑ. ඊට පස්සේ එතැනින් එහාට ගත් ගණන අනුව නේ calculate වෙන්නේ. If you have an auction for Rs. 1 billion, whatever you take more is a loss.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Yes. මේ calculation එකට අනුව. That is true. ඒකේ පළමු එක තිබෙන්නේ 31 sequence- එතකොට 31 sequence එක bid price එකක් තිබෙනවා, රුපියල් 84යි, ශත 35ක්. අර 9.25- 2020 series එකට ඒ ගොල්ලන් රුපියල් 84ක් තමයි දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතැන loss එකක් නැහැ. ඒ loss එකක් නැත්තේ මොකද? ඒක 10 වන තෙක් අරගෙන තිබෙන නිසා. හැබැයි, කලින් එක යනවා නම්, loss එකක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත්, ඒක නැහැ. මෙහෙම ගියොත් loss එකක් නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ තිබෙන්නේ 2020 ඒ series එක 1025 කූපන් එකත් එක්ක. ඒකේ 100,065,000වලින් නැවැත්වූවොත්, ඊට පස්සේ ගන්න හැම එකක්ම loss එකක් හැටියට තමයි calculate කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. Same basis එකේ තමයි යන්නේ. අපේ policy ගැටීමක් නේ මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ 77 ගත්තේ ඒ 77 මුළු අවශ්‍යතාවම auction එකෙන් පුරවන්න ගත් තීරණය නිසා නේ? ඒ තීරණයත් එක්ක අපට loss එකක් calculate කරන්න පුළුවන්ද, බැරිද කියන ගැටලුව මතුවනවා. අර same position එකම තමයි මෙතැනටත් දාන්න වන්නේ. එතකොට policy difference එකක් පමණයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඕකට මම එකඟ වන්නේ නැහැ. මට තව පේළි තුනක් පමණ add කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමා මේකට එකඟ වන්නේ නැද්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කිව්වේ මට තේරුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ computation එකට-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි ඒකට එකඟ නැහැ කියලා මුලින්ම කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එකඟ නැහැ නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා කිව්වා, මනඃකල්පිත අවස්ථාවක් කියලා. I want to explain even more than that.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම ඇතුළත් කරන්න එපා. අපි ඔක්කෝම එකට-

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි කෑමෙන් පස්සේ නැවත පස්වරු 2.00ට සභාවේ වැඩ ආරම්භ කරමු.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී දිවා ආහාරය සඳහා කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවන ලදී.)

දිවා ආහාර විවේකයෙන් පසුව, පස් වරු 02.05ට කාරක සභාව නැවත ආරම්භ විය.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ අවසන් කොටස් ටික නිසා අද ඉවර කරගන්න අපි උපරිම වශයෙන් උත්සාහ ගනිමු.

8 (ii)හි කොටස් ටික හරිද? ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාට ජේළි දෙක තුනක් එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑය කියා කිව්වා නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, අප කොටසක් අත්හැරියා නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හොඳ වෙලාවට ඒක මතක් වුණේ, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. මේක ඉතාම වැදගත්. මාර්තු මාසයේ 29 වැනි දා bond එක තිබෙනවා නේ. මාර්තු මාසයේ 29 වැනි දා bond එක උදේ offer කළා නේ. උදේ offer කරලා, කට්ටිය bond එකට bid කරලා bond එක ගත්තා. Perpetual එක යම්කිසි ප්‍රමාණයක් ගත්තා. අනික් කට්ටියත් යම්කිසි ප්‍රමාණයක් ගත්තා. එදා හැන්දෑවේ සමරසිරි notice එකක් issue කළා. ඒ notice එකේ දවසත් මාර්තු 29වැනි දා. ඒකේ කියනවා, "අප ඇමෙරිකන් ඩොලර් බිලියන 3ක US Dollar bonds market එකට නිකුත් කරන්න යනවා" කියා. මේක අතිශයින්ම වැදගත්, එදා bond market එකේ ratesවලට. අප ඉහළ ratesවලට bond එක ගත්තා. නමුත්, market එකේ මේ බව දැනගෙන හිටියේ කවුද? මේ බව දැනගෙන සිටි කට්ටිය ලොකුවට bonds ගත්තා. මොකද, market එකේ interest rate එක පහළට යනවා, බැහැපු ගමන් අපට ලොකු profit එකක් තිබෙනවා කියා ඒ අය දන්නවා. මෙතැනදී මහ බැංකුව පැත්තෙන් අතිවිශාල වැරැද්දක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මොකද, මේ එදා දවසට අවශ්‍යම information එකක්, එදා bond එක ඉවර වනතුරු තියාගෙන හිටියා, publish කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක කලින් දන්න මිනිස්සු වැඩේ දුන්නා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. නිර්දේශ යටතේ කියන්න වෙනවා, "කවදාවත් මෙහෙම දේවල් කරන්න බැහැ" කියා. නමුත්, ඒ නිර්දේශවල නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Note එකේ ලියන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක ලියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "මෙහෙම සිදුවීමක් සිදුවී ඇත" කියා කෙටියෙන් කියමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ කොටස ඇතුළත් කළ යුතු තැන මම පසුව කියන්නම්.

මාර්තු 29වැනි දා -බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළ දින හැන්දෑවේ- බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවෙන් පසුව මහ බැංකුව විසින් notice එකක් issue කර තිබුණා, -

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: දැන්වීමක් නිකුත් කර තිබුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මහ බැංකුව ඇමෙරිකන් ඩොලර් **මිලියන** 3,000ක බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වෙනවා කියා දැන්වීමක් නිකුත් කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: බිලියන 3ක් කියලා, -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. බිලියන 3ක.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එදිනමද, ඊට පසුවද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ අය ගන්න බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: දවස් කීපයකින් -අප්‍රේල් 11වැනි දා- කැඳවුම් කරලාත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, සති දෙකක් ඇතුළත.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: බිලියන 3ටම කැඳවලාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, ඩොලර් බිලියන 3කට.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: Notice කරලා කියන්නේ, කැඳවීමක් කරලාද?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Notice on request for proposals to be considered.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ , request කරලා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඩොලර් බිලියන 3ක් වෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ. Notice on request for proposals to be considered for appointment of lead managers.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Rs. 450 billion. මොකද නැත්තේ? 450, 150න් වැඩි වන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ බව notice එකකින් දැන්වූවා. මෙම දැනුවත්වීම එදින ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ ලංසු තැබූ primary dealersලා අතර යම්කිසි primary dealersලා දැනගෙන හිටියා නම්, ඒ තොරතුර ඔවුන්ට වඩාත් වාසිදායක වූ බව නිසැකයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම සංවේදී සහ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියේදී මිල තීරණය කිරීමේදී වැදගත් වන කරුණු පිළිබඳ පාරදෘශ්‍යභාවයකින් කටයුතු කළේ නම්, එක් ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවෙකුට හෝ කිහිප දෙනෙකුට එම තොරතුරුවලින් අයුතු වාසියක් ලැබීමට ඇති ඉඩකඩ අහිමි කළ හැකිව තිබිණි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඩොලර් බිලියන 3ක් එදා හවස දෙනවා කියා නිවේදනය නිකුත් කිරීම ඊට පෙර මේ බව කවුරු හෝ දැනගෙන සිටියාද කියන කාරණයයි එතැනින් අදහස් විය යුත්තේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එදා උදේ හැමෝටම කිව්වා නම් හැමෝම equal තත්ත්වයකට පත් වෙනවා. එහෙම නොකර හවස නිල වශයෙන් කිව්වා. ෂුවර් එකටම එක්කෙනෙක් දෙන්නෙක් දැනගෙන හිටියා. එතකොට ඒ අය "ටක්" ගාලා play කරනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකයි වුණේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒවා issue වුණාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තවම නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිවරුනි, මන්ත්‍රීවරුනි, මට මේ කාරණය ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? අප දැන් "පාඩු ගණනය කිරීම" කියන කාරණයේ නේද ඉන්නේ?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ කාරණය අවසන්. දැන් 9වන කාරණය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම කිව්වා නේ, මට ඒකට කාරණයක් ඇතුළු කරන්න ඕනෑය කියා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක තමයි ඇහුවේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක පොඩි කාරණයක්. මට විනාඩි තුනකින් පමණ අවසන් කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකේ මගේ තර්කය මෙයයි. අපට ලැබුණු සියලු තොරතුරු අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය කියන එකේ රීතිය ගැන report එක බැලුවොත් අපට පැහැදිලි වෙනවා. ඒ රීතියට පටහැනි වෙන්න නම්, ව්‍යතිරේකයක් අවශ්‍ය නම් තමයි 2008දී Board Paper එකක් මාස තුනකට ගෙනැත්, ඊට පසුව යළිත් මැයි මාසයේ දෙසැම්බර් මාසය වනතුරු ගෙනැත් වෙනස් තත්ත්වයක් මත සෘජු ක්‍රමයට ගත්තේ. ඒ සෘජු ක්‍රමයට ගන්න එකෙත් ප්‍රශ්න සහගතයි. පෞද්ගලික primary dealersලාට දෙන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එකත් ප්‍රශ්න සහගතයි. ඒ වාගේම captive sourcesවලට විතරයි දෙන්න පුළුවන් කියා තමයි ඒ Board Paper එක අනුව සඳහන් වන්නේ. 2009න් පසුව හදිසි අවස්ථාවක් යටතේ, සෘජු ක්‍රමය යටතේ ලබාගන්න පුළුවන් කියා කිසිම Board Paper එකක් නැහැ. සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිත කළොත් මේක මහඟරවා ගන්න පුළුවන් කියන උපකල්පනය මතය තමයි අප මේ ගණනය කර තිබෙන්නේ.

අනික් කාරණය මෙයයි. එහෙම නම් සෘජු ක්‍රමය මතත් වෙන්දේසි මිලටම ගන්න ඕනෑ. වෙන්දේසි මිල බිලියනයක් ලෙස දැම්මොත්, ගත්තේ 10.12ට නම්, එතකොට ඊට වඩා ඉහළින්, ඒ ළඟ ප්‍රමාණයට ගන්න පුළුවන් සෘජු ක්‍රමයට. ඊට ඉහළින් ගන්නා සියල්ලම පාඩු සහගතයි. අනික් එක, සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිත කිරීමේදී captive sources පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්ද compensation එකක් ගෙවන්නේ නැතිව කියන එකත් ප්‍රශ්න සහගතයි. අප ඒ ප්‍රශ්න සහගත තත්ත්වය මත තමයි මේ ගණනය කරන්නේ. හරි ක්‍රමය නිවැරැදි ක්‍රමයක් කියා ගණනය කරලා තමයි අප මේ පාඩුව ගණනය කරන්නේ. ඒ කාරණය අප සලකා බලන්න ඕනෑ, මේ ගණනය කිරීම ඒ ඒ පදනම් මත හරිද කියා. ඒක ඇතුළත් කළොත් පමණක් මේ කාරණය පැහැදිලි වෙනවා.

මම ඒ කාරණය කෙටියෙන් කියන්නද? මේක start එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔය කීවැනි පිටුවද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 30වන පිටුවේ, අන්තිම.

මාර්තු 29වැනි දින බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවේදී සිදු වී ඇති, විගණනය විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලදුව, ඇස්තමේන්තු අවාසිය.

මම මේ කාරණය එතැනට ඇතුළත් කරන්නම්. එතකොට හරි ද කියා බලන්න.

"මෙම අවාසිය ගණනය කර ඇත්තේ සෘජු ක්‍රමය නිවැරදි ක්‍රමවේදයක් වශයෙන් භාවිත කළ හැකි පසු බිමක් තුළ පමණි. නමුත්, සියලු ලියකියවිලි සහ අත්පොත -manual එක- පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේදී අපට පෙනී යන්නේ 97 වර්ෂයෙන් පසුව බැඳුම්කර හඳුන්වා දීමෙන් පසුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය රීතිය වශයෙනුත්, සෘජු ක්‍රමය හදිසි අවස්ථාවලදී ව්‍යතිරේකයක් ලෙස භාවිත කළ හැකි බවත් ය. තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිත කිරීමේදී මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල විශේෂ පත්‍රිකාවක් මඟින් එය කළ යුතු බවත් අනාවරණය වේ. තවද, 2008 වසරෙන් පසු එවැනි මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල අවසරයක් ලැබුණු බවට කිසිම සාක්ෂියක් අප වෙත ලැබී නොමැත. තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයේදී විශේෂයෙන්ම රජයේ අරමුදල් භාවිත කළ යුතු බවට පැහැදිලි සඳහනක් එම මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවල ඇත. තවද, එහිදී එම අරමුදල් ආරක්ෂා වන ලෙස කොන්දේසි කිහිපයක්ද එම පත්‍රිකාවල ඇතුළත් වී ඇත. තවද, 2008.01.07 එම්බී/පීඩී/1/26/2008 මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවට අනුව සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයේදී ඇති විය හැකි අගතීන් පහක් (1,2,3,4,5) "possible implications" යනුවෙන් අවදානම් තත්ත්වය එහි දක්වා ඇත. එනම්, සෘජු ක්‍රමය රටෙහි පවතින අස්ථාවර තත්ත්වයක් සහ අත්‍යවශ්‍ය අවස්ථාවක පමණක් මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල අවසරයක් ඇතිව භාවිත කළ හැකි ව්‍යතිරේකයක් ලෙස ඉතාමත් පැහැදිලි වේ. එසේ නම් අවාසිය ගණනය කිරීමේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිත කළ හැකි යයි උපකල්පනය කිරීම නිවැරදි නොවේ."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : "කළ හැකියි" නොවෙයි. "කළ යුතුයි"

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "කළ යුතුයි" නොවෙයි. "සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිත කළ හැකි බව නිවැරදි නොවේ."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : "කළ යුතු බව"

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක තමයි අදහස් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "කළ හැකි බව හෝ කළ යුතු බව උපකල්පනය කිරීම නිවැරදි නොවේ."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ කියවමු ටික නැවත අහලා බලමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔක්කෝම කියවන්න.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය : "මෙම අවාසිය ගණනය කර ඇත්තේ සෘජු ක්‍රමය නිවැරදි ක්‍රමවේදයක් වශයෙන් භාවිත කළ **යුතු පසු බිමක්** තුළ පමණි. නමුත්, සියලු ලියකියවිලි සහ manual පරීක්ෂා කිරීමේදී **අපට** පෙනී යන්නේ **97** වර්ෂයෙන් පසුව බැඳුම්කර හඳුන්වා දීමෙන් පසුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය රීතිය වශයෙනුත්, සෘජු ක්‍රමය හදිසි අවස්ථාවකදී ව්‍යතිරේකයක් ලෙස භාවිත කළ හැකි බවත් ය. තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිත කිරීමේදී මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල විශේෂ පත්‍රිකාවක් මඟින් එය කළ යුතු බවත් අනාවරණය වේ. තවද, 2008 වසරෙන් පසු එවැනි මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල අවසරයක් ලැබුණු බවට කිසිම සාක්ෂියක් අප වෙත ලැබී නොමැත. තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයේදී විශේෂයෙන්ම රජයේ අරමුදල් භාවිත කළ යුතු බවට පැහැදිලි සඳහනක් එම මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවල ඇත. තවද, එහිදී එම අරමුදල් ආරක්ෂා වන ලෙස කොන්දේසි කිහිපයක්ද එම පත්‍රිකාවල ඇතුළත් වී ඇත. තවද, 2008.01.07 එම්බී/පීඩී/1/26/2008 මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවට අනුව සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිතයේදී ඇති විය හැකි අගතීන් පහක් "possible implications" යනුවෙන් අවදානම් තත්ත්වය එහි දක්වා ඇත. එනම්, සෘජු ක්‍රමය රටෙහි පවතින අස්ථාවර තත්ත්වයක් සහ අත්‍යවශ්‍ය අවස්ථාවක පමණක් මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල අවසරයක් ඇතිව භාවිත කළ හැකි ව්‍යතිරේකයක් ලෙස ඉතාමත් පැහැදිලි වේ. එසේ නම් අවාසිය ගණනය කිරීමේදී සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිත කළ හැකි හෝ කළ යුතු බව උපකල්පනය කිරීම නිවැරදි නොවේ."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සෘජු ක්‍රමය නිසි ක්‍රමය ලෙස-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : "අවාසිය ගණනය කිරීමේ පදනමක් ලෙස සෘජු ක්‍රමය නියමිත ක්‍රමය ලෙස සැලකීම සාධාරණ නොවේ." කියා ඇතුළත් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "සාධාරණ නොවෙයි" කියා නොවෙයි, "වැරදි සහගත වේ."

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට කෙටුම්පතේ 8.2 යටතේ තිබෙන වගුව අයින් වනවාද, එහෙම නැත්නම් එලෙසම තබනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : වගුවට උඩින් තිබෙනවා නේ අකුරු ටිකක්. ඒ අකුරු ටිකත් අයින් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නේද? ඒ කියන්නේ, 8.2 සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ඉවත් කරනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා :ඒක එලෙසම තියනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ගණනය කරපු එක නේ. ඒක අපට අයින් කරන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා :ඒක මෙහෙම ලියන්න. "ගරු විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය අනුව මෙසේ දක්වා තිබුණද," කියලා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 8.2-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා :ඒක අපි කලින් ඇතුළත් කළා නේ. "මනඃකල්පිත හා උපකල්පනය කරන ලද-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා :ඒක අපි ඔතැනට ඇතුළත් කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අවාසිය කියලා-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ 23වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙන එකද? මෙතැනටත් ඒකම දාන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඊළඟට අපට 37වැනි පිටුවට යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට සිදුවූ මූල්‍යමය අවාසිය.

"මෙම බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවේ තවත් විශේෂිත කරුණක් වන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණයට යටත් වන සහ ප්‍රාථමික වෙන්දේසියෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් ඇති ආයතනයක් ලෙස සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල වැඩි ඵලදායී අනුපාතිකයන් සහිත ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් සාපේක්ෂව අඩු බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණයක් ලබාගෙන තිබූ අතර, අඩු ඵලදායී අනුපාතිකයක් සහිතව ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් මිලදී ගැනීම හේතුවෙන් ලබාගත හැකිව තිබූ මූල්‍ය වාසිය අහිමි කරගෙන තිබූ බවයි.

ඔවුන්ට අවශ්‍ය ඉතිරි බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රමාණය ඍජුවම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් මිලදී ගැනීමට අයදුම්කර හෝ නොමැතිව ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් මිලදීගෙන තිබීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වන බවද විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මඟින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි. මහ බැංකුවේ මුදල් මණ්ඩලයේ භාරකාරීත්වයේ පවතින ආයතනයක් වන සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල මෙලෙස කටයුතු කිරීම පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකුව විසින් අවධානනය යොමු නොකිරීම ද ප්‍රශ්නකාරී තත්ත්වයක් බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මඟින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි."

ඒක හරි නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : 38වැනි පිටුවේ 3වැනි ඡේදියට පසුව මේ විධියට සඳහන් කරන්න.

"සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ අරමුදල් ප්‍රාථමික ගනු දෙනුකරුවන්ට අයුතු වාසියක් ලබා ගැනීම පිණිස යොදා ගැනීම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් පසු ගිය වසර 5ක කාලය තුළ නිරීක්ෂණය වී ඇත. එම තත්ත්වය තව දුරටත් සිදුවන බවද පෙනේ. එසේ හෙයින් සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල සතු අරමුදල් වඩාත් ඵලදායී ලෙස ආයෝජනය කිරීම පිළිබඳව විශේෂ ප්‍රතිපාදන සකස් කළ යුතුව ඇත."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, අපි කලින් සඳහන් කළ කාරණයත් ඇතුළු කරමුද? "EPF එකෙන් ගන්න එකත් ප්‍රශ්න සහගතයි" කියන එක. සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ මුදල් compensation නැතුව ගන්න බැහැ. 2008 දී සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට දුන්නේ උද්ධමනයටත් සියයට 6ක් උඩින් තියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ, ඒක වෙනස් කළා. 2007 මැයිවල ඒක වෙනස් කළා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying. That is wrong.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : "තවද, සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල තුළ ඇත්තේ මේ රටේ සේවකයන් විසින් සේවකයන්ගේ අනාගතය වෙනුවෙන් රටේ නීතිය ප්‍රකාරව ඉතිරි කරනු ලබන මුදල් වේ. එම මුදල් වඩා ඵලදායී ලෙස ආයෝජනය කරන ක්‍රමවේදයන් පිළිබඳව සහ එම මුදල්වල ආරක්ෂාව පිළිබඳව වැඩිමනත් නීතිමය ප්‍රතිපාදන සකස් කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාව කමිටුවේ අවධානයට යොමුවේ."

ඒක හරි නේද? ඒ කියන්නේ, සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ මුදල් ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් අලුත් අණපනත් හදන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක අපට පෙනී ගියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එතැනදී කියන්න ඕනෑ මේකයි. ඔබතුමා කලින් කිව්වානේ, අවුරුදු 5ක කාලයක් නිරීක්ෂණය කළා කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අවුරුදු 5ක කාලය වැඩිද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ, අවුරුදු 5ක කාලය හරි. අවුරුදු 6ක විතර කාලයක් ඉඳලා,-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එහෙම නම් අවුරුදු 5, අවුරුදු 6ක් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : "බැඳුම්කර වෙළෙඳ පොළේ සහ කොටස් වෙළෙඳ පොළේ" කියන එක ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඊළඟ එක මම කියන්නම්.

"9.3 ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතයක් තීරණය කිරීම හේතුවෙන් මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ සිදුවූ බලපෑම."

"2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් තීරණය කිරීමට පාදක කරගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවැති ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය සියයට 9.48ක් විය." ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා තමයි ඒක සඳහන් කළේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, auction එකට කලින් තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය 9.48 කියලා කියනවානේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවේ 63වැනි පිටුවේ ඇති වගුවේම තිබෙනවා;

"3.3. Government securities: primary, secondary market yield rates as per the week ending 25th February 2015."

හර්ෂ නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කිව්ව එක හරි. 30-year bond එක 10.14 යනුවෙන් ඒකේ සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : කීවෙනි පිටුවේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ 63වන පිටුව. මීට කලින් ඒක ඔබතුමාට evidence එකේදී click වුණා. 63වන පිටුවේ අවසානයට තිබෙන වගුව. අපි හැම තැනම සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ 9.48 කියලානේ. ඒකේ අන්තිමටම සඳහන් වෙන්නේ buying,- එතකොට අන්තිම ගණනයනේ එතැනට එන්න ඕනෑ. වඩා නිවැරදි ඒකනේ. අවසානයට තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය. ඒක 10.14. ඒක තමයි සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි නිවැරදි සාධකය. ඒ කියන්නේ, සුමානයක් ඇතුළත 66 basis points උඩට යනවා. Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva, did you understand how the interest rates are climbing high?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : පෙබරවාරි 25වැනිදා?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඔබතුමා mark-to-market කියලා එකක් ගෙනාවා මතකද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: So by 27th, it must have been climbing. So, 66 basis points have climbed within five days. ඒ කියන්නේ, you can see the upward trend on the interest rates.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔබතුමා කොහොමද දැක්කේ? කවදා එකද කලින් බැලුවේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මේ තියෙන්නේ last week average එක. That is 9.48. So, within four to five days, it is climbing. ඒක ඉතාම වැදගත් කාරණයක් ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. 10.14. අපි මේක miss කරලා තිබෙනවා. Rate එක දානකොට තැන් හතර පහකම සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ 9.48 කියලා. It is 10.14. ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ සාක්ෂියකින් විතරයි. මේ වගුවේම තිබෙනවා 10.14 කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඇත්තටම ඒක ඉතාම වැදගත් point එකක්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: 66 basis points within five days.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හොඳයි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හොඳටම හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා : අපට මේක ඉක්මනින් අවසන් කරගන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට අයිතිය තිබෙනවා ඕනෑ දෙයක් කථා කරගෙන යන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මේකේ ගැඹුරට බහින්න, බහින්න මේකේ තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්න අපට පෙනෙනවා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ගරු රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළේ ඉතාම තද point එකක්. මම argue කළා, අසීම්ගේ evidence එක අනුව 10.16 කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Perpetual Treasuries Limited නිලධාරියාගේ evidence එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්, Mr. Palisenaගේ evidence ඒකෙන් මම argue කළා. හැබැයි, මෙතැන තිබෙනවා එදා buying rate එක තිබුණේ 10.14යි කියලා.

ඉතින් කොහොමද අප කියන්නේ, 9.48 කියා? මෙය මඟ හැර යන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕක තමයි වැදගත්ම කාරණය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ, 25වන දායි. 27වන දා නොව, 25වන දායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, ඔය 25වන දායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 26වන දා එක බලන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 27වන දා තමයි ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ mark- to-market 1.6 කියා. Can you see how much it is climbing?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: That is a big point. We have to concede that.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Within four days, 66 basis points climbed up.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි ඒ, අර 5 අයින් කරලා 6.5 කරන්න කලිනුයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ, secondary market එකේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Primary market එකේ policy rate එක සියයට 1.5කින් වැඩි කළා නේ. Primary market එකේ policy rate එක සියයට 1.5කින් වැඩි කළාම secondary market එකේත් එය යම්කිසි විධියකට වැඩි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. අපි දන්නේ නැහැ, ඒ කීයකින්ද කියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ, වැඩි වන්න ඉස්සර වෙලායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. මේ, වැඩි කරන්න කලිනුයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ lectures අනුව three-day rule එක අනුව 1.5 climb up වන කොට 60 basis points උඩට යද්දී, can you imagine the interest rate in five days?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: My Learnened Friend, I concede your point. I did not see that.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ගිහින් study කළා mark-to-market කියන්නේ මොකක්ද කියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එය පුදුම විධියට බලපානවා නේ. මොකද කරන්නේ, ඒකට? නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, අපි ඒකට මොකද කරන්නේ? එතැනදී අපි කියනවා නේ, එදා තිබුණේ 9.4යි කියා. කොහේද අප ඒක කියන්නේ?

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ, පෙර සතියේ පැවැති- අප කියන්නේ, පෙර සතියේ පැවැති average එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට ඒක වැරැදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විනාඩියෙන් විනාඩිය නේ යන්නේ. විනාඩියෙන් විනාඩිය යන විට සතියක් දුර වැඩියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්තිමට තිබෙන එක නේ අප ගන්න ඕනෑ. අන්තිමට තිබෙන දත්තයි අප ගන්න ඕනෑ. "This week" එකේ.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: අප දැම්මේ, "last week" කියායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Last week කියා දැම්මාට ගානක් නැහැ. එහෙම දැම්මාම calculation ඔක්කෝම වැරැදියි. 9.48 ඉඳලා 10.1කට වැඩි වන කොට- එහෙම දැම්මාට පසුව එය indicate වුණේ නැහැ නේ. තනිකරම වැරැදියි නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ළඟම එක නේ දාන්නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: 27th කීයද දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මා හිතන්නේ 10.16 කියලායි. ඒක තමයි අරයා කියන්නේ. Mark-to-market කියා කියන්නේ-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මෙතුමා දාලා තිබෙන්නේ 9.48යි. last week එකේ average එකයි. මේ week එකේ 10.16යි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ week එකේ නොවෙයි. 25වන දා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, 25වන දා. දවස් දෙකකට කලින්.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Yes, that week.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: තවත් දවස් දෙකකුත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මේක නේ වැදගත්ම අංකය. ඒ කියන්නේ, 60 basis points වැඩි වෙනවා, ඒ දවස් හතරපහට. Three-day rule එකත් අයින් කරනවා, 27වන දා. එතකොට ඔය ඔක්කෝම ගණනය -අප ගණනය කරන interest rates- වැරැදියි. එවිට නිකම්ම spring එක වාගේ 11.5ට interest rate එක යනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි එය adjust කරන්න වෙනවා Auditor-General's Report එකේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තැන් දෙකකම තිබෙනවා එය.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එය වෙනස් කරන්න වෙනවා නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. ඕක තමයි පාදක කරගන්නේ, අපේ ගණනයට. 9.4 වාගේ ගණනකට තමයි තිබුණේ. ඊට පසුව එය 11 යි දශම ගණනකට ගියා කියලා නේ අප කියන්න හදන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ගණනය කරන කොට "අරක වැරැදියි. මේක වැරැදියි." කියා කිව්වාට Central Bank එකේ-

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, පෙර සතියේ කියන එකයි අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. එහෙම නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. හැබැයි පෙර සතිය කියන එක ගොඩක් පරණ වැඩියි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්. කමිටුවේ එකක් විධියට එය දාන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා එය සංශෝධනය කරන විධිය කිව්වා නම්, දමන්න පුළුවන් මෙතැනට.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එදා තිබුණු yield rate එක මේකයි කියා එයට යටින් දැම්මා නම් හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එවිට අපේ basis එක වෙනස් වෙනවා. අප build up කරන්නේ එක case එකක් නේ. 9.48 ගැන කියලා, ඒක වැඩි වුණා කියලා නේ අපි මෙච්චර කල් argue කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම දන්නේ නැහැ, ඔබතුමා මට වඩා හොඳට දන්නවා නේ මේ තුළ තිබෙන-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ point එක හරි. මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්න දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් තමයි, අපේ ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා ඇසූ කාරණය. පුවත් පත් දැන්වීමෙහි 12.5ක් කියා තිබුණා නේ. එය ඉහළ -high- ගණනක්. එතරම් ඉහළ rate එකක් පුවත් පත් දැන්වීමෙහි දැම්මේ ඇයි කියා ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහත්මයා ඇහුවා. පුවත් පතේ එහෙම දැම්මා නම් 11 යි දශම ගණන ගත්තාම, එහි තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මොකක්ද කියා එතුමා ඇහුවා. එය සාමාන්‍ය පුරවැසියකු අහන ප්‍රශ්නයක්. මගේ හිතටත් එය එනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: හැබැයි ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා, එම ඡේදයේම යටින් කියැවෙනවා-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කුමන ඡේදයේද කියා මට කියන්න?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කමිටුවේ report එකේ -(38) පිටුවේ- 9.3 බලන්න. එහිම යටින් සඳහන් වෙනවා, "...තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපල සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය. ...." කියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකත් වැරැදියි නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 10.14යි. සාමාන්‍යය තමයි-

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, සාමාන්‍යය -average- එක තමයි දාලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි, සාමාන්‍යය නොවෙයි නේ මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහි තිබෙන භාෂාව බලන්න. "පමණක් විය." කියා නේ තිබෙන්නේ. අපි ඒක නේ ඔප්පු කරන්න හදන්නේ. මේ Interest rate එක හරි low, එය උඩ ගියා කියන එක නේ අපි ඔප්පු කරන්න හදන්නේ. භාෂාවෙන්ම මෙය පෙනෙනවා. "පමණක් විය." කියායි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතැන පරස්පරයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. පළමුවැනි වාක්‍යයේ කියනවා "....පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපල සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 9.48 ක් විය." කියා. ඊට පසුව ආපසු කියනවා, "...තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපල සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය. ...." කියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන ලොකු ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. මොකද, මෙතැන කියන්න හදන්නේ, 9.48ක් තිබෙන විටත් 12.5ක් දුන්නේ ඇයි කියා නේ. හැබැයි 9.48ක් නොවෙයි තිබුණේ. 25වන දා වන කොට තිබුණේ 10.14යි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: It is a huge difference.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Yes, it is a huge difference.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ මුළු case එකම මෙමඟින් අනෙක් පැත්ත හැරෙනවා. ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා, it is a huge gap. Three-day rule එක අයින් කළාම it is about a 2.5 per cent difference.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන ගැටලුව තිබෙන්නේ, three-day rule එක අයින් කරපු එක මෙහි නැති එකයි. Three-day rule එක අයින් කරපු එක මෙහි තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට අමතරව, මේකත් වැරැදියි නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, ඒ කාරණය ගොඩක් වැදගත්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මෙහි භාෂාව බලන්න කෝ. "10.03 ක් පමණක් විය." කියායි තිබෙන්නේ. Report එකේ concentrate කර තිබෙන්නේ 9.48 කියන එකයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහි ලියා තිබෙන විධිය ටිකක් නිවැරැදි මදි.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: වෙනස් කරන එක-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, මෙහි වැදගත්කම- මාසයක් ඇතුළත මේ increase එක වුණා නම් කමක් නැහැ.

Within about three, four days, you can see an increase of about 1 per cent.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Okay. I will agree.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක නිවැරැදි කරමු දැන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මොහොතක් ඉන්න. අපි එක එක දේවල් කියනවා. මට හරියටම මේ point එක තේරුණේ නැති හින්දායි අහන්නේ. නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මේ කියන කතාව - ඒ කියන්නේ 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27වන දිනට කලින් සතියේ ද්විතීයික වෙළඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 9.48ක් වුණා කියා- ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබුණාට, එය 10.14ක්ය කියා ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා කියන කථාවට ඔබතුමා එකඟ වෙනවාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: එය මෙතැනත් සඳහන් වෙලා තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ buying rate එකේ average එකයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මා කියන්නේ. 9.48ක් කියන figure එක 10.14ක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියා ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නවාද? එච්චරයි. පිළිගත්තොත් අපට එය දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ උත්තරයක් නොවෙයි මා බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ උත්තරයක්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අප average එකයි දාලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: දෙකේම average නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්, දෙකේම average එකයි දාලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. මෙහි optics එකේ ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. 9.48ට තියෙද්දී 12.5ට කූපන් එකක් දැම්මේ ඇයි කියන ප්‍රශ්නය බැලු බැල්මට තදයි. නමුත් 9.48 මෙතැනට අදාළ නැහැ. අදාළ වන්නේ 10.3යි.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: අපි සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක පසුව නේ ලියා තිබෙන්නේ. එය ලියා තිබෙන්නේ නිකම් addendum එකක් වාගෙයි. 9.48ට තිබෙන විට ඇයි 12.5ට දුන්නේ?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. ඒක නේ මේ argument එකේ basis එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එලෙස තිබියදී 12.5ක කූපන් එකක් දෙන්නේ ඇයි? "...තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම්... අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතීයක වෙළඳපල සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය..." කියායි සඳහන් වන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "පමණක්" කියායි සඳහන් වන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: "පමණක්" කිව්වාම, 9.48ත් වඩා අඩුයි වාගෙයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : "පමණක්" කියන එක වැඩක් නැහැ. "විය" කියා සඳහන් කරමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : "10.3ක් පමණක්" කියන එක "10.03ක් විය" කියා කිව්වා නම් හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : අපි වාක්‍යයෙන් වාක්‍යයට ගනිමු. කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ 9.3 ඡේදය කියවන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා : කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ 9.1 ඡේදය සහ 9.2 ඡේදය නිවැරැදියි නේ. ඒ ඡේද දෙක එහෙම ම තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : 9.3 ඡේදය කියවන්න. 9.3 ඡේදයේ වාක්‍යයෙන් වාක්‍යය ගනිමු. "2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් තීරණය කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 9.48ක් විය." කියන එක හරිද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඊළඟට, "එලෙස තිබියදී අදාළ වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා .... - මා හිතන්නේ ඒ වාක්‍යය එතැනින් අයින් කරමු. පස්සේ අහන question එක ඔබතුමන්ලා අහන්නේ ඒ නිසා නේ. එහෙම ගණන හදා ගත්තේ කොහොමද කියලා නේ අහන්නේ. "එලෙස තිබියදී අදාළ වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා 12.5%ක ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කර තිබුණි." කියන ඒකත් හරි නේ. "තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03ක් පමණක් විය." කියන එක වැරැදියි.

9.3 ඡේදයේ ඉහතින් සඳහන් වන්නේ, "ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය" කියලායි. ඊට පසුව එම ඡේදයේම සඳහන් වනවා, "ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය" කියලා. ඒ වාක්‍ය දෙකේම වචන සමානයි නේ. එතකොට ඒ වාක්‍ය දෙකේ අගයන්

දෙකක් වශයෙන් සඳහන් වුණේ කොහොමද? ඒ දෙකම කියන්නේ සතියකට කලින්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : තව එක වරදක් තමයි, මෙහි සඳහන් කරනවා, "දින දෙකකට පෙර" කියා. දින දෙකකට පෙර සතියක් නැහැ. දින දෙකකට පෙර තිබෙන්නේ දිනයක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : එතැන බලන්න ඕනෑ, auction එකට දවස් දෙකකට කලින් rate එක කීයද කියලා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : දින දෙකකට පෙර average එක ගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, අපි 9.3 ඡේදය ගැනයි සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ. පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ඒ ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් තේරුම් කර දෙන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, දැන් අපේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ 38වන පිටුවේ 9.3 ඡේදයේ මෙසේ සඳහන් වනවා: "2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් තීරණය කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 9.48ක් විය. එලෙස තිබියදී අදාළ වෙන්දේසිය සඳහා 12.5%ක ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කර තිබුණි. තවද වෙන්දේසියට දින දෙකකට පෙර එනම් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03ක් පමණක් විය. ඒ අනුව 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසි සඳහා ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතය ලෙස සියයට 12.5 තීරණය කළ ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවීය".

දැන් මෙතැන පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙන්නේ. එදා 25වන දා ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළේ 30-year bond එකට තිබී තිබෙන spread එක තමයි, 10.14යි, 9.92යි. Buying 10.14යි, selling 9.92යි. එතකොට average එක 10.03යි. එතකොට මේකේ කරුණු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. 10.03, එහෙමත් නැත්නම් selling rate එක 10.14 කියන එක 9.48ට වඩා සෑහෙන වැඩියි. ඒක නිවැරැදියි නේ. එතකොට 9.48 සහ 12.5 අතර තිබෙන තරම් ලොකු වෙනසක් මෙතැන නැහැ. ඒක තමයි මේ සාකච්ඡා වන්නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : ඇත්තටම මේ වාර්තාවේ එහෙම කියන්නේත් නැහැ, කියන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේත් නැහැ. Comparatives විතරයි සඳහන් වන්නේ. එයට අවශ්‍ය විශේෂ කාරණාවක් තිබෙනවා නම් සඳහන් කිරීම සුදුසුයි. ඒකේ ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මේක secondary market එක. ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි එතැන තිබෙන්නේ. Secondary market එකේ තිබෙන එකයි, ඊළඟට පරණ bond එකකුයි අතර වෙනස තිබෙනවා. ප්‍රධානම ප්‍රශ්නය මේක justify කරලා නැහැ. මේ වන කල් justification එකක් ගන්න බැරි වුණා. ඒකේ justification කියන එකෙන් අදහස් වන්නේ මේ නිසා මෙතැනට එනවාය කියන එක නොවෙයි, 12.5 ගත්තේ මොන පදනමින්ද කියන කාරණයයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මා verbatim එක කියෙව්වා, justify කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා දැන ගන්න. මට මතක නැහැ, කොහේද තිබුණේ කියලා. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ survey එකක් කරනවාය කියනවා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : Survey එකක් කරනවා නම් survey එකේ papers තිබෙන්න එපා යැ. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම එහෙම මොනවත් බැහැ. එහෙම තිබෙනවා නම් ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. Changes ඕනෑ දෙයක් කළාට ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීමේදී ගත්ත තොරතුරු අනුව තමයි ඒ කාරණය දැම්මේ. ඒ නිසා අපි මේ gap එක reconcile කරන්න ගියේ නැහැ. මෙහෙම secondary market එකේ gap එකක් තිබෙනවාය කියන කාරණය කිව්වා විතරයි. 12.5කට justify කරන්න කිසිම evidence එකක් දුන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලෝ researches කරනවාය කියලා papers දෙන්න කිව්වා. නමුත් එහෙම කිසි දෙයක් දෙන්නත් බැරිව ගියා. ඒ කාරණය විතරයි කියන්නේ. ඒක අවශ්‍ය විධියට කර ගන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා : ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, පොලී අනුපාතයේ බලපෑම සම්බන්ධයෙන් තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ 28වන පිටුවේ 5.1.19 ඡේදයේ සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම සඳහන් වන්නේ. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව දුන් පිළිතුරෙන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ පිළිතුරට බලපෑමක් නොවන නිසා මෙය යාවත්කාලීන වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙනවා. එහි උපලේඛනයේ පිටු අංක 152 – 153 දක්වා සඳහන් වනවා. එහිදී මේ පිළිබඳව කළ සාකච්ඡාව තුළ නිශ්චිත verbatim එකක් නැහැ. ඒ වෙලාවේ ප්‍රශ්න කිරීමක් කෙරිලා නැහැ. ඒ නිසා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය ම සනාථ වන කාරණාවක් නිසා තමයි ඒ කාරණය මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කළේ. ඒකේ contradiction එකක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. ලේඛනවල කොහේවත් contradiction එකක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය මෙයයි. අපි කරන්නේ සංකීර්ණ subject එකක් නේ. අපට ඕනෑ ගණන් ලියන්නත් බැහැ, අපට ඕනෑ

ප්‍රශ්න අහන්නත් බැහැ. දැන් මේ වාර්තාව අනුව තිබෙන දේ ඉතාමත් පැහැදිලියි. මේ රටේ අන්තිමට තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය මොකක්ද? අපට තිබෙන වාර්තාවලට අනුව අවුරුදු 30 bond එකෙන් 10.14 ලැබෙන්නේ. ඒ වන කොට අන්තිමට තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය 10.14යි. මේ 25වන දාට තිබෙන ප්‍රමාණයයි. ඒක නේ සඳහන් වන්න ඕනෑ. වැදගත් වන්න ඕනෑ ඒකයි. අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒකයි වැදගත් වන්නේ.

අනික් කාරණය තමයි, ගිය සුමානේ 9.48ට තිබුණු ප්‍රමාණය දවස් පහකින් 10.14 දක්වා වැඩි වනවා. එතකොට පෙනෙනවා, මේ දවස් ගණන තුළ interest rate එක sixty basis points වැඩි වෙලා තිබෙනවාය කියලා. ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවට අනුව අපි ගණනය කරනවා නම්, ඒක තමයි වැදගත් වන්නේ. මේක 8 තිබ්බලා වැඩි වුණා නම්, you can see the upward trend. මෙතුමා කියන විධියට මේක 11 ඉඳලා පහළට බහිනවා නම් පහළට බහින එකක් අපි උස්සා තිබෙනවා. ගිය සුමානේ 9.48ට තිබුණා කියන්නේ විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක වෙනසක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒකට තවත් angle එකක් තිබෙනවා. කවදාද, newspaper එකේ publish කළේ?

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය : 25, 26 දවස්වල.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : 25 නම් 25 දිනය ගත යුතුයි.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය : මේ ගොල්ලෝ coupon rate එක calculate කරන්නේ ඊට පෙර සතියේ secondary market average එක සලකා බලලායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Average එක සලකා බැලුවාම අනික් එක මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : එතුමිය කියන එක නිවැරැදියි. ගිය සුමානේ average එක සලකා බලනවා. එතකොට upward trend එක පෙනෙනවා නේ. මේ සුමානේ බැලුවාම -

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : ඔය අනුපාත දෙකම පිළිබඳව ලොකු formula එකක් තිබෙනවා.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය : 25වන දා rate එක එන කොට මේක publish කරලා ඉවරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ මොකක් හෝ formula එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : තිබෙනවාය කියලා කියනවා. අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. අපි ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් අපට දීලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ලැබී නැත්නම් ලැබී නැහැයි කියා ලියන්න ඕනෑ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : ඒකේ අදහස නැහැයි කියන එක තමයි. තීරණය කළ ආකාරය අනාවරණය නොවේ කියා සඳහන් වන්නේ ඒ නිසායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මෙයින් අදහස් වන්නේ, මෙපමණ අඩු ප්‍රමාණයට තිබුණු පොලී අනුපාතය 12.5කට හදලා තිබෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එකයි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : ඒක අනාවරණය වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අනාවරණය අපි දන්නේ නැත්නම්, ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ formula එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක ලියවෙන්න ඕනෑ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : අපි formula එකක් ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් දීලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අපට නැති එකක් ලියන්න බැහැ නේ. අපට දුන්නේ නැහැයි කියලා අපට ඕනෑ ඒවා ලියන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඉල්ලුවත් දීලා නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා, දීලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, අපි දන්නේ නැත්නම් ලියන්න ඕනෑ, "අපි formula එකක් ඉල්ලා තිබෙනවා. නමුත් formula එකක් ලැබිලා නැහැ. ඒ නිසා ඒ ගණනය කළ ආකාරය පිළිබඳව අපට පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් නොමැත" කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙර්රා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, formula එකක් තිබෙනවා කියන එක කොහෙන්ද හම්බ වුණේ? Formula එක හම්බ වුණේ නැහැ. නමුත් formula එකක් available කියන එක කොහෙන්ද හම්බ වුණේ?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අය කිව්වා. ඒ අය වාචිකව කියනවා නේ, formula තිබෙනවා. research කළා . ඒ වාගේ කාරණා කියනවා නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අපි ඇහුවා, formula එකට ගන්නේ මොනවාද කියලා. නමුත් ඒකට උත්තරයක් ලිඛිතව දුන්නෙත් නැහැ, වාචිකව දුන්නෙත් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙහි භාෂාව බලන්න කෝ. ඉතා පැහැදිලියි නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මන්ත්‍රීතුමා දැන් හරිනේ. මේක ඉක්මනට ලියමු. 9.3හි සඳහන් දේ කෙටියෙන් කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම කෙටියෙන් කියන්න ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හරි, කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතයක් තීරණය කිරීම හේතුවෙන් මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ සිදු වූ බලපෑම:

"2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනට ස්ථාවර පොලී අනුපාතිකයක් තිරණය කිරීමට පාදක කර ගන්නා ලද පෙර සතියේ පැවති ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 9.48ක් විය." ඉතිරි වාක්‍ය ඉවත් කරලා කියන්නම්. තවද, "2015 පෙබරවාරි 25 දිනට පෙර අවසන් සතියේ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ සාමාන්‍ය ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.03 ක් පමණක් විය." තවද, 25 වන දින පොලී අනුපාතය වූයේ 10.14 කි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ පත්තර දැන්වීම දැම්මේ එදා ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක ලියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තවද, අදාළ වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳ පුවත් පත් දැන්වීම ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කළ 2015.02.25 දින පොලී අනුපාතිකය වූයේ 10.14 කි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කරුණු මෙසේ තිබියදී වෙන්දේසි සඳහා 12.5 ක,- මේ ඡේදය මෙහෙම්ම තියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එකී වෙන්දේසිය පිළිබඳව 2015.02.25 දින ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන ලද පුවත් පත් දැන්වීමේ සියයට 12.5ක පොලී අනුපාතිකය සඳහන් කර තිබුණේ යම් සමීක්ෂණයක් සහ සමීකරණයක් අනුව බව මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් විසින් වාචිකව විගණකාධිපති වෙත පවසා තිබුණ ද, එවැනි සමීක්ෂණයක වාර්තාවක් හෝ ඊට අදාළ සමීකරණයක් හෝ විගණකාධිපති වෙත ලබා දීමට මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් අපොහොසත් වූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, අපි මෙහෙමයි කිව්වේ. එහෙම සමීක්ෂණයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා කිව්වාට සමීක්ෂණයේ වාර්තාව දුන්නෙත් නැහැ. formula එකක් තිබෙනවා කියලා කිව්වාට formula එකක් දුන්නෙත් නැහැ, කියලා. ඒකට තවත් කොටසක් එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ. සභාපතිතුමනි, 10.14 තිබුණ දවස කවද්ද? මම කලින් කියපු එක කියන කොට 25 වැනි දින 10.14 ක් තිබුණා කියලා කිව්වා නේ. බලන්න, මම අන්තිමට කියපු එකේ 25 වැනිදා පොලී අනුපාතය 10.14 ක් කියලා කිව්වා ද? තවද, ඉහත කී පුවත් පත් දැන්වීම පළ කර 2015.02.25 වන දින ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය 10.14 ක් විය. තවද, three-day rule එකේ effect එකත්,-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Three-day rule එක effect වෙන්න 12.5 දැම්මේ bond එකට දවස් කිහිපයකට කලින්නේ. දැන් three-day rule එක ඉවත් කළේ bond එක දවසේ නේ.

පාර්ලිමේන්තු නිලධාරිනියක්: තවද ඉහත කී පුවත්පත් දැන්වීම් පළ කළ 2015.02.25 දින ඵලදා අනුපාතය 10.14 ක් විය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම කරුණ පිළිබඳව විශේෂ අවධානයට ලක්විය යුතුව ඇත. 9.4 වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීමෙන් මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට වැඩි වාසිදායක තත්ත්වයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකිවීම. ඒක අපේ මූලධර්මවලට හානියක් නැත්නම් තිබුණට කමක් නැහැ. කියන්න බලන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තනිකරම හානියක් වෙනවා. වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වුණේ නැහැ නේ. දැන් තිබෙන ක්‍රමය තමයි වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය. වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් විතැන් වුණේ 2008 දී ඍජු ක්‍රමයටයි. ඒ special Board approval එකක් අනුව දෙසැම්බර් මාසෙ වෙනකම් විතරයි. දෙසැම්බර් මාසෙන් පස්සේ කිසි Board approval එකක් නැහැ, ඍජු ක්‍රමයට. එතකොට විතැන් වීමක් සිදුවෙලා නැහැ. වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය තමයි පවතින ක්‍රමය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 9.4හි තිබෙනවා, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන්වීමෙන් මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට වැඩි වාසිදායක තත්ත්වයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකිවන බවට විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති තර්කය පිළිබඳ නියම තත්ත්වය. "..වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන්වීමෙන් මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට වැඩි වාසිදායක තත්ත්වයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකිවන බවට වූ විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ මතය පිළිබඳ කමිටුවේ අදහස." -"කමිටුවේ අදහස" කියලා එය වෙනස් විය යුතුයි. ඊට පසුව අපි මේ තිබෙන දේ කියලා පිළිතුරක් දෙමු.

අපි මුලින්ම මේ තර්කය ලියමු. "ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළ ගනුදෙනු, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම නිසා ඵලදායිතා අනුපාතිකය පොලී අනුපාතිකයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් ගැනීම නිසා රජයට අමතර පිරිවැයක් දැරීමට සිදුවන බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් සවිස්තරව පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි. වට්ටම් කළ අගයකට බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන්ට අළෙවි කළද ඒවායේ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ මිල ඉහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන්ට මෙම ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ විකිණීම මගින් වැඩි

ලාභ ආන්තිකයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් ලැබෙන බවත් එම තත්ත්වය තුළ රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසිදායක තත්වයක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත විතැන් වන බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි.

කෙසේ වෙතත් මින් විස්තර කර ඇති පරිදි අත්පොතේ B (i) පරිච්ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන නීතියෙන් පිළිගත් කාර්ය පිටපාටිය අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය රීතිය බැවින් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම නිසා අවාසියක් සිදුවන බවට වූ තර්කය පිළිගත නොහැකිය.''

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් තද වැඩියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නම් පොඩ්ඩක් අඩු කරලා දෙන්නකෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තද වැඩි වුණේ, දොළහමාරක් වැඩියි කියන එක පිළිගන්න බැහැ කියන එක -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. මේ ඒක නොවෙයි. මේ වෙන එකක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ වෙන point එකක්. We are on 9.4. ගරු හර්ෂ මැතිතුමනි, මේ කථා කරන්නේ - වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම වැරැදියි කියලා අදහසක් තිබෙනවා නේ, එයින් හානියක් වුණා කියලා. අපේ මුල් තර්කයට යනවා. අපි ගිහිල්ලා කියනවා, වෙන්දේසි විතැන්වීම Rule එක නිසා මේ විධියට තර්ක කිරීම වැරදියි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකට කූපන් එක පටලවා ගන්න එපා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කූපන් එක නැහැ මෙහි. ඔබතුමා 9.4 කොටස කියවා ගන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ''ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළ ගනුදෙනු, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම නිසා ඵලදායිතා අනුපාතය පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් ගැනීම නිසා රජයට අමතර පිරිවැයක් දැරීමට සිදුවන බව ....'' ඔව්, ඔව්. ඒක වැරැදියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ලේකම්තුමිය, මෙහෙම දමමුද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කියපු එක කපන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තියනවා. ඒකේ තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද?

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: **''**කෙසේ වෙතත් මින් විස්තර කර ඇති පරිදි අත්පොතේ B (i) පරිච්ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන නීතියෙන් පිළිගත් කාර්ය පිටපාටිය අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය රීතිය බැවින් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම නිසා අවාසියක් සිදුවන බවට වූ තර්කය පිළිගත නොහැකිය.**''**

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ''තවද, වෙන්දේසියට විතැන්වීමක් කළ යුතුව නැත.''

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඕනෑ නැහැ. Rule එක කිව්වාම -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But you have to understand that with the Board Papers the Rule was changed to the direct placement in 2008.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි නේ, තිබෙන්නේ. මාතෘකාව තිබෙන්නේ, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන්වීමෙන් මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට වැඩි වාසිදායක තත්ත්වයක් - මේ කියන්නේ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට මේ මොකක්ද කියන්නේ? වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය විතැන් වීම කියලා කියන්නේ, රීතිය direct placement.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, එය අපි පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ කියලා තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ කියන වචනය එන්න ඕනෑ නේ. ඒක ඇවිල්ලා නැහැනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Manual එකේ B (i) අනුව රීතිය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය නිසා මෙහෙම තර්කයක් නඟන එක logical නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වුණත් ගිය සටහන්වල සටහන් වුණේ, රීතිය වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය - මම විස්තර කරන්නම්. ඉස්සර වෙලා මෙතැන අදහස් ගොඩක් ප්‍රකාශ වුණා නේ. ඒ වුණාට වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයත් පුළුවන්, direct placementතුත් පුළුවන් කියන තර්කය තමයි පළමුවෙන්ම ගොඩ නැඟුණේ. Monetary Board එකේ approvalsවලින් ඒ තර්කය බිඳුණා. ඒක තිබෙන්නේ, 2008 ඉවර වෙනකම් විතරයි. එතකොට දිගටම රීතිය පැවතුණා කියන එක සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ නැහැ. ඒක මෙතැනට අදාළ නැත්තේ - මෙතැන කියන්නේ auctionවලට යන එක policy එකක් විධියට වැරදියි, නීතිය විධියට වැරදියි කියන තර්කය මත නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: යන එක නොවෙයි, විතැන් වීම.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විතැන් වීම කියන්නේ switching නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, switching.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඉතින් මොකක්ද කියන්නේ?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then you must agree that the system which was in place is the direct placement system. That is obvious. For example, I switch from this chair to the other chair. Then I have been in this chair.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තමයි. අපි කියනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ තර්කය වැරදියි කියලා. That is all. ඒකනේ අගට කිව්වේ. **"**මෙසේ තර්ක කරන ලද නමුත්, මේ හේතුව නිසා පිළිගන්නේ නැත." That is all. ඕනෑවට වඩා comment කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. එතැනින් එහාට ගියොත් ඒක personal.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: ඕනෑ නම් to make it even better, add කරන්න පුළුවන් -

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly. That is what I am saying.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: අන්තිම වාක්‍ය ඕනෑ නැද්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අන්තිම වාක්‍ය ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඇතුළත් කළා නේද?

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: "වෙන්දේසියට විතැන්වීමක් කළ යුතු නැත."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "කළ යුතු නැත."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පටලවන්න එපා. මම ඒකට කැමැති නැහැ. මම කියවපු ටික නැවත කියවන්න.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: "කෙසේ වෙතත් මින් විස්තර කර ඇති පරිදි අත්පොතේ B (i) පරිච්ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන නීතියෙන් පිළිගත් කාර්ය පිටපාටිය අනුව වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය රීතිය බැවින් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම නිසා අවාසියක් සිදුවන බවට වූ තර්කය පිළිගත නොහැකිය**."**

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම එතැනින් නතර කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "වෙන්දේසියට විතැන්වීමක් සිදු වූ බවට පිළිගත නොහැක." විතැන්වීමෙන් අවාසියක් නොවෙයි, වෙන්දේසියට විතැන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "වෙන්දේසියට විතැන් වීමෙන් අවාසියක් වූ බවට විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් නඟනු ලබන තර්කය පිළිගත නොහැක."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඉතින් හරි නේ. අපි ඒකනේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නේද තිබෙන්නේ? මම කිව්වේ ඒක නේද? "විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් නඟනු ලබන තර්කය පිළිගත නොහැක." That is all.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපිට ඕනෑ නම් තව මෙහෙම clarify කරන්න පුළුවන්, "ඵලදායිතා පොලී අනුපාතය තීරණය වන්නේ..." -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ ගැන අපි කලින් කිව්වා. Then, 9.5.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම නිසා රජයට අයත් ආයතන මගින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වලව තිබුණු බව...." - එයත් වැරදියි නේ. Direct placements ගත්තේ රජයේ ආයතනවලට දීලා නේ. That is totally wrong.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "බැදුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන් වීම නිසා රජයට අයත් ආයතන මගින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වලව තිබුණු බව..." - මේ කියන එකේ තේරුම මොකක්ද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඇත්තටම සාර්ථකව රජයේ ආයතන වෙන්දේසිවලින් ලබාගෙන නැහැ. ඒකයි කියන්නේ. මම හිතන්නේ එහෙමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ ඒ ගොල්ලන් වෙන්දේසියෙන් ලබා ගැනීමට පුරුදු වෙලා හිටියේ නැහැ කියලා. ඒ නිසා රජයට ලබා ගන්න පුළුවන් වාසිය ලබා ගන්න බැරි වුණා කියලා -

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: පුරුදු කථාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ තිබෙන්නේ, "...මහජන බැංකුව, ලංකා බැංකුව වැනි රාජ්‍ය ආයතන බැදුම්කර වෙන්දේසිවලින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වලව තිබුණු බව..." -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ, direct placement කළා නම් මේවා රජයට -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Direct placement පාවිච්චි කළ නිසා auctionsවලට ගියේ නැහැ නේ. Auctionවලට එතකොට පුරුදු වෙලා හිටියේ නැහැ. Auctionsවල සම්බන්ධතාව මේ ගොල්ලන්ට තිබුණේ නැහැ කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කළා නම් හොඳයි. මටත් තේරුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව කියවන්නද? පිටු අංක 39 - 5.3.1: "2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනෙන් පසු බොහෝ බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබූ පළමු අවස්ථාවේ සිටම බැඳුම්කර වෙනුවෙන් වට්ටම් සහිත මිල ගණන් එනම් නාමික අගයට වඩා අඩු අගයන්ට මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් වී තිබුණු අතර එහි ප්‍රතිඵලය වූයේ එලදා අනුපාතිකය පොලී අනුපාතයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් ගෙන තිබීමයි. මෙමගින් රජයට අමතර පිරිවැයක් දැරීමට (ආයෝජකයන්ට වට්ටම් ලබා දීම) සිදු විය. එනම් මුහුණත අගය රු.100ක බැඳුම්කර වට්ටම් සහිතව ඊට වඩා අඩු අගයකට අළෙවි කළද, බැඳුම්කරය කල් පිරීමේදී රුපියල් 100 බැගින් ආපසු ගෙවිය යුතු වීම හේතුවෙන් එම වට්ටම් වටිනාකම බැඳුම්කරය නිකුත් කළ දිනයේදීම රජයේ අමතර වගකීමක් බවට පත්වීම වේ. වට්ටම් කළ අගයකට බැඳුම්කර ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට අළෙවි කළද ඒවායේ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ මිල ඉහළ මට්ටමක පැවතීම හේතුවෙන් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ට මෙම බැඳුම්කර ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ විකිණීම මගින් වැඩි ලාභ ආන්තිකයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාවක් ලැබෙන අතර එම තත්ත්වයන් තුළ රජයට ලබා ගත හැකිව තිබූ වාසි සහගත තත්ත්වයක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත විතැන් වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. මෙම පසුබිම තුළද සම්පූර්ණ මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවම සපුරා ගැනීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති මිල ගණන් පිළිගෙන වෙන්දේසි මගින්ම වට්ටම් සහිතව බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කර තිබුණි."

" ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදය පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකුව විසින් ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර විගණන ඡේදය සඳහා බලපෑමක් ඇති නොකරන බැවින් සහ වෙනත් තොරතුරු මගින් මෙම ඡේදය පිළිබඳ නොඑකඟතාවයක් නොවූ බැවින් මෙම ඡේදය යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවට ඵලෙසම ඇතුළත් කරන ලදී" යොමුව: උපලේඛනයේ පිටුව 158-159

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේකේ අදහස වෙන්නේ මොකක්ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියෙව්වේ කී වෙනි පිටුවෙන්ද සභාපතිතුමා?

සභාපතිතුමා: 39 පිටුවේ 5.3 එකේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සිදුවූ ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනස්කම් සමඟම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුතුවලදී ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වූ සේවක අ ර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල ජාතික ඉතිරි කිරීමේ බැංකු අරමුදල් කළමනාකරන සමාගම, මහජන බැංකුව, ලංකා බැංකුව වැනි රාජ්‍ය ආයතන බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිවලින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වල වී තිබුණු බව විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මගින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

" ක්‍රමවේදයේ වෙනස්කම් සමඟම" ඒ මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: වෙන්දේසියෙන් රජයට අවාසියක් වුණා කියන කොටස තමයි ඊළඟ එක තිබෙන්නේ. 9.5.1ට තමයි ඊළඟ කොටස අදාළ වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේකේ මාතෘකාව වෙනස්කරමු. " බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන්වීම කියන වචනය අයින් කරමු. මොකද ඒකට debate එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ විතැන්වීම ගැන. බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය භාවිත කිරීම තුළ, රජයට අයත් ආයතන මගින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වලව තිබූ බව" අපි ඒකේ මාතෘකාව වෙනස් කරනවා. විතැන්වීම වෙනුවට "බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය භාවිත කිරීම නිසා රජයට අයත් ආයතන මගින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වලව තිබූ බව"

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: "විතැන්වීම" අයින් කරනවා. "නිසා" කෑල්ල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ අගට එකතු කරමු. " එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් තුළ-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ එකතු කරන්නේ කොතැනටද?

අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මාතෘකාවට නොවෙයි. 9.5 ඡේදය අගට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මගින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මම කියපු එක තමයි එතුමා අදහස් කර තිබෙන්නේ. එතුමා අදහස් කර තිබෙන්නේ, **auction** එක නිසා direct placementsවලදී captive sourcesවලට අවස්ථාව දෙනවා නේ. ඒක මේ අයට auction ක්‍රමය නිසා අවස්ථාවක් නොමැති වීම. ඒකයි මෙතුමා කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Primary dealersලාගෙන් තමයි ගිහින් වැඩි මිලට අර ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක නේ ETP එකත් captive source එකක් විධියට recognize කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කියන්නේ. .

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒකයි Insurance Trust Fund එක ඔක්කොම එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කෙළින්ම දැම්මා නම් හරි නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක වෙනම නිර්දේශයක් විධියට යන්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි නිර්දේශයක් දාලා මේකට එකතු කරමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේකට අපට එකඟ වෙන්න බැහැ නේ. අපි කියන්නේ auctionsවලදී හැම දෙනාටම සාධාරණ අවස්ථාවක් තිබෙනවා කියන එක නේ. ඒකේදී අපි කියන්න ඕනෑ ආණ්ඩුවේ දේවල් ඒ වාගේම competitive වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ සමහර ආයතනවලට auction එකේදී ගන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ETF එක primary dealer කෙනෙක් නොවෙයි.

ඩබ්ලිව්. පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ETF සහ Insurance Trust Fund එකට primary dealership එකක්වත්, authorized dealership එකක්වත් නැහැ ඒ අය ආයෙත් දෙන්න ඕනෑ primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට මොකක්ද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: **ඒක කෙරෙන්න** ඕනෑ primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මහජන බැංකුව, ලංකා බැංකුව තිබෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ අයට primary dealership තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ වාක්‍ය වැරදියි. උදාහරණය වැරදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පටලවාගන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක අයින් කළොත් ප්‍රශ්නයක්ද? මේක complicated නේද? මේක විස්තර කරනවා නම් සෑහෙන්න විස්තර කරන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඡේදයක් පිටින් අයින් කරන්න එපා. අපේ argument එක යටින් තියන්න. නැත්නම් numbers වෙනස් වෙනවා. අනිවාර්යෙන් මේක compare කරනවා නේ alternative views තිබෙනකොට. එතකොට ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: උඩ වෙනස් කළාට පසුව ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ යට එක. උඩ විතැන් ක්‍රමය කියන්නේ නැතිව "බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට රජයට අයත් ආයතන මගින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වලව තිබූ බව". එහෙම තිබ්බා නම් හරි නේද? Otherwise, it will get complicated.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මෙතැනදී මම හිතන්නේ, මෙතැනදී අපි කියන්න ඕනෑ, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට යාමෙන් විශේෂයෙන්ම EPF එකට සහ ETF එකට වෙන්දේසියට යන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පටලවා ගන්න එපා. ඕනෑ කෙනෙක්ට වෙන්දේසියට යන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ යන්නේ එක්කෝ සෘජුවම ඔයගොල්ලන්ට license එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් සහ EPF එකට license එකක් නැතුව primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා වෙන්දේසියට යන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Their point is, they must have direct access. ඒකයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Direct access තිබෙනවා ඕනෑ කෙනෙක්ට, through a primary dealer.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what they are saying.

ගරු(ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. Primary dealer කෙනෙක් ඇවිල්ලා primary market එකෙන් වෙන කෙනෙක් සඳහා ගන්නවා. දැන් Bank of Ceylon එක ඇවිල්ලා Perpetual Treasuries වෙනුවෙන් ගත්තානේ තුන්දහසක්. ඒක ගිහින් වෙන ගණුනකට විකුණන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක ඒ ගණුනට දෙනවා. They are broker dealers. පොඩි brokerage commission එකක් තිබෙනවා. නැතුව මිලෙහි ලොකු වෙනසක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Still, it is a loss.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: No, it is not a loss. It is a small, minute cost.

එතැන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ primary market එකෙන් අරගෙන EPF එකට Secondary market එකේදි විකුණුවොත්. එහෙම කළොත් තමයි loss එකක් තිබෙන්නේ EPF එකට. එතකොට EPF එකට හරි Bank of Ceylon එකට හරි ඕනෑම captive source එකකට. එතකොට private

placement කළත්, cost එකක් තිබෙනවා. Auction කළත් එම cost එකම තිබෙනවා. එතකොට private placement එකේ සිට auction ක්‍රමයට ගියා කියලා cost එකේ වෙනසක් නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමන්ලා මා කියන දේ තේරුම් ගන්නවාද? Private placement එකෙන් ගත්තත්, auction එකෙන් ගත්තත් ETF එකට යන වියදම එකමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන්නේ, private placement එකේ chance එක ගන්න පුළුවන්. Auction එකේ ගන්න chance අඩුයි. Auction එකේ තමයි ලාභය එන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම එකක් නොවෙයි.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Private placementsවලදී private කිව්වාට මිනිසුන්ට දෙන එකක් නොවෙයි. නැවතත් dealersලා හරහා යන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Cost එක එකයි.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Cost එක නැහැ. Cost කියන්නේ ඔබතුමන් කියන විධියට brokerage එක නොවෙයි. Interest rate එකේ difference එක. මොකද private placement එකේ interest එක නතර වෙනවා. නතර වෙලා ඒ interest rate එකට තමයි මේ අයට ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ. නමුත් අර පැත්තට යන කොට එහෙම ගිහිල්ලා discount එකකුත් එක්ක-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමන් මෙතැන ටිකක් පටලවාගෙන. එහෙම වෙන්නේ නැහැ. වෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. මම දකින විධියට මම ETF එක. Central Bank එකට යන්නේ. ETF එක හැටියට කෙලින්ම Central Bank එකට යන්න බැහැ. ETF එකට යනවා නම් මම primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා යන්න ඕනෑ. Primary dealer කෙනෙක් හරහා ගිහිල්ලා, මට අදාළ නැහැ කොයි ආකාරයටද Bond එක ලබා ගන්නේ කියලා. මම සමහර විට auction එකෙන් ලබා ගන්නවා වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මම සමහර විට private placement එකෙන් ලබා ගන්නවා වෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔය මොන ක්‍රමයෙන් ලබා ගත්තත්, මගේ transaction cost එක එකයි. මොකද මම ගෙවන්න ඕනෑ primary dealerට transaction cost එකක්. මෙතැන transaction cost එක වෙන් කර ගන්න ඕනෑ cost එකෙන්. Transaction cost එක කියන්නේ මම ගෙවන brokerage එක. Cost එක කියන්නේ මම primary auction එකෙන් අරගෙන ඒක මට transfer කර ගන්නවා transaction cost එක ගෙවලා. ඒක එක විධියක්. එහෙම නැත්නම් මම primary වෙන්දේසියට යන්නේ නැතුව මම බලා ගෙන ඉන්නවා. මොකද මම බලාගෙන ඉන්නේ, මම යන්නේ නැහැ. මගේ තරඟකාරය ගිහින් ගන්නවා. මට එයත් එක්ක වෙනම side deal එකක් තියෙනවා. එයා අරගෙන මට වෙන ගණුනකට secondary market එකේ විකුණනවා. මේ දෙක පටලවා ගත්තොත් වැඩේ upset යනවා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Private placement ක්‍රමයට යන කොට ඔය කියන විධියටම ඔබතුමන් කියන කාරණය හරි. නමුත් auction එකට යන වෙලාවේම එයා තීරණය කරලා එයාගේ මිලට තමයි එන්නේ. එතකොට secondary market එකට එන්නේ නැහැ. Secondary market එකට ආවාම තමයි gap එක තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Secondary market එකට ගියොත් තමයි පාඩුව තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක වෙනම දාන්න ඕනෑ. මේ cost එක කියන එක primary market එකේ cost එකක් එන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක hypothetical situation **කියන පැත්තේ/eaka** තිබෙන්නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: Hypothetical නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Secondary market එක අඩු වුණොත්?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක පසුව වෙන දෙයක් නේ. එහෙම වුණොත් අපි ගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි කියන්නේ, ඒක hypothetical. පස්සේ වෙන දෙයක් කියන්නේ ඒක විකෘති කරලා නේ. It is always up අපි උඩ කියලා. පල්ලෙහා, secondary market එකේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 1ක් purchase කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ගන්නවා නම්, purchase වෙන issue එක ගැනයි එතැන කියන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is what I am saying.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒක විසඳා ගනිමු. මේ වාක්‍ය නැවතත් කියවමුද? If you do not mind? බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට විතැන්වීම නිසා,-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: "විතැන් වීම නිසා" කියන එක ඉවත් කළා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කියවනකම් ඉන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: "රජයට අයත් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වල වී තිබූ

බව'' කියලා නේ තිබෙන්නේ. මේකෙන් කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? වෙන්දේසියට ගිය නිසා ETF එකට cost එක වැඩි වුණා කියලා නේ. අපි ETF එක කියලා ගනිමු කෝ.

එල්.එස්.අයි. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒ කියලා තිබෙන්නේ, cost එක ගැන නොවෙයි කියන්නේ participation එක ගන්න තිබුණු bond quantity එක අඩු වෙලා කියලා තමයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: The Hon. Harsha, listen to me. They are trying to say auction එක යන කොට ඉස්සර Direct Placementsවල මේගොල්ලන්ට ETF ඒවාට ගන්න තිබුණු අවස්ථාව වැඩියි. මොකද fixed rate එකක් තිබෙනවා, බලලා ගන්න පුළුවන්. Auction එකේ ඒ risk එක අරගෙන යන්න පුළුවන් ability එක is limited for these - රජයේ ආයතනවලට. මම වැරදි නම් නිවැරදි කරන්න. ඒ රජයේ ආයතනවලට chance එකේ possibility එකේ sacrifice එකක් කරන්න වෙනවා because of the Auction System කියන එක තමයි මේ කියන්න හදන්නේ. මම නිවැරදිද කියලා මම දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන විධිය තේරුම් ගන්න අපහසු නම්, තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් විධියට ලිව්වාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: What they are saying is, -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම පොඩි කාරණයක් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම අපි realistic ගත්තාම රජයේ ආයතනවලට මේගොල්ලන් ආපහු ගිහිල්ලා Secondary market එකෙන් තමයි අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. මොකද, auction එකට ගිහිල්ලා මේගොල්ලන්ට place කරගන්න බැහැ. මොකද, EPF එක ගත්තොත්, high rate එකකට, auction එක යන්නේ නැහැ. මොකද, risk එක ගන්න කෙනෙක් නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is correct.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ නිසා ඒ ගොල්ලන් කරන්නේ Secondary market එකෙන් නොවෙයි, ඒ වැඩ ඉවර වුණාට පස්සේ එතැනින් ගිහිල්ලා යම් වැඩි ගණනකට දමලා තිබෙන්නේ. අපටත් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන දේ මම පිළිගන්නවා. ඒක තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන් ආකාරයට ලිව්වා නම් හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මෙතැන පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. අපි මේ ගණනය කරගෙන එන්නේ EPF, ETFවලට compensation එකක් නැතිව primary දෙන්න එපා කියලා නේ. ඒක නේ අපේ argument එක. 2008 Board Paper එක අනුව - you must always secure Government's funds. අපට ඕනෑ විධියට interest ratesවලට ගන්න පාවිච්චි කරන්න බැහැ. ඒ විධියට පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන්, උද්ධමනය වාගේ ඔක්කෝටම කොන්දේසි සහිතවයි. එතැනදි තමයි ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය එන්නේ. ඒක පහසු වෙන්නේ EPF, ETFඑකට decision අරගෙන ඒ primary එක ගන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙනවා. මේ ක්‍රමවේදය නැත්නම්, Direct Placement එකේ ගන්න ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැහැ. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට අලුතෙන් Board Paper එකක් ඇවිල්ලා ගන්නවා නම්, ඒ කථාව නිවැරදියි. ඔබතුමා කියන argument එකත් හරි. පෞද්ගලික ආයතන වාගේ risk එකක් අරගෙන මේගොල්ලන් auction එකට යන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක නිවැරදියි, ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. මම මේ විධියට දැම්මොත් හරිද බලන්න. ''බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට,-

සභාපතිතුමා: 9.5 කියන මාතෘකාවේ වෙනසක් වෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මාතෘකාව වෙනස් කරලා මේ විධියට ලියන්න. මම කියන විධිය නිවැරදි නම්, ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්න. ''බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේදී වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගැනීමේදී රජයට අයත් ආයතන මඟින් සාර්ථක ප්‍රතිඵල ලබා ගැනීම දුර්වල වී තිබුණු බවට නිගමනය වේ.''

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: I think, it is okay. මම හිතන විධියට අපට කියන්න ඕනෑත්, ඒක නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Listen. 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 කියන ඒ වාක්‍යම ඉවත් කරලා මේ විධියට ලියමු. ''වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට අනුව රජය මඟින් පාලනය වන සහ රජයේ ආයතනවල අරමුදල් බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගැනීමේදී තරඟකාරී ක්‍රමවේදයට බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගැනීමට අපොහොසත් වේ. එයට හේතුව වනුයේ, එම අවදානම දැරීමට එම රජයේ ආයතනවලට හැකියාවක් නොමැති වීමයි. එම නිසා තරඟකාරී ක්‍රමවේදයකට රජයේ ආයතනවලට වෙන්දේසියේදී බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදයක් සපයන්නේ නම්, ඒ උපරිම

ලාභය ලබා ගැනීමට රජයේ අරමුදල්වලට හැකියාව ලැබෙන බවට COPE කමිටුව නිගමනය කරනු ලබයි."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්, ඒ විධියට ලියන්න. That is okay.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඒක නිවැරදියි නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කමිටුවේ අදහස විය යුතුයි. එකක් දමන්න.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: Sir, 9.5 මාතෘකාවට පසුව නේද ඒ ටික එන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම මාතෘකාව වෙනස් කළා නේ.

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: මාතෘකාව යටින් තිබෙන ඡේදය ඉවත් කරලා මේ ටික ලියන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, ඔක තමයි අදහස. ඊළඟට 9.6හි තිබෙනවා, "ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාතයන් තීරණය වීම තුළ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වීම." කියන මාතෘකාව යටතේ, "ඉහළ පොලී අනුපාත සමඟ මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබීම හේතුවෙන් එම වෙන්දේසි සම්පූර්ණයෙන් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වූ අවස්ථා 5ක් 2015 – 2016 මැයි දක්වා කාලය තුළ වාර්තා වී තිබූ බවත්, ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් විසින් මහ බැංකුව අපේක්ෂා කරන මිල ගණන්වලට වඩා ඉතා ඉහළ මිල ගණන්වලටද මිල ගණන් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවක් ඇති වී තිබූ බවත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව මඟින් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලබයි." කියලා. (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඒක නිවැරදියි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නිවැරදියි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 10වැනි මාතෘකාව තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන්න යන්න නිර්දේශ ගැන නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඊට කලින් මේ වාර්තාවේ කොතැනක හෝ මේ කාරණය ගැන සඳහන් වුණාද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය එනවා. අපි Three Day Rule එක ඉවත් කළා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඇතුළත් කළා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Three Day Rule එක ඉවත් කළ නිසා සියයට 5 සිට සියයට 6.30 දක්වා ගිය එක මුළු Interest Rates Yield Structure එකම ඉහළ ගියා කියලා නිවැරදි තැනට ඇතුළත් කළා නේද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Yield Structure එක ඉහළ ගියා කියලා දැම්මේ නැහැ, Three Day Rule එක වෙනස් වුණා කියන එක විතරක් ලිව්වා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Three Day Rule එක වෙනස් වුණු නිසා Yield Structure of Interest Rates එක ඉහළ ගියා කියලා ලිව්වාද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මට මතකයි, ඒ විධියට ලිව්වා කියලා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක ලිව්වා නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉහළ ගියා කියලා ලිව්වේ නැහැ. Three Day Rule structure එක වෙනස් වුණා, 5 සිට 6.30ට ගියා කියලා ලිව්වා. ඒක ඉතින් සිතාගන්න ඕනෑ.

එස්.එන්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: ඒක check කරලා බලන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බලන්න දෙයක් නැහැ, අපි ලිව්වේ, Three Day Rule එක ඉවත් කළා, 5 සිට 6.30ට ගියා කියලා. Yield Structure එකම ඉහළ ගියා කියලා ලිව්වේ නැහැ. ඕනෑ නම්, ඒක මෙතැනට ඇතුළත් කරලා මෙතැනින් අවසන් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැනට දමන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක අවසන් වෙන තැනට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක අතනට දැම්මා නම් හරි. මේක හදන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැනට ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ විධිය ලියා ගන්න. "දින තුනෙහි රීතිය වෙනස් වීම තුළින් ඵලදා අනුපාතිකය - (Yield Structure) - ඉහළ ගිය බවට නිගමනය වේ." ලේකම්තුමිය, ඒක දින තුනෙහි රීතිය වෙනස් කළ තැනට ඇතුළත් කරන්න. ඊට පසුව 10වැනි මාතෘකාව තිබෙනවා, "2015 – 2016 මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති විසින් සකස් කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශ" කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශ 14ක් තිබුණා. ඒ නිර්දේශ 14 තමයි මේ ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවශ්‍ය විධියට ඒක අදාළ කරගන්න පුළුවන්, ඒ නිර්දේශ 14 ඒ විධියටම ලියනවාද නැත්නම් අනවශ්‍ය ඒවා ඉවත් කරනවාද කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපේ Structure එක වෙනස් වුණා නේ. ඒ Structure එකට අනුව මේ නිර්දේශ සකස් කරමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම හිතන විධියට නම්, එකක්වත් ඉවත් කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. අන්තිම නිර්දේශයේ පොඩි වෙනස්කමක් කරන්න තිබෙනවා. එපමණයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට වෙනස් කරන්න ඒවා තිබෙනවා. මම එකින් එක කියන්නම්.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඉක්මනට එකින් එක කියන්න කෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: (i) වැනි නිර්දේශය විධියට සඳහන් වෙනවා, "ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණවලදී මෙන්ම පවතින ක්‍රමවේදයන් වෙනස්කම්වලට භාජනය කිරීමේදී සහ නව ක්‍රමවේදයන් හඳුන්වා දීමේදී එමඟින් රටේ ආර්ථිකයට සිදුවන බලපෑම දිගු කාලීන හා කෙටි කාලීන වශයෙන් සලකා බලා අදාළ තීරණවලට එළැඹිය යුතු වන අතර, එලෙස කටයුතු කළ බවට පිළිගත හැකි සාක්ෂි අවශ්‍ය අවස්ථාවන්හිදී ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට හැකි වන පරිදි පවත්වාගෙන යෑම." කියලා. ඒක නිවැරදියි නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නිවැරදියි, ඒකේ ගැටලුවක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ii. ද්විතීයික වෙළඳ පොළද නියාමය කිරීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතු නොවන තත්ත්වයක් තුළ මූල්‍ය වෙළඳ පොළ හැසිරවීමේ හා නියාමය කිරීමේ කාර්යය වඩාත් ඵලදායීව ඉටු කිරීම අඩපණ වීම වළක්වනු වස් අවශ්‍ය සියලු දත්ත ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව පවත්වා ගැනීම.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: iii. මහ බැංකු විසින් නිකුත් කළ බැඳුම්කරයන් කල්පිරි මුදල් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා තමන් වෙත ඉදිරිපත් වන අවස්ථාව දක්වා එම බැඳුම්කරයේ හිමිකාරිත්වය හා ගනුදෙනු වන ආකාරය පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් පවත්වා ගැනීම.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: iv. රටක මහ බැංකුව කෙරෙහි පවතින විශ්වාසය එහි නිලධාරීන් විසින් ගන්නාවූ තීන්දු තීරණවල අවංකභාවය මතද රඳා පවතින හෙයින් හා විශ්වාසය දේශීය මෙන්ම අන්තර් ජාතික වශයෙන්ද පවත්වා ගත යුතු හෙයින් නිලධාරීන් ගන්නා වූ තීන්දු තීරණයන්ගේ අවංකභාවය කාල පමාවකින් තොරව ඒත්තු ගැන්විය හැකි පරිදි යම් කාල සීමාවන්ට යටත්ව හෝ හෝ විනිවිදභාවයකින් යුතුව කටයුතු කිරීම.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නෛතික තත්ත්වයන්ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේකයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද ඒවාටම සීමා නොවි -අන්න එතැන මට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා- ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ කළමනාකරණ තීරණයන්ට බලපෑම් කළ හැකි මට්ටමේ නිලධාරීන් හා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට සම්බන්ධිත ආයතන අතර යම් බැදියාවන්හි ගැටීම් පවතින්නේ නම් සද්භාවය පෙරදැරි කර ගෙන සුදුසු අනාවරණයක්ද සහිතව සිය කාර්යයන් ඉටු කිරීමට මහ බැංකුවේ ඉහළ කළමනාකාරිත්වය කටයුතු කිරීම.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: I will give you an example. මේකේ කියන්නේ නෛතික තත්ත්වයන්ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේකයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද ඒවාට සීමා නොවි කියලා නේ. මම මේකේ අනෙක් පැත්ත පෙන්වන්නම්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, මේකේ idea එක හරි. ඒ වුණාට ලංකාව වගේ රටක නිලධාරීන්ට මේ වගේ wide scope එකක් දෙන්න බැහැ. එහෙම දුන්නොත් මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමා පහළට ඇවිත් අර තීන්දුව ගත්තා නම්, රීති ගැන හිතන්නේ නැතිව conscious එක අනුව ගත්තා නම් මෙන්න මේ ගණනට 10 ගන්න කියලා තමන්ගේ බෑනාට කියලා යන්න පුළුවන්. අපි wide scope එකක් දෙනවා නිලධාරීන්ට තමන්ගේ discretion එක අනුව වැඩ කරන්න කියලා. එහෙම දුන්නොත් direct placementවලදී එහෙම තමන්ට ඕනෑ ඕනෑ කට්ටියට හිතලා දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ලංකාවේ නිලධාරීන් දැනටත් විනය අනුව කටයුතු නොකරන නිසා මේ වගේ scope එකක් expand කළොත් discretion එකට විශාල ප්‍රශ්න එනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Not a big deal nemei. It is a big deal. මේකේ රීති තිබෙනවා. මේ රීති අනුව නේ manual එක එන්නේ. ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ඇමතිතුමා manual එක එන්නේ guideline එකක් විධියට නේ. ඕනෑම දෙයක් කරන්න බැහැ නේ. Board එකට තීන්දු ගන්න වෙනවා. ඒවා ඔක්කොම documentary evidence එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ තීන්දු. මේකේ දෙන්නේ පුළුල් එකක්. දැන් හිතන්නකෝ, නෛතික තත්ත්වයන්ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේකයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද,

you do not have to consider those. According to your conscience and discretion you have to take decisions for the betterment of the country. If you include this, Mr. Arjuna Mahendran can come and say that I took it for the betterment of the country. I do not care about the manual, I do not care about the board paper. I have a conscience and I know that we need Rs.10 billion by Monday so I gave them the instructions and directions to take this money.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන දේ explain කරන්නද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් මේක දමන්න හේතු වුණේ අපේ accounting standardsවල තිබෙනවා related party transactionsවල කියලා වෙනම standard එකක්. ඒ standard එකේ close relationship එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් විතරයි, ඒ කියන්නේ family member කෙනෙක් වගේ ඉන්නවා නම් විතරයි disclose කරන්න කියලා මේකේ කියන්නේ. එහෙම නම් අනිවාර්යෙන්ම disclose කරන්න ඕනෑ financial statementsවල මෙහෙම relationship එකක් තිබුණා කියලා. Disclose කිරීම. මෙතැන තිබෙන මේ ගනුදෙනුවේදී කියනවා නේ relationship එකක් තිබුණා කියලා. ඒක තිබෙනවා නේ. තිබුණා. නමුත් ඒක disclose කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් නීතිමය වශයෙන් පැන නඟින්නේ නැහැ, අර කියන standard එකේ නැති නිසා. ඒ කියන්නේ close relationship එකක් කියන නිර්වචනය යටතට මේක වැටෙන්නේ නැති නිසා. අන්න ඒක නිසා තමයි අපි කියන්නේ එහෙම තිබුණේ නැතත් ethically තමන්ට එහෙම relationship එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක disclose කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම කියන එක හරි. මේක කියෙව්වාට ඔබතුමාගේ හිතේ තිබෙන දේ තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඒවාට සීමා නොවී කියන්නේ නැතිව ඒ තුළ සිට-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්න ඒකයි. ඒවාට සීමා නොවී කියන්නේ තිබුණත් ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලා නේ. ඔබතුමාට තේරෙනවාද? ඒකේ කියන්නේ එහෙම තිබුණත් ඒකට අවශ්‍ය නැහැ කියලා නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දෙපැත්තක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දෙපැත්තක් නොවෙයි. මට තේරුණේ මෙහෙමයි. නෛතික තත්ත්වයන්ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේකයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද - මට එහෙම අදහසක් තමයි ආවේ. එසේ තිබිය හැකි වුවද ඒවා මත සීමා නොවී - දැන් හිතන්නකෝ ඒ ගිණුම්කරණය තිබෙනවා if you have a relationship, you must disclose. එතකොට you do not have to disclose. You must go by what is good for the country and your conscience and you must take a discretion to take your decision. That is very dangerous in our country. අපිත් කියන්නේ මේකයි. Conflict of interest නම් නොකළ යුතුයි කියන එක තමයි අපේ අදහස. මේවාට නීති ගෙනෙනවා. ඕවා අපේ රටේ අනුගමනය කරන ඒවා නොවෙයි. මගේ සහෝදරයෝ කිසිම තනතුරකට මම දමන්නේ නැත්තේ ඒ නිසායි. ආවොත් මම අයින් වෙනවා. මේක ලංකාවේ අනුගමනය වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා හොඳ guideline එකක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. Conflict of interest ඉන්නවා නම්, පවුලේ සාමාජිකයෝ ඉන්නවා නම් අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම disclose කළ යුතුයි. ඒ disclose කරන එක තමන්ගේ තීන්දුවලට අනිවාර්යයෙන් බලපෑ යුතුයි කියලා මොකක් හරි එකක් ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම තිබෙනවා accounting standardsවල.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒකේ තිබෙන එක මේ කියන clause එක නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකට ඒක දමන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ clause එකට මේක එන්න ඕනෑ කියලා දමන්න ඕනෑ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි කියන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ වුණාට වෙන එකක් කියැවෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම හිතන්නේ ගරු සුජීව ඇමතිතුමා කියන්නේ මෙතැනටත් වඩා තද එකක් නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණය නිසා මේක වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ. මේක යටින් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස දමන්න පුළුවන්. පස් වැනි අංකය යටින් දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණය පමණක් නොවෙයි නේ. ගොඩක් සම්පිණ්ඩනය කරලා හොඳ නිරීක්ෂණ ටික නේ මේ අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. මේ ඔක්කොම ටික අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඒකට අරක add කරන්නද?

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැතිව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ නේ. මෙතැන විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණයේ වරදක් එනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ ඇමතිතුමා, ඒකේ වරදක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණය මෙසේ වුවද කියලා, ඔබතුමාගේ එක දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක මම දැන්ම කියන්නද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: පුළුවන් මේ යටින්-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක එතැනට නොවෙයි දමන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වෙනම දමන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන දැම්මත් කමක් නැහැ.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: මේක තව strong වෙන එක නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙතැන දැම්මා නම් හොඳයි කියලායි මම සිතන්නේ. එතකොට පැහැදිලි වෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා මේකට කැමතිද? නෛතික තත්ත්වයන්ගේ හා ගිණුම්කරණ ප්‍රමිතියන්ගේ විවිධ නිර්වචනයන් හා ව්‍යාතිරේකයන් තිබිය හැකි වුවද, මේකෙන් මොකක්ද අදහස් කරන්නේ? ව්‍යාතිරේඛයන් කියන්නේ -

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ තුළ සිට කියලා දැම්මා නම්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ තුළ සිට නේ එන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ තුළ සිට සහ ඉන් ඔබ්බට ගොස් මේවා වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා නේ කියන්නේ. මෙතැන සඳහන් කරන්නේ ඒවාටම සීමා නොවී.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නැහැ. මෙතුමා කියාපු දෙයින් ඒක පැහැදිලි වුණා. මෙතුමා කිව්වේ-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතුමා කිව්ව එක වැඩක් නැහැ නේ. මෙතැන තිබෙන එක නේ යන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: දෙවිධියටම ඒක ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: සුදුසු ආකාරයකට යටින් දමන්න. එතකොට හරි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක හරි නම් හරි. අපි වෙන එකක් දමමු පස්සේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට මේකේ වෙනසක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම දැන් good news එකක් කියන්නද? අපේ කොමිටියටම හොඳ news එකක්. අපට ප්‍රශ්නය වෙලා තිබුණේ extend කළාද නැද්ද කියන එක නේ. Extend කරලා නැහැ. ඒ කියන්නේ 2008 වසරේන් private placement කථාව ඉවරයි. අපේ case එක ගොඩක් strong වෙනවා. අපි මේක දැනගෙන හිටියේ නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There is no case beyond that.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Private placement එක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ 2008 දෙසැම්බර් මාසය වෙනකම් විතරයි. 2008 වසරේ ජනවාරි සිට අප්‍රේල්. ඊට පසුව මැයි සිට දෙසැම්බර්. COPE Secretariat එකෙන් උදේ fax කරලා ඇහුවා මේක දිගු කළාද කියලා. ඒ අයගේ Board Papers බලලා දිගු කරලා තිබෙනවා නම් අපට දන්වන්න කියලා. Central Bank එක Board Papers බලලා කියලා තිබෙනවා දිගු කරපු බවක් ඒ අය දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා. ඔතැන තිබෙන අනෙක් කරුණ මොකක්ද කියලා දන්නවාද, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා? කිසිම දවසක primary dealersලාට private placement කරන්න ඉඩ දීලා නැහැ. ඒ අයට කරන්න දීලා තිබෙන්නේ EPF එකට හරි, captive source එකට හරි පමණයි. මේ අය මොකද කළේ? මේ අය ගිහින් private placement කරලා ඒ අයගේ inventory එකට ඒ අය bonds ගත්තා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, පිට රට ආයතනයක් Rs.100 billion සොයලා තිබෙනවා. මම ඉදිරි පරීක්ෂණවලට තොරතුරු ලබා දෙන්නම්. Private placementවලින් Rs.100 billion හොයලා තිබෙනවා. මගේ ළඟ ඔක්කොම facts එක්ක තිබෙනවා. Private placement එකේ ලෙහෙසියි නේ. තමන්ට අවශ්‍ය කෙනාට දමනවා, inside information එක දෙනවා.

එතකොට මේක හරි, මේක දාන්න ඕනෑ නැහැනේ.

"(vi). ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගනු ලබන බොහෝ තීරණ සමස්ථ ආර්ථිකයට දිගු කාලීනව බලපෑම් ඇති කරවන අතර එවැනි අභිශය වැදගත්, සංකීර්ණ හා සංවේදී තීරණයන් ගැනීමේදී"

- I want copies of that document, Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva.

"නිවැරදි පදනමකින් එම තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්නේද යන්න ස්වාධීන පාර්ශ්වයකගේ පරීක්ෂාවන්ට සහ අධීක්ෂණයකට ලක්වීම ඉතා වැදගත් වනුයේ එකී තීරණයන්ගෙන් ජනිතවන යහපත් මෙන්ම අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵලවලටද සමස්ථ ජනතාවට මුහුණ දීමට සිදුවන හෙයිනි. ඒ අනුව එවැනි සංකීර්ණ තීරණ විධිමත් ඇගයීමකින් තොරව ඉතාමත් සරලව හා ක්ෂණිකව ගෙන එමඟින් යම් අයහපත් ප්‍රතිඵල ඇති වී තිබේද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය තොරතුරු ඒ සඳහා බලවරමක් ඇති ආයතනයන්ට ලබා දීමට බාධා සිදුවන පරිදි මුදල් නීති පනතේ 45 වගන්තියේ සටහන් රහස්‍යතාවය සුරැකීමේ ප්‍රතිපාදන යොදා ගත නොහැකි වන පරිදි එම වගන්තිය සුදුසු පරිදි සංශෝධනයට ලක් කළ යුතුය."

මේ ඡේදය හරි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරි, ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "(vii). මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරතුරු නිවැරදිව හඳුන්වාදෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර (ඇමුණුම 1 - හි ඇමුණුම xxxiv බලන්න) එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුරු (ඇමුණුම 1 - හි ඇමුණුම iii බලන්න) අනුව ලබා දී ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබේ. එහෙයින් රාජ්‍ය විගණනය විසින් එවැනි තොරතුරුවලින් හඳුනාගනු ලැබූ තොරතුරු මෙම වාර්තාවට එලෙසම ඇතුළත් නොකර එම තොරතුරු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ගරු කථානායකතුමා වෙත ලබා දෙන බවත් සඳහන් කළ යුතුව ඇත." ඒ ඡේදය හරි නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරි, ඒක හරි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "(viii). ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳුන් අතර බැඳුම්කරවලට අදාළව සිදුවන අන්තර් ගනුදෙනු නියාමනය කිරීම සඳහා නිසි ක්‍රමවේදයක් මාර්ගෝපදේශ මඟින් හඳුන්වා දිය යුතුය.

(ix). බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසියට අදාළව ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරනු ලබන වෙන්දේසිවල අවසාන දිනය හා වේලාව යම් යම් අවස්ථාවලදී දීර්ඝ කිරීම අනුමත කර තිබූ අතර එවැනි දීර්ඝ කිරීම් නොවැළැක්විය හැකි සාධාරණීකරණය කළ හැකි කරුණුවලට සීමා කළ යුතුය.

(x). සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ලියා පදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු නොවූවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු මෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ලබා දී ඇත. එසේ වුවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළඳ පොළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට විකල්පයන් ලෙස වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් ද්විතීයික වෙළඳ පොළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් දක්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. මේ වන විට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ පවතින අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල එම අධීක්ෂණයෙන් බැහැරව ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කළ හැකි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බවට පත් කිරීම."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරි, හරි. මම නම් ඔයිටත් එහා යනවා. මගේ මතය තමයි අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම මහ බැංකුවෙන් අයින් කළ යුතුයි කියන එකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒකට මමත් එකඟයි. ඒක ඇතුළත් කරමුද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මෙතැනට දාන්නට එපා, අපේ නිර්දේශවලට ඇතුළත් කරමු.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : අපි කියන්නේ අර්ථ සාධක අරමුදල මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණයෙන් බැහැරව ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කළ යුතුයි කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුවලට විතරද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔව්, මේ issue එකට අදාළවනේ කියන්නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : මම කියන්නේ overall ඒක ගැන.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "(xi). මේ වන විට ඉදිරි මාසයේ අවශ්‍යතාව ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය වෙතින් ලබා ගන්නා අතර අවම වශයෙන් එය ඉදිරි මාස තුනක කාලයක් දක්වා දීර්ඝ කිරීම." ඒක හරිද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරි. අපි කිව යුතුයි මාස 12ටම දාන්න කියලා. Official calendar එකක් දෙන්න කියමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක very good. You have to take quick decisions also.

"(xii). ඉහත පරිදි මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරය ලබා ගන්නා ලද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාවය රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරය කල් ඇතිව තීරණය කිරීම."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක තේරුනේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : That is a bit ad hoc මම හිතන්නේ. ඉහත පරිදි මහ භාණ්ඩාගාරය ලබා ගන්නා ලද මුදල් අවශ්‍යතාව රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරය කල් ඇතිව තීරණය කරන්නට බැහැ නේද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : පුළුවන්, මේක Budget එකෙන්නේ තීරණය කරන්නේ. ඒක අවුරුද්දකට ඉස්සෙල්ලා තීරණය කරන්නේ. අවුරුද්දට අදාළ seasonal ප්‍රමාණය දැන ගත්තාම මාස 12න් බෙදලා මාසයකට අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාණය සොයා ගන්නට පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ. රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරය?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : රැස් කර ගන්නා ආකාරයත් එතකොට තීරණය කර ගන්නට පුළුවන්. මේක auction කරවාද, loans ගන්නවාද කියලා තීරණය කර ගන්නට පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔතැන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ value එක බලපානවානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. The important point is this. ඔය documentation එක අනුව system is auction system. ඒ අනුව මේ ඡේදය හරි. So, the auction system is the system. මුදල් රැස් කර ගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදය තමයි auction system එක.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : නැහැ, ඒ bonds විතරයිනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අන්න ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. එතකොට ඒක ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියන්නට බැහැනේ, loans වලින් ගන්නවාද කියලා. How can you decide?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : දැනුත් අපි decide කරනවා foreign loans කොපමණ ගන්නවාද, domestic කොපමණ ගන්නවාද, bond කොපමණ ගන්නවාද කියලා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Then, we will leave it.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : අපි කියන ඒවා develop වුණාම ඔතැනින් තමයි පටන් ගන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "(xiii). ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම. එනම් පසුගිය කාලය තුළ එක් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බුන්වත්භාවයට පත්වීම හේතුවෙන් රජයද ඇතුළුව එම ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු සමඟ ගනුදෙනු කළ ආයෝජකයන් අසීරුතාවයට පත්ව ඇත."

විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඒ කියන්නේ ඔබතුමා මේක දැම්මේ නැහැ නේද? මේ තුන් දෙනාටම මේ බුන්වත්භාවය- Entrust Capital Markets and Perpetual Treasuries එක් කෙනෙකුටවත් ටෙන්ඩර් නැතිව තමයි දීලා තිබෙන්නේ primary dealership එක. ඒ කාරණය ඊළඟට දාමු නේද?

"එවැනි තත්ත්වයන් වැළකෙන පරිදි ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් ඔවුන් මූල්‍ය ශක්තීන් ඇතුළු අදාළ වර්යාවන් පිළිබඳ ප්‍රමාණවත් අධීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු වීම."

මේකට ඊට වැඩිය hard එකක් දාන්නට ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා හරි. මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ on going එක අධීක්ෂණය කිරීමක්. එතකොට ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට දෙන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එකත් බලන්නට ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : " (xiv). ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් විගණකාධිපති වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති තොරතුරු අතර ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය සුරැකිය යුතු ලේඛන හඳුන්වා දෙන ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර ලේකම්ගෙන් විමසන ලදී. ඒ සඳහා පිළිතුරු ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාර නියෝජිත ලේකම්වරයකු දන්වා තිබුණේ, භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට අදාළව මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යයන් වර්ෂයේ විසර්ජන පනතින් අනුමත සීමාවන් තුළ රජයේ ණය අවශ්‍යතාව මාසික පදනමින් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ මහ බැංකුව වෙත දැනුම් දීමට සීමා වන බවයි. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණ කටයුතු භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යභාරය පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණ කටයුතු භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යභාරය ඉහතින් දක්වා ඇති සරල කාර්යයකට සීමා වන බවට විගණනයේදී එකඟ විය නොහැකි බව."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එතැන මට පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ ඡේදයේ එකම වාක්‍යය දෙපාරක් තිබෙනවා, repeat වෙලා තිබෙනවා. "පිළිබඳ අධීක්ෂණය භාර ප්‍රධාන ආයතනයක් ලෙස මහා භාණ්ඩාගාරයේ කාර්යභාරය" කියන කොටස දෙපාරක් ඇතුළත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එතැනින් ඒ කොටස අයින් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : දැන් main point එක බලන්න. අපේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ 14ක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ 14න් එකකටවත් අපේ කණ්ඩායම විරුද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ. අපිව යම්කිසි

විධියකින් පත්තරවලින් විවේචනය කළත් අවසානයේදී වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ 14න් එකකටවත් විරුද්ධ නොවීමයි. අපි එකකටවත් විරුද්ධ නැහැ, ශක්තිමත් කරන්නට කථා කළා හැරුණු කොට. ඒක වෙනම කථාවක්.

නමුත් මට මෙතැන පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. භාණ්ඩාගාරය සහ මහ බැංකුව අතර තිබෙන ගනුදෙනුව ගැන. අපි දන්නවා සමහර කාලවලට Finance Ministry එක යටතට Central Bank එක එනවා. දැන් Finance Ministry එක යටතේ නැහැ Central Bank එක. දැන් Central Bank එක තිබෙන්නේ අගමැතිතුමාගේ Ministry එක යටතේ. මෙතැන කියන්නේ Finance Ministry එකයි Central Bank එකයි අතර යම්කිසි අධීක්ෂණයක් තිබෙන්නට ඕනෑ නේද? ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් පැටලිලි සහිතයි, මොකක්ද ඒ?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මේ කථා කරන්නේ. භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුව කරන්නේ නියෝජිත කාර්යයක්. ඒ නියෝජිත කාර්යයේදී agentsලාට ඇවිල්ලා agency - principal relationship එක තිබෙන්නට ඕනෑ. අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම agent කරන දේට principal බැඳෙන්නට ඕනෑ, එහෙම නැත්නම් principalට පුළුවන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ agency එකට නියෝග කරන්නට. අද ඒ දෙකම නැහැ. මොකද, මේ ගොල්ලන්ගේ තිබෙන්නේ කොල කෑල්ලකින් ඕනෑ ප්‍රමාණය කියන එක විතරයි. එතකොට ඒක ඒ ගොල්ලන් අරන් දෙනවා. කොයි වෙලාවකවත් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය කියලා නැහැ මේ interest rate එක මේ මේ කාලයට මේ මේවා කරන්නට ඕනෑ කියන කාරණය. ඒක කියා ගන්නට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට බැහැ. මේ issue එකේදී අපි හොඳටම දැක්ක කාරණයක් තිබෙනවා. දැන් 10 billion ඉල්ලනවානේ. නමුත් discountවලට ගියාම හම්බ වෙන්නේ 7 billion. ඉතිරි ටික ගන්න ආයේ යන්න ඕනෑ මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් වෙනත් loan එකක් ගන්න ඕනෑ. මේවා පිළිබඳව කිසිම control එකක් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මම කැමැතියි ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දාන්නට.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : කවුරුන් හෝ කමක් නැහැ. අපි කියන්නේත් ඒකනේ. මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දාන්න කියලා කියන්න ගිහින්නේ ප්‍රශ්න ඇති වුණේ, බිලියන ගණනක් exceed කළා කියලා. ඒක ඇත්තටම මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයෙන් exceed වෙලා තිබුණා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි. ඒක තමයි පැහැදිලිව කිව්වේ, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ බලතල මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය කිසි තේරුමක් නැතිව පාවිච්චි කරනවා කියලා. මෙතැනත් ඒ වාගේම issue එකක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔබතුමා එතැන නම් ඉන්නේ, මමත් එතැන ඉන්නවා. ණය ගැනීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයට නොවෙයි ර්ලිමේන්තුවේ වගකීමට යටත් වෙන්නට ඕනෑ. මම හිතන්නේ අපි එතැනටයි එන්න ඕනෑ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : මම සියයට 100ක් ඒ කථාවට එකඟයි. සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙතැනදී මේ කාරක සභාව හැටියට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ 14ක් තිබෙනවා. කෙටුම් පතේ හැටියටත් ඒවා තිබෙනවා. ඒවා ගැන කවුරුවත් එකඟතාවක් පළ කරලා නැහැ. අපි මේ කමිටුව හැටියට-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අරගොල්ලෝ නව දෙනා අනුමත කළානේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ ගොලල් අනුමත කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ වාර්තාවනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ වාර්තාව කියලා එකක් නැහැ. මේ තිබෙන කෙටුම් පතටනේ ඒ ගොල්ලන් අත්සන් කරලා ගියේ, printing mistakes එක්කම.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නමුත්, ‘‘මේකට අපි එකඟ වෙනවා’’ කියලා නැහැනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ ඔක්කොම අපි භාර ගන්නට ඕනෑ නැහැ. එතුමා කියන දේ අපි පිළිගන්නවා නම් පිළිගන්නවා, නැත්නම් නැහැයි කියනවා. එතුමා කියන දේ හරි වෙන්නට පුළුවන්, වැරදි වෙන්නට පුළුවන්. මේ වාර්තාවේ කොහේවත් නැහැ, ‘‘කමිටුව විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ 14 පිළිගනී. ඒ නිර්දේශ අනුව කටයුතු කිරීම සුදුසු බව කමිටුවේ හැඟීමයි. ‘‘ කියලා. ඒක මේකේ කියන්න ඕනෑනේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරි, ඒක දාන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මෙතැනත් දාන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : කලබල වෙන්න එපා. විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ නිගමනයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ටිකත් තවම ඉවර නැහැනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. මේක දාලා ඉන්නකෝ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා : මේක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශනේ, අරවා එක එක්කෙනාගේ ඒවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. අපි කියන්නට ඕනෑ මෙතැනට. මේ පළමුවෙනි 14 අපි බැලුවානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒකේ නම් දාලා, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් දාලා-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒක නොවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. මම කියන දේ අහන්නකෝ. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : නිර්දේශවලට අපි සියයට සියයක් එකඟයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ නිර්දේශවලට එකඟ බව සිංහලෙන් ලියන්න ඕනෑනේ මේකට. ඒකයි මේ කියන්නේ. පොඩ්ඩක් අහගෙන ඉන්නකෝ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : 10.1ට කලින් ලියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : 10 අගට මෙහෙම ලියන්න. ''ඉහත කී විගණකාධිපතිවරයා විසින් පෙන්වා දෙන ලද නිර්දේශයන් 14 මෙම කමිටුව විසින් සලකා බලන ලද අතර, එම නිර්දේශයන් 14 මෙම කමිටුව පිළිගන්නා ලදී.''

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : **"**එලෙසින්ම'' කියලා සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඔව්, ''එලෙසින්ම පිළිගන්නා ලදී.'' කියලා සඳහන් කරන්න. ඊළඟට ''එම නිර්දේශයන් ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහා රජය විසින් පියවර ගත යුතුව ඇත.'' කියලා සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : දැන් 10. 1ට යමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක ඉවර කර ගත්තාම ලේසියිනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒක 41 පිටුව නේද? එහෙනම් ඊළඟ එකට යමු නේද? 10.1 - 2015 -2016 මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපති විසින් සකස් කරන ලද විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ නිගමන-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ''විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවෙන් පෙන්වා දෙනු ලැබූ වළක්වාගත හැකිව තිබූ රුපියල් -මා දන්නේ නැහැ, කීයද කියලා- ට්‍රිලියන 889ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය සහ එහි 5.2.3 ඡේදයේ දැක්වෙන වළක්වා ගත හැකිව තිබූ රුපියල් 784,898,755ක ඇස්තමේන්තු ගත අවාසිය ලෙස 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 සහ 2016 මාර්තු 29 දින පැවති භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසි දෙකේදී වළක්වා ගැනීමට හැකිව තිබූ එකතුව මිලියන 1,674ක ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය වළක්වා ගැනීමට කටයුතු නොකිරීම පිළිබඳව බලධාරීන් වගකිව යුතු බව නිගමනය කරනු ලබයි.'' කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඒ වාක්‍ය අනෙක් එකත් එක්ක එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, දෙකේ ඉලක්කම වැදිලා තිබෙන්නේ වැරදීමකිනුයි කියලා සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ ඡේද දෙකම එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : හොඳයි. එහෙම නම් ''තවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමයට භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට තීරණය ගත් 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා සිදු කර ඇති බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම්වලට අදාළව ද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත වාසි හෝ අවාසි ගණනය කළහොත් ඉහතින් දක්වන ලද ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය තවදුරටත් ඉහළ යාමේ හැකියාවක් පැවතීමද බැහැර කළ නොහැකි බව නිගමනය කරනු ලබයි.'' කියන එක සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔබතුමා articulate කරන්න. ඊට කලින් මා points ටික දෙන්නම්, මා දකින විධියට. දැන් මෙතැන අපට වුණු assumption එකේ වැරැද්ද තමයි සෘජු ක්‍රමයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවීමට 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27වැනි දින ගත් තීරණය. 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දින තීරණය ගත්තා සෘජු ක්‍රමයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කරන එක තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවන්න. නමුත්, අපි දන්නවා-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : තත්පරයක් ඉන්නකෝ. ඔය කියන 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 27වැනිදා සෘජු ක්‍රමයට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම අත්හිටුවනු ලැබේ කියලා මොනවා හෝ සාක්ෂියක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ. කොහේවත් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ ගොල්ලන් කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මුළු auction එකෙන්ම බිලියන 10 ගන්න කියලානේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ කිව්වාට මාසයක අවශ්‍යතාවලින් auction එකකට ගිහිල්ලා auction එකෙන් සල්ලි ගන්නවා කිව්වාම

තිබෙනවාද සෘජු ක්‍රමය, -මාර්තු මාසයේත් ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවානේ, private placements-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, ඕනෑ වෙලාවක auction එකෙන් වැඩියෙන් ගන්න පුළුවන්. Auction එකක් දාලා බිලියන එකකට 10ක් ගන්න තහනමක් නැහැ. කොහේවත් තහනමක් නැහැ. ඒකේ තිබෙන්නේ අසාමාන්‍ය භාවයක් විතරයි. ඒ නිසා සාමාන්‍ය ක්‍රමවේදය අනුව ඒ කටයුතු සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ තීන්දුව අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ, auctionවලට අපි සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම පිවිසෙනවා කියන තීන්දුවක් මත නොවෙයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. දැන් මෙතැනදි අපි උපකල්පනය කරන්නේ, සෘජු ක්‍රමය තමයි හරි ක්‍රමය. ඒ සෘජු ක්‍රමය තාවකාලිකව පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනිදා අත්හිටුවුවායි කියලායි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : That is right.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නමුත්, දැන් අපට හම්බ වුණු document එකෙන් පැහැදිලි වෙනවා, ඒක එහෙම නොවෙයි, ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම තාවකාලිකව අත්හිටුවා තිබෙන්නේ වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයයි කියලා. තාවකාලිකව authorization එකක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවා සෘජු ක්‍රමයට 2008. 2008 දෙසැම්බර් මාසයෙන් සෘජු ක්‍රමයට ගත්ත authorization එක අහවර වෙනවා. එතකොට අපි නැවතත් වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට යනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුතුයි.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා : හැබැයි, ඒක ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි ප්‍රශ්නය. 2009 ඉඳලා-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා : ඒක සඳහන් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක සඳහන් වුණාම මේක අදාළ වෙන්නේ නැහැ, මෙතැනින් එහාට.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මෙතැනදි විගණකාධිපතිවරයා එකඟ වෙන්න ඕනෑ මේක සංශෝධනය කරන්න. මොකද, මෙතැනදී මම කැමැති වෙන්නේ නැහැ, විගණකාධිපතිවරයා එක මතයකත්, අපි තව මතයකත් ඉන්නවාට. සියලු දත්ත අපි ගාව තිබෙනවා. අපට පුළුවන් තැනක අපි එකඟ වෙනවා. මොකද, අපි අවාසි ඔක්කෝම ගණනය කරන්නේ අර තැන ඉඳලානේ. ඉතින් ඒ තැන අපට ඉන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන ප්‍රශ්නය සාධාරණව දැන් පැන නැඟී තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම. ඒකට මගේ report ද, ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස් ද කියන එක වැඩක් නැහැ. මේක අපි සියලු දෙනාගේම-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : සියලු දෙනාම එකඟ වෙමු, මොකක් හෝ එක මතයකට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඥානය සහ -

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, මගේ අදහස මා කියන්නම්. දැන් අපි මේ මුළු ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ මේ report එක හැදුවේ, එක පැත්තකින් සාක්ෂි සටහන්, වාචික ප්‍රශ්න කිරීම්, ලිඛිත ලේඛන ලබා ගැනීම් වගේම පූර්ව අදහසක් හැටියටම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පදනම හැටියට සලකායි. එතකොට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පදනම හැටියට සලකලායි අපි අපේ නිරීක්ෂණයන් මේ පෙළ ගැස්ම මේ කෙටුම්පතේ ඇති කර තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට ඒකට වෙනත් අලුතින් තර්ක අලුතින් කරුණු එකතු කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත්, ඒ අලුත් කරුණු මත විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය බැහැර වෙන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම බැහැර වෙනවා නම් ඒක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ කටයුත්තක්. දැන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව පදනම් කරගෙනයි මේ වාර්තාව පදනම් වුණේ. ඒ පදනම් වුණු නිසා විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ ටික තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය තිබෙනවා. එතකොට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනයට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස, පැහැදිලි කිරීම අනුව, වෙනස් අදහසකට එනවා නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් ඒ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය ළඟින් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ අදහස ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එකක් ඒක.

සභාපතිතුමා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට බැහැ, - විගණකාධිපතිතුමා දිගටම කියාපු කාරණය ඒක- විගණන මතය -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දිගටම කිව්ව කාරණාව කියලා-

සභාපතිතුමා : විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය වෙනත් මතයක් වෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : සාධාරණව මේ ප්‍රශ්නය විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට යොමු කරන්න පුළුවන්.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : ඒකේ ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. Page 100 පෙරලන්නකෝ. මේකේ monthly programme එක දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : කොතැන ද? යාවත්කාලීන කියන එකද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : ඔව්, යාවත්කාලීන වාර්තාවේ. මාර්තු මාසයේ document එක එහෙමම තිබෙනවා. මාර්තු මාසයේ කොහොමද bonds purchase කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒක Monetary Board එක අනුමත කරපු, DDMC එක අනුමත කරපු schedule එක. එතකොට ඒ schedule එක base කරලා තමයි-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ schedule එකේ දිනය කවදා ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මාර්තු මාසයේ. 27. 2. DGSM 27. 2. ඒකේ මුලින්ම තිබෙන්නේ primary actions, direct placements ඔය දෙකනේ තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට ඒකේ ගණනක් දීලා නැහැනේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, ඔක්කෝම සඳහන් වෙනවා. ගන්න ප්‍රමාණයත්, ගන්න හැටිත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : කොහෙද තිබෙන්නේ?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : ඊළඟ page එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : හරි, ඊළඟ page එකේ තිබෙනවා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : Primary auctions කොච්චර යනවාද, direct placements කොච්චර යනවාද කියලා සඳහන් වෙනවා. මේක base කරලයි හදලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේක Governor අනුමත කරපු එක. එතුමාගේ අත් අකුරින්ම සටහන් තිබෙනවා, ඊළඟ-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Governor අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ 2 -3. ඒක දාලා තිබෙන්නේ පස්සේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : මේක ගැන විගණකාධිපතිගේ මතය ගැන සාකච්ඡා කර කර ඉන්න එකේ නම් තේරුමක් නැහැ. කමිටුවේ මතය යටින් සටහන් කරන එක තමයි කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. මා ඊයෙත් කිව්වා. මොකද, විගණකාධිපතිගේ මතය වෙනස් කරන්න තරම් කිසිම දෙයක් මට නම් මේ වනතුරු ලැබුණේ නැහැ. මතයට පදනම් කරගත්ත කාරණය. ඒක අපි ඉතාමත් ක්‍රමානුකූලව සකස් කරලා තිබුණු uniformity පදනම් කරගෙනයි මතය තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට එහා ඔය කථා කරපු දේවල් සම්බන්ධයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කරලා කමිටුවට ඕනෑ proposal එකක් සකස් කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකට කිසිම issue එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Issue එකක් නම් නැහැ තමයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන ගැටලුව තිබෙන්නේ, 27.02.2015 දින Treasury Bonds 1000ක් primary auction එකෙන් සහ 12550ක් direct placements එකෙන් ගන්නය කියලා මෙහි recommendation එකක් තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නම් අපි ඒක කෙළින්ම මෙතැන කියන්න ඕනෑ. අපි මේකට add කරන්න ඕනෑ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේක ගණන් හදන්නේ මේ ආපු ක්‍රමයට ප්‍රකාරව මේ ගොල්ලන් තීරණය කරලා තිබෙනවා මෙච්චර direct placements, auction එකෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒ composition එක.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ composition එක දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: නමුත් base එක තිබෙන්නේ ඒක නෙවෙයි lowest cost කියන base එක. Lowest cost කියන base එකට මේ ගොල්ලන් Board එකේ සකස් කරලා line කරලා හදලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක පදනම් කරගෙන තමයි decision එකට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. Lowest cost යනවා නම් මෙන්න මෙතැනින් නතර වෙන්න ඕනෑ එහෙම නැත්නම් ඉතුරු ටික direct placements වලින් යන්න ඕනෑ කියන කාරණය DDMC පැහැදිලිවම මේව කරනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 2.6 කියන එක දුන්නේ නැහැ නේ. 2.6 කියන එකනේ ඔබතුමා ඔය කියන්නේ. 2.6 කියන එක දුන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: දුන්නේ නැත්තේ ඉන් එහාට ගියේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගොල්ලන් හැදුවාට දුන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් 10 ට agree වුණා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. විගණකාධිපති සහ අපේ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට දුන් කාර්ය අනුව අපට ලැබුණ තොරතුරු පදනම් කරගෙන රාජ්‍ය මුදල් ආරක්ෂාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් කරපු නිරීක්ෂණයක් හැටියට තමයි මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඊට එහා ගිය කාරණා ටික පහළින් සටහන් කරමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමාට missed වෙච්ච එකක් තිබෙනවා. මේක දැම්මාට, බලන්න උඩ note එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. Star එකක් තිබෙනවා. යාවත්කාලීන විගණන වාර්තාවේ 101 පිටුව බලන්න. 101 පිටුවේ ඒ star එකට දාලා

තිබෙනවා ‘Mode of borrowing - only from primary auction.” Cost වැඩි වෙනවා කියලා දාලා තිබෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: “Mode of borrowing - only from primary auction.” කියලා තියෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: “Mode of borrowing -only from primary auction.” කියලා මෙහි ලියලා තිබෙනවා. කවුද අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවා DDMS කියලා. 27.05/ DDMS කවුද කියන්න දන්නේ නැහැ.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: There is no signature.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන case එකක් තිබෙනවා. එතැන තිබුණාට ඒක මේවා කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Include කරලා නැහැ නේ. ඒ මාසයේ කවලම් කරලා දෙකම ගියා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙනවා “Mode of borrowing - only from primary auction.” කියලා. මම කියන්නේ ඕක ඔය කියන විධියටම ගන්න බැහැ. ගන්න බැරි හේතුව තමයි මේකේ තිබෙනවා තමයි. හැබැයි, ඒකේම note එකක් තිබෙනවා, “Mode of borrowing- only from primary auction.” කියලා. එහෙම note එකකුත් මෙහි තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක සැලකිල්ලට ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒකත් සැලකිල්ලට ගන්න එපැයි. ඒ note එක තිබුණේ නැත්නම් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය සියයට සියයක් පිළිගන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා. මේ note එකත් එක්ක එතුමාගේ මතය සියයට සියයක් පිළිගන්න බැහැ නේ. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, අපි ඒකට මොකද කරන්නේ?

ඩබ්ලිව් පී. සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: අත්සනක් නැති නිසා අපට ඒක consider කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අත්සනක් තිබ්බත් නැතත් දැන් මේකටත් අත්සනක් නැහැ නේ.

ඩබ්ලිව්. පී. සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: Governor අත්සන් කරපු මේ Minute එක බලන්න කෝ. 102 පිටුව බලන්න. එහි නිශ්චිතවම කියනවා**,** “EPF/ NSB/ SLIC to be ordered to stabilize rates” කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඕක දෙව්ධියකට තර්ක කරන්න පුළුවන්. එක තර්කයක් තමයි “moral suasion” කියලා Central Bank එකේ පාවිච්චි කරන strategy එකක් තිබෙනවා. “Moral suasion” කියන එක අජිත් නිවාඩ් කබ්‍රාල් හිටපු අධිපතිතුමා ගොඩක් කළා. බැංකුවට call කරනවා. බැංකුවට call කරලා කියනවා ඔයගොල්ලන් අඩු bids දාන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, ආණ්ඩුවට අමාරුයි වැඩි bids දැම්මොත්. ඒ කියන්නේ ඒක circular එකක් හැටියට අරින්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් ආණ්ඩුවේ අවශ්‍යතාව මේකයි කියලා informally කියනවා. ඒකට වචනයකුත් තිබෙනවා “moral suasion” කියලා. එතකොට “moral suasion” මඟින් අපට පුළුවන් කාට හරි කියන්න අඩු bid එකක් දාන්න කියලා. එහෙම වෙනවා. Governor, “to stabilize rates” කියන එකෙන් අදහස් කළේ එක්කෝ privately place කරන්නද, එහෙමත් නැත්නම් moral suasion මඟින් interest rates stabilize කරන්නද කියන එක අපට මෙතැනින් තීරණය කරන්න බැහැ. ඒ අදහස් දෙකම මේකෙන් එළියට එනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කියලා නැහැ මොකකින්ද කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කියලා නැහැ මොකකින්ද කියලා. කියලා තිබෙන්නේ “EPF/ NSB/ SLIC to be ordered to stabilize rates.” කියලායි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: You can use it for direct placements.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Either way, you can.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔය තර්කයට එනකොට transparency සඳහා auction යන්න කියන එක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම අප්සට් යනවා. ඒකයි වැඩේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි, අප්සට් යන්නේ?

ගාමිණි විජේසිංහ මහතා: එක තැනක අපි transparency auction යන්න කියනවා full transparency කරන්න. අනික් පැත්තෙන් stabilize rates-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක වැරැදියි. මම නම් මෙතැන නැහැ. මේ argument එකත් එක්ක මම නැහැ. මම ඒකට වෙනම නිර්දේශයක් කරන්නම්. නමුත් මම කියන්නේ සමහර විට දැන් 27 වෙනිදා මේක ඉවර වුණාට

පස්සේ මේක ප්‍රශ්නයක් වුණා වෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ. මොකද, interest rates ඉහළ ගිය නිසා. මාර්තු 02 වෙනිදා තමයි මේ කියන්නේ interest rates stabilize කරන්න කියලා. "Refer rates to pre Sep-2014. Manage Rupee liquidity to stabilize UD/LKR at 132/90 spot."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේකේ කොහේවත් නැහැ නේ-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, මේකේ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ මෙන්න මේ උඩ තිබෙන note එක.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Definitely, it is a separate note done, not by the Governor.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: "Not by the Governor." ඒක තමයි. කවුද, මේක දැම්මේ?

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That should be there. It is part of it.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකේ තිබෙනවා නේ, "mode of borrowing -only from primary auction"කියලා. Cost එකත් ඉහළ යනවා කියලා indicate කරලා තිබෙනවා arrow එකක් දාලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: It is tallying with the next note, Hon. Minister. ඒකේ කියලා නැහැ, "to be taken from the direct placements" අනං මනං කියලා මොනවත් කියලා නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි, දැන් මේකේ මෙහෙම දෙයක් තිබෙනවා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා, මේ note එක දැම්මාට, මේ note එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ නැහැ නේ. මේ note එකට power එකක් තිබෙනවාද කියන එක ඊළඟට බලන්න ඕනෑ, We have to look into whether this has any legal validity.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක මට තිබෙන අදහසක්. ඒ note එක දැම්මාට note එක ක්‍රියාත්මක වුණේ නැහැ කියන අදහසට අපි මුලින් ගියා නම් ඇත්තටම අපට ගොඩක් නිලධාරින් කැඳවා ලොකු විමර්ශනයකට යන්න අවශ්‍ය වෙන්නෙත් නැහැ. මොකද, එතකොට අපට පූර්ව අදහසක් තිබෙනවා නේ ඒ note එක ක්‍රියාත්මක නො වෙච්ච නිසා ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙච්ච එක හරි එක කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා නිලධාරින්ගෙන් ආව අදහස් කියන්නකෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මගේ අදහස.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙච්චර කල් මේ සාකච්ඡාව සිද්ධ වුණේම අධිපතිවරයා DDMC එකට ඇවිල්ලා කරපු දැනුවත් කිරීම්, අධිපතිතුමා කිව්ව නිසා ඒ මත පදනම් වෙලා notice එක ඒ ආකාරයට හදන්න සිද්ධ වුණාය කියන ඊළඟ programme එක. ඊට පස්සේ superintendent ඒකට footnote එකක් දාලා "Governor instructed" කියලා කියපු ඒවා ගැන නේ අපි විමර්ශනය කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වැරැදියි කියලා ආවා නේ. ඒක පරස්පර විරෝධියි කියලා ඒ note එක එච්චර නේ තියෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මේ note එකේ validity එකක් නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒවා මත නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ නිගමනයට එන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මේ note එකට validity එකක් නැත්නම් ඒ කියන සාක්ෂි අනුව හෝ යන්න ඕනෑ නේද? ඒ සාක්ෂිවල අසීම් සහ සමරසිරි යන ඔක්කෝමලා මොනවාද කියන්නේ. අපි lady officerගේ සාක්ෂිය විතර නේ සලකා බලන්නේ. පරස්පරවිරෝධීව හතර ජාතියක් කියන lady officerගේ evidence එකට අපි -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැනට යන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මේ note එකේ validity එක ගැන බලන්න. මේ note එකේ validity එකක් නැහැ නේ. මේක දෙයක් වුණාට පස්සේ -

මේ note එක අත්සන් කරන්නේ 27 වෙනිදා bond auction එකෙන් පස්සෙ නේ. මේ note එක අත්සන් වෙන්නේ bond auction එකෙන් පස්සේ.

Bond auction එකේදී primary auction එකෙන් බිලියන දහයම අරගෙන ඉවරයි. Primary auction එකෙන් බිලියන දහය අරගෙන ඉවර නම් එක බිලියනයක් විතරක් මේක ගන්න කියන එකේ තේරුමක් නැහැනේ. එතකොට අපි precedent එක බැලුවොත්, *de facto* තිබෙන position එක මොකක්ද? ඔය ගොල්ලන්ගේ legal points මේවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි මේකනේ කථා කළේ. මේ note එක ආවේ කොහොමද කියලානේ ඇසුවේ. ගත්තාට පසුව මේ note එක ආවේ කොහොමද කියන එක ගැනනේ, අපි සාකච්ඡා කළේ.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: - එම basic principle එක violate වෙනවා. ඒක තමයි issue එක තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට අනෙක් ඔක්කෝම ඒවා - ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔය මොනවා කථා කරගෙන ගියත් නැවත මුලට ඇවිල්ලා බැලුවාම, හරි; auction

යන්න ඕනෑ. ඇත්ත. හැබැයි, Rs. 1 billion දමලා Rs. 10 billion ගත්තාම ඔය කියන basics, transparency ඔක්කෝම ඉවරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉතුරු සල්ලි ගන්නේ කොහොමද කියන එක ගැන -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඒකේ කිසි අවුලක් නැහැ. Direct placementsවලින් මෙතෙක් කල් දිගටම අර ගත්තා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉතා කෙටි ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නේ. මම අහන්නේ සිකුරාදා -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි, සිකුරාදා වෙනකම් - ඒක තමයි -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සිකුරාදා වෙනකම් ගන්න try කළානේ. ඔබතුමා මේවා බැලුවේ නැද්ද?

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. අපි දෙදෙනා -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් සාධාරණ ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්නේ. ඔබතුමාගේ නිගමනයට එන්න -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: - Due care නැහැ කියන එක, අපි කියන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: That is correct. මට හිතෙන විධියට, ඒක සිදු වුණේ - direct placementsවලට දැම්මා ඕනෑම සීමාවකින් සහිතව. Direct placements එක දුන්නේ, - අපිට දුන් evidenceවලදී කිව්වේ, Thursday වෙනකොට හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන් වුණේ බිලියන තුනහමාරයි කියායි. මොකද, ලංකා බැංකුවේ අයිරා ඉවරයි. මහ බැංකුවේ අයිරා ටික ඉවරයි. Treasury Bills ටික ඉවරයි. එතකොට ආයෙත් සල්ලි ගන්න කිසිම ක්‍රමවේදයක් නැහැ. Bonds ටික පුළුවන් තරම් open කරලා direct placements දැම්මා. ආවේ බිලියන තුනහමාරයි. ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි. ක්‍රමවේදය - system එක- වැරදියි. හැබැයි, එතකොට අපට උත්තරයක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ. සිකුරාදා දමනවානේ, Rs. 1 billion. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ Rs. 1 billion ගන්නවා, direct placement එකේ 11.75ට. එතකොට ඒක කොතරම් වැරදිද? අපි මේ කයිවාරු ගහනවා, direct placement එක අඩු interest ratesවලට ගන්න පුළුවන් කියා. හැබැයි, සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ බිලියන දෙකක් ගන්නවා, 11.75ට. එතකොට ඒකට අපි වැරදි හොයන්නේ නැහැ. කවුරුවත් මොනවත් කියන්නේ නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ assumption එකෙන් තමයි මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් ගණනය කරන්නේ, 11.73ට බිලියන දහයක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා; 7.5න් පහළට ඇයි නොගන්නේ කියා. ඊට පසුව එම නිලධාරීන් - අපි දෙන්න ඕනෑ, උත්තරයක් ඉතුරු පැය දෙකේදී කොහොමද ඉතුරු මුදල් ටික -බිලියන නවය- හොයන්නේ කියා. අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම සඳුදාට අපට ක්‍රමවේදයක් දෙන්න ඕනෑනේ. නැත්නම් a., b., c. කියා ව්‍යතිරේක තුනක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ, මේ ගොල්ලන්ට ගන්න පුළුවන් කියා සල්ලි හොයා ගන්න. බැරි නම් කොහොමද - විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන එක හරි. Thursday වෙනකම් මොනවා හෝ ක්‍රමවේදයකින් ඇයි සොයා නොගත්තේ කියා දැම්මාට අපේ විරුද්ධත්වයක් නැහැ. Then, on Friday, Rs. 1 billion දමා දෙකට auction වැහුවාට පසුව තව පැය දෙකකින් ඉතුරු බිලියන නවය හොයා ගන්නා ක්‍රමවේදයකුත් අපි දෙන්න ඕනෑනේ, එතකොට නිලධාරීන්ට. Postmortem කරන්න පුළුවන් අපට. But, they have to find solutions also.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි බලමු මෙතැනින් ඉස්සරහට යන්නේ කොහොමද කියා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ 889 loss එක calculate කරන්නේ එකෙන් කපලානේ. එක සහ දහය අතර තිබෙන වෙනස තමයි ඔය 889 කියන්නේ. හැබැයි, අපි "as much as possible through auctions and the rest through private placements" කියන එකට ගියොත් එහෙම, මේ 889 එන්නේ නැහැ. එතකොට එන්නේ හයසිය ගණනක්. එහෙම නැත්නම් face value කියන එකට ගියොත් එන්නේ පන්සිය ගණනක්. එතකොට මේ අටසිය ගණන සහ 784 calculate වෙන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය මත. එම නිගමනය නොවෙයි, "as much as possible" කියන එක මහ බැංකුවෙන් කළේ. මහ බැංකුවෙන් කළේ "as much as possible" කියන එක 2.6 කියන එකනේ, ඒක භාර දුන්නේ නැති වුණාට. භාර දුන්නේ නැති වුණාට ඒ ගොල්ලන් recommend කරපු එක තමයි 2.6. ඒ recommend කරපු එකට ගියා නම් 889ක loss එකක් එන්නේ නැහැ. එන්නේ හයසිය - විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ calculation එකටම කළා නම් 688ක loss එකක් එන්නේ. අපි ඒක clarify කර ගනිමු.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: අපි ඒක යටින් සටහන් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් කලින් ඔබතුමන්ලා අවාසිය අනුමාන කරපු ආකාරය ගැන සටහනක් යෙදුවා වාගේ - ඒකේ එකතුවනේ මෙතැන මේ තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් නිගමනයක් - පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් ලියන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මම කිව්වේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා calculate කරපු විධියට ගියෝතින් -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. ඒක හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා calculate කරපු විධියට ගියා නම් මහ බැංකුවේ කියා තිබෙන්නේ "as much as possible" කියන එක නම් ඒ ගොල්ලන් දීපු recommendation එක 2.6 නම් 889ක loss එකක් එන්නේ නැහැ. ඒකට එන්නේ වෙන loss එකක්. හැබැයි, 784 loss එක තිබෙනවානේ, මාර්තු 29 වැනි දා එකේ. ඒකේ "as much as possible" කියන එක කීයද? පෙබරවාරි 27 වැනි දා එකේ බිලියන 2.6 නම් - ඒක තනිකර ඔය ගොල්ලන්ගේ මතය. 29 වැනි දාට ඔය ගොල්ලන්ට මේ loss එක calculate කරන්න එහෙම position එකක් නැහැ ඇත්තටම. මොකද, පෙබරවාරි මාසයේදී -

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: දෙකම advertise කරපු ගණනට ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැන මත දෙකක් තිබෙනවානේ. Advertise කරපු ගණනට වඩා වැඩි ගණනක් දීපු තැන් මීට වඩා බොහෝ අවස්ථාවලදී සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්, ඕනෑ තරම් ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : දිගටම advertise කරපු ගණනට වඩා තුන් ගුණයක්, හතර ගුණයක්, පස් ගුණයක් පමණ අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. එහෙමනම්, මේක advertise කරපු ගණනට වඩා ගන්න හැම එකක්ම loss එකක් නම්, මේ වාගේ සිදුවීම් අතීතයේ බොහෝ සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එහෙමනම්, මේකත් මෙතැනට දමන්න ඕනෑ වනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒ කියන්නේ, auction කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක ඔබතුමා කරන්න ඕනෑ. මම කරන්න සූදානම් නැහැ. මොකද, දැන් ඔබතුමා ඒ position එක ගන්නවා නම්, ඒ position එකේදී මීට කලින් ඕනෑ තරම් අවස්ථාවලදී කියපු ගණනට වඩා ඕනෑ තරම් වැඩිපුර අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. නමුත්, ඒ කිසිම දෙයකින් රජයට loss එකක් වුණා කියලා අපි කියන්නේ නැහැ. අපි loss එකක් වුණා කියලා කියන්නේ, මෙතැන පමණයි. එහෙමනම්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ හෘද සාක්ෂිය මට කියන්නේ, ඒකත් add කළ යුතුයි කියලායි. එහෙම නොවුණොත් මේක partial වෙනවා. ඔබතුමා එහෙම කළායින් පසුව අපට අපේ මතය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මේ loss calculation එක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය සෘජු ක්‍රමය කියලායි. නමුත්, දැන් අපට ලැබිලා තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව, නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය වන්නේ සෘජු ක්‍රමය නොවෙයි, නිවැරදි ක්‍රමය වන්නේ auction එක කියලායි. එම නිසා මේ loss calculation එක ගැන අලුතෙන්ම අපට හිතන්න වෙනවා. මෙතැන පමණක් loss එකක් වූ විධියට තමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මෙයින් අදහස් කරන්නේ. මොකද, අපි අවුරුදු ගණනකට නේ බලන්නේ. මාස 12කට වඩා එහාට යන ක්‍රමයක් බලන්නේ. මේක එදා ඉඳලා සිදු වුණු දෙයක්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගෙන් මම සද්භාවයෙන් යුතුව ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා ඔබතුමා ඒ professional උදව්ව කරන්න කියලා.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : අපි දැන් අලුත් report එක හදනවා නේ. අවුරුදු 10කට පරණ එකකට ඒ අලුත් report එක හදනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : මේ report එකට හදන්නේ නැහැ නේ

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : බැහැ. මේ report එකට හදන්න මට බැහැ නේ. මේ report එකට මට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ special cases දෙකක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔබතුමාට පුළුවන් නේ point එකක් එකතු කරන්න. ඔබතුමාට ඕනෑම අවස්ථාවකදී මේ කාරක සභාවේ අපි සාකච්ඡා කරපු කාරණාත් එක්ක- ඔබතුමා calculation එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් එක point එකකට එකඟ වුණා නේ. මම ඉල්ලන්නේ සද්භාවයෙන් යුතුව මෙපමණයි. advertise කරපු ගණනට වඩා යම් කිසි ප්‍රමාණයක් ගත්තා නම්, ඒ නිසා loss එකක් සිදු වුණා කියලා calculate කරනවා නම්, මීට කලිනුත් මේ ක්‍රමවේදය හරහා මෙවැනිම අවස්ථා බොහෝමයක් තිබුණා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, එවැනි සිදුවීම් සිදු වුණු බව ඔබතුමා පිළිගන්නවාද? එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවා නම් කියන්න. එපමණයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ මෙහෙමයි විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, නියෝජ්‍ය විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, අපට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මේක නේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : අපිට එහෙම ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : සුජීව සේනසිංහ මැතිතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා මොකක්ද කිව්වේ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ. අපි එහෙම මේ particular point එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් පළමුවෙනි වතාවට study කළේ. විගණනය කළාට මේවා specific areas. ඔබතුමා දන්නවා නේ මේවායේ ඔක්කෝම million transactionsවලට

කෙරෙන්නේ නැහැ. Case එකක් ආවොත් පමණයි කරන්නේ. එතකොට මෙච්චර මේ in detail කියලා මේ වැඩේ කළේ මෙය කරන්න කියලා කියපු නිසා. අපට දැන් back ගිහිල්ලා ඔය සියල්ල කිරීමට අපහසුයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ කරන්න කියලා නොවෙයි. මම කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමාගේ හෘද සාක්ෂියට අනුව ඔබතුමා දන්නවා විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සියලුම විගණන නිලධාරීන් දන්නවා, ගරු සභාපතිතුමාත් දන්නවා, අපිත් දන්නවා මීට කලින් බොහෝ අවස්ථාවලදී ඉල්ලපු ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා වැඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් මහ බැංකුව විසින් ගත්තා. ඒක අපි දන්නවා ඒ ගැන අලුතෙන් මෙතැන establish කරන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක් නොවෙයි. ඒත් ඒ සත්‍යය මෙතැන පොඩි සටහනක් හැටියට එකතු කරන්න. මොකද, එකතු කළෝතින් අපි professionally honest වනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මෙහෙමයි. දැන් මේ කාරණාව පිළිබඳව වාර්තාවක් විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා කථානායකතුමාටත්, කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු සියලු දෙනාටත් දීලා ඒ වාර්තාවට අදාළ නිරීක්ෂණයන් මීට කලින් සාකච්ඡා කළා නේ. මේ වාර්තාව පදනම් වෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට භාර දුන්නු අපි කාරක සභාවෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටී නිෂ්චිත කාරණාවකට අදාළවයි. මේ බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සම්බන්ධවයි. තවත් බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනු තිබෙනවා. ලංකාවේ බොහෝ සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මේ කාරණාවට අදාළව මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒක අපි මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින්ටත් භාර දීලා ඔවුන්ගේ නිරීක්ෂණත් අරගෙන, ඔවුන්ගේ නිරීක්ෂණවලට නැවත විගණනවලට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණත් දීලා මේ උපලේඛන දෙකක් හදලාත් තිබෙනවා. ඒවා ඔක්කෝම අධීක්ෂණය කරලා නිරීක්ෂණය කරලා තමයි අපි මේ අවසාන අවස්ථාවට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. අවසාන අවස්ථාවට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන අවස්ථාවලදී නැවත විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය, නිගමනය වෙනස් කර ගන්න කියන එක කාරක සභාවට සාධාරණ නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ ඒක සාධාරණ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක සාධාරණයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : සාධාරණ හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා නම්-

සභාපතිතුමා : පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කියනකම්. ඔබතුමන්ලාට පුළුවන් මේ කෙටුම්පතේ තිබෙන විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය ඔබලා පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ කියලා අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. එහෙම නැත්නම් ඔබලා පිළිගන්නා ප්‍රමාණය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට දැන් මේ අයුරින් බලපෑමක් වෙනවා නම් මම ඒකට එකඟ නැහැ. ඒක බරපතළයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, සත්‍ය තත්ත්වය මෙයයි. මම කියන දේ අහන්න

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කාරණයේදී විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනයක් තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ නිගමනය නැවත වෙනස් කරන්න කියලා කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් බලපෑමක් කරනවා නම් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : නැහැ නැහැ බලපෑමක් කළේ නැහැ. ඉල්ලීමක් කළේ.

සභාපතිතුමා : ඉල්ලීමක් වුණත් එය සාධාරණ නැහැ. ඒක කාරක සභාවට ඔබතුමන්ලා දාන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමන්ලා කාරක සභාවේ ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාවටයි ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ වන්නේ. මෙයට "එකඟ විය නොහැක, එහෙමත් නැත්නම් එකඟ විය හැක" යනුවෙන් යෙදිය යුතුයි. එහෙම නැත්නම්, මේක වැඩිදුරටත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය වෙනස්විය යුතුය. අලුත් විය යුතුය. එවැනි මොනවා හරි දෙයක් යොදන්න ඕනෑ. මේ නිගමනය මත ඔබතුමන්ලාට සෑහීමකට පත් විය නොහැක කියලා වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඔබතුමන්ලාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවට. හැබැයි, මේ නිගමනය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් වෙනස් කර ගෙන වෙනත් නිගමනයක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙතෙක් කළා වාගේ, අවශ්‍ය කරුණු ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ දෙයක් එකතු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මතය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු කථානායකතුමනි, දැන් මම කථා කරන්නද?

සභාපතිතුමා: හොඳයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙම කෙටුම්පතේ පොඩි නිවැරදි කිරීමක් කරන්න කියලා විගණකාධිපතිතුමා අපට යෝජනා කළා. එතුමා කිව්වේ නැති පොඩි දෙයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා සඳහන් කළා. ඒකට කලින් මන්ත්‍රීවරු එකඟ නොවුණු නිසා වැරදි වෙනවා නම්, අපි වැරදි ගණනය කරලා තිබෙනවා නම්, අන්තිම තීන්ත කියලා ඒක තියා ගන්න එක නොවෙයි අපට COPE කමිටුවෙන් කරන්න ඕනෑ වන්නේ. නිවැරදි ගණනයක් කරලා තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක නිවැරදියි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙයින් රටට ගම්‍ය වන පිළිතුර වන්නේ මොකක්ද? මේ ගනුදෙනුව යම් කිසි දෝශයක් තිබෙන ගනුදෙනුවක්. මේ ගනුදෙනුවෙන්

රටට විශාල පාඩුවක් සිදු වී ඇත. ජනතාවට - මිනිසුන්ට- මේ මොනවාවත් වැටහෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක නේ මේ පණිවුඩයක් විධියට දෙන්න හදන්නේ. කලිනුත් මේ වාගේ auctionsවල හැම එකේම පාඩු සිදු වෙනවා නම් ඒක සඳහන් නොකිරීම- කලින් අපෙන් ප්‍රශ්න ඇහුවේ නැද්ද, කොහොමද වුණේ කියලා. 2015 ඉඳන් 2016 වෙනකන් ක්‍රමවේදය මේකයි කියලා, අපට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ඇස් වහලා පරීක්ෂණ කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? අපි විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වන්නේ, සියලු කාරණා සලකා බලලා 1948 ඉඳලා- මාසයක කාලසීමාවක් ඇතුළත විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට විශේෂ වාර්තා හදන්න බැහැ. විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව, 1948 වසරේ ඉඳලා රටේ තිබෙන නීති-රීති, අණපනත් සියල්ල සැලකිල්ලට අරගෙන තමයි වාර්තාව හදන්න ඕනෑ. මේකේදී අඩුම ගණනේ අනෙක් auctionsවලත් ගන්න ගණනට වඩා වැඩි ගණනක් ගන්න වෙන්නේ අපේ පොලී අනුපාතිකයට. එහෙම නැත්නම්, මේ ඉල්ලුමට හා සැපයුමට අනුව ලෝකයේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙමනම්, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය වැරදියි කියලා ලියන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එවැනි දෙයක් ඇතුළත් නොකර මේකෙන් බලාපොරොත්තු වනවා නම්, මේ දේශපාලන point එකක් ලබා ගන්න-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එතැනට යන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ. එහෙමනම්, ඒ තරමටම hard and fast නම්, ඉතින් අපට කථා කරලා වැඩකුත් නැහැ. අපට ඔබතුමන්ලාව දැනුවත් කිරීමේ හැකියාවක් පවා නැහැ. අවසානම දේ ඒක නම්, සත්‍ය දෙය මේක නම්, ලිව්ව දෙය මේකයි මේක මට අයින් කරගන්න බැහැයි කියා හිතනවා නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එතකොට අපි අපේ නිර්වචන දාන්නම්. හැබැයි, COPE කමිටුවේ අපි දිගටම ඔහොම්මයි වැඩ කරන්නේ. ආයේ කෝප් කමිටුවේ සාධාරණව වැඩ කරන්න ජීවිතේටවත් බලාපොරොත්තු වෙන්න එපා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ගෙන යන ආකල්පය අනුව තමයි මමත් දිගටම වැඩ කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මගේ නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම අවසන් කරනකම් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ වනතෙක් දිගින්-දිගටම ආවේ ලොකු fight එකක් දීලා. නැහැ, මටත් තේරෙනවානේ. අපි සාධාරණවයි කියන්නේ. අපට ඕනෑ කිසිම දෙයක් අපි ඇතුළත් කරන්න කියන්නේ නැහැ. ඉතින්, මුල සිටම ඔබතුමාත් එක්ක විශාල සටනක් දිලා තමයි මේ ස්ථානයට ඇවිල්ලා මේ ටිකවත් කර ගත්තේ. ඒ නිසා සත්‍යතාව ඔබතුමාට වැඩක් නැත්නම්, ඔබතුමාට විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට සත්‍ය කියන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා වැඩක් නැත්නම් මොනවා කරන්නද? දවස් ගණනක් පාඩම් කරලා මේ කරුණු සියල්ල ලබා දුන්නේ. ඒ ලියකියවිලිවල අදාළත්වය ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ නැත්නම්, වාර්තාවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ දේශපාලන මතයක් නම් ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කළාට කමක් නැහැ. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ අධිකරණ ක්‍රියාමාර්ග අපි ගන්නම්. කෝප් කමිටුවේ සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් අපි ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින්නේ, අපක්ෂපාතීව පක්ෂ, පාට භේදයකින් තොරව සත්‍ය අවධාරණය කර ගැනීම සඳහා සියලු දෙනාම මෙහෙයවන ලෙසයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මම හිතන්නේ මේක,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මට කථාව අවසන් කරන්න දෙන්න. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමා කථා කරන්න. එහෙම ඔබතුමාට කරන්න බැරි නම්, ඔබතුමා හිතනවා නම් මේක වෙනස් කරගන්නේ නැතිව ඔබතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ පණිවිඩයම යවන්න ඕනෑ කියලා, අපි කොච්චර කරුණු සඳහන් කළත් ඒ මතයේම, ඒ විකල්පයේම ඉන්නවා නම්, එහෙනම් අපි ඉදිරියටත් කථා කරලා වැඩක් නැහැ. අපි එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කාරණය එහෙම්ම තියලා, අපේ අදහස් ටික එකතු කරමු. ඒකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණාව අනුව පේන්නේ ගිය සතියේ රැස්වෙලා මේ ඔක්කෝම තීරණය වෙච්ච විධියට විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාව සිකුරාදා ආපු විධියට තමයි මේ කථා කරන්නේ. එහෙම නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා, ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඒක පදනමක් හැටියට අරගෙන නැවත විමර්ශනය ගෙනියන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මේ අටවැනි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේදී තීරණය කරලා, ඒ අනුව නිලධාරීන් කැඳවලා ඔවුන්ගේ විමර්ශන මේකට අරගෙන මේ බොහෝ දේවල් සිද්ධ වුණා. ඒ සිද්ධ වෙලා ලිඛිත ලේඛන සාක්ෂි සටහන් සියල්ල එකතු කරගෙන තමයි මේ කෙටුම්පත හදලා තිබෙන්නේ. නැත්නම් දේශපාලන පණිවිඩයක් දෙන්න කෙටුම්පතක් හදලා නැහැ. කවුරු හරි එහෙම එකක් කියනවා නම්, ඒක වැරැදියි. මේ වනතුරු සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මම විශ්වාස කරනවා, මම මධ්‍යස්ථව ඔබතුමන්ලාට මේකට සහයෝගය දෙනවා කියලා. ඒ නිසා තමයි මම මෙතැන දැනුත් ඉන්නේ. ඒක නිසා මම කියන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා දැන් උත්සාහ

කරනවා නම්, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය වෙනස් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා, ඒක වැරැදියි. ඔබතුමන්ලාම හිතලා බලන්න, සාධාරණය කියන්නේ ඒකද කියලා. ඒක කොයිතරම් දුරට සාධාරණද? ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ කාරක සභාව හැටියට මේ කෙටුම්පතට විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ පිළිබඳව, නිගමන පිළිබඳව, නැත්නම් මේ සභාපතිවරයා විධියට මම ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කෙටුම්පතේ නිරීක්ෂණ පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලාට වෙනස් අදහසක් දරන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමන්ලා වෙනස් අදහසක් කරන නිසාම නේ මේ කෙටුම්පත වාර්තා දෙකක් හැටියට පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්නේ. මම කියන්නේ, ඒ යථාර්ථය තේරුම් අරගන්න කියලයි. නැත්නම් එක වාර්තාවයි නේ ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ යථාර්ථය තේරුම් අරගෙන ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ නිගමනය මෙසේ වුවද, මෙන්න මේ, මේ කරුණු මත ඒක වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ හරි, අලුත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ හරි කියලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා අපේ නිගමනය මේකයි කියලා කියන්න. මම ඒක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කරන්නම්. ඒක වෙනම එකක්. ඊට පස්සේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුව ඒක තීරණය කරයි. පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තීරණය කරයි, රට තීරණය කරයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා හරිද, ඔබතුමන්ලා හරිද කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ කෙටුම්පතේ මෙතැනට එනකම් සංශෝධනය වුණා නේ. කෙටුම්පත හරි නම් නේ මේ නිර්දේශ ඊට පස්සේ ඉදිරියට එන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා දරන දැක්ම අනුව, ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක විග්‍රහ කරගන්න ආකාරය අනුව, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ විග්‍රහය අනුව නේ ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධනය කළේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, ඔබතුමාගේ දැනුම අනුවයි සංශෝධනය වුණේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක තේරුම් ගත්ත ආකාරයට තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක සංශෝධනය කළේ. ඒ අයිතිය ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඇතුළු අපි සියලු දෙනාගේ අනුදැනුම ඇතුවයි ඒක සංශෝධනය වුණේ. නිවැරදි එක නේ සංශෝධනය වුණේ. ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ ඒක වැරැදියි කියලාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට මට මතයක් තියේවි. මේ කාරක සභාවේ සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලාට මගේ සහයෝගය පළ කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලා තමන්ගේ නිගමනය මේකට දෙන්න. එච්චරයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම එක දෙයයි කියන්නේ. දැන් ඊළඟ එකෙන් කියන්නේ professional due care ගැනයි. ඒ කියන්නේ වෘත්තීමය විවක්ෂණභාවය ගැන. විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට තිබුණු limitations අපි දැක්කා. එතුමාත් ඒවා වාර්තා කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම අපි මේ කෙටුම්පත පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡාවේදී තර්කානුකූලව එක අවස්ථාවකදී ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමා මෙහි සංඛ්‍යාත්මක දෝෂයක් වගේම ප්‍රතිපත්ති දෝෂයකුත් පෙන්නුම් කරලා දුන්නා. එතකොට සභාපතිතුමා විධියට ඔබතුමා මේ කෙටුම්පත සකස් කරද්දී මතු වෙන සාක්ෂිවලට නොගැළපෙන විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය මේ වාර්තාවේ කොටසක් කරන්න තීරණය කරලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ආයෙත් ඒක වැරදියටයි තේරුම් අරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. මම ඒක නිවැරදි කරන්නම්. විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාව පදනම් ලේඛනයක් හැටියට අරගෙන තමයි මේ draft එක හදලා තිබෙන්නේ, ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් එක කාරණාවක්. ඒක පදනම් කරගෙන තමයි අපි සාක්ෂි විමසුවේ. ඒක නිසා නේ මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට නැවතත් කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක මහහැරීම ගැන මම කනගාටු වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මොකක්ද, මහහරිනවා කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා:ඇයි, දැන් මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිවරයා අනාවරණය කර ගත් තොරතුරු අනුව ඒ වාර්තාවට කරන යාවත්කාලීන පැහැදිලි කිරීමක්. මොකද, ඒක වෙන්නේම විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාව නැවත සාකච්ඡා කරද්දී මේ කාරක සභාවෙන්ම තමයි යෝජනාවක් ආවේ මේ අලුත් සාකච්ඡාව අනුව, මේ ඉදිරිපත් වෙච්ච අලුත් කරුණු අනුව විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාව යාවත්කාලීන කරන්න කියලා. ඇයි, එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක කිව්වේ? ඒ යාවත්කාලීන කිරීමට අනුව තමයි ඊට පස්සේ මේ උපලේඛනයයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ අලුත් වාර්තාවයි එන්නේ. ඇත්තටම ගත්තොත් මේ වාර්තාව අලුත් නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා මේක බලන්න කෝ. මේ සාක්ෂි සටහන්වලින්, ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරු සාකච්ඡා කරපු කරුණු එකතු කරලා තමයි මේක ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. දැන් බලන්න මේ නිගමනයන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිවරයා මොකක්ද කියන්නේ කියලා. යාවත්කාලීන කරපු වාර්තාවේත් කියන්නේ මොකක්ද? ඒ නිගමනයේ වෙනසක් වෙලා නැහැ. ඒක මම දාන්නේ නැතිව මට හිතෙන දෙයක් දාන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අනෙක් කරුණට යන්න කලින් මට තව එක අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න. අපේ සහෝදර මන්ත්‍රීවරු කිසි කෙනෙක් කිසිම වෙලාවක මේක වෙනස් කරන්න කියලා කියනවා නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට කිසිම බලකිරීමක් කළෙත් නැහැ. මේක වෙනස් කරන්න කියලා කියන්නෙත් නැහැ. මම අහන්නේ එක දෙයයි. අපේ හෘදය සාක්ෂියට අනුව අපි දන්නවා, මෙවැනි දෙයක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම හරහා දේශපාලන වැඩ පිළිවෙළක් ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙනවා කියලා. අපි සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම මධ්‍යස්ථ වෙන්න නම්, "මීට කලිනුත් මේ ආකාරයටම ඉල්ලපු ගාණට වඩා Treasury Bonds නිකුත් වෙලා තිබෙන බව අපට දකින්නට ලැබේ." කියන සත්‍ය විතරක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න කියලායි කාරුණිකව ඉල්ලන්නේ. එච්චරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාගේ ඒ ප්‍රකාශය ඉතාම ඔරපතළයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇයි, ඒ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට විගණකාධිපතිතුමා මේ නිගමනය ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ දේශපාලන අරමුණක් ඉලක්ක කරගෙනයි. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මැතිතුමා පුද්ගලයෙක් හැටියට නොවෙයි මේ කියන්නේ. එතුමා දරන්නේ විගණකාධිපති ධූරයයි. අපි එකඟ නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් අපි පිළිගන්න ඕනෑ, විගණකාධිපති කියන තනතුරේ මතයයි. මොකද, මේ මතය මෙතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ පුද්ගලිකව නොවෙයි නේ. මෙතුමාගේ නිලධාරීන් සහ කාර්ය මණ්ඩලය මේ සියලු දෙනාගේම මතයයි මේ ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Show the whole truth, nothing but the truth. සත්‍ය මීට වඩා ලොකුයි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක සාපේක්ෂයි නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි කෑල්ලයි බලන්නේ. සත්‍ය මීට වඩා ලොකුයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා දකින විග්‍රහයට අනුව සත්‍ය මෙච්චරයි කියලා ඔබතුමා කියනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මේක මගේ මතය නොවෙයි. මම කියන්නේ සත්‍ය කියන්නේ මෙතැනත් මේ සිද්ධිය වෙලා තිබෙනවා, මීට කලිනුත් මේ සිද්ධිය මේ විධියටම සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එතකොට මේක වැරැද්දක් නම්, මීට කලින් වෙච්ච දේත් වැරැද්දක්. මම කියන්නේ මෙහෙම දේවල් මීට කලිනුත් වෙලා තිබෙන බව කියන්න කියලායි. ඒක ඇත්ත නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමන්ලා සාධාරණ විධියකට විග්‍රහ කරගන්නා ආකාරයට සංශෝධනයක් කරමින් මේ කෙටුම්පත සංශෝධනය කළා. ඒක නේ අපි කවුරුත් දකින ඇත්ත දේ. එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා පිළිගන්නා ආකාරයට auction එක දිගටම තිබුණාය කියන පදනම එක්ක මේ සාකච්ඡාව කරගෙන ආවා. හැබැයි, දැන් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට සාපේක්ෂව ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතුමා එතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණවල limitationsවල ඒ ඔක්කෝම ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. මහ බැංකුවේ තිබෙන ඔක්කෝම ලිපි ලේඛන ටික ගෙනැල්ලා මෙතැන ගබඩා කළොත්, තවත් දේවල් හඳුනා ගන්න පුළුවන්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා නිරීක්ෂණය කරපු දවසේ තිබිච්ච තොරතුරුවලට පස්සේ කරුණු නිරීක්ෂණය කළොත් තව දේවල් සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමා එතුමාගේ limitations යටතේ ඉදිරිපත් කරන නිගමනයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිගමනය පිළිගන්නවාද, නැද්ද කියන එක ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මතයයි. මම කියන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලා නිගමන ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලා නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඒක මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කරන්නම්. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනය පිළිගන්නේ නැත්නම්, "පිළිගන්නේ නැහැ." කියන එක හරි දමන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා වැරැදි අර්ථ කථනයක් දෙන්න හදන්න එපා. ඔබතුමා පිළිබඳව ලොකු ගෞරවයක් මගේ තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා සාධාරණ වෙන්න. මම මෙච්චර වෙලාවක් සාවධානව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මේ කරුණට සහයෝගය පළ කළා නේ. ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඒක පිළිගන්නවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට තේරෙනවා නම් දැන් මේක විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට පැහැදිලි කරන්න පුළුවන්. එතුමාගේ මතය එතුමා විසින්ම ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරනවා නම්, -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම කියන්න එපා. ඒ මතය ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරනවා නොවෙයි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ ඒකට බලපෑම් කරන්න එපා කියලායි. අපේ වාර්තාවේ ඒක දමන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: බලපෑමක් නොවෙයි නේ කළේ. මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට කථා කරන්න අයිතිය

තිබෙනවා නේ. එහෙම දෙයක් ගැන කථා කළාම ඔබතුමා කියනවා බලපෑම් කළා කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම සෘජුවම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් අහන්නම් කෝ. ඊට පස්සේ මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මෙතැනින් ඉවරයි. මම මේකයි අහන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අපි හොරයක් හංගන වැඩක් කළේ නැහැ. අපි විවෘතව මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළා. පළමුවැනි වතාවට අපි අලුත් ප්‍රශ්න හොයා ගත්තා. පළමුවැනි වතාවට අපි අලුත් අලුත් දේවල් ගැන දැන ගත්තා. එතැනදී අපේ සමහර මත වෙනස් වුණා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මේ ගනුදෙනුව තුළින් රජයට අවාසියක් වුණා කියලා ඔබගේ ඒ ගණන් හැදීමත් එක්ක මේ මතය ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. හැබැයි, මේ විධියටම මීට කලිනුත් ඉල්ලපු ගණනට වඩා bonds අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමාගේ විග්‍රහය අනුව ගියොත් ඒ සියලු අවස්ථාවලදී රජයට අවාසියක්, පාඩුවක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමා ඔව්ද, නැද්ද කියලා කියන්න?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : ඒක ගණන් බලලා කියන්න ඕනෑ. මට උත්තර දෙන්න තිබෙන අවස්ථාව නිසා මම කියන්නම්. මේ වෙන කල් මේවා placement එකට නේ ගියේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Placement නොවෙයි, මම කියන්නේ auction කරපු ඒවා විතරයි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : Auction එකක් මීට කලින් කළේ නැහැ නේ. auction එක තිබුණේ-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : දෙසැම්බර් මාසයේ තොරතුරු අරගෙන බලන්න.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : එතැනදී කළේ මිල තීරණය කර ගැනීම විතරයි නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : අපි එක point එකක් ගනිමු. 2014 දෙසැම්බර් මාසයේ තොරතුරු අරගන්න කෝ. අන්තිම එක ගන්න. 2014.12.30වැනි දා. Auction එකට 1,500ක් දානවා. 2,500ක් ගන්නවා. ඒ, මීට කලින් තිබුණු auction එක. ඒකෙත් මේකම සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එක, දහය වෙලා නොවෙයි. නමුත් එකහමාර, දෙකහමාර වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ලොකු දුරකට යන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. Interest එක වැඩි වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මේ, 18වැනි auction එක. 16වැනි auction එකේ එහෙම වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක මෙතැන තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි මේක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම දැක්කේ නැහැ වාගේ ඉන්න එක සාධාරණද? ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ professional due care එක ඇතුළේ ඒක දැකලා අපට ඒක නොදැක්කා වාගේ කටයුතු කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, මම කියන්නේ මේක වෙනස් කරන්න කියලා නොවෙයි. ඊට මාසයකට කලින් කරපු auction එකේත් මේක මේ විධියටම සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. Auction එකේ කියපු ගණනට වඩා වැඩිපුර අරගෙන තිබෙනවා. එහෙම නම් එතැනදීත් යම්කිසි අලාභයක් හෝ අවාසියක් රජයට වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මේක වෙනස් කරන්නේ නැතුව ඔබතුමාට එක වාක්‍යයක් එකතු කරන්න පුළුවන්, "මීට කලිනුත් මෙවැනිම විධියට මහ බැංකුව ක්‍රියාත්මක වෙලා තිබෙනවා" කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : "සිදු වූ අවස්ථා ඇත."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : "සිදු වූ අවස්ථා ඇත." එච්චරයි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : මට කථා කරන්න පුළුවන්ද? විගණකාධිපති දේශපාලනීකරණය වෙලා කියලා වචනයක් හරි කථා කළා නම් මම ඒ ගැන කනගාටු වෙනවා. මොකද මේ කාර්යයේදී විතරක් නොවෙයි, මේ සෑම කාර්යකදීම අපි අපක්ෂපාතීව කටයුතු කරනවා. ස්වාධීනත්වය සහ ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔය දකින ජාතික අවශ්‍යතාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් පසු ගිය කාලයේ කටයුතු කරපු ආකාරය පිළිබඳව මගේ හෘදය සාක්ෂිය දන්නා නිසායි මම කථා කරන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : සමාවෙන්න, බාධා කළාට. එතැනින් එහාට යන්න කලින් මට යමක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. I apologize you. මම කියපු දේ ගැන ඔබතුමාට ඒ විධියට හිතුණා නම් මම සමාව ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. ඔබතුමාගේ දේශපාලනීකරණයක් ගැන නොවෙයි මම කිව්වේ. මම කිව්වේ, මේක politically පාවිච්චි කරනවා කියලායි. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමාගේ දේශපාලන ස්වාධීනත්වය ගැන මගේ සියයට සියයක් විශ්වාසය තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමාට ඒ විධියට හැඟුණා නම් මම ඔබතුමාගෙන් සමාව ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. මම එහෙම අදහසකින් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා : මේකයි, මම කියන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ. වාර්තාවක් සකස් කරන එක හිතන තරම්ම ලෙහෙසි නැහැ. සකස් කරපු වාර්තාවක් විවේචනය කරන එක ඊට වඩා ගොඩක් පහසුයි. මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා තිබුණු සීමාවන් සහ බාධක පිළිබඳව අලුතෙන් කෝප් කමිටුවට විස්තර කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. ඒ සියලුම කාරණා පදනම් කරගෙන මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කළේ, අපට දීලා තිබුණු ඉතාමත්ම කෙටි කාලය සහ සියලුම බාධක මැද කෝප් කමිටුවේ අවශ්‍යතාව ඉෂ්ට කරන්න මිසක් විගණකාධිපතිගේ පෞද්ගලික අවශ්‍යතාවක් ඉෂ්ට කිරීම සඳහා හෝ විගණකාධිපති

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් සඳහා නොවෙයි. විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව Central Bank එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණනය කරපු පළමුවැනි අවස්ථාව මෙය නොවෙයි. Central Bank එක පටන් ගත්තු දවසේ ඉඳලා ඒ ආයතනය විගණනය කරන්නේ විගණකාධිපති. Central Bank එක විතරක් නොවෙයි, මේ කාර්යයට සම්බන්ධ වෙලා ඉන්න මහජන බැංකුව, ලංකා බැංකුව, NSB එක, EPF එක, ETF එක, Sri Lanka insurance Corporation එක තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිගේ විගණනයට යටත්වයි. මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට වරදක් කියනවා නොවෙයි. ඊට වඩා broader area එකකට ගිහිල්ලා තමයි විගණකාධිපති මේ කාරණය දිහා බැලුවේ. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා කථා කරපු issue එක "related party" කියන කාරණයේදී අපි ඊට වඩා ගොඩාක් ඈතට යනවා. මට පොඩ්ඩක් කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. මට මේ කාරණය විස්තර කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

ඒ ආයතනවලට සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි අවබෝධයක් ඇතුව තමයි අපි ඒ කාරණා පිළිබඳව කථා කරන්නේ. උදාහරණයක් හැටියට කිව්වොත් EPF එකේ තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය කියන්න පුළුවන්. ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේ ප්‍රශ්නය ගැන අනෙක් පැත්තට ගිහිල්ලා මම EPF එකත් එක්ක කථා කරනවා. අපේ Report එක ඔබතුමන්ලා බැලුවොත් හැම වතාවකදීම මේ කාරණය සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපි මේ කාරණය හැම දාම explain කරනවා. හැබැයි, එතැන අපි නොදකින, අපි කථා නොකරපු ඊට වඩා වැදගත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මම දන්නවා, ඔබතුමන්ලාත් මම වාගේමයි කියලා. රජයේ වියදම් - least cost - කියන තැන ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔක්කෝම ඉන්නවා කියලා මම සියයට සියයක්ම පිළිගන්නවා. යම් කාරණාවලදී යම් යම් වෙනස්කම් තිබුණත්, ඒ least cost එකේදී අපි ගනුදෙනු කළ යුත්තේ කොහොමද කියන කාරණය පිළිබඳව අපි ඔක්කෝම හොඳ තැනක ඉන්නවා. සාකච්ඡාව අවසන් අදියරේ තිබෙන නිසා EPF එකේ transparency එක ගැන මෙතැනදී මතු වුණු කාරණය ගැන මම යමක් කියන්න ඕනෑ. Transparency එක ගැන කථා කරන කොට ඒකේ උඩින්ම ඉන්නේ විගණකාධිපති. රජයේ good governance සහ transparency ගැන බලන කොට oversight බලය තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිට. මේ හැම එකක්ම transparency ඇතුව කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන පදනමේ ඉඳගෙන තමයි අපි ඔක්කෝම සාකච්ඡා කරන්නේ.

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුනි, EPF එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාම අපි දකින ඔය auction එකේ තිබෙන transparency එක මීට වඩා පොඩ්ඩක් වෙනස්. ඒ පැත්තෙන් දකින නිසායි මම මේ කාරණය කියන්නේ. අපි auction එකේදී EPF එකට සාධාරණයක් වෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා දැක්කාට ඊට එහා ගිය තව සිද්ධියක් තිබෙනවා. EPF එකට මාසයකට බිලියන 2ක් විතර excess එකෙන් සල්ලි එනවා. ඒ කාරණයේදීත් මම විගණකාධිපති හැටියට බලන්නේ EPF එකේ ලාභයට වඩා EPF එකේ capital එකේ security එක පිළිබඳවයි. Capital එකේ security එක කියලා කියන්නේ risk factor එක. Risk factor එක zero තිබෙන එකම point එක තමයි, Treasury Bills හෝ Treasury Bonds. හැම වෙලාවේම interest rate එක decide වෙන්නේ Treasury Billsවල rates plus, risk factor කියන කාරණය මතයි. මම ඔබතුමාට ඒ කාරණය කියන්න ඕනෑ. විගණකාධිපති හැම වෙලාවේම බලන්නේ EPF එකේ capital එකේ security එකයි. ඊළඟට තමයි, interest rate එක බලන්නේ. Capital එකේ security එක බලන කොට, මුදල් ආයෝජනය කරන්න තිබෙන වැදගත්ම තැන තමයි, Treasury Bonds හෝ Treasury Bills. එහෙම දැම්මේ නැත්නම් අපි ප්‍රශ්න අහනවා, කොහේද මේකට security එකක් තිබෙන්නේ කියලා. අපි ඒ විධියට EPF එකට questions දානවා. හැබැයි, EPF එක ඔය කියන විධියට ඔය auction එකට යන rate එක නැතුව ඊට සියයට 5ක් අඩු කරලා fix කළත් EPF එකට ඒ මුදල් ආයෝජනය කරන්න තිබෙන එකම තැන Treasury Bonds හෝ Treasury Bills. මොකද, ඒ සල්ලි ගන්න investment කරන්න වෙන කොහේවත් තැනක් නැහැ. හෙට දවසේ මේ කාරණා ඔක්කෝම අමතක කරලා Central Bank එක කිව්වොත්, "නැහැ. EPF එකට ගෙවන්නේ සියයට 5යි" කියලා, ඒත් EPF එකට කරන්න තිබෙන එකම දේ මෙතැනට මුදල් ආයෝජනය කරන එකයි. මොකද capital එකට hundred per cent safety එකක් තිබෙන්නේ මෙච්චරයි. ඒ නිසා තමයි අපි Government එකේ Treasury Security එක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ. Placement base එකේ ප්‍රධාන concept එක හැටියට මම දැක්කේ ඒ කාරණයයි. මොකද, open market එකේ auction එකකට ගිහිල්ලා EPF එකට five million වැනි විශාල මුදලක් අරගෙන මිනිස්සුන්ගේ ලාභය වැඩි කරනවාට වඩා, අපට අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් Government එකේ least cost එක පිළිබඳව වැඩියෙන් හිතන්න වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒක තමයි priority. ඒ priority list එකේ ඉඳලා තමයි විගණකාධිපති මේ අනතුර ගැන හැම වෙලාවේම බලන්නේ.

ඔබතුමන්ලා කියනවා වාගේ ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ගොඩක් දේවල් තිබෙනවා. ඊට වඩා තව ගොඩක් දේවල් තිබෙනවා, ගිහිල්ලා මේකේ බලන්න. නමුත් යම් ආකාරයකට මේ කාරණයේදී මම සියයට සියයක් එකඟ වෙනවා, ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ කියන කතන්දර සම්බන්ධයෙන්. හැබැයි විගණකාධිපතිට දීලා තිබුණු කාල සීමාවත්, ඔක්කෝම එක්ක ගත්තාම, ඊළඟට මේ කියන අනෙක් ආර්ථික ප්‍රශ්නත් එක්ක මේ සියලුම දේවල් අරගෙන කථා කරන කොට, - ඊට පස්සේ දීලා තිබුණු මේ සීමාව, මේ දේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලිව අපි පළමුවැනියෙන්ම කියනවා, මොකක්ද අපේ සීමාව කියලා. මෙන්න මේ කාල සීමාවට අදාළ bonds issue කිරීම කියන කාරණය. ඉතින් පිටි පස්සට ගිහිල්ලා තව ඕනෑ කාරණයක් ඇත්තටම explain කරන්නත් පුළුවන්. හැබැයි ඒ explain කිරීම කියන කාරණයේදී - දැන් ඔය ඔබතුමා මතු කරපු ප්‍රශ්නය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මට හැඟීමක් තිබෙනවා. නමුත් මට මේ වාර්තාවේ එතැනින් එහාට එහෙම යාමේ හැකියාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ, මේ වාර්තාවේ දීලා තිබුණු limit එක පදනම් කර ගෙන. හැබැයි එහෙම ගියා කියලා මම මේ තරම් දෙයක් දකින්නේ නැහැ. මොකද හේතුව, අපි sample test එකකින් තමයි හැම දෙයක්ම කරන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ sample එක තීරණය වන්නේ තමන්ගේ බුද්ධි ගෝචරත්වය මතයි. Sample එක සියයට සියයක් කියලා එක් කෙනෙකුට කියන්න පුළුවන්. තව කෙනෙකුට කියන්න පුළුවන්, නැහැ මට සියයට සියයක් ඕනෑ නැහැ, මට සියයට පහක් බලලා මේ sample එකේ population එකේ කාරණය කියන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. හැබැයි විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවත් ඒ වාගේ යම් යම් කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගත්තාට පස්සේ - මොකද මේවා deeply සලකා බලලා, continuously කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මොකක්ද කියන එක ගැන දැඩි අවබෝධයක ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම ඉන්නවා. ඉතින් ඒවා පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි මේ කාර්යය කළේ. සමහර වෙලාවට මේ වාර්තාවේ වචනයක් වචනයක් පාසා අපි සිය සැරයක් පමණ පසු ගිය කාලයේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්න ඇති. එහෙම කරලා තමයි අපි මේ වචනය වෙනස් කළේ. මොකද, මේකෙන් කවුරුවත් අයුතු ලාභයක් ගත යුතු නැහැ; අයුතු දේශපාලන වාසියක් ගත යුතු නැහැ; එහෙම නැත්නම් මේක වැරදි විධියට විග්‍රහ කළොත් එහෙම - මොකද, විගණකාධිපතිගේ ගෞරවය, නම්බුව ආරක්ෂා කර ගන්න ඕනෑ, මේ ආයතනය පවත්වා ගෙන යන්න නම්. මොකද, මේක දවසකට තිබෙන එකක් නොවෙයි. ඒ නිසා මේක ඉතාමත් වැදගත්. ඉතින් ඒ නිසා අපි හුඟක් වෙලාවට ඒවා බලලා තමයි මේ වචන - උදාහරණයක් හැටියට ගත්තොත් එහෙම මෙතැන එක තැනක තිබෙනවා, "නිලධාරින්" කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා දකින්න ඇති මේ "න්"යන්න දමන්න අපි කොච්චර මහන්සි වුණාද කියලා. මොකද, ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන ප්‍රශ්නයේ පළමුවෙනිම කාරණය තිබෙන්නේ අන්තිමට, ඒකයි. ඒකේ පැහැදිලිව කියනවා, "ගලවා ගැනීමට කටයුතු නොකිරීම පිළිබඳව නිලධාරින් වගකිව යුතු බව නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ" කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා පසු ගිය දවස් ටිකේම ඒක ඔප්පු කරන්න පුදුම උත්සාහයක් ගත්තා. ඒක හරියට හරි. ඒක විගණකාධිපතිවරයාත් කියලා තිබෙනවා. පැහැදිලිව පෙනෙන නිසයි නිලධාරින් කියන වචනය පාවිච්චි කළේ. මොකද, හේතුව මම කොයි වෙලාවකවත් කියන්නේ නැහැ, අපි කොයි වෙලාවකවත් කියන්නේ නැහැ, මේක එක පුද්ගලයෙකුගේ වරදක් කියලා. ඒ පුද්ගලයාට වඩා පහළ වැරදිකරුවෝ අපි දකිනවා. එතකොට ඒක අපි පැහැදිලිව - නමුත් අපි එක තැනකවත් මේ විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ නමක් පාවිච්චි කළේ නැත්තේත් ඒකයි. "පර්පෙචුවල්" කියන එකත් පාවිච්චි කළේ නැහැ. අපට Central Bank එකේ - මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා උඩට-පහළට ගිය ඒවා ගැන අපි කිසිම තැනක කථා කරලා නැහැ. අපට ඒවා අදාළම නැහැ. ඊළඟට "පර්පෙචුවල්" කියන එක ගැන අපි වචනයක්වත් කථා කරලා නැහැ. අපට ඒක අදාළම නැහැ. මොකද, ඊට එහා ගිය vision එකක් විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට තිබුණා, මේ කාර්යය කිරීමේදී. අපි එතකොට ඒ පැත්තෙන් තමයි මේ කාර්යය ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම සිදු කළේ. එතකොට ඔබතුමා කියන ආකාරයට මීට එහා ගිහිල්ලා යම් යම් කාරණා ගැන සලකා බැලීම ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම කරන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් පසු ගිය කාලයේ මේ auction පදනම් කර ගෙන මේ රටට අඩුම පිරිවැයක් ඇති වන ආකාරයට මේ bond එක, price එක decide කළේ කොහොමද කියන එක අපි ගොඩක් අධ්‍යයනය කළා. ඒ කරලා තමයි - අපි කොයි වෙලාවකවත් private placements අගය කරන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඊළඟට auction එක සියයට සියයක් රැක ගන්න උත්සාහ කරන්නේත් නැහැ. ඔය දෙකම අපට අදාළ නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිට වැදගත්ම දේ වන්නේ අඩුම පිරිවැයට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් ටික සපයා ගැනීම කියන එක විතරයි. එතකොට ඒ කාරණය සඳහා ඉතා වැදගත් කාරණයක් තමයි -සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා හැම වෙලාවේම කියනවා වාගේ- transparency එක. හැබැයි transparency එක කියන කාරණය ඉස්සරහට ගන්න විගණකාධිපතිට පුළුවන්කමක් නැහැ. ඔහුට උඩින්ම තිබෙන දෙය තමයි අවම පිරිවැය. ඉතින් අවම පිරිවැය සඳහා

transparency එක open කර ගන්න පුළුවන්, යම් පැත්තකට. ඒ කාරණා ඔක්කෝම පදනම් කර ගෙන තමයි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේ නිරීක්ෂණ ටික දුන්නේ. ඉතින් මේකෙන් යම් යම් තැන්වලට පුළුවන් තරම් අඩුවෙන් වදින්නත්, නමුත් විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාවේ වටිනාකම රැඳෙන්නත් තමයි අපි ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම මේ කාර්යය සිදු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඉතින් ඒකේ යම් කාරණයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, කිසිම ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ, මේකට යටින් සටහන් කරන්න. මම ඊයෙත් කිව්වේ ඒකයි. විගණකාධිපතිට 26 පැත්තෙන් හිතන්න පුළුවන්කමක් නැහැ. Opinion එකක් දෙන්න බැහැ. අනෙක් පැත්තෙන් ගත්තාම දුන්න opinion එකක් වෙනස් කිරීමෙන් විශාල damage එකක් වෙනවා. වෙනස් කරන්න සුදුසු තරම් කාරණයක් මේ වෙනකල් මම මේකේ දැක්කේ නැහැ. මේ amount එක වුණත් පැහැදිලිවම අපි සටහන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය කියන කාරණය. එතකොට මේ ඇස්තමේන්තුව - මෙන්න මේ ක්‍රමවේදය කල්පනා කරලා බලන විට මීට වඩා වෙනස් කියන එක යටින් සඳහන් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිම විරෝධතාවක් නැහැ. මේ වැඩේ එතැනින් කරමු කියන තැන තමයි මම ඉන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුනි, මට පොඩි කාරණාවක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න දෙන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, facsimile එක ආවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරි. දැන් එන්න පුළුවන්, facsimile එකක්. නමුත් මට එක කාරණාවක් පැහැදිලි කරන්න දෙන්න. ඇත්තටම දැන් ඔබතුමා කියපු කාරණාවත් එක්ක මට ඇත්තටම - මේ කාරණාවේදී මම ඉන්න ස්ථාවරය මම කියන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවා, සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මම මේ වගකීම් භාර ගන්න කොටත්, මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පැන නැඟිලා තිබුණු බව. බැඳුම්කර සම්බන්ධ මේ ප්‍රශ්නය පැන නැඟිලා තිබුණු එකක්. ඉතින් එතකොට මේ මුළු පාර්ලිමේන්තුවමත්, මුළු රටමත් මේකේදී ඇත්තටම සිදු වුණු ක්‍රියාවලිය මොකක්ද කියලා දැන ගැනීමේ උවමනාවෙන් සිටියදී තමයි මට මේ වගකීම භාර දුන්නේ. ඒක නිසාම තමයි මීට කලින් අනු කාරක සභාව - අපි සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඕනෑම ආයතනයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවක් අර ගන්නවා නේ. ඒක පදනම් කර ගෙන නේ අපි පරීක්ෂණයක් පවත්වන්නේ. හැබැයි මීට කලින් ඩිව් ගුණසේකර මහතා සභාපතිත්වය දැරූ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ අනු කාරක සභාව විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ වාර්තාවක් පදනම් කර ගත්තේ නැහැ. විගණකාධිපතිවරයාත් සම්බන්ධ කර ගත්තා. නමුත් මුළු කාරක සභාවම සම්බන්ධ වෙලා ඔවුන් විසින් තමයි ඒ කටයුත්ත කළේ. ඒකට වඩා මූලික පදනම් ලේඛනයක් අවශ්‍ය නිසා තමයි මම මේකට විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ සහාය ලබා ගත්තේ. මම ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාට ඒ සහයෝගය ඉතාම අඩුපාඩුවකින් තොරව එතුමා ලබා දීම පිළිබඳව. ඉතින් එතුමා ලබා දුන් ඒ වාර්තාව පදනම් කර ගෙන ඒ වාර්තාවට presentation එකකුත් එතුමා කරලා, අපි සාක්ෂි ලබා ගැනීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ආරම්භ කළා. ඒ සාක්ෂි ක්‍රියාවලිය මේ දක්වා අරගෙන ආවා. ඒ කාරණාවේදී මම අවංකව, ඉතා පැහැදිලිව කියන්න ඕනෑ, දේශපාලනීකරණය - මටත් දේශපාලනයක් තිබෙනවා. මටත් පක්ෂයකුත් තිබෙනවා. මම දේශපාලනය කරනවා. නමුත් මගේ විෂයයට සාධාරණයක් ඉෂ්ට වෙන්නවත්, මගේ උගත්කමට සාධාරණයක් ඉෂ්ට වෙන්නවත් මම ඒක මොන වෙලාවකවත් මෙතැන ඉස්සරහට ගත්තේ නැහැ. ඒකට මම වෙනුවෙන් ඔබතුමන්ලා සාක්ෂි දරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා මම වෙනුවෙන් ඒ ගැන ප්‍රසිද්ධියේ කියලාත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ ගැනත් මම ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මම මේ කාරණාව සම්පූර්ණ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශයට භාර දුන්නා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට මම අවංකව කියන්නම්, මගේ මේ කෙටුම්පතේ හැම වචනයකටම මේ වෙනකල් මම වග කිව්වා. මේ කෙටුම්පතේ හැම වාක්‍යයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්ම ඔබතුමන්ලා ප්‍රශ්න කරන කොට මම තමයි ඒකට උත්තර දුන්නේ. අඩුම වශයෙන් තමයි මම නිශාන්ති මහත්මියට ඒවාට උත්තර දෙන්න, පැහැදිලි කරන්න ඉඩ දුන්නේ. මොකද, මම මේ අයට පොරොන්දු වුණා, ඔබතුමන්ලා හදපු මේ වාර්තාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් සම්පූර්ණ වගකීම මම භාර ගන්නවා කියලා, සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට. මේ කෙටුම්පතට මම කිසිම විධියකින් ඇඟිලි ගැසීමක් කළේ නැහැ. පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශයෙන් තමයි මේ ලේඛනය හැදුවේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා දැන් මේ පෙන්වා දෙන කරුණුවල සමහර දේවල් තවත් අලුත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ, වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේම ඒක ව්‍යාකරණමය වශයෙන් ගැළපෙන ආකාරයෙන් සකස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ වාගේ සමහර ඒවා තිබෙනවා. ඉතින් ඒක අපට තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙම තිබෙද්දී ඒ තරම් ස්වාධීනව මේ කටයුතු කරන්න මම උත්සාහ කළා. එක වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න බැරි වුණු එක ගැන කනගාටුවක් තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එක වාර්තාවක් තමයි ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එක වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කළාට මත දෙකක් තිබෙනවා නේ දැන්. මත දෙකක් හැටියට වාර්තා දෙකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒක නිසා මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්නේ මේකයි. මේ දක්වා මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට සහයෝගය පළ කළා. මේ වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලාට ගැළපෙන ආකාරයට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. මේ නිරීක්ෂණ, නිගමන, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමන ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මේ කණ්ඩායමට අවශ්‍ය විධියට සකස් කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක සකස් කර ගන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලා තාවකාලිකව මෙතැන සභාපතිවරයෙක් පත් කර ගන්න. පත් කර ගෙන ඒක සකස් කරලා ඒ වාර්තාවත් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා කාර්යාංශය හරහා මට භාර දෙන්න. මම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඒක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නම්. ඇත්තටම මේ දේශපාලනීකරණය කියන පදයත් එක්ක මට තවදුරටත් මෙතැන කටයුතු කරන්න අමාරුයි. මම සභාපති වෙන්නම ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. මම සභාපති වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. මම සභාපති හැටියට හිටියාද, නැද්ද කියලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. බහුතරය මෙතැන ඉන්නවා. මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කර ගැනීම වෙනුවෙන්, ඉදිරි කටයුතු වෙනුවෙන් - ලොකු කටයුතු ප්‍රමාණයක් නැහැ, මම හිතන විධියට. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නයි තිබෙන්නේ, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනත් එක්ක. මට අවසර දෙන්නකෝ, සභාපති හැටියට. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලා තාවකාලිකව සභාපතිවරයෙක් පත් කර ගෙන මේ කාරණය අවසන් කරන්න. මට තවදුරටත් මේ විධියට කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ. ඒ ගැන මම කනගාටු වෙනවා.

(ප.ව. 5.05ට සභාපතිතුමා මූලාසනයෙන් ඉවත් විය.)

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. එහෙම කරන්න එපා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා නැඟිටලා යන්න එපා. පොඩ්ඩක් අහන්න. අපටත් ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තාවකාලිකව සභාපතිතුමා වශයෙන් අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා පත් කර ගැනීමට මා යෝජනා කරනවා.

(ප.ව. 5.08ට ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා මූලාසනාරූඪ විය.)

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවේ 10වැනි ඡේදයේ නිගමන එක, දෙක අයින් වුණානේ. එක, දෙක සහ IIIට පසු මෙම කරුණු,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් අහන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: දැන් ප්‍රශ්න අහන්න එපා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එක, දෙක සහ IIIට පසු මෙම කරුණු ඇතුළත් කිරීම සුදුසු වේ. මම කියන දේ අහන්නකෝ. මෙම විගණනය පිළිබඳ කටයුතුවලදී විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට තිබූ විෂයය පථය සීමා වීම් පිළිබඳ විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් මුල් අවස්ථාවේදීම කරුණු දක්වා ඇති අතර එම කරුණු මෙසේය. උපුටා ගැනීම කියලා අංක 3 තිබෙන විස්තර සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම ඇතුළත් කරන්න. එකක්වත් අඩු කරන්න එපා. අංක 3 තිබෙන සියලුම කරුණු ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම ඇතුළත් කරන්න. ඒ කියන්නේ, සම්පූර්ණයෙන් මේ පොතෙන් cut and paste කරන්න. ඒ කරුණු මොනවාද කියලා මම කියන්නම්.

මෙම වාර්තාවෙන් ඉස්මතු කර ඇති නිරීක්ෂණයන් තුළින් නිගමනයන්ට එළඹීමේදී මාගේ විෂය පථය මතු දැක්වෙන සීමා කිරීම්වලට යටත්ව තිබූ බව අවධාරණය කරනු ලැබේ.

3.1 විෂයගත ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළව මහ බැංකුව යම් මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතක දැක්වෙන පිළිවෙත් අනුව කටයුතු කළ යුතු බව සඳහන් කර තිබුණද, එය එහි මුදල් මණ්ඩලය විසින් හෝ වෙනත් අධිකාරී බලයක් සහිත ආයතනයක් විසින් අනුමත කළ සමස්ත මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොතක් නොවන බව මා වෙත වාර්තා වී තිබීම.

අපි ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳලා තිබෙනවා. අඩු කරන්නේ නැතිව ලියන්නයි මට ඕනෑ කරන්නේ.

3.2 විෂයගත ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වීමේ කාර්යය විගණකාධිපති වෙත පැවරුණු දිනය හා අදාළ සිද්ධීන් සිදු වූ දිනයන් අතර සැලකිය යුතු කාල පරතරයක් තිබීම.

3.3 අදාළ විෂයගත කරුණු පිළිබඳ විෂය බද්ධ පෘථුල දැනුමක් සහිත මූල්‍ය හා ආර්ථික විශේෂඥයින්ගේ සහය ලබා ගැනීමට ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් නොතිබීම හා මෙම වාර්තාවේ පළමු ඡේදයේ දක්වා ඇති රහස්‍යභාවය පිළිබඳව ගැටලු සහගත තත්ත්වය නිසා එවැනි සහනයක් ලබා ගැනීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වීම.

සමහර දුර්වලතාවලට හේතු ඒවායි. ඇත්ත තත්ත්වය ඒකනේ.

3.4 ඉහත 3.3 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් විශේෂඥයින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සතුව සිටියද එම නිලධාරීන්ගේ සහය අපක්ෂපාතී ලෙස ලබා ගත හැකිද යන්න ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වීම.

3.5 අදාළ විෂයට සම්බන්ධිත ඉතා වැදගත් ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ පිළිබඳව තොරතුරු එම තෙවන පාර්ශ්වයන් වෙතින් සෘජුව ලබා ගැනීමට හෝ තහවුරු කරවා ගැනීමට අධිකාර බලයක් විගණකාධිපති වෙත නොතිබීම.

3.6 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවට මෙම වාර්තාවේ (ඇමුණුම vi) හි දක්වා ඇති ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වෙත ප්‍රමාණාත්මක බලපෑමක් සිදු කිරීමේ හැකියාවක් තිබුණේද යන්න අනාවරණය කර ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් නොවීම.

3.7 ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතර ද, මහ බැංකු අධිපති සහ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතරද එකිනෙක පුද්ගලයන් අතර ප්‍රමාණාත්මක බලපෑමක් සිදු කිරීමේ හැකියාවක් තිබුණේද යන්න අනාවරණය කර ගැනීමේ හැකියාවක් නොවීම.

ඒ කියන්නේ, පුද්ගල සම්බන්ධතා මුකුත් evidenceවලට ඇවිල්ලා නැහැ.

3.8 ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් හා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් අතර සිදු වන දුරකථන සංවාද පටිගත කර නොතිබීම නිසා එම තොරතුරු පරීක්ෂා කළ නොහැකි වීම.

3.9 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින වෙන්දේසිය සිදු වූ අවස්ථාවට අදාළ පටිගත කළ සජීවී දර්ශන භෞතිකව පරීක්ෂා නොකිරීම.

3.10 මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලබා දුන් තොරතුරු අතර තිබූ රහස්‍ය හා සංවේදී තොරතුරු නිවැරැදිව හඳුන්වා දෙන ලෙස මහ බැංකු අධිපතිගෙන් ලිඛිතව ඉල්ලා සිටි අතර එයට ලබා දුන් පිළිතුර අනුව ලබා දී ඇති තොරතුරු සියල්ලම රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු ලෙස සැලකීමට සිදුව තිබීම හේතුවෙන් වාර්තා කිරීමට සීමා පැවතීම.

මම කියන්නේ ඔය ටික අපි as it is දමමු කියලායි. Edit කරන්නේ නැතිව එතැන ඉඳලා අපි කමිටුව හැටියට අපේ comments ඉදිරියට කරගෙන යමු කියලායි මම කියන්නේ. ඊට ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟයි නේද? අපි ඒ ටික උපුටා දක්වනවා. දැන් කමිටුවේ වාර්තාව මම කියන්නම්.

ඉහත කී විෂය පථය සීමා වීම් මෙන්ම මෙම පරීක්ෂණයේදී ඉදිරිපත් වූ බැඳුම්කර හා සම්බන්ධ ක්‍රියාවලියේ ඇති අනිකුත් දුර්වලතාද එලෙසම මෙම ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළව, - forensic audit කියන වචනයට අදාළ සිංහල වචනය දමන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: රස පරීක්ෂක වාර්තාව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ, රස පරීක්ෂක වාර්තාව නොවෙයි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: වෝහාරික විගණනය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වෝහාරික විගණනය - forensic audit - නොපැවැත්වීමද යන කරුණු අනුව ද, විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ ... අනුවද විශේෂයෙන්ම භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම පිළිබඳ රීතිය පිළිබඳ පවතින නීතිය ප්‍රකාරව (රීතිය) වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය බවත්, ව්‍යතිරේකය සෘජු නිකුතු ක්‍රමය බවත් යන මූල ධර්මය පිළිබඳව ඉහත කී විගණකාධිපති වාර්තාව සකස් කරන අවස්ථාවේ විගණකාධිපතිවරයා වෙත නිසි අවබෝධයක් නොතිබීම නිසා සමස්ත ගණනය කිරීම පිළිබඳවම ඉහත කී දෝෂය ඇති වී ඇත. ඊට අමතරව මෙම පරීක්ෂණයේදී-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඔතැනට "නිසි අවබෝධයක් නැතිව" කියන වචන වෙනුවට "limitations" කියන වචනය ඇතුළත් කරමුද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දැනුම පිළිබඳ සීමාවන් නොමැති වීම ද හේතුවෙන් ඉහත කී i, ii සහ iii කියන සාවද්‍ය නිගමනයන් තුනට එළඹී ඇත. තවද, මෙම කෙටුම්පත සාකච්ඡා කරන අවස්ථාවේදී මතු වූ කරුණු පැහැදිලි කර ගැනීම සඳහා මෙම පරීක්ෂණය අතරදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මහජන ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ අධිකාරීවරයා මඟින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කමිටුව වෙත ගෙන්වා ගන්නා ලද 2016.10.24 සහ 2016.10.21 දින දරන ලිපි දෙකෙහි සඳහන් කරුණු පිළිබඳව මෙම වාර්තාව සකස් කරන අවස්ථාවේදී විගණකාධිපතිවරයා වෙත ප්‍රවේශයක් නොතිබුණු බව පෙනේ. එම කරුණු අලුත්ම කරුණු වේ. එම ලිපි දෙක මෙම වාර්තාවේ ඇමුණුම් ලෙස ඇතුළත් කිරීම කළ යුතුව ඇත. ඒ අනුව ප්‍රශ්නගත බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය හා සම්බන්ධව විගණකාධිපතිවරයා වෙත තිබුණු සීමාවන්ද, නිවැරදි තොරතුරුද ඉහත කී වාර්තාවන් සකස් කරන අවස්ථාවේදී විගණකාධිපතිවරයා වෙත මහ බැංකුව මඟින් ලබා නොදීමද හේතුවෙන් ඉහත කී i, ii සහ iii යන නිගමනයන්වලට එළඹී ඇති බව මනාව පැහැදිලි වේ. මෙය විගණකාධිපතිවරයා වෙත කරනු ලබන දෝෂාරෝපණයක් නොව, නිවැරදි සත්‍ය තත්ත්වය නිවැරදි සත්‍ය තොරතුරු මත නිවැරදි නිගමනයකට එළඹීමට විගණකාධිපතිවරයා වෙත අවශ්‍ය සාධක අදාළ මුල් අවස්ථාවේදී නොතිබුණු බව පැහැදිලි වන බව කමිටුවේ අදහසයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම පොඩි කොටසක් ඇතුළත් කරන්නද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කාරණය කියන්න.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There is no evidence to say that it was extended from 2008.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපට evidence හම්බ වුණා නේ, එහෙම වෙලා නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

2016.10.21 දින ලිපියේ සඳහන් කරුණු සහ 2016.10.24 දින ලිපියේ සඳහන් කරුණු එලෙසින්ම වාර්තාවේ උපුටා දැක්වීම සුදුසු ය.

ඒක interpretation එකක් නැතිව as it is දමමු. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ කොටස් දෙක-

ඒ අනුව බැඳුම්කරවලට අදාළ අත් පොතේ සඳහන් සෘජු ක්‍රමයට ලබා ගන්නා බැඳුම්කර හා සම්බන්ධ වන ක්‍රියාවලිය 2008 අවසානයෙන් පසු මහ බැංකුව විසින් කිසිම විටෙක දීර්ඝ කර නොමැති බව පැහැදිලිය. එනම්, 2008 අවසානයේ සිට 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 යන වසරවල සෘජු නිකුත් කිරීම් ක්‍රමයට නිකුත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කොට ඇත්තේ නීතියෙන් පරිබාහිරව බව කමිටුවේ අදහසයි. එම නීති-විරෝධී සෘජු බැඳුම්කර මඟින් රටට සිදු වූ බලපෑම පිළිබඳව විධිමත්ව පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වීම අත්‍යවශ්‍ය වේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: There was a letter from the Ministry of Finance asking for that to be included.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊළඟට, අප කියපු අන්තිම කාරණය මොකක්ද? අප agree වෙලා, නමුත් වාර්තාවේ වෙනස් කරගන්න බැරි වුණු කාරණය මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගණනය සම්බන්ධයෙන්. අන්තිමට කිව්වේ මේකයි. "නිලධාරීන් විසින්..." ඒක නේ. First එකට උත්තරය දුන්නාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකට තමයි මට කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගණනය කිරීම ගැන.

"සෘජු ක්‍රමය අනුව උපකල්පනය කළ නොහැක. "

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක අප මුලින්ම කිව්වා නේ. අන්තිම වාක්‍යයක් කියමු, වැඩි විස්තර නැතිව.

"එසේ හෙයින්, ඇස්තමේන්තුගත අවාසිය පිළිබඳව විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගේ නිගමනය නිසි කරුණු සහ අදාළ නීතිය පිළිබඳ තත්ත්වයට නොගැළපෙන බව කමිටුවේ හැඟීමයි."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "තත්ත්වයට" කියා කියන්න එපා. තව මොකක් හෝ වචනයක් දමන්න. "පටහැනි" කියන වචනය වාගේ එකක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "...අදාළ නීතියට සහ ඉදිරිපත් වූ සාක්ෂිවලට පටහැනි බව කමිටුවේ අදහසයි."

ඊළඟ නිරීක්ෂණය.

"තවද, ඉහත විස්තර කළ පරිදි 2008 සිට 2016 දක්වා වූ සම්පූර්ණ කාලයට අදාළව නිසි විගණනයක් ඉදිරියේදී කරන්නේ නම්, බැඳුම්කර පිළිබඳව සහ ඊට අදාළව රටට සිදුවී ඇති බලපෑම පිළිබඳව වඩාත් නිවැරදි නිගමනයක් කළ හැකි බව කමිටුවේ හැඟීමයි. "

ඊළඟ නිරීක්ෂණය.

"රජය හා සම්බන්ධ මූල්‍ය කටයුතු හා සම්බන්ධ වන පෞද්ගලික ආයතන පිළිබඳ විස්තරාත්මක නිගමනයක් කිරීම සඳහා විගණකාධිපතිවරයා වෙත අවශ්‍ය බලය ලබාදීම ඉතා වැදගත් කරුණක් බව පෙනී යයි. විශේෂයෙන්ම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගේ සහ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ යෙදෙන ආයතනවල ගිණුම් පිළිබඳ සොයා බැලීම සඳහා පූර්ණ බලයක් විගණකාධිපති වෙත තිබිය යුතුව ඇත. ඒ පිළිබඳව කමිටුවේ අවධානය යොමු විය."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Can we go into a Private Company Act?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ. අප කියන්නේ අනාගත නීති හදන්න කියලා නේ.

"ඊට අදාළව නව නීති සකස් කිරීම සුදුසු බව කමිටුවේ හැඟීමයි."

අපට ඊළඟට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ නිර්දේශයි. ඒවාට යන්න කලින් මෙම කරුණුවල අතරමැදට මොනවා හෝ එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවාද? පොඩ්ඩක් අපි පොදු කාරණා ටික කියමුද? ඒ කියන්නේ, එක එක්කෙනාගේ වගකීම් ගැන. ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ, "හල් 'න' යන්නේ" වගකීම ගැන. ඇත්තටම විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ගොඩක් හිතලා "හල් 'න' යන්න" දැම්මාට, රටේ මිනිසුන්ට "හල් 'න' යන්න" තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ. ඒකයි අපට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. අප ඒ "හල් 'න' යන්න" ටිකක් ලොකු කළේ ඒකයි.

ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියපු විධියට තමයි ඔක්කොම උපදෙස් දුන්නේ. කවුරුවත් ඔබතුමාට විරුද්ධව ගියේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "එලෙසම මෙම බැඳුම්කර සිදුවීම පිළිබඳව කාරක සභාවේ පරීක්ෂණය අතරදී මතු වන තවත් වැදගත් කරුණක්

වන්නේ, මහ බැංකුවේ එක් නිලධාරියෙකු පමණක් නොව, මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය හා සම්බන්ධ සියලු නිලධාරීන් එක්ව හෝ වෙන් වෙන්ව මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව වගකිව යුතුව ඇති බවයි.''

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නිර්දේශවලට උත්තර නේ, මේ එන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නිර්දේශවලට ඕනෑ කරන background එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඊට පසුව අප නිර්දේශවලට එනවා.

මෙහි තිබෙනවා, ''මෙම වාර්තාව සැකසීමේදී විගණකාධිපතිවරයාට අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු සහ ඉහත සඳහන් ඡේදවලින් අනාවරණය වූ කරුණු අනුව මහ බැංකු අධිපති විසින් ස්වකීය කාර්යය මෙහෙය වීමේදී මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් අපේක්ෂා කරනු ලබන වෘත්තීය විචක්ෂණභාවයකින් කටයුතු කර ඇති බව තහවුරු නොවූ බව නිගමනය කරනු ලබයි'' කියා. Is there anything on this?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එය තිබෙන දේ නේ. අපි කාරක සභාවේ පොදු නිර්දේශ ගනිමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ ටිකට උත්තර ඔක්කොම හරිද? i, ii, iii, iv කියන කොටස් සියල්ලටම උත්තර හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. අප ඒක separate answer කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. පොදු ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් නේ, පරස්පර වන්නේ. ''i ට මේක, ii ට මේක'' කියන්නේ නැතිව, මෙහි තිබෙන සියලුම කරුණු cover කරන ස්ථාවරයක් කිව්වේ. ස්ථාවර දෙක පටහැනියි. එච්චරයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 1 සිට 41වන පිටුව දක්වා හරිද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මේ අදහස මෙහෙම තියෙද්දි, අපේ අදහසත් දැම්මා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අප ඒක quote කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, මේ ලිපි දෙකම කෙළින්ම වාර්තාවෙන්ම උපුටා දක්වන්න තීරණය කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, වඩා පැහැදිලි වෙන්න මම මේ කාරණය කියන්නම්. ඔබතුමා කියන විධියට, යම් දෙයක් නම් ඔවුන් -සියලු නිලධාරීන්- වග කියනවා කියන එක. එහි පැහැදිලිම කාරණය මේකයි. ආසිම්, සමරසිරි සහ නානායක්කාර කියන තුන්දෙනාම කියනවා ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව ගත්තේ ස්වාධීන තීන්දුවක් කියා. ඒ කාරණාව තමයි වැදගත්ම වන්නේ. හෙක්ටර් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇහුවාම, කවුරුවත් ඒ කාරණාව පරස්පර විරෝධී ලෙස දක්වා නැහැ. කවුරුවත් ඒකට විරුද්ධව අදහසක් දීලාත් නැහැ. ඒ කරුණ අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම මෙහි අන්තර්ගත වෙන්න ඕනෑ. පොඩ්ඩක් හෝ පරස්පර විරෝධීව කියා තිබෙන්නේ අර lady, සෙනෙවිරත්න පමණයි. සෙනෙවිරත්න හතර ජාතියක සාක්ෂි දෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: සෙනෙවිරත්න ඒකට උත්තර දුන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Convince කියා කියනවා; instruct කියා කියනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපේ ගැටගහපු Report එකේ 11වන ඡේදය, as it is එදා අප උපුටා දැක්වුවා. ඒකේ ''සමරසිරි මහතා මේක පිළිගත්තා, evidenceවලදී'' කියන එක දැන් අපේ වාර්තාවේ කොටසක් වශයෙන් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ආසීම් මහත්මයා පිළිගන්න එකත් තිබෙනවා. ඒකත් ඕනෑ නම් කෙටියෙන් ඇතුළු කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, මම ගොඩක් ඒවා ලියාගෙන ආවා, recommendationsවලට කලින්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 66වැනි පිටුව. මෙන්න මේ කාරණය.

> '' **The Hon. Eran Wickramaratne:** My question is, did the Governor after the decision of your recommendation or he went along with your recommendations in this situation?'' Then,
>
> ''**Dr. M.Z.M.Azim**: It is basically the Tender Board decision. The Tender Board communicated that to the Governor?''

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මා මෙය ඇතුළත් කරන්නද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඉහත කී පරිදි මතු වී ඇති අවාසිය පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නය එක් පුද්ගලයකුගේ තනි තීරණයක් මත සිදු වූවකට වඩා කණ්ඩායමක් විසින් ගත් තීරණයක් බව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ රාජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, එතුමාගේ තනතුර මොකක්ද?

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: "අවාසිය" කියන වචනය හොඳද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අවාසියක් තිබෙනවා කියා අප පිළිගන්නවා නේ. "අවාසිය" කියන එකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අවාසියක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "අවාසිය" කියන වචනය අයින් කරන්න.

මතුව ඇති ප්‍රශ්නයට අතිරේක ණය අධිකාරී ආචාර්ය අසීම් විසින් මෙසේ පිළිතුරු දී ඇත.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පිටුව 66.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එය උපුටා දක්වන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 66/839. "It is basically the Tender Board's decision. The Tender Board communicated that to the Governor."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කොතැනද දැන් අපි ඉන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Tender Board decision කියන එක. 41 පිටුවේයි අප දැන් ඉන්නේ. 41 පිටුවේ අග අපේ reasons කියනවා responsibility එක ගැන.

මෙය මූලික වශයෙන් ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුවේ තීරණයකි. ඉන් පසුව ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව එම පණිවිඩය අධිපතිතුමාට දැක්වූවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, මෙය සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ One billion to ten billion decision එක කියලායි. අපි එය කොහේ හෝ සඳහන් කළාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Evidence තිබෙන්නේ ඒ කාරණය ගැන විතරයි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: English එකත් සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: තවම විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශවලට අදහස් දක්වන එකද කරන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තවද, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිතුමාද එම කාරණය තහවුරු කර ඇත.

He was not contradicted by anybody.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කවුද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Nobody has contradicted his position even there.

ඒ කෑල්ල ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මහ බැංකුව තුළ ඇති බැඳුම්කර වෙළඳාම හා සම්බන්ධ රහසිගත තොරතුරු දරා සිටින පුද්ගලයන් එම තොරතුරු කෙතරම් දුරට ආරක්ෂා කරන්නේද යන්න පිළිබඳ මෙම පරීක්ෂණයේදී සාක්ෂි මඟින් හෙළි වූ කරුණු අනුව සැකයක් ඇති වී ඇත. විශේෂයෙන්ම මෙම ප්‍රශ්නගත 2015.02.27 දිනට අදාළ බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය හා සම්බන්ධව ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙන්දන්ට අමතරව වෙනත් බාහිර පුද්ගලයන්ද තොරතුරු දැන සිටි බව සහ මහ බැංකුවේම සේවකයකු රුපියල් ලක්ෂ හතහමාරක මුදලක්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: **සඳහා** බැඳුම්කර ඉල්ලීමක් කර ඇති බව වාර්තා වේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සඳහා බැඳුම්කර ඉල්ලීමක් කර ඇති බව ද, එම තැනැත්තා මහ බැංකුවේ සේවකයන් සමඟ කරන ලද සාකච්ඡා පිළිබඳව මෙම කමිටුවේ ඉදිරිපත් වූ සාක්ෂි අනුව එම තැනැත්තා-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එම තැනැත්තා මහ බැංකුවේ අනෙකුත් සේවකයන් සමඟ කළ සාකච්ඡා අනුව එම තොරතුරු අනාවරණය වූ බවට-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සාකච්ඡා අනුව රහසිගතව තිබිය යුතු බවට සාධාරණව අපේක්ෂා කළ තොරතුරු බොහෝ දෙනෙකු අතර ප්‍රචාරය වී ඇති බව පෙනී යයි. එම තොරතුරු හෙළිදරව් කිරීම කරන ලද නිලධාරීන් කවුද, එම එක් එක් නිලධාරියා විසින් එම තොරතුරු බැහැර කරන ලද්දේද යන කාරණා පිළිබඳව විශේෂයෙන්ම පරීක්ෂා කළ යුතුව ඇත. එසේ සොයා ගැනීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය කරන ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන්ගේ සංඛ්‍යාංක හා පා සටහන් (digital footprints) පිළිබඳ නිරීක්ෂණය කිරීම අත්‍යවශ්‍ය වේ. ඉතිහාසයේ සිදු වූ සිදුවීම්වලට අදාළව මෙන්ම අනාගතයේ මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳව විශ්වාසය තහවුරු කිරීම සඳහා ද එම පියවර ගත යුතුව ඇත.

ඇතුළත් කරන්න තවත් මොනවා හෝ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔව්. මම ඊයේ රෝ මෙය කියවා, ගත් අදහස් වගයක් තිබෙනවා. අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමනි, අවශ්‍ය නම් -කොහේ හෝ තැනක සඳහන් කිරීම අවශ්‍ය නම්- මේවා ඒ නියමිත තැන්වලට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මෙමඟින් වැටහෙන දෙයක් තමයි මහ බැංකුව තුළින් බොහෝ තොරතුරු එළියට ගලාගෙන ගිය බවක් පෙනීම. verbatim එකේ එක තැනක තිබෙනවා මම දැක්කා මහ බැංකුවේ සේවකයෙක් ඊට කලින් දවසේ primary dealer

කෙනෙකුගේ office එකට ගිහින් account එකක් open කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන කතාවකුත්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : ඒක කිව්වා. ඒක බැහැ කියනවා, 1 million අඩු කරනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒක අපේ නිර්දේශවල සඳහන් කරනවාද? කොතැනද සඳහන් කරන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒක නිරීක්ෂණයක් වශයෙන් සඳහන් කරමු.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී වීජේසිංහ මහතා : ඒක සඳහන් කරන එක හොඳයි. පිටිපන වාර්තාවේත් එය සඳහන් වනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා : පිටිපන වාර්තාවේත් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ වනවා නම් අපේ නිරීක්ෂණවලට ඇතුළත් කරන්න. අභ්‍යන්තර තොරතුරු එළියට ගලා ගෙන ගිහින් තිබෙනවා. අභ්‍යන්තර තොරතුරු එළියට ගලා යෑම හරහා primary dealersලා ඒකෙන් profit කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිරීක්ෂණය අපට කරන්න පුළුවන්. මෙහිදී Perpetual Treasuries ආයතනයට එවැනි අභ්‍යන්තර තොරතුරු ගිය බවට අපට සාධාරණ සැකයක් මතු වනවා.

දෙවන කාරණය වශයෙන් මා කියන්න කැමැතියි,-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Why do you not say everybody got the information?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Perpetual Treasuries ඇතුළු primary dealersලා. සියලුදෙනාම insider information ගත්තාය කියලා මා හිතන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : නම සඳහන් කරන්නේ නැතුව primary dealersලා කියා සඳහන් කරමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : Perpetual Treasuriesලා කියා සඳහන් කරන්න. ඒ ආයතනයත් එක්ක නේ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. Perpetual Treasuries ඇතුළු primary dealersලාට මේ තොරතුරු ගිහින් තිබෙන බවක් අපට පෙනෙනවා. සමහරු ඒ තුළින් advantage එකක් අරගෙන තිබෙනවාය කියා කිව්වා. ඒක නිවැරැදිද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : නිවැරැදියි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : දෙවන කාරණය මෙයයි. මා මේ වචනය කියන්න කැමැතියි. මට පෙනනවා, rogue ring එකක් මෙය ඇතුළේ තිබෙනවාය කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : එය සඳහන් කරලා, ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉදිරියට පරීක්ෂණ කළ යුතුයි කියා සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එය නිර්දේශවලට එන්න ඕනෑ. මේවා අපේ නිරීක්ෂණ නේ. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් bond marketsවල සහ stock marketsවල මේ විධියට white collar crimes සිද්ධ වන කොට මේවාට rogue rings කියලා කියනවා. Rogue ring කියන්නේ කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්නවා, මේ කණ්ඩායමේ පුද්ගලයන් ඉන්නේ එක් එක් ආයතනවලයි. එක් කෙනක් EPF එක ඇතුළේ ඉන්න පුළුවන්. තව එක් කෙනෙක් Public Debt එක ඇතුළේ ඉන්න පුළුවන්. තව කෙනෙක් primary dealer එක ඇතුළේ ඉන්න පුළුවන්. තව කෙනෙක් Bank of Ceylon එකේ ඉන්න පුළුවන්. මෙහිදී පෙනෙන දෙයක් තමයි, මෙය එක් කෙනකු හෝ දෙදෙනකු එකතු වෙලා කරන ලද දෙයක් නොවෙයි, කණ්ඩායමක් විසින් කාලයක් තිස්සේ සිදු කරන ලද දෙයක්ය කියලා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ කාරණය ලියන්න වෙයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : එය ඔබතුමා ලියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාදාමය තුළ අයුතු ලෙස වාසි ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙන්දන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ ඇතැම් නිලධාරීන්, අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ ඇතැම් නිලධාරීන් සහ ලංකා බැංකුව ඇතුළු බැංකුවල නිලධාරීන් සමඟ අයථා ලෙස කටයුතු කරන බවත්, ඒ හරහා එම නිලධාරීන් - විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, ඒ ring එකේ තව කවුද ඉන්නේ? Primary dealers, Central Bank Officials, bank officials-

Mr. W.P.C. Wickremaratne: Chief dealers in the primary-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : ඒ ආයතනවල නිලධාරීන් rogue ring - ඉංග්‍රීසි වචනය ලියන්න. ඒකේ සිංහල වචනය සොයා සඳහන් කරන්න- ලෙස කටයුතු කර ඇති බවද කමිටුවේ නිරීක්ෂණයයි. මෙය වැළැක්වීම සඳහා ගත යුතු පියවර ඉතා ඉක්මනින් ම නොගතහොත් බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය වෙන්දේසියෙන් සිදු වුවද, සෘජු ක්‍රමය- private placement- අනුව සිදු වුවද, රටට පාඩු සිදු වීම වැළැක්විය නොහැකිය. සභාපතිතුමනි, auction කරන එකේ විතරක් නොවෙයි, private placement එකේත් rogue ring ඉන්න පුළුවන් නේ. හොරු ඉන්නවා නේ. ඒ අනුව සිදු වූ වැරැදි අනාගතයේදී නිවැරැදි කර ගැනීම සඳහා කටයුතු කරන විට වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයට මෙන්ම සෘජු ක්‍රමයටද - private

placement ක්‍රමයටද- අදාළව පියවර ගත යුතුව ඇත.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මගේ ඊළඟ observation එක, මෙතැන යම්කිසි වැරැද්දක් සිද්ධ වුණා නම්, ඒ සිද්ධ වුණු වැරැද්ද හැටියට මා දකින්නේ, එක බිලියනයක් වෙනුවට බිලියන 10ක් කියා ගත්ත තීරණය මුල් අවස්ථාවේදී සියලුම ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන්ට communicate නොකරපු එකයි. අපි තීරණය කළා නම් auction එක open කරන්න කලින් උදේට ගන්න, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : Discuss කළාට පස්සේ 12.30ට තමයි තීන්දු කළේ, 11.75ට පහළින් තිබෙනවා නම් ගනිමුයි කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඊට පස්සේ ඉඳලා සියයට 100ක් ගන්නේ auction එකෙන් නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ, නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ තව මාසයක් ගිහින් ඊළඟ මාසයේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : දැන් දිගටම ගන්නේ auction එකෙන් නේ. මෙතැනදී අපි යම්කිසි සම්ප්‍රදායානුකූල වැඩ පිළිවෙළක් වෙනස් කළා. එය හරිද, වැරැදිද කියන එක නොවෙයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, their explanation was that there was no fairness to most of the dealers. But, that is not the criteria of the Central Bank. The Central Bank criteria is to get the most amount of money at the least amount of interest rate.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Correct.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Their excuse was that they did not-

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: They may have an excuse. What I am saying is, සම්ප්‍රදායානුකූලව කර ගෙන ආපු දේ වෙනස් කිරීම පිළිබඳව සියලුදෙනාම දැනුවත් වුණා නම් -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : දැනුවත් වුණා නම් interest rate එක ඉහළ යනවා නේ. If anybody knows that you are-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : දැන් එහෙම නේ වෙන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is a different story. At that moment, what they said was they could have- The Governor asked, "Why did you not go for 10 billion?" The Governor asked that question from the Debt Department. The Debt Department said, "We cannot do that, Sir. If the 10 billion.... to the dealers, then, they know that we are desperate for that money. So, they would have bid for higher rates like 13 per cent or 12.5 per cent. So, we do not want to divulge that. Then, go and see for 1 billion.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: He is not talking about the amount. He is talking about the method.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මා හිතන්නේ fact of the matter is, එදා උදේ යම්කිසි වෙලාවක තීරණය කළා නේ, අපි auction එකෙන් මේවා ගන්නවාය කියා. එහෙම තීරණය කළා නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා : නැහැ. නැහැ. In the morning they did not have a clue. I will tell you. In the morning they went for 1 billion. One billion ගියාට පස්සේ, then they asked, "Sir, we have got 20 billion because there was no volatility in the market". There was no actually liquidity in the market. So, all of a sudden, they realized they were borrowing from outside; foreign loans, dollar loans. So, they wanted to go for the local market. Then, they realized that over 20 billion, it has been suspended. They were excited and then they said, "Okay. Why can we not take 20 billion?"

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මා දන්නවා. මා මේ general point එකක් ගෙනෙන්නේ, නිර්දේශයක් හැටියට ඉදිරියටත් කර ගෙන යන්නයි. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් market එකක් කියන්නේ බොහෝ විට නීතියක් නැතුව රීතිවලින් කර ගෙන යන තැනක්. යම්කිසි දෙයක් සිද්ධ වනවා නම් ඒ විධියටම සිද්ධ වෙයි කියන බලාපොරොත්තුව market එකේ තිබෙනවා. The rational expectation කියන එක ගැන අපි ආර්ථික විද්‍යාවේදී කථා කරනවා. Rational expectation එකක් මත තමයි අනික් අය මේකට bid කළේ. එතකොට මේක වෙනස් වුණු නිසා ඔක්කොම upset ගැහුවා. ඒක තමයි වුණේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඇතුළු කරන system එක නේ අහන්නේ. ඒක දෙවිධියකට දමන්න පුළුවන්. හරි හෝ වැරැදි හෝ සාම්ප්‍රදායික ක්‍රමයෙන් එක විට බැහැර වෙනවා නම්, ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් යම් කිසි දැනුවත් කිරීමක් dealersලාට කළ යුතුයි කියන අදහස දමන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි දමන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි මෙච්චර වෙලා fight කරලා, auction තමයි නිවැරැදි ක්‍රමය,

ඒ ගොල්ලන් වැරැද්දක් කළේ කියලා, නැවත මේක වෙනස් කරද්දි මෙහෙම කරනවා කියලා-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නය තියෙන්නේ auction නොවෙයි, ගිය ගණන පිළිබඳවයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe : That is very complicating. Do you know why? ලොකු විස්තරයක් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි කිව්වා ඒ ගොල්ලන් කළේ වැරැද්දක් කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි දන්නවා වැරැද්දක් කියලා. නමුත් සාම්ප්‍රදායිකව-

The Hon. Sujeewa Senansinghe : You have to explain the whole scenario.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඇයි එහෙම නම්, ඒ කළේ වැරැද්දක් කියලා අපි කිව්වේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: උදේ තීරණයක් අරගෙන three day rule එක අයින් කළා. එහෙම නම් ඒ තීරණය පිළිබඳව හවස් වෙන්න කලින් market එක දැනුවත් කරන්න තිබුණා. ඒ තීරණය උදේ 9.30ට ගත්තා නම්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 දින පෙරවරුවේ three day rule ලෙස හඳුන්වනු ලැබූ පොලී අනුපාතිකය පාලනය කිරීම සඳහා එතෙක් පවත්වා ගෙන යන ලද රීතිය ඉවත් කරන ලද අතර, එම වෙනස හේතුවෙන් වෙළෙඳ පොළ තුළ පොලී අනුපාතිකය සියයට 5 සිට සියයට 6.5 දක්වා එනම්, සියයට 1.5කින් ඉහළ යන ලදී. මෙය වෙළෙඳ පොළ පොලී අනුපාතිකය පිළිබඳ ඉතා බරපතළ ලෙස බලපාන කරුණකි. මෙම තොරතුර ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන ලද්දේ 2015.02.27 වන දින හවස් වරුවේය. එනම්, ප්‍රශ්නයට ලක් වූ වෙන්දේසියෙන් පසුවය. මෙම තොරතුර සියලුම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙන්දන්ට වෙන්දේසියට ප්‍රථම ලබා දී තිබුණේ නම්, වඩාත් සාධාරණ අවස්ථාවක් සියලුම ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙන්දන්ට ලැබෙන අතර, මතු වූ ප්‍රශ්නය ඇති නොවන්නට ඉඩ තිබුණි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මගේ තව නිරීක්ෂණයක් තියෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: රහස්‍යභාවයෙන් වුණු දේවල් එළියට ගියා කිව්වා නේ. රහස්‍යභාවය කිහිප දෙනෙකුට එළියට ගිය නිසා ඒ ගොල්ලන් දැන ගත්තා. එතකොට ඔබතුමා කිව්ව වාක්‍යයෙන් රහස්‍යභාවයෙන් යුතු තොරතුරු ඔක්කෝටම දෙන්න කියලානේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: රහස්‍යභාවය නොවෙයි. ගත්ත තීරණය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Transparency කියන්නේ ගත්ත තීරණය. Market එකේ පොලී අනුපාතිකය සියයට 1.5කින් වැඩි කරන්න රජය ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය තීරණයක් ගන්නවා නම්, ඒ තීරණය ගත්තේ උදේ නම්, ඒක හැමෝටම කියන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම කියන්න අපහසුතාවක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මේ තරම් ලොකු වෙනසක් වෙනවා නේ. ඒක සාමාන්‍ය අභ්‍යන්තර ගනුදෙනුවක් නොවෙයි නේ. සියයට 1.5කින් market rates වැඩි වෙනවා නම්-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: එතකොට bid කරන්නේ අරක cover වෙන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන වෙලා තියෙන්නේ, සමහරුන් මේක දැන ගන්න නිසා නේ, වැඩියෙන් bid කළේ. හවස bid කළා නේ. මම එහි අනෙක් පැත්ත කියන්නම්. ඒකත් මේකට add කරන්න. මේ සියයට 5 සිට 6.5ට ගෙනියපු එක හැමෝටම කියන්න තිබුණා. එලෙසම, 2016 මාර්තු 29වැනි දා ජාත්‍යන්තර වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් ඇමෙරිකානු ඩොලර් බිලියන 3ක සෙවරී බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමට ගත් තීරණය, එදින වෙන්දේසිය අවසන් වූවායින් පසු නිවේදනය කිරීම වෙනුවට වෙන්දේසියට කලින් එම නිවේදනය කර තිබුණා නම්, සියලුම ගැනුම්කරුවන්ට එම තොරතුරු දැන ගැනීමේ හැකියාව තිබුණි. එසේ වූවා නම් පොලී අනුපාත බොහෝ දුරට පහළ වැටීමට ඉඩ තිබුණි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි මේ කලින් කරුණ එක්කද යන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොදුවේ නිරීක්ෂණ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Tender Board එක රුපියල් බිලියන 20 ගන්න එපා කිව්වා නම්, Tender Board එකට රුපියල් බිලියන 10ත් ගන්න එපා කියන මතයේ ඉන්න තිබුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක Tender Board එක ගත්ත තීන්දුවක් කියන කරුණටත් එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක අපි මේ ආකාරයට වෙනම point එකක් විධියට ගනිමු. "රුපියල් බිලියනයක් සඳහා බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය පවත්වා, දිනය අවසානයේ රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ලබා ගැනීම විවේචනයට ලක් වී ඇත. මෙම විවේචනයට හේතු වී ඇත්තේ Perpetual Treasuries ආයතනය හැර අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙන්දන් එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් අපේක්ෂා නොකරන බවට ඇති වී ඇති හැඟීමයි.

එසේ අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙන්දන් ඒ තොරතුරු දැන සිටියේ නම් වඩාත් සාධාරණ තරගයක් අපේක්ෂා කළ හැකිව තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව

රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් සඳහා පමණක් වෙන්දේසි කිරීමට යෝජනා කිරීම.

ඒ කියන්නේ, රුපියල් බිලියන 13ක් සඳුදාට ඕනෑ නම්, රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් විතරක් - ඊට වඩා වැඩියෙන් ඉල්ලන්න තිබුණා නේ. මම මේ කියන කාරණය හරි නේද? ඒ අනුව සඳුදා දිනට රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් අවශ්‍යව තිබියදී, රුපියල් බිලියන එකක් පමණක් සඳහා ටෙන්ඩර් කැඳවීමට ගත් තීරණයද-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒක ගැටලු සහගතයි නේ. එතැන තීරණයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. Cost factor එක බලලා නේ ඒක කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: රුපියල් බිලියන 10ක් ඕනෑ නම්, අඩු ගණනේ රුපියල් බිලියන 03ක්වත් ඉල්ලන්න ඕනෑ නේ. අපි දැන් කථාව කියන්නේ, - එකක් ඉල්ලලා 2.8කට යන එක තමයි හරි වැඩේ. 03ක් ඉල්ලලා 10ට යන්න තිබුණා. එතකොට ඒ original decision එක වැරදි නැද්ද?

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම. ඒක තමයි අපිත් කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මුදල් ගෙවන්න තිබුණ නම් මට සඳුදා 10ක්, මම සිකුරාදට එකක් ඉල්ලලා තේරුමක් නැහැ නේ. ඔය line එක - ඒ කියන්නේ interest වැඩි වෙනවා. අපි desperate කියලා දැන ගත්තාම market එකේ interest එක වැඩි වෙනවා කියන එක නේ කියන්නේ. එහෙම නම් අඩු ගණනේ තුනක් ඉල්ලන්න තිබුණා. ඒ අනුව එම මුල් තීරණය දෝශ සහගත බව කමිටුවේ හැඟීමයි. තවද, දසගුණයක් තරම් ඉහළ අනුපාතයකට යෑම තුළ සාධාරණ තරගයක් සඳහා අවස්ථාවක් නොතිබුණු බව පෙනී යයි.

මේකට බැරිද අපට යෝජනා කරන්න, policy එකක්? මේ වාගේ වේලාවල යම් විධියක internal system එකක් ඕනෑ නැද්ද, මේ වාගේ decision එකක් ගන්න?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපේ නිර්දේශය විය යුත්තේ දෙන ගණනට වඩා ශතයක්වත් වැඩිපුර ගන්න එපා කියන එකයි.

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා: අපි propose කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒක තමයි. එහෙම කියන්නත් බැහැ. එතකොට ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති නොවී කරන්න පුළුවන්, competitive and non-competitive system එකක් දමන්න පුළුවන්. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. දහයයි කිව්වොත් දහයයි; එකොළහයි කියන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයක් වැළැක්වීම උදෙසා වන නිර්දේශ ඉදිරියේදී ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ඇත. එම නිර්දේශ මෙම වාර්තාවේ "නිර්දේශ" කොටසේ අන්තර්ගතව ඇත.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමනි, අපි 10ක් ගන්නවා කියලා දමලා, අපට පුළුවන් - දැන් මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ, මේ private placement එකේ ප්‍රශ්නය නේ. මේ private placement නැතුව අපිට පුළුවන්, non-competitive system එකක් හදා ගන්න, EPF එකට දෙන්න. ඒක තමයි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. Hybrid system එකකට එන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි 10ක් කියලා 11ක් ගන්න බැහැ. 10ක් කියලා 8ක් ගන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට හැබැයි ඔබතුමා කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ, මම කියපු එක. මම කිව්වේ -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ අනුව ඉහත කී ආකාරයට දැන්වීමෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටින ලද ප්‍රමාණයට වඩා ඉතා අසාමාන්‍ය මුදලක් වෙළෙඳ පොළෙන් ලබා ගැනීම නිසා ඇති වී ඇති ප්‍රශ්නය පිළිබඳව ටෙන්ඩර් කමිටුව වගකිව යුතුව ඇත.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අනෙක් එක තමයි, මාර්තු 29 වැනිදා වෙන්දේසියේදී Perpetual Treasuries ආයතනය විසින් ලබා ගන්නා ලද බැඳුම්කරවලට ගෙවීම සඳහා ඔවුන් සතුව මුදල් නොතිබුණු හෙයින් ඒ සඳහා මහ බැංකුවෙන් සෘජුවම මුදල් සැපයීම සිදුවූයේ කෙසේද යන්න පිළිබඳව හරියට explanation එකක් ඇවිල්ල නැහැ. ඒක කියන්න ඕනෑ.

එදා අපි Rs. 29 billion ගත්තා නේ. Rs. 29 billion ගන්නා විට මේ Perpetual Treasuries එක ගොඩක් ගත්තා. ඒවාට ගෙවන්න මුදල් තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඉතින් මොකක්ද, කළේ? Central Bank එකෙන්ම සියයට 8 පොලියට ණයට ගත්තා. එතකොට Central Bank එක කොහොමද, මෙච්චර ගොඩක් දුන්නේ?

29 වන දා auction එකේ දී Perpetual Treasuries එක ගත්ත බැඳුම්කරවලට ගෙවීමට ඔවුන් සතුව මුදල් නොතිබුණු හෙයින් ඒ සඳහා මුදල් මහ බැංකුවෙන්ම ලබා ගෙන තිබුණා; අතිවිශාල මුදල් ප්‍රමාණයක්. ඒ ගනුදෙනුව සිදු වුණේ කොහොමද කියන එක පිළිබඳව මහ බැංකුවෙන් කිසිම කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමක් සිදු වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ 2016 මාර්තු මාසයේ 29 වන දා -

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: ඒක අපේ ළඟත් නැහැ. අපි confirm කරලා ගෙන්වා ගනිමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පර්පචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ් සමාගම bond

transaction එකට ඉදිරිපත් වුණා. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට එයින් ලොකු ප්‍රමාණයක් ලැබුණා. එදින හැන්දැව වන විට ඒ ගත්තු බැඳුම්කරවලට අදාළව මුදල් ගෙවන්න වෙනවා නේ. ඒ මුදල ගෙවන්න මේ ගොල්ලන් ගාව සල්ලි නැහැ. මේ ගොල්ලන් මොකක්ද කළේ? මහ බැංකුවට ගිහිල්ලා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ණයක් ගත්තා. මහ බැංකුවේ discount window එකෙන් සල්ලි ඉල්ලා ගත්තා. ඒ දේවල් නේ වැරදි. ඒවා නේ හොරකම් කියන්නේ. සම්පූර්ණ වැරැදියි නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සම්පූර්ණ වැරැදියි. මහ බැංකුවේ discount window එකෙන් සල්ලි අරගෙන ගිහිල්ලා, මහ බැංකුවටම ආපහු දුන්නා මෙන්න කියලා. මේ ගොල්ලන් සියයට 8ක පොලියට මහ බැංකුවෙන් ණයක් අරගෙන, සියයට 14 පොලියට බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගත්තා. එහෙම වෙන්න හැකියාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා : මට ඒ කාරණය දැන් තමයි තේරුණේ. මම ඒ කාරණය නැවතත් පැහැදිලිව කරලා කියන්නම්. "2016 මාර්තු මාසයේ 29වැනි දා වෙන්දේසියට ඉදිරිපත් වී රුපියල් බිලියන 29ක මුදලක් වටිනා බැඳුම්කර ලබා ගත් පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ් සමාගම එම බැඳුම්කර සඳහා මහ බැංකුවෙන්ම රුපියල් බිලියන කියලා හිස් තැනක් තියලා ප්‍රමාණය අඩු පොලියකට ණයට ලබාගෙන ඇත. එම තත්ත්වය තුළ පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ් සමාගම යම් අයුතු වාසියක් මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ ලබාගෙන ඇති බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. මෙම නිශ්චිත කරුණ පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනය කොට, එයින් රටට සිදු වී ඇති අලාභය ගණනය කොට එම අලාභය වගකිවයුතු තැනැත්තන්ගෙන් අයකර ගැනීමටද එම තීරණ සඳහා වගකිවයුතු නිලධාරින්ට එරෙහිව ක්‍රියා කළ යුතුවද ඇත."

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒ නිර්දේශය නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේක දාන්න කෝ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : මේක edit කරන කොට ඒක හදන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි නිර්දේශ එකකට, දෙකකට යමුද? අපි එක නිර්දේශයකට යමු, ඉතිරි ටික පසුවට ගනිමු.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: තිබෙන නිර්දේශ ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් බලනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒවා තිබෙද්දී මේ වාර්තාවේ මුලින්ම තිබෙන එක නිර්දේශයකට යන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා : වාර්තාවේ 45 පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා නේ, විශේෂ නිර්දේශය.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒවා අපි ගන්නේම නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා : ඒවා කට්ටිය දමපු ඒවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: විශේෂ නිර්දේශ නොවෙයි, පොදු නිර්දේශවලින් ගන්න පුළුවන් ටික ගනිමු.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා : "2015, 2016 සඳහා බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සඳහා අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා සෘජුවම වග කිව යුතුයි." කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා : ඒ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ අපි සාකච්ඡාවට ගන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කාරක සභාවේ පොදු නිර්දේශ 01. මෙම කාරක සභාව විසින් පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් කරන ලද 2015.02.27 සහ 2016.03.29 යන දින දෙකට අදාළව සිදු වූ ගනුදෙනුවලදී පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ලිමිටඩ් සමාගම අයුතු ලාභයක් ලබා ඇති බව ඉතා පැහැදිලිය. මේ හා සම්බන්ධව අපරාධ පරීක්ෂණයක් ඉක්මණින්ම පැවැත්වීම අවශ්‍ය වේ. එසේ හෙයින්,

01. පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ප්‍රයිවෙට් ලිමිටඩ් සමාගමේ අළෙවි කළමනාකාර හරීන් නිශාන්ත මහතාගේ සාක්ෂියෙන් එළිදරව් වන ලද එම සමාගමේ සභාපති ජෙෆ්රි ඇලෝසියස්, අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල සාමාජිකයන් වන ගොඩ්ෆ්‍රි ඇලෝසියස්, අර්ජුන් ඇලෝසියස්, මුතුරාජා සුරෙන්ද්‍රන්, පුෂ්‍යා ගුණවර්ධන සහ රංජන් හුළුගල්ල යන අයට එරෙහිව ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ පොලිස් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් වහාම අපරාධ පරීක්ෂණයක් ආරම්භ කළ යුතු බවට යෝජනා කර සිටිමු.

පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ගැන කිව්වොත් ඒකෙන් අයුතු වාසියක් ලැබූ බව මේ පර්පෙවුවල් ඩීලර් සමාගම අපට පෙනෙනවා. අනෙත් අය ගැනත් අපි කියනවා. මේ specific සමාගම ගැන, එහි අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන් ගැන, කලින් evidence තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ අය ගැන criminal investigation එකක් immediately පටන් ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඔය කියන මහා නිර්දේශවලත් වෙන මොනවත් බරපතළ දෙයක් නැහැ නේ. අපි ඊට වඩා progressive.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: How are we going to decide the interest rate. Hon. Harsha De Silva, at this COPE, we are investigating one. I have information about many such other

companies. Who you not investigate everybody? We cannot be bias in investigating.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන පර්පෙවුවල් එක මේක කරන ලද බව අපට පෙනෙනවා නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva, what I am saying is to investigate everybody. Policy එක මෙයයි මෙයයි කියලා අඩු වෙන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පර්පෙවුවල් එකේ investigate කරන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon Sujeewa Senasinghe: Everybody – all the primary dealers - must be investigated. Take Entrust for instance. We are not talking about it. Entrust 9 ½ billion. 5 billion has been taken from the Central Bank. Nobody is even not talking about it, and that is a daylight robbery. They have taken 5 billion from the Central Bank and bought properties. We are not talking about that. Politically, we are trying to be correct and we are saying investigate-

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: Entrust එක.

The Hon Sujeewa Senasinghe: All.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එක එක නම් දාන්නේ නැතුව කළා නම් හොඳයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි කට්ට කාගෙන මෙතැන හිටියත්, නැඟිටලා ගිය මහත්වරු නිකම් ඉන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔක දැම්මා කියලා නිකම් ඉන්නවාද? කවුරුවත් නැගිට්ටා කියලා- We must have a sound mind. What I am saying is, I want the police of the CID to investigate everybody. Just because we have been given a task how can we-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන පර්පෙවුවල් එක අනිසි විධියට insider information පාවිච්චි කරපු බව බැලූ බැලුමට පෙනෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: But, Hon. Harsha De Silva, how do you know others have not used it.

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha De Silva: I do not know.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly, that is what I am saying. ඇයි අපි එක හොරෙක් අල්ලන්නේ. අයි හොරු ඔක්කොම අල්ලන්න බැරි? Hon. Ajith Perera, what I am saying is, everybody must be investigated.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Yes.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන පර්පෙවුවල් එකනේ මෙතැන මූලිකව තිබෙන්නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is because we have been given one object. What about others? Just because politically people have dragged one company – Mr. Arjuna Mahendran – are we going to punish only them?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන අපි 27 වැනිදා එක ගැන නම් බලන්නේ, මම කියන්නේ ඊට කලින් සහ පසුව ඒවාත් බලන්න ඕනෑ. 27වැනිදා case එකට අපට පර්පෙවුවල් එකට විරුද්ධව කථා කරන්න වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමා කියන එකත් හරි, එතුමාට විෂය පථය දුන්නේ මේක ගැන විතරයි. ඒ නිසා එතුමා ලියන්නේ ඒක ගැන විතරයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක තමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක තමයි නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමන් කිව්වා එහෙම නැතුව කලින් auction එක ගැන සඳහන් කරන්න කියලා. මමත් කියන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම අජිත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්ව දෙයට මම එකහයි. ඊට පස්සේ තවත් -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: I will add that. තවද, මහ බැංකුව සතු රහසිගත සහ සංවේදී තොරතුරු පිටතට යාම සහ එම තොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීම මගින් අයුතු ලෙස පොහොසත් වූ වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙන්දන් පිළිබඳව සොයා බැලීම සඳහා අපරාධ පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්වීම නිර්දේශ කරනු ලැබේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේ case එකට සම්බන්ධ පර්පෙවුවල් නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ අපටනේ. 2016 වර්ෂයේ තව ආයතනයක් තිබෙනවා නම් අපි ඒක නොකර ඉන්නවාද? ඒක තමයි. අපිට ඔක්කෝගේම හොර අසු වෙන්න ඕනෑ. එක් අයෙකුගේ නොවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ යෝජනාවෙන් සියල්ලම cover වෙනවා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: පර්පෙවුවල් ඇතුළු කියලා-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කාටවත් බය වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. පර්පෙවුවල් මෙතැන සොරකම් කරලා තිබෙනවා කියලා අපට පෙනෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි කවුරුත් බැහැ කිව්වේ නැහැ . අපි කියන්නේ අනෙක් අයවත් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න කියලා. That is what I am saying.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ දාපු කාරණය අනුව පර්පෙචුවල් එක්ක විශේෂයෙන් සහ අනෙක් අයවත් cover වෙනවා. අපි කියන්නේ මේ හැම එකක් ගැනම criminal investigation එකක් කරන්න කියලා.

The Hon. Harshana Rajakaruna: Exactly.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: That is exactly the point.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: I will give my point. තවදුරටත් ප්‍රකාශ කර සිටින්නේ, මෙම COPE එක මගින් පරීක්ෂා කරනු ලැබුවේ, 2015 පෙබරවාරි මස සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා, මහ බැංකු බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගනුදෙනුවලට අදාළව බව පැහැදිලි වේ. තවද, 2008 මුල සිටම පැවති වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමයෙන් ඔබ්බට ගොසින් සෘජු ක්‍රමය භාවිත කිරීමට අවසර ලැබුණේ 2008 වර්ෂය අවසන් වනතුරු බව මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකාවලින් පැහැදිලි වේ. 2009 වර්ෂයේ මුල සිට මේ දක්වා සෘජු ක්‍රමය මගින්ද, වෙන්දේසි ක්‍රමය මගින්ද, ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන් හට මහ බැංකුවේ රහස්‍ය තොරතුරු නොයෙක් විට නීති විරෝධී ලෙස ගලා ගිය බවට කරුණු පැහැදිලි වේ. එමනිසා 2008 වර්ෂයේ මුල සිට මේ වන තෙක් සියලුම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් කලින් සඳහන් කළ පරීක්ෂණයට අදාළ කර ගන්නා ලෙසත්, මෙම කමිටුව නිර්දේශ කරනු ලබයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ විස්තර එන්න ඕනෑ නිරීක්ෂණවලට නිගමනය කිව්වාම ඊට වඩා specific action එකක්.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: This is the action. You said that one company must be investigated. මා කියන්නේ, "All the companies must be investigated." කියායි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මා කිව්වේත් ඒකම තමයි. Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම ඇතුළුව කියලායි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, මුලින් කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම තමයි කිව්වේ. මා Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම ගැන මුලින් කිව්වා. ඊට පසුව කිව්වා, ඉතිරි ඒවාත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා. ඒ දෙක එකතු කළාම ඔක්කෝම අයිති වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Interest ගැන -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Interest ගැන කිව්වේ නැහැ. ඕනෑ නම්, interest ගැනත් විශේෂයෙන් කියන්නම්. මෙතැන interest ගැන evidence එකක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: නම් කියන්න ඕනෑද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නම් කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම නේ මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ. Interest එක කොහොමත් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා: එකකවත් ඒක කිව්වේ නැහැ. Second proposal කියලා කිව්වා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම තමයි කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කියපු දේ නැවත කියවන්න පුළුවන්ද?

එන්.එස්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: පළමුවැනි එකද, දෙවැනි එකද?

ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා: දෙවැනි එක.

එස්.එන්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: තවද, මහ බැංකුව සතු රහසිගත සහ සංවේදී තොරතුරු පිටතට යෑම සහ එම තොරතුරු ලබා ගැනීම මඟින් අයුතු ලෙස පොහොසත් වූ වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳුන් ගැන සොයා බැලීමට අපරාධ පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතුය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම ගැන කිව්වේ මොකක්ද?

එස්.එන්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහත්මිය: සිදු වූ ගනුදෙනුවලදී Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම අයුතු ලාභයක් ලබා ඇති බව ඉතා පැහැදිලිය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "ලබා ඇත්නම්" කියලා දැම්මා නම් හොඳයි නේද, ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එම සමාගම අයුතු ලාභයක් ලබා තිබෙනවා කියන එක නේ පැහැදිලි වන්නේ. කවුද කළේ කියන එක නොවෙයි. කවුද කළේ කියන එක ගැන specifically නැහැ. හැබැයි, data බැලුවාම- මේක උසාවිය නොවෙයි නේ.

(Off the record.)

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අයුතු ලාභයක් ඇති බව පෙනී යයි. ඒක ඇසට පෙනෙනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is fine.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් වේලාව පස් වරු 6.40යි. අපි විශාල කාලයක් කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා සුදුසු දිනයක නැවත මුණගැසී අවසාන නිගමන කරන්න කියා මම ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. සුදුසු දිනයක් කියන්න පුළුවන්ද? හෙට දින රැස්වෙන්න පුළුවන්ද? Will others come?

ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා: බදාදා?

එස්.එන්. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කලින් COPE Report එකේ debate එක හෙට තිබෙනවා. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැද්ද?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හෙට බැහැ, හෙට අපි විවාදයට සහභාගි වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඕනෑ නම් සභාපතිතුමාට පුළුවන්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ. දැන් අපි තීරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා: Thursday රැස් වෙනවා නම්, හොඳයි කියලා හිතනවා. Thursday යොදා ගනිමු.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කමක් නැහැ. නැඟිටලා ගියාට පසුව අපි මොකද කරන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැඟිටලා ගියා නේ. සභාපතිතුමා ඉන්න ඕනෑ නේ ඒ ටික බලාගන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතුමා ඉන්න එපායැ, ඒ ටික බලාගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම්, ඒ විධියට කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා කීයටද රැස් වෙන්නේ? සවස 2.00ට නේද?

ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, සභාව නැවත රැස් වන එම වෙලාව කියන්න. මහන්සි නිසා-

ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා: අද බොහෝ වේලාවක් සාකච්ඡා කළ නිසා, මහන්සි නිසා බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා පස් වරු 2.00ට නැවත රැස් වන බව මම දැනුම් දෙනවා.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.)

ඇමුණුම 22

ඇමුණුම 22
இகணைப்பு 22
Annexure 22

පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව
2016 ඔක්තෝබර් මස 26 වන බදාදා

පැමිණ සිටී:

ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා (සභාපති)
ගරු රවුෆ් හකීම් මහතා
ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා
ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා
ගරු රවීන්ද්‍ර සමරවීර මහතා
ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා
ගරු වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ මහතා
ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා
ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා
ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා
ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා
ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා
ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා
ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා
ගරු මාවෙ සෝ. සේනාධිරාජා මහතා
ගරු එස්. ශ්‍රීතරන් මහතා
ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා
ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා
ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා
ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා
ගරු ඥානමුත්තු ශ්‍රීනේසන් මහතා
ගරු අබ්දුල්ලාහ් මහ්රූෆ් මහතා
ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා

සහයට පැමිණ සිටී:

එච්.එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ මහතා, විගණකාධිපති, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව;
ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා, අතිරේක විගණකාධිපති;
එස්.එම්.ඩී.එස්.එස්. රෝහිත මහතා, සහකාර විගණකාධිපති;
එල්.අයි.එස්. ජයරත්න මහත්මිය, විගණන අධිකාරී

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සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් අපි කාරක සභාවේ වැඩ කටයුතු ආරම්භ කරමු. ගරු මැති ඇමතිතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාත්, විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඇතුළු නිලධාරි මණ්ඩලයත් ගෞරවයෙන් පිළිගන්නවා. භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ අවසන් වාර්තාවේ දෙමළ පරිවර්තනයේ සහ ඉංග්‍රීසි පරිවර්තනයේ කොටස්වල - දෙමළ පරිවර්තනයේ "විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ" කියන කොටස translate වෙලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඒක අඩුවක් හැටියට තිබුණා. මම විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් ඒක ගෙන්වා ගත්තා. ගෙන්වා ගෙන ඒ ටික ඒ අයට ලබා දුන්නා. එතකොට දෙමළ පරිවර්තනයේ සියල්ල සම්පූර්ණයි. ඉංග්‍රීසි පරිවර්තනය දැන් ගෙනෙනවා. භාෂා පරිවර්තන සහිතව මේ වාර්තාවේ ඇමුණුම් ටික මම බැලුවා. ඇමුණුම් ටික ඔක්කෝම වාගේ තිබෙනවා. ඇමුණුම්වලට එකතු වෙනවා නම් එකතු වෙන්න තිබෙන්නේ, verbatims ටික. ඔක්තෝබර් 20, 21 සහ 24 දිනවලින් 21 වනදා වරුවක් වෙනකල් verbatims ටික දැනට ලැබී තිබෙනවා. එතකොට සම්පූර්ණ වෙන්න තිබෙන්නේ 21 ඉතිරි වරුව සහ 24 වනදා සම්පූර්ණ දිනයේ verbatims ටික. ඒ ටික තමයි ඇමුණුම්වලට එකතු වෙන්න

තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට ඒ කොටස සම්පූර්ණ කරන්න පුළුවන්. සම්පූර්ණ කරපු ටික අපි මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට දීලා තිබෙනවා. ඒකේ වෙනස්කම් බලලා ඔබතුමන්ලාට සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ එක මොකක්ද කරන්නේ කියලා බලලා අවසන් වාර්තාව - මගේ බලාපොරොත්තුව වන්නේ ඇත්තටම මේ සතිය ඇතුළත අවසන් වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාව මුද්‍රණය කරන්න පුළුවන්කමක් තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: පුළුවන්. ඒ ටික එකතු කළාම මුද්‍රණය කරන්න බාධාවක් නැහැ. වාර්තාව හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ මුල් කෙටුම්පතේ "විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියලා අගට තිබෙනවා නේ. එකඟතාවක් ඇති වුණා, - ඒකට නැවත යන්න නොවෙයි. අපට ඒක වෙනස් කරන්න අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ. නමුත් එකඟතාවක් ඇති වුණා, විශේෂ නිර්දේශ - මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් සඳහන් කරන්න කියලා. මම හිතන විධියට ඒක තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් මෙහෙමයි. අපි ආයෙත් ප්‍රශ්නය මුලට යන්න අවශ්‍ය නැති නිසා මම මේ සරල කර ගන්නයි මේක කියන්නේ. අපි ඉදිරිපත් කළ කෙටුම්පතේ 11 වන පිටුවේ තිබෙන 3.2 කොටස තමයි අපි එකඟතාවෙන් සංශෝධනය කළේ. ඒ සංශෝධනය දැන් මේ සංශෝධිත එකේ තිබෙනවා. සංශෝධිත එකේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව - සංශෝධනය කරලා දැන් අවසානයට සකස් කරලා තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ 13 වන පිටුවේ ඉතා පැහැදිලිව තිබෙනවා, 3.2 සංශෝධනය. ඒ සංශෝධනය තිබෙන්නේ - අපි කිව්වේ, ඉහත කී 3.2 ඡේදයට ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා, අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා, අශෝක් අබේසිංහ, සුජීව සේනසිංහ, හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි, වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ, හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා යන පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රීවරු එකඟ නොවුණු අතර, මෙම ඡේදය මතු දැක්වෙන පරිදි සංශෝධනය කළ යුතු බවට ඔවුන් එකඟ වූහ කියලා 3.2 අගට ඇතුළත් කරන්න කියලා. මම verbatims වලත් බැලුවා, ඔබතුමන්ලා ඉදිරිපත් කළ සංශෝධනය ඒ ආකාරයටම ඇතුළත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු කොටසයි, ඒ වාගේම මෙතුමා අවසානයට කියපු කොටසයි ඇතුළත් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එතැනින් පස්සේ මම verbatims ටික ඔක්කෝම බැලුවා. එතැනින් පස්සේ ඇත්තටම විවිධ මත ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එක එක කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මෙහෙම-මෙහෙම කියලා අපි අවසාන නිර්දේශ ගැනත් කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා. එක එක ඒවා හැම තැනම කථා කරලා තිබෙනවා. මම මේ ටික ඔක්කෝම කියෙව්වා. හැබැයි එතකොට මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟ වුණු පිරිස වාර්තාව මින් ඉදිරියට සංශෝධනය නොවෙන්න කියලා ඉවත් වෙලා ගිහිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා දැන් තීරණය කරන්න වෙන්නේ - ඒ වාර්තාව ඒ ආකාරයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාව හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි. අපි ඒත් එක්කම එකඟ වුණා, මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු ආකරයට - "විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියලා කිව්වා නේ. ඒ "විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියන ස්ථානයේ ඒ නිර්දේශ - ඒක ඔබතුමාගේ original කෙටුම්පත නොවෙයි නේ. එතකොට ඒ "විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියලා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් සඳහන් කිරීමට පමණක් -

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අපි ඒකට එකඟ වුණේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා යෝජනා කළා. නමුත් අපි එකඟතාවකට ආවේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එකඟ වුණා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: නැහැ, අපි එකඟ වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇයි, එකඟ වුණේ නැත්තේ?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අපි කිව්වේ, පරණ වාර්තාව එහෙමම යන්න කියලා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: Heading එක වෙනස් කරනවා කියලාත් කිව්වා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එකඟ වුණත් - දැන් අයිතිය තිබෙන්නේ කාටද? දැන් අපි මේකේ ඔය කොටස්වලට යන්න ඕනෑ, තමුන්නාන්සේලා මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නවා නම්. මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නේ නැති නිසා - මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නේ නැති නිසා මේ වාර්තාවේ සංශෝධන හෝ මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් විය යුතු කරුණු ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව පිළිගන්නා අය විතරයි. පිළිගන්නේ නැත්නම් අපි දමන එක අපට දමන්න ඕනෑ. අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවට සංශෝධන කරන්න එන්නේ නැහැ. එහෙම එන්න බැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව අපි දමන්නේ. මේකේ සංශෝධනයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ ඒක තමයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි හදන එක අපි දමා ගන්නවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි කිව්වේ, එදා එකඟ වුණා කියන එක විතරයි. ඒක ඔබතුමා දමන්න කැමැති නැත්නම් කැමැති නැහැ කියලා ඔබතුමා ප්‍රකාශ කරන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙහෙමයි. මුලින්ම COPE එකට වාර්තාවක් ආවා නේ. අපි ඒ වාර්තාවට එකඟ වෙමින් සංශෝධන සහිතව යන්න ගියේ පොදු අර්ථයෙන්. හැබැයි තවත් එකක් දමලා අරකත් සංශෝධනය කරන්න ගියාම, එතකොට විකාරයක් නේ. ඒ නිසා මේ සංශෝධන ඔක්කෝම නැතුව පරණ එක දමමු.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, සංශෝධන මොකුත් ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු එක අපි දමනවා. එච්චරයි. අපි ඔක්කොම අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒක දමනවා. එතුමන්ලාට ඕනෑ නම් වෙනම එකක් දමන්න. එච්චරයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් මේ වාර්තාවට පොදු එකඟතාවක් නැහැ නේ. පොදු එකඟතාවක් තිබෙනවා නම් විතරයි පොදු සංශෝධන එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ වෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේකට පොදු එකඟතාවක් නැති නිසා - යම් වාර්තාවකට සංශෝධන සිදු කිරීමේ අයිතිය තිබෙන්නේ ඒ වාර්තාවට එකඟ අයට විතරයි. අනෙක් අය දමන සංශෝධන අපි පිළිගන්න - ඒ නිසා ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සංශෝධනයට පෙර දීපු වාර්තාව මේක. මම ආවේ නැහැ, 20 වන දා. ඒකේ තිබෙන්නේ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා. මේකේ වෙනස් වෙලා තිබෙනවා, මෙම වාර්තාව සඳහා එකඟත්වය පළ කරන ලද මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ විශේෂ - එහෙම ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒකට එකඟ වුණා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔව්. ඒ එකඟ වුණු කාරණා නැවත වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට ඕනෑ දෙයක් කියන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: එකඟ වුණු කාරණා ආයෙත් වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අප මේ සාකච්ඡාව මුලදී එකඟතාවකට ආවා නම්, ඒ එකඟතා සියල්ල පදනම් වන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව පොදු එකඟතාවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කළ හැකිය කියන පදනම මතයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, යන වෙලාවේ තමයි කිව්වේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ ගැන පොදු එකඟතාවකට එන්නේ නැත්නම්, මේ වාර්තාව වෙනස් කිරීමේ අයිතිය තිබෙන්නේ ඒ වාර්තාවට එකඟ වෙන අයටයි. මේක පුදුම කථාවක් නේ. එතුමන්ලාත් වාර්තාවක් දමනවා. මේ වාර්තාවටත් සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න හදනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන කාරණයේත් යම් දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. එතුමා එහෙම කිව්වාට, අප එක එක දේවල්වලට එකඟ වුණා. ඒ, මෙතැනට ඇවිත් අප එක වාර්තාවකට එකඟ වුණා කියා නොවෙයි. එක එක කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් අප විවාද කළාට පසුව ඒ ඒ එක එක කාරණා සම්බන්ධයෙන් එක එක විධියට අප එකඟ වුණා. ඒ එකඟතාව මතයි අප යම් නිගමනවලට ආවේ. ''විශේෂ නිර්දේශ'' කියන එකට මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් ටික දමනවා කියා ඒ නිගමනවලදී එකඟතාවකට ආවා. ඒ එකඟතාව මතයි, අප සභාවේ කටයුතු ඉදිරියට කරගෙන ආවේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම එකඟ වුණා. ඔබතුමා හිටියේ නැහැ නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Let me finish. මම කියන තුරු ඉන්නකෝ. 11වන පිටුවට යනතුරු ඒ සංශෝධනවලට එකඟයි කියන කාරණයට මන්ත්‍රීවරු සියලුදෙනා එකඟ වුණා. ඉන් පසුව, ''එතැනින් එහාට අප සංශෝධනවලට කැමැති වන්නේ නැහැ, මෙතැනින් එහාට තිබෙන සම්පූර්ණ දේ වාර්තාව ලෙස සලකලා අප ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා'' කියා මන්ත්‍රීවරු නවදෙනෙක් හෝ අටදෙනෙක් අත්සන් කළා. එතැනින් පසුව එතුමන්ලා සභාවෙන් පිට වෙලා ගියා. ඉතිරි වුණු මන්ත්‍රීවරු ටික සාකච්ඡා කරලා, සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරගෙන, එය අවසන් කළා. ඒ නිර්දේශවලින් තමයි ඉවර වුණේ. එතැනින් එහාට යනවා මිසක්, අපට ආයෙත් මුල සිට පටන් ගන්න බැහැ. අලුතින් ඇවිත්, ''මේක කරනවා, අරක කරනවා'' කියා කියන්න බැහැ. ඒ නිසා අපි එකඟ වුණු දේවල් සියල්ල ඒ ආකාරයට අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අප එකඟ වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාව අප අත්සන් කර තිබෙනවා. අත්සන් කළ අය එකඟයි. ඒ අත්සන් ටික පසෙකින් තියලා, නැවත මේක සංශෝධනය කරලා අත්සන් දමාගන්න. ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. අත්සන් කළ අය කියනවා, ''තාවකාලිකව අපේ අත්සන් ටික පැත්තකින් තියනවා, අපට මේකේ තවත් සංශෝධන ටිකක් දමන්න තිබෙනවා, ඒ ටික දමලා අප සංශෝධනය කරනවා'' කියා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: සියලුදෙනාම එකඟ නම් එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්. අප එහෙම කරන්නම්. අප නැවත අත්සන් ගන්නම්. දැන් අර අත්සන් නොවෙයි. මෙන්න වාර්තාව. මේ වාර්තාවට ඒ අදාළ සංශෝධන ටික දීලා,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒ කාරණයත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න. "කලින් අත්සන් කළා මේ පිරිස, නැවත ඒවා ඉවත් කරගන්නවා" කියා ඒ සියලු විස්තර ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Mr. Chairman, මේ chapter එක close කළා නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක විසඳෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමා වාර්තා දෙකක් දමන්න. මෙතුමන්ලාත් වාර්තාවක් හදලා නේ. ඒක එතුමන්ලාට දමන්න කියන්න. ඉවරයි නේ. අප ඒකට සංශෝධන ගේන්නෙත් නැහැ; බලන්නෙත් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මටත් කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: එක එක්කෙනා කථා කරන්න. සියලුදෙනාටම අවස්ථාව දෙන්නම්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එදා ඉදිරිපත් කළ වාර්තාව -ඔබතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ කෙටුම්පත- අප ළඟ තිබෙනවා නේ. අද දුන්න එක නොවෙයි, ඒක මොකක්ද කියා මම දන්නේ නැහැ. එදා දුන්න වාර්තාව අප ළඟ දැන් තිබෙනවා. එහි 11වන පිටුව - 3.1, 3.2- දක්වා අප එකඟතාවන්ට ආවා. ඉන් පසුව ඉතිරි කොටස ගැන අප අතරමඟ කථා කළ විවිධ දේවල් තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, එහි 4 වන ඡේදය, "භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන්...." කියන ඡේදයේ සිට වූ කිසිම දෙයක් ගැන අප අවසාන එකඟතාවකට ආවේ නැහැ. සාකච්ඡා කළා, එකඟතාවන්ට ආවේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා අප ඉන් පසුව තමයි අත්සන් කළේ. මේ සභාවේ රැස්වී සිටි මන්ත්‍රීවරු 8දෙනෙක්, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාත් හිටියා. ඔබතුමාත් අත්සන් කළා. එතකොට නවදෙනායි. සභාපතිවරයා වශයෙන් ඔබතුමා මේකට අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. අප බුද්ධිමය වශයෙන් දූෂිත වෙන්න කැමැති නැහැ. ඒ නිසා 11වන පිටුව දක්වා අප එකඟ වුණා. අප සාකච්ඡා කර එකඟ වුණු දේවල් ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කරන්න තරම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් අපට නැහැ නේ. 11වන පිටුව දක්වා අප එකඟ වුණා. ඒ වාර්තාව මෙතැන තිබෙනවා. ඉන් පසුව අප විවිධ ඒවා කථා කළා. ඒවා ගැන එකඟතාවන්ට ආවේ නැහැ. ඔය විශේෂ නිරීක්ෂණ, පොදු නිරීක්ෂණ, නිගමන කිසිවක් අදාළ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා 11වන පිටුව දක්වා වෙනස් වුණු දේවල්වලට එකඟයි. එහෙම තමයි අත්සන් කළේ. ඉන් පසුව as it is තියමු. Technically ඔබතුමාට තිත් කොමා ආදිය වෙනස් කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම් ඒවා වෙනස් කළාට කමක් නැහැ. ඒක තමයි වාර්තාව. කරුණාකරලා එහෙම කරන්න. අද අපට කාලය නාස්ති කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, record එක බලන්න. Record එක බලලා කියවන්න. එතකොට හරි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අප දෙයකට අත්සන් කළාට පසුව මොකක්ද එහි අරමුණ, අදහස? අප ඒකට එකඟයි කියන එකයි. ආයෙත් කාලය නාස්ති කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. එතුමන්ලාට එතුමන්ලාගේ සංශෝධන දමාගන්න කියන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු තැනෙන් පස්සේ, අත්සන් කළ කවුරුවත් සභාවේ හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. සභාවෙන් යන්න ඉස්සර වෙලායි එකඟ වුණේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, විවිධ සාකච්ඡා සිද්ධ වෙන්න ඇති. හැබැයි, මේ කෙටුම්පත විධිමත් ලෙස පිටුවෙන් පිටුව සාකච්ඡා කරගෙන ගියා. එතකොට අප පිටුවෙන් පිටුව සාකච්ඡා කර අවසන් කර තිබෙන්නේ 11වන පිටුව දක්වායි. තව පිටු පෙරළා පෙරළා අරවා මේවා කිව්වා, ගරු සුජීව මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි. ඒවා කිව්වාට වැඩක් නැහැ. අප 11වන පිටුව දක්වා සාකච්ඡා කර අවසන් කර තිබෙනවා. එතැනින් එහාට මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන ඒවාම තමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. ඔබතුමා අහගන්න. එතුමා කිව්වා, මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු ටික තමයි විශේෂ නිර්දේශ ටික දැම්මේ කියා. එතකොට මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් ටික දමන්න කියාත් එතැනදී එකඟ වුණා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අප ඔක්කොම එකඟයි නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණයත් හරි. එහෙම නම් ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔක්කොම එකඟයි කියා දැම්මාට කමකුත් නැහැ; ඒ නිර්දේශවලට මෙන්න මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු සියලුදෙනාම එකඟයි කියා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කාරණය විශේෂයෙන් සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. මේකට අත්සන් කරන්නේ ඒකට තමයි. ඒ ගැන එහෙම නම්, විශේෂයෙන් වගන්තියෙන් වගන්තියට දමන්න

ඕනෑ, ''මේකට මෙහෙමයි, මේකට මෙහෙමයි'' කියා. එහෙම කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Hon. Anura Dissanayake, that is also correct.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මේ legal advice අරගෙන ඇවිත් තිබෙන්නේ. අප මේක කරන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉන්න, මම විසඳුමක් දෙන්නම්. මේ සාකච්ඡාව කෙළවර කරන්නේ, ''කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ'' කියා නේ. මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟ වන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම් සංඛ්‍යාව සඳහන් කරලා, -මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟ වෙන මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා ඉන්නවා නේ, ඔක්කොමලා.- ''මෙම කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟ වෙයි'' කියා සඳහන් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම වෙන්න ඕනෑ නැත්තේ වෙන මොකුත් නිසා නොවෙයි. මේ මුළු වාර්තාවටම අප එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒක පැහැදිලි කර දුන්නාම මොකද වන්නේ?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය වෙන එකක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවේත් ඒ නම් ටික දමන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ''කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ.

ඉහත නිර්දේශයන්ට පහත අත්සන් තබන මන්ත්‍රීවරු එකඟ වේ'' කියා සඳහන් කරනවා. එච්චරයි. එතකොට මේ වාර්තාව හරි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේකයි වාර්තාව. මේ වාර්තාවේ වගන්ති, අනුවගන්ති ගොඩක් තිබෙනවා. මේ එක එක වගන්තියට කැමති කැමති අය බලලා මේ කටයුත්ත කරන්න බැහැ. මුළු වාර්තාවටම 11දෙනා කැමැතියි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කිව්වේ ඕක නොවෙයි. මේ මහත්වරු කථා කරන්නේ මගේ ප්‍රශ්නය නොවෙයි.

මම කියපු කාරණය මේ උගත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු වරදවා තේරුම් ගත්තා. මම කිව්වේ මේකයි. එදා අප යම් එකඟතාවකට ආවා. අපේ සාකච්ඡාවෙන් යම් කණ්ඩායමක් ඉවත් වෙලා යනවා. හැබැයි, ඉවත් වෙලා යන්නේ 11වැනි පිටුවෙන් පසුව තිබෙන කාරණා එලෙසම පිළිගෙන කියායි. ඒ ගැන අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒ සටහන් බලන්න. ඒ යන්න කලින් එකඟතාවක් ඇති කර ගත්තා. අපේ අර නම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබුණා නේ. ඇත්තටම කමිටුවේ ඔබතුමා සකස් කළ නිර්දේශ තිබෙන්නේ, ''පොදු නිර්දේශ'' කියායි. එක් එක් මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඉදිරිපත් කළ යෝජනා තිබෙන්නේ ''විශේෂ නිර්දේශ'' කියායි. ඒ යෙදුම ගැළපෙන්නේ නැහැ කියන කාරණය. ඔබතුමාට මතක ඇති, නේ. ඒ වෙලාවේ අප එකඟ වුණා, මේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ කවුද කියා ඔවුන්ගේ නම් එතැන සඳහන් කරන්න. කැමති කෙනෙකුට, ඔක්කොටම හෝ. දැන් මට වුණත් මේකටත් එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන් කියා හිතමු. මා කියන්නේ මේකයි. ඒ එකඟතාව වාර්තා වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ අනුව, එම විශේෂ නිර්දේශ ඉදිරිපත් කළේ කවුද කියා අන්න ඒ ඇතිවුණු එකඟතාවට කැමැති වුණු අයගේ නම් ටික කියන්න. එච්චරයි

සභාපතිතුමා: මගේ තීරණය මෙන්න මේකයි. මේ වාර්තාවේ කෙටුම්පත ඉදිරිපත් කළාට පසුව, පැහැදිලිව මේකේ තිබෙනවා කාරක සභාවේ පොදු නිර්දේශය. ''පොදු නිර්දේශය'' කියන එකට මේ කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඔක්කොටම එකඟ වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්; විරුද්ධ වෙන අයට විරුද්ධ වෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

එකඟ වෙච්ච අය ඔක්කෝම පොදු නිර්දේශයටත් එකඟයි. ඊළඟට කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියන එක දාලා තිබෙන්නේ කාරක සභා වාර්තාවට. කාරක සභා වාර්තාව හැටියටයි ඒ විශේෂ නිර්දේශය තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට මේකට අත්සන් කරන මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඔක්කෝම මේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශයන්ටත් එකඟයි. එතකොට නැවත වතාවක් මෙයා දැම්මා, මෙයා දැම්මා කියලා දාන්න අවශ්‍ය වන්නේ නැහැ. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. එහෙම අවශ්‍ය නැහැ නේ. එතකොට මේ කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශයන්ට එකඟ නොවන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට ඒ සඳහා එකඟ නොවෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි ඒකට එකඟ වුණා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, අපි එහෙම එකඟතාවක් ඇති කරගෙනයි පිටත්වෙලා ගියේ. ඔබතුමා කියනවා නම් අපි ඒ වෙලාවේ ගත්ත එකඟතාව-

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා ප්‍රශ්නය වෙන්නේ මේකයි. භාෂාවෙන් මේක කවුරු හැදුවත් දැන් කවුරුත් මේකට එකඟයි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. මෙතැන

technical ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. අපි heading එක වෙනස් කරමු කියලා කිව්වේ මේ වාර්තාවේ පොදු නිර්දේශ කියනකොට ඇතිවන හැඟීමත්, විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියනකොට ඇතිවන හැඟීමත් දෙකක්. අන්න ඒ කාරණාව නිසා තමයි අපි කිව්වේ මේක මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නිර්දේශ කියලා දාලා, එක එක නම්වලට දමමු කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නිර්දේශ. අත්සන් කරන කට්ටියගේ. විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කිව්වාම තේරුමක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කිව්වාම එන හැඟීම මොකක්ද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවක් තියෙනවා නේ. අපේ දරුවන්ට උප්පැන්න දෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ. අපි අපේ වාර්තාව කරමු. ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ වාර්තාව ඒ ගොල්ලන් දාන්න. එතකොට ඉවරයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. දැන් මේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව සකස් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිගේ අදහස්, මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අදහස්, නිලධාරීන්ගේ අදහස් යන සියල්ලක්ම එකතුවෙලායි. ඊට පස්සේ පොදු වාර්තාවක් හැදුවාට පස්සේ නැවතත්, විගණකාධිපතිගේ කරුණු, මේවා මෙයාගේ කරුණු කියලා තැන් තැන්වල ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ නැහැ. මේක පොදු වාර්තාව. මන්ත්‍රීවරු අත්සන් කරන්නේ මේ වාර්තාවට. එතකොට මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ අදහස් කියලා දැම්මොත් මේ අදහස් ටික විතරක් නොවෙයි, කලිනුත් එක එක අදහස් දුන්නා නේ. ඒ අදහසුත් මේකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ වාර්තාවට අත්සන් කිරීමෙන් පිළිඹිබු වන්නේ ඒ නිර්දේශය ඒ වාර්තාව අත්සන් කරන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ බවයි. ඔව්වරයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මට පොඩි අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න. මෙතැන පොඩි technical කථාවකුත් එක පැත්තකින් තිබෙන බව පෙනෙනවා. එකක් තමයි පොදු නිර්දේශ සහ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා ආපුවාම පොඩි issue එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියන කාරණය. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. මේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියන කාරණා පොදු නිර්දේශය ඇතුළෙත් තිබෙනවා නම් අපට ඒවා පොදු නිර්දේශ විධියටම හැම දෙයක්ම ඇතුළට දාලා එතැන අපි එකඟතාවකට එමු. එතකොට ඔක්කෝම මේක ඇතුළට එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියන එකත් ඉවත් කරලා, කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ කියලා දාමු.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නිර්දේශ කියලා දමමු.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර අමාත්‍යතුමා එතකොට නැවතත් open වෙනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නැහැ. නැහැ. ඉන්නකෝ මම කියන එක අහන්න කෝ.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර අමාත්‍යතුමා කියන කථාව හරි. කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ කියලා දාන්න. එතකොට විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ කියන එක ඇතුළට ඔක්කෝම දමමු. එතකොට ඉවරයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඊට වඩා ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. මම මේ කියන්නේ අන්තිම මෙහොතේ හෝ එදාට වඩා හොඳ සහභාගිත්වයක් මෙතැන තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේම අපට මේ නිර්දේශ පිළිබඳ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගෙන් විශේෂ ගැටලුවක් නැති බවයි කාරක සභාවෙන් පිටත කථා කළාම තේරෙන්නේ. අපට බැරිද මේ නිර්දේශ පිළිබඳ යම් ආකාරයක එකඟතාවක් ඇති කර ගන්න. අපි සාකච්ඡාවෙන් සම්මුතියෙන්- මොකද, මේ බෙදීමෙන් කාටවත් යහපතක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. ඒකෙන් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවටත් මේ කමිටුවටත් යහපතක් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපට මේ කාරණා පිළිබඳ, නිර්දේශ පිළිබඳ පොදු එකඟතාවක් ඇති කර ගන්න බැරිද? ගරු සභාපතිතුමා ඔබතුමා අන්තිම මොහොත වෙනතුරු මේ කාරක සභාවට සහභාගි වෙච්ච නිසා ඔබතුමාට පෙනී යනවා ඇති නිර්දේශ පිළිබඳ සැලකුවොත් එහෙම-

ඒ වාගේම ඔබතුමා එදා තාවකාලිකව ඉවත්වෙලා ගියාට පසුව සාකච්ඡා කරපු කාරණා බැලුවාම මූලික වශයෙන් අපට පෙනෙනවා මූලධර්ම අතර ලොකු වෙනසක් නැහැ. ඉතුරු ඒවා සලකා බැලුවාම අපට පෙනෙයි, පොදු කිව්වත්, විශේෂ කිව්වත්, මොනවා කිව්වත් අවසානයේ ඔය line එකේ තමයි යන්නේ. අද කාරක සභාවට පුළුල් සහභාගිත්වයක් තිබෙන වෙලාවේ අපට බැරිද යම් ආකාරයක එකඟතාවෙන් මේ නිර්දේශ ගැන එකඟ වෙන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: උදාහරණයක් කියන්නම්. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා දාලා තිබෙනවා නේ මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා ගැන සාධාරණ සැකයක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. හරි නේ. අපට කියන්න පුළුවන් එක් කෙනෙක් මේ වාර්තාවේ දාලා

තිබෙනවා අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා සෘජුවම වගකිව යුතු අතර, කියන කාරණය ඕනෑ නම් ඇතුළත් කරලා සාධාරණ සැකයකින් තොරව අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා මේකට වගකිව යුතුයි කියලා අපි කියමු. මේකේ තිබෙනවා නම් අපට-

ඇත්තටම සභාපතිතුමා පොදු නිර්දේශ කියන එකෙත් පැහැදිලිව තව හැදෙන්න ඕනෑ කාරණා තිබෙනවා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට ගත්තොත් පොදු නිර්දේශ කියන එකේ වංගු ගහලා තිබෙන්නේ. පළමු වෙනි එකේ කියනවා සැක සංකා මතුවෙනවා කියලා. සැක සංකා මතුවෙනවා නොවෙයි කෙළින්ම කියමු අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා මේකට පැහැදිලිවම වගකියන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: සැක සංකා මතුවෙනවා කියලා නොවෙයි, සැක සංකාවලින් තොරව කියලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: සැක සංකාවලින් තොරව ඔප්පු වෙනවා කියලා. එච්චරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඔබතුමාගේ මතය.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නැහැ. නැහැ. පොදු මතයක් විධියට අපි ඔක්කෝටම එන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක තමයි අපි කථා කරන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක තමයි මම මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා එකඟ වෙව්ව දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ එකඟ වෙව්ව දේ අපට ඇති.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "අපි කියන්නේ" එහෙම පෞද්ගලිකව කථා කරන්න එපා. බලපෑමක් සිදුකළ බවට සාධාරණ සැකයක් ඇතිවිය හැකි ආකාරයේ සාක්ෂි හෝ කරුණු කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ හෙළිදරවු වී ඇති බවට කරුණු කාරක සභාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි කියලා මෙහේම කියනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම තමයි ලියන්නේ. වාර්තා ලියන භාෂාව එහෙම තමයි. ඔයා හොරා කියලා ලියන්නේ නැහැ නේ. අපි හොරා කියලා ලියන්නේ නැහැ. සභාව වාර්තාව ලියන ක්‍රමය මේ. එහෙම නේ. අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුව කියන්නේ නැහැ හොරා කියලා. අපි කියන්නේ වෙන විධියකට. අපට මේ හොඳටෝම ඇති.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි නම් ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා හොරාට හොරාම කියලා කියනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම මේ අදහසක් කිව්වේ වෙන එකක් නිසා නොවෙයි. මම කිව්වේ මේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියන කාරණය වෙනම සඳහන් කිරීම තුළ අපි විශාල ගැටුමක් ඇති කරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක නතර කර ගන්න නම් පොදු නිර්දේශ ඇතුළට මේක ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්ද කියන එක තමයි අපි කල්පනා කරන්න ඕනෑ. එච්චරයි මම කියන්නේ. එතකොට අපි ඔක්කෝටම එකට එකතු වෙලා මේක කියන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Mr. Chairman, this is the first time we are participating in the discussion because just two hours ago we were given the draft report. So, all of this sounds Greek to us. Just two hours ago. It is very unfair. It is only now I got the English version of the Report and the Tamil version I got two hours ago. How do you expect us to participate in this deliberation or do you want us to go out?

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: You are a lawyer by profession.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: No. Even that I got only now. There are four of us.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: I also got it now.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Hon. Minister, I am not asking you. I am asking the Chairman. So, you better keep quiet. I am asking the Chairman. I am not asking you. Please!

The Chairman: Hon. Sumanthiran-

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: You cannot tell me to keep quiet.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: I am not asking you.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: You cannot tell me to keep quiet.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මට කථා කරන්න.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: You cannot tell me to keep quiet.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: I can tell you anything. Please keep quiet.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා මට කථා කරන්න.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: You must know how to speak.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: I am addressing the Chair.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: You cannot tell me to keep quiet.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: It is a serious issue that I am raising. If you want to belittle by saying, "You are a lawyer. Why can you not read in English? Why can you not read Sinhala?", that is a different matter. I do not expect that kind of comments from you. I am raising a very serious issue. I raised it in Parliament also. Do you all actually want us to seriously deliberate in this or want us to stay out of this? If you want us to deliberate on this, you must give us in the language that we can understand without having discussions for several days, without us being able to participate in anything and then thrust this under our nose and expect us to sign this or that.

How can you do that?

සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත්, ගරු සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මේ කාරක සභාව රැස් වන හැම දිනයක් පිළිබඳවම සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට අපි දැනුම් දුන්නා. එතකොට සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ වගකීම කාරක සභාවට සහභාගි වීම. ඒ වාගේම මේ කෙටුම්පත සාකච්ඡා කරන්න කලින් පළමු කෙටුම්පතකුත් අපි සාකච්ඡා කළා. ඒ පළමුවෙනි කෙටුම්පත අපි සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට දුන්නාට පස්සේ තමයි මේ දෙවෙනි, අවසාන කෙටුම්පත සකස් කළේ. ඒ දෙවෙනි අවසාන කෙටුම්පත සකස් කරලා සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට ලබා දුන්නා. භාෂාව ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එතකොට ඒ අය හැමෝටම පෞද්ගලිකව ලිඛිතව කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න එක අවස්ථාවක් දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: මම ඒක ගැන කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ. මම කියන්නේ, දැන් වාර්තා කෙටුම්පතක් අපට ඉදිරිපත් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කෙටුම්පත අපි සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඉදිරිපත් කළේ විසිවෙනි දා.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: හරි. My point is this: We have got the draft report only now. We, the four of us, had a discussion even on that just before we came here. We have come to a certain decision as to how we are going to participate in this, even with the shortness of time. So, will you give us a little time for us to be able to say our position with regard to this because for the first time, I am looking at the draft? If you allow that-

I am also of the view that there must be one recommendation. I agree with the Hon. Minister of Sports that there should not be general recommendations and special recommendations and that there should be one recommendation.

The other thing we discussed was this: It is tradition or a practice for the Chairman to present a report. So, as the Chairman of this Committee, you must present the report of this Committee. There cannot be two reports of this Committee; there cannot be more than one report of this Committee. If a majority of Members here are in agreement with your report, that is the report of the Committee. If there are Members who do not agree with certain views expressed in that report, they can dissent and that dissent can be recorded or they can produce a dissenting report only to the extent that they dissent from the report. But, there should be one report.

Now we have gone through the report and the four of us are in agreement with that draft report of the Chairman except one matter. There is one small point that I want to make on your penultimate recommendation in what appears as a special recommendation, if it is all one recommendation. It states:

"Mr. Arjun Mahendran is directly responsible for the Bond transaction in 2015/2016 and taking legal action against him and other relevant officers as well as recovering from him the loss incurred is recommended."

I think the language is very bad. We have no problem with the first part. I think the Committee can say, "directly responsible." We have no problem with that. "-taking legal action against him and other relevant officers" is also a recommendation that we can agree with. But, I do not think this Committee can recommend "recovering from him the loss incurred". I am suggesting that having said, "You take legal action" then, you must leave it to the court to decide.

So, if you delete that part, we are in full agreement with the Chairman's draft report.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: හරි. ඇත්තටම ඒක තමයි කරන්න ඕනෑ. සභාපතිතුමනි, මමත්

කියන්නේ අපි ඔක්කෝම එකතු වෙලා මේ වාගේ තිබෙන අඩු පාඩු ටික-

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඒ කාරණාවට අත්සන් කරපු අනික් මන්ත්‍රීවරු එකඟද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ තිබෙන ඒවා ටික කථා කරලා බේරා ගෙන මේක අවසන් කර ගනිමු.

ගරු අශෝක් අබේසිංහ මහතා: මම ඒක එදා කිව්වා.

The Hon. Anura Priyadarshana Yapa: That is quite valid. I also agree with him that we cannot just give a report with regard to penal penalties. Penal penalty is something else.

The Hon. Bimal Ratnayake: But, some people - so-called lawyers - categorically said that.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ කාරණය නේ අපට තිබෙන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: මම සභාපතිතුමා හැටියට ඉස්සෙල්ලාම මේ කෙටුම්පතට අත්සන් කරපු අනික් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගෙන් මේ කාරණය අහන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකට මට පොඩ්ඩක් ඉඩ දෙන්න.

දැන් මේ කාරණය හැමෝම අවධාරණය කර ගන්න. මම ඇතුළුව මෙය වාර්තාවක් හැටියට පිළිගත් මන්ත්‍රීවරු ප්‍රමාණයක් මෙය අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම අත්සන් කරනවා. නමුත්, ඒක එළියට දමන්න එපා. මම ආවේ නැති නිසායි ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරි. ඒක පිළිගන්නවා.

ඒක නිසා ඉස්සෙල්ලාම මම දැන් මේ සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු යෝජනාව ඒ අත්සන් කරපු මන්ත්‍රීවරු පිළිගන්නවාද කියන එක පැහැදිලි කර ගන්න ඕනෑ. එපමණයි. එතකොට එතුමා මුළු කාරණාවට එකඟ නම්,-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ තර්කය පැහැදිලියි නේ. අපට ගත යුතු ක්‍රියාමාර්ග පිළිබඳව නිර්දේශයක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයේ ප්‍රතිඵලය මොකක්ද කියලා අපට කියන්න බැහැ. ඔහුගෙන් පෞද්ගලිකව අය කර ගන්නවාද කොහොමද කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට අත්සන් කරපු මන්ත්‍රීවරු ඒක සංශෝධනය කරලා හැදුවා නම් හරි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇත්තම කිව්වොත්, ඔය recommendationsවලින් බහුතරයකට සුළු වෙනස්කම් සහිතව මටත් එකඟ වන්න පුළුවන්.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: It will be very strong, if it can be a consensus report.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ සඳහා අපට තව දවස් ගණනාවක් නාස්ති කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මේ කියන එක අහගන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලා දැන් රණ්ඩු වෙලා ගියා නේ, මෙතැනින්. අපි දැන් මේක බේරා ගන්න හදන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි රණ්ඩු වෙලා ගියේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම කියන එක අහන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපට හොරාගේ වාර්තාවයි, පොලිස්කාරයාගේ වාර්තාවයි join කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන පොදු කාරණාවලට හානියක් නොවෙන වෙනස් කළ යුතු කාරණා මේක ඇතුළේ තිබෙනවා නම්, අපි දැන් පොඩ්ඩක් කථා කරලා ඒ ටිකට එකඟතාවකට ඇවිල්ලා අපි ඒක කරමු. හානියක් නොවන විධියට මම මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඕවා කරලා හෙට දමනවාද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දැන් කරන්න ඕනෑ. මෙතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ පොඩි පොඩි ඒවා තිබෙනවා. අන්න ඒවා ටික හදමු කියලායි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මට අවස්ථාවක් දෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමනි, මේකේ වචනවල එහෙට මෙහෙට පොඩි වෙනස්කම් එක්ක මටත් පුළුවන් එකඟ වන්න. ඒ අනුව අපට කථා කරලා එකඟ වන්න පුළුවන් තැනකට අපට එන්න පුළුවන්.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා කලින් සාකච්ඡා කරපු වාර්තාවට මොකද වන්නේ, ඒකේ මූලික නිගමන වෙනස් කරන්න කථා කළා නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නිගමන.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපේ එක සංශෝධනය කරලා ඒ ගොල්ලන්ගේ එකක් දමනවා ලු. එහෙම නම්, අපි එකඟ නැහැ. දෙකක් දමන්න බැහැ, එකයි දමන්නේ. ඒ ගොල්ලන් තව එකක් දමනවා ලු.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. රවුල් හකීම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දෙකම දමන්න නොවෙයි, අපි මේක ශක්තිමත් කරන වැඩ පිළිවෙළකට යන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: දෙකම දමනවා ලු.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. I am going to make one recommendation. If by adjusting a few words here and there, we can all agree on the recommendation then, that is good. But, if there are differences on the narration, you can dissent saying, "We do not agree with the narration, but we agree with the recommendation."

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Agreed.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: I say, a composite, unanimous recommendation from the COPE will be far more forceful than a divided recommendation.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. මේකටම අදාළයි. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වේ, දෙකකට එකඟ වන්න බැහැ. ඇයි, ඕ ගොල්ලන් මේකට එකඟ වුණේ නැහැ නේ කියලා. ඇත්ත වශයෙන් බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අපි නිර්දේශ සාකච්ඡා කරන අවස්ථාවේ ඔබතුමා සිටියේ නැහැ. වෙන කවුරුත් සිටියේත් නැහැ. අපි නිගමන 14ටම එකඟ වුණා. ඔබතුමන්ලා හිටියේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: නිගමන නොවෙයි, නිර්දේශ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නිර්දේශ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: බොරු කියන්න එපා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: බොරු නොවෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා නිර්දේශවලට එකඟයි, නිගමනවලට එකඟ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. අපට මේ නිර්දේශවලට එකඟ වන්න පුළුවන්. එහෙට මෙහෙට වවන එකක්, දෙකක් වෙනස් වුණොත්නේ. හැබැයි, ඒක ඇතුළේ තිබෙන ක්‍රමවේදය පිළිබඳව අපි එකඟ නොවන තැන්වලදී "අපි එකඟ නොවේ" කියලා කියන්නම්. එපමණයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ, ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. නිගමනවලට- පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, mikeවලට ගහන්නේ ඇයි?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඕනවාට වඩා වැඩියි ගරු ඇමතිතුමා, පොඩ්ඩක් බලන්නකෝ. ඇයි mikeවලට ගහන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගේ අදහස කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ නිර්දේශ සහ නිගමන පදනම් වෙන්නේ යම් ක්‍රියාවලියක කථාවක් ගොතමින්. ඒ ක්‍රියාවලියේ කථාවේ අවසානයේ තමයි මේ නිගමන සහ නිර්දේශ එන්නේ. නමුත් වෙනත් path එකකින් මේ නිර්දේශ සහ නිගමන ආපුවාම වෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි, මේ නිර්දේශ සහ නිගමනවලට එකඟතාවට ආපු ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් 08දෙනා මේ path එක විසින්, ඒක නිර්දෝෂී කරනවා. ඒක බරපතළ කාරණයක්. ඒ කියන්නේ විභාග කිරීමකදී නිර්දේශ, නිගමන තිබුණාට ඒ නිර්දේශ සහ නිගමනවලට එන පාරත් වැදගත්. අපි විකෘති පාරකින් ගිහිල්ලා නිර්දේශවලට ආපු හැටියේ ඒ නිර්දේශ වැඩක් නැහැ. මොකද, ඒ පාරෙන් ඒ නිර්දේශ පෙන්වන්නේ නැහැ. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න මම පෙන්වන්නම්. ඒ එක කාරණයක්. දෙවෙනි කාරණය මෙයයි. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, අවසන් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට කථාව අවසන් කරන්නට ඉඩ දෙන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ අපි පොදු වාර්තාවට එකඟ වෙනවා නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. නැවත නිර්දේශ ගැන සලකා බලන්නට පුළුවන් පොදු වාර්තාවට එකඟ වෙනවා නම්. නමුත් පොදු වාර්තාව තිබියදී අපි පොදු නිර්දේශ හදලා, path එක දෙකක් දාන එක කරන්නට බැහැ. මොකද, ඒ එන පාරෙන් ඒ නිර්දේශ තමයි එන්නේ. මේ එන පාරෙන් එන්නේ මේ නිර්දේශ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නැහැ, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. අපේ යෝජනාව තිබෙන්නේ, මම කියන්නේ පොදු වාර්තාවට එකඟ වෙන ගමන් නිර්දේශ දියාරු නොවන විධියට නිර්දේශ ශක්තිමත් කරන වැඩ පිළිවෙළක් ගැන අපි කථා කරමු කියලායි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම එකඟයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එතුමාත් එකඟයි. ඒකයි මම මේ කියන්නේ, යන්න දෙන්න ඒ විධියට.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කියන්නේ මම ආයෙත් ඇහුවොත්, මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟයිද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. එතුමා විතරක් එකඟයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇයි නැහැයි කියන්නේ, අපි අත්සන් කරන්න හදන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි අත්සන් කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න මම බේරලා දෙන්නම්. ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ඇමතිතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. මම සභාපතිවරයා හැටියට මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: නීතීඥයෙක්නේ, ගණන් ගන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේ කාරක සභාවේ මූලාසනයක් තිබෙනවා, ඒකත් පොඩ්ඩක් මතක තියා ගන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලා හැම කෙනෙකුටම කථා කරන්නට අවස්ථාව දෙනවා වාගේම මූලාසනයක් තිබෙන බවත් මතක තියා ගන්න. මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා හොඳ තැනකට එනවා නම් ඒ තැන තමයි, මේකේ 11වෙනි පිටුව දක්වා ඔබතුමන්ලා යම් සාකච්ඡාවක් කරගෙන ආවා. 11වෙනි පිටුවේ සංශෝධනයකින් අපි නතර වුණා. ඉන් පසුව මේකේ සියලු කාරණාවලට ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ නම්, ඒ එකඟතාව අනුව නිර්දේශවලට යම් සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කර ගැනීමට ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ නම්- වාක්‍ය හැටියටනේ තිබෙන්නේ, ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ- ඒ අනුව මේ වාර්තාව විතරක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරමු. එතකොට වාර්තා දෙකක් නැහැ. මේ වාර්තාව පොදුවේ හැමෝම ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා, නිර්දේශවල හරය වෙනස් නොකර.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම පොඩි කාරණයක් කියන්නම්. දැන්-

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට තව වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවක් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි. දැන්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපේ ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමාගේ අදහස අහගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට අපි ආයේ යන්නේ 11වෙනි පිටුව ළඟින්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දැනට පොදු නිර්දේශ සහ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ කියලා සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවානේ. ඒ ලැයිස්තුවේ තිබෙන සියලුම දේට හරයාත්මකව මම එකඟයි. මම ඊළඟට කියන්නේ, හේතු දැක්වීමේ මාර්ග දෙකක් ගැන කිව්වානේ. අපට ඕනෑ නම් ඒ මාර්ග දෙකට -මම මේ කියන්නේ මේ කාරක සභාවේ ගෞරවය වෙනුවෙන්- හේතු දැක්වීම වෙන වෙනම කරන්නට පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමන්ලා දන්නවා දැන් සාමාන්‍ය නඩු තීන්දුවක් ලිව්වත්, වරදකරු බව තීන්දු කිරීමට විනිශ්චය මණ්ඩලයම එකඟයි. නමුත් එක විනිශ්චයකාරවරයෙක් විත්තිකරුව වරදකරු කරන්නේ එක හේතුවක් මත, තව විනිශ්චයකාරවරයෙක් ඔහුව වරදකරු කරන්නේ වෙනත් හේතුවක් මත. මම ඉතාම ගෞරවයෙන් කියන්නේ, මේ විධියට මේ නිගමන ගැන එගහ වෙන්නට සියයට 99.9ක්ම පුළුවන්කම තිබියදී අපි වෙනත් පාරවල්වල ගියොත් අපිට හොඳ නැහැ. එම නිසා මම හරහාත්මකව,- මගේ වචනය ගන්න- මුල ඉඳලා අගටම මේ වාර්තාවට සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම එකඟයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: දැන් ගරු සභාපතිතුමා දිපු වාර්තාව තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශ, පොදු නිර්දේශ සහ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: පොදු නිර්දේශ සහ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ සියල්ලම අයින් කරලා කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ කියලා කියන්නට පුළුවන්. ‘‘පොදු’’ කියලා ඕනේත් නැහැනේ, කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ කිව්වාම හරිනේ. එතැනින් උඩ තිබෙනවානේ තව කථාවක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒකේ උඩත් මම කියන්නම්. උඩත් විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ 14ක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිර්දේශ 14ට අකුරක්වත් වෙනස් නොකර දැනටමත් අපේ සාකච්ඡාව තුළ අපි එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. දැන් වෙනස තිබෙන්නේ ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු විධියට ආපු මාර්ගය ගැන. ඒ මාර්ගය කළවම් කරන්නට ඕනෑ නැහැයි කියලා මම පිළිගන්නවා. එහෙම නම් ඒ ආපු හේතුවලට කැමැති පිරිස කණ්ඩායම් දෙකකට තුනකට බෙදෙනවා නම් ඒ හේතු ගැන අපි වෙනම ලියමු. නමුත් අවසාන නිගමන සියල්ල එකක් නිසා, මම හැමෝටම තේරෙන භාෂාවෙන් ඒ ගැන කියන්නම්. නඩුවක වරදකරු කිරීමේ තීන්දුවට එළැඹෙනවා එක් එක් විනිශ්චයකාරවරු විවිධ හේතු මත. ඒ වරදකරු කිරීමේ තීන්දුවට හෝ ඔහුව නිදහස් කිරීමේ තීන්දුවට එළැඹෙන විනිශ්චයකාරවරයා තමන්ගේ reasons වෙන වෙනම ලියනවා. නමුත්

සමාජයට කියන්නේ මේ චිත්තිකරු වරදකරු එහෙම නැත්නම් නිවැරදිකරු කියලා. එහෙම කරන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙනවා.

පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, ඒකත් පුළුවන්. මම කියන්නේ ඒ body එකත් , -පොඩි වෙලාවක් යයි- propose කරන්නට පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි නඩුවකදී ඒක තීරණය. නඩුවකදී දෙපැත්තකින්ම මොහුට මරණීය දණ්ඩනය දෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලා තීරණයක් දෙනවා. නමුත් මේක නඩුවක් විභාග කිරීම සඳහා උපයෝගී කර ගන්නා ලියවිල්ලක්. ඒකයි මෙතැන තිබෙන වෙනස. මේක මූලික වාර්තාවක්නේ. මේක තීරණයක් නම් අපිට පාරවල් කිහිපයකින් ඇවිල්ලා මේ දඬුවම තීරණය කරන්නට පුළුවන්. පාරවල් කිහිපයකින් එන්න පුළුවන්, මොකද එකම දඬුවමනේ තීරණය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. නමුත් ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ ඒක නොවෙයි. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ මේක නඩුවක් විභාග කිරීම සඳහා සකස් කරන ලද ලියවිල්ලක්. ඒ ලියවිල්ලට පාරවල් කිහිපයකින්, එකම නිගමනයකින් ආවොත් ගැළවෙන්නට පාර හැදෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඇත්තම කථාව මේ ලියවිල්ල මත නඩුවක් දාන්නට බැහැ. මම මේ නඩුවක් ගැන කිව්වේ කාටත් තේරෙන උදාහරණයක් හැටියට. අපි එළැඹෙන නිගමන ක්‍රියාත්මක කර ගන්න උසාවියට යන්න බැහැනේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු විජයදාස රාජපක්ෂ මැතිතුමාගේ ලියවිල්ල තමයි ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණය පදනම් කර ගත්තේ Insurance එකයි Marine Services එකයි ආපහු ආණ්ඩුවට ගන්නට.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හරි, සාක්ෂියක් වශයෙන් භාවිත කරන්නට පුළුවන්. මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. අපට මේ හරයාත්මක කාරණා ගැන සියයට 100ක්ම වාගේ එකඟ වෙන්නට පුළුවන්කම තිබියදී ඒ එකඟතාව වාර්තා කරන්නේ නැතිව, බෙදුණු සහ වෙනස් දෙයක් සමඟ සමාජයට යාමෙන් අපි කාට හෝ හොඳක් වෙනවාද? ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අනෙක් අතට ඔබතුමා කියනවානේ මේක අධිකරණයේදී පාවිච්චි කරන්න පුළුවන් කියලා. ඔබතුමා හිතනවාද මේ COPE එකේ ඇති වුණු බෙදීමේ නොම්බර ගණන අධිකරණයකදී වටිනවා කියලා. නැහැ. Reasoning තමයි වටිනේ, reasoning මතයි රඳා පවතින්නේ. මේ සභාවේ සාමාජිකයින් 26 දෙනා බෙදුණු ආකාරය නඩුවකදී වටින්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අවසාන ප්‍රථිපලය විධියට ඒක තමයි කියන්න තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට පොඩ්ඩක් ඉඩ දෙන්න. ගරු රවුෆ් හකීම් ඇමතිතුමාට අවස්ථාව දෙන්නට ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා අවස්ථාව ඉල්ලුවා, ඒ නිසා අවස්ථාව දෙන්නට ඕනෑ.

ගරු රවුෆ් හකීම් මහතා: ඕනේ නැහැ, මට අවශ්‍ය කථා එක්කොම කියලා ඉවරයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔයගොල්ලන් ළඟ මොකක් හෝ කොළයක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "ඔයගොල්ලන්" නොවෙයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: "ඔබතුමා" අනේ. ඇත්තටම මට එසේ ප්‍රකාශ වන්නේ, එහෙම දැනී තිබෙන නිසායි. එහෙම නොවෙයි නම් ගොඩක් හොඳයි. දැනෙනවා නේ එකක්. භාවිතාවකදී දැනෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා සිටියේ නැහැ නේ, මේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නිර්දේශවල මෙන්න මේක තමයි වෙනස් විය යුත්තේ, අනෙක් අඩංගුවේ මෙන්න මේ ටික තමයි වෙනස් විය යුත්තේ කියන එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් කුමක් හෝ කොළයක් ඔබතුමන්ලා අත තිබෙනවාද කියා මට කියන්න. දැනට එකක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අප දීපු එක-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: වාර්තා දෙක අරගෙන සංසන්දනය කරන්න බැහැ නේ. ඒක කරන්න ගියොත් ආයෙත් දවස් ගණනක් යාවි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙහි තිබෙන එකින් එක අරගෙන-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මහා ලොකු දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඇත්තටම අපි මේ දේ භාරගන්න කැමැතියි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපි බලමු. එකඟ වන්න බැරි නම් අපි එකඟ නොවෙමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 1, 2, 3 කියා කියවාගෙන යමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේ සාකච්ඡාවට අප සම්බන්ධ වන එකේ තේරුමක් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: කාරණා ඉක්මනින් ගන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 11 තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු අමාත්‍යතුමා,-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එකඟ වෙනවා නම්, අපි එකඟ වෙලා වැඩ කරමු.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අපි එදා එකඟ වෙන්න කොච්චර උත්සාහ කළාද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. කමිටුවක් විධියට-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඔබතුමා සිටියේ නැහැ නේ එදා. එදා අපි කොතරම් උත්සාහ කළාද එකඟ වෙන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: උත්සාහ කළේ නැහැ. නැඟිටලා ගියා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ වැරැදුණු ඒවා අපට ආපසු හදාගන්න පුළුවන් නම්, හදාගන්න සූදානම් නම් හරි නේ. ඒ නිසා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අපි එකතු වෙලා මෙය දෙනවාද;

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අපි උත්සාහ ගත්තා, අමාත්‍යතුමා? ඔබතුමාට ඒක තේරෙන්නේ නැද්ද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දෙයක් කරන්න කලින් අපට කියන්න බැහැ නේ, ''මේකයි කරන්නේ'' කියා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේ ගැන කියන කොට-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපි තවත් ටිකක් බලමු, මොකක්ද කාරණය කියා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මෙහි general intention එක තේරෙනවා නේ. ගරු සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඉතාම ඉක්මනින් මෙය අධ්‍යයනය කරලා clearly කිව්වා, මෙහි සමස්තයට එකඟයි, මෙන්න මේ නිශ්චිත කාරණයට එකඟ නැහැ කියා. ඒ නිසා අපට එය හරි පැහැදිලියි. අපට එය තේරෙනවා. අපි පිළිගන්නවා. මොකද, එය clear. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා කියන්නේ, මෙයට හරයාත්මකව එකඟයි කියා නේ. එහෙම නැතිව, කරුණුවලට එකඟයි කියා නොවෙයි නේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හරි, හරි. පොඩ්ඩක් බලමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, අපි යාළුවන් වශයෙන් ඉඳලා, වාද විවාද කරලා, අද මෙය අවසන් කළාට පසුව ආයෙත් යාළුවෝ වෙනවා. අප මෙය ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන්නේ නැහැ. නමුත් අපට තිබෙනවා නේ හැඟීමක්, මොකක්ද වුණේ කියන එක ගැන.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මා ඔබතුමාට පැහැදිලි කර දෙන්නම්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඇත්තටම එහෙම ඕනෑ නැහැ. ඔබතුමාට නිසි ගෞරවය ඇතිවයි මා කිව්වේ. ගරු සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මෙයට නිරීක්ෂණ ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට අපට එය පැහැදිලි වුණා. එතුමා ලොකු දේවල් පැටලුවේ නැහැ. එතුමා කිව්වේ, නිශ්චිත කරුණක්. හැබැයි ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා කියන්නේ, එතුමා මෙහි හරයට කැමැතියි කියායි. මෙහි path එකට එතුමා කොහොමත් එකඟ නැහැ. එතුමාට වෙනම path එකක් තිබෙනවා. මා මේ කියන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව -ඔබතුමාගේ දෙවන කෙටුම්පත- ගැනයි; අප අත්සන් කරපු එක ගැනයි. එතුමාට path එක ගැනත් එකඟතාවක් නැහැ. හැබැයි හරයාත්මකව නිර්දේශවලට එකඟයි. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, හරයාත්මකව නිර්දේශවලට එකඟයි කිව්වාම, අත්සන් කරපු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් වශයෙන් අපට සිද්ධ වෙනවා නැවත වතාවක් විශේෂ නිර්දේශ සහ පොදු නිර්දේශ ගැන -ඒ නම වෙනස් කරලා, ඔක්කෝම නිර්දේශ ගැන- නැවත වෙන වෙනම සාකච්ඡා කරන්න. අපට එකඟ වන්න සිදු වන්නේම ඒකටයි. එතුමා හරයාත්මකවයි එකඟ. එතුමා කරුණෙන් කරුණට එකඟ බව කිව්වේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම කරලා බලමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එවිට සිදු වන දේ මොකක්ද? අපි මෙය විවෘත කරගෙන කවදා දක්වා යනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අදින් අවසානයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එහෙම නිම්දු කරන්න බැහැ නේ ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා, ඔබතුමා දැන් කාරණා එකක් දෙකක් කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ ටිකට as it is එකඟයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා වාගේ, ඔබතුමාත් 1, 2, 3 කියා කියන්න. අපි මොකවත් කියන්නේ නැහැ. අපේ වාර්තාව ගැන ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම හරයාත්මකව එකඟ වනවා කිව්වේ මේකයි. මේ ටිකට අමතරව මට මේකට තවත් කාරණා කීපයක් එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මීට අමතරව නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, මීට අමතරවයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා, කරුණාකර ඔබතුමාට කියන්න පුළුවන්ද, අප මෙය අත්සන් කරපු වෙලාව වන කල්-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එතුමා දැන් කියන්නයි යන්නේ. එතුමාට කියන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න කෝ.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: අපි ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට අවස්ථාව දෙමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඉස්සර වෙලාම මේ නිර්දේශ ගැන එතුමාගේ අදහස කියන්න කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා, ඉතිරි ටික කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා, ඔබතුමා කියන්න කුමකටද විරුද්ධ, කුමකටද පක්ෂ කියා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අන්න ඒක කියන්න. ඊට පස්සේ අලුත් ඒවා කියන්න. ඔබතුමා එකඟ ටික ඉස්සර වෙලා කියන්න. ඊට පසුව අලුත් ඒවා කියන්න. එතකොට අපට තේරෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙහි තිබෙන හැම දේටම එකඟයි. මීට වඩා හොඳ ලස්සන භාෂාවෙන් මෙය ලියන්න ඕනෑ. මගේ අදහස ඒකයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ භාෂාව හොඳයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ඊට අමතරව කරුණු කීපයක් මට මෙයට එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ, මේ තිබෙන කරුණුවලට අමතරවයි. තිබෙන කරුණු පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 42වන පිටුව ගන්න, ගරු නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 42වන පිටුවේ ඉඳලා 45 දක්වා තිබෙන පිටුවලින් -42, 43, 44, 45 පිටුවලින්- මේ තිබෙන කරුණු මෙලෙසින්ම- සමහර වාක්‍යවලට මම කැමැති නැහැ. මීට අමතරව, මට මෙයට කරුණු කීපයක් එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවා.

පළමුවන එක මේකයි. අපේ සාක්ෂිවලින් හෙළිදරව් වුණා මේ ක්‍රියාවලියෙන් අයුතු ලෙස ලාභ ලබා තිබෙන Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක අධික, අයුතු ධනයක් උපයාගෙන තිබෙනවා කියා. Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක විතරක් නොවෙයි, ඒ සමාගමේ අධ්‍යක්ෂවරු, Perpetual Treasuries Limited එකේ අයිතිය තිබෙන holding companies- ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා වාගේ, මේ රටේ පුරවැසියකු යම් වෙලාවක මේ ලේඛන මත යම් තැනකට යනවා නම්, ඇත්ත වශයෙන්ම එම පුරවැසියාට යම් දෙයක් ලබා ගැනීමට හැකියාව තිබෙන්නේ- Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක, එහි අයිතිය තිබෙන holding companies සහ ඒ සමාගමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළින් ඒ ධනය දැනටමත් එළියට අරගෙන තිබෙනවා නම්. ඒ Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක සහ ඒ වාගේම holding companiesවල අධ්‍යක්ෂවරුන්ගේ වගකීම පිළිබඳව හෝ වගවීම පිළිබඳව මෙහි ඇතුළත් විය යුතුයි. එය මෙයට එකතු වන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ, අර කියපු ඒවාට අමතරව නේද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, ඊට අමතරව.

අපි හෝ මම- අප මේ කමිටුව තුළ එකඟතාවකට ආ නිසායි ''අපි'' කියා හඳුන්වන්නේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් අපි හැමෝම මෙතැන තනිවමයි ඉන්නේ.- ඒ වාගේම මම විශ්වාස කරනවා- අප මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය අධ්‍යයනය කර තිබෙන්නේ දවස් දෙකක් ගැන විතරයි. 2015 පෙබරවාරි 27 කාරණය ගැන කමිටු දෙකම විස්තරාත්මකව අධ්‍යයනය කර තිබෙනවා. 2016 මාර්තු 29 එක ගැන මතු පිටින් අධ්‍යනය කර තිබෙනවා. අපි ඒ ගැන මෙතැන කථා කළා. ඊට අමතරව තවත් 23ක් තිබෙනවා, අප කිසිම සාක්ෂියක් මෙහෙයවූයේ නැති. ඒ කාරණා 23 සම්බන්ධව අධ්‍යයනය කළාම අපට පෙනෙනවා යම් රටාවක්. ඔය කියන බිලියන 5 සහ 14 කියන්නේ මුළු කාලයම. ඔය කියන transactions විසි ගණනම. ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ මෙයට වග කිව යුතු පුද්ගලයා මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු අධිපති පමණක් නොවෙයි. මහ බැංකුවේ හිටපු අධිපතිගේ අයුතු බලපෑම් පිළිබඳව හෝ බලපෑමක් පිළිබඳව හෝ සම්බන්ධයක් පිළිබඳව සාක්ෂි තිබෙන්නේ මුල් සිද්ධිය ගැන පමණයි. ඇත්තම කථා කළොත් shocking සිද්ධිය ඔක නොවෙයි. Shocking සිදුවීම් බර ගණනක් තිබෙනවා. එයින් ලොකුම එක තමයි 2016 මාර්තු 29වන දා එක; බිලියන 40 බිලියන 77ක් වූ එක. මගේ අදහස නම්- මේ ක්‍රියාවලියට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති, ඒ වාගේම මුල් සිද්ධියේත් නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරු දෙදෙනාම ඇවිත් තිබෙනවා Tender Committee එක ඉස්සරහාට. Evidence තිබෙනවා. Tender Committee එක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් irresponsible විධියට කටයුතු කර තිබෙනවා. ඒ අයගේ වගකීම් ගැන- මා කියන්නේ නැහැ, ඒ

අයගෙන් සල්ලි ගන්න ඕනෑ criminal liabilities තිබෙනවා කියා. ඒ අයගේ වගකීම පිළිබඳව- ඒ වාගේම මට මෙයට එකතු කරන්න තවත් කාරණා කීපයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියපු කාරණය තවම අවසන් වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ අයගේ වගකීම පිළිබඳව සඳහන් වන්න ඕනෑ. දැන් කාරණා දෙකයි.

තුන්වන එක මේකයි. තවමත් මේ දෙය වෙනවා. අපි immediately ගන්න ඕනෑ පියවර- උසාවි යන්න දෙයක් නොවෙයි. Immediately ගන්න ඕනෑ පියවර අපි අපේ සාකච්ඡාවේදී සෑහෙන දුරකට හඳුනා ගත්තා. Immediately ගන්න ඕනෑ පියවර අප මෙයට එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. එවිට කාරණා 3යි.

ඊළඟ එක මෙයයි. විශේෂයෙන්ම insider information සම්බන්ධව -අභ්‍යන්තර තොරතුරු සම්බන්ධව- මේ රටේ විශේෂිත නීතියක් නැහැ. මතයක් තිබෙනවා -මමත් විශ්වාස කරනවා- දැනට තිබෙන බැංකු නීතිවලින් යම් ප්‍රමාණයක් ආවරණය ලබා දඬුවම් කරන්න පුළුවන් කියා. නමුත් අපි immediately recommendation එකක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ- Insider information සම්බන්ධව share market එකට දැනටමත් නීති තිබෙනවා. ඒ හා සමාන නීතියක් immediately මේ රටට අරගෙන එන්න ඕනෑ කියා- ඒ line එක තමයි.

දැනට කාරණා 4ක් ගැන මා කියන්නම්. ඒවා අතර අපට එකඟ වෙන්න බැරි දෙයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ හතර මා නැවත කියන්නම්.

පළමුවන එක, Perpetual Treasuries Limited එක සහ එයට අනුබද්ධ තවත් ආයතන තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ ආයතන අයුතුව උපයා තිබෙන ලාභය පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනය කොට ඒ ධනය යළි අත් පත් කරගැනීම සඳහා කටයුතු කළ යුතුය කියන එකයි. එහි ප්‍රශ්නයක් අපට නැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Directors in person - පෞද්ගලිකව නම්-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: තවත් එකක් එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මොකක්ද, අනෙක් එක?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒ වාගේම අනෙක් ආයතනත් ඕනෑ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මා අවසන් කරන කල් ඉන්න. මේ හතර ගැන-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔය කාරණයටම එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ එකක්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අප එය ඊට පසුව ගනිමු.

පළමුවැනි එක මා කිව්වා. දැන් දෙවන එක ගනිමු. මෙතුමා කිව්වා, මේ ගනුදෙනු දෙක- මෙහෙම වෙන්න පුළුවන් නේ. මා මේ කියන්නේ විවෘතවයි. මේ ගනුදෙනු දෙක පිළිබඳව අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහත්මයා වග කිව යුතු බව පෙනෙනවා. එහෙත් තවත් ඒවා තිබෙනවා. ඒවාට එතුමා සම්බන්ධ නැති නිසා එය වෙනත් තැනක විය හැකියි වාගේ උපකල්පනයක් හැදෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒක වැළැක්වීම-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක ලියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ලියන එක නොවෙයි. මා මේ කියන්නේ හරයයි. එහෙම නම් අප කියන්න ඕනෑ මේ ගනුදෙනු දෙකේදි හෝ එකේදි -අපි පූර්වයෙන් සඳහන් කර තිබෙනවා- අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහත්මයාගේ මැදිහත්වීම තිබෙන බව. ඔහු සිටි කාලයේදී ම සිදුවූ අනෙක් ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳවද විධිමත් පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතුයි.

එහෙම නම්, ඒ කාරණයත් හරි නේ. අපි මේ දෙක ඔප්පු කර තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, එතැනට තවත් එකක් එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. ඔබතුමා සිටියේ නැති අවස්ථාවේ අපි දීර්ඝව සාකච්ඡා කළා, මාර්තු 29වන දා බැඳුම්කර සිදුවීම ගැන. කරුණාකර මට විනාඩි 2ක් දෙන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතුමා කියන කාරණය බාධා නොකර විනාඩි දෙකක් අහගෙන ඉන්න. බාධා කළොත්-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි මේ ගැන දිගින් දිගටම සාකච්ඡා කළා. අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් පහළට ගියා, Bond Room එකට ගියා, මෙය බැලුවා, කවුද ඇවිත් ඉන්නේ කියා බැලුවා, අහවල් තැනින් ඉරක් ගැහුවා, 10.45ට උඩට ගියා යනාදි වශයෙන් අපි විනාඩියෙන් විනාඩියට මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කළා; දීර්ඝව සාකච්ඡා කළා. දීර්ඝව සාකච්ඡා කරලා අපි කිව්වා මෙතැනට මොහුගේ යම්කිසි බලපෑමක් තිබෙන බව අපට හැඟී යනවා කියා. අපි පොදුවේ එතැනට ආවා. හැබැයි ඊළඟ

අවුරුද්දේ මාර්තු මාසයේ 29වන දා ඔය කියන එකට වඩා විශාල සිද්ධියක් වුණා.

එතැනදි, "30ක් ගන්න ඕනෑ" කියලා කිව්වා. 30ක් ගන්න දැම්මා. හැබැයි, 77ක් ගත්තා. දැන් 1ක් ගන්න කොට 10ක් ගත්ත එකට අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන්, "10ක් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා Governor instruct කරපු නිසා තමයි ගත්තේ" කිව්වා. හරි නේද? 30 ඉඳලා 77 ගන්න කොට Governor instruct කළා කියලා කොහේවත් නැහැ. Governor එතැනට ගිය බවකුත් නැහැ. Governor මේවා බලපු බවකුත් නැහැ. Governorගේ 27වැනි දා තිබුණු මැදිහත්වීම 29වැනි දා තිබුණේ නැහැ. නමුත්, ඒකත් අරකටත් වඩා විශාල වංචාවක් හැටියට අපට පෙනී යනවා. මගේ හෘදය සාක්ෂියට අනුව මට පෙනෙන දේ තමයි, එක්කෙනෙක්ට වඩා තවත් කට්ටිය මේකට සම්බන්ධ බව. මම හිතන්නේ අපි ඒක සඳහන් කළ යුතුයි.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා:එච්චරයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කැඳවලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේකේ ඒක තිබෙනවා. මේකේ තිබෙනවා අනෙක් අය- ඒක අපට ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මගේ ඉල්ලීම තමයි, "නම්වලින් කියන්න ඕනෑ" කියන එක.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: කමක් නැහැ. එතකොට 3වන නිර්දේශය-

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එතුමා අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන්ගේ බර අඩු කරන්න හදනවා.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ. අපි අර case එක අවසන් කරලා "අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් වගකිව යුතුයි" කියන වගන්ති ටික තිබෙනවා නේ. අපි ඒ ටික ඔක්කෝම තහවුරු කරලා අවසන්. ඒවායේ වෙනසක් නැහැ නේ. ඊට අමතරව අපි පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම ගැන කියනවා. එතැනින් පසුව තිබුණු අනෙක් ගනු-දෙනු ගැනත් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න කියලා කියනවා. ඒකේ වැරැද්දක් නැහැ නේ. හැබැයි, අපි අරක තහවුරු කරලා තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අනෙක් primary dealersලා-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මෙහෙමයි එන්නේ. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කිව්වා, පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගමයි, ඒකට අදාළ අනෙකුත් ආයතනයි අධික ලාභයක් උපයා ගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා. එක හරි. ඒක පෞද්ගලික ආයතනයක්. අපි වරද දැම්මාට ඒගොල්ලන්ට තිබෙන සරල තර්ක තමයි, ඔයගොල්ලෝ බැඳුම්කර දුන්නා; අපි ගත්තා. එතකොට උසාවිය ගියාට ඒ අයට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. හැබැයි, මේකට අපි තව එකක් එකතු කරනවා. ඒ තමයි, "අධික ලාභ ලැබීම සඳහා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා සෘජුවම මේ ආයතනයට උදව් කළා" කියන එක. ඒක එකතු කළොත් තමයි ඒ කාරණය ඔප්පු වෙන්නේ. ඒ කාරණය එකතු කළොත් හරි. ඒක එකක්. ඊළඟට තව පොඩි කාරණයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම මේක අවසන් කරලා-

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඕකටම පොඩි කෑල්ලක්. තර්කය යන්නේ ඒක නිසාමයි. ඔබතුමාට පහසුයි එතකොට. ඊළඟ එක තමයි, අපි මේ පරීක්ෂණය කළේ නිශ්චිත එක කරුණක් ගැන පමණයි. අපට අයිතියක් නැහැ ඒකට අනෙක් ඒවා එකතු කරන්න.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙනවා නේ ගනු-දෙනු වෙනවා කියලා. ඒ නිසා විශේෂ නිරීක්ෂණවලදී අපට කියන්න පුළුවන්, "අනෙක් ඒවා ගැන පරීක්ෂා කරන්න" කියලා. ඒකට අපට කමක් නැහැ. මොකද, මේ නිර්දේශ ටික අවසන්. අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් ගැන මේ නිර්දේශ ටික ඉවරයි නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ මේ නිර්දේශ ටිකට එකඟයි. මේවා මුකුත් එන්නේ නැහැ. මේ අලුතෙන් එකතු වන ඒවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒවා සෙල්ලිපි වාගේ. ඒවා වෙනස් වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි,-

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම අවසන් කරනවා. එතකොට ඒක හරි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: තව නිර්දේශ දෙන්න.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට මේකට අලුතෙන් එනවා, ඔය නිර්දේශ දෙක. ඊට පස්සේ අපිට දැනෙනවා, "මේ ගනු-දෙනුව වාගේ තව ඒවා විය හැකියි" කියලා. මොකද, අපට තොරතුරු ආවා. තව ඒවා තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නිසා, ඒ ගැනත් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඊළඟ අපට සැකයක් තිබෙනවා-

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඔබතුමා ගියා ටිකක් දුර වැඩියි.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අවසන් කරනවා. ඊට පස්සේ තිබෙනවා, "විධිමත් ක්‍රමවේදයක් මහ බැංකුවේ නැති නිසා තවදුරටත් මෙවැනි ගනු-දෙනු ඕනෑ කෙනෙකුට කළ හැකිතාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ඒකට විධිමත් ක්‍රමවේදයක් හදන්න." ඒකත් අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හැබැයි, පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, මේකේ තිබෙන ඒවා තියන්න. 4වැනි නිර්දේශය තමයි, "තොරතුරු ලබා දීම සඳහා, දඬුවම් පැනවීම සඳහා වූ නීතියක් සම්පාදනය කරන්න". ඒකත් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එතකොට මේකේ අපි ඔය කියපුවා ගනිමු කෝ. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. මේකේ ගත්තාම දැන් -

සභාපතිතුමා: 11.1 යටතේ තිබෙන කාරක සභවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: 44 පිටුවේ කාරක සභාවේ විශ්ෂ නිර්දේශ යටතේ තිබෙනවා, "මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින් විසින් තනි ආයතනයක් ලෙස පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනයට අයථා වාසියක් ඉපයීමට හැකි වන ලෙස කටයුතු කිරීමටත් එසේම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලෙස අදාළ ආයතනයද එම වාසි ලබා ගැනීමේ අමුණ සහිතව ක්‍රියාත්මක වීමත් මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය පාලනයේ විනිවිදභාවය සහ විශ්වාසනීයත්වය සඳහා බරපතළ ලෙස අහිතකර තත්ත්වයක් වන බැවින් එම තත්ත්වය පිළිබඳව නීතිමය බලය සහිත පිළිගත් ආයතනයකින් පුළුල් විමර්ශනයක් කිරීමත් නැවත එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීමට ගතහැකි සියලු පියවර ගැනීමත් නිර්දේශ කරයි." එතකොට මේකේ 4වැනි නිර්දේශයත් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, "ඉදිරියේදී මෙවැනි මූල්‍ය අක්‍රමිකතා ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීම සඳහා-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Specifically දාන්න.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම කියන්න හදන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ-

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන් හදන දේ මට තේරෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කාල වකවානුවක් දෙන්න. ඒක immediately හදන්න. නැත්නම් දිගින් දිගටම මේක යනවා.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: විශේෂ නිර්දේශ යටතේ ඒකත් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අර්ථය තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මේකේ තිබෙනවා, එහෙම පිළිගත් එකක් කරන්නත් ඕනෑ; මේවා ගැන පරීක්ෂණ කරන්නත් ඕනෑ කියලා. ඕනෑ නම් අපට මේක දෙකට කඩන්න පුළුවන් නේ. ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ. මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරින් විසින් තනි ආයතනයක් ලෙස පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනයට අයථා වාසියක් ඉපයීමට හැකි වන ලෙස කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතන අධික ලාභයක් ලබා ගෙන තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතන ලබා ගෙන තිබෙන ලාභයත්, ඔවුන්ගේ හෝල්ඩින්ස් සමාගම පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනයක් කළ යුතු වනවා. ඒක එක වාක්‍යයක්. එතකොට ඒක හරි නේද?

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: Insider trading ගැනත් එකේම සඳහන් කළොත් හොඳයි.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්, ඒක හොඳයි. එතකොට ඒක, එක වාක්‍යයකට එනවා. දෙවැනි වාක්‍ය තමයි, "මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයක් වැළැක්වීම සඳහා නීතිමය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග ගත යුතුය" කියලා. මේක ඇතුළේමයි ඒක තිබෙන්නේ. එක ඇතුළේ තිබෙනවා නේ "බලය සහිත පිළිගත් ආයතනයකින් පුළුල් විමර්ශනයක් කිරීම" කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාගේම ඊළඟට මම අවධානය යොමු කරනවා කෙටුම්පතේ 44 පිටුවේ තිබෙන ඊළඟ කාරණය සම්බන්ධයෙන්. "මෙම ප්‍රශ්න ගත බැඳුම්කර-

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: දැන් ඒ දෙක අවසන්ද? කරුණු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. එකක් බැඳුම්කර ගනු-දෙනුව සිදු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. මහ බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාවලිය ඒකට දායක වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා මේගොල්ලෝ අයුතු ලාභයක් ලබලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ ලාභය පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂණයක් කරලා ඔවුන්ගෙන් අය කර ගැනීමට කටයුතු කළ යුතුයි. ඒක එකක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: දෙවැනි එක තමයි, අනාගතයේදී මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීම සඳහා පරීක්ෂණයක් කරලා, අධ්‍යයනය කරලා නීතිමය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග හදන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒක නොවෙයි දෙක.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ වාගේ ලාභ ලබපු තවත් ආයතන තිබෙනවා. මේ කාරණයත් ඒකටම ඇතුළු කළොත් හොඳයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අන්න හරි.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: විශේෂ නිරීක්ෂණ 4ක් කිව්වා. මම ඒ 4 ගත්තේ 1, 2 වශයෙන් පිළිවෙළට නොවෙයි. 1වැනි එකයි, 3වැනි එකයි මම ගත්තේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒවා ඇතුළත් වනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ වාගේ ලාභ ලබපු තවත් ආයතන තිබෙනවා. ඒ ආයතන ගැනත් මේකේ සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි කොහොමද එහෙම කියන්නේ?

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක: අපි පරීක්ෂා කළේ, පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම ගැන. ඒක වෙනම එකක්. මේක blot වෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, අනිත් companies ඔක්කෝම හොරු කරන්න පුළුවන්ද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නැවත පටලවා ගන්න එපා. දැන් හරි නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අනෙක් primary dealersලා පටලවන්න බැහැ. අපි දන්නේ නැහැ ඒ මිනිසුන් හොරුද, නැද්ද කියලා. ඒවා ගැන වෙනම පටන් ගනිමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒවා ගැන අපි පරීක්ෂා කරන්න වෙනම පටන් ගනිමු.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට සාධක නැහැ නේ. දැන් කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ 1, 2 හරි නේ. එතකොට පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම ගැන කිව්වා. නීතිය ගැන කිව්වා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 1, 2 නොවෙයි. 1 සහ 3 කිව්වේ.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: 1 සහ 3 බද්ධ කරලා තමයි මේ දෙක හදන්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් විසඳා ගන්න ඕනෑ. ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කරුණු 4යි කිව්වේ. මම හිතන විධියට මෙතුමන්ලා එකඟ වෙන්නේ- දැන් අංක 11 සිට අපි නැතුව මෙතුමන්ලා සංශෝධනය කරපු කරුණු වගයක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගැන පස්සේ කථා කරමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඉන්න කෝ කියනකම්. එතකොට අංක 11 ඉඳන් කරපු සංශෝධනවලට මොකද වෙන්නේ?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි ඒක අහලා බලමු කෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සංශෝධන නැහැ. ඔක්කෝම එකඟ වුණා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතැනට පස්සේ එමු කෝ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහත: දැන් ඔක්කෝම අදින්නේ නැතුව ඉන්න කෝ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එතැනින් තමයි පටන් ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒවා කිව්වේ නැත්නම් වැඩක් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මේක පටලවන්නේ නැතුව කළා. එතුමාට අවසන් කරන්න දෙන්න කෝ.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. අපි බැලුවොත් අපේ කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ ටික තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශවලට මේ එන ඒවා අපි ප්‍රතිවිරෝධයක් ලෙස නිකම් ''මේක නම්, මේක'' කියලා දෙපැත්ත කේවල් කිරීමෙන් නොවෙයි නේ අපි පිළිගන්නේ. අපි පිළිගන්නේ පදනමින්. මම කියන්නේ ඒකයි. ඒ කියන්නේ, ''මේකට එකඟ නම්, එකඟයි'' කියන කේවල් කිරීමෙන් නොවෙයි. අපි කියනවා, ''මේවා ඇතුළත් විය යුතුයි.'' කියලා.

අරකට එකඟ වනවා නම් මේකට එකඟ වනවාය කියන කථාවක් අපට තවම නැහැ. අපි කියන්නේ, ඒ ගොල්ලන් දකින නිර්දේශත් ඇතුළත් විය යුතුයි කියලායි. එතකොට හොඳයි නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒකේ වෙනසක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් හරි නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතැන තිබෙන්නේ නිර්දේශ. අපි වාර්තාවට එකඟයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මට එක කාරණයක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නිර්දේශ ගැන නේ දැන් කථා කරන්නේ. නිර්දේශ ටික ඉවර කරන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 1වන නිර්දේශය නිවැරැදියි නේ. 2වන නිර්දේශයත් නිවැරැදියි නේ. ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමා තව එකක් කිව්වා. "අනාගතයේදී" කියන කාරණාවටත් අපි ආවා නේ. ඊට පස්සේ, මේ බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව විසින් මහා පරිමාණ වංචාවන් සිදු වී ඇති බව හෙළිදරවු වී ඇති නිසා ඒ කාල වකවානුව තුළ මීට අමතරව සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධයෙනුත් පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතුයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා වැරැදියි. මා ඒක නැවතත් කියන්නම්. මෙහි loss එකක් calculate කරලා තිබෙන්නේ ගනුදෙනු දෙකක් සඳහායි. පෙබරවාරි 27වන දා සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුව සහ මාර්තු 29වන දා සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුව සඳහායි. අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් පහළට ගිහිල්ලා, කොළ බලලා, අනම්, මනම් case සියල්ලම වුණේ පෙබරවාරි 27වන දා තමයි. 29වන දා වුණු ගනුදෙනුවට අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් පහළට යන එක, කොළ බලන එක, ඒ හුටපට මොකුත් නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: පළමුවන දිනයේ අත් දැකීම් මත වෙන ක්‍රමයක් අනුගමනය කළාය කියා අපට ඕනෑ නම් උපකල්පනය කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි දන්නේ නැහැ, මොනවා වුණාද කියලා. ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. මටත් ගෞරවයක් දෙන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මා අහගෙනයි ඉන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: දෙවන දිනයේදී එහෙම හුටපටයක් වෙලා නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Loss එක සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Loss එක සිද්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් පහළට යන එක, check කරන එක යනාදී ඒවා සිදු වුණේ නැහැ. මා දන්නේ නැහැ. හෙළිදරවු වුණු එකයි මා කියන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: දෙවන දිනයේදී එහෙම දෙයක් වුණේ නැහැයි කියලා කොහොමද කියන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. මට අදාළ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට මෙහෙම සඳහන් කරන්න පුළුවන් නේ. අපි විශේෂ අවධානයට ලක් කළේ මේ ගනුදෙනු දෙක සම්බන්ධවයි. මේ ගනුදෙනු දෙක හරහා මහ ජනයාගේ ධනය විශාල ලෙස නාස්ති වුණා හෝ අපතේ ගියා හෝ විනාශ වුණා හෝ මොකක් හෝ සිදු වී තිබෙන බව පැහැදිලියි. ඒ නිසා අපට -COPE එකට- සාධාරණ සැකයක් මතු වනවා, මීට අමතරව සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුවලදීද මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වී තිබෙනවාය කියලා. ඒ නිසා ඒ පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂණය කළ යුතුයි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමාට පොඩ්ඩක් miss වුණා. එතකොට 29වන දා සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුවට මොකද කියන්නේ?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔක්කොම කළේ කවුද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Primary Dealersලා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම නම් සඳහන් කරන්න ඕනෑ, "ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා වශයෙන් ධුරය දරපු කාලයේ සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනු" කියලායි. ඒ ගැන සැකයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අපි අනාගතය ගැන කියනවා. අපට අනාගතය ගැන කියන්න බැහැ නේ. "අනාගතයේ මේ වාගේ වෙයි, වෙන්න එපා"යි කියලා කියනවා.

ගරු සභාපතිතුමා: මා හැම දාම කියපු දේ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනික් ආයතන ගැන සඳහන් කරන්නේ නැත්තේ ඇයි?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ කාලය නිශ්චිතයි. මෙහි ආරම්භක කාලය තමයි, පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ 27වන දින සිදු වූ ගනුදෙනුව. මෙහි අවසන් කාලය ලෙස අපි සලකන්නේ, මාර්තු 29වන දා සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුවයි. මේ වගන්තිය ගැනයි මා කියන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, පාර්ලිමේන්තුව යෝජනා කරන්නේ අපට මොන ගනුදෙනුව ගැන පරීක්ෂණය කරන්නද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ආරම්භක ගනුදෙනුව පෙබරවාරි 27වන දා සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුවයි. අවසන් ගනුදෙනුව මාර්තු 29වන දා සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුවයි. මෙහිදී, පසු ගිය අවුරුද්දේ පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුවේදී සහ මාර්තු මාසයේදී සිදු වුණු ගනුදෙනුවේදී -එයට හවුල් වුණේ කවුද කියලා මා කියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කලින් කියලා ඉවරයි.- මහ

ජනතාවගේ ධනය විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් නාස්ති වෙලා හෝ අපතේ ගිහින් හෝ තිබෙන නිසා සාධාරණ සැකයක් මේ කාරක සභාවට පැන නඟිනවා, අනික් ගනුදෙනුවලදීද මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වී තිබෙන නිසා ඒ ගනුදෙනුද පරීක්ෂා කළ යුතුයි කියලා. හැබැයි අපි පදනම් කර ගන්නේ මේ ගනුදෙනු දෙකේ සිද්ධ වුණු වංචා මතයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට -COPE එකට- පාර්ලිමේන්තුව වගකීම පවරා තිබෙන්නේ මේ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුව ගැන සොයන්න විතරයි. අපට ඒකෙන් පනින්න බැහැ. ඒ ගනුදෙනුව ගැන සොයා ගෙන යන කොට හම්බ වුණු ඒවා තමයි අනික් ගනුදෙනු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ ගනුදෙනු සිදු වෙලා තිබෙන ආකාරය බැලුවාම අපට -කාරක සභාවට- හිතුණා, අනික් ගනුදෙනුවලදීත් මේ වාගේ සිදු වෙලා ඇති, ඒ නිසා අනික් ගනුදෙනුත් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න ඕනෑය කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. මා කියන්නේ, අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් සිටියා හෝ නොසිටියා හෝ Perpetual Treasuries ආයතනය තිබුණා හෝ නොතිබුණා හෝ insider trading එක තවමත් වෙනවා කියලායි. මේ ගනුදෙනුවේදී අපි ඒක පැහැදිලිව දැක්කා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරියට හරි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේක ඇතුළේ ඉන්න අය අනික් ගනුදෙනුවලදීත් ඒවා කරනවා. ඒ අයත් අල්ලා ගන්න ඕනෑ. මා කියන්නේ ඒකයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරියට හරි. ඒක සඳහන් කරන්නේ නැත්තේ ඇයි?

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, කියන කල්. ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මට මොහොතක් ඉඩ දෙන්න. දැන් ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන කාරණාවට අනුව නිර්වචනයක්, නිර්දේශයක්, නිගමනයක් හදා ගන්න ඔබතුමන්ලාට අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. එවැනි කාරණාවක් මේ නිර්දේශවලත් තිබෙනවා. ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් කියෙව්වොත් හොඳයි. "ඉදිරියේදී මෙවැනි මූල්‍ය අක්‍රමිකතා ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීම සඳහා ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳුන්ගේ වෙළෙඳ පොළ කටයුතු සහ ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වය පිළිබඳ පසු විවරණය කිරීමේ යන්ත්‍රණයක් මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ මැදිහත් වීම සහිතව ස්ථාපිත කිරීම නිර්දේශ කරන අතර එමඟින් මහ බැංකුව රජයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සඳහා මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය සිදු කරන ආකාරය පසු විපරම් කිරීමේ හැකියාව මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයටද ලැබෙනු ඇත." ඒක එක කාරණාවක්. තව නිර්දේශයක තිබෙනවා, -

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙතැන පොඩි ගැටීමක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: තව එකක් ඇතුළු කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒකේ කිසි ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. ඒක නේ කලින් කිව්වේ, ලිඛිතව දෙන්න කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මා කියන්නේ, ඒක ඕනෑම නැහැ කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, කියන කල්. "රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාලීම සඳහා වගකිව යුතු ප්‍රධානම ආයතනය වන ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය ටෙන්ඩර් නිකුත් කිරීම් හා ප්‍රදානය කිරීම්වලදී ඒ පිළිබඳව කටයුතු අධීක්ෂණය කිරීම සඳහාත්, අවශ්‍ය සියලු පසු විපරම් කිරීම සඳහාත් විධායකය මඟින් විශේෂ නිරීක්ෂණ කණ්ඩායමක් වහාම පත් කළ යුතු යයි නිර්දේශ කරයි." මේ ආදී වශයෙන් මෙහි පොදු හරය තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලාට එකතු කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මා නම් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය වශයෙන් එක කාරණයකට විරුද්ධයි. දැන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව තිබෙන්නේ ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය යටතේයි. අපි දැන් තව කෙනකුට වගකීම් පවරන්න හදනවා, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය මේ කටයුතු අධීක්ෂණය කළ යුතුයි කියලා. මා නම් කියන්නේ, දැන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව අයත් වන්නා වූ අමාත්‍යාංශය -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මා විරුද්ධයි, අමාත්‍යාංශයකට දෙනවාට.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මට අදහසක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබෙනවා. පළමුවන එක තමයි, අපි මෙවැනි වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන කොට එකඟතාවෙන් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑය කියන එක. දෙවන එක තමයි, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සුවිශේෂී ආයතනයක් බව. ඒක මතක තබා ගන්න. ඒ ආයතනය ක්‍රියා කරන්න ඕනෑ ක්‍රමවේදයක් තිබෙනවා. අනික් කාරණය, මෙය අනාගතයටත් බලපාන බව මතක තබා ගන්න. ඒ නිසා අපි මේ විකාර කථා කරන තරමටම මෙය අවුල් වනවා. වැදගත් යමක් කථා කරලා වාර්තාව දෙමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කරුණු එවන්න. මේ කාරණාව අවධාරණය කළේ වෙන මොකක්වත් නිසා නොවෙයි. "ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳ පොළ කටයුතු පිළිබඳව පසු විපරම් කිරීමේ යන්ත්‍රණයක් ඔබලාට තිබෙනවාද?" කියා මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්තුමාගෙන් ඇහුවාම, මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශයේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම වුණේ එවැනි යන්ත්‍රණයක් නැහැ කියන එකයි කියලා verbatimsවල -සියලුම සාක්ෂි

සටහන්වල- තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා තමයි මේ කාරණය ඇතුළත් කළේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මා කියන්නේ, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සුපරීක්ෂණය කිරීම සඳහා අමාත්‍යාංශයකට භාර දීම සුදුසු දෙයක් නොවන බවයි. ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව ඇමතිවරයකුගේ විෂය යටතට එන්න ඕනෑ. මේ bonds සහ bills අධීක්ෂණය කරන්න යම් විධියක independent body එකක් ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: ලෝකයේ කොහේවත් නැති ඒවා යෝජනා කරන්න එපා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ වාර්තාවට ඇතුළත් කරන්න මට එකම කාරණයක් තිබෙනවා. මට එක යෝජනාවක් තිබෙනවා. අපි මේ සම්බන්ධව check කරලා බැලුවාම, එදා ඔබතුමාත් දැක්කා, අනික් ද්විතීයික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් ගත්ත එක හළපු හැටි සොයන විධියක් ගැන කිසිම දෙයක් කවුරුත් ළඟ තිබුණේ නැහැයි කියලා. ඒක තමයි ඇත්ත කථාව. යන්ත්‍රණයක් තිබුණේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකයි මා කියන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ නිසා මේ ගනුදෙනුව ගැන සහ 29වන දා ගනුදෙනුව ගැන, - මැයි මාසය දක්වා වුණත් කමක් නැහැ.- forensic audit එකක් කරන්න ඕනෑය කියන කාරණය මා යෝජනා කරනවා. මොකද, ඒකෙන් තමයි සොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉදිරියට කටයුතු කිරීම සඳහා නිර්දේශවලට ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේකෙන් අල්ලා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ පරණ ඒවා සියල්ලම මේ report එකට ඇතුළත් කරලා පටලවා ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. COPE එකේ සමස්ත වාර්තාව ගැන නොවෙයි නේ අපි දැන් කථා කරන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒක නෙමෙයි මම කියන්නේ. මම කියන එක අහන්නකෝ. මට විනාඩියක් කථා කරන්න දෙන්නකෝ. අනාගතයේදී මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් උසාවියට යන මිනිහෙකුට කියන්න පුළුවන්කම තිබෙන්නට ඕනෑ, "මම මෙන්න මේ සම්බන්ධව, මෙන්න මේ මතය උඩ තමයි මම මේ කාරණය කියන්නේ" කියලා. ලෝකයේ අනෙක් රටවල්වලත් ඒක හොයන්න තිබෙන එකම ක්‍රමය තමයි forensic audit එක. එතකොට දන්නවා, කවද්ද ගත්තේ, කවද්ද බෑවේ, කීයටද බෑවේ, කොහොමද බෑවේ, බාන්න කලින් DFCC එකට බෑවේ කොහෙන්ද, පැන් ඒෂියා බැංකුවට බෑවේ කවද්ද කියලා. ඒ සියල්ල සොයාගන්න පුළුවන්. මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්නේ මේකයි. විශේෂයෙන්ම මම මුල ඉඳලාම මේ කථාව කිව්වා. මේ කාරණය ඇතුළත් කරන්න බැරි වුණොත් මේවා තුළ තිබෙන දේවල් අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා කථා කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකේ තිබෙනවා, Securities and Exchange Commission කියලා එකක්. Bond එක කියන්නේ security එකක්. Stock එක කියන්නෙත් security එකක්. එතකොට bonds and stocks යන දෙකම අයිති වෙන්නේ securities කියන instrument එකට. එතකොටම මේකට අලුතෙන් ඒවා අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. අපට කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ bond trading එකත් Securities and Exchange Commission එකේ නියාමනයට ගේන්න කියන එක පමණයි. එතකොට මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය ගාවගන්න ඕනෑත් නැහැ, මොකුත් ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු හර්ෂ නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමා, නැවත දීර්ඝ සාකච්ඡාවලට යන්නේ නැතුව කෙටියෙන් ඔබතුමාගේ අදහස කියන්න. මේකේ තිබෙන නිර්දේශවලට අමතරව ඔබතුමන්ලාට නිර්දේශ එකතු කරන්න තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒවා නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් යෝජනා හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. එතකොට හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: එතකොට අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය අමාත්‍යතුමාගේ දෙවැනි නිර්දේශයට අපි එකඟ වුණා නම්, ඉස්සෙල්ලාම ඒ එකඟ වුණු දේ මොකක් කියලා හැමෝටම කියලා ඒකට agree වෙමු. අනිත් කාරණය මේකයි. අපි අනිත් ආයතන ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑද, නැද්ද කියන එක ගැනත් කථා වුණා. අපට මෙතැන සියයට 100ක් evidence තිබෙනවා, සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ සම්බන්ධයක් තිබෙන බවට. මේවා අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට බාපු බව අපි දන්නවා. ඒ නිසා "සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල" කියන නම කියවෙන්නම ඕනි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ, සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලට තමයි ඒවා විකුණන්නේ. එතකොට සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදලේ funds govern කරන ක්‍රමය ගැන මීට වඩා transparent තත්ත්වයක් - විනිවිදභාවයක් - තිබිය යුතුයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම කිව්ව කාරණය ඒ විධියටම දැම්මා නම්, සාකච්ඡා කළ යුතු දේවල් ගොඩක් ඉවරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: යෝජනා ටික ඇතුළත් විය යුතු තැන් ටික කියන්නකෝ. ඕනෑ නම් පැය ගණනක් සාකච්ඡා කරමු.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නැහැ, කථා කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා නියෝජ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාගේ අදහස් ටික ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා. දෙවැනි කාරණය තමයි, "සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල" කියන එක අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ඇතුළත් කරමු. ඒකට අපි ඔක්කෝම එකඟයිනේ. ඒ යෝජනා දෙකයි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමාගේ යෝජනාවයි තුනයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හොඳයි, කරුණු තුනයි. මේක ලේකම් කාර්යාලයක් විසින් කරන්න ඕනෑ වැඩක්. ඒ නිසා ඔබතුමන්ලා මට නිශ්චිතව අදහස් කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: අදාළ අය ගැන පමණක් කථා කරන්න. නැත්නම් මුළු ලංකාවේම money market-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ඇමතිතුමා කරපු යෝජනාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක ඉවර කරගන්න මට පොඩ්ඩක් ඉඩ දෙන්නකෝ. "කාරක සභාවේ පොදු නිර්දේශය" කියන එකේ මේ විධියට කියනවා. "2015 සහ 2016 යන වසර දෙක තුළදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව නිකුත් කරන ලද බැඳුම්කර,-

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මගේ අදහස නම්, money market එකට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නොවන ඒවා අදාළ තැනට ගේන්න. මේක හොල්මන් කරන්න එපා කියන එකයි මම කියන්නේ. අපි මේ සොයන්නේ නිශ්චිත කාලයක සිද්ධ වුණු කාරණාවක් ගැනයි. අනෙකුත් කාරණා ගැන අපට COPE එකේ වාඩි වෙලා තව දුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කරන්න පුළුවන්. මේක involve වෙන්නේ ලංකාවේ money market එකට. කරුණාකරලා ඒක අවුල් කරන්නේ නැතුව මේ වාර්තාව හදන්න ඕනෑ කියන එකයි මගේ අදහස. මොකද හේතුව, පස්සේ මේවා ලොකු ප්‍රශ්න බවට පත්වෙනවා. අපි නොදන්න ප්‍රශ්න මේක ඇතුළේ තිබෙනවානේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉතින් හොඳයිනේ ඒවා එළියට එන එක.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: නැහැ, මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. අපි කොහොමද අනෙක් primary dealersලා සියලුම දෙනාම මේකට ගාවගන්නේ. එහෙම නම් අපි ඒවා වෙනම කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ. මෙහෙම කරන්න බැහැනේ. අපට ඒක කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, කලින් කිව්ව යෝජනා තුන ලියන්නකෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. දැන් පරීක්ෂණයක් කරනවා. Perpetual Treasuries එක පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂණය කරන කොට අනෙක් ආයතනවල සිද්ධිත් එළියට එනවා. එතකොට ඒවා නොකර ඉන්නද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට අවස්ථාව දෙන්නකෝ. මම කියන්නේ මේකයි.

වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපට අදාළ නැති ඒවා කියන්න එපා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: "අනෙකුත් ගනු-දෙනු" කිව්වාම, ඒ ගනු-දෙනුව අස්සේ අනෙක් ගනු-දෙනුවල වංචා ගැනත් තිබෙන්නට ඕනෑ. එච්චරයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි දාන්න බැරි?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අනෙකුත් ගනු-දෙනු සහ අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි, එච්චරයි. ඇයි අපි දාන්නේ නැත්තේ?

වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. මේ වාර්තාවේ සිදුවන අකටයුත්ත තමයි මේ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පාර්ලිමේන්තුව අපට පැවරුවේ නිශ්චිත ගනු-දෙනුවක් පිළිබඳව සොයා බලන්න විතරයි. එතකොට ඒ කාරණයට අදාළව විතරක් Report එක ලබාදෙන එක තමයි සාධාරණ. ඒකට අනෙක් dealersලා, අරවා මේවා පැටලෙව්වාම අපි මේක කළේ සද්භාවයෙන් නෙමෙයි කියලා ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙනවා. වෙන කෙනෙකුගේ නමක් ඇතුළු කරන්න අපට අයිතියක් නැහැ. මේ ගනු-දෙනුවට අදාළ සමාගමයි,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි නැත්තේ?

වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ කියනකල්. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක බොඳ කළොත්, ඒ කියන්නේ කවදා හෝ මේක අධිකරණයට අරගෙන ගියොත් මෙන්න මේ දේ වෙන්න පුළුවන්. "මේ බලන්න, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයාට අදාළව ගහලා තිබෙවා 29වැනිදා එක. පාර්ලිමේන්තුව කියලා තිබෙන්නේ මේ කාරණය ගැන විතරක් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න කියලා. මේ කමිටුව ද්වේශ සහගතව කටයුතු කරලා තිබෙනවා" කියලා කිව්වොත්, උසාවිය අපි ගන්න තීරණය නෙමෙයිනේ ගන්නේ. Lawyersලා අපි කියන ඒවා

නෙමෙයිනේ පෙන්වන්නේ. ඒ නිසා අපට භාර දීපු වගකීම අපි අදාළ rule එකේ අරගෙන යමු. ඊට එහා පැත්තේ සිදුවන අතුරු කාරණා මේකට අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. අවශ්‍ය නම් කවුරු හෝ මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකුට ඊළඟ එකට යෝජනාවක් දාන්න පුළුවන් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න කියලා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාට තර්ජනය කරනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, නැහැ.

වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, තර්ජනය කිරීමක් නෙමෙයි ඉල්ලීමක්; යෝජනාවක්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: වංචාවක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා කියලා මේ ගනු-දෙනු දෙකෙන් අපට තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිසා අනෙක් ගනු-දෙනු ගැනත් විභාග කරන්න කියලා අපි යෝජනා කරනවා. ඒක අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම මේ ගනු-දෙනුවලින් අපට තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙනවා, පර්පවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම අතිරේක ලාභයක් ලබාගෙන තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒ නිසා අනෙක් ඒවා ගැනත් පරීක්ෂා කරන්න. ඒකනේ ඇත්ත තත්ත්වය. ඒ කියන්නේ එක කාරණයක් ගැන මේ ගනු-දෙනුවෙන් අපට තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙනවානේ.

අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි. මේ මුළු process එකම වැරදියි කියලා කියන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අනිත් අය ගැනත් කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අපි මෙහෙම කරමු. පොදු නිර්දේශයේ ගැටලුවක් නැත්නම් අපට අනෙක් කරුණුවලට යන්න පුළුවන්. පොදු නිර්දේශය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේක ඇමතිතුමා මතයක් ඉදිරිපත් කළා. ඒක නිවරදි කරගෙන අපි ඉස්සරහට යමු. ඒකෙන් කියන්නේ, 2015, 2016 යන වසර දෙක තුළදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව සිදු කළ බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම්වලදී එවකට අධිපතිව සිටි අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා මැදිහත් වීමක් හෝ බලපෑමක් සිදුකළ බවට සාධාරණ සැකයක් ඇති විය හැකි ආකාරයේ සාක්ෂි හෝ කරුණු කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ හෙළිදරව් වී ඇති බව කාරක සභාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරන ලදී." අවශ්‍ය නම් ඒක දාන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට කියන්න වෙන්නේ, "බලපෑමක් සිදුකළ බවට සාධාරණ සැකයකින් තොරව කරුණු හා සාක්ෂි කාරක සභාව හමුවේ හෙළිදරව් වී ඇත" කියලා. එහෙමද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නෙමෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් මේක කෙමෙයි හරි එක. නැත්නම් මේක වැරදි වෙන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ. ඔතනට එන්න ඕනෑ, අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන්, ඒ වාගේම සාක්ෂිවලින් හෙළිදරව් වෙලි තිබෙනවා තව දෙදෙනෙක්,-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: "අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන්" කියලා දාන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: "ඒ සියලු දෙනාම මේකට සම්බන්ධ බව සාක්ෂිවලින් අනාවරණය වී තිබේ" කියලා දාන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මුල් එක දාලා, "එමෙන්ම" කියලා දාලා, වෙන් කරන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මෙතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා තමයි වැරැද්ද කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, තව ඉන්නවා නම් හොයලා බලන්න කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කාරණය හරිනේ?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අනෙක් නිලධාරිනුත් බලපෑමක්නේ කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. මෙතුමා part එක දාලා, උඩට අරගෙන ගිහිල්ලා සම්මත කළේ. Mrs. Senewiratne ම කිව්වානේ, "Do it" කියලා කිව්වා කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Mrs. Senewiratne 4දෙනෙක් ගැන කිව්වා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපි හයියෙන් කෑ ගහන්නේ නැතුව මේක ඉවර කරගමුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කාරණය හරිනේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම යෝජනා කරන්නම්. මෙම කෙටුම්පතේ 42 වෙනි පිටුවේ 11 වෙනි නිර්දේශය යටතේ, "...සිදු කළ බවට සාක්ෂි හෝ කරුණු කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ හෙළිදරව් වී ඇති බව කාරක සභාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි..." කියලා යෙදීම හොඳයි. එතකොට මේ කාර්ය අවසානයි නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ,මෙතැනම මේ අග, මුල වෙනස් කරන්න එපා කියලායි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කියන දෙය අහන්න. ඔබතුමාම මට කියන්න මේ කොටසෙයි, අනෙක් කොටසෙයි අතර තිබෙන වෙනස මොකක්ද කියලා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා කියන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: "...කරුණු හෙළිදරව් වේ..." කියලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, වචනයෙන්-වචනය කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: 2015- 2016 යන වසර දෙක තුළදී ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ සිදු කරන ලද බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීමේ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී, අප පරීක්ෂාවට භාජනය කරන ලද- අපි දන්නේ නැහැ. අපට ඔක්කෝන්ටම අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහත්මයා සම්බන්ධයි කියලා කියන්න බැහැ- අප පරීක්ෂාවට භාජනය කරන ලද ගනුදෙනු දෙකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. දෙකක් හෝ එකක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දෙකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන්ගේ සම්බන්ධය ගන්නේ එකකටයි. 27 වෙනිදා ගනුදෙනුවේ දී එවකට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිව සිටී අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතාගේ මැදිහත්වීමක් හෝ බලපෑමක් සිදු කර ඇති බවට සාධාරණ සැකයකින් තොරව-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ නැහැ. සාධාරණ සැකයකින් තොරව කියලා යොදන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේක උසාවියක් නොවෙයි. එහෙම යොදන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් මේක තමයි දාන්න පුළුවන් ක්‍රමය වන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: සාධාරණ සැකයක් ඇති විය හැකි ආකාරයේ හෝ සාක්ෂි- මෙන්න මේකයි මම කියන්නේ-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මට කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ. විනාඩියක කාලයක් දෙන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ "ඔක්කෝම බැඳුම්කර" කියලා කියන වචනය වෙනුවට, අපි යොදනු ලබනවා "නිෂ්චිත" කියලා. මෙතැන්ට ඒක එන්න එපෑයැ. ඊට පසුව මෙහෙම යොදන්න පුළුවන්. "ඊට අමතරව,ඊට පසුව මාර්තු මාසේ සිදු වූ එම ගනුදෙනුවේදී ද විශාල අලාභයක් සිදු වී ඇති බැවින්, ඒ වාගේම ඒ කාල පරතරය ඇතුළත්ව -තවත් මොනවා හරි ගනුදෙනුවක් සිදු වුණා නම් අපට ගණන කියන්න පුළුවන්- මේ ගනුදෙනුවේ තිබෙනවා. ඒවා පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂණයක් කර එයට සම්බන්ධ පුද්ගලයන්ද අනාවරණය කර ගත යුතුය" යනුවෙන් සඳහන් කළ හැකියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට පෙනෙන කාරණය මෙයයි. අපි අග, මුල වෙනස් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මම ඔබතුමාට යෝජනා කරන දෙය වන්නේ, අපි cover කරන්නේ ඒ මුළු කාලයම නේ. අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතාගේ නම ඇතුළත් කරන එක ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ වාගේම අපේ හිටපු විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ සාක්ෂියෙන්ම පෙනෙනවා, තව නියෝජ්‍ය නිලධාරීන් දෙදෙනෙක් එම විවාදයට අයුතු ලෙස සම්බන්ධ වෙලා තිබෙනවාය කියලා. ඊළඟට, පී. සමරසිරි මහතා කියනවා, "අපි තමයි මෙම තීරණය තනිකර ගත්තේ" කියලා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Dr. Azim.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එතකොට ඒ Tender Board එකේ කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්නවා. මගේ හැඟීම අනුවයි මම මේ කියන්නේ. ඒ අනුව, මගේ යෝජනාව වන්නේ,-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: සමරසිරිත් ඉන්නවා. අරයත් ඉන්නවා. මෙයත් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් අහගෙන ඉන්න මම මේ කියන දේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමා කියන දෙය අයගෙන ඉන්න. එය වැදගත්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මෙච්චරයි. අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන්-

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ ඡේදය අවසන් කරනවා. ඊට පසුව-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඉන්න. ඉන්න. ගරු අනුරු දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, තව පොඩි කොටසක් යොදන්න තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙමනම් වෙනස් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මගේ යෝජනාවක් තිබෙනවා. "...බලපෑමක් සිදු කළ බවට සාක්ෂි හෝ කරුණු කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ හෙළදරව් වී ඇති බව කාරක සභාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි..." "සාධාරණ සැකයක්..." කියන කොටස ඕනෑ නැහැ. කෙළින්ම පැහැදිලිව ඔප්පු වෙනවා කියන එකයි මේකෙන් කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "...බලපෑමක් සිදු කළ බවට සාක්ෂි හෝ කරුණු කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ හෙළිදරව් වී ඇති බව කාරක සභාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි..."

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: කරුණු කාරණා මත ඔප්පු වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දැන්, මෙතැන සාධාරණයක් ඉෂ්ට වෙන්න එපෑයැ. දැන් මේ පළමුවෙනි ඡේදය as it is තියන්නද එහෙම නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පළමුවෙනි ඡේදයට තවත් එකතු කිරීමක් කරන්න ඕනෑද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි පළමුවෙනි ඡේදයට එකඟ වෙමු. පළමුවෙනි ඡේදය අකුරක්වත් වෙනස් නොකර as it is තිබෙනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඉතින්, "සාධාරණ සැකයක් ඇති විය හැකි..." කියන කොටස වෙනස් කරන්න කියලායි මම නම් කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ. එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මැතිතුමනි, පොඩ්ඩක් අහගෙන ඉන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මට හිතෙනවා," සාධාරණ සැකයකින්..." කියන කොටස යොදන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒක වෙනස් වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙනම්, එම කොටසත් ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම තිබෙන්න හරිනවා. දැන්, මෙම කෙටුම්පතේ සඳහන් කරුණුවලට අමතරව වෙන තිබිය යුතු කරුණු මොනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මෙය අංක 01 කියලා දාන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: හොඳයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එක අකුරක්වත් වෙනස් නොකර අංක 01 කියලා දාන්න. මම මේ පැහැදිලි කර ගන්නයි කියන්නේ. දෙවැනි එක ඒ විධියටම දාන්න මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ නියෝජ්‍ය අධිපතිවරුන් වන-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මම කියන්නේ නම් දාන්න එපා, නිලධාරීන් කියලා දාන්න කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අජිත් පී.පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, මෙහෙම දැම්මොතින්, "...මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළට අදාළ නිලධාරීන්..." කියලා

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙයට සම්බන්ධ අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කියලා දාන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කියලා දැම්මාට කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Tender Board එකේ නිලධාරීන් කියලා-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කියලා දැම්මාම අර කට්ටියත් අහු වෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එකඟයි. සභාපතිතුමාත් සමඟ එකඟයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Tender Board එකේ නිලධාරීන් කියලා-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Tender Board එකේ membersලා මේ සාක්ෂි වල ඉන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නම දාන්න එපා. අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කියලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කියලා දැම්මාම අර කට්ටියත් අහු වෙයි. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: කරුණාකරලා මටත් විනාඩියක කාලයක් ලබා දෙන්න. පොඩ්ඩක් අහ ගන්න. මගේ අදහසත් ගන්න. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, මෙතැන පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. අපි නම් දැම්මොතින් ඒ නම් තිබෙන අය පමණයි අහු වෙන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙයට අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කියලා යොදමු. සමස්ත ක්‍රියාවලියටම අදාළ නිලධාරීන්-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මටත් කථා කරන්න තත්පරයක කාලයක් ලබා දෙන්න. මේකේ සාක්ෂි තිබෙනවා. අඩුම **තරමේ පී.එන්.වීරසිංහයි, බී.ඩී.ඩබ්ලිව්.ඒ. සිල්වායි දෙන්නා-**

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම වැඩක් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙයට අදාළ නිලධාරීන් කියලා යොදමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: කරුණා කරලා මම කියා සිටින්නේ දැන් වෙලාව 4.15යි. මේක තවදුරටත් ගෙන යන්නේ නැතිව අවසන් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, වෙලාව 4.15යි. 5.00ට VAT ඡන්දය. හෙට දිනයේදී පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට මෙය ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සමස්ත ක්‍රියාවලියට-

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: සමස්ත නොවෙයි, මෙම ක්‍රියාවලියට.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙම ක්‍රියාවලියට අදාළව අනෙකුත් සියලු නිලධාරීන් මේ සඳහා වගකිව යුතු බව-

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. වගකිවයුතු බව යොදන්න බැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මෙම වැරදි සහගත ක්‍රියාවලියට සම්බන්ධ වී ඇති සියලු නිලධාරින්ට එරෙහිව කටයුතු කළ යුතු බව කාරක සභාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුනි, එතකොට ඔබතුමන්ලා බලන්න මේ වාක්‍යයෙන් තිබෙන්නේ මොකක්ද කියලා. උගත් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා මේ කෙටුම්පතේ සඳහන්ව තිබෙන වාක්‍ය කියවන්නේ නැති වුණාම තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි මේ. මම මෙම කෙටුම්පතේ 42වන පිටුවේ, 11 වන නිර්දේශයේ දෙවැනි ඡේදයේ සඳහන් සියල්ල කියවන්නම්. ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධනය කරපු කොටස හරි. ඊළඟ කොටසේ මෙසේ සඳහන් වනවා:

"... කාරක සභාව විසින් කරන ලද පරීක්ෂණ හා සාක්ෂි විභාග කිරීම්වලදී, ඇතැම් ගනුදෙනුවල උපරිම පාරදෘශ්‍යභාවය නොමැති බවද, එහිදී කටයුතු කළ ආකාරයෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ විශ්වසනීයත්වය පළුදු වී ඇති බව ද යන්න පිළිබඳව සාධාරණ සැකයක් ඇති විය හැකි ආකාරයේ සාක්ෂි හෝ කරුණු කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ හෙළිදරව් වී ඇති බව කාරක සභාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි.

එසේම, ඒ කාලයේ සිදුවී ඇති බැදුම්කර ගනුදෙනු හරහා ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් එක් ආයතනයක් - ඕනෑ නම් අපට යොදා ගන්න පුළුවන් Perpetual Treasuries Limited කියලා- ඉතා විශාල මූල්‍යමය ලාභාංශ - මෙහි ලාභාංශ නොවෙයි. ලාභ යනුවෙන් නිවැරදි විය යුතුයි. එය අපි නිවැරදි විය යුතුයි කියලා කිව්වා- උපයාගෙන ඇති බව කාරක සභාව නිරීක්ෂණය කරයි.

එබැවින්, -මම "එබැවින්" කියලා යොදලා තිබෙන්නේ, "ඉහත සියලු කාරණා නිසා කියන අර්ථය සඳහන් වෙන්නයි. ඒකයි මගේ වචනාර්ථය වන්නේ.-

- එසේ වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන් හෝ ආයතනයන්ට එරෙහිව පැනවිය යුතු දණ්ඩනයන් හෝ වෙනත් නියමයන් නිර්දේශ කිරීම සඳහාත්,

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දණ්ඩනයක් කියලා යොදන්න බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔහොම ඉන්න කියනකම්. ඔක්කෝම කියවන්න ඕනෑ.

- එකී අයථා කටයුතු හේතුවෙන් රජයට හා මහජනතාවට සිදුවී ඇති අලාභය හෝ පාඩුව එකී වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන්ගෙන් - all - හෝ ආයතනවලින් -ඒ ආයතනවලින් හා සියලුම ආයතනවලින්- අයකර ගතයුතු බව නිර්දේශ කරන අතර, ඒ සඳහා අවශ්‍ය අධිකරණමය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග ගත යුතු බව කාරක සභාව අවධාරණය කරයි.
- "එසේම, නිර්දේශිත දණ්ඩනයන් හෝ වෙනත් නියමයන් අවශ්‍ය අයුරින් ක්‍රියාත්මක වන බව සොයා බැලීම සහ සහතික කිරීම සඳහාත්, ඒ පිළිබඳව පසු විපරම් කිරීම සඳහාත්,
- එමෙන්ම, එබඳු ආකාරයේ කටයුතු මින් ඉදිරියට සිදු නොවීම සඳහා අවශ්‍යයෙන්ම ගත යුතු සියලු පියවර, ආවේක්ෂණ හා තුලනයන් ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහාත්,
- එකී ආවේක්ෂණ හා තුලනයන් මහ බැංකුව විසින් නිසි පරිදි ක්‍රියාවේ යොදවන බවට සොයා බැලීම සහ සහතික කිරීම සඳහාත්, ඒ පිළිබඳව පසු විපරම් කිරීම සඳහාත්, පාර්ලිමේන්තුව සෘජුව මැදිහත් විය යුතු අතර එය පාර්ලිමේන්තුව සතු රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍ය පාලනයට අදාළ මූලික වගකීම බව කාරක සභාව අවධාරණය කරයි."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට විනාඩියක් කථා කරන්න දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. එහි තවදුරටත් සඳහන් වෙනවා:

"එසේ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමෙන් රජයට සිදු වූ අලාභයන් අය කර ගැනීම සහ පවතින නීති යටතේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වීම පාර්ලිමේන්තුව සතු වගකීමක් ලෙස ඉතා ඕනෑකමින් කාරක සභාව නිර්දේශ කරයි."

එතැනින් ඒ කොටස අවසන් වෙනවා. නමුත් තව දුරටත් සඳහන් වෙනවා,

"එසේම, යළි මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීමට පියවර ගැනීම ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව තුළ සහ ඊට අනුශාංගික අනෙකුත් ආයතන තුළ සුදුසු යාන්ත්‍රණයක් ක්‍රියාත්මක වීම එම ආයතන විසින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට සහතික විය යුතු බව කාරක සභාව අවධාරණය කරයි.

එසේම,

රටේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාලීම සඳහා වගකිව යුතු ප්‍රධානතම ආයතනය වන ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය ටෙන්ඩර් නිකුත් කිරීම් හා ප්‍රදානය කිරීම්වලදී ඒ පිළිබඳව කටයුතු අධීක්ෂණය කිරීම සඳහාත් අවශ්‍ය සියලු පසු විපරම් කිරීම සඳහාත් විධායකය මඟින් විශේෂ නිරීක්ෂණ කණ්ඩායමක් වහාම පත් කළ යුතු යයි ද කාරක සභාව නිර්දේශ කරයි.

මෙම ගනුදෙනුවලදී අයථා අන්දමින් කටයුතු කර ඇති ඕනෑම පුද්ගලයකුට මින් ඉදිරියට කිසිදු විටෙක මෙරට කිසිම රාජ්‍ය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවක, රාජ්‍ය සමාගමක හෝ රජයට සම්බන්ධ කිසිදු ආයතනයක සේවය කිරීමට ඉඩකඩ ලබා නොදිය යුතු යයිද කාරක සභාව වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කරයි.''

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියවලා අවසාන නැහැ, තවත් තිබෙනවා. මේ සියල්ල කියවා අවසන් වීමෙන් පසුව ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවශ්‍ය කාරණා ඇතුළත් කරන්න. මෙහි තවදුරටත් සඳහන් වෙනවා:

''ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 148වැනි වගන්තිය ප්‍රකාරව රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍ය පාලනය සම්පූර්ණයෙන්ම පැවරී ඇති මෙම උත්තරීතර පාර්ලිමේන්තුව වෙත, කාරක සභාවට මෙතෙක් ඉදිරිපත් වී ඇති සියලු ලේඛන, තොරතුරු හා සාක්ෂි (එකී ඇතැම් තොරතුරු සංවේදී යයි ප්‍රකාශ වුවද) ඉතා ඉක්මනින් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම කාරක සභාවේ දැඩි වගකීමක් බවද කාරක සභාව විශ්වාස කරයි.

එම වගකීමට අනුව මෙම නිර්දේශ සහිත වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන අතර මෙම වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසු පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තුළ ඒ පිළිබඳව විවෘත සංවාදයක් ඇති කළ යුතු බවටත් කාරක සභාව නිර්දේශ කරයි.'' කියලා. ඒක තමයි මේ වාර්තාවේ පොදු හරය. ඒකට ඇතුළත් කරන්න තවත් දෙයක් තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තවත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න දේවල් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒ වාර්තාව පැහැදිලියි. තවත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න දෙයක් නැහැ. මම ඒක අනුමත කරනවා. අපි එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කරුණුවල සියල්ලම තිබෙනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා නිකම් කියවනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේක bulldoze කරනවා නම්, bulldoze කරමු. **සභාපතිතුමා:** මේකට ඇතුළත් කරන්න තව මොනවා හෝ තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කවුරුවත් ලියන්නේ නැත්නම් මම තනියම හෝ ලියනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔබතුමා ලියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා ඒ කරුණු ටික කියැවීම ගැන ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා. නමුත්, මෙතැන මම කියා සිටි කරුණක් අන්තර්ගත වෙලා නැහැ. අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන්ට අමතරව මේ ගනුදෙනුවට සම්බන්ධ තවත් පුද්ගලයන් මහ බැංකුවේ ඉන්නවා. ඒ නිසා එතැන specifically තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ, මහ බැංකුවේ ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ ධුර දරන කියලා හෝ කුමක් හෝ ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ මේ ක්‍රියාවලියට සම්බන්ධ අය. ඒ අයගේ නම් ලැයිස්තුව ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මම කිව්ව එක ඉවත් කර ගන්නම්. මොකද, අහිංසක මිනිසුන් කිහිප දෙනකු සිටින නිසා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඒක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ තැන නිවැරදිව කියන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 42වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වෙනවා නේ, එබැවින්,- කියන එකට යටින් ''එසේ වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන්'' කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්, වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන් කවුද කියලා අපි හඳුන්වමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන් මහ බැංකුවේ,-

සභාපතිතුමා: පැහැදිලි කිරීම් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. මොකද, අපි සෑම දෙනාටම තේරුම් ගන්න පුළුවන්. වාක්‍ය ලියන්න ඕනෑ ස්ථානය පමණක් කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ''එසේ වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන්'' කියන තැනට එනවා,-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලය සම්බන්ධ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අද positive වැඩි වෙලා. Negative වුණා නම් හොඳයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මූල්‍ය මණ්ඩලයක් නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඇතුළත් කරන්න තිබෙන දෙයක් ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ තරම් උනන්දුවක් කලින් තිබුණා නම්, කොපමණ හොඳද? මම නැඟිටලා යනවා යන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතැන අවසානයට ඇතුළත් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ මෙපමණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම නැඟිටලා යනවා යන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කලබල වෙන්න එපා. අපි කරන්නේ වැදගත් කටයුත්තක්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 42වැනි පිටුවේ ''එසේ වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන්'' කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ''පුද්ගලයන් හෝ ආයතනයන්'' කියන දෙකම සඳහන් වෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: "එසේ වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන්" කියන එක විසිරිලා නේ තිබෙන්නේ. එතැනට ඇතුළත් කරමු, "එසේ මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට වගකිව යුතු පුද්ගලයන්" කියලා. ප්‍රශ්නය ඉවරයි නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හරි.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒක හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එසේ කියන එක වෙනුවටද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: පුද්ගලයන් සහ ආයතනයන් කියන එක වෙනුවට.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, අනෙකුත් පුද්ගලයන්.

ගරු **හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා:** ඔබතුමා වාක්‍ය කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අනුර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඒ වාක්‍ය සකස් කරන ඕනෑ ආකාරය ඔබතුමා කියවන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එසේ වගකිව යුතු,-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නැහැ, එම සිද්ධියට කියලා වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට වගකිව යුතු අනෙකුත්,-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා ටිකක් ඉන්න. මෙතුමා කිව්වාට පසුව එය වැරදිනම් නිවැරදි කරන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට වගකිව යුතු- මොකද, මහ බැංකු අධිපතිවරයා නියෝගයක් දුන්නත්, අනෙක් අයටත් වගකීමක් තිබෙනවා එය නොකර සිටීමට.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: අන්න හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමා, ඒක ලියන්න ඕනෑ විධිය කියන්න කෝ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එසේ මෙම ගනුදෙනුවට වගකිව යුතු මහ බැංකුවේ අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන් සහ ආයතනයන්ට.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එතැනට තවත් දෙයක් එකතු කරන්න ඕනෑ. අපි විමසූ සාක්ෂිවල තිබෙනවා, සමහර අයට ඒ කියන්නේ, පළමුවැනි සාක්ෂිකරුට, දෙවැනි සාක්ෂිකරුට බලපෑමක් වුණා කියලා කියපු එක ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක ඒ නිලධාරියා දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. අධිපතිවරයා බලපෑමක් කළත් ඔහු නිලධාරියෙක් නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් බලපෑමක් වුණා කියලා ඔවුන් කියනවා නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ විධියට කිව්වාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මෙතැනින් පසුව ඒවා ඔප්පු වෙයි නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: වීරකුමාර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මේ උසාවියක තීන්දු ලියන වේලාවක් නොවෙයි. මේ COPE එකෙන් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි පුද්ගලයෙක් ඉන්නවා කියලා දන්නේත් නැහැ; පුද්ගලයන්ගේ නම් දන්නේත් නැහැ; ඔවුන් නම් කරන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ කාරණාවට එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතුමා කියපු විධියට මම අවසාන වාක්‍ය කියවන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අවසාන වාක්‍ය නොවෙයි, අවසානයේ සංශෝධිත වාක්‍ය.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන විධියට ඒ වාක්‍ය මේ ආකාරයට සංශෝධනය විය යුතුයි. ලේකම්තුමිය ඒක ලියා ගන්න. "එසේ මෙම ගනුදෙනුවලට වගකිව යුතු මහ බැංකුවේ අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන් හෝ පුද්ගලයන් හෝ ආයතනයන්ට,-

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පුද්ගලයන් ඕනෑ නැහැ, නිලධාරීන් කියලා දමන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම නැවත වතාවක් සංශෝධනය වාක්‍ය කියවන්නම්. "එසේ මෙම ගනුදෙනුවලට වගකිව යුතු මහ බැංකුවේ අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන් හෝ ආයතනයන්ට එරෙහිව පැනවිය යුතු දණ්ඩනයන් හෝ වෙනත් නියමයන් නිර්දේශ කිරීම සඳහාත්."

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතැන එන්න ඕනෑ, නිලධාරීන් හා පුද්ගලයන් හා කියලායි, හෝ කියලා නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම නැවතත් සංශෝධන වාක්‍ය කියවන්නම්. "එබැවින්, එසේ මෙම ගනුදෙනුවලට වගකිව යුතු මහ බැංකුවේ අනෙකුත් නිලධාරීන් හා ආයතනයන්ට එරෙහිව පැනවිය යුතු දණ්ඩනයන් හා වෙනත් නියමයන් නිර්දේශ කිරීම සඳහාත්." නිවැරදිද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නිවැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අනෙක් කාරණා නිවැරදියි නේ. වෙන වෙනම නිශ්චිත කාරණා තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: නැවතත් වෙනස් කරන්නද හදන්නේ. වෙන වෙනම නිශ්චිත කාරණා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ විධියට ලිව්වොත් වෙන ෙද් මම කියන්නේ ඔබතුමාගේ හොඳටයි. 44වැනි පිටුවේ සඳහන් වෙනවා, "කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේකට ඇතුළත් වෙලා නොමැති කාරණා මොනවාද කියලා බලමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔව්, මේකේ හරය ලස්සන වෙන්න ඕනෑ නිසයි මම කියන්නේ. Repetition එකක් තිබෙනවා,-

සභාපතිතුමා: ටිකක් ඉන්න. මම දීර්ඝ වාක්‍යයක් කියෙව්වා නේ. ඒක එතැනින් අවසන් වෙනවා. එතැනින් පසුව තිබෙන ඒවා ඔබතුමන්ලා හදන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ ගැන තමයි මේ කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාක්‍ය නිවැරදියි නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නිවැරදියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම අවසානයට කියවලා නතර කළේ, "එම වගකීමට අනුව මෙම නිර්දේශ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන අතර මෙම වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසු පාර්ලිමේන්තුව තුළ ඒ පිළිබඳව විවෘත සංවාදයක් ඇති කළ යුතු බවටත් කාරක සභාව නිර්දේශ කරයි." කියලා. ඊට පසුව නැවතත් තිබෙන "කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියන කොටස ඇතුළත් කරන්නේ නැහැ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ වාක්‍ය ටික ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ, ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවශ්‍ය නම් ඇතුළත් කරන්න. සියලු දෙනාම අහගෙන ඉන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඒක තිබෙන්නේ වාර්තාව අවසන් කිරීමක් වාගේ නේ. ඒ නිසා අනෙක් කාරණාත් ඇතුළත් කරලා ඒක එන්න ඕනෑ අවසානයටයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තවත් කාරණා තිබුණොත් නේද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔව්.

සභාපතිතුමා: හොඳයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: "කාරක සභාවේ විශේෂ නිර්දේශ" කියන මාතෘකාව යටතේ තිබෙන 4වැනි ඡේදය කියවන්න කෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කාරණා යටතේ ඇතුළත් විය යුතු තවත් කාරණා තිබෙනවා නම්, ඒවා ඇතුළත් කරලා හදන්න. මෙහි සඳහන් වෙනවා:

- "මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් එක් තනි ආයතනයක් ලෙස පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනයට අයථා වාසියක් ඉපයීමට හැකි වන ලෙස කටයුතු කිරීමටත්, එසේම ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු ලෙස අදාළ ආයතනයද එම වාසි ලබා ගැනීමේ අරමුණ සහිතව ක්‍රියාත්මක වීමත් - එහෙම ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට අයිතියක් නැහැ නේ.- මහ බැංකුවේ මූල්‍ය පාලනයේ විනිවිදභාවය සහ විශ්වසනීයත්වය සඳහා බරපතළ ලෙස අහිතකර තත්ත්වයක් වන බැවින් එම තත්ත්වය පිළිබඳව නීතිමය බලය සහිත පිළිගත් ආයතනයකින් පුළුල් විමර්ශනයක් කිරීමත් නැවත එවැනි තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීමට ගත හැකි සියලු පියවර ගැනීමත් නිර්දේශ කරයි." කියලා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නිවැරදියි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක කලිනුත් කිව්වා නේ. ඒකම නේ ඒ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කොතැනද කියැවුණේ. කලින් කියැවුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: කියැවුණා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ. පැහැදිලි කිරීම අවශ්‍ය නම්, අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්ව කාරණය තමයි මේ තිබෙන්නේ.

- "බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය හරහා රටට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීමේදී රජයේ හදිසි-,

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එය ප්‍රමාණවත්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇති, ඇති.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙය ප්‍රමාණවත් නැත්නම්, පස්සේ තවත් කරුණු එකතු කරමු.

- "බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය හරහා රටට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීමේදී රජයේ හදිසි මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවන් සපුරාලිය හැකි රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍ය ආයතන සඳහා ප්‍රමුඛතාව ලබා දිය යුතු බව නිර්දේශ කරන කාරක සභාව, ඒ සඳහා ප්‍රතිපාදන සලසන වගන්ති මහ බැංකුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත ඇතුළු අනෙකුත් අදාළ ලේඛනවලට ඇතුළත් කළ යුතු යැයි මහ බැංකුවට නිර්දේශ කරයි."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතැන පොඩි දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. "බැඳුම්කර ක්‍රියාවලිය හරහා රටට අවශ්‍ය මුදල් සම්පාදනය කර ගැනීමේදී රජයේ හදිසි මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතාවන් සපුරාලිය හැකි රාජ්‍ය මූල්‍ය ආයතන සඳහා ප්‍රමුඛතාව ලබා දිය යුතු බව නිර්දේශ කරන කාරක සභාව,...." කියලා, මෙතැන සඳහන් කරද්දි එය එතරම් සුදුසු නැහැ නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එය ඒ ගොල්ලන් නිර්දේශ කරන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඉස්සර වෙලා ඔබතුමා මේ කරුණු ටික සාකච්ඡා කරලා අවසන් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ කියන්නේ පොදුවේ.

- "මෙම ප්‍රශ්නගත බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවට සම්බන්ධ පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවෙකු ලෙස ඉතා කෙටි කාලයක් තුළ අධික ලාභයක් උපයා ඇති අතර එසේ ලාභ ඉපැයීමේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පිළිබඳ පූර්ණ බලැති යාන්ත්‍රණයක් මඟින් පරීක්ෂණයක් කළ යුතු අතර එමඟින් ඔවුන්ගේ කටයුතු හරහා මහ බැංකුවට හා රජයට මූල්‍යමය පාඩුවක් සිදු වී ඇත්දැයි ඉතා කඩිනමින් අනාවරණය කර ගැනීම මහ බැංකුවේ වගකීමක් ලෙස කාරක සභාව තරයේ විශ්වාස කරයි."

අපට අවශ්‍ය නම් මේ කරුණු දෙක එකතු කරන්න පුළුවන්. 01ඟි සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙන ටික 03ට ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතැනට ගන්න ඕනෑ මෙහෙම, ෙම් පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂණ කිරීමේදී පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම අයුතු ලෙස විශාල ලාභයක් ලබා ඇති බව අපිට තහවුරු වුණා. මහ බැංකුවේ මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනු විශාල ප්‍රමාණයක් සිදු වෙන බැවින්, තවත් අය මේ පිළිබඳව ඉන්නවාද කියා සොයා බැලිය යුතුයි කියලා අපි නිර්දේශ කරනවා.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Very good.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙයින් අපට තහවුරු වුණා පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය ඉන්නවා කියලා. අපි තවත් අය ඉන්නවාද කියලා දැන ගන්න ඕනෑ. තව පිරිසක් ඉන්නවාද කියලා හොයන්න ඕනෑ. මෙයින් අපි තහවුරු කළා පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය මේ ගනුදෙනුවෙන් ලාභ ලැබූ බව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඉහළින් තිබෙනවා. ඒ paragraph එක සියල්ලම එනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: "මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් විසින් එක් තනි ආයතනයක් ලෙස පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනයට අයථා වාසියක් ඉපැයීමට හැකි වන ලෙස කටයුතු කිරීමටත්...." කියලා උඩින් තිබෙනවා. ඒක මත පදනම් වෙලා අපි කියනවා-,

සභාපතිතුමා: ඊළඟට වාක්‍යයත් දමමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහිදි අපිට එළිදරව් වෙලා තිබෙනවා අයුතු ලාභයක් ලබලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒ නිසා අපට සාධාරණ සැකයක් තිබෙනවා තවත් මේ ආකාරයේ සමාගම් උපයා තිබෙනවාද කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: "අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්" කියලා දමන්න එපා. අපි මේ කථා කරන්නේ කවුරු ගැනද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඇයි?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, "අනෙකුත් ආයතන" කියලා, කිව්වාට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මම එහෙම කියන්නේ මොකද දන්නවාද? අපි මේ කථා කරන්නේ මහජන බැංකුව, NSB එක ගැන. එතකොට, මේ රටේ බැංකුවලට ගැහුවා කියලා, අපිට allegation එකක් ඒවි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුව?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ලංකා බැංකුව දැනටම involved. ඒ නිසා මම කියන්නේ අනුර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන එකට කිසි හානියක් නැහැ නේ. "අනෙකුත් ආයතන" කියලා දමන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: "අනෙකුත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්" කියලා දමන්න.

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: Primary dealersලා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: "අනෙකුත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්" කියලා දමමු. මොකද, ලංකා බැංකුවේ තිබෙන එකත් අපට හොයන්න ඕනෑ. ඒකෙන් ගිහිල්ලා Rs. 30 billion, Rs. 40 billion දෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනිවාර්යෙන්ම.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: අනවශ්‍ය කාරණා දමන්න එපා. වැදගත් වාර්තාවක් දමන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් අපි මේ පරීක්ෂණය කළේ විශේෂයෙන් ගනුදෙනු දෙකක් සම්බන්ධයෙන්.

එතකොට, අනිත් අය වැරදි කරලා තිබෙනවා නම් අපි මේ වාගේම කටයුතු කරමු කිසිම ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. අපටත් පොඩ්ඩක් කථා කරන්න දෙන්න. ඒ නිසා මෙය දැමීම තුළින් මේ පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගමට දෙන නියෝගය අඩු කරන්න ඕනෑ නම් අනිත් ටික දමන්න. ඒක ලියලා තියා ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කොහොමද අඩු කරන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක ලියලා තියා ගන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේ සියලු කොන්දේසි දමලා මේ හොරකමේ බර අඩු කරන්න හදන්නේ. මේක තේරෙන්නේ නැත්ද? අපිටත් තෙරේනවා මේ මොකටද යන්නේ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මගේ යෝජනාවක් තිබෙනවා. මම මගේ යෝජනාව කරන්නම්, අපේ උගත් එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මෙය තීතී වාක්‍යයෙන් සකස් කරාවි. මෙහෙම යෝජනාවක් කරන්නම්, මේ පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනයේ විමර්ශනය තුළ ඔවුන් අධික ලාභ ලබා ඇති බව නිරීක්ෂණය වන බැවින්, එය නිශ්චිත වන බැවින් , ඔබතුමා නීතීඥ භාෂාවෙන් එය හදන්න. මෙවැනි අයුතු ලාභ ලබා ගැනීමේ තත්ත්වයන් ඇති වීම වැලැක්වීමට, ඇති වෙලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා විමර්ශනය කිරීමට සුදුසු යාන්ත්‍රණයක්-, එය හදන්න නේ දැන් ඕනෑ. එහෙම යාන්ත්‍රණයක් සකස් කිරීමේ යෝජනාව දමමු. අනෙකුත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ටද අදාළ වන පරිදි කියලා දැම්මාට කමක් නැහැ. සුදුසු යාන්ත්‍රණයක් සකස් කර ඒ මගින් පරීක්ෂා කිරීම

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ එක මන්ත්‍රී කෙනෙක් හොරකම් කරලා අහු වෙලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි දැන් පරීක්ෂා කරන්නේ පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම ගැන නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: Bond issue එක ගැන, හරි නේ. එතකොට bond issue එකට සම්බන්ධ වෙච්ච සමාගම පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් සමාගම. ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් අතේ තමයි රටේ මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳ පොළ සහ විදේශ අවධානය කියන සියල්ලම තිබෙන්නේ. අපි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙන් අනිත් අයවත් සැක කරනවා වාගේ වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කෙළාත් එය රටට බලපානවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එතකොට, ඉතුරු බිලියන 05 හම්බ වුණු අය.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙය වැදගත්. මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුව. මේ නිශ්චිත ගනුදෙනුව ගැන විතරයි අපි කථා කරන්න ඕනෑ. නැත්නම් එය බලපානවා. මේ වාර්තාව එළියට යනවා. ඒක රටට බලපානවා. ඒක නිසා ඒ අදාළ කරුණ ගැන පමණක් අපි කථා කරමු වෙනත් ඒවා පටලවන්න එපා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා දැන් යෝජනාවක් කළා. මේ යෝජනාව අහන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය ගැන හොයන්න ගියේ නැහැ. අපි ගියේ බැඳුම්කරය ගැන හොයන්න. බැඳුම්කරය ගැන හොයාගෙන යන කොට අපට එළිදරව් වුණා, පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය ලොකු ලාභයක් ලබලා තිබෙනවා කියලා. එහිදි අපිට දෙපැත්තෙන්ම තහවුරු වුණා, බැඳුම්කරයේ ක්‍රියාවලියත් එක්ක අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතාගේ සම්බන්ධය ඒ පැත්තෙන් ඔප්පු වෙන කොටම, ඔහුගේ බැණා මේක ලබන කොටම තවත් අපිට විශ්වසනීය ලෙස තහවුරු වෙනවා අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා මෙහි ක්‍රියාවලියේ ඉන්නවා කියලා. එය නේ අපිට ඒ දෙකෙන් තිබෙන්නේ. හැබැයි අපි හොයන්න ගියේ මෙය-, පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය අයුතු ලාභයක් ලැබුවා කියලා තහවුරු වෙලා තිබෙනවා. අපිට අනෙක් ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳව, ඔය ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳව- ''ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු'' කියලා, එහෙම නම් කරන්නේ නැතිව- අනෙක් ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳවද පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ''අනෙක් ගනුදෙනු පිළිබඳව මෙවැනි පරීක්ෂණ යාන්ත්‍රණයක් සකස් විය යුතුය'' නේද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: කියන දේ අහන්න කෝ. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා කිව්වා, ආයතනයක් පත් කර අනෙකුත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් පිළිබඳ පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන්න කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආයතනයක් පත් කර, ආයතනයක් සකස් කර ගනුදෙනු-,

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ''අනෙක් ගනුදෙනු'' කිව්වාට කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගනුදෙනු සහ ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා ලියපු දේ අහගන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපේ පරීක්ෂණයේදී ප්‍රාථමික ගැනුම්කරුවන් උපයපු එක හොයන්න ගිහින්, අපට කොටු වුණේ පර්පෙවුවල්

ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය නම්, අනිත් අය ගැන අපට කියන්න බැහැ. නමුත්, අපි අයුතු ලාභය ලැබූ ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් හොයන්න ගියා, පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය අපිට කොටු වුණා. එතකොට, දැන් අපට අනිත් අය ගැන කියන්න බැහැ. හැබැයි, අපි ගියේ බැදුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව ගැන සොයන්න. ඒ කියන්නේ, අපිට පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය කොටු වුණා. හැබැයි, දැන් අපිට සාධාරණ සැකයක් තිබෙනවා අනිත් ගනුදෙනු ගැනත් සොයන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මෙහෙම තර්කයක් තිබෙනවා, මෙහි පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් වාගේම මහ බැංකුවේ නිලධාරීන් වැරදියි කියලා තමයි අපි පර්පෙවුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් වැරදියි කියලා කියන්නේ. එහෙම නම්, අනිත් ගනුදෙනුකරුවන් වාගේම-, එක් කෙනෙකුට මේ වැඩය කරන්න බැහැ නේ. එයට දෙපැත්තට සම්බන්ධ වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒ නිසා තමයි පරීක්ෂණයක් කරන්න කියලා කිව්වේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගනුදෙනු කියනකොට, අනෙකුත් ගනුදෙනු ඇතුළේ තිබෙනවා-,

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහිදී මෙම බැදුම්කර ගනු දෙනුව පිළිබඳව අප සිදු කළ විමර්ශනයේදී නැත්නම් කාරක සභාව සිදු කළ විමර්ශනයේදී Perpetual Treasuries ආයතනය අතිරේක විශාල ලාභයක් අයුතු ලෙස ලබා ඇති බව තහවුරු වී ඇති හෙයින්, අනෙකුත් ගනු දෙනු පිළිබඳව ද පරීක්ෂණයක් සිදු කිරීමෙන් මෙවැනි අක්‍රමිකතා සිදු වී ඇති දැයි අනාවරණය කර ගැනීම සඳහා සුදුසු යන්ත්‍රණයක් සකස් කළ යුතු බව කාරක සභාව තරයේ අවධාරණය කරයි. ඉදිරියේදී මෙවැනි මූල්‍ය අක්‍රමිකතා ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීම සඳහා -ඒ කියන්නෙත් ඒකම තමයි- ඉදිරියේදී -

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අනෙකුත් ගනු දෙනු කියලා කිව්වාම ඒක විසිරිලා තිබෙනවා. මේකේ සැකයට ලක් වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ හොයා ගෙන යද්දී අධිපතිවරයායි. එතකොට මෙම අධිපතිවරයා යටතේ වුණු අනෙකුත් ගනු දෙනු-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එහෙම ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම නම් මහ බැංකුව-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක ඕනෑ නැහැ. දැනට මෙහෙම යමු. එහෙම වුණොත් et cetera, et cetera ගොඩක් එනවා. ඊළඟ වාක්‍ය මේ විධියට සඳහන් කරමු. ඉදිරියේදී මෙවැනි මූල්‍ය අක්‍රමිකතා ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීම -

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දිවයිනෙන් පිට යන්න තිබෙන නිසා මම කමිටුවෙන් නික්ම යනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාට සුබ පතනවා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: පරණ වාර්තාවට මම පක්ෂයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දැන් කරපු සංශෝධනවලට එකඟයි නේද?

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මා ඉන්න වෙලාවේ කරපු සංශෝධනවලට-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දැන් කරන ලද සංශෝධනවලටත්-

සභාපතිතුමා: සමාවෙලා පොඩ්ඩක් ඉඩ දෙන්න. "ඉදිරියේදී මෙවැනි මූල්‍ය අක්‍රමිකතා ඇති වීම වැළැක්වීම සඳහා ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳුන්ගේ වෙළෙඳ පොළ කටයුතු හා ද්විතියික වෙළෙඳ පොළ ක්‍රියාකාරිත්වය පිළිබඳ පසු විපරම් කිරීමේ යන්ත්‍රණයක්.." -එතකොට අර කියන කාරණාවම තමයි- කියලා සඳහන් කරමු. මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය කියන එක වෙනස් කරනවාද?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මහ බැංකුව අදාළ වන අමාත්‍යාංශය කියලා -

සභාපතිතුමා: මහ බැංකුව අදාළ වන-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒකත් අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි "යන්ත්‍රණයක්" කියන එක සඳහන් කරමු. "යන්ත්‍රණයක් ස්ථාපිත කිරීම නිර්දේශ කරන අතර එමඟින් මහ බැංකුව රජයේ මූල්‍ය අවශ්‍යතා සඳහා මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය සිදු කරන ආකාරය පසු විපරම් කිරීමේ හැකියාව ලැබෙනු ඇත." කියලා -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එච්චරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරි නේ. එතකොට කාටද කියලා නැහැ. ඊළඟට මේ දක්වා යාවත්කාලීන නොකරන ලද රාජ්‍ය ණය කළමනාකරණ දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ මෙහෙයුම් අත් පොත වහාම යාවත්කාලීන කළ යුතු අතර, එහි බැදුම්කර හරහා රජයට මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය කිරීමේදී එසේ මූල්‍ය සම්පාදනය කළ හැකි රාජ්‍ය ආයතන සඳහා ප්‍රමුඛතාව දීමේ ප්‍රතිපාදන ඇතුළත් කළ යුතු බව නිර්දේශ කරයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: EPF එක-

සභාපතිතුමා: කලින් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මේක වෙන විධියකටයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැනට යමක් එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑයි කියලා මා යෝජනා කරනවා. අපි මහ බැංකුවේ bonds ගැන පරීක්ෂණ කරන කොට අපට ආයතන දෙකක් ගැන හෙළිදරවු වෙලා

තිබෙනවා, යම් නිශ්චිත කාරණා. ඒ දෙකම රජයේ ආයතන. එකක් EPF. එකක් BOC. මම කියන්නේ, EPF එකේ funds manage කිරීමේ ප්‍රශ්නය ගැන නම කියලා කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එපා, එපා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පෞද්ගලික නම් නොවෙයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: EPF fund management පිළිබඳව ඒ ගොල්ලන්ට විශේෂ වැඩ පිළිවෙළක් හදලා වැඩ කටයුතු කරනවා කියලා කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මට ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය නිරාකරණය කර ගන්න ලෙහෙසියි. ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙන්න මෙහෙම නිරාකරණය කර ගන්නවා නම් ලේසියි. ඔබතුමන්ලා කවුරුත් පිළිගත්ත විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශවල මෙන්න මේ නිර්දේශයට අවධානය යොමු කරන්න. 40වැනි පිටුව. එහි 10 වැනි නිර්දේශය මෙසේ සඳහන් වෙනවා:

"සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ලියාපදිංචි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු නොවූවද ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනු මෙන් ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීම සඳහා හැකියාව ලබා දී ඇත. එසේ වුවද සේවක අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල ප්‍රාථමික වෙළෙඳපළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමට විකල්පයන් ලෙස වෙනත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවන්ගෙන් ද්විතීයික වෙළෙඳපළෙන් බැඳුම්කර මිලදී ගැනීමේ ප්‍රවණතාවයක් දක්වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය වේ. මේ වන විට ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ අධීක්ෂණය යටතේ පවතින අර්ථසාධක අරමුදල එම අධීක්ෂණයෙන් බැහැරව ස්වාධීනව කටයුතු කළ හැකි ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු බවට පත් කිරීම."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ තිබෙන්නේ විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශය නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශය as it is හෝ අන්තිම ටික හෝ -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, ඕනෑ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට අපි ඒ නිර්දේශ සියල්ල පොදුවේ පිළිගන්නවා නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒවා අපි පිළිගන්නවානේ. ඒවා සියල්ල අපි පිළිගන්නවා නම් ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. මුළු වාර්තාවම පදනමක් හැටියට පිළිගන්න නිසා නිර්දේශ ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එහෙම නම් 2015- 2016 බැඳුම්කර ගනු දෙනුව සඳහා -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: තව එකක් තිබෙනවා. Bank of Ceylon ගැන කොහේද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අනේ! ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: හදිසියි, වැඩ තිබෙනවා නම් යන්න. තරහා වෙන්න එපා. ලංකා බැංකුව කියන ආයතනය තමන්ගේ විධායකයේ අවසරයකුත් නැතිව එතැන ඉන්න dealing room එකේ අය බිලියන 13ක් ඔය අපි ප්‍රශ්න කරන නිශ්චිත දවසේ මේකට දාලා තමයි මේ game එක ගැහුවේ. එතැන ඉන්න අයගේ වගකීම ගැන අපි හොයලා බලන්නේ නැද්ද? ඒ අය රජයේ සේවකයිනෙන්. එච්චරයි කියන්නේ. කරුණාකර, මේක මහ හරින්න එපා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒකත් කෙටියෙන්-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒක අනිවාර්යයෙන් දමමු.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක සඳහන් කරමු, මේ නිශ්චිත සිදුවීමේදී ලංකා බැංකුවේ-

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක කොතැනටද එන්නේ? අර නිර්දේශවලට ඉහළින් සඳහන් කරමු. "මෙම නිශ්චිත බැඳුම්කර ගනු දෙනුවලදී ලංකා බැංකුව ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකු ලෙස තවත් ප්‍රාථමික ගනුදෙනුකරුවකුට ලංසු තැබීම සඳහා මැදිහත් වීම ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වන බව කාරක සභාවට.."-

The Hon. Ajith P. Perera: It is not only that.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ඒක නොවෙයි දමන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එච්චර details නැතිව පෙබරවාරි 27-

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: බැංකුවට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා primary dealer කෙනකුට දෙන්න. නමුත්, අවසර ගන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එම නිලධාරීන්ගේ හැසිරීම පිළිබඳව ද විශාල සැකයක් ඇති වී ඇති බැවින්, ඒ පිළිබඳව ද පරීක්ෂා කරන්න කියලා සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒක විතරක් නොවෙයි. මෙම ගනු දෙනුවට ලංකා බැංකුවේ ණය ලබා දීමේදී හෝ වෙනත් කාරණයකදී අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රියා පිළිවෙත අනුගමනය නොකරමින් ක්‍රියා කර ඇති නිලධාරීන් සම්බන්ධව හෝ ඒ අය පිළිබඳව පරීක්ෂා කරන්න ඕනෑය කියන එකත්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කළා නම්-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒ අය කියනවානේ නැහැ කියලා. අරයා තනියමයි ගත්තේ කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ. අරයා ගිහිල්ලා කියනවා, දුන්නා කියලා-

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: සම්මත ජාතියේ, මීට පස්සේ bond market එකට බල්ලෙක්වත් එන්නේ නැහැ. ඒකත් ලියලා තියා ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: Exactly! කොහොමද වෙන කෙනකු bid කරන්න බැරි නම් එන්නේ. Anybody can bid. මේක තිබෙනවා Report එකේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එතකොට හොඳයි. ආණ්ඩුවට වැඩ කරන්න සල්ලි නැහැ. අපි ඒකට පක්ෂයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පෙබරවාරි 27 ගනු දෙනුව කියලා සඳහන් කරන්න.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: එක මනුෂ්‍යයෙක් තීන්දුවක් ගන්නේ නැහැ. ලියලා තියා ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා අමාත්‍යතුමනි, ඒ අයිතිය තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, මේ මැදිහත් වීම අස්වාභාවිකයි. පළමුවැනි වතාවට සිදු වුණු දෙයයක්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, ඔබතුමා කිව්ව මුල් ටික නැතිව ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවෙකුට තවත් ප්‍රාථමික ගැණුම්කරුවෙක් වන Bank of Ceylon එකට මුදල් දෙන්න බැරි කමක් නැහැ, මොකද risk එකක් නැතිව commission එකක් ගන්න පුළුවන් Bank of Ceylon එකට. ඒ අයගේ ආදායම් පැත්ත බලනකොට.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැවත in detail තර්කවලට යන්න එපා. මෙම බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවලදී ලංකා බැංකුව වෙනත් අවස්ථාවක අනුගමනය කරන ක්‍රියාවලියට පටහැනිව කටයුතු කර ඇත්තේ නම්-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම පටහැනිව නොවෙයි. වරදක් කර ඇත්නම් විය යුතුයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතුමා කියන්නේ මෙහෙමයි, පෙබරවාරි 27 බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවේදී ලංකා බැංකුවේ ක්‍රියාකාරීත්වය, පිළිබඳ බරපතළ සැකයක් කමිටුවට අවධාරණය වී ඇති බැවින් ඒ පිළිබඳව සොයා බලා පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්විය යුතුයි.

The Hon. Dayasiri Jayasekara: Agreed.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ පිළිබඳ සොයා බලා පරීක්ෂණයක් පැවැත්විය යුතුයි. ඊළඟට 2015 සහ 2016 වර්ෂවල බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සඳහා "හිටපු මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති" කියලා විතරයි සටහන් කරන්න කිව්වේ. සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඔබතුමන් ඒ ගැන කියන්න.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: "Directly responsible" is all right. "Taking legal action against him and other relevant officers" is also all right.

සභාපතිතුමා: අලාභ අය කර ගැනීම කියන එක ඉවත් වෙනවා. නීතිමය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග ගැනීම සිදු කළ යුතු යැයි නිර්දේශ කරයි.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: සභාපතිතුමා ඒකට අදාළ තවත් එකක් තිබෙනවා. An identical thing is there in your general recommendations. One before the last paragraph states, "The Committee further recommends that no person who has acted in irregular manner in these transactions be allowed to serve in any government department, State corporation or any other institution associated with the government of this country in future." We have expanded the scope of that in the general recommendations earlier. "Other officials" කියලාත් දැම්මා. So, having said that, we cannot prescribe a punishment like this for all. You will catch up whole lot of people in this. So, I suggest that you add "ඔප්පු වුනොත්".

සභාපතිතුමා: නීතිමය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග ගැනීම සහ එහිදී ඔප්පු වන කරුණු අනුව.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: වරදකරු වුණොත්.

සභාපතිතුමා: වරදකරු වුණොත් කොහොමත් දඬුවම් දෙනවා නේ. වරදකරු වුණොත් දඬුවම් නොදී ඉන්නවාද?

ගරු එම්.ඒ.සුමන්තිරම් මහතා: වරදකරු කියලා කියන්නේ, there will be degrees of responsibility and liability. We cannot just say someone is either guilty or not guilty. This is not a criminal judgement. So, "වරදකරු බව ඔප්පු වුණොත්" කියලා කියන්න බැහැ. There will be degrees. So, I suggest that you delete this.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නිති ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගැනීම කියලා දැම්මාම ඉවරයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එවැනි අපකීර්තිමත් කියලා මොකක් හරි එකක් දමමු.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Unless you say very specifically-

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඔයා මොකක්ද suggest කරන්නේ?

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Because we have expanded the list of people coming under this scope in the general recommendation, there may be whole lot of people and merely to say all of them cannot serve in any government department and so on without checking on the degree of liability is not good. You go to court, then the court will decide that. You had better not to prescribe the punishment here.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම 2015 සහ 2016 බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනු සඳහා අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා හා සෘජුවම වග කිවයුතු නිලධාරින්ට අදාළව නීතිමය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග ගැනීම නිර්දේශ කරයි.

ගරු එම්.ඒ සුමන්තිරම් මහතා: ඒක හරි. මම කියන්නේ කලින් එක.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක අවසන් කරමු.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මම ඉල්ලීමක් කරනවා, හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති කියලා දාන්න නම දාන්නේ නැතිව ඉන්න කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Special recommendations ඉවර කරමු. සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන එක ඉතිරි කරගෙන.

සභාපතිතුමා: බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනු සඳහා අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් මහතා සහ අදාළ නිලධාරින්ට නීතිමය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග ගැනීම නිර්දේශ කරයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, එක ඉල්ලීමක් කරනවා, හිටපු අධිපතිතුමා කියලා දාන්න, අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් කියලා නම දාන්නේ නැතිව.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම තමයි දැම්මේ. දෙතුන් පාරක් මම එහෙම තමයි කියෙව්වේ. මම නැවත වතාවක් කියනවනවා, 2015 සහ 2016 වර්ෂවල බැඳුම්ර ගනදෙනු සඳහා හිටපු මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති වශයෙන්. එතකොට අලාභ අය කර ගැනීම් කියලා නැහැ. මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනුවලදී -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැන පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. 2015 සහ 2016 වර්ෂවල බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව. මෙතැන තිබෙනවා මේ කාල වකවානුව ගත්තොත් එහෙම ගනුදෙනු තිබෙනවා බිලියන කෝටි ගණනක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම නිශ්චිත බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවේදී කිව්වාම හරි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ප්‍රස්තුත ගනුදෙනුවේදී.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 27 වෙනිදා එකයි දෙකම දාන්න ඕනෑ. දිනයක් දාන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම ප්‍රස්තුත බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සඳහා. ප්‍රස්තුත කියන්නේ අදාළ කියන එක.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: හරි.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ වාක්‍ය කියවලා අවසන් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙම ප්‍රස්තුත බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුව සඳහා හිටපු මහ බැංකු අධිපති අර්ජුන මහේන්ද්‍රන් සෘජුව වග කිව යුතු අතර, ඔහුට සහ අදාළ නිලධාරින්ට එරෙහිව නීතිමය ක්‍රියා මාර්ග ගැනීම නිර්දේශ කරයි.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: නැවතත් නම කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නම නැතිව, මහ බැංකු අධිපති. මහ බැංකුවේ අදාළ නිලධාරින්ට.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: කුමාරස්වාමි මහතා අයින් වුණොත්.

ගරු එම්.ඒ.සුමන්තිරම් මහතා: මම දැන් කියපු එක. අනාගතයේදී ..

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා නම දැම්මාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ කී වෙනි පිටුවේද මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ටිකක් ඉන්න.

ඊළඟ කාරණය මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනුවලදී විනිවිද භාවය සහ මහ බැංකුවේ විශ්වාසනීයත්වය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සඳහා විධිමත් යාන්ත්‍රණයක් සැකසීම. "විධිමත්" කියන වචනය මම යෝජනා කරනවා

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම මෙතැනදී යමක් කියන්න කැමතියි. විශේෂයෙන් කියන්න කියලා හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා, එතුමා දැන් ඒක කියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක තමයි specific දෙයක්, ඒ කියන්නේ Bond කියන එක දුවන දෙයක් නේ. හෙටත් Bonds ගනියි. විනිමය නියාමන පාලන කොමිෂන් සභාවේ තිබෙන කාර්ය පටිපාටිය නිශ්චිත වශයෙන් අදාළ කිරීම සඳහා ඊට ගැලපෙන නීති සංශෝධනයක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුව කළ යුතුයි කියලා. උදාහරණයක් විධියට මෙවැනි insider information පිළිබඳ criminal liability පිළිබඳ දෙන්න නම් - කිහිප දෙනෙකුට හරි investigations කරලා තිබෙන්නේ නිතිය තිබෙන නිසා නේ. එක් කෙනෙක් දෙන්නෙක් හරි හිරේ යවලා තිබෙන්නේ එතනින්නේ. ඒ වාගේම දඩ ගහලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාගේ ඒක මෙතැනට apply කරන්න ඕනෑ. අවුරුදු ගණන් ඉන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ඊළඟ

සතියේ පල කරන්න පුළුවන්. ඒ නීතිය සංශෝධනය කරලා ඒකේ scope එකට මේක ගන්න කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් තවත් කරුණු එකතු කරන්න පුළුවන්. දැන් ඔබතුමාගේ කාරණය කියන්න?

The Hon. (Dr.) Harsha de Silva: Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka. විනිමය පාලන නියාමන කොමිෂන් සභාව.

සභාපතිතුමා: විනිමය පාලන නියාමන කොමිෂන් සභාව.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙම බැඳුම්කර සහ භාණ්ඩාගාර බිල්පත් පිළිබඳ වැරදි සිදු කරන තැනැත්තන්ට එරෙහිව දණ්ඩනයන් පැනවීමට අදාළ වන පැහැදිලි නීතියක් නොමැති බව මෙම කමිටුව නිරීක්ෂණය කරන බැවින්. දැනට පවතින Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka Act ඉක්මනින් සංශෝධනය කර මෙම ක්ෂේත්‍ර දෙකද එකී පනතේ පාලනයට ගැනීම සුදුසු බව මෙම කොමිෂම නිර්දේශ කර සිටියි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අන්තිම වාක්‍යය කියන්න. සුරැකුම්පත් සහ විනිමය කොමිෂන් සභා පනත සංශෝධනය කර අවශ්‍ය දණ්ඩනයන් ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ හැකි වන පරිදි -

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාත් ඉන්න නිසා මේ කියන්නේ. මම පෞද්ගලික සුරැකුම්පත් සහ විනිමය කොමිෂන් සභා පනත ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මෙය යෝජනා කරන්නේ හොඳ අදහසකින් වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මේ වැරැද්දට දඩුවම් දෙන්න හරි නීතියක් නැහැ. ඒක අපිම කියනවා. සේපාල ඒකනායක වාගේ backdate කරලා නීතියක් හැදුවේ නැත්නම් අපිම නීතියක් නැහැ කියලා කියනවාද දන්නේ නැහැ. මට තේරෙන්නේ නැති නිසා අහන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක සිවිල් නීතිය.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අනාගතයේදී මේ සම්බන්ධව ඇති වන ගැටලු විසඳා ගැනීම සඳහා වහාම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ගෙනැවිත් මේ පනත සංශෝධනය කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක සිවිල් නේ තියෙන්නේ. ඒක අපරාධ කරන්න තියෙන්නේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපරාධ ද සිවිල් ද කියලා වැඩක් නැහැ. අපි කියන්නේ, අනාගතයේදී මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධව නිවැරැදි ක්‍රියාමාර්ගයක් ගැනීම සඳහා වන නීති සම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලිය වහාම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ගෙනැවිත් සම්මත කළ යුතුයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: දැනට නීතියක් නැහැ කියලා ලියන්න එපා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ exchange නීතිය tested law එකක්. ඒ නිසා ඒක amend කරන්න. නැත්නම් අලුත් පනතක් ගෙනැල්ලා මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට දමන්න අවුරුදු පහක් ගනීවි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපි මෙහෙම දමමු. "මෙවැනි ගනුදෙනුවලදී විනිවිද භාවය සහ මහ බැංකුවේ විශ්වාසනීයත්වය ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සඳහා වන නීති සකස් කර, එය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම අත්‍යවශ්‍ය කාරණයක් ලෙස කමිටුව සලකයි."

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එයට තවත් කොටසක් එකතු කරන්න කියලා, මා ඔබතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. මෙවැනිම කාරණාවලදී අපේ රටේ නීතියක් හදලා, ඒ නීතිය දැන් පරීක්ෂාවට ලක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. Tested law එකක්.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඒ නීතිය ගැන අපි තවම හරියට දන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක අධ්‍යයනය කරලා නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කලින් කිව්ව නීතියටම සංශෝධනයක් ගෙන එන්න කියලා මා යෝජනා කරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඇයි ඒක දමන්නේ නැත්තේ. එහෙම කළා නම්, මාසයක් දෙකක් ඇතුළත අපි හැමෝටම එකතු වෙලා ඒක apply කරන්න කියලා push කරන්න පුළුවන්. මේ සම්බන්ධව මාස තුනක් ඇතුළත නීතියක් ගෙන එන්න කියලා දමන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මාස ගණන් අපට කියන්න බැහැ. හැකි ඉක්මනින් කියලා දමන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: හැකි ඉක්මනින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ගෙනැවිත් සම්මත කරන්න කියලා දමන්න.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Page 43.

සභාපතිතුමා: හැමෝම බලන්න, page 43.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: One before the last paragraph.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: " මෙම ගනුදෙනුවලදී අයථා අන්දමින් කටයුතු කර ඇති ඕනෑම පුද්ගලයකුට මින් ඉදිරියට කිසිදු විටෙක මෙරට කිසිම රාජ්‍ය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවක, රාජ්‍ය සමාගමක හෝ රජයට සම්බන්ධ කිසිදු ආයතනයක සේවය කිරීමට ඉඩකඩ ලබා නොදිය යුතු යයිද කාරක සභාව වැඩිදුරටත් නිර්දේශ කරයි" ඒක දමන්න එපා. ඒක අයින් කරන්න. Too big scope.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: ඒක punishment එකක් අපට ඒක prescribe කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒවා අධිකරණවලින් තීන්දු කරයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ 43වැනි පිටුවේ අග ඡේදය මේක යටතට එන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ ....." කියන කොටස අන්තිමට එනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි notice කරපු දෙයක් තමයි, මේ අය ගොඩාක් සල්ලි හම්බ කළා. මේ ක්‍රියාවලිය පටන් ගන්නා විට මේ අයට කිසිම tax එකක් දැම්මේ නැහැ. ලංකාවේ business කරන හැමෝම tax ගෙවන්න ඕනෑ. මේ අයට කිසිම විධියකින් බද්දක් පනවන්නේ නැහැ. මේ කියන්නේ බද්දක් පනවන්න කියන එක නොවෙයි. ලාභ ලැබුවොත් යම් කිසි බදු අය කර ගැනීමක් තිබිය යුතුයි කියන එක මා හිතන්නේ සාධාරණයි. මේක special consideration එකක් කලින් දුන්නේ. දැන් ඒක අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමාගේ යෝජනාවට බොහොම ස්තුතියි. නමුත්, ඒ පිළිබඳව විමර්ශනයක් අපේ කාරක සභාව තුළ සිද්ධ වුණේ නැහැ. ඒ නිසා අපේ මේ කාරක සභාවේ-

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries සමාගම ගැන විශේෂයෙන් ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා අපි කිව්වා නේ. ඒකට Perpetual Treasuries සහ Holding Companies කියන එකත් ඇතුළු වෙන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒක අනිවාර්යෙන් දමන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක 44වැනි පිටුවේ තිබෙනවා, "මෙම ප්‍රශ්නගත බැඳුම්කර ගනුදෙනුවට සම්බන්ධ පර්පෙචුවල් ට්‍රෙෂරීස් ආයතනය සහ ....." කියන තැනට සමූහ සමාගම හෝ ඒ ආයතනයේ නම දමමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් නීතිමය වශයෙන් ක්‍රියාත්මක වන ක්‍රමයක් තියෙනවා නේ. එහෙම එකක් ආවේ නැහැ නේ. එහෙම සාක්ෂියක්වත් ඇහුවේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට එකඟ නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: Perpetual Treasuries සහ Holding Companies ගැන මම කියනවා. මේ ගරු සභාව කැමැති නැත්නම් මා මෙතැනි ඉදිරියට ඒක කියන්නේ නැහැ. That is all.

සභාපතිතුමා: ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. එක මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙකු එකඟ නැතිනම් ඒක අපට දමන්න පුළුවන්. එතකොට වෙනම විශේෂයක් නැතිව, " කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ" කියලා දමන්නේ, එතකොට මේ " කාරක සභාවේ නිර්දේශ" සඳහා අද සහභාගී වන කාරක සභික මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් සියලු දෙනාම පොදුවේ එකඟයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: කාරක සභාව ඒකමතිකව කියලා දමන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකමතිකව කාරක සභාව එකඟයි. නොපැමිණි කියලා එකක් නැහැ නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: වාර්තාවට එකඟයි කිව්වාම, අපි මෙහි යම් කිසි වෙනස්කම් කිහිපයක් කළා. ඒවා මහ ලොකු දේවල් නොවෙයි. Technical points සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපි සාකච්ඡා කරලා වෙනස්කම් කිහිපයක් කළා. ඒවාට අපි මොකද කරන්නේ? මම එක උදාහරණයක් කියන්නම්. සෘජු ක්‍රමයට යනවාද, auction ක්‍රමයට යනවාද කියන එක පිළිබඳව ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබුණා. එතැනදී අපි හිතුවේ, සෘජු ක්‍රමයට යන එක තමයි විය යුතු දේ කියලා.

මොකද, ඒකට 2008 වසරේ ජනවාරි මාසයේ approval එකක් ගත්තා කියලා අපි හිතුවා. ඒක ඇත්තටම හිතුවා. නමුත් අපි පසු ගිය සතියේ COPE එක රැස්වුණු අවස්ථාවේ ඒ පිළිබඳ මහ බැංකුවෙන් විමසලා බැලුවාම මහ බැංකුව අපව දැනුවත් කළා ඒ approval එක දීලා තිබෙන්නේ 2008 වසරට පමණයි කියලා. එතකොට අපි ඒක පසුව සොයා ගත් දෙයක්. ඒ fax එක එව්වේ 26 වැනි දින -

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපි ආයේ ඕක -

(ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්නකෝ, ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර ඇමතිතුමා.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: මේක අහගන්නකෝ. වැදගත් දෙයක්.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Can I disturb for a moment?

I do not think we can go into all of those details that you are explaining. But, I think you have the right where you have disagreed on the narration of events you have the right to dissent on that. The most important thing is, all of us have agreed on the recommendations. On the narration, I think, the other Members can dissent and put that dissent down. But, all have agreed for the final recommendations.

සභාපතිතුමා: Thank you. මේ කියන වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශ සඳහා මුළු කාරක සභාවම ඒකමතිකව එකඟයි. එතකොට මේක තමයි වාර්තාව. මේ වාර්තාවේ අන්තර්ගත හරය තිබෙනවා නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා කියපු ආකාරයට වෙනස්කම් හැටියට

සාකච්ඡා කළේ. ඒ ටික ඇමුණුමක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඇමුණුම නොවෙයි, කොටසක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි අංක 11 වෙනකම් amend කළා. ඔය bodies දෙක එකට දමලා නිර්දේශ ටික උඩින් දමන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒකෙන් ''ඔළුව ජපන්, කඳ ජර්මන්'' වෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි මේ සාකච්ඡා කරලා කරන්නේ. නිකම් නොවෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම කියන්නම් කරන විධිය. සභාපතිතුමා, මම ඔබතුමාට කියන්නේ. ඔබතුමා දුන්න මේ වාර්තාව තිබෙනවා. දැනට අපි 11 දෙනෙක් අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. එම වාර්තාවේ 11 වැනි පිටුවේ සිට සමස්ථයම. දැන් ඔක්කොම නේ. දැන් සිදු වුණු සංශෝධනත් එක්ක අපි එකඟයි. ඊළඟට ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇතුළු අනෙක් මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාට නිර්දේශ හැර වෙනම වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. නිර්දේශවලදී අපි සමානයි. 11 දක්වා සමානයි. 11න් පසුව වෙනස් කියලා වෙනස් කර ගන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක දවස් ගණනක්, පැය ගණනක් කථා කරලා දැම්මේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේක dissenting report එකක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම කියන්නේ මේ වාර්තාවේ අපි එකඟ වුණු නිර්දේශ තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ නිර්දේශ ටික පොඩ්ඩක් පැත්තකින් තියන්න. අපි දමනවා මුල සිට නිර්දේශ දක්වා කියලා. 41 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙන අපේ වාර්තාව තිබෙනවා. නිර්දේශවලට අපි ඔක්කොම එකඟයි නේ. එතකොට ''අ'' කියලා යනවා අපේ වාර්තාව, Body එක සම්පූර්ණයෙන්. 11,12 අදාළත්වයක් නැහැ. ඊට පසුව දමනවා ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ body එක. ඊට පසුව දමනවා පොදු නිර්දේශය. එහෙම නැතිව අපේ නිර්දේශ අස්සේ වෙන ඒවා දමන්නේත් නැහැ. එතුමන්ලාගේ නිර්දේශ අස්සේ අපේ ඒවා දමන්නේත් නැහැ. That is okay.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ''අ'' කියන කොටසට එකඟ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නාම ලේඛනය එන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ලේකම්තුමා, සභාපතිතුමාට පුළුවන් 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා එකඟ වුණාය, මෙහෙම වුණාය කියලා මුළු විස්තරයම -

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි මේ හදාගත්ත එක COPE වාර්තාව ලෙස දමනවා, මේ තිබෙන එකත් එක්ක. ඊට පසුව අපි දමනවා පිටු අංක හරි, නිර්දේශ දක්වා හරි අතිරේක ඇමුණුමක් -

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මට කියන්න දුන්නොත් පහසු වෙයි කියලායි මම සිතන්නේ. කලින් අදහසක් ආවා නේ වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් වෙයි කියන පදනමින් ඒ වාර්තා දෙක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා. ඒ අනුව මේ විධියේ මුල පිටුවක් ගැළපෙනවාද කියලා බලන්න. ශ්‍රී ලංකා ප්‍රජාතාන්ත්‍රික සමාජවාදී ජනරජයේ 8 වැනි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පළමු වැනි සැසිවාරය. මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා පොඩ්ඩක් අවධානය යොමු කරන්න. 2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කර ඇති භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධව පරීක්ෂා කර බලා කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ ඉදිරිපත් වූ සියලු කරුණු හා ඉදිරිපත් වූ වාචික සාක්ෂි පදනම් කර ගෙන කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීන් විසින් සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තා සියල්ලම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට පිළිගන්වමින් කාරක සභාවේ සභාපති විසින් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන වාර්තාව. ඒක පළමු වැනි පිටුව. වාර්තාව හැටියට තිබෙන එක ඉදිරිපත් කරන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්. මේ අනුව ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මහතා, මන්ත්‍රීවරු, so and so යන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විසින් සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව ''අ'' වාර්තාව වශයෙනුත් -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාර්තාව නොවෙයි. නිගමනයට හේතු. ඔක්කොම reasons. ඇත්තටම වාර්තාව කියන්නේ මේ ඔක්කොම. නිගමනයට හේතු. ඒ කියන්නේ දැන් Sets දෙකක් තිබෙනවා නේ. නිගමනයට හේතු. නිගමනයට සියලු දෙනා ඒකමතිකයි. නිගමනයට හේතු sets දෙකක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වාර්තාව නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ. වාර්තා දෙකක් කියලා කියන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා: වාර්තා දෙකක් නොවෙයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නිගමනයට හේතු 1, නිගමනයට හේතු 2.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාර්තා දෙකක් නොවෙයි. නඩු තීන්දු දෙකක් නැහැ. තීන්දු දෙකක් නැහැ. වාර්තාව එකයි. හේතු sets දෙකක් තිබෙනවා. එපමණයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට ඉවර කරන්න අවස්ථාව දුන්නා නම් තව ලෙහෙසියි. ගරු මන්ත්‍රීන් විසින් සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව ''අ'' වාර්තාව වශයෙන්ද - කලබල වෙන්න එපා- අහවල් අහවල් මන්ත්‍රීන්

විසින් සකස් කරන ලද වාර්තාව "ආ" වාර්තාව වශයෙන්ද පොදුවේ සියලු දෙනා විසින් පිළිගන්නා ලද නිර්දේශ නිගමනයන්ද සහිතව ඉදිරිපත් කරමි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, එක ඉල්ලීමක් කරන්නම්. වාර්තාව කියලා දැම්මාම වාර්තා තුනයි. එහෙම දමන්න එපා. නිගමනයන් 1, 2 කියලා දෙන්න. එතකොට තමයි වාර්තාව එකක් වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නිගමනයට හේතු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මම එකක් දුන්නොත් තව වාර්තාවක් වෙනවා. නිගමනයට හේතු 1, නිගමනයට හේතු 2.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම මුලින් කිව්වේ ගරු අනුර මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, එක තීන්දුවකට එනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ එක logic එකක්. අපි කියන්නේ එක logic එකක්. But, still අගට එන දේ භාර ගන්නවා. අවශ්‍ය නම් credibility එක තියා ගන්න Systems ආරක්ෂා කර ගන්න. අවශ්‍ය නම් systems කඩන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නිගමනයට ඇමුණුම 1, නිගමනයට ඇමිණුම 2. තීන්දුව එකයි.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මෙතැන ඇත්තම කථාව මේකයි. අපේ නිර්දේශවලට මෙතුමන්ලා එකඟයි. එතකොට නිර්දේශ එකයි. අපිත් එකඟයි, ඒ අයත් එකඟයි. නිර්දේශ එකයි. එතකොට body එකේ ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ. නිර්දේශවලට එකඟ නම් body එකේ ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙන්න විධියක් නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මම මේ ප්‍රශ්නය හරියටම බේරන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේ මනුස්සයාට පිස්සු.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඔබතුමා අනවශ්‍ය ප්‍රශ්නයි ඇති කරන්නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මම මේක හරියටම බේරන්නම්. මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නය ආවේ, බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය සම්බන්ධයෙන්. හරිද? බැඳුම්කර වෙන්දේසිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රශ්නයක් ආවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා හිටපු ස්ථාවරය වුණේ, පරම පවිත්‍ර එකම දේ වෙන්දේසිය කියලා. ඔබතුමන්ලා කොහේදෝ ඇවිදලා කොළ කැල්ලක් හොයාගෙන ආවා, ජනවාරි 8 –

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: කොළ කැල්ලක් නොවෙයි. අපි අරගෙන ආවේ හරි ලේඛනය.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කියපු එක මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපි නොවෙයි, ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් අරගෙන ආවේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: මට කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න කෝ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අවුල් කරන්න එපා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: අපිත් මෙච්චර වෙලා අහගෙන හිටියා නේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා ලියුමක් හොයා ගත්තා. මහ බැංකුවෙන් හොයා ගත්තා කියලා හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි වෙනම කථා කරමු.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක මේකට අදාළයි. Private placement කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක 2008 කාලයේ ගත්තු එකක්. මහ බැංකු නිලධාරීන් ඇවිල්ලා කිව්වේ, මේ ක්‍රම තුනම අපි අනුගමනය කරනවා කියලා. ඒ කථාව අනුව තමයි මේ වාර්තාවෙයි, නිර්දේශවලයි මේ කාරණා ඇතුළත් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. Body එකේ, private placement එක මේ කාලයට විතරයි වෙන්දේසිය තමයි පරම කිව්ව ගමන්-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක ආපහු කියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ නේ, මන්ත්‍රීතුමා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අර්ජුන් මහේන්ද්‍රන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ හරිම වැඩේ. වෙන්දේසිය කරපු එක නේ කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි නම්, ඒක හරි නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: හරිම වැඩේ නම් මේකේ වරදක්, චෝදනාවක් නැත.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වරදක් නැහැ කියලා report එක දාන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, මම ඒ ගැන කියන කල්. වෙන්දේසිය අනුමත වෙනවා. මම නියම කාරණයටයි දැන් එන්න හදන්නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: උසාවිය තීන්දු කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: උසාවිය නොවෙයි, පාර්ලිමේන්තුවයි තීන්දු කරන්නේ. අපි උසාවි යන්නේ නැහැ නේ. උසාවි යන එක වෙනම කථාවක්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. යනවා.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ අපට තීන්දු දෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපට තීන්දු දෙන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙහෙමයි වෙන්න ඕනෑ. කෝප් වාර්තාව ලෙස සභාපතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කරපු වාර්තාව මේ නිර්දේශයත් එක්ක අපි ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. නිර්දේශවලට එකඟ වෙන්න පුළුවන්. මේකේ තිබෙන දේවල්වලට එකඟතාවක් නොවන මන්ත්‍රී කණ්ඩායම වෙනම ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අනුර දිසානායක ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, කඩන්න එපා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම නැතුව බැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපේ වාර්තාව දමමු. අපි සංශෝධනය කරපු එක දමමු. ඔබතුමන්ලා ඒකට විරුද්ධ එක දාන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒ සඳහා බහුතරය ගන්න ඕනෑ. එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙන දෙයක් තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවේ කටයුතු අවසන් වෙන්නේ සාමාජික මන්ත්‍රීවරු අත්සන් කිරීමෙන් නේ. අපි තවමත් දන්නේ නැහැ මේ වාර්තාවේ නොම්බර වැඩි කාටද, අඩු කාටද කියලා. මම මේ කියන කාරණය පොඩ්ඩක් අහගෙන ඉන්න. ඒ අනතුර ගන්න එපා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සාධාරණ වෙන්න. අපි ඔක්කෝම ඉවර කළේ කෝප් කමිටුවේදී. මේ දේවල් එළියේ කළේ නැහැ. වාර්තාව එළියේ හදලා ගෙනාවේ නැහැ. කෝප් කමිටුවේදී සියලු දෙනාම සාකච්ඡා කරලා තමයි සංශෝධන ගෙනාවේ. ඒකට අවමාන කරන්න එපා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කාරක සභාව පිළිබඳ ගෞරවයක් තියන්න ඕනෑ. වාර්තා එක, වාර්තා දෙක කියලා කථාවක් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මට පොඩ්ඩක් උදව් කරනවාද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කොප් වාර්තාව තිබෙනවා. ඒ වාර්තාවට එකඟ නොවන කණ්ඩායම විසින් අනෙක් එක ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. එහෙම එකක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ලොකු නැහැ. අපේ සංශෝධන ගැළපෙන්නේ නැත්තේ ඇයි? හඳුන්නෙත්ති අපට වඩා ලොකු නැහැ. එහෙම නැහැ. හඳුන්නෙත්ති අපට වඩා ලොකු නැහැ. අපි හැමෝම එකයි.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මේ ගොල්ලන් කියන විධියට දැම්මොත් අපි දෙගොල්ලන්ම එකයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: බහුතරය තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: කොහොමද බහුතරය තිබෙනවා කියලා කියන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක draft එක. අපි ඉවර කළා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: බහුතරය එන්නේ අත්සන්වලින්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි සාකච්ඡා කරලා ඉවර කළා. කමිටුවේදී සංශෝධනය ඉවර කළා. ඔබතුමා හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: යෝජනා කරපු එක අපි ස්ථිර කරනවා. අපි මේ කටයුතු අවසන් කරනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම මේ ගැන කථා කරන්න හැදුවා. බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා මට කථා කරන්න දුන්නේ නැහැ. Private placementද, auctionද කියන කාරණය ගත්තාම අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා, මේ දෙකේ මොකක්ද වෙන්දේසි වෙන්නේ කියන එක ගැන. ඒ නිසා මේක විනිශ්චයට භාජනය කරන්න එපා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය debateවල ඕනෑ විධියට කථා කරමු. හැබැයි, මේක ඇතුළට මේවා ගෙනැල්ලා ඒ මත බෙදීමක් ඇති කර ගත්තොත්, අපි ගෙනාපු සියලු දේවල් ඉවර වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා කරුණාකරලා සියලු දෙනාගෙන්ම ඉල්ලන්නේ, මේ තිබෙන issue එකක්, දෙකක් නිසා අපේ එකඟතාව නැති කර ගන්න එපා කියන එකයි. මේක ඔබතුමන්ලාට තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නයක්. අපටත් වෙනම ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මම අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලන්නේ, මේක මේ විධියට කල්පනා කරලා අරකට මේ කෑල්ල, අර කෑල්ල කියලා දාන්න ගියොත් අපට ලොකු ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා තමයි මම අවසාන වශයෙනුත් කියන්නේ, පොදුවේ අපි මේ සියලු දේට එකඟ වෙමු කියලා. හැබැයි, ඒක ඇතුළේ තිබෙන කාරණා පිළිබඳව ඔබතුමන්ලාට මතයක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. අපට වෙනත් මතයක් තිබෙන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, ඒ මතය මේක ඇතුළට ගෙනැල්ලා, ''මාස කිහිපයට දුන්නා, ඊළඟට private placement කරන්න කිව්වා, auction කරන්න කියලා කිව්වා'' කියා දැම්මොත්, මුළු වාර්තාවම අනාථ වෙනවා. මම

කරුණාවෙන් ඉල්ලන්නේ මේ වැඩේ කරන්න එපා කියලායි. වෙන උත්තරයක් නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලාටත් කියන්නේ මේ වැඩේ කරන්න එපා. අපි මේ ගැන දවස් තුන, හතරක් සාකච්ඡා කරලායි නිගමනයකට ආවේ. නිකම් නොවෙයි. ඒක කෝප් කමිටුවේන් එකතුවෙනුයි ආවේ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එහෙම වුණොත් ආණ්ඩුව ඇතුළේම අපට බෙදීමක් ඇති වෙනවා. මම ඒකට කැමති නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නම් මේකට එකඟ වෙන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඒක එතකොට එක්සත් ජාතික පක්ෂයේ මතය වෙන්න පුළුවන්; ශ්‍රී ලංකා නිදහස් පක්ෂයේ මතය වෙන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. මට පොඩ්ඩක් කථා කරන්න වෙලාව දෙන්න. මේක සටහන් කර ගන්න. විශේෂයෙන්ම මෙතැනදී සාකච්ඡාවට භාජනය වුණා, private placement වලට යෑම සම්බන්ධ අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල වාර්තාවක් පිළිබඳ. අපි කලින් අනුකාරක සභාවේ පරීක්ෂණ කමිටුවේ හිටියා. ඒකට මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපතිවරයා ඇතුළු ඒ නිලධාරින් සහභාගී වුණා. 2008.01.07වැනි දින අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල තීරණයත්, 2008.10.07වැනි දින ගත්තු අධ්‍යක්ෂ මණ්ඩල තීරණයත් ඒ පරීක්ෂණවලදී අපට ඉදිරිපත් කළා. අපට තිබෙන තොරතුරු අනුව අපි අවබෝධ කරගෙන තිබෙන්නේ මෙයයි. 2008.10.07වැනි දින ඒ Monetary Board එක ගත්තා වූ තීන්දු තීරණය තුළින් මොන ආකාරයකින්වත් දින වකවානු ඒකට ඇතුළත් වෙලා නැහැ. ඒ අනුව තමයි අඛණ්ඩව ඒ කටයුතු දිගටම කරගෙන ආවේ. ඒක සටහන් කර ගන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක ඔබතුමාගේ මතය.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මගේ මතය. මේ කාරක සභාවට ලියුම් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. සභාපතිතුමා මහ බැංකුවෙන් ලියුම් ගෙන්නා ගත්තාද? ඒ ලියුම අනුමත කරලා තිබෙන්නේ කවුද? ලියුම් ගෙන්වා ගන්නවා නම් අධිපතිවරයාගෙන් ගෙන්වා ගන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක අධිපතිවරයා නිර්දේශ කරන්න ඕනෑ. නිලධාරින් මෙහාට ලියුම් එවලා, එක එක අර්ථ විග්‍රහ මේකට ගන්න පුළුවන්කමක් නැහැ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒ ලියුම් ගැන සභාපතිතුමා දන්නේ නැහැ. කාර්ය මණ්ඩලයේ නිලධාරින් යවලායි ගෙන්වා ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වැරැදියි. අවශ්‍ය ලියුම් ගෙන්වා ගෙනයි ෆයිල්වලට දාලා තිබෙන්නේ. සභාපතිතුමා දන්නේත් නැහැ, ලියුම් ගැන.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න මම කියන කල්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා office එකට ගිහිල්ලා ගේන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකේදී මෙන්න මේ කාරණා මම අවධාරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. මේ කාරක සභාවේ verbatim මම බලන්න උත්සාහ කළේත් ඒක නිසා. Verbatim වලින් මේක නිරීක්ෂණය වන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා මම බලන්න ඕනෑ. ලේකම්තුමියගෙනුත්, අනෙක් සියලු දෙනාගෙන්මත් ඒ සහයෝගය මම ඉල්ලා සිටිනවා. අපි 24වැනි දා ෆැක්ස් එකක් ගෙන්වා ගෙන තිබෙනවා, 21වැනි දා ලියපු උත්තරයකට. ඒ කියන්නේ අපි මේ සාකච්ඡාව යන අතරතුර කාලය නේ. 21වැනි දා අපි ගෙන්වා ගත්තු ඒ ෆැක්ස් එක පස්වරු 3.30ට තමයි මේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ලැබිලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: කවුද අත්සන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: ෆැක්ස් එකෙන් එවපු උත්තරයේ තිබෙනවා, Dear Mrs. Wickremasinghe - ලේකම්තුමිය ආමන්ත්‍රණය කරලා, "Decisions of the Monetary Board within the period of 2008.

This has reference to your letter dated 21.10.2016 on the above subject addressed to the Governor of the Central Bank." Governorට තමයි අපි address කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. "The Monetary Board approval has been granted to raise funds through direct placements from captive sources in 2008 Board Paper." එහෙම දාලා තිබෙනවා. මේකේ විස්තරය තිබෙනවා. Superintendent Public Debt Department කියලා නමක් නැතුව අත්සනක් විතරයි තිබෙන්නේ. Governor අපි direct කරලා -

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කාරක සභාවෙන් තීරණය කළාද එහෙම ලියුමක් ගෙන්වා ගන්න ඕනෑ කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරියටම බලන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කවද්ද තීරණය කළේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: Governor අපට උත්තරය එවන්න ඕනෑ. මෙකෙදි Governor උත්තරය එවලා නැහැ. ලොකු සාකච්ඡාවක් අස්සේයි මේක සිදු වුණේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නියෝගයක් දුන්නාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: නියෝගය බලන්න ඕනෑ, කොයි විධියටද සටහන් වෙන්නේ කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 21 සිකුරාදා තමයි නියෝගය දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේකේ Governor උත්තරයක් එවලා නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 21 තමයි නියෝගය දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 21 යවලා තිබෙනවා. 24 තමයි එවලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මෙතැන ගහ ගන්න ඕනෑ දෙයක් නොවෙයි වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 24 කියටද එවලා තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න, විග්‍රහ කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: බරපතළ දේ තමයි, අපි මේ Central Bank එක ගැනම තමයි සාකච්ඡාව කරන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න කෝ කථා කරන්න.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමාට කථා කරන්න වෙලාව දීලා, ඊට පස්සේ මටත් විනාඩියක් දෙන්න කථා කරන්න.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: අපි කිව්වා, මේකේ පොඩි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා කියලා. ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය මේකට මහා ලොකුවට බලපාන්නේ නැහැ. 2008 ජනවාරි මාසේ මාස තුනකට මේ permission එක දීලා තිබුණා. ඒක දීර්ඝ කළාද, නැද්ද කියන එක පිළිබඳව දැනගන්න අපට අවශ්‍ය වෙලා තිබුණා. ඒ නිසා අපේ ලේකම්තුමියගේ ලියුමේ තිබුණේ සියලුම Board Papers කාරක සභාවට එවන්න කියලායි. එතකොට මහ බැංකුව 2008 Public Debt Department එකට සම්බන්ධ සියලුම Board Papers ටික කාරක සභාවට එව්වා. මෙන්න මෙච්චර විතර lot එකක් කාර් එකකින් ඇවිල්ලා මෙතැනට දීලා ගියා. එතැනදී ඒ Board Papers බලන කොට අපි දැක්කා, මේක extend කරලා තිබෙන්නේ මැයි මාසේ ඉඳලා දෙසැම්බර් මාසයට පමණයි කියලා. ඒක තමයි ඔය තිබෙන්නේ. ලියුමක් නොවෙයි, ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි. තිබෙන්නේ අත්සන් කරපු Board Paper එකක්. ලියුමක් නොවෙයි. ඒ Board Paper එක අපේ කාරක සභාවේ නිලධාරි මහත්මියට ගෙනැල්ලා දුන්නා. ඒවා ඔක්කෝම එතැන තිබෙනවා. ඒක ලියා ගත්තා. ඒක ලියුම් කෑල්ලක් නොවෙයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක වෙන එකක්. මේක වෙනම එකක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ඒකත් එක්ක තමයි ආවේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: හරි, හරි. ඒකත් එක්ක ආවා කියලා ඔබතුමා දන්නවා. ඒක අපි දන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මුළු කාරක සභාවම දන්නේ නැහැ නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක තමයි කිව්වේ, අපි දන්නේ නැහැ කියලා.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: මම හිටියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි මේ කාරක සභාවේදී මේ කණ්ඩායම විසින් මේ වාර්තාව සකස් කරන්න ගිහිල්ලා ඔබතුමන්ලා එක වෙලාවකදී විරෝධයකුත් පෑවා. ඔක්කෝම තිබියදී නැවත Board Papers ගෙන්න ගන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ කියලා. හැබැයි, ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමන්ලා නැවත මේ මුළු වාර්තාවට අනුමැතිය දීලා ගියාට පස්සේ දෙවැනි වතාවට ආයෙත් සාකච්ඡා කරන කොට Board Papers ඔක්කෝම ගේන්න තීරණය කළා. මම ඒක පිළිගන්නවා. හැබැයි, Board Papers ගෙන්වා ගැනීමේදී මෙහෙම ලියුමක් ගෙනාවේ නැහැ. ඉතා පහැදිලිව කියන්න ඕනෑ, Board Papers ගෙන්වද්දී මෙහෙම ලියුමක් එවන්න කියලා ඉල්ලුවේ නැහැ කියලා. Board Papers ටික එව්වා නම් ඇති.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: එහෙම නම්, කාගේ අවශ්‍යතාවටද මේ ලියුම ගෙනාවේ? ගෙන්න ගත්තේ මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉන්න, මම මේ ලියුම කියවන්නම්. මේක Board Papers එවපු file එකේ ආවේ නැහැ. මේක ආවේ fax එකකින්. මේ දෙකම ආවේ 24වැනිදා. 21වැනිදා නොවෙයි. එකම වෙලාවේ නේ ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේ fax දෙකම ආවේ එකම වෙලාවේ. 24වැනිදා 3.30ට එකක් ආවා. 24වැනිදා 3.31ට තවත් එකක් ආවා. 24වැනිදා තමයි මේ fax දෙකම ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ Public Debt Department එකෙන් Central Bank එකට, PDD,

Central Bank fax එකෙන්. මේ තිබෙන්නේ එහේ fax No. එක - 0112-477719.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ නිලධාරියාගේ නම මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 24වැනිදා ප:ව: 3.31ට පළමුවැනි කොළය හැටියට ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙනවා. දෙවැනි කොළය හැටියට ආපු එකට අංක දෙක කියලා දාලා තිබෙනවා. PDD/ Central Bank, Fax No. - 0112-477719. 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 24වැනිදා ප:ව: 3.30ට. එතකොට පළමුවැනි කොළය හැටියට ඒ අය එවපු එකේ තිබෙන්නේ මෙහෙමයි:

At this stage, the Chairman read out the fax.

ඒක පොඩ්ඩක් බලන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, මම පුද්ගලිකව ඒ ගැන අවබෝධයක නැහැ, 24වැනිදා උදේ සිට අපි මේ ගැන කථා කරමින් සිටියදී එහෙම තීරණයක් අරගෙන ලියුමක් යැව්වාද කියලා.

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: වෙලාව කීයද?

සභාපතිතුමා: වෙලාවක් නැහැ, 24වැනිදාම ඉල්ලුවා කියලා තමයි මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 24 දවල් 12ට විතර ඇරියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක බලන්න ඕනෑ, මම direction එකක් දීලා යැව්වද කියලා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: නැහැ, ඔබතුමා එදා හිටියේ නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා හිටියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මැතිතුමා එදා හිටියේ නැහැ නේ. 24 කියන්නේ සඳුදා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: 24වැනිදා සවස 5.00 විතර වෙනකම් මම හිටියා. මම බලන්න ඕනෑ, ඒකට මම direction එකක් දුන්නාද කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මැතිතුමා නැතිව ලියුම් ආවේ නැහැ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 24වැනිදා ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මැතිතුමා හිටියා ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක තමයි, මම ඒක ගැන පොඩ්ඩක් බලන්න ඕනෑ. මම ඒක verbatim reportsවල බලන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සුනිල් හඳුන්නෙත්ති මැතිතුමා පෙරේදා හිටියේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: හිටියේ නැත්තේ කොහේද, මම ඉඳලා සවස නේ ගියේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒ ගියේ ඊට කලින් දවසේ. 23වැනිදා නේ ගියේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම 24වැනිදා හිටියා. පැය කීපයයි මම හිටියේ නැත්තේ. අහගන්න කෝ. මේකේ තිබෙන විධියට,-

"At this stage, the Chairman read out the fax.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමාට පැටලැවිලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඉස්සෙල්ලාම Board Papers-

සභාපතිතුමා: Board Papers ටික තමයි ගෙන්වා ගත්තේ. ගරු හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මැතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමාට මතක නැහැ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඉස්සෙල්ලාම Board Papers ටික ඉල්ලුවා. ඊට පස්සේ Board Papers set එකක්ම එව්වා. ඒ Board Papersවල තිබුණේ මාස තුනකට විතරක් දෙන්න කියලා. මම හිතන්නේ දෙසැම්බර් වෙනකම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: නැහැ, අප්‍රේල් වෙනකම්.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: හරි, මට හරියට මාසය මතක නැහැ. ඊට පස්සේ මෙතැනින් එහාට තවත් දික්කරලා තිබෙනවාද කියලා තහවුරු කිරීමක් අවශ්‍යයි කියලා අපි කිව්වාම තමයි, මේ ඉන්න පාර්ලිමේන්තු නිලධාරි මහත්මිය fax කළේ.

ගරු (වෛද්‍ය) නලින්ද ජයතිස්ස මහතා: කවුද අපි කියන්නේ?

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමාත් එක්ක අපි හතර පස්දෙනෙක් හිටියා නේ. ඒ අයත් එක්ක. ඒක කළේ හොරෙන් නොවෙයි. එතැන හිටියේ අපි පස්දෙනෙක් විතර නේ. එතැනදී අපි ඉල්ලුවා ඊට පස්සේ තමයි Central Bank එක එවලා තිබුණේ. මොකද, මෙතැනට ගෙනැල්ලා දුන්නාට පස්සේ අපි ඔක්කෝම ඒක බැලුවා. ඒකේ කොළ දෙකක් තිබුණා. ඒකේ තමයි කිව්වේ, මෙතැනින් එහාට,- අන්න එතකොට තමයි අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගෙන් ඉල්ලුවේ මෙතැන basis එකේ පොඩි ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. එතකොට තමයි සභාපතිතුමා මෙතැනින් නැඟිටලා ගියේ.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මගේ අදහස කියන්නද? අපි මේ සිද්ධියේදී Private Placements කරනවාද, auctions කරනවාද කියන එක මේකේ මූලික කාරණාව නොවෙයි. මේකේ තිබෙන මූලික කාරණාව තමයි,

යම්කිසි ක්‍රමවේදයකින් යම් පුද්ගලයෙකුගේ අනුදැනුම උඩ යම් පුද්ගලයෙකුට හෝ කණ්ඩායමකට අයුතු ලාභයක් ලැබුණාද කියන එකයි. ඒක විතරයි අපට දැනගන්න අවශ්‍ය. අනෙක් දේවල් ඔක්කෝම කතාන්දර විතරයි. ඒවා අපි හදාගන්න රූප රාමු. මේ රූප රාමුවට ගියොත් මේ චිත්‍රය මැවෙනවා. මේකට ගියොත් මේක මැවෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 21වැනිදා අපි ලියුමක් යවලා තිබෙනවා, 2008 අදාළ සියලුම Board Papers එවන්න කියලා. අපි දැන් බලන්න ඕනෑ, 24වැනිදා එහෙම ලියුමක් යැව්වාද කියලයි.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, මගේ තර්කය ආපහු මම කියන්නම්. අපි අතර Private Placements වලටද, auctions වලට යන එක ගැන පිළිබඳව යම් මතවාද තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, මම කියන්නේ මේ කාරණය සම්බන්ධව ඒක වැදගත් කාරණයක් නෙවෙයි කියලයි. සිද්ධිය තිබෙන්නේ,- එහෙනම් අපිටත් කියන්න පුළුවන් නේ අපේ මතය මේකයි කියලා. ඒක නොවෙයි නේ අපි කියන්නේ. අපි එහෙම මතයක් කියන්නේ නැහැ. අපි කියන්නේ මේ සිද්ධිය තුළ අර Private Placements එකෙන් හෝ Auctions එකෙන් හෝ මේ සම්බන්ධව සිද්ධියක් ඇති වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ සම්බන්ධව ඇති වෙලා තිබෙන කාරණය පිළිබඳව තමයි අපි කථා කරන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි නේ, ගරු ඇමතිතුමා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම කියන්නේ, ගරු ලසන්න අලගියවන්න මැතිතුමා කියපු එකයි. මම ගන්නේ ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය නොවෙයි. මම ගන්නේ technical issue එකක්, කෝප් කමිටුවට අදාළව. කරුණු දෙකක් මට තිබෙනවා. එකක් ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මැතිතුමා කියාපු 21වැනි සිකුරාදා එවපු මේ ලියැවිල්ල.

මම ඒකත් බැලුවා. දැන් මේ බොහොම අමාරුවෙන් ගන්න බැරි වෙලා තිබුණු ලිපි ලේඛන මේ ගන්නේ. ගරු සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා Attorney-Generalගේ ටික පෙන්වූවාට පසුව තමයි ලෝක අමාරුවෙන් documents ටික ගන්න හම්බවුණේ. එහෙම තැනක 21 දීලා සෙනසුරාදා, ඉරිදාත් වැඩ කරලාද, 24 උදේ මේක එව්වේ? ඒ, පළමුවැනි කරුණ. දෙවැනි කරුණ තමයි, මම ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයෙන් දැන ගන්න කැමැතියි - ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමනි, තමුන්නාසේලා කවුරුත් එකඟ ඇති, අපි මෙතැනින් නැඟිට යනකොට එකඟ වුණේ, 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා විතරයි. මේ තිබෙන්නේ, අද අපට දීලා තිබෙන කෙටුම්පත; අර අත්සන් කරපු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් නවදෙනාගේ කෙටුම්පත වශයෙන්. මේකේ -අද අලුතින් දීලා තිබෙන එකේ- 13 වැනි පිටුවේ උඩ වාක්‍යයක් තිබෙනවා, "The Monetary Board Approval is sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placements of Treasury Bonds and rupee loans in respect of-"

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඕක අදාළ නැහැ.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: Let me speak. This is not between us.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: කොතැනද තිබෙන්නේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 13 වැනි පිටුවේ උඩම Englishවලින් තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: අලුත් එකේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අලුත් එකේ 13 වැනි පිටුවේ උඩම තිබෙනවා - Please! මට ඉවර කරන්න දෙන්න, ගරු හර්ෂ මැතිතුමනි. අපි නව දෙනා අත්සන් කරනකොට එකඟ වුණු තැනක් තිබෙනවා. ඒක හරි පැහැදිලියි. 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා විතරයි, පරණ document එකේ. 3.1.1 දක්වා විතරයි. ඊට පසුව අපේ document එක කියා එකක් අපට දැන් දීලා තිබෙනවා -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක නොවෙයි, ඔය. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ document එක නොවෙයි. ඔය අපේ document එක.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: No, this is ours.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: වැරදීමක්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: දෙකම එකයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. දෙකක්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඕකේ මුල් පිටුව බලන්න. දෙකක්. ගරු බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඕක නොවෙයි. ඔය වෙන එකක්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: - හඳුන්නෙත්ති කියා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක ගැන නොවෙයි, මෙතුමා කථා කරන්නේ. ගරු බිමල් මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ඔබතුමා වරද්දා ගෙන.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා අද අපට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ - අපි නවදෙනා

අත්සන් කරපු වාර්තාව තිබුණානේ. ඒක 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා -

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මුල පිටු 11 සමානයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අන්න හරි. මම කියන්නේ ඒකයි. මුල පිටු 11 සමානයි. ඊට පසුව අපි පිළිගත්තා, as it is. එතකොට අපට එන්න ඕනෑ මොකක්ද? අපි නවදෙනාගේ වාර්තාව වශයෙන් ලැබිය යුත්තේ මොකක්ද? මුල පිටු 11 සමාන, අනෙක් පිටු එලෙස තිබෙන වාර්තාවක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක හරි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමාගේ ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයෙන් අපට දීලා තිබෙන්නේ ඒකද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එතැන ගැටලුවක් තිබෙනවා. මම ඒක නිරීක්ෂණය කළා. මමත් මෙම කාරක සභාවට එන්න පැයකට කලින් අවසානයට සකස් කර තිබෙන වාර්තාව කොයි ආකාරයේද කියා බැලීමට ලේකම්තුමියගෙන් ඉල්ලා ගත්තා. ඒක සාකච්ඡා කරන අතරේ තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලා නිගමන, නිර්දේශවලට ගියේ. ඒ නිසා මට අවස්ථාව දෙන්න, මේක පැහැදිලි කරන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: මේක දමා තිබෙන්නේ කවුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මම පැහැදිලි කරනකම් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. අපි කලින් ඉදිරිපත් කරපු කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේ 11 වැනි පිටුවේ අපි 3.2 සංශෝධනයක් කළා. එම 3.2 සංශෝධනය තමයි අලුතින් දී තිබෙන එකේ, සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන වාර්තාවේ 13 පිටුවේ තිබෙන්නේ. මම ඒක verbatim reportsවල බැලුවා. Verbatim reports එක්ක බලද්දී, මට පෙනෙන ආකාරයට ඒකේ ලොකු ගැටලුවක් නැහැ. මෙන්න මේක විතරක් වෙනස් කරන්න කියා මම ලේකම්තුමියට කිව්වා. "ඉහත කී 3.2 ඡේදයට ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා, අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා, අශෝක් අබේසිංහ, සුජීව සේනසිංහ, හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි, වසන්ත අලුවිහාරේ, හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා යන ගරු පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් එකඟ නොවූ අතර, මෙම ඡේදය මතු දැක්වෙන පරිදි සංශෝධනය කළ යුතු බවට එකඟ වූහ." කියා තිබෙනවා. හරිද? එතකොට මම කිව්වේ, "මෙම ඡේදය මතු දැක්වෙන පරිදි සංශෝධනය කළ යුතු බවට ඔවුන් එකඟ වූහ." කියා දමන්න කියායි. එතකොට ඔවුන්ගේ සංශෝධන නේ, යටින් එන්නේ. ඔවුන්ගේ සංශෝධනය මේ ආකාරයෙන් තිබෙනවා. "පොලී අනුපාතයට සමාන ඵලදා අනුපාතයකට බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කළහොත් -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ඒක වැරදියි. ඒකේ error එකක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, කියනකම්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙතැන තිබෙන පළමුවැනි ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. අපි 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා නම්, 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා කවුද එකඟ; කවුද එකඟ නැත්තේ කියා තිබෙන්න අවශ්‍ය නැහැ. 11 දක්වා එකඟ වෙලා ඉවරයි නේ. 11න් පසුව තිබෙන ඒවාටත් කවුද එකඟ; කවුද එකඟ නැත්තේ කියා තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ. අපි එකඟ එක තිබෙනවා. ඔයගොල්ලන් එකඟ එක වෙනම Report එකක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: Sub Report එක.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, මේ Report එක ඒක නොවෙයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ මතු කළේ, ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය නොවෙයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේ issue එක ඒක නොවෙයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ මතු කළේ - 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා අපි එකඟ වෙලා, ඒක තමයි අපි අවසන් කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. අපි එකඟ Report එක. හැබැයි, 11 වැනි පිටුවෙන් පසුවත් එක ඡේදයක් ඉවත් කරලා තිබෙනවා; තව කොටසක් ඇතුළු කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ දෙක වුණේ කොහොමද?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක වුණේ කොහොමද? කවුද අයින් කළේ, කවුද මෙන්න මේක දමන්න කිව්වේ? මට ඒ ගැන කියන්න. "The Monetary Board Approval is sought for-" කියන එක දමන්න කිව්වේ කවුද?

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමාගේ අවසරය ඇතුවද, ඒක වුණේ? කවුද ඒ බලය ගත්තේ?

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපේ වාර්තාව වෙනස් කරන්න සභාපතිතුමාට බලය දුන්නේ කවුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒක මෙහෙමයි. හරි පැහැදිලියි. ඉන් පසුව මම සියලුම verbatim reports බැලුවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා නැඟිට යනතෙක් සියලුම verbatim reports බැලුවා. සාකච්ඡාවක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. කරුණු කරුණු හැටියට සාකච්ඡා වෙලා තිබෙනවා. අරක හොඳයි; මේක හොඳයි, අගට මුලට ගිහිල්ලා, මෙහෙයුම් අත්පොත පිළිබඳව, 4.1 පිළිබඳව, 4.1.2 පිළිබඳව කරුණු සාකච්ඡා වෙලා තිබෙනවා. හැබැයි, ඒ කරුණුවල නිශ්චිත වෙලා "මෙන්න මේ

කාරණයට, කාරක සභාවේ ඔක්කෝම මේ සංශෝධනයට එකඟයි" කියා නැහැ. ඇත්තටම එහෙම තිබුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම කළේ කවුද සභාපතිතුමනි?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඉංග්‍රීසි වාක්‍යයක් එකතු වෙනවාය කිව්වා -

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේකේ ගොඩක් වැරදි තිබෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න.

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්: - කථා කළාට පසුවද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔය ගොල්ලන් කථා කළාට පසුව. ඒක හරි. මේ කවුරුත් ඒක දන්නවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට විනාඩියක් දෙන්න. අද දීපු එකේ errors මහා ගොඩක් තිබෙනවා. එකක් නොවෙයි, ගොඩක් වැරදි තිබෙනවා. මම කියපු ඒවා නොවෙයි, සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වෙන ඒවා මේකේ තිබෙන්නේ. මේකේ වැරදි ගොඩක් තිබෙනවා. මේක හදන්න ඕනෑ. මට දුන්නොත්, හෙට උදේට මම මේ සංශෝධන ටික හදා දෙන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයට අතපසුවීමක් වෙලා තිබෙනවා. නැඟිට ගියාට පසුව - මට කියන්න දෙන්නකෝ. ඕනෑ නම් verbatim reports ටික ආයෙත් මුල ඉඳලා කියවන්නම්. නැඟිට ගියාට පසුව අපි එකඟ වුණේ - ඊට පසුවදා උදේත් අපි ඕක ගැන කථා කළා.- 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා පමණයි. 11 වැනි පිටුවෙන් පසු දේවල් ටික -අනෙක් ටික- මේ අත්සන් කරපු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ වාර්තාවේ තිබෙන ආකාරයෙන්ම තිබෙන්න දෙන්න ඕනෑ. එතකොට දැන් මෙතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය තමයි -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, 12, උඩ දෙක සංශෝධනය කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, නැහැ. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න කියනකම්. සංශෝධනය කරපු නම් මොකුත් නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, දැන් ගැටලුව පැහැදිලියි නේ. ලේකම්තුමියගේ පැත්තෙන් කියන්න, එම ඡේදය ඇතුළු වුණේ කොහොමද කියා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අන්න හරි. ඒක ආවේ කොහොමද කියා කියන්න.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: මට මතක විධියට මේක 13 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා සංශෝධනය කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: නැහැ. අපි agreed නේ. 11 දක්වා කළා කියා අපි ඔක්කෝම agreed.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: 13 වෙනකම් කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: 11 වෙනකම් විතරයි. අපි කථා කරලාම ගියේ, 11 කියන එක තමයි. මට මතකයි. නම්වත්, මොකුත් නැහැ, වෙන කොහේවත්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 12ත් කළා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 12 කළා. Agree වුණේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහෙම වෙන්න ඕනෑය කියා ඔබතුමා සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කළා, පසුදා උදේ. එතැනින් තමයි මේ ප්‍රශ්නය මහදී -

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පිටු කථාව නැතුව අංකයි අරගෙන සංශෝධනය කළේ. ඔබතුමා verbatim reports බලන්න.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඒක ඇත්ත.

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: පිටු අංක නොවෙයි, කළේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: 3.2 බලන්න. මේකේ පිටු පැටලිලා නම් 3.2 බලන්න. අපි පිටුවෙන් පිටුව ගියේ. අපි 3.2 දක්වා සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟ වුණා. මම ඉතාම වගකීමෙන් කියනවා - "The Monetary Board approval is sought for-" කියා වාක්‍යයක් අපේ වාර්තාවට දමා තිබෙනවා. එහෙම දෙයක් අපි නවදෙනා යනකම් කිසිම වේලාවක කථා වුණේ නැහැ. ඒක කථා වුණේ, ඔබතුමන්ලා document එක ගෙනාවාට පසුවයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා මහ බැංකුවෙන් අලුත් වාර්තාවක් ගෙනාවාට පසුව තමයි මේ වාක්‍ය ආවේ. ඒ වාක්‍ය කලින් තිබුණේ නැහැ. මම challenge කරනවා, පුළුවන් නම් පෙන්වන්න කියා -

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, verbatim reportsවල බලන්න. 13 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා ගියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔහොම ඉන්න කියනකම්. Verbatim reports තිබෙනවා. ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මැතිතුමා කියනවා, "11 වැනි පිටුවේ 4.1 එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ." කියා. හරිද? සභාපතිතුමා කියා තිබෙනවා, "අලුතින් යමක් එකතු වෙන්න ඕනෑ කුමන ස්ථානයද කියා කිව්වොත්, අපට ඒක එතැනට ඇතුළු කරන්න පුළුවන්" කියා. මේ verbatim reportsවල අවසානය දක්වාම - මම කියවන්නේ 50 වැනි පිටුව. 106 වැනි පිටුවේත් තිබෙනවා, අපි ඒ කාරණය හදලා සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කරමු කියා. මෙහෙම කථා

කරගෙන, කථා කරගෙන ගියාට - මේකේ හැම තැනම ඒ වාගේ ඒවා තිබෙනවා. මේ දේ ගැන අවසානයේ කරන්නේ මොකක්ද කියා එකඟ වෙලා නැහැ. සාකච්ඡා වෙලා තිබෙනවා. එකඟතාවකින් ගිහිල්ලා නැහැ. එකඟතාවකට ආවේ, 3.2 කොටසට පමණයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා මට මේක කියන්න. අපි නැඟිට ගිය ස්ථානය 106 පිටුවනේ. නැඟිට ගිහින් තිබෙන්නේ, 106න්ද?

ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක්: ඒකේ ගැටලුවක් නැහැ නේද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ. ඇත්ත ගත්තොත් මෙහෙමනේ -

සභාපතිතුමා: 3.2න් නතර කරමු කියා මම කියන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: තිබෙන විධියට කරමු. මේක වෙනස් කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ. මේක අපේ Report එකනේ. අපේ ක්‍රමවේදය.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ එකේ සංශෝධනය කර ගන්න පුළුවන්. මම මේක බැලුවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා සංශෝධන ගෙනාපු එක. - බලන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමා මේක කරලා තිබෙන්නේ, අපි නොවෙයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා හදපු Report එක තිබෙනවා. නමුත් දැන් අපට අනෙක් ඔක්කෝම සංශෝධන, නිර්දේශ, අරවා-මේවා සංශෝධනය කරන්න - මොකක් හරි කර ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක හරි. කරපු ටික කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: හදපු Report එක තිබෙනවා. මේ වාර්තාවේ 11 වැනි පිටුවේ 3.2 දක්වා අපි එකඟතාවකට පැමිණ තිබෙනවා. ඊට පසුව මෙතැන ඇති වූ යම් තත්ත්වයක් තිබෙනවා. සමහර විට ලේකම් මණ්ඩලය ඒක පටලවා ගන්න ඇති. නමුත් අපි කියන්නේ මෙච්චරයි. 11 වැනි පිටුවෙන් පසුව ඉවත් කරපු ඡේදයක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒ ඡේදය මේකට ඇතුළත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. අමතරව ඇතුළත් කරපු කොටසක් තිබෙනවා නම් ඒක ඉවත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. ඒක තමයි "ආ" කියන ක්‍රමවේදය පිළිගන්නා කණ්ඩායමේ අදහස.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ඒ අදහස ඇතුළත් කරන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට අපි කරන්න ඕනෑ, ඉවත් කරපු කොටස නැවත ඇතුළත් කරන එකත්, ඇතුළත් කර තිබෙන කොටස ඉවත් කරන්න එකත් නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක එතැනට ආවේ කොහොමද කියලා, පසුව සොයා බලන්න ඕනෑ. මොකද, ලේකම් මණ්ඩලය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පැහැදිලි ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා. මතයට විරුද්ධ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා එකඟ වුණා "as it is" කියලා. පස්සේ ඒක cook වෙන්නේ කෙහොමද? පසුව මෙතැන documents cook කරන්නේකවුද?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ඒක අපි මේ වාර්තාවට පසුව සොයමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ 3.2හි සංශෝධනයෙන් පසුව, අලුතින් ඔබතුමිය සංශෝධනය කර ලියපු පොතේ නම් 13 වැනි පිටුව, මේ වාර්තාවේ නම් 11 වැනි පිටුවේ 04 කොටසින් පසුව පොදු නිර්දේශ දක්වා අත්සන් කරන ලද මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ කෙටුම් පතේ තිබෙන ආකාරයටම වාර්තාවේ ඇතුළත් වෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒ පිටුව මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: කෙටුම්පතේ 11 වැනි පිටුවේ, 3.2 කොටස -පරණ එක- එකඟතාවයෙන් වෙනස් මත දරමින් සංශෝධනය කරන ලදී. 04 වැනි අංකයේ සිට තිබුණු ආකාරයටම නිර්දේශ දක්වා -44 පිටුවේ 11.1 දක්වා කොටස් සියල්ලම- කෙටුම් පතේ තිබුණ ආකාරයටම අත්සන් කරන ලද මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවේද ඇතුළත් විය යුතුය.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: තවත් පොඩි සංශෝධනයක් තිබෙනවා. මේකට අලුතින් එකතු වෙලත් තිබෙනවා. ඒක ඉවත් වෙන්න ඕනෑ. 3.2 යටතේ ඇති කරුණු සම්පූර්ණයෙන් සාවද්‍ය බැවින් මෙවැනි ප්‍රකාශ කිරීම ආර්ථික විද්‍යානුකූලව වැරදියි.

අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: දැන් තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. මෙහි එක කොටසකට අපි අතර පොඩි එකඟතාවක් තිබෙනවා. අවසන් කොටසට අපි අතර පොදු එකඟතාවක් තිබෙනවා. මැද කොටසක් තිබෙනවා, වෙනස් කම් තිබෙනවා. දැනට තිබෙන තත්ත්වය ඒක නේ. එතකොට එක continued වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද වාර්තාවක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ අඛණ්ඩ වාර්තාව. ඒ වාර්තාවේ මැද කොටසට එකඟ නොවන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්නවා. ස්ථාවර නියෝගවල 103හි මෙසේ සඳහන් වෙනවා. "විශේෂ කාරක සභාවක් ඒ ඒ දිනවල රැස්වීම්වලට පැමිණෙන මන්ත්‍රීන්ගේ නම්ද, විභාග කරනු ලැබූ සාක්ෂ්‍යකරුවන්ගේ නම්ද ඡන්දය විමසීම සඳහා බෙදීමක් ඇති විණි නම්, යෝජිත ප්‍රශ්නයද, යෝජකයාගේ නමද, රැස්වීමට සහභාගීවූ මන්ත්‍රීන් ප්‍රශ්නය මත ඡන්දය දුන් ආකාරයද, කාරක සභාවේ

කාර්ය සටහන්හි ඇතුළත් කර, එම කාර්ය සටහන් සාක්ෂ්‍ය සටහන්ද සමඟ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කොට කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව සමඟ මුද්‍රණය කළ යුතුය". ඒක තමයි ස්ථාවර නියෝග අනුව අනුගමනය කළ යුතු කාරණය.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේක විශේෂ කාරක සභාවක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙවැනි තත්ත්වයක් ඇති වුණාම අනුගමනය කරන්න පුළුවන් ක්‍රමවේදය, ස්ථාවර නියෝගවල සඳහන් කරලා තිබෙනවා. ඒ කියන්නේ, විශේෂ කාරක සභාවක් ඒ ඒ දිනවල රැස්වීම්වලට පැමිණෙන මන්ත්‍රීන්ගේ නම්ද, විභාග කරනු ලැබූ සාක්ෂ්‍යකරුවන්ගේ නම්ද ඡන්දය විමසීම සඳහා බෙදීමක් ඇති විණි නම්, -ඡන්ද විමසීමක් නැති වුණත් දැන් බෙදීමක් තිබෙනවා- යෝජිත ප්‍රශ්නයද, යෝජකයාගේ නමද, රැස්වීමට සහභාගීවූ මන්ත්‍රීන් ප්‍රශ්නය මත ඡන්දය දුන් ආකාරයද, -මේ කොටසට මේ අය පක්ෂයි, මේ කොටසට මේක ඇතුළත්- කාරක සභාවේ කාර්ය සටහනෙහි ඇතුළත් කර, කාර්ය සටහන්, සාක්ෂි සටහන් සමඟ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කොට කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව සමඟ මුද්‍රණය කළ යුතුය.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔතැන තිබෙන වෙනස මේකයි. ඔබතුමා කියන සාධකය එන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව හැදුවාට පස්සේ නේ. ඔය තියෙන්නේ කෙටුම් පතක්. ඔබතුමා කියන එකේ කෙටුම් පත් 03ක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කෙටුම්පතේ අවසාන එක තමයි ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවක් ලෙස සම්මත කළේ. නමුත් ඒක අවසන් වාර්තාවක් බවට පත් වන්නේ නැහැ. දැන් ඔබතුමා කියන්නේ අපි හදන එකේ, ඊළඟට හදන අංග සම්පූර්ණ වාර්තාවේ- ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන විධියට "ආ" කොටස කියලා දෙවැනි කොටස් දෙකක් දාලා උඩ එකයි, යට එකයි. ඒක තමයි වාර්තාව. ඒකට සම්මතව ඡන්දය දෙන්නත් පුළුවන්, විරුද්ධව ඡන්දය දෙන්නත් පුළුවන්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ. ඒක වැරදියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ අතර මැද තිබෙන වාද-විවාද ගැන ඡන්දය විමසන්නේ නැහැ. මතයක් විමසනවා නම්, මතයක් විමසන්න ඕනෑ යම් නිශ්චිත කාරණයක් ගැන. ඒ කියන්නේ ඒ නිගමනය ගැන. එතකොට ඒ නිගමනය ගැන ඒකමතිකයි. ඒ නිගමනයට එළැඹුණු මාර්ගය පිළිබඳව වෙනස් අදහස් තිබෙනවා. ඒ නිගමනයට එළැඹුණු මාර්ගය පිළිබඳ ඡන්දය විමසීම් තියන්න බැහැ. එහෙම නම් ඡේදයෙන් ඡේදය අහන්න ඕනෑ නේ. උදාහරණයක් විධියට, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ මුල් draft එකේ තිබෙන සමහර ඡේද, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ මතය පිළිබඳව තිබෙන 14 පිටුව as it is, අපි සාකච්ඡා කළා. එහෙනම් අපි වගන්තියෙන් වගන්තිය ඡන්දය විමසනවාද? එහෙම නැහැ. ඒ නිසා ඡන්ද කථාව අදාළ වන්නේ අවසාන නිගමනයටයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නිගමනයට නොවෙයි, මේ තිබෙන්නේ වාර්තාවට. වාර්තාව කියන්නේ නිගමනවලට නොවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාර්තාව කියන්නේ නිගමනවලට නොවෙයිද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාර්තාවේ content එක ගැනයි මේ කථාව. ඒ වාර්තාවේ content එක ගැන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් පිරිසක් අතර විවිධ මත තිබෙනවා. මම ඉතාම ගෞරවයෙන් කියන්නේ, මත දෙකක් නොවෙයි, මේ සටහන් බැලුවොත් මත කිහිපයක් තිබෙනවා කියන එකයි. ඔබතුමා සිටියේ නැති නිසා ඒ ගැන දන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක අපිට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි හැමෝටම - කමිටුවට- ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒ සාධාරණය තමයි ඉටු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා කියන එක හරි, මම පිළිගන්නවා. වෙනස් තැන්වලදී එතුමන්ලාට අයිතියක් දීලා තිබෙනවා, ඒ මූලික සටහනට විරුද්ධ නම් විරුද්ධයි කියලා ලියයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මේ මතය විමසීම -ඡන්දය විමසීම- වැනි කාරණා අදාළ වන්නේ යෝජනාවක් සම්මත කිරීම වැනි අවසාන නිගමනයකදී නේ. එහෙම නැත්නම් දැන් තිබෙන content එක, ඡෙදයෙන් ඡේදයට -paragraph එකෙන් paragraph එකට- කීදෙනෙක් කැමතිද කියලා අහන එක. එහෙම අහලා අවසන් කරන්න බැහැ නේ ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා. එතකොට ප්‍රායෝගික දේ මොකක්ද? ප්‍රායෝගික දේ තමයි, සාකච්ඡා වූ කාරණා දෙකම වාර්තාවේ යම් අනුපිළිවෙළක් අනුව -වැඩි පිරිසක් කැමැති නම් මුලින්ම, අඩු පිරිසක් කැමති නම් දෙවනුව- සඳහන් කරන්න පුළුවන්. It is okay.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමා කියන කාරණය පැහැදිලියි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ප්‍රමුඛතාව පිළිබඳ ප්‍රශ්නයක් තිබෙනවා නම්, සභාපතිතුමා බලන්න මුලින් කී දෙනෙක්ද අත්සන් කරන්නේ කියලා. අපි දන්නේ නැහැ හරියටම කොච්චරද කියලා. එවැනි නිගමනවලට එළැඹීම සුදුසු නැහැ. වැඩි පිරිසක්

අත්සන් කරන content එක "අ" එක මුලින් ඇතුළත් කරන්න. ඊළඟ පිරිස අත්සන් කරන content එකක් තිබෙනවා නම් දෙවනුව ඇතුළත් කරන්න. අපි නිගමනයට එළැඹුණු හේතුව වාර්තාවේ කොටසක් නේ. මෙතැන උසාවියක් නොවුණත් මම උදාහරණයක් කියන්නම්. තීන්දුව ගැන එකඟයි. දඩුවම ගැන එකඟයි. ඒ වරදකරු වීමට හේතු වූ කාරණා ගැන විවිධ තර්ක අදහස් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා සම්බන්ධිතයි.

ඒ නිසා ඒ ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳන ලද සාමාජිකයින්ගේ විවිධ අදහස් ඒ content එකේ තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ. හැබැයි, මූලික වශයෙන් කණ්ඩායම් දෙකක් වශයෙන් බෙදිලා සිටින බව මට පෙනෙනවා. ඒ නිසා බර අනුව, අනුපිළිවෙළක් සහිතව ඒක වාර්තා කරන්න. එච්චරයි.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: Exactly.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. වගන්ති වගන්ති හැටියට හෝ යෝජනාවෙන් යෝජනාවට හෝ ඡන්ද විමසන්න කියලා නොවෙයි මම කියන්නේ. මම කියන්නේ මේකයි. දැන් ගත්තොත් මුල් කොටසට එකඟ, අවසන් කොටසට එකඟ, මැද කොටසට එකඟ නොවන තත්ත්වයක් තමයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ කියන්නේ, මේක සමස්ත වාර්තාවක්. නිගමන වෙනම නැහැ. මේක මුල් කොටසත්, මැද කොටසත්, අග කොටසත් එකතු කරපු වාර්තාවක්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වාර්තාවක් නොවෙයි කෙටුම්පතක්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: හරි. කෙටුම්පතක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මම තව කාරණයක් කියන්නම්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා කථා කළානේ. ඔබතුමන්ලා කථා කරනකොට අපි අහගෙන හිටියා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම අන්තිමට ඒ ගැන කියන්නම්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ආරම්භක කොටස තිබෙනවා. නිර්දේශ කොටසක් තිබෙනවා. අතරමැද කොටසක් තිබෙනවා. ඒවා ඔක්කොම එකතුවෙලා තමයි කෙටුම්පතක් හැදෙන්නේ. 1,2,3 කියලා කොටස් තුනකින් යුක්ත කෙටුම්පතක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ කෙටුම්පතට තමයි ඡන්ද විමසන්නේ. ඡන්ද විමසීමට ලක් කළාට පස්සේ ඒක තමයි සම්පූර්ණ කෙටුම්පත. ඒ කෙටුම්පතට පක්ෂ කණ්ඩායමක් ඉන්නවා. ඔවුන් කියනවා, "Right, ඒ කෙටුම්පතට අපි එකඟයි" කියලා. එකඟ නොවන කණ්ඩායම කියනවා, "අපි කෙටුම්පතේ සමහර කොටස්වලට එකඟයි. නමුත් අපි මෙන්න මේ කොටසට එකඟ නැහැ. මෙන්න මේ කොටසට අපේ එකඟතාව" කියලා වෙන කොටසක් දෙනවා. ඔව්වරයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, උත්තරයක් දෙන්නම්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: වාර්තාවේ එකඟ නැති කොටසට ඒගොල්ලන් සටහන් කරලා දෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හරි මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, thank you. ඔබතුමා දැන් තේරුම් කරලා දීම අවසන්නේ. අපිටත් ඒ කාරණය තේරුම් කරන්න දෙන්නකෝ. ඔබතුමා කියන ආකාරයට පළමුවැනි කොටසට ඔක්කොම එකඟයි. අන්තිම කොටසටත් ඔක්කොම එකඟයි. මැද කොටස අපි එළියෙන් ගෙනැල්ලා නොවෙයි ඇතුළත් කළේ. කෝප් කමිටුවේ අපි ඉඳගෙන ඉඳලා තමයි මැද කොටස් දෙකම හැදුවේ. එළියෙන් ගෙනැල්ලා ඇමුණුවා නොවෙයි. මැද කොටස් දෙකම 1 සහ 2 කියලා දාලා (අ) නැත්නම් (ආ) කියලා දාලා ඔය වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන එක තමයි සභාපතිතුමාට කරන්න තිබෙන දේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම මෙහෙම කරන්නම්. අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මේ විධියට කිව්වොත් හරිද කියලා බලන්න. නැත්නම් වෙනස් කරන්න. මම තත්පරයෙන් මේ ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳන්නම්.

2015 පෙබරවාරි මාසයේ සිට 2016 මැයි මාසය දක්වා කාල පරිච්ඡේදය තුළ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව විසින් සිදු කර තිබූ භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් පූර්ණ ලෙස පරීක්ෂා කර වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතු බවට 2016 අහවල් මස අහවල් දින රැස් වූ පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාව තීරණය කළාය.

කාරක සභාව 2015 මස සිට දින දක්වා - මෙච්චර කාලයක් පුරා - අවශ්‍යයි හැඟුණු සියලු ලේඛන ගෙන්වා පරීක්ෂා කිරීමෙන්ද, සියලු නිලධාරීන් හා පුද්ගලයින් ගෙන්වා වාචික සාක්ෂි ලබා ගැනීමෙන්ද, කාරක සභාවේදී ඉතා දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කිරීමෙන් පසුව විගණකාධිපති විසින් සකසන ලද වාර්තාව කාරක සභාව ඉදිරියේ කරන ලද වාචික සාක්ෂි සලකා බලා සකස් කරන ලද කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව කාරක සභාවේ දින ගණනාවක් හා දීර්ඝ කාලයක් පුරා විස්තරාත්මක වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කරන ලදී. පැහැදිලියිනේ. එලෙස ඉතා දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් කරුණු සාකච්ඡා කිරීමේදී කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාව සඳහා සහික මන්ත්‍රීන් සියලු දෙනාගේම පූර්ණ එකඟත්වය ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා දැඩි උත්සාහයක් ගත් නමුත්

වාර්තාවේ 11 වැනි පිටුව දක්වා ඡේද සඳහා පොදුවේ එකඟ වූ අතර - මම පැහැදිලි කරන්නයි හැදුවේ - ඒ අනුව අභවල් අභවල් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විසින් සකස් කරන ලද 11 වැනි පිටුවේ සිට 30 වන පිටුව දක්වා,-

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මේක උදාහරණයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: වගන්ති වශයෙන් කියන්න පුළුවන්. අභවල් වගන්තියේ සිට අභවල් වගන්තිය දක්වා වාර්තාව සහ නිගමනයන්ට හේතු (ආ) කොටස වශයෙන්ද, අභවල් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විසින් සකස් කරන ලද - 11වැනි පිටුවේය කියලා හිතමු. - අභවල් පිටුවේ අභවල් වගන්තිය දක්වා එතුමන්ලාගේ වාර්තාවේ සහ නිගමනයන්ට හේතු (ආ) කොටස වශයෙන්ද, ඊට පසුව ඕනෑ නම් (ඇ) කොටස වශයෙන් දාන්න පුළුවන්. සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විසින් නිගමනය කරන ලද නිර්දේශ හා නිගමන (ඇ) කොටස, -

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එපා. ඒක commonනේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වුණාට කමක් නැහැ. ඒවා නිගමනනේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් කියනකොට (ඇ) ඕනෑ නැහැ, - එතකොට ඒක common.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙනම් එහෙම දමමු. සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විසින් එකඟ වන ලද නිර්දේශද ඇතුළත් වාර්තාව මේ සමඟ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරමි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මට කථා කරන්න අවස්ථාව ලබා දෙන්න. ප්‍රශ්නය මේකයි. පෞද්ගලිකව මමත් හිතාගෙන හිටියේ ඕක තමයි. සභාපතිතුමා, පෞද්ගලිකව මමත් හිතාගෙන හිටියේ ඔහොම තමයි. නමුත් අපට ස්ථාවර නියෝග අනුව ඔය විධියට කටයුතු කරන්න බැහැ. ස්ථාවර නියෝග අනුව තිබෙන්නේ එක වාර්තාවයි. ඒ වාර්තාවට කැමැතිද, අකැමැතිද? හැබැයි, ඒකේදී මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට විශේෂ අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. එක අත්සනයි කියලා ගන්න පුළුවන්. නමුත් මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ට අයිතිය දීලා තිබෙනවා, තමන් විශේෂ කරුණකට විරුද්ධ නම් ඒකට විරුද්ධ වෙන්න. එක වාර්තාවයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ වාර්තාවට දෙපැත්තෙන්, තුන් පැත්තෙන් ආපු යෝජනා දමන්න බැහැ. මේ උදාහරණය පැත්තකට දමන්න. අපි ඊයේ විවාද කරපු ලේඛනය ගන්නකෝ. ඒකේ තිබෙනවා, කෝටි 33,000ක වංචා ගැන සහ මූල්‍ය පාඩු ගැන. ඒවා සිදුවෙලා තිබෙන්නේ මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ පාලන කාලයේ. මම මේ විවෘතව කථා කරන්නේ. මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා ඇතුළු හතර පස් දෙනෙක් එකතුවෙලා වෙනම කථාවක් කියනවා. අපි ඒක ඇතුළත් කරනවාද? වැඩක් නැහැනේ. මම හරි තර්කයක්නේ ගෙනෙන්නේ. මම අහන්නේ සාධාරණ ප්‍රශ්නයක්. එයාර් ලංකා එකේ පාඩුව බිලියන මෙච්චරයි කියලා අපි කියනවා. මෙතුමන්ලා හතර දෙනෙකු එකතුවෙලා කියනවා, "එහෙම නැහැ. Planes කැඩුණා. එල්ටීටීඊ එකෙන් ගැහුවා" වාගේ මොනවා හෝ. එහෙම බැහැනේ. එහෙම දෙක තුනම දාන්න බැහැ. හැබැයි, මෙතුමාට අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා. ඒ මොකක්ද? බිලියන 143ක් එයාර් ලංකා පාඩු කළා කියලා කිව්වාම මෙතුමාට එතැනදී විරුද්ධ වෙන්න පුළුවන්. හැබැයි, එතුමාගේ කරුණු එතැන ලියන්න බැහැ. ඒකට තමයි මේ Standing Orders තිබෙන්නේ. මමත් හිතාගෙන හිටියේ මගේ කථාවයි, මෙතුමාගේ කථාවයි, ඔක්කොමගේ කථා ලියන්න පුළුවන් කියලායි. එහෙම ලියන්න බැහැ. එක වාර්තාවයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඔබතුමා දැන් සද්භාවයෙන් කිව්ව යෝජනාව දේශපාලන වශයෙන් මට තේරෙනවා. හැබැයි, Standing Orders අනුව එහෙම කරන්න බැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මට තත්පරයක් දෙන්න. ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, 11වැනි පිටුවෙන් පසුව ඇති 4.3 ඡේදයට සියලු දෙනාම එකඟයි. කෙටුම්පතේ කොටස් බෙදීම වැරැදියි කියලායි මම කියන්නේ. එකඟ නැති දේවල් මම කියන්නේ නැහැ. එකඟ දේවල් කියන්නේ. කෙටුම්පතේ 4.3 ඡේදයට සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරු විරුද්ධත්වය නොපෑම නිසා එකඟ වී ඇත.

4.4 ඡේදයට සියලුම මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් එකඟ වී ඇත; 4.5 ඡේදයට සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත; 4.6 ඡේදයට සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත; 4.6.1 සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත; 4.6.2 සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත; 5.1.1 සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත; 5.1.2 සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත; 5.2 එකඟ වී ඇත; 5.4 සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත. පොඩ්ඩක් වෙනස් නම් මම කියන්නම්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: 5.3.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: 5.3ට එකතු කළා. එකක්වත් කැපුවේ නැහැ. එකඟ නැහැ නොවෙයි. 5.3 තිබෙන කරුණු වෙනස්නේ. ඒකයි මම කිව්වේ නැත්තේ. 5.4 සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත. 5.5 සියලු දෙනා එකඟ වී ඇත. 5.6. සියලු දෙනා එකඟයි. 5.7 සියලු දෙනා එකඟයි. 7, -

සභාපතිතුමා: 6?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ, 6 සම්බන්ධයෙන් වාදයක් තිබෙනවා. 7වැනි ඡේදයට සියලු දෙනා එකඟයි. මම record කරන්න ඕනෑ නිසයි කියන්නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: එකඟ නොවන කරුණු කිව්වා නම් ඊට වඩා හොඳ නැද්ද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපි වැඩි දෙනා එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. 8ට සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟයි. 8.1හි පළමු වැනි ඡේදය වැදගත් ඡේදයක්. අපි ඒකට as it is එකඟ වුණා. 9හි 9.1 සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟ වුණා. 9.2 සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟ වුණා. ඊළඟට, 9.3ට වාද කළා. නමුත්, අපි as it is එකඟ වුණා. 9.4ට එකඟ වුණා. 9.5ට එකඟ වුණා. 9.6ට එකඟ වුණා. 10හි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශයන් 14ට සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟ වුණා. ඔබතුමා නායකයා විධියට හඳන අවසාන ලිපියේදී මේ වාර්තාවේ බඳේ තිබෙන මම කලින් කිව්ව කොටස්වලට වාදයක් තිබුණා කියලා කිව්වොත්, ඒක වැරැදියි. කෙටුම්පත මත පදනම්ව ඔබතුමා සිදුවීම ලියන එක ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒ ලියන විට මැද කොටසත් ලියන්න. ඒ කොටස්වලටත් එකඟ වුණා කියලා කියන්න. වාදයක් නැති දේවල් වාදයක් නැහැ කියලා කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ගරු අජිත් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මම කියන්නම්. මේ වාර්තාව හැදුවා. වාර්තාවට මුළුමනින්ම එකඟ අය අත්සන් කරනවා. ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධනවලට යටත් වූ අය හැටියට අත්සන් කරලා, සංශෝධන ටික අමුණලා දෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කිව්ව සියලු දෙනාම එකඟ ඒවා හැරෙන්න, අනෙක් ටික අමුණන්න ඕනෑ. සංශෝධන ඇමුණුමක් විධියට දමමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: සංශෝධන දමන්න බැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ඇමුණුමක් විධියට දමන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සංශෝධන ඇමුණුමක් දමන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමා කලින් යෝජනා කළ ක්‍රමය හොඳයි. ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන්නේ technical ප්‍රශ්නයක් නේ.

ගරු චන්ද්‍රසිරි ගජදීර මහතා: ඇතැම් කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් එකඟ නොවන නිසා-

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: I do not think the Standing Orders are hard-and-fast like that, that you cannot record a dissent. It has been the practice to record dissents in any report that goes**.** From what Hon. Ajith P. Perera said it is a few paragraphs that they do not agree with. It is possible for them to now propose to delete those paragraphs and we can take a vote. At the end the resultant position will be that you have to record that they have dissented from these. It does not make any difference. I think, we put the report and say that they are dissenting on the following paragraphs and they are giving their reasons for the dissent.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senansinghe: We have sat in the COPE and discussed these. We are not coming from outside and bringing these things. That is also a draft. So what we amended is a draft.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගරු සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන ක්‍රමය හොඳයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි එළියෙන් ගෙනාවා නම් ඔබතුමා කියන දේ හරි. මේ draft එක හැදුවේ මෙතැන ඉඳගෙන.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඉඳගෙන හඳන කොටම තමයි වෙනස්කම් එන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු අනුර මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඒ final draft එක. ඔක්කොම අවසන් වුණාට පසුව අලුතින් කාරණාවක් ගෙන ආවා නම්, ඔය ක්‍රමය හරි. මෙතැනදී ඔය original draft එක සාකච්ඡා කරලා අවසන් කරනවා. එතකොට මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් කියනවා, "මම මේවාට එකඟ නැහැ. මෙන්න මේ ටික දමන්න." කියලා. එතකොට තමයි ඔය කාරණාව එන්නේ. මෙතැනදී වුණේ එහෙම නොවෙයි. අපි 11.30ට නැවැත්වූවාට පසුව, මේ COPE කමිටුවේ ඉඳගෙන මුල සිට දිගටම සංශෝධනය කර ගෙන ඇවිත් නැවැත්තුවා. මේ COPE කමිටුව ඇතුළේ ඉඳගෙන. එළියේ ඉඳගෙන නොවෙයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ අවසන් කරලා තිබුණු වාර්තාව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අවසන් කරලා තිබුණේ නැහැ. අවසන් කළේ draft එකක්.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Hon. Sujeewa Senasighe, at the end it comes to the same thing.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: No, It is not.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කෙටුම්පත අපට දුන්නා. ඒ කෙටුම්පතට කණ්ඩායමක් එකඟ වුණා. එකඟ නොවුණු කණ්ඩායම සංශෝධන ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මේ ගරු සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන දෙයට එකඟ වෙන්න. ඒක හරි. අපි මේ විධියට කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ දවස් දෙක හමාරක් සාකච්ඡා කළේ සංශෝධන දෙන්න නේ. මට කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න. අපි යථාර්ථයට මුහුණ දෙමු. This is the reality.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මුලින් සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟ අය අත්සන් කළා. ඊට පස්සේ සංශෝධනවලට යටත්ව එකඟවන අය අත්සන් කළා. සංශෝධන ටික අමුණලා දෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි ඡන්ද විමසීමෙන් පසුව නැවත රැස් වෙමු.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු මද වේලාවකට අත්හිටුවයි.)

කාරක සභාව කල් තැබීමෙන් පසුව නැවත රැස්විය.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: මම ඒ සඳහා යෝජනාවක් කරන්නද? දැන් අපට අවශ්‍ය එක වාර්තාවෙක් නේ. මම සිතන්නේ ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා කියාපු දේවල්-

සභාපතිතුමා: එම ඡේද ටික. ඒ chapters ටික.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: Paragraph 5.3, 6.2, වගේ 5ක් විතරක් ඇති, එකඟ නොවන ඒවා. ඒවා identify කරලා ඒවාට මේ මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා එකඟ නැහැ කියලා - dissent කරනවා කියලා -

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එක යට එක නොවෙයි නේ.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: නැහැ. වෙනම - separately- දමලා - ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා කියාපු එකත් ඇත්ත. ඒ කියන්නේ අන්තිමට ඇවිත් ඒකට dissent කරනවා කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ නේ. මේ ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒකත් ඇතුළත් කරන්න. මේ ගැන දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡාවක් තිබුණා, එහිදී මේ අයට වෙනස් මතයන් තිබුණා කියන කාරණාව අපි දැන් වෙනම අන්තිමට, at the end of the report, we will include.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මොකක්ද ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන්නේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මොකක්ද කථා කළේ?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ. අපි කතා කළේ නැහැ.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: I suggested, apart from what I suggested earlier, to make it a little more explicit. The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe was making that point that it should not seem like that you have dissented when the report was presented and your report was brought from outside. So, we will say very specifically to cover that. Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe, you are thinking that your dissention is not something that you brought from outside. I am suggesting that it should be mentioned in the Chairman's Report that "these following Members are not in agreement with this paragraph and this paragraph. These factors were discussed. Their disagreement and their position was discussed in the Committee and the reasons for their dissent from that are separately annexed at the end of the Report."

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: I am asking to connect it to there. Then, you will get a proper indication. We amended this here, not outside.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: The other option is, if you want it there itself, generally, what you do is, put a footnote in the main Report saying, "This is the reason for dissent by so and so." But, the Report itself will look very ugly. It is not a footnote because you cannot put that. That is the reason. What I am suggesting you is, to put it separately, but in the narration you can say very clearly that "this is not something that you brought from outside. This was discussed in full." Your views were also presented to the Committee and the Committee has agreed that you can present your reasons for dissenting as part of the Report.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: The only thing is this. What you say is correct if we agreed at the end of the day on the main report. Now, we brought this. What happened was, we amended this in the COPE. You are giving priority- Actually, why can you not take our amended one as the main report? Until the middle of the report, it is a draft. We completed the draft report on that day. We amended the draft report and finished.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මම මෙහෙම කියන්නද? ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියාපු කාරණයත්, අනෙක් ඔක්කොමත් බලලා අපි ඇත්තටම footnote එක දමනවා

වෙනුවට - ඔබතුමන්ලා පෙන්වා දුන් ආකාරයට අතරමැද 11 වැනි පිටුවෙන් පසුවත් එකඟ වුණු කරුණු ලොකු ප්‍රමාණයක් තිබෙනවා නේ. පොඩි ප්‍රමාණයක් නොවෙයි. හරයටම යන එකඟ වූ දේවල් තිබෙනවා. එකඟ නොවූ කරුණු අංක වශයෙන් 7ක්, 8ක් තිබෙනවා. Original draft report එක ලියලා "කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙම හේතු දැක්වීම පිළිබඳව පහත සඳහන් වෙනස් මතයද කමිටුවේදී ඉදිරිපත් විය" කියලා දමන්න, footnote එක දමන්නේ නැතිව. අපි ඒ විධියට යමු. එතකොට කෙනෙකුට පෙනෙනවා majority view එකක් - යම් අදහසක් තිබෙනවා නේ. වැඩිපුර හැඟීමක් තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒකට වෙනස් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. කෙසේ වෙතත් මෙම කාරණය පිළිබඳ වෙනස් මතයක් "x", "y" "z" මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලදී. එම මතය මෙසේය. උපුටා ගැනීම.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මැතිතුමා කියාපු එකමයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එකඟ නොවන හැම තැනම තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ කියලාද?

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: නැහැ. අන්තිමට. වාර්තාවක දමන්න පුළුවන් අවසානයේදී මූලික වාර්තාකරුට එකඟ නොවී මෙන්න මේ මේ කරුණු ඉදිරිපත් කළා කියන එක තමයි.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේ මන්ත්‍රී කණ්ඩායම විසින් මේ අදහස ඉදිරිපත් කළා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට පොඩි අදහසක් තිබෙනවා. දැන් මේ වාර්තාවේ-

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, අපි එකඟතාවන් සියල්ලම වාර්තාවේ ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. එතකොට අපේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු කිහිප දෙනෙක් මැද කොටසේ කරුණු ගණනාවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් එකඟ නොවී වෙනම කාරණා ටිකක් කියනවා. මෙන්න මේ මන්ත්‍රීවරු මෙන්න මේ කරුණු සම්බන්ධයෙන් මෙහෙම කිව්වා කියලා ඒක අවසානයේදී ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එහෙම කරන්න බැරි හේතුවක් තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම තව එකතු කිරීමක් කරන්නම්. මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට පහසු කරන්නම්.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එම ඡේදය තිබෙනවා. ඒ ඡේදයේ පොඩි star mark එකක් දමනවා. යටින් තිබෙනවා, ඒ කියන්නේ අවසානයේදී තිබෙනවා මෙන්න මේ ඡේද පිළිබඳව කියන්නේ වෙන කථාවක් කියලා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක කෙනෙකුට තේරෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නොවෙයි. මම යෝජනාවක් කරන්නම්. ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියාපු විධිය තව පහසු කරන්නම්, ඒ ක්‍රියාවලිය වෙන විධියටම. අපි උදාහරණයකට හිතමු 4.1 කියලා. 4.1.1ට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ එකඟතාවක් නැහැ. එතකොට 4.1 ඡේදයේ උඩින් හරි, යටින් හරි, ආරම්භ කරන තැනින් හරි අපි දමනවා මෙන්න මේ මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලා මේ කාරණාව සම්බන්ධයෙන් වෙනස් මතයක් හෝ වෙනස් අදහසක් හෝ දරන ලදී කියලා. ඒ වෙනස් අදහස් ටික අවසනයේ ඇතුළත් කරනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මම නම් කියන්නේ එතුමන්ලාගේ නම් ටික යටින් footnote එකේ දමන්න-

සභාපතිතුමා: වෙනස්කම් ටික ඇමුණුමකට දමනවා. නම් ටික විතරයි එතැන දමන්නේ. නම් ටික විතරක් එතැන දමනවා. අදහස ඇමිණුමක දමනවා.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, අපට නම් මේ ගැටුම ගැන අවබෝධයක් තිබෙනවා. මේක පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ගියොත් කියවා ගන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නම් ටික දමන එකේ තේරුමක් නැහැ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඕක කියවන්නේ කොහොමද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සංශෝධනය එන්න ඕනෑ එතැන නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නම් ටික දමන එකේ පොඩි තර්කයක් තිබෙනවා. වෙනස්කම් ගොඩයි. සමහර ඒවාට එකඟයි. පොඩි කණ්ඩායමක් දෙකක් වගෙයි නේ ඉන්නේ. මූලික එක තිබෙනවා. එකඟ නොවන අය තව කණ්ඩායමක් නේ.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මේ කියන විධියට ඒක වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපි කියන විධියට ඕක වෙන්නේ නැහැ. කරුණු කිහිපයක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිහිප දෙනෙකුගේ තිබෙන වෙනස් මතය අවසානයේදී වෙනම කරුණු හැටියට එනවා. එතකොට වෙනස්කමක් පෙනෙන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: කිහිප දෙනෙක්ගේ නොවෙයි, එතකොට දෙපැත්තටම එන්න පුළුවන්නේ. එතකොට majority එක හොයන එක විතරයිනේ.

ගරු එම්.ඒ.සුමන්තිරම් මහතා: Contents ගැන අපි එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙන්නේ. මේ form ගැන තමයි

තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය. කොහොමද මේක ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ? So, I am now speaking to the majority of the Members. What the dissentients want is, - not that they have just dissented - to express that these views were discussed and that it was presented and all of that. So, give it a little prominence. It is not going to take away from the Report. If you give it prominence, it is not going to take away from the Report. I mean, in fairness to the dissentients - They have not just come here and say, "We cannot agree to this." That is not what has happened. They have participated in the deliberations and I think, due regard must be given, in the body of the Report, for their dissent and reasons for that. So, I am appealing to the majority to give in a little and accommodate the dissentients' views because it does not take away from the Report. In the final analysis, it will show that the majority Report is this and a smaller number – I mean, they have given their mind and that is fair. It is not just saying, "No." They are giving reasons and Parliament and the public must also have the benefit of what they are saying also. We should not in anyway, block that. So, in view of that my appeal is, accommodate that and put it in the main Report.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම ඔබතුමාට කාරණාවක් හැටියට කියන්නම්. මේ Report එකේ තිබෙන කරුණුවල අපි කවුරුත් නිගමනවලට නිර්දේශවලට එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙනවා. යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට බොහෝ කාරණාවලට එකඟ වූ කාරණා තිබෙනවා. ඒ වායේ වෙනස්කම් තිබෙන ඒවා, මෙතැන ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, අපි එකඟ වූ අයට අපේ Report එකේ වෙනස් වූ දේවල් පෙනෙන්නේ නැද්ද?වෙනස් වූ අයට වෙනස්කම් හරියට පෙනෙන්නේ නැද්ද? එකඟ වූ අයට එකඟ වූ එක හරියට පෙනෙන්නේ නැද්ද කියන එකනේ. මේ Report එක විතරක් නොවෙයි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් වෙන්නේ. මේ Report එකත් එක්ක ඇමුණුම් හැටියට ඔබතුමන්ලා සාකච්ඡා කරන කරුණෙන් කරුණ සාකච්ඡා කරන ලද සියලුම දේවල් verbatim reports ඇමුණුම් හැටියට එනවානේ. එතකොට මේක සමස්තයක් ලෙස කියවන ඕනෑම කෙනෙකුට මෙහි අදහස පැහැදිලියි. වෙනස්කම් මොනවාද යනුවෙන් වෙනස්කම් පැහැදිලියි. කියවන කෙනෙක් මේක උඩින් පල්ලෙන් කියවන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක professorsලා නොවෙයි කියවන්නේ. මේක කියවන කොට first body එක ඉවර වෙනවා. ඊට පස්සේ මිනිසුන් සංශෝධන සොය සොයා ඉන්නේ නැහැ. මම කියන එක අහන්න. අපි දැන් ඇවිල්ලා කිව්වා නම් ඔබතුමන්ට මෙන්න මේ ටිකට අපි වෙනස් කම් එකතු කරනවා කියලා, ඔබතුමන් කියන එක හරි. මොකද අපට මැදට දාන්න බැහැ නේ. අපිට side එකට දාන්නත් බැහැ. පහළින් කියනවා මේ වෙනස්කම් ටිකට අපි එකඟ වෙනවා කියලා. පහළින් ඒක ඔබතුමන් සඳහන් කරනවා. අපි එහෙම නොවෙයි. ඔබතුමත් එක්ක ඉඳලා, විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ සියලු දෙනාත් එක්කම ඉඳලා, අපි එකතු වෙලා තමයි පළමුවෙනි pages 10 amend කරද්දි තමයි ඉතිරි ටිකත් කළේ. එතකොට ඒක ඔබතුමන්ලා ඔක්කොම අමතක කරලා, ඒක අයින් කරලා, පළමුවෙන්ම agree වෙලා ගිය අය මූලිකාංගය ලෙස ගෙන නිකමට කථා කළේ නැහැ. අපි මහන්සි වෙලා මේක හැදුවේ. නිකම් ගෙනැල්ලා එල්ලනවා නොවෙයිනේ. එතකොට අපි agree වෙලා නිකමට කථා කළේ නැහැ. අපිට මේක දාන්න ඕනෑ කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ. මේක දාන්න කියද්දී විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවෙන් කිව්වා ඔබතුමන්ලා කියන එක වැරදියි. මේ කාරණා අනුව මේ දේ වෙන්න බැහැ කියලා. එහෙම අපි විශාල වශයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කරලා කරුණු දීලා තමයි කළේ. නිකම් ගෙනැල්ලා මේක ඇතුළත් කරන්න කියලා කිව්වේ නැහැ. සභාපතිතුමත් ඒ බව කිව්වා.

සභාපතිතුමා: දැන් ඒක වෙන වෙනම හරි, එකට හරි සාකච්ඡා කරපු සියලුම දෙනා මෙතැන ඉන්නවා. මේ සියලු දෙනාම මේ කෙටුම්පත ඒ ආකාරයෙන් සාකච්ඡා කළේ, අවබෝධයක් සඳහා. තම තමන් මොනවා හෝ තත්ත්වයක් ඇතිව මේක අවබෝධ කර ගෙන තිබෙන්නේ. ඒක නිසාම අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමාට කියන්න පුළුවන් වෙන්නේ, අපි මේ පහට එකඟයි, හයට විරුද්ධයි, හතට එකඟයි. මොකක් හරි ඒ කරුණු ටික ඒ ආකාරයෙන් කියනවා. ඒ නිසා දැන් තිබෙන්නේ මේක ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ පහසුවනම් අපට, හොඳම දේ තමයි, මම කියන්නේ මේ වාර්තාව, වාර්තාව නොවෙයි. එකේ ඔබතුමන්ලා එකඟ නොවූ කරුණු ටික වෙනම දැක්වීමේ තිබෙන වැරැද්ද මොකක්ද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා ඇහුවේ මෙපමණයි. ඔබතුමා ඇහුවේ," අ" සහ "ආ" යන්න කියලා දෙපැත්තට දාන්න. ඒකටත් එකඟ වෙන්නේ නැහැ. අපිට ඒක සංශෝධනය ඇතුළට දාන්න දෙන්නෙත් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "අ" සහ "ආ" කියලා දැම්මොත් වාර්තා දෙකක්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මෙතැන වාර්තා දෙකක් දැන් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන දේ කරමු.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Standing Orders අනුව ගත්තොත් එක වාර්තාවයි. ඒකට කැමතිද නැද්ද කියලා විතරයි. නමුත් අපි සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන විධියට අපි ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ intellectual labour එකට respect කරන්නයි අපි එකට වැඩ කරන්න ඕනෑ. අපි හෙට දිනයේ වෙන corruption එකකට විරුද්ධව එකට එකතු වෙලා fight කරයි. ඒ නිසා with all respect, විරුද්ධ වෙච්ච මන්ත්‍රීතුමන්ලාගේ විරුද්ධතාවය. එම ඡේදය ළඟ asterisk එකකින් දාලා යටින් footnote එකකින් විරුද්ධයි කියලා දාලා, මේ recommendationsවලින් පසුව මේ Report එකේම එතුමන්ලා නිශ්චිත කරුණුවලට විරුද්ධ වූ reasons ටික දානවා.

සභාපතිතුමා:ඕනෑ නම් මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්නම්. ඒක තිබෙන ඡේදයත් දාලාම දාන්න. මම අවසන් කළේ නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි ඒකට එන්නේත් අපි එකට වැඩ කරන්න ඕනෑ නිසා, ඔබතුමන්ලා මේ තරම් දුරක් මේකට compromise කරලා ආව නිසා ඒකට respect එකක් වශයෙන්. නැත්නම් එක වාර්තාවයි කැමතිද? නැද්ද? ඒක හරි නැහැ නේ එතකොට මොනවත් reasons එන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: මම නම් කියන්නේ සුමන්තිරම් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු දේට අපි එකඟ වෙමුද? ඔබතුමා නැවතත් කරුණා කරලා කියන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක ගොඩාක් යන්න බැහැ. එකඟ නැත්නම් කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ ඡන්දයක් විමසලා මේ වාර්තාව දාලා අවසන් කරමු. ඒක තමයි ස්ථාවර නියෝග. ස්ථාවර නියෝගවලින් එහාට යන්න තමයි අපි උත්සාහ කළේ. ස්ථාවර නියෝගවලින් තමුන්නාන්සේලා දරණ දිශාවට යාමට තමයි අපි උත්සාහ දැරුවේ. නමුත් ඒ ස්ථාවරයට එකඟ නැත්නම් අතහරින්න වෙන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔබතුමන් කියන්නේ 103 ගැන. ඒක කියන්නේ තීන්දුව ගැන. තීන්දුව ගැන එකඟයි. එහෙම නම් මොකක්ද ඡන්දයක්. යෝජිත ප්‍රශ්නය වාර්තාවට එකඟද? ඔක්කොම එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙතැන කෙටුම්පත් දෙකක් නැහැ.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: කෙටුම්පත් දෙකක් නැහැ එකයි තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එක කෙටුම්පතයි. බහුතරයකුත් තිබෙනවා නමුත් අපි බහුතරය නැතිව යන්න හදන්නේ. මොකක්ද මේ කරන්න හදන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: එක කෙටුම්පතයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒ කෙටුම්පත මෙච්චර වෙලා සාකච්ඡා කළා. මෙහි බෙදීමක් ඇති කර ගන්න එපා කියලයි මගේ ඉල්ලීම. එක වාර්තාක් තිබෙන්නේ, එක කෙටුම්පතක් තිබෙන්නේ . ඔබතුමන්ලා දෙගොල්ලන්ම එකට වාඩි වෙලත්, වෙන වෙනමත් මේක තමයි අධ්‍යනය කරලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේක කෙටුම්පතක් හරි මොකක් හරි එකක්, කෙටුම්පතක් තිබෙනවා, ඒකට වෙනස් අදහස් තිබෙනවා. මූලිකව හදපු එක පිළිගන්නවාද? වෙනස් අදහස් සහිතව පිළිගන්නවාද කියලා ඡන්දයකට යමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම ඡන්ද තිබන්න බැහැ. කොහොමද ඡන්ද තිබෙන්නේ? මෙයා කියපු කථාව හරි යන්නේ නැහැ. මම බැලුවා. මේකෙන් කියන්නේ අවසාන නිගමනය ගැන ඡන්දයක් විමසන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමන් මොන ප්‍රශ්නය අහන්නේ කියන්නකෝ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම අහන්නේ 103 " විශේෂ කාරක සභාවක් ඒ ඒ දිනවල රැස්වීම්වලට පැමිණෙන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නම්ද, විභාග කරනු ලැබූ සාක්ෂිකරුවන්ගේ නම්ද, ඡන්දය විමසීම සඳහා බෙදීමක් ඇති වුණි නම්, යෝජිත ප්‍රශ්නයට" අහන්න මොකක්ද යෝජිත ප්‍රශ්නය. ඔබ මේ වාර්තාවට කැමතිද? එකඟයි. That is the ප්‍රශ්නය. ඒක ගැන මෙතැන වාදයක් නැහැ. ප්‍රශ්නය තිබෙන්නේ, ඒ ප්‍රශ්නයට හැමෝම එකඟ වෙලා තිබෙන විසඳුම සෙවීමේදී ආව මාර්ගය සහිතව ගෞරවයක් සහිතව-

ගරු අනුර කුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒක තමයි සමස්තය. නිගමනවලට කැමතිද? නිර්දේශවලට කැමතිද? එහෙම නැහැ. අහන්නේ එකයි. Report එක හැදෙන්නේ ආපු ගමනයි, නිගමනයයි, නිර්දේශයි සහිතවයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: අජිත් පෙරේරා මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, ඔය නීතිමය කරුණුවලට මම වැඩිය කැමති නැහැ. සන්සුන් වෙන්න. මාර්ගෝපදේශ ඔක්කොම මට තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සභාපතිතුමා, මේ වාර්තාවේ පටුනක් කියලා එකක් තිබෙනවා

නේ. පටුනේ තිබෙනවා සභාපතිතුමාගේ සටහන් ආදිය.

අපි සියලු දෙනාම එකඟ වුණු නිර්දේශත් ඒකට ඇතුළත් වෙනවා. ඒ නිසා ඒ පටුනට දමන්න පුළුවන් අපට මේ තිබෙන්නේ මේ, මේ අයගේ සංශෝධිත යෝජනා කියලා. මේකේ පටුනක් තිබෙනවා නේ. මේ කරුණ අපි දිගින් දිගටම කියපු කාරණයක්. කාරක සභාව පරීක්ෂා කරලා, සාකච්ඡා කරලා, ඒ සියල්ලම කරලා ඔබතුමන්ලා ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් සකස් කළ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළා. අපි කවුරුවත් ඒ වාර්තාවේ අකුරක්වත් වෙනස් කළේ නැත්නම් ඒක තමයි වාර්තාව.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වෙනස් කළා නම් මොකක්ද වෙන්නේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: වෙනස් කරන්න අයිතියක් තිබෙනවා නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: වෙනස් කළා නම් මොකක්ද වෙන්නේ කියලාත් කියන්න.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඒක කියනකම් පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට ඡන්දය විමසා සිටිනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගැන මම ඔබතුමන්ලාට කියන්නම්.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක කියන්න මට අවසර දෙන්න. මේකට ඉදිරිපත් කළ වාර්තාව සංශෝධන නොකර සිටීමේ අයිතියකුත් අපට තිබෙනවා. අපි සංශෝධනය කරන්නේ නැහැ. සංශෝධනය කරන්න ඕනෑ නම්, සංශෝධනය කරන්න. ඒ අයිතිය තමයි අපි දීලා තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ සහයෝගයත් දීලා තිබෙනවා.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: සාකච්ඡා කරන්න අයිතිය අපි දුන්නා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒකට මම තවත් කාරණයක් එකතු කරන්නම්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අයිතිය දෙන්න ගිහිල්ලා මේක තවත් දිග්ගස්සන්න එපා. ඔබතුමන්ලා අයිතිය ගන්න. හැබැයි, සිකුරාදාට වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: අපි වැඩ කරමු. හැබැයි, පස්වරු 8.30 වෙන කොට තීරණයක් ගන්න බැරි වුණොත්, මම නම් යන්න යනවා.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඒ විධියට ඔබතුමා යන්න බැහැ. අපි මේක පස්වරු 8.30 වෙන කොට අවසන් කරමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. මේ කාරණා ගැන මට ඔබතුමන්ලාට අවධාරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දැන් එන පොට හරියන්නේ නැහැ. ඒක මම කිව්වා කියලා ලියලා ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාට මේ කාරණා ගැන අවධාරණය කරන්න ඕනෑ. මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තිබෙන නීතිමය තත්ත්වය ගැන මම සොයා බැලුවා. මේ ටිකත් අහගන්න. මේ ටික මම කියන්නේ, recording සඳහායි.

"**<u>එක්සත් රාජධානියේ පාර්ලිමේන්තු පරිවය.</u>**

මූලාශ්‍රය: 2015 පාර්ලිමේන්තු විශේෂ කාරක සභා සහික මන්ත්‍රීන් පිළිබඳ මාර්ගෝපදේශය."

ඒ කියන්නේ, මෙවැනි විශේෂ කාරක සභාවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් එක්සත් රාජධානියේ තිබෙන මාර්ගෝපදේශය. එහි සඳහන් වෙනවා:

- "කිසියම් වාර්තාවක් සලකා බැලීමේදී කාරක සභාව රැස්වීම අවස්ථාවේදී සභාපතිවරයා වාර්තාවක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් තිබෙන වෙනස් වූ මතයන් තිබෙන විට කිසියම් එකඟතාවයකට පැමිණීමට පැමිණීමට හැකි වන පිණිස එකී වෙනස් මතයන්ද සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කාරක සභාවේදී සාකච්ඡාවට භාජනය කරනු ලැබේ." කියලා.

මම ඒක කළා. තවදුරටත් සඳහන් වෙනවා:

- "කාරක සභා එකඟතාවයෙන් ඉදිරියට කටයුතු කරගෙන යාමට උත්සාහ දරන අතර ඒවා සම්බන්ධයෙන් සාමාන්‍යයෙන් ඡන්ද විමසීම් හෝ බෙදීම් ඉතාමත් විරලය.

- කෙසේ වෙතත්, කිසියම් සහික මන්ත්‍රීවරයෙක් අදාළ කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාවට හෝ එහි විශේෂිත වූ කොටසකට හෝ තමන්ගේ විරුද්ධත්වය ප්‍රකාශ කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කරන්නේ නම් එකී වාර්තාවේ එවැනි එක් එක් ඡේද වෙන් වෙන් වශයෙන් හෝ මුළු වාර්තාව හෝ සම්බන්ධයෙන් බෙදීමක් හෝ ඡන්දයක් විමසන ලෙසද බල කර සිටීමින් එහි විධිමත් කාර්ය සටහන්වල එය සාමාන්‍යයෙන් සටහන් කරනු ලැබිය හැකිය...

මේ කාරණාව වැදගත් කාරණාවක්:

- "...කාරක සභාවක් විසින් එක් වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබන අතර "සුළුතර පිරිසක්

විධිමත් වාර්තාවක්" ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ හැකියාවක් නොමැත. විකල්ප වාර්තාවක් යෝජනා කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කරන සභික මන්ත්‍රීන්ට මූලාසනයේ එවැනි කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවට එය ඉදිරිපත් කළ හැකිය. ඊට එකඟ වන්නේ නම් කාරක සභාවේ වාර්තාවක් වන්නේය. එකඟ නොවන්නේ නම් එය මුළුමනින්ම ඡන්ද විමසීමකට ලක් කරන අතර එයද වාර්තාවේ විධිමත් කාර්ය සටහන්වල ඇතුළත් කරනු ලැබේ."

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ කියන්නේ මොකක්ද දන්නවාද? වෙනම එකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා නම්, ඒක පවා කාරක සභාවේ අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියලායි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම තවත් කාරණයක් කියන්නම්.

"<u>කැනඩාවේ පාර්ලිමේන්තු පරිවය.</u>

මූලාශ්‍රය: ප්‍රායෝගික මාර්ගෝපදේශය - නවවැනි සංස්කරණය (ප්‍රතිශෝධිත)

- කාරක සභාව විසින් පිළිගැනීමෙන් අනතුරුව පමණක් කිසියම් කාරක සභාවක වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබිය හැකිය.
- ඊට අමතරව ස්ථාවර නියෝගවලට,-

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: එකඟතාවක් තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතුමා කියන දේට ඇහුම්කන් දෙන්න.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: Footnote හැටියට දමන්න එකඟයි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Footnote හැටියට දමන්න පුළුවන් පිටු 5ක් පමණ. සම්පූර්ණ වාර්තාවම දමන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු වීරකුමාර දිසානායක මහතා: ඒ විධියට වාර්තාව වෙනස් කරන්න එපා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: Footnote කියන්නේ, පිටු 5ක් පමණ footnote වෙනවා.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: එහෙම නොවෙයි.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොත්වල තිබෙන්නේ වැඩිපුර footnotes.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: පොඩ්ඩක් අහන්න කෝ. There are seven paragraphs that he has identified. Every paragraph you put a footnote and different formulation will appear there. It will not go into five pages.

The Hon. Bimal Rathnayake: Why not?

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: No, it will not. Just that one paragraph.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඉරක් ගහලා යටින් ලියනවා. ලොකු පොත්වල තිබෙන්නේ ටිකක් ලොකුවට. එපමණයි තිබෙන්නේ.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: Then, what happens next is the change they want in that way – Now when we had these Subcommittees on Constitutional Reforms wherever there were dissents, put in the footnote.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: මේවා footnote වෙන්නේ නැහැ, ඇත්තටම මේවා පිටු 4ක්, පිටු 5ක් දිග ඒවා.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: එපමණ ලොකු වෙන්නේ නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා ටිකක් ඉන්න. මම මගේ පැහැදිලි කිරීම තවම අවසන් කළේ නැහැ. කැනඩා පාර්ලිමේන්තු පරිවයේ තිබෙන්නේත්:

- "කාරක සභාව විසින් පිළිගැනීමෙන් අනතුරුව පමණක් කිසියම් කාරක සභාවක වාර්තාවක් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබිය හැකිය.
- ඊට අමතරව ස්ථාවර නියෝගවලට අනුකූලව විරෝධය දක්වන හෝ අතිරේක වූ මතයන් (එනම් අමතර අදහස දක්වමින් කෙටි විස්තරයක්) එකී වාර්තාවේ විෂයගත කාරණයට කාරක සභාවේ එකඟතාවයෙන් යා කළ හැකිය." කියලායි.

ඒ කියන්නේ, යා කරන්න තිබෙන්නේ. ශ්‍රී ලංකා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ අපට තිබෙන මාර්ගෝපදේශය තමයි:

"1984 උපරිමාධිකරණ විනිශ්චයකාරවරයෙකුට එරෙහි..

නෙවිල් සමරකෝන්

...විෂම පැවැත්ම හෝ අබලතාව හෝ පිළිබඳ චෝදනා විමර්ශනය කර එකී චෝදනා සම්බන්ධයෙන් පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තා කිරීමට පත් කරන ලද පාර්ලිමේන්තු විශේෂ කාරක සභාව විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද නිරීක්ෂණයන්ට පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රී හා විරුද්ධ පාර්ශ්වයේ නායක අනුර බණ්ඩාරනායක, පාර්ලිමේන්තු මන්ත්‍රී දිනේෂ් ගුණවර්ධන හා සරත් මුත්තෙටුවෙගම යන මන්ත්‍රීවරුන් වෙනස් වූ මතයක් දැරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් එකී මන්ත්‍රීන් තිදෙනා විසින් වෙන්ව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නට යෙදුණු වාර්තාව එකී මුල්

වාර්තාවේ පරිශිෂ්ටයක් ලෙස යා කොට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම පූර්වාදර්ශයක් ලෙස පැවතීම.''

මේක මගේ පුද්ගලික මතයක් නොවෙයි, පාර්ලිමේන්තු මහලේකම්තුමාගෙන් මම ලිඛිතව ලබා ගත් කාරණාවක්. දැනට මේ ටික තමයි මට පූර්වාදර්ශයක් ලෙස තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා අපට කිව්වේ, අවසන් කෙටුම්පත ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න සියලු දේ පරීක්ෂා කරලා බලලා මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ගේ නිර්දේශත් දෙන්න කියලායි. ඔබතුමා තීන්දුවක් අරගෙනවත්, ලේකම් කාර්යාලය තීන්දුවක් අරගෙනවත් නොවෙයි මේක දැම්මේ. අපි සියලු දෙනාගේ අදහස් ගැන මෙතැන සාකච්ඡා කළා. අපි ඔබතුමා සමඟ ඉඳගෙන අවසන් කළේ ඒ සාකච්ඡාවයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: කවුරුත් එහෙම තමයි. ඔබතුමන්ලා අවසන් කළා. මෙතුමන්ලා පිළිගත්තා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මට මේක කියලා අවසන් කරන්න දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ වාර්තාව ඔබතුමන්ලා සියලු දෙනාම පිළිගෙන තිබෙනවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔබතුමා කොහොමද කියන්නේ ඒක අන්තිම වාර්තාව කියලා? ඒක අන්තිම වාර්තාව නොවෙයි, කෙටුම්පතක්. ඒ කෙටුම්පත තමයි නිවැරදි කරන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා වාර්තාව පිළිගත්තා. ඔබතුමන්ලා නිගමන පිළිගත්තා නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි ඒවා නිවැරදි කළා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා නිගමනත් පිළිගත්තා. ඊට පසුව දැන් තවත් මොනවාද කියන්නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමාත් සමඟ ඉඳගෙන අපි මොනවාද කළේ?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කළා; කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව පිළිගත්තා; ඒවායේ සංශෝධනත් කළා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: සංශෝධනය කළේ නැති එකට අපි මොකක්ද කරන්නේ?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: දිගටම ඒවා පිළිගත්තේ නැහැ නේ, ඔබතුමා දිගටම හිටියේත් නැහැ නේ?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හිටියා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ සංශෝධන මේකට ඇතුළත් කරලා වාර්තාව හදන්න කියලායි. එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, ටිකක් ඉන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ඔබතුමා අවසන් තීරණයක් දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: අවසාන තීරණයක් දෙන්න කලින් මේ කියන්නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපට කියලාත් කුමක් හෝ ගෞරවයක් තිබෙන්න ඕනෑ නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ ගෞරවය වෙනුවෙන් තමයි මෙපමණ වේලාවක් කථා කරන්නේ. නැත්නම්, මේ වෙන කොටත් මේක අවසන් කරනවා. සියලු දෙනාම අහගන්න, මේක ඉතා වැදගත්. එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමනි, අපි 20වැනිදා රැස් වුණේ මේ කෙටුම්පත ගැන සාකච්ඡා කරලා අනුමත කරන්නයි. එතකොට මේක මුළුමනින් කියවන්න ඕනෑ කියලා මෙතුමන්ලා විනාඩි 20ක කාලයක් ඉල්ලා සිටියා. පැයක කාලයක් කියෙව්වා. පැයකට පසුව තමයි, සියලු දෙනාගේම එකඟතාව ඇහුවේ. එකඟතාව අහන වේලාවේ මමත් ඇතුළුව 14දෙනකු සිටියා. මම නැතිව ගත්තොත් 13දෙනෙක් සිටියා. ඒ 13දෙනාගෙන් 8දෙනෙකු ඒ අවස්ථාවේ වාර්තාවට එකඟතාව පළ කරලා අත්සන් කළා. අනෙක් අය මේකට එකඟ වුණේ නැහැ. මට ඕනෑ වුණා නම්, ඒ වේලාවේ බහුතරයෙන් සම්මත වුණා කියලා මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න තිබුණා. හැබැයි, ඒ වේලාවේ මම ඒක කළේ නැහැ. මම මෙතුමන්ලාට අවස්ථාවක් දෙන්න ඕනෑ නිසායි ඒක නොකළේ. ඊට පසුව තමයි මේ කාරක සභාව තීරණය කළේ සාකච්ඡා කරන්න.

ඊළඟට මේ අය එළියට ගිහින් ඇතුළට ඇවිල්ලා තමයි තීරණය කළේ, ''සම්පූර්ණ වාර්තාවේ අපි පිළිගන්නා කොටස සංශෝධනය කරන්න එපා, ඒක අපේ වාර්තාවක් හැටියට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලා කැමති වාර්තාවක් සභාපතිතුමා සමඟ වාඩි වෙලා සකස් කර ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න'' කියලා. ඒ දෙක එකතු කරලා මට වාර්තා දෙකක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. මම ඒක භය නැහැ. මගේ කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව බහුතරයෙන් පිළිගත්තා කියලා, මෙතුමන්ලා සාකච්ඡා කළ එක ඇමුණුමට ඇතුළත් කරන්න පුළුවන්. මම කරන්න ඕනෑ ඒක නේ. නමුත් මම ඒක නොකර මෙතරම් වේලා ඉවසන්නේ ඔබතුමන්ලාට සාධාරණයක් ඉෂ්ට කරලා එක වාර්තාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නයි. මොකද, verbatimවල තිබෙනවා ඔබතුමන්ලා ''වාර්තා දෙකක් ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න'' එකඟ වුණා කියලා. ඒ විධියට එකඟ වූ එකක් තිබෙනවා. මම මොකටද ඒක වෙනස් කරන්නේ. මට පූර්වාදර්ශ මොකුත් ඕනෑ නැහැ, දැන් තීරණයක් දෙන්න පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමන්ලා බහුතරයෙන් සම්මත කළ වාර්තාවක්

තිබෙනවා. මම මෙය තවත් ඉවසන්නේ, ඔබතුමන්ලාට දේශපාලනික ප්‍රශ්නයක් ඇති නොවන ආකාරයට ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන්නයි.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: ඊට අමතරව අද සවස අපි කවුරුත් ගරු කරන එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අපට යම් යම් මගපෙන්වීම් ටිකක් කළා. අපි ඔබතුමා ගැන විශ්වාසය තබා තමයි මේ දක්වාත් ආවේ. දැන් ඔබතුමා එකපාර එළියට ගිහින් ඇවිත් footnote දානවා කියලා කියනවා. එහෙම කරන්න එපා.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: I want this on record. Because of what the Hon. Lasantha Alagiyawanna said now, I am walking out of this Committee.

The Hon. Chairman: The Hon. Sumanthiran, I humbly request you, please do not -

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: I said about the footnote right at the beginning also.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේදී කාරක සභාව සුළු වේලාවකට කල් තැබිණි)

The Hon. Anura Priyadarshana Yapa: I want to say this in fairness to the Hon. Sumanthiran. He has made two suggestions. That is all.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: You see that we come to one agreement so that it will be one document.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබීමෙන් පසුව නැවත රැස්විය)

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේක සත්භාවයෙන් කරන්න හදන වැඩක් නේ.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියපු මේ footnote එක සම්බන්ධයෙන් බොහෝ අයගේ මතය වන්නේ, පිටු 03-04ක් තිබෙනවා කියලා නේ. වැඩිම වුණොත් පොඩි paragraph එකක් තිමයි තිබෙන්නේ. ඒකට අවසර දෙන්න. ඒ footnote එක ගැන කිව්වේ වෙන කවුරුත් නොවෙයි සුමන්තිරන් මන්ත්‍රීතුමා නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මේ footnote එක දැම්මා කියලා මේ original draft එකේ තිබෙන බර නැති වන්නේ නැහැ. මෙහි බොහොම සුළු එකතු කිරීම් කිහිපයක් පමණයි තිබෙන්නේ. මෙතැන වාක්‍ය 5-6කට වඩා එකක්වත් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: පැහැදිලියි.

ගරු අනුර ප්‍රියදර්ශන යාපා මහතා: මේකේ footnote එකක් එහෙම දාන්න බැහැ. අපි footnote එකෙන් කියන්නේ අහවල් පිට බලන්න කියන එක නේ. ඒ අනුව තමයි දමන්න වෙනනේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: "Footnote" නැතිව "endnote" කියන්න කෝ. කථාව ඉවරයි නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙහි යටින් ඉරක් ගහලා disincentive එක ලිව්වා. නැත්නම් ඒක වෙන් කරලා ගන්න බැහැ. මෙතැන තිබෙන්නේ අපේ මුළු එක නේ. නමුත් මම වගකීමෙන් කියන්නම්, ඒ draft ඒකේ තිබූ සමහර ඒවා අඩු වුණා, අපි එකතු කරලා තිබෙන්නේ වාක්‍ය 05ක හෝ 06ක ප්‍රමාණයක් පමණයි කියලා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, Latinවලින් *nota bene* කියලා තිබෙනවා නේ. ඒ අනුව පිටුවෙන් තුනෙන් පංගුවකට අඩුවෙන් මේක එනවාද කියන එක එක් කාරණයක්. දෙවැනි කාරණය තමයි, ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ නම් ටික ඇතුළත් කරන්න ඕනෑ කියන එක. එතකොට තමයි මේක විශාල වන්නේ.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: So, you can say the report is signed by these people- all the names are here. So, all the recommendations are unanimous.

The Hon. M.S. Sumanthiran continued.

Then, you can say, "Certain parts of the narrative of the report are not agreed to by these Members" Put the dissentients' names there or whatever and say, "Their alternative suggestions which were discussed in the Committee have been put in the footnotes" කතාව ඉවරයි නේ.

The Hon. Sujeewa Senasinghe: That is it.

සභාපතිතුමා: එතකොට, එය මට පහසුයි. කවුරුත් එයට එකඟයි නේද?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම්, ඔබතුමන්ලා තාක්ෂණික වශයෙන් එකඟ කාරණය නිසා, මට දැන් සහයෝගය දෙන්න. හරි නේ. මේ වාර්තාවේ අපි පිටුවෙන් පිටුව යනවා. මෙහි footnote එක

දමන්න ඕනෑ තැන ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ පිටුවෙන් බලලා මට කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපට කොතැනින් හරි අතපසු වුණොත්, දැන් අපට සොයා ගන්න බැහැ නේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපිට මේ ලැබිලා තිබෙන්නේ අසම්පූර්ණ note එකක්. අපි මේ ඉදිරියට යන්නේ විශ්වාස කරලා. එය ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් කරන්න. අපි මූල ධර්මයට එකඟ වුණා නේ. අපි හොයන්න එන්නේ නැහැ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට හෙට උදේ දෙන්න, එතකොට අපි කියන්නම්.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආයෙත් පටලවන්න එපා. ඕනෑ නම් පැයක් යයි මෙය අවසන් කරන්න, මම නම් එකඟයි.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපට හොයා ගන්න බැරි වුණොත්?

සභාපතිතුමා: පුළුවන්. ඔබතුමාට තව ඕනෑ නම් කථා කරලා හොයා ගන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා rest එකක් ගත්තා, අපි එහෙමත් නැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා උදව් කරන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 11 ඉවරයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: 11නොවෙයි, මුල ඉඳලාම යමු. 01වෙනි පිටුව, ලේඛන දෙකම මගේ අතේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: කෙටුම්පත නේද?

සභාපතිතුමා: කෙටුම්පත හෝ ඕනෑ දෙයක්, ලේඛන දෙකම මගේ අතේ තිබෙනවා, report එක මගේ අතේ තිබෙනවා.

ඩබ්ලිව්.පී.සී. වික්‍රමරත්න මහතා: කෙටුම්පත ොමාකක්ද කියලා නැවත කිව්වා නම් හරි.

සභාපතිතුමා: මන්ත්‍රීවරු අත්සන් කරපු, මේ නිගමන ඇතුළත් කරපු, 11 වෙනි පිටුව දක්වා එකඟතාව තිබෙන-,

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මෙයද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: නැහැ, pages වෙනස්.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නම්. ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ ලේඛනයත් මගේ අතේ තිබෙනවා, ලේඛන දෙකම මගේ අතේ තියාගෙන මම ලකුණු කර ගන්නවා. ලේකම් කාර්යාලයත් ඉන්නවා.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අතපසු වෙන ඒවා පසුව කියන්න දෙන්න. ඔබතුමා කියන්න එපා මෙතැන එකඟ වුණා කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා මෙච්චර වෙලා නිගමන සාකච්ඡා කරපු-, මගේ කෙටුම්පත කියලා මුලින් දීපු එක පැත්තකින් තියන්න. හරිද, සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරලා-,

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මේකද?

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: නැහැ, නැහැ මෙය.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: නැහැ, අලුත් එක ගැන කියන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම මෙහෙම කියන්නම්, 01 ඉඳලා 50 දක්වා පිටු තිබෙන ලේඛනය අතට ගන්න.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: පිටු 50ක් තිබෙන ලේඛනයක් අපට නැහැ. **සභාපතිතුමා:** එය ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: පිටු 52යි.

ගරු හර්ෂණ රාජකරුණා මහතා: අපට තිබෙන්නේ පිටු 46ක ලේඛනයක්.

සභාපතිතුමා: සියලු දෙනාටම එය ලබා දෙන්න.

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපිට තිබෙන්නේ පිටු 45ක ලේඛනයක්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, අපි අත්සන් කළ ලේඛනයේ තිබුණේ පිටු 45යි.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරි, හරි.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: අපි එයින් සාකච්ඡා කරමු. මොකද, ඒක නේ document එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: එයින් සාකච්ඡා කරමු. කෙටුම්පතෙන් සාකච්ඡා කරමු. ඔය තිබෙන්නේ මම මුලින්ම දීපු කෙටුම්පත. හරිද? ඔබතුමන්ලා සංශෝධන ඇතුළත් කරපු එකත් තිබෙනවා. මම දුන්න කෙටුම්පතත් තිබෙනවා, එයට ඇතුළත් කරගෙන යමු. 01 වෙනි පිටුව ලේඛන දෙකේම හරි. මගේ කෙටුම්පත ඉස්සර වෙලා බලමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: එහි හැදින්වීම-

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පොඩි කාරණයක් කියන්නම්, දැන් ඇත්තටම මෙතැන footnotes ටික කථා කරන්න නේ ඕනෑ වෙන්නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඒක clear. දැන් අපි ගන්න පදනම් ලේඛනය වන්නේ 09 වෙනි දා

ඔබතුමා table කරපු, අපි නමදෙනෙක් අත්සන් කරපු මුල් වාර්තාව.

සභාපතිතුමා: 11 වෙනි පිටුවට යන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: දැන් ඔබතුමා ඒකේ footnotes නේ යන්න ඕනෑ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔව්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එතකොට, on behalf of that group, Hon. (Dr.) Harhsa de Silvaට කියන්න - අපිට involve වෙන්න දෙයක් නැහැ - එතුමන්ලාගේ amendment එක ඒ අදාළ තැනට දෙන්න කියලා. පිටු අංකය වැදගත් නැහැ. වැදගත් වන්නේ 3.2,3.4 කියන එක.

සභාපතිතුමා: එය හොඳයි. එහෙම කරමු. 3.2 ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ නේ. එතකොට 4?

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: "භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කරන ලද ප්‍රතිපත්ති, ක්‍රියා මාර්ග හා නීතිමය පසුබිම."

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි 4 දක්වා ගියා නේ.

සභාපතිතුමා: "භාණ්ඩාගාර බැඳුම්කර නිකුත් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මහ බැංකුව අනුගමනය කරන ලද ප්‍රතිපත්ති, ක්‍රියා මාර්ග හා නීතිමය පසුබිම."

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඒක වෙනස් කළා, එය ඇතුළත් කර ගන්න.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතැන වෙනස් වෙන්නේ මොනවාද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මම වෙනස් වෙන තැන් කියන්නම්. 3.2හි-,

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 3.2, එයට කලින් එකඟ වුණා නේද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න. 4.1.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: පිටු අංකය කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දෙවැනි වාර්තාවේ 13, පළමුවැනි එකේ 11. 4.1.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 4.1 නොවෙයි, 4.2

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: 4.2 ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න, 4.1.1

සභාපතිතුමා: 4.1.1, එයට footnote එකක් එනවා.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: සමාවෙන්න. 4.1

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: 4.1ද, 4.1.1 ද?

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 4.1 සහ 4.1.1

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: පළමුවෙන් එකක් කියන්න. 4.1 ගැන කියන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: 4.1

ගරු මහින්දානන්ද අලුත්ගමගේ මහතා: 4.1 තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය මොකක්ද?

සභාපතිතුමා: එහි දෙකම එක විධියට තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: 4.1-,

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතැන තිබෙන ප්‍රශ්නය, පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් නැතිව නිකම් වාක්‍ය කියන්න කෝ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: වාක්‍ය පටන් ගන්නා තැන සහ අවසන් කරන තැන කියන්න. මුළු ඡේදයම කියවන්න එපා.

සභාපතිතුමා: ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා, මට පහසු නිසා මම කියන්නම්, 4.1ට ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ. ඒක ඒ විධියටම තිබෙනවා. 4.1.1ට තමයි සංශෝධන තිබෙන්නේ.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: අපි මෙය හෙට උදේට බලමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාත්, ලේකම් කාර්යාලයේත් පහසුකම දෙනවා නම් මම හදන්නම්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: දෙන්නම්.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: හෙට උදේ මම එන්නම්.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, එතුමන්ලා කරපු සංශෝධනත් මේ කමිටුවේ කථා කරලා නේ කලේ. එතුමන්ලාගේ කණ්ඩායමත් කමිටුවේ සාමාජිකයන් වශයෙන් නේ රැස්වුණේ. ඒ වෙලාවේ එකඟ වුණු ඒවා තිබෙනවා නේ. අන්න එය නිශ්චිතව footnote එකක් විධියට දෙන්න.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: මෙහි සියල්ලම ලියලා තිබෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: මෙහි ලේකම් කාර්යාලයෙන් type කරලාම තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නැහැ. දැන් කරන්න පුළුවන්.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: ඔබතුමා fresh එකේ ඉන්නේ. අපි දවස් ගණනක් වැඩ කරලා අපහසුවෙන් ඉන්නේ.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: Timeframe එක හදා ගන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. දැන් හරි නේ. පැහැදිලියි නේද?

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා සමඟ Hon. (Dr.) Harhsa de Silva වාඩි වෙලා මෙය-

සභාපතිතුමා: මම දැන් සකස් කරනවා. ආචාර්ය හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා ගරු මන්ත්‍රීතුමා අපි දැන් එය කරමු.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මෙතැනද සකස් කරන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: අපි Mr. Gajaweera Arachchigeගේ office එකට ගිහිල්ලා එතැන computer එකෙන් කරමු.

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: With a fresh mind, හෙට උදේ කරමු.

ගරු ලසන්ත අලගියවන්න මහතා: මට timeframe එක හරියට කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: Footnotes ඇතුළත් කළාම මේ වෙනස්කම් ටික-,

ගරු සුජීව සේනසිංහ මහතා: හෙට උදේට බලමුද?

සභාපතිතුමා: කියනකම් ඉන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට කථා කරන්න ඉඩ දෙන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: හර්ෂ මන්ත්‍රීතුමත් එක්ක මම හෙට උදේ footnotes එක දමන එක සකස් කරනවා.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ඊට පස්සේ ඔබතුමා වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නේ කොහොමද කියලා කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම සිකුරාදා උදේ පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

The Hon. Bimal Ratnayake: Agreed.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: එයට translation issues අනම් මනම් වෙන්න බැහැ. ඒකයි මම කියන්නේ. එය කරන්නේ ඔබතුමා නොවෙයි ලේකම් කාර්යාලය.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නම් ටික දමමු.

සභාපතිතුමා: නම් ටික දමනවා.

The Hon. M.A. Sumanthiran: It will be a unanimous report.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලා නැගිටින්න කලින්, මට මේ වාර්තාවට සම්පූර්ණයෙන් එකඟ වෙච්ච අය කවුද, footnotes දමන්න එකඟ අය කවුද කියලා නාම ලේඛනය කියන්න ඕනෑ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: නිගමන වලට පස්සේ මේ වාක්‍ය දමන්න, "මෙම සියලු නිගමන පිළිගන්නා කාරක සභාව, එම නිගමන අනුමත කොට ක්‍රියාවට නගන ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කරයි." දැන් අපි විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමන දැම්මාට අපි නිර්දේශ දීලා නැහැ නේ. "මෙම සියලු නිගමන පිළිගන්නා කාරක සභාව, එම නිසා එම අනුමත ක්‍රියාවට නගන ලෙස..." කියලා දමන්න, එතකොට ඒක වෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: අපේ footnote එකේ තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එහෙම නම් ඒක පොදු එකට දමන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: එය මෙහෙමයි, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශවල තිබෙනවා.

ගරු අජිත්. පී පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමා, අපි කිව්වා footnote එකේ තිබෙනවා, විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ අපි පිළිගන්නා අතර ඒවා ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුතුයි කියලා.

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනවලටත් ඒක තිබෙනවාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිගමනවලටත් ඒක තිබෙනවාද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: එතකොට ඒක foot note නොවෙයි, පොදු ක්‍රමය.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ කලබලයට මේ ප්‍රශ්නය විසඳන්නට එපා, පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ නිර්දේශ කියන එකට ඒක තිබෙනවා. 10වෙනි කාරණය විගණකාධිපතිතුමා විසින් සකස් කරන ලද විගණන වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශවලට ඔබතුමන්ලාගේ footnote එක තිබෙනවා. විගණකාධිපතිතුමාගේ විශේෂ නිගමනවලට ඒක නැහැනේ?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න, මොකක්ද ඔය කියන්නේ?

සභාපතිතුමා: 10.(1)ට නැහැ.

ගරු බිමල් රත්නායක මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, ඔව්වර ඇතුළට යන්නට ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මන්ත්‍රීතුමා කියන විධියට අපි overall මේවා ඉදිරිපත් කරන්නට එකඟයි. එහෙමයි දාන්නට ඕනෑ. එවිට footnotes ගැන ප්‍රශ්නයක් නැහැ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: මම කාරණයක් කියන්නම්, මේක පටලවලා ගන්න නිසා. එක දවසක මේ සභාවේ Membersලා වෙනස් වුණා. මම මේ පරිස්සම් වෙන්නයි කියන්නේ. බ්‍රහස්පතින්දා footnotes දාපු අය එක පිරිසක්, සිකුරාදා footnotes දාපු අය එක කොටසක්, සඳුදා footnotes දාපු කට්ටිය තව කොටසක්. ඒ කාරණය හොඳට හිතේ තියාගෙන footnote එක දාන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ නිසා තමයි මම මෙන්න මේ කාරණාව කියන්නේ, මම මේ ඉල්ලීම කරන්නේ ඒක නිසායි. පූර්ණ වශයෙන් මේ වාර්තාවට එකඟ අයගේ නාම ලේඛනයක් මම ගාව තිබෙනවා. දැන් මෙතැන දාන්නේ නම්නේ, අත්සන් නොවෙයිනේ.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: පූර්ණ වශයෙන් වාර්තාවට මමත් එකඟයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: නමුත් footnotes සඳහා නම් කරන අයගේ නාම ලේඛනයක් අවශ්‍යයි. මට දැන් කොළයක ඒ නට් ටික ලියා ගන්නට අවශ්‍යයි. එහෙම නැත්නම් කවුද footnotesවලට සංශෝධන සහිතව එකඟ කියලා මම වාර්තාවේ දාන්නේ කොහොමද? ඔබතුමන්ලා හැමෝම මට ඒ සඳහා එකඟතාව දෙන්න. ඔබතුමන්ලා නම ලියලා අත්සන් කරලා දෙන්න.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: එහෙම බැහැ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇයි?

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: දවස් තුනකට තුන්ගොල්ලක් ඇවිල්ලා තිබෙන්නේ. එතකොට කොහොමද දාන්නේ? ඒකනේ මේ කියන්නේ. අද සිටින සියලුදෙනාම අත්සන් කරලා දෙන්න බැහැ. එක දවසක තුන්දෙනෙක් ඇවිල්ලා footnotesවලට සහයෝගය දීලා තිබෙනවා, ඉතිරි දවසේ දෙන්නෙක් ඇවිල්ලා සහයෝගය දීලා තිබෙනවා කියමු. ඒ ගැන ඔබතුමාගේ පැමිණීමේ ලේඛනයේ තිබෙනවා, ඒ පොත බලාගෙන දාන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: හරි, එකෙන් බලලා දාන්නම්. ඒ වාගේම අද දිනයේ කාරක සභාවට සහභාගි වෙන අයගෙන් සම්පූර්ණ වශයෙන් වාර්තාවට එකඟ වෙන අයගේ නාම ලේඛනයක් සහ footnotes සහිතව එකඟ වෙන අයගේ නාම ලේඛනයක් අවශ්‍යයි. මට අද දිනයේ සහභාගි වන අයගේ නම්-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමාට නම් ටික දෙන්නකෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: ඇයි ඔබතුමන්ලාට මේකට අත්සන් කරලා දෙන්න බැරි?

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: හැමෝම එකඟයිනේ, දාන්නකෝ.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම දින බලලා අදාළ නම් ටික දාන්නම්. විසිරි යන්න කලින් පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා. සිකුරාදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට මම මේ වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා, ඒ සඳහා මේ කාරක සභාව එකඟද?

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: Footnotes හදා ගන්න බැරි වුණොත් හෙට දවසේත්, footnotes නැතිව හෝ සිකුරාදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරන්න.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, පොඩි පැහැදිලි කිරීමක් තිබෙනවා. Now, it is a unanimous report subject to certain dissentions on certain matters. Friday, you are going to present it to Parliament. In outside, there will be questions whether this මේක වැදගත්, ඒ සඳහාත් මම යෝජනාවක් කරන්නම්. We do not have to say anything in detailed until you present the Report. But, I think it may be good to say that the COPE Committee has agreed on one Report which will include if these people have any disagreements on this reports.

ගරු (ආචාර්ය) හර්ෂ ද සිල්වා මහතා: මේක හොඳ වැදගත් කාරණාවක්, අහ ගන්න.

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: ඔව්, මේක වැදගත්. මම ඒ සඳහාත් යෝජනාවක් කරන්නම්.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඔනේ නම් අපට තව දෙයක් කරන්නට පුළුවන්, ඒ අනම් මනම් කියන්නේ නැතිව specifically -

ගරු එම්.ඒ. සුමන්තිරන් මහතා: ඔව්, ඒකත් හොඳයි.

සභාපතිතුමා: පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න. දැන් mediaවලින් එළියේ ඉන්නවාද?

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඉන්නවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම නම් ඒගොල්ලන්ට එන්න කියමු.

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: අපි කථා කරන්නේ නැහැ, ඔබතුමා කියන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: මම කියන්නම්. මෙතැනට එන්න කියලාම මම කියන්නම්. මාධ්‍යයට කියන්නට අවශ්‍ය දේ ලියාගෙනම කිව්වා නම් හරිනේ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර ගනු දෙනුව පිළිබඳව COPE එක විසින් කරන ලද පරීක්ෂණයේ කටයුතු අවසන් වුණා. එම වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශයන් පිළිබඳව ඒකමතික තීරණයක්-

සභාපතිතුමා: මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර ගනු දෙනුව පිළිබඳව COPE එකේ විමර්ශන කටයුත්ත අද දින අවසන් වුණා. එම වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශයන් පිළිබඳව කාරක සභාව දීර්ඝ සාකච්ඡාවකින් පසුව ඒකමතික තීරණයන්ට එළැඹුණා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: කාරක සභාවේ සියලුම සාමාජිකයින් විසින් එකඟතාවකට ආවා. වාර්තාවේ යම් යම් කරුණු පිළිබඳව වෙනස් මතයන් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබෙනවා. එම මතයන් වාර්තාවේ සඳහන් වෙන්නේ නැහැ. සිකුරාදා දිනයේ මෙය පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ඉන් පසුව ස්වාභාවිකවම ප්‍රශ්නයක් මතු වෙනවා-

සභාපතිතුමා: නැහැ, ඒක කියන්න ඕනෑ නැහැ.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: අපි කවුරුත් එකඟතාවකට එමු වෙනස් වූ කරුණු මොනවාද කියලා ඇහුවොත් මෙහෙම කියන්නට. සිදුරාදා දින මේ වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා. එවිට සියලු දෙනාටම ඒක බලා ගන්නට පුළුවන්. ඒ විධියට කියමු. ''වෙනස් වූ මතයන්'' කියලා කිව්වේ නැත්නම් වෙනත් case එකක් එනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, මගේ යෝජනාවක් කියන්නද? හේතු දැක්වීම පිළිබඳව වෙනසක් තිබෙනවා කිව්වානේ. එහෙම කියන්නත් එපා, ඔබතුමා වාක්‍ය දෙක තුනකින් කියන්න, ''අද මේ කාරක සභාවේ කටයුතු අවසන් වූ බව සතුටින් දැනුම් දෙනවා. සියලුම සාමාජිකයින් අවසන් නිගමනයන් පිළිබඳව පොදු එකඟතාවකට පැමිණියා. ''

සභාපතිතුමා: ඒ වාර්තාව සිකුරාදා පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කරනවා.

ගරු අජිත් පී. පෙරේරා මහතා: එහෙම නැත්නම් වෙන්නේ අපි ඕක කියපු ගමන් මොනවාද වෙනස් හේතු කියන එක ගැන කථා කරන්න වෙනවා.

සභාපතිතුමා: එහෙම කරමු. පොඩ්ඩක් ඉන්න මම කියන්නම් අවසාන වශයෙන් මාධ්‍යයට කියන ප්‍රකාශය. '' මහ බැංකුවේ ගනු දෙනුව පිළිබඳව COPE කමිටුවේ විමර්ශනය අද දින අවසන් වුණා. එම වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශයන් පිළිබඳව කාරක සභාවේ දීර්ඝ සාකච්ඡාවකින් පසු සියලුම සාමාජිකයින් එකඟතාවකට පැමිණියා. එකී වාර්තාව සිකුරාදා දින පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කාරක සභාව එකඟතාවට ආවා. ''

ගරු දයාසිරි ජයසේකර මහතා: වාර්තාවට සිකුරාදා දින ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කාරක සභාව එකඟතාවට ආවා.

ගරු අනුර දිසානායක මහතා: සිකුරාදා දින එම වාර්තාව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කාරක සභාව තීරණය කළා කියලා සඳහන් කරන්න.

සභාපතිතුමා: Mediaවලට එන්න කියන්න.

(මේ අවස්ථාවේ මාධ්‍යවේදීන් කාරක සභා කාමරයට කැඳවන ලදහ.)

සභාපතිතුමා: හෙට උදේ 9.00ට .....-

ගරු හෙක්ටර් අප්පුහාමි මහතා: ගරු සභාපතිතුමනි, -

සභාපතිතුමා: 2015 මැයි 26 වැනිදා ඉඳලා පුරා මාස 18ක් පැවති පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභාවේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුවේ බැඳුම්කර ගනු දෙනුව පිළිබඳ විමර්ශනයන් අද දිනයේදී අවසන් වුණා. ඒ වාර්තාවේ නිර්දේශයන් සඳහා කාරක සභාවේ සියලුම සභිකයින් එකඟතාවකට පැමිණියා. ඒ වාගේම වාර්තාව සිකුරාදා දිනයේදී පාර්ලිමේන්තුවට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට කාරක සභාව ඒකමතිකව තීරණය කළා. මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් සහය පළ කළ විගණකාධිපතිතුමා ඇතුළු විගණකාධිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ නිලධාරින්ටත් ඒ වාගේම පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ අපේ කාරක සභාවේ සියලුම දෙනාටත්, මේ වාර්තාවේ කරුණු කාරණා පිළිබඳව රට තුළ ඇති වුණු විවිධ සාකච්ඡාවන්, සංවාදයන් සමඟ මේ වාර්තාවට දායකත්වය සැපයූ සියලුම ජනමාධ්‍යවලටත්, මාධ්‍යවේදීන්ටත් මා ස්තුතිවන්ත වෙනවා. කාරක සභාවේ මන්ත්‍රීවරුන්ටත්, ඒ වාගේම ලේකම් මණ්ඩලයටත් මගේ ස්තුතිය පළ කරනවා. බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

මාධ්‍යවේදී නිලධාරි මහත්මයෙක්: අද දින කී දෙනෙක් මේ කාරක සභාවට සහභාගි වුණාද?

සභාපතිතුමා: මේ ඉන්න අය තමයි. බොහොම ස්තුතියි.

(කාරක සභාව කල් තැබිණි.)

ඇමුණුම 23

ඇමුණුම 23
இகணப்பு 23
Annexure 23

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පිටපත් අංකය : Copy No. : /13

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය : Board Paper No. : MB/PD/1/28/2008

රැස්වීම් අංකය : Meeting No. : 1/2008

ලිපිගොනු අංකය : File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

විෂය අංකය : Item No. : 28

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව : Department : PUBLIC DEBT

දිනය : Date : 7.1.2008

TABLED BOARD PAPER

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත : **To : The Monetary Board**

මාතෘකාව : SUBJECT : PROPOSED YIELD STRUCTURE FOR TREASURY BONDS TO BE MOBILISED THROUGH DIRECT PLACEMENTS IN 2008

The purpose of this Board Paper is to;

(i) inform the Monetary Board of the plan of direct placements on Treasury Bonds and Rupee loans in 2008 to be arranged through the captive type investors.

(ii) seek the Monetary Board approval for the yield structure proposed for medium and long term direct placements on Treasury bonds and Rupee loans.

Introduction

According to the government cash flow for 2008, government expects to raise Rs 355 bn from domestic rupee sources by issuing Treasury bonds and Rupee loans. The main investor group operating in the long term debt market is state owned and state managed captive type sources. Major captive investors are EPF, NSB and ETF. Resource availability with these captive sources in 2008 is estimated at Rs 300 bn. (EPF –Rs 183 bn, NSB – Rs 83 bn and ETF – Rs 33 bn). The annual investment programmes of these captive sources indicated that Rs 235 bn would be invested in Treasury bonds while the balance to be invested in Treasury bills and other instruments.

Based on the above estimates, Rs 120 bn has to be collected from non captive sources mainly from Treasury bonds and Rupee loans through auction process to meet the borrowing requirement. In addition, Rs 9 bn is to be raised through new Treasury bills as indicated in the Cash Flow totaling Rs 129 bn borrowings from non captive market sources. This amount excludes the re-issue of maturing Treasury bills during the year estimated at Rs. 690 bn.

In 2008, the government's borrowings requirement from the domestic market through Treasury bonds and Rupee loans is excessive and not be able to raise through the normal auction process at a reasonable yield rates. Therefore, it would be advisable to raise funds available with captive type investors through direct placements. Further, considering the bunching problem in the domestic debt, it is suggested to issue long term securities in order to lower the refinancing risk in the future. Since, there is no active yield curve for long term maturities, this paper has proposed

suitable rate structure for long term maturities based on the medium term inflation targets given by the Economic Research Department.

Proposed Yield Rate Structure

The Medium Term Macroeconomic Framework has targeted a downward inflation path as given in Table 1 and on which the proposed rate structure is based.

Table 1
Inflation Targets as per MT Macroeconomic Framework

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
11.0%	9.0%	7.0%	5.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%

Based on these inflation targets, a proposed yield rate structure is estimated taking in to account real returns of 3% - 4% and appropriate risk premium for future market risks. The proposed yield rate structure for different maturities is given below. Details of the yield rate analysis is attached (Annex 1).

Table 2
Proposed Yield Rate Structure (After Tax)

Maturity	2 yrs	3yrs	4 yrs	5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	9 yrs	10 yrs	15 yrs.
Yield (%)at Real return of 4%	16.70%	15.85%	15.10%	14.40%	13.80%	13.46%	13.20%	13.00%	12.80%	12.60%
Yield(%) at Real return of 3%	15.80%	14.90%	14.15	13.40%	12.90%	12.45%	12.15%	11.95%	11.80%	11.55%

Possible Implications

- Shifting of a large share of fund mobilization program through direct placements would help lower the amount to be raised through the auction process thereby reducing the pressure on the market yield.
- However, this has a negative impact on the domestic debt market development.
- Initially, there would be a dual rate structure for similar maturities that would distort the market operations since current market rates are above the proposed rate structure due to high inflationary expectations.
- Possible mark to market losses for captive holders until the entire debt market stabilize around the proposed rate structure.
- Captive holderswould keep these securities in their investment portfolio in order to avoid mark to market losses.

- Captive holders could not trade or sale these bonds without capital losses if duel rate structure continues.
- This would have some impact on Primary Dealer operations reducing their operation in primary and secondary markets.

Considering the above issues, it is suggested to issue long term bonds with 6,8, 10 and 15 years tenure for direct placements. The proposed rates for these bonds (net of taxes) are 13.90%, 12.15%, 11.80% and 11.55% respectively.

Since the domestic debt market is volatile in the recent past, it is proposed to review this rate structure at end of April 2008, taking into consideration the development in debt market and macroeconomic environment in the economy.

The Monetary Board approval is sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placements of Treasury bonds and Rupee loans in respect of captive investors such as EPF, NSB and ETF during January-April 2008.

DG(W) SMB AG(P) Actg. SPD

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

posal for the Yield Rates (Based on Inflation expectations)

Interest Rates Which Would Equate

ent Value At Given Real Rate Of Return

Without Market Risk Premium at Real rate of					Market Risk Premium	With Market Risk Premium at Real rate of					Remarks
0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	4.00%		0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	4.00%	
12.70%	13.65%	14.59%	15.53%	16.46%	0.25%	12.95%	13.90%	14.84%	15.78%	16.71%	After Tax Rate
11.53%	12.49%	13.45%	14.40%	15.34%	0.50%	12.03%	12.99%	13.95%	14.90%	15.84%	
10.51%	11.49%	12.46%	13.43%	14.39%	0.70%	11.21%	12.19%	13.16%	14.13%	15.09%	
9.55%	10.55%	11.54%	12.52%	13.50%	0.90%	10.45%	11.45%	12.44%	13.42%	14.40%	
8.76%	9.78%	10.78%	11.79%	12.78%	1.10%	9.86%	10.88%	11.88%	12.89%	13.88%	
8.19%	9.21%	10.24%	11.25%	12.26%	1.20%	9.39%	10.41%	11.44%	12.45%	13.46%	
7.75%	8.79%	9.82%	10.85%	11.87%	1.30%	9.05%	10.09%	11.12%	12.15%	13.17%	
7.41%	8.46%	9.50%	10.53%	11.56%	1.40%	8.81%	9.86%	10.90%	11.93%	12.96%	
7.13%	8.19%	9.24%	10.28%	11.32%	1.50%	8.63%	9.69%	10.74%	11.78%	12.82%	
6.30%	7.38%	8.46%	9.53%	10.59%	2.00%	8.30%	9.38%	10.46%	11.53%	12.59%	
14.11%	15.16%	16.21%	17.25%	18.29%		14.39%	15.44%	16.49%	17.53%	18.57%	Before Tax Rate
12.81%	13.88%	14.94%	16.00%	17.05%		13.37%	14.43%	15.49%	16.55%	17.60%	
11.68%	12.76%	13.84%	14.92%	15.99%		12.46%	13.54%	14.62%	15.70%	16.77%	
10.62%	11.72%	12.82%	13.92%	15.01%		11.62%	12.72%	13.82%	14.92%	16.01%	
9.74%	10.86%	11.98%	13.09%	14.20%		10.96%	12.08%	13.20%	14.32%	15.42%	
9.10%	10.24%	11.37%	12.50%	13.62%		10.43%	11.57%	12.71%	13.83%	14.96%	
8.61%	9.77%	10.91%	12.05%	13.19%		10.06%	11.21%	12.36%	13.50%	14.63%	
8.23%	9.40%	10.55%	11.70%	12.84%		9.79%	10.95%	12.11%	13.26%	14.40%	
7.93%	9.10%	10.26%	11.42%	12.57%		9.59%	10.76%	11.93%	13.09%	14.24%	
7.00%	8.20%	9.40%	10.59%	11.77%		9.22%	10.42%	11.62%	12.81%	13.99%	

Expectations (Forecasts)

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	>2017
11.00%	9.00%	7.00%	5.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%



සටහන් පත්‍රය
MINUTE PAPER

ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය
MONETARY BOARD

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මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/1/26/2008

ලිපි ගොනු අංක :
File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

රැස්වීම් අංක : 1/2008
Meeting No. :

විෂය අංක : 26
Item No. :

දිනය : 07.01.2008
Date :

සටහන :
MINUTE : 26. Proposed Yield Structure for Treasury Bonds to be Mobilised through direct Placements in 2008

The Chairman informed the Board that the CBSL has been concerned about the unwarranted increases in the interest rates on government securities. Against this background, he informed that he had requested the Departments of Public Debt and Economic Research to come up with proposals with respect to the issue of government debt instruments and also aiming at minimizing the interest rate differentials between the primary and the secondary markets. The Board discussed the proposal in detail.

The Official Member was of the view that the investors mentioned in the paper, namely, the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF), Employees' Trust Fund (ETF) and the National Savings Bank (NSB), should not be treated alike as the cost structure in mobilizing funds by these three institutions differ. He also emphasized the need to take a realistic inflation forecast and stated that during the first half of the current year inflation is likely to remain high as several projects will continue to incur costs towards completion, whilst defence expenditure is unlikely to reduce and that certain adjustments in the administered prices will also have to be made. He further mentioned that in addition to the three institutions mentioned in the paper, the Public Debt Department should also look at several other sources such as different funds. He was also of the view that auctioning of government securities should aim at sources with more liquid funds.

(P.T.O)

The Board taking into consideration the views expressed by the members, approved :

(a) to allow the EPF to invest in longer term Government papers based on long term inflationary expectations plus 4 percent real rate of return and 2 percent risk premium to cover the errors in inflation projections;

(b) ETF also to be offered investment opportunities in Government paper on the same basis;

(c) for Superintendent of Public Debt (SPD) to negotiate with NSB for investments in Government paper, based on yield rates proposed in the paper; and

(d) For the Monetary Board to review the rates after April, 2008.

The Board requested SPD to report back to the Board with the progress on the proposal. The Board also requested CBSL to review the primary dealer system as this doesn't seem to raise funds from the market in an effective manner.

TRUE COPY

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

TO : SPD
DER
S/EPF

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Copy No. :

රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 11/2008

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 16
දිනය :
Date : 02.05.2008

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/11/16/2008

ලිපිගොනු අංකය :
File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව :
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board

මාතෘකාව : PROPOSED YIELD STRUCTURE FOR TREASURY BONDS TO BE MOBILIZED
SUBJECT : THROUGH DIRECT PLACEMENTS IN 2008

The purpose of this Board Paper is to seek the Monetary Board approval for the yield rate structure proposed for medium and long term direct placements on Treasury bonds, during May – December 2008.

Introduction

1. The Monetary Board on its 1/2008 meeting held on 07.01.2008 approved following rate structure (Table 1) to be used for direct placements of Treasury bonds in respect of major investors such as EPF, NSB and ETF during January – April 2008. Since, there is no active yield curve for long term maturities, this rate structure was based on the medium term annual inflation targets given by the Economic Research Department at that time, with real return of 4 percent and risk premium of 2 percent.

Table 1

Yield Rate Structure (After Tax)

(percentage)

Maturity	2 yrs	3 yrs	4 yrs	5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	9 yrs	10 yrs	15 yrs
Yield	18.45	17.35	16.40	15.50	14.80	14.25	13.85	13.55	13.30	12.60

2. In 2008, the government's borrowing requirement from the domestic market through Treasury bonds is excessive (Rs 314.0 bn) and not be able to raise this total through the normal auction process at a reasonable yield rates. Therefore, Monetary Board approval was given to raise funds available with captive type large investors through direct placements. Further, considering the bunching problem in the domestic debt, it was instructed to issue long term securities in order to lower the refinancing risk in the future. Accordingly PDD raised Rs 115.0 bn from EPF, NSB and ETF by issuing Treasury Bonds through direct placements during January-April 2008[1]. (EPF Rs 68.6 bn, NSB Rs 41.8 bn and ETF Rs 4.7 bn)

[1] As at 24 April 2008

Proposed Yield Rate Structure for May – December 2008

3. Inflation forecasted in December 2007, i.e. at the time of estimating existing yield rate structure is given in Table 2 below. By the end March 2008, monthly inflation forecasts have been revised upward (Table 2), taking into account recent developments in the global market and the macro economy. However, the medium term inflation targets given by the Economic Research Department have remained unchanged showing a downward inflation path as given in the Table 3 below.

Table 2
Inflation Expectations

2008	Inflation forecasted at (p/p)	
	Dec 2007 (%)	Mar 2008 (%)
January	19.8	20.8*
February	17.8	21.6*
March	17.7	23.8*
April	17.8	24.1
May	18.1	24.5
June	16.9	23.3
July	15.7	22.0
Aug	14.8	21.1
Sept	14.9	21.2
Oct	12.8	19.0
Nov	11.7	17.9
Dec	11.8	18.1

*actual

Table 3
Annual Inflation Targets as per MT Macroeconomic Framework

2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
9.0%	7.0%	5.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%

4. The yield rate structure of Treasury bond market has declined during 1st four months of the year by about 100 bps. Accordingly, yield rates of Treasury bonds with 2 yrs and 3 yrs maturity decreased to 18.00 percent and 17.05 percent during this period. Following the same trend, Treasury bill rates too declined by 95 – 263 bps during the same period.

Table 4
Yield Rates of Primary Auctions

Maturity (yrs)	Yield Rate of Primary Auctions (end period)				
	End 2007	Jan 2008	Feb 2008	Mar 2008	Apr 2008
T-bonds 1 year	---	18.58 %	---	---	---
2 year	15.50 %*	---	18.00 %	---	18.00 %
3 year	---	17.06 %	---	17.05 %	17.05 %
T-bills 91 days	21.30 %	19.25 %	18.48 %	18.39 %	18.67 %
182 days	19.99 %	19.29 %	18.97 %	18.96 %	18.97 %
364 days	19.96 %	19.45 %	19.04 %	19.00 %	19.01 %

* as at end November 2007.

5. Considering the reduction of the interest rate structure in the primary and secondary markets and unchanged medium and long term inflation forecasts by the ERD, it is proposed to issue medium and long term bonds with maturities over 3 years tenure for direct placements during May-December 2008 with the same rate structure given during Jan – April 2008, as given in the Table 5. Yield rates for Treasury bonds with maturity of 2 yrs and 3 yrs are proposed to maintain at current market levels of 18.00 percent and 17.05 percent.

Table 5
Proposed Yield Rate Structure for May-December 2008 (After Tax)

(percentage)

Maturity	2 yrs	3 yrs	4 yrs	5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	9 yrs	10 yrs	15 yrs
Yield	18.00	17.05	16.40	15.50	14.80	14.25	13.85	13.55	13.30	12.60

6. The Monetary Board approval is sought for the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placements of Treasury bonds in respect of captive type large investors such as EPF, NSB and ETF during May – December 2008.

DG (W) SMB AG (P) SPD

Acting Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

3

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MINUTE PAPER

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CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

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MONETARY BOARD

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මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/11/16/2008

ලිපි ගොනු අංක :
File No. : 08/11/002/0007/001

රැස්වීම් අංක : *Meeting No.* : 11/2008

විෂය අංක : *Item No.* : 16

දිනය : *Date* : 02.05.2008

සටහන : *MINUTE* : 16. Proposed Yield Structure for Treasury Bonds to be mobilized through Direct Placements in 2008

The Board having considered the paper approved of the proposed rate structure to be used for direct placements of Treasury Bonds in respect of captive type large investors such as Employees' Provident Fund, National Savings Bank and Employees' Trust Fund during May – December, 2008.

TRUE COPY

M A R C Cooray
Secretary
MONETARY BOARD

TO : SPD
Thro' AG(P)

පිටපත් අංකය :
Copy No. :

මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංකය :
Board Paper No. : MB/PD/25/20 /2008 .10

රැස්වීම් අංකය :
Meeting No. : 25/2008

ලිපිගොනු අංකය :
File No. : 08/11/003/0060/002

විෂය අංකය :
Item No. : 20

දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව
Department : PUBLIC DEBT

දිනය :
Date : 07.10.2008

TABLED BOARD PAPER

මුදල් මණ්ඩලය වෙත :
To : The Monetary Board

මාතෘකාව : IMPROVEMENT OF MARKET LIQUIDITY THROUGH ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
SUBJECT: OF EMPLOYEES' PROVIDENT FUND.

The purpose of this Board Paper is to seek the Monetary Board approval to;

(i) Issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at an interest rate 5 basis points above the rates prevailed in the secondary market through private placements; and

(ii) Request EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations.

2. It has been observed an emerging pressure on the government borrowing programme since mid September 2008. The main contributory factors include excessive government borrowings from domestic sources, delay in government borrowing from external foreign currency sources, newly developed turmoil in the international capital market and continuous shortfall in liquidity in the domestic market. As a result, there is a high risk of increasing the interest rates in the domestic market and the possibility of funding through the Central Bank to meet borrowing shortfalls.

3. In this context, it would be advisable to adopt a market stabilisation process by inviting the EPF to play an active role in both the primary market, preventing upward pressure in the primary market and actively trading in the secondary market thereby improving liquidity in the government securities market.

4. Accordingly, the Monetary Board is invited to approve;

(i) to issue Treasury bonds to Employees' Provident Fund at a interest rate 5 basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements; and,

(ii) to request the EPF to create liquidity in the secondary market by actively engage in secondary market operations.

DG(W) S/MB AG(P) S/PD

M A R C Cooray
Secretary

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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் **Public Debt Department**

24 October 2016

Ms Nishanthi Wickramaratne
Secretary
Committee on Public Enterprises

Dear Ms Wickramaratne,

MB Paper No. MB/PD/11/16/2008

This has reference to your letter dated 24th October 2016, on the above subject.

1. In the Board paper referred to in this letter, the Monetary Board has granted approval for the yield rate structure to be applied for the private placements through captive sources for the period May- December 2008. We do not observe any extension for the same decision.

   However, as per the Board Paper dated 07/10/2008, Monetary Board has given approval to issue Treasury Bonds to Employees Provident Fund and Other captive sources at an interest rate five basis points above the secondary market rates through private placements.

2. The answer to this question was provided by a letter dated 21 October 2016. A copy attached for your easy reference.

Yours sincerely,

Superintendent of Public Debt

10 වන මහල, අංක 30, ජනාධිපති මාවත, කැ. පෝ. 590, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
94 11 2477277/574 94 11 2477718
10 ஆம் மாடி, இல. 30 சனாதிபதி மாவத்தை கொழும்பு 1 த. பெ. இல. 590, கொழும்பு 01, இலங்கை
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www.cbsl.gov.lk

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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
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රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் Public Debt Department

21 October 2016

Ms Nishanthi S. Wickramaratne
Secretary
Committee on Public Enterprises

Dear Ms Wickramasinghe,

Decisions on Monetary Board within the period of 2008

This has reference to your letter dated 21.10.2016 on the above subject, addressed to the Governor of the Central Bank.

The Monetary Board approval has been granted to raise funds through direct placements from captive sources in 2008 (Board paper No. MB/PD/1/26/2008 dated 07.01.2008). Except for the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), all the other captive sources need to come to the auction through a primary dealer. Therefore, year 2008 could be considered as the year where the Primary Dealers were first allowed to participate in private placements.

Yours sincerely,

Superintendent/Public Debt Department

30 වන මහල, අංක 30, ජනාධිපති මාවත, කො. පෝ. 590, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
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ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ බැංකුව
இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

රාජ්‍ය ණය දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව பொதுப்படுகடன் திணைக்களம் Public Debt Department

24 October 2016

Ms Nishanthi Wickramaratne

Secretary

Committee on Public Enterprises

Dear Ms Wickramaratne,

Main Features of Treasury Bonds

This has reference to your letter dated 24th October 2016, on the above subject.

The particulars of the above document presently appearing in the Central Bank Web site had been appearing since 29th March 2012.

Superintendent of Public Debt

10 වන මහල, අංක 30, ජනාධිපති මාවත,
ත. ඇ. 590, කොළඹ 01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
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ඇමුණුම 24

ඇමුණුම 24
இகணப்பு 24
Annexure 24

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Bids Received for the Auction held on 27-02-2015 for ISIN LKB03045C013

Auction Date	Issue Date	Iss. Date for Cal.	Bond Series	ISIN	Dealer Name	Bid Serial	Amount	Offer	Settlement Date	Maturity Date	User ID	Last Update Date	Last Update Time
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03C45C013	Entrust Securities PLC	1	50,000,000	104.50720	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7236	27-02-2015	10:03:12
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	02-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03C45C013	Entrust Securities PLC	2	50,000,000	103.11582	03-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7236	27-02-2015	10:03:24
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03C45C013	Natwealth Securities Ltd.	1	50,000,000	102.20760	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7254	27-02-2015	10:11:46
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03C45C013	Natwealth Securities Ltd.	2	50,000,000	99.89960	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7254	27-02-2015	10:12:03
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Union Bank	1	50,000,000	76.48088	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7302	27-02-2015	10:13:18
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Union Bank	2	50,000,000	74.21250	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7302	27-02-2015	10:14:12
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Sampath Bank PLC	1	100,000,000	62.52160	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7278	27-02-2015	10:20:01
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd.	1	50,000,000	86.08512	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7055	27-02-2015	10:27:11
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd.	2	50,000,000	85.74286	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7055	27-02-2015	10:27:55
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Acuity Securities Ltd.	1	50,000,000	112.01000	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5175	27-02-2015	10:26:02
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Acuity Securities Ltd.	2	100,000,000	85.74000	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5175	27-02-2015	10:28:22
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Capital Alliance	1	100,000,000	90.17596	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5245	27-02-2015	10:30:59
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Perpetual Treasuries	1	250,000,000	97.87800	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5281	27-02-2015	10:32:07
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Perpetual Treasuries	2	250,000,000	95.83940	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5281	27-02-2015	10:32:33
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Perpetual Treasuries	3	500,000,000	93.87950	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5281	27-02-2015	10:32:58
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Perpetual Treasuries	4	1,000,000,000	91.92980	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5281	27-02-2015	10:33:46
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC	1	250,000,000	90.17700	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7311	27-02-2015	10:35:24
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC	2	250,000,000	88.42880	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7311	27-02-2015	10:35:52
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Pan Asia Banking Corporation PLC	3	100,000,000	86.74250	02-03-2015	02-03-2045	BOA7311	27-02-2015	10:36:19
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	People's Bank	1	150,000,000	102.20720	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7135	27-02-2015	10:37:40
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Seylan Bank PLC	1	1,250,000,000	95.80740	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7287	27-02-2015	10:42:55
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Employees Provident Fund	1	500,000,000	99.99930	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5087	27-02-2015	10:42:36
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	NSB Fund Management Company Ltd.	1	100,000,000	104.50730	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5183	27-02-2015	10:42:55
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	NSB Fund Management Company Ltd.	2	100,000,000	102.20720	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5183	27-02-2015	10:43:27
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	NSB Fund Management Company Ltd.	3	100,000,000	101.75305	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5183	27-02-2015	10:43:38
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Employees Provident Fund	3	500,000,000	104.50730	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5087	27-02-2015	10:44:39
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Employees Provident Fund	2	1,000,000,000	102.20720	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5087	27-02-2015	10:45:13
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	02-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd.	1	50,000,000	99.87900	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5272	27-02-2015	10:50:48
27-02-2015	02-03-2015	03-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Wealth Trust Securities Ltd.	2	50,000,000	99.17700	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5272	27-02-2015	10:51:22
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	First Capital Treasuries Ltd.	1	100,000,000	110.95980	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA5184	27-02-2015	10:52:24
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Bank of Ceylon	1	8,000,000	112.33470	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7010	27-02-2015	10:56:44
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	02-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Bank of Ceylon	2	500,000,000	108.39930	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7010	27-02-2015	10:57:03
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	03-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Bank of Ceylon	3	3,000,000,000	104.09950	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7010	27-02-2015	10:57:22
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	04-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Bank of Ceylon	4	5,000,000,000	88.40740	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7010	27-02-2015	10:57:41
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Bank of Ceylon	5	5,000,000,000	85.76950	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7010	27-02-2015	10:57:57
27-02-2015	01-03-2015	01-03-2015	12.50%2045A	LKB03045C013	Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp.	1	100,000,000	90.17700	02-03-2015	01-03-2045	BOA7052	27-02-2015	11:04:26

E. A. HETTIARACHCHI
DIRECTOR

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The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Less than all the others.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The latest one was the lowest ineffective yield rate.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Anywhere close to thirty years that you have had in the past.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: One was the 29 years and nine months I referred to.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That you take as thirty years. Anything for twenty years.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We do twenty years also.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You have a history of having these long term bond issues. This is not a new thing?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you give us a record of long-term bonds that are beyond 20 years or beyond 15 years.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Considering long-term bonds that are beyond 15 years, I do not have precisely the maturity details.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: You can give those to us later.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: We can give you the details later and details are also provided with the-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: I have a question. Now you mentioned about five occasions – from June, 2013 to 27th February, 2015 – where long-term bonds were issued. Other than the last bond issue, all other instances – say for example, in June 2013 you wanted to issue Rs. 2 billion, so you raised Rs. 3 billion and then it is Rs. 5 billion. In 2014, it was Rs. 2 billion which was the same amount as in 2013 and it was again raised up to Rs. 2 billion. Considering the last bond issue, Rs. 1 billion went up to Rs. 10.58 billion. Why is that?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The funding modality in terms of meeting the gross borrowing requirements specified in the Government Appropriation Act is managed through direct issuances as well as auctions and up until the recent 30-year bond issue, we had both avenues available. So, at times we do not raise the total fund requirement by the Treasury, we raised part of the requirement through auctions and the balance requirement was offered through direct placements channel. Recently, of course, there were discussions internally in the Bank also that we should be gradually moving away from direct issuances channel, that we should be looking at more market-based, market-oriented mechanism of financing and the proposal was to go into the full-scale public auctions. So, in this particular instance, this took place on the 27 of February and that was a Friday. Next day was 28th Saturday, 01st is Sunday and the 02nd March is the first business day of the month of March where the Treasury requested Rs. 30.5 billion in their cash flow and this Rs. 30.5 billion by that time, Sir, we have funded about Rs. 3.5 billion as prefunds to the Treasury and the balance requirement was something like Rs. 10 plus billion precisely. Then, on the particular auction announcement day, we published the auction announcement on 25th in Central Bank's website and in international newswires like Bloomberg, Reuters or whatever and the national newspapers carried the press advertisement on 26th where we announced Rs. 1 billion. At that time, the direct placement channel was available for us and that was not suspended or requested to stop. On the day of the auction – of course, on the 26th also we were told possibly we had to make a call on this, but on 27th- the auction day – we were told that it would be better if we could seriously look at this arrangement and that we should go through public auctions and raise the funds. Upon realizing that we have received bids up to Rs. 20 plus billion, 20 times oversubscribed, the senior management highlighted the fact that this is an ideal opportunity that we should be moving into public auction and the requirement was Rs. 10 plus billion – the balance requirement of 2nd of March. We have been asked to consider this as an option and proposed this balance requirement through the 30-year bond that we have offered, and we took that message to the Tender Board. This was the reason why we have gone to the entire amount.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: From Rs. 1 billion to Rs. 10 billion?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: That was because you had the opportunity and you thought that you grab the opportunity. Am I clear?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly.

The other thing, Sir, we also had to factoring that we had no business in between Friday to Monday. So, if we do not accept that, we will not be able to conduct another fresh auction.

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So, we have factored all these things into consideration and then the management's view also has been factored in and based on that, we suggested to the Tender Board and the Tender Board basically after deliberations – as the usual process in the Tender Board when it come to issuances of Treasury bonds or Treasury bills – decided, "Okay, we should be meeting the entire requirement of the Treasury from the auction itself.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Because it was an offer.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it ethical to make the general public know that the requirement is this? Is it a normal practice?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is not necessarily a strange practice because there were instances that even we have accepted 11 times of the offer.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: In the past?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Yes.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Can you just give us some details on those? I mean, it is not now but we will need some-

The Chairman: They have given those details.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Probably those details are also there. In 2014, I remember, considering 182-day Treasury bills, we have accepted more than 11 times of the offer. Probably the month is-

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: So, it is a normal practice?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is like three, four times we usually accept that based on the bids that we receive and also market knows the kind of arrangement from the very long time – since the day that probably I have been posted to the Department of Public Debt. We see that the bidders – the primary dealers- sometimes come and bid one and half times of the auction itself. So, they themselves are ready to accept one and half times of the auction and there may be institutions which sometimes come in three, four times of the auction offered expecting the entire amount been accepted.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: This is an accepted norm.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: But, in this instance, one particular company bid for 13 times.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: Exactly, because for us, we have seen the total bids. The usual practice is, before we decide all these things, it is a matter of one hour, Sir. We open the auction around 8.30 in the morning and the closing time of it is 11 o' clock. After that, we download all the electronic bidding that they submit; we do not have any manual intervention. Everything comes through the secured systems that we are having in place. So, they submit the bids and based on those, we usually see the aggregate at first.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Is it only the Treasury, the Department of the Public Debt of the Central Bank and the hierarchy of the Central Bank know that you need Rs. 13.3 billion?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: The precise cash flow requirement is known by these parties.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Is it strange that a primary dealer – one particular company – offers 75 per cent of the total offer?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: It is subsequent information for us.

The Hon. (Mrs) Rosy Senanayake: Is it an unusual thing or has this happened before?

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: I cannot recall exactly, but it might be 13 times or 15 times by a particular primary dealer. But, there are instances where big institutional investors like EPF, they are the biggest institutional investor.

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: That is the normal practice. The EPF, the ETF and the Sri Lanka Insurance bid for long-term Treasury bonds. Normally primary dealers never bid for long-term bonds.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: But, institutions like the Bank of Ceylon-

The Hon. Susil Premajayantha: Those are government institutions.

Dr. M.Z.M. Azim: But, the fact here is, Sir, the subsequent information for us that another primary dealer has come through the Bank of Ceylon is not immediately after the option available for us. At that time what we have seen is the Bank of Ceylon is bidding.

The Chairman: You are under the impression of that it was Bank of Ceylon who is bidding.

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